

POLITICAL


M O N I T O R

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To win broadly based African support, further constitutional reforms will have to entice opposition dialogue off the streets and away from the informal sphere, into authentic negotiating forums.

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


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


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**A QUESTION
OF THE RIGHT ATTITUDE**



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Diagnosis

AFRICAN POLITICAL RIGHTS: Part Two Reform and Acceptability

By Professor Lawrence Schlemmer

The major structural defect in the South African social system is the absence of meaningful political integration of the African majority. This exclusion from basic rights makes the society increasingly vulnerable to external attack and costly internal stress. In this, the second part of the analysis, Prof Schlemmer assesses the major recent policy position taken by the State President which has been commonly taken to herald an acceptance of African political rights.

The probable reform options open to the government are reviewed and the reactions of African leaders are assessed. Research results on what is acceptable to African populations at large are presented.

The conclusion drawn is that a constitutional formula based on federal principles with inbuilt protection against domination by some groups over others is a realistic, negotiable possibility. The constitutional form would, however, have to contain certain signal departures from separatist principles in order to make it politically possible for significant African leaders to participate.

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Acknowledgment: The Daily News

Regional devolution of power within a different political framework would bring government closer to the people

The lack of national political rights makes it impossible to determine exactly which leaders are formally representative of African opinions

The interests of rank-and-file African people in the common area tend to be abused where no conclusive yardstick of their opinions exists

The State President's speech at the opening of parliament indicated a shift in policy towards the political position of Africans

In Part One of this analysis in the last issue of Indicator SA, the lack of political rights for Africans at national level was analysed to be a very significant basic factor in the urban unrest. It was pointed out that this lack of rights also undermines local government leadership and administration, weakens the society's ability for crisis management in times of unrest, is seen to justify violent protests and demonstrations and casts all security action in the role of systematic oppression of the spirit of freedom.

It may be further pointed out that the lack of political rights for Africans in the common area has effectively discredited the 'homelands' policy both internationally and among most local Africans in the common area. In a different overall political context political autonomy for certain cultural regions could be seen as a healthy devolution of power, bringing government closer to the people in regions or provinces with unique problems and characteristic forms of land tenure, custom and social organisation.

Five Voices

One of the most serious effects for the system of the lack of African political rights at national level is that it makes it impossible for African spokespeople to emerge who are legitimately and formally representative of African interests and opinion. For a long time the role of articulating black needs and views has been 'up for grabs' as it were. Church leaders and in some instances the executives of civic associations with an unknown basis of political support have been able to fill the role. Today there are perhaps five powerful voices speaking on behalf of African people: Bishop Tutu of the South African Council of Churches, Chief Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha, the United Democratic Front (UDF) which is a federation of voluntary organisations, the Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and the emergent trade union movements. All five groupings have a distinctive posture. Some, like the trade unions and Inkatha, have very large bases of signed up membership but not one of these groups, as far as the common area of South Africa is concerned, has the formal status of being the elected *political* representatives of the cross section of Africans in the common area.

The confusion and damage which this causes is currently best exemplified by the so-called disinvestment issue. Lobbyists abroad who are for and against disinvestment and sanctions against South Africa can take their pick of who to quote as speaking on behalf of African people in South Africa. No conclusive opinion is possible and the interests of rank-and-file African people could suffer grievous damage in the process.

Significant Speech

No doubt in part responding to these issues, the State President, Mr P W Botha in a very significant speech at the opening of Parliament on 25 January clearly stated certain planned new departures in policy in regard to the political position of African people:

- The non-independent homelands would not be forced or coerced to take independence and instead a basis for a higher level of autonomy within South Africa would be formulated;
- African communities in the common area would be treated for constitutional purposes as political entities in their own right which would be given a form of representation at central level, presumably unconnected with the homelands (until recently one constitutional goal among others which was being actively considered was a form of representation through a linkage with homelands);
- Unnecessary 'fragmentation' would be avoided by attempting to develop forms of political cooperation with other groups for Africans within the political-constitutional framework existing at the present time. The meaning of this is not altogether clear at the time of writing but it would appear to suggest that complex new constitutional forms for Africans in the common area would be avoided. If so, this would reduce the possibility of whatever developments which emerge being labelled a 'special' or 'apartheid' dispensation for Africans.
- Mr Botha further indicated that the issue of a common citizenship for all races, including Africans, would be more intensively investigated than hitherto. The debate in government circles currently concerns which Africans should be included — only urban Africans, or non-independent homeland regions, or all Africans;
- He proposed that an informal, non-statutory 'forum' be established to explore constitutional options for Africans, to which black leaders and interest groups would be invited to give evidence on an ad hoc basis. In this respect Mr Botha was seeking to avoid creating a body (like the earlier proposal of a Black Council, which failed) which would be labelled as a form of statutory separation of constitutional planning for Africans distinct from that of other groups. The informality of the name and the structure appears to be an attempt to emphasise flexibility and to reassure critics that no preconceived goals or assumptions would be imposed on the process of negotiation.

Reactions

Mr Botha's policy speech succeeded partially in winning over critical audiences. Most of the opposition press responded favourably but some editors, as with the Sunday Tribune (27/1/85), for example, identified a 'fatal flaw' of constitutional paternalism, despite the apparent flexibility of the proposed forum. A review of reactions by SATV on 27/1/85 presented various homeland leaders, African mayors and spokesmen for the Urban Councils Association of SA (UCASA) welcoming the proposals. Dr Nthato Motlana, of the Soweto Civic Association reserved judgement (Sunday Tribune, 27/1/85). The BBC, the London Daily Mail, the Guardian and other British and European newspapers gave cautiously optimistic assessments, as did President Reagan's office and the British foreign office.

On the other hand Chief Buthelezi, Bishop Tutu, AZAPO and the UDF vehemently rejected the proposed constitutional process (Rapport, 27/1/85). Chief Buthelezi, seeing a parallel between the earlier failed Black Council and the proposed 'forum' indicated that it would be political 'suicide' to participate in the deliberations of the forum. The UDF viewed it as yet another attempt to divide blacks, and AZAPO labelled the whole intention behind the proposals as a 'shamocracy'.

Bishop Tutu, commenting from the Netherlands while on a speaking tour, also categorically rejected the proposals and in so doing made a revealing statement. According to reports he said that only 'authentic' black leaders could negotiate on constitutional matters and 'all our authentic leaders are either in jail or in exile. They'll have to be released first' (Daily News, 26/1/85). This statement advertently or inadvertently gives credence to the view that the South African government has to be pushed or persuaded either to the point of capitulation, or to a more or less complete sacrifice of its own plans and programmes and an abandonment of all internal African leadership before any meaningful constitutional reform can take place. It also promotes the view that no form of peaceful evolutionary change or negotiation involving internal leaders is possible. It is quite clear, however, that despite the informality of its structure, the proposed negotiating forum has not overcome the suspicions or principled objections of the most significant echelons of black leadership.

The Prospects

Taking account of the range of black leader reactions quoted above, the probable negotiating position and the bottom line of the government on the issue of constitutional reform as well as rank-and-file African attitudes (referred to presently) allows some broad assessments to be made of possible constitutional developments over the next few years.

The reactions of the most significant black spokespeople confirm the points made in Part One in the last issue that no meaningful acceptance of reforms by African leaders is possible unless the proposed dispensation is non ethnic, symbolically a substantial departure from apartheid or separatism, involves an unqualified acceptance of common citizenship for all and does not attempt to divide 'urban' Africans from those in the self-governing National States. The very large Inkatha constituency, for example, is very strongly represented outside of KwaZulu, particularly on the Witwatersrand and a cleavage of this constituency would meet with determined rejection.

The reactions by African spokespeople also suggest that the form of negotiation is as important as the eventual constitutional forms, because it is in the negotiations that political reputations will be enhanced or damaged. The proposed forum will succeed up to a point but the most significant negotiations are likely to be on an ad hoc basis in individual meetings between members of the South African cabinet and African leaders. In this way the taint of cooperating in a separatist structure will be avoided. One might anticipate that even one or two of the UDF-linked African Civic Associations might be prepared to talk on an unstructured basis. Botha has provided for negotiation both outside and inside the forum.

Possible Constitutional Forms

The most interesting question, however, is what form of constitutional proposals might emerge from such a process. On the government side the bottom-line has been frequently stated — self-determination in regard to white community affairs and protection from domination in national or common affairs. This does not appear to be negotiable at all at this stage.

White self-determination and protection from domination basically implies three possible constitutional forms:

- One is a 'confederal form' in which African common-area representation occurs along with voluntary participation by independent and non-independent homelands and the Republic of South Africa in an over-arching 'council' based on multi-lateral


Media and opposition responses to Mr Botha's proposals ranged from favourable support and cautious optimism to categorical rejection

Azapo, Chief Buthelezi and the UDF rejected participation in the proposed non-statutory 'forum' to negotiate African constitutional status

Significant African leaders will not accept reforms unless they are non-ethnic and based on the principle of common citizenship

Past reactions of African spokespeople intimate that the form of negotiation is as important as the outcome

On 6 September 1984, Mr P W Botha was elected as the executive State President in terms of the new constitution. This historic picture shows the first full sitting of the electoral college constituted by the white, coloured and Indian houses of the new tricameral parliament. A consociational solution to the issue of future African representation would involve the creation of either a fourth parliamentary chamber or a special African Council.



The government platform of white self-determination implies three possible constitutional forms: confederation, consociation or federation

To resolve the problem of defining federal 'regions', government might demarcate single or groups of African townships as regions


membership agreements. Virtually no acceptance from common area African leaders nor from self-governing homelands could be expected for this proposal. If an attempt were made to implement it, it would probably unleash worse disorder than the recent coloured and Indian elections and would pile ammunition in the hands of South Africa's critics abroad.

- Another possible proposal from the government side can be very loosely termed 'consociational'. It might involve the proposal to establish either a fourth chamber of parliament or a special chamber or council for African common area representation. A fourth chamber would have unfortunate political consequences because the size of existing chambers is fairly rigidly based on population size, hence an African chamber would involve very visible relative under-representation. A special African Council outside of the parliamentary structure would immediately be seen as an apartheid structure and meet with total rejection from the potentially most significant participants. The potential merits of consociationalism in the form of consensus-seeking joint committees would be totally eclipsed by the negative political symbolism.

- The third basic option would be a 'federal' form of proposal (although the label 'federal' might be avoided for historic reasons and because it would sound like PFP policy). A 'federal' form would involve either the creation of a new 'common affairs' tier of government on which the 'white', 'coloured' and 'Indian' Republic of South Africa would be represented along with African representation drawn from a series of African urban, 'white' rural and (perhaps) non-independent homeland regions. The African regions would have a high degree of self-government, similar to that characteristic of the non-independent homelands.

The federal council might conceivably be a 'common affairs' upper house or a council with the status of a senate. In keeping with federal arrangements in many countries the representation would not necessarily be proportional. Representation could be either directly elected or nominated from the elected African regional authorities and, of course, from the three chambers of parliament.

This federal form has not been very seriously entertained by the cabinet up to now because of the difficulty of establishing 'regions'. Geographically and ecologically rational regions would all have African majorities. However, this difficulty might be circumvented, as implied above, by simply demarcating major African townships or groups of townships as political regions. Their lack of economic viability and a tax-



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base would have to be attended to by taxes on industry and transfer payments, agreed upon by the new 'federal' tier of government.

If such a 'federal' tier of government could both initiate and review common affairs legislation it would involve significant participation by Africans in national government, notwithstanding the fact that Africans would be unlikely to enjoy a majority in the allocation of seats.

Genuine Power-Sharing

This type of proposal would probably come closest to genuine power-sharing without the sacrifice of self-determination by the participating population segments. What would its chances of acceptance by Africans be? The African population at large can be considered first. Two studies, the major investigation by Hanf et al of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany (1978) and the survey research for the Buthelezi Commission (1982) provide fairly recent indications on the reactions of urban Africans in the Transvaal and Natal/KwaZulu (sample sizes 1 020 and 1 879 respectively). (Political options were simply and graphically worded with trained Africans conducting interviews in both studies.)

Hanf et al found the following:

- The most popular political dispensation was a unitary state with universal franchise — 85 percent support
- However, only between one-quarter and one-third of Africans interviewed would accept nothing less than the ideal. A clear majority were prepared to *accept* other options
- Some 47 percent of Africans interviewed were prepared to accept the suggestion of self-governing African and non-African regions (provinces) but with equal white-black representation in a national government
- A qualified franchise, partition (even in which Africans were given most land) and an African dominated federal arrangement all obtained much lower levels of acceptance (20 to 33 percent).

In the Buthelezi Commission research the findings, given here for the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, were:

- The most popular suggestion was a unitary state with universal franchise — 75

A federal tier of government dealing with common affairs would involve significant African participation in national government

Federal constitutional forms would probably come closest to genuine power-sharing, while not sacrificing group self-determination

Two major research studies show that federal or consociational politics would be acceptable second-best options for African majorities

Negotiating federal forms of government might be interpreted as perpetuating apartheid structures

Various politically viable proposals might depart from the separatist formula: a multi-racial common affairs cabinet or conjoint regional government

percent support

- The second most favoured option was representatives from homelands and urban areas enjoying equal representation with whites at national level — 60-66 percent support or acceptance
- Other options, including minority black representation in parliament, a qualified black franchise, a unitary system but with a white veto in parliament and equal partition obtained less support or acceptance (52 to 18 percent).

Second-best Options

The two major studies reinforce each other to suggest that while Africans would virtually all like one-man-one-vote in a unitary state, federal or consociational options would be acceptable second-best options for majorities or near-majorities. These options, therefore, would appear to be *sellable* by African leaders.

Would African leaders be prepared to 'sell' a federal option to their followers? This is difficult to assess. Both Chief Buthelezi and Dr Phatudi have come out clearly in support of federal options as a basis for constitutional progress. Some prominent Soweto opinion leaders in the orbit of the old Committee of Ten and the Civic Association have appeared to be willing to consider federal options. There probably are more opinion leaders in this situation, because rhetoric prior to negotiations is not necessarily a reliable indication of reactions when concrete offers are made.

Counter Mobilisation

There are, however, well-organised and articulate groupings and lobbies both locally in the UDF and other organisations and abroad, that would mount an intense barrage of criticism and mobilisation against any proposed dispensation which appeared to have the potential for gaining African support as well as providing guarantees of white political security and continued major influence as an ethnic component in a constitution. Experience in the period of the coloured and Indian elections would suggest that the counter mobilisation abroad would reach the level of the United Nations and some foreign governments. Hence African would-be participants in a constitutional negotiating process could easily be deflected by the wave of criticism.

Vulnerable Dimension

The negotiating process and federal proposals of the type suggested above would be most vulnerable on one major dimension; the perpetuation of a segregated political dispensation. It would immediately be able to be labelled an apartheid structure. Because of this one feature the constructive participation of meaningful African leadership and opinion would be in doubt, to say the least.

What is required of federal constitutional proposals is that they have at least certain elements which counter the 'apartheid' label. The Buthelezi Commission proposals, while providing fully for white political security, achieved this to a substantial degree by recommending conjoint or shared government in a region of the country — KwaZulu/Natal. Both internationally and for Chief Buthelezi, Inkatha and a wide range of non-radical groupings the Buthelezi Commission formula appeared to survive the test of a non-apartheid dispensation.

Multi-racial Regional Rule

It would seem then, that politically viable proposals emanating from Mr Botha's new initiatives would have to depart from the separatist formula in at least some respects. One, already established in the present constitution, might be a multi-racial common affairs cabinet. Another might have to be the acceptance of conjoint or multi-racial government at a regional level in certain areas. The most appropriate regions would be non-traditional, highly urbanised and industrialised areas in which a high degree of inter-racial contact and economic cooperation has already been established. Parts of the Witwatersrand, Natal/KwaZulu in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg area, the East London area and perhaps even the Cape Peninsula would be indicated.

These areas have a key political significance and cooperative or joint government without majority domination in these places might well be the trade-off which could lead to a viable constitutional compromise which could survive the winds of political antagonism both from the right and the left of our political spectrum. Of all the options and possibilities, the federal formula with certain clear departures from certain separatist structures would represent the most workable compromise between realistic opposing demands. Research results indicate that it is also achievable. The 'special African council' option may, however, be tried by the government first, but it appears inevitable that it will have to be superseded by something approximating a federal structure. *ISA*

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 The Buthelezi Commission: *The Requirements for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal*. Durban, H and H Publications 1982

TOWNSHIP UNREST

*as seen by
Township Residents*

By Professor Lawrence Schlemmer

Township unrest in South Africa is like a Rorschach inkblot to political commentators. Very frequently people read into the disturbances what they want to find. In this brief research-based analysis Prof Lawrence Schlemmer reviews the divergent opinions on the unrest in the media and compares them with the views of those closest to the action - the rank-and-file residents. Rank-and-file residents give little support to the notion that unrest is mainly due to agitation, but they do draw attention to a wide range of interacting factors in South Africa's tragic disturbances.

Unrest as Agitation?

The wave of township unrest which occurred in late 1984 and which is continuing in a few sporadic outbreaks in the Eastern Cape and the Orange Free State has elicited the usual range of explanations in the media. Among official and semi-official commentators, such as the SABC, for example, the role of planned instigation has been stressed. In its 'Comment' on 5 September 1984 the SABC said 'It is pointed out that they (the riots) began at about the same time on Monday morning in five quite separate residential areas The calculated brutality of some of the murders and violence perpetrated against elected local government representatives bore the signs of well-considered symbolism'. Development Board officials were also quick to point to organisations: 'If you look

carefully at the people who are involved (in the township protests) it's always the same names, the people of Cosas affiliated to the UDF' (FM 12/10/84).

One official of the East Rand Board added that in his view the unrest was planned from outside South Africa (ST 9/9/84). An East Rand Town Councillors' meeting levelled an attack for instigating riots on the United Democratic Front (UDF) and even the long established Committee of Ten (Sow 9/11/84), which according to some observers has become fairly staid in recent times. The Mayor of Soweto last year also condemned the role of the UDF which he viewed as being dominated by Indians and whites (RDM 8/10/84). The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, has repeatedly blamed instigators: 'The unrest situation was not only fanned by revolutionary elements, but was also exploited

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by criminal and intimidatory forces' (NM 23/10/84). The Minister has, however, also referred to deep-seated grievances among the mix of causes (Leadership SA, Vol 3 No 3, 1984: p29).

Pervasive Grievances

In sharp contrast, other organisations have stressed socio-economic and political grievances which are pervasive in the black communities involved and which require little or no instigation in order to find expression. These organisations include Lawyers for Human Rights (RDM 2/11/84), which emphasised rents and poor schooling; Fosatu, which sees both government and big business as fundamentally responsible for the township conditions underlying the riots (Star 4/12/84) and a range of academics and church leaders. Professor Tony Mathews sees the township violence as uncoordinated and irrational, expressing 'deep resentments and frustrations that arise out of relative but real hardship and impoverishment — in short out of the basic inequality of the social system' (Leadership SA, *ibid*: p23). Cosas (Congress of South African Students) spokespeople have protested that the riots were a popular rejection of the black local authorities, of high rentals and an impoverished and unequal education system (FM 12/10/84).

Revolutionary Consciousness

Rev Beyers Naude, however, has stressed what Cosas and Azapo have said on a number of occasions as he looks beyond particular grievances: 'There is a total rejection of the government system by the black community . . . and 'there is a growing willingness to risk shooting and dying . . . ' (Star 4/10/84). This viewpoint points to a nascent rise in revolutionary consciousness, transcending specific factors and causes.

The Educational Dimension

A four month enquiry by Professor Tjaart van der Walt commissioned by Minister Viljoen, during which 132 community spokespeople were interviewed, added another major dimension to the line-up of possible causes. Although the full report has not been made public, ministerial statements suggest that the report found that education was not a major factor underlying the disturbances. Instead emphasis was placed on ineffectiveness, maladministration and possible corruption in black local government and administration. Furthermore, widespread ignorance of the way levies and rates were determined contributed to the poor image of black local government in the townships (Sow 4/1/85).

The close coincidence of township unrest and school boycotts would suggest, however, that the educational dimension to the problem should not be dispensed with in any analysis of causes. The fact that most of the action in the unrest was carried on by youths and young adults with the exception of the very initial protests in the Vaal Triangle, in which householders were involved in a largely peaceful protest, would also indicate that one should add the Cosas protests about black education to the line-up of claimed causes.

A Complex Pattern

Hence the 'causes' or factors put forward in the public debate on the unrest break down into the following:

- agitation (which could be more neutrally described as mobilisation); and/or
- community grievances of a socio-economic kind; and/or
- a malfunctioning and misperceived local authority system; and/or
- grievances related to education and post school adaptation, aggravated by anti-social youth reactions of a more common kind; and/or
- a transcending political consciousness centred around a total rejection of segregation and the political dispensation of blacks.

Obviously all or most of these categories of factors can be presented simultaneously in a complex pattern of social unrest and street violence. Yet it is signally important to consider the different emphases that are placed on the various categories by conflicting groups. Different emphases become political absolutes in public debate, as is clear from the quotes given, and the issue of the weight of different factors is a very important issue to explore.

One perspective that could deepen an understanding of the relative weight of the different factors is the viewpoint of the people closest to the unrest, the township populations themselves. All too often the rank-and-file residents are voiceless while the unrest and rhetoric in the media rages about them.

The Survey

A survey undertaken (mainly on another topic) by Indicator SA in cooperation with the established and reliable commercial research organisation Market Research Africa in November and December of 1984, contained one or two items which provide some interesting and relevant insights.

The sample was an area-stratified random selection of 1 000 black households in all the main metropolitan areas of South Africa (excluding Cape Town). Within households, adults aged 16 years and over were selected by means of a random selection grid. The fieldwork was carried out by trained and experienced black fieldworkers under the constant control of field supervisors. Ten percent checks on validity were carried out. The analysis below is based on one question asked in particular:

'Why do you think that young people in the townships are behaving the way they do?'

The context of the interview at a time when unrest was or had been widespread, provided a clear and immediate focus on the township disturbances.

Because the study was in fact undertaken for other purposes the results of this single probe are obviously tentative. No firm conclusions can be drawn. The insights emerging, however, are at least as useful as an input into the debate as much of the somewhat over-simple claims made by public figures. The broad results are set out in the table on page 10.

Viewpoints of Township Residents

The tentative suggestions emerging from these results can be summarised as follows:



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In the second half of 1984, violent street clashes between black youth and police during election, school and rent boycotts again characterised township unrest.

- Collectively, township residents do not oversimplify the problems of youth behaviour — they acknowledge a wide range of factors.
- Nevertheless, a substantial minority of over one-third of township residents cannot give reasons. This result does not appear to reflect an unwillingness to disclose causes since virtually the entire sample answered much more overtly political questions in the rest of the survey. There appears to be a great deal of uncertainty about youth behaviour in the townships.
- The one major factor which township residents reject most clearly is the instigation and agitation thesis. While there may be active mobilisation, by the time youth present their behaviour to their parents they are probably convinced advocates of their causes.
- The major factors as the rank-and-file see them are education, breakdown of family authority and discipline, youth deviance and poor recreation, financial frustrations and a range of socio-economic grievances.
- Education-related grievances emerge most strongly in Pretoria, where the educational problems became politicised and widely debated very early in the period of the disturbances.
- Rent increases and levies might well be most prominent in the Vaal Triangle, giving some support to the van der Walt report.
- The areas of most intensive early youth unrest also tend to emphasise overt political factors, as do the better educated respondents generally. Clearly a highly

political message is conveyed by sustained youth unrest and organisation.

- KwaZulu/Natal respondents, who experienced youth disturbances much longer ago (in early 1984 in Lamontville and other places), are relatively very unconvinced about socio-political and educational factors. They emphasise unemployment and youth deviance. It is fairly clear that the socio-political culture of Natal/KwaZulu differs sharply from the Transvaal and other areas, partly under the influence of Inkatha. Nevertheless, the role of social deviance in aggravating protests is seen to be very relevant elsewhere as well.

These brief research insights cannot give conclusive results. They suggest, however, that many of the claims made about township youth activity, particularly those relating to agitation and instigation on the one hand, and to a willing revolutionary spirit on the other, must be treated with extreme caution.

Township violence is multi-faceted. In seeking constructive solutions more careful investigations are required. In the meantime it would be wisest to pay heed to all the voices in the public debate, albeit with circumspection.

ACRONYMS

- FM Financial Mail
- NM Natal Mercury
- RDM Rand Daily Mail
- Sow Sowetan
- ST Sunday Times

**CAUSES OF CURRENT YOUTH BEHAVIOUR
AS SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONED BY TOWNSHIP RESIDENTS**
(Percentages sum to over 100 since more than one cause could be mentioned)

INPEST

Categories of Causes Mentioned

Overt or larger political factors	10%	19%	16%	3%	17%	11%
Financial frustrations	13%	13%	19%	16%	20%	20%
Rents and township charges/increases	5%	16%	8%	1%	3%	7%
Poor living conditions	2%	3%	2%	1%	8%	5%
Unemployment/lack of job opportunity	10%	10%	3%	36%	15%	15%
Breakdown of tradition/family authority and discipline	18%	8%	15%	38%	31%	24%
Liquor, drugs and poor recreation	17%	6%	5%	74%	17%	16%
Education-related causes	19%	20%	37%	13%	25%	37%
Bad elements/instigation	3%	4%	—	5%	2%	1%
Other/diverse	11%	12%	16%	14%	15%	10%
Don't know	39%	36%	32%	7%	24%	25%
	All Metropolitan Townships (n 1000)	Vaal Triangle (n 108)	Pretoria (n 107)	Natal KwaZulu (n 150)	Matric or Higher (n 63)	16-24yrs with Std 8 or higher (n 161)
	High/Early Violence Townships					

Resistance to African Town Councils :

The Collapse of Indirect Rule

By Patrick Laurence, Political Editor, Rand Daily Mail

From February 1984 onwards, educational and community unrest simmered in Atteridgeville (Pretoria), Tumahole (Parys) and the Eastern Cape, breaking out into open insurrection in many African townships between September and November. Patrick Laurence identifies many strands in the complex pattern of township unrest and isolates the immediate causes, while analysing aspects of government response which might have accelerated a process of growing violence. He interprets the use of troops to quell African rebellion in terms of the collapse of indirect rule through community/town councils and a return to the most direct forms of coercive control by government.

The violent upheavals in South Africa's African townships began in earnest in the Vaal Triangle on September 3, but even before that there had been unrest in a wide range of townships stretching from Atteridgeville, near Pretoria, to Tumahole, near Parys. By November 7 at least 156 people (SAIRR figures) had been killed in the violence, many by police attempting to contain the disturbances and restore 'law and order'.

In attempting to assess the significance and analyse causes of the unrest, one can start at any of several points:

- The deployment of the defence force to back up the thinly stretched South African police in 'Operation Palmiet'
- The boycott of school by upwards of 250 000 black scholars
- The massive stayaway by African workers in the Transvaal and the township violence associated with it
- The impact on blacks of rising unemployment and escalating prices
- The widespread hostility towards members of the newly-established town councils.

Town Councils Rejected

The violence directed at town councillors is one strand which stands out in the complex pattern of township unrest over the past few months, particularly since the bloody outburst of rage in the Vaal Triangle in early September. The extent of the animosity was poignantly manifest in a brief news item recording an apology to the African community in the Vaal Triangle townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Bophelong, Boipatong and Evaton. The Reverend Bongani Vimbela apologised for conducting the funeral of town councillor Mr Leburu Diphoko, who was killed in Evaton during the unrest, and called on town councillors in the Vaal Triangle to resign (Sow 26/10/84).

In a similar development, Bishop Simeon Nkoane, suffragan Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, led a church delegation which

asked the mayor of KwaThema, the Reverend Joe Mzamane, to resign from the KwaThema Town Council. The delegation charged Rev Mzamane with 'practising double standards by being a priest and serving in an institution that was promoting apartheid' (Sow 28/10/84). Rev Mzamane, however, refused to resign on the grounds that he had not been elected to his position by the delegation.

The condemnation of town councils as 'apartheid institutions' and the rejection of councillors as 'collaborators in apartheid' was often expressed more violently. Within hours of the first, furious eruption of violence in the Vaal Triangle on September 3, three councillors, two of whom were deputy mayors, were brutally murdered by enraged crowds. The mayor of Lekoa, Mr Esau Mahlatsi, was lucky to escape with his life.

In the weeks that followed, town councillors were subject to continuing physical and psychological pressure to resign. There was a spate of bomb attacks on the homes and property of township mayors and their councillors. The victims included the mayors of Soweto, Dobsonville, Katlehong, Leandra and Vosloorus.

Some councillors stood their ground and refused to resign. However, at least four councillors resigned from the Vaal area, three of whom had served on the Lekoa Town Council, which is drawn from Sebokeng, Bophelong, Boipatong and Zamdela, and the most dramatic evidence of the potency of the pressure came in Ratanda, near Heidelberg. All but one of the eight-member Ratanda Council resigned. The surviving member was the mayor, Mr L M Mohlomi, who identified the anger of residents at proposed tariff increases as the major factor behind the resignations. Scheduled elections for a new council in Ratanda had to be cancelled because no candidates made themselves available for office (Sow 12/11/84).

Two-day Stayaway

The stayaway strike by Africans in the Transvaal on November 5 and 6 was in

The violence directed at town councillors stands out as a feature of township unrest since September's outburst in the Vaal Triangle

Town councils were condemned as 'apartheid institutions' and town councillors rejected as 'collaborators'

UNREST

Rent riots in the Vaal Triangle, early September 1984. Shops and business premises owned by African town councillors were looted and set alight.



Acknowledgement: Rand Daily Mail

The homicidal attacks on town councillors in 1984 sets these disturbances apart from the 1976/77 period, when councillors were verbally abused

Africans are more opposed to tri-racial government by whites, coloureds and Indians than to the prospect of continued unilateral white rule

Election polls for the new town councils were even lower than the 1977/78 elections for the unpopular community councils they replaced

support of seven demands. One, significantly, was for the resignation of town councils. The violence in the townships which accompanied the stayaway included several episodes where councillors were the targets of anger. In the East Rand township of Katlehong two African youths were killed when police fired birdshot to disperse a mob besieging the home of a local councillor. In Tembisa, the township worst hit by violence during the stayaway, three councillors resigned because they feared for the safety of their families (RDM 9/11/84).

Seen in the context of the 1976-77 unrest, in which at least 574 people were killed, according to the Cillie Commission of Inquiry, hostility towards Africans serving in local government institutions was not a new development. However, what is new in the period of township unrest, is the degree of the hostility and, in particular, the murderous actions which have arisen from it.

In 1976-77, the animosity was largely confined to verbal assaults on members of the then Urban Bantu Councils and to attempts to persuade them to resign. The homicidal attacks associated with the present disturbance constitute a qualitatively significant change.

Hostility Towards 'New Deal'

An important factor generating the marked increase in hostility was almost certainly the new tri-racial constitution. The tri-cameral parliament, of course, included coloureds and Indians while excluding Africans. Studies by the Department of Political Science at Rand Afrikaans University in 1983 showed that Africans were more opposed to the idea of tri-racial government by whites, coloureds and Indians than to the prospect of continued unilateral white rule (RDM 21/9/84). The new township councils, established late last year under the Black Local Authorities Act,

were offered by the government as a partial substitute for representation in the new parliament.

The new town councils thus came to be seen as part of the government's 'new deal'. They were subject to the same hostility that was directed at the new parliament, and particularly at coloureds and Indians who sought election to it. Those who served in the town councils were slated as 'collaborators' in the same forceful terms used against the Labour Party and the National People's Party, because of their participation in the tri-cameral elections.

Even before the campaign against participation in the new constitution reached its climax in the weeks before the elections of August 22 and 28, there were clear pointers to the unpopularity of the new town councils. Almost without exception percentage polls in elections to the new councils were low. Significantly, they were markedly low in Lekoa (14.7%) and Evaton (5.9%). Again almost without exception, polls were lower in last year's elections than in the elections in 1977-78 for the already unpopular community councils, which the town councils were designed to replace (SAIRR 1983 Survey: p258/9).

Collapse of Indirect Rule

The unrest underlined the unacceptability of the town councils, and accentuated the growing reluctance to serve in them. The implication is far-reaching. It means the near total collapse in parts of South Africa of the government's attempt to construct a system of indirect rule in African urban areas. To a large extent, continued white hegemony in South Africa depends on the government's ability to recruit political auxiliaries through whom it can rule indirectly. The failure of the new town councils — like the community councils before them and the Urban Bantu Councils before that — means that the government has had to revert increasingly to

direct rule, often in its most naked form of control by the police and the army.

The disintegration of the system of indirect rule in the Vaal Triangle was dramatically evident on October 23 when a combined force of 7 000 policemen and soldiers entered Sebokeng to restore 'law and order'. The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, said that revolutionary forces had created a situation of anarchy and that Operation Palmiet, as the combined police-army exercise was codenamed, was designed to bring lawlessness to an end (Star 27/10/84). But, in a later interview, he conceded that there was a second, parallel objective, 'to show that the state can be in authority of the situation, that it has the machinery to be in command of a particular situation' (RDM 2-3/11/84).

Use of Troops

The government tried to play down the political significance of the use of troops in quelling unrest. Both Mr le Grange and the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, stressed that soldiers were involved in a 'backup role' only and that the actual house-to-house searches and arrests were made by

line of defence' and, concomitantly, that the army, as the second line of defence, had not been called on (Frankel, 1980).

The use of so many soldiers so openly served to indicate the severity of the crisis generated by township rebellion. The advantages of deploying troops appear to have been outweighed by the disadvantages. If the goal of Operation Palmiet was to apprehend revolutionaries, it was unsuccessful. Of the more than 350 people arrested, none were charged under the security laws. Most were charged in specially-created courts for a variety of relatively minor offences, ranging from contravention of the influx control laws to possession of dagga, pornographic literature and dangerous weapons (knives and unlicensed firearms, but not AK-47 rifles, limpet mines or Soviet-made grenades).

SADF Intervention Counter-productive

If the aim was to eradicate the spirit of rebellion, to eliminate the influence of 'radicals' and restore the confidence of the 'large majority of peace-loving people' in the government (interview with le Grange, see

Faced with the disintegration of indirect rule through local authorities, the government has had to revert to direct rule through the police and army

The open use of 5 000 soldiers to assist police indicates the severity of the crisis generated by township rebellion



A joint 7 000-strong SADF/ISAP force entered the Vaal Triangle township of Sebokeng in late October. In Sebokeng, soldiers searched all 19 000 houses, erected road blocks, and looted government buildings and town councillors' property.

the police. They cited previous occasions in which troops had assisted police, as well as the relevant section of the Defence Act which authorised the use of troops to maintain internal order. President P W Botha even disclosed that troops had been used in 1976-77 (Beeld 26/10/84), a fact which was not evident to journalists at the time.

