

VOLUME THREE NUMBER FOUR

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# INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A

## 'VIOLENT EVOLUTION'

*A Middle Road to Change?*

## CAPE CAULDRON

*The Eastern and Western Fronts*

## SEBE'S CISKEI

*The First Five Years*

## ECONOMIC LINKS

*South and Southern Africa*

## INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

*Relapse and Rebirth*

Socialism for South Africa: Black Attitudes  
 Public Pensions . . . . An Age-Old Issue  
 Catharsis in Coloured Education — Two Perspectives  
 The COSATU Comet: A Sting in the Tail  
 Sport Apartheid — To Boycott or not to Boycott



University of Natal

THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS

Centre for Applied Social Sciences  
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# INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA QUARTERLY REPORT

# VOL.3 NO4

A U T U M N . 1 9 8 6

## POLITICAL MONITOR

Black Workers & The Alternative: Attitudes towards socialism	<i>L Schlemmer</i>	1
South Africa Beyond 1984 : The dynamics of violent evolution	<i>F van Zyl Slabbert</i>	6
A National Civil Disorder: A chronology of the emergency	<i>IPSA Research</i>	10
A Peacemaker in Troubled Times	<i>IPSA Interview with H W van der Merwe</i>	14
The Neighbourhood Coup: A fall from grace in the mountain kingdom	<i>P Laurence</i>	18

## ECONOMIC MONITOR

Black Business: On the cutting edge of change	<i>J Natrass</i>	1
The Southern African Nexus: Dependence or interdependence?	<i>G Maasdorp</i>	5
The Big Business of Reform: Bringing it all closer to home	<i>C Saunders</i>	11
Economic Outlook	<i>M Holden &amp; M McGrath</i>	14

## RURAL & REGIONAL MONITOR

State Old-Age Pensions: A blessing or a burden	<i>V Moller</i>	1
Developing the Ciskei: In search of a strategy		6
States of Independence: Sebe's Ciskei	<i>IPSA Research</i>	7
Industrialising the Ciskei: A costly experiment	<i>A Hirsch</i>	15
Ciskei's Economic Reforms: Correcting the critics	<i>L Louw</i>	18

## URBAN MONITOR

Sport & Society: The real boycott issues	<i>D Booth</i>	1
An Unfinished School Crisis in the Cape of Storms	<i>O van den Berg &amp; B O'Connell</i>	7
Handling an Own Affair: Tricameral 'coloured' education	<i>IPSA Interview with C Ebrahim</i>	11
Beyond the Blackboard: Teacher associations & politics	<i>R Burrows</i>	14
The New Frontier: Rebellion in the Eastern Cape	<i>M Tyala</i>	18

## INDUSTRIAL MONITOR

Forging or Foundering: The industrial council in the metal industry		1
Beyond Minimum Wages: The logic of multi-level bargaining	<i>G Schreiner</i>	2
The Ins & Outs of COSATU: The new state of the union	<i>IPSA Research</i>	5
Of Invention & Intervention: Collective bargaining after Wiehahn	<i>K Jowell</i>	11

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
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# POLITICAL

M O N I T O R

**INDICATOR**  
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Ian Bisset

*The hundredth anniversary of May Day was celebrated internationally on 1 May 1986. In South Africa, does widespread black support for this institution signify solidarity with the international labour movement or does it represent popular identification with a symbol of socialism?*

- 1** *Black Workers & The Alternative: Attitudes towards Socialism*
- 6** *South Africa Beyond 1984: The Dynamics of Violent Evolution*
- 10** *A National Civil Disorder: A Chronology of the Emergency*
- 14** *A Peacemaker in Troubled Times*
- 18** *The Neighbourhood Coup: A Fall from Grace in the Mountain Kingdom*



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# Black Workers & the Alternative

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIALISM

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer



Alongside South Africa's civil disorder of the mid-1980's the tenor of township dissident and nationalist opposition has shifted from a civil rights to a predominantly socialist orientation in rhetoric and action. Are the radical goals and objectives of a black political elite shared by the rank-and-file though? Drawing on several major attitude surveys conducted between 1980/85, Professor Schlemmer discusses the opinions of key interest groups in urban black society - unionised, industrial and migrant workers. In evaluating the extent of any ideological drift from capitalism towards

socialism, he focuses on worker perceptions of free enterprise, private ownership, welfare policies and general employment practices. Schlemmer broadly concludes that an eclectic combination of social democratic beliefs is found among South Africa's urban proletariat, which will not necessarily swing to the radical alternative if capitalism is able to provide improved material benefits.

