POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN KENYA AND TANZANIA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

I. Introduction

Political systems of every description continuously confront a problem crucial to their survival: how to prepare the younger members of the system for the political responsibilities they must one day assume. This problem is quite general; it exists in all societies in every historical epoch, and it embodies a learning process that stretches back to a child's first perceptions of the larger social world. How children learn the values that will guide their future behavior in politics, and what it is they learn, are questions with answers that vary from society to society. Societies like-wise differ in the degree of explicit attention devoted to training the young for participation in politics. But whether the learning process is carefully controlled or left to chance, and whether the result is to fortify the existing political order or to prepare for the new, political socialization is so basic a function that it deserves the closest attention of those who would understand the probable future of any on-going political system.

As with so many other fields of knowledge, systematic thought about political socialization would seem to have begun with the Ancient Greeks. Plato's Republic is in essence a treatise on how to arrest political change through appropriate socialization of the young. Aristotle, too, was deeply interested in political socialization, though he envisaged civic education as preparation for active participation in the city-state democracies of his time. With the rise of Christianity, writings on political socialization became less rich. The early Christians were inclined to assume that the moral man is the religious man, and that politics was primarily a matter of morality. Interest in civic education as such was therefore subordinated to an over-arching concern with the means of propagating the Christian faith. For almost exactly the opposite reason, secular writers in the post-Reformation era had little to add to the theory of political socialization. A dominating assump-tion of those who sought to employ the methods of science in the study of politics was that political man was everywhere the same - amoral, self-centered, largely unaffected by the cultural values of the society in which he lived - and that the proper concern of philosophers and statesmen was to find ways of adapting the rules of the political contest to these fixed psychological propensities. It was only after Rousseau had emphasized, in essay after impassioned essay, that education decisively imparts social values to the impressionable child, that political philosophers once again directed their attention to the connection between the learning experiences of the child and the ordering of political life in his society.

Two characteristic developments in contemporary civilization appear to ensure a more sustained interest in the content and consequences of political socialization. The process of socialization has, in the first place, been rendered more visible and more determinate by the proliferation of formal schooling systems throughout the modern world. For large and rapidly increasing proportions of young people in all but the most backward countries, socialization is no longer primarily a haphazard experience arising from un-regulated contact with parents and other diverse and diffuse community influences. And the same technological revolution that has made modern systems of formal schooling feasible has made functionally necessary a relative unifor-mity in the socializing experiences to which children are subjected. Thus, for the first time in history, political leaders can contemplate transmitting politically relevant values to a very large proportion of the young through a limited set of manipulable channels.

Closely allied with this development is a second: the spread of a participative ethos among the members of all modern political systems. What-ever the reality of the distribution of effective power, political leaders of modern polities are under heavy pressure to derive their theoretical right to govern from the support that they (or the movements they head) allegedly enjoy

from those who are bound by their decisions. Symbolically, the spread of the participative ethos is marked in the shift in status of the non-officeholder from "subject" to "citizen"; practically, it has meant that political leaders can no longer confine their attention to the orientations of an ascriptive elite comprising a small number of royal households. In modern democracies - most notably, in such strongly populistic democracies as the United States and Switzerland - great importance is therefore attached to courses in civic education and citizenship training in the schools. Totalitarianism, however, is also a response to the spread of the participative ethos; and totalitarian leaders have manifested an even more thorough-going acceptance of its implications. The state-controlled youth groups which are the mark of such regimes - the Ballila of Mussolini's Italy; the Hitlerjugend of Nazi Germany; the Soviet Union's Young Pioneers; and the Red Guards of Mainland China - are testimony to the importance that even the most tightly controlled regimes attribute to the political socialization of the young.

These considerations apply generally throughout the modern world; but they are brought into particularly sharp focus in the case of the new nations. For it is in the new nations that one can see most clearly a simple but important truth about political socialization: namely, that citizens are made, not born. The new nations of the world - and more particularly the new nations of Africa - confront problems that for the most part require a drastic reshaping of the orientations of their citizens. In many cases these nations have inherited national boundaries from the colonial period that cut across so many tribal groupings as to condition the survival of the nation on a complete reorientation of parochial loyalties. A renewed sense of pride in the distinctive cultural traditions of the people must be fostered; yet these traditions cannot be allowed to impede the aspirations for rapid economic growth. At the same time, the citizens of these nations must learn to assume political responsibilities for which their previous way of life leaves them quite unprepared. Other problems too numerous and too familiar to bear repeating crowd in together; and these problems must be solved or coped with in nations that are generally beset by linguistic barriers, underdeveloped communications systems, scarce financial resources, and scarce administrative skills, yet which acknowledge the legitimacy of the ordinary citizen's desire to participate in shaping his destiny. If the new nations of Africa are strongly future-oriented, if they attribute great importance to national citizenship training, and if they rely heavily on formal education for this purpose, one need not look far for an explanation.

So much is obvious; and yet, having acknowledged the importance of political socialization in these contexts, we have left all of the significant questions unanswered. We do not know, for example, which figures - parents, teachers, religious leaders, politicians, the writers for the mass media - most decisively contribute to an African child's conception of the political world and his place in it. We do not know what conceptions he holds of the responsibilities of citizenship, and what expectations he has developed with regard to the leaders of his country. We do not know how he balances traditional beliefs against modern orientations, personal interests against dedication to the national welfare, commitment to law and order against impatience to see rapid social change; nor do we know how salient racial, religious, and tribal categories remain in his thinking. On all these matters we have some more or less well-founded speculations, but very little in the way of solid evidence.

It is with the object of answering some of these questions, and supporting the answers with some hitherto unavailable evidence, that we have written this paper.

II. Scope and Nature of the Survey

The data on which this paper is based is drawn from a larger study of education and citizenship in the three East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.(1) A central feature of that project has been the administration of an extensive questionnaire concerning citizenship and the political system to more than 10,000 East African school children. Respondents were chosen on the basis of random nation-wide samples of schools containing

terminal-year Primary, Secondary, or Higher School Certificate classes.(2)
To maintain comparability, standard Primary and Secondary questionnaires were
used in all three countries, with variations in wording limited in all but a
few instances to items specifically relating to one country only.(3)

Because of the very large number of respondents in the study, it
has not been possible up to now to make use of the total sample for purposes
of analysis. What we have done instead for this paper is to select for dis-
cussion a sub-sample of 200 Primary and 200 Secondary responses in both Kenya
and Tanzania. These samples comprise in each instance 20 pupils drawn
randomly from each of 10 primary schools and from 6 secondary schools, with
two of the secondary schools being represented by Forms II, IV and VI. In
choosing the schools for our sub-sample, we sought to include in varying
combinations both boarding and day schools; co-educational and unisexual
schools; schools representing both governmental and religious sponsorship;
and schools located in such varying environments as the center of Dar-es-
Salaam and the hinterland bush country 100 miles from the nearest provincial
center. In Tanzania it was also possible to include schools ranging from
all-African to all-Asian student bodies. We cannot say of this sample, as
we can of the original, that it constitutes a statistically representative
microcosm of the universe of East African students; and we cannot therefore
validly argue that what is true of this sample will also be necessarily true
of the students of Kenya and Tanzania as a whole. Nevertheless, the sample
is representative in that it contains within it the full range of school
environments in these two countries; and for present purposes, such repres-
entativeness is perhaps sufficient. Table 1, below, shows the distribution
of schools in the sub-sample by the criteria of their selection.

Table 1

Distribution of Schools in Sub-sample
by Criteria of Selection

Criterion	Schools*			
Location	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Urban (Dar, Nairobi)	1	1	1	2
Provincial Town	4	3	4	4
Bush	5	2	5	-
Composition/Sex				
Boys	1	5	1	4
Girls	-	1	1	1
Co-ed.	9	-	8	1
Composition/Race				
All-African	10	6	8	4
All-Indian	-	-	1	1
African-Indian	-	-	1	1
Facilities				
Day	10	2	7	2
Boarding	-	4	3	4
Sponsorship				
Catholic	3	2	3	1
Protestant	4	2	2	1
Government	3	2	2	3
Aga Khan	-	-	1	1
TAPA	-	-	1	-
Muslim	-	-	1	-

* K-Prim = Kenya Primary. K-Sec = Kenya Secondary, and likewise for
  Tanzania. Most of the tables in this paper will maintain this order of
  presenting the different samples.

About 70 percent of the Tanzanians, and about 80 percent of the
Kenyans in this sub-sample of schools are boys, and approximately 15 percent
of the Tanzanian sample is non-African, mostly Indian. Religiously, the Kenya
samples are divided about equally between Protestants and Catholics, while
the Tanzanian groups fall almost evenly into Muslim, Protestant and Catholic
adherents. Altogether, the 800 respondents we shall discuss in this paper
constitute approximately one-eighth of the original sample from which they
were drawn.

III. Schools and the Learning Environment

Basic to the design of the project has been the supposition that the
schools of East Africa form the principal instrumentality through which the
socialization of young East Africans proceeds today. Schools are, of course,
only one among many possible sources of influence on a young person. The
family, the church, work and peer groups, radio and newspapers, all represent
agents to which young people may give their confidence and attention, and
through which attitudes about what is good and bad, possible and impossible,
expected and deviant, are continually transmitted. By taking the school as
the basic unit of our study, we deliberately (though reluctantly) forego a
concern with the direct socializing impact of these other agents. Further, by
limiting ourselves to the study of those in school, we lose the opportunity to
compare students with school leavers, or with those who do not enter school at
all. In the East African societies that form the background to our study,
these other groups in fact represent a majority of the age group we are
concerned with.(4) But administrative problems alone are sufficient to rule
out at this time a systematic investigation on a national basis of children
outside the schooling system. And given the hypothesized role of the school
as the single most decisive socializing agent in the life of those children
sufficiently fortunate to be admitted, and the declared intention of the East
African governments' to expand the educational net, there are more than enough
theoretical and practical reasons for investigating even so severely limited
a population.

But what warrant do we have for supposing that the schools serve as
at least potentially the single most decisive socializing agent in the life of
those who attend school? The answer to this question is suggested by consid-
eration of the ways in which the influences to which children are exposed in
the school environment differ from influences beyond the school. The organ-
ization of the school day means that even the primary school child must remain
in the classroom from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., with short breaks for lunch and tea;
indeed, in boarding schools even the student's off-hours are spent within the
ambit of the school. Within the classroom, information is directed at students
for long periods of time by teachers whose overall status generally sets them
apart from other adults in the community and whose qualifications to instruct
are scarcely open to overt challenge. Moreover, the child in school is
cognitively prepared to receive information; the disciplined classroom
environment is pre-eminently a setting for compelling him to focus his
attention in ways which those outside the school may never be called upon to
do. His motivation is generally great, for it is starkly clear to most parents,
and usually to the child himself, that all hope of upward social mobility rests
directly on successful performance in accordance with the norms of the school.

Finally, the school experience offers opportunities not available
elsewhere both for the explicit learning of civic and political values through
textbooks and specific indoctrination and for the more diffuse, though
certainly no less significant, absorption of basic social attitudes. The
Kenya Education Commission recognized that the schooling experience includes
these two modes of learning in its observation that "A sense of belonging to
a nation is not merely, or perhaps mainly, something that comes from study or
the reasoning faculties. Quite as important as the growth of knowledge is the
experience of an atmosphere ... the need to diversify the student body and the
staff of schools have a connection with this psychological factor."(5) (I, 41)
Indeed, the Commission gives considerably more attention in the remainder of
its report to the impact of the school environment on the future citizen than
it does to the formal educational curriculum in civics. The experience of

attending a multi-racial school, the first encounter with social sanctions applied by a peer group that owes its existence to the school rather than to the village or to tradition, the collegial interaction between a young teacher and his students - these potentially significant events and many like them are all outside the scope of a textbook, though certainly not outside the control of those with responsibility for creating schools that serve the interests of their society.

It is, in fact, the direct relationship between the school system and the larger society that makes the study of a select group of school children of greater value than the study of those who are not in school. Educational institutions, unlike the many other agencies of socialization to which non-school children are exposed, are deliberately and explicitly designed to induct, train and allocate individuals to roles essential to maintaining a society. By focussing our attention on the schools, we can evaluate the results of the major socializing agencies against the national goals they are supposed to serve. As these goals have been spelled out on a number of occasions in the two countries discussed in this paper, we should review the stated goals briefly before going on to our data.

In Kenya, we are particularly fortunate in having the Education Commission's Report as a guide to the kind of citizen the schools are expected to produce. The Commission takes as its starting point the observation that "No problem is more important to the future welfare of Kenya than the cultivation of a sense of belonging to a nation and a desire to serve the nation." (I, 28) Although schools are not the only means of promoting national unity and economic development, they are central to both processes. Primary education provides "the minimum basic educational requirement for take-off into the modern sector of our national life," while secondary education prepares young people for greater responsibility and a place in the modern world. The citizens who must emerge from the educational process are expected to possess certain qualities, the most important of which we have listed below:

(1) A commitment to national unity, but not to uniformity; a tolerance and respect for tribal, racial and religious diversity.

(2) A respect for the "customary aspects" of African culture; and a willingness to assist elders in understanding the implications and demands of social change.

(3) An acceptance and appreciation of social change and the new attitudes required for modernization.

(4) A desire to preserve traditional feelings of social equality; an absence of snobbery and an ease of communication between those of different backgrounds.

(5) A restraint based on historical instincts and moral values, on (untempered) individual competitiveness.

(6) A spirit of self-help, "the mark of a virile and self-confident people who are not fatally contaminated by the habit of supine reliance on the Government to do everything for them."

No similar document is currently available for Tanzania. We must consequently surmise what kind of citizen will be needed to help realize the goals most prominently featured by the Tanzania African National Union (TANU) in its manifestoes on the social order it seeks to introduce in Tanzania. To judge from such manifestoes, the educational institutions of Tanzania must help produce citizens with the following attributes:

(1) An unequivocal identification with a united nation transcending parochial, tribal, religious, racial, or class loyalties.

(2) A proud consciousness of Tanzania's African heritage.

(3) A readiness to adapt cultural conventions and individual
    behavior to the demands of rapid economic growth, and to
    assume leadership in furthering this trend.

(4) A willingness to suppress aggressively individualistic
    behavior in favor of cooperative endeavours to achieve the
    common good.

(5) A commitment to the removal of the bases for class conflict,
    including the abolition of all advantages not arising from
    differential contributions to nation-building.

(6) A high valuation of the public as against the private sector
    both as regards the choice of career and with reference to
    conceptions of the appropriate scope for state action.

(7) A disposition toward critical yet responsible appraisal of
    the performance of public officials, combined with a readiness
    to assume responsibility for such evaluations.

(8) A favorable image of the prevailing TANU ideology and its
    principal expositors, most notably President Nyerere.

These lists cannot be rendered strictly comparable. They draw on
different sources, the former very specifically related to education, the
latter more general in its origins and purpose. Nevertheless, they give an
idea of the heavy burden that is placed on the schools in the creation, trans-
formation, and re-inforcement of fundamental social orientations. The scope
and comprehensive character of those orientations suggests that the educat-
ional process can contribute to their emergence only through a combination
of indoctrination and social experience. The doctrine of non-racialism will
not take root in a racially segregated schooling system, nor will students
take exhortations regarding the dignity of manual labour seriously as long as
teachers use the threat of a return to the shamba as an inducement to harder
study. An integrated football team, on the other hand, may be a far more
potent teacher of racial tolerance than four chapters in a civics textbook.
In any case, the school, both through its curriculum and through its wider
educational environments, necessarily holds a strategic position in all larger
governmental plans for the transformation of   East African society. But
whether the school child is aware of the responsibility thus thrust on his
school, and how far he remains susceptible to its influence, is a question that
we can best answer by turning to our data.

IV.   Agents of Socialization: The Students' View

The world of a student in Kenya and Tanzania contains many sources
of new perspectives. His teachers ply him with precept and fact; he is asked
by political leaders to follow some national credo; his religious leaders
advise him on whole ways of life; his parents hope he will avoid their mis-
takes; and so on. Naturally, not every message, verbal or non-verbal, that
is presented to a student will be accepted; many will be rejected, others
suspected or ignored. One of the important questions we must therefore ask
about the process of political socialization in East Africa is: what are the
sources from which students most willingly accept instruction, advice and
guidance? Which institutions or individuals do students perceive to be the
primary agents in shaping their own awareness of political and social respon-
sibilities?

As an approach to this question, we focussed on the concept of
'social trust' as a crucial indicator of the effective influence that different
agents of socialization might have. A student's sense of the trustworthiness
of those from whom he might learn is likely to determine how much faith he is
willing to place in their words and deeds. A relationship characterized by a
high degree of social distrust is probably incompatible with the effective
transmission of values and attitudes; it also makes respect and co-operation
more difficult.

To look more closely at the feelings of students toward a number of important socializing agents, we asked them to indicate how often they could trust different kinds of people. We presented the question with this introduction:

> "Some people are almost always fair and honest. It is safe to trust them. There are other people who it is better not to trust. We must be careful how we deal with them. What about the following people? In general, can one trust them?"

Each group of people was then introduced with the following phrase: "In general, one can trust ..... ," and four choices were presented: Always, Usually, Not Often, and Never. To simplify Table 2, we have combined the two positive alternatives and presented their scores as a single measure of social trust.

TABLE 2

Percentage of Students who say that Members
of different groups can be trusted Always or Usually

GROUPS	K-Prim[1]	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Fathers	78	92	85	87
Teachers	80	79	86	77
Religious Leaders	74	82	90	84
Government Leaders	72	57	89	63

[1] There were some indications that Kenyan primary pupils occasionally reversed the meaning of the choices; this may account for their consistently lower trust scores when compared with Tanzanian pupils.

Toward these four groups, at least, the students in our sample evidence a widespread and consistent sense of trust. It is interesting that on the whole, the degree of trust felt toward teachers and religious leaders is only slightly less than that felt toward parents. And, with the exception of 'government leaders,' there is no consistent difference between primary and secondary students in their feelings of trust toward the four groups. Other data in our study confirm this tendency on the part of secondary students to be more critical of those in political roles. As secondary students come to view the world generally with a more critical eye, they are not likely to omit their political leaders from its scrutiny, especially in societies where officials are expected to be responsive and responsible to those they govern. Political roles, too, suffer from strains that are less likely to appear in the roles of teacher, priest or parent: the gap between promise and performance can be much greater for those who depend on and must bid for the support of large groups than for those whose roles are built around individual and personal relationships.

At the same time, it would be misleading to assume that the level of trust that secondary students have in their political leaders is so low as to suggest alienation or hostility. In a study of 256 extra-mural students in Uganda early this year, Prewitt found that 'politicians' were trusted 'always' or 'usually' by only 13 percent of the sample. Parents and teachers had the trust of nearly 90 percent of the same group.(6) In comparison with these figures, we might conclude that secondary students in Kenya and Tanzania are reluctant to accept all political leaders at face value, but they are certainly ready to grant their trust to many.

The data in Table 2 are most encouraging with regard to the learning environment and the social function of the schools. Teachers who enjoy the trust of a large majority of their students are able to play an effective role as agents of socialization; indeed, whether consciously or not, teachers set standards and establish goals that others will accept as their own, if only because the examples emanate from people they trust.

We can still inquire, however, into the extent to which the reservoir of social trust that these agents hold with students is effective in promoting the communication of social and political attitudes. Does any one of these highly trusted groups exercise more influence than the others over the political socialization of students in our sample? We asked students themselves to tell us which agents they thought had taught them the most about being good citizens of their countries. The data in Table 3, below, spell out clearly the significant status of teachers as perceived agents of socialization. Since we cannot attribute the distributions in Table 3 to differences in trust for each of the groups, we must assume that both the structure of the school environment, and the explicit transfer of information from teacher to pupil, gives teachers an advantage over other possible agents of socialization.(7)

TABLE 3

Percentage of students who mention different agents
as having taught them the most about being good citizens

AGENTS	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Teachers	47	71	35	56
Parents and relatives	27	42	25	47
Politicians & MPs (Kenya)) TANU Leaders (Tanzania))	16	9	29	24
Religious leaders, clergy	2	21	6	16
Other; no answer	8	12	5	4

Percentages of secondary responses total more than 100 due to multiple responses. Primary pupils were allowed one choice, secondary two choices.

One important national difference worth noting in Table 3 is that concerning teachers and political figures - the former are mentioned more frequently by Kenyans than by Tanzanians as agents of socialization, the latter more frequently by Tanzanians than by Kenyans. For Tanzanian primary pupils, local leaders are seen as more important agents of political socialization than parents. Taking even the more specific phrasing of the Tanzanian item into consideration ('TANU leaders' as against 'MPs and politicians' in Kenya), it is still significant that about a quarter of the Tanzanian students say they have learned something about citizenship from people who occupy roles that have come into existence only in the last generation. In Tanzania, perhaps, local party leaders are beginning to emerge as 'community influentials' whose positions rest as much on the public's appreciation of their qualities as citizens as on their political skills.

Because we allowed secondary students two choices, and primary only one, we cannot make direct comparisons between them in Table 3. It would appear, however, that the same agents of socialization affect them to more or less the same degree. As long as they are in school, students are prepared to trust their teachers, and to accept from them more than just the instruction contained in the syllabus, or required for the examinations.(8) Most of this learning process is probably informal and not directly related to political or social attitudes; it is thus distinguishable from explicit indoctrination or instruction in 'civic values', and from the communication of information about the political system itself. This raises a question, then, about the agents of information, the sources of knowledge of the ongoing political and social world. Are the agents of general political socialization also important for the day to day concern of students with facts and opinions about their countries?

We asked students what they thought were the 'best ways' to learn about what was happening in their country. Their responses, contained in Table 4, suggest that the primary sources of information about current events are the mass media, although it appears that teachers continue to be the

TABLE 4

The best ways to learn about what is
happening in the country (In percent)

AGENTS	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Radio and newspapers	85	96	60	96
Teachers	9	54	33	48
Parents and relatives	2	3	5	3
Older people in home area	4	3	2	6
Classmates (Sec. only)		9		12

Percentages of secondary responses total more than 100 due to
multiple responses. Primary pupils were allowed one choice,
secondary two choices.

leading agents involved in the interpretation of the news. It is likely that
much of the contact secondary students have with the mass media occurs within
the school context. In many of the schools we visited, libraries contained
foreign as well as local newspapers and magazines, and occasionally we found
notice boards containing clippings on important events. Most secondary schools
have 'current events' clubs, for the specific purpose of discussion and debate
on contemporary issues. This may help to account for the somewhat greater
role allotted to classmates than to parents as sources of information. Further,
special radio broadcasts are prepared for schools in both Kenya and Tanzania,
and again teachers may play an important part in the interpretation of such
programs. The very small proportion of students who mention their parents or
older people suggests again that the school is felt to be, and actually
functions as, the most important link between the student and the larger
society around him.

Our data, then, lend support to the supposition that the school
environment and teachers in particular play a crucial role in both the
implicit and explicit political socialization of young people. Teachers rank
far above any other agents as the models and sources of citizenship values,
and they contribute heavily to the students' awareness of his ongoing society.
It is interesting that students themselves rank 'citizenship training' as the
most important purpose that schools can serve. Table 5 contains the ranked
indices derived from responses to this question:

"These are purposes which schools in (K) (T) might have.
How important are they?"

TABLE 5

Rank order of purposes of schools,
by weighted indices

PURPOSES	K-Sec	T-Sec	
Teach students to be good citizens of (K) (T)	869	867	1,000 = Max.
Teach students the skills necessary to get jobs	622	630	
Teach students the important things to know for the examinations	579	585	
Teach students to be religious (to be good Christians, etc.)	547	428	
Teach students about the important African traditions and customs	353	400	200 = Min.

Respondents ranked the five purposes in order of importance; the index was constructed by tallying five points each time a problem was ranked first, four points for second, and so on. If all respondents ranked a problem first, it would have 1,000 points, the maximum score; 200 is the minimum.

It is significant that students in both countries rank the diffuse function of 'citizenship training' above the specific tasks of teaching skills for jobs and knowledge for examinations. Although these latter two objectives are instrumental to individual mobility and to the economic development of the country, they do not take priority over the contribution that the schools might make to national integration and a politically participant population. Although we shall deal with the issues in greater detail below, it is worth noting that instruction in religious beliefs and in traditions is not considered of great importance. Tanzanians place less weight on religion, and more on tradition, than do their Kenyan counterparts, but both groups are alike in giving them lowest priority.

Schools, then, are seen by students not only as the place where they are actually inducted into the citizen's role, but also as the _proper_ environment for this process. For them, schools and teachers seem to replace all other agents of training and areas of practice in the responsibilities and requirements of being a citizen. This brings us to a further question: What do students have in mind when they speak of 'good citizens?' We shall look at some of the answers to this question in the next two sections.

V.   The Attributes of the 'Good Citizen'

Most of the students in our study have not yet 'come of age' in regard to their roles as citizens; few, if any, have had money or services extracted from them by the state, and most are excluded by their age from voting or participation in the institutions that govern their lives. On the other hand, contact with and obedience to the law, and an active interest in politics, may not be the only, nor even the most important aspects of the citizen's role in the societies we are studying. Although the obligation to obey the law and to take an interest in its creation may fulfil the requirements of 'good' citizenship in the classical democratic concept, the relationship between individuals and their governments and societies in East Africa might demand a different concept of the citizen's role.

To obtain a picture of the emphases that students place on a range of attributes that might make up a 'good' citizen, we asked them to describe which people 'are the best citizens of (Kenya) (Tanzania)' by choosing three of the seven alternatives shown in Table 6. As the data in Table 6 indicate, our respondents hold ideas about citizenship that are not confined to the classic definition.

TABLE 6

Percentage of Students Mentioning
Different Qualities of the 'Best' Citizen

QUALITIES	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Obeys (parents, teachers, laws)	69	64	62	75
Is well-educated, does well at studies	53	18	59	17
Works hard	53	63	24	56
Is interested in government	50	10	54	46
Helps others	41	50	37	15
Knows traditions and customs	14	12	21	17
Is religious	9	12	16	7

(N, all samples = 200)

Percentages total more than 100 since respondents could give more than one answer.

Obedience to authority (whether parents and teachers in the case
of primary, or law in the case of secondary students) is the most frequently
mentioned attribute of the 'best' citizen. This attribute is basically a
'passive' orientation and is probably one that our respondents share with
members of many other societies. Although there is fairly uniform agreement
between educational levels and between countries on the importance of
obedience, there are greater variations in regard to the next four qualities.

For primary pupils in both countries, education is another principal
mark of the good citizen. On the other hand, secondary students, who have
already achieved 'elite' status within the educational system, appear to turn
their attention to the application of their educational skills and only a
small percentage consider education in itself to be important to performing
the citizen's role. Because they are at the terminal stage of their primary,
and perhaps their educational careers, primary students apparently emphasize
the importance of the acquisition of education to the successful performance
of most adult roles.

A willingness to work hard, like the possession of education, is
an attribute not usually associated with the performance of the citizen's
role. But with the exception of the Tanzanian primary pupils, more than half
of our respondents did consider it important. In societies marked by chronic
unemployment and underemployment, the man who has a job is expected to work
hard at it. The theme of 'work' is common in public statements, as is its
corollary, that there is 'no room for idleness'. The good citizen thus becomes
the man who does his job, whatever it is, and does it well.

The classical quality of 'interest in government' is considered by
about half of our respondents to be important to the citizen's role; secondary
students feel this in slightly smaller proportions than primary pupils.
Interest in government, like willingness to work hard, is an 'active' orien-
tation to the citizen's role, although in an individualistic, rather than
collective way. Willingness to help others represents a more community-
oriented definition of citizenship behavior, and was chosen by a somewhat
larger proportion of Kenyans than Tanzanians. There is no clearcut pattern
here, and the rather surprisingly low proportion of Tanzanian secondary
students choosing this alternative may be attributable to their frequent
failure to mark three alternatives, rather than to basic attitudinal differences
between them and the other three groups.

Knowledge of traditions, and a religious approach to life, are both
clearly of little importance to most of the students in our study, at least
as far as their bearing on the citizen's role is concerned. Slightly higher
proportions of Tanzanians did consider traditions important, a finding which
is consistent with their position on traditions in Table 5 above. Knowledge
of traditions, like education, represents a means to the achievement of other
goals, rather than a definite passive or active orientation. For most primary
pupils, traditional knowledge does not seem to be nearly as significant for
the citizen's role as modern education, whereas for secondary students neither
form of knowledge seems critical.

What impact does exposure to the educational system have on the
qualities that are emphasized? Except for education, there are only minor,
and not entirely consistent, differences between educational levels. This
finding is what we might expect on questions of this type, for the definition
of what makes a good citizen is, in a sense, a national definition; it
represents an ideal to which all members of the society should be able to
aspire. In this regard, it is only the quality of education which is
automatically beyond the reach of many members of the nations in our study;
a man without formal, modern education can still meet the other obligations
or qualifications that are contained in Table 6. The primary pupils, then,
attribute, perhaps unconsciously, a certain elitist aspect to 'good' citizen-
ship; the secondary students in both countries seem agreed upon an open and
generally active notion of the citizen's role, with emphasis distributed
between individualistic (works hard) and collective (helps others) orien-
tations.

In the case of national differences, there are again no consistent patterns. Although we might expect the degree of variation to be greater between secondary students than between primary students from the two countries, it is in fact almost the same: the mean variations in percentage between primary pupils for the seven choices is 9, and between secondary students, 10. On the other hand, variations between educational levels within each country are more noticeable. While the mean variation between Kenyan primary and secondary students is only 11, it is 19 for the two Tanzanian groups. There is, then, somewhat less concurrence in emphasis within the Tanzanian system than within the Kenyan. As is evident from Table 6, primary pupils in Tanzania place more weight on education and helping others than do their older colleagues, while the latter group puts more stress on hard work.

The general impression given by Table 6 is one of a diffuse, rather than a specific, notion of citizenship. Five of the seven alternatives received a high proportion of the Kenyan primary choices, while the Kenyan secondary students and Tanzanian Primary pupils spread their responses mainly over four alternatives. If a fully stereotyped definition of the 'good' citizen existed in either of the two countries, we could expect to find much more evident 'peaking' on only three alternatives. As it is, the data suggest that at both educational levels, students have ideas about the qualities required to perform the citizen's role and that many of these qualities seem of nearly equal importance. The good citizen not only takes an interest in government, he also contributes to economic development; not only does he obey the law, he also 'helps others'. Much of the behavior that would be associated elsewhere with personal motives is here associated with 'citizenship', a concept that ultimately comes to embrace not a purely politically-oriented and idealized relationship between man and his government, but rather a broad and basically realistic set of qualities to which all men may aspire.

VI.   Some Dilemmas and Problems of Citizenship

Our question on who makes the 'best' citizens gave students a chance to express their preferences between a number of important personal qualities as they bear on the performance of the citizen's role. Outside this context, however, these qualities may assume more or less significance in students' minds. An important question that we can consider, and one that throws additional light on the meaning of citizenship, is: when do the obligations and attitudes that serve the goal of 'good' citizenship come into conflict with other goals, and how are such conflicts resolved? When, for example, is obedience not essential? To what privileges does a good education entitle a person? How effective is individual initiative and hard work? Is cooperative effort with one's fellow citizens even possible? How meaningful are religious beliefs? How far does 'interest in government' imply active intervention in public affairs? Do traditions have any relevance to the contemporary world?

Although we cannot answer all of these questions adequately, we can take up several dimensions of most of them, and try to explore how the qualities that might make up a good citizen are seen in relation to other roles, behavior and social goals.

A.   Law, Obedience and Individual Morality

In every social system, there are tensions between the universal obligations that all people have to accept, and the personal obligations that each individual may feel. Although everyone is expected to tell the truth in court, for example, many people would hesitate to do so if it might lead to punishment for a relative or close friend. Or, in another case, a law that makes everyone eligible for military service may be disobeyed by a person whose particular religious or moral beliefs commit him to a non-violent life. Every society will have different norms governing the resolution of such conflicts, and different degrees of tolerance for those who deviate from the norms. On the basis of the relatively high importance attached to obedience by students in Kenya and Tanzania, it is worth looking at their responses to situations in which legal, social and personal obligations may make 'obedience' more than just a simple choice between legal and illegal behavior.

The concept of 'immoral law' focuses our attention on such conflict situations in two ways. First, it is predicated on the assumption that there is a higher law or morality which may be appealed to from ordinary law. Second, it denies the absolute legitimacy of the ordinary law-making body. Those who accept the idea of 'immoral' laws are thus more susceptible to acts of civil disobedience than those for whom all laws are 'good' and 'just', or those who will continue to obey laws they do not like simply because they have no rationale for doing otherwise. Where do East African students stand on this question? Will they obey a law ever if they consider it immoral, or do they have some notion of a higher law that would justify their failure to obey the laws of their own government? We asked students the following question in this regard:

"Sometimes you may think that a law is bad or immoral. Should you obey that law?" (Primary)

"If someone believes a law is wrong or immoral, he has a right to disobey it." (Secondary)

The percentage of students in each group who said that an immoral law need not be obeyed was:

K-Prim	41%
K-Sec	39%
T-Prim	53%
T-Sec	32%

Without knowing what criteria would have to be met before our respondents would consider a law to be 'wrong' or 'immoral', we cannot say what implications these fairly sizeable proportions of willing disobedients have for social order. On the whole, other evidence in our data suggests that, at the primary level, students think that most laws are good and that the government does not often make mistakes; secondary students are somewhat less positive in their faith in the government's wisdom, but neither are they cynical. Thus, although fairly large percentages of students in all samples say they would not obey an 'immoral' law, other evidence suggests that few, if any, laws are likely to be regarded as 'immoral'. The proportions do indicate a latent readiness on the part of students to allow individual judgments about law to determine their conformity to it; length of exposure to education does not seem to have any consistent impact on this attitude, though the difference between primary and secondary students in Tanzania is noticeable.

A more concrete case of conflict between law and personal judgment was raised by the following item, in which students were asked to choose one of two alternatives to answer the question:

"Which man helps (Kenya) (Tanzania) more?

1. The man who does not pay his taxes in order that he can use the money to pay his children's school fees.

2. The man who pays his taxes, but then cannot pay his children's school fees.

The problem is fairly clear: does one break the law in order to help his children and, presumably, thereby help the country, or does one obey the law, pay his taxes (which also serve the interests of the nation) but fail to provide education for his children? The percentage of secondary students who said that fees, rather than taxes, should be paid was:

K-Sec	59%
T-Sec	39%

Well over half of the Kenya secondary students are ready to endorse an action that contravenes a law, at least when the aim is further education. Tanzanian students, who on the whole tend to be somewhat more committed to obedience, and who do not have the problem of school fees at the secondary level, are somewhat less firm in their endorsement of the 'illegal' horn of the dilemma. The issue is also less salient in Tanzania generally than in

Kenya, where both the size and principle of fees are important political issues; this may help to account for the larger proportion of Kenya students who favored paying fees. Even more suggestive of an explanation, however, is the high value placed on education. In a conflict between familial and social obligations, it is not surprising that the diffusely helpful act of paying taxes, as crucial an obligation of citizenship as it may be, takes second place for many students to the fulfilment of specific obligations within the family.

The importance of obedience as an element of good citizenship, then, is not so great as to blind the students in our sample to exceptions; in some instances, the good citizen may still serve his nation even when he does not follow the letter of its laws, as, for example, when he pays school fees instead of taxes. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that students in East Africa are on the verge of anarchy; in contrast, a basic respect for authority and the virtue of obedience seems to be laid down by the time a pupil leaves primary school; the secondary school experience does nothing to undermine this foundation.

B.   Education and Elitism

A stranger observing the status of educated people in East Africa would probably conclude that they were a special, and privileged, caste. Most of the outer marks of an established elite characterize the well-educated here. For one thing, they represent a tiny fraction of the population. We have already noted the Kenya Education Commission's figure of 3 percent of the age group for those in secondary school. And this proportion grows even smaller as students leave school and enter the occupational marketplace; there, 'age group' means everyone seeking work, and of this group, secondary school graduates, not to mention university graduates, constitute much less than 3 percent. In population terms, then, they possess what perhaps 99 percent of their fellow citizens lack - secondary or higher education. The rewards and perquisites they command are equally unavailable to the rest of the population. Good salaries, permanent urban living, the material and symbolic pleasures of the European elite that has now made room for new members - all these are a function of education, and the privilege of the educated.

But the observer who concludes that this is some hereditary elite, born to its place, would be incorrect. For the most part, the educated elite of East Africa is an elite of attainment rather than of ascription. Though outwardly it bears all the characteristics of ascriptive elites in other societies, the basis of its position is an educational system that was never exclusive in its recruitment or in the opportunities it offered for mobility. The Alliance High School in Kenya, for example, never turned away an otherwise qualified entrant for lack of fees; neither have its Headmasters granted favors to the children of 'old boys', despite requests to do so. There have been, and still are, vast inequalities in the distribution of educational facilities, and this in turn places all the members of some communities at a disadvantage. But on the whole, the origins of the students in our sample are remarkably alike; few of the secondary students have parents who attained the same level of education. Their parents, in fact, are generally peasant farmers, with at most a few years of primary education. Thus, whatever the many factors that determine which 3 percent are able to enter secondary school in any given year, parental wealth or status is probably not significant. The students in our sample, then, constitute an elite based on educational attainment, although they will inherit the status and privileges that are generally associated with an ascriptive elite, and that in fact once belonged to one - the Europeans - in East Africa.

What are the attitudinal consequences of this unusual combination of achievement-based mobility and ascriptive-like status? Do the educated elite come to think of themselves as a 'chosen' group, if not 'born' to their place, at least 'made' for it? Or do they retain an awareness of their origins, and a feeling of egalitarianism toward their less fortunate fellow citizens? One area in which these attitudes manifest themselves concerns the

amount of influence that people should have on the government as a function
of their education. We asked our students to choose one of the following
alternative propositions:

1. The government should listen equally to what everyone
says about its work.

2. The government should listen more to educated people
than to people without education.

The percentage of each sample choosing the first, or egalitarian alternative,
was:

K-Prim	71%
K-Sec	75%
T-Prim	70%
T-Sec	86%

Secondary students, to a somewhat greater degree than primary,
support the egalitarian ideal, in spite of their even more 'elite' position
in the educational hierarchy. This tendency of primary pupils to be more
concerned with the differential effects of education is consistent with their
responses on the qualities of the good citizen, which we discussed earlier.
It is also worth noting here that national differences are greater at the
secondary level, with a somewhat higher percentage of Tanzanians favoring
egalitarianism. Longer exposure to education should, in fact, be associated
with greater differences between the national samples, for if there are
objective national differences in values or in the educational environment,
they should manifest themselves more clearly among the older students, those
who have had the most opportunity to absorb the core values and attitudes of
the system. In the case of this particular item, however, the degree of assent
to the egalitarian alternative is so great in all samples that it would be
unfair to characterize some groups as 'elitist' on the basis of their
marginally lower scores.

To shed further light on the question of educational elitism, we
asked students how they felt about the following proposition:

"A person with a good education should be given more respect
than a person without any education at all."

The percentage of students who agreed with this proposition, or who accepted
it as true, was:

K-Prim	57%
K-Sec	46%
T-Prim	(not included)
T-Sec	16%

The pattern here follows that of the item on 'influence on govern-
ment' in that, at least for Kenya, the secondary students are more egalitarian
than their younger colleagues, with the Tanzanian secondary students being the
most egalitarian. On the basis of this and the preceding item, of course, we
cannot be conclusive about the impact of elite status on the attitudes of the
first generation to hold it. It appears, however, that students continue to
be more conscious of their origins and the means of their mobility than they
are of the status they have attained. Still, a fairly large proportion, in
Kenya at least, do believe that their education entitles them to more respect
and more influence in government than they would grant those without
education.(10).

Increasing exposure to education, however, does seem to be
associated with increasing egalitarianism. From the viewpoint of the final
year primary pupil, further education is the most important thing in his life
(about 80 percent of the Kenya primary school pupils expect a place in
secondary schools, although only about 10 percent will actually find one),
and it is not surprising that he attaches more social significance to it than
the secondary student does. The older group has leapt the biggest gap, and
seems to grow more aware of the social and political importance of values and

attitudes not dependent on education - obedience, hard work, cooperation and interest in government. Education, in itself, seems to mean less to those who have it, than to those who want it.

C. The Efficacy and Purpose of 'Hard Work'

The ethic of 'hard work' seems to have a special meaning in East Africa. It is a secular and material concept here, divorced from beliefs about rewards and punishments after death. It manifests itself in such slogans as "Uhuru na kazi", and in the traditional attitude toward a guest: "Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe". Work is an integral part of life and, as we have seen, part of citizenship as well. Although a majority of students in three samples (Tanzania primary was the exception) felt that hard work was important to the citizen's role, it is only by exploring their ideas about the effectiveness and rewards of the 'work' ethic that we can begin to understand the high value that is attached to it.

In the often difficult economic conditions of East Africa, and with the limited resources that individuals have to fall back upon in time of need, there would seem to be support for an attitude that looks toward the government, or to other external sources, for help in improving one's lot. We posed this attitude to our respondents as an alternative to hard work as a way of coping with the environment in which man finds himself. Specifically, we asked students to indicate which of the following statements was more true:

1. It is difficult for a man to improve his life unless the government makes conditions better.

2. A man who works hard enough can improve his life, even if government does not make conditions better.

The percentage of each sample who agreed with the second alternative was:

K-Prim	83%
K-Sec	71%
T-Prim	73%
T-Sec	63%

On the whole, there is strong support for the notion that the individual has the capacity to deal with his surroundings, and to alter them in his favor. Holding educational level constant, the Kenyans tend to maintain this view more generally than the Tanzanians; but in both countries, the secondary students are slightly less confident in the unaided ability of man than are the primary pupils. The long history of educational self-help schemes in Kenya, as well as the strong achievement values held by many of the country's predominantly agricultural tribes, may help to explain the national differences. The fact that most primary pupils are attending schools built by community self-help efforts, in contrast to the students in government-aided secondary schools, may have influenced the generally higher 'work-oriented' responses among the younger groups, who may be reminded daily of the products of individual and community initiative.

In another item, in which the work ethic was rated against other, less achievement-based modes of behavior, three-fourths of our secondary sample singled it out as one of the 'best ways to success.'

TABLE 7

Percentage of students who mention different
'best ways to success' (Secondary only)

WAY TO SUCCESS	K-Sec	T-Sec
Be well educated	87	82
Work hard	79	75
Have friends in government	13	15
Belong to certain tribe	6	2
Come from rich family	4	4
Be willing to break laws	2	2
Other	3	3

Percentages total more than 100 due to multiple responses.

Table 7, which indicates the relative importance attached to answers
to the question, "What are the best ways to be successful in (Kenya)(Tanzania)
today?" also throws light on a number of other aspects of our present inquiry.
Consonant with their high degree of trust in authority, secondary students do
not believe that nepotism, tribalism or favoritism are valid ways to success.
A belief that economic and social mobility were linked to corruption would
require a much greater cynicism than is evidenced by our sample. Similarly,
the notion that laws should or can be evaded as a means to mobility is strongly
ruled out; in this context, there seem to be no doubts about the value of
obedience. Almost unequivocally, secondary students in both countries view
personal achievement, rather than differential privilege, as the best way to
success.

Before leaving the question of 'hard work', it would be worth looking
at the rewards that students expect as a result of working hard at their
studies. We have already observed the belief among students that 'work pays
off'; now we can look more closely at how it pays off, which in turn should
give us an indication of the priorities that students themselves set among
their own goals. From a list of seven "reasons students often give for
working hard at their studies", we asked students in primary and secondary
schools to choose three. Table 8 contains the distribution of responses to
all seven reasons.

TABLE 8

Reasons why students work hard at their studies
(In percent)

REASONS	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
To support my parents or to help my brothers and sisters go to school	88	91	69	66
So I can get a good job and live a comfortable life	67	83	59	78
To become a government leader and help rule my country	60	46	63	45
Because it is my duty to the government	19	35	24	59
To become important in my home area	18	9	23	6
To please my teachers or Headmaster	18	6	19	5
So I can marry an educated person	10	11	3	3

Percentages total more than 100 due to multiple responses.

Perhaps the first thing one notices in Table 8 are the different emphases between primary and secondary students. In both national groups, secondary students gave greater weight than primary pupils to 'get a good job' and 'duty to government' as reasons for studying hard, while consistently higher proportions of primary pupils ticked 'become a government leader', 'become important in my home area', and 'please my teachers'. With equal consistency, all four groups, with the Tanzanian primary pupils deviating the most, attached the greatest importance to supporting their parents or relatives. It is interesting to note that students in Kenya attached slightly more importance to education as a factor in marriage than did the Tanzania sample, while the latter were more likely to tick 'duty to government' than were their Kenya counterparts. For all groups, hard work at school is seen most clearly as leading to occupational and perhaps political mobility, and to an ability to fulfil obligations to parents and other family members. To a somewhat lesser extent it is identified with duties outside one's personal and kinship group - to one's government or teacher, for example.

We can sum up briefly our findings about the meaning of 'hard work'. First, as we saw in Table 6, a majority of all but the Tanzanian primary pupils consider 'hard work' to be an attribute of the good citizen. Most of our students feel that hard work is not futile, but rather that it can be effective in changing the conditions of one's life, and that it may lead to economic mobility and the personal satisfaction of meeting one's family obligations. In holding this basically 'developmental' point of view, the students in our sample place the same meaning on the work ethic as do their respective governments. At the same time, there is an inevitable tension between the personal nature of the work ethic and the cooperative goals toward which East African societies are supposed to progress. A belief in the value of hard work solely for the personal gains it can bring would run counter to the desire of both the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments to restrain competitiveness and to foster a sense of collaboration and respect between peers. In the next section, we shall go on to look at some of the other factors that affect cooperation and development in East Africa.

D.   Trust, Cooperation and Development

For the foreseeable future in East Africa, expatriates and non-citizens will play important developmental roles. For the indefinite future, East African citizens will come from different racial groups. And it is unlikely that the diverse ethnic groups that have lived for centuries within the current national borders of the three states will lose their identities for generations yet to come. The lines that might divide these new nations are clearer perhaps than in most other parts of the world; yet equally clear is the commitment of the three governments to treat these lines not as impermeable boundaries, but as the very frontiers upon which change must be worked.

Some indication of the scope of the problem that faces any effort to bring such diverse groups together is given by the degree of social trust they feel toward each other. We have already seen how a sense of trust affects the conditions under which people learn, and their willingness to accept the guidance of different authorities. In this section, we are more concerned with the extent to which a basis of trust exists for future cooperative efforts between the different residents of the countries we are studying. Table 9 shows the feelings of the students in our sample toward the trustworthiness of four general categories of persons, from each of which a future citizen's partners in cooperation might be drawn.

TABLE 9

Percentage of students who say that members
of different groups can be trusted Always or Usually

GROUPS	K-Prim	K-Sec	T-Prim	T-Sec
Africans	62	38	61	40
Classmates	44	45	37	32
Europeans	48	29	36	22
Asians	29	11	23	15

Th re are a number of striking patterns in Table 9. First, the impact of education seems to result consistently in a lower degree of trust toward all of the groups (the one exception is in Kenya students' feelings toward classmates). In no case did more than half of the secondary students feel that any of these categories of people could be trusted, and it was only toward Africans that a majority of primary pupils felt trustful. In general, these data do not constitute a favorable prognosis for cooperative effort.