The use of troops at Sebokeng may have been presented as part of an ongoing tradition, but there is no doubt that the use of so many troops in a single township operation constituted a new precedent. One newspaper estimated that 5 000 of the 7 000-strong force were soldiers. In 1976-77, the role of the army was downplayed at the time. The authorities prided themselves that the unrest had been contained by the police as the 'first

RDM 2-3/11/84), it was not fulfilled. The Vaal Triangle responded massively and positively to a call to workers to stay at home on November 5 and 6 in protest against government policies. Upwards of 90 percent of the workers stayed away (RDM 6/11/84), and the boycott of schools by African pupils remained almost total in the Vaal Triangle in the weeks that followed Operation Palmiet.

The lawyers for human rights stated that police handling of the unrest in general, and Operation Palmiet in particular, aggravated rather than controlled the unrest (press statement 1/11/84). Police action 'exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and good sense', and Operation Palmiet represented the 'height of police intervention in the black townships', the lawyers said. On the long

Instead of eradicating a spirit of rebellion, 'Operation Palmiet' probably mobilised community support for the two-day worker/student stayaway

UNREST

Lawyers for Human Rights warned that military assistance would cause black people to perceive the SADF as 'an instrument of white political repression'

Trade union support for the stayaway indicates that government has failed to confine them to strictly labour issues

Unions decided to defy government labour policy and to participate in actions designed to promote broader community and political demands

November's regional stayaway in the Transvaal represented the formation of an alliance uniting student, community and worker leaders

term consequences, they warned that Operation Palmiet would cause blacks to perceive the South African defence force as an 'instrument of white political repression' and, at the same time, 'encourage resistance to military call-up amongst whites who do not wish to participate in the suppression of black political aspirations and the enforcement of discriminatory laws' (ibid). If the 'show of strength' at Sebokeng and neighbouring townships on October 23 and 24 was designed to root out 'agitators' and bring the unrest to an end, it failed lamentably. Barely a week after Operation Palmiet a wide range of black organisations met at Khotso House in Johannesburg to discuss the crisis and consider ways in which blacks could demonstrate their opposition to government policies. The upshot, announced in a communique on October 31, was to call on Transvaal workers to launch a two-day stayaway on November 5 and 6. Of particular significance was the pledge of support given to the stayaway by the major trade unions, including the Federation of South African Trade Unions, the Council of Unions of South Africa, the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa and the Transvaal region of the South African Allied Workers' Union (press statement 31/10/84).

Unions and Stayaway

The support of trade unions was critical for two reasons:

- It signalled the failure of government policy to confine trade unions to strictly labour issues, and also to prevent them from backing broader community and political demands
- It ensured the stayaway campaign of the backing of trade unions with organisational strength on the factory floor and, consequently, of grassroots worker support.

The decision of the trade unions to defy governmental attempts to exclude them from the political arena was as important as the disintegration of indirect rule with the collapse of town councils. Government alarm at the stance taken by the trade unions was signalled by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr F W de Klerk, who stated that the underlying principle of South African labour laws was to keep politics out of employer-employee relations. That principle, he added, was under pressure, as trade unions were seen by some politicians as a launching pad towards political power (RDM 7/11/84).

The stayaway was planned as a demonstration of black power in support of a list of demands. Significantly, the list of demands was headed by a call for the withdrawal of the army and police from the townships (press statement 31/10/84). Further demands were for the resignation of town councillors, the release of detainees and political prisoners, the freezing of township rentals and bus fares and the withdrawal of 'unfair' General Sales Tax and taxation.

Stayaway Estimates

The stayaway was a success from the point of view of the organising Transvaal regional stayaway committee, headed by Mr Thami Mali, Soweto regional organiser for the United Democratic Front. Estimates varied, but most observers agreed that the stayaway was particularly successful on the East Rand and in the Vaal Triangle, where the percentage of absentee workers was put as high as 85 to 90 percent (SAR 9/11/84). In Soweto, the stayaway was less effective, but estimates varied from between 50 and 66 percent.

Professor Edward Webster, of the University of the Witwatersrand, who has made a close study of the stayaway as a political weapon, rated the November 5 and 6 stayaway the most successful in nearly 35 years (RDM 8/11/84). The detention of all four members of the Transvaal regional stayaway committee as well as the president of FOSATU, Mr Chris Dlamini, within three days of the end of the stayaway was testimony both to its success and government fears that a second stayaway might be launched.

The meeting which led to the formation of the Transvaal regional stayaway committee was called by the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). But COSAS was not directly represented on the stayaway committee. According to Mr Mali, COSAS was too involved in the student boycott to spare any of its senior members to serve on the committee. The boycott, which started in Atteridgeville, near Pretoria, at the beginning of the year, reached a climax of a sort during the stayaway when an estimated 400 000 scholars boycotted schools (see 'School Unrest 1984' in Indicator Vol 2 No 3, Urban Monitor: p9/13).

The stayaway represented the formation of an alliance uniting student, community and worker leaders. In that sense it marked, as Professor Webster has noted, a resurgence of the tradition of the 1950s, when stayaways were the product of similar alliances. At the same time it marked a break from the pattern of the mid-1970s, when the six stayaways of the troubled 1976-77 period were largely student-initiated and led (Webster, 1981). Perhaps, in the end, the real importance of the November stayaway was that it revitalised a popular front form of extra-parliamentary resistance which had all but died out after the Sharpeville shootings of March 1961 and the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress a month later.

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NEWSPAPER KEY

RDM — Rand Daily Mail
SAR — Southern Africa Report
Sow — Sowetan



THE POLITICS OF NON-COLLABORATION

Moving towards Co-optation, Repression or Exclusion?

By Indicator SA Researcher Graham Howe

Although formal power is only attained through participating in government institutions, the extra-parliamentary movement which has emerged in South Africa in the 1980's is capable of exerting considerable political power in the informal sense. Simultaneously, a grand stalemate has developed because participants within both of these political forums are accustomed to operating within their own insular parameters.

Graham Howe, a UCT master's student in extra-parliamentary opposition politics, discusses at length the inevitable predicament of exclusion which faces groups practising the non-participation tactics of boycott, stayaway and protest. He suggests that government and populist rhetoric obscure the potential institutional linkage and exaggerate the ideological divide between formal and extra-parliamentary politics.

Perhaps the embryonic form of 'prison dialogue' currently taking place between government and the ANC indicates that a long overdue process of closing the historical gap is already underway. On the other hand, the potential for co-optation is being simultaneously undermined by the ongoing nationwide repression of anti-apartheid organisations and by the forthcoming treason trials of at least 28 prominent political and labour activists.

Excluded from institutional politics, the less radical sectors among extra-parliamentary forces practise the moral politics of protest

Their boycott strategy aims to produce a crisis of legitimacy for segregated institutions, thus securing government concessions

Opposition factions located further to the left use the boycott as part of a revolutionary non-collaboration strategy

The UDF and NFC symbolise on a national level the political ideals of community, student, labour and other grassroots affiliates

The non-collaboration strategy is arguably as much a part of South Africa's political tradition as are the formal politics of parliamentary participation. The historical exclusion of the black community from central government and the restrictions placed on the political expression of left-of-centre ideologies have spawned several generations of extra-parliamentary protest movements applying this strategy in the various forms of the boycott tactic.

Whereas in most democratic societies only radical fringe parties unable to attract sufficient electoral support operate outside of the political mainstream, in South Africa, reformist organisations representative of large numbers of unenfranchised black people conduct extensive activity beyond the confines of parliament. A recent commentary on the moderate nature of their goals recognises that 'Mass political organisation in South Africa has always been nationalist or popular, organising membership as "the nation" rather than as members of the working-class . . . aiming at the abolition of apartheid' (WIP No 34:12/14), an ideological orientation which is not necessarily socialist or anti-capitalist.

Moral Protest Politics

Political exclusion in South Africa has produced a parochial dynamic, whereby 'radical' liberal, social democratic and black nationalist groups, left out in the cold by institutional politics, traditionally practise the moral politics of protest. In a nutshell, their boycott strategy is intended to produce a crisis of legitimacy for unrepresentative incumbents, thus obstructing the operation of segregated political institutions, and eventually leading to government concessions.

The successful organisation of voter boycotts by extra-parliamentary opposition predictably invokes considerable fury from the authorities and accusations of intimidation amid fears of mobilised urban black communities. However, the smokescreen of both government and African nationalist rhetoric tends to obscure the fact that the politics of abstention as an alternative to voter participation in elections is an acknowledged democratic right in other western societies.

Professor Andre du Toit of the University of Stellenbosch rejects the assumption that boycotts are essentially undemocratic and argues instead that, 'The right to say no is a basic democratic principle . . . Only to the extent that government seeks to be based on consent does the option arise to withhold democratic participation' (CT 8/09/84).

Ideological/Strategical Divisions

The unreasonable stigma of extremism attached to all 'boycotters' in the eyes of the white electorate tends to exaggerate the 'radical' nature of their goals, while

obscuring the existence of socialist opposition groups located further to the left of the South African ideological spectrum. There is a crucial distinction between excluded groups using the boycott tactic to win concessions and enter a reformed political system, and more radical groups applying the same tactic as part of a revolutionary non-collaboration strategy.

The crucial role played by fundamental ideological divisions found among extra-parliamentary opposition movements, highlighted by the diverse reactions to Senator Edward Kennedy's recent visit to South Africa, will be analysed in a forthcoming Indicator SA article. However, the manifestation of these factions in terms of the different strategical approaches to the boycott is discussed here.

Growing from Grassroots

Past and present formations of internal, extra-parliamentary movements include the All-African Convention of the 40's, the Congress Alliance of the 50's, the Black Consciousness Movement of the 70's and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its rival, the National Forum Committee (NFC) of the 80's. A key NFC affiliate, the Cape Action League (CAL), representing over 40 civic, worker, youth and activist bodies (Sol 09/83) typifies the new form of grassroots political organisation which has emerged in the current decade. Its house-to-house campaign conducted to mobilise a voter boycott of elections for the tri-cameral parliament played a significant role in the particularly low polls in coloured working-class areas in the Cape Peninsula (Star 18/10/84).

Today, the UDF symbolises on a national level the political aspirations of up to 650 affiliate organisations (UDF Boycott Pamphlet April 1984) representing between 1 to 1.5 million people, while the NFC represents about 200 community, student, labour and other activist organisations at the grassroots level (Barrell 1984). The rhetoric of the UDF and NFC which describe themselves as 'mass movements' may well be justified, especially in contrast to earlier popular movements which were constituted by relatively small national activist groups with an original membership base measured in terms of tens of thousands of supporters at the most.

However, actual organisational strengths cannot only be measured in terms of affiliate membership numbers, as other factors are equally crucial in determining the real power of popular movements with no direct access to the formal polity. If opposition politics are to come of age and secure substantial political concessions, their activities will have to go beyond symbolic rejection of government policy and achieve more than the series of moral victories won by voter boycotts.

Government Response

The initial response of several political commentators to the emergence of popular protest movements such as the UDF and NFC during 1983 was that the government was caught in a catch 22 situation. These national bodies developed in the period preceding the inauguration of the new constitution, when the government created a short period of legitimacy where, in its attempts to claim consent for its plans, it must allow the possibility of open dissent' (SAO 10/83).

Twelve months later, any semblance of a honeymoon came to an abrupt end during the week of 21 August preceding the coloured and Indian tri-cameral elections, when over 40 boycott campaigners were detained, 17 of whom were issued preventive detention orders for six months under Section 28(1) of the Internal Security Act (RDM 27/08/84). By mid-December 1984, eight national UDF and affiliate leaders had been charged with treason related to the SA Indian Council, local government and tri-cameral voter boycotts organised between 1981/84. They are currently being held while awaiting trial.

Press Comment

The sustained security crackdown on extra-parliamentary opposition forces since mid-


1984 has elicited criticism across the board in the English and Afrikaans language and black press:

- Volksblad columnist Jan Brand warned that, 'To immobilise an organisation, to place its leaders under restriction, does not extinguish the organisation's aims or the ideals it stands for (NM 19/11/84).
- Rapport said that its support for the government's use of its powers did not diminish its view that all the unrest represented symptoms of conflict that could not be eradicated with force (ibid).
- City Press editor Percy Qoboza warned that 'to ban the UDF would be most stupid — especially in today's volatile climate' (DN 17/10/84).
- Professor Andre du Toit emphasised that 'what reformist potential the new parliamentary system has may well depend on whether our political processes can accommodate extra-parliamentary movements' (CT 13/09/84).

Regardless of government intentions, however, the confederal nature of the UDF and the NFC simply do not lend themselves to simple repression through amputation of the leadership. This traditional form of

The sustained security crackdown on opposition activists since mid 1984 has elicited widespread criticism

The reformist potential of the tri-cameral parliament hinges on whether it can accommodate extra-parliamentary movements



Contemporary extra-parliamentary movements will have to move beyond the venerable protest traditions of boycott and stayaway in order to squeeze substantial political and socio-economic concessions from government.

Acknowledgement: Rand Daily Mail

To repress leaders could be self-defeating in the case of the confederal UDF and NFC. Security surgery might stimulate renewed growth from the grassroots

Non-participation is a less emotive term for the tradition of non-collaboration adhered to by opposition strategists

The non-collaboration strategy is obstructionist: government is unable to co-opt authentic leaders and achieve indirect rule

In South African politics, the most common form of non-participation is the boycott

security surgery could well be a self-defeating exercise: the direct representation of a myriad localised bodies within the UDF's complex national and regional organisational structures could serve to stimulate rather than prevent renewed growth from the grassroots and greater politicisation. The banning of the ANC and PAC and the jailing of an elite leadership in the early 60's or the similar suppression of black consciousness organisations in October 1977 do not necessarily provide a precedent for effective security actions against the mass-based movements of the 1980's.

The Politics of Refusal

Non-participation is simply a less emotive term for the traditional adherence by extra-parliamentary opposition groups to a strategy of 'non-collaboration' with segregated political institutions. Deriving its historical roots from the Unity Movement of SA's (UMSA) political platform of non-collaboration in the mid-1940's and African rejection of Hertzog's Native Representative Council (NRC) of 1936/46, the boycott in particular persists today as a means by which popular extra-parliamentary groups may attempt to obstruct grand apartheid initiatives.

What might be collectively termed 'the politics of refusal' embraces a wider range of extra-parliamentary campaigns than those which simply express opposition to the inception of new central and local government institutions. Historic landmarks of popular protest stretch from the African nationalist Defiance Campaign against new social apartheid legislation in 1952, through a series of school/university, bus, consumer and rent boycotts, to mass strikes and stayaways throughout the 50's.

A dramatic revival of these traditional forms of protest has been highly visible in the contemporary cycles of civil unrest over African school boycotts between 1976/77, the coloured school boycotts and the twenty year anniversary of the Republic between 1980/81; and the national election and ongoing rent boycott in the Vaal Triangle townships during the inauguration of the new constitution in 1983/84. The four worker/student stayaways in the PWV complex between September/November 1984 (see Urban Monitor article) constitutes a variant of the larger non-participation protest tradition, in the form of a symbolic withdrawal of labour to protest against general government policies.

Non-Collaboration and the Boycott

The more radical theory of non-collaboration (see Sizwe on Origins, 1979: p54/6) holds that if non-collaboration is implemented by the

unenfranchised as a long-term strategy, governments will be unable to pursue the traditional colonial politics of 'divide and rule' through the cooptation of petit-bourgeois leaders into inadequate political institutions. The central rationale of this strategy is obstructionist: 'An oppressed people cannot be ruled for long unless they are prepared to participate in institutions designed for their own oppression' (Hassim, 1984: p16). Furthermore, unity among diverse extra-parliamentary groups is strengthened and developed during the course of political organisation around specific issues.

Non-collaboration in South African politics is applied most commonly in the form of the boycott. Advocates of non-collaboration distinguish between the use of the boycott as strategy and as tactic: 'As a tactic, boycott will have limited objectives and a short-term duration . . . Boycott as a strategy though involves a consistent and wide-ranging application of the principle of non-participation' (King, 1983: p163). An appropriate analogy which illustrates this apparently esoteric distinction would be the use of a strike to secure a wage increase (a short-term tactic) as opposed to the refusal of some emergent trade union to register or participate in official collective bargaining mechanisms (a long-term strategy).

The long list of government initiatives which have fallen victim to the boycott strategy spans almost 50 years and includes numerous apartheid bodies including the NRC, the Coloured Persons Representative Council (CPRC), the SA Indian Council (SAIC) and recent local and central government elections between 1983/84 (see Indicator Pol Monitor 2/3: p7/11).

The unusual power of the boycott is even reflected in the mechanisms of the new parliament. Aware that participating parties might conceivably withdraw from the new tri-cameral parliament after the elections, the designers of the constitution empowered the President to lower the quorum of any of the three ethnic chambers or to reconstitute parliament in terms of the remaining house(s) if a general boycott of proceedings occurs. That the possibility of a 'participatory' boycott is provided for in the design of the constitution indicates the seriousness with which the government views the obstructionist effects of such strategies.

There is a fundamental divide between participatory and non-participatory opposition groupings about the theory and practice of the boycott tactic and a great deal of political heat has been generated in the black community over differing approaches.

Participatory Boycotts

While the boycott tactic is normally associated with political groupings working outside the system, organisations such as Inkatha, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP)

and the coloured Labour Party (LP) have all engaged in the politics of non-participation, either on a systematic or occasional basis. It should be emphasised that, 'Boycott as a tactic is not inconsistent with a participatory strategy' (King, *ibid*: p163). The major boycott platforms in this camp consist of:

- The 'enterist' boycott: the LP fought both elections for the now defunct Coloured Persons Representative Council in 1969 and 1975 on a boycott ticket. Although the LP did not fulfil its election promise not to take up CPRC seats if victorious at the polls, the collapse of the CPRC in 1980 due to the LP's obstructionist role led national chairman David Curry to claim 'a victory for the party and a ratification of its stand for using the platform of the CPRC to destroy the basic structure of the policy of separate development . . . of the coloured people' (WIP No 25: p7)
- The Inkatha variant: Chief Buthelezi has opted for a similar strategy, to obstruct the National Party's homelands policy, while utilising homeland government as a platform to promote the interests of KwaZulu. During recent talks with State President P W Botha, Chief Buthelezi rejected Inkatha participation in local government elections or on the Cabinet Committee investigating African constitutional development (STr 2/12/84)
- The protest variant: the PFP refused to participate in the President's Council, while it investigated constitutional options, to protest against the exclusion of Africans from the new dispensation. The LP followed suit, though both parties subsequently opted to participate in the new political structures formulated.

Left-wing critics of groups which utilise apartheid institutions typically focus on the ambiguity of participatory tactics: 'for talking the politics of liberation but practising the politics of collaboration' (WIP No 25: p7). Advocates of 'critical' participation stress their anti-apartheid intentions and reject the 'impotent' politics of extra-parliamentary boycotts. Transvaal LP leader Jac Rabie defends the party's decision to 'go inside' on these grounds: 'It was realised that the politics of protest only was over, affirmative action was imperative . . . we must think in terms of power at this stage' (*ibid*: p11).

Non-Participatory Boycotts

While the issue of separate 'constitution' referenda in the coloured and Indian communities was still alive in early 1983, there was considerable debate in extra-parliamentary circles as to their own course of action. Old political divisions re-emerged over whether the mobilisation of a massive no vote in the referenda constituted participation in the constitutional process itself or not. The different positions adopted crystallise the differing concepts of the boycott as strategy or tactic and illustrate the

larger social democratic/socialist divide:

- **Strategical Boycotters:** NFC affiliate CAL proposed a total boycott of either a referendum or elections (Sol June/July 1984). The African People's Democratic Union of SA (APDUSA), the Unity Movement's political wing, argued that participation in an ethnic referendum was a form of support for the constitution and might split opposition into 'no' votes and boycotters, producing a majority 'yes' vote (Hassim 1984: p16)
- **Tactical Boycotters:** Indian Congress leaders in the UDF argued in support of a 'no' vote in the referendum, as an indication both of the extent of popular rejection and the size of their constituency to the government (WIP No 31: p16). The TIC criticised UMSA's absolutist stance on non-collaboration as a principle, on the basis that rigid moral principles inhibited tactical action at the level of realpolitik (TIC 1983: p20/21).

In any event, these political divisions did not play a very prominent role in the absence of referenda in the coloured and Indian communities and both popular movements conducted boycott campaigns of the tri-cameral elections. There is some irony in the fact that the very low voter turn-out indirectly converted the elections themselves into a form of symbolic referendum.

Legitimacy: Moral and Political Dimensions

To achieve long-term success, the fruits of protest action must ripen beyond the self-evident moral crisis of legitimacy engendered for coloured and Indian politicians participating in the new parliament. With reference to the self-financing of future 'own affairs' local councils, Professor Hermann Giliomee astutely comments that, 'This is where the question of legitimacy becomes a live political issue . . . the raising of rents and service levies in Cape Town by the Labour Party (or in Durban by the National People's Party) could become a trigger for major confrontation' (The Pattern of Politics: CT 6/10/84). The bitter lessons learnt by unrepresentative African town councillors attempting to increase township rents in September 1984 in order to finance their new town councils provides an ominous precedent. By late 1984, it appeared as if only four out of 22 town councils in the PWV complex were still functioning (Star 21/11/84).

The crucial political function of legitimacy lies in the impact on government of the withholding of popular support for new political initiatives. To what extent does a voter boycott affect white nationalist perceptions of the long-term viability of unrepresentative government institutions? As one political commentator asks: 'Is non-participation a means of opposing the establishment by exercising sufficient

A great deal of political heat is generated in the black community over the theory and practice of the boycott

Inkatha, the PFP and the Labour Party all engage in boycott tactics, either on a systematic or occasional basis

In the non-collaboration camp, the two approaches to the boycott - as strategy or tactic - mark the social democratic/socialist divide

To what extent does a voter boycott affect government perceptions of the long-term viability of unrepresentative institutions?

Reactive protest politics tend to focus on rejecting inadequate reforms rather than asserting creative strategies

The political opposition mobilised around particular issues dissipates rapidly once each seemingly landmark event passes

It is untrue that only radical socio-economic and political restructuring would satisfy 'radical' liberal and social democratic groups

If government decriminalises left-of-centre ideologies and offers substantial concessions, internal anti-apartheid groups might settle for a compromise

pressure on it to force it into real reform, or is it non-participation for its own sake?' (BS 11/84).

Issue-Orientated Politics

Next to the devastating impact of security crackdowns, there is another very simple phenomenon which continues to bedevil extra-parliamentary opposition politics in South Africa and partially explains the cyclical resurgence of these groups. The loss of continuity and momentum is a central dilemma of extra-parliamentary opposition groupings, and is intimately related to the reactive nature of protest politics which tend to focus on the rejection of inadequate government concessions rather than the assertion of creative strategies. The actual naming of groups is indicative: the Anti-SA Indian Council, the Anti-Presidents' Council Committee and a myriad other popular groups explicitly organised around the issue-orientated negation of government policy and ethnic institutions.

The political energy generated around particular events, be they elections for new forms of government or the implementation of the Koornhof bills, inevitably dissipates rapidly after each seemingly landmark event. As long ago as 1951, political activists noted that, 'Every fresh piece of anti-African legislation is apprehended as something out of the blue and viewed as a thing in itself and not as part of a whole process' (UMSA Declaration, April 1951). In order to exert more than a temporary impact and squeeze substantial political and socio-economic concessions from government, contemporary extra-parliamentary movements will have to move beyond the venerable protest traditions of boycott, stayaway and the African nationalist symbols and sentiment of the 1950's.

The Freedom Charter

Conservative critics contribute another red herring to South African politics when they claim that only complete socio-economic and political restructuring of South African society could satisfy aspirations of the extra-parliamentary opposition movement. In particular, the kinds of demands made in the CA's Freedom Charter of 1955 are perceived as the epitome of a socialist programme of demands.

However, adherence to the goals of the Freedom Charter was deliberately not made a condition for affiliation to the UDF. Instead, the UDF articulated its own moderate declaration of intent in a move designed to accommodate liberal groups unable to reach consensus on the document. In any case, as Karis points out, the Charter is 'Based on notions of natural rights liberalism, it is not a Marxist document; it envisages a mildly socialist but not anti-capitalist bourgeois democracy' (1983: p394).

Conclusion

Political solutions emanating from the world of realpolitik centre on negotiation and concessions, sparing little thought for utopian ends. It is not too fanciful a notion to suggest that 'radical' liberal and social democratic anti-apartheid groups might in the medium-term have to settle for a compromise in order to come in from the wilderness of extra-parliamentary opposition. This will depend in turn on the decriminalisation and subsequent institutional incorporation of left-of-centre ideologies, and an observable shift in the government's attitude to dialogue with moderate elements in the ANC.

A recent categorisation of the liberal spectrum in South Africa emphasises the major role played within the UDF by 'radical' liberals: characterised as 'Non-racial and welfarist in orientation . . . their liberalism consists rather in their vague and tendentially social-democratic definition of socialism, and in their failure to articulate a clearly anti-capitalist position' (Glaser, 1984: p18). The writer concludes that under certain conditions, 'their own vague social democracy will be likely to prevail over rival political positions and the popular movement will become linked to a reformist project' (ibid).

The recent dissent within the PFP over the issue of military conscription crystallised a divide between the party's centrist and liberal wings, which ultimately boils down to the attitude of party members to extra-parliamentary opposition (STr 9/12/84). To some degree, this kind of indirect linkage between parliamentary and populist politics indicates the potential common ground which exists beyond the rhetoric of non-collaboration. If the government responds to the exertion of power at the informal level with substantial concessions, it is possible that sectors within extra-parliamentary opposition might begin to enter the realm of formal political participation, leaving the symbolic politics of protest behind. *IPJA*

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ACRONYM KEY FOR SOURCES

- BS Black Sash News
 CP City Press
 CT Cape Times
 DN Daily News
 NM Natal Mercury
 RDM Rand Daily Mail
 S4O South African Outlook
 Sol Solidarity, CAL Newsletter
 STr Sunday Tribune
 WIP Work in Progress


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INDICATOR VOL.2 Nº4


SOUTH AFRICA JANUARY 1985

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Shacks surrounding the Isithebe border industry, a decentralisation point situated partly in Natal and KwaZulu.

- 1** *Fiscal Aspects of Dependency*
- 6** *Economic Outlook*
- 8** *The Social Implications of Industrial Decentralisation*
- 13** *Selected Economic Indicators*



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THE HOMELANDS:

Fiscal Aspects of Dependency

Jill Nattrass looks at the financing of the homelands since 1975 and argues that not only is the overall level too low, but the nature of the financial relationship between the Republic of South Africa and its satellite regions itself hinders homeland economic development.

*By Professor Jill Nattrass, Head of the
Development Studies Unit at the University of Natal*

The areas now known as the 'National States' have been an integral part of the development of the modern South African economy since the discovery of gold and diamonds in the latter half of the 19th century. However, the role played by these areas in South Africa's development was largely ignored until the advent of Neo Marxist historical analysts who attempted to develop a coherent analysis of the creation and evolution of the homelands in relation to the changing conditions in the capitalist core economy. The homelands were seen as initially providing a source of a cheap labour supply for the emerging capitalist economy, but as the modern economy became unable to absorb all the labour that could be supplied, this role subsequently evolved into that of a 'labour reserve'.

The situation at present appears to be highly fluid. Not only is the modern economy currently expelling labour, mainly from the agricultural sector and to a lesser extent from the mining industry, but also growing population pressure in the national states, coupled with an almost total lack of investment there during the first 70 years of the twentieth century, have combined to undermine the ability of these areas to continue to serve as labour reserves. They are no longer able to support the surplus population.

South Africa now finds itself in a situation in which the natural dictates of modern capitalism imply a diminishing need for a growing cheap labour supply, whilst at the same time the living conditions of an increasing proportion of the population are under extreme pressure: without access to wage labour they find it almost impossible to survive. The emphasis placed by the government over the past decade on the need to improve living standards in the national states can be seen as an initial reaction to these changing pressures. Despite these efforts, the major source of income to the national states remains and will continue to be wage labour in areas beyond their borders.

Dependency and Public Finance

The major characteristic of South Africa's national states is the extent to which living conditions there are dependent upon earnings obtained from work outside their boundaries. Table 1 illustrates the extent of this dependency.

Due to growing population pressure and the effects of a total lack of investment up to 1970, the national states can no longer support the surplus population

Despite efforts to improve living standards in the national states, they are dependent upon earnings obtained beyond their borders

The potential tax base of the national states is much smaller than the gross national income would lead one to believe

GST, unlike direct tax collected from migrant workers, is not remitted to these states - a substantial loss of income

Migrant labour benefits the central economy by reducing its labour costs and increasing its profits and growth rate

Investments made by national states in developing their workforce are only partially covered by transfers from the central government

Table 1

THE INCOME DEPENDENCY OF THE NATIONAL STATES

Gross Domestic Product as a Percentage of Gross National Income in Year

National State	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Transkei	38	39	39	40	42	43
Bophuthatswana	37	39	34	35	40	41
KwaZulu	24	25	25	22	22	21
Lebowa	36	34	30	28	32	30
Gazankulu	30	32	32	32	35	33

SOURCE: Statistical Survey of Black Development 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981. BENSQ, Pretoria, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982.

Even in the least dependent of the five states discussed in table 1, Transkei, more than half of the area's national income was generated through the export of labour. In the most dependent of the states listed in the table, KwaZulu, more than three quarters of the national income was earned from the export of labour in one form or another.

Exporting Labour

Clearly this massive export of labour has a number of implications in the field of public finance. On the revenue side of the balance sheet the gross national income is from two to four times larger than the gross domestic product of the national states. Studies have shown that migrant workers typically remit only between one quarter and one fifth of their earnings to their families in the national states, needing the remainder to support themselves at their workplace. This means that the potential tax base of the national states is in fact very much smaller than the gross national income would lead one to believe.

At present the central government remits to the governments of the national states the estimated amount of direct tax collected from their residents working in the Republic of South Africa. However, no similar remittance is made in respect of the General Sales Tax (GST) collected on purchases made in the Republic of South Africa by homeland residents. On the basis of figures for 1980 it is calculated that, had GST been 10 percent in 1980 and been transferred to the national states, the effect of this transfer would have been to double the amount of public sector funding in those areas for that year!

The large-scale export of labour from the national states also benefits the central government in other ways. The investment made by the governments of the national states in developing their workforce through the provision of education, housing and health care is in the main not reaped by them but instead by the central government, as the profits generated by that labour accrue and are taxed in the area where the labour is employed — the Republic of South Africa.

At the same time, influx control, where it is effective, reduces the cost of homeland labour to the central economy. The families of the migrant and commuter workforce are housed and educated in the national states at a lower standard and cost than if the family unit had to be accommodated in the core economy, reducing the cost of labour to the economy as a whole, increasing profits and the taxes on those profits, as well as the rate of growth of the economy.

Not Development Aid

Because migrant and commuter workers retain their ties with their homelands and leave their families there, these workers too return to these areas when they lose their jobs or finish their working career, relieving the modern core economy of some of the costs of unemployment and retirement. This again frees funds for more directly productive investment and economic growth.

Certainly one must accept that the large budgetary transfers made by the central government to the national states cover part of these costs and in this sense can be seen as a recognition of their share of the burden borne by the national states. This would, however, be far clearer if the transfers were not clouded in terminology like 'Grants from the RSA Treasury' (for the self governing states) and 'RSA Development Aid' (in the case of the 'independent' states). Certainly these transfers are not development aid in the normally accepted sense of the word. In 1981/82 for instance in the self governing states, some 57 percent of total government spending went on population resettlement, education and social welfare — the major portion of which in some way benefitted

the economy beyond the borders of those states.

The Source of Funds

The governments of the national states (both self governing and 'independent') obtain funds to finance public sector spending from three main sources; from the central government in the form of a transfer, from loans guaranteed by the central government, raised either on the local or foreign money markets, or from so-called 'own sources' of finance which comprise local taxes, licence fees, royalties, interest earned and transfers of African taxation together with, in the case of the independent homelands, a share of the receipts of the Southern African Customs Union (see table 2).

Not only is the share of 'own sources' in total government revenue very small but, small as it appears, it is actually an overstatement of the degree of control that these states have over their own finances. The main components of 'own sources', taxation collections from Africans and the share of the Customs Pool (in the case of the 'independent' states), are both outside the direct control of the local governments concerned. Pressure is brought to bear on the governments of the national states to conform to taxation rates determined by the central government. In the case of the Customs Pool the basis on which the receipts are to be allocated is determined in round table discussions with other member countries, the BSL States (Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho) and the Republic of South Africa.

The only national state with any substantial quantity of 'free funds' (ie free in the sense that the control from the Republic of South Africa is limited) is Bophuthatswana, which earns significant amounts of royalties on the minerals that are mined in the area.

The almost total reliance of the national states on budgetary aid from the central government limits the autonomy of the governments of these areas in a number of ways. Not only are they clearly highly vulnerable to financial pressure from the central government should they step out of line either economically or politically, but are also under significant pressure to conform to common patterns of taxation.

In 1981/82 the national states' governments spent half of their budget on housing, resettlement, education and welfare

The reliance on budgetary aid from the central government makes the national states vulnerable to financial pressure

Table 2 'OWN SOURCES' OF REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE IN THE EIGHT (ORIGINAL) NATIONAL STATES 1974/75 — 1981/82

National State	Own Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue in Fiscal Year					
	1974/5	1976/7	1977/8	1978/9	1980/1	1981/2
Transkei	19	16	33	41	50	37
Bophuthatswana	23	19	22	68	65	60
Venda	22	18	18	22	26	23
Ciskei	22	21	20	21	17	14
KwaZulu	22	24	28	25	20	18
Lebowa	27	24	28	27	28	23
Gazankulu	29	31	27	33	22	18
QwaQwa	55	57	57	64	46	41

SOURCE: Statistical Survey of Black Development 1979, 1980, 1981. BENSU, Pretoria.

Fiscal Nightmare

This dependence on the central government for funding, places the homeland governments in an almost impossible position from a fiscal policy viewpoint. Normal government budgeting procedure is to estimate the level of government spending and its allocation amongst the different expenditure heads in terms of the government's economic policies, and then to raise revenue through a mix of taxes and loans that are thought to be compatible with those policies. In the case of the national states this process is reversed: first some estimate has to be made of what funding the national state believes the central government will make available to it, then expenditure levels may be budgeted accordingly. Expenditures have to be approved through the departmental votes in the South African Republic's budget, thus limiting the degree of autonomy in this area too.

On the policy front further limitations stem from a concerted effort by the central government to maintain a common approach to such things as industrial decentralisation incentives, the standard of education and taxation policies. Whilst there are at present signs of strain in this area — particularly with respect to Ciskei and Transkei, which is likely to increase should more states opt for independence — there is no doubt that the central government wields sufficient power over the financial affairs of the governments of the national states that

Normal budgeting procedure is reversed; expenditure levels are budgeted according to the estimated funding the central government will make available

The establishment of the SA Development Bank is a switch to funding on a project basis

The degree of central government control will only be reduced, however, by the Bank's ability to generate funds from other services

deviant behaviour is not in fact likely to be allowed to develop to any significant degree.