From the vantage point of the white establishment, the 1976 'Soweto' unrest, despite its violence and tragedy, seems almost innocent compared with black politics in 1986. Ten years ago the rallying spirit, the rhetoric and the slogans all amounted very much to a cry for dignity, rights and opportunity within the system. However trenchant the protests, the black consciousness of the time was not directed at the ground rules of the political economy, apart from the removal of statutory racial discrimination.

There was, and still is a sense among most liberal-democratic observers of the events of 1976/77, that the protest leaders' demands could have been accommodated by substantial, negotiated reform. Those leaders in the main wanted entry into the system as the full equals of whites.

By contrast, the unrest of 1984/86, as well as new developments in South Africa's emergent trade unions, have some very large new implications for the ground rules of the system and for its future. The leaders no longer want to enter the system: many want to demolish it. A socialist agenda has been moved to the centre stage in the current conflict. White capitalism is the new target.

### Popular Marxism

In the 1976/77 period, white liberals and reformers, including many industrial leaders, could afford to react with some smugness and heap blame upon the government. Today these same people are in some distress and confusion. Saying to the government that 'We told you so' holds little consolation when the system itself is at stake.

A commitment to a class struggle has been developing quietly in the ranks of the emergent union movement for more than a decade. In the former Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) - since dissolved into the ranks of COSATU - this consciousness was well to the fore long before the current unrest. Worker organisations, however, must inevitably develop a sense of solidarity in

A workers' rally on May Day in Durban, 1985. The political rhetoric of the new COSATU federation is tempered by its strategic goals as a labour movement.

A socialist agenda has come to occupy centre stage in black opposition since the civil rights protests of 1976/77.

BLACK ATTITUDES

*The new black unions' rhetoric on class conflict is relatively subdued, but worker groups will inevitably develop solidarity in opposition to capital*

*Both the UDF and National Forum movements have recently endorsed the goal of an alternative political economy along socialist lines*

*AZAPO is committed to an explicit socialist programme, including extensive nationalisation, and regards the UDF's position as mere 'welfare capitalism'*

*One of COSATU's founding resolutions calls for increased foreign pressure, including disinvestment, unlike FOSATU's ambivalent stance*

opposition to the owners and managers of capital, and FOSATU's as well as the other union groupings' rhetoric on class conflict was relatively subdued - more so than most union movements in Europe in fact.

Between 1983/84 a much more overt popular marxist ideology emerged through media reports. Thami Mali, chairman of the Transvaal regional stayaway committee, declared openly in a press interview in November 1984: 'I am a revolutionary ... our intention is to make this country ungovernable.' When asked about one man one vote in a unitary South Africa he countered, 'Yes, but that is not enough. It must be a workers' state ..', or in other words, a socialist South Africa.

Since then similar endorsements of an alternative political economy have been frequent. For example, the United Democratic Front (UDF) in an editorial in its journal 'Isizwe' ('The Nation') depicted its struggle as an attempt along the lines of the Freedom Charter, to 'fuse two strands of the South African movement for liberation - the national (for the people to rule their own country) and the workers' struggle for socialism' (Vol 1/No 1 1985: p6).

The Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and the National Forum movement are even more explicit. As early as mid 1984 the AZAPO journal 'Frank Talk' (Vol 1/Nos 2-3, July/August 1984) carried a statement in response to the Nkomati accord which presented its goals as 'The reconquest of the land, the building of an Azanian Nation ..., the leadership of the black working class, a socialist character and content, and anti-imperialism.'

A competition in socialist positioning may be occurring between the UDF and AZAPO, and the latter organisation, or certainly its leaders, has defined its position even more tightly. AZAPO tends to regard the position of the UDF as mere 'welfare capitalism' or social democracy. At the end of last year it committed itself to a programme aimed at instituting:

- the nationalisation of all major industry, finance and commerce
- the abolition of ownership of all productive land, including farms and rent-earning accommodation
- the abolition of rights of inheritance
- state control of all media; and,
- the limiting of personal property to articles of personal consumption, a house, the implements of smallholder agriculture and earned savings (van Staden, *The Star*, 19/12/85).

### The COSATU Stance

The ideological position of the UDF and AZAPO may be somewhat academic at the present time since they are not in a position to implement their ideas. This does not apply to the trade unions, however, which have an ongoing role in economic decision making. Interest obviously focusses on the largest union grouping, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), founded in December 1985.