Although historical reasons are obviously involved in the lower sense of trust toward non-Africans, it would seem that the overall pattern of distrust is not entirely dependent on race. Indeed, primary pupils in both countries say they can trust Europeans as often, or more frequently, than their classmates.

Variations in degree of trust between primary pupils in the two countries are more or less equal to variations between secondary students; thus, an increase in age and education is not associated with increasing national differences in these attitudes. Between different levels of education within a single country, there is somewhat greater concurrence between the feelings of the two Tanzanian samples than there is between the Kenyans; this suggests that secondary education in Kenya may be associated with greater changes in attitudes of social trust than occur in Tanzania.

On the whole, though, the data in Table 9 require further analysis than we are able to provide here, at least if we wish to search for the factors that account for differences in the degree of trust evidenced by students at different levels. On the surface, the impact of the generally ethnically or racially mixed secondary school does not seem to produce a greater sense of social trust in students; primary pupils, though generally in ethnically homogeneous schools, display a greater overall sense of trust. In absolute terms, however, the levels of trust for both educational groups seem low; and the implication of these attitudes for social cooperation are clear - if more than half of a population is reluctant to trust its fellow citizens and workers, the prospects for cooperative efforts are bound to be severely limited.

Such efforts will also be affected by the willingness of students to take part in them. One indication of this attitude was provided by responses to the following statement:

> "During part of his vacation, a secondary student should
> have to work without pay in community service, such as
> building schools or teaching people to read."

The percentage of secondary students in the two countries who agreed with or thought this statement true was:

K-Sec   60%
T-Sec   65%

These proportions do not suggest an unqualified endorsement of the idea contained in the statement; at least a third of the students in both countries feel that they should not have to sacrifice part of their vacations in unpaid, developmental employment. We cannot determine whether the qualification of work without pay was of more concern to those who disagreed than the requirement of community service itself. In either case, however, their responses suggest a reluctance to override personal interests or obligations in the interest of their communities. (11)

One other finding is relevant to this discussion. We asked secondary students what criteria they would have in mind when choosing the kind of work they would pursue. About two-thirds of the students in both countries mentioned, "The usefulness of the job to the development of the country." Again, a minority of about a third (perhaps not the same third, however) did not consider this an important criterion in their occupational orientation.

In short, the area of social trust and willingness to 'help others' seems to be one in which there is only relatively weak attitudinal support for the announced objective of the Kenya and Tanzania governments to foster a cooperative ethnic and a sense of national integration. Fairly strong feelings of social distrust characterize most of the students in our sample, and a substantial minority of them do not seem predisposed toward socially beneficial applications of their skills.

E.   Interest in Government: Patience vs Intervention

In their study of the civic culture, Almond and Verba draw a distinction between "subjects" and "citizens".(12)   The former hold a passive view of their obligations as members of society: "what the government does affects him, but why or how the government decides to do what it does is outside his sphere of competence."   The "citizen", on the other hand, "is expected to take an active part in governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and to make his views known."

Students, as well as other groups in society, vary between these two orientations, although students are much more likely to be "citizens". Indeed, the "citizen" orientation itself has variable implications for action. In a number of Latin American and Asian nations, for example, students are highly politicized and intervene actively in the political arena, often in opposition to the existing regime.   In contrast, in the United States, most highly politicized students tend to be recruited into wings of the major political parties, and thus express their political interest within the framework of the prevailing system, rather than in opposition from outside. In East Africa, there is little evidence to suggest that students are highly politicized;   they do not react publically, as a group, to major political decisions - neither are they ready to lend a hand in undermining the legitimacy of their own governments.   Nevertheless, about half of the students in our samples mentioned 'interest in government' as a mark of a good citizen.   Here we can investigate how much 'activism' is implied in this endorsement of 'interest'.   Can we make some preliminary classification of East African students into 'subject or 'citizen' categories?

Our best indicator of political interest was a direct question about it: "How interested are you in matters of government and politics?" The percentage of students in each group who replied that they were Always or Usually interested was:

K-Prim	90%
K-Sec	84%
T-Prim	93%
T-Sec	77%

These percentages are all relatively high in comparison with those cited by Almond and Verba for adults in their five-nation study, where the percentage who followed accounts of political and governmental affairs regularly or from time to time varied from 37 percent in Italy to 80 percent in the U.S.(13)

As the data in Table 4, above indicated, most of our students' interest in politics is probably expressed through reading newspapers or other contact with the mass media.   For some students, however, discussions of politics in school are also important.   Only about one-seventh of the two secondary samples said they 'never' took part in school discussions, while about two-sevenths said that they 'always' did so.   Again, this compares quite favorably with Almond and Verba's data on frequency of 'talking politics with other people' (the proportion of those saying they 'never' talked politics ranged from 24 percent in the U.S. to 66 percent in Italy; in Mexico it was 61 percent.)(14)

Is this relatively high degree of 'interest' the limit of students' participant orientations toward government and politics, or are they willing to make their views known as well?   To do so would seem to require a belief

in the legitimacy of offering opinions to political leaders, as well as a sense of obligation to do so. That students in our sample believe in their right to make known their views was indicated in their choice between the following alternatives:

1. Ordinary people should feel free to give advice to our political leaders, or to ask them for help.

2. Our political leaders cannot do their work properly if ordinary people are always giving them advice, or asking for help.

The percentage of students who chose the first alternative was:

> K-Sec   87%
> T-Sec   80%

We then asked, "Which man helps the nation more?"

1. The man who is patient and who does not interfere when the government makes a mistake.

2. The man who complains when the government makes a mistake and who tells the government about it.

The percentage who chose the second alternative was:

> K-Sec   94%
> T-Sec   92%

On the verbal level, at least, secondary students in both Kenya and Tanzania seem equally committed to an active, 'interventionist' role as citizens. At the same time, other findings support the conclusion that although students are eager to express their views, many of which are critical, their sense of trust and confidence in their leaders is enough to make this criticism constructive and to avoid cynicism.(15) In many ways, these students are closer to being 'citizens' than 'subjects' in large measure, it seems, as a function of their being in school.

F.   Religion and National Integration

The place of religion is somewhat ambiguous in the new nations we are studying. On the one hand, the historical and continuing role of the missions in providing education is acknowledged and appreciated, as is the ecumenical and universalistic spirit that informs most contemporary churches. On the other hand, religious loyalties represent yet one more potential barrier to the national unity which all less 'global' loyalties must presuppose. Religion may divide as well as unite, and for governments whose first social concern is the creation of national unity, the claims that religion may make on a young person's loyalties must be the object of some consideration. Here we can touch only briefly on a few of the social implications of our students' religious beliefs.

We have already observed that, for most students, being religious is not of major importance to being a good citizen. The active and socially participant definition of good citizenship that students gave does not mean, however, that they are irreligious. Nominally, at least, almost all are members of some religion; fewer than two percent of the secondary groups, and one percent of the primary groups, indicated that they had 'no religion'. There seems to be no decline in the profession of religious affiliation associated with higher education, nor are there signs of a strong agnostic or atheistic tradition that might attract a larger proportion of sceptical higher secondary students. But religion, to judge from our responses, is seen as an essentially private matter; its connection with citizenship appears tenuous to most students.

Religion may be one among many grounds on which people exclude others as possible marriage partners, and as such it is a good indicator of the lines of social cleavage in a society. We asked secondary students to indicate some of their own feelings on this matter in the following question.

observation that, "In Kenya there is no question of the worship of the state taking the place of the worship of God, or of nationalism supplanting religion." (KEC Report, I, p.33).

Leaving aside the ambiguities of the choice, and looking at the choices that were made, we can begin by observing that, within each country, primary pupils were more likely than secondary students to choose religion over nation; and between countries, Tanzanians tended to choose religion more than their educational counterparts in Kenya. Thus the slightly greater preference among Tanzanians for nation over tribe is offset by their greater preference for religion over nation. Kenyan secondary students, in contrast, were the only group to reverse the direction of their responses and to choose nation over religion to a definite, yet not extreme, degree. Until we are able to look more closely at some of the possible independent variables affecting these patterns, we can only conclude that for those with higher education, tribe becomes a less meaningful focus of loyalty as against religion and nation. Greater ambiguity exists as to the balance between the importance of nation and religion. There is little reason to expect, however, that developments in either country will force a resolution of this ambiguity, or that its existence at the present time constitutes a serious impediment to national integration.

G.   Traditions and the Priorities of Development

It is not difficult to describe the attitude that the countries in our study have officially taken toward the place of tradition in the modern world. Almost every major document issued by the two governments makes some reference to traditions. President Nyerere, for example, told Tanzanian children in his speech to them in July 1964:

> "All children - whether they are at school or not - must learn the traditional skills of our people. From your parents and grandparents you must learn the stories, poems, and the history of our people - for many of these things are not written down, and if you fail in this they will be forgotten. These stories are part of our heritage; you must carry them forward into the future."(16)

Similarly, the Kenya African National Union's Manifesto states:

> "It is fundamental to our desire to create a truly AFRICAN society that local customs, arts and social patterns should be preserved and modernised. Our people must be proud of their heritage. We intend to show that Africans have much to offer the world. This is why we foster the resurgence and adaptation of all that is valid for the twentieth century in our indigenous cultures."(17)

There are, then, two aspects to the concern with tradition: continuity and adaptation. Not only must certain cultural products be preserved, but others must be adapted to fit modern social structures and situations. Are students concerned with either of these problems? Do they think it is important for them to know the traditions and customs of the country? Do they see a conflict between traditions and the demands of modernization, or do they attribute some constructive importance to traditions in the modernization process?

One indicator of students' attitudes toward knowledge of traditions was given in their choice of the 'good' citizen's qualities, in Table 6 above. Only a very small percentage of students in all the samples attached much importance to traditions in the context of citizenship. Exposure to education does not seem to affect students' low appraisal of this factor. This conclusion finds support in Table 5, above, where the teaching of traditions as a purpose of schools was ranked lowest by both secondary samples, well below the teaching of jobs, skills and preparation for examinations. Tanzanians tend to attach somewhat more importance to the use of schools for this purpose

than do Kenyans, but they still rank it last among five possible purposes.
Although we do not have equivalent evidence for primary pupils, we did ask
them what they were proud of in their countries: 14 percent of the Tanzanian
pupils mentioned 'customs and traditions', while only 6 percent of the
Kenyans did so. In absolute terms, the salience of traditions is quite low;
relatively, there is a consistently greater emphasis by Tanzanians upon them.

Further insight into attitudes toward tradition was provided by
secondary students' responses to a question asking them to rank, in order
of importance, five problems facing the country. Table 11 contains the rank
order, by indices, of these problems. In both countries, the development-
related problems of education, and agricultural and industrial expansion,
took precedence over the preservation of traditions and customs. In this
case, only slight differences separated the Tanzanians from their Kenya counter-
parts on the question of traditions.

TABLE 11

Rank order of problems facing the
country, by weighted indices

PROBLEM	K-Sec	T-Sec
		1,000 = Max.
Providing education for every young person in (K) (T)	918	882
Training more young people to be good farmers	695	596
Building more factories to make more jobs in the towns	663	533
Providing public care for the aged and the sick (T only)		519
Building an East African Federation (K only)	391	
Preserving African traditions and customs	313	326
		200 = Min.

Respondents ranked the five problems in order of importance; the index was
constructed by tallying five points each time a problem was ranked first,
four points for second, and so on. If all respondents ranked a problem
first, it would have 1,000 points, the maximum score; 200 is the minimum.

In real terms, the importance of the three top-ranking 'problems'
is not likely to diminish in the near future. In effect, then, our respon-
dents are relegating the 'problem' of traditions to more than inferior rank -
they imply that it may never become important, and that little will be lost,
so far as citizenship and development are concerned, if this should happen.
The official and rhetorical emphasis placed on traditions, then, has had
little apparent impact on the attitudes of the generation most crucially
involved in bridging the gap between the old and the new. Perhaps more than
any previous generation, they have access to the world of their grandparents
and to the world of their grandchildren. If they do not form the link, their
own children will be even less able to do so.

VII.   Conclusion

It has been our object, in the preceding pages, to report on the
preliminary findings from a cross-national survey of political socialization
in East Africa. To do much more - to refine the categories of analysis, to
test systematically our suggested explanations for similarities and differences
in the responses, to draw broad conclusions concerning the relationship between
schools and society in these countries - is beyond the scope of this paper.
Such an undertaking would in any case be premature. It is essential to keep
in mind that the data we have here presented comprises a sub-sample of two
larger nationwide samples, and that only the larger samples provide a statis-
tically valid basis for generalizing about the students of Kenya and Tanzania.
We have, of course, some reason for believing that the data we have analyzed
in this paper bears some rough correspondence to our larger sample. The
variety of schools we have included in our panel ensures the incorporation
of the major differentiating variables of the schooling system. Nevertheless,
we cannot be sure that we have not over-represented or under-represented
certain significant groups of students; and because we can not be sure, we
must treat our findings with due caution.

Accepting these limitations, there are still some patterns in our
data so striking as to call for at least a brief comment. One of these
patterns is the marked difference between primary and secondary student
responses on a wide range of items. Although primary and secondary students
hardly differ in their definition of good citizenship (with the exception,
already noted, of the greater importance assigned by primary students to
educational attainment), they differ repeatedly, and usually in the same
direction, over the resolution of dilemmas arising from these commitments.
Primary students, taken as a whole, attach greater importance to educational
attainment; are less egalitarian in their convictions; are less imbued with
the ethic of hard work; profess greater interest in politics; attribute
greater salience to religious and tribal affiliations. They manifest greater
trust in other members of society, and a less critical disposition toward
figures of authority. Perhaps connected with these latter attitudes is a notable
propensity among primary students to express their views in unqualified terms;
whereas secondary students cautiously tick "usually" and "sometimes", primary
students see the world in the sharper contrasts of "always" and "never".
The constancy with which variations of the same magnitude and direction show
up between primary and secondary students of both countries provides
additional support for the supposition that schools have a decisive impact
on the formation of citizenship attitudes. Although we cannot yet rule out
the possibility that age, and not length of exposure to education, accounts
for these variations between the two educational levels, it seems unlikely that
age alone can account for the degree of uniformity in the variations that we
have observed.

If systematic difference emerges from the comparison of primary
with secondary respondents, there is an often startling similarity between
the responses given by Kenyan and Tanzanian students of the same educational
level. On question after question we found Kenyan and Tanzanian primary
students, or the secondary students of the two countries, differing in their
answers by only a few percentage points - sometimes by as little as one res-
pondent in 200. This observation has its exceptions. Tanzanian students at
both levels assign a higher priority to their religious commitments than do
Kenyans; Kenya students as a whole show markedly greater trust of their fellow
man than do Tanzanians. Elsewhere, however, the cross-national similarities
are so constant as to raise questions about the significance of the nation
state as a differentiating variable.

From one perspective, this finding is hardly surprising. East
African school children confront, after all, rather similar environments.
In both countries, chronic poverty and the need for rapid economic develop-
ment are constant themes. Kenya and Tanzania were subjected to roughly similar
colonial and missionary influences; in both, the educational system functions
as the principal ladder to high position. National boundaries in East Africa
are notoriously no respectors of tribal groupings. Yet recent observers of

the East African scene have tended to highlight certain differences in the
political style of the two countries. Tanzania is conventionally depicted
as a mass-mobilization, intensely national, radically egalitarian political
system; Kenya, as a more loosely structured state more hospitable, on the
whole, to free enterprise and other symbolically Western influences. If these
differences in fact exist, they have not yet shown up clearly in our findings,
which tend rather to confirm the unity of East African society. We believe
that an informed student of East African affairs who studied our data without
knowing its country of origin would generally have difficulty in dealing with
the fine shades of difference; and that where clear differences emerged, he
would be as likely to make the wrong assignment as the right. The far more
unequivocal opposition of Tanzanian secondary students to educational elitism
is perhaps the one clear instance of a substantial difference in the "expected"
direction.

It may be argued, and with much justice, that Uhuru is a very
recent phenomenon in both countries; that it is still much too soon to look
for national differences when the indigenous political styles of the two
countries are still very much in the early stages of evolution. It is worth
asking, therefore, where one should look for the first signs of emerging
difference. Conceivably, these differences might first show up at the primary
level; the secondary students on our sample, after all, completed most or all
of their primary education under British administration, while primary students
can hardly have more than a hazy conception of life in the colonial era.
Alternatively - and, we believe, more plausibly - secondary students, with
their more mature interests, their greater education, their more sophisticated
perceptions, their greater distance from the simple, homogeneous village
community, and their more realistic prospects of exercising political power,
might be taken as the more sensitive indicators of diverging political styles.
Be that as it may, we found no marked and consistent trend toward greater
differences between secondary groups than between primary groups where such
differences existed at all. One reason may be that East African students as
a whole show little evidence of being highly politicized. The characteristic
physical isolation of the secondary boarding school, the demanding standards
of work and clear rewards for academic achievement, the embryonic character
of student political organizations and the absence of a tradition of student
radicalism all combine to remove both occasion and incentive for intense student
involvement in political affairs. The secondary student is still shielded from
the direct pressures of the larger society; for him, politics is still a
spectacle, not a vital determinant of his daily routine.

Such, then, is the portrait of the future citizens of Kenya and
Tanzania that emerges from our survey: citizens for whom hard work counts
for more than political activism, for whom traditions have lost their hold
without being replaced by political ideology, for whom educational advantage
has not led to a demand for privilege, for whom strong support for the existing
political regimes is mixed with a disposition toward critical appraisal of
individual performance in political roles. Such a portrait does not represent,
perhaps, the ideal that the most politically committed members of these
societies will seek to realize; nor do such responses as those on social
trust suggest that the attainment of a strong sense of national identity will
be without stress. Measured by the goals that the leaders of Kenya and
Tanzania have set for their countrymen, however, the prognosis for future
success is still bright. If exposure to the educational systems of these
countries has not yet produced the model citizens a new nation might hope for,
the trend in this direction is clear.

N O T E S

1.   Although the name Tanzania is used throughout this paper, the study has been confined to the mainland portion of the United Republic formerly known as Tanganyika.

       The Education and Citizenship Project was initiated by Prof. K. Prewitt. It was subsequently designed and administered by Mr. D. Koff and Mr. G. Von der Muhll in Kenya and Tanzania respectively, and will shortly be administered by Prof. Prewitt in Uganda. The Project has been conducted under the auspices of the Political Science Research Programme of the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere University College, and with the co-operation of the Institute of Development Studies (University College, Nairobi) and the Institute of Public Administration (University College, Dar es Salaam). We would particularly like to thank Prof. James S. Coleman, Director of the PSRP, for his support of the Project, as well as Dr. B. Massell, Director of the IDS, and Dr. David Kimble, Director of the IPA, for their assistance. The co-operation - and indeed, the active assistance - of the Ministries of Education in Kenya and Tanzania was indispensable to the successful administration of the Project; and we gratefully acknowledge our debt to Mr. K. Mwendwa, Chief Education Officer, Mr. G. C. Knight, Mr. G. C. Maina, and Mr. S. K. Kimalel, of the Kenya Ministry of Education, and to Mr. J. Sawe, Chief Education Officer, Mr. S. A. Nalitolela, and Mr. J. D. Mganga, of the Tanzania Ministry of Education, as well as to those many teachers, headmasters, Regional and County Education Officers, too numerous to mention by name, whose gracious forbearance and assistance immeasurably facilitated our study. On no account can we fail to mention our invaluable field assistants, Mr. C. Cerere, Mr. J. Kibaki, Mr. J. Massare, Mr. R. Rwehumbiza, Mr. G. Hyden, Miss R. Berins, and Miss A. Wipper. Miss Wipper also played a role in the design of the Project that cannot properly be acknowledged in a footnote. Finally, thanks are due to Mr. R. Fawcett of the Curriculum Development Centre, Nairobi, for his expert advice on the wording of the English-language questionnaires.

2.   To the Primary VII or VIII, Secondary IV, and Secondary VI classes, we added a small sample of Secondary II classes in order to maintain some degree of continuity between the Primary and Secondary responses. In addition, we selected stratified samples of schools for control purposes where only one or a very small number of schools of a theoretically relevant type appeared in our original sample.

3.   The primary and secondary questionnaires differed principally in that certain questions were left out of the primary questionnaire, while others that were left open in the secondary questionnaire were presented as a choice among several alternatives at the primary level. In Tanzania, a Kiswahili version of the primary school questionnaire was used except in a small number of predominantly Asian schools where English was the more familiar language.

4.   David Morrison suggests that in Tanzania, the proportion entering primary school may be less than 50 to 55 percent of the eligible age group. In Kenya, the proportions by Province range from 2 to 100 percent, with a national average of 58 percent; secondary admissions in Kenya constitute 3 percent of the age group. (See Kenya Education Commission Report, Part II, p.9, and Part I, p.85). But the administrative difficulties in reaching these other groups, in contrast to a definable and 'captive' sample of students, are immense. Merely drawing and locating samples of primary school leavers, let alone designing a questionnaire for non-literate children, suggests some of the problems.

5.   See Kenya Education Commission Report, Vol I, p.41 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1964).   Future references to this Report will be made in the text by the initials KEC, followed by the volume and page numbers.

6.   See K. Prewitt, "Uganda Extra-mural Students and Political Development", unpublished ms., 1966.

7.   Another advantage that teachers have is their education; they may simply know more than most of the other adult figures in the student's world. On the other hand, the instructional role of parents is not entirely without substance: only 29 percent of the Tanzanian secondary students, and 40 percent of the Kenyans, said they had not learned anything important about Tanzania and Kenya, respectively, from their parents.

8.   Teachers are also seen as sources of advice on post-school problems.   About two-thirds of both secondary samples mentioned their teachers as the best agents for advice on careers; about one-fourth attributed the same ability to their parents.   At the primary level, 50 percent of the Kenyans, and 40 percent of the Tanzanians, chose teachers over parents as the best people they could talk to about their lives after they left school.   The teacher's role is thus expected to be multifaceted; in practice, it may be confined too strictly to formal instruction.

9.   In a preliminary analysis of data on Kenya primary pupils, unemployment, ignorance, criminal tendencies, and poor citizenship were all found to be associated with lack of education in the minds of primary pupils. See D. Koff, "Education and Employment: Perspectives of Kenya Primary Pupils," (Univ. College, Nairobi; Conference on Education, Employment and Rural Development, Sept. 1966).

10.   In view of the recent prominence of this issue in Tanzania, it is perhaps important to record that the data was collected before the outbreak of student demonstrations in Dar es Salaam.

11.   See Note 10.

12.   G. Almond and S. Verba, Civic Culture (Little, Brown edition; Boston, 1965), pp. 117-121.

13.   Ibid., p. 54.

14.   Ibid., p. 79.

15.   For an extreme expression of political cynicism by 'school leavers' in Ghana see Cameron Duodu, The Gab Boys (London, forthcoming).

16.   "Sikukuu ya Saba Saba, Hotuba ya Rais kwa Watoto," (Min. Informati and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, 1964), p.7.

17.   "What a KANU government offers you", (Publicity Dept., KANU, Nairobi, 1963), p.12.

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FS 2-2

THE CASE FOR BASIC RESEARCH IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

It is more usual for those who want to emphasise the importance of pure research in a developing country to adopt one of two lines of argument. One is that the distinction between pure and applied research is an ignorant one only made by those who are unfamiliar with the movement of human thought. Many scientists believe that Descartes' retreat into a room with a stove in order to find proof of own existence started a new line of enquiry which they are still working out. His belief that the problems of mathematics should not be solved separately like a bag of tricks but would yield to a general philosophical approach led directly to the invention of Cartesian geometry and on to the contemporary discoveries of atomic science. For this sort of reason an eminent scientist in Africa said to me that to contribute to to-day's problems in agriculture one should study agriculture but to solve the problems of agriculture twenty years ahead one should now be working on physics. This is to find a place for intellectual curiosity as a precondition of a useful science. It still leaves in question the value of reading and research which does not in its own substance lead on to practical results. The other argument is that the pursuit of knowledge is an end in itself which cannot be explained to those who are deaf to its appeal in the same way that radicals cannot negotiate with racialists and you cannot praise the practice of virtue to those without moral sensibility. In this view a university will always to be some extent beleaguered and the opponents of the pure lovers of truth simply have to be outmanoeuvered, crushed or voted down but will for ever remain, the uncomprehending and hostile Philistines who make up the enemy at the gates.

Rejecting both these paths I have always preferred Francis Bacon's ideal of those who study "for the glory of God and the relief of man's estate" because I believe that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is not only one of the redeeming qualities of the human race but a most useful activity to be going on in a developing land. Moreover it is a duty to persuade those who are uncertain of its value that it is wise to invest in learning just as John Stuart Mill believed that liberty was an irreducible good in itself but that an effort should be made to justify freedom to the sceptics. The immediate problem in Dar is the reading term now suggested as part of the Political Science M.A. Programme. It is to be one term of what we hope will be almost undirected reading. Is it necessary that our graduate students should have one term in which to read freely without any formal connection to a specific course but ending with an oral or written examination upon the subject as a whole? I believe it is but I recognise that it will use money which the government could otherwise spend on children who are close to death and that in a society which is neither cynical nor wealthy government expenditure on this lavish scale must always be justified to the general public. If we need it we should try to have it: if not, not. Similarly with the academic staff. Is it necessary that they should have time and facilities to read and do research beyond what they need to teach their courses? I believe it is. We could not say we have been justified if our graduates read nothing but trash and take to drink but these are our best students and I think we can rightly assume some measure of intellectual curiosity and an inner drive towards serious work. We would be happy if our students used this term to read in a way that is not directly related to an examination and is therefore more disinterested. We would be happy if they not only went more deeply into what they have studied in class but ventured out into the intellectual hinterland beyond their courses and we would be happy if some of them became so possessed with an idea that they were forced to follow wherever it might lead.

While they are undergraduates our students do not read enough. It is their greatest single weakness. Because they do not read as much as they should they are forced to concentrate on the essentials for course work and examinations. Not only do they not know as much as they might but the things they do know are like pools of light in a surrounding darkness. As a result they make an uneven showing in

examinations.. They sell themselves short: sometimes adequately
able to reveal the skills they have learned and sometimes making
mistakes involving for example hundreds of years as they describe
Machiavelli's influence on Saint Augustine. This makes external
examiners flinch and in later life causes politicans and technocrats
from other places where they have been educated more generally seriously
underestimate our nationals. It is my contention that the term of
reading we have in mind would strengthen the hard core of their work
but would also deposit the scraps of extra information which may be
unimportant in themselves but gradually link up the concentrated
centres of intellectual concern we all teach about in order to form
some vaguely coerent picture of the whole.

In the meantime the reluctance of the first year students to depart
from their arduous course work has perhaps two implications. It makes
me doubt the value of wide survey courses in the first year although
it enhances their value later on. Without any background at all a
survey course slides into ever deepening confusion. It also makes me
unsure whether students should be urged so resolutely to 'skim' as I
have heard people advise in orientation courses. Skimming as a first
year art enables a student to cover a lot of ground which is good but by
teaching a student so deliberately to read only what is most important
we may prevent him immersing himself in the material and strengthen an
attitude of grudging acquisitiveness.

This uneven admixture of what is known very well and what is hardly
known at all weakens the students confidence in himself. He knows he lives
too close to the frontiers of his knowledge to speak with any authority.
It is unnerving to discover that what you read in one book is contra-
dicted in another but much less alarming when you have once realised
that the contradiction is itself under devastating attack in yet another
place. Wider reading might sharpen the image of intellectual life as a
disputed territory where people and ideas crowd together in constant
movement and dogmatic certainty has been dissolved in the confusion
of dogmas. The air if full of voices. I would like my students at
least to sense the babble of the world.

Moreover the same students who are very suttle about what is close
to them are often surprisingly unimaginative about events which are
more remote. "America is a - England expects that - the Tanzanian
Government believes - " All these simple phrases are rarely heard in
conversation between insiders to whom the mere accumulation of
detailed knowledge gives a different view. Reading is some substitute,
admittedly an inadequate one for this. I would almost say that
it doesn't matter exactly what facts one knows about or even whether they
are strictly accurate provided that they all add up to an experience
of complexity. General reading and the publication of the findings
of pure research are invaluable contributions to that awareness
which should include belief in the incredible. It is neither
important nor edifying to know that when Asquith was Prime Minister
of England he used to write love letters to a young woman during
the cabinet meetings directing the bloodstained carnage of the
1914 - 1918. War. It is important to know that such things happen
because otherwise no one could believe that they did, and knowledge
of people very different from ourselves which is an essential
knowledge in the twentieth century rests upon openness to the
unexpected. I would be pleased if our students read political
memoirs as well as political speeches - biographies - good but
/accounts even bad more journalistic/of political events - more novels of the
political world. The whole idea of politics as conspiracy which is an
idea that now weakens Africa could much more easily be brought within
the limits where it is true. and strengthening if our politicians ----
and students become pol ticians overnight - knew a lot of unnnecessary
and irrelevant information about the outside world. A wider and more
general knowledge about random events reinstates the significance of
chance, of the local preoccupation and of the myriad currents which
flow about a political decision. In a recent conversation Isaiah
Berlin, an Oxford historian, expressed doubts on the particular value to
politicians of reading history which he thought might by itself make them
imitative and inflexible. However, in general, he went on, 'I think it
an advantage to a statesman to know anything. I think the more
statesmen know, on the whole, the better." This view underlies my

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attachment to wider reading and pure research.

But why do the clever people at our universities not read more now? The examination system? a too narrowly utilitarian view of learning? the conscious effort that must be made to read in English which is often a third language? The very limited appeal of scholarship and the ideal of objective truth which is the scholar's gift to the community? They may go together if the language barrier also serves as a barrier to imitating a style of moral commitment.

It would be ludicrous for the University of East Africa to read everything in Swahili or Luganda yet I believe that many of the faculty are too tense and fearful about an essentially unreal problem. There is a feeling that if we take our finger out of the dyke the flood waters of parochialism and national isolation will engulf us all. But this should not be a question of principle. Why not sometimes one thing and sometimes another? I am sure it would help our students to read more if we took the language issue more casually. In the first year Course in Politic Thought I would l ke to make my students think about tyrannicide. It is, like revolution, a place where two prayers meet and I would like them to in recognise its dilemmas and ambiguity.   They have lived in an age/which great power has been greatly abused; they have seeen the fall of tyrants like Hitler and Mussolini liberate whole nations but they have also heard of the death of Lumumba, - Kennedy and Sylvannus Olympio. If they are to be good citizens of Africa they must know that political temptation can take many forms. A good text for this is Shakespeare's <u>Julius Caesar</u> and since there is a good translation in Swahili we shall use it. The Zambians, the Ugandans and I will use an English one as well and I hope we will all feel at home and able to share in the exercise of our political imagination.

Translating the classics of political thought into Swahili as John Nottingham hopes to do is another great step forward even although I know from Ralph Tanner that recently a Tanzanian translating Machiavelli's <u>The Prince</u> was unable to recommend the mass murder of a deposed prince's surviving relatives and mistrnaslated Machiavelli's words as advice to more them to another district! But Tanzania, even East Africa is a small place amd much must still come to it from the out- side. The only remedy for those who find it difficult to read in English is to read more and more and more. This is one reason for having a post graduate reading term and here the faculty who are engaed in reading and pure research can set a standard.

Every university should have one genius in residence. Unfortunately there are too many universities but the luxurious growth of legend around an old or eccentric professor is an essential part of the mysterious way in which one generation beckons the next into an intellectual tradition. It is in itself a contribution to our knowledge of philosophy to fall under the spell of a philosophic way of life. After the death of his father in 1912 Wittgenstein inherited a great fortune which he gave away completely in order to live a life of frugal simplicity. Twice a week in Cambridge he met his classes in the empty rooms at Trinity to which students had to bring chairs or sit on the floor. There were no ornaments or paintings on the bare walls but in his living room were two canvas deck chairs and in his bedroom a canvas bed. There was also a plain wooden chair on which Wittgenstein sat during classes in the middle of the room and there he carried on a visible struggle with his thoughts. He often felt that he was confused and said so.. Frequently he said things like ' I'm a fool' 'You have a dreadful teacher. I'm just too stupid today". There were frequent and prolonged periods of silence with only an occasional mutter from Wittgenstein and the stillest attention from the others. During these silences Wittgenstein was extremely tense and active. His gaze was concentrated; his face was alive; his hands made arresting movements; his expression was stern. One knew that one was in the presence of extreme seriousness, absorption, and force of intellect."(1)

The compulsive reader has a similar effect. It is essential to a University to have in its midst a few alcoholics of the book who cannot stop reading. Lonely lights seen burning at night in offices where scholars longer on; researchers in the library stacks, books on the floor, on shelves, on desks; in faculty members' bathroons and lavatories, all silently influence.

(1)This marvellous description is from Norman Malcolm's Lndwig Wittgenstein. A
                                                    Memoir, OUP 1958

students towards seriousness, absorption and intellectual passion. So would
a Bookshop where books were handled as if they were precious. It is dis-
heartening to assign fifteen pages of reading to a first year student and hear
him murmur in self-indulgent self pity "that's too much" but it is our fault
that we have not created a climate where to express such a grudging attitude
towards learning would be completely unthinkable. Our students have not
usually fallen in love with the life of ideas; they know too dimly its pleasures
and its pains and this may be because we have not lived like Wittgenstein!

There is a possibility in Africa that over the next ten or twenty years
its Universities could become like Mathew Arnold's Oxford the home of a lost
cause. Mathew Arnold, you will remember, believed that the dreaming spires of
Oxford should recall the newly industrialised society to the soul that
economic progress had to stifle. Because the scholars of Oxford were not
involved in political necessity, and the need for violence and compromise but
dwelt in a past which had necessarily elsewhere to be under attack it kept alive
all that was defeated by the spirit of the age. It was faithful, even
perversely so to that part of the truth which had been sacrificed for victory
and to that side of the question that had to be suppressed in the cause of
progress. "We have not won our political battles" he said " we have not carried
out main points, we have not stopped our adversaries advance, we have not
marched victoriously with the modern world; but we have told silently up
on the mind of the country".

In the same way the Universities of Africa could support the defeated
against the pressures of nation building and economic progress. They could
become the home of that voice which seemed to have been silenced when one
nationalist leader after the next widened the base of his party and took it
out of the hands of urban lawyers into the uneducated countryside. Since the
military coups in Africa, revealed the faltering power of charisma and in
the general disappointment with the slow rate of economic progress this voice
of conservative opposition is louder and it could become the characteristic
voice of African universities, mature, compassionate, idealistic, courageous,
but absolutely disastrous to itself and to the nation. However the Universities
have to do something which is like this but very different. While they must
avoid becoming, as Maxim Gorki was said to be in Russia, an alternative
government, they should become a place for studying the universal of which
East Africa is but a part.

As does East African art. The culture of East Africa has been savaged by
colonialism. What will come now will have to be postcolonial. Even when it is
closest to tradition contemporary art will have to be avant garde because
in order for African art to be alive again new meanings and new experiences
will have to be poured into the old moulds.

An African artist stands in a new place and he has the right to feel that
at the Universities he has patrons who will pay and natural allies who will
try to understand his work because they also are shaping a free response to
life in forms that are more than utilitarian.

Out of the Universities' devotion to the general and the universal the
country's intellectuals may discover (if they are not unduly intimidated or
begin to frighten themselves), a truer view of what is genuinely useful to the
immediate situation. We must strive to be relevant to the nation's problems
but when governments attempt to tell universities exactly what is relevant and
what is not then scholars have to journey on to lands of more hopeful
institutions. In a recent issue of Transition Mr. Perritt talking about the
students at Makerere summarised the extreme utilitarian view of education
(which he did not share) as "Less Shakespeare and More Tractors." But the
leading spokesman for practical education in Africa, Reny Dumont, summarised
Africa's False Start in economic progress as 'Too many tractors....not enough
food crops." It might be the role of a University to say "Less Shakespeare
and Less Tractors" against the most entrenched local interests and the most
passionate local convictions. It might also be the role of a University
to say, as I believe, 'more Shakespeare, more Swahili poetry and more crops."

An American magazine which is extremely hostile to the present regime
in Cuba recently described Castro rifling through a bookshop in Havana
because he objected to the presence there of Homer and the absence of books
about growing sugar. The source is tainted but it will serve as an image
for there are other people who would wish it to be true because they approve
of such impatience. However it is not at all sure that the secret of
improving labour productivity on the state farms lies

in any book nor that Homer has no place in Havana. A University where
some one is reading Homer as well as studying agriculture may draw attention
to a relevance which the society has neglected. Homer's _Iliad_ delineates
more richly than any book I know the way in which two men of wrath
struggled against and finally laid aside their very just anger and so
preserved their humanity at the risk of personal humiliation before those
who would uphold a warrior's brittle honour. It is difficult to imagine
any more useful work for Castro to have lent to Krushaev and Kennedy at
the time of the missile crisis in Cuba and wherever there are men of
anger in power Homer will still be relevant.

In an long essay on Homer Simone Weil said that the real subject of
the _Iliad_ is power "which makes a thing of anybody who comes under its
sway. When exercised to the full it makes a thing of men in the most
literal sense for it makes him a corpse (but) a man upon whom a weapon
is directed becomes a corpse before he is touched. He can think of
nothing, and before him other men behave as if he were not there." Homer
protests against this abuse of the powerless but he does more than protest.
He warns. His whole poem suggests that those who control such weapons
lose the touch of fear which restrains the powerful, and act fatally
beyond their strength, irresistibly so in this artificial solitude,
because they no longer know their power has limits. Like sleep walkers
they prepare their death and move towards that inevitable nemesis and
"destruction which the Greeks called the anger of the gods.

The _Iliad_ is about what Nyerere called the crime of the world on
that important occasion when he intervened in the Legislative Council to
protest against what appeared to be the popular local opinion on
behalf of the minorities of East Africa and especially the Asians.
"So what is the crime of the world to day? It is oppression of man.
It is the treatment by those in power of those who have no power, as if
they were goats and not human beings, that is the crime of this world,
that is what we have been fighting against". The _Iliad_ is relevant to
Cuba because it is relevant to humanity, it is on that most general
level that the University may help most and that their intellectual values
are most involved.(1)

I do not advocate the reading or the writing of the _Iliad_/because ^only
it can serve as a moral text to restrain government excuses but in
order to show that the intellectual life is a complex structure and the
very thing that people need simply will not be available to them
unless scholars have a genuine sense of freedom; freedom which they
will use and abuse to produce a vast wealth of material, including much
that does not immediately become relevant and much that may never be
relevant at all. Only in the absence of reconception and control
will the really good work that is any use to anyone be done, for nothing
is less able to lift the people's burdens than the dreary rubbish which
has been produced in dictatorships in the name of committed scholarship.
As Castro said once "The Revolution Must be a school of Unfettered Thought."(2)

A book has lately been published called "The Quest for Absolute Zero"
A review says "A prize example in academic research which produced a
technological pay-off is the effort to see how cold you can get. For
just below the boiling point of liquid helium, the great Dutch scientist
Kamerlingh Onnes found that mercury suddenly loses all electrical
resistance. This remarkable phenomenon of 'superconductivity' in metals
and alloys is now being exploited to make extraordinarily powerful
electro magnets and the implications for various branches of electrical
engineering are considerable. Apart from this, the study of liquid helium
is bringing quite new insights into matter. The story .. starts with the
liquefaction of oxygen in 1877".

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(1) I would like to believe that as David Hume implied in his essay" On
Refinement in the Arts" the spirit of learning is inherently alien to the
spirit of violence. "Knowledge in the arts of government " he said "begets
mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the advantage of human
maxims above vigour and severity". This view of a merciful political
science is however no more true of the modern world than Tocqueville's
"Violence mixed with philosophy and enlightenment. There we have
Napolean and the nineteenth century together".

(2) The Quest for absolute zero by K. Mendelssohn(World University Press
1966) Reviewed in the _Observer_ by 'J.D."

It has taken almost a hundred years before these rewards could be exploited and those who began the work in 1877 have, perhaps, long since died: yet any demand by private capital for short cuts to technological advance would have frustrated the free creativity out of which progress was to come. The state and the universities can do a great deal to create the conditions that stimulate human inventiveness but the poor work produced by the tame intellectuals of authoritarian regimes has never had this potential. The story of low temperature research is not only one of time but also of trans-European scholarship that gradually accumulated results across the frontiers of national relevance. Much of it however went on in Leiden which has in this century magnificently guarded the objectivity of its founder. William the Silent's "Tranquillus in undis". At the same time and out of the same moral impulse Leiden protected its Jewish students from the racial irrelevances of the Nazis and refused to surrender to the fascists' perverted demands for a science which was totally subservient to the national interest.[1]

Tanzania has only about 10 million people. The world has more than 2,500 million. To be engrossed too narrowly in this small country's immediate problems would be to make their solution more difficult by isolating Tanzania from the rest of Africa and from the accumulated experience of the human race. It would give Tanzanian citizens a false picture of their place in the world with tragic economic and political consequences; it would cut them off from the knowledge of alternatives and it would produce in students who were entirely engrossed with themselves and their own problems an unattractive and self interested people. They would also be very bad TANU members! TANU's first pledge is to the universal brotherhood of man. The party has accepted its involvement in humanity and in other people's problems. It has refused to accept national tribalism as its final form or to place economic progress above devotion to principle.

The University community does not proslytise its attitudes but it should be living in a way which itself exemplifies the conditions which are essential to the free pursuit of objective truth and which are exactly those that are essential to a just society. This means maintaining the University as a place where tribe and race and religion do not define the individual and where internal problems and differences of opinion are not resolved by violence: where authority cannot be corrupted and students are not afraid to speak; where you cannot live parasitically upon your father's wealth and buy the examination papers and where people work long hours and are devoted to their work. Above all there must be a deep sense of human responsibility and involvement. The disinterestedness of those who embark on pure research and the self-lessness of those who pursue knowledge for its own sake is akin to and supports the political disinterestedness and economic self sacrifice which is the burning issue of East Africa. It will be wonderful if our academic scientists find new uses for sisal but whenever the College administration shows that it respects learning as well as power; whenever a student thinks "he can't have done this for the money" as he looks at the peculiar results of our peculiar researches; whenever a student freely reads a serious book which will not help him in his career the University has struck a blow for African Socialism and political justice.

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(1) Incidentally the son of a chemistry professor there was discovered reading Homer by the German officer who was searching his house for the pamphlets his father was at that very moment burning in the kitchen stove. The pamphlets were reduced to ashes while the officer read a few lines in stumbling Greek and endeavoured to persuade the son that the Dutch and the Germans should cooperate together in protecting Western civilisation against the barbarian threat from the East. Another advantage in having a copy of the Iliad about!

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND EASTERN AFRICA

The purpose of this paper is to examine the way in which the OAU
has developed since 1963 and to estimate the effect of these develop-
ments on Eastern Africa. The first section will deal with the factors
which led to the formation of the OAU and its initial structure, the
second with the way in which this structure has been modified and
used during the past three years, and the third with the impact of
the OAU in Eastern Africa and vice versa.

I. The Formation of the OAU

The formation of the OAU in 1963 was influenced partly by the
nature of the emerging African state system and partly by the ex-
perience which had been gained from other African organizations -
notably the two which immediately preceded it, the Union Africaine
et Malgache (UAM) and the Casablanca bloc.

By 1963 the main characteristics of the African state system
were becoming apparent. Since the states were for the most part
small and fragile with a fairly even distribution of power between
them, relations within the continent were on the whole regulated by
a shifting pattern of alliances and counter-alliances rather than by
the crude application of power. Most states had closer ties
(especially in the economic field) with outside states than with
each other and this gave foreign powers considerable leverage within
the continent. Though there was a strong emotional commitment to
unity, based on racial consciousness and the common experience of
colonialism, there were in fact marked regional and cultural dif-
ferences (and embryonic ideological ones) and groupings based on
these differences were already appearing. Finally, certain areas
which would naturally be included within the system were alienated
from it because they were governed by colonial or white minority
regimes for which the majority of the African states felt an extreme
antipathy.

In spite of the difficulties inherent in this situation, the
emotional commitment to unity was sufficiently strong in the six
years immediately preceding the formation of the OAU for a number of
inter-African organizations to be formed. The nature and experience
of these organizations posed one fundamental question. If the
objective was to promote African unity and create some solid African
entity on the international scene, was it a better strategy to
encourage 'partial' organizations (i.e. organizations formed of
similarly oriented states likely to be able to reach agreement and
act) in the hope that other states would be attracted and join, or
was it better to form from the beginning a 'universal' organization
which would include all shades of opinion, even if the compromises
this entailed made it difficult for the organization to take effective
action.

The UAM and the Casablanca bloc were both quite frankly partial
organizations, formed in 1961 after the first attempt at a universal
organization, the Conference of Independent African States, had
collapsed because it could not contain the different factions growing
up within it. The two organizations shared other similarities. Both
were confined in membership to the governments of the independent
states and, unlike other earlier organizations, excluded non-
governmental groupings (such as parties and trade unions) and the

liberation movements of the dependent states. The members of each
seemed also to have recognised, tacitly at least, that for the moment
it was impossible to use organizations of this kind to work directly
for political union, and were concentrating on building up a struc-
ture which would promote functional co-operation in areas of maximum
agreement. Though these similarities existed, however, the use to
which the two organizations were put was very different. For while
the UAM was essentially defensive and inward-looking and designed
primarily to protect the status quo and regulate relations between
its members, the Casablanca bloc was basically outward-looking, and
the main aim of its members was to create a radical pressure group
in world affairs.

Both of these organizations were, in terms of achievement,
comparatively successful, mainly because a fairly high level of con-
sensus existed among their members. So the formation of the UAM
helped to check the collapse of the federal economic links in former
French West Africa, and the Casablanca states were able to exert a
strong influence on the way in which the Congo crisis was handled by
the UN. But by 1963 a number of African leaders were beginning to
feel that the advantages of partial organizations were now more than
outweighed by the disadvantages. Not only were a number of states
which belonged to neither group excluded from all participation in
inter-African activity, but the division of Africa into rival groups
was quite clearly being exploited by outside powers in ways which
both groups (though for different reasons) felt to be harmful. At
the same time, now that the bitterness which had caused the initial
split had died down, each group was anxious to extend its influence
and break out of the narrow confines imposed by the existing organiza-
tions. From 1962 on, therefore, there was increasing pressure for a
return to a universal-type organizational structure.

These then were the circumstances which led the formation of the
OAU at the conference in Addis Ababa in May 1963. On structure and
form there was very little disagreement. This was to be a universal
organization with the main aim to bring all states together rather
than to set stringent conditions for membership. The trend towards
governmental control was continued and political parties, trade
unions and liberation movements were given no status within the
organization. All states except Ghana agreed that African unity
should be approached through the tackling of common problems jointly
and that though a strong secretariat should be established, decision-
making should be kept firmly in the hands of the Heads of State.

On other points there was hard bargaining. The Casablanca states
would only accept the defensive aspects of the UAM Charter (respect
for sovereignty, condemnation of subversion and non-interference in
internal affairs) if their own more outward-looking concerns (non-
alignment, anti-colonialism) were also included. The Casablanca
states also demanded that absolute priority must be given to assisting
the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The result was curious
hotch-potch of principles and purposes, which combined rather con-
servative statements designed to protect the status quo in inter-
African relations with radical commitments towards the outside world.