Development Bank

There has been much speculation as to whether the advent of the Southern African Development Bank is likely to increase or decrease the extent of control exercised by the central government over the expenditures of the national states. The establishment of the bank represents a change in the approach to funding the national states: an approach based on providing funds on the basis of an overall expenditure programme has been replaced by a greater emphasis upon funding on a project basis. Such a switchover effectively gives the donor more control over the destination of the funds; in this sense the foundation of the bank will clearly represent an increase in the degree of control. However, to the extent that the bank itself can be considered free from central government control (which will probably depend upon its ability to generate funds from other services, which at present looks limited) the degree of direct central government control will be reduced.

When one compares the annual amount spent per head by the governments of the national states with that spent in the rest of South Africa (see table 3) one sees very clearly that the national states do in fact lose out — particularly when one remembers that they comprise the areas in which the need for spending on infrastructure and services is greater than it is in the rest of the country.

Areas outside the national states clearly enjoy the benefits of government spending to a greater extent than do these states themselves. There is also some evidence which suggests that there is a financial payoff for taking independence,

Table 3

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD IN THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE YEARS 1975 AND 1980

Area	Total Expenditure per Head		Percentage Change 1975/1980	Ratio to RSA	
	1975	1980		1975	1980
<i>Independent States</i>					
Transkei	58	167	188	1: 5.7	1: 3.5
Bophuthatswana	68	294	332	1: 4.9	1: 2.0
Venda	72	257	257	1: 4.6	1: 2.3
Ciskei	136	228	68	1: 2.5	1: 2.6
<i>Self Governing</i>					
KwaZulu	59	113	91	1: 5.6	1: 5.2
Lebowa	68	93	37	1: 4.9	1: 6.3
Gazankulu	82	168	105	1: 4.1	1: 3.5
KaNgwane	103	286	178	1: 3.2	1: 2.0
QwaQwa	98	255	160	1: 3.4	1: 2.3
<i>Republic of South Africa</i>	333	586	76		

SOURCE: South African Statistics 1982. Central Statistical Services, Pretoria, 1982. Statistical Survey of Black Development 1981 Vol. I and II. Buro vir Ekonomiese Navorsing en Ontwikkeling, Pretoria, 1983.

Areas outside the national states clearly enjoy the benefits of government spending to a greater extent than these states themselves

since taken as a whole the level of public sector spending is clearly significantly greater in the 'independent' homelands than it is in the others. Neither KwaZulu nor Lebowa, both of whose leaders are openly critical of the whole concept of 'independent' national states, appear to get their fair share of even the limited funding that is made available to the more acquiescent national states.

Constraints on Growth

Notwithstanding the difference in the levels of government spending in the

national states and the Republic of South Africa, it must be accepted that the constraints on public sector spending extend beyond the limitations imposed by a shortage of funds. In respect of other developing countries it has been argued that one can classify such economies in terms of those factors which constrain their rate of economic growth. There are, according to growth theorists, three classes of such constraint: an absorptive capacity constraint; a capital constraint, which may be reflected in terms of either a shortage of savings or a shortage of foreign exchange; and a manpower constraint. It is argued that apart from short term fluctuations and market imperfections, these constraints will become sequentially binding.

The process of economic growth has as a prerequisite the need for a minimum supply of adequately trained manpower and a basic level of physical infrastructure. When an economy is at a very low level of development its major economic characteristic is its inability to make full use of the other economic resources that are available to it. At this stage of an economy's development, the rate of economic growth cannot be increased by merely pumping in additional capital resources as the economy may not have the capacity to absorb them.

Manpower Crisis

Years of racism in both the educational system and the job market in South Africa have created a situation in which the majority of all the posts in the higher levels of the job ladder are presently filled by whites, and the supply of adequately trained Africans is still so small that it is virtually impossible for the national states to recruit the people needed to staff the public sector properly. In 1982, for example, the situation in KwaZulu was so difficult that one engineer was responsible for all the engineering work in KwaMashu, Umlazi and Clermont — an urban area housing at least 400 000 people (ie larger than the city of Pietermaritzburg). The result is that the majority of senior service positions in the homeland governments are presently staffed by white officials seconded from the Department of Co-operation and Development. In 1981 there were just under 2 500 such white public sector officials employed in the national states.

The placement of the homelands in the economic and geographic periphery, coupled with the low level of physical infrastructure, also adds to the difficulties encountered in recruiting adequate staff and completing public sector projects. The shortage of manpower particularly at the professional and technical levels virtually forces the governments of the national states to concentrate their investment funds in relatively large, centralised projects that can be adequately supervised by the staff that is available to them. As a result, it is usually the smaller, geographically dispersed development projects that are omitted; projects that are most needed among the poorest segments of the community. In other words, the lack of manpower has the unfortunate side effect of acting to channel what development funding there is into projects that are centralised or managed by outside consultants and which tend to benefit the few rather than the majority who are in need.

Conclusion

The role of national states in the continued expansion of a capitalist South Africa is changing as a result of changing relations of production. The economic evolution of these states to at least the point where they can provide sufficient economic opportunities to absorb the population that cannot be absorbed in the capitalist central economy, will not be achieved within the present levels of funding and the existing fiscal structures in the national states. The financial transfers to the national states from the core economy are at present wholly inadequate for the generation of any real economic growth there; less than thirty percent of the funds available are used on income and employment generating activities and the creation of physical infrastructure.

It is always possible for the long term needs of any economy to be clouded by short term political issues, and the new political dispensation in South Africa may be an example of this. It is likely that conflict will emerge between the long term survival needs of the present central government — which must entail increased efforts to generate some income earning opportunities in the national states, inevitably involving increased government funding — and the short term politically-engendered need to finance progress for the newly enfranchised Indian and coloured groups. As time progresses this conflict will sharpen and should the economy remain at its presently depressed levels for any length of time it could well develop into a full scale crisis — in the Marxian sense of the word — which the state may find impossible to resolve. TCA

The constraints on public sector spending extend beyond the limitations imposed by a shortage of funds

Because of years of racism, the supply of adequately trained Africans is totally insufficient to staff the national states' public sector

The shortage of manpower forces these states to concentrate on large, centralised projects which tend to benefit the few

The financial transfers to the national states are wholly inadequate for the generation of any real economic growth there

Natal University economist
Professor Mike McGrath
analyses current trends in the economy

The expansion of domestic demand during the second quarter of 1984 inevitably produced a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments

The deflation of the economy induced by the tightening of monetary policy produced a rapid decline in business confidence

In the first quarter of 1983 most commentators predicted that the economy would slide into a severe depression. Indeed the average of seven forecasts for 1983/84 reported in Indicator SA Vol 1 No 1 was that real gross domestic expenditure would decline by 4.6 percent, and that the real gross domestic product would fall by 1.1 percent. A recovery was only forecast for the second half of 1984. These predictions proved to be entirely incorrect. In fact, the performance of the economy could hardly have been further removed from the forecasters' predictions. Between April 1983 and June 1984 a mini-upswing took place, and after June 1984 there was a sharp downturn.

The main causes of the upswing were large increases in government spending and private consumption, accompanied by massive increases in the money supply. Real GDP (gross domestic product) showed a positive growth rate of 2.5 percent for the year ended June 1984 and real government spending in the first half of 1984 was 14 percent higher than it had been in the same period in 1983,

while in the second quarter of 1984 private consumption was rising at a real rate of 10 percent per annum. The expansion of domestic demand inevitably produced a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments, and from September 1983 the rand started to depreciate relative to all the major currencies. The decline in the rand was exacerbated by the simultaneous appreciation of the US dollar, and the sharply declining dollar price of gold.

The prospect of accelerating rates of inflation and further depreciation of the rand eventually forced the Reserve Bank to adopt a more restrictive policy stance, and the annual rate of growth of the broad money supply was reduced from 22 percent in June 1983 to 17 percent in September 1984. The result was a sharp rise in domestic interest rates, as illustrated by a rise in the prime overdraft rate from 14 percent in June 1983 to 25 percent in August 1984, coupled with a 'substantial decline' in gross domestic expenditure (Dr G de Kock, 'The "Mix" of Monetary and Fiscal Policy', address to Financial Mail Investment Conference 16/11/84).

SHORT TERM PROSPECTS

Table 1 • FORECASTS FOR 1985 •

% CHANGE ON PREVIOUS YEAR	FORECASTER			
	Barclays	Nedbank	BER*	Sanlam
Real Gross Domestic Expenditure	-0.9	-0.9	0.3	-0.7
Real Gross Domestic Product	1.0	1.9	—	1.8
Real Private Consumption	-0.9	-0.7	-0.9	0
Real Fixed Investment	-5.2	-4.5	-3.4	-2.4
Inflation Rate	11-12	10.5	12	12.5


*Bureau for Economic Research

The deflation of the economy induced by the tightening of monetary policy produced a rapid decline in business confidence. Dun and Bradstreet's October survey of the retail and wholesale sectors showed that the number of companies expecting a decline in profits trebled since May, while the number of companies expecting a decline in sales had almost doubled (RDM Business Day; 19/11/84). The Barclays business outlook of October reflected a picture which was 'one of the bleakest ever reflected in these surveys...' (Barclays Business Brief, October 1984: p1). Figure 1 shows the state of expectations as recorded by the Barclays survey since 1983 and dramatically illustrates the collapse in business confidence.

A number of recent forecasts of economic growth during 1985 are also extremely pessimistic, as shown in table 1.

On the positive side the forecasters predict a reduction in the prime overdraft rate, and some modest improvement in the rand/dollar exchange rate. These forecasts are based on an acceptance of the new Finance Minister's declared intentions to cut the rate of growth of government expenditures, and of the Reserve Bank's intentions to exercise control over growth of the money supply. However, the attainment of both these goals is certainly not inevitable. The Financial Mail of 16/11/84 reported 'signs of growing pressure on government to bring down interest rates prematurely', and indeed the Reserve Bank lowered its rediscount rate three days later. If either of these goals cannot be achieved higher inflation rates and a weaker rand will inevitably result in 1985, although in the short term unemployment rates will be lower.

Figure 1 **The State of Expectations 1983-1984**



SOURCE: Barclays Business Brief, October 1984

PROGNOSIS

Strong pressures are being placed on the state to reduce its expenditures. The economic case in favour of this prescription seems overwhelming, for the share of the total public sector in the GDP increased from an average of 21 percent in the 1960s to an estimated 28 percent in 1984 (Bureau for Economic Research, Prospects for 1985: p42). The group most politically vulnerable and who is therefore most likely to suffer the brunt of these reductions are Africans outside the urban communities, ie those who are part of the homeland structure (see J Natrass, 'Economic Prospects of the New Constitution', Indicator Vol 2 No 3). Huge urban biases in the provision of services such as education and health already exist and on grounds of social justice, pressures to reduce the level of transfers to the homelands must be strongly resisted.

There is also renewed pressure on the government to reduce the personal income tax burden. Again this is understandable for the ratio of taxes to GDP has risen from 16.1 percent in the 1960s to 24.1 percent in 1984 (BER, op cit: p42). However, any moves to substitute increased GST for direct personal tax should also be rejected since they would be totally out of keeping with the accepted need to raise black incomes, and mitigate the effects of the recession on the poorer elements in the community.

One non-regressive possibility for increasing government revenues which the newly appointed Tax Commission should investigate is that of taxation of personal wealth. The only wealth tax in operation at the present time is an estate tax, and its contribution to the states revenue has fallen to a negligible amount. Estate and gift duties in America yield approximately 2.3 percent of the federal government's revenue, and if

South African estate duty were adjusted to attain the same yield in the tax year 1978/79 it would have generated an amount of revenue equal to one-third of the total budget transfer made from the central government to the homelands. The taxation of deceased estates is a potentially valuable source of finance, which has the advantage of requiring no increases in the rates of taxes on either current income or consumption. Further, an increase in the rate of taxation of wealth would also contribute directly to a reduction in inequalities in the distribution of wealth, and thereby contribute to the process of income redistribution.

In recent years the personal savings ratio has fallen, which is a great cause for concern because it reduces the rate at which growth in the economy can take place without inflation. The causes of the reduction have, however, received very little analysis. One cause is undoubtedly the redistribution of income which has taken place over the last decade, another is the prevalence of inflationary expectations and the availability of credit to finance purchases. A third may lie in the structure of income taxes, for highly progressive taxes can have strong disincentive effects on saving. Expenditure taxation offers a promising solution to this problem. Taxes on expenditure (ie income-saving) can provide incentives to save, even though the rate is progressive. Such a form of tax could either be substituted for income taxation, or used to complement the income tax.

Bold initiatives on all fronts will need to be taken in South Africa in the next few years. On the fiscal front these will require the financing in a non-inflationary way of expenditures on black development. A progressive expenditure tax, and an effective estate duty are two possibilities which merit serious investigation. JPA

On grounds of social justice, attempts to reduce state expenditures by reducing the level of transfers to the homelands must be strongly resisted

An increase in the taxation rate of wealth is one non-regressive possibility for increasing government revenues, while contributing to the process of income redistribution

To provide an incentive to save, expenditure taxation could be substituted for income taxation, or used to complement the income tax

THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION

*A case study of
the impact of industrial development
at Isithebe on the population of the area*

*By Libby Ardington
of Natal University's Development Studies Unit*

The government's strategy of offering subsidies and incentives to industrialists to stimulate development in homeland areas is a major aspect of its general policy of limiting black urbanisation into white metropolitan areas. The flip side of this policy coin is the stringent application of influx control measures in the urban centres.

While the ultimate 'success' of the government's attempts to keep the major cities 'white' is the subject of a lively ongoing debate, more immediate questions as to the impact of industrial development on previously rural communities need to be addressed.

The Isithebe industrial complex in KwaZulu, widely regarded as a successful example of the decentralisation strategy, provides the researcher with an excellent case study into the effects of industrial development on a rural community. Libby Ardington outlines and comments on the results of a study of the area undertaken by Natal University's Development Studies Unit. The Isithebe study is contrasted against a control study undertaken in the Nkandla district of KwaZulu, where no industrial development has taken place.

Ardington notes that while incomes in the Isithebe area have risen dramatically since the first factories were opened there in 1971, the previously homogenous, stable rural community has given way to a burgeoning industrial population, largely housed in sprawling, unserviced squatter settlements. The failure to adequately plan for and provide the infrastructure, housing and social services necessary to accommodate this population has resulted in the emergence of a spectrum of 'new' social problems and tensions.

Ardington concludes that decentralisation programs such as Isithebe can only succeed if undertaken in the context of full regional development.

Professor J Nattrass pointed out in Indicator SA Vol 1 No 2 that 'historical patterns of development in South Africa have created a situation in which the productive capacity of the economy is highly spatially concentrated but largely divorced from the concentrations of population'. This dislocation has been reinforced by the measures controlling the movements of the African population and has led to the co-existence of extreme levels of wealth and poverty, which have a significant racial overlap. Thus although income gaps are narrowing, in 1980 on average whites received five times the income of urban Africans and twenty times the income of rural Africans. Faced with such socially, politically and economically unacceptable income differentials it is not surprising that the government, in view of its continued commitment to separate development, has attached increasing importance to the decentralisation and deconcentration of the economy.

Urban life, for all its problems, offers Africans an income four times that what the average African achieves in rural areas — R725 per annum as opposed to R182 per annum in 1980 figures. Unless some acceptable alternate to the increasing poverty of rural areas is provided, Africans will, despite the increasing harshness of influx control legislation, continue moving to the cities in a desperate attempt to improve their quality of life.

Are the decentralisation or deconcentration points such an alternate? Can they attract and support a population at a level that will enable them to compete with established industrial areas?

A closer look at one of the decentralised areas — Isithebe — may answer some of these questions.¹ Isithebe is situated in KwaZulu 110km north of Durban. Adjacent to it, also in KwaZulu, is the township of Sundumbili which was established by the government to house the African employees of the SAPPI Pulp and Paper Plant, erected, independently of the decentralisation policy, on adjoining land in Natal in 1955. Development of Isithebe's infrastructure began in 1968 and the first factories opened in 1971. Twelve years later 80 factories employing 8350 persons were in operation.

The Effects of Decentralisation

The effects of decentralisation are not only felt in the industrial area, at the SAPPI factory and in Sundumbili but also in the entire area surrounding the industrial development. Here the original inhabitants have had great changes wrought in their lives and here the thousands who have been unable to find accommodation in the formal township of Sundumbili have been forced to settle. The deconcentration area thus consists of the SAPPI factory (situated in Natal), the Isithebe industrial area and the township of Sundumbili (both of which were excised from

the Mathonsi tribal ward), and that part of the remainder of Mathonsi ward of KwaZulu which has borne some of the impact of the influx of industrial workers and their families. The four areas comprising the deconcentration point are each separately administered and involved in this administration are two governments and numerous government departments.

Data obtained from two of a number of area studies conducted throughout the country over the past two years as part of the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development give information on the effects of decentralisation upon the population of a rural area. One of the studies was conducted in the Isithebe area itself and the other in a rural area in the Nkandla Magisterial District where no development has occurred. Prior to the arrival of SAPPI the Isithebe area was similar to many other parts of rural KwaZulu with there being almost no employment opportunities other than on adjoining white farms. We may, for comparative purposes, consider that the results from the Isithebe area would have been similar to those of the Nkandla area were it not for the industrial development that has taken place.

Measuring Social Transformations

The changes that have occurred affected not only the original inhabitants but also those who came into the area in response to the industrial development.² Measuring these changes is complicated by their unevenness. Developments have not affected all households equally and it was found that, despite the considerable influx of persons taking up employment at the factories, there were still persons resident in the area who had been unable to find employment at Isithebe and who were forced to migrate in order to earn an income.

Other inequalities stem from the location of homesteads. Some people are living in their original homes and others have obtained accommodation in the township of Sundumbili — but the majority have been forced, when unable to obtain formal accommodation, to obtain permission from the local chief to settle on tribal land and

Faced with unacceptable racial income differentials, the government has attached increasing importance to economic decentralisation and deconcentration

Development of Isithebe began in 1968 and by 1980, 80 factories employing 8 350 persons were in operation

Decentralisation has affected the entire area surrounding the industrial development, not only original inhabitants but also new migrants

Table 1

• OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS •
between the ages of 16 and 60

	Isithebe		Nkandla	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
EMPLOYED	74,5	33,0	61,0	10,6
UNEMPLOYED	11,5	10,8	22,6	7,7
SMALL BUSINESS	1,0	9,4	2,4	0,5
<i>Part-Time</i> SMALL BUSINESS	0,0	11,6	2,4	36,7

Not only are amenities available to different degrees in the various areas, but they are provided by different authorities on a different basis

The increased availability of wage employment for women is reflected in higher per capita household incomes and lesser involvement in informal sector activities

erect their own dwellings. The location of homesteads was found to be of great significance in determining access to basic amenities such as water, sewerage, roads, education etc. Not only are these amenities available to different degrees in the various areas but, further, they are provided by different authorities on different bases.

Bearing these differences in mind, it was found that in 1983 annual per capita incomes in the Isithebe area were R599 and those in the rural area R144. Average per capita incomes for the formal township were R650. Incomes in the Isithebe area were unevenly distributed (ranging from R102—R5 376 per head per annum) but were closer to urban than to rural incomes.

Employment Opportunities


Table 1 gives selected occupational statistics for persons between the ages of 16 and 60 in the two areas. The availability of local employment opportunities has clearly benefitted the entire community, but the most marked difference is in the number of women employed in the decentralised area. There are virtually no local wage employment opportunities for the uneducated in rural areas, and social norms and practical considerations often make it impossible for women to become migrants. In Isithebe this is no longer the case and women have not hesitated to become involved in the wage economy. The presence of a second wage earner in the household has a dramatic effect on per capita incomes. The households surveyed in Isithebe had an average of 2,1 persons in wage employment and there was a clear correlation between per

capita incomes in the household and the number of persons in wage employment. Two thirds of those employed were in unskilled jobs and the average annual salary for males was R3 000 pa and that for females R1 091 pa. There appeared to be little difference between the salaries of those who were locally employed and the 16 percent who worked as migrants out of the area.

The increased availability of wage employment for women is also reflected in the far lower numbers engaged in informal sector or small business activities than in the rural areas — there is less need to resort to such activities to supplement income. However, despite the fact that a far smaller percentage of adults is involved in such activities, the percentage of income derived from this source is almost as great as that in the rural area, as Figure 1 indicates. The continually expanding closer settlement opens up endless opportunities for informal sector activity, which local residents are clearly beginning to exploit.

Sources of Income

Figure 1 also shows significant differences between the two communities with regard to the percentage of household income derived from migrants' remittances and pensions. Wherever the role played by these two sources is as great as it was in Nkandla, incomes are certain to be very low.³ The relative incomes of migrants and their dependents at home are particularly clearly illustrated in the Isithebe area where there were both migrants into and out of the area. Both types of migrants remitted



approximately 22 percent of their salaries and the salaries earned locally and by migrants out of the area were similar. The per capita incomes achieved by migrants and their dependents were, however, startlingly different. Households with a migrant member had median per capita incomes (R331 pcpa) approximately half of the median income per capita for the total survey (R599 pcpa). Where the household was headed by a migrant incomes fell even further to R250 pcpa. On the other hand, per capita incomes in the households of migrants into the area were far the highest found in the survey — R4 077 pcpa — reflecting the fact that the average migrant retained 78 percent of his salary for himself and any member of his family who might be living with him at his place of employment, while his dependents 'at home' shared the balance (on average 22

industrial society are developing.

Educational levels in the area are today closer to those of urban than rural areas and are continually improving. Thus whereas 70 percent of those over 65 years of age have had no education this is the case only for 5 percent of the 10—14 age group. Facilities are still far from meeting demand and availability is uneven. Whereas only 6 percent of the township households surveyed contained children between the ages of 7 and 16 who were not at school, 37.5 percent of the households of the original residents of the area did.

Access to Facilities

Most of the inequalities in access to facilities are attributable to the location of the homestead. Sundumbili is administered by

By contrast, in Nkandla, where no development has occurred, incomes are much lower and largely rely on migrants' remittances and pensions

The important determinants of incomes are the number of wage earners per household and whether or not they live at home

Facilities are still far from meeting demand and their availability is uneven, which is mainly attributable to the location of the homestead

The area surrounding the KwaZulu-administered township falls under the local tribal chief, where facilities must largely be self-provided



Migrants' remittances have ceased to be the primary source of income for households in Isithebe.

percent) between themselves.

A comparison of incomes per head points to the fact that the important determinants are the number of wage earners per household and whether their jobs allow them to live at home. It follows therefore that the development of Isithebe has had a dramatic effect upon household incomes.

A Developing Industrial Society

Apart from its effect upon incomes, decentralisation has led to other significant changes in the area. Access to health and educational facilities has improved greatly, as have transport facilities, shops etc. On the other hand access to free and clean water and fuel has virtually become a thing of the past as has the possibility of supplementing incomes through subsistence agriculture. Gone too is the security of a homogeneous stable community and in its place all the stresses and problems of a developing

KwaZulu, whose responsibility it is to develop the town, build the roads and houses, lay on the water, sewerage and lighting, build the schools, clinics etc. The extent to which these facilities can be provided is limited by the budget but is in no way dependent on financial or any other input from the local community. In contrast, the area surrounding the township where the area's original inhabitants and all the more recently arrived squatters live, falls under the administration of the local tribal chief and his indunas. Any facilities provided in this area have to be provided by the community itself, although in a number of cases (such as the provision of schools) a partial refund can be claimed by the community on completion of the facility.

The result of these differing policies is the juxtaposition of two communities with very different living conditions whose wage earners work in the same factories and earn

As a result, those outside the township have no water, sewerage, electricity, roads or clinics, and are poorly supplied with schools

The budget for supplying the social infrastructure bears no relation to the rate of development of the industrial area

The final irony is the application of first world rules to people living in an area which the first world has not yet reached

Subsidies and incentives should be offered to individuals for building their own homes or supplementing their income

similar incomes. Those in the township live in brick houses (which they rent or own), have piped water and waterborne sewerage, street lights and the option of household electrification, maintained roads, relatively plentiful schools, a clinic etc. Those outside the township have neither water, sewerage nor electricity laid on, have no roads on which they might drive to their self-built homes, are relatively poorly supplied with schools and have no clinic.

The Housing Shortage

The chronic shortage of housing and other facilities has occurred because the budget for supplying the social infrastructure for the area bears no relation to the budget (and thus the rate of development) of the industrial area, and because the township and the industrial area are administered by different authorities. It was, for example, 10 years after the development of Isithebe began before any new houses were built in the area. In 1983, when there were approximately 10 000 persons in wage employment in the area, there were 1 800 houses in Sundumbili and the schools and clinic were inadequate even for the township's population. Although the authorities have recognised the problem and have taken some steps to rectify the situation it is unlikely to improve in the near future. In 1983 the Decentralisation Board approved plans for the creation of 18 000 new jobs at Isithebe at a cost of R168 193 000, while the Port Natal Administration Board which had the responsibility for the development of the township, was allocated only R1,1m.

Defining 'Development'

Can the existence side by side of a modern, first world, beautifully maintained, highly technologically advanced industrial area to a squatter area where householders' tenure is not secure, where there is no sewerage, water or electricity, where there are few roads and fewer schools, be termed 'development' — even if incomes have almost quadrupled as a result of decentralisation?

The final irony is the application of first world rules and regulations to people who are living in an area which the first world has not yet reached, and who are trying to take themselves from the third world to the first in the absence of a government program to do so. These are the people who would wish to build their own houses, lay on their own water, electricity and roads and perhaps most important of all develop their own small businesses or informal sector activities, but are denied the right to do so unless they can meet first world standards.

If decentralisation programmes are to succeed they must be aimed at full regional development — not merely at industrial decentralisation. Planning and budgeting must cover both the human and the industrial factor. Just as subsidies and incentives are offered to industrialists, so

should they be offered to individuals with regard to building their own homes or supplementing their incomes. The time is not right and the money is not available to insist that all small businessmen operate from licensed and inspected premises or that all people live in double brick walled houses. Housing is an area requiring particular attention — not only is the shortage chronic but the relaxation of building regulations and the release of sites to entrepreneurs would result in the creation of a large number of jobs in the building industry.

Conclusion

- The creation of local wage employment opportunities through the decentralisation policy leads to substantial increases in incomes in the area of decentralisation.
- These increases benefit not only those living in the area but all who come into the area to take up employment.
- The provision of infrastructure and other developments associated with decentralisation can lead to improved access to health, educational and other facilities.
- As a result of closer settlement and the increased number of wage earners in the community, opportunities for income creation through informal sector activities are enormously increased.

HOWEVER

- As a result of population concentration the availability of basic needs such as clean water and fuel may deteriorate rapidly, just as services not previously required (such as sewerage and rubbish removal) become essential.
- Similarly the ability to supplement incomes through subsistence agriculture will decline as population grows.
- Where industrialisation proceeds at a pace which greatly exceeds that for the provision of infrastructure and social amenities, tensions in the community will result.
- These tensions will be aggravated where the access to amenities — houses, roads, water, education, electricity — is uneven.
- Traditional systems of administration will fail if they are left without any adaptation or increased budget to provide facilities for and administer a community that owes them no particular allegiance.
- The development of the community from rural to urban will be severely hindered and unnecessary tensions created if out-of-time-and-place first world regulations are applied both to urban planning and informal sector activity. J.P.A.


FOOTNOTES

- 1 This article does not consider the economic viability of the industries themselves nor does it consider the cost of job creation at these points. However, the fact that at Isithebe each job created thus far has cost R20 000 in capital expenditure and is costing R3 000 per annum in government subsidies makes the consideration of costs essential when evaluating the programme. Similarly alternate policies for employment creation in decentralised areas (e.g. intensification of agricultural employment through irrigation) merit attention but are not dealt with here.
- 2 Only one quarter of the household heads surveyed were born in the area.
- 3 Pensions at the time of survey were R40 per month (compared with the average monthly salary of R238) and migrants generally remit only one quarter of their salaries.

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
EMPLOYMENT

(EXC. AGRICULTURE & DOMESTIC SERVICE)



The economy continued at a low ebb from the employment viewpoint. The first half of 1984 saw very little growth in jobs outside agriculture. Wages however grew in real terms

ECONOMIC TRENDS





ECONOMIC TRENDS

Black unemployment levels rose steeply in the first half of 1984

Real values of output have fallen in all sectors of the economy

The utilisation of productive capacity fluctuated but remained at relatively low average levels





Investment levels have declined

Both public and private sector investment has declined

Private consumption expenditure has also fallen sharply


INDUSTRIAL

M O N I T O R

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The apparent progress of labour reform tends to be eroded by conflicting legislation dealing with influx, security and homeland controls.

- 1** *The Pre-Wiehahn Legacy: Homeland Labour Regimes*
- 4** *Homeland Labour Legislation*
- 7** *Legislative Contradictions in the Post-Wiehahn Period*
- 13** *The Machinery and Occupational Safety Act*

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THE PRE-WIEHAHN LEGACY: *Homeland Labour Regimes*

By Indicator SA Researcher Graham Howe

There is an enormous legislative gap between the several bodies of labour law currently utilised in the homelands and the uniform post-Wiehahn labour order applicable in the central economy today. A common denominator of the ten legislative regimes inherited by homeland governments during the 1970s is that they are all characterised by anachronistic labour laws in varying degree.

Since 1979, the South African government has extended significant concessions to black workers, recognising trade unions, granting access to centralised bargaining mechanisms and allowing greater freedom of worker association and organisation. The Wiehahn reforms, introduced through legislative amendment and repeal, have mostly bypassed the homelands. These discrepancies between older and contemporary labour regimes are explored and commented upon in the following chart on the major labour statutes applied in the homelands.

For instance, the legitimacy of trade unions and their potential contribution to dynamic industrial relations is not facilitated in the statutory dispute-settling mechanisms provided for in most homelands. The exceptions here are Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, where unions are recognised in restricted cases. In the other eight homelands, the archaic Black Labour Relations Regulations Act No 48 of 1953 or the Transkei/Venda Labour Acts allow instead for worker representation through a decentralised system of liaison and works committees at plant-level.

Furthermore, the protective social ambit of the Unemployment Insurance and Workmen's Compensation Acts does not extend to five of the homelands. Where all the homeland labour regimes are concerned, existing minimum wage levels do not apply either, nor do recent improvements to health and safety labour laws enacted by the central government, with the very recent exception of the Ciskei. In these spheres, homeland workers are subject to anachronistic statutes which have been on the law books for up to forty years or more.

Although the ten homeland labour regimes vary between repressive extremes to more pragmatic approaches, all these governments tend to actively oppose the role of party-independent, non-ethnic national trade unions. Several homelands readily turn to security legislation to suppress union activity. Ciskei is the most obvious example in this regard, having banned the powerful South African Allied Workers' Union from this territory in September 1983. During last year, over 60 trade unionists were detained by the Ciskeian government.

The legislative gap between earlier and contemporary labour regimes is soon bound to have a greater impact in the context of increased industrialisation both within homelands and on the border growth-point fringe. In the absence of real avenues to resolve industrial disputes, it seems likely that the primitive collective bargaining framework intended by the homelands will eventually produce labour unrest in these illusory sanctuaries for 'union-free' investment.

LABOUR LEGISLATION IN THE HOMELANDS

INHERITED LEGISLATION

In the first instance, all inherited labour statutes are 'frozen' at the second constitutional stage at which each homeland is granted self-government. In other words, the subsequent amendment or repeal of legislation by the central South African government does not apply to the 'frozen' labour regimes of the homelands. Where legislation empowers the Minister of Manpower to promulgate regulations, these are 'frozen' at the prior legislative assembly stage.

LABOUR LEGISLATION

HOMELAND	SELF-GOVERNMENT	DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	INHERITED LEGISLATION
Bophuthatswana	June 1972	December 1977	Shops and Offices Act 75 of 1964 Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 of 1941 ¹ Wage Act 5 of 1957 (since repealed in Bop)
Ciskei	August 1972	December 1981	Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 ³ (Other SA labour legislation currently under review by a special labour committee, to promote Ciskei's 'free trade' strategy)
Gazankulu	February 1973		Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 (see footnote 3) Wage Act 5 of 1957 ⁴ All other SA labour legislation in form operative as of attaining self-government, excluding social welfare and wage determination statutes ⁵
KaNgwane	August 1984		The Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953, until repealed by SA government in 1981. However, new Labour Relations Act is inapplicable, so that no labour relations legislation now exists here (see footnotes 2/3) The Wage Act 5 of 1957 ⁶ Most of SA labour regime, excluding welfare and wage provisions
KwaNdebele	March 1981	Forthcoming Independence	Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 inherited before repeal by SA government later in 1981 Wage Act 5 of 1957 (see footnote 4) Most of SA labour regime circa 1981, excluding welfare and wage provisions
KwaZulu	February 1977		Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 ⁷ The Unemployment Insurance and Workmen's Compensation Acts are administered by the SA Department of Manpower Wage Act 5 of 1957 (see footnote 4) Most of SA labour regime circa 1977, except that wage determinations and several training acts are not applied
Lebowa	October 1975		Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 Wage Act 5 of 1957 (see footnote 4) Most of SA labour regime circa 1975, including welfare statutes but excluding wage determinations
Transkei	May 1963	October 1976	Various inherited employment training and registration acts
Qwaqwa	October 1974		Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953 (see footnote 3) Wage Act 5 of 1957 (see footnote 4) Most of SA labour regime circa 1974, excluding welfare and wage statutes
Venda	February 1973	September 1979	Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 of 1941 Shops and Offices Act 75 of 1964 (see footnote 1)

FURTHER NOTES

- 1 The two preceding statutes apply even though the SA government subsequently repealed and replaced these in 1983 with the more progressive Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 and the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act No 6, which set up a system of safety representatives and committees.
- 2 In terms of South African Proclamation R84 of 1970, the renamed SA Labour Relations Act (previously, the SA Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956) is not inherited by the homeland governments, unless they choose to adopt it in the 'post-independence' phase. Under SA Proclamation R94 of 1972, the ICA does not apply on premises owned or leased by the homeland development corporations at 'border' growth-points.
- 3 Apart from Bophuthatswana and the Transkei, all the other homelands utilise this archaic collective bargaining statute. Based on the SA Bantu Settlement of Disputes Act of 1953, as amended by the SA government in 1973, the Black Labour Relations Regulations Act severely constrains African union and strike activity, instead relying on decentralised collective bargaining mechanisms such as in-house committees.
- 4 Excludes inherited wage determinations, although empowers homeland government to establish a wage board and make own determinations.
- 5 Section 13 of Schedule 1 of the National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971 states that all self-governing homelands have

ADOPTED LEGISLATION

Secondly, where South African labour acts are adopted by self-governing or 'independent' homelands in their entirety and without revision, these statutes are 'frozen' in a similar sense, ie as they stand at the time of adoption, unless later amendments are initiated by a homeland government.

REVISED LEGISLATION

Lastly, the major examples of labour legislation initiated by homeland governments which deviate from the South African statutes they are modelled on are listed below, including brief notes on the major points of divergence.