According to one account of the launching of COSATU (*Finance Week* 2-8/1/86), it was accompanied by '... heady rhetoric - something of a mix of black nationalism, soap-box marxism and sheer anti-apartheid anger ...' directed at 'the capitalist exploiters of the working class.' Patrick Laurence has described COSATU as a synthesis of the activist tradition of the SA Congress of Trade Unions (the trade union wing of the 1950s' Congress Alliance which included the ANC), and the organisational drive at factory floor level of FOSATU unions (*Weekly Mail*, 9/12/85).

The very recent visit of the leaders of COSATU to the ANC in Lusaka has suggested what its fundamental political loyalties may be. In 'Congress News' (January 1986), COSATU's first newsletter, a resolution is published calling for increased pressure from abroad and for disinvestment, a stance which its predecessor FOSATU was somewhat hesitant in adopting (*Business Day*, 3/12/85).

Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, in his speech at the launching of COSATU, argued that the 'political struggle is not only to remove the government ... the wealth of society must be shared among all those that work in this country' (*Congress News* *ibid*). COSATU, however, seems bound to temper these commitments with its own strategic goals. Ramaphosa also reminded delegates that COSATU must contribute to the liberation struggle but not at the expense of building up support in the factories. This has also been the trend in most other unions and seems to reflect views among trade union leaders when they are not on stage (see Allais, HSRC 1985).

These developments raise the question of how the black masses in general and the rank-and-file workers and trade union members perceive capitalism and its alternatives.



## DATA BASE

### QUESTION: 'Think of an African country ruled by Africans to the north. What is best for such a country?'

(Options presented slightly paraphrased below)

	1981 URBAN BLACKS NATAL & TRANSVAAL (N784)	1982 MIGRANT WORKERS NATIONWIDE (N676)	1984 URBAN INDUSTRIAL WORKERS TRANSVAAL & E CAPE (N451)
Businesses owned privately by any race	78%	52%	60%
Businesses owned by black businessmen	(Option not included)	(Option not included)	23%
Businesses owned by black elected government	21%	48%	18%
Factories managed by businessmen, any race	58%	38%	(Not asked in 1984)
Factories managed by businessmen and employees	17%	31%	
Factories managed by black elected government	25%	32%	

### Rank-and-File Attitudes

There are good reasons for anticipating that black people would generally lean towards radical alternatives to capitalism. Leon Louw of the Free Market Foundation is of the opinion that '... virtually all propaganda to which blacks, especially in the labour movement, are exposed is so called "class analysis", ie socialism/communism/marxism. Every black newspaper, magazine, periodical, pamphlet, charter, political figure and so on, with few exceptions, is in the marxist idiom, often unwittingly' (Louw, NAFCOC Submission: p4).

Louw is overstating the case since the powerful medium of SABC television is certainly not marxist, and at least one prominent leader, Chief Buthelezi, President of Inkatha, has sharply criticised the disinvestment strategy of the radical spokesmen. Furthermore, much of the media communication is protest oriented rather than socialist. Louw's point is taken, however.

Furthermore, in recent times, we have seen red communist party flags prominently displayed at the funerals of unrest victims. More generally, however, in a society of such marked income inequality as South Africa, it would be surprising if radical alternatives were not popular. On the other hand, as Xan Smiley of the (British) Economist (1/2/86: p47) points out: 'Working conditions and real wages for urban black labour, especially skilled black labour, have improved sharply in the past decade or so ... In real terms average black income per head outside farming and the homelands rose in the 1970s by 63 percent (the rise for Indians, coloureds and whites was 25 percent, 7 percent and 2 percent)... The wage gap between black and white miners' average pay has narrowed from a ratio of 18:1 in 1972 to 4:1 today. Black workers in the car industry get a minimum of R2.50 per hour ... higher paid black car workers get R6 per hour compared with low-grade white clerical workers' R3.75 per hour...'

The point that Smiley's figures make is that under conditions of unionisation and social responsibility pressure on white employers, black workers employed in the modern sector in South Africa's cities have experienced substantial recent material improvements under capitalism, and therefore might see the system as beneficial.