The structure finally agreed on was fairly elaborate with four
principal organs - the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the
Council of Ministers, the Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration. In addition, a number of special
commissions were set up to consider various technical aspects of co-
operation. Great care was taken, however, to ensure that the
Secretariat would be administrative only, and that all power would
remain with the states. In this way the organization was virtually
prohibited from taking swift action.

All this bargaining took place in an atmosphere of considerable goodwill and the speeches made at Addis show that most Heads of State were deliberately playing down the differences which divided them. Almost all of them showed that they were willing to make concessions in order to create a structure which would enable them to establish more fluid alliances and negotiate and exert influence within a wider context. Nevertheless, it was clear that the OAU Charter itself contained a number of contradictions and that on the whole differences had been papered over rather than eliminated.

II. Developments 1963-1966

During the three and a half years in which the OAU has been in existence a number of trends have become apparent. In order to analyse these, it is necessary to look in a little more detail at the extent to which the organization has been able to achieve its objectives in the three major areas of activity established by the Charter: the liberation of the remaining dependent territories, the settling of disputes within the continent and the promotion of economic co-operation.

As a result of pressure from the Casablanca states, the liberation of the dependent territories emerged as a major theme at Addis. The conference immediately appointed a delegation of four of the foreign ministers present to co-ordinate pressure at international level (and especially at the UN) and at the same time established by resolution a co-ordinating committee with headquarters in Dar es Salaam to channel aid to the liberation movements. Initially, this new co-ordination of effort had some impact and there seemed to be a considerable degree of consensus on this issue. The delegation did succeed in stepping up activity at the UN, particularly on South Africa, and the 1963 Security Council resolution calling for an arms boycott and the 1964 expert group report, which recommended that mandatory sanctions should be used against South Africa if all else failed, were concrete results. At the same time, the formation of the Liberation Committee at the beginning undoubtedly did increase the morale of the liberation movements and help to rationalise and make more effective the aid they were getting.

But over the last two years, as the activity of the African states has begun to impinge more closely on the basic interests of the settler and colonial regimes and through them on the interests of the Western powers, this consensus has begun significantly to break up and the leverage which foreign powers have within the continent has become more and more evident. At the same time, it is now clear that certain African regimes are beginning to reconsider whether it is really in their own best interests to encourage the activities of radical liberation movements.

This situation has led to increasing disunity both at international level and within the Liberation Committee itself. In the last year African states have failed properly to exploit the growing unrest in Portuguese Guinea and French Somaliland, mainly because in the one case Senegal and Guinea and in the other Ethiopia and Somalia cannot agree on tactics. The Rhodesian crisis has also been badly mishandled because the degree of consensus and the ability of states to take action in a situation where the western powers are determined to stop it, was considerably overrated. In the Liberation Committee itself, the members of which range from Nigeria and Senegal to Algeria and the UAR, activity has increasingly been paralysed on the one hand by the failure of the members to agree on what movements should be recognised, where arms should be bought and

the gener 1 strategy to be applied and on the other by the reluctance of African states which are not members of the Committee to pay their assessments. These differences came to a head at the recent Assembly meeting in Addis where a number of states appeared willing to halt the work of the Committee altogether by voting against the adoption of its budget. In this situation, the price of unity has more and more become inaction, to the growing frustration of states willing and able to do more.

The second major concern of the Addis conference was to provide some permanent machinery to which disputes involving member states could be referred for discussion and if possible settlement within the African context. This was a considerable innovation (no African organization had made such provision before) and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was conceived in fairly elaborate terms.

Before the Commissioners had been appointed, however, a number of disputes arose which had to be dealt with in an ad hoc fashion. And it was here that the advantages of a universal organization, able to bring a wide spectrum of views and sympathies to bear on a local dispute, became apparent.

The first two disputes submitted to the OAU were border conflicts involving in the one case Morocco and Algeria and in the other Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. In each case when fighting broke out an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers was called, and the matter discussed. The Council was able in each instance to bring about a ceasefire and initiate negotiations, and though no solution to the substantive problem was possible (since there were no sanctions which could be used against the disputants) it was clearly extremely useful to have this kind of forum to which disputes could be referred without loss of face and talked out in a wider context. On these occasions the African states showed an impressive solidarity in their concern both to stop the fighting and prevent outside powers from exploiting the situation.

These two disputes, both of which hinged on the problem of boundaries drawn during the colonial period, encouraged the Heads of State to pass a general resolution in July 1964, which pledged all member states 'to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.' Here again the OAU was playing a useful role in setting out and expressing the concensus, and in helping to move the general body of African opinion to an agreed position on a contentious issue.

Because these disputes were local in nature and neither outside interests nor the immediate self-interest of the member states was closely involved, a fairly high degree of consensus was possible and effective action could be taken. The 1964/65 Congo crisis, however, which grew out of the clash between the Tshombe Government and rebel forces active in the eastern areas of the country, created a very different situation.

This dispute was referred to the OAU Council of Ministers in September 1964, and member states were immediately bitterly divided between those who saw any intervention by the OAU in the affairs of a n independent country as an infringement of the Charter and as a dangerous precedent for the future, and those who felt that what was happening in the Congo had implications for outside one country and that African states must at least try to prevent African issues being settled by the intervention of outside forces. As a result, the OAU ad hoc commission which had been established to consider the situation was paralysed, and no real action was possible.

The fact that Tshombe, with heavy backing from the United States and Belgium, seemed about to crush the rebellion and consolidate himself in power, while the OAU was able to do nothing either to reconcile the African disputants or check foreign intervention, so infuriated some of the more radical states that they began to give extensive aid to the rebels on a bi-lateral basis. This came too late, however, really to effect the issue and by mid-1965 the rebellion had been more or less crushed. This tendency towards a return to partial action was echoed by the former French African states when in May 1965, while not withdrawing their support from the OAU, they formed a new organization, very similar to the UAM, called the <u>Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache</u> (OCA M).[1]

These disputes and the attempts to settle them have emphasized three things: first, that while African mediation in African disputes can be very successful, there are virtually no levers that the OAU can use against determined foreign intervention[2]; second, that where foreign interests are involved as sharply as in the Congo case, it is impossible to expect that a consensus will be maintained except at the level of inactivity, and third, that in a dispute like that in the Congo, where African passions and interests are really affected, there is likely, if the universal organization remains passive, to be a return to partial groupings, if only on an <u>ad hoc</u> basis, in order that some action may be taken.

Finally, one of the main aims of the Addis Charter was to create conditions where greater economic co-operation would be possible among member states. This was emphasized particularly by the Casablanca bloc as a way of building up contact between states, of giving them greater interest in each other and of reducing their dependence upon the outside world. This concern is expressed first in a long resolution of the conference which sets out the fields in which co-operation is especially needed and the kinds of research

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[1] The position of the partial organizations already existing when the OAU was formed, was not made clear by the Addis Charter. The matter was discussed at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Dakar in August 1963, when after a lengthy discussion a resolution was adopted which stated that organizations based on geographical, cultural or economic ties and designed only to co-ordinate activity on these matters, could be formed within the OAU framework. The clear implication was that political organizations would not be permitted and on this basis both the UAM and the Casablanca bloc were disbanded. OCAM, which undoubtedly had political aims, was in fact a clear infringement of this resolution.

[2] Even if the African states had been united it seems unlikely that they could really have prevented US aid to Tshombe or the Belgo/American paradrop on Stanleyville, though they would certainly have been in a better position to do so.

and surveys which should be undertaken, and second in the Charter
itself which establishes a number of technical commissions to do
this kind of work.

In fact in the field the OAU has been able to achieve very
little, mainly because the majority of states have so little free-
dom of action in this respect, but also because the staff, finance
and technical expertise required to tackle such problems are just
not available. Though the commissions have met several times,
countries have tended to send politicians rather than technical
representatives and the resolutions passed have in most cases been
quite impossible for the Secretariat to implement. As a result,
there has recently been pressure that the commission should be re-
formed in a less elaborate way and that the scope of their work
should be modified.

In this situation, most work in this field has been carried out,
not by the OAU but by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
which as a UN body has some of the financial resources and technical
services which the OAU lacks, and which in its terms of reference
is committed to promoting inter-state co-operation in economic
matters. Initially there was some rivalry between the two bodies,
but at the end of last year an agreement was signed between the
UN (acting for the ECA) and the OAU formalizing co-operation in
these fields[1], and over the past eighteen months the OAU has begun
to give the ECA some of the political access and support which it
has badly needed. Though the ECA is not ultimately under African
control and should therefore be treated with some reserve, its
endeavours to establish sub-regional co-operation [2] and to promote
joint economic projects between neighbouring countries do, at least
in some cases, appear to be having results. Very little impact has
really been made, however, on the basic problem of the vulnerabi-
lity of the African economies or on the tendency of African govern-
ments to adopt an exclusively short-term perspective in their treat-
ment of economic questions.

In general, therefore, though the OAU has achieved some impres-
sive results where purely African affairs are concerned and remains
an extremely valuable forum for discussion and negotiation within
the continent, it has not so far been able to do much to lessen the
extent of foreign leverage within Africa and to prevent the consensus
of its members from breaking up when foreign interests are involved.

This weakness has prompted two reactions. On the one hand, that
of the Ghana Government (up to the overthrow of Nkrumah) which con-
sistently pressed for some strengthening of the organization and
some surrender of sovereignty to it, so that more decisive action
could be taken in these circumstances. On the other, that of most of
the remaining states which, while supporting the OAU as an organ of
contact and discussion, have begun to re-form within it essentially
partial organizations to take action where the OAU is unable. OCAM,
the new sub-regional economic groupings and the occasional ad hoc
meetings of the more radical states are all examples of this second
tendency.

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[1] For full text see UN Doc. GAOR A/6174, 16 December 1965.

[2] Since to the UN the whole continent of Africa is a region,
what one would normally call a region (i.e. West or East Africa)
becomes a sub-region in ECA parlance.

Given the fact that Nkrumah has now been overthrown and that even when he was in power his proposals for strengthening the OAU received very little support, the second tendency seems to be the one most likely to prevail, and it seems probable that in the future we shall see the OAU structures being used in this way, in an attempt to reap at the same time the advantages of both partial and universal organizations. Whether it can survive in this form will depend upon the nature of the problems which arise over the next few years. For if really contentious issues ɛ arise, the OAU, like the Conference of Independent African States before, may not be able to contain the factions within it and may explode into separately organized partial groupings. In this case, Africa will be in for another period of overt hostility in continental politics, with all the advantages and disadvantages that this entails. In any event, for the foreseeable future the trend in inter-African relations seems likely to involve in some form or other the clash between partial and universal interests, the exact outcome depending upon the flow of events at any one time.

III. The Implications for Eastern Africa

These then are some general conclusions about the structure and development of the OAU. The purpose of this final section is to look at the situation in Eastern Africa in the light of these conclusions and examine first the role that Eastern African states have played in shaping the OAU and their attitudes towards it; second the ways in which OAU action has impinged upon Eastern African problems, and finally the implications of these trends for inter-state relations in this area.

Tanganyika came to independence well before the OAU was formed, in the period when inter-African politics were dominated by the hostility existing between the UAM and the Casablanca bloc. Tanganyika steadfastly refused to join either of these groups and Nyerere seems consistantly to have used his influence to press for a return to a universal organization. When Uganda became independent in November 1962, Obote endorsed this attitude.

In pressing for a return to universality, Nyerere seems to have been influenced by three things: his desire to bring those states which stood outside either grouping into some active participation in inter-African activity; his belief that once people were brought together disputes would ultimately be talked out, and his conviction that if only Africans could get together and discuss their problems in an African context, the differences and distortions caused by outside traditions and outside pressures would eventually disappear, and a common African consensus emerge. In his speech at the Addis conference itself, he urged these points very strongly saying that the purpose of the conference was to allow this 'common denominator' to emerge.

At this time the Eastern African states had their own partial organization, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern African (PAFMECSA). This differed somewhat from the UAM and Casablanca bloc, however, in that it was based on regional rather than ideological proximity, and within the regional limits included all shades of opinion. During the period of UAM/Casablanca hostility, PAFMECSA had emerged as a fairly strong organization and had assumed at this time the major responsibility for assisting the liberation movements. It was unique in another way in that it was the only African organization to admit the governments of independent countries and the liberation movements of dependent territories to membership on an equal footing. This imparted to its operations an egalitarian air quite missing from other similar proceedings.

Since PAFMECSA was in fact a universal organization, though operating within the confines of a region, and had not been formed with the object of projecting a special political point of view into a wider context, it would probably have come within the definition of acceptable partial groupings established by the Dakar resolution in 1963 (see footnote, page 5.) But once the OAU had been formed, the Eastern African leaders preferred to disband PAFMECSA, and it was agreed that its functions should be transferred either to the governments themselves or to the OAU Secretariat. Eastern Africa appears therefore to have accepted the formation of the OAU with a good deal of euphoria and to have expected that it would be able to deal not only with broad continental problems but also with local and regional matters. Tanganyika in particular seems to have been ready to use the OAU extensively and to surrender some initiative to it.

How far have these expectations been modified or changed by the experence of the last three years? In general, it would seem that there has been a certain amount of disillusionment, or at least a more realistic understandings of the complexities of the African state system and of the limitations within which the OAU must work. At the same time, there is certainly a much greater appreciation of the depth of the differences both in attitude and situation which divide the African states, and the difficulties involved in eradicating such differences. This greater realism would soon to have been caused in the main by the OAU's handling of four crises in which Eastern Africa was closely involved, namely the East African mutinies of 1964, the general problem of refugees, the Congo crisis of 1964/65 and the whole question of the liberation of Southern Africa. The first time that the OAU was really drawn into Eastern African affairs was after the British troops had been called in to quell the mutinies in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda in January 1964. In this situation Nyerere immediately called for an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers. His aim seems to have been first to try and counter the impression circulating in some quarters that the mutiny in Tanganyika had been a popular revolt put down by colonial troops to keep a puppet regime in power; second to use the OAU machinery to get the remaining British troops replaced by Africans, and third to suggest to the OAU that some machinery should be established, so that in future situations of this kind states could appeal for help to an African organization rather than to an outside power.

Though from a public relations point of view the meeting was undoubtedly successful and most states went away convinced that Nyerere did still represent the popular will, the debates showed quite clearly how difficult it was for the OAU to reach an agreed position even in a case such as this which initially at least appeared relatively uncomplicated. For the suggestion that the OAU should take any decisive action, either on an adhoc basis or in a more permanent way, met with an almost generally negative response. On the one hand, certain states argued that for the OAU even to recommend any course of action in this situation (and particularly to indicate to a country what kind of troops should be used) would be an intervention in that country's internal affairs, and that the most the OAU could do in this situation was to 'note with approval' the decisions of the Tanganyika Government; on the other hand, another group of states argued against any permanent machinery being set up for use in this kind of situation, on the grounds that the OAU might find itself involved in keeping unrepresentative governments in power. Both these arguments showed quite clearly that there was not at this point sufficient common will or trust among the states for the OAU to be any further strengthened in the ways suggested. In this situation, no action was taken beyond endorsing Tanganyika's decision to replace British troops with Africans.

The second time Eastern African states called on the OAU was in 1964 over the growing problem of refugees in Eastern and Central Africa. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Lagos in Feburary 1964, as a result of appeals from Tanganyika, Uganda and the Congo, an OAU Commission to

consider the whole problem of refugees in Africa was set up. At the
first meeting of this Commission, Uganda (with 70,000 refugees mainly
from the Sudan and Rwanda) and Tanganyika (with 30,000 mainly from
Rwanda, Congo or Mozambique) asked that the problem of dealing with such
refugees and supporting them during the period of exile should be taken
over by the OAU, and that a fund for which all African states would be
assessed should be established for this purpose. At the same time,
they suggested that an attempt should be made to draft a convention
setting out the general principles which should govern the treatment
of political exiles and refugees in Africa.

These suggestions were in general approved, but though a convention
establishing such a fund and setting out certain general principles
was drafted by the commission by the beginning of 1965, it has never
been possible to get this convention approved by the Council of Ministers
or the Heads of State. Time and again, the convention has been returned
for 'further consideration', not because there is any real disagreement
on its terms but because certain states do not wish to see this crucial
problem regulated in any clear-cut way. Meanwhile those (mainly Eastern
African) states, which bear the brunt of the refugee problem, have
had to continue to deal with it on an ad hoc basis and make piece-meal
arrangements. Here again it has been shown that sufficient consensus
does not exist at present for such a far-reaching decision to be taken
by the OAU.

The real limitations of OAU action were perhaps most clearly
illustrated to Eastern Africa one the handling of the 1964/65 Congo
crisis, as described above. Eastern Africa was inevitably deeply
involved in this. The rebel leaders were mainly Swahili speakers
from the Eastern areas of the Congo; some of them or their predecessors
had attended earlier PAFMECSA meetings, and stories of Lumumba and
Katanga secession had already entered deeply into Eastern African
mythology. More important , the main access of the rebels to the
outside world was through Eastern Africa. That the OAU recognized
this close involvement was shown by the fact that Jomo Kenyatta was
made chairman of the OAU commission set up to deal with the problem.
The failure of the commission to act was particularly galling to
the Eastern Africa states in these circumstances, and Uganda and
Tanzania were among those countries which gave active bi-lateral
help to the rebels when the commission collapsed. The resulting
debacle both helped to discredit the OAU and also left very
acute problems of neighbourly relations between the new Congo
Government and those states which had actively opposed it.

Finally, the role of the OAU in the liberation struggle has
been particularly important in Eastern Africa, and especially in
Tanzania. Tanzania, as the nearest independent state to Southern
Africa with good connections with the outside world, has since 1961
been constantly involved in these problems and has provided a base
for most of the liberation movements in this area. Initially, Tanzania's
assistance was given on a bi-lateral basis, later through PAFMECSA and
finally through the OAU Liberation Committee. The burden of helping
the liberation movements has been a severe one both in terms of finance,
security and responsibility, and the Tanzania Government has always
sought to spread this burden among as wide a range of African states
as possible. The creation of the Liberation Committee was therefore
welcomed with relief - and again a good deal of euphoria.

The disputes within the Liberation Committee and its failure in
many cases to take decisive action has therefore been particularly
bitter for Tanzania, and, when coupled with the failure of the OAU as
a whole to deal with the Rhodesian problem, has caused fairly
deep disillusionment. Increasingly often in the last eighteen months,
Tanzania has found herself, in the company of a small number of other
states, in a position where she is ready and able to take action,

but is either slowed down or, as in the case of the decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain, made to look ridiculous, by the inability of other states to act.

All these problems and frustrations have taught the basic lesson in Eastern Africa, that while the OAU is an extremely useful organ for discussion and contact, it cannot in present circumstances be relied on to take action, even in situations where some action is absolutely essential. This being so, it has been necessary for states to find other means of ~~making~~ taking decisions, even if only on an ~~ad hoc~~ ad hoc basis, in situations where action cannot be postponed.

The result of this in Easter Africa has been that a whole hierarchy of new groupings and new ad hoc alliances have been formed to deal with specific issues. So problems of general economic relations in the area are dealt with through the Economic Community of Easter Africa, set up in May 1966 as part of the ECA's new strategy of sub-regional co-operation; the question of relations with the new Congo government and the regulating of refugee problems were dealt with at the 'Good Neighbours' summit of Eastern African leaders, held in Nairobi in May 1966, and increasingly Tanzania, where more radical issues are involved, has tended to go outside the bounds of Eastern Africa and associate with other countries in Africa which more nearly share her point of view. This new situation has the advantage of greater flexibility, and seems particularly appropriate since even within Eastern Africa itself there are fairly deep divisions and differences. So far these new groupings have existed quite happily within the OAU umberella and no issue has yet become so controversial that there has been pressure for the formation of any partial grouping on a permanent basis.

The Eastern African case therefore confirms the general conclusions set out above: The OAU having reached a period in which divisions are so deep and the freedom of action of many states so limited that unity can only be maintained by inaction, other groupings are springing up within it to deal with specific issues. Whether these issues become so important that not only the consensus of the OAU but also its structure is broken, will depend on the range of problems which arise and the attitude of outside states.

Catherine Hoskyns

December 1966.

THE POLITICS OF TANZANIA'S "DEVELOPMENT FRONT": AN INTRODUCTION

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Owing to illness, it proved impossible for me to prepare a full-dress paper for the Conference as had been originally intended. I was therefore able to make only an extended oral presentation on a rather more general level: the following represents a synopsis of my remarks.

*   *   *

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance for a new generation of political scientists in Africa of the study of the participants engaged in local government and in the process of local planning, as well as the dynamic interactions among those participants. For many of the broader overviews of African systems have been completed, and yet we still know little enough about the politics of the quintessential African- the peasant. In Tanzania the African cultivator comprises 95% of the population; in addition, for economic development the question of "mobilization" in the agricultural sector for increased production, and the challenges presented thereby, loom strikingly large. We must therefore increasingly turn our scholarly attention to the district level, and even lower in the organizational heirarchy, to understand the politics of development.

Rather more has been done in this regard, perhaps, by students of Ugandan politics than those in Tanzania but the latter country presents a range of distinctive questions which are no less worthy of attention. This is so because the government there has deliberately chosen an approach to development which I have found it useful to characterize as "the development front". This term refers to the government's attempt to coordinate a number of instrumentalities- local council, cooperatives, government agencies- in some sort of integrated phalanx, this being designed to present, in sofar as is possible, an uniformity of stimuli to agriculturalists in an effort to move them from more traditional and conservative modes of production and involvements. The party, theoretically, is to play the dominant role in leading and integrating these varied participants. The structural frame of this process (including the forums provided by the various development committees) are familiar enough from work by Tordoff, Bienen and others; knowledge of the political behaviour involved is rather more slight. Nonetheless from the point of view of government effort, as differentiated in this context, from grower response, this is what 'mobilization'- a word much used but to seldom defined- means.

To a large extent this is what "planning" must mean as well. We have been presented with a spate of analyses of the process of generating national plans, especially at the highest levels of government; these are important contributions. But one tends to forget the extent to which a five year plan is really a continuing five-year effort to wrench something out of the original outline. And much of this effort is carried out at the local level. I was struck, for example, in looking at the regional and district breakdowns of the current Tanzanian plan to see how little of the input is from the central government. In the agricultural sphere the financial contribution of 'local government' and 'quasi-private' (especially the cooperatives) sectors are designed to be considerable. And, as the first years of the plan show, these contributions are sometimes only in part delivered. Similarly much of the development effort depends on the initiative of these groups in pushing certain programmes. For example a large cooperative like the VFCU has a network of contacts, considerable financial resources and so on; a great deal of politics near the Lake centres around attempts to jostle the VFCU into action on various fronts. In sum, therefore, these distributions of financial outlay and

activism or initiative in the cause of development are in large
part the substance of the politics of Tanzania's "development
front".[1] We know little enough about this process and a sketching
of the lineaments of such a novel form of "competition" should
be a first priority.

Another advantage of this kind of focussed approach to the
"development front" is the possibility of obtaining better
evidence as to the quality and characteristics of the instrumenta-
lities of development. At the national level often only a very
high level of generalization on such matters, generalization
bordering upon occassion on Kremlinology, is possible; however in
the district one sees, for example, possible tensions between
party and bureaucracy, stimulated by different backgrounds and
roles, played out more graphically and personally. As other
examples, one sees the extent to which different department
or governmental agencies have "ideologies" or "mental sets" of
their own which characterize their efforts. And one sees the
dramatic difficulties, in day-to-day terms, of producing a
party for the vanguard role intended within the existing
development strategy. Related to this more generally, certain
dimensions of the problem of the quality of manpower become evident,
a possible limitation upon certain types of policy choice which
has not as yet been sufficiently explored.

A further important aspect that scholars have tended to
discuss, if at all, only on the broadest level is of even
greater importance for the future shape of the society- this is
the whole process of class formation which tends to accompany
development. Urban factors will be of great importance to the
emergence of such differentiations as have significant impact
but the rural sectors cannot be ignored. The logic of agricul-
tural extension work, the main weapon of agricultural expansion,
tends in the direction of encouraging "kulaks" and yeoman
farmer elements; these may then in turn search for further
springboards to enhance their already advanced positions. An
emergent class structure will not long stay its hand before
influencing the political system. Some assessment of the extent
to which these new factors resulting from the onward movement of
the market economy cut across the barriers of kinship, undermine
or reinforce traditional sources of power and influence and are
turned to "modern" political account is in order. At the national
level it is rather easier, if equally misguided, for a political
scientist to look at the mere interaction of institutions or even
overtly discernible "groups" and call it politics; the network of
social determinants seems so vast and yet so amorphous. Such
evasion is not so easy at the local level, the impact of the
traditional setting as well as its changing characteristics
being marked. The interactions between the institutional
participants within the "development front", as well as the
character of those structures themselves, must therefore also
be related in a rather more fundamental way to this changing social
setting.[2]

1. For a further brief comment on this distinctive political
   problem in regard to the cooperative movement, and its reflection
   at the level of national debate see my "An Introduction to the
   Cooperative Report", Mbioni, Volume III, # VII, (December, 1966).

2. In parenthesis we might also note the possibility of seeing
   the creation of other aspects of the politics of the future in
   the countryside, though perhaps not at this juncture in Tanzania:
   new reactions to modernisation and/or elite abuses of authority
   in the form of "populist" rejections of the city, or a Mulelist
   political regeneration.

A final generalization emerging from my own work to date in a number of districts is the absolutely fundamental importance of the <u>historical dimension</u>. This is true for understanding social change, but equally so for insight at the level of institutional interaction. For anyone interested in a purely functional political analysis of the relations between the main participants in the development front would get nowhere without finally drawing upon the benefits of "historicism". Thus the characteristics of the nationalist movement in a particular district markedly effect present day political relations. Another example: I have found it to be strikingly important to discern who started the cooperatives in a particular district, what groups they have represented over time, and the nature of the early relationships of the cooperative with the political movement. It is thus particularly gratifying to note the prominent position assigned to historians at this year's conference. The kind of "historicism" characterizing the work of my history colleagues at Dar Es Salaam can be an important tool in breaking down our generalizations about "nationalism", "mobilization", and "rural resistance", and forcing us to confront the complexities of varying districts!

For the political scientists these observations may be seen to present a number of dilemmas. One that I have faced rather graphically is the decision as to how to strike the balance between geographical spread of research and the depth of the analysis to be pursued. Insofar as political science has tended to encourage macroscopic sorts of inquiry one wants to get sufficient spread to facilitate generalization about the overall system, but it is increasingly evident in Africa how much one stands to miss in relatively short stops in any given district if one's interest is in the politics of rural development. More theoretical consideration as to the kinds and character of system-wide generalizations which are possible and for what purposes are clearly in order: presumably agricultural economists would also be especially interested in this question.

One is also faced inevitably with the limitation of one's training as a political scientist. The necessity of anthropo-sociological understanding or at least anthropological collabora-tion are underscored. One feels that the traditional divisions between disciplines are a nonsense, in any event, striking against the possibility of a "totalizing" social vision, but this is nowhere more evident than in this kind of work. To some extent, of course, anthropologists have been preoccupied in capturing the lingering "purities" of fast passing cultures and some of their work, quite rightly, has not been so immediately useful to our needs. As the market economy permeates more deeply and "tribalists" even more pressingly are transformed into "peasants", to use those rather unsatisfactory terms, anthropologists and sociologists are making the kinds of contributions anthropologists have made to political study in India (c.f. the work of Fred Bailey). This kind of work must be encouraged.

These problems are compounded in Tanzania because of the sheer magnitude of the country. It may be, however, that one proximate solution, for at least some of these questions, may be a higher degree of coordination among researchers and, especially, among disciplines on the question of local research. One might canvass, initially, the possibility of drawing up a basic inventory of knowledge on districts and some plan as to the establishment of research priorities. Perhaps an assess-ment of usefully typical or especially strategic areas for concentration of joint research could be discussed. A series of small conferences on special areas or questions might also further such coordination, as, for example, this year's Kivukoni seminar on agricultural development with special reference to

settlement. (One might suggest here some forum for a dis-
cussion of socialist forms in agricultural or, another,
class formation in the rural sector). Some such factoring
of problems and priorities might also provide useful guide-
lines to incoming researchers as well as to students on assignment
within the University of East Africa, the latter often being
strategically well placed for the collection of important
local data. In sum, in Tanzania we must begin to face up
more seriously to some of the challenges of the study of
rural development, meeting problems of coordination and co-
operation, as well as those problems related to the possible
necessity of generating a new vocabulary for studying a
relatively virgin and uncharted field.

UGANDA-SUDAN RELATIONS AND UGANDA-CONGO

RELATIONS, 1962-66

A Comparative Examination

by

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&
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Uganda-Sudan Relations and Uganda-Congo Relations, 1962-66: A Comparative Examination.

Interstate relations are at the least a two way affair. One state acts vis-a-vis another one and the latter on its part counteracts to influence the action of the other. The chain of action and counteraction continues on this pattern. Properly speaking, therefore, one should study both sets of action. We shall not however do this in this paper. Our main interest centres on the Uganda-end of the interaction change; and action from the other end will be dealt with only to the extent that it is required to give better understanding to policy being pursued by Uganda.

A state may involve itself in a direct confrontation with another state, for example, Morocco with Algeria on their conflicting claims over the Tindouf area, and Kenya with Somalia over the N.F.D. It may, on the other hand, get involved in the affairs of another state arising primarily out of the domestic problems of the other state. With Uganda, her international relations with her neighbours have been mostly of the second kind. There has been no direct conflict of interest between Uganda and Rwanda, Uganda and Congo, and Uganda and Sudan. But Rwanda, Congo and Sudan have had their own domestic troubles which have often spilled over the boundaries into each other's territory and also into Uganda. The problem such a situation creates is of two kinds. There is first the problem of the refugees who flee from political persecution and seek refuge in Uganda. What should Uganda do about these refugees? Should she welcome them or repatriate them? If welcome, what liberties should she allow them in Uganda? The second is the problem of the violation of the territorial integrity of Uganda either by Rwanda, Sudan or Congo government troops in hot pursuit of the fleeing refugees, or by bands of refugee-fighters. Thus it was that Nekyon was provoked once to say:

> "There may come a time when our forces may have to clash with Rwanda forces as according to our sovereignty we cannot allow our sovereignty to be interfered with by any foreign power. If a foreign government's forces drive into the country and arrest people within our territory we must defend those who are on our land."[1]

Rwanda at one time was the biggest external affairs problem for Uganda when the latter harboured about 37,000 refugees from there.[2] Since then, the problems with the Congo and the Sudan, the two giant neighbours of Uganda, have been the more serious. This

paper attempts to make a comparative examination and appraisal of
the policy of Uganda towards these two states.

The Sudan Problem for Uganda:

Colonialism has been a constant source of problems for
Africa. In the case of Sudan, it brought into one geographic entity
people of two diverse ethnic origins -- black and Arab -- and
having brought them together, it failed to integrate them into a
nation. Perhaps the period of colonial rule was too short a time
to forge nationhood in the Sudan, but the British policy of indirect
rule by which local chieftainships were retained for local adminis-
tration, the division of the country into two administrative regions --
the north and the south -- and the influence of the Christian mis-
sionaries in the south were not particularly conducive to forging
such nationhood as might have been created by a more vigorous policy
of integration.

It is not surprising therefore that on the eve of independence,
in 1955, there should have occurred a clash between the two ethnic
regions of Sudan: a revolt of the southern Equatoria Corps was
ruthlessly suppressed by troops from the north. Two ethnic commu--
nities can suffer joint domination from an external colonial power,
particularly when there is no immediate hope for either of them to
attain independence. When prospects for independence do materialise,
each may define its limits of self-determination. In Sudan, the
northerners, because in the majority and with better prospects of
taking over as successors of the British, defined self-determination
for the entire Sudan as one entity. The southerners, because in the
minority and apprehensive of domination by the Arabs of the north,
defined self-determination to mean separate independence for the
north and the south. The clash between the two was therefore in-
evitable.

The north-south relations of Sudan fall into three periods.
The first period, 1955-58, was the period of the beginning of
organised resistance by the southerners. The second period began
with the military coup of General Abboud in 1958. For six years,
the military regime pursued a rigorous policy of repression of the
south, including attempts to Arabise the south by, for instance,
introducing the teaching of Arabic in southern schools. The mili-
tary regime created the refugee problem at its worst; estimates have
been made of between 50,000 to 80,000 refugees as having fled Sudan

into the neighbouring territories of Congo and Uganda. The October 1964 Revolution which threw over the military regime ushered in the present period of north-south relations, when the Khartoum government, while not relenting on their repressive measures, have at least indicated the willingness to negotiate a political settlement with the southerners.

Uganda achieved her independence during the second period. She was thus born with a neighbour's problem in hand probably at its worst period. The Uganda Government's immediate policy, continued from the British days, was governed by the Alien Refugees Ordinance. To summarise Uganda's policy with regard to the refugees from Sudan, the main features were:

1. Continued good relations with the Sudan Government as the cornerstone of the policy.

2. Open door to the refugees fleeing from Sudan in accordance with the Ordinance.

3. Undesirability of permitting the refugees to indulge in political activity and to use Uganda as a base of operations against Sudan in accordance also with the International Convention on Refugees.

4. Accordingly, the desirability of removing refugees for rehabilitation in areas away from the Sudan borders.

In the words of a Uganda Government spokesman:

"If the Sudanese wish to settle down in a new life here they are welcome. But if they come here merely to use Uganda as a springboard for attacks and subversion against a friendly neighbouring government, they are jeopardising our international relations and reputation. We are not going to allow that to happen."[3]

The above policy, the rationale for which we provide later, has more often produced strained relations between the Uganda Government and the southern Sudanese refugees than between the Uganda and Khartoum Governments. The Southern Sudanese often see this as a conspiracy, backed allegedly by a "secret pact", between the two governments to wipe out the resistance of the Southerners against the northern authorities. The Uganda government often seen to provide substance to these allegations for, in pursuit of the above policy, it has been compelled from time to time to take vigorous action against southern Sudanese political leaders in Uganda said to have indulged in political activities injurious to the cordial relations between Uganda and Sudan. Thus in February 1964 the Government sent to jail Joseph Oduho, a leader of the Sudanese African National Union, for reportedly amassing a rebel army to raid

Sudan. More recently, in 1966, the Government again found it nece
sary to detain Southern Sudanese political leaders for their politi-
cal activities.

The Uganda Government considers it an abuse of hospitality
that the southern Sudanese refugees should treat Uganda as a base
for their political and military activities, much more so, when
their military organisation called the Anyanya should actually
clash with Uganda forces.[4]

The southern Sudanese complaint against Uganda Government is
based on their disillusionment with the fact that this African
country has not come out more openly to support them to fight Arab
domination, and on their surprise that Uganda continues to have
cordial relations with Khartoum while they (the Southern Sudanese)
are suffering. Oduho is thus reported to have said:

> "These countries are members of the O.A.U., yet when we seek
> even sympathy from our black African brother-States, we get
> the O.A.U. policy of non-intervention in neighbours' affairs
> quoted at us. How do the activities of Egypt and Algeria
> measure up to this policy?"[5]

Oduho's complaint does not meet with entirely unsympathetic
ears in Uganda. In January 1966, the leader of the Parliamentary
Opposition in Uganda, A. Latim, had this to say on behalf of the
Southern Sudanese: "The Arab Sudanese go out to the Arab world and
call for help, and the Arab world does help them in their problem
of the Southern Sudan as to how they should suppress that part of
black world, but when we (meaning S. Sudanese) appeal to the black
world, and show them that this is inhuman, they just laugh."[6]

There is at least one way, however, that the Uganda
Government has gone a step beyond the old British policy. It has
taken the more positive line of attempting to mediate between the
southern Sudanese and the Khartoum Government. Pressure from Uganda
on both the Khartoum Government and the refugee political leaders in
Uganda was one significant reason among others that led in March
1965 to the convening of the famous Round Table Conference in
Khartoum. Uganda sent a delegation of four to the Conference, and
actually participated in the talks. Although the Conference failed
to produce implementable solutions, it was the first occasion for
the Khartoum Government and the Southern Sudanese to meet in this
manner. Subsequently, the Uganda Government has continued to seek
a mediating function, either through bilateral negotiations with
the Khartoum Government, or through multilateral diplomacy in con-
junction with the other Eastern African leaders, or through the

Organisation of African Unity. These have not succeeded largely
because of the stubborness of the two parties, and not because of
a lack of attempt at mediation by the neighbouring states of Sudan.

The Congo Problem for Uganda

Broadly speaking, the problems that the Sudan and the Congo
present to Uganda are alike. They are all largely a function of
the crisis in national integration that exists in each of these
countries - Problems arising from this crisis have dominated Uganda's
relations with both of these countries since the attainment of her
own independence and even in the few years prior to independence.

Once this general similarity in the sources of the problems
that the two countries present to Uganda are noted, however, one
notices a number of differences in specific aspects of the problems
from each country as they come to confront Uganda. Uganda-Sudan
relations, as we have seen, are dominated by the Southern Sudan
problem, which has been a constant problem for both the Sudan and
Uganda for the last eleven years or so. On the Congo side, by
contrast, while we know that like in the Sudan there has been littl
agreement on the type of regime suitable for the country. The pro-
blems affecting Uganda have not presented themselves in as constant
and monolithic a form as that of the Sudan. The Congo problem has
disaggregated itself into several distinct aspects: the initial
civil and military disorders immediately after independence; the
consequent influx of white refugees into neighbouring countries;
the interpersonal warfare among the politicians; the secessions -
attempted and actual; the East West struggle; the series of civil
wars and revolts in the country, particularly that between the
Tshombe Government and the rebels; and so on. It is significant
to note this changing nature of the Congolese problem as it is per-
tinent to the understanding of Uganda's foreign policy toward the
Congo. If foreign policy is taken as a Government's reaction to a
foreign problem then changes in the nature of that problem can be
expected to generate changes in policy too.

Another important difference between the sets of problems
facing Uganda from the two countries can be given in terms of
geography. The Sudan problem is geographically limited to the
Southern part of the Sudan and to the Northern part of Uganda. It
has therefore always been close to Uganda, and has hence always
kept Uganda on the alert about its own integrity, as it is too clos

to be ignored or forgotten. The Congo problem (if we may be permit-
ted that simplification despite our earlier submission that the
Congo has presented a series of fairly distinct problems) has been,
from this point of view geographically mobile. Sometimes the pro-
blem has centred around Leopoldville only, as it did for example
when the world's eye was rivetted on to the quarrel among Lumumba,
Kasavubu and the other politicians; sometimes it has centred in such
far away places as Katanga, Kasai, Kwilu and so on; and at times it
has creeped right to Uganda's very doors, as it did for example in
1960-61 with the influx of white refugees, and in 1964-65 with the
influx of Congolese refugees and with the threateningly close
location of the theater of conflict (Ituri-Kibali Province) between
Tshombe and the rebels. All these movements in the locale of crisis
in the Congo can be reasonably expected to affect the nature of
Uganda's policy toward the Congo. At times the Congo problem has
been so geographically remote that Uganda could afford to relax
and take it easy, as it were; but at other times it has veered so
close to Uganda's borders that, like with the Sudan problem, it did
work up Uganda to a very high degree of watchfulness over its in-
tegrity and responsibility for refugees.

When the Congo attained her independence in 1960, Uganda's
foreign relations were still in the hands of the British Protecto-
rate Government. For the Protectorate Government the problem with
regard to the Congo was very much like one aspect of the problem
that the Sudan had been presenting since 1955, namely that of
refugees -- white refugees fleeing from the Congo after the mutiny
of the Congolese Army. Affairs at Leopoldville where the political
struggle among Lumumba, Kasavubu, Tshombe and others was raging
were too remote to be of any concern to the Protectorate Government;
and at any rate the metropolitan British Government in London was
taking care of them. Hence for the Protectorate Government the
refugees constituted the nub of the Congo problem, and policy was
geared to giving them access into Uganda and to catering for them
in accordance with the provisions of the Alien Refugees Ordinance
of 1960.

Unlike the Sudanese refugees, the refugees from the Congo
were not Congolese nationals; it was Belgium that had dealings on
their behalf with the Uganda Protectorate Government. Accordingly,
they did not pose for Uganda that complication which the Sudanese
refugees were posing -- the white refugees from the Congo
did not attempt to fight their way back

into the country from which they had fled. However, although this
particular complication was non-existent on the Congo side at this
time, the political disorder and confusion on the Congo side produced
in Uganda that normal reaction one expects to find in a country
bordering out another one with internal chaos. Uganda became con-
cerned about the dangers to its inhabitants and the possibility of
an overspill of chaos from the Congo onto its own territory.

By the time Uganda attained her independence in October 1962,
the cause of concern to it about the Congo -- the influx of refugees --
had ceased to be a major problem. Although the hold of the recon-
cilliation Government of Cyrille Adoulla over the country was somewhat
tenuous,[7] much of the political turbulence and chaos that had char-
acterised the first two years of the Congo's independence had sub-
sided considerably. The most outstanding problem still left for the
Congo -- the problem of Katanga secession and the military operation
it called for -- were geographically too far to be materially signi-
ficant for Uganda-Congo relations. Hence for the newly independent
Uganda the Congo was as deserving a country as any for normal peace-
time state to state relations.

In March of 1963 a Congolese Mission headed by Adoula's
Minister of Defence, M. Jerome Anany, visited Uganda when many prob-
lems of mutual interest to the two countries were discussed. Two
outstanding outcomes of the mission are worth noting. The first one
was that "the Uganda Government in the interests of good neighbourly
relations and as a gesture of African solidarity, was to provide
during the next six months food supplies for the Congo Army worth
about £10,000 or 2,000,000 Congo francs."[8] The second outcome of the
mission was that Uganda and the Congo were to establish formal diplo-
matic relations at embassy level in order to strengthen friendly re-
lations between the two countries.[9] The newly independent Uganda
was engaged in consolidating friendship with both the Congo and the
Sudan. In the month that the Congolese mission visited Uganda, the
Uganda Prime Minister made a very successful visit to the Sudan,
where he was given a very warm reception by the Abboud Government.[10]

The foundations of this incipient friendship between the two
countries were to be very seriously shaken by the resurgence of
political and military strife in the Congo in 1964. The story of
this new phase in the Congo's independent history has been very ably
narrated by scholars like Crawford Young and in the Centre de
Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (CRISP) studies.[11]

Mounting dissatisfaction with the Adoula Government among some
Congolese politicians began to take the form of military struggle
to oust the regime by about the second half of 1963. In Kwilu
Province Pierre Mulele was organising the villagers into military
bands to harrass the Administration and in Brazzaville a number of
anti-Adoula politicians had come together to form the National
Council of Liberation (CNL) which also began to make raids into the
Congo (Leo).[12] All these were however too remote geographically to
have any impact on Uganda-Congo relations.

Tshombe's assumption of power in Leopoldville in July, 1964
and the capture of Stanleyville in August of the same year by the
anti-Central Government forces added new dimensions to the Congolese
problem as perceived by Uganda and other African countries. The in-
surrections started during the Adoula regime; and Adoula was a man
accepted by all the African countries as a genuine and legitimate
leader of the Congo; hence little overt sympathy, if any, was given
by any African country to the anti-central government forces, except
possibly Congo-Brazzaville which harboured the National Council of
Liberation.[13] With Tshombe at the helm, however, African indifference
was quickly muted into consternation, anger and sympathy for the
forces fighting against the Leopoldville regime. Uganda's policy
reaction was dualistic.

The openly professed policy of the Uganda Government which
appeared both in the Press and in debates in the Uganda Parliament
was clearly stated to Parliament by the (then) President in his
annual communication from the chair in November 1964. According to
his statement the elements of this policy were: a) to support and
work closely with the Organisation of African Unity Special Recon-
ciliation Commission on the Congo to find a political solution for
the Congo problem; b) to oppose foreign intervention c) to work
for the withdrawal of mercenaries d) to urge both sides to stop
fighting and e) to assist the Congolese leaders to find a political
solution to the problem through peaceful means.[14] A number of op-
position as well as government members of the National Assembly,
however, felt skeptical about the truth of this stated policy. In
February 1965, following the bombings of two Uganda villages by
Tshombe forces, a Government member, Abu Mayanja, for example,
called the policy "a little ambivalent". Daudi Ocheng, another M.P.,
said: "we do not seem to be clear in our minds as to what our policy
towards the Congo is."[15] Outside the Parliament this skepticism took
the form of active practical work, as it were, to pry into the secrets

of the Government's Congo policy. Members of Parliament visited
West Nile where the Congo disturbances exerted their impact on Uganda;
they consorted with refugees, and, apparently followed Uganda Govern-
ment Army trucks at times to see who and what were in them.[16]

In early 1966, and following the famous Ocheng allegations
against the Government, some of the less known facts about Uganda's
Congo policy became public.[17] The Government, according to the Prime
Minister's evidence before the Judicial Commission of Enquiry, was
advised by a section of the governing party's parliamentary caucus
to recognise the Stanleyville regime of Gbenye, but some members felt
this was going too far. Hence a compromise was reached whereby the
Government, with the party's blessings and those of the other two
East African Governments (Kenya and Tanzania), was to assist the
forces fighting against the Tshombe regime. This assistance took the
form of training of the anti-Tshombe forces by Uganda army personnel
and provision of supplies through Uganda to these forces. This
feature of Uganda's policy toward the Congo seems to be completely
absent in Uganda's Sudan policy.

Another impact of Tshombe's assumption of power was the re-
appearance of the refugee problem. Two sets of refugees poured into
Uganda. As the anti-Tshombe Forces expanded their grip over the
Eastern Congo from their Stanleyville base, followers of the care-
taker government of Tshombe had to flee before them into Uganda and
other neighbouring countries. Later when Tshombe ousted the insur-
gents from their Stanleyville base and continued to clean them out
even from the countryside, it was their turn to come to Uganda also
as refugees. Mr. Okello, the M.P. from the West Nile District of
Uganda which was most affected, described this process and Uganda's
reaction very vividly in a speech in Parliament.

> "....Now, in the Congo, in the beginning the rebels were
> sweeping over the country and the followers of the care-
> taker Government had to flee the country and pour into
> West Nile. At that time no African leader raised his
> voice, despite the fact that they (sic) did not know the
> sources of supply of weapons to these rebels..."

> "....When the tide in the Congo turned and Tshombe's men
> were gaining ground, African leaders immediately condemned
> them and shouted at the top of their voices..."

The first set of refugees - the followers of the Central
Government seemed to have been treated in very much the same way as
the Sudanese refugees under the provisions of the Alien Refugees
Ordinance of 1960. The second set of Congolese refugees constituting

the Anti-Tshombe forces received a different treatment. Evidence
of this abounds. Opposition members of Uganda Parliament, for ex-
ample, talked of Congolese rebels riding in Uganda Army trucks, using
Uganda army uniforms.[18] As is pointed out already, the Prime Minister
was later to confirm that the refugees belonging to the anit-Tshombe
forces were indeed getting privileged hospitality from Uganda and
often also military training and supplies from Uganda.

Tshombe's reaction to this was naturally violent. He refused
to recognise any safe sanctuary for his opponents and brought the
war right onto Uganda's soil. In February of 1965 two Uganda villages
in West Nile, Paidha and Goli, were bombed and a war scare hung over
the two countries. Aside from the bombings, the two border customs
post of Goli and Vurra were overrun by the Tshombe forces. It took
a determined defence by the Uganda army before the mercenaries and
Tshombe's other forces could be rolled back from Uganda's territory.[19]

Uganda's Policy Rationale with Regard to the Congo and Sudan

Uganda Government is often accused of pursuing a differential
policy toward the Congo and the Sudan. Although professing to be no
aligned in the civil wars of the two countries, it has obviously
taken a more sympathetic line in favour of the Congolese who fought
against the Central Congolese authority, than the Sudanese who did
the same. To those whose sympathies lie with the Southern Sudanese,
the Uganda Government's policy seems reprehensible for at least two
reasons.