ADOPTED LEGISLATION	REVISED LEGISLATION
Bop Apprenticeship Act 4 of 1974 Bop Unemployment Insurance Act 17 of 1978 Bop Workmen's Compensation Act 12 of 1979	Bop Labour Act 4 of 1979 (waives SA prohibition on recruiting through chiefs and provides for repatriation of employees) Bop Shop Hours Act 25 of 1979 (unifies three provincial ordinances) Bop Industrial Conciliation Act 8 of 1984 ² (requires unions operative in homeland to have head offices there and gives Registrar discretionary powers over registration)
Ciskei Apprenticeship Act 7 of 1973 Ciskei Unemployment Insurance Act of 1983	Ciskei Workmen's Compensation Act 11 of 1984 Ciskei Manpower Training Act 33 of 1984 Ciskei Machinery and Occupational Safety Act 35 of 1984 Ciskei Conditions of Employment Legislation Act 34 of 1984
Gazankulu Apprenticeship Act 6 of 1974	None
None	As KaNgwane was given self-governing status on 31 August 1984, it has not yet repealed or amended any SA labour acts
None	Has not repealed, amended or initiated any labour legislation
KwaZulu Apprenticeship Act 9 of 1978 ⁶ KwaZulu Factories, Machinery and Building Work Continuation Act of 1977	KwaZulu Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 10 of 1981 (to establish an Industrial Court at Ulundi and require unions to register in KwaZulu if certain statutory requirements are met)
Lebowa Apprenticeship Act 11 of 1979	None
Transkei Wage Act 15 of 1977, created wage board Transkei Workmen's Compensation Act 20 of 1977 Transkei Unemployment Insurance Act 11 of 1983 Transkei Apprenticeship Act 10 of 1974	The Transkei Labour Relations Act 13 of 1977 ⁹ The Transkei Unemployment Act 11 of 1983 (covers migrants, commuters and 'local' workers; requires claimants to have been employed for 18 out of previous 52 weeks)
None	Has not repealed, amended or initiated any labour legislation
Venda Unemployment Insurance Act 11 of 1983 Venda Workmen's Compensation Act 9 of 1980 Venda Wage Act 5 of 1981, may establish wage board	Venda Labour Act 18 of 1982 (wide definition of employee to include domestic servants; combines provisions for labour relations and recruitment; provides for worker representation through liaison committees and permits recruitment through chiefs)

jurisdiction over all labour matters excluding the Workmen's Compensation and Unemployment Insurance Acts.

6 In line with the other homelands, inherited wage determinations do not apply, though KaNgwane is an exception in one sense in that it is not empowered to establish a wage board.

7 This is applied instead of KwaZulu's own ICA amendment of 1981. The legality of the latter statute and the stated intent to adopt subsequent SA ICA amendments are in doubt because they ignore SA government prohibitions (see footnotes 2/3 above).

8 The unified worker training legislation enacted by the SA government in 1981, the Manpower Training Act 56 which recognises both trade unions and employer associations, is not utilised.

9 Based on the ICA as it stood in 1977, the Transkeian version does not recognise the existence of trade unions, provides instead for liaison committees and labour inspectors or magistrates to settle disputes, and makes legal strikes almost impossible (see footnote 2).

SOURCE

C Cooper, *The Homelands and Trade Unions, SAIRR Topical Briefing*, July 1984.

N Haysom, see accompanying text.

A Whiteside, *Labour Legislation in South Africa and the Black States*, forthcoming in *Industrial Law Journal*, Vol 101/Part 4.

Homeland Labour Legislation

A Separate Development?

By Nicholas Haysom, labour lawyer

Not only do different labour laws apply in the central economy as opposed to the homelands, but legislation differs significantly across each homeland. On attaining 'self-government' at different periods, each of these homelands inherited most aspects of South African labour law as it then stood, regardless of later improvements. Faced with this legal maze, even lawyers, let alone management and trade unions, are confused as to which conciliation machinery exists or how they should comply with registration requirements. Fink Haysom discusses problems of labour organisation and legislation in the context of decentralisation incentives which suspend minimum wage levels and offer tax perks for homeland developments. In order to illustrate the complex variations, he outlines the 'labour regimes' (the differing bodies of labour law) currently applicable in three industrialised homelands: Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu.

Without exception, workers in the homelands are subject to more repressive labour legislation

National trade unions must work towards establishing uniform wages and working conditions for both urban and homeland members

There is some irony in the observation that the Wiehahn Labour reforms have not abolished a dual industrial relations system as intended. Instead the reforms have thrown into sharper focus the disjuncture between the industrial relations legal framework operating in 'white' South Africa and the various legal regimes in the homelands. Instead of the racial division which the Wiehahn reforms were intended to eradicate, we now have an insider/outsider division. Those 'outsiders' governed by homeland labour legislation find themselves without exception governed by more primitive or more repressive laws.

Protecting Low Wages

The reasons for a less tolerant attitude to the principles of collective bargaining in the homelands are twofold. Both relate to the position of the homelands in the overall political and economic structure of South Africa. The first is economic. The homelands, whatever their legal status, are overwhelmingly dependent on South Africa for aid and for the export of their main commodity, men and women willing and able to work. Homeland governments have looked to investment within their homelands as a means of development and the creation of a taxable base. Because marketing, transport and other infrastructural development has for historical and political reasons bypassed the homelands, the various homeland regimes have little to offer except cheap labour and tax perks. To this end existing minimum wage agreements applicable in the central economy have been suspended in the homelands. Apart from Ciskei and KaNgwane, homeland governments are empowered to establish a wage board and to make independent (and

lower) wage determinations in order to entice investors (see chart, pp2/3)

Trade unions pose a threat to this low wage policy. In the first instance collective bargaining will push wages up, particularly in the light of the depressed wage rates and working conditions in these areas. More particularly, nationally based industrial unions have a vested interest in establishing some uniformity in wages and conditions for both its urban and homeland members. This is so if only to prevent enterprises escaping or shifting the emphasis of their production to areas or plants where they can avoid the standards set by hard-fought but open collective bargaining.

Brittle Regimes

The second dimension to homeland attitudes to trade unions is political. Trade unions by their nature are not ethnic organisations. They are founded on industrial divisions and have increasingly developed a national presence. Their membership is drawn from workers who suffer the effects of influx control and who experience most intensely the lack of political control over the structures that govern them. The emerging trade unions representing these workers are by and large characterised by their democratic form.

In contrast homeland political structures are atavistic, founded on the tribal and ethnic structures bolstered by the central government in the 1950's. Tribal personages have been given extraordinary policing and parliamentary functions in the new governments.¹ Furthermore, not only are these bureaucracies undemocratic but they display a marked hostility to parliamentary and other visible opposition. Such visible

opposition has largely dissipated in less than a decade.²

Their fragile political support has produced brittle regimes who view independent and non-ethnic unions with suspicion. Even in KwaZulu, a rare case whose bureaucracy is not without support and which has countenanced unions, there has been a public war of manoeuvre to induce unions to enter Inkatha.³

More typically, on the other side of the homeland spectrum, the Venda Minister of Manpower in 1981 could have been echoing his white parliamentary predecessor of 1953, when introducing the archaic Venda Labour Act of 1981. He stated: 'the country had not yet reached a stage of development that could entertain trade unions' and that he hoped such a stage would come 'but that we will only allow it when we are sure such unions have no outside influence'.⁴ The consequent framework for industrial relations in some of these homelands is shaped as much by security legislation as by labour legislation. Ciskei is the extreme example.

The Legal Framework

Unravelling the confused tangle of homeland labour laws is a formidable task, even for the legally trained, as is revealed by evident legal ignorance on the topic. For the aspirant investor or unionist, the task becomes prohibitively awesome. The task encompasses no less than the collected annual South African Statutes, including the regulations issued in terms of those statutes, together with those for all the homelands and all the relevant proclamations or statutes altering the constitutional status or legislative capacity of each and every homeland. Armed with these, the diligent researcher must refer for his starting point to the Black States Constitution Act of 1971,⁵ which sets out a three-stage constitutional path to legislative autonomy.

Legislative Assemblies

At stage one, the legislative assembly stage, the homeland government may make its own regulations in the labour sphere which override regulations issued in terms of South African Statutes such as the Factories Act Regulations for example. The Legislative Assembly may not, however, promulgate its own statutes in conflict with South African statutes. The areas in which such homelands can act is listed in a schedule to the Act. This schedule includes labour. It is noteworthy however, that in the schedule the term 'labour' excludes Workmen's Compensation and Unemployment Insurance as provided for in South African statutes.⁶

Self-governing and 'Independent' Homelands

The most significant date for the examination of homeland labour legislation is the date of passage into the second constitutional stage — the stage of 'self-government'. At this point all operative South African legislation

dealing with labour is frozen. The homelands may now repeal or amend South African statutes by means of their own labour statutes. The only significant difference brought about by 'independence' is that the homelands need no longer submit their legislation to the central government for approval.

'Frozen' Laws

All the homelands have accepted self-governing status at different times and hence successively 'frozen' the operation of different regimes of labour legislation since 1971. As labour legislation in South Africa has been frequently amended, the 'frozen' statutory regimes differ in the case of the various homelands. Hence an attempt to ascertain the South African statutory regime at the time of 'freezing' (determined by the year in which self-governing status is granted), requires more than an examination of the principal Act in its original form.

The researcher will notice next that the independent homelands of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and the self-governing homeland of KwaZulu have passed their own statutes regulating collective bargaining and minimum wages.⁷ In the case of the Transkei and Venda, the domestic legislation perpetuates the in-house committees of earlier South African labour laws relating to Africans. Here the minimal protection against victimisation of union members no longer has effect. Having tracked down these Acts, the researcher will be able to set out the law governing collective bargaining machinery in the various homelands.

The Wild Card

However, there is a joker in the pack of cards. The wild card is a set of proclamations issued by the State President by virtue of the powers granted him by the Black Administration Act.⁸ These substantial powers, indeed dictatorial powers in law, allowed him to summarily impose new laws or dispense with old ones without the niceties of the parliamentary process. Proclamation R84 of 1970 as amended⁹ sets aside the applicability of the Industrial Conciliation Act and all wage determinations (but not the Wage Act) in the homelands. We can presume that the reasoning was to allow for sub-minimum wage rates in the homelands as part of the decentralisation plan.

However in 1984 the ramifications of these proclamations as well as their actual existence seem to have been forgotten. Thus in KwaZulu the legislation which attempted to reintroduce the Wiehahn amendments into that homeland, purported to amend the Industrial Conciliation Act but overlooked the fact that that Act did not apply. Legal opinion is now divided as to whether the KwaZulu Act has its intended legal effect.

Confusion

The different labour regimes operative in each of the ten homelands are summarised in

Fragile political support produces homeland regimes who view independent and non-ethnic unions with suspicion

The framework for industrial relations in some homelands is shaped as much by security as by labour legislation

On attaining 'independence' homelands do not have to obtain central government approval for legislation they initiate

Sub-minimum wage rates seem to be an integral feature of decentralisation plans

Limited industrialisation and unionisation in most homeland areas has softened the potential chaos of differential labour legislation

The industrialised exceptions, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu tend to follow a policy of incorporating unions within the ruling party

Homeland governments also have supervisory power over commuters and unions operative in the central economy

The proliferation of labour regimes is unhealthy as the effects of homeland tensions inevitably reverberate within the central industrial relations arena

a separate chart (see pp2/3). Three categories have been utilised to describe forms of homeland labour legislation: inherited and adopted acts, either 'frozen' at the self-government or later adoption stages, and amended 'remodels' of South African statutes enacted by homeland governments.

However, the confused state of affairs evident from the chart has not had the chaotic impact it might have had. Primarily this is because, apart from the Ciskei, KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana, there is very limited industrialisation and union organisation in these areas. The significant exceptions to this rule arise because of mining development in Bophuthatswana and industrial development in Isithebe, Babelegi and Mndantsane. Also, Ciskei, KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana include the dormitory towns of major industrial areas such as Durban, East London and Brits/Pretoria. The main features of the labour law and official conduct towards unions in these three areas may be isolated as follows:

Ciskei

The Ciskeian response has been characteristically severe. All the major unions have had their leading organisers detained, in some cases repeatedly (AFCWU, GWU, SAAWU, TAWU).¹⁰ The most significant union in the region, SAAWU, has been banned. Commuting workers are in the ironic position of being lawful members of SAAWU during the working day in East London, but having to officially abandon their membership by night. The applicable labour legislation would appear to be the archaic Black Labour Relations Regulation Act. However, the security legislation prohibits 'intimidation' strikes and boycotts in very broad terms.¹¹ The Act does allow the defence that the strike was a legal strike in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. However, given the inapplicability of this Act to the homeland, it is difficult to see how such a defence could be raised.

Bophuthatswana

In Bophuthatswana, collective bargaining is now governed by the Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act. For present purposes the most significant feature of this Act is the ban on 'foreign' unions, ie central South African ones. This feature may be traced to the prevalent hostility to non-ethnic unions and must be linked to government support for officially approved unions, particularly in the mining sector. A further distinctive feature is that the Act provides for a strike procedure that effectively blocks legal strikes. The registration procedure grants undue discretion to the registrar of unions.¹²

KwaZulu

The KwaZulu Act,¹³ if one accepts it as operative, can be primarily distinguished from its South African counterpart by the fact that it allows unions to join political parties. This feature relates to the ruling party's desire that unions should affiliate to Inkatha.

These latter three examples reveal a tendency in the homeland policies towards incorporating unions within the ruling party.

Implications

The influence of homeland regimes goes further than the regulation or control of unions within their borders, however. Such homelands can and do affect unionism in central South Africa. If union meetings take place in a township subject to homeland laws or the approval of homeland officials, employees may be subject to a range of discretionary powers possessed by party officials and the township management. These circumstances allow homeland governments supervisory power over commuters and their South African unions. This cannot be healthy in the light of legislative attempts to introduce a uniform and less restrictive approach to collective bargaining.

There is one particularly notable problem that the proliferation of different legislative regimes poses for industrial relations and, especially, for corporate enterprises. Let us take the Bophuthatswana or KwaZulu examples. Company managements with head offices in Pretoria, Johannesburg or Durban may have to deal with a union or proliferation of branches of the union according to different laws and using different conciliation machinery for separate plants. While in the same geographical region, plants may be variously located within or outside a nearby homeland. The unions, too, may have to comply with two or three different registration procedures and other formalities. Managements which choose to utilise barriers to collective bargaining sponsored by the homelands may well find that the unions will choose to bargain outside the homeland, at headoffice or at other plants.

The proliferation of distinct and differing legal regimes is extremely unsatisfactory for a range of reasons. Above all else, as the recent events in the Ciskei have shown, the effects of the policies and tensions operating inside the homeland boundaries cannot be confined within the homelands, and reverberate throughout the South African industrial arena. TPA

FOOTNOTES

- 1 See G Mare, *Homelands: Farce Function or Tragedy*, South African Research Services 1981. N Haysom, *Ruling with the Whip*, Centre for Applied Legal Studies 1983.
- 2 See R Wickstead, and B Streek, *Hender unto Kaiser Ravan*, 1980. N Haysom, *Homelands and the Administration of Justice*, in *Human Rights in the Homelands*, Fund for Free Expression, New York 1984.
- 3 C Cooper, *Labour Legislation in the Homelands*, in *South African Review No 2*, SARS 1984. N Haysom and M Khoza, *Trade Unions in the Homelands*, p37. SALDRU/Carnegie Poverty Conference 1984.
- 4 Republic of Venda, *National Assembly Verbatim Reports*, 27 March 1981, Vol 13, p67.
- 5 Act 21 of 1971. Note however that Transkei followed a separate constitutional path.
- 6 Sec 3 of Act 21 of 1971 read with the first schedule.
- 7 Venda Wage Act 5 of 1981, Venda Labour Act 18 of 1982, Transkei Wage Act 15 of 1977, Transkei Labour Act 14 of 1977, Transkei Labour Relations Act 13 of 1977, Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act of 1984, KwaZulu Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 10 of 1981.
- 8 Sec 25 of Act 37 of 1927.
- 9 R 124/1971, R 102/1972, R 94/1972.
- 10 N Haysom, *Ruling with a Whip*, p15-22.
- 11 Sec 4 and Sec 48, Ciskei National Security Act 13 of 1982.
- 12 Sec 42 Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act of 1984.
- 13 KwaZulu Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 10 of 1981.

Legislative Contradictions in the Post-Wiehahn Period

Two research studies by
Gilbert Marcus and Geoff Budlender,
reviewed by Loretta van Schalkwyk

After Wiehahn, African worker rights and trade unions became part and parcel of a collective bargaining forum which has never existed in splendid isolation from the surrounding polity. From the outset of this reform initiative, influx and security controls have sorely intruded into industrial relations, undercutting the newly granted worker freedoms of association, assembly and urban-based unionisation. Loretta van Schalkwyk draws on two critical perspectives of the web of contradictory legislation to illustrate the political limitations of labour reform.

On 5 and 6 November 1984, the Transvaal's urban black community made a dramatic statement of protest when, on the calculation of the Labour Monitoring Group (LMG), up to 800 000 workers participated in a stayaway from work (see Urban Monitor).

The LMG states that the stayaway was most successful 'where strong trade union organisation and community and student organisation coincided... Unionised factories gave overwhelming support to the stayaway with some 70 percent of the companies in the LMG sample reporting a stayaway rate of over 80 percent..' (Financial Mail - FM 16/11/84).

Beyond the Shop Floor

The figures indicate the growing strength of organised labour in South Africa. The preparedness of these workers to participate in a demonstration of political protest indicates that their level of grievance and frustration outweighed the tenuous status of employment in the current recession and the increasing threat of unemployment.

Subsequent to the stayaway, FOSATU issued a statement to clarify why their members had participated in the protest. The statement read: 'Our reasons for supporting the stayaway were:

- We wanted a clear announcement removing the age limit in the schools

- We wanted democratically constituted Student Representative Councils in the schools
- We wanted the army removed from the townships and a stop to police harassment of residents
- We wanted a suspension of rent and bus fare increases These factors directly affected our members as workers and parents and we took the action because of this' (FWN Oct/Nov 1984).

Into the Political Arena

The detention in terms of government security legislation of CUSA general secretary, Phiroshaw Camay and FOSATU president Chris Dlamini, as well as other unionists, has catapulted industrial relations into the political arena. The anxiety with which the situation has been viewed by employers was reflected in the unprecedented joint statement of protest against the detention of trade unionists issued by the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM).

FCI further stated that it considered the detention of Dlamini and Camay as leaders of South Africa's two largest black trade union federations, as 'the single most serious threat to labour reform and collective bargaining in South Africa

Worker participation in the stayaway indicates that their political frustration outweighs the recessionary threat of unemployment

The detention of trade union leaders after the stayaway has catapulted industrial relations into the political arena

During the course of 1984, a known 515 trade unionists and workers were arrested or detained under security legislation

Although industrial legislation in SA sets out to incorporate international labour rights, other laws deny these selfsame principles

While the LRA recognises the right of worker freedom of association, the Internal Security Act inhibits this ILO principle

since the release of the Wiehahn report' (Star 15/11/84).

FOSATU in turn issued a press statement stating that the quality of industrial relations would be irreversibly altered while 'certain government and certain major employers are not fully aware of the implications of charging union leaders in terms of Security legislation' (press statement 2/12/84).

FOSATU was reacting both to the detention of unionists involved in the stayaway and the SASOL dismissal of 6 500 workers represented by the FOSATU affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial Union.

The statement of protest doubtless was also directed against the fact that by November 1984, in the course of the year, a known 515 trade unionists and workers had been detained or arrested in the homelands or South Africa under security legislation (IIR, Info Sheet Oct 84). In November, 19 unionists were still in detention under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act (Star 15/11/84).

Union spokespersons have time and again pointed out that the majority of the workers have been carrying out normal union work when they have been arrested or detained. Naturally police action is thus seen as harassment and a violation of South Africa's stated acceptance of international labour

principles such as freedom of association, expression, assembly and movement.

Contradictory Legislation

Industrial peace is always precarious owing to the fundamental conflict of interest that exists between employers and employees. As Hyman (1981) points out, 'conflict and accommodation are two contradictory but inescapable aspects of industrial relations'. In South Africa the tensions in industrial relations are compounded and exacerbated by the lack of black political rights and the web of contradictory legislation, which on the one hand sets out to incorporate international labour principles, while on the other hand, other legislation denies these self same principles.

The difficulty of conducting normal or peaceful industrial relations in the context of contradictory legislation has been clearly highlighted by two seminar papers delivered in the course of 1984. In the first, labour lawyer Gilbert Marcus examines the principle of freedom of association as it applies to the labour movement in South Africa. In the second, Geoff Budlender, an attorney of the Johannesburg Legal Resource Centre focuses on recent developments in labour law and influx control which regulate the incorporation and exclusion of workers from the employment market place.

Freedom of Association and the Labour Movement in South Africa


'In South African law there exists no fundamental right to the freedom of assembly or association, which is unhindered by legislative controls...the freedoms of assembly, association, movement and speech, have been substantially eroded by drastic legislative measures' (Gilbert Marcus, 1984).

Marcus points out that the freedoms of speech, association and assembly feature prominently as the cornerstones of democracy in all civilised states. He illustrates how in the context of labour law the freedom of association and the right of workers to organise has been embodied in two international conventions promulgated under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention together with the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention protect the basic principles underlying trade union activity and affirm the freedom to organise and to bargain collectively.

A superficial examination of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, argues Marcus, would suggest that some of the fundamental principles embodied in the International Conventions are in fact

contained in the South African labour legislation. However, he contends that the linking of Section 78 of the Labour Relations Act to the Internal Security Act of 1950 makes mockery of such a suggestion. While in principle the freedom of association of employees is statutorily recognised, the Internal Security Act contains wide ranging powers to inhibit the freedom of assembly of workers.

'The freedom of employees to form trade unions is, by itself, a meaningless right if it is unaccompanied by other complementary rights which form part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining. At the very least, this implies the right to organise and mobilise support by holding meetings and...it implies the right to withhold labour by striking. Equally important is the right to picket. Despite the "guarantees" contained in S 78 of the Labour Relations



Acknowledgement: Rand Daily Mail

LABOUR LEGISLATION

Act, legislative restrictions relating to the holding of meetings, strikes and pickets, have rendered these guarantees defective' (ibid).

Legislative Restrictions

Marcus discusses some of the more important legislation that inhibits or prevents unions from holding meetings, as a direct contradiction of Section 8(1)h of the Labour Relations Act, which requires that the constitution of a registered trade union must provide for the calling and conduct of meetings of members. He points out that legislative restrictions extend to gatherings on both private and public property.

The statutes referred to by Marcus are:

- The Trespass Act No 6 of 1959
'The essential feature of the offences created by this provision is the penalising of those persons who enter or who are in or upon land or buildings without the permission of the owner or lawful occupier...the Act...introduces a new concept of trespass which consists of being unlawfully in or upon land even though the initial entry was not unlawful...' (ibid)

- The Internal Security Act No 74 of 1982

'The purpose of the Act, which consolidates most of the existing security legislation, is to provide for the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. It repeals several sections of the Riotous Assemblies Act No 17 of 1956 which had previously made possible the

most drastic restrictions on the holding of meetings whether in public or on private premises. However, the repealed sections of the Riotous Assemblies Act have been virtually incorporated verbatim in the Internal Security Act' (ibid)

Marcus finds it curious that the power to prohibit gatherings in terms of the Internal Security Act is seen as part of the process of 'maintaining law and order', which means in practice, he suggests, that while not all gatherings are perceived as a potential threat to the maintenance of law and order, the state nevertheless has a useful device to deal selectively with particular gatherings.

Marcus also points out that as 'the South African legislation makes no distinction between peaceful protests of a non-political kind and potentially violent demonstrations, the prohibitions on gatherings of a political or quasi political nature (like trade union meetings) is seen as part of the process of maintaining law and order in the same way as the control of a brawl at a sports meeting' (ibid).

Other legislation listed by Marcus which restricts the right of workers to assemble peacefully is:

- Section 9(7) of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945 which empowers the Minister to prohibit the holding of any meeting, including a social gathering, which is attended by a black, in any urban area outside a black residential area where he considers that such a meeting will be undesirable having

The freedom to form trade unions is meaningless unless accompanied by other complementary rights essential for fair collective bargaining

A host of security, black administration and trespass statutes impose restrictions on many kinds of public and private meetings

LRA limitations on strike action devalue the right to withhold labour, a fundamental weapon in collective bargaining

Workers on strike who congregate on factory premises may be prosecuted for attending an illegal gathering

The right of employees to assemble and organise is constrained further by the virtual outlawing of picketing

LRA provisions merely serve to facilitate the formation of unions. The actual practise of trade unionism is nowhere guaranteed

regard to the number of blacks likely to attend such meeting or is likely to cause a nuisance to persons resident in the vicinity where such meeting will be held.

• Section 5 of the Black Administration Act No 38 of 1927 empowers the State President, where he considers it to be in the general public interest, to order the removal of 'any tribe, portion of a tribe, Black community or Black' to a designated area within the Republic. Once resettled, the affected require written permission should they wish to 'proceed to any place, district or province indicated in the order...'

Section 27 of the Act specifically empowers the State President to make regulations concerning 'the prohibition control or regulation of gatherings or assemblies of Blacks'.

• Section 38(ter) of the Development Trust and Land Act No 18 of 1936, the provisions of which are similar to Section 9(7)(f) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945, which applies to urban areas. The two Acts taken together entitle the Minister to prohibit gatherings in both urban and rural areas.

• Section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977 empowers a magistrate or justice to issue a warrant where there are reasonable grounds for believing either that the internal security of the Republic or the maintenance of law and order is likely to be endangered by any meeting held on any premises or that an offence has been committed or is being planned on any premises.

Right to Strike

Marcus, in line with his contention that the right of employees to organise must be complemented by a right to withhold labour by striking and the right to picket, examines the South African legislation that effectively prevents the exercise of these two rights.

He holds that the prohibitions on strikes are so far-reaching that few strikes are ever legal, rendering the strike weapon, an essential component of the collective bargaining process, practically useless by virtue of the limitations contained in the Act.

The Black Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act No 38 of 1953 totally prohibited strikes by black workers, the instigation of such strikes and the incitement of black workers by any person to take part in or continue such a strike. In 1973, the prohibition of strikes by black workers was repealed. The provisions of the Labour Relations Act now govern the question of strikes by both blacks and whites. Strikes are not illegal unless they are undertaken in contravention of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act.

Should workers opt for an illegal strike, given the restrictions on striking in the legislation, they render themselves liable to criminal prosecution and stand to be dismissed. Furthermore, as Marcus points out, the ramifications of an illegal strike go far beyond the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. For example, a group of striking workers who congregate in the factory premises may well find themselves prosecuted for attending an unlawful gathering in terms of the Internal Security Act. In addition, an employer could invoke the provisions of the Trespass Act in a situation where striking workers refuse to leave the factory premises.

Marcus shows that while the picket is a recognised device employed by trade unions worldwide to ensure that decisions reached by the majority of its members are implemented, in South Africa even peaceful picketing is virtually impossible without committing a criminal offence. Picketing is subject to all the prohibitions on gatherings already discussed.

Marcus also draws attention to the Intimidation Act No 72 of 1982 as a further means of worker control and inhibition of worker rights. He points out that although the Act was clearly conceived as a security measure, it has been routinely used to charge workers involved in labour disputes.

Police Action

Marcus suggests that the growing power of black organised labour and the increasing ability of both registered and unregistered unions to flex their industrial muscle has given rise to intensive security police surveillance.

'The result', he suggests, 'has been what appears to be a concerted attempt to break the leadership of certain of the black unions by means of the vast armada of security laws'.

Thus Marcus shows that in South Africa, trade union organisation is restricted by legislative control at both an organisational and individual level.

He concludes: 'The provisions of Section 78 of the Labour Relations Act merely serve to facilitate the formation and membership of trade unions. The actual practice of trade unionism is nowhere guaranteed and is in fact subject to the stranglehold of a plethora of restrictive enactments. What is strikingly apparent is the use of security legislation to stifle union activity. This constitutes a direct interference with the freedom to organise. But other enactments work in a more subtle way. The system of influx control which ensures that blacks are in a perpetually vulnerable position serves to act as a severe deterrent against potential union activity' (ibid).

Incorporation and Exclusion: Recent Developments in Labour Law and Influx Control

In focussing on the pass laws and the South African migrant labour system, Budlender's paper shows how the laws affecting influx control seriously inhibit free association and another fundamental principle, the right to work. Budlender's argument illustrates how both in their historical context and continued application, influx control laws implicate the state and employers in the politicisation of industrial relations.

Budlender examines the invidious situation of African workers subjected to an influx control policy which requires that people be treated as foreigners with no rights in the urban areas, while at the same time the labour policy suggests that they are free to be members of trade unions in the urban areas with full attendant rights.

Conflicting Demands

Budlender observes that 'the history of the pass laws illuminates two conflicting demands which continue today. On the one hand whites have wanted to limit the number of blacks in "white" areas for political security. On the other hand, blacks have been required in the "white" domains to keep the wheels of industry and commerce turning.

Particularly over the last twenty years, there has been an increasing trend to meet these two conflicting demands by the use of the migrant labour system. The whole premise of the migrant labour system is to say to workers: you will be here while we need your labour and you will be somewhere else when we don't. In that way, at least in theory, the potential conflict between the two demands for political "security" and labour is met' (Budlender, 1984).

The 'push-pull' migrant system has resulted in a number of negative factors. Not least, as pointed out by Duncan and Chaskalson (Leadership SA: Vol 3 No 4), in an employment procedure which is both 'humiliating for the workers and inefficient from the point of view of employers and employees'; a curtailment of skills acquisition and a major cause of urban and rural poverty.

Influx control, state Chaskalson and Duncan, is built on two pillars: control over employment and control over residence. And at the heart of this control, argues Budlender, is the question of worker citizenship.

Worker Citizenship

He points out that the citizenship issue is highly complicated. As a consequence of the homelands policy there are, according to Budlender, at least three different citizenship categories as far as black people are concerned:

- There are the people who are South African citizens in the full sense of the word - people who are citizens of 'homelands' (for example, KwaZulu) which have not taken constitutional

independence

- There are the 'new foreigners': people who were formerly South African citizens, but who became 'foreigners' when the South African parliament enacted a statute conferring constitutional independence on their putative 'homelands' (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana)

- There is a class of people, referred to as 'aliens', who have never been South African citizens, such as citizens of Zambia or citizens of the Transkei born after the date of independence of the Transkei. In South African law 'they are every bit as much "aliens" as citizens of Zambia, Mozambique or any other country'.

Budlender points out that as the homelands take constitutional independence, 'the proportion of black people who are citizens of South Africa drops. They become new foreigners, and their children born after independence become "aliens". There is an already substantial number of children whom one would regard as South African in the colloquial sense, but who are legally aliens' (ibid).

The citizenship question is linked to influx control through Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act on the one hand, and Section 12 of the Urban Areas Act on the other hand.

People with Section 10(1)(a), (b), or (c) rights are entitled to remain in an urban area without first obtaining permission. The recent Rikhoto and Komani test cases expanded Section 10 rights: the former made it possible for contract workers to acquire Section 10(1)(b) rights; the latter made it easier for wives and children of qualified men to acquire Section 10(1)(c) rights, and also simplified the acquisition of Section 10(1)(a) rights by children born in the cities.

Contradicting Section 10

Section 12 of the Urban Areas Act stands in direct contradiction to Section 10, and holds that no person who is a foreigner and was not formerly a South African citizen may ever acquire Section 10 rights. Those with Section 10 rights, who were formerly South African citizens, do not have their position affected, but children born after independence of the homeland to which they are officially assigned can never acquire these rights, regardless of where they were born or have lived. In addition they are subject at

The migrant labour system balances two conflicting demands: a reduced urban African populace versus an adequate labour supply for industry

Influx control is built on the twin pillars of control over employment and control over residence

The homelands policy has produced three types of African citizens. The issue of uniform worker citizenship is integral to union rights in SA

For urban Africans, the consequence of losing SA citizenship after homeland 'independence' is that their children will lose Section 10 status

The gradual diminution in the number of urban 'legals' will inevitably lead to an increase in the use of migrant labour

The use of influx controls undermines the notion of job security, a worker right accepted by the Industrial Court

The likely costs of loss of employment are considerably higher for the migrant worker, forced to return to a distant homeland

any time to deportation under the Aliens Act and under the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act.

Thus, Budlender points out, there is a gradual diminution in the number of black people who have a right to remain in the cities, and, if the policy is allowed to unfold to its full conclusion, there will be no black South Africans, and therefore no blacks with a right to remain in the cities.

As workers will still be needed in the cities, the situation must lead to an increase in the migrant labour system.

Other Controls

Where homelands do not take constitutional independence, other factors of control are being developed. Budlender cites three factors:

- A person living in one of the major black townships that fall outside the prescribed area of a city, such as Umlazi and KwaMashu, adjoining Durban, cannot acquire Section 10 rights because the town falls outside the prescribed urban area. The worker becomes a 'frontier commuter' daily crossing a Durban/KwaZulu 'boundary'
- The freezing of land acquisition and home-building inside a prescribed area and the development of a new township outside the prescribed area, such as Soshanguve situated on Trust Land just outside the Pretoria prescribed area, restricts young people from prescribed areas such as Atteridgeville or Mamelodi who want their own home to the limited option of moving to Soshanguve at the cost of losing their Section 10 rights.
- Urban relocation where the new township is placed outside the prescribed area, such as Valspan and Badplaas, forces township residents to forfeit the Section 10 rights which they previously held.

Removing Rights

In summary, Budlender concludes that 'alongside the citizenship process, housing and township development are thus also being used to remove Section 10 rights and to prevent people acquiring these rights. The underlying theme is of removing rights, of creating a population which has no right to be in the urban areas, but is there by permission to work for a particular employer only until that employment comes to an end. The process is one of exclusion and removal of rights, placing people under administrative control in which they are subject to administrative discretion as to where they may work, where they may live, and whether or not they may continue to do so' (ibid).

Influx Control vs Job Security

Budlender cautions that 'at a time when

more and more people are to become migrant workers, present in the cities by official discretion and subject to deportation, the Industrial Court says that there is a right to security of employment. This right has its origins in the definition of an unfair labour practice, which includes unfairly prejudicing a worker's work security...

'At a time when people are increasingly to be required to leave the area at the end of their migrant labour contracts - because that is the notion of migrant labour, that the worker remains only for as long as the contract continues and must leave as soon as it comes to an end - we have the judgement in the Precision Tools case, which states that it can be an unfair labour practice to refuse to re-employ a migrant worker. There is no way that the Precision Tools case is, in its theoretical underpinnings, reconcilable with the notion of a labour force which is constantly oscillating and which has no rights whatsoever to be in the area. The Precision Tools case is founded once again on the notion of a right to job security.

'Particularly at a time of high unemployment, job security becomes arguably the most important issue for workers... There is now growing pressure from workers on the various parts of the manpower structure - on the Department of Manpower, the court, on employers - in regard to the right to job security. This pressure will continue to increase, because of the effect of the "influx control" imperative.

'Loss of employment is always a serious matter for a worker. The influx control policy raises the cost very substantially. The consequence to a migrant worker of losing a job is that he or she is required immediately to leave the area, to register at the tribal labour bureau in the homeland as a workseeker, and to sit and wait there until he or she is recruited for work in the towns. The prospects of recruitment are very poor. A substantial period of unemployment is the very probable result of dismissal for a migrant worker.