### Three Surveys, 1981/84

The empirical evidence available to address these questions is mixed. Some data supports the view that quite substantial majorities of black communities in the past have supported the concept of private ownership of production. The

*In a society of such marked income inequality as South Africa, it would be surprising if radical alternatives to capitalism were not popular in the black community*

*Nevertheless, effective pressures on white employers have produced substantial material benefits for black workers in the modern sector*

BLACK ATTITUDES

*Surveys suggest that urban black workers tend to quite strongly favour free enterprise, though migrants are divided in their support for capitalism*

*Seven out of ten urban black respondents in an HSRC survey undertaken in 1985 accepted the principle of private ownership in general*

*In an Indicator SA survey (1984), workers who supported free enterprise were simultaneously critical of the employment performance of private firms*

*Rank-and-file Africans appear to have a rather mixed set of beliefs about capitalism. Little evidence of a consistent ideological paradigm exists*

accompanying table collates survey findings of my own, in which an attempt was made to exclude the coincidence of capitalism and apartheid in South Africa by asking questions in the context of an African country in independent Africa.

The pattern of results in the table suggests that the urban workers tend to favour free entrepreneurship quite strongly. It is the migrant workers, perhaps with their more marginal status, greater insecurity and perhaps feelings of not being able to compete in the urban milieu, who are more evenly divided between private and public ownership.

### The 1985 HSRC Study

These results tend to be supported by a more recent study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (Jacobsz, HSRC 1985). A question was posed as to whether or not 'business undertakings should belong to private individuals or privately-owned companies?'

Some 41 percent of the 1 098 urban black respondents agreed with the question. Among the 42 percent who disagreed, however, the majority (36 %) gave reasons for their answers which indicated that they believed in private ownership anyway. These were answers like 'Businesses should belong to anyone', 'The rich should buy businesses', 'Only individuals' or 'Only private companies'. In general it seemed that seven out of ten respondents accepted private ownership in one form or another.

### Other Recent Findings

These results are perhaps surprising in the light of other findings, and in particular those which bear upon perceptions of private industry. In an earlier Indicator SA Issue Focus on Disinvestment (Schlemmer 1984), it has been pointed out that the same respondents who generally supported private ownership and management were equally critical of the employment performance of private firms in general:

- some 90 percent or more felt that industrialists worked with and supported the government, favoured other races over Africans and got as much work for as little pay as possible
- 70 percent or more felt that African workers were often unfairly dismissed and prevented from making full progress; and
- some 60 percent considered that supervisors were allowed to treat Africans badly.

Project Free Enterprise, which included a very large study by Martin Nasser among 2 829 African workers, found a very negative perception of the way industry is structured (Nasser et al, UNISA 1984). For example, the unskilled African workers in the sample - the largest group - believed, on average, that managers' salaries accounted for as much as half of a firm's running expenses; that over 70 percent of post-tax profits went to management bonuses and increases; and that less than 20 percent of improved sales and productivity went to increases in production workers' wages.

Clearly the understanding of capitalist industry among African employees is one of a system 'rigged' against the interests of workers like themselves. A perusal of the results of other questions asked, as well as other studies conducted in the past suggests that support for the principle of privately-owned industry derives not so much from any approval of its structure. Instead it stems from an appreciation, inter alia, of industry's past performance in generating increased opportunity, wages and benefits as Smiley's interpretation (see above) would suggest (even though the wages are considered to be at too low a level).

A brief review of other relevant findings makes it quite clear that rank-and-file Africans have a rather mixed set of attitudes and beliefs concerning the elements of the contrast between private entrepreneurship and socialism: very little evidence of a consistent ideological paradigm exists, as one would no doubt expect among poorly educated workers.

### Social Democrat Orientation

The same 1985 HSRC study found that while as many as 42 percent of black workers did not believe in a political function for their trade unions, the majority of these respondents expressed this view because they did not believe that a political role could be successful. Present developments may well be changing that perception.

The study also found that majorities of African township residents would not wish to see non-African businessmen in the townships - as many as 79 percent



expressed this attitude in the case of the prospect of incoming Afrikaans businessmen. Attitudes to private ownership of land appeared to be more or less evenly divided. In giving supporting reasons, the major factor against such ownership appeared to be the non-availability of land, so that a majority would seem to be in favour of individual title.

Oddly enough, a slight majority of the rank-and-file African respondents in the HSRC survey would not like to have the rich more heavily taxed to pay for public services. This finding was in sharp contrast to other results which showed consistently 'social democrat' values:

- some 80 percent wanted state pensions
- over 70 percent supported government price control
- roughly 60 percent or more wanted statutory minimum wages, sub-economic state housing and 'the dole'.