In the Congo, it was covertly assisting an African rebel force
to topple the authority of a Government which was also African, where-
as in the case of the Sudan it was prepared to accept with equanimity
the rule of an Arab central authority over fellow black Africans in
the south. Secondly, whereas both in the Sudan and in Congo, the
so-called rebels were resisting the central authority, in the Sudan
they were fighting for their more fundamental rights as human beings
who asked to be treated with at least as much respect for their
languages and religion as enjoyed by the Arabs in the north. In
the Congo they were fighting more because of their disagreement with
the system of Government in Leopoldville and their political aversion
to one or two characters - like Tshombe - who occupied the seat of
Government. It is at least defensible on moral grounds to argue that
if the Uganda Government were to spare sympathies for anybody at all
they should spare them for those who were fighting for their basic

human rights than for those who were fighting to change the character and composition of a regime.

It was not simply the Southern Sudanese who, out of frustration or disillusionment, complained about the apparent dualism in Uganda Government's attitude toward the Congolese and themselves. Some members in the Uganda Parliament also felt the same. They were disturbed not only by the apparent lack of sympathy of the Government for the Southern Sudanese, but also the apparent inability of the Government to take strong action against the Khartoum Government consequent upon frequent violations of the territorial integrity of Uganda by the Sudanese forces, whereas the same Government had made vitriolic verbal attacks on the Tshombe Government of the Congo following the 1965 incidents at Goli and Paidha. A motion of censure introduced by the Opposition in the Uganda National Assembly in January 1966 expressed "the deepest regret for the silence Uganda Government has displayed over the frequent violations by the Sudanese troops of our territorial integrity."[20] Of weakness in dealing with similar violations of territorial integrity by the Congolese troops, the Government has never been accused.

The above accusation could perhaps be dismissed as unfair. Violations of territorial integrity that occurred as a result of troops in hot pursuit of fleeing refugees over poorly demarcated 450 miles of Uganda-Sudan borders could not possibly call for the same degree of protest as the actual bombing by Tshombe's planes of villages right inside the Uganda territorial bounds. Besides the Uganda Government had in fact protested to the Sudan Government every time the Sudanese troops had committed violations of Uganda's territorial integrity, and every time the Khartoum Government had either apologised, or apologised and paid damages.[21]

But then what about the charges and Government confession that the Uganda Government had actually gone out of its way materially to support and to train Congolese rebels who fought with the central authority? If the Government could justify this intervention in Congolese affairs, they could equally well justify intervention in the seemingly more deserving case of the Southern Sudanese. If the justification for intervention in the Congo were to be based on the argument that the Congo question was not purely a domestic matter for Congo since it overspilled the boundaries into Uganda, then the same argument could be employed to deny the essentially domestic character of the Sudan problem as well.

The Uganda Government had argued that it could not interfere in the Sudanese question because it was bound by the Charter of the C.A.U. to respect the sovereignty of neighbouring African states.[22] By the same token then the Uganda Government should have refrained from interfering in the affairs of the Congo as well.

What can the Uganda Government say in its defence? It could argue that its policies with regard to Congo and the Sudan were really the same. Both in the Congo and in the Sudan, the Uganda Government wished to see stable governments that recognised the integrity of their states. It could not possibly support a secessionist movement in the Sudan, while at home it was itself deeply involved in preserving Uganda's political and territorial integrity from possible secessionist movements from certain areas. But Uganda had the same policy toward Congo and Sudan not only from the perspective of the objective of maintaining territorial unity of the two states, but it had also the same policy with regards to the tactics to be employed in pursuing the objective of unity. It had advised both the Sudan Government and the Congo Government that a military solution to their problems was no solution.[23] The only way to bring about an acceptable solution was for the parties to come together and reach a settlement by negotiation. In the case of the Congo, Uganda had supported the C.A.U. Conciliation Commission headed by President Kenyatta. In the Sudan, Uganda had taken a still more positive line of promoting the Khartoum Conference of March 1965, and sitting in its deliberations as a mediator.

But this still does not explain why Uganda should have assisted the Congolese rebels against the central authority, for surely, it could be argued that that was the way to destroy Congolese unity, not preserve it. Besides, whatever the Uganda Government's views on which type of Government in the Congo was most conducive to preserve its unity, how could it, having accepted the non-interventionist principles of the C.A.U. Charter, justify its interventions in the Congo?

One answer to the above could be that the so-called interventions were not really interventions, for Uganda, as a sovereign state, could do what it liked within its own boundaries. This is not an easily defensible argument, however, since Uganda is a party to a convention that specifically prohibits states to allow their territory to be used as a base for operations against another state. It has been shown above that Uganda was, in fact, training

the Congolese rebels in Uganda territory so that these could go
back and fight the central Government troops of the Congo.[24]

The other justification for Uganda's interventions must then
be that the situation in the Congo under Tshombe's regime was so
exceptional as to absolve Uganda of the non-interventionist restric-
tion. In other words, if the Congo had a Government other than
Tshombe's, Uganda would have scrupulously maintained a policy of
non-intervention. Just as in the case of the Sudan. The Sudan had
a government which was at least local. Even if its legitimacy was
questioned by the Southern Sudanese, and in the case of the Abboud
Government even by the northern Sudanese, it was never a government
that was imposed by an outside imperial power. Tshombe's government
was a "stooge" government which sought assistance from the Americans
and the mercenaries to put down nationalist revolutions in other
parts of the Congo who sought to remove such vestiges of colonial
rule that still remained in the Congo. This view was extensively
aired in the debates in Uganda's Parliament following the bombings
of Uganda villages by Tshombe's forces in February 1965.[25]

In the Sudan, both the Khartoum Government and the Southern
Sudanese could, in a sense, be described as "nationalists." Only
they were nationalists who had different conceptions of what was
good for the Sudan. Uganda Government could take no posture other
than a neutral one between the two groups of nationalists in the
Sudan. In the Congo, on the other hand, the Tshombe Government
could not be described as a "nationalist" Government. "Anybody who
uses mercenaries," declared Uganda Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Sam Odaka, "anybody who uses South African mercenaries, or
fraternises with them, is not a nationalist."[26] Gbenye, the leader
of the so-called "rebels," was the real nationalist. "Regarding
Gbenye," the then Prime Minister Milton Obote testified before the
Uganda National Assembly, "we in Uganda cannot call this man a rebel.
How do we prove that he is a rebel?"[27] When the East African leaders,
Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere met Gbenye in Mbale in January 1965,
they considered themselves in conference with a nationalist from
the Congo, not a rebel.

But does this justify Uganda's action in helping the Gbenye
nationalists? To a set of African nationalists and Pan-Africanists
the answer to this question is an easy 'Yes'. Uganda and all those
committed to removing colonialism and neo-colonialism from the
African soil were indeed obliged to do something concrete to help
the Congolese nationalists who were fighting a losing battle against

imperialists and mercenaries. Was it not the American-Belgian
Stanleyville operation against the nationalists in November 1964
that had sabotaged the working of the O.A.U. Conciliation Commission
headed by Kenyatta? Obote said:

> "I have talked to Gbenye; he is prepared to sit round a
> table now, but Tshombe is not prepared. Why? Because he
> is receiving arms. He is receiving assistance and that
> assistance has frustrated even the O.A.U..... The O.A.U.
> Ad Hoc Commission headed by the President of Kenya
> cannot now move ahead because Tshombe feels that after
> the fall of Stanleyville, what is the need of sitting
> with the O.A.U. Commission."[28]

It is un-African to sit idly by and see the Congolese nat-
ionalists get defeated by a "stooge" government shored up by
assistance from the Americans and South African mercenaries. At
least the Sudan Government did not have to employ mercenaries. "How
many White mercenaries are there in the Sudan? How many white mer-
cenaries are there in Rwanda?" asked Sam Odaka rhetorically to his
Opposition benches in the National Assembly.

It is true that the Sudan problem was a serious one, and dis-
turbed the peace of the area. Uganda was therefore concerned that
it should be settled by peaceful negotiation between the parties.
But Uganda could not really support the secessionist movement in
Southern Sudan in a situation when the dire need in Africa was to
check a re-balkanisation of Africa on tribal and ethnic lines. If
Uganda supported the Southern Sudan, she would then be called upon
probably to support also the separatist demands of the somalis in
the neighbouring state of Kenya, and probably other similar demands
in the continent. Again Uganda was not unsympathetic to the suffer-
ings of the southern Sudanese. But they could not expect to get
support from Uganda by invoking the ideas of racialism.

> "We are in a predicament where we cannot denounce racialism
> in Southern Africa and support it when it comes to Southern
> Sudan,"[29] declared Sam Odaka.

It is also true that the Sudan problem was a problem for
Uganda because refugees from there spilled into its territory. But
the problem with the Congo was still more serious, for it not only
exported refugees over its borders but could even, if one were not
vigilant, export neo-colonialism over its borders. Once an imperial
power has established a base in one African country, it might spread
outwards. Surely it needed a much more vigorous action against a
state whose neo-colonialism spilled over its boundaries than a state

whose refugees only spilled over the boundaries. Both the Congo and
the Sudan were sick societies, and Uganda was compelled to immunise
itself from the possible contagious spread of neo-colonialism of one
state, and of the movement toward secession of the other. If Uganda's
posture toward the Congo and the Sudan appeared different, it was
only because of an incidental short-lived aberration in the Congo
policy occasioned by the emotional repugnancy that Uganda-- like many
other African countries -- felt and feel toward Tshombe and his
foreign friends.

Concluding Observations

The situation dominating Uganda-Congo relations and Uganda-
Sudan relations as we have examined them above are for Uganda not
confined only to her borders with these two countries — in the South
West on her border with Rwanda a similar situation is to be found.
In the North East on her border with Kenya the situation is not
quite the same — in that it is not political -- but the border here
is as turbulent and as much in need of watching as those separating
Uganda from Rwanda, the Congo and the Sudan. For Uganda such trouble-
lined borders, as our analysis may have hopefully shown, give rise
to some very serious implications.

In the first place they make it imperative for Uganda to main-
tain and build strong security forces, particularly the army; and
this is what the last two or so years of her relations with the
Sudan and the Congo have in fact done. Large contingents of her
troops have to keep surveilling these borders and it has been found
that the single battallion that once served the Protectorate Govern-
ment is no longer adequate for this task. Getting away from the
military aspect of such relations, the kind of border that Uganda
has with the Congo and the Sudan will for some time continue to
stifle such aspects of peaceful relations as trade and communication
between Uganda and both of these countries. The psychological fear
associated with the borders of these countries is at least at the
moment not at all conducive to the movement of trade and people.
This is of course very unfortunate for Uganda which stands to gain
a lot by peaceful relations and trade from these two large countries
which in their portions touching Uganda are relatively underdeveloped
and therefore open to be exploited commercially by Ugandan business.

Finally, it should be noted that the problem facing Uganda
with regard to these two countries is not unique to her in Africa.
Other countries surrounding these two countries have experienced
the same problem. This is a problem characterised not only by the
difficulties arising from the influx of refugees and the concern
for a bordering country's territorial integrity, but also by a big
difficulty of choice in foreign policy. The kind of situation in
the Sudan and in the Congo confronts a neighbouring country with a
very dangerous dilemma - namely to remain on good terms with the
Central Government against which dissidents are fighting or to re-
main on good terms with the refugee dissidents. As the case of the
Sudan and the Congo have perhaps shown, either choice is risky.
Uganda has been on fairly good terms with the Sudan Central Govern-
ment but in so being she has earned the anger of the Southern
Sudanese refugees who have at times chosen to vent their anger on
Ugandan territory. In the Congo case she opted secretly to remain
on good terms with the dissidents fighting against Tshombe's
Central Government and in return earned the wrath of that Government.

The tragedy in this for all of Africa is that the likelihood
of developments in many other African countries similar to those in
the Sudan and the Congo are not entirely remote. Already we have
the case of Kenya and her Northern Frontier District confronting the
Somali Republic with the dilemma mentioned above. A similar situa-
tion is budding in Nigeria where the East has been heard to talk of
secession unless an acceptable constitutional formula is found.
The rise of such situations is a cause of great concern to neigh-
bouring states and a threat to peaceful African interstate relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hansard, National Assembly, 2nd Session, 4th meeting (20th March, 1964), p.1450-51.

2. Speech from the Chair by the Governor, Hansard, 17th May 1962, p. 285.

3. Weekly News, 8 November, 1963, p.17.

4. Uganda Argus, 4 November, 1966, p.1.

5. E.A. Reporter, 8 April, 1966, p.14.

6. Hansard, Volume 56, p.469-70 (13 January 1966).

7. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 345.

8. Uganda Argus, March 6, 1963, p.1.

9. Uganda Argus, March 5, 1963, p.1.

10. Uganda Argus, March 11, 1963.

11. Crawford Young, Op.Cit.; and for the CRISP works, see for example, Etudes Congolaises Jan.-Feb. 1965 - "La deuxième indépendence".

12. Crawford Young, Op.cit. p.583.

13. Crawford Young, Op. cit. p.586.

14. Hansard, Vol. 36.

15. Hansard, Vol. 39 (Mayanja p.650) (Ocheng p.660).

16. Latim's evidence before the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the Ocheng' allegations. Uganda Argus, March 16, 1966. p.3.

17. Uganda Argus, March 26, 1966.

18. Latim's evidence before the Judicial Commission of Enquiry.

19. Much of this information has been collected by one of the authors from interviews.

20. Hansard, Vol. 57, Motion before the National Assembly on 21.1.1966.

21. Sam Odaka, Hansard, 21 January, 1966, p.707-708.

22. See Nekyon's speech, Hansard, 20 March, 1964, p. 1487-88.

23. See Odaka's speech, Hansard, 15 February, 1965, pp.664-665.

24. Prime Minister's Evidence before the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the Ocheng allegations, Argus, March 26, 1966.

25.   See Hansard, Vol. 39.

26.   Hansard, 15 February 1965, page 667.

27.   Hansard, 15 February 1965, page 671.

28.   Hansard, 15 February 1965, page 672.

29.   Hansard, 21 January, 1966, page 710.

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EDUCATING CITIZENS FOR TANZANIA   PS3-3

1

For more than a century Africans living in what is now Tanzania
have been exposed--increasingly as the years have passed--to the values,
customs, and scientific knowledge of the Western and, to a lesser extent,
Eastern worlds. Of the many channels of transmission, certainly one of the
most important has been the growing network of institutions imparting
formal, predominately literary education to children. Introduced by
Christian missionaries and later supported and regulated by colonial
governments, schools and colleges based largely on European models have
gradually displaced tribal, clan, and even family educational systems
as the chief means of preparing a sizeable proportion of the youth of
the country for adulthood. When independence came, the TANU government
found itself on the horns of a dilemma: it became responsible for a system
of formal education that was playing an important role in the social-
ization of the young and, indeed, had been an important factor in the growth
of nationalism, but which was ill-adapted--despite a few well-intentioned
experimental innovations by the colonial government--to the processes
of economic development, social change, and political mobilization and
integration.

Time does not permit an analysis of the interplay of historical
factors from which the dilemma arose; that task will be undertaken in
a thesis devoted to an examination of mainland Tanzania's attempts to
transform institutional structures for the education of children from
a colonial orientation to one more relevant to the needs of nation-
building. The more limited purpose of this paper is to discuss the role
of one component of the educational and socialization system, formal
primary and secondary education, in producing future generations of
citizens. The comments are tentative and based on impressions rather
than systematic analysis of the data that have been collected for the
larger study.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the central theme, it should
be noted that some of the more obvious deficiencies of colonial formal
education have been tackled over the course of the last few years.
Soon after the victory of TANU in the elections of 1957 and 1958, ex-
patriate administrators--driven by the demands of African nationalists,
pressures from abroad, and the realization that independence would not
be long delayed--paved the way for sweeping changes. From their endeavours
emerged programmes, designed in part through consultation with future
leaders of the country, to unify four educational systems divided by race
and several sub-systems split by religion, to create a single non-
discriminatory teaching service, to expand secondary and higher education
in order to satisfy the demand for high-level African manpower to fill
the growing number of government jobs, and to center the curriculum on
the study of Tanzania and Africa rather than on that of Britain and the
Commonwealth. Much progress has been made on all these fronts in the
past five years, during which the Government has taken further important
steps such as the abolition of secondary school fees to enable the most
capable students to proceed through their education towards the pool of
skilled manpower required for development purposes. Meanwhile adminis-
trative measures devolved more responsibility for primary level education
upon local authorities, placed Africans in the headships of most post-
primary institutions, and created a Ministry of Education organized
centrally on functional lines, equipped with a Planning Section, and
staffed both at headquarters and in the field by a preponderance of
citizens.

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1 The name Tanzania is used throughout the paper, but refers only to
   that part of the United Republic formerly called Tanganyika.

The record of achievement has been impressive in many areas, but is formal education performing functionally towards the fulfillment of goals and aspirations prescribed for the nation by the President and other national leaders? Two political crises of 1966, both generated by forces that lie partly outside the schools and colleges, have exposed the educational system to the criticism that it is failing to produce citizens with the attitudes and skills needed for development at economic, social and political levels. The first sprang from mass discontent about the failure to obtain either places for further education or paid employment of a much larger group of primary school leavers than ever before; the second from the demonstration by students of post-secondary institutions against the terms under which they were to be inducted into the National Service and from the ultimatum of their leaders threatening passive resistance if their own terms were not accepted. These overt manifestations of tension within the political system were symptoms of a malaise found in many developing areas and which elsewhere has led to much more violent upheavals within the social order.

In the industrialised countries of Europe and America, formal education, although undoubtedly acting as a catalyst for innovation, spread with, and in some cases followed, economic development; in Tanzania, as throughout most of the Afro-Asian world, education has preceded, and is being consciously used to stimulate, socio-economic change. In the early colonial days school attendance and success in examinations enabled an individual to raise the standard of living of his extended family and to escape himself from the poverty of subsistence agriculture to the amenities provided by a clerical or teaching post. However, as the facilities for full primary level education grew in the last years of imperial rule and during the era of independence, there was neither a proportionate expansion of economic opportunities outside the agricultural sector nor a coherent workable programme to make schools relevant for the rural environment. Meanwhile, with the arrival of uhuru and the development of projects to stimulate economic growth, the chances for a select minority of individuals to advance themselves grew markedly. Formal education, while reaching only approximately fifty per cent of the school age population, was alienating an increasingly large minority of children from undertaking agricultural activities, yet only giving to a few opportunities that would lead to jobs paying salaries between twenty and forty times the per capita income of the country.

At the heart of this problem lies an intense conflict of aims: the nation's leaders desire to create at one and the same time the conditions necessary for an egalitarian socialist society and a rapidly developing economy. The latter goal, because it cannot be achieved at a uniform rate throughout all economic sectors and geographical regions, accentuates inequalities in its furtherance. If it could be attained under tight state control, it could lead eventually to a general levelling in an upward direction of material standards, but in Tanzania the state has not, at least at present, the resources at its command to proceed single-handedly. The only alternative to the present type of development programme would be abandonment of a strategy for growth in favour of a policy of relative economic stagnation accompanied by a drastic levelling down of standards towards the lowest common denominator.

The educational system, which has tended to exacerbate the conflict
between these goals, is one tool the government has at its disposal to
lessen the tension and to effect a partial reconciliation of them.
Through actions and statements, national leaders have demonstrated that
they wish to bring about among children and parents a closer approxima-
tion between their expectations from education and the opportunities
the economic realities of the country can provide. They have also shown
that they wish to inculcate in young people, especially those who are
fortunate enough to obtain a formal education beyond the primary level,
attitudes of responsibility towards, identification with, and commitment
to the nation. The studies of the role of East African primary and second-
ary schools in the process of political socialization by Prewitt, Von
der Muhll, and Koff should render data on the extent to which these
attitudes already exist; but the cruder index of events suggests that
there is much left to be done. Manpower planning is crucial to a
developing country through its attempt to make the most efficient use of
scarce human and financial resources, but it serves only to train and
allocate bodies, not to develop minds. Let us look now at the formal
educational system to see where it is failing and what it could accomplish
towards producing citizens for the type of social order Tanzania is
trying to create.

One of the gloomiest factors that must be examined is the inegali-
tarian nature of education, particularly distressing because there is no
prospect of changing it until that far-off date when the economy will
be able to sustain growth sufficient to provide an educational system
for all. By that time it may be too late to break down a class system
whose origins will have come from educational privilege.

Inequality of opportunity exists at the very base of the system,
the Standard I level. Although the exact proportion of school age children
entering the first class will not be known until the forthcoming census
is taken, it may well be less than the government estimate of fifty to
fifty-five per cent. The means of selection vary from area to area,
but for the most part entry into a stream of forty-five is given by
teachers--assisted by representatives of parents--on a first-come, first-
served basis to children ranging in age from nine down to seven. In
Kilimanjaro, where pressure is intense despite a higher proportion of
available places than elsewhere, many children go first to kindergartens
staffed by voluntary untrained teachers and are required to take a simple
oral test based on knowledge and numeracy to gain admittance. Basically,
entry is determined by luck or parents' ingenuity.

Limited economic and technical resources and more pressing priorities
decree that rapid expansion cannot ensue without placing a drastic strain
on the system that could well lead to a drop in standards so great that
the educational process would collapse. Given the political pressure
from parents disgruntled by lack of opportunities and others understand-
ably resentful of the exclusive nature of education, it is remarkable
that the government has been able to stem the growth of schools, most
notably since the Five Year Plan was inaugurated in 1964. Apart from
a few new grant-aided streams sanctioned each year to enable the pro-
portion of children in schools to remain roughly constant as population
grows, no local authority, voluntary agency, or community is allowed to

start a class unless it can guarantee the payment of recurrent costs indefinitely.

Thus, this basic inequality will remain a feature of the system for a long time, and nothing much can be done to alleviate it. However, the government is working slowly towards the provision of a full seven year course for all who are fortunate enough to enter Standard I. Examinations of dubious validity written in the fourth year of school, sent home seventy-nine per cent of children in 1961 and approximately only fifty per cent in 1965. This process means, nevertheless, that a growing number of children are competing for secondary school places, which in turn must remain limited if there is not to be a wastage of scarce resources and the creation of yet another social problem with respect to Form IV leavers.

The primary school has become the scene of intense competition, which is antagonistic to the formation of an attitude of social responsibility, so important to the inculcation of other values national leaders wish to instill in the young. Fortunately there are solutions to this problem other than breaking the bottle-neck at FormI. Obviously one approach lies in the production of a curriculum that is more closely identified with the needs of the country. During the colonial era, missionaries and officials made several attempts to move away from a theoretical 'bookish' course of study to one they perceived as being more relevant for the African setting. Both early efforts to adapt Western schools to traditional forms of education and later ones to create syllabuses with vocational biases failed, partly because they were based on mistaken premises or faulty organization and partly because they were viewed as cheap tricks to relegate the African to an inferior status and to withhold from him the things the European enjoyed.

When independence came, the TANU government, possessing a legitimacy its predecessor had never won, could have taken steps to remould the curriculum away from its 'white-collar job' orientation. However, the party, which had already succeeded in pressuring the colonial Department of Education to remove the stress laid upon agriculture and handwork in African primary schools and which was committed to giving Africans privileges and amenities long denied them, was hardly in a position to follow such a course of action. Although syllabuses were Africanized (in content if not fully in perspective) in 1963, an important step in fostering identification with the nation and in removing an inferiority complex among future generations, it was not until 1966 that the school leavers crisis forced a re-evaluation of the role the primary school curriculum was playing in producing future citizens who would contribute to national development in all senses.

Subject sub-panels[2]--consisting of administrators, educationalists, and primary school teachers--were selected to review syllabuses, textbooks, and resource materials and to recommend changes in them. Their final reports have not yet been written, but it is clear from their preliminary work that one of the chief aims of the sub-panels is to develop the notion among children that a person's education or job does

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2 These sub-panels are committees of the subject panels of the Institute of Education that have co-opted additional members who are especially concerned with primary school education.

not make him any better or worse than his fellow citizens. If pre-
liminary recommendations are followed through, new courses in geography
and civics will concentrate, among other things, on the problems of
social and economic development and the important roles people in
all walks of life have in solving them. History, instead of a narra-
tive of facts and dates, will become an illustration through the lives
of famous people of some of the attitudes and characteristics it is
felt Tanzanians should possess. After changes are approved, the
next step will be to produce texts and teachers' guides written from
the Tanzanian point of view. Already, some encouragement has been
given to teachers and others to submit manuscripts, but it will
take a long time and a considerable financial investment before really
suitable materials become available.

During the time these initial steps have been taken to remould
the curriculum, politicians and educationalists alike have been
clamouring for a re-introduction of agricultural instruction in
primary schools. In July, the Minister for Education, in a letter
addressed to all teachers, noted that ninety-six per cent of children
who enter Standard I finish their formal education after completing
all or part of the primary school course. Since most of these young
people will have to live and work in rural areas, the primary schools
must play a major role in preparing them to accept farming as their
eventual career. Immediately thereafter, the Primary Schools Panel
of the Institute of Education met to consider the implications of
the Minister's pronouncement. The members decided that the entire
curriculum from Mathematics through to Swahili and English must be
utilized "...to motivate pupils to a healthy attitude towards the
land as a livelihood"; they agreed that the content of agricultural
theory in the general science course would be increased and that
practical farming would be brought back into the timetable.[3]

Many people--as will be shown when responses from a sample of
teachers and others involved in education are tabulated--regard the
re-introduction of agriculture as a panacea for the school leavers
problem. However, a child between the age of ten and fifteen,
physically and psychologically immature and equipped with only
rudimentary concepts of good agricultural techniques, cannot acquire
land for himself let alone clear it for cultivation if it did become
available. Nor can he be expected through his own unaccompanied
efforts to influence his older relatives to change their habits
in relation to cultivation or animal husbandry. Moreover, a forthcom-
ing study will show that there is little positive correlation between
formal education, even when it has involved a significant agricul-
tural content, and farming methods.[4]

Fortunately, the people involved in planning the changes are
under no illusions about the severe limitations they must face.
Their main aim is to raise the status of agriculture as an occupation
in order to induce as many children as possible to accept willingly
the fact that they have no viable alternative. The planners realize
that it is neither desirable nor possible for primary schools to

3 The Institute of Education, "The Re-introduction of Agriculture
  in the Primary School Curriculum", mimeographed, 1966.

4 This conclusion, a preliminary one, has been reached by J.D.
  Heijnen who has been doing research on the relationship between
education and agriculture in Mwanza Region.

train farmers as such; they know that the drudgery of the heavy
agriculture syllabus of the 1950's succeeded more in alienating
young people from the land than in attracting them to it. There
will be difficulties in acquiring land for schools, devising for
them several practical courses suitable to local conditions, and
above all providing them with teachers who have both technical
expertise and sensitivity towards children. Because of these ob-
stacles, the programme will be introduced slowly in stages, begin-
ning in 1967 with two pilot projects in each region.

Still, the whole exercise will be futile unless the revolution
in agriculture is accelerated to the level at which children can
really believe that farming, on a collective or individual basis,
is as satisfying in its social and economic rewards as life and
work in the towns. There is little room for optimism on this point,
apart from the negative aspect that numbers of school leavers are
growing so rapidly that perhaps people will begin to realize that
poverty on the shamba is better than unemployment in an urban slum.
In the short-run, if the schools programme is not to collapse, the
crucial work of the government and other interested parties lies
in extensive follow-up activities for children from the time they
finish school until they reach maturity. Already the Ministry of
Agriculture is drawing up tentative plans to increase the number
of extension workers so that some can be deployed in working among
school leavers and their families. Meanwhile, there is a need to
establish, perhaps within the Ministry of Community Development and
National Culture, a bureau responsible for coordinating and assisting
a great range of agricultural and craft schemes that have sprung
up through the initiative of local leaders, but which tend to die
a quick death in the absence of technical and managerial expertise.
Shortage of Tanzanian manpower will probably necessitate the use
of foreign personnel, mostly volunteers paid by agencies abroad,
for these schemes; if so, it would be wise to select only those
people who have had at least a year's experience in teaching or
government posts.

Another requirement for the success of curriculum developments,
agricultural and general, in changing values and attitudes is good
teaching. Although there are many exceptionally gifted people in
the Tanzanian teaching profession, the majority of primary school
teachers are rather limited in ability and intellectual experience.
Most have had at best eight years primary school education and two
years teacher training, during which they were govern a 'tramline'
course outlining the material and methods they were to follow for
each subject. In the classroom, their approach is teacher- rather
than pupil-centred, making the learning process passive rather than
active; moreover, in the final two years, they teach in a language
that neither they nor the pupils have fully mastered. The result
is that much of what reaches the child is disconnected and unrelated
to his experience. The tendency to rely on rote learning is re-
enforced in the upper standards wherein teachers feel compelled to
orient their approach to the General Entrance Examination because
of several pressures placed upon them: the feeling that results are
the only concrete means by which they can evaluate their progress;

the suspicion that promotions are partly dependent upon the number
of children they can place in post-primary institutions; and the
awareness that parents are solely interested in seeing their children
advance to the next educational plateau.

Much has been written and said about the need for a revolution
in teaching techniques in primary schools. The report of the Binns'
Study Group of 1951 contains several suggestions to make the class-
room experience more lively and relevant to the East African child,
recommendations that were endorsed by the Cambridge Conference on
African Education a year later [5] Since that time, many teachers'
colleges have been attempting to foster change, and, in the post-
independence era, the government has taken the further step of phasing
out the training of Standard VIII leavers. By the end of the current
Five Year Plan, all future primary school teachers will be emerging
after fourteen years of formal education from multi-streamed colleges
staffed by highly qualified citizens and expatriates. Of course, a
major problem confronting these colleges is how to design a cur-
riculum and create an academic and social atmosphere that will
lead not only to an improvement of teaching methods but also to an
appreciation by their students of the role they can play in influ-
encing the minds of future citizens in ways that will best serve the
needs of the country. The task is a particularly difficult one
because many teacher trainees are unwilling recruits to a profes-
sion that for them is the last resort if they are to obtain salaried
jobs. Some of the steps, described below, that are being taken to
re-shape attitudes in secondary schools are being extended to
teachers' colleges, but more thought is required about the impli-
cations of these measures and about the introduction and implementa-
tion of new ones.

Even if the colleges realize a degree of success, the job of
fomenting change when there are already thirteen thousand teachers
in the field is formidable. Several young teachers report that once
in the school environment they find it difficult to persuade their
seniors of the worth of new methods; before long, many revert to
teaching in the way they themselves were instructed at the primary
level. Moreover, they face shortages of materials and teaching aids,
and many of them have neither the initiative nor the desire to spend
time or money on improving the situation.

There are, however, several factors at work to combat these
difficulties; annually, hundreds of serving teachers are taking
upgrading and refresher courses conducted by the Ministry and the
Institute of Education, while thousands more are attending weekend
seminars organized at the local level; the corps of Primary School
Inspectors, whose main function is to offer teachers constructive
advice rather than negative criticism, is expanding: and District
Education Officers, through control of the education accounts of
local authorities, are gradually raising the equipment level of
schools. A further expedient to make the best use of new teachers
would be to have them posted by Ministry and Voluntary Agency of-
ficials to schools either in groups or where the heads are known to
be dynamic and willing to innovate. Such a procedure would undoubtedly

5 Both reports may be found in The Nuffield Foundation and the
  Colonial Office, African Education. Oxford, Oxford University
  Press, 1953.

foster the development of uneven standards in the short-run, but
these are now found anyway. In the long-run, if there is to be an
improvement in the educational system's standard of performance,
the present vicious circle must be broken.

While better methods of stimulating the child to enjoy the
experience of learning can contribute to an orientation away from
viewing the primary school as little more than a means to secure
further education, many people feel that a necessary step in the
process is to diminish the importance of the General Entrance
Examination in selection for Form I through greater reliance than at
present on the testimonials of teachers. Unfortunately, limited
experience with pre-selection has demonstrated that some teachers,
succumbing to their own preferences and to pressures from parents,
have falsified pupils' performance cards. If, on the one hand, it
became generally known that children's cumulative records together
with recommendations were to be the major determinants of further
education, teachers--honest or not--would be exposed to criticisms
from parents, attacks by local political leaders, and possibly
social ostracization and physical assault. If, on the other, the
lessened significance of the examination were not made known to
pupils and parents, children would still regard their chief function
as cramming for results. Thus, in the near future about the best
solution that can be expected is the continuation of the present
system of partial pre-selection followed by test papers for which
the value of cramming is known to be limited. Perhaps later, if
colleges and senior teachers can foster a greater attitude of re-
sponsibility within the teaching profession a more far-reaching
change can be made. Of course, before that time arrives, the govern-
ment and TANU will have to conduct an extensive propaganda campaign
to impress upon parents that teachers are the legitimate authorities
to pass judgment on the educational performance of children.

This last point brings us to a consideration of the need to
re-educate parents about the aims of formal education. Professor
E. B. Castle has written:

> African tribal education was essentially a preparation for life
> in the sense that school education today is no such preparation.
> This training took the form of the type of instruction we associate
> with apprenticeship--working with and watching the skilled
> elder. It was an exercise in participation in which the child's
> whole personality was engaged. It included not only simple
> manual skills but the inculcation of communal values and engage-
> ment in emotionally satisfying ritual activity, song, music,
> rhythm and dance....the old education is not viable today....The
> content of education has changed and must change. But the concept
> of the purpose of education need not change....African tradition
> requires that teaching should no longer be based exclusively
> on the written and spoken word: this view is supported by the
> best modern educational opinion: but many African teachers, and
> particularly African parents and students, demand that it should be
> so based, and they view with suspicion attempts to lift them out
> of the verbal rut. Thus, while African tradition points to a
> most desirable type of education, Africans seem to be demanding

a poor type of education, turning their eyes away from their own
wisdom in an understanding of what constitutes the 'useful.[6]

Considerable misunderstanding arises between schools and the com-
munities they serve. Some is the result of irresponsible behaviour
on the part of teachers, but much of it springs from the fact
that there has been insufficient publicity and explanation about
what schools are trying to accomplish. The degree of success in
persuading parents that educational expansion must await the avail-
ability of money and teachers and in getting them to organize
committees to assist in carrying out some of the external functions
of schools indicates that a broader campaign could bear fruit
provided appeals were couched in terms the people could comprehend.
The programme to re-introduce agriculture is especially likely to
fail unless national TANU leaders can convince their local counter-
parts to promote the scheme actively in the rural areas.

The abolition of primary school fees is a proposal many people
advocate as a means to reduce unrealistic aspirations among parents
and to assist in solving other difficulties as well. The case for
taking such a step is a strong one. A father, in contributing to
the cost of his children's education, feels he is making an invest-
ment that should produce dividends in the form of his son's salary
and his daughter's brideprice. While parents the world over want
something better for their offspring than they have for themselves,
those in Tanzania, where the extended family rather than the state
is the provider of welfare for the old, have a purely economic
motivation as well as this basic one in sending their children to
school. If government--national and local--were to pay the full
cost of primary level education from general revenue, the economic
incentive would not disappear, but parents would suffer less from
a sense of frustration of money wasted when their sons and daughters
are refused the opportunity of further study.

Abolition of fees would also remove ability (or willingness)
to pay--hardly a socialist criterion--as a means of restricting
enrolment. Two examples demonstrate that the present system of
fees remission does not fulfil that function. In August the
Kilimanjaro District Council, facing a serious shortfall in educa-
tional revenue, ordered that all pupils whose fees were outstanding
should go home and remain there until payment was made. Many
children returned after their parents produced the necessary money,
but a few did not, thereby forfeiting their chances for further
education. Those in Standard VII were allowed to sit for the General
Entrance Examination provided their guardians signed a pledge to
pay fees as soon as possible; however, at one school, several pro-
spective candidates missed the examination because they could not
be reached in time. In some other areas of the country, head-
teachers found it difficult, for the first time in years, to fill
all their Standard I and V places because parents claimed that the
secondary school selection process in 1965 demonstrated the futility
of investing cash in an education that in their view led to nothing.

6 E. B. Castle, Growing Up in East Africa, London, Oxford University
   Press, 1966, pp. 199 and 201. (Castle's italics.)

Three objections stand in the way of abolishing fees: first, it is claimed that it would be discriminating against the majority to allow a few youngsters the opportunity of attending the better equipped and staffed English medium schools; second, it is said that fees are an indispensable source of revenue; and third, it is felt that it would be unfair to place the burden of educational costs on the entire adult population when only one half of the country's children receive the benefits.

The first argument is not as serious as it looks since a form of discrimination already exists: parents of Standard I children in a former European school pay forty-two times and in a former Asian school twelve times the ten shillings charged for most Swahili medium schools. The answer would be to retain fees in some of these special schools for the present, while gradually working towards integrating others into the dominant system. The second is more difficult to refute because fees do provide much of the money required for school materials, equipment, and boarding facilities. That they are essential under present financial arrangements can be shown by the experience of some district councils that almost went bankrupt when they temporarily abolished fees for lower primary classes shortly after independence. Nevertheless, if the government became firmly convinced of the potential benefits of abolition, it could re-allocate some of its revenue and persuade local authorities to alter their taxation structures to make up the shortfall. The last objection is an individualist one inherited from colonial days, and could be answered by the government's proclaiming, as it has been with respect to tuition-free secondary schools, the maxim that education serves the whole community. However, those people whose children failed to obtain entry to Standard I could not be convinced of the validity of this principle unless some system of random selection for places is devised. Since it has been impossible to eliminate the influence of political pressures on Form I selection, it is inconceivable that a system based purely on chance, with no consideration of ability, would be politically viable at the primary level. Thus, until economic development permits the establishment of universal primary school education, it will likely be necessary to retain fees in order to mollify the parents of children who are denied the opportunity of formal education.

Whatever techniques can be used to create new attitudes among pupils, teachers, and parents through and towards primary schools are important not only in re-channelling behaviour in directions that are consistent with total national development, but also in bringing a greater degree of relevance to institutions in the next tier of the educational system. For example, a transition at the lower level from learning by rote to learning by activity could help to change the dominant academic atmosphere of secondary schools from one of examination consciousness to one of thought stimulation, provided of course that teachers were prepared and equipped to assist the change. The acceptance of the view that people of all occupations play significant roles in development could raise the status of post-primary institutions biased towards engineering,

agriculture, and commerce. But the really crucial question facing
secondary schools is how to develop an elite that has not a cor-
responding elitist mentality. The Second Vice-President, in his
letter to Members of Parliament and TANU leaders written when the
school leavers crisis was subject to hot debate, touched upon the
dilemma by noting, "All Tanzanians have equal rights, but all cannot
be selected for secondary school education."[7] How is it possible
to prevent a student from developing a sense of superiority when
he succeeds against tremendous odds in securing a secondary school
place? How can this attitude be dampened once he enters an environ-
ment in which the standard of living is usually higher than he has
experienced before, in which he is constantly reminded of the impor-
tance of educated people in fulfilling manpower requirements, and in
which he is exposed to ideas that seem to negate the worth of the
society from which he has emerged? He is unlikely to be convinced
of the validity of the argument that he has merely been lucky,
(although it contains a germ of truth), and it is naive to think that
he will believe claims that he is really no different from his less
fortunate fellows who failed to proceed beyond primary school.
However, attempts can be made to channel his personal ambitions towards
social goals and to make him realize that education not only confers
privileges but also creates obligations. Dr. Nyerere, ever since
he became Chief Minister in 1960, has been talking to students
and calling upon them to recognize their responsibilities to the
community, but it is obvious that exhortation has not been enough.
If change is to come, the educational and social systems must be ad-
apted to foster it.

Again, as at the primary school level, syllabuses have been
altered to remove many of the irrelevancies of colonial education;
however, not as much stress has been laid upon character development,
perhaps because of the necessity to concentrate upon a large body
of technical knowledge that has to be mastered for later life. In
addition, it must be remembered that students are required to meet
certain standards prescribed by the Cambridge Oversea Examinations
syndicate on the basis of courses devised by education authorities
not just in Tanzania but also in Uganda and Kenya.

Although many subjects can be utilized for the crucial process
of making students realize their social obligations through the
stimulation of serious thought among them about the problems facing
their country, the greatest potential lies in civics courses. At
present, Form II history is devoted to a study of the economy and
political institutions of Tanzania. Unfortunately, it has often
been thrust upon expatriates who, while they may have the best
intentions, have limited knowledge of the country and scanty access
to materials that would expand it. Moreover, they find they must
be extremely careful not to alienate African students who resent
outsiders telling them what is best for their own country, even if
what is said is fully in accord with government policy. While the
sensitive nature of civics makes it a subject that should be taught
by citizens as soon as possible, a good textbook in the hands of
students and any competent teacher could contribute to enlivening
a subject that has tended to center upon a dry formalistic approach

7 R. M. Kawawa, "To Educate the Nation", open letter to Members
   of Parliament and TANU leaders, 2 February, 1966, Ministry
   of Information and Tourism, mimeographed.

to institutional frameworks and theoretical functions. Father
Meienberg's Tanzanian Citizen has been rejected as unsuitable, but
there are good prospects for the publication of a more satisfactory
book next year.

An experiment in giving a class in current affairs for Form IV,
initiated by the Headmistress of Tabora Girls' School, has been
extended to all secondary schools. The head or senior citizen
on the staff meets students once a week to discuss with them current
economic, social, and political developments; together, they try
to place them in the perspective of past trends and to relate them
to the problems of Tanzania. Some headmasters feel they have made
considerable progress in stimulating thought and developing the
faculty of intelligent criticism; others, however, complain that
they cannot get students interested in topics other than those
that are amenable to superficial political analysis. The annual
Headmasters' Conference could provide a forum for comparing the use
of various formats and teaching methods for this course.

Some of what has been said about primary school teaching applies
to the secondary level as well, but another dimension, to which
allusion has been made, is added through the heavy reliance upon
teachers from Europe, North America, and Asia. One encounters in
Tanzanian secondary schools a continually changing community of
people who come from diverse cultural backgrounds and who have
preferences for different philosophies of education and value sys-
tems. Most of the expatriates--notably the Europeans and Americans--
feel their role is the

essentially technical one of disseminating
knowledge in order to prepare students for examinations. Although
the extent to which moral attitudes, political preferences, and
social prejudices are subtly transmitted and absorbed is difficult
to gauge, it is certainly true that the small minority who arrive
in the country with a mission to convert Tanzanians to their way
of thinking soon realize the futility of that task. Sympathetic
teachers from abroad can assist their African colleagues to relate the
experience of students to the needs of the society in a number of
ways, but the chief burden of overseeing 'political' activities
in which the schools are involved falls upon the citizen staff
members. Since many local teachers find this aspect of their
role a frustrating one to fulfil, a strong case exists for giving
them channels of communication with government and party officials.
A series of seminars involving teacher and TANU participation, even
if deliberations were inconclusive on a general level, could
contribute to the removal of apprehensions on both sides.

The atmosphere of the school society is an important social-
izing medium, but it is difficult to generalize about trends in
Tanzania because so much depends upon the personality of headmasters
and their relationships with staff and students. Many schools,
under the tutelage of both expatriates and citizens, retain author-
itarian and paternalistic strains imported from British grammar

schools and perhaps re-enforced by the mores of African family
life. Others, still maintaining discipline, have become much
freer and more open. Some headmasters regard the cane as the only
answer to unacceptable behaviour, while to others it is anathema.
Patterns of student government lie along a spectrum between a
prefecture system rigidly controlled by teachers to a students'
council elected through a constitution modelled upon the national
one. Money-raising projects vary from ones that stimulate the in-
dividual profit motive through those based on cooperative principles
to those that contribute to the welfare of the house dormitory or
the school. Obviously, all of these factors have an influence on
the minds of students, and need careful analysis to see which of
them are functional to the inculcation of desired values.

In colonial days, many secondary schools were like fortresses
defending themselves from the society that encircled them. Now,
more and more are conducting community development projects, most
notably adult literacy and self-help schemes, in order to develop
attitudes of social responsibility and to emphasize the dignity
of manual labour. Unfortunately in the wrong hands, some of these
attempts to place the schools in close touch with the realities of so-
cial and economic problems have misfired, especially when the
underlying purposes have been obscured. Regarding students as
a pool of free labour without making their experience a relevant
learning one dampens enthusiasm and generates hostility among them.
However, many cases could be cited to show that such projects,
presented so that they can be understood to possess value, can
contribute to fostering desired attitudes within the student body and
to improving the image of the school in the community.

Another innovation has been the policy to promote an identi-
fication between TANU and students by establishing branches of the
TANU Youth League (TYL) in all schools. Again the experience has
been mixed. In one school, the enterprising headmaster completely
integrated TYL with existing activities; in another, the League
was permitted to compete with older organizations with the result
that the student body split into two factions. In response to the
apparent need for a coherent plan, the Second Vice-President's
Office has recently devised a model TYL programme that allocates a
definite set of roles to the school branches, such as the respon-
sibilities for self-help and literacy schemes, traditional dancing
and singing, and local history projects. It will take two to
three years before conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness
of the experiment, but it certainly has the potential of lessening
disaffection on the part of students towards government by giving them
a legitimated channel for venting suggestions and grievances (a
role the defunct National Union of Tanzania Students failed to fulfil)
and providing the party with means to present soundly reasoned
arguments for policies that might otherwise be misunderstood.

This new arrangement, like the National Service, is also
designed to stimulate greater affinity among educated and uneducated
youths by increasing the points of contact between the two groups.
Of course, it is naive to think that intermingling alone will
eliminate mutual antipathy, but a carefully planned programme, for

example of vacation work camps could be utilized so that each
group could learn from the other.

Some of what has been said has applicability to post-secondary
institutions, but it is not within the scope of this paper to
examine their roles in the socialization process. However, it should
be noted that the expulsion of students who demonstrated against
the terms of compulsory National Service has stimulated considerable
thought and controversy about this question, especially within
the University College of Dar es Salaam. The current debate may
lead to the convening of a commission of inquiry or a large-scale
seminar to explore in greater depth some of the problems confronting
higher education in a developing country, but, while steps towards
change may be taken at the apex of the system, reform at the lower
levels is essential.

It will not be easy to produce all the stimulants necessary
for the development of a sense of social obligation and commitment
among school and college students, but one condition outside the
educational system is essential: teachers, politicians, and civil
servants must demonstrate that socialism is more than mere verbiage.
If only a few of them act according to the principles they preach,
cynicism will be the by-product of their endeavours. Effective
implementation of any programme formally designed to change values
demands that those responsible for it reflect the attitudes to be
instilled, not those to be expunged.

In introducing the main section of the paper, mention was
made of the conflict between goals that creates tension within the
educational system. Note has been taken of the role formal education
is, and could be, playing to harmonize these aims more closely;
however, before change occurs too rapidly to reverse, there are
certain questions political leaders must answer. What do the values
of responsibility towards, identification with, and commitment to
the nation involve in concrete terms? They can be defined in several
different ways, and there seems to be no general agreement about
what they mean in the Tanzanian context. Moreover, since they do
not appear to be based on fundamental human instincts, is it really
possible to develop them merely through a more effective utilization
of existing educational structures? If not, what compulsions--
physical and psychological--are required to create a new system?
Finally, if revolutionary changes are made, what will be their
impact on the declared intentions of the government to foster
economic development and political democracy?