'This seriously raises the stakes within the factory when disputes emerge over dismissals or over retrenchments, because increasingly the price becomes very high. The potential for conflict within the industrial structure is thus raised enormously' (ibid).

Budlender predicts that the labour/citizenship conflict 'is where one of the great political dramas of our time is likely to be played out...' 1984

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THE MACHINERY & OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ACT

Whose Prerogative is Safety Management?

By Steuart Pennington,
Industrial Relations Consultant

South Africa's industrial safety record, by international standards, is appalling. In over 300 thousand recorded industrial accidents in South Africa in 1983, over two thousand people lost their lives and more than 24 thousand people were permanently disabled. These accidents cost South African industry more than three and a half million man days. The Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1984 responds to this situation by bringing the responsibility for the management of safety into the ambit of the employer/employee relationship, and placing considerable onus on the employer. However, the conflicts of interest and interpretation which are endemic to the relationship between employer and employee are given a new and particular focus in the context of the new Act.

The issue of who controls safety representation in the workplace and whether management holds the prerogative in designating safety representatives are likely to become crucial in industrial bargaining.

Industrial Relations Consultant Steuart Pennington, who has recently conducted a countrywide seminar programme on the subject, outlines the implications of the new Act, and isolates areas where significant differences of interpretation between management and labour have already become strongly evident.

The major thrust of the new Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA) is to shift the responsibility for safety management away from the relationship between the state and the employer to that of the employer and the employee. It would appear that the government has adopted and to a certain extent adapted the West German *Berufsgenossenschaften* system where both the state and the employer/employee have a responsibility for monitoring safety.

- The Act provides for the establishment of an advisory council which will include representatives from the Department of Health as well as employer and employee organisations. Safety representatives, one per 50 employees, are to be designated and safety committees established where two or more safety representatives exist.
- The scope of the Act has been widened to cover all activities except the mining and explosive industries, and the definition of 'safe' has been widened to include illness as well as injury or death.
- The powers of the safety inspectorate have been substantially widened, to enable inspectors to serve improvement, contravention and prohibition notices, and penalties for contravention of the Act have been substantially increased.

Designation of Safety Representatives

The issues of the designation of safety representatives and the Act's definition of 'employee' may be expected to become hot metal on the anvil of industrial bargaining.

Definition of Employee

The Act requires that employers designate (in writing) safety representatives from among employees. However, the definitions of 'employer' and 'employee' are extremely wide.

- Employees are defined as 'any person working for an employer and receiving or entitled to receive any remuneration or who works under the direction or supervision of an employer or any person who in any manner assists in the carrying on or the conducting of the business of an employer'.
- Employers are defined as 'any person whomsoever who employs or provides work for any person and remunerates that person or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate him, or who permits any person in any manner to assist him in the carrying on or the conducting of his business, but

A safety representative is to be designated per 50 employees and safety committees established where two or more safety representatives exist

All activities, except the mining and explosive industries, are covered by the Act and the powers of the safety inspectorate have been substantially widened

Table 1

● INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS IN SA (1983) ●

	PERMANENT DISABLEMENT	FATALITIES
Africans	20 505	1 816
Coloureds	1 602	160
Indians	218	19
Whites	1 949	191
TOTAL	24 274	2 186

311 648 Industrial accidents in South Africa in 1983.

3 688 711 Man days lost due to industrial accidents in South Africa in 1983.

SOURCE Dept of Manpower

The Department of Manpower has made it clear that employers will be expected to designate safety representatives from among workers

The labour movement views the Safety Act as an attempt to preserve management prerogative in the area of safety and health

Labour spokespersons have indicated that they will only be happy with complete control of the election and training of safety representatives

excludes a labour broker within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act.

Legal advice suggests that, in terms of these definitions, all persons employed in an organisation except the Board of Directors, or the Owner, are, for the purposes of the Act, employees.

The commonly made distinction between *management* and *worker*, therefore, does not apply. It would appear that all levels of management, except arguably the most senior manager, are defined as employees.

It is therefore not clear whether the Act intends safety representatives to be designated from the ranks of workers, supervisors, or middle management, or a combination of all three.

Choice of Safety Representatives

The Act stipulates that safety representatives must be 'acquainted with the conditions at the workplace' and that their functions are to:

- Inspect the workplace, machinery and safety equipment once a month
- Bring any threat or potential threat to the safety of employees to the attention of the employer or safety committee
- Report in writing to the safety committee or to an inspector, serious incidents that involve injury.

It may be concluded then, that the Act precludes the designation as safety representative of any person who lacks:

- literary or communication skills
- an understanding of machinery and safety equipment, and
- a working knowledge of the Act and regulations.

The Act also clearly states that 'an employer shall take the prescribed steps to ensure that safety representatives (and safety committees) perform their duties assigned to them (by certain sections of the Act)'. Failure to do so may well result in prosecution and a fine of up to R2 000,00.

For the employer, the onus of responsibility placed upon him/her by the Act obviously requires the designation of persons he/she regards as highly responsible, competent and

reliable. In the past, and in terms of the Factories Act, the practice was to appoint a safety engineer from senior management and a number of safety officers from supervision. These persons would sit on a safety committee and ensure that the organisation complied with the Act and regulations, and National Occupational Safety Association requirements, if there were any.

In its recent seminar series on the Act, the Department of Manpower made it clear that, in the spirit of the legislation, employers will be expected to designate safety representatives from among workers, and not just supervisory staff, where practicable of course.

Responses by the labour movement to the designation procedure as given in the Act have already vociferously condemned it as non-consultative and undemocratic, in that it denies the right of labour to elect their own safety representatives without reference to management.

Labour and Management Responses

In general, it would appear that the labour movement views the Safety Act as an attempt to preserve management prerogative in the area of safety and health, by institutionalising bureaucratic liaison committee type structures which preclude direct negotiation between unions and management on safety matters.

Dr J Myers of the UCT Industrial Health Group describes the legislation as 'flawed' in that its non-consultative designation procedure allows for unilateral management control. J Maller and M Steinberg argue that the Act 'is clearly an attempt to pre-empt Health and Safety becoming a bargaining issue . . . and to help assert employers' prerogatives in this area . . . It sets out to institutionalise the potential conflict in bureaucratic structures such as management appointed and controlled safety committees.' They argue further that 'at present capital and state are trying to find an area of consensus over health and safety, before the unions are in a position to take it up consistently and militantly.'

Competition for the control of safety representation in the workplace may be expected to become and remain a prominent issue. Labour spokespersons have indicated that they will only be happy with complete control of the election and training of safety representatives. In fact, one labour spokesman indicated that the relationship between safety representatives and management should be no different to that between shop stewards and management.

Those organisations that have experienced demands by the labour movement to enter into collective bargaining on safety and health have been presented with the following:

- The right of labour to elect their own

safety representatives with no reference to management

- The right to stop work without prior consultation
- The right to have health and safety training directly linked with shopfloor action
- The right to information including: investment plans of the organisation; the records and specifications of all machinery and safety equipment; safety budgets; hazards in the work area; internationally accepted safety standards and precautions; results of medical examinations; factory inspector decisions; etc
- The right to call an expert to assist with safety investigations
- The right to negotiate on all safety matters, including safety standards within the organisation, protective clothing, the constitution of safety committees, the election and training of safety representatives, and the manner in which safety is regulated.

The reaction of employers to these demands has, at this stage, generally been cautious. From a series of countrywide seminars conducted by the author, a general reluctance among employers to allow labour to elect their own safety representatives, or to have much say in the administration of safety in the workplace has become evident. However, employers are generally uninformed about the details of the Act and the concomitant regulations.

Those employers who were informed about the Act were generally unaware of trade union response to the legislation, and were intrigued by the trade union approach.

Employer Responsibility

Under the new Act, the responsibility for ensuring that safety is properly administered and that safety standards are properly adhered to rests more with the employer than it has in the past. Not only does he/she have to ensure that safety standards are maintained, but also that safety representatives and committees do their jobs properly. This will undoubtedly reinforce the employer's determination to retain control of the designation and administration of safety representation.

Clearly the onus on the employer is considerable. In summary he/she has to:

- Know the contents of the Act, as he/she must be able to apply it in the workplace
 - Designate safety representatives in writing, and ensure that the safety representative is acquainted with conditions in the workplace
 - Ensure that safety representatives perform their functions properly by either conducting training programmes or monitoring them
 - If he/she employs more than 100 persons, establish safety committees on which he/she or his/her appointee, will have to sit, take note, and ensure that meetings take place at least once every three months.
- (Recommendations forthcoming from safety

committees, are required to be actioned)

- Ensure before he/she sells any machinery that it complies with laid down requirements
- Report accidents or incidents that occur in the workplace to the Department of Manpower
- Be prepared to make all records available to an inspector.

In addition, the employer is required to be aware of the lengthy list of possible offences under the Act. Of particular interest is Section 28,2 of the Act which, according to legal interpretations, states that in the case of an accident which does not prove fatal to an employee, if it can be proved that by his/her actions or omissions the employer would have been guilty of culpable homicide had the employee been killed, then the employer may still be guilty of culpable homicide. The implication that an employer may be guilty of culpable homicide as the result of an industrial accident, even if death does not occur, may be regarded as a significant new feature of the Act.

In the event of acts or omissions by employees, agents or mandatories, the employer is obliged to furnish proof that he gave more than a verbal instruction attempting to prevent such acts or omissions.

Powers of DOM Inspectorate

In a recent series of seminars conducted on the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act and its implications for the industry, the Department of Manpower inspectors in all major centres were asked to convey the Department's approach to the new Act, and while they were quick to indicate that the axe would not fall immediately, and with devastating effect, they did make the point that the powers of the inspector had been extended, and that they were now able to serve improvement, contravention and prohibition notices. Inspectors are entitled to come onto the premises without forewarning and if necessary demand information and see documents. The inspectorate intends embarking on a substantial recruitment drive to fill the many vacant posts.

Controversial Issues

It would appear then, that the major points of controversy in the immediate future will centre round the following:

- The manner in which safety representatives are designated/elected; will this area be the preserve of management, or will workers be able to elect their own safety representatives, or is there some middle road? Or will it be appropriate to develop a situation in which there are safety representatives to represent worker interests and management representatives to represent management interests?
- The manner in which safety committees are constituted; what will the

A general reluctance among employers to allow labour much say in the administration of safety in the workplace is evident

This reluctance is undoubtedly reinforced by the increased responsibility of employers for ensuring the proper administration of and adherence to safety standards

Even if death does not occur, an employer may be guilty of culpable homicide as the result of an industrial accident

Inspectors are now able to serve improvement, contravention and prohibition notices and are entitled to inspect premises without forewarning

Controversy will centre round such issues as the appointment of safety representatives, their access to information and the reporting of potential hazards or incidents

A safety agreement should be entered into including, among others, safety and management representatives, inspections, discipline, and procedure for reporting accidents

The emergent union movement in particular is likely to look critically at safety both as a recruitment technique and a way of asserting labour control in the workplace

There is, however, much scope for joint problem solving between management and workers

management/worker ratio be and to what extent will management condone the co-opting of outside 'experts' by reason of their specialist knowledge?

- The manner in which inspections are carried out; will safety representatives inspect on their own, will they be accompanied by management representatives, when, for how long, will formal inspections and running inspections take place?
- The reporting of potential hazards; will there be a right to stop work, what will the role of the inspector be, what remedial action will have to be taken by the employer?
- The reporting of incidents; will workers be transferred from one workplace to another, what remedial steps will be taken by the employer, inspector, and safety representative?
- The access to information by safety representatives; will they be acquainted with the workplace, machinery and safety equipment and the introduction of new techniques, machinery etc?

Typical of the emergent union approach, has been a demand for:

- Health and safety regulations
- Information about the plans of the undertaking to include any production and development or investment plans or any changes proposed insofar as they affect the health and safety at work of their employees
- Information of a technical nature as to hazards and precautions necessary to eliminate or minimise them in respect of machinery, plant, equipment, processes, systems of work and substances at use at work
- Access to the Accident book
- Access to any other information specifically to do with the health and safety at work of employees, including the results of measurements taken by the employer or persons acting on the employers behalf
- Result and samples of test taken in connection with safety
- Results of any statistical analyses taken by management of workers' health at the workplace
- A complete breakdown of all substances used at work with the nature of them and the possible detrimental effects on workers.

Safety Agreements

It is recommended that a safety agreement, or safety policy, be entered into which should include the following:

1. Definitions
2. Safety representatives
 - 2.1 Designations and elections
 - 2.2 Terminations
 - 2.3 Functions of the safety representatives
 - 2.4 Reporting on safety issues
 - 2.5 Time off for training
3. Designated management representatives
4. Examinations and inspections

- 4.1 Examinations of the machinery and equipment
- 4.2 Inspections of the workplace, machinery and equipment
- 4.3 Procedure when conditions are considered unsafe
5. Procedure for reporting accidents
6. Safety committees
 - 6.1 Structure
 - 6.2 Functions of the safety committee
7. Changes in conditions of work
8. Facilities and information
9. Discipline in the event of ignoring safety requirements
10. Medical examinations and conditions applying to those declared unfit for work.

Stoppage of Work

Professor P A K le Roux, at a recent seminar conducted by the author, indicated that if workers wished to stop work as a result of unsafe conditions, they could follow any one of the following steps:

- Go to an inspector in terms of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (Section 23)
- Get an interdict (if conditions are considered unsafe)
- Use the unfair labour practice and the industrial court
- Apply for a status quo order in terms of Section 43 of the Labour Relations Act
- Negotiate through a safety committee and if failure to reach agreement through the industrial council or a conciliation board, use the strike ballot
- Stop working as a result of an unlawful order
- If dismissed, then through the common law courts, sue for breach of contract.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that safety is going to become a major industrial relations issue in South Africa over the next decade. To some extent the battle lines between employers and the trade union movement have already been drawn around the questions of designation/representation and prerogative. As with the pensions and tax issues in the past, the emergent union movement in particular is likely to look critically at safety both as a recruitment technique and a way of asserting labour control in the workplace.


In spite of the already apparent conflict between employers and labour over health and safety, it is firmly believed by this author that, with a clear understanding of the issues involved, there is much scope for joint problem solving between the parties involved. Management and workers should tackle the safety issue jointly and work through the conflict areas in order to achieve a workable solution to the problem of safety in South Africa. JPA



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Informal markets, held to coincide with pension payout days, emphasise the absence of appropriate facilities.

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MOZAMBIQUE

Interdependence in Southern Africa?

By Reg Rumney, of the Business Day, Rand Daily Mail

The Nkomati Accord was one of the most dramatic diplomatic events in Southern Africa last year. While the spirit of the Accord, essentially a non-aggression treaty, has been soured by the continuing and escalating activities of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, South Africa and Mozambique cautiously move into a new era of diplomatic and economic relations. One result of events since the Accord has been the opportunity for South Africans to view circumstances within independent Mozambique. Reg Rumney revisited Maputo recently, and from both discussions and officially released reports, presents an overview of the important issues effecting the country's post independence development.

The present government of Mozambique has inherited the consequences of 20 years of war, first against the Portuguese, and after independence against Rhodesia, South Africa and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

In an economic report drawn up this year by Mozambique's Council of Ministers for presentation to the embassies of creditor nations in order to explain the country's need to seek rescheduling of its foreign debt, estimates of 5,5 billion dollars were placed on total damages and lost revenue since independence in 1975. According to this report, summarised by the official news agency AIM, major contributing factors have been:

- The loss of revenue which ironically resulted from the United Nations' policy of sanctions against the then Rhodesia, and the disruption of economic and social infrastructure by Rhodesian forces
- Lost revenue from port and railway charges, the decline of the transport industry, and the loss of remittances from Mozambican workers in Rhodesia and South Africa

- The continuing battle against the MNR
- South Africa's 'undeclared war' on Mozambique, and an alleged deliberate policy of running down commercial relations.

Destabilisation and Natural Disasters

When the Portuguese handed over administration in 1975, the Bank of Mozambique inherited a paltry one million dollars in foreign exchange reserves from the colonial issuing bank — Banco Nasionale Ultramarino. Production in the last two years of colonial administration is estimated to have dropped by about 36 percent and departing settlers left little, getting money out of the country by various methods.

Besides the major source of income from port and rail transport services, which were severely disrupted by war, sanctions and sabotage, the economy was unfortunate not to inherit a major export cash crop or commodity. Mozambique entered the community of independent nations as

Mozambique's Council of Ministers estimates the cost of total damages and lost revenues since independence at US\$5,5 billion

Entering the community of nations in 1975 with a per capita annual income of US\$117, Mozambique is one of the world's twenty poorest countries

MOZAMBIQUE

A deliberate destabilisation policy is claimed to have caused damages to physical, social and commercial infrastructure and services amounting to some US\$3,8 billion

New development projects, port and rail services, rural schools, health posts and shops were effected significantly

A drop in labour recruitment to South Africa's mining industry placed an additional 70 000 men into a job market ill equipped to handle existing demands

Frelimo's celebration of nine years of independence: 'Eastern bloc' military equipment on parade in Maputo.

one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita annual income of US\$117.

An indication of officially perceived drawbacks and problems is given in the Council of Ministers' report:

● Port Revenues

In 1983 an unused cargo handling capacity of a million tons existed in Maputo, yet only 16 percent of the 1973 volume of South African goods was handled. South Africa is accused of deliberately sending only low tariff income goods through Maputo. While it is well known that South African shipping companies have shied away for reasons of security, theft, transport delays and poor communications, the Mozambicans maintain that these problems were a result of a deliberate campaign of widespread destabilisation mounted against the newly independent country in which bridges, railways, locomotives, communication centres, production units, power lines, vehicles and equipment were destroyed.

● Production and Services

The destabilisation campaign resulted, according to the report, in losses in production, delays in implementing projects, lost port and rail revenues, the loss of schools, health posts and shops, the destruction of villages and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. During 1982 and 1983, 900 commercial establishments in rural areas were obliterated, damaging the regular market supplies of about 4,5 million people. The report estimates that the direct effect of South Africa's 'undeclared war' on Mozambique is in the region of US\$3,8 billion.

● Migrant Labour


Recruitment of Mozambican miners dropped from 120 000 in 1975 to 49 000 in 1984. As a result, the Mozambican labour market, already ill equipped to handle existing demands for jobs, is

overstressed by an additional surplus of 70 000 men.

While a South African mining house source denied any policy to cut down on Mozambican miners, claiming chaotic bureaucracy in the transition period as the cause of the drop in recruitment, a labour expert attributes the cutback to a general reluctance on the part of the mining industry to be dependent on any one source of labour. Whichever interpretation is made, Mozambique has experienced losses in revenue estimated at US\$568 million.

● Floods, Cyclones, Drought

As though the aforementioned problems were not enough for any newly independent country to be



Acknowledgement: M. Gordinati / A. Gordon



Acknowledgement: M. Gaidobla; A. Gordon

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Xipamanenie market. "We must start with the principle of paying less to the person who produces less, or with poor quality . . . moving to the principle of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work". See page 5.

able to cope with, Mozambique has simultaneously had to contend with widespread devastation caused by a series of large-scale natural disasters.

In 1978/79 the Limpopo, Incomati and Zambezi rivers flooded, killing 45 people and dislodging 220 000, creating damages estimated at US\$96 million. In 1979 cyclone Justine entered northern Mozambique, and in early 1984 at least 175 people died in the floods caused by Cyclone Demoina as the Incomati, Umbelazi and Pongola rivers flooded their banks, washing away the crops of 350 000 people and leaving 50 000 homeless and destitute. Combined with the effects of the widespread drought since 1981, these natural disasters are estimated to have set back production by nearly 50 percent.

● Imports and Exports

As in all fuel importing countries, costs have escalated massively since 1973 and by 1982 crude oil and petrol imports cost the country US\$200 million, 11 times more than in 1973. Since 1981 the accumulative effects of deteriorating terms of trade, combined with floods, drought, a drop in oil supplies and 'destabilisation' have meant a loss of export earnings estimated at US\$131 million.

Trends and Policies since Independence

Urbanisation, Housing and Relocation

A large part of Frelimo's political support has always been based in the northern, northeastern, eastern and central-southern areas. At the Fourth Party Congress in May 1983 neglect of deteriorating circumstances in the countryside was officially recognised, and reaffirmations made by the Maputo-based Frelimo leadership to strengthen political links and increase support and services to these communities. Consequently, senior members of the political bureau were sent to take over provincial government and senior officials sent to manage provincial affairs.

However, this late political recognition of escalating problems in the countryside has done little to halt an inevitable process of urbanisation, as people moved to Maputo, Beira and Nacala in search of food, shelter and jobs. Maputo's population has doubled since independence to around 800 000, boosted ironically by fleeing settlers in 1975 who vacated dwellings which subsequently provided housing for hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans. Official policy

Four-fifths of Maputo's population are now living in informal settlements. In influx measures similar to South Africa's, officials moved 'unproductives' to 'areas of origin'

FOOD CRISIS

Five years ago most foods were available at markets or shops, yet presently what food is available to Mozambicans is rationed except for an abundance of peri peri. The country as a whole faces an official deficit of 256 000 tons of maize, 74 600 tons of wheat and 83 000 tons of rice for the year ending April 1985 and is now seriously dependent on food donations from Europe and the United States. These donations have increased every year for the last three years, but have been hampered by difficulties faced in effective distribution and marketing. Attempts by government to replace the 4 000 small traders who left at independence with a system of 'logas do povo' or peoples shops, with the state having to take control of most wholesale and retail trade in urban and rural areas, has met with limited success. Attempts to move foodstuffs from areas of surplus to areas of need has proved to be extremely difficult.

In education, significant developments in enrolments, pupil:teacher ratios and school facilities have been made. At independence only 0.1 percent of Mozambicans had completed primary schooling

Government neglect of peasant agriculture in favour of state cooperatives led to political reactions and drops in production. New policies aim to promote individuals and family farmers

4 Regional Monitor

nationalised abandoned residential and investment property, but allowed owner/occupiers to keep their homes. While one-fifth of all housing in Maputo is properly serviced, the majority of the city's population are housed in 'informal' or shanty settlements which sprawl around the city proper, forming suburbs in their own right.

For Frelimo's Central Committee, reactions to these changes have been ambivalent. On the one hand reports declare that 'the face of the old colonial demarcation by race and wealth is something that we can hardly remember'. On the other hand in 1983, in a measure similar to South Africa's application of influx control and pass laws, a programme of moving 'unproductives' to 'areas of origin' began — victims being the so-called 'unemployed, unemployable, parasites and marginal elements'.

Da Silva, writing in *Work in Progress* (WIP32, July 1984), notes that 'such unproductives were sent to their home districts in the countryside at the time of the worst drought and famine in living memory, or were forcibly removed to the remote northern areas ostensibly to work on the labour starved state farms. This generated fear and resentment as every single resident of the major urban areas was compelled to go through an exhausting, confusing and authoritarian process to prove they were productive. Local administrative officials were able to assume unchecked powers to determine the fate of those living in their areas. Reports from the relocation areas were of appalling conditions and lack of food.'

Education

Progress made in education since independence is a serious indictment of Portugal's contribution to

its colony: at independence only 0.1 percent of the population had completed primary schooling, and the country had few technical people and hardly any really skilled workers.

In 1975 a literacy programme was initiated which resulted in a 20 percent drop in the literacy rate. By 1982 pupil enrolment at primary schools had doubled and the figure for secondary school pupils trebled since independence. Teacher/pupil ratios have changed from 1:84 to 1:53 and 121 secondary schools are reported to be operating compared to 33 in 1975. Post-independence teacher training has produced more than 10 000 primary school teachers and 3 500 secondary school teachers. Overall policy is directed towards an emphasis on technical schooling and two technical schools and seven agricultural colleges have recently been built.

Health

Health care in Mozambique has seen a dramatic change in policy since independence. In 1977 medicine was nationalised, becoming virtually free for everyone, and a priority has been to extend comprehensive health care to rural districts through the establishment of first aid centres and health centres. To date 333 first aid centres, 28 health centres and one rural hospital have been built. By 1981 all of Mozambique's districts had at least one professional health worker with diagnostic and therapeutic skills.

One indicator of developments in health care has been the declaration by the World Health Organisation of Mozambique as a smallpox-free zone. More than 20 million vaccinations, reaching 95 percent of Mozambicans, were given against measles, tuberculosis, tetanus and smallpox. Presently an enlarged vaccination programme is in operation aimed chiefly at reducing infant mortality from polio, measles, diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough. Urban areas have already seen a drop in infant mortality rates from 150/1000 at independence to 80/1000 in 1981.

Agriculture

Agricultural production is the country's most valuable resource, yet to develop its inherent potential. Since the departure of the majority of the settler population, some of whom destroyed their ranches and plant or transferred cattle herds to South Africa, the devastation from drought and floods combined with changing government policies have provided fertile ground for discontent in rural areas, successfully exploited by the MNR.

Immediate post independence policy was to concentrate on developing relatively large, but difficult to manage, mechanised state farms on the neglected and abandoned farms. The programme swallowed up expensive state resources, and in some areas peasant land was expropriated and peasants forced into 'voluntary labour'. Hostility towards Frelimo was generated as pre-independence expectations failed to materialise. The extent of government neglect of the family farmer or peasant sector is indicated by a drop in their contribution to gross production from 75 percent at independence to 36 percent in 1982/83.

At the 1983 Congress, Frelimo re-evaluated its

agricultural policy and noted with regard to the private sector capitalist farmers that: 'the economic and financial machinery which would lead this sector to increase the degree of its participation in agricultural production has still not been put into operation'.

Attempts are now being made to promote small farmers, both economically and politically. In the Limpopo valley in Gaza province, previously unutilised state farms have been given to peasants in the form of half to two ha plots, while private farmers are being given land according to their ability to farm it. Producer prices for cashew nuts, traditionally an important export crop, have been doubled to encourage the growing of surpluses for sale, and supplies of consumer goods to cashew producing areas are being increased to encourage spending from cash crop incomes. In June this year the Soviet Union donated consumer goods for this purpose, said to value US\$13 million.

Fishing Industry

At the time of writing the 'traditional' or peasant fisherman sector accounted for around 49 percent of fish 'production', the state and cooperatives 13 percent; joint ventures with other countries 33 percent and the private sector five percent.

By 1981 Mozambique's own prawn fleet, in joint ventures with Spain, the USSR and Japan, had more than doubled pre-independence fish and prawn catch figures. Domestic consumption of fish, however, did not increase significantly in the post-independence period. The low increase in the domestic use of fish has been due to a large scale reduction of fish imports, largely from the German Democratic Republic.

Ports and Railways

Since 1977 total investment in transport has been about US\$150 million, with railways and ports accounting for two-thirds of expenditure, but by June 1984, Ports and Railways showed a deficit of US\$16 million, expected to reach over US\$20 million by the end of this year. Minister of Ports, Railways and Shipping, Alcantara Santos blames the MNR and recession but also cites bad management.

Productivity

While Santos highlights poor management, Frelimo are taking an increasingly hard line about the lack of worker productivity. The 1984 Central Committee report blames poor worker productivity for the massive imbalance between wages and productivity — the total wage bill this year exceeds the total value of goods on sale by US\$250 million.

New approaches are being considered, including the introduction of incentives: 'more pay for the person who works more, works better and achieves higher indices of efficiency and productivity. We must start the practice of paying less to the person who produces less, or with poor quality. In this way we shall move towards the socialist principle of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work" '.

For many on the left in Mozambique the fear is a swing to the right. Da Silva notes that 'the 1984 state plan (PEC 84) indicates that drastic cuts in

DEBT CRISIS

As a consequence of the problems outlined above, the Mozambican government has been forced to rely on three major sources of revenue in attempts to limit debt and finance development expenditure: donations from a variety of diverse sources; loans from organisations in western, or rather the 'non-socialist' countries including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Kuwait Fund and OPEC; and fairly substantial loans from socialist countries, although figures are not available. About 75 percent of the total debt has been incurred through the financing of development projects and programmes since independence. By world standards Mozambique's debt is not 'huge' and to avoid a debt crisis the country has decided to request rescheduling and join the hitherto 'unacceptable' World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In doing so it has become the 148th nation to join these organisations. While initial discussions, negotiations and project proposals were at the time of writing ongoing, laws have been passed designed to facilitate foreign investment, and recent reports of multinational cooperative ventures in the fishing industry and in the area of labour supplies to South Africa reflect a change in the government's overall approach.

existing social services are being discussed, if not planned. The document speaks of the need to end a "spirit of freeloading" and proposes the introduction of charges for medical services, prescriptions and basic education. It further proposes the reduction of the total number of people employed in the state apparatus. One of the major objectives of such measures is to reduce the money supply in Mozambique' (WIP *ibid*).

Conclusion


Within Mozambique official policies, programmes and attitudes are variously being adjusted as the full implications of a hasty independence in a debilitating environment have become apparent.

While the MNR continues to feed off discontent and historical affiliations, Frelimo's imperatives remain the political and military mobilisation of a fledgling nation. This in turn is dependent on the government's ability to ensure both economic and social progress. The new relationship with South Africa needs to be seen in this light. Furthermore, the increasing intervention by external supporters of the MNR could retard the limited progress to date, destroy the potential of the Accord, and draw the subregion into a degree of conflict similar to the Angola/Namibia region. **UJLA**

As official policies and programmes are changed, the left fears a post-Nkomati swing to the right

While Frelimo needs the Accord to work, the MNR could raise conflict to levels similar to Angola/Namibia

INGWAVUMA



Problems in Paradise

By Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel

In 1982 the ownership and jurisdiction of the Ingwavuma district of northern Natal, bordering Swaziland and Mozambique, was the subject of intense negotiations between South Africa, Swaziland and KwaZulu authorities.

What commentators interpreted as a South African government manoeuvre to secure the cooperation of Swaziland in the completion of the grand homeland design, and eliminate the perceived threat of guerilla insurgency did not, however, eventuate. The attempt to extend Swaziland's boundary to incorporate the approximately 100 000 Zulu and Thonga people living in the 8 000 km square district was dismissed in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court on the grounds that the State President failed to consult with the KwaZulu government.

Jeff Zingel takes a critical look at the development problems facing Ingwavuma, a 'natural wonderland' wherein projects, as much as anywhere else, require considered coordination with realistic appraisals of people's circumstances, requirements and aspirations. He notes that the situation in all its complex dimensions represents a classic dilemma for development prospects in contemporary Southern Africa. If Ingwavuma continues to be poorly handled, it could become another example of wasted and misplaced initiative with unforeseen long term consequences - the ultimate losers being the ordinary people of Ingwavuma.

At the height of the Ingwavuma crisis, the Rumpff Commission was appointed to investigate the competing and conflicting claims to the district. However, in June 1984 it was disbanded amid fears that unpronounced negotiations were taking place over Ingwavuma's future and tensions between KwaZulu authorities and Swaziland heightened. In August the difficulties besetting this sub-region were again highlighted when an estimated 4 000 'refugees' left the district for Swaziland, receiving United Nations relief and support (Star 17/8/84).

Ingwavuma and the adjacent Ubombo district is 'home' for about 150 000 people. A developing KwaZulu administration is attempting to provide services and an infrastructure in the wake of a three year drought followed by the serious flooding after cyclones Demoina and Imbuia. Most people in the area are now more than ever dependent on opportunities in the mainstream South African economy in order to secure a home base, escape unrelenting poverty and lack of opportunity.

From the point of view of development, however, the area is viewed as a resource base of considerable future potential (several major agricultural production schemes have been formally mooted) and since Paul Kruger's day as 'protector' of Swaziland, Kosi Bay has been viewed as a port.

To the strong conservationist lobby in South Africa the area represents a unique ecosystem of immense importance; the range and diversity of flora and fauna found there are seen as valuable natural resources which require careful research, management and protection.

People and Politics

The region has been variously named Thongaland, Maputaland or Makhasini. The existing boundaries which cut across 'ethnic' and geographic entities were originally drawn for administrative convenience, and have resulted in Ingwavuma becoming a political football in the playing out of regional and international politics.

Pretoria's decision to cede Ingwavuma to KwaZulu in 1976 to 'consolidate' KwaZulu forced leaders of the major groups in the district — the Thembes, Ntunjwas, Njowe and Mngomezulu to consider their allegiances. Factions viewed either Swaziland or KwaZulu as the dispensation for their futures, with the end result being declarations of loyalty to KwaZulu (RDM 3/8/82).

The unilateral reversal of Pretoria's intentions in 1982 led to a predictable furor, with Swaziland's leaders again laying claim to the area, notwithstanding appeals from the African National Congress to the late King Sobhuza. One commentator (du Toit, DD 27/7/82) suggested that Pretoria's offer concerned 'the possible uses of a closer

alliance with a view to having an ally within the Organisation of African Unity and furthering the objectives of an eventual confederation of states'.

An African Wonderland

Such a history of political and administrative machinations has dominated headlines, tending to obscure what researchers in the natural sciences have long viewed as an area of primary national importance.

The region comprises six interlocking ecological zones including, from east to west, the Lebombo and Ubombo mountains, the Pongola river floodplain, the sand forest and Makhathini Flats belt, the Mozi swamp drainage system, a system of coastal lakes and a unique coastal zone. The South African Wildlife Society has proposed this area as a 'world heritage site' for consideration by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, and the list of the area's outstanding natural assets include the Gwaliweni forest in the Lebombo mountains, a type unique to South Africa; the Sihangwane Sand Forest, home of the last free ranging elephants outside nature reserves; the 10 000 ha Pongola floodplain and adjacent system of shallow pans which provide a living for many of the 35 000 adjacent people and contains the most diverse freshwater fish fauna of any inland system in South Africa; the Ndumu Game Reserve, whose lakes and pans support crocodiles, hippopotami and numerous bird species; an unspoiled estuary and lake system at Kosi Bay, with an effective fish trapping network built permanently by local people; and the Maputaland coral reef — the only one in South Africa feeding 80 percent of all fish species of South Africa's coastal waters.

Conservationists, obsessed with such a diverse heritage have made pronouncements in the past which appear to demonstrate a higher level of consideration for the flora and wild life of the area than for its human population. Bruton (1980) expressed the opinion: 'Bold steps may have to be taken, such as the restructuring of the social community, the restriction of human population growth, the reservation of certain areas for winter grazing only, the withdrawal of some lands for cultivation . . .'

Major Developments

Obviously the area is an African territory requiring African solutions. Development programmes and projects to date in this underdeveloped corner of South Africa have in many cases been dominated by overtly political designs, resulting in piecemeal, opportunistic or crisis oriented approaches. Many programmes have been initiated and established with insufficient knowledge or recognition of their long term consequences for society, the economy or the ecology.

For ordinary people living there project

Existing boundaries, drawn originally for administrative convenience, cut across 'ethnic' and geographic entities, making the district a political football in regional politics

Comprising six interlocking ecological zones, Ingwavuma boasts a magnificent range of unique natural resources

Most development projects have been initiated with insufficient knowledge or recognition of long term consequences for local society, economy and ecology

Grandiose plans to irrigate the flood plain paid scant attention to local people living there for 80 years under the threat of resettlement

FELT NEEDS IN A UBOMBO TRIBAL WARD

Attitudes of Kwajobe people of Ophansi ward

During 1983 a CASS field researcher, George Yengwa elicited the following community needs, attitudes and problems:

● WATER ●

Besides one borehole water supplies do not exist. During seasonal rains the Ophansi and Mozi rivers are contaminated with cholera, or animal waste washed from upstream. In dry periods the Mozi river is a stagnant pool or lake. Both rivers require bridges, or the road needs larger pipes at river crossings. Children miss school, adults miss medical attention and livestock get trapped in summer rains.