In the Indicator study of 1984 (op cit), some 90 percent of African workers indicated that they would prefer a policy of equalisation in housing, education and wages over material incentives for hard work and initiative. Seven out of ten respondents indicated a preference for welfare policies over policies aimed at stimulating growth.

### Some Broad Conclusions

The results quoted above must be seen as tentative, and more in-depth work would be required in order to provide a clear grasp of present day economic values among African people. What the available findings suggest, however, is that at a time when a highly crystallised socialist paradigm is emerging among the extra-parliamentary black political elite, and to some extent among union leaders as well, the rank-and-file have a fairly loose mix of views.

On the one hand, as one would expect among poor people, public welfare policies have a very clear appeal. Similarly, as one might anticipate among less-skilled African workers in a clearly differentiated racial employment structure, considerable antagonisms or at least serious misgivings towards white-controlled private enterprise exists. Serious distortions exist in the way the micro-economics of employing agencies are understood.

On the other hand, there appears to have been an appreciation of the performance of modern capitalist industry in generating sought after wage opportunity and benefits, albeit at levels perceived to be well short of expectations. Certainly no rigid rejection of the concept of private ownership of production has been evident in the results quoted. Furthermore, these findings are supported by a very thorough earlier study undertaken by the German Bergstraesser Institut (Hanf et al 1981).

It would be entirely understandable if the current deep economic recession has altered perceptions of the benefits of capitalism, but it is perhaps too soon for the broad pattern to have changed dramatically.

### State of Flux

It would seem as if the trend among the mass of South Africa's urban proletariat could go either way. The attitudes of the black elites are bound to have increasing influence. Whether private enterprise can regain and surpass past performance in the generation of worker benefits in order to countervail the influence of the dissident political elites remains to be seen. In this process the stance taken by black workers' own organisations, the trade unions, will be decisive.

Loose impressions among labour observers suggest that some middle level trade union leaders are becoming more radicalised under pressure from the dissident township political elites, while others find the unrest disruptive and counter-productive for worker interests. Popular attitudes and stances within the labour movement may be in a state of flux and uncertainty. No time has ever been more crucial for open communication between employers, employer organisations and the emergent labour movement. JWA

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*Most survey results to date show consistent 'social democrat' values, with majority worker support for welfare policies over individual material incentives*

*Although an explicit socialist paradigm is emerging among a black political elite, rank and file workers have a fairly loose mix of economic values*

*It is too soon to tell whether the current recession has yet altered urban black perceptions of the benefits of capitalism*

*Whether private enterprise can generate more material outputs for workers and thus countervail the appeal of socialism remains to be seen*

# SOUTH AFRICA BEYOND 1984

## THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT EVOLUTION

By Dr van Zyl Slabbert, Former Leader of the  
Progressive Federal Party

*On 7 February this year Dr Slabbert voluntarily stepped down as leader of the Official Opposition and as an MP, in a dramatic move that astounded critics and supporters alike. After seven years at the helm of the PFP, Dr Slabbert's gesture of resignation was grounded in his conclusion that 'The circumstances in our country are simply too serious for us to bluff ourselves in the clubby atmosphere of parliament'. In the following analysis, he expands on this theme to show how government policies and actions actually fuel a degenerative spiral of violence and counter-violence, instead of promoting the politics of negotiation.*

POLITICAL CONFLICT

*The overthrow of the state by violent means and the installation of a revolutionary regime in its place remains highly improbable in South Africa*

*Those who rule and the subjects of minority domination who seek to resist have totally unequal access to instruments of coercion and violence*

It is self-delusion to present the conflict in South Africa as if it can be resolved either peacefully or violently, or alternatively, to present it as a choice between evolutionary or revolutionary change only. There is no such arbitrary choice or option. Instead, an inconclusive or unresolved revolution can be more accurately characterised as a process of prolonged violent evolution.

Violent evolution need not inevitably end with a successful revolution, through the overthrow of the state by violent means and the installation of a new regime in its place. All present indicators make this outcome a highly unlikely possibility for South Africa. Simultaneously, this does not mean that there will not be an increase in the use of responsive violence against the state. For in its crudest form, apartheid itself as a policy represents the use of legalised violence by the state against the majority of its peoples.

### Conditions of Violence

What is amazing about South Africa is the relatively low level of violence that has been used against the state up until as recently as 1985. All the structural conditions for violent conflict have been present in South Africa for a very long time. With the implementation of apartheid over the last three decades, these conditions have become even more sharply articulated:

- A racial minority dominates politically and uses its power to systematically exclude the racial majority from successfully

challenging it by constitutional means.