5th December, 1966   David Morrison

From Federalism to Neo-Federalism in East Africa *

by Donald Rothchild

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"A Federation of at least Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika should
be comparatively easy to achieve," Tanganyika's President Julius K.
Nyerere wrote in March 1963.   "We already have a common market,
and run many services through the Common Services Organization --
which has its own Central Legislative Assembly and an executive
composed of the Prime Ministers of the three states.   This is the
nucleus from which a Federation is the natural growth."1

Within a year, however, it had become apparent that an East
African federation would not be comparatively easy to establish.
Despite a broad aspiration for African unity, experience following
decolonization shattered hopes of an easy movement toward regional
unification.   A sense of national belongingness and national interest
emerged rapidly after uhuru.   The effects of this outgrowth of
national consciousness upon region-building were great indeed.   So
much energy became consumed by the demands of nation-building that
little remained for such less immediate goals as political federation.
Borders hardened to some extent into barriers and the fluidity of the
colonial period passed.   In East Africa, as in West Africa before it,
federations proved difficult to construct and harder still to maintain.

Nevertheless, because federation is a response to genuine needs,
it seems certain that the desire to found transnational unions will
persist in the years to come.   Economic inducements such as regional
comparative advantage and economies of scale as well as expanded
opportunities for interterritorial projects (electric power and
irrigation systems), a wider financial base, and a more rational
allocation of skilled technicians and managerial personnel are
constants -- even if the benefits apply unequally to prospective
partners.2

Moreover, it is necessary to broaden the balance sheet by
mentioning the wide gamut of non-economic advantages such as
increased aid and investment appeal, international influence and
leverage, and enhanced military capability.   These inducements,
even if sometimes more potential than actual, are not likely to
disappear with the passage of time; instead, success with
industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture as well as
increasing involvement in world politics will make national autarchy
more and more impossible to effect.   Clearly the federation issue
is not dead.   Since closer unity is a logical response to the needs
of long-term stability and development, it is likely to be a
recurrent field for inquiry and experimentation among the modernizing
countries.

* Parts of this essay are adapted from my article, "The Limits of
   Federalism: An Examination of Political Institutional Transfer
   in Africa," which will appear in the Journal of Modern African
   Studies, Vol.4, No.3.

An examination of region-building in Africa is important not only as a case study of supranational activity but also as an analysis of the relationship between political action and constitutionalism. Federation is seen as an essentially political problem, a bargaining situation involving a legitimate play of interests — territorial and interterritorial. As such, the main political participants in the dialogue can advance perfectly logical and rational reasons for joining or not joining a wide geographical union. At heart, however, political motives are viewed as most central in the decision-making process. Perhaps, then, the federation issue is of the very essence of the human condition. Widespread agreement exists in principle on the benefits of transnational unity; yet men seem to be gripped by immobilisme, frequently placing the highest priorities on short-term objectives.

If men fear the unknown and shrink from commitments on a broad scale, logic requires that political analysts search out a variety of alternatives which will reduce integration load factor. It is possible that the plunge into unity can be made less awesome in this manner. Surely where classical federalism fails to satisfy Africa's requirements of stability and development, the investigation of new forms of statecraft is essential. Here is where the political scientists have been lacking in foresight and ingenuity. They have moved behind the events of Africa, offering little insight into the variety of institutional arrangements available for experimentation.

This study seeks to examine both the limited utility of classical federalism under African conditions and the nature of the attempt to innovate and form novel institutional structures. It will show the movement from federalism to neo-federalism not as a failure of will and purpose but as a logical adaptation to the political conditions and pressures of the post-colonial era. Neo-federalism represents the triumph of ingenuity and responsibleness, not the reverse.

<p align="center">* * * * *</p>

How might regional unification to be brought about in Africa? Although "federation" seemed to imply a formula for achieving integration, it actually proved to be not one but many designs. Recognition of the existence in East Africa of strikingly different conceptions of what federation comprises is crucial to an understanding of the breakdown of negotiations on unity in that region during 1963 and 1964. As Colin Leys observes: "what Tanganyika wanted, what the Kenyans were willing and able to agree, and what most people in those countries understood, was not federal government, but unification."3   For the Tanganyikans and Kenyans, regional unity involved "the concept of a tightly constructed federation"4. In fact, Tanganyikans were willing to endure the adverse short-term implications of the existing common market arrangment because they assumed that a "close political federation" would reallocate developmental opportunities to the poorer areas. 5   But for the Ugandans, federation inferred a loose plan of interterritorial coordination. Throughout the negotiations on East African unity, Uganda's representatives strove to limit central authority in such fields as foreign affairs, citizenship, external borrowing, agriculture and animal husbandry, higher education, mines, and trade unions. Thus a fundamental divergence existed in conceptions about the nature of federation; these divergencies contributed substantially to the final collapse of the working party deliberations, for they proved too basic to make compromise feasible.

It should be clear at the outset that if one or more prospective partners conceived of federation in loose structural terms, amalgamation along unitary lines was out of the question — unless its advocates resorted to coercive manipulation to achieve their ends.6   In fact, territorial consciousness developed quickly with independence, leaving all too few nationalists who could espouse President Nyerere's 1962 sentiment expressed in the rhetorical comment: "what is Tanganyika after all — East Africa makes more sense."7 Territorial consciousness combined with a keen

understanding and fear of the strength implicit in a transnational unitary government precluded the adoption of a highly centralized polity. Possible schemes of administrative decentralization within a unitary system were not deemed by all to be sufficient safeguards of territorial interests. Since unitary government implied ultimate central superiority, it was not surprising to find some territorial nationalists resisting subordination and demanding a division of competences which guaranteed a limited but effective autonomy.

Unquestionably unitary government had wide appeal among East Africa's opinion formers. In a positive sense, unitary structures were praised for enhancing swift decision-making, facilitating administration, and contributing to nation-building; in a negative sense, such structures were regarded favorably because of their ability to avoid waste, duplication and overlapping responsibilities. In Kenya, members of the Kenya African National Union rejected majimbo (subregionalism), arguing that it created "conflicting pockets of power;"8 in Uganda, Dr. Obote and his colleagues viewed Buganda's federal relationship with the center under the 1962 constitution as an impediment to unity. When introducing the April 1966 Constitution, Obote made a point of terminating Buganda's entrenched powers under the former basic law and creating a unitary system of government in his country.9 Ironically, the same Dr. Obote who was an ardent exponent of unitary government at the territorial level in 1966 had been an equally ardent proponent of a loose federal system at the supranational level during the 1963/64 deliberations. In acting in this manner, he was consistent in upholding what he saw as Uganda's national interest against the twin forces of Buganda separatism and overcentralization in an East African context.

Even though evoking wide appeal, unitary government was inapplicable to East Africa's circumstances because it lacked the capacity to reconcile the area's stubborn diversities. But could federalism act as a satisfactory alternative? By dividing the power of the state between governments coordinate in nature,10 could federalism provide a workable balancing mechanism between the polar extremes of centralism and separatism? For federalism to be applicable in a given situation, the following five conditions are required:

(1) an adequate, geographically-based diffusion of power;

(2) an ethos favorable toward federalism;

(3) a climate of political tolerance;

(4) a sense of community;

(5) a myth of potential benefit.

Since some African spokesmen looked to federalism as a means of ensuring economic viability while safeguarding subregional or tribal interests, an adequate, geographically-based diffusion of power became a prerequisite to the maintenance of a lasting equilibrium. Such a tensional type of federalism virtually precluded two-unit arrangements, for the security of subregional interests lay in the fluidity of diverse and overlapping relationships. As James Madison observed in his call for federation following the American war of independence: "Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other."11 In Africa as in the United States, enlarging the size of the state, with a resultant increase in social diversity, appealed to many as a means of spreading political power, thereby inhibiting the advent of majoritarian tyranny.

If two-unit federal schemes have been the easiest to negotiate, they have also proved the most difficult to maintain in any kind of equilibrium.   The momentum of politics in the post-decolonization era has revealed centripetal forces which have either succeeded in overwhelming regional authorities or succumbed to them. The first pattern (Uganda-Buganda 12 and Ethiopia-Eritrea relations) led to unitary government; the second pattern, exemplified by the Mali Federation, led to the split up of the supranational arrangement.   In either case what was demonstrated was the fragility of federal arrangements when superimposed on situations where an inadequate diffusion of political power took place on an areal basis.13

In East Africa, the inability of federalism to thwart a central leadership determined to gain hegemony was evident in Uganda.   Prior to independence, Baganda leaders sought to gain ironclad safeguards for their nation within the larger state.   They were keenly aware of the inability of subregional guarantees to protect the Ashanti, their counterparts in Ghana, and insisted, prior to ending talk of secession, upon a full federal relationship between their kingdom and the central government.   A. Milton Obote, the leader of the Opposition in parliament at that time, recognized the need to work out an accommodation with the politically powerful Baganda and, at the London conference in 1961, accepted Buganda's key demands -- federal status and indirect Lukiiko election of its representatives to the National Assembly.   Obote's diplomatic coup brought his Uganda People's Congress (UPC) to power in alliance with Buganda-based Kabaka Yekka (KY).   Such an alliance of diverse -- even antagonistic -- interests could only endure as long as each political party lacked the strength to rule alone.

At the outset, the constitutional and political arrangement seemed to augur well for Baganda interests.   Unlike the Ashanti, who were politically divided and held somewhat flexible attitudes toward innovation and modernization, the Baganda were united, progressive, and strategically located in the heartland of their country.14   Yet even these initial advantages proved incapable of preventing the Obote administration from gaining the upper hand.   In the constitutional sphere, Obote was able to take advantage of his wide discretion under the basic law to refuse to transfer such services as forestry and police to Buganda authorities.   Moreover, conflicts over juridical and fiscal relations were generally resolved in favor of the central government.   In the political sphere, the attraction of being on the government side led to a series of defections from the ranks of KY and the Democratic Party which significantly altered the balance of power in the National Assembly.

By 1964, the UPC had drawn sufficient support from its two opponents to oust KY from the cabinet and rule on its own.   With KY leaders and supporters joining the UPC in significant numbers as well as locked in internal party conflict among themselves, Buganda unity was gravely weakened and the kingdom was left exposed to new pressures in the constitutional sphere.   The final showdown came in 1966 when Obote seized power and suspended the 1962 constitution "to ensure stability, unity and order in the country."15   On April 15, 1966, parliament adopted a new constitution which abrogated Buganda's entrenched privileges under the 1962 basic law and treated the country as a unitary state.   As Obote bluntly told the members of parliament: "there is no federation and there is going to be no federation."16   The Buganda Lukiiko bitterly criticized the new constitution, and, on May 20, passed a resolution calling on the central government to leave Buganda soil within ten days time. This ultimatum, which was signed by Sir Edward Mutesa, was followed by arrests, disturbances, and, finally, the storming of the Kabaka's palace.   Buganda's second secession attempt had failed, confirming, for the moment at least, the unitary nature of Uganda's constitutional system.17

If Uganda's experience suggests the difficulty of applying federalism in situations where only one powerful ethnic group possessed meaningful autonomy within the system, the Mali experience

indicates the fissiparous strains of territorial nationalism upon a
two-unit federation. As originally conceived, the Mali Federation
was to consist of the four territories of the Soudan, Senegal, as of
Dahomey, and Upper Volta.   However combined pressure from France's
de Gaulle and the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny caused the two
weaker members to withdraw.   What was left was a rump federation of
two dissimilar neighbors, the Soudan and Senegal, -- unlike in their
ideologies, attachment to French culture, economic priorities, and
nature of party mobilization and control.   Soudanese and Senegalese
leaders strove realistically to play down the impact of these
differences by providing in their joint constitution for equal
territorial representation in the federal Assembly.   In practice,
moreover, equality of membership on the federal Council of Ministers
was accepted policy, and a balance of interests was implicit in the
choice of Soudan's Modibo Keita as Premier and Senegal's Mamadou Dia
as Vice-President and Minister of Defense.   Nevertheless, such
concessions to territorial interests were of limited utility.   As
William Foltz notes:

> While such an emphasis on representational parity
> could go far to allay fears of either side's being
> systematically exploited by the other, it also
> could decrease the federal government's flexibility
> of action....Equally serious, if a repeated pattern
> of unilateral defection from territorial solidarity
> developed, one side could enjoy a permanent majority
> on all issues. 18

     That this reduction in the load factors of integration was too
limited in the circumstances of a two-unit federation soon became
evident.   In 1960, Senegalese leaders insisted that the parity
principle be applied in working out the division of executive posts
after independence.   When the more radical and centralist-minded
Soudanese refused to support Leopold Senghor's bid for the federal
presidency and thereby failed to allay Senegalese suspicions and
anxieties regarding their role in the future federation, Senghor and
Mamadou Dia organized a military coup which successfully split the
federation into two separate parts.   The first strains of independ-
ence had been sufficient to undo the weak and unproved links between
these two West African territories.

     Federation is poorly adapted to situations where two power
centers are in conflict with one another; however, is it more likely
to endure if applied to an area which includes three or more major
subregional or territorial groups?   To be sure, the greater the
number of powerful groups comprising the union, the greater the
difficulty involved in negotiating the federal agreement.   Neverthe-
less overcoming this difficulty of negotiation may be the price of
avoiding a structural instability which tends toward the extremes
of centralization or separation.

     The diffusion of power along federal lines among three or more
constituent units has been attempted in Nigeria and planned in East
Africa.   The Nigerian and proposed East African experiments seemed,
at the outset at least, to be propitious.   So long as tribal units
could act successfully as centers of countervailing power, 19
Nigeria's federalism, with its four, powerfully-based regional
governments, seemed to offer favorable circumstances for the
maintenance of political pluralism. Nigeria's extensive social
diversity and vigorous party competition buttressed this formal
spreading of power, laying the foundation for an enduring dispersion
of authority within a single state structure.   The growth of
economic and social interdependence, moreover, appeared to augur
well for the political stability of the new state.

     And if the territorial units could be utilized as centers of
countervailing power, East Africa, with its long history of
administrative coordination, possessed objective conditions for unity
as favorable as any in the third world.   Certainly social, cultural,

political and economic differences existed at the time of the June 5
declaration on federation, but they were small compared to those
elsewhere. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda formed a contiguous land mass
area, had been ruled by the same metropolitan power, and had emerged
from colonial rule at roughly similar times.   Their leaders shared
common educational backgrounds and a common pan-Africanist ideology;
moreover their experiences together in operating a joint customs
union, common currency and tariff arrangement, and such inter-
territorial services as railways, posts and harbors, and airways
created links which made its proponents optimistic about the chance
for unity.   There was little reason to doubt the territorial units'
capacity to offer effective resistance to an overweening center,
making a hopeful enterprise of East Africa's supranational experiment
with federalism.

In practice, however, multidimensional federalism has thus far
failed to materialize in Africa since its advocates have been unable
to make a stable and creative adjustment between constituent units,
whether tribal or territorial.   During January 1966, Nigeria's
military abruptly seized power and scuttled the federal system in
the process.   Corruption, the Western Region crisis, the treason
trials, and the trade union strikes have all contributed substantially
to the decline of federalism.   Upon seizing power, Major-General
Aguiyi-Ironsi issued a decree making the regional military governments
responsible to the central military government under his command; he
immediately showed his determination to establish a unitary system
of government by appointing Francis Nwokedi as Commissioner on Special
Duties, charged with establishing an administrative machinery for a
united Nigeria.20   In summary, then, Nigeria's ethnic-based, multi-
dimensional political pluralism may have propped up federal
institutions for a longer period than did the more limited pluralism
of Ghana or Uganda, but in time even Nigeria's social diversity
proved incapable of sustaining a viable federalism.

If Nigeria's ethnic loyalties complicated the task of bringing
about a significant degree of linkage among regional and central
political leaders, East Africa's territorial loyalties proved at
least as difficult to combine into a common polity.   The accession
of all three countries to separate, sovereign independence, as
President Julius Nyerere prophesied in advance of the event,21
created internal political and economic pressures which were
dysfunctional to regional integration.   Nation-building as well as
economic planning and development were soon accorded a higher priority
than supranationalism, a tendency reinforced in the political sphere
by the growth of vested interests and the decline of elite linkage.22
Consequently, even if a three-unit 23 East African federation went
far toward satisfying the first requirement of an adequate,
geographically-based diffusion of power, it has failed, much as has
multidimensional Nigeria, to find a sufficient countrywide consensus
to keep these groups in a stable relationship.   Under such
circumstances, it does not come as a surprise to find both Nigeria
and East Africa pursuing essentially similar alternatives, namely
searching for new transnational arrangements which are looser than
classical federalism in their construction.   In doing this, they
are fully cognizant of the prevailing lack of consensus and they
are moving to reduce integration load factors in an effort to
preserve the most crucial benefits of inter-unit coordination.

The second test of applicability -- an ethos favorable to
federalism -- showed such a system to be lacking in appeal in many
quarters.   As already indicated, a number of important East
Africans, when thinking of federalism, conceived of a highly
centralized polity.   East African negotiations on unity consequently
floundered, for federalist-oriented Uganda refused to surrender
powers to a tightly-constructed supranational state system.

In addition to this basic divergence of conceptions of the
nature of federalism is the attitude of elite groups toward this
form of statecraft.   Quite clearly, federalism evokes little
enthusiasm in Africa as a whole and, as might be anticipated, has

less appeal for the ideologue than for the pragmatist. Its overlaps,
duplications, compromises, excessive legalism, and lack of symmetry
offends the ideologically-oriented person, who seems almost
instinctively to recoil from proposals for federalism, except, perhaps,
at the pan-African level. The outstanding example of this viewpoint
is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who provoked the ire of East African leaders
with his statement that,

> In effect, regional federations are a form of
> balkanization on a grand scale. These may give
> rise to the dangerous interplay not only of power
> politics among African States and the regions,
> but can also create conditions which will enable
> the imperialists and neo-colonialists to fish in
> such troubled waters.24

Nkrumah's avowed hostility to federalism stemmed in large measure from
his bitter battle against Ashanti subregionalist aspirations at the
time of Ghana's independence. He successfully headed off attempts
to place subregionalist restraints upon his own authority and then
went on to raise grave doubts about the utility of federalism else-
where.   Thus he advised Patrice Lumumba against the use of federalism
in the Congo, arguing that it inhibited economic development and was
tainted with "tribalism" and "neo-colonialism."   "...Just at a time
when a strong government is necessary," he argued pragmatically in
support of his general ideological position, "federalism introduces
an element of paralysis into the machinery of State, and slows down
the process of governmental action...."25.   For Nkrumah, such a
loose form of polity as federalism could be justified only at the
pan-Africanist level.

The ideologues explicit rejection of federalism might have been
expected; what did occasion surprise, however, was the pragmatists'
lack of enthusiasm for such a system.   One must distinguish here
between two types of pragmatists: those who viewed federalism as no
more than a transitionary step on the path to unitary government, and
those who saw federalism, much as Nkrumah alleged, as a disguised
form of balkanization.

In Nigeria, Soudan (now Mali), and Uganda, many leaders sought
federalism mainly to ease the transition to unitary rule.   They
recognized that any attempt to impose a unitary system at the time of
independence would result in grave instability, perhaps secession.
Therefore they sought to reduce integration load factors by
compromising on federalism. In doing so, they did not abandon their
preference for unitary government.   Uganda's Obote conceded a
federal relationship to Buganda prior to independence largely to end
the kingdom's secessionist claims; however, with a decline in Buganda
unity and power, he strengthened the center's hegemony and, in 1966,
successfully proposed a new constitution which abrogated Buganda's
entrenched privileges and treated the country as a unitary state.
On the other hand, when Soudanese leaders pressed for a unitary system
"as perfectly logical, indeed historically dictated,"26 the Mali
Federation disintegrated.   And in Nigeria, a number of politicians
linked most intimately with the federal system were to question the
long-range desirability of this type of polity.   "The time may come,"
declared federal Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,
"after understanding one another better, and without one tribe
dominating the other, when we can hope for a unitary form of government,
but not now."27   Federalism was seen as a response to Nigerian
circumstances -- in particular, the nature of Nigerian fears and the
configuration of power within the state 28 -- not a desired end in
itself.   It was considered preferable to disunity, but intrinsically
a second-best.29

Other African pragmatists looked upon federalism as a means of
securing virtually complete subregional autonomy.   Thus Katanga's
Moise Tshombe, motivated as much by parochial political considerations
within Katanga 30 as by the desire to minimize Katanga's fiscal
contributions to the center, advocated a loose form of federalism in

the Congo.   Federal government was not to be a transitionary stage
on the way to unitary forms but a means of dispersing power on a long-
term basis -- in Nkrumah's terms, balkanization in disguise.   As
early as December 1959, Tshombe outlined his party's position on the
future Congo constitution.   He called for the creation of "sovereign"
states which would surrender "a determined part of their sovereignty
to a Federal State."31.   How much power were the states to surrender?
Obviously very little, for Tshombe specified that the competency of
the central government "would be limited to questions of general
interest to the Congo"   and that central authorities would be pro-
hibited from intervening in "interior matters" or in economic affairs,
"except within the limits of co-ordination at the national level." 32
The trend of separatist thinking was thus already set which led
ultimately to the Tananarive conference where a decentralized constit-
ution was considered by Congolese leaders and a subsequent demand by
Tshombe (in the negotiations on the Plan of National Reconciliation)
for "a fully decentralized federation."33   As Prime Minister Cyril
Adoula suggested, such an emphasis on separatism ran counter to the
spirit of cooperation and coordination essential to true federalism.
"If Mr. Tshombe really wants a federal regime," Adoula wrote, " he
must accept all its consequences, including the renunciation of
privileges in the division of foreign currency.   To fix a definite
percentage beforehand is out of the question."34

In sum, Tshombe's conception of the role of federalism contrasted
sharply with those of Obote, Keita, and Balewa, yet the overall effect
of their views was similar.   None of the pragmatists (to say nothing
of the others) were committed to a lasting form of cooperative
federalism, with the result that an ethos favorable to genuine
federalism was lacking.   As a consequence, the federal principle fail-
ed to secure crucial support from the key leaders of Africa -- making
its application in the decolonization era perilously difficult.

The third test of the applicability of federalism, a climate of
tolerance, points up the limits of political institutional transfer.
Federalism is, after all, a system accruing from Western liberal
values.35   Wrenched away from an environment that accepts the
unquestioned worth of political pluralism, constitutionalism, legalism,
and compromise, it tends to operate against an alien and inhospitable
background.   This alienation becomes more poignant when complicated
by third world conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and ethnic separat-
ism.

In fact, political life in the developing lands runs counter to
the kind of environment conducive to stable federalism.   Constitution-
alism and legalism at the modern state level are broadly accepted means
of reconciling interests in the west.   However Africans frequently
look upon them with widespread indifference, seeing them as imports
dangerous to their countries' modernization.   Political pluralism
is considered a virtue in many western countries, but in Africa,
where a consensus on goals and values is often lacking, it is regarded
as a further threat to order and development.36

The political process during and after decolonization, high-
lighted by a remorseless struggle for power between local elites,
complicates the emergence of conciliatory intergroup relations on a
multidimensional basis.   More often than not the parliamentary
system hurriedly thrust upon African states by the departing colonial
power is superseded by a single party or no-party presidential system
which looks most critically at the kind of diffusion of responsibil-
ities implicit in federalism.   This tendency is reinforced by the
great demands implicit in modernization which impose heavy burdens
on federal government.   In earlier times, when federal schemes were
effected in the west, state systems were comparatively stable and
citizens made minimal demands upon their governments; the present-day
welfare state era, however, places enormous strains on federalism,
both in the level of services required and in the nature and extent
of state participation.   The effect of this strain upon region-
building is noted by Ali A.Mazrui, who observes that

> ...socialism can be inherently parochial when it
> is concerned with national planning.   For in the
> concept of planning the preoccupation of socialism
> is with the domestic needs of the individual country
> and with the control of domestic factors of production.
> Therefore, as Tanzania has got more socialistic, it
> has had to become less Pan-African regionally.
> Impatient to be in full command of its home economy,
> it has progressively weakened the East African spirit.37

The effect of these background conditions on federalism can be seen
in the difficulties involved in creating and working federal relation-
ships.   The new leaders, inspired by socialism and convinced that
western-styled constitutionalism hampers the tasks of modernization,
play down the values of western liberalism.   This is not to
criticize their assessment of their countries needs and priorities,
but merely to point out that the effect of these assessments is to
create a climate basically unhealthy for federalism.

In addition, the tensions inherent in the political process
also run counter to the evolution of elite complementarity.   The
demographic artificiality and newness of African states as well as
the evolution of integral nationalism thwart the emergence of the kind
of value framework in which tolerance and diversity flourish.
Consequently, political conflicts are too fundamental in nature,
with elections becoming something akin to "win all, lose all" battles
between adversaries.   It is because these conflicts are so basic
and the stakes so high that single party or no-party control along
centralized lines becomes an accepted feature of political life.

The implications of this for federalism are enormous.   Since
the crucial actors on the political scene tend to be alike in the
manner in which they chafe at institutional or interest group
restraints as well as in their conception of politics as something
approximating a "zero-sum" game,38 little flexibility is left for
such essential requisites of federalism as compromise and tolerance.
Senegalese fears of eclipse in a Mali Federation dominated by
Modibo Keita and his militant, unitary-minded Union Soudanaise led
to a hasty retreat from commitments no longer to their liking.
Somewhat similar anxieties were evident in the discussions over the
proposed East African federation, not only among the Baganda, the
Arabs of Zanzibar, and the spokesmen for the moderately conservative
Kenya African Democratic Union but, more significantly, among such
principals as Prime Minister Obote of Uganda.   Uganda's demand at
the working party meetings for loose federal links was an outward
expression of grave apprehensions.   A comment on this state of mind
was Kenya Minister of State Joseph Murumbi's statement at the
height of the federation debate:

> I feel that in Uganda, we have this difficulty
> of the leadership there fearing they will be
> absorbed into an East African Federation. Some
> of the Uganda leaders feel they might become
> non-entities overnight.39

The fear, as Adoko Nekyon expressed it, of being thrown into
darkness 40 caused Ugandans to craw back from East African
integration, unless unity were hedged about with sufficient
restrictions to ensure broad freedom of action for the constituent
parts.   Obote and his cabinet colleagues recognized fully the
centripetal tendencies in modern federalism as well as the "zero-
sum" gains situation of politics on much of the continent.   Only
conditions which involved considerably reduced load factors --
in particular a climate of tolerance and compromise -- might have
made a plunge into the unknown a decision of less magnitude, and
it is these conditions which were largely lacking in the East
Africa of 1963/64.

A sense of community, the fourth requirement, has all too
frequently been insufficient to the needs of federalism in Africa.

Precisely because there is nothing natural about most of Africa's multi-tribal or proposed multi-territorial states, the building of a sense of community is one of the main challenges that face Africa's new leadership. Nigeria's serious tribal rioting of 1966 underscores the formidable obstacles to such an undertaking; this violence has led to the weakening of inter-unit economic and political links and the repatriation of many hundreds of thousands of people to their region of origin, emphasizing local nationalism at the expense of Nigerian nationalism.41 For reasons already discussed, the new African leadership prefers to create a sense of community by the most direct means at hand. with the consequence that it shies away from such reconciliational institutions as federalism out of a fear that concessions to parochialism will inhibit modernization.42 Under certain circumstances the unitary, one party or no-party systems to which these leaders are attracted are able to foster elite linkage in tribally or regionally compartmentalized states; nevertheless the persistence of such differences in large socially pluralistic states like Nigeria makes some form of decentralized structural mechanism essential, although not necessarily along classical federal lines.

The nature of inter-unit linkage points up the difficulties in the way of forging a sense of community. A combination of the colonial heritage and low levels of economic development has limited transactions between contiguous sovereign states in eastern and western Africa as well as between regions within such large countries as Nigeria and the Congo (Leopoldville). The effects of the colonial heritage, lack of coordinated planning and slow modernization, are evident in many ways: the arbitrary linguistic divisions, the existence of competing and poorly connected road and rail services, the inadequacy of telecommunications ties, and the special subsidy, tariff and commodity agreements between former metropolitan powers and their African associates. Also, because intersectoral flows between African regions are relatively small,43 the coordination of the continent's economic efforts is often accorded a lower priority than the maintenance of access into existing high-priced markets in Europe and North America.

Of course, where a strong sense of community preceded the establishment of common political institutions, the chances of these joint institutions surviving separatist pulls in an area of low social and economic exchange are enhanced. The importance of such a sense of community is illustrated by the cases of Somalia and Cameroon, where irredentist sentiments proved sufficiently strong to unify peoples artificially separated by the chance factors of colonial occupation. But subsequent events elsewhere in Africa have underlined the great extent to which these acts of integration by impulse are special cases indeed.

Finally, the fifth requirement, a myth of potential benefit, is inadequately satisfied in much of Africa. In assessing the benefits of wide territorial integration, leaders have been all too prone to concentrate, statically, upon the existing situation and to pay little heed to the potential for growth. Such an outlook is as paralyzing as it is one-sided. In addition, the nature of interest group activities in Africa, as compared to those in Europe, gives little impetus to federation. Whereas expectations of rising prosperity lead European interest groups to seek increased transnational coordination, their African counterparts often lack this myth of potential benefit 44 arising from wide geographical unification. In the industrial societies of Europe "supranationality and a lively spillover process are able to flourish"45 because pluralism, free enterprise, and a broad economic interdependence create a transnational framework within which the political actors must operate to a very great extent. By comparison, African politicians are much freer to determine whether or not to enter a federation, because interest groups are neither as powerful nor as transnationally oriented as in Europe. In this sense, Uganda's Obote has greater manoeuvreability than France's de Gaulle,46 the former can refrain more easily from committing his country to a

political federation if he concludes that the risks outweigh the anticipated rewards.   And given the politician's full awareness of immediate problems and risks, he is tempted, in setting his priorities, to play down the significance of potential benefits.

* * * * *

Since the federal compromise would seem to have limited utility under post-independence conditions in Africa, it logically follows that constitutional relations will generally have to avoid the reconciliational middle and move to either unitary government or loose inter-unit arrangements.   In the case of unitary systems, the ruling elite's preference for such schemes is a response to its two essential challenges to successful administration: the mainten- ance of national stability and unity and the achievement of modernization.   Strong central leadership is viewed by civilian and military elites alike as a prerequisite for modernization. These men chafe impatiently at subregional limitations upon their authority and reject the conflicts and compromises of federalism as wasteful, disconcerting, and even corrupting.   They seek order and symmetry, national integrity and rapid strides toward industrial- ization.   Quite naturally, then, concessions to tribal and ethnic autonomy are feared as divisive manoeuvres.   And wherever the leaders of the independence period made expedient moves to include subregionalist guarantees in their constitutions in order to speed independence, the men in power of a few years later felt no com- punction about breaking such colonialist-inspired safeguards in the name of higher responsibilities.

The obverse of this drive for unitary forms is the fear of centralized power which these forms engender.   In certain cases, anxieties on the part of traditional or territorial groups have led to the ultimate non-reconciliational extreme of demands for complete autonomy.   But the dangers inhering in such demands were pointed out clearly by Chief Obafemi Awolowo shortly after his release from prison; "the breaking up of Nigeria into a number of sovereign states," he stated, "will not only do permanent damage to the reputation of contemporary Nigerian leaders, but will usher in terrible disasters which will bedevil us and many generations to come."47.   Separatism is the "no-win" course of action for all parties involved in such constitutional disputes.

However, many politicians who took cognizance of local fears of an overweening center sought compromise solutions between the extremes of unitary government and total separation.   Thus the same Lt.-Colonel Yakuba Gowon who ruled out the breakup of Nigeria as "economically and politically suicidal,"48 also ruled out a unitary system as unrealistic under existing circumstances.   "As a result of the recent event and the other previous similar ones," he declared in a nationwide broadcast upon assuming power, "I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time."49

Realism, then, required a search for a compromise in the broad area between the extremes of strong centralization and full autonomy for constituent units.   The extent of the central government's competence would depend upon a number of factors such as the level of inter-unit transactions, the tenacity of the will to union, the strength of parochial apprehensions, the closeness of elite linkage, and so forth.   Supranational associations carried over from previous relationships, bringing with them a history of shared experiences, albeit sometimes painful, may add an impetus to the setting up of more comprehensive and centralized constitutional arrangements.   But the experience of the decade following decolonization makes one point quite evident: these constitutional arrangements must be designed, as far as is practicable, to conform to the basic configurations of power in the area or they are not likely to endure the test of time.   To

miss this point is to tempt grave instability, and perhaps the destruction of the state itself.

At this juncture in history it is possible to analyze the logic behind the trend toward the extremes of unitary government and separatism as well as the reaction, in certain cases, away from these extremes and in the direction of various reconciliational compromises. But it is premature to draw any but the most general conclusions on the nature of the reconciliational models which will be utilizable in modern Africa. As was indicated in the main body of this paper, classical federalism has thus far failed to provide a workable balancing mechanism between the competing claims of parochial and countrywide nationalism. Even in Nigeria, a land of great size and broad diversity of traditional groupings, the protections of federalism proved unavailing. This incapacity to act as a guarantee of subregional interests was in no way lost on Africa's tribal or territorial leaders. They were genuine in their desire for national and international unity, but they were reluctant to pay the price that such unification seemed to entail. Thus while new experiments with classical federalism cannot be precluded especially in Nigeria, the growing awareness of its centripetal implications makes unlikely any large-scale return for the present to experiments with this constitutional form.

But if classical federalism has limited utility, it follows that the urgent need for some type of interterritorial arrangement will have to be met largely by other reconciliational devices. Here it is necessary to point to the creative role that neo-federal arrangements are likely to play in the future. Neo-federalism, an archetype which applies to a wide gamut of supranational relationships which may potentially develop into new forms of federalistic or genuine federal polities, is a useful category for the broad array of transnational institutions emerging in the world today. What Francois Perroux calls "the solidarity of the plurinational infrastructure"50 may be an apt way of describing modern man's answer to the challenge of modernization in an era of mini-nationalism. Surely in today's Africa, to be innovative is only to be realistic.

In neo-federalism, then, we find a creative attempt to preserve the essence of unity in the face of massive centrifugal pressures. In Africa, a number of inter-unit associations exemplify the present-day search for such innovative associations. The French-speaking states of west and equatorial Africa have worked out a number of interterritorial relationships which integrate the sovereign states in a limited way. The Afro-Malagasy Common Organization, successor to the Union Africaine et Malagache, has pursued common political and social as well as economic activities. At the 1966 Heads of State meeting in Tananarive, OCAM statesmen endorsed President Leopold Senghor's inter-African cultural activities and supported studies on the possibilities of a joint insurance company and planning conference. In the past, the OCAM has taken a strong political position on such questions as Ghanaian subversion, participation at the 1965 Accra summit conference, and accommodation with Tshombe's Congo republic. The Central African Economic and Customs Union has progressed slowly in the direction of common developmental policies and fiscal and customs arrangements; significantly, the beginning of construction on a joint oil refinery at Port Gentil, Gabon, was hailed by President Leon Mba as a "brilliant success. . . which may preview this African unity which we all desire."51 Perhaps most significant of all, the Council of the Entente has provided the foundation for economic, social and political cooperation. Although the Entente has no interterritorial institutions, it boasts considerable achievements in joint diplomatic representation, foreign policies, port facilities, railway links, and solidarity funds. The solidarity fund involves a valuable means of redistributing Ivory Coast wealth to the poorer members of the grouping.52 Senegalese Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam's appraisal of the Entente is interesting.

> This is undeniably a flexible type of organization.
> It takes account of certain realities in present-day
> Africa, particularly national realities.   But there
> are weaknesses too in the Conseil de l'Entente.
> Notwithstanding the safeguards written in, certain
> states fear they may become satellites of the Ivory
> Coast.   Moreover there are difficulties in the
> organization of common financial arrangements,
> notably the distribution of the Customs receipts,
> collected at the port of Abidjan, which belong
> jointly to several states.53

Despite these difficulties, the leaders of the Entente states have
spoken most hopefully regarding the future of their grouping.   For
example, the presidents of the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta
jointly declared after a meeting in Upper Volta in December 1964 that
they envisaged "an eventual fusion of their three countries."54

In English-speaking Africa the trend is much the same.   Once
the delegates to the working party on East African federation openly
revealed the extent of their differences, a higher priority was placed
upon strengthening the East African Common Services Organization than
upon political federation as such.55   From this point onward, a
search took place -- and continues to take place -- to find a firm
flooring on which a supranational organization of limited competence
could be established for the long term.   The process of decentralizing
some of the more politically sensitive fields of responsibility has
been disheartening to the observer.   In such areas as currency
coordination, university development, military cooperation, the
encouragement of interterritorial trade, industrial location, and
joint initiatives in attracting tourism, movement has been in the
direction of a weakening of links.   The key question now is whether
the momentum of disintegration can be stopped before running its full
course.   Can the non-essential be jettisoned and the ship of
transnational union be saved with some of its cargo still intact?
If this can be accomplished, the decentralizing process should be
viewed as a creative,or at least a life-preserving, one.56

It is too early to predict whether lasting neo-federal links
can be forged in East Africa.   Many East Africans have come to
pessimistic conclusions, reasoning that the failure of all partners
to ratify the Kampala agreement is a bad omen for the unity of the
region.   Thus Uganda's Shafiq Arain told the November 1966 meeting
of the Central Legislative Assembly that "the Kampala agreement has
been made sheer mockery."   On the basis of this experience, he
predicted "that if there was a way of dividing the Railways and the
Post Office in East Africa we would be doing just that."57

On the brighter side, however, is the serious consideration
East Africans are presently giving both to the Philip Commission's
report on the future of the East African common market and common
services and to the treaty of cooperation between the three countries.
Success in these negotiations will be a victory for neo-federalism.
Indications are that the draft treaty includes major proposals
redefining the role and powers of the East African Central Legislative
Assembly and the EACSO Secretariat, relocating a number of the
constituent section of EACSO in Uganda and Tanzania, moving the EACSO
Secretariat in whole or in part from Nairobi, decentralizing the
University's activities, and setting out a new system of economic
cooperation.58   Provided that agreement can be reached on some such
cooperation and present uncertainty over the future of East African
links can be ended, a quickening of commercial activities can be
anticipated.59

In the case of Nigeria, the constitutional picture is one of
great unpredictability.   At the September 1966 national conference
on Nigeria's future constitution, Lt.-Colonel Gowon said he believed
that the delegates should reject both a unitary system and complete
separation.   He then advanced four possibilities as practicable

courses of action:

      1 A federal system with a strong central government,
      2. A federal system with a weak central government,
      3. Confederation,
      4. An entirely new arrangement peculiar to Nigeria.60

A combination of the latter two categories, envisaging new decentral-
ized constitutional structures, may well fit the broad description
of neo-federalism.   Particularly interesting from this standpoint
is the fourth category, since such an African-inspired initiative
could act as a precedent for other large African states seeking to
harmonize similar deep-seated subregional differences.

    Although the All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference recommended
that Nigeria retain its federal form of government,61 Eastern leaders
resisted a return to the former order.   At the Lagos conference,
Eastern spokesmen proposed that Nigeria should become a confederation
of four largely autonomous regions.   Eastern Nigeria's Military
Governor, Lt.-Colonel Ojukwu, repeatedly denied any wish for secession;
at the same time, however, he asserted that "the factors which make
for a true federation do no longer exist."62   Anti-Ibo violence had
led to a constitutional impasse.   Eastern Nigerians spoke earnestly
of seeking ways and means for ensuring the continued existence of
the "giant of Africa," but their anxieties caused them to shun
Lt.-Colonel Gowon's appeals to return to the October constitutional
conference.   Clearly, unless greater trust emerges at all levels,
the sense of community and inter-reliance intrinsic to federalism
will be lacking, making the adoption of such a constitutional
system difficult indeed.   In that event, a reduction in integration
load factors will become a creative act, for a looser type of state-
form will seem essential to keep the country intact.

    In conclusion, the trend from federalism to neo-federalism in
Africa is not an indication of failure, but a practical adjustment
to the dynamic interplay of forces which were thrust to the surface
at the time of independence.   The proponents of neo-federalist
arrangements may yet demonstrate the way to unity by effecting a
lasting reconciliation between general and particular interests at a
time when the nature of the political process in the third world
makes old formulas suspect.   Perhaps a widespread realization that
integration tactics, even objectives, have shifted and that political
federation is no longer deemed the immediate goal under all circum-
stances may lead to a healthy easing of tensions.   Such a general
relaxation might prove productive over the long pull, allowing men
to build gradually upon an ever increasing functional interdependence.
As Tanganyika's Governor G.S. Symes astutely observed following the
failure of efforts in the 1930's to bring about political closer
union:

        This Government is in complete accord with the
        recommendation of the /‾Joint Select Committee
        on Closer Union in East Africa_7 that the
        several Governments should develop the maximum
        co-operation that can secure the public interest
        and promote efficient and economical management
        of the public services.   In so far as Tanganyika
        is concerned the process of co-operation may
        prove to have been simplified by the decision
        that a political or constitutional union of the
        three Territories is no longer an imminent
        issue.63

Paradoxically, then, the most effective federalists of the present
era may well be those who shun the lures of the political kingdom.
Such an approach may lack drama, but results are what matter most.

FOOTNOTES

1. "A United States of Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies,
    Vol.1, No.1 (March 1963), pp. 5-6.

2. See the discussion in my "East African Federation," Transition,
    Vol. III (January-February, 1964), pp. 39-42, and "A Hope
    Deferred: East African Federation, 1963-64, in "Politics in
    Africa: 7 Cases, ed. by Gwendolen M. Carter (New York: Harcourt,
    Brace & World, 1966), pp. 219-224, and Benton F. Massell, East
    African Economic Union: An Evaluation and Some Implications
    for Policy, Memorandum RM-3880-RC (Santa Monica, California:
    Rand Corporation, 1963), Sect. II.

3. "Recent Relations between the States of East Africa, "International
    Journal, Vol.XX, No. 4 (Autumn, 1965), p. 519. Italics as in
    text.

4. T.J. Mboya, "East African Labour Policy and Federation," in
    Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems, ed. by
    Colin Leys and Peter Robson (Nairobi: Oxford University Press,
    1965), p.103.

5. See the speech by Tanganyika Minister for Development Planning,
    A.Z.N. Swai, in National Assembly Debates (Tanganyika), 7th
    Meeting (June 20, 1963), cols. 695-698.   Such a reallocation
    was favored by Kenya's Murai Kibaki in his article, "Federate-
    Now," Spearhead, Vol.1, No. 5 (March 1962), p.11.

6. On coercive manipulation, see my article, "Force and Consent in
    African Region-Building," Makerere Journal, No.11 (1965), p.28.

7. East African Standard (Nairobi) December 10, 1962, p.1.

8. House of Representatives Debates (Kenya), 1st Session, Vol.1
    (June 27, 1963), col.418.   Statement by Dr. Kiano.

9. National Assembly Debates (Uganda), Second Series, Vol. 59
    (April 15, 1966), pp. 16-18.   For a background discussion on
    Ugandan federalism, see Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin,
    "Uganda", in National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African
    States, ed. by Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University
    Press, 1966), pp. 370-379, and Apolo R. Nsibambi, "Federalism
    in Uganda: Myth or Reality." Unpublished M.A. thesis,
    University of Chicago, 1966.

10. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
    Constitution, 9th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1952), p. 157, and
    K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford
    University Press, 1963), pp. 33-34.

11. The Federalist, No.10 (New York: Random House, Modern Library,
    n.d.), p. 61.   The ideas on Madison's diversity hypothesis
    were worked out with Professor J. David Greenstone.

12. In 1962, full federal status was extended to the western
    kingdoms and Busoga; however when the Western Kingdoms and
    Busoga Act of 1963 was approved by parliament, it became clear
    to all that only Buganda possessed the autonomous functions
    and powers associated with genuine federal status.

13. It must be recognized that territorial and ethnic groups are
    not the only possible basis for pluralist politics in Africa.
    Modern economic interest groups such as trade unions,
    professional associations, cooperatives, and employer
    associations are developing rapidly.   But these groups do not
    at present offer a sufficient basis for a diffusion of political
    power because of their support for the main aims and objectives

of the political élite and because the weakness of their
organizations.

14. For a perceptive comparison of Baganda and Ashanti traditionalism,
    see David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago:
    Chicago University Press, 1965), pp. 100-116.   Ghana's
    experiment with regionalism is analyzed in the following:
    Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford
    University Press, 1964), passim., and my "On the Application
    of the Westminster Model to Ghana," Centennial Review, Vol.1V,
    No. 4 (Fall, 1960), pp. 465-483.

15. Uganda Argus (Kampala), February 25, 1966, p.1.

16. National Assembly Debates (Uganda), Second Series, Vol.59
    (April 15, 1966), p.18.

17. Although the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into a single
    state is an example of successful two-unit integration, it is
    questionable whether this union can be described as federal in
    nature.   The interim constitution is brief and somewhat lacking
    in precision.   It was a hurried document which left authorities
    much freedom to shape its form and meaning.   Supplement to the
    Gazette of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Vol.
    XLV, No. 31 (May 1, 1964), pp. 401-415.   Furthermore, the
    Cameroonian experiment with federalism is of limited relevance
    because centripetal forces have proved overwhelming in that
    country.   Not only have constitutional provisions assured
    central leadership but the most important political parties of
    West Cameroon have now united with single party of the Eastern the
    Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo's Union Camerounais. West
    Africa, October 1, 1966, p. 1111, and Willard R. Johnson,
    "The Cameroon Federation: Political Union Between English-and
    French-Speaking Africa," French-Speaking Africa: The Search
    Identity, William H. Lewis ed., (New York: Walker & Co., 1965),
    pp. 206-211.

18. From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale
    University Press, 1965), p. 162, and "An Early Failure of Pan-
    Africanism: The Mali Federation, 1959-60," in Politics in Africa:
    7 Cases, ed. by Gwendolen M. Carter (New York: Harcourt, Brace
    & World, 1966), p.52.

19. See James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa," in
    The Politics of Developing Areas, Gabriel Almond and James S.
    Coleman, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960),
    p. 368.

20. Sunday Times (Lagos), February 13, 1966, p.1.

21. Julius Nyerere, "Freedom and Unity," Transition, Vol.IV, No.14
    (May-June, 1964), pp. 40-44.   Kwame Nkrumah, when arguing for
    continental integration, makes a similar point about supra-
    national unity.   See his Africa Must Unite (London: Heinemann,
    1963), pp. 214-215, and "Towards African Unity," Spearhead
    (Dar es Salaam), Vol. II, No. 4 (April, 1963), p. 4.

22. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration
    (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 82.

23. As federation became increasingly difficult to negotiate among
    the three East African territories, national spokesmen commented
    at times on the possibility of speeding a limited unification
    by joining two countries only.   See, for example, Uganda Argus
    (Kampala), October 25, 1963, p.1., and "Speech By The Minister
    Of External Affairs, Mr. Oscar Kambona On The East African
    Federation To The National Assembly At the June Sitting," June
    23, 1964, Meetings and Discussions on the Proposed East Africa
    Federation (Dar es Salaam: Information Services of the United
    Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 1964), p. 29.

24. *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 214-215.

25. *Evening News* (Accra), April 19, 1961, p.4.

26. Foltz, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

27. *West Africa*, March 3, 1962, p. 243.