● TRANSPORT ●

Representations for more buses have been to no avail.

● WILD ANIMALS ●

Herbivorous hippos and elephants, protected by legislation, do extensive damage to humans, crops and homes. After Funwayo Manukuza was critically injured attempting to chase hippos from his lands, representations to both the Regional Authority and the Natal Parks Board offices at Hluhluwe, aimed at finding protective measures to safeguard crops and people, received little attention. 'The community does not anticipate a favourable response in the near future.'

● GAME RESERVES ●

The absence of fencing allows Kwajobe livestock to wander into the Mkuzi game reserve and adjacent white farms, where they are impounded. Appeals by Kwajobe leaders to representatives of the Parks Board and farmers have proved fruitless.

● AGRICULTURE ●

A government tractor service hiring out ploughing at concessionary rates, was withdrawn without notice in 1980. Private contractors are viewed as desultory and inefficient, providing a limited service hampered by the absence of a fuel depot. Community priorities are for demonstration plots to be initiated and supervised by government, cooperatives to be initiated by a 'technocrat' and fuel depots to be established by the KwaZulu Development Corporation.

An informal market and a rural 'school'.

Pensions form one of the largest cash injections into the district. Enthusiastic school attendance masks the realities of household domestic tasks and long walking distances. Pupils withdraw at critical examination times in order to assist with agricultural tasks at peak periods.



initiatives have a dismal record, contributing to tension, insecurity and outright animosity. In 1975 a bridge built by a conservation body across the Sordwana Bay estuary caused silting, destroyed a mangrove swamp and the rich fishing ground of local people. Plans for a fish factory and for coconut plantations in the Kosi Bay area, both later abandoned, resulted in the removal of over 30 000 households. During the seventies about 3 000 people were moved from the site of a strategic missile range around Lake St Lucia and relocated to Mbazwana with little land, water and employment. Minimal compensation for household and agricultural assets were made. Several hundred people adjacent to Ndumu game reserve have moved southwards fearing the proclamation of their land into the recently planned elephant and game reserves.

The Makhathini Flats and Pongola floodplain, presently the home of over 30 percent of the Maputaland population, was declared Crown land in 1903, despite the fact that it had been home to local people for several generations. Now state land, the area has long been viewed with eagle-eyes either as

a veritable breadbasket of the north or a place to relocate others affected by removals. Recently a small contingent of people from the notorious Msinga district at least 300 km away have obtained land there.

Grandiose plans to irrigate the plain led to the construction of the Jozini dam on the Pongola river. Initial intentions were to develop 64 000 morgen to sugar cane, producing over 500 000 tons per annum and to settle white farmers there. Such intensive, monocultural, industrial agricultural proposals raised strong objections, largely from those objecting to the effects of altered water supply to the delicate ecology of the floodplain. Scant attention was paid to the fears of local people who have been there for 80 years under the threat of resettlement. At present the scheme has developed only to the extent of supplying an area about 1 000 ha in extent with irrigation for structured African small-holding agriculture. Paradoxically this move has entailed removing most of the original inhabitants from their homes and livelihoods.

The dam and irrigation scheme extensions continue to be critical issues in the 'development' of this important resource, from the dual perspectives of the destruction of the floodplain ecology and the provision of water timeously to coincide with the

seasonal water requirements of the thousands of people who cultivate fields along the plain (Heeg and Broom, 1982: p82).

Community Needs

'Felt needs' research conducted in 1982 by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences among ordinary people of most of the wards of the two districts reveals some of the more important day to day issues. In all wards surveyed the lack of proper road access, transport services, cattle dips, stock dams, boreholes, creches, primary schools and telephones were seen by the communities interviewed as urgent.

In one instance, that of Qondile ward, construction of the Makhathini irrigation canals has cut access for livestock to drink at the Pongola river. The result is larger trekking distances to Jozini dam to the west, and increased stock theft as animals wander far and wide in search of water. The community blames the irrigation scheme, where no accommodative and appropriate facilities were installed.

The impounding of stray cattle by white farmers or game rangers who impose fines for their return is a frequently heard complaint wherever tribal lands abut farms or reserve areas (see box).


Such incidents give insight into what constitutes 'development' for people of the region. Gross production targets and 'holistic' ecological proposals are far removed from the domain of the men and women trying to farm or open a shop, and to

Gross production targets and 'holistic' ecological proposals are far removed from the domain of the target groups; ordinary people living in the area

A perpetual ready cash shortage among the community and limited available cashable assets prohibit local investment in possible capital projects

Attention has only recently been focussed on the social consequences of the overbearing conservationist and agribusiness lobbies

The situation, a classic Southern African dilemma, could result in the people of Ingwavuma being the ultimate losers



If current proposals are implemented, communities are likely to be forced into an array of 'ecological' zones, core and resource areas, bewildering local attempts at self-improvement, mobility and security.

send their children to school. Derman and Poultney, in a Carnegie Conference paper (1984), detail some major constraints on making a living, progress, and the quality of life in Ingwavuma.

Firstly, mark-ups on goods bought at rural stores range from six percent to 31 percent on staple foods (such as maize and sugar) and from 28 percent to 68 percent on non-food essentials (washing powder and batteries), compared to the nearest available supermarket at Mkuze. Purchases from 'illegal' rural vendors are marked up even further. Derman attributes this to existing legislation and the high cost of transport on the district's few roads of poor condition.

In education, school passrates are low, with two high schools having matriculation passrates of 21 percent and no pupils obtaining university entrance. Major contributing factors are lack of electrification, low teacher salaries and the conflicting demands of end of year examinations coinciding with peak labour periods in the agricultural cycle, when children are required by parents to assist.

Thirdly, access to health care for ordinary people is costly. Those with transport charge between R50 to R200 to convey ill people to clinics or hospitals in a community where vehicle ownership is low and disease-control relatively rudimentary.

In combination these factors create a perpetual ready cash shortage and reduce

available cashable assets which could be used for investment in any possible capital projects.

Conclusion

Over the past few years development and conservation research has received high priority in Ingwavuma. Only recently has attention been focussed on the social consequences resulting from the priorities pursued by overbearing conservationist or agribusiness lobbies. A realistic recognition of the practicalities of their proposals and the requirements and limitations of local society and economy should precede any further planning. One policy document, 'Tongaland — Zonal Ecology and Rural Land Use Proposals', has at least managed to practically combine the twin demands of peoples' needs and circumstances and an ecologically sound planning approach. However, much further work is required to clarify both method and procedure in the implementation of the proposals. Should this not be undertaken opportunely, the people of Ingwavuma are likely to be left behind in a holistic ecological vacuum, forced into and out of an array of zones, 'core' areas and 'resource' areas further bewildering their attempts at self improvement, mobility and security.

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ACRONYMS

- DD Daily Dispatch
- RDM Rand Daily Mail

INDIA

MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS IN A FRONTLINE STATE

Botswana's Politics of Succession

By Brian Egnor and Alan Whiteside

The elections for national and local government in Botswana passed almost unnoticed in the South African media, overshadowed by the saturation coverage given to the coloured and Indian elections. However, the proximity of the elections in Botswana and South Africa allows a comparison which throws into relief the dissimilarities between these neighbouring African states.

Botswana's enthusiastic voter response, the open political expression of a broad and representative ideological spectrum, and the role of self-help housing as a salient urban election issue, provide the architects of South Africa's democratisation process with an example of the political legitimacy so evidently lacking from their recent constitutional exercise.

The co-authors of this frontline perspective are Brian Egnor, an experienced government consultant and development economist from Botswana, and Alan Whiteside, a development consultant with the Economic Research Unit at the University of Natal. Their commentary on Botswana's fourth post-independence election focusses on the unexpectedly high voter turnout, the significant inroads made by the socialist opposition into the traditional political dominance of 'Khama's party' and the likely effect of this development on foreign policy issues.

Botswana recently held elections for local and national government, the first test of the ruling party's popularity since the death of Sir Seretse Khama. Under the leadership of his successor, President Quett Masire, the incumbent Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) took the lion's share of parliamentary seats, albeit with a reduced share of votes and significant losses in the simultaneous town and district council elections.

Political commentators proved astute in anticipating that 'Khama's party' led by Dr Masire, a self-made man without the advantage of the chiefly prestige of his predecessor, would lose a measure of urban electoral support. Although the BDP won all but six of the 34 parliamentary seats, its overall share of the votes decreased dramatically from 75.2 percent in the 1979 elections to 51.7 percent. The socialist opposition, the Botswana National Front (BNF) doubled its share of votes, gained five parliamentary seats, and won clear majorities on the Gaborone and Francistown Town Councils.

High Turnout at Polls

On the heels of a concerted voter registration drive, 227 758 people showed up at the polls on 8 September 1984, an impressive turnout of 76 percent of registered voters. This compares favourably with the relatively poor 50 percent showing in the 1979 elections, and almost reached the peak turnout of 80

percent in the country's first post-independence elections in 1966. The renewed high level of voter participation in Botswana's fourth post-independence election has stemmed fears of growing political apathy and indicates a contrary process of increasing politicisation among the rapidly growing urban population.

Five parties participated in an election conducted peacefully and without major incidents. The increase in numbers of registered voters meant that the actual number of polling stations grew from 434 to 700, and polling hours had to be extended. Three of the parties won seats in parliament: the ruling BDP (28), the socialist BNF (5) and the radical nationalist Botswana People's Party (BPP) (1).

Khama's Old Guard

The BDP's retention of power was undoubtedly facilitated by Dr Masire's strategic decision to nominate virtually the same slate of aging and rather uninspiring stalwarts who had won previous elections for the party. If he had attempted to replace the 'old guard', a number of these politicians might well have opted to run as independents. This in turn would have dissipated the established party organisation and support built up by the BDP.

In a major upset, BDP External Affairs Minister Archie Mogwe, a well-known diplomatic figure in frontline state and third world forums, lost the Gaborone North

The ruling BDP won 28 out of 34 parliamentary seats, but lost a significant measure of urban electoral support

The socialist BNF made substantial gains in the simultaneous town and district council elections, and won five parliamentary seats

BOTSWANA

In two major upsets, BDP External Affairs Minister Archie Mogwe and BDP Vice-President Peter Mnusi lost their respective Gaborone North and South seats to BNF candidates

Increased service levies in self-help housing areas (SHHA) were a key urban election issue. Discontented SHHA dwellers largely supported opposition parties

In order to qualify for World Bank loans, the ruling BDP is committed to the full recovery of SHHA service arrears

The Botswana government strives to prevent SADCC from becoming an ineffectual talking shop staffed by a large, self-perpetuating bureaucracy

constituency to Maitshwarelo Dabutha of the BNF. His vacant portfolio was assumed by Dr Gaositwe Chiepe, previously Minister of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, and the only woman in the cabinet. Mr Mogwe was subsequently nominated as one of four indirectly elected MPs, taking over Dr Chiepe's portfolio in a ministerial swap.

One of the few controversial incidents in the elections concerned the Gaborone South result, where BDP Vice-President Peter Mnusi was judged to be victor over BNF socialist leader Dr Kenneth Koma by 122 votes. The Botswana High Court nullified the result, however, after the discovery of a sealed ballot box containing uncounted votes from the constituency. Koma subsequently defeated Mnusi by 742 votes in a by-election in early December, confirming the BNF's growing status as an opposition party. One of the four nominated BDP MPs is expected to step down to allow Mr Mnusi to re-enter parliament.

Contrary to the expectations of political commentators, President Masire did not nominate some of the younger MPs to his new cabinet announced shortly after the election. Few changes were made at the executive level and only two new members were appointed to the ruling executive.

Housing: An Urban Election Issue

The main parties drew clear battle lines over the levels of service levies in the urban Self-Help Housing Areas (SHHAs). Of the sixty thousand urban people who live in these areas, over 70 percent have fallen in arrear with their payments. The ruling BDP is committed to the full recovery of SHHA servicing costs from these 'beneficiaries', in order to fulfil World Bank requirements for a series of loan agreements. However, there are signs of rising discontent among the urban poor over the issue of service levies beyond their means. The SHHA dwellers voted largely in support of opposition parties offering administrative solutions to reduce service levies through government subsidy.

Declining Urban Support

Apart from ruling party losses in Gaborone North among SHHA dwellers, and the indecisive result in Gaborone South, the BDP also narrowly escaped defeat in the Francistown constituency. The BDP beat the radical nationalist BPP led by Dr Knight Maripe, by a mere 130 votes. However, the BDP took the urban seats of Lobatse and Phikwe without difficulty.

Because of the much higher number of votes cast, it would be unwise to categorically assert that popular support for the BDP has declined significantly at the parliamentary level over the last five years. Nevertheless, although the BDP made an almost clean sweep of the 34 parliamentary seats based on

the majoritarian 'winner takes all' principle, the position might have been entirely different if Botswana's constitution allowed for a system of proportionate representation.

If opposition parties had coalesced and avoided splitting the vote in certain constituencies, at least another four BDP seats might have been in jeopardy. The election results would then have confirmed a decisive rather than incremental trend of declining support for 'Khama's Party', especially in urban areas.

Local Council Elections

A striking indication of opposition BNF support can be gained from the results of the town and district council elections. Dr Koma's socialist party won handsome majorities on the Gaborone and Francistown Town Councils, and all four seats at the new diamond mining town of Jwaneng. In a clean sweep, the BNF also took control of the separate North East and Southern District Councils. Dr Koma was formerly the highly respected tribal leader of the latter area.

The local councils are heavily grant-aided by the central government and have no prospects of reaching financial autonomy. Since 1969, the Minister of Local Government has been empowered to nominate a certain number of councillors and MPs. This measure was introduced to remedy what the BDP perceived as an anomalous situation, whereby councils with opposition majorities were 'irresponsibly' spending government resources for which the BDP Minister was accountable to parliament.

Nomination Controversy

After the elections, the Minister for Local Government exercised his legal prerogative and nominated numerous councillors in a controversial move to regain government control over the town and district councils. After the opposition parties raised an outcry against what they claimed to be a travesty of democracy aimed at obviating their electoral successes, the Minister agreed to reduce the number of BDP nominees. Nevertheless, should the four councils with opposition majorities step too far out of line, the government can be expected to make further BDP nominations.

In terms of the compromise reached, the BDP retains control of the Francistown and North East District Councils through appointing several nominees, even though the opposition BNF won 7 out of 11 seats and 9 out of 14 seats respectively on the two councils. Although additional BDP councillors were also appointed, the socialist BNF maintains its electoral majority on the Gaborone and Southern District Councils.

Foreign Policy

Unlike many developing countries, Botswana maintains a low diplomatic profile abroad,

though it plays an active part in world affairs at the United Nations. On issues of concern to the African bloc, Botswana tends to align itself with the majority vote, while generally supporting the western bloc in other instances. Little change in Botswana's traditionally pragmatic and moderate foreign policy will result from the elections.

Botswana's attitude towards other frontline states in the sub-continent might best be characterised as one of cooperation and solidarity. Sir Seretse Khama was a leading figure in the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). The government has earned credit for keeping up the momentum of SADCC and preventing it from becoming yet another ineffectual talking shop staffed by

a large, self-perpetuating bureaucracy (see article on SADCC).

President Masire has followed in Khama's footsteps and won praise for his role as current chairman of SADCC. Botswana's relations with its African neighbours continue to be sound. However, there has been a certain amount of strain in relations with Zimbabwe due to Botswana having granted refugee status to fugitive dissidents from Matebeleland and because of hot pursuit cross-border raids by Zimbabwean troops. Nevertheless, such tensions are moderated by the willingness of the leaders and relevant ministers to meet informally and at short notice — the reverse of the tentative 'telephone diplomacy' conducted between Gaborone and Pretoria (see box). *UPWA*

Little change in Botswana's traditionally pragmatic and moderate foreign policy will result from the elections

BOTSWANA & SOUTH AFRICA

The View from across the Border

As South Africa and Botswana do not exchange ambassadors, the kind of political contact which does take place is termed 'telephone diplomacy'. In dealing with South Africa, the Botswana government treads warily and follows a pragmatic line, recognising that the Republic dominates the subcontinent, both militarily and economically. At the economic level, relations are fairly cordial, though Botswana may be expected to negotiate more aggressively for advantages in the future.

In general, the return to power of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party will ring in few foreign policy changes. Pronouncements by ex-Foreign Minister Mogwe's successor, Dr Chiepe, indicate that Botswana's typically anti-apartheid stance is unlikely to soften (see main article). In a recent speech in the UN's General Assembly, Dr Chiepe warned of the consequences of South Africa's political exclusion of its African majority: 'Where there is no democracy to provide for the counting of heads, men denied these rights and brutalised by oppression inevitably turn to violence as what they believe, however wrongly, to be the only way of obtaining their rights' (Botswana Daily News 10/10/84).

Following the South African government's negotiation of non-aggression agreements with Swaziland and Mozambique, pressure has been brought to bear on both Lesotho and Botswana to sign similar defence pacts. Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha has accused Botswana of wishing to benefit from economic cooperation with South Africa on the one hand, but of obstructing attempts to counter ANC guerrilla attacks launched from Botswana territory on the other. A recent SABC News Commentary maintained this line of criticism: 'At a time when several important states in Southern Africa are showing far more positive inclinations towards normalising relations with South Africa, Botswana appears to have decided to dig in its heels and make belligerence and intransigence the order of the day' (SABC 26/10/84).

Back in 1966, Sir Seretse Khama made it very clear that Botswana would not allow its territory to be used as a base for exile nationalist groups to undertake hostile

acts against its neighbours. President Masire adheres to this longstanding policy as indicated in a recent press statement on the subject: 'The Botswana government has always indicated its willingness to discuss with neighbouring countries any weaknesses which they might perceive in the implementation of the policy... What must be clearly understood is that the signing of a non-aggression pact can in no way prevent isolated violations' (Botswana Daily News 4/9/84).

Ironically, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) devotes most of its energies to maintaining a first line of defence for countries whose internal policies Botswana is powerless to influence. In effect, all defence spending has the purpose of controlling ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU dissident activities. In a recent statement, the South African Commissioner of Police, General P J Coetzee acknowledged that 'The ANC uses this infiltration route without the sanction of the Botswana government and the Botswana Police have in the past arrested ANC members who had fled to Botswana after committing acts of terror in the Republic' (RDM 5/11/84). The Botswana government is currently in the uncomfortable position of spending an estimated P20m per annum (R24.43m) on defending the borders of South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Assuming that guerrilla attacks against South Africa will be stepped up in the future, concomitant pressure can be expected for Botswana to increase its defence budget. Instead of single-mindedly pursuing a non-aggression pact, the South African government should rather devote its energies to the initiation of mechanisms for reimbursing the real costs of the BDF's indirect contribution to the security of the Republic's border.

In the face of resistance from Botswana, it is clear that even if a non-aggression pact were to be negotiated, it would be more useful for internal consumption in South Africa, than it would be in improving the cool but businesslike relations the two states currently enjoy. If forced into a corner, the government of Botswana might turn such a treaty into a Pyrrhic victory by making the forced nature of such an 'agreement' clear to the rest of the world.

BOTSWANA

UNDERSTANDING RITUAL KILLINGS

Witchcraft accusations and social transformation

By Professor Gerhard Schutte,
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WITCHCRAFT

In January 1984, two men from the Mogoboya village near Tzaneen were hanged before a chanting crowd of more than 1 000 people after being accused of causing lightning that killed a 24-year old woman (RDM 7/2/84). In another incident, police arrested 21 followers of chief Jan Ledwaba in the Zebediela area after two people accused of 'being evil sorcerers and using bad magic to manipulate lightning bolts' were burned alive (DN 23/2/84). In Seruleng three people were reportedly burned alive by a 'bloodthirsty mob' in a similar incident (RDM 28/2/82). More recently chief German Mohlala and village elders of Motibidi in Lebowa ordered a 'witch-hunt' after 13 young girl initiates died in a fire caused by lightning. The chief's adviser reportedly stated: 'This lightning was definitely not natural and we're tracing the culprits. We are going to deal very harshly with them' (Star 30/7/84).

Such incidents have caused considerable problems for the authorities as they occur in a context which lies outside of South Africa's legal system and is unintelligible to most white South Africans. Trials of suspected 'witches' are held by 'people's courts' guided by village *inyangas*. Subsequent action and arrests by police have resulted in confrontations with the local people, and police have used teargas to disperse angry tribesmen demanding the release of those arrested. A prominent academic, Professor J A van der Heever of the University of the North, has been quoted as seriously questioning the use of South African courts to deal with offenders, as attitudes to witchcraft 'cannot be eradicated by law' (Star 16/8/84).

Professor Schutte delves beneath the surface of such incidents to uncover the complex of meanings and interpretations which underlie them. He explains how the profile of the 'witch', perceived by communities as 'the enemy within the gate', has changed in recent years as a result of social transformations which have fragmented and rearranged previously cohesive communities. Resettlement, increases in population density in rural areas and the disintegration of traditional subsistence patterns have placed communities under strains beyond their control, leading to attempts to purge the community by identifying and neutralising 'scapegoats'. Schutte notes that witchcraft accusations have been shown to increase in times of social transformation in both European and African societies, and draws a parallel with conspiracy theories which exhibit similar thought processes whereby crises or maladies suffered by a community are attributed to the evil machinations of an identified person or group.

A lack of sensitivity surrounds the context in which ritual killings occur

Every year a number of ritual killings are reported in the press. They seem to occur predominantly among African communities living in the eastern and northern parts of the country. The usual reaction among the westernised readership of these reports is one of puzzlement and dismay about the 'barbaric' practices involved of say, killing an individual who is said to have caused the death of another by directing a bolt of lightning at him or her. This particular impression is generated against the background of a degree of

sensationalism and a lack of sensitivity to the context in which these events occur.

Reports usually deal with the consequences of an accusation, namely that a certain person engaged in the practice of witchcraft. It is the objective of this brief article to explore why and how a person becomes constructed in the image of a witch. At the risk of invoking the wrath of some anthropologist colleagues I will only confine myself to a description of some general feature of witch beliefs and practices in order to elucidate the particular phenomenon of a

'ritual killing'.

Inexplicable Misfortune

Witchcraft accusations are based on a complex set of assumptions about the causation of misfortune in many traditionalist African communities. The suffering of misfortune through accidents or disease calls for the restoration of wellbeing through various measures. In this context the powers of magic or the ancestors are invoked. Of course it would be a distortion to deny even traditionalist societies a secular attitude to certain accidents and misfortunes and the restoration of a satisfactory state of affairs. What interests us here though, are those instances of misfortune that are deemed to be unusual, unnatural or inexplicable. They require the specialised intervention of ritual. Such ritual involves the use of magic.

Magic

To put it briefly, magic is essentially a means of controlling certain forces perceived to affect the fate of man. Magic relies on the manipulability of 'forces' or 'properties' attached to nature or man. In a positive sense then, magic may be used to enhance or protect your health, your success, sexual attraction, the fertility of your lands, etc. In a negative sense though, magic may be used to harm your enemies, to gain an unfair advantage over others — in fact every severe transgression of the canons of established interpersonal morality may be interpreted in this sense.

Magic may be used by the community to secure the wealth, prosperity and protection of the collectivity or tribe. In the past (whether this occurs presently is unknown) the chief in certain northern Transvaal groupings was allowed to mix powerful medicine with the seeds for the new year's crop in his territory. This powerful medicine sometimes contained human parts associated with fertility such as the genitalia of a young person. Such substances were obtained through ritual murder for which no retribution was exacted since it was generally observed necessary for the common good.

Witchcraft

The utilisation of magical substances (with the exclusion of human parts) for your own protection or wellbeing is also allowed. In stark contrast to 'tribal' and personal magic, stand witchcraft practices. Traditionally speaking, witchcraft runs against the grain of accepted morality and jeopardizes the order of society. It causes misfortune to both the individual and society as a whole and needs to be eradicated. Witchcraft is a result of the evil and selfish intentions of an individual or group of individuals. Among some groups a distinction is made between 'day' — and 'night-witches'. The 'night-witch' is normally not aware of his condition and is born that way. He is therefore strictly speaking not

accountable for his actions. (The detailed distinction between witches and sorcerers will be left aside here.) It is the 'day-witch' however, who is accountable and who is severely dealt with.

Whether conscious ('day') or unconscious ('night') of his/her deed the witch perverts the normal order of things. He/she acts out of spite, malice, jealousy and selfishness in his or her own interests. He has extraordinary powers and has access to powerful forces to achieve his antisocial ends. Instead of using magic to the benefit of society or for himself in a way that would not harm others, he directs his powers against fellow men — especially against those with influence. The witch may use familiars like the hyena or corpses raised from the grave to do his work. He can practice long distance witchcraft by injecting poison into the food or bodies of his victims. Such poison is lethal and western medicine is deemed to be ineffective in its treatment. The witch is also deemed to be able to harness and direct lightning to strike down his targets.

Ordinary people would protect themselves against misfortune caused by witches by procuring substances from a diviner to be applied to themselves, their dwellings and even their cars. Should a person suffer misfortune or unexplained illness he would consult a diviner in order to establish the cause and to undertake countermeasures.

Diviners

In traditional society the diviner ('witchdoctor' is a misnomer) occupies a powerful though ambivalent position. He is deemed to have extraordinary powers of insight. Not only can he detect and use effective substances but he can also detect the unseen influences affecting individuals by virtue of his special relationship with the world of ancestor spirits. When an afflicted person visits him, he establishes the cause of the misfortune or illness through a set of divining bones or dice. It is through these bones that the spirits reveal the 'truth' to him. Underlying his diagnostic practice is the theory of personal causation of misfortune. Of course room is left for accidents and impersonal causation of minor illness and mishaps but it is the more serious forms of misfortune that call for an identification of the culprit.

Some illnesses or accidents may be caused by the ancestors who desire to remind their offspring of their existence and certain obligations towards them. Where the divining bones indicate such causation, the misfortune is not of a serious nature and can be neutralised by ritual means through, for example, the sacrifice of a beast. Should the diviner however diagnose witchcraft as a cause, it is a different matter. The patient then needs to take protective measures whereas the diviner is required to 'fight' the witch with all means available to him. This counteracting of witchcraft takes the form of

Suffering misfortune from accidents or disease requires restoration of well being by various measures

Magic, used positively or negatively, is a means of controlling forces effecting the fate of man

When practised, witchcraft is seen as the result of evil intentions of individuals or groups, jeopardising the order of society

Diviners serve as diagnosticians of causes of personal misfortune, and if witchcraft is diagnosed, are required to neutralise its power

Typical witches are seen to be fringe people, eccentrics, newcomers and successful people - scapegoats for hate, conflict and discord in a community

In European and African societies witchcraft accusations increase in times of social transformations. In South Africa political trends and policies contribute to such transformations

In modern times the same thought processes upholding principles in witch beliefs are evident in conspiracy theories abounding among white South Africans

ritual involving the projection of forces that would neutralise the power of the witch and perhaps kill him.

In cohesive communities the identity of the witch may become public knowledge and such an accused would then, depending on the seriousness of the case, either be controlled, made to leave the community or might be killed by stoning, hanging, impalation or strangling. Communities look very severely on cases where witchcraft is deemed to have caused death such as through lightning, poisoning or murder. When a corpse is found with certain parts missing, it is a straightforward indication of witchcraft.

In the preceding description an attempt was made to reconstruct some traditional assumptions about witchcraft. No judgement was made on their truth or falsity. What is of prime interest to the scientific observer though is the social consequences such beliefs may have. For this reason the target of witchcraft accusations should be examined. The actual occurrence of murder for obtaining human parts is not denied herewith. Such murders are very rare in comparison with the number of accusations.

The Witch as Scapegoat

In the traditional context, the typical witch is an outsider to the group. He is physically present in a community but has outside loyalties — fictitious or real. He is described as the 'hidden enemy within the gate' (Mayer, 1954: p17). Thus, a kinsman of an outgroup can fall prey to an accusation if things went wrong in the community where he lives. The typical target for an accusation is a person whose loyalty is under suspicion, whose attitude may be seen to undermine the moral pillars of his community.

In recent times the profile of the typical witch has changed. Since kinship based on residence has largely changed through resettlement and relocation policies, communities are less closely knit than before. Old persons on the fringes of local groups, eccentrics, newcomers to localities and successful and progressive individuals are at risk. Strangers and persons with extraordinary attributes such as wealth in a poor environment may be more easily suspected of witchcraft and constructed in the image of a witch than others. In accusing a person of being a witch the community accords to him an inversion or perversion of the values they wish to uphold. In a sense then, they draw and redraw the boundaries of their community as a moral community by excising the witch physically. The witch and what happens to him is a demonstration by the community to itself of what should be avoided at all costs. The witch, it can be argued, becomes a 'scapegoat' for hate, conflict and discord in a community.

Social Transformation

It is a well documented phenomenon that

witchcraft accusations tend to increase in times of social transformation. Social relations become more demanding and strained. The face of South Africa's rural areas has undergone drastic change in recent years. The resettlement of communities within African rural areas has destroyed the kinship-based residence patterns. The increase of population density as a result of the resettlement of people from outside the homelands has introduced large numbers of strangers into existing communities. Access to the traditional means of subsistence, arable and grazing land, has become restricted or non-existent and competition for increasingly scarce resources has intensified. It is thus understandable that under these changed circumstances potential victims of witchcraft accusations abound for the traditionalist who believes in these things. It only requires a bolt of lightning or some unprecedented misfortune to trigger off a witch hunt.

Nowadays the resulting purge of the community is unsuccessful. Outside forces complicate the restoration of moral boundaries within rural communities. Tension and competition between people are not mulified by the exemplary destruction of the witch. Although an increase in witchcraft suspicions is a general feature of traditionalist societies undergoing rapid social change, the South African phenomenon cannot be isolated from policies and political trends that engineer such transformations.

Barbaric or Rational?

It would be wrong to assume that witch beliefs or the thought processes on which they are based pertain to the whole of the African population or that they are peculiar to the African population alone.

In rural African communities there is overwhelming evidence of a secular attitude to misfortune and its causation. At times certain sections of these communities tend to withdraw to available traditional resources to solve problems beyond their control, for which no secular solutions are evident. For their own safety's sake those who differ in their interpretation of the situation will obviously lie low.

Comparative study shows that witchcraft is not a peculiarly 'African' phenomenon. European societies have long traditions with regard to witches. The most popular image is that of the old, marginalised and socially dispensable woman. In modern times, the self-same thought processes that uphold the principle of personal causation inherent in witch beliefs are evident in conspiracy theories such as those which abound among white South Africans. This may be seen as one of the reasons why so many people and books are banned in South Africa today. *IPWA*

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URBAN

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The parastatal SASOL dismissed thousands of unionised workers because of their participation in November's two-day stayaway.

Acknowledgement: The Star

- 1 *The Stayaway Strikes of 1984*
- 6 *A Chronology of Township Unrest*
- 10 *Natal/KwaZulu Schools 1984*
- 12 *Indian Education: A Brief Overview*
- 15 *Quantity and Quality in Coloured Education*
- 18 *The Great Housing Sale: Myth vs Reality*

Although some specific demands made by stayaway organisers were met, a further round of detentions also occurred

Political activists and trade unionists had different perceptions of the aims and effects of the stayaway

Participants were divided over whether the stayaway was intended to be a demonstration, general or radical strike

Some activists displayed a healthy pragmatism as regards the inevitable limitations of the stayaway tactic

A stayaway is defined as 'a general withdrawal of labour which is not directly related to issues on the factory floor' (Moss 1983)

including: the withdrawal of the army/police from townships, the resignation of community councillors, no increases in rent, service charges and bus fares, the reinstatement of dismissed workers, the release of detainees and political prisoners, abolition of pupil age limit restrictions and corporal punishment, and the right to elect democratic student representative councils (SRCs) (LMG; FM *ibid*).

Responses and Concessions

At the time of writing, certain specific community demands made by stayaway organisers had been met: rent increases in some of the PWV townships were temporarily scrapped, especially after the Vaal Triangle stayaway (RDM 6/9/84), and at least 20 town councillors and five mayors resigned (STrib 18/11/84). However, the remaining town councils and government development boards continue to exert pressure on Vaal township residents to settle arrears accrued since September during the ongoing rent boycott (see chronology).

As regards student demands, a form of SRCs was announced by the Department of Education and Training (DET). However, both the Congress of SA Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) immediately rejected the Pupil Representative Council (PRC) constitution drawn up by DET on the grounds that it prohibits affiliation to local or national political bodies and aims at co-opting the pupil/student movement (RDM 15/10/84). In early December, in a new attempt to resolve the schools boycott deadlock, DET invited 'all persons with a vested interest in education' to submit proposals for a draft constitution to the department (RDM 6/12/84).

Some detainees were selectively released over this period but many remained in 'preventive' detention until early December. In fact, the stayaway resulted in a further round of detentions amid speculation that the organisers, including 13 detained unionists, would face charges of economic sabotage or treason under Section 54 of the Internal Security Act (STrib 25/11/84).

Simba Quix management agreed to reinstate the 464 workers fired in August, an action which had triggered off a consumer boycott and featured as one of the TRSC's workplace demands.

Strategies and Perceptions

In a recent article on the resurgence of black protest politics in South Africa since 1976, Thomas Karis, an American author of seminal studies of opposition movements in South Africa, commented: 'A persistent hope is that violence could be minimal if the wheels of the political system and the economy are stopped from turning' (1983: p402), exhibiting a kind

of extra-parliamentary protest mythology also detectable in statements made by some South African political activists. However, a healthy pragmatism has been evident in other quarters as to the inevitable limits of stayaway action.

The two-day stayaway was barely over before differing perceptions of the stayaway as a tactic became apparent among the groups and leaders involved. The gulf between the aims and methods of political activists and trade unionists is evident from statements following the stayaway: whereas one organiser claimed that the tactic would be used again 'to bring the machinery of this country to a standstill' (FM 16/11/84), participating union leaders rejected calls for a five day stayaway from 26 November. During top-level consultations with employer representatives, FOSATU and CUSA made clear their opposition to a second stayaway in the near future (FM 23/11/84 and CP 25/11/84).

The co-existence of different perceptions as to the purpose and effects of the stayaway is hardly surprising, considering the diverse organisations involved. Predominant political and strategic positions may be broken down as follows:

- As a Demonstration Strike (*Most realistic*)

FOSATU's Education Secretary, Alec Erwin spelt out the Federation's rationale for trade union participation: 'The situation in the Transvaal is in our view close to civil war and needed clear protest action . . . The stayaway was a very clear show of mass discontent with specific government policies' (FM 16/11/84). The support extended by organised labour was also the result of broader community pressure to demonstrate worker solidarity with the student movement. CUSA general secretary Piroshaw Camay emphasised that core worker issues were included in the TRSC's list of demands (*ibid*), including a specific workplace grievance: the reinstatement of Simba Quix workers.