28. On the circumstances involved in the adoption of Nigeria's federal system, see my *Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa* (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), pp. 141-177.

29. Dr. M.I. Okpara, the premier of the Eastern Region, expressed such feelings in 1960. He described the federal system as having many drawbacks (i.e., expense and lack of strength) but at the same time observed that it was "better to have a united country with a federal system of government than to disintegrate. We as a party have not found favour with the federal system of government. We prefer the unitary system where the little tribalist will be eliminated." *Daily Times* (Lagos), March 25, 1960), p.1.

30. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 504, 511. Also see Rene Lemarchand, "The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of Katanga Secession," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (June 1962), pp. 412-416.

31. Informations et Documentation Africaines, *The Federalist Vocation* (Brussels: INDAF, n.d.), pp. 2-3. The Robert Bartlett Collection.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Report to the Secretary-General from the officer-in-charge of the United Nations operation in the Congo on developments relating to the application of the Security Council resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961*, U.N. Doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (November 26, 1962), Annex IX, p.2.

34. *Ibid.*, Annex III, p.3.

35. See the discussion in A.H. Birch, "Opportunities and Problems of Federation," in *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems*, ed. by C. Leys and P. Robson (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 6-9.

36. Ruth Schachter, "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No. 2 (June 1961), p. 305.

37. *Political Commitment and Economic Integration* (Nairobi: International Seminar on Economic Co-operation in Africa, 1965), p.7. Typescript copy.

38. A situation "where any gain by one or more players must be equal to the loss of one or more rivals." Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p.66. Also see the discussion in Lucian W. Pye's *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 27-30.

39. *Uganda Argus* (Kampala), October 25, 1963, p.1.

40. *Ibid.*, August 21, 1963, p.1.

41. Lt.-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of Eastern Nigeria, estimated that approximately one million refugees had returned to the Eastern Region alone. *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 28, 1966, p.2.

42. For a discussion of the assumption that single party systems foster economic development, see my "Progress and the One-Party State," _Transition_ (Kampala), Vol.VI No. 10 (September 1963), pp. 31-34.

43. In 1965, Tanganyika, which had domestic exports totalling £62,778,000, sold £4,569,000 to Kenya and £1,346,000 to Uganda. _Economic and Statistical Review_, No. 18 (Nairobi: E.A.C.S.O., 1966), pp. 29-34.

44. Amitai Etzioni, _Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 252.

45. Ernst B. Haas and Philippe Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America," _International Organization_, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), p. 726.   Also see Ernst B. Haas, _The Uniting of Europe_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 291-299.

46. See Anthony Lewis, "Britain Is Still Far From Europe," _New York Times_ (Paris), November 23, 1966, p.4.

47. _Daily Times_ (Lagos), August 5, 1966, p.8.

48. _West Africa_, September 17, 1966, p.1070.

49. _Daily Times_ (Lagos), August 2, 1966, p.2.

50. Quoted in Albert Tevoedjre, _Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account of the UAM_, Occasional Paper No.11 (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1965), p.8.

51. _West Africa_, June 25, 1966, p. 729.

52. I. William Zartman, _International Relations in the New Africa_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. ,
125.

53. Doudou Thiam, _The Foreign Policy of African States_ (London: Phoenix House, 1965), pp.51-52.

54. _West Africa_, January 9, 1965, p. 34.

55. _Meetings and Discussions on the Proposed East Africa Federation_ (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1964), p.9, and _Nationalist_ (Dar es Salaam), June 2, 1964, p.6.

56. See my paper, "The East African Multiversity As A Political Institution" (Kampala: East African Academy, 1966), pp. 9-11. To be published in 1967 as part of the Proceedings of the East African Academy.

57. _East African Standard_ (Nairobi), November 26, 1966, p.3.

58. _Daily Nation_ (Nairobi), October 17, 1966, pp. 1,24.

59. In November 1966, Lord Aldington, the chairman of National and Grindlays Bank observed during a visit to Nairobi that large-scale foreign investment in East Africa was being held up because of delay in agreement on the common market. _Daily Nation_ (Nairobi), November 15, 1966, p.1.

60. _West Africa_, September 17, 1966, p. 1070.

61. On August 8, 1966, Lt.-Colonel Gowon announced steps to ensure a rapid return to the former federal structure.   Consequently his plan called for "the immediate modification or nullification of any provision of any decree which assumes extreme central-isation." _Daily Times_ (Lagos), August 9, 1966, p.1.

62. *West Africa*, August 27, 1966, p. 964.

63. *Correspondence (1931-1932) arising from the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa* (London: H.M.S.O., 1932), p.42.

INTERIM COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF EASTERN AFRICA.

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF EASTERN AFRICA
TERMS OF ASSOCIATION

Pursuant to the Resolution adopted by the Sub-
Regional Meeting on Economic Co-operation in East Africa held
in Lusaka, Zambia, from 26 October to 2 November 1965
(E/CN.14/346 - E/CN.14/ECOP/12) the Signatories to these
Terms of association hereby confirm their Governments' accept-
ance of the recommendation to establish the Economic Community
of Eastern Africa and undertake to negotiate a Treaty by which
the Community shall formally come into being and to seek
ratification of this Treaty by the Member States.

Pending ratification of the Treaty by the Member
States, the Signatories being duly constituted as the Interim
Council of Ministers as provided for in the above Resolution,
do hereby accept on behalf of their Governments the Terms of
Association as hereunder described.

These Terms of Association shall constitute a trans-
itional agreement governing the means of co-operation between
the Member States prior to the formal establishment of the
Community.

ARTICLE 1
AIMS OF THE COMMUNITY

1. The aims of the Community shall be:
   (a) to promote through the economic co-operation
        of its Member States a co-ordinated develop-
        ment of their economies, especially in industry,
        agriculture, transport and communications, trade
        and payments, manpower and natural resources;

   (b) to further the maximum possible interchange of
        goods and services between its Member States
        and, to this end, to eliminate progressively
        customs and other barriers to the expansion of
        trade between them as well as restrictions on
        current payment transactions and on capital
        movements;

(c) to contribute the orderly expansion of trade
between the Member States and the rest of the
world and, to this end, take measures which
render their products relatively competitive
with goods imported from outside the Community,
and to seek to obtain more favourable conditions
for their products in the world market; and

(d) by all these efforts and endeavours to make a
full contribution to the economic development
of the continent of Africa as a whole.

ARTICLE 2
GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS

2.   In order to achieve the aims of the Community,
the Member States shall:

(a) within the Community and without, work in close
co-operation with one another and co-ordinate
and harmonise their economic policies;

(b) keep each other informed and furnish the Community
with the information required for the
achievement of its aims;

(c) within the Community, consult together on a
continuous basis, carry out studies and, in
their light, determine the areas and lines of
economic development to be undertaken in common;

(d) endeavour to formulate and adopt common policies,
and negotiate and conclude Agreements between
themselves or through the medium of the Community,
designed to serve the achievement of its aims,
including the common development of specific
branches of industry, the joint operation of spe-
cific transport and communications services, joi-
nt research, training of manpower and the joint
implementation of other projects as well as
of common trade and payments arrangements;
and

(e) ensure, within the Community and without, that
the common policies that have been adopted and
the Agreements that have been concluded for
the achievement of the aims of the Community
are carried out.

3.   Member States shall take all steps required for the
implementation of the Decisions and Recommendations of the
Community, duly adopted and ratified by responsible Member
States and for the provision of budgetary and other resources
for their implementation.

ARTICLE 3
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND WITH OTHER
BODIES

4.   Nothing in these Terms of Association shall be deemed
as preventing individual Member States from taking, within
the Community or without, common measures of economic co-opera-
tion without the agreement of other Member States provided
that such measures do not prejudice the aims of the Community.

5.   Member States which belong to or join other systems
of economic co-operation shall inform the Community of their
membership and of those provisions in their constituent instru-
ments that have a bearing on these Terms of Association.

ARTICLE
STRUCTURE

6.   The Community when established shall have, as its
principal organ, a Council of Ministers, an Economic Committee
and a Permanent Secretariat, the composition, powers and
functions and procedures of which shall be described in the
Treaty. The Community may also establish subsidiary organs
and other bodies as may be required and provided for in the
Treaty.

ARTICLE 5
DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.   Pending ratification of the Traty which shall
make provisions, _inter alia_, with respect to Decisions,
Resolutions, Recommendations and Voting Rules, the Interim
Council hereby agrees that its Decisions, Resolutions and
Recommendations, adopted unanimously shall provisionally
apply between the Member States. Decisions which are arrived
at unanimously at any Meeting of the Interim Council at which
some Member States are not present shall be referred back to
absent Member States for their assent, such assent to be
signified to the Permanent Secretariat of the Interim Council
in writing within three months of such referral.

ARTICLE 6

INTERIM COUNCIL OF MINISTERS - COMPOSTION, POWERS AND PROCEDURES

8.   Membership of Interim Council of Ministers of
the Economic Community of Eastern Africa shall be open to all
such Members and Associate Members of the United Nations Econ-
omic Commission for Africa as fall within the area known as
The East African sub-region, namely the area comprising
Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar and
Mauritius, and such other countries as the Interim Council of
Ministers or the Council of Ministers may decide to admit.

9.   Pending creation of its Council of Ministers under
the Treaty, the Interim Council of Ministers shall be compo-
sed of Ministers respondible for economic affairs or planning
or of other Ministers designated by the Member States or, in
exceptional circumstances, by plenipotentiaries at Ministerial
level; shall determine those areas of economic development
to be undertaken in common by Member States, the manner and
degree of such development and the time required therefore;
shall meet at times and at places as it may itself deem
necessary, a quorum for such meetings being two-thirds of the
Member States.

10.   The Interim Council shall have power to establish
an Interim Economic Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

11.   The Interim Council shall have, as its principal
immediate task, the drafting of the Treaty governing this
Economic Community of Eastern Africa, the submission of the
Treaty to Member States and the initiation of action as may
be deemed necessary and appropriate to facilitate the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE,
DECEMBER 19TH TO 22 D, 1966.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR A GREATER EASTERN AFRICA
(Paper submitted to the Conference by the
Minister for Labour, Dr. J.G. Kiano).

The concept of Pan Africanism is not new.   It dates
as far back as the close of the last century and early in the
twentieth century when some Americans of African origin sought
to popularise the idea of unity and brotherhood between
Americans of African origin and the peoples of Africa.   A
second objective in promoting this idea of Pan Africanism
was to champion "Negro Freedom" both in Africa, America and
the West Indies.   The late Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois of U.S.A. became
the chief spokesman of Pan Africanist ideals during this period.
In 1919 he convened the first Pan African Congress in Paris and
in 1921 the second Pan African Congress was held in various
capitals of Europe.   Unfortunately after 1923 the Pan African
movement began to decline.   The main reason for the decline
appears to have been the fact that participation by African
leaders in these Congresses was greatly limited and most
participants were either American Negroes or intellectuals
from the West Indies.   Another contributing of these Pan
African Congresses were.   To some it was essentially an
attempt to bring about racial solidarity;   to others it was a
politically inspired movement to protect the rights of African
viz-a-viz the League of Nations and still to some other part-
icipants in these conferences educational and economic reforms
were called for, implying that these were necessary before the
Africans were ready for self-government.   Obviously, therefore,
it was not strictly correct at this early stage of Pan Africa-
nism to regard it as a movement because there was nothing
cohesive about its intentions or aspirations.

It was soon after the Second World War that a much
more articulate approach to Pan Africanism began to appear.
The Pan African Congress held in Manchester in 1945 declared
solemnly:

"the struggle for political power by colonial and
subject peoples is the first step towards, and the
necessary prerequisite to, complete social, economic
and political emancipation. We are unwilling to
starve any longer while doing the worlds drudgery, in
order to support, by our poverty and ignorance false
aristocracy and a discarded imperialism. We condemn

the monopoly of capital and the role of private

wealth and insustry for private profit alone. We

welcome economic democracy as the only real democracy."

Our President, His Excellency Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah and Dr. Du Bois were among the leading personalities
Pan Africanism suffered from the fact that its meetings were
being held in Europe under the leadership and inspiration of
"men about to go home to lead African nationalist movements"
in their respective countries. These cantional struggles in
the respective African territories tended to push to the
background Pan African activities whether economic or
political or even ethnic but the spirit of comradeship never-
theless continued to be felt by these leaders.

We may consider the third phase of Pan African move-
ment as dating between the First All-African Peoples' Confer-
ence held in Accra in 1958 and the establishment of the
Organisation for African Unity in 1963. During this period
nationalist leaders in different parts of Africa actively
sought to co-ordinate their efforts in order to accelerate
the process o liberation of Mother African. As one can
imagine, therefore, political resolutions and programming
took the upper handand economic considerations only appeared
in the form of condemnation of exploitation associated with
colonialism.

However, in terms of our topic today, a major step
was taken in Eastern and Central Africa during the third phase
of the Pan African movement. This was the establishment of the
Pan African movement of Eastern and Central Africa (PAFMECA).
The first meeting of PAFMECA took place in Mwanza, Tanzania
in 1958. Like all other Pan African conferences the question
of liberation of Africa from colonialism was the main concern
at the first and subsequent meetings in PAFMECA.
PAFMECA continued as an organization until 1963 (as a matter
of fact it has never been officially dissolved) and it did
create the frame of reference for the greater Eastern Africa
which is now beginning to take shape as I shall show later in
this paper. It is interesting at this juncture to point out
that in May 1963 a meeting of leaders passed a resolution in
Addis Ababa that Ethipia and Somalia should become members
of PAFMECA in addition to Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zambia
and Malawi and that the doors should be kept open for African
political parties in Rhodesia, Basutoland and South West Africa
and Bechuanaland to join should they so desire. Accordingly the
name PAFMECA was changed to PAFMECSA.

If this ideal of a PAFMECSA region was ever to be achieved no one could doubt at this time the fact that its nucleus would be the East African Common Market and East African Common Services Organization. This was because Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had had their economies, their communication system, their currency and even their higher education system co-ordinated and often administered jointly for as far back as the 1920's. In 1926, for example, as result of the Ormsby-Gore Commission the governors of the three territories held their first meeting to discuss matters of mutual interest in terms of accelerating the general economic development of East Africa. This was followed by the 1929 Hilton Young Commission on Closer Union of East African territories. Though no definite arrangements were made then, nevertheless these meetings of govenors continued irregularly until after the Second World War when Britain thought of formalising the governors' conference and rationalising the structure of the various inter-territorial bodies in order to give them legislative and constitutional standing; thus the East African High Commission came into being in 1948. When it became abvious that the three East African territories would sooner become independent, a conference was held in Britain in 1961 to make arrangements for transforming the East African High Commission into the East African Common Services Organization. It was very much envisaged then that the three territories would constitute a political federation as soon as all three were independent. Were this to succeed then one would have expected Malawi, Zambia and eventually Rhodesia and possibly Bechuanaland to join the Federation.

Unfortunately the idea on East African political federation did not succeed but economic co-operation and inter-territorial service organisations have continued to exist. This co-operation in East Africa has not been without upheavals and strains during the short period that the three countries have been independent.

The main issue has been how to achieve and maintain equitable distribution of the profits accruing from the Common Market. The second reason is how to distribute fairly the cost of maintaining the Common Services, and thirdly how to distribute industries using the whole of East Africa as their market and which prefer to be sited mainly in one of the three territories. Short term solutions have been suggested and in some cases put into effect without much success. We had the Raisman formula which, in simple language, called

upon Kenya to pay the biggest portion of the cost of running
the Common Services because it appeared that Kenya received
the biggest share of the Common Market. We then had the
infamous Kampala Agreement which was signed but never
respected or observed. The basic idea in this Agreement was
quota restrictions of trade and encouragement of local indus-
tries particularly in Tanzania and Uganda so that they may
import less from, and export more to, Kenya. With the break-
down of the East African currency the Kampala Agreement was
shelved. It then became increasingly felt that what was need-
ed was a thorough and fundamental examination of the economic
and service relationships of the East African set up which
would lead to long-term rather than short term solutions.
Consequently the Phillips Commission was established and we
should be hearing its final recommendation in the very near
future. What is most encouraging, however, in terms of the
possibility of creating a greater Eastern Africa is that
despite the fact that these difficulties were being experienced
among the East African territories nevertheless a conference
was convened in Lusaka under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa to discuss the possibilities of
promoting an economic community of Eastern Africa: including
not only Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania but Ethipia, Somalia,
Ruanda Burundi, Zambia, Mauritius and Rhodesia when she becomes
an African governed territory. Thus in addition to the
countries affiliated to PAFMECSA in 1963 the French speaking
countries in Eastern Africa were also to be involved in these
most important discussions.

　　　　Background to this conference was not only the PAFMECSA
ideal but also the fact that the Pan African movement was begin-
ning to accept a regional approach particularly in the field
of trade and economic development without losing sight of
the long run continent-wide ideal. For example, the OAU was
established in 1963 as an all-Africa organization, yet various
African States were already organising themselves on
regional basis. There was the unfortunate Ghana-Guinea-Mali
Union which was greatly hailed but which soon came to nothing.
There was also the OCAM which was established in 1965
and is still functioning. And by this time there already
existed 18 African countries being mainly the former French,
Belgium and Italian colonies who as a group were associate
members of the European economic community.

What I am trying to illustrate here is that within
the purview of OAU, regional economic and even political
groupings are considered not as a step backward from ideal-
istic Pan Africanism but rather as the first realistic and
practical steps towards eventual commercial, industrial
and even political co-ordination throughout the whole contin-
ent. This approach is accepted by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa which sponsored the Lusaka Conference.
The Conference noted that regional approach to industrial
development was likely to result in a significantly faster
rate of industrialisation than would be the case were the
process to be undetaken on isolated country basis. The
Secretariat of ECA had actually worked out a number of large
scale industries which could be established in the Eastern
African region as a whole but which could not be economically
run to serve one or two of the countries in question. A large
scale steel industry is an example of such heavy industries
which could come into being only if the whole region came to
some agreement, according to the findings of the Secretariat.
The Conference also noted that because of the variety of
produce within the region the volume of trade among the members
would be increased significantly instead of importing some items
from overseas. This idea of increasing trade among African
countries is very much in accordance with the aims and hopes
and objectives of the OAU. It is also very much in agreement
with the feelings of the developing countries who attended
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in
Geneva in 1964. In that Conference it was noted very strongly
that the economic gap between the highly industrialised and
developing nations continue to wide. The prices of the primary
goods which the developing countries send to the highly
industrialised countries suffer from chronic fluctuations
while the prices of the heavy industrial exports to the
developing countries continue to rise.

The almost total dependence of the developing countries
upon the industrialised countries as the export markets continue
to divide the world into the "have" nations (that is the highly
industrialised countries) and the "have not" nations (that is the
developing countries). It is felt by this writer that unless the
developing contries themselves deliberately increase trade among
themselves and reduce their depenents upon export markets in the
industrialised countries the economic gap will continue to widen,
because the industrialized countries do not seem determined to help
in stabilizing prices at primary products. It would indeed be

a great achievement in Eastern Africa if the countries in
this region established an economic community to increase
volume of trade among the member countries and to create
circumstances which would justify establishment of a good
number of heavy industries serving the whole region. Another
great advantage that would arise has to do with the present
"cut throat" competition for foreign investments which all
developing countries are angaged in. The time has come when the
developing countries in the world and particularly in Africa
should convene a foreign investments' conference in which all
the concessions and advantages given to the foreign investors
would be so standardised that these foreign investors will
cease to play one developing country against another.
Were we to establish the economic community of Eastern Africa
the first thing we would do is to agree on such a convention
so that an investor will not say to any member of the commun-
ity: "unless you give me such and such a concession I shall go
to Zambia or to Ethiopia or to Malawi, etc., etc."

It was most gratifying that the Lusaka Conference
came out with agreed principles and objectives which are
attached here as Appendix I. The countries concerned are

expected to signify their approval to these objectives so
that the next conference can be held to take us as close as
possible to this great aim of an economic community for
Eastern Africa. This is a moment for greatness. We shall
either meet the challenge and become the first in the under
developed world to meet the problems facing developing countries
in a concrete manner or fail in the labrinyth of petty politics.
The ideals of Pan Africanism are now meeting the acid test of
practical programmes and operative institutions. It was alright
to resolve that when Africans take over the reigns of government
they, shall all unite throughout the continent to fulfil their
dreams of unity and brotherhood. Now that we Africans have
the opportunity to create the necessary institutional arrangements
for the Eastern African Economic Community as well as continue to
strengthen the OAU.

This brief discussion on Pan Africanism as related
to the possibilities of bringing about an Economic Community
for Eastern African cannot be considered complete without
mentioning a few factors and events which have intensified the
feeling of need for co-operation and co-ordination among some of the
countries within the region. When, several years ago, the struggle
for the downfall of the so-called Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

was at its height, it was only natural and logical for the
African people in that area to consider seriously the
possibility of economic and political ties with their brothers
to the north, namely Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, among others.
Thus co-operation among African leaders of East Africa and
those from the defunct Federation has been close and intimate
since and even before the beginning of PAFMECA. It was
obvious that if the Federation collapsed (as it did eventually)
trade and political ties with the East African group of Kenya,
Tanzania (then Tanganyika and Zanzibar separately) and Uganda would
be far much more preferable than such ties with South Africa.

Following the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland and the achievement of independence by Malawi
and Zambia a new situation has been precipitated to make the need
for ties mentioned above all the more felt. Trade between Zambia
and Rhodesia under illegal Smith is almost at standstill, and
even Malawi's overtures to Rhodesia and the Portuguese will not
solve Malawi's economic problems or remove the tragedies of
political isolation by fellow African neighbour-nations. Thus
actions linking Zambia and eventually Malawi to the East African
alliance have already started to take shape. Trade discussions have
taken place severally between East African and Zambia leaders.
As a matter of fact trade volume has sharply risen during 1965
and 1966. Talks about a railway link have been rife of late and the
improvement of road communication is already underway. With improved
communication there will certainly be increased trade and more
economic and even political co-ordination of select under-
takings. Arrangements for the oil pipeline from Tanzanian
coast to Zambia have now been concluded. These are illustrative
examples of how Greater Eastern Africa is emerging perhaps
unhailed and unsung but as a matter of fact. Let us all
wish Greater Eastern Africa all success and let us also
resolve to do our share to make it a success.

POLITICAL   SCIENCE   AND   ECONOMIC   DEVELOPMENT

Certainly the vast majority of political scientists, and
undoubtedly all development economists, would reject the claim
that the phenomenon and the problem of economic development falls
within the professional disciplinary scope of political science.
It would be agreed that like all good citizens of the world
political scientists rightfully have an abiding concern with the
improvement of the material welfare of mankind.   It would also be
recognized that those political scientists specializing on the
developing areas ought to be particularly concerned with economic
development, if only because the latter constitutes such a major
component of contemporary political ideology and rhetoric, as well
as public policy.   But to go beyond this and suggest that economic
development as a distinctive scientific problem is or should be a
preoccupation of political scientists--as distinguished from being
used as an independent variable in political analysis--would provoke
derision within the profession.   Indeed, many professional
economists are not at all sure that economic development falls
within the scope of economics as a scientific discipline.

No one, of course, has proposed expanding the scope of political
science--the social science discipline already most burdened with
endless and fruitless debate over the nature of its boundaries.   It
has been proposed, however, that the ancient and honorable subfield
of "political economy" should be restored to a position of legitimacy
and dignity.   As political scientist Aaron Wildavsky has argued:

"I would like to advocate a return to what used to be called
 'political economy' in the days before politics and
 economics became firmly entrenched as separate disciplines.
 There is now a discernible trend--which means that at least
 15 or 20 people are involved--toward use of economic
 concepts to study politics and political concepts to study
 economics."[1]

In fact, according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
such a hybrid--or, more accurately, originally unitary--discipline
still exists and, happily, neither political science nor economics
are able to claim single parentage:

"political economy 1: an 18th century branch of the art of
 government concerned with directing governmental policies
 toward the promotion of the wealth of the government and
 the community as a whole; 2a: a 19th century social
 science comprising the modern science of economics but
 concerned principally with governmental as contrasted with
 commercial or personal economics; b: a modern social
 science dealing with the interrelationship of political
 and economic processes."

Whether or not one can say such a hybrid subfield (or separate
social science) actually exists, depends upon how rigid one is in
applying the criteria of what constitutes a discipline.   If one is
a purist, as economists more than political scientists rightfully
and understandably tend to be, then there is no question that it
falls far short of meeting even minimally the basic ideal ingredients
of a discipline.[2]   If one is a non-purist, and can agree with the

following loose definition of a field of knowledge by the late
Frederick Dunn, then the notion of an emergent hybrid subfield (or
restored unitary discipline) of "political economy" is acceptable:

> "A field of knowledge does not possess a fixed extension
> in space but is a constantly changing focus of data and
> methods that happen at the moment to be useful in
> answering an identifiable set of questions. It presents
> at any given time different aspects to different observers,
> depending on their point of view and purpose. The
> boundaries that supposedly divide one field of knowledge
> from another are not fixed walls between separate cells of
> truth but are convenient devices for arranging known facts
> and methods in manageable segments for instruction and
> practice. But the foci of interest are constantly
> shifting and these divisions tend to change with them,
> although more slowly because mental habits alter slowly
> and the vested interests of the intellectual world are as
> resistant to change as those of the social world."[3]

For present purposes we will assume that the emerging congruence
of concern among political scientists and economists in the
interrelationship between political and economic development in
the developing areas, as manifest in their joint use of economic
and political variables, constitutes a sufficiently identifiable
focus of interest as to label it a scientific problem of the field
of "political economy."[*]

In this paper we will examine a few selected developments in
the two disciplines which have fostered this convergence of interest
in what we will call the "political economy of development". This
will be followed by a discussion of the "political preconditions"
and then the "political consequences" of economic development. The
choice of these latter two themes reflects our central concern with
the polity-economy relationship in terms not only of how predomi-
nantly political factors, viewed as independent variables, affect
economic development (the dependent variable), but also the
opposite, namely, how economic development (the independent variable)
affects political development.

I.   THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT.

The immediately obvious explanation for the increased awareness
among political scientists and economists that they occupy common
ground is the conviction through experience that political and
economic development are closely related, but how and when is
still controversial. However, independent, but complementary
and frequently identical, changes were already in progress or in
gestation in both disciplines which greatly facilitated the rela-
xation of the boundaries that ever-greater specialization over the
years has tended to erect around them. The facilitative changes
in political science have been discussed in another paper and
only need to be summarized here.[5] The changes in economics are
somewhat more complex and uncertain, but nonetheless they are
significant enough to support the argument of convergence and
mutual disposition to recognize political variables and constraints,
if not disciplinary interdependence.[*]

Political science has always been more or less amenable to
give consideration to how non-political variables affect politics.
This was certainly less true during the period of formal-legalism
which preceded the impact of behavioralism. Since the World War
II, however, many influences have operated to expand the scope of
disciplinary concerns, and one of the most important, as we shall

3.

see, is the impact of the developing areas themselves. The main
point here is that the profession was amenable to an expansion of
its concerns, partly because of the tendency of its practitioners
to regard it as the "umbrella" discipline, and partly because of
the delayed impact on it of the scientific perspective. The
result has been fuzzy boundaries, lack of focus, and extraordinary
diversity in schools, approaches, and methods. As Heinz Eulau
has lamented:

> "Unfortunately, political scientists have expended an
> inordinate amount of time and effort disputing the origins
> and nature of their discipline. And the colloquy is
> likely to continue for some time to come. If, therefore,
> at mid-century, political scientists are agreed on anything,
> it is probably on the muddled state of their science.
> Political scientists are riding off in many directions,
> evidently on the assumption that if you don't konw where
> you are going, any road will take you there."[6]

This is admittedly somewhat harsh, and somewhat out of date, but
it is basically true--there has undoubtedly been a permissiveness
and a receptivity to innovation and expansion in political science
which practitioners in the "harder" social sciences could neither
tolerate nor digest.

A second aspect of the development of the discipline has been
the truly extraordinary expansion of interest in and commitment to
the developing areas among a new and more scientifically-oriented
generation of political scientists. During the first decade
(1952-1962) of the functioning of the U.S. Foreign Area Training
Fellowship Program, for example, political scientists made up more
than one-quarter of the total of more than 400 fellows sent to the
developing areas. They outranked all other disciplines, having
more than double the number of economists and four times the number
of sociologists. Already disposed, and, by their permissive
discipline allowed, to study anything politically relevant (and in
the tempestuous decade of terminal colonialism almost everything
was politically relevant), they became the proponents and carriers,
on a rather massive scale, of an entirely new orientation in the
discipline. This orientation was marked by an intensification of
the macropolitical perspective (national elites, national parties,
and the nation-building process tended to be the main foci), and by
an explicitly interdisciplinary commitment (derived in part by
contact with the structural-functionalism of anthropological
colleagues in the field, and by their perception of the obvious
importance of the setting of politics). With characteristic
brilliance Harry Eckstein has explained the reason for the heavy
emphasis given to the setting of politics by this postwar generation
of "developing area" political scientists:

> "Because political scientists found in such systems much
> less differentiation between the social and political--
> that is, few specialized organizations for political
> decision-making or competition--they simply could not
> help seeing the extent to which the political is
> embedded in social relations. . . Moreover, the whole
> political system was in flux. . . and when political
> processes are unsettled--when patterns of politics are
> in the making rather than functionally autonomous of the
> conditions creating them--the nonpolitical is always
> particularly obtrusive and apparent."[7]

Moreover, this intensive personal exposure of a new generation to
the realities of the developing areas not only strengthened their
macropolitical (nation-building) and holistic perspective, as well
as their sensitivity in general to the relevance of the setting
of politics; it also brought the scholars concerned into direct

contact with the major problem of public policy of the postcolonial period, namely, economic development. In due course one or another aspect of the politics of economic development emerged to the fore as dissertation topics and research proposals by the second wave of younger political scientists coming to Africa.

In the meantime other major reorientations were already well underway within the discipline which tended to strengthen, as well as to be strengthened by, the foregoing developments stimulated by the discovery of the developing areas. Among the most relevant of these were (1) the increasing popularity within the discipline of the "systems" mode of analysis developed by David Easton and the related functionalism of Gabriel Almond; (2) the shift from static to dynamic modes of analysis for the study and comparison of patterns of political development in both historical and contemporary perspective--a new trend which has gathered enormous momentum and with which one associates the names of David Apter, S.N. Eisenstadt, S.M. Lipset (the latter two being political sociologists), and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, among others; and (3) the astonishingly belated reconceptualization of the function of the polity/being that of ultimate physical compulsion to the idea of the creative, purposive mechanism through which societal goals are achieved.

Each of these major re-orientations in the political science discipline has had evident implications for the role of economic variables in political analysis. The shift to the concept "political system" as developed by David Easton, encourages political scientists to think of the political system analytically (i.e. as encompassing all politically relevant activity in any institutional sphere) rather than confining the "political" to the narrower concept of "state" (i.e. the ensemble of concrete political and governmental structures (parties, legislatures, courts, etc.) in a society). This broadened conceptualization of what constitutes the "political" realm gives the political scientist a legitimate interest in other institutional spheres (such as the economy) in other processes (such as labor migration, commercialization of land and labor, taxation, to mention a few) as well as in the reciprocal relationships between these spheres and processes on the one hand and the polity, analytically defined, on the other.[8] The same stretching and recasting of the discipline's boundaries results from the functional approach to the study and comparison of political systems as elucidated most notably by Gabriel Almond.[9]

The second major re-orientation in the discipline--the shift from static or "equilibrium" analysis to dynamic and developmental analysis--has reached massive proportions in the short span of five years. The volume of literature on the subject is already almost frightening. The latest refinements in how one conceptualizes political development--as distinguished from, say, economic development--are extraordinarily intriguing. There is a plethora of definitions, but all reflect the intensive interaction and cross-fertilization among a rapidly expanding group pushing back this new frontier of the discipline. The most recent definition is the most refined. It has at its core the notion of enhanced capacity or capability of the political system, an element found in most other definitions. Characteristically it comes from the pen of Gabriel Almond:

> "Political development . . ./is/. . .the increased
> differentiation and specialization of political structures
> and increased secularization of political culture. The
> significance of such development is, in general, to
> increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the perfor-
> mance of the political system: to increase its capabilities."[10]

Development results "when the existing structure and culture of the political system is unable to cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization."[11] Almond and his co-author (Powell) then identify four types of "system-development" problems (or challenges) which every new state encounters at birth, and which all states repeatedly encounter again and again as challenges are renewed: (1) the problem of state building (which includes the dual problems of penetration and integration of the society, challenges which are met only by "significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political system", by "the development of a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy", and by "the development of attitudes of obedience and compliance"); (2) the problem of nation building (which includes the twin problems of obtaining the loyalty and commitment of the culturally heterogeneous population to the new nation); (3) the problem of participation (created by "the rapid increases in the volume and intensity of demands for a share in the decision-making of the political system") and (4) the problem of distribution (created by a "rapid increase in the volume and intensity of demands that the political system control or affect the distribution of resources or values (for example, opportunity) among different elements of the population."[12]

As indicated, these system-development challenges are coped with by the acquisition by the political system of the appropriate capability: regulative, extractive, distributive, symbolic and responsive. How they are coped with is affected by five major factors (1) the types of problems or challenges faced (i.e., their magnitude, timing, diversity, etc.); (2) resources the system can draw upon under various circumstances; (3) development in other institutional spheres (e.g., "When an economy develops new capabilities--new systems of production and distribution--the loading of the political system with demands for welfare may be significantly reduced, thereby affecting political development); (4) the functioning pattern of the system itself; and (5) the response pattern of the political elites to the political system challenges.[13] Finally, all of these elements in Almond and Powell's new conceptual and analytical framework point toward a "theory of political growth". Here is how they put it:

> "If we can relate the structural and cultural characteristics
> of political systems to the ways in which they have
> confronted and coped with these common system-development
> problems, we have taken the first steps in the direction
> of a theory of political growth which, for example, can
> help us explain why French and British politics differ in
> particular ways. Such a theory may also be helpful to
> people who are concerned with the question of how to
> influence political development--our own governmental
> officials and the elites of new nations."[14]

Space has been given to a description of the key elements in this proposed approach to the study of political development because it conveys a fairly representative picture of the way in which some political scientists are grappling with concepts and schema to analyze political development--not just change, but the acquisition by a political system of a qualitatively new and enhanced capability to perform its functions. Much of the language is unfamiliar; it is also difficult to see how one operationalizes, how one measures, development at this macroscopic level. But the main point is that in so many ways political development thus conceptualized relates to or depends upon the economy and its development-- such notions as "extractive and distributive capability" are only the more obvious cases in point.

Although it has been sometime since governments in Western
countries finally accepted a continuing responsibility for the
function of providing welfare, planning the economy, and using the
power of the state to seek and achieve new goals, political scientists
until very recently continued to define the "political realm" (the
state) either in the simplistic 19th century law-and-order terms of
Max Weber: "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within
a given territory", or in such equilibratory Parsonian terms as
"pattern maintenance" "adaptation" or "integration". The point
involved is put very well by J. Roland Pennock:

> "political systems develop their own autonomous political
> goals and....the attainment of these collective goals is
> one of their major functions, providing an important measure
> of their development. But a question arises: Is one goal
> as good as another or are states to be judged partly by the
> goals they select? Here we enter the realm of political
> goods.....We are indeed still dealing with the attainment
> of political goals, but the focus of attention is upon those
> goals that satisfy 'needs'--not just needs of the states as
> such, matters that will enable it to persist, but human
> needs whose fulfillment makes the polity valuable to man,
> and gives it its justification. I shall call these goals
> "political goods"........The degree to which a political
> system achieves these political goods may be considered yet
> another dimension of political development."[15]

Interestingly, one of his four "political goods" (the other three
being the classical "maintenance of law and order", "justice", and
"liberty") is "the promotion of economic growth, whether indirectly
by supplying the necessary infrastructure, by providing conditions
that encourage the immigration of foreign capital and expertise, or
more directly by governmental 'planning' and enterprise". Today
this is "accepted as a proper function of government; and the
effective energies spent on it constitute a measure of the society's
political development".[16] This re-definition of the polity, belated
though it may be, not only underscores the modern political
scientists concept of the polity; it also provides another index--
an economic index--by which political development is measured.

In turning to changes in the discipline of Economics which have
facilitated convergence with development-oriented political science,
a non-economist suffers serious disabilities. Happily, however,
economists have been openly introspective and self-critical, so
that a non-economist's only worry is whether he has interpreted their
ruminations correctly. The first significant contrast between
economics and political science is the greater scientific rigor
(both attempted and achieved) and the self-image economists have
of being the only really "hard" social scientists with a predictive
capability. This they can rightly claim, but at a price. It has
meant, among other things, a reluctance to include non-economic
variables in their analysis, and an almost pathological hostility
to being stigmatized as area specialists. The avoidance of non-
economic variables is deliberate: "Society has an economic aspect
and this is the element economic science purports to explain,
leaving others to other disciplines" (Frank H. Knight). This
compulsion to avoid the non-economic realm and to disclaim any
competence whatsoever where it intrudes itself, is brought out
vividly in economist Karl de Schweinitz's interesting distinction
between economic "development" and "growth", which deserves being
quoted at length:

> "/Economic/ growth may be defined as increasing output (GNP)
> per capita. /Economic/ development has broader reference
> to the building of institutions, new lines of production,
> and the dissemination of attitudes essential for self-

sustaining growth. . . .It must be acknowledged at once
that economics is concerned more with growth than
development and so, paradoxically, does not have much to
contribute to the explanation of the origins of growth.
Recently it has been taken to task for this 'failure',
the charge being that while appropriate for growing
systems the narrow concerns of economics do not explain
much where growth is not taking place. . .These critics
ask too much of economics. Unlike Marxian analysis,
which attempts to encompass the totality of behavior, it
does not pretend to be a complete science of society.
Economics is concerned with market phenomena in
nationally-integrated economies. Where these do not
exist, its analytical techniques are non-operative. . .
However imperfect economics, it is further advanced as
a policy science than the other social sciences. And
if it has not been more effective in helping new states
realize growth objectives, it is because so many of
them have not yet developed institutions conducive to
growth. For explanations of this lack of development,
however, one should look to political science or
sociology, rather than to economics."[17]

The argument that scholarly competence is a function of scholarly
purity is difficult to challenge.

Another reason for the economists' tendency to avoid political
variables is their closer and more continuous link to governments
as policy advisers. de Schweinitz's claim that economics is a
more highly developed policy science is undoubtedly correct:
economists know it, employing governments know it, and other social
scientists know it. As a result economists are more acceptable,
indeed, more sought after, as social science technicians in the
policy formulation process. Their much closer relationship with
governments is revealed in the recent survey by Leclercq and West
of economic research and development in Tropical Africa. They
found that the research program of each of the ten African centers
they covered "was designed in consultation with government
economists who were concerned with official priorities and
informational needs. . .In some countries it has been close, formal,
and continuous. . .In other countries the contact with government
has been less intimate, but nowhere wholly absent. In all ten of
these centers there is an explicitly recognized responsibility
(reinforced, in most cases, by a provision in the institute's
charter or constitution) to insure that research will produce
information useful to the governments of Africa in confronting the
full range of their developmental and other economic problems."[18]
None of the other social sciences can even begin to approximate
this close rapport, even though they may try very hard. But it
has one obvious consequence--a tendency, characteristic of anyone
in the establishment, to avoid or ignore political variables,
sometimes by the convenient phrase ceteris paribus. This tendency
is underscored by the fact that even those development economists
who readily acknowledge the relevance of the social and cultural
context of development, or even psychological variables, frequently
exclude those of a political character.

These two factors--the imperative of disciplinary purity and
the constraints of the economists' role--help to explain their
evident reluctance (in contrast to what they must regard as free-
wheeling by political scientists) to involve themselves in the non-
economic environment. Moreover, the very nature of these two
factors means that they will continue to serve as constraints upon
many economists. Nevertheless, there have been at least three
major re-orientations in economics which have nudged economists
into a position where one can talk meaningfully about a hybrid
subfield called the "political economy of development". It is

particularly interesting and relevant that these three new orienta-
tions parallel exactly the principal re-orientations in political
science previously discussed, a fact suggesting the operation of
certain generic forces in the social sciences. These new emphases
in economics are (1) the macroeconomic perspective emerging from
the Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution and reinforced
by the impact of the developing areas; (2) the shift in focus
from static equilibrium models to development; and (3) a reluctant,
but nonetheless genuine, acceptance of the unavoidability of taking
into account the setting or context ("exogenous factors") within
which economic growth occurs.

By the end of World War II macro-analysis in economics was well-
established. The development of Keynesian ideas made it possible
for economists to consider major aggregate variables and to look
at an economy as a whole, in the same sense that postwar political
scientists were nudged by systems-analysis and structural-
functionalism to look at the polity as a whole. Moreover, Keynesian
economics favored a very considerable degree of government regulation
and direction of the economy, a point of view highly congruent with
the transformative "social engineering" ideology of the political
elites of the new states emerging from colonialism. The new
holistic orientation in economics was thus linked with their acceptance
of the idea that the polity had a creative, purposive and goal-
seeking function.

The second major re-orientation has been what Walter Newlyn
has described as the "significant shift in the 'centre of content'
of the subject of economics itself". A postwar phenomenon, he
describes it as follows:

"By excessive concentration on...static analysis, economists
have lost touch with the bold generalisations of Adam Smith,
Ricardo, Malthus and Marx about the basic growth variables.
. . .Indeed, during this century economists have had sadly
little to say about the 'causes of the wealth of nations'.
The significant shift in the centre of content of the
subject...has taken place, like many previous changes in
the emphasis of economic thought, in response to the social
problems of the time. (The latter, including the "immensity
of the task of transforming the economies of the underdeveloped
countries"). . .has turned economists away from their pre-
occupation with the fluctuations of activity in industrial
societies to the problems of growth of primitive societies.
Economists became once more interested in growth as a process
to be examined and explained. . .all economists have
suddenly become 'development' specialists and, as a result,
have become interested in comparative studies of growth. . .
this specialisation necessarily means that their comparative
method must be applied to the economy as a whole. . ."[19]

This argument is almost identical with any number of explanations
for the re-orientation of their discipline given by political
scientists. Recalling Almond, the goals of the two disciplines
are identical: "growth as process", "comparative studies of
growth", studying the economy (or polity) "as a whole". The
generic reason is exactly as Newlyn has stated it--a "response to
the social problems of the time".

Finally, economists like political scientists (but far more
reluctantly) have also admitted the relevance of the "setting" for
economic growth. The decisive persuasive factor, as with political
science, has been their encounter with the realities of the
developing areas. The first wave of economists drawn to the
developing areas saw capital formation as the chief problem, but
this simple model of growth inevitably had to be modified because

of its woeful inadequacy. Economists were thus compelled, as
Manning Nash put it, "to confront the social and cultural system,
so to speak, head on".[20] This meant taking systematic account of
the context of economic development, including attempts "to
specify how a given range of social and cultural features inhibits,
promotes, channels, and determines the course of economic
development".[21] This broadening of the spectrum of the economists'
world is associated with the work of Walt Rostow (Stages of
Economic Growth), Arthur Lewis (Theory of Economic Development), as
well as the various writings of Gunnar Myrdal, Bert Hoselitz,
Everett Hagen, Simon Kuznets, Albert Hirschman, and many others.
They have all turned at some point or other in their analyses to
anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists for a stipulation
of the "social" context of development.[22] That conversion to
"exogenous factors" has not been total is reflected not only in
Walter Newlyn's minimalist observation that "an economist working
on the problems of an African country needed some knowledge of the
social setting in which the economy worked, but a rather limited
knowledge was probably sufficient",[23] but also in the virtual
exclusion of the "political" (in contrast to the "social") setting
or context as a relevant variable in economic analysis. In the
next section we will probe more deeply into the economists'
perspective of the political realm.

II. THE POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The most striking new emphasis in discussions on the nature of
politics and the problem of economic development in the developing
countries, and particularly in Africa, is the almost unanimous
agreement on what has come to be known as the "primacy of the polity".
The arguments asserting polity primacy over other institutional
spheres tend to fall into three categories: (1) the argument of
African cultural continuity; (2) the argument of situational
necessity; and (3) the argument made by those reacting against a
previous or prevailing emphasis upon the primacy of non-political
determinants in human behavior and organization.

The argument that the primacy of the political sphere in
contemporary Africa is rooted in African culture is advanced by
Professor Lloyd Fallers, certainly one of the most brilliant
macrosociologists of this generation already well-known for his
penchant and talent for uninhibited generalization. His proposition
deserves quotation at length:

". . .in traditional Africa goods and services, both as
symbols and as facilities, circulate primarily in terms
of political relations, for it is the polity that dominates
stratification. . .Traditional African societies. . .have
characteristically exhibited patterns of role differentiation
in which political specialization has been more prominent
than economic. The ambitions of their members have been
directed primarily toward attaining authority, and economic
processes have commonly been dominated by the political needs
of individuals and groups. . .Although direct cultural
continuity may be difficult to achieve, some characteristic
features of the traditional systems may perhaps persist and
give a distinctly African character to the new independent
nations. For example, in the new African nations, as in
the old, political structures seem likely to continue to
dominate economic ones, and political elites to retain
their pre-eminence. To be sure, the place of economic
processes in society has changed greatly. Whereas in
traditional societies an essentially static economy was
manipulated for political ends, the new independent states
make rapid economic development the principal aim of public

> policy. . .The traditional cultural emphasis upon
> authority coincides with, and perhaps helps to produce,
> modern conceptions of planning for economic development."[24]

All sorts of questions are provoked by this stimulating but
bewildering hypothesis.   Perhaps the most immediately relevant
one is whether it has been empirically validated--indeed, can it
be?   Most anthropologists are reluctant to generalize in this
manner about "traditional African culture", largely because of the
enormous diversity of indigenous institutional forms and the fact
that they personally are intimately familiar with only one or two
societies.   They are equally averse to generalize about cultural
continuities.[25]   Such scholarly caution is laudable, but if we are
going to make any meaningful advance in the macroanalysis of
societies (polities, economies) as "wholes" we need bold hypotheses
such as Fallers has given us--it is after all only a hypothesis
and does not claim to be a statement of fact.   In any event, this
particular hypothesis regarding cultural continuity in the "primacy
of the polity" stands as an exciting challenge to the behavioral
sciences to validate, qualify or disconfirm.

The main burden of the argument for the priority of the political
sphere over the economy in the developing countries is, however,
based on situational necessity.   The case has been made most
persuasively, not by political scientists, but by sociologists
and economists.   Among sociologists, Talcott Parsons, S.N. Eisenstadt
and T.H. Marshall, and others, have addressed themselves directly
to this point, namely, that the nature of the situation prevailing
in the developing countries makes the dominance of the political
factor absolutely essential.   Parson's main point is that the
"original development of industrialism in the Western world not
only did, but had to take place in 'capitalistic' forms....through
agencies not structurally identified with 'public authority'".[26]
Economic development in the developing areas, however, requires
the primacy of political authority.   Both Eisenstadt and Marshall,
arguing from stratification theory, present a slightly different
case.   Marshall points out that in much of the literature, "when
politics and   stratification are thought of together, the focus of
interest is more often the effect of social stratification on
political life than the effect of the political factor on stratifi-
cation".[27]   However, he agrees with Eisenstadt's hypothesis--not
confined only to developing areas--that when a country has recently
won its political independence or undergone a major revolution the
situation tends to be monolithic and dominated by the political
factor.   Then, "the power variable has an autonomy of its own....,
(and)...the holders of power tend to establish it as the most
important criterion of stratification, to which all other criteria
and rewards should be subordinated".[28]

Several development economists have made equally strong arguments
for various other, although always situational, reasons.   Walter
Newlyn suggests that the peculiarity of the development problems
which face the primitive economies of Africa has convinced
economists of the "need for deliberate planning and for governments
to play a major role as entrepreneurs in the transformation of the
modes of production of such economies".[29]   Andrew Kamarck, Chief
Economist of the World Bank, has furthered the argument by stressing
the heavy dependence of the development economist in Africa upon
political considerations:

> "...it cannot be taken for granted that a particular
> country will or will not benefit from participating in
> a common market, customs union or federation.   The answer
> must depend on an economic analysis within the framework
> of the political and constitutional decisions that
> determine how the economic benefits can be distributed.