- As a General Strike (*Most wishful*)

One TRSC spokesperson defined the purpose of the stayaway as to force government to negotiate the demands of the Congress Alliance's Freedom Charter of 1955 (FM 16/11/84). Although the stayaway was only organised on a regional basis and therefore intrinsically limited in national impact, some of the organisers evidently had expectations of eliciting specific government reforms. Such expectations hark back to the stayaways of the 1950s, characterised by Glenn Moss in an article in WIP as 'a general withdrawal of labour which is not directly related to issues on the factory floor . . . the assumption being that the government would make concessions when



Acknowledgement: The Star

After the two-day stayaway, thousands of SASOL workers are paid off and await transport for deportation to the homelands. Continuing talks between management and FOSATU's Chemical Workers' Industrial Union have led to the re-instatement of 2 513 workers out of 4 300 applicants so far..

UNREST

faced with this wide-scale protest' (1983: p29/32).

• As a Radical Tactic (*Most utopian*) There is a socialist tradition of mass strikes which goes back to the early Marxian writings of Engels, Rosa Luxemburg and the anarchist, Bakunin (McLellan, 1979: p47/50). In terms of these theories, the sustained withdrawal of labour through a mass strike is either supposed to lead to the collapse of the capitalist state (Bakunin) or coincides as an ongoing strategy with the beginnings of a period of revolutionary ferment (Luxemburg). Although in the contemporary South African context such theories beg the question of the material capacity of workers to sustain mass strike action or their will to do so, similar perceptions were perhaps shared by radical supporters of the November stayaway. Although the success of the two-day strike was undeniably limited, there was talk among some political activists of creating 'an ungovernable situation' and 'liberated zones' (RDM 7/11/84).

Employer Responses

The common denominator among responses by employers interviewed by

the LMG was one of tolerance, backed up by the principle of 'no work, no pay' (Star 20/11/84). Tony Ewer, labour spokesperson for the Transvaal Chamber of Industries, stated that 'there was a lot of sympathy for the situation many employees found themselves in, in view of the intimidation that took place (FM 16/11/84). The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce has since issued policy guidelines for employers in the event of another stayaway, recommending that employers should deduct wages, while also taking the 'individual circumstances' of employees into account (Star 20/11/84).


An exceptional response came from the para-statal SASOL, where management undertook the mass dismissal of between 5.5 to 6.5 thousand workers in response to the stayaway. Many labour commentators interpreted this unprecedented action as intended to symbolise a show of strength by the state.

Government Response

Twenty-four hours after the end of the stayaway, security police swooped on its organisers, arresting six unionist and community leaders under internal security legislation. In the following week, further detentions of FOSATU president

The South African working-class neither has the material base nor is it sufficiently organised to sustain mass strike action

Many employers responded tolerantly to the stayaway, albeit guided by the principle 'no work, no pay'



Frying Pan: The Workplace/The Fire: The Broader Community. The government seems determined to draw an inflexible security line between normal union activity and overt political action.

Key FOSATU and CUSA unionists were arrested in the midst of discussions with business leaders, aimed at preventing more industrial unrest

The 1984 stayaways were more successful than those organised by Soweto students in 1976

Chris Dlamini, CUSA's Camay and other unionists and political activists took place. Subsequent speculation in the media points to the possibility of a 'show trial' being held, similar to the infamous Treason Trial of the 1950s (STrib 25/11/84). Commenting on the detentions, Minister of Manpower Pietie du Plessis said that 'There should be no doubt that trade union personalities who become involved in actions where the security of the state is threatened would equally be dealt with . . . the government will not tolerate destabilising activity in any sphere, including that of labour relations' (interview in FM 16/11/84).

The Aftermath

The detention of thirty people in the weeks following the stayaway (RDM 15/11/84), including 13 trade union leaders, elicited concerted criticism from prominent employer associations. On 14 November, in an unprecedented show of united protest over a directly political issue, the Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) and the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) delivered a joint statement to Minister of Police, Louis le Grange. They warned the Minister that the stayaway detentions were 'a precipitous step that can only exacerbate a very delicate situation' (STrib

18/11/84). Apparently key FOSATU and CUSA leaders were arrested in the midst of discussions aimed at preventing further industrial unrest.

1976 and 1984 Comparisons

In pursuit of a yardstick to measure the significant features of the recent stayaway, it is instructive to isolate some of the central features of success which appear to set the November 1984 experience apart from its 1976/77 predecessors. Although the stayaway tactic was applied in the context of waves of civil unrest similar to those in 1976, the emergence of myriad community-oriented organisations since 1980 undoubtedly provided a unique foundation of grassroots support for the 1984 stayaways. The seminal role played by an increasingly unionised workforce with growing organisational and strategic expertise also partly explains the success of the recent stayaway in comparison to the relatively unsuccessful stayaways called by the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) in 1976.

Some of the key dimensions evident in the organisation and execution of the recent stayaway include:

- **Involvement of Organised Labour:** FOSATU, CUSA, independent and community-based unions drew on superior organisational structures on the factory floor to coordinate a worker stayaway. With a democratic mandate for worker participation, the street clashes between student activists and workers ignoring the stayaway call which characterised the 1976 situation were largely absent. The coercive nature of much of the stayaway campaigning at commuter points in 1976 is pointed out by Glenn Moss: 'It was the fact of not going to work, rather than its effect on participants and organisation, that was uppermost . . . the student leadership saw success or failure in numerical terms' (1983b: p15/16).

- **Worker/Community/Student Organisational Linkage:** The formation of joint parent/student committees in many townships during the civil unrest represented a fresh organisational initiative to coordinate action over community and educational issues. From the organisers' perspective, the TRSC's work and experience undoubtedly consolidated this process of linkage on both an organisational and symbolic level. The popular use of phraseology such as 'worker-parents' and 'student-children' (FWN Nos 33/34) illustrates the symbolic impact of the new worker/community/student political equation.

- **Factory-based Organisation:** In the residential-based stayaways of 1976, workers were effectively asked to risk individual victimisation, as levels of participation varied tremendously within factories. Union participation in the organisation of the November stayaway probably reassured workers that their action would be a collective one and dealt with by management as such (Moss, *ibid*: p14/15).

- **Migrant Worker Support:** In November 1984, COSAS activists appear to have been especially intent, through visits and discussions, on mobilising the hostel-dwellers to support the stayaway. The violent clashes between pupils and migrants of 1976 were avoided. Also, union organisation of factory stayaways meant that migrants — workers with the least job security — may have felt the risks of participation were lower, although the mass dismissals of CWIU members at SASOL might well undermine future migrant worker support for political action.

- **Organisation and Mobilisation:** After a month's preparatory work, involving joint meetings, consultations and extensive pamphleteering, the TRSC publicly launched its two-day stayaway campaign. Unlike the stayaways of 1976/77, which were partially inhibited by clandestine organisation, the TRSC coordinated support in an open and

democratic manner.

- **Indirect Pressure on Government:** The stayaway led to informal discussions between business associations and the union federations over explicitly political issues. Criticism of the stayaway detentions by these influential groups and the subsequent release of unionists could be construed as resulting from the successful mobilisation of a reformist lobbying sector, which has previously refrained from overt political actions (see 'Business and Politics: A Duty to Speak Out, FM 23/11/84).

Conclusion

It would appear as if the authorities are determined to draw an inflexible security line between 'legitimate' union activity in the industrial arena and explicit 'political' action in the wider society. The entire TRSC executive was released on bail on 5 December after being charged with subversion under Section 54 (2) of the Internal Security Act. Seven other former detainees, including union leaders, were subsequently brought to court, swelling the number of stayaway activists who currently await trial to 12.

Ironically, the overall effect of the government's repressive response to the November demonstration strike might well be to further politicise and consolidate organised labour. Although the strategies and tactics of stayaway participants differed, ranks can be expected to close as the protracted legal drama of a 'show trial' unfolds. A beleaguered union movement will undoubtedly make renewed efforts to reconcile these factions in the ongoing unity talks, as the major stepping-stone towards launching a single 'super-federation'.

As for the stayaway's impact on the urban political environment in general, its longer term effects are more elusive and difficult to anticipate. However, in terms of the effect on the political consciousness of participants, the overwhelming success of the stayaway, a milestone in urban protest, has self-evidently boosted the confidence of the African working-class to register united protest against a repressive government response to popular demands. *UNREST*

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ACRONYM KEY FOR SOURCES

- CP City Press
 FM Financial Mail
 FWN Fosatu Worker News
 LMG Labour Monitoring Group
 RDM Rand Daily Mail
 STrib Sunday Tribune
 WIP Work in Progress

The myriad community organisations provided a unique foundation of grassroots support for the 1984 stayaways

Trade unions drew on superior organisational structures on the factory floor to coordinate a worker stayaway

Joint worker/parent/student committees in the townships coordinated action over community and educational issues

As the November 1984 stayaway was organised on a factory rather than residential basis, workers faced lower risks of individual victimisation

Activists visited and mobilised hostel-dwellers in order to avoid the student/migrant clashes of the 1976 stayaways

A CHRONOLOGY OF 6 MONTHS OF

The advent of the new year brought little relief to the unstable African townships in the PWV and Eastern Cape regions. Renewed rioting flared in the Vaal Triangle, the East Rand and Grahamstown/Port Elizabeth, where protests simmered throughout 1984, bringing death and destruction. Since the first elections under the Black Local Authorities Act in November 1983, many township residents have refused to accept the authority of the African town councils to levy rental increases as a source of revenue for these new bodies. Since 3 September, 350 000 township residents in the Vaal Triangle have refused to pay any municipal tariffs and arrears of R10 million due to the Lekoa Town Council have accumulated (Star 10/1/85).

The findings of the Van Der Walt survey into the causes of the Vaal unrest, commissioned by the government late last year, were released in January. The report emphasised that 'the problem behind the unrest and school boycotts in the Vaal Triangle to a large extent lies in the field of black local government' (RDM 4/1/85), identifying corruption and maladministration by the town councils, poor communication and residents' ignorance about rates and levies as catalysts of the unrest (Sow 4/1/85). The Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education has since undertaken not to increase rentals or service charges

UNREST

	POLITICAL STRATEGIES <i>Elections, Boycotts & Stayaways</i>	TOWNSHIP UNREST <i>Town Councils, Rents & Riots</i>
August 1st & 2nd week	<p>UDF, NFC and CUSA/FOSATU affiliates intensify voter boycott campaigns, through mass meetings, pamphlets and house to house visits. The UDF 'One Million Signatures Campaign' against the constitution reaches the 500 000 mark.</p> <p>Participating parties conclude low-key electoral campaigns, conducted mostly through closed meetings, face-to-face canvassing and the media.</p>	<p>By early August, township rentals and service costs had been increased in Pretoria, the East and West Rand, the Eastern Cape and other regions. The Evaton and Lekoa town councils announced increases in the Vaal Triangle townships.</p> <p>2/3 August: Rent riots break out in Thabong (Welkom, OFS), after earlier protests against increases in Tumahole (Parys) in mid-July. In Atteridgeville, the mayor's house is petrol-bombed.</p> <p>15 August: In Daveyton, 6 East Rand Development Board vehicles are damaged and 2 high schools are stoned, as student/rent protest spills over into violence.</p>
August 3rd & 4th week	<p>Nationwide protest meetings are held over weekend of 17/19 August. 6000 People attend the UDF first anniversary rally in Cape Town. At an earlier rally, African delegates from Transvaal civic associations also condemned the elections.</p> <p>22 August: House of Representatives (coloured) election poll: 19 percent of all potential voters, dropping to equivalent 5 percent in 20 Cape Peninsula constituencies, dominant coloured residential area. Labour Party takes 76 out of 80 direct election seats.</p> <p>28 August: House of Delegates (Indian) election poll: 18 percent of all potential voters. Controversy rages over role of special votes, numbering almost 25 000. 30 percent of all votes cast.</p> <p>Rajbansi's NPP takes 18 seats to Reddy's SP 17.</p>	<p>21 August: Further unrest breaks out in Tembisa, Tumahole, Sharpeville and Vosloorus over rent and educational issues. Schools, cars and town councillors' houses and shops are set alight. In Imbali (Pietermaritzburg), officials' houses and vehicles and a beerhall are stoned as 1 500 youths protest against Dr Koornhof's visit to inaugurate the new town council.</p> <p>28/30 August: Sporadic unrest breaks out in the PWV complex, the Eastern Cape and elsewhere. Police vehicles and buses are stoned, schools and council offices are damaged in incidents of arson and petrol bombing.</p> <p>Township residents defy the East Rand Development Board and refuse to pay rents due on 1 September.</p> <p>The Daveyton Town Council drops rent increases by R5, the Atteridgeville Council drops increases, and 3 community councillors resign in Ratanda (Heidelberg).</p>
September 1st & 2nd week	<p>1/2 September: More than 2 000 Vaal residents support stayaway call at mass meetings held to protest rent and electricity increases.</p> <p>3 September: VCA, Sharpeville Anti-Rent Committee, COSAS, UDF and AZAPO organise one-day stayaway. Organisers also call for boycott of shops, garages and taxis owned by town councillors. Residents of 5 Vaal Triangle townships begin a rent boycott.</p>	<p>3 September: Rent riots spread quickly throughout the Vaal Triangle, the day on which increases come into effect — Sharpeville: Deputy Mayor and a councillor are killed, homes of council officials are gutted, Lekoa: Chairman of Council is killed, Sebokeng: Councillor is stoned to death, shopping centre, petrol station, bus depot, beerhalls and schools are destroyed. Boipatong/Bophelong: Councillors' houses and shops looted, administration and post offices set alight.</p> <p>Thabong (Welkom): Police and private vehicles, buses, and officials' homes are stoned.</p> <p>Tembisa (East Rand): Youths stone vehicles and beerhalls.</p> <p>4/6 September: The rent protests develop into an orgy of violence, spreading to other townships in the PWV area (eg Mamelodi and Vosloorus). Another deputy mayor is killed (Evaton), councillors' homes are attacked, classrooms and clinics are destroyed.</p> <p>Town councillors go into hiding. 3 resign. At least 10 town councils agree to suspend rent and service increases, including Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Evaton and Soweto. Funerals of unrest victims are attended by 10 000 people.</p>
September 3rd & 4th week	<p>16/18 September: NUM calls first legal strike by black miners. Amidst police intervention and riots, 10 miners die, 450 are injured, many during illegal strikes over following week.</p> <p>17/18 September: A one-day protest stayaway organised by the RMC in Soweto spills over into a second day of unrest.</p> <p>FOSATU's SFAWU launches a consumer boycott of Simba Quix products in a move to reinstate 464 workers fired at the company's Isando plant in August.</p>	<p>Sporadic general unrest continues in the PWV area and the Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth/Grahamstown).</p> <p>17/19 September: Large scale rioting in Soweto during stayaway. 60 Buses and cars are damaged, delivery trucks and shops are looted and beerhalls/hostels/official buildings are attacked by mobs. A train is boarded and gutted on the tracks.</p> <p>Thokoza: Mobs burn down a wholesale outlet and a supermarket (owned by a policeman).</p> <p>Renewed violence in East Rand townships of Tembisa, Vosloorus and Katlehong.</p>

TOWNSHIP UNREST

DISSENT - 1984

until a special committee has studied ways of determining rates and levies (Star 4/1/85).

However, the opposed town councils and civic associations remain locked into stalemate over the politics of rents and self-finance. Although several of the new African local authorities on the West and East Rand announced pending rental increases in January, corresponding community groups continue to reject their authority to do so and question the very legitimacy of African town councils elected on an average seven percent election poll. Persistent community pressure has produced yet further resignations during January, involving another two members of the Lekoa Town Council and the entire Ilingelihle Village Council (Cradock).

The purpose of the following chronology is to separate some of the major conflict issues, so as to provide a bird's-eye view of the tumultuous cycle of unrest which has dominated South African society since mid-1984. This schematisation of issues is intended to reflect the larger political processes of reform, opposition and counter-response often obscured in the multitude of incidents and events reported in the daily press.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE <i>Arrests, Detentions & Deaths</i>	SCHOOL UNREST <i>Boycotts & Grievances</i>
<p>In Thabong police use teargas and rubber bullets to disperse 500 demonstrators. 18 Arrests. 90 People are arrested on a wide range of electoral picketing and pamphleteering charges in week preceding elections.</p>	<p>32 Schools boycott (E Rand: 11; Welkom: 3; Soweto: 1; Cape Peninsula: 4; E Cape: 7; Pretoria: 6); all on educational issues. Six schools still closed. Some violence in E Rand and Welkom areas; 34 arrests, 1 death, over 10 injured.</p> <p>7 Tertiary institutions boycott; 2 on political and 5 on educational issues. Two are closed. 600 Students are expelled; 16 arrests, 1 death and over 5 injured.</p>
<p>Police detain a further 35 boycott campaigners on eve of first elections. UDF leaders taken into 'preventive' detention include 'Terror' Lekota (Publicity Secretary), Archie Gumede (National President), Dr Essop Jassat (TIC President), George Sewpersadh (NIC President), Curtis Nkondo (Chairperson, RMC) and Aubrey Mokoena (UDF Transvaal Vice-President).</p> <p>Heavy police presence at polling stations and violent clashes occur, dozens of protesters and election poll monitors arrested nationwide.</p> <p>Police and demonstrators clash violently at Lenasia West polling station. More than 100 people are injured by rubber bullets, police batons and stones thrown.</p> <p>Police quell sporadic township rioting in the PWV area, using teargas to disperse crowds of youths. There have been 204 election related arrests, with 124 people still in detention at close of month (DPSC).</p>	<p>73+ Schools boycott (E Rand: 33; Vaal Triangle: 1; Welkom: 3; Soweto: 6; Cape Peninsula: 5; E Cape: 16; Pretoria: 7; Natal: 1; Bloemfontein: 1); 1 on rents issue, 18 on political issues, 52 on educational and/or political issues. Six schools still closed. At the time of elections: 630 000 coloured pupils, 'thousands' of Indian and white pupils and 30 000 African pupils boycott schools. Towards end of month most coloured, Indian and white schools back to normal. Violence in E Rand, Welkom, Vaal Triangle, Soweto, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein and Pretoria areas. 20 Arrests, 5 deaths, 21 injuries (press reports).</p> <p>30 Tertiary institutions boycott; 3 on educational issues, 27 on political issues. 12 Temporarily closed, classes temporarily suspended at 2, further expulsion of 2 academics brings total to 10 at 1 university and at same 500 students are taken from campus; 2 000 students expelled at other university. 75+ Students arrested. Towards end of month, all but 3 are returning to normal.</p>
<p>Large contingents of armed police move into Vaal townships to quell rebellion. Three days of unrest and clashes with police leave 26 people dead and at least 300 injured. 141 People later appear in court on charges of public violence.</p> <p>6 September: The Ministers of Law and Order, Defence, Internal Affairs and National Education inspect strife-torn townships.</p> <p>12 September: Government bans indoor political meetings in 21 magisterial districts of Transvaal, Eastern Cape, Natal and Free State. In Soweto police use teargas and rubber bullets, and guard town council buildings, businesses and homes, amidst riots on seventh anniversary of Steve Biko's death in detention.</p> <p>13 September: Six UDF and NIC leaders take refuge in British Consulate, Durban, after the Minister of Law and Order orders their redetention. A Supreme Court judge had set aside their original detention orders of 21 August. Police use teargas and sjamboks to disperse large crowds in Soweto. Riot death toll reaches 50.</p>	<p>123 Schools boycott (E Rand: 13; Vaal Triangle: 87; E Cape: 10; Pretoria: 10; Welkom: 3); 23 on educational issues, 2 on political issues, other 98: combination of rent/political issues and/or fear of riots. Approximately 120 000 African pupils involved; 14 schools still closed or suspended. Violence in Pretoria, E Rand and Vaal Triangle areas; 6 deaths, unknown number injured. DET closes Vaal Triangle, E Rand and Pretoria schools one week earlier for holidays.</p> <p>6 Tertiary institutions boycott; 2 on educational and 2 on political issues, other 2 combination of educational issues and solidarity with boycotting pupils. Violence at 4 (Transkei, Northern Transvaal, W Cape and Zululand); 273 arrests, 15+ injured, 1 closed temporarily, 600 students refused entry until they reapply at 1 institution.</p>
<p>22 September: Police arrest at least 666 people in the Vaal townships, mostly mourners at funerals of unrest victims. Of these, 500 are held in Sebokeng, 132 in Bophelong and 34 in Sharpeville.</p> <p>26 September: Government releases six election boycott campaigners including: Saths Cooper, AZAPO Deputy President, and Cape Vice President Peter Jones; the UDF Transvaal General Secretary Moss Chikane, and Moruti Mapetla of COSAS. Ten prominent activists remain in detention.</p>	<p>140 Schools boycott (E Rand: 13; Vaal Triangle: 91; W Rand: 1; Pretoria: 6; Welkom: 3; E Cape: 26); 22 on educational issues, 118 on combination rent issues/general unrest. Violence in E and W Rand and E Cape; 3 arrests; classes still suspended at 6, and 6 schools still closed.</p> <p>8 Tertiary institutions boycott; 1 on educational issues, 1 on political issues, other 6 combination of political and educational issues. Violence in W Cape; temporary closure of 2, all full time students expelled at 1 institution; 2 arrests.</p>

UNREST

<p style="text-align: center;">October 1st & 2nd week</p>	<p>Trade unions, community and activist groups pledge support for the Simba boycott. The reinstatement of SFAWU workers becomes one of the TRSC demands in early November.</p> <p>10 October: AZASM and COSAS initiate series of meetings with parents and workers to broaden support for school boycott in wider community.</p> <p>14 October: Meeting of 4 000 people establishes the KwaThema Parent-Student Committee which organises one-day stayaway strike with trade unionists.</p>	<p>Rioting is unabated, with fresh outbreaks in KwaThema (East Rand), Bothshabelo (OFS), Joza/New Brighton (PE) and Kagiso. Community councillors' and policemen's properties, official buildings, buses, beerhalls and schools remain principal targets. The first white victim of unrest dies in a stoning incident in Sebokeng.</p> <p>Government allows town councils to take control of bottle stores on the East Rand, in order to provide a source of revenue.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">October 3rd & 4th week</p>	<p>22 October: One-day stayaway at KwaThema, near Springs, is highly successful. Second localised stayaway planned for 29 October is shelved and co-ordination of larger regional action begins.</p> <p>27 October: The umbrella TRSC is formed by the VCA, RMC, CUSA, FOSATU, independent unions, COSAS and other community and youth organisations.</p> <p>31 October: The TRSC launches a joint campaign by 37 organisations for a two-day stayaway strike to be held on 5 and 6 November.</p> <p>The rent boycott continues in the Vaal Triangle, as arrears accumulate.</p>	<p>16 Children under 15 years old have died during the six weeks of civil unrest.</p> <p>In Graaff-Reinet (E Cape) the house of the community council chairperson is petrol-bombed, and in Ikageng (Potchefstroom), unrest also breaks out.</p> <p>Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Dr G Viljoen announces that the state will compensate residents who suffered physical and financial damage during the rent riots. The government empowers 32 of the new local authorities (town and community councils) to set up their own police forces.</p> <p>KwaThema: Barricades of rubble block main roads, bottle-store is destroyed and buses/vehicles stoned. 131 People are estimated to have died during the past two months of unrest (SAIRR).</p> <p>23/31 October: New wave of township unrest sweeps affected PWV and Eastern Cape regions.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">November 1st & 2nd week</p>	<p>The TRSC distributes 400 000 pamphlets and 5 000 posters calling on township residents to observe the stayaway. COSAS activists visit hostels and mobilise migrant workers.</p> <p>5 & 6 November: About half-a-million workers participate in stayaway. Average 60 percent response in PWV complex, with 90 percent stayaway in Vaal Triangle and 85 percent on East Rand.</p> <p>7 November: SASOL, a parastatal dismisses 6 000 workers for participation in stayaway strike.</p> <p>9 November: 70 percent localised, one-day stayaway organised in Grahamstown spills over into rioting.</p> <p>Informal talks open between business organisations and CUSA/FOSATU: detentions of 13 unionists interrupt these talks aimed at preventing more unrest.</p> <p>Three major employer associations, the FCI, AHI and ASSOCOM issue statements criticising detentions of labour leaders and call on government to charge or release them.</p>	<p>The authorities cut off electricity in Sharpeville in an attempt to coerce residents to settle rent/service arrears. During stayaway, rioters damage at least 55 Putco buses in 6 Vaal Triangle townships, and 7 houses owned by town councillors are attacked on East Rand. The following riot deaths are reported: Tembisa (7), Katlehong (5), Ratanda (6), other Transvaal townships (3).</p> <p>In Eastern Cape townships of Fingo Village, Joza, KwaZakhele and Grahamstown, renewed unrest occurs. Police vehicles are stoned and a beerhall is burnt down.</p> <p>The mayor of Atteridgeville resigns. In Ratanda, elections for new councils are postponed as no candidates come forward. In Soweto, the town council announces electricity tariff increases of 20 percent.</p> <p>10 000 Mourners attend funerals of 7 unrest victims in Tembisa.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">November 3rd & 4th week</p>	<p>19 November: FOSATU opposes calls for further stayaways in near future. Other organisations such as CUSA and AZAPO also scotch rumours of an impending five-day stayaway from 26 November.</p> <p>21 November: Black activists in the USA launch sit-in campaign at South African diplomatic missions to protest against detentions and apartheid policies. Hundreds of prominent Americans are subsequently arrested after further sit-ins and protests.</p> <p>28/29 November: UDF organises bus boycott in Capetown to protest a 12.5 percent increase in fares.</p>	<p>By 20 November, at least 22 councillors and 5 mayors have resigned on the Reef, with 5 murdered during riots. Five members of the Duduza Community Council (Nigel) rescind their earlier resignations.</p> <p>The Soweto City Council reverses a 1981 decision to exempt all pensioners from rental payments.</p> <p>The Oranje-Vaal Development Board and Lekoa/Evaton Town Councils obtain court orders to force employers to deduct rent payments from township residents' wages. Other attempts to recover rent arrears include threatening residents with eviction, suspending essential services, police/army raids and legal actions.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">December 1st & 2nd week</p>	<p>9 December: In Sharpeville, a meeting of 5 000 residents decides to continue rent boycott until its September demands to scrap some service charges and reduce rentals to R30 are met.</p> <p>12 December: The UDF calls for a 'black Christmas', a consumer boycott and mourning period for the victims of civil unrest — those killed, maimed or in detention.</p>	<p>5 December: Soweto councillor Edward Manyosi is assassinated on the eve of his pending election as mayor, to replace incumbent E Tshabalala. The home of Edward Kunene, elected as mayor, is firebombed.</p> <p>13 December: The East Rand Development Board hands over R22m to 7 town councils, including beer profits obtained to promote financial self-administration and funding. The Tembisa Town Council reintroduces a R4 service levy, withdrawn after earlier unrest.</p> <p>In Grahamstown, two youths die during unrest in Fingo and Joza townships. Barricades are erected, vehicles stoned and a beerhall and church are set alight. In Sasolburg, crowds go on rampage in Zamdela township, stoning police vehicles and destroying two shops owned by a community councillor, a butchery, a supermarket and a bus.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">December 3rd & 4th week</p>	<p>Christmas Week: Most shops close in the PWV townships in response to UDF call. The black Christmas campaign is observed in some of the more volatile PWV and Eastern Cape townships, but fails to have a national impact.</p> <p>25 December: Thousands of youths march through Evaton, while others in Boipatong and Sharpeville spend day cleaning township cemeteries, to honour those killed during riots. In Ilingelihle township (Cradock), community organisations hold a massive protest rally.</p>	<p>All Lekoa Town councillors (Vaal Triangle) now live in a heavily guarded compound of 40 houses in Sebokeng, as their homes were destroyed during unrest.</p> <p>Christmas Week: During renewed rioting in the PWV area, the homes of three town councillors (Pretoria/East Rand) and a policeman are attacked (Boipatong), and a supermarket (Mamelodi) and beerhall (Sebokeng) are burnt down. Crowds stone policemen in Katlehong.</p> <p>27 December: The Atteridgeville/Saulsville Residents Organisation calls on the newly elected town councillors to resign.</p>

<p>Mourners arrested en masse for illegally attending a funeral are fined R50 (or 50 days). Death toll in unrest is now estimated to be between 70-80 people.</p> <p>6 October: Security police redetain NIC President George Sewpersadh, Vice-chairperson M J Naidoo and Mewa Ramgobin, as they leave the safety of the British Consulate. Three UDF leaders continue to take refuge.</p> <p>8 October: Supreme Court upholds validity of new Section 28 'preventive detention' orders of original 6 Consular refugees. Minister of Law and Order announces greater army/police collaboration to suppress unrest. Four community and student leaders from Cradock are released after more than 6 months in detention.</p>	<p>190 Schools boycott (E Rand: 56; Vaal Triangle: 87; E Cape: 43; Welkom: 3; Cape Peninsula: 1); 102 on combination of rent/educational issues and/or because of 'spreading of unrest'. 88 on rent issues and/or 'spreading of unrest'. Total of approximately 170 000 African pupils affected. Violence in E Rand and E Cape; 3 Soweto schools disrupted by other pupils; 6 schools still closed, threatened closure of 13 E Rand schools; 68 arrests, 1 death, 6 injured.</p> <p>3 Tertiary institutions boycott; combination of educational/political/sympathy issues. One closed for rest of year, exams cancelled.</p>																																																						
<p>14/17 October: British Labour Party MP Mr Donald Anderson visits the Consulate Three and other detainees.</p> <p>23 October: 'Operation Palmiet' (Bullrush): A combined 7 000 strong police/army force swoops on Sebokeng township at 2 am. Troops search all 19 500 houses and arrest 354 people. Mass arrests are also made in Sharpeville and Boipatong during house-to-house searches by SADF and police. Five special courts are set up in Vanderbijlpark and Sebokeng.</p> <p>Transkei bans the UDF and two affiliates COSAS and AZASO.</p> <p>27 October: Police arrest 52 people en route to a funeral of an unrest victim in Sebokeng. The SADF and police again seal off Sharpeville and Boipatong and conduct searches.</p> <p>31 October: The DPSC estimates that 1 600 arrests were made in the PWV area during September and October.</p>	<p>210+ Schools boycott (E Rand: 56+; Vaal Triangle: 87; E Cape: 58; Pretoria: 5; W Rand: 3; Cape Peninsula: 1); 67 on educational issues, 56 on combination of education/rent issues or because of 'spreading of unrest', 87 on combination of rent issues and spreading of unrest. Total of approximately 200 000 African pupils affected. Violence in Soweto, E and W Rand, 3 deaths. 900 Pupils boycott matric exam, 4 000 opt to write next year, out of a total of 83 000 candidates.</p> <p>4 Tertiary institutions boycott; 1 on political issues, 3 on educational issues. Violence in Bophuthatswana; 1 temporarily closed, 1 still permanently closed, full time students barred till next year when they must reapply; at other institution 600 previously expelled students allowed to write exams.</p>																																																						
<p>24 People die as police and rioters clash violently in PWV townships. Troops move into Tembisa (Kempton Park) and Tsakane (Brakpan).</p> <p>8/9 November: Security police raid UDF and FOSATU offices. The four TRSC members detained include TRSC Chairman Thami Mali, Soweto Youth Congress President Oupa Monareng and two trade unionists. FOSATU president Chris Dlamini, VCA Chairperson Lord McCamel and other activists are also arrested.</p> <p>Police fire rubber bullets, teargas and birdshot to disperse large crowds in Pretoria and Eastern Cape townships.</p> <p>14 November: CUSA General Secretary Piroshaw Camay, NUSAS President Kate Phillip, and at least 15 others are detained. 220 People are now in detention, including 12 unionists.</p> <p>Police and SADF raid hostels in Sebokeng and arrest 2 000 residents over rent arrears. Two people are killed and 175 arrested during unrest over following weekend.</p> <p>15 November: The Minister of Law and Order states that 130 people have died during the township unrest, 96 of these in police action. 195 People were injured in police action and another 215 injured during riots.</p>	<p>375+ Schools boycott (E Rand: 171; Vaal Triangle: 87; E Cape: 60; Pretoria: 57; and in Soweto poor to normal attendance during stayaway at 375 schools); 60 on educational issues, 87 on rents issues or because of general unrest, 228 combination of educational and rents issues and stayaway. Total of approximately 400 000 African pupils affected. Violence in E Cape, E Rand and Vaal Triangle, 16+ arrests.</p> <p>3 Tertiary institutions boycott; 1 on educational issues, 1 joins stayaway, 1 has been closed. 325 Female students banned at one institution after banning of 255 male students earlier, 6+ arrests.</p> <p>Armed police guard African matric examination centres nationwide and use teargas on pupils who attempt to disrupt exams.</p>																																																						
<p>Combined SADF/SAP operations continue in volatile PWV area. Police now refuse to comment on 'day-to-day activities of the army in the townships'. 115 People are arrested during raids on Tembisa, 50 of these on looting charges.</p> <p>AHI, ASSOCOM and FCI representatives meet separately with the Ministers of Law and Order and Manpower to discuss detentions.</p> <p>29 November: Police arrest 30 demonstrators in Johannesburg during a national day of protest against state repression.</p> <p>The DPSC estimates that security police actions during 1984 have pushed the number of detentions without trial to 1 093 including 515 students and youths, 202 community workers, 15 COSAS office-bearers and 14 UDF leaders. The Minister of Law and Order states that only 164 people remain in detention.</p>	<p>Few press reports: Approximately 163 000 African pupils affected (E Rand: 20 000 pupils; E Cape schools: 45; Vaal Triangle: 87 with some attendance at 25; Pretoria: 1 school sympathy boycott and 50% attendance at 5 schools; rest of country: various levels of attendance). In the W Rand matric exam candidates at 1 school boycott 1 exam in solidarity with an arrested pupil; some violence in E Rand with unknown number injured. Schools close 30 November.</p>																																																						
<p>5 December: 16 prominent activists and unionists are released, including Dlamini (FOSATU) and Camay (CUSA); 11 Section 28 Notices providing for preventive detention are withdrawn.</p> <p>7/10 December: Police/SADF patrol Grahamstown townships and use tearsmoke and rubber bullets to disperse crowds.</p> <p>10 December: The three former Consular refugees, Ramgobin, Sewpersadh and Naidoo of the NIC, TIC President Jassat and RMC leaders Nkondo and Mokoena appear in court on treason charges.</p> <p>12 December: The remaining 3 refugees leave the British Consulate, UDF President Gumede and member Paul David are arrested and join the other 6 activists awaiting trial on treason charges. 12 Stayaway organisers are accused of treason and released on bail.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ACRONYMS</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>AHI</td> <td>Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ASSOCOM</td> <td>Associated Chamber of Commerce</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AZAPO</td> <td>Azanian People's Organisation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AZASM</td> <td>Azanian Students Movement</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AZASO</td> <td>Azanian Students Organisation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COSAS</td> <td>Congress of South African Students</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CUSA</td> <td>Council of Unions of South Africa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DPSC</td> <td>Detainees Parents Support Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FCI</td> <td>Federated Chamber of Industries</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FOSATU</td> <td>Federation of South African Trade Unions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NFC</td> <td>National Forum Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NIC</td> <td>Natal Indian Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NP</td> <td>National Party</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NPP</td> <td>National Peoples Party</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NUM</td> <td>National Union of Mineworkers</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NUSAS</td> <td>National Union of South African Students</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PFP</td> <td>Progressive Federal Party</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PWV</td> <td>Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RMC</td> <td>Release Mandela Campaign</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SADF</td> <td>South African Defence Force</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SAP</td> <td>South African Police</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SFAWU</td> <td>Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SP</td> <td>Solidarity Party</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TIC</td> <td>Transvaal Indian Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TRSC</td> <td>Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UDF</td> <td>United Democratic Front</td> </tr> <tr> <td>VCA</td> <td>Vaal Civic Association</td> </tr> </table>	AHI	Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut	ASSOCOM	Associated Chamber of Commerce	AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation	AZASM	Azanian Students Movement	AZASO	Azanian Students Organisation	COSAS	Congress of South African Students	CUSA	Council of Unions of South Africa	DPSC	Detainees Parents Support Committee	FCI	Federated Chamber of Industries	FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions	NFC	National Forum Committee	NIC	Natal Indian Congress	NP	National Party	NPP	National Peoples Party	NUM	National Union of Mineworkers	NUSAS	National Union of South African Students	PFP	Progressive Federal Party	PWV	Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging	RMC	Release Mandela Campaign	SADF	South African Defence Force	SAP	South African Police	SFAWU	Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union	SP	Solidarity Party	TIC	Transvaal Indian Congress	TRSC	Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee	UDF	United Democratic Front	VCA	Vaal Civic Association
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<p>21 December: The 8 UDF/Indian Congress/RMC leaders are denied bail while awaiting trial set for 29 March 1985, on charges of committing treasonable activities between 1981/84.</p> <p>Christmas Week: Police use birdshot to disperse crowds attacking councillors' homes and development board property in the PWV townships.</p> <p>Imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela rejects an offer of conditional release under Transkeian auspices.</p> <p>Final government figures put the death toll at 211 due to police action during unrest in 1984, with another 368 people wounded. According to the Minister of Law and Order, 135 people were still in detention at the end of January 1985.</p>																																																							

NATAL/KWAZULU SCHOOLS 1984

Pupils in the Middle

While large parts of South Africa were swept by massive school boycotts during 1984, schools in Natal/KwaZulu were largely unaffected. From an interview with African pupils of a school under the administration of the Department of Education and Training, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer and Indicator Researcher Monica Bot derive evidence to support their contention that the mobilisation for boycott was counteracted in Natal/KwaZulu 'by the pervasive presence of another well-mobilised force, Inkatha'. Of interest is the fear of politics evident among these pupils, who wished to avoid any controversial topics, although they may not, according to the authors, be regarded as representing all pupils' viewpoints. The authors conclude by asking how long the schools in Natal/KwaZulu can preserve the present peace.