In other words, the political scientist cannot get a
general judgment from the economist that a federation or
a customs union is desirable per se for Country X until
he can tell the economist how the distribution of
political power will influence economic decisions."[30]

In his pioneering study of the relationship between economic and
political development the economist Charles Wolf suggests still
another reason for the dominance of the political factor. He
points out that nationalists in many colonial areas perceived the
relationship between political and economic power in causal terms,
namely, whoever possesses political power has, and ought to have,
control over the economy.

"Historically...there was a direct correspondence between
political and economic status. Europeans were in a
commanding position politically, as well as economically.
...Under these circumstances, it was easy and perhaps
natural for...nationalists to proceed from observed
correlation to attributed causation. A widespread
conviction grew among nationalist leaders and followers
that political independence, by changing political
stratifications, would somehow bring about economic
improvement as well."[31]

One of the most explicit and detailed arguments rationalizing
the priority of the political realm in the developing areas is that
made by economist Wilfred Malenbaum. He notes that in the first
decade of discussion regarding economic development in the newly
independent countries it was universally assumed that economic
growth was mainly a technical and virtually autonomous process,
the independent variable affecting all other spheres. Painful
experience convinced many economists that the relationship was
precisely the reverse. Out of this ordeal of frustration, he
affirms the following proposition:

"We now know that the primary ingredient of economic growth
is motivational more than material. /We also know/ that
the motivation for change in a nation demands some national
expression. The attitudes and desires of parts of the
nation—including, where relevant, the demands of the
market place—must somehow combine to serve as the national
expression. This task of combination extends far beyond
tasks of organization or of administration. It is
essentially and fundamentally a political task, reflecting
skilled leadership....(Economic growth is not possible)...
unless the political structure, including its leadership,
seeks their attainment as explicit and major goals."[32]

This stress upon political leadership as the vital ingredient in
economic development is common in most of the literature. The
importance of nationalism or ideology, in the manipulative hands of
such leadership, is also emphasized.[33] Indeed, Neil Smelser goes
so far as to argue that in the periods of early modernization
political leaders will increase their effectiveness by open and
vigorous commitment to utopian and xenophobic nationalism.[34] This
prescription is a far cry from the usual assumption one has had of
rationality, sobriety and hard work, and savings and sacrifice
being the necessary accompaniments of economic growth. It is the
Protestant Ethic turned upside down.

The third category advocating the primacy of the polity comprises the anti-economic-determinists. Two political scientists, Glenn D. Paige and Herbert Spiro, authors respectively of the suggestive titles "The Rediscovery of Politics" and "Africa: The Primacy of Politics", have sought to rectify the imbalance in weight they felt social scientists had given to the socio-economic determinants of politics and political behavior. Paige's main conclusion is that political action (ideas, leadership, organization and power) can be conceived both as a "causal" and "relatively autonomous" force, and that the social sciences should place much greater emphasis upon political leadership and political creativity as a determinant of human events and development, including economic growth.[35] A similar argument, with special reference to Africa, is advanced by Spiro.[36]

That are we to make of this avalanche of arguments for viewing the polity as the master independent variable upon which all else depends in the economic development of new states. As for the anti-economic determinists of the third category, one gets the uncomfortable feeling that in their laudatory effort to restore some balance to the polity-economy relationship they are unwittingly guilty of a political determinism, or at least of a vast over-simplification of the tangled web of polity-economy interrelation-ships which characterizes the actual development process. Through-out the modern era there has been a back-and-forth pendulum movement in how the relations between the economy and polity have been perceived. The mercantilists were fusionists--in their view the economy and the polity were indistinguishable. Adam Smith attacked the idea of an undifferentiated economy and polity on the grounds that each had different purposes which should be independently pursued; each ought to be functionally autonomous. Marx sided with the mercantilists in his view that the economy and the polity were intimately linked, but he differed from them in his subordination of the polity to the economy. Keynes saw them as relatively autonomous spheres, but the polity could influence the economy not necessarily through direct intervention, but through the political manipulation of strategic economic variables.[37] Those who currently stress the primacy of the polity, the "modern polity supremacists" cover a fairly wide spectrum ranging from those believing in a neo-mercantilist fusion to those comfortable with a Keynesian polity manipulation of key economic variables. In Africa their ideological orientations are as diverse as the existing formulations and practices of African socialism suggest.

How do we explain this complex back-and-forth movement. The subject is manifestly too complicated to disentangle here. Certain obvious explanations emerge from the foregoing survey. One is a deterministic one, namely, any prevailing perspective of the economy-polity relationship is situationally determined, that is, it reflects the actual state of forces including cultural tradition, in the society concerned. Secondly, some economic or political thinker or powerful political personality or elite group advocating a particular pattern of relationship is able either to impose that pattern or win sufficient adherents to have it catch on. Finally, the oscillation of the pendulum from polity to economy primacy may be nothing more than a manifestation of a common syndrome of competitive academia, what James W. Fesler has called "the natural history of revolts against conventional wisdom". By this he means the tendency for a new entrant into the polemic on a particularly timeless question "to make the newly discovered element the independent variable to which the earlier perceived part of reality becomes a merely dependent variable".[38] This is such a well-known feature of the scholarly world that one wonders how much reality has been and is being distorted by the latest discovery of a new-- or an old--independent variable. For the present era in Africa, it is clearly the polity which is in the ascendant.

There are several problems raised by this "primacy of the polity" notion. The popularizers of this concept—like most other concepts amenable to normative and existential interpretations—do not always carefully distinguish between whether the polity "ought to be" or "is in fact" dominant. Our survey suggests they mean both. In any event, whichever is meant, there is implicit in the notion the suggestion that polity primacy is either a political precondition or a correlate of economic development. Do post-colonial African realities validate this assumption? The picture is not entirely clear and the time interval is too short to judge However, the cases of Ghana and Guinea, where polity primacy unquestionably reached its zenith, might provide some insight. Together with Mali they were the two states with the strongest, and presumably most creative leadership. They were the most self-conscious about the development of a coherent activist ideology, about the creation and maintenance of a highly centralized and monolithic organizational structure, including total monopoly over and fusion of associations, total assimilation of party and governmental structures, and total fusion of the polity and the economy.

The record of economic development in these two states since independence would tend to disconfirm the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between polity primacy and economic growth. In Guinea shortly after independence the government set up a complete monopoly over both foreign trade and domestic wholesaling. Although the achievements of the new state were quite remarkable, particularly in view of the abrupt withdrawal of the French, there were catastrophic failures in economic policy and planning. There are many explanations for these failures, but as Elliot Berg argues, "the major burden rests with the Guineans themselves".

> "The state trading venture was an unmitigated disaster,
> afflicting the whole economy. An inexperienced Guinean
> management found itself in charge of what was in effect
> the largest trading firm in Africa. Despite some gallant
> efforts, the distribution system rapidly fell victim to
> a massive administrative muddle...Fundamental reappraisals
> were hindered by the need to maintain socialist purity, an
> unwillingness to look coolly at all alternatives. Official
> economic discussion in fact became increasingly divorced
> from reality....The costs of Guinea's false starts cannot
> be calculated only in terms of wasted resources and foregone
> growth. Much of the popular enthusiasm for the regime and
> the dynamism of its leadership has been dissipated. Cynicism
> and corruption have spread, and signs of disaffection appeared.
> The moral and political cement binding the state together
> has been weakened as respect for law, and for the regime,
> has diminished."[39]

The story is not dissimilar for the much wealthier state of Ghana, whose economy steadily deteriorated between independence in 1957 and the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966. During that period Ghana's foreign exchange reserves dropped from £170m to nothing; national income per head in 1960 was £G70; by 1964 it had gone up in real terms only to £G76. Personal consumption actually dropped during these years from £G50 to £G47.[40] The list of serious deficiencies in many sectors of the economy traceable in one way or another to the policies of the government is too long to recount here. As Ghana's Government Statistician and chairman of the National Economic Committee concluded, "It was obvious that the economic factor was one of the most important causes of the Revolution".[41] Thus, we confront a strange paradox: in Africa's two new states in which there was the greatest determination to fuse the polity and the economy and to establish and maintain the primacy of the polity at its highest level, there has been either a poor or a disastrous record of economic development.

It is easy these days to concentrate and personalize the blame for these failures. In fact these failures do not necessarily disconfirm the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between polity primacy and economic development in new states. They do compel us, however, to make a major revision in the hypothesis. Banal though it may sound, polity primacy can correlate positively with economic development if the polity concerned has the requisite political power for the effective performance of its functions. In practical terms this means, borrowing from the language of Almond and Powell, an adequate regulative and extractive capability, a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy, and widespread attitude of obedience and compliance in the population. The primacy of the political dimension implies not only that political action (ideas, leadership, organization and power) transcends and determines development in other institutional spheres, which are by definition completely dependent upon and responsive to it, but that it operates without constraints, that is, it has the overriding power to insure that its will prevails. In most of Africa's new states--including Ghana and Guinea--one finds, however, considerable organizational weakness, only partial and intermittent penetration of the periphery by the center, an acute shortage of managerial and organizational skills, relatively feeble (i.e., non-motivating) ideology, and a host of cultural and situational constraints. The polity has primacy over objective socio-economic conditions, but only in a relative or presumptive sense. Inspired, purposive and willful political leadership must be accompanied by effective political power and organizational capacity. Both are necessary, but, even then, possibly not sufficient for economic development to occur.

The foregoing is related to a second dimension of the ongoing debate about the political preconditions for economic growth, namely, the existence of an efficient bureaucracy, which is surely a component of organizational capacity. The more recent literature on economic development reflects near unanimity on the absolute essentiality of an effective system of public administration. Representative of this consensus is William Kapp's assertion that "The success or failure of national economic planning in the underdeveloped world depends to a significant degree upon the establishment of an effective system of public administration capable of implementing the economic, social and political reforms and policies which the development plan entails".[42] The point need not be labored, it is both obvious and well-known. Yet there is not complete consensus. Referring to John Kenneth Galbraith's list of four preconditions (one of which was "a reliable apparatus of government and public administration"), Albert O. Hirschman observed that

> "...whenever development occurs, it does so invariably in the absence of one or several of these 'required' components or preconditions. In nineteenth century Germany, it occurred without much primitive accumulation of capital and in Italy without the Protestant ethic, to mention some of the earlier theories on prerequisites; and during the postwar period, Brazil experienced development in the absence of monetary stability, and Colombia even in the absence of public order, not to speak of land reform... Therefore, I continue to advocate that in their research the experts pay special attention to the emergence and possible rationality of new or inverted sequences. When they discover an "obstacle", such as poor public adminis- tration...their job does not consist in merely advising its removal; they ought to explore also how, by moving the economy forward elsewhere, additional pressure (economic and political) could be brought on the obstacle to give way."[43]

This is useful wisdom distilled from the comparative study of
conditions normally associated with economic development, but does
it not ignore the peculiarity of the African problem of economic
development referred to by Hewlyn?   Here the need for central,
planned and directed economic development is so manifest, and the
dependence of such a process upon an efficient and trained
bureaucracy so clear, that while one can share Hirschman's and
Gershenkron's scepticism that history provides little guidance,
one can also insist that the overpowering logic of the African
situation makes an effective public administration a precondition
for economic development.

    Economists and political scientists are not only concerned with
the identification of political and administrative preconditions of
economic development, but also with the nature of political
constraints and the latitude of political feasibilities in concrete
situations.   Some of these are generic to African as well as other
societies.   Being multi-ethnic societies political leaders must
be acutely sensitive to the imperative of ethnic arithmetic not
only in the allocation of jobs, but also in the geographical
allocation of resources and in the distribution of the product of
economic growth.   Heeding this imperative frequently plays havoc
with economic rationality, but it is a political constraint of such
pervasiveness and magnitude, because it strikes at the very heart
of the legitimacy of the governing regime, that economists neglect
it at the peril to themselves as well as the political leaders they
advise.   In recounting his Pakistan experience, economist David
Bell illuminates the determinative power of this particular type
of political constraint over what rationale allocation theory would
suggest:

> "The economic disparity between the two wings of the country
> had become by 1953 an explosive political issue in the less
> favored East Wing and geographical parity had become the
> clear policy of the national Government.   The Planning
> Board therefore worked from the beginning toward the
> objective of equality in development as between East and
> West Pakistan....In the future the Board is likely to have
> to face more directly the question of how much income loss
> is justified by a gain in equality.   The political question
> seems to be very firm: geographical equality in economic
> welfare as between the two wings of the country would
> undoubtedly be described as an overriding objective.   But
> the political position might be reconsidered when the
> economic cost, if any, of equality is known."[44]

This is an example of one type of political restraint which the
specialists of the "political economy of development" must include
within their range of concerns.

III. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

    Political economists of development are concerned not only with
how political variables and constraints affect economic development,
but also with how the latter, as an independent variable, affects
political behavior and institutions.   This latter dimension will
be examined with reference to three rather well-known issues:
(1) economic development and political competitiveness, (2) rapid
economic growth and political instability, and (3) uneven economic
development and political integration.

    The statistical evidence (however reliable it may be is still
in dispute) unquestionably suggests a close connection between
economic development and political competitiveness (a situation
close to but not completely synonymous with democracy).   Higher

degrees of economic development are associated with greater
political competitiveness; and, conversely, the lowest levels of
economic development tend statiscally to be linked with authori-
tarianism.   The statistical exceptions, as well as the historical
pattern of development of many individual countries, tend to
reinforce the presumed connection.   The argument and the data are
set forth in greater detail in analyses made by Lipset (the
pioneering study)[45], Coleman and Hagen, and need not be repeated
here except to note that these studies only suggested a statistical
correlation, and not a causal nexus.

What is of greater interest here are the counterarguments to
the hypothesis that economic growth and political competitiveness
are positively correlated.   We have already noted the reaction the
hypothesis provoked on the part of the anti-economic-determinists
(the "political supremacists").   The most persuasive rebuttal,
however, is that of Morris Janowitz, who argues the case best in
his own words:

> "...this type of analysis appears to have limited relevance
> for understanding, on a comparative basis, the dynamic
> relationship between economic development and political
> forms....there is no basis for asserting that, with higher
> levels of economic development, there is a movement toward
> more competitive political systems.   In fact, among those
> nations with the highest level of economic development,
> the absence of democratic competitive systems is more
> note-worthy than their presence, since competitive systems
> are concentrated in the middle level of economic development
> ....But the analysis is not without meaning if the general
> hypothesis is abandoned and the underlying process examined.
> Authoritarian-personal regimes are heavily concentrated among
> the nations with low economic development, for these nations
> are just embarking on economic development.....(However) the
> basic conclusion is that, with higher economic levels, the
> outcome is as likely as not to be in the direction of
> military oligarchy, and perhaps somewhat more likely."[46]

This conclusion is somewhat contradicted by Eckstein's observation
that between the great extremes of economic development and economic
underdevelopment there is a "large no-man's land where apparently
any governmental order, from stable democracy to totalitarianism
can exist",[47]   We are clearly in the presence of an issue that
cannot be definitively resolved, at least not until there is a
vast improvement in our statistical data and a greater consensus
on the definition of political forms.   In the meantime this
extremely complex subject provides common ground for a continuing
dialogue among specialists in the political economy of development.

There is far greater consensus on the politically destabilising
consequences of rapid economic growth.   Mancur Olson has gathered
together the very considerable literature on this issue and comes
out with the unqualified conclusion that "rapid economic growth
is a major force leading toward revolution and instability".[48]   It
has this effect because it increases the number of individuals who
are déclassé ("detribalized" in old Africanist jargon) and most
disposed to lead or to follow in a revolutionary movement;   it
markedly increases the number of gainers (the insatiable nouveaux
riches) and losers (the bitterly resentful nouveaux pouvres), both
of whom tend to become alienated;   and it vastly expands the
numbers caught up in the "revolution of rising expectations".[49]
Eckstein concurs that the rate of economic development and premature
populism are decisive factors.   He concludes that the only
predictions which seem to follow from this type of analysis are
"that late industrialization is, in the typical case, likely to
have political consequences directly opposite to those of early

industrialization, and that rapid industrialization is particularly
dangerous to democracy if, paradoxical though it may seem, it is
accompanied by rapid democratization".[50]

Must we conclude from the foregoing that there exists an over-
riding political imperative to slow down the rate of economic
growth in politically unstable new states as a conscious and
prudent public policy? An affirmative answer could be given to
this query if there were any truth in the contention some have made
that frequently a not insignificant portion of the pressure for
rapid economic growth in new states is inspired by political elites
themselves. Among the reasons given is a possible misjudging of
popular sentiment. Survey research would certainly be one way for
elites to ascertain the validity of this point, and, if true, then
systematic regulation of the tempo of economic change might not be
ruled out in states confronting a precarious political situation
internally.

Hagen rejects the idea that there is a positive correlation
between the beginning of economic growth and political instability.
The "awakening of the masses", their growing awareness of the
possibility of change, he argues has been brought to them "by the
course of history; it is surely almost entirely independent of
economic growth.[51] But even if economic growth is one of the
contributory causes of this awakening, the remedy is not to curtail
or to forego growth. On the contrary,

> "....awareness that they are not powerless will surely
> reach the peasant and worker in the absence of economic
> change, even if slightly late, and their reaction will
> be the more extreme if nothing has previously been done
> to indicate that the world has regard for them.
> Opportunities for economic growth that reach the dis-
> contented groups are surely a counteragent to political
> instability, though they may be an insufficient counter-
> agent if the accumulated bitterness has grown too great."[52]

Thus, the Hagen counterhypothesis is that economic growth which
creates new economic opportunities for the discontented groups in
a society lessens the tendency for radical political activity to
follow.

A final consideration is both the disposition and the capacity
of individuals and groups to accommodate themselves to the hard
realities of life. The "revolution of rising expectations" may
indeed lead to a "revolution of rising frustrations", but the
latter does not necessarily lead to actual revolution. Any
number of examples--historical and contemporaneous--can be found
of individuals and categories of persons who, by all objective
criteria, should be on the brink of revolutionary violence or
bitterly alienated, but who are nonetheless disposed and capable
of adjusting themselves to disappointment and only partial
fulfillment of their original expectations. This imponderable
in human nature is all to frequently overlooked. In the painful
choices political leaders must make it is admittedly a calculated
risk to base decisions on the assumption of accommodation rather
than revolution, but dedicated and inspired (and inspiring)
leadership itself can frequently ensure that the dice are loaded
in favor of accommodation.

The third selected issue concerns the effect of economic growth
upon political integration. This has been brilliantly examined
by economist Elliot Berg in his effort to explain postwar political
developments in former French West Africa, and particularly to
explain why differential political choices were made at certain
critical junctures. He found the economic factor unquestionably

dominant at each crisis point. Underlying these complex
political events, he argues, "is a set of economic circumstances
which have given shape to the political decisions made; in West
Africa, as elsewhere, political choice is conditioned by the
nature of the economic environment in which it takes place".[53]
The unequal economic development among the various territories of
French West Africa was the decisive factor in the political choic
which resulted in the subsequent political fragmentation of that
vast stretch of the African continent.

Economic growth can also have a politically dysfunctional
effect as a result of its uneven impact in an ethnically pluralis
context.   It can not only perpetuate, but all too frequently it
intensifies, tensions among different ethnic, regional, and paroc.
groups.   Before planned economic growth is launched existing gro
and regions are not only at a different level of economic
development, but they have differential capacities for further
development.   Those already more developed have an inherent
advantage over those that are less developed.   As Adam Curle has
noted, "It is a sad fact that, once the process of development ·
starts in one sector of a society, the inequalities within that
society tend to increase....Trade, labour and enterprise are apt
to move towards the progressive areas, leaving the poor zones
still poorer".[54]   The net result of this natural operation of
economic forces invariably tends to be heightened ethnicity, and
sometimes even political separatism.

The foregoing issues illustrate the many areas of public
policy and problems of nation-building where the practical and the
theoretical concerns of the political scientist and the economist
converge.   They provide a basis for a potentially fruitful
dialogue, in which one would hope the purism of the economist and
the dilettantism of the political scientist might be somewhat
reduced.   Whether there is enough there yet for a new subfield
having the badge of "political economy of development" is a
question that must remain open.

NOTES

1. Aaron Wildavsky, "Private Markets and Public Arenas", in
The American Behavioral Scientist, IX (September, 1965), p.33. He
bases his argument on the interesting work by economists Downs,
Black, Buchanan and Tulloch; as well as organization theorists such
as Barnard, Simon and March. He argues (at p.33) "The politics
of coalitions, reliance upon feedback mechanisms, avoidance of costly
procedures of calculation, all may be said to characterize
governmental bureaucracies as well as private firms". It should be
noted that Wildavsky, and the economists he includes, are
exclusively concerned with the convergence in the preoccupations
of scholars studying highly complex advanced industrial societies,
and not the developing areas.

2. It has been suggested that there are eight ideal ingredients
of a discipline: disciplinary self-consciousness; a body of classic
works; specialization of personnel within the field in terms of
commonly agreed-upon subfields; an easily differentiated subject
matter; a body of generalizations or abstractions; concepts
peculiar to the field of study; generally accepted and relatively
standardized methods of analysis by means of which to confirm or
invalidate theories; and a body of data and accessible, possibly
indexed, reports of data. Cyril Roseman, et al, _Dimensions of
Political Analysis_ (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp.4-6. Most social
science disciplines would not meet all of these criteria. Political
Science would probably have the lowest score.

3. Frederick S. Dunn, "The Scope of International Relations",
World Politics, I (Oct., 1948), p.142 Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, _The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ (University of Chicago Press,
1962, who observes (at p.4) "the early developmental stages of most
sciences have been characterized by continual competition between
a number of distinct views of nature".

4. Being relaxed about disciplinary boundaries and the nomen-
clature for clusters of scholars focussing on a particular scientific
problem at a given moment is only being realistic in the present
stage of development of the social sciences. In developing the
rationale for the hybrid subfield of "economic sociology" Neil J.
Smelser observes (at p.23 of his _The Sociology of Economic Life_
(Prentice-Hall, 1963) "...the analytic distinctions we make are
bound to be controversial. All who call themselves economists
(econometricians, labor economists, institutional economists, some
economic historians) do not agree about the precise nature of
economics; all who call themselves sociologists (demographers,
historians of social thought, small-group analysts, some social
psychologists) are even more divided about their own field". Again,
in commenting upon the emerging hybrid field of "political anthro-
pology", David Easton noted that such a subfield did not exist and
would not exist until a great many conceptual problems are solved;
nevertheless, he continued to use the term as a rubric under which
to discuss the range of phenomena and problems of common interest
to political scientists and anthropologists.

5. James S. Coleman and Emory Bundy, "Applied Political Science
Research and Development", Unpublished Conference Paper, USSC First
Annual Conference, 3-9 January 1966.

6. "Political Science", in Bert F. Hoselitz (Ed.), _A Reader's
Guide to the Social Sciences_ (Free Press, 1959), p.91.

7. Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics,
Past and Present", in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, _Comparative
Politics_ (Free Press, 1963), p.25.

8. Coleman and Bundy, op.cit., pp.4-5.

9. Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960), pp.5-64.

10. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Little Brown: 1965), p.105, pp.31-48. Cf. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Little Brown: 1966).

11. Ibid., pp.34.

12. Ibid., pp.35-37.

13. Ibid., pp.39-40.

14. Ibid., p.37.

15. J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods", World Politics, XVIII (April, 1966), p.420.

16. Ibid., p.423.

17. Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., "Economics and the Underdeveloped Economies", The American Behavioral Scientist, IX I (Sept., 1965), pp. 3 and 5. Italics added.

18. Hughes Leclercq and Robert L. West, "Economic Research and Development in Tropical Africa, Social Research, 32 (Autumn, 1965), pp. 307-308.

19. Walter T. Newlyn, "The Present State of African Economic Studies", African Affairs (Spring, 1965), p.39.

20. Manning Nash, "Approaches to the Study of Economic Growth", Journal of Social Issues, XIV (Jan., 1963), No.1, p.2.

21. Ibid., p.2.

22. Ibid., p.3.

23. Newlyn, op. cit., p.48.

24. Lloyd A. Fallers, "Social Stratification and Economic Processes", Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz (Eds.), Economic Transition in Africa (Northwestern University Press: 1964), pp.126, 127, 129, 130.

25. The most penetrating analysis of the relevance of traditional cultural traits for modern behavior is Igor Kopytoff's "Socialism and Traditional African Societies", in William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., African Socialism (Stanford University Press, 1964), pp.53-62.

26. Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Institutional Framework for Economic Development", in Hebrew University, The Challenge of Development (Jerusalem: 1958).

27. T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (New York: 1964), p.130.

28. Quoted in Ibid., p.134.

29. Newlyn, op.cit., p.44.

Blah

30. Andrew Kamarck, "Economics and Economic Development" in Robert A. Lystad, The African World (Praeger: 1965), p.241.

31. Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia (Princeton University Press: 1960), p.301. Wolf was here referring to Asian nationalism and the new states of Asia, but the same situation prevails in Africa.

32. Wilfred Malenbaum, "Economic Factors and Political Development", The Annals (March, 1965), pp.42-43.

33. Gunnar Myrdal in his Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions singles out nationalism as the principal effective force in the economic growth of underdeveloped countries.

34. Neil J. Smelser, "Toward a Theory of Modernization", in Amitai Etzioni (Ed.), Social Change (Basic Books, New York: 1964), p.273. He adds that they should not, however, take their enthusiasm too literally. They should practice flexible politics behind the facade of an inflexible commitment to a national mission (p.274).

35. Glen D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics", John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (Eds.), Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change (McGraw-Hill Book Co.: 1966), pp.49-58.

36. Herbert J. Spiro, Africa: The Primacy of Politics (Random House: 1966). At p.152 he asserts that "In virtually every historical instance, substantive change in economy, society, culture, or elsewhere was brought about by political action".

37. This summary draws heavily upon Neil Smelser's historical survey of how key economic thinkers have viewed the polity-economy relationship. See Smelser, op.cit., pp.4-12.

38. Quoted from Paige, op.cit., p.50, to whom I am indebted for illuminating this particular phenomenon of which we are all aware but needed Fesler to make the point.

39. Elliot J. Berg, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78 (November 1964), pp.558-560.

40. Tony Killick, "Making Ghana Grow Again", West Africa (August 20, 1966), pp.937-938.

41. "Ghana's Economic Legacy", West Africa, November 5, 1966, p.1259.

42. William Kapp, "Economic Development, National Planning, and Public Administration", Kyklos, XIII (1960), p.172.

43. Albert O. Hirschman, "Comments on 'A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change'", in The Brookings Institution, Development of the Emerging Countries (Washington: 1962), p.41. He continues, "I believe with Gerschenkron that the only generalization one can make about the development of latecomers is that they will not follow the sequence of their predecessors, but will insist on changing it around or on skipping entirely some stages as well as some 'preconditions'".

44. David E. Bell, "Allocating Development Resources: Some Observations Based on Pakistan Experience", Public Policy: Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration (Harvard University Press: 1959), pp.104-105.

45. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), pp.69-105; James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas", in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: 1960), pp.532-544; and Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change", in The Brookings Institution, op.cit., pp.1-38.

46. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.21 and 23.

47. Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton University Press, 1961), p.39.

48. Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force", The Journal of Economic History, XXIII (December, 1963), pp.530-531. See also, Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, op.cit., pp.39-42; Charles Wolf, Jr., op.cit., pp.296 ff.; Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics (Methuen: 1966), p.102; and Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India", Dissent, 8 (Spring, 1961), pp.172-179.

49. Olson, op.cit., pp.530-541.

50. Eckstein, op.cit., p.42.

51. Hagen, op.cit., p.37.

52. Ibid., p.37.

53. Elliot J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa", The American Political Science Review, LIV (1960), pp.391-405.

54. Adam Curle, The Role of Education in Developing Societies, (Ghana University Press, 1961), pp.7-8.

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION
A RADICAL ANALYSIS

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Certain historians are inclined to view the political awakening of Asia and Africa as part of an ongoing, worldwide, social revolution, previously inaugurated in Europe and America. In that perspective, colonial nationalism and its aftermath appears to involve primarily another "revolt of the masses," another rising of the "great unwashed," another "search for status" by the lower classes of the world.[1]

The idea of a universal revolutionary trend is mainly derived from the doctrine of progress. Persons who entertain that optimistic view of history also tend to believe in the inevitability of emancipation through social conflict. Frankly, that is my personal predisposition. In broad outline, the revolt against colonial and semi-colonial domination does appear to validate a doctrinaire conception of the stages of emancipation. First of all, there is a struggle against alien and racial domination. Typically, leadership of the national independence movement is assumed by a national bourgeoisie, which proceeds to exploit its newly acquired political power to its own advantage. Then class divisions within the new nation are nakedly exposed, leading to class conflict and, in time, the reconstruction of society.

An objective appraisal of the postcolonial world will reveal at least one flaw in this sanguine prognosis that is fully appreciated by realistic observers. Mass movements in most of the new nations do not commonly follow the lines of class division. The major forms of mass action in the "developing" countries of Africa and Asia are communal, tribal, and religious movements that conform to vertical social divisions between historic "peoples," religious communities, and cultural nationality groups.[2] In short, the classic social revolution is likely to be intercepted and diverted off course by powerful forces that cast doubt on the inevitability of social progress.

Realistically, political scientists have tried to comprehend the twin issues of social deprivation and parochial separatism together. The concept of national integration has been defined to satisfy that need.[3] But the twin issues are nonetheless difficult to relate with theoretical precision and the elusive linkages between class action and cultural nationalism in particular continue to pose major problems of social theory. One analytic response is to minimize the importance of class action and focus upon the mediation of inter-community relations by various functional elites, e.g., teachers, civil servants, politicians, soldiers, communications specialists, etc. That approach is widely favoured by political scientists today. Its value will be questioned in this paper, which advocates an alternative approach in terms of class analysis. I will try to show the relevance of class analysis to the search for solutions to great issues of national integration in Africa.

"Nation-Building"

Insofar as national integration contemplates the creation of higher loyalties that supercede parochial loyalties to subnational communities, tribes, language groups, or regions, it is a universally acclaimed goal of the African renaissance. Even the most fervent advocates of Pan-African unity do accept national integration as a necessary and positive step toward ever-widening spheres of integration on the African continent.

On the other hand, national integration has also been interpreted to contemplate the establishment of durable national sovereignties at the expense of wider regional or continental unities. Need we remark that the uses of significant ideas vary with the value orientations of those who use them? In this case, thinkers and scholars who value order and stability above all are apt to concentrate on the need to create viable authorities in the existing nation-states. It may not matter much to them if the nations concerned, acting individually or collectively, are capable of exerting only minimal influence in world politics. Indeed, a conservative value orientation may actually favour the perpetuation of existing patterns of statehood and, logically, the present balance of power in the world.

These observations may point to a hidden difference of meaning between two related terms that have been used interchangeably, namely, "national integration" and "nation-building." The former is an expansive concept, implying the creation of durable bonds of unity within a state that are not, however, detrimental to Pan-African or other regional unities.[4] The latter term, "nation-building," may make a fetish of national sovereignty to the detriment of supranational integration. Those authors who have used this concept without prejudice to the goal of international political unity may object that it need not be interpreted so narrowly. That objection should be respected so long as the divergence of thought on an important issue is recognized.

As a rule, the value orientations of scholars affect their use of ideas indirectly through the medium of their methodological approaches. At present, the most influential approach to the study of political development is probably structural-functional analysis. That approach, inspired by the sociology of Talcott Parsons, teaches that in any social system, or sub-system therefo, e.g., political system, certain crucial functions must be performed for the system to survive. Structural-functional analysis is ideally conceived to foster the comparative method of study. It requires the formulation of functional categories that lead to the discovery of functional equivalents between societies that differ in respect of their institutions. The

functionally equivalent structures of diverse societies can then be compared on the basis of their relative efficiencies in the performance of various functions.[5]

It is sometimes alleged that structural-functional analysis has a built-in conservative bias because of its focus on the conditions required to perpetuate the system under examination. Be that as it may, the survival of a system, as Edmund Burke insisted, implies an ability to accept change. An approach that is primarily concerned with the conditions that permit a system to survive cannot fail to value change. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the structural-functional approach is eminently well-suited to the study of social change, including national integration in the developing areas.[6] While the functional approach does not exclude the logical adoption of "radical" analyses which emphasize the revolutionary possibilities of change, its tendency to assume the survival of whatever system is being studied does appear to load the ideological dice on the conservative side. Too often, we fail to appreciate that the adoption of a particular mode of social analysis implies some acceptance of the ideology that lies behind it. In today's Africa, an undue emphasis on the existing state system is likely to promote a conservative outlook that cannot easily accommodate the radical values of liberation, economic freedom, and continental unity.

Functional approaches to the analysis of political development rely heavily upon the invention of categories for the purpose of classification. Familiar examples drawn from recent work on political parties include the "ideological party," the "party of integration," and the "party of solidarity." Such categories, based on functional criteria, are used to predict the probable effects of various party-types upon the systems within which they function. Categories relating to other institutions, e.g., "modernizing bureaucracy," and whole-system categories, e.g., "tutelary democracy," have also been conceived. These categories may have great analytic value. At the same time, as these examples suggest, there is a pronounced tendency in functional analysis to extend the method of classification into the treacherous realm of prediction, and to judge institutions on the basis of their presumed probable consequences. The focus of concern shifts away from what an institution or system is, away from what it does today, to the presumed result of its performance. Critical judgments of the effect of a system on the present generation may then be suspended in deference to what it may be expected to produce sometime in the future. In this respect, functional analysis tends to share the moral approach of Marxism and other forms of historicism which justify today's evil as the price that must be paid for tomorrow's good.[7]

At the very least, it can be said that functionalist thought in political science is not normally associated with social criticism and poses little threat of exposure to those who control the institutions of national power. It might also be remarked that the "new school" of political science in America, now so influential the world over, has, for all its scientific refinement, largely failed to grapple with the deepening social and political problems of American society. Is that approach now destined for adoption by political scientists in the newly developing countries?

Class Analysis

Studies of political development that do not adopt structural-functional or systems analysis are likely to focus upon the actions of social groups or classes. One school of thought, influential in the study of American politics, has found that social equilibrium is the result of competition between groups for economic and political goods. Other "conflict" theories, inspired by the work of Georg Simmel, have the same general import.[8] Marxian thought suggests an approach in terms of class action including the dynamics of class formation. The present writer prefers that approach to others.[9]

In the absence of a "system" orientation, functional explanations of political behaviour may be less rewarding than other types of scientific explanation. In particular, causal and "genetic" or historical explanations come to the fore.[10] The logic of a causal approach that also emphasizes class analysis is not by any means intrinsically superior to that of a functional approach that emphasizes systems analysis. Many factors affect one's choice of an approach; they include one's value orientation, training, and perceptions of disciplinary goals, among other things. In what follows, an attempt will be made to indicate briefly the relevance of class analysis to some problems of national integration.

Tribalism is widely supposed to be the most formidable barrier to national unity in Africa. Nearly every African state has at least one serious problem of ethnic or regional separatism. It is less frequently recognized that tribal movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men of power in furtherance of their own special interests, which are, time and again, the constitutive interests of emerging social classes. Tribalism then becomes a mask for class privilege. To borrow a worn metaphor, there is often a nontraditional wolf under the tribal sheepskin.

Nigeria affords an illuminating example. The major nationalist parties in that country served to promote the selfish and patriotic ends of the Nigerian bourgeoisie. Each party secured its power in a region of the country by appealing to ethnic sensibilities among other means. Under a federal system of government, each party was able to consolidate its power by exploiting regional government resources. Privileged class interests, entrenched in the regions, have been opposed to any fundamental transformation of the regional power system. Time and again, they have been willing to perpetuate electoral fraud at the risk violence and secession in order to prevent radical political changes. Tribalism has been their most trustworthy weapon against change.

An analysis along these lines does not underestimate the intensity of tribal conflict. It does suggest that tribalism should be viewed as a dependent variable rather than a primordial political force in the new nation. Political tensions in Nigeria, as in other African states, have not been purely tribal. They involve the penetration of tribal elements by other social forces, as, for example, in cases of conflict between groups of settlers and sons of the soil in urban areas. Jealousies excited when industrious settlers appear to monopolize jobs and commercial opportunities in a poor section of the country are especially inflammable when political tension is high.

In all underdeveloped countries, where the traumas of secularization are strong, the potential for violence is great. In Africa, violent passions flow easily into tribalistic channels. It is not very meaningful to say that a particular nation has been disrupted by tribalism. Political science should seek deeper to find the root causes of tension and violence. For the most part, journalists are content to cry "tribalism," and the opinions of journalists weigh heavily on the student of contemporary history. It takes intellectual courage and a measure of theoretical conviction to resist them. The tyranny of day-by-dayism(or journalistic scholarship) is not less stultifying to political science than the older Africanist tyranny of administrative scholarship. Deference to the stereotypes of the mass media can be as short-sighted today as deference to the biases of colonial administrators has been in the past.

A second problem area in which class analysis may be useful has to do with the contribution of civil servants and military officials to national unity. In Africa today, the new ruling classes are based on power, wealth, and opportunity for personal achievement. The criteria of inclusion include high status occupation, high income, control of wealth-producing enterprises, and superior education. An approach

in terms of class analysis does not necessarily imply the existence
of major class conflict. Class formation is more significant than
class conflict as a form of class action in contemporary Africa. Intra-
class conflict is supremely important. It occurs in a form that has
been imperfectly described by many students as generational conflict.
The explanation, simply, is that most of the incumbent political
leaders belong to the nationalist generation that led the independence
movement, while most of the younger civil servants and junior army
officers belong to a more sophisticated development generation. Fre-
quently, the younger men have little real or personal knowledge of
the complexities of the freedom movement, less respect for the
abilities of their seniors, and no tolerance at all for their techni-
cal and other foibles. In many new states, bureaucrats and military
officers have conspired to seize power. Sometimes this is done under
the misleading banner of revolutionary class struggle.

Class analysis will indicate that such a claim is rarely if
ever true. All that has happened is the overthrow of one section of
the ruling class by a somewhat younger, more efficient, and possibly
more idealistic section, a commonplace in history. No one should
expect a social revolution to ensue. Where in the Third World have
such technocrats ever shown an ability to reconstruct their societies?
If anything, they tend to be further removed from populist and re-
volutionary values than their predecessors of the freedom generation.
They commit gross political errors, become demoralized, fall to fight-
ing among themselves, and allow the old vices of their class to revive.

A sound analysis might reveal the inherent limitations of the
technocratic intelligentsia and spotlight the necessity to combat its
antidemocratic tendency of social exclusiveness. It might also be
seen that the coup d'etat is no substitute for serious efforts to re-
solve fundamental political problems.

Finally, class analysis may expose bogus claims that are made
in support of many one-party states. Often one-party states in develop-
ing countries are justified by their leaders and supporters as being
workers and peasants dictatorships, dictatorships of the whole people,
or workers and peasants democracies. Alternatively, they have been
condoned on functional grounds in view of their assumed probable con-
tributions to national development, irrespective of the current costs
they are known to exact in liberty and democracy. These arguments
have been challenged by the late Frantz Fanon, who has alleged that
most of the African one-party states are, in fact, crass bourgeois
dictatorships that actually retard national development.[11] General
statements of this kind have their prudent exceptions. But it is

beyond dispute that in certain one-party states the political leader-
ship is accurately described as the core element of a privileged
class that profits from its monopoly of power at the expense of the
people. One-party states may, of course, be so organized that they
do really serve the needs of the people in a developing country. Too
often, however, the one-party regime shields an incumbent leadership
from justifiably telling criticisms of its conduct. Political
scientists should not rely upon the genius of insightful non-political
scientists, like Fanon, to describe the realities that lie behind
those deceptive facades.

The Critical Spirit

I have criticized the "functional" approach to political
development on two related grounds. First, its tendency to foster
a conservative value orientation by virtue of its focus upon the
requirements of existing state and social systems. I do not mean to
push this criticism too far. An individual follower of the function-
al school may not have any personal commitment to the system under
examination. One may choose to adopt a "systems" approach on purely
scientific grounds, e.g., to determine precisely the functional
properties of institutions, to facilitate comparative analysis, to
promote theoretical knowledge in this direction, etc. Nonetheless,
we should be aware of the argument that some important questions of
radical import are likely to escape due notice by the functional
school. If we think that social and political problems today cry out
for radical solutions, we may prefer a school of analysis that is
geared to the study of social conflict and deprivation. I have en-
tered a claim for class analysis. The types of explanation normally
associated with it and other forms of "conflict theory" are no less
scientific in nature than functional approaches. In any case, the
logical and typological virtues for which the functional approach
is justly reknowned may have little relation to current human needs.
For that reason, "systems analysis" in political science may truly
deserve to be known as "the new scholasticism."[12]

My second objection to the functional school is its tendency
to shy away from all normative criticisms of existing institutions.
If certain practices are deemed to be "functional" in regard to the
maintenance of a system, the human costs of such practices in liberty
or happiness may be overlooked or countenanced as being somehow
necessary. For that reason, I have suggested that the moral implica-
tions of functional analysis are similar to those of historicism,

which holds that since certain developments are inevitable, the means chosen to accomplish them cannot be condemned on purely ethical grounds.

Thus I have advocated an approach to political analysis which may be termed Marxian (if only for lack of a better shorthand expression), but I have rejected the historicist approach to ethical theory, of which Marxism is one example. In fact, however, there are two different ethical traditions in Marxian thought -- the historicist and the humanist.[13] The former has been used to justify tyrannies for the sake of assumed progress. The latter tends in the opposite direction to engender searchingly critical appraisals of institutions from the standpoint of their present effects on human beings. Traditionally, political science has fostered a similarly critical outlook on government. Traditional political science is truly and honorably described as a "muckraking" discipline. For political science to abdicate its critical function in a fit of system-oriented, nation-building zeal would be a tragedy for both the discipline and the public interest.

In new nations the need for critical perspectives on existing institutions is not less desperate than in older states. Critical scholarship might well contribute substantially to the causes of national and regional integration. For example, most new nations are dependent upon the Western industrial powers for the basic ingredients of their national development programs. The forms of such dependence are multiple; technical, financial, commercial, intellectual, and military. A functional approach to national integration, focusing upon the particular nation-state as a system-in-being, tends to point up the beneficial effects of such dependence upon that system's development. By contrast, a class analysis is more likely to show relationships between the rulers of the new nation and their foreign patrons. Clearly, the existing patterns of external dependence influence the patterns of social and political development in new nations. It has also been suggested that economic dependence upon Western capitalism will actually hinder the development and disrupt the integration of underdeveloped countries by "integrating" important sectors of their economic and social structures with the dominant, foreign-based socio-economic system.[14] That and similar hypotheses deserve careful consideration.

Even the problems of tribalism in Africa may be related to the forms of external dependence. In his memoir of the Katanga rebellion, Conor Cruise O'Brien remarks on the curious fact that the Baluba of the Kasai abandoned secession and made peace with the

Lulua people when American policy came down decisively in favour of
a unified Congo. This happened, he notes, after the Kennedy Adminis-
tration took office. O'Brien speculates that Baluba attitudes might
have been influenced by American companies that have mining interests
in the Kasai. He quips that it may be a traditional custom of the
Kasai tribes to fight one another when the Republicans are in power
in Washington, but to live in peace under Democratic Administratio .
tions.[15] I do not know enough to verify these notions, which may be
far fetched, but they seem to suggest a possibly fruitful line of
political research.

Finally, a critical school of political science might help
to refurbish the waning idealism of university students and promote
its development along socially constructive lines. It is a fact, to
which many university teachers in Africa will attest, that the vast
majority of African students today are first and foremost job seekers
who aspire to well paid, high-status, materially comfortable occupa-
tions.[16] No doubt they are also nationalistic. But nationalism
without idealism can become as routinized and empty of radical mean-
ing as French Socialism. Fanon has warned that a generation that
fails to cope effectively with the problems of society will seek
solace in escapist, reactionary, and racialist forms of nationalism
which obscure the causes of its failure and accomplish little of
lasting value. That kind of nationalism is the weak echo of a
lost ideal. A school of political science that frankly fosters
social criticism may help to bring African nationalism back from
despondency to the path of creative idealism.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Isaiah Berlin, <u>Two Concepts of Liberty</u> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) pp.42-44; and Edward Hallett Carr, <u>The New Society</u> (London: Macmillan, 1951).

2. W. Arthur Lewis has written in this vein: "Plurality is the principal political problem of most of the new states created in the twentieth century. Most of them include people who differ from each other in language or tribe or religion or race; some of these groups live side by side in a long tradition of mutual hostility, restrained in the past only by a neutral imperial power. French writers use the word 'cleavage' to describe a situation where people are mutually antipathetic, not because they disagree on matters of principle, like liberals and socialists, or because they have different interests, like capitalists and workers, but simply because they are historic enemies, Cleavage cannot be overcome merely by argument and economic concessions, as in the traditional British manner, because it is not based on disputes about principles or interests. Hence it is the most difficult of all political problems." <u>Politics in West Africa</u> (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), p.66.

3. "For our purposes," write James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., "<u>national</u> integration is regarded as a broad subsuming process, whose two major dimensions are (1) <u>political</u> integration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community, and (2) <u>territorial</u> integration, which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community." <u>Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa</u> (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 8-9.

4. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania has perceived this difference clearly: "....in order to avoid internal conflict and further disunity each nation state is forced to promote its own nationhood. This does not only involve teaching a loyalty to a particular unit, and a particular flag - although that is serious enough. It also involves deliberately organising one part of Africa economically, socially and constitutionally to serve the overall interests of the people of that part of Africa and (in case of conflict) not the interests either of another part of Africa or of Africa as a whole." An address at the installation of President Kaunda as Chancellor of the University of Zambia, July 12, 1966. This thought-provoking address elaborates on the contradiction between Pan-Africanism and nationalism in Africa. President Nyerere's observations were not wholly pessimistic about Pan-African prospects. Thus: "It is not impossible to achieve African unity through nationalism, just as it was not impossible for various tribal associations or tribally based parties to merge themselves into one nationalist movement." The present writer takes a similar view of national integration as an expansive idea that transcends existing national sovereignties.

5. This approach is advocated for the study of developing countries by Gabriel A. Almond in his notable essay, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64. A comparable exposition of "systems analysis" is David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

6. See, for example, David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965).

7. There is a current fad of in-group criticism in Africanist circles reproaching Western scholars who have previously defended one-party regimes that have since fallen from popular grace. The criticism is misdirected against allegedly patronizing Afrophile sentimentalism that is said to have done a disservice to both Africa and scholarship by lending intellectual respectability to ordinary dictatorships. Unfortunately, books in this field are too often judged for their conclusions instead of their analytic qualities. Some of the best books that have spoken well of African one-party states are not at all patronizingly Afrophile. They are plainly objective from a functionalist point of view.