The massive wave of African school boycotts during 1984, which at times built up to a total of 400 000 pupils on strike, has been hotly debated in the media and in educational circles. The pattern of events and the ensuing commentary and debate leaves no doubt that there were three major ingredients in these events:

- Mobilisation and organisation, more commonly referred to as agitation in official circles, seen clearly in the early stages of the boycotts when action appeared to be concentrated near prominent pupil leaders and active branches of pupil organisations;
- Widespread grievances about the performance and quality of the school system for Africans, very tellingly illustrated in the fact that at the end of 1983 only 9.8 percent of African pupils sitting for their senior certificate examinations obtained matriculation passes;
- Very serious problems in the collective reactions and competence in dealing with pupil restiveness of school staff who, with few exceptions, appeared to be intimidated, helpless or apathetic in the face of pupil action.

The interaction of these elements was a dynamic undoubtedly played out in most African schools in the country. In one area of South Africa,

Natal/KwaZulu, the mobilisation for boycott was counteracted by the pervasive presence of another well-mobilised force, Inkatha, an organisation which has always opposed boycotts as futile and injurious to the African community.

Hence in Natal the one major element, that of the mobilisation of unsophisticated but discontented pupils for concerted action, was not able to become a dominant influence. In Natal/KwaZulu a different balance of political forces appeared to exist which held pupil action of the type seen in the Transvaal and Eastern Cape in check.

An insight into the delicate balance in the Natal/KwaZulu situation was obtained from in depth discussion with a group of typical senior pupils at a high school in one medium sized township in the Durban region. The township itself had not escaped political strife since open conflict had broken out between Inkatha and United Democratic Front (UDF)-linked groups some time before the onset of the school boycotts.

A salient feature of the responses of the group suggested that the particular balance of political forces in the wider environment was reflected in the school: 'Some schools have two to three different political parties, which leads to trouble, there is

always a clash possible'. Furthermore, the pupils interviewed said, these parties often supported totally different strategies: 'One group says, "the pen is mightier than the sword", the other group says the opposite'.

As a consequence, these pupils had decided to stay impartial, despite the fact that they had at times been approached by either UDF or Inkatha supporters at school. These approaches, they said, could be very convincing, certainly to some pupils: "You are so intelligent, how can you do nothing about your suppressed brethren" or "We are relying on you, you are the future leaders"'.

Closely linked to the issue of politics was, according to these pupils, intimidation: 'Many pupils are influenced by elders, from university, or parents ... they threaten them, "do this, do that", they use students'. Asked why these individuals would want to use students, the pupils replied that political activists felt that 'students can do more, like go into houses, and they have quickness of understanding, they have lots of information, so they can be used as a tool by others who have little education'. The activists themselves were described by them as 'empty tins', whereas most 'educated people were busy, they have no time to do this'.

According to the pupils spoken to, there were teachers who had also tried to influence pupils, which they felt was totally wrong because 'Teachers are your parents at school we do what teachers want, so they mustn't talk politics and influence students'. In Natal/KwaZulu, however, because a reasonable number of pupils could be either UDF or Inkatha supporters, they said that many teachers were 'afraid to talk to students, because they don't know what organisation they belong to'.

The emphasis on keeping politics separate from other fields was also clearly expressed with regard to religion, where they felt it was similarly wrong of church ministers to 'get mixed up with politics', and instead they should be asked 'to pray to God, that all this trouble and violence ends'.

So turbulent is the potential political dynamic in an African school that the pupils spoken to had reacted by cultivating a generalised avoidance of anything controversial. They displayed distinct uncertainty, if not fear of controversy, which extended beyond the political even to aspects of history, biology and religion because even there, according to the pupils interviewed, 'little things can cause arguments that cause political problems'. The pupils mentioned, for example, reading about job reservation in history, which had immediately caused a 'whole political discussion', and the issue of evolution versus creation which they felt had only acted to further confuse them.

Futility of the Boycott Strategy

The pupils expressed their dislike of boycotts and violence several times, and felt that there was little to be gained by taking part in them. Some remarks the pupils made were: 'destruction contributes to non-success'; 'what is the result of burning the schools, rebuilding takes a long time and they forget that they throw away their parents' money'. They took quite a pragmatic view of the persuasive tactics of organisations: 'They forget how politics work, you demonstrate, then you are taken by the

police and you lose your future'.

They were also concerned that they might become the victim of boycotts at university; 'We might pay and then have to leave after a few months because of boycotts'. Because of these fears, they wished that there were 'groups with responsibility who want blacks that are bright'.

The pupils interviewed were quite ambitious and felt strongly that education should come first, 'then you have a platform, then you are in a position to speak up. We as students first, but then later!'

Frustrated Moderates

The pupils interviewed clearly represented a category of moderate students who were totally pragmatic in their approach to political issues in the schools. This is a category which can probably survive in the more evenly balanced political arena of Natal/KwaZulu but which is argued or coerced into submission in other parts of the country.

Yet, these moderates are by no means unaware of the structured disabilities of African pupils. While disagreeing on political strategies they sympathise with their counterparts in other parts of the country, since their situation showed many similarities. At their school they also suffered from a lack of (qualified) teachers, of facilities and textbooks, and they were quite concerned about the implications of the age limit restriction. Although they were reasonably satisfied with the prefect system at their school they felt that, in view of the countrywide unrest, there should be more democratic representation in the schools: 'There should be a notable group of students with a responsibility that black education succeeds. They should work hand in glove with the pupils, and avoid quarrelling.' This group would also be responsible for liaising with parents and teachers.

Conclusion

The pupils spoken to do not represent all pupils' viewpoints. To the left of them are UDF and COSAS sympathisers. Active Inkatha-linked students are another category. It is no more than common sense to accept that pupils' viewpoints, both in Natal/KwaZulu and in the rest of the country represent a wide spectrum.

What distinguishes the situation in Natal/KwaZulu from that in the Transvaal is the wider political balance. COSAS, for example, is not represented in the school from which these pupils were drawn, and probably in most other schools. From the impressions given by the pupils, Inkatha, although a significant factor in most schools, is not necessarily dominant or the exclusive organisation. The real difference between Natal/KwaZulu and other parts of the country lies in the pattern of mobilisation.

Yet the pupils' keen awareness of their disabilities and of the shortcomings of African education raises the question of how long the schools in Natal/KwaZulu can preserve the present peace. The grievances are clear and are an ever-present opportunity for political exploitation. The pupils spoken to may eschew political organisation but they are aware of the need for mouthpieces to plead for reform. One can only hope that whatever organisation takes up the cause of these pupils will do so without the destruction and conflict which has virtually crippled African education elsewhere. UJDA

INDIAN EDUCATION

a brief overview

By Pat Samuels,
President of the Teachers Association of South Africa

Although Indian matriculation passrates have not as yet reached the level of those for white education, they are very favourable when compared to coloured and African passrates. Indian education, however, has in the past also had to cope with problems similar to those of coloured and African education. Pat Samuels gives a brief overview of the problems of Indian education prior to and after the takeover of Indian education by the Department of Indian Affairs, and outlines future priorities.

Prior to the takeover by the Dept of Indian Affairs in 1966, Indian education was in a state of deprivation

Some of the problems were a shortage of qualified teachers, abnormal pupil loads, platoon classes and ineffective streaming of pupils

The takeover of Indian education by the Department of Indian Affairs in Natal in April 1966 and in the Transvaal one year later, saw the beginning of a new era in the provision of education for Indians. Prior to that date, Indian education had been in a state of deprivation with respect to school accommodation and provision.

Out of necessity, the Indian community's role in the provision of education for its children was one of great magnitude and worth. From the early days of settlement in the colony of Natal the Indian community, often with assistance from various Christian missions, had begun to build its own schools because the colonial authorities had neglected to do so. In the early 1930s the community's school building programme gained momentum throughout Natal. After World War II the Natal Provincial Administration began to make progress, albeit slow, towards the greater provision of education for Indians.

In 1964, the Minister of Indian Affairs announced that the control of Indian education and teacher training would be transferred from the provinces to the Department of Indian Affairs. He also declared that the situation with respect to Indian education in Natal had hitherto been unsatisfactory, and that Mr P R T Nel was appointed to investigate the matter.

Mr Nel said in April 1964 that if the government did take over control he would advocate a special and urgent programme to

eliminate a major problem peculiar to Natal, namely that of platoon or double shift classes. It was said that more than 30 000 children were attending classes held in the afternoons (Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1964).

In an article in The Teachers' Journal, the South African Indian Teachers Association stated that since 1961 there had been a sharp decline in the results achieved by Indian pupils in the Natal Senior Certificate Advanced Grade examination. Some reasons suggested were the ineffective streaming of pupils, the effect of the platoon system, abnormal pupil loads and the shortage of adequately qualified teachers (Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1968).

The Double Shift or Platoon System

As table 1 shows, the number of pupils in platoon classes dropped from 28 513 in 1966 to 14 191 in 1971, and by the end of 1983 had virtually dropped to nil.

In the 1970s the principals of schools with platoon classes introduced many ingenious methods to integrate these classes with the normal classes, so that all pupils completed the school day by 14h30. This meant, however, that the whole school population sometimes suffered disadvantages. One system devised was the moving of classes

outdoors for oral work, notwithstanding the often adverse external physical conditions, while other classes were involved in written work indoors. The procedures adopted to accommodate platoon classes at schools, therefore, brought disadvantages to pupils other than those who were in these classes.

Table 1 also shows that the average size of platoon classes was large, but nevertheless close to that for normal classes. Fortunately, principals have taken care that normal and platoon classes have had an approximately equal number of pupils. The sympathetic attitude of principals towards pupils in platoon classes has facilitated the integration of the platoon classes into the normal school.

Schools Building Programme

Since 1966, the state took over or accepted the closure of some schools which were hitherto partially funded by the state, and began an intensive school building programme. This programme considerably

eased accommodation problems and helped phase out the platoon school system. As table 2 shows, the holding power of schools increased and by 1983, 17.2 percent of the total school population was in senior secondary school, as opposed to 11.3 percent in 1973.

Teacher:Pupil Ratios

Also as a result of the school building programme, both primary and secondary school classes have progressively approached more manageable proportions for teachers (see table 3). Although the table gives the impression that teacher:pupil ratios have come close to the ideal of 22 pupils per secondary school teacher and 25 pupils per primary school teacher, these ratios have been calculated without distinguishing between teachers and management staff, librarians, remedial teachers etc. However, one has to take note of the general improvement in teacher:pupil ratios especially at secondary school level, although ideal teacher:pupil ratios have yet to be reached.

Since 1966, an extensive school building programme helped to phase out the platoon system

The holding power of schools also increased and teacher:pupil ratios generally improved

Data Base

Table 1

PUPILS IN PLATOON CLASSES, 1966-1983

No of pupils	28 513	14 191	11 940	14 028	12 030	5 426	801
No of schools	93	54	51	51	53	28	3
No of class units	—	400	310	369	343	162	23
No of pupils per class	—	35.5	38.5	38	35.1	33.5	34.8
	1966	1971	1973	1976	1979	1982	1983

Table 2

SCHOOL POPULATION IN THE FOUR PHASES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL, 1973-1983



Junior Primary	34.5	33.7	31.7	30.1	27.8
Senior Primary	28.8	30.9	28.7	29.0	29.8
Junior Secondary	24.9	22.4	23.8	24.6	24.5
Senior Secondary	11.3	12.5	14.8	15.5	17.2
Other	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.8	0.7
Total School Population	175 484	186 476	212 402	221 219	223 745
	1973	1976	1979	1982	1983

Table 3

TEACHER POPULATION, 1969-1982

Primary	4 106	4 370	4 568	5 190	5 662
Teacher:Pupil Ratio	—	26:1	24:1	29:1	27:1
Secondary	1 649	2 070	2 296	2 978	3 349
Teacher:Pupil Ratio	—	30:1	22:1	21:1	21:1
Other	16	123	137	95	255
Professionally Qualified ¹	86%	94%	96%	91%	90%
Unqualified ²	14%	6%	4%	9%	10%
University Degree ³	(unknown)	15.5%	18.8%	21.2%	24.0%
	1969	1973	1976	1979	1982

Notes:
¹ & ² These are percentages of all professionally qualified and all unqualified persons in the total population
³ Percentages of all professionally qualified persons only



As a result of smaller classes and improvements in facilities and professional qualifications of staff, passrates improved

High priority must be placed on the institution of adequate pre- and in-service teacher education facilities

Improvement in Educational Quality

Results of the Senior Certificate examination passes over the years show that the quality of the curriculum has improved (see figure 1). In 1969, 59.9 percent of Senior Certificate candidates passed, which steadily grew to 85 percent in 1975, reaching 84 percent in 1983. The depressed figures for 1980/81/82 may reflect the effect of the school boycotts by pupils during 1980/81. Factors contributing to the general improvement in passrates were not only improved teacher:pupil ratios but also improvements in the quality of school facilities and in the professional qualifications of teachers.

Quality of School Buildings

The 20 classroom primary school with multi purpose rooms, needle work room and book distribution room built in the 1970s was a great improvement over state aided austerity schools and NED schools. Since the beginning of the 1980s superior 18 classroom schools with a large library/resource centre and six other specialist rooms were introduced to the school building programme. The quantity and quality of the teaching aids improved considerably. Secondary schools also underwent changes that brought a great amount of sophistication to styling, arrangement of teaching/learning spaces for various subjects, and the provision of audio visual facilities etc.

Professional Growth

Since World War II, as has happened in most parts of the world, Indian teachers became more aware than ever before of the real need to upgrade their academic and professional qualifications, so that they could more adequately meet the requirements of a rapidly advancing programme of differentiated education. The provision of black classes for undergraduate study by the Natal University College, the greater opportunities for external studies at the University of South Africa, the establishment of the Springfield Training College and Durban University College, and in-service classes organised by the Department of Education have all given a tremendous boost to the upgrading programme. The stimulation given by the Teachers Association was also an important factor.

At present, the minimum level of qualification required for a teacher at the point of entry to the service is matriculation plus three years. Approximately 93 percent of the teachers on the permanent establishment are now in possession of such qualifications, an improvement of approximately 10 percent on the 1965 figure. Of these teachers, 28.3 percent were holders of one or more university degrees in 1983. This represents a 4.3 percent increase over the 1982 figures (also see table 3).

Unqualified Temporary Teachers

After an initial drop in 1973, however, the percentage of unqualified temporary teachers has grown steadily to 10 percent in 1982. This was clearly the result of a shortage in teacher training facilities, for which the Education Department may be held responsible as it had failed to meet the requirements of the projections made by its own education planners. Figure 2 shows the number of teachers required as against the number produced over ten years. Notwithstanding the fact that the projections were well below the actual requirements, these projections have not been met.

Conclusion

There is much evidence to show that Indian education has made steady progress over the past 15 years. Material progress in the provision of education in all its aspects has made possible a progressively higher quality of educational output.

For the highest possible educational standard among Indians it is necessary that, inter alia:

- the remaining state-aided schools be transferred to the state as soon as possible so that rapid upgrading of facilities may be possible
- adequate pre-service and in-service teacher education facilities are instituted as a matter of high priority
- prescriptive classroom teaching techniques that stifle creative teaching be replaced with an official attitude which allows more innovative procedures. JPSA

QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN COLOURED EDUCATION

By Professor H D Herman of the Department of Education at the University of the Western Cape


The substantial rise in the number of black matriculants has frequently been cited as evidence pointing to improved conditions in black education. However, as was pointed out with reference to African education in the last issue of Indicator SA, statistics pointing to rising numbers tell little about the quality of education received. Passrates (percentage passes) on the other hand, may be regarded as indicators of quality. In an article in Indicator SA Vol 2 No 2, Professor Herman outlined developments in coloured education since the Department of Coloured Affairs (now Internal Affairs) took over coloured education in 1964. He drew attention to the high rate of attrition (failure and dropout) in coloured schools: only 88 out of every thousand pupils who enrolled in substandard A in 1971 eventually obtained a Senior Certificate. In this article he examines coloured Senior Certificate passrates and matriculation exemptions over the same 20 year period, compares these with results achieved in white schools, and concludes that these indicators of educational inequality are a further indictment of South Africa's racially separated educational system.

The number of coloured Senior Certificate (SC) candidates in coloured schools rose gradually from 1 344 in 1964 to 3 804 in 1976, and then increased sharply over the next seven years to reach a total of 11 076 in 1983 (see figure 1). The number of passes rose equally steadily from a meagre 595 in 1964 to 2 374 in 1975; thereafter the graph becomes erratic due to turmoil and disruption in coloured schools in


the traumatic years of 1976 and 1980/81, and to an anomalous result in 1979 (see below).

The number of failures reached a high point in 1981, ascribed by the Department of Internal Affairs to the cumulative effect of the disruption of classes by pupils in 1980 and 1981 (report of Superintendent General of Education, Cape Provincial Administration, 1960).

After a steady increase in the number of coloured senior certificate passes up to 1975, numbers fluctuate due to the 1976 and 1980/81 unrest



The gap between the number of candidates and the number of matric exemptions, a quality indicator, has widened steadily since 1964



Consequently, there is an acute shortage of graduates in jobs such as secondary school teaching

Percentage passrates, another quality indicator, have remained at a disappointingly constant level

The unusually high passrate in 1979 has added to the suspicion that passrates are in fact controlled

The discrepancy between coloured and white passrates confirms the belief that formal apartheid in the educational structure is at the root of educational inequality

Matric Exemptions

The gap between the number of candidates and the number of matric exemptions, a primary indicator of educational quality, has widened steadily since 1964. Of the 11 076 SC candidates in 1983, a mere 1 679 or 15.2 percent obtained matric exemptions. As matriculation exemption is the passport to undergraduate study at university, this figure provided the national pool from which the 1984 intake for first-year degree studies had to be drawn. The small number of coloured degree students at university and the acute shortage of graduates in jobs such as secondary school teaching is a direct consequence of the paucity of students with matric exemptions.

Distinctions

Another quality indicator is the number of candidates who achieved an 'A' aggregate symbol. Until 1977 no more than one coloured SC candidate per year had achieved this symbol —indeed until 1972 it had never before occurred. In 1977 the figure leapt to 19, explained by the introduction in the mid-seventies of a new, differentiated SC course with subjects offered on both higher and standard grades, making it easier for pupils to achieve an 'A' aggregate symbol. Even so, in 1983 only 28 of the 11 076 candidates, or 0.25 percent, achieved an 'A' aggregate pass.

Passrates

Figure 2 shows percentage passes in coloured schools from 1964 to 1983. With the exception of 1979, this quality graph has remained at a disappointingly constant level. The effects of unrest in schools on pupil performance is clearly indicated by the sudden drops in percentage passes in 1976 and 1981. While some commentators might argue that passrates of around 70 percent are far from derisory, they should be aware that SC candidates, whether they pass or not, in fact represent a 'chosen few' who have been successful in reaching standard ten. In Indicator SA Vol 2 No 2 attention was drawn to the high rate of attrition and limited holding power of coloured schools.

1979: An Anomaly

The unusually high passrate of 88.5 percent in 1979, reflected in the sharp peak on both the quantity and quality graphs (figures 1&2), has been the subject of keen speculation

among the coloured educational fraternity. It is believed that this peak reflects an aberration caused by an unusually high upward adjustment of marks, rather than an unprecedented level of achievement for that year.

Suspicion

The SC results of the various education departments are adjusted to Joint Matriculation Board (JMB) norms, and suspicion does exist in some quarters that passrates are in fact controlled. The validity and reliability of the SC examinations themselves has also been seriously questioned by many educationalists, and the view has been expressed that as a result of the pervasive influence of the ruling political ideology, all aspects of education, including examinations, are shaped to the needs of the white minority (Cape Times, 7/1/82).

Comparative Results

Figure 3 shows comparative figures for white and coloured pupils for 1960 and 1983. The comparison of white and coloured examination results elicits strong and often emotional reactions on the part of coloured community leaders, teachers organisations, teachers, parents and media commentators. It is argued that the white and coloured population groups are reasonably comparable in terms of culture, educational tradition and geographical distribution, and the discrepancy in the SC passrates for these groups confirms the belief that formal apartheid in the structure of education is at the root of educational inequality. In particular, the discrepancy between the percentages of white and coloured SC candidates who achieved a matric exemption (71.3% and 15.2% respectively) shows in terms of a clear quality indicator the outcome of racially separate and unequal schooling. Positive trends such as the steady increase in the number of passes are overshadowed by a broad and fundamental rejection of the separate systems of schooling and examination, and the continuing disparity between the achievement outcomes of coloured pupils in comparison to those of whites.

Credibility

Before 1970, although schooling was racially separate, the credibility of the SC

examination was not suspect among coloured people in the Cape Province as all Cape pupils wrote the same examination. However, when the Department of Coloured Affairs became a separate examining authority in 1970, despite vehement opposition in the coloured community to separate SC examinations, attention was immediately focussed on comparisons of the results achieved by the two groups of pupils. The legitimacy, validity and standards of the coloured SC examination have since then been regarded as suspect by many, in spite of the supervisory and coordinating role of the JMB.

In an article in 'Educatio' (First Quarter Issue, 1983), the journal of the Cape Professional Teachers Association, R van den Heever challenges the reliability and predictive value of the SC examination. The controversial statement is made that the coloured examinations are more difficult than those for whites and that some teachers support the theory that the stringent selection process of examinations in coloured and African schools is part of the strategy to retain the dominant position of whites in South African society.


Critics have also questioned the system whereby matriculation marks are adjusted for various departments along lines which are not open to public scrutiny. Whatever the merits of these arguments, they do have a significant effect in a racially divided society, and are to be expected in view of the small number of coloured pupils who achieve university entrance.

It is clear that if the proposals of the De Lange Report (1981) for equality of educational opportunity and education to meet manpower needs are to be addressed seriously, and if the credibility of the SC examinations is to be maintained, the role and functions of examinations such as the matriculation examination as selection and allocative tools will have to be reassessed.

Conclusion

The causes of weak matriculation results in coloured schools are in many instances the same as those which pertain in African education.

- Inadequate educational provision, as reflected in low per capita expenditure. The lack of suitable school accommodation, high teacher:pupil ratios and a lack of physical facilities are a result of this.
- The shortage of teachers, particularly qualified graduates for secondary schools. At present only seven percent of the teachers in coloured schools are graduates and only 37 percent have a post-matriculation education diploma, a minimum requirement even in third world countries.
- The lack of sound curriculum planning and development in secondary education, and the persistence with a curriculum which is not geared towards third world needs in South Africa. Problems related to social disadvantage and to what Feuerstein



calls the 'retarded performer' are ignored.

- The persistence of an elitist secondary education system geared towards university preparation, even though very few blacks eventually reach university.
- The management and structural inadequacies of the matriculation examination as such.
- Finally, the problems which Nationalist ideology creates for education, in that it leads to an over-politicisation of education. Rejection of the ethnic labels and separate educational structures lead to frustration, lack of identification with the school system and demotivation of both teachers and pupils. *UPJA*

A shortage of facilities and qualified teachers, and an academically oriented curriculum are some contributors to weak matric results

THE GREAT HOUSING SALE

Myth vs Reality

By Toni Lamont, Professor of Sociology
at the University of South Africa

The idea upon which the government's 'Great Housing Sale' of 1983-84 was based, that the country's lower income groups would be willing and able to snap up 500 000 houses within a single year, in a period of deepening recession, has hopefully been evicted from its residence in official policy and rehoused in the resettlement camp for discarded South African myths.

Professor Lamont analyses certain key factors which have inhibited the sales campaign, and presents the view that the ultimate success of the programme depends upon its being perceived not as a unique 'event' but as the first stage in an ongoing social process.

Most of the 500 000 houses on sale to all race groups were made available for African purchase on 99 year leasehold

In a sudden and unprecedented policy shift, the South African government announced in early 1983 that it was to embark on a massive real estate exercise: some 500 000 government-owned houses were to be released for sale to the general public. At the time, the scheme was viewed by its proponents as an advance of free market principles, and a direct outcome of the government's meetings with the private sector at the Carlton and Goedehoop Conferences in 1980 and 1982.

While the offer included all race groups, the large bulk of dwelling units were to be made available to residents in African townships, now able to 'buy' property in prescribed areas on a 99 year leasehold basis. As was pointed out in a previous article in this publication (T Lamont, Indicator SA Vol 1 No 2), this option is obviously less attractive than the freehold ownership available to other race groups.

By August 1984, only 3.1 percent of saleable units had been purchased by Africans in terms of the 99 year leasehold system (see table 1). Nevertheless, the number of houses sold to Africans (22 203) is more than double the number sold to the other population groups combined. Bearing in mind that the government had initially announced its intention that the great housing sale be completed within one year of its inception in July 1983, and that by August 1984 only 7.3 percent of the total saleable units had been sold, it is clear that something has gone seriously wrong.

In the previous article, it was predicted that


the alienation of potential buyers, a lack of coordination between the public and private sector bodies involved and a high level of confusion and ignorance in both sectors as to the mechanics of the process, would impede the implementation of the then nascent programme. Several aspects that were unclear or unknown when the sales campaign was launched have taken shape over the past year and a half, and although some aspects are still unclear or unresolved while certain new obstacles have emerged, it is possible to indicate the main factors which have been responsible for thwarting the great housing sale:

- The organisational machinery required for the implementation of the programme was not established in time
- The campaign was approached as if the sale of the houses was a unique 'event' rather than the first stage in an ongoing social process
- Buyer resistance and alienation have been exacerbated in some quarters by a trend to politicise and campaign against the housing sale
- The establishment of a massive primary market for housing has not been supported, due to factors restricting mobility, by the development of a secondary market.

Lack of Organisational Machinery

The lack of organisation is a direct result of

Because only 7.3 percent of the houses were sold between July 1983 and August 1984, the housing sale has been extended



the suddenness of the announcement by the government that it was going to sell its housing stock — an announcement which caught most people and organisations unawares. This switch in policy was a radical one and the policies of affected organisations had to be altered equally drastically. Most seriously affected were the administration boards, the building societies, the surveyors-general and the deeds offices.

Administration Boards

The administration boards, in their relationship with community councils and later with municipalities, had to rearrange their procedures, train staff, alter documentation and coordinate all activities to prepare for a totally new approach to housing management. But before this could be done, the boards had to receive clear directives and instructions from higher authority. Within the framework of the civil service it took more than the three months allowed for such directives to materialise. Even then there was little clarity, since the boards had to take some of their own decisions, certain matters had to be negotiated and the local authorities had to assimilate the new policies and procedures. This uncertainty was not conducive to the speedy constitution of the organisation required.

Land Surveys

A problem area directly linked to the organisational unpreparedness of the administration boards was the fact that stands in the African townships were not originally surveyed as required by the surveyors-general of the various provinces. Surveying is costly and time-consuming. In Soweto, where the organisational component seems to have been more prepared than elsewhere, the traditional theodolite surveying procedure was eschewed in favour of more expedient aerial surveys, but only

after strong objections from the surveyors' profession.

An agreement has been concluded between the land surveying profession and the government, whereby the former have agreed to lower their fees for the specific surveying of African townships. These surveys have been given the highest priority in order to remove obstacles from the sales campaign, but are still in progress throughout the country.

Building Societies

The building societies have experienced problems with regard to the housing sale, in that the bulk of the saleable dwellings did not meet their traditional standards of acceptability. It can be said that building societies have gone out of their way to accommodate this problem and reconsider their standards in such cases. A second adjustment, however, has been a matter of financial risk and administrative awkwardness. Building societies prefer applications for bonds to be large enough to justify the trouble of investigating, considering and registering them. In the case of the bulk of the saleable houses, the selling price is relatively low — often less than the level preferred by building societies. As far as security is concerned, the problem is similar. On a small bond the recovery of an outstanding balance, keeping in mind the administrative costs involved, might be considered to be hardly worthwhile.

Initially, only one building society declared itself totally committed to the campaign. It took steps to amend its organisation accordingly and large sums of money were allocated to cover expected sales, particularly with regard to African housing. As it turned out, far more was allocated than applied for. As time went on, other building societies made the changes necessary to meet the requirements of the sales campaign.

Administration boards and building societies were unprepared for the sudden campaign to sell government housing stock

Another obstacle is that stands in the African townships are still being surveyed, a time-consuming process

The bulk of saleable dwellings did not initially meet traditional standards for building societies

HOUSING

The sales campaign was approached as a unique 'event' rather than as the first stage in an ongoing social event

The advantages of home ownership, such as financial security and profit, only apply where substantial mobility exists

Any scheme developed by the authorities without broad participation becomes politicised. Several political groups campaigned against the sale

A promotion campaign will be launched to convince people of the benefits of home ownership within the free market system

Deeds of Sale

As far as the registration of deeds of sale are concerned, it is evident that the increase in applications, linked to special circumstances with regard to legal and administrative requirements, has placed a serious burden on the offices of Registrars of Deeds. These offices, normally understaffed, have found it difficult to adjust at relatively short notice to these new demands.

Event and Process

In any society where mobility is possible, a secondary market normally develops behind any new primary market which is established. In the case of the great housing sale, a huge primary market was created without the potential for a secondary one, particularly in the case of Africans and Indians. One of the advantages of home-ownership advocated by the protagonists of a free market system is financial security and the profit motive, but this only applies where substantial mobility is possible.

Soweto is one among many examples that the availability of sufficient serviced stands, finance and manpower to establish a secondary home industry and market does not exist: there are about 105 000 dwellings in this city but there is a potential for only 7 000 more stands. This potential is hardly utilised. At present only 2 500 erven are in the process of development. A Sowetan buying one of the 65 000 saleable dwellings in this city in terms of the campaign and wishing to sell shortly afterwards at a profit, would be unable to do so as there is no secondary market to utilise.

The extension of African townships and cities, and to a lesser extent Indian and coloured townships, is seriously hampered by legislative and administrative obstacles, such as the Group Areas Act, which have specifically been designed to prohibit the entrenchment of other population groups in the 'white' urban areas of the development cores in South Africa. For instance, despite the enormous demand on the Reef area of Transvaal, it is virtually impossible to acquire more land for the development of African housing near the 'white cities'.

Politicisation

Recent events have again shown the potential for the politicisation of any scheme developed by the authorities without adequate participation in the design thereof by the population groups who are to be affected. It is known that several political organisations have been actively involved in campaigning against participation in the great housing sale. This may be a contributory reason for the poor response to the campaign among coloured people. Such politicisation, if it persists, could become one of the most serious obstacles facing the campaign.

New Action

The realisation that the sales campaign has

failed in terms of its original action programme has forced the authorities to take several steps in an attempt to rectify the situation. Following its original base of private/public sector cooperation, the government has constituted a Joint Committee on Housing Matters, representing various departments and organisations, to coordinate action, discuss problems and seek solutions. The committee meets regularly.

H.O.M.E.

The necessity for the creation of a secondary housing market has led to the formation of HOME, a training organisation for black estate agents, run jointly by public and private enterprise. HOME, an abbreviation for Home Ownership Marketing Enterprises, is based in Johannesburg, but has several branches in other urban areas. Estate agency is relatively new in black areas and agents who enter the market can remain employees of HOME for some time on a salary plus commission basis. They enter an undeveloped market, with a clientele among whom the majority still have to be convinced of the advantages of entering the free market system with regard to housing.

The original period of one year during which the saleable housing could have been purchased has been extended for another year under the same conditions. This concession may have a negative result, however, since it may have served to reduce the urgency factor in potential sales. Rental is still lower than building society repayments, further eroding the economic incentive. It is obvious that the 'deadline' for purchases will have to be extended again, or even eventually abolished. Amended conditions of sale which encourage purchasing should be instituted as soon as possible.

A large scale promotion campaign aimed at changing people's values is soon to be launched on various levels. It is hoped that such a promotion will entice potential buyers to enter the market. However, there may be very deeprooted buyer resistance in some quarters and it is uncertain whether such a promotional campaign will be sufficient to obtain the required results.

Conclusion

Enough time has passed for the myths surrounding the great housing sale to have been replaced by a less ambitious and more pragmatic perception of the complexities involved in its execution. Both the public and private sector bodies involved appear to have realised the nature and extent of the process which has been set in motion. Ultimately, the success of the campaign depends on the response of potential buyers.

The authorities responsible for the implementation of the great housing sale have hopefully begun to recognise it in terms of the social movement which it in fact represents — and settle down to the hard slog of selling hundreds of thousands of houses.

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