8. See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956). A comparable work in the field of social anthropology is Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955).

9. The main theme of my own substantive work concerns the political implications of class formation in Nigeria. Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

10. See the discussion of these types of explanation in Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 116-25.

11. "The single party is the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous, and cynical." Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p. 133.

12. Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 89-110.

13. See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 26-27, following, on this point Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

14. See Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. 190-98.

15. To Katanga and Back (London: Hutchison, 1962), pp.

16. The recent example of 400 university students in Tanzania demonstrating in protest against two years of national service at reduced salaries is symptomatic. The <u>Times of Zambia</u> commented acidly on their behaviour:

"The youngsters feel that the ordeal of passing examinations entitles them to membership of a new 'merito-cracy.' They forget about men who studied in prison, when they could get the books, or snatched an hour with book and candle between sessions of political organisation and dodging the colonial police.

"The great danger is that they may forget the ideals and objectives for which their fathers and elder brothers fought.

"Among these objectives was the education, at State expense, the students are now enjoying. More than that, is the ideal of societies where one class does not prey on others as leeches of laziness." <u>Times of Zambia</u>, October 26, 1966.

POLITICAL SCIENCE, BUREAUCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT.

Political scientists are likely to focus increasing attention on problems of bureaucracy l and public administration in African The concern with African administration is not a new one and has roots which extend to the earliest political literature in African studies, Raymond L. Buell's THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN AFRICA and Lord Hailey's monumental AFRICAN SURVEY. Between the World Wars and until nationalist activity began to disrupt the stability of the colonial system, the orientation of research was largely towards formal aspects of colonial administration, direct vs. indirect rule, district administration, and the creation of African local governments. The primary subjects of   . Political Scientists' attention were the relationship between these diverse structural arrangements and the extent to which such structures could be viewed as a 'training ground' in democratic practices. 2

When nationalism displaced public administration as the principal focus of political research, primary attention was given to the causes and variant forms of anti-colonial protest, the organization and ideology of independence movements, and, to a certain extent, the political consequences of mobilizing rural populations. The contemporary carry-over of the concern with nationalism is the study of 'nation-builiding'. Awareness that many of the fundamental pre-requisites of a stable national polity are simply not present in most newly independent African states is, in fact, likely to make 'national integration' a predominant concern of Political Science for some time to come. The importance of this point is that revived interest in African bureaucracies will be far more influenced by the literature on nation-building and political development than by the historic studies of administration in Africa. The guiding perspectives of the new research have already become clear: the functions of bureaucrac as a vehicle of development, its relationship to broad processes of social and cultural modernization and its role in the institutionalization or breakdown of extra-bureaucratic governmental structures.

The reasons for the resurgence of attention to public administration in Africa are many and varied. Some pertain to the changing character of the subject matter of political research. The are of nationalism has ended and been replaced by a period of turbulence and instability. In a political context in which institutional forms shift abruptly, and in which representative structures of government have an evanescent quality, bureaucracy seems to offer at least one stable and persisting sector of the political arena. Moreover, there can be little doubt that as conciliar structures decline or disappear, bureaucracies, military and civil, take on a dramatically heightened political role.

Part of the increasing preoccupation with bureaucracy is traceable to the shifting concern of African leadership. African leaders have become primarily concerned with the processes and methods of achieving 'development', a task which seems to require the specialised techinical skills that only administrators or economists possess. Even in those societies where massive human mobilization is viewed as major method of achieving change, this is frequently regarded as a measure to be employed in accordance with the advice and recommendations of the administrative class.

Another aspect of the canging political arena which has impelled
Political Scientists to focus their attention on the administrative
sector is the increasing unwillingness of host countries to entertain
research on politically 'sensitive' subjects. Historically the Political
Scientist in Africa has enjoyed unparalleled access: he has been given
the use of confidential documents, treated with frankness and openness
in interview relationships, and, in general, has had his research
facilitated by politicians and administrators to a far greater degree
than might be the case in his onwn society. Even today researchers
involved in rural and district research frequently experience wholehe-
arted cordiality and hospitality in the course oftheir investigations,
and the extent to which some Political Scientists are made privy to
delicate matters of stateeven at the national level is often astoni-
shing. African governments do exhibit, however, a rapidly increasing
tendency to set boundaries about certain areas of national political
life in order to insulate them from political ideological cleavages
among national leadership, and problems of internal securityare the most
obvious examples of such'enclosed' areas in certain countries. This
closure has funneled research progressively away from party politics
towards the more 'neutral' area of public administration.

The Tendency towards closure is, in part, a product of a natural
desire for secrecy regarding delicate matters affecting the stability and
policies of a regime, Political Scientists have grown fully accustomed
to living with the notion that there is an area of governmental privacy
beyond the purview of even the most legitimate research in their own soci
eties and certainly there can be little disagreement on the point that
any government has wright to distinguish appropriate from inappropri-
ate areas of political investigation. There may be impatience and
vexation at where the boundary is drawn, but only the most presumptuous
would assert that the legitimacy of political research overrides all
considerations of secrecy.

A second and more disturbing reason for the tendency towards
closure relates to the behavior of political scientists themselves,
specifically the possibility that governmental intelligence work is
being concealed in the guise of research. The 'Project Camelot'
episode, and other incidents in which researchers have admitted to
being contacted by (and in one or two cases actually working for
intelligence agencies buttresses the suspicion that political research
in particular may be used to conceal aspionage. A recent circular issued
by one African government articulated this suspicion quite openly when it
stated that the need for "checks and controls" on research arose from"the
possibility that, under the guise of research, confidential intelligence
might be gathered for use for a foreign power".(sic) The fact that most
political researchers in Africa are in fact of alien national origin can
do little to allay this fear.

Sheer indiscretion on the part of a few field investigators
has also contributed to growing governmental defensiveness. There have
already been several cases in which the privilege of access to govern-
mental materials has been abused by individuals who have published inf-
ormation embarrassing to governmental leaders and organizations. A more s
subtle but quite pervasive form of abuse has been the simple failure to
make available copies of the research product to those who helped make
it possible. Whether Political Scientists as a group can take collective
measures to helpcorrect these situations in order to safeguard the
interests of future researchers, or whether the essentially free enterprise
character of field investigation, scholarly competition among univer-
sities abroad and publication pressures on individual scholars make
collective restraint impossible, is problematical.

In an atmosphere of increasing concern with secrecy on the part of
host governments, bureaucracy, or public administration, seems to offer
the Political Scientist a conveniently neutral, non-sensitive, subject

for research. Moreover, if it is true, as LaPalombara has stated, that in developing countries "the bureaucratic arena will almost invariably reproduce in microcosm many of the basic political conflicts that characterize the developing system itself", the study of public administration offers very much the same overall knowledge of the total political system that studies of party and ethnic conflict held in the past.

Research in public administration also dovetails nicely with the changing mood of political science. As the exuberant optimism of the nationalist era is replaced by a sober confrontation with the dilemmas and complexities of the development process, numerous political scientists articulate an interest in 'policy-relevant' research. Since administrative organs play such a critical role in achieving development, any research with the potential of identifying problems in the national administrative apparatus promises to help facilitate developmental goals. The political scientists' desire to make a contribution to African development is not surprising. It stems from an of viable and responsible institutional arrangements under civil leadership. Despite widespread claims to the conduct of scientific, value-neutral research, the overwhelming majority of political scientists retain a commitment to the ideal of representative government.

One factor which distinguishes political science from other disciplines is the extent to which political scientists themselves sustain an on-going dialogue over the merits of 'pure'vs. 'applied' (or policy-relevant) research, and indeed, debate at length over whether the distinction between the two is a valid one. Neither economics nor history, for example, seem to exhibit any great crisis over these issues. Economists seem sublimely secure in the extent to which they can safely assume that virtually any field research project will have immediately valuable ramifications of vital interest to planners and other high officials in government circles. Historians, on the other hand, seem under no particular compulsion to make their studies of iron age archaeology or ancient kingdoms and empires relevant to the policy formulations of the new states. The reason for the on-going debate within political science over the 'pure' vs. 'applied' issue may well lie in the extent to which political science, of all disciplines, seems to be experiencing difficulty in maintaining open channels for research. Certainly one of the most compelling arguments behind the 'applied' school, if one assumes the validity of the pure-applied dichotomy, is the promise that applied research will establish a degree of credibility and legitimacy for political science inquiry, and thereby ensure or facilitate continued access to the political system.

Despite the importance of the pure vs. applied debate, increasing attention to bureaucracy in Africa is probably far less a matter of expediency (establishing legitimacy and ensuring access) than it is a product of the tendency of virtually any regional study to become internally specialised and differentiated. Pioneering area research tend to be general and comprehensive in its approach; later, such research is characteristically supplemented by studies of a more narrowly focussed sort, both in the sense that local and district studies tend to follow national studies, and in the sense that particular institutional structures or behavior patterns are singled out for special attention This pattern has already occurred in Asian studies, for example. If one can describe a 'developed' research pattern for a given region of the world, then it seems to consist of a heterogeneous assortment of research enterprises occurring simultaneously and continuously, with a high degree of interaction between comprehensive national studies, specialised monographic work, and a fairly abstract theoretical literature. The vast bulk of political research in Africa to date has been of many more or less general sort and has consisted primarily of national studies of independence movements and political parties.

A pattern of differentiation is clearly discernible as present
researchers turn towards local case studies and a more specialised
focus within the national setting. Research on bureaucracy in
African states will be an integral part of this differentiation.

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.

It is of utmost importance that public administration has re-
entered the political study of Africa during a period of turbulence
and uncertainty. The succession of military coups and crises of
national unity has shattered the buoyant optimism of political
science in the late 1950's and replaced it with a more sober and
sombre perspective. The early debate over whether a single-party
system could be democratic has been replaced by a dialogue over
whether terms such as "decay" and "breakdown" are more appropriate
than "development" and "modernization" as generic, all-encompas-
sing descriptions of the process of political change in the new
nations.

The same sense of uncertainty has already manifested it-
self in the treatment of bureaucracy in the developing areas.
Running through LaPalombara's volume on BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 3 is an implicit debate among the contributors
over whether bureaucracy plays an essentially positive and constructive
role, facilitating political development and socio-economic moder-
nization, or has a negative impact, restricting the growth of
representative institutions and hampering the emergence of groups
and classes characteristic of a modernized society. Quoting or
summarizing several of the authors in his volume, LaPalombara notes
that "the presence of a strong bureaucracy in many of the new states
tend to inhibit the growth of strong executives, political parties,
legislatures, voluntary associations and other political institutions
essential to viable democratic government." And, the bureaucracies of
the developing areas will often hamper the growth of a private entrep-
eneurial class. Merchants and others who might work to transform the
economy ar incessantly harassed." 5 Eisenstadt, whose essay echoes both
sides of this debate, argues on the positive side that if structural
differentiation, functional specificity, and the acquisition of new
and enhanced capabilities are the central attributes of political modern
ization, these qualities are to be found in bureaucracy far more than
other institutional sect.ors. of the society. Moreover, he argues,
bureaucracies have historically performed a variety of functions critical
for the modernization of their societies. These include unification
and centralization socialization, and the regulation and aggregation of
group demands. 6

Much of this debate revolves around the definiton, amplification
and significance attached to a single concept, one which is shared by
a host of authors writing about the relationship between bureaucracy
and political development. The concept, stated as a proposition, is that
there is an institutional imbalance between bureaucracy and other
institutional sectors of the polity and that bureaucracy is further more
developed and powerful than the representative structures of govern-
ment, parties, legislatures and associational interest groups. To
illustrate the broadly diffused, widely shared, and central importance
of this concept in the literature on bureaucracy and political develo-
pment, it may be useful to offer several quotations. Riggs has stated
the concept in the following terms:

> " A phenomenon of utmost significance in transitional
> societies is the lack of balance between political
> policy-making institutions and bureaucratic
> policy-implementing institutions. The relative
> weakness of political organs means that the political
> function tends to be appropriated in considerable
> measure, by bureaucrats. Intra-bureaucratic

struggles become a primary form of politics." 7

Ferrell Heady speaks of "an imbalance in the growth of political insti-
tutions (in the developing nations) with the bureaucracy among those
in the more mature category". He expands on this proposition as follows:

> "Imbalanced political development is another
> characteristic of past events in the developing
> countries. Traditional cultural patterns, col-
> onialism and the telescoping of change have
> produced political systems that are askew as
> judged by experience in the more developed pol-
> ities, particularly those with a representative
> democratic institutional framework. Means for
> interest articulation and aggregation, through
> such instrumentalities as an informed electorate,
> parties, and representative legislative bodies are
> either weak or absent except in the most rudim-
> entary form. On the other hand, the executive
> agencies of government are dominant under an
> elitist leadership." 8

Echoes of a similar theme are to be found in the writings of S.N.
Eisenstadt:

> "In the formal structures of government, some parallel
> tendencies can also be discerned(uneven change) ...
> The first is the obvious preponderance of the
> executive over all other brances of government.
> This development flows from the need to take over
> and operate the governmental machinery smoothly. It
> is connected with a strong emphasis on govern-
> mental economic activity... The legislature is
> usually passive and subservient or so unruly as
> to minimize the effects of its own influence and
> power. This does not mean that the different leg-
> islative bodies in all new countries are totally
> ineffective, though in some they may be non-
> existent. It does indicate that their effective
> function as mediators between the executive and
> the population at large is rather weak." 9

Lucien Pye speaks of "an imbalance between recognized administrative
tradition and a still inchoate political process" in the developing areas
and argues that in Vietnam and Pakistan, for example, "power and authority
are concentrated in the realm of administrative official-dom". Later, in
the same piece, he essays to explore the "reasons for the relative weaknes
s of the non-bureaucratic components of the political system." 10

The idea of institutional imbalance has achieved a position of
central and pervasive importance in the literature on bureaucracy
in developing countries and, for this reason, it is essential to
examine it systematically. The concept actually consists of two quite dis-
tinguishable and empirically unrelated propositions. The first is that
in a large number of new states, representative institutional structures -
- legislatures, parties and electoral processes -- are characterized by
extreme weakness and fragility; the second, that the bureaucratic sector,
possessing high functional capability, and high relevance to economic
development, has gained a substantial amount of autonomous power and
authority. The remainder of this paper is a commentary on these
propositions.

An endless succession of military coups, the high incidence of
anomic and violent political behavior and the almost universal decline

of political parties in the new states seem ample evidence to support
the idea of fragility, weakness and extreme instability in the repres-
entative sector of government. The underlying reasons for this weaknes
s can best be explored by contrasting the pattern of institutional
evolution in Africa with that which occurred historically in those
western societies which have successfully developed viable represe-
ntative political systems. The conclusion is inescapable that many of
major historical conditions which facilitated the growth of effective
representative government in a small number of western societies
are absent in the new states, of Africa and elsewhere. The importa-
nt point, from the standpoint of this essay, is that the very conditio
ns which have made it difficult for new nations to develop
legitimated and effectively institutionalized representative organs
of government also make it virtually impossible for the bureau-
cratic sector to exercize a high degree of authority.

Lucin Pye has identified the effective institution-
liazation of representative government in western societies
with the successful resolution of a set of historical crises .11
Of the six crises distinguished by Pye, four are especially
relevant for comparative purposes these are; identity,
legitimacy, participation and distribution. It can be argued that the
major historical condition which enabled England and the United States
to handle these crises was that, in both cases, the crises w e conf-
fonted sequentially and in the order stated. The purest case f
this phenomenon is the United States. The creation of a strong sense
of national identity, facilitated by a high degree of linguistic and
cultural homogeneity, was ensured by the common experience of
revolutionary war, after which elements of the society opposed to the
creation of an independent American national identity either emigra-
ted or remained silent. The formulation of a constitutional frame-
work legitimated by the consensual agreement of the former colonies
occurred only after the completion of the war and, importantly, took
place during a period of relative tranquility when no other major
crises had to be dealt with. The "rules of the game", a presidential,
federal and bicameral system, were worked out and agreed upon
before they had to process any controversial matters of national
policy.

One important feature of the constitution was that it
did not provide for a high degree of direct popular par-
ticipation. The President, for example, was chosen by
electoral college and it was certainly not anticipated when
the constitution was ratified that the college would become a
virtually automatic 'rubber stamp' of the popular vote.
The Senate, as well, was indirectly elected, by nomination
of the separate state legislatures and, perhaps most import-
antly, universal suffrage was not provided for. Each state
was allowed to set the terms of suffrage for its own citizens
and not only were women in many cases excluded from partici-
pation, but numerous states had rather stringent property
qualifications. Only gradually, during the nineteenth century,
were restrictions on the right to vote eliminated and a con-
dition of universal suffrage established. Distribution or,
more specifically, governmental involvement in the social
distribution of national income did not become an issue
until the "New Deal'. At this time, the society moved
abruptly away from the classical 'laisses-faire' liberalism
of the nineteenth century and into full acceptance of the
idea that providing minimal standards for impoverished and
deprived social groups was a state responsibility.

In England the crises of identity and legitimacy were
intertwined with one another. The gradual creation of a con-

constitutional monarchy and the establishment of a sense of
national identity were both completed, for England, Scotland
and Wales, at least, by the end of the eighteenth century.
As in the United States at the same time, however, popular
participation was highly restricted by property and other restrictions
limiting suffrage. The gradual enfranchisement of the working
classes and their full incorporation into the political system
required more than a century to complete. Despite the social misery c
created by the industrial revolution, distribution did not become
a political problem at this time. A considerable amount of re-
distribution of national income occurred through the extensive
activities of private charities and philanthropies but the
consequence of extra-governmental distributive activity was
primarily to postpone the date at which this issue became a
matter of state concern. For all practical purposes,
distribution did not become a political issue until the
post-war Labour Government and, as in the United States, it
remains the principal political issue to thid day.

The sequential pattern of crisis confrontation dis-
tinguishes western historical experience markedly from that in
Africa and other developing areas. One of the most common
generalisations about newly independent African states is that
they must confront all these crises at once: that is, they
must establish a unified sense of national identity, work
out mutually agreeable constitutional arrangements, incorporate
culturally diverse elements into the political system and
conduct extensive welfare programs simultaneously. In a
political context in which the "rules of the game" lack
widespread consensual validation, but in which universal
suffrage facilitates maximum popular involvement in
the political process, the difficulties of seeking widely
agreed-upon policies for welfare and distribution are greater
than many systems can endure.

Other differences between the historical phasing of the
development process as it occurred in western societies and that
which is occurring in Africa are also directly relevant to
the enormous burden on Africa's political systems, hence to
the weakness of their representative structures. One major
difference is that in western democracies, the early phases
of the industrial revolution preceeded the creation of fully
participant democratic institutions. In both western society and
in the developing areas, socio-economic transformation from
relatively simple agrarian life to a industrial-commercial
urban pattern has involved massive problems of human dis-
location and deprivation: overcrowding, low wages, inadequate
standards of health and sanitation, improper diet and generally
degrading conditions of life. The restricted character of
participation in western societies, however, meant that by
and large impverished urban and rural masses were not
structurally in a position to ranslate their socio-economic
grievances into demands on the polity. In Africa, however,
universal suffrage combined with a political culture stressing
norms of equality and participation has able deprived
urban and rural groups to transmit their grievances directly
to the polity and to make strong demands for ameliorative
welfare measures.

The difference in the historical evolution of political
culture is itself high significant. Even when expansion of the
franchise incorporated lower and working classes into a
participant stance in the western polity, the prevailing
values were largely classical "laissez-faire" theory.

Despite having structural access to the political system,
groups wishing to make distributive claims on government
were confronted with a pervasive economic ethos, the terms
of which stressed that the ' greatest good of the greatest
number' could only be achieved if the state remained aloof
from the economy. Only the free and unfettered competition
of uninterfered with economic forces, so the theory went,
would result in true progress of the human condition. Because
of this ethic, political claims of a distributive sort did not
possess legitimacy and to a large extent could be ignored
or treated as marginal by representative state structures.
Thus, newly participant groups were inducted into the system
and largely socialized to its rules, procedures and norms
before they were in a position to make heavy demands upon it.

By the time distributive claims acquired legitimacy,
industrialization and commercialisation of the economy
had proceeded to a point where substantial resources were
available to the polity with which to undertake ameliorative
welfare activity. In the meantime, this degree of growth had
taken place, among other reasons, because the polity was not
engaged in diverting resources away from capital re-investment
and accumulation into immediate spheres of consumption (health
education, welfare). The most important point, however ,
that the western polity faced powerful distributive demands
only at a time in its development when economic resources
were available to meet them; its ability to respond pos-
itively to claims for welfare activity enforced and solidified
its legitimacy.

Participant political arrangements have been combined
with a political culture stressing the need for a high degree
of state welfare activity at a far earlier stage in the
development process in Africa than was the case in the west,
at a time when most economies are not yet sufficiently
productive to make substantial resources available for
welfare and distributive purposes. Virtually all African
countries, even those which do not profess "African socialism,"
have set high standards in such fields as health, education,
and other areas of social policy. Because of sheer scarcity
in the economic realm however, many governments cannot but
fail to meet their own articulated goals. This failure
lowers popular confidence in government and weakens its
legitimacy.

The same difference in political culture development has
a second and perhaps more important consequence for legitimacy
and institutionalization. As long as western societies
possessed a "laissez-faire" political culture, great issues
affecting the human condition were not basically considered
political questions. By and large, the problems which had
to be processed through the conciliar organs of government
were for this reason, of a relatively low order of intensity;
staffing the police and fire departments, managing the school
system and paving the streets, to state the more obvious
examples. Laissez-faire political culture thus permitted a
fairly long period of 'could' politics during which most
issues were not such as to arouse any great emotional or
ideological fervor. This period of politics of low intensity
permitted the institutional network to 'break in'. 'Hot'
issues- poverty, human rights, ect...- were not processed
into the political system until patterns of institutional
behavior had already been worked out and solidified, so that
when difficult, emotionally intense problems did have to
be confronted, agreed on and accustomed methods for doing so
were available.

African governments have not had a 'breaking in' period of
'could' politics during which to work out and solidify
institutional practices and behavioral patterns. The rep-
resentative organs of government have had to confront the
most difficult and delicate decisions from the very beginning
of their existence. One basic reason for this is the absence
of a private entrepreneurial elite in Africa. Whereas in
western society, economic development was by and large the
product of the activities of an autonomous entrepreneurial
class, most African societies do not possess an entrepreneurial
elite sufficiently large to generate wholesale economic
growth. This compels the state to function as an economic
unit and to employ a large part of its resources for capital
projects and investment. Thus, unlike their western counter-
parts, African polities must make fundamental decisions about
what proportion of national expenditure will go for economically
productive enterprises (roads, infrastructure, industrial
finance) and what proportion to social services. Such decisions
are highly controversial and the political difficulty of
handling them is compounded by a lack of well-established
institutional routines and procedures.

The social crisis of urban misery created by economic
change is probably far greater in Africa today than it was
in the west at a corresponding period in its development.
The reason for this is to be found in the relationship between
technology and modernization. When western nations were being
transformed from rural agrarian societies into an urban
commercial pattern, technology was simple and labor intensive.
No matter how many migrants flocked to the cities, and no
matter how limited their skills, jobs could nearly always be
found in the emergent industrial complex; in coal mines,
textile mills, or building roads and railroads. The widespread
practices of child and female labor probably indicate that
there were more jobs than people. Thus, although human
conditions were extremely poor, some form of employment and
therefore some level of personal income was available. One
historian has argued that the massive availability of jobs
for relatively unskilled laborers was a major vehicle for the
socialization of culturally and linguistically differentiated
ethnic groups in the United States. 12 Equally important, the
availability of employment meant that social pressures on the
political system were not great since there was less need to
initiate and implement remedial social measures. Such political
welfare activity as did exist, was often undertaken
by political parties, a phenomenon which resulted in the
creation of large, stable and deeply loyal bodies of supporters
for party organization.

African nations have begun to undergo the process of
industrialization during an era of automation and complexity.
The creation of new plants and industries does not mean the
expansion of employment opportunities simply because indus-
trial capacity can be radically increased at only marginal
cost in added labor. Cities attract large number of rural
migrants because they represent opportunity for upward
mobility but since such industries as textiles need to
automate in order to compete on international markets, the
number of additional jobs created is painfully small and
expectations go largely unfulfilled. Moreover, the jobs that
are created usually require a relatively high degree of
training and skill. This aggravates an already existing

elite-mass gap since cities tend to become increasingly
divided between a relatively small number of well-paid
skilled workers on the one hand, and a vast majority of
unemployed on the other. Despite a large amount of concealed
unemployment, the gap remains one of the most visible and
salient features of urban life in Africa and contributes to
a widespread sense of social deprivation and political
frustration. Not only does the economy fail to function as an
agency of socialization, but it in fact generates additional
pressures on the polity. The highly volatile character of
urban crowds in such Asian countries as India, Pakistan and
Burma has already become a major source of political
instability. The same is increasingly true of several African
countries as well.

As regards the direct relationship between party and
bureaucracy, the historical contrast between western and
African experience is particularly striking. Fred Riggs
has pointed out that the 'spoils system' as a mode of
bureaucratic recruitment was extremely important in
encouraging the development of strong political parties in
western society. 13 His argument is that spoils provided
an attractive material incentive to the formation of
effective party organization and as such functioned
as an impetus to party activity during the formative period
of national politics. At times when ideological commitment
waned, spoils furnished an important substitute focus for
partisan competition. Of greater importance is that fact that
spoils placed civil service personnel in the position of
being entirely dependant for their positions upon political
leadership, and, in this respect, represented the complete
subordination of the administrator to the politician. A
certain amount of spoils recruitment remains an important
part of party activity even today in the United States, but
the important point is that by the time merit replaced spoils
as the basic method of recruitment, parties had been able to
acquire a high degree of functional and organizational
autonomy.

Political parties in most post-colonial societies
confront a well organized and long-established pattern of
merit recruitment to the civil service. As a political practice,
the notion of achievement has exactly the opposite consequence
from spoils. Not only does it deprive party organizations of an
important material incentive to partisan activity but it
stresses the autonomy and independence of the administrator
from the politician. The reason for this is the basic
concept of achievement recruitment: servants
gain their positions by virtue of their own personal skills
and training, not because of loyalty or service to partisan
causes. This notion is deeply engrained in the minds of most
African civil servants and can easily become the basis for
resistance to demands or pressures for a greater degree of
political responsiveness.

One important reason for the weakness of representative
organs of government deserves separate mention. This is the
tendency of intellectual elites in developing countries to
prefer administrative rather than political careers. The
greater prestige, security and often material regards of
an administrative occupational role have already tended to
siphon off many of the most talented members of developing

countries. It is not uncommon for example, for politicians
in newly independent states to shift over from legislative
or party positions into the civil ser... and, indeed, Lucien
Pye argues that this was the basic cause of the decline of
political parties in Burma and Ghana. 14 Of more ominous
and long-range significance is that fact that university
students in many developing countries tend to be oriented
towards administrative, not political, career patterns.
The long-range result may well be a massive 'talent gap'
between bureacracy and representative structures, an
imbalance which could easily contribute to a severe
discrepancy in power and authority.

Some of the basic conditions which cause the weakness
and fragility of representative structures of government in
Africa may be summarized as follows:
1) African states need to confront simultaneously a set of
complex 'crises of development' that, in western societies,
were dealt with one at a time. These are; identity, legitimacy,
participation and distribution. Because a sense of common
national identity and widespread consensual validation
for political institutions are only partially or marginally
completed when universal opportunities for political
participation are established, representative structures
must absorb the demands of social groups which neither
identify with the nation-state nor accept its institutional
setting.

2.) Because a political culture stressing welfare norms
tends to precede even the early phases of
industrialization and commercialization in ...rica, widespread
demands for social services and welfare measures arise
before the economy has generated sufficient resources to
meet these demands. Since the publicly declared values of
political leadership frequently reflect welfare ...ects of
the political culture, the polity is placed in a position
of failing to achieve its own goals, In western societies
the comparatively late intrusion of strong welfare expectations
into the polity meant that, by and large, adequate resources
have been available to carry out social policy. This has been
an important factor in reenforcing legitimacy and institution-
alization.

3.) Due also to the early appearance of a participant, egali-
tarian and welfarist political culture in Africa, represen-
tative structures must cope, from the very beginning, with
intensely important and controversial questions. They do
not have the benefit of a fairly long 'break in' period
during which they can process relatively non-controversial
issues. Such a 'break in' period has played a critical
role in the development of democratic government in western
societies for it has facilitated the building up of a set of
institutional rules of the game, an agreed on set of
internal procedures and methods for processing demands on
the polity.

4.) The tendency for African states to enter the process of
industrialization at a fairly advanced and automated level
means that, in general, economies are not creating sufficient
added employment to absorb rural-urban migration. Extreme
social deprivation and political frustration are the
results. Since jobs that are available usually require
a high degree of skill and training, the society becomes
increasingly divided between a skilled   industrial elite

increasingly divided between a skilled industrial elite
and a mass of unemployed.

5.) The greater attractiveness of administrative careers
siphons off some of the most able and talented political
leaders. The result is a massive and highly vasible 'talent
gap' between political parties and national bureaucracies.
This gap critically weakens the viability of parties and
other representative structures. The political parties'
ability to control and manipulate administration is also
reduced by the universal practice of achievement recruit-
ment the basic idea of which is that individuals in the civil
service hold their positions by virtue of personal skill and
training, not political loyalty. Spoils recruitment,
combined with the fact that parties, not adminstration,
played an imprtant welfare function, were critical in the
creation of viable party organizations in western society.

     The proposition that bureaucracy has gained radically
enhanced power and authority by performing political
functions left undone due to the weakness of representative
sturctures (the second half of the concept of institutional
imbalnce) can best be assessed by examining the sources of
bureaucratic influence and the limitations on its exercize.
At least four separate factors contributing to a growth
of administrative influence on political decisions can be
identified. These are; 1.) the increasingly scientific and
technical character of government policy. 2.) the vast gap
in specialised training and intellectual skills between the
administrative and representative sectors of government,
3.) a tendency to identify what is administrative in fairly
broad terms and, 4.) the absence of mechanisms for exercizing
political control over administrative activity.

1.) A growing role for bureaucracy seems to be an inferent
feature of an age where the formulation and implementation of
any dimension of national policy requires highly specialised
training and technical skill. Bureaucracy is a sector of govern-
ment where these qualities are frequently located in considerable
disproportion to other sectors and several eminent political
scientists(Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, David Truman) have called
attention to the fact that the highly specialised and intri ate
nature of government programming in a technological are has
resulted in a dramtic growth in the influence of administrators
even in societies where representative structures are viable
and dynamic. This argument requires one major qualification.
To the extent that political leadership retains power and
authority to set basic national goals, to make fundamental decisions
regarding domestic and foreign policy, and to rank foreign
and domestic policy priorities, growing bureaucratic influence
does not impair the essential character of representative govern-
ment.

     That the role of s edilly qualified administrators
should be particularly great in developing countries is not
surprising. Since the promotion of overall economic
development is a state responsibility, civil servants with
competence in fields that bear upon development have a
special position in government circles. Administrative
experts in fields such as development economics, international
trade, agricultural marketing and cooperative organization
have a degree of influence which far exceeds that of
many administrators in western societies.

2.) In many African countries, the influence of administrative
cadres is further heightened by a vast discrepancy in
specialized training and technical skills between the
bureaucracy and party organization. There is a tendency for
skilled political leaders to gravitate towards admin-
istrative careers after independence, and bureaucratic
career rewards often attract the most able university
graduates into administration as well. A wide intellectual
gap between party and bureaucracy can easily lead to the
complete domination of internal decision making processes
by administrative personnel. Moreover, due to the weakness and
fragility of their representative institutions, many African
political elites are deeply absorbed with critical problems
of stability and sheer political survival. These pressures
compel them to devote their efforts and attentions to symbolic f
functions, to the legitimization of the regime, and
to seeking consensual validation of their own leadership status.
In this way, pervasive instability reenforces the inherent
tendency to leave the actual running of the country in the
hands of administrative cadres. Unless political leadership is
relatively free of day-to-day political creses, its role will
be limited to the articulation of broad, diffuse and non-
controversial goals. In this context, the area of administrative
discretion and flexibility is highly political since
fundamental questions such as policy priorities and differential
resource allocation become subject to bureaucratic decision.

3.) Most governments operate from day to day on the basis of
a standing set of assumptions about what is 'political' and
what is 'administative'. In newly independent states these
assumptions tend to be carried over from the practices and
attitudes of the colonial era, and, since colonial rule was
largely administrative in its orientation, the sphere of
what is political is frequently conceptualized in fairly
narrow terms. The validity of any rigid distinction between
policy and administration is dubious but this is especially
so in developing areas where the range of state activity is
extraordinarily wide. The distinction is even more unrealistic
when what is administrative tends to be defined broadly.
The result is that certain phases of policy are construed as
administrative which are, in fact highly political. One
important example of this is the implementation of development
projects. The method of organizing a cooperative movement,
a self-help project or an agricultural improvement scheme
can have enormous consequences for the social and political
relationships of a rural area, hence for the power structure
or a whole country. Project implementation, however, is nearly
always identified as an administrative task and, except in
cases where individual politicians have a personal interest
in a particular project, this phase of policy is left
entirely in the hands of government officials.

4.) Closely related to the wide range of governmental
activities defined as administrative is the fact that few
newly independent countries have developed effective
mechanisms for the political control and supervision of
administrative activity. Virtually nowhere to be found
is an African equivalent to the Congressional Committee
of Inquiry of the Swedish Ombudsman. Although the press can
sometimes offer an outlet for the grievances of individual citizens
against administrative abuse, the fact is that parties,
legislatures, and individual political leaders do not possess
a regularized and institutionalized and mechanism for exercis
ing political control of administrative behavior.

This elaborately interrelated set of factors has led to the emergence of a powerful and influential role for the administrative class in Africa and in other developing areas. The fundamentally important point, however, is that there is a world of difference between the argument that administrators have come to occupy a positon of considerable influence and are a prominent, if not frequently decisive, force in political decision making, and the proposition–– suggested by the concept of institutional imbalance–– that bureaucracy is an autonomous center of power and authority. This distinction is crucial to the argument which follows: that there are is crucial to the argument which follows: that there are inherent limitations on the capacity of a bureaucracy to function as a cohesive, autonomous decision making body.

The greatest limitation is that the social and political power of the administrative class is of an indirect sort and lies almost exclusively in its capacity to exercise influence on the political structures of government. Civil bureaucracies do not possess internal mechanisms of authoritative decision making and are, for this reason, wholly unable to react to crises of decay in the political sector. This may help explain two highly significant aspects of administrative behavior in states where military govern- ments have assumed power. When the representative structures of government were exhibiting symptions of a 'break down' in authority, the bureaucracies were wholly unable to assume even an interim position of national leadership, and did little more than maintain essential services. The tendency for bureaucracies to seek power by influencing political leadership may also explain why civil administrations in Africa have adapted so quickly and easily to the military leaders who have assumed control after the deterioration of party regimes.

There are three other reasons for the inability of bureaucracy to function as an autonomous political force. First, bureaucracies by themselves are almost wholly lacking in legitimacy. Whatever legitimacy they do acquire is usually derivative from that of the political system as a whole and its terms extend only to the implementation of governmental programs. Individual administrators or governmental agencies may wield considerable behind the scenes influence, but the absence of widespread consensual validation for such a role precisely explains why it remains 'behind the scenes'. Secondly, African bureaucracies have not acquired either an associational clientele or a public 'constituency' Social modernization has not proceeded to the point of fostering an array of functionally specific interest groups and voluntary associations. In industrial societies, these groups are often a powerful source of influence and support for governmental agencies and departments. One potential powerful set of voluntary associations is the trade unions. These could for example, offer powerful support and leverage to governmental agencies sponsoring social and welfare leg- islation. In many African countries, however, trade unions have been isolated from independent political action by restrictive legislation.

The final reason for bureaucratic weakness is, quite simply, that bureaucracies are not intrinsically unified structures. It is inherent in the very nature of bureaucracy to be segmented along functional lines. This is why, in fact, the generalization that intra-bureaucratic

politics are often a miniature replica of national politics
is basically untrue. National politics involves complex
patterns of conflict and cleavage amon an array of ethnic,
regional class and functionally organized groups. Intra-
bureaucratic polites almost invariably involves functional
fragmentation, one policy area contending against another
for a larger portion of scarce governmental resources. The
tendency towards inter-sectoral conflict seems to be so
ubiquitous and so deeply engrained a feature of administrative
behavior that it is doubtful whether any bureaucracy can,
on its own, generate an authoritative centralized source of
leadership.

Possession of these basic qualities- centralized command,
legitimacy and popular support- is the main difference between
military organization and civil bureaucracy, and the main
reason why it has become so easy for the military to
assume the leadership of newly independent countries. The
military can, by ceremonial display, by appeals to national
pride, and by stressing the need to purify the political
arena of corruption and conflict, arouse a level of popular
support which exceeds that available to party leadership.
If this support is not the same thing as legitimacy, it
often seems to serve the same function in creating a popular
willingness to accept the regime.

Military coups have most frequently occurred in situations
where civil institutions have become so weakened and
ineffectual that violence and anomic behavior are the
principal modes of political expression. For this reason,
the military's near monopoly of the means of violence and
its ability to restore order by force, together with its
ability to impose discipline on a chaotic society have most
frequently been cited as the principal reasons for a military
assumption of power. A virtual monopoly of the means of
violence is certainly the basic pre-requisite of military
coup, and the means by which successful take-over is accom-
plished, but the fact is that military organizations
nearly everywhere possess this quality. The unique quality
which military leadership offers to a politically turbulent
developing country is its capacity to furnish an authoritative,
unified source of command.

The availability of a unified extra-bureaucratic source
of authority is so important, and so independent a varialbe,
that it seems to be highly determinative of whether or not
bureaucracy plays a positive role for development. Where a
source of firm political guidnce is present, bureaucracy
ordinarily performs a range of functions critical for economic
growth, social modernization and political stability. Some of
these have been described by Eisenstadt; they include, for
example, maintenance of a unified political framework, ser-
vices, and political socialization. In practically every case
where administration has performed these roles for development
an effective extra-bureaucratic center of authority has been
operative, whether monarchy military, party system or
dictatorial junta.

Where an extra-bureaucratic center of authority is not
present, or is weak due to a crisis of legitimacy, civil
administration seems prone to a variety of forms of internal
breakdown, rather than to a surpation of political power.
The key argument here is that where representative leadership for
administration, the result is less likely to be an admin-

administrative aggrandizement of power, than increasing admini-
istrative malfunction. Three separate types of administrative
malfunction may be distinguished: corruption, alienation,
and sectoral fragmentation. A major precipitant of each of
these patterns of administrative decay, is a failure of
coordination and control by political stuctures of government.

Corruption is perhaps the most widely discussed form of
bureaucratic deterioration perhaps because it is the most
dramatic. Two separate types of corruption need mention
First corruption can simply take the form of pervasive
bribe-taking, a phenomenon which is usually accompanied
by declining morale and an atmosphere of political
cynicism. There is a considerable dialogue among political
scientists about the consequences of this type of corruption
for development. Some have argued that it may have certain
positive developmental benefits. It may, for example,
facilitate the emergence of an indigenous entrepeneurial
class since many administrators who gain   eth through
bribery re-invest in the local economy. Or, in situations
where the existing entrepeneurial group is of alien ethnic
origin, and is often for this reason subjected to harassment
or intimidation, corruption may introduce a note of humaneness
and economic rationality into the system.

Both these arguments seem highly dubious. Much of the
money gained through corruption apparently finds its way
outside the local country and ends up in a numbered Swiss
bank account or in some other form of easily redeemable
asset in a hard corrency country. The degree of insecurity
engendered among alien entrepeneurial groups by official or
sem-official governmental harassment is rarely compensated
by administrative dishonesty. One of the most common
economic difficulties of newly independent states is the
flight of capital engendered by the fears of nationals of
alien origin. Even if both arguments have a ring of truth,
there is serious question whether the general atmosphere
of inequality, eleitism and cynicism which seems to accompany
rampant dishonesty is worth whatever benefits are derived.

A second form of corruption is the collective protection
of narrowly defined bureaucratic interests, identified
by Riggs as "tenure, seniority rights, fringe benfits, and
concealment of poor performance." The tendency for bureaucrats
to band together in mutual self-protection is a natural by-
product of the radical elite-mass gap in many developing
countries. Since few if any opportunities for horizontal
mobility are present, the personal consequences of losing a
civil service position are disastrous. This is the primary
incentive for collective disregard and concealment
of sub-standard performance. One possible consequence of
this situation is a extreme degree of compartimentalization
and specialization, with corresponding over-employment in
government agencies and services. The end result is that
overall levels of performance decline since strong internal
pressures develop against individuals who seek to excell.

Without firm political direction, administrators may
easily become alienated from the human problems of their
societies. There are several structural reasons for this
phenomenon. Unless political goals are continuously
re-defined for administrative personnel, there is a tendency
for rules and procedures of bureaucratic operation to
be treated as ends in themselves. The highly specialized
and compartimentalized character of most bureaucratic

work is such as to obscure the broad objectives of government
policy. This situation, often termed 'ritualism' has considerable
relevance to numerous African bureaucracies. The principal
reason for this is that as Africanization of the civil
service occurred in many African counties, recruitment
tended to be unevenly distributed amongthe ethnic groups of
the society, a result of the differential availability of
higher educational opportunity. In many of these cases,
the leadership and mass base of dominant governing parties
do not come from the same social group which furnishes a
large proportion of the higher civil service. When this is
the case, the tendency is for these political structures to
regard one another with suspicion and apprehension, attitudes
that are scarcely compatible with the sort of mutual
cooperation requisite for the implementation of national
goals.

Bureaucratic in-fighting and fragmentation along
functional lines are also highly dysfunctional to development.
The internal power relationships of government ministries and
departments rarely corresponds with the order of priorities
that is best for overall growth. Since the most common
bureaucratic posture in these struggles is a defensive one,
an effort to guard an established budgetary position, the
typical result of intra-administration battling is budgetary
inertia and stalemate. Patterns of expenditure with no other
basis than historical precedent may be continued from year to
year in complete disregard of developmental criteria. Probably
the most difficult aspect of development planning is the
effort to change lon-standing patterns of governmental
expenditure. More importantly, the conflicts and antagonisms
generated in heated budgetary struggles tend to make
cooperation and communication between government organs
difficult. Since numerous development programs require
collaborative efforts among a set of agencies or ministries,
the result is to place whole projects and development
schemes in jeopardy.

Effective development planning can, in large measure,
help to overcome these dysfunctional tendencies. Planning
is the major sector of government bureaucracy, with the
possible exception of finance which does not have a specific
functional or sectoral commitment. To the extent that planners
have an 'interest' within the bureaucracy, it can be iden-
tified as the rational pursuit of economic growth. For
this reason, planners can perform a particularly
valuable function in helping to overcome centrifugal
administrative tendencies. Their support, on one side or
the other of a budgetary disagreement, carries the weight
of representing the economically sound choice. Planners can
use this influence to achieve a gradual but substantial
shift in the overall distribution of governmental expen-
ditures. Planners also perform yeoman service in gal-
vanizing other sectors of administration into developmental
activity. By their continual barrage of requests for
suggested development projects, development estimates, and
growth statistics, planners do much to help overcome
tendencies towards alienation and routinization among the
sectoral ministries.

The great problem of development planning lies in the
fact that few governments appreciate the extent to which
planning is a fundamentally political, not economic, process.
The most important functions of planning-- resolving bureaucratic
conflict, generating development consciousness, and modifying

the prior ty patterns of government policy— require political
means, such as influence and authority and have immensely
political consequences, the success or failure of socio-
economic modernization. Despite these conspicuously political
characteristics, planning is almost invariably conceptualized
as an economic enterprise, and little thought or attention is
given to increasing the leverage and power of planners in the
decision-making process. The result is that planners are
normally compelled to operate with insufficient power to
accomplish their objectives.

Regardless of how much administrative status planners are
given, however, their role cannot be an effective one unless
there is an extra-bureaucratic source of power to sanction
and enforce their decisions. Planners are, in the last
analysis, one group of civil servants among others. They
can buttress and supplement political authority by assuming
the burden of performing certain important political functions—
selection of economic priorities, coordination of the national
bureaucracy, mobilization of administrative resources for
development— but if the polity lacks an independent source of
authority, planners will become impotent despite statutory
provisions to the contrary. When the absence of authority leads
to dysfunctional bureaucratic tendencies (corruption, alienation,
fragmentation) planners will be no more immune than anyone else.

From the standpoint of political authority, the most
disturbing tendency in African politics is the decline of
political parties. Where this has occurred, the characteristic
leadership pattern is a personalistic cabinet autocracy,
with a more or less fictional party organization performing
a weak legitimization function. The characteristic symptoms
of this situation are that national politics deteriorates
into little more than a struggle for power among top leaders,
though on occasion these struggles have a vague ethnic or
ideological quality, subordinate echelons of party org-
anization become apathetic and formal legislative organs of
government recede in importance and visibility.

Personalistic regimes seem highly susceptible both to
the practice of corruption and to widespread popular
perception of politics as corrupt. Exactly why this is
the case may be unclear. The reason may lie in the fact that
institutional regimes are simply better adept at concealing
or disguising pervasive administrative malpractice.
Conversely, since the essence of autocracy is the absence of
ties of responsibility between leadership and formal governmental
structures, the greater degree of autonomy of leaders may
facilitate corrupt behavior. Whatever the cause, the fact is
that there seems to be a direct and positive relationship
between political personalism and corruption. In this context, the
military's symbolic quality as an instrument of purification is
likely both to encourage its intervention, and to arouse popular
support of a period of military rule.

F O O T N O T E S:

1.) As used in this paper, the term 'bureaucracy' refers
only to the civil administration of a society and does not
include the military unless otherwise specified.

2.) Traces of these early concerns continued to preoccupy
researchers during the era of nationalism, and could be
discerned in the publication of a series of monographic
studies of Legislative Councils in the Anglophonic areas,
in numerous articles in the Journal of African Administration,
and in such works as L. Gray Cowan's LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
WEST AFRICA.

3.) Joseph LaPalombara (ed.) BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT. Princeton University Press.
Princeton, 1963.

4.) ibid., pp.22-23
5.) ibid., pp. 24-25

6.) S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development",
op. cit. pp.96-110.

7.) Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development" : A
Paradoxical View", in LaPalombara, P. 120

8.) Ferrell Heady, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE. Prentice-Hall, 1966. pp. 61 and 64-65.

9.) S.N. Eisenstadt, "Political Development" in Amitai and
Eva Etzione (eds.) SOCIAL CHANGE. Basic Books,
New York, 1964. pp.321-322.

10.) Lucien Pye, "The Political Context of National develo-
pment" in DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS, Irving Sterdlow(ed.) Syracuse U.P., 1963.
pp. 25ff.

11.) Lucien Pye, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, Little,
Brown Co. Boston, 1966. ch. 1.

12.) Oscar Handlin, THE UPROOTED. Beacon Press, Boston.

13.) Riggs, op. cit.

14.) Lucien Pye, in Sverdlow, op. cit. pp. 32-33.

15.) Eisenstadt, in LaPalombara, op cit., pp.110.