- This state structure is crudely imposed on the economy, in which the factors of production blatantly combine to bolster white privilege and prevent black mobility.
- In particular, there is a unilateral and grossly disproportionate racial allocation of land, where the guiding principle seems to be that the fastest growing population is confined to the smallest residential areas.

Although numerous commentators have remarked on the potential for violence under such conditions, there are not really satisfactory accounts for why it has not actually happened. It is difficult not to indulge in psychological explanations about the personality disposition of the average black African. For example, it took the ANC fifty years of non-violent petitioning and protest against white domination before it cautiously committed itself to the armed struggle. Even then, the vast majority of its supporters did not involve themselves in it.

One explanation that has been offered is the obvious disparity in the availability of instruments of violence between those who dominate and those who wish to resist such domination. But how does one then explain the upsurge in violence and organised resistance against the state over the last 18 months?

### Patterns of Resistance

Surely the military technology and the techniques of coercive control at the disposal of the state are more sophisticated than they have ever been. Yet





D Hartman/AFRPIX

the pattern that is emerging is becoming clearer by the day. The potential for violence inherent in the structural conditions of South Africa is being realised - we are caught up in a process of violent evolution in which the only choice is more or less violence before and if we resolve our conflicts.

But why has this choice emerged so starkly now? Only the precision of hindsight will afford us a reasonably adequate explanation of how, as a result of a particular historical process, the potential for violence has become an unpleasant reality. No doubt the following macro-developments will be part of such an explanation:

- rapid population growth and the rate of urbanisation
- dramatic shifts in the pattern of urban black family life
- the collapse of state community administration in urban areas
- the growth of black trade unionism
- the disintegration of state controlled black education
- the loss of ideological purpose by those who govern
- a declining economy
- increasing international isolation, and so on.

Yet it is how these processes combine and interact with each other that presents the key political actors with certain options. And ultimately, it is how they respond to these options that in turn determines the level and nature of violence in resolving political conflicts.

The party that has controlled the state machinery since 1948 is obviously a key actor in this drama. The manner in which it reacts to the above developments has a decisive outcome on the level of

violence used in resolving political conflicts. Several responses by the government over the last few years have had a decisive impact on the pattern of violence and counterviolence that has emerged.

### The Tricameral Parliament

The tricameral constitution has revealed how government is prepared to accommodate some of those previously excluded from the centre of power. However, the compulsory racial/ethnic group is the only basis for constitutional accommodation of coloureds and Indians, in a manner which poses no threat to white political domination. The underlying racial logic of the tricameral parliament is now also extended to the regional services councils. Yet both institutions are totally rejected by the vast majority of people outside parliament as a basis for negotiating political demands.


The government is not prepared to accommodate Africans on even the same limited basis. Africans are specifically and constitutionally excluded from parliament in a much more definite manner than was the case under the previous constitution. Universal suffrage on a common role - which is what the vast majority of black people insist on - would literally mean the destruction of the tricameral system. Therefore, for many black people, conventional constitutional change has become impossible with the implementation of the tricameral parliament.

Any subsequent attempts by government to engage African leaders in negotiation look like a separate, different, inferior deal

*Heavily armed riot police confront a peaceful student demonstration near the University of Cape Town, August 1985.*

*The manner in which government responds to key social processes has a decisive impact on the level of violence used to resolve political conflicts*





Mark Bernoff

*Suspected arson attacks destroyed several departments at the University of Natal recently. Heightened levels of political violence appear to have now brought the frontline to campuses.*

*Tricameral politics have undermined the prospects of constitutional, non-violent change and precipitated inherent violence into the open*

and are rejected out of hand. Negotiation politics have been given a bad name by the new parliament, and the extra-parliamentary response has been of a protesting, confrontational nature. The UDF symbolises the all or nothing response to tricameral politics. It has mobilised people on the basis that all forms of legal non-violent protest against 'the system' have to be used.

### Further Consequences

The reaction of government has been to make such protest increasingly difficult, if not impossible, in the hope of channelling protest back to its own constitutionally created instruments, ie management committees, community councils, tricameral legislatures, homeland governments. Yet exactly the opposite has happened - resistance has consolidated and the division between violent/non-violent protest has become more tenuous. The distinction between the UDF and the ANC has become more blurred and the politics of liberation have become more institutionalised, with its own culture of resistance eulogising new heroes, events and values.

Another almost unnoticed consequence of tricameral politics is the manner in which executive/military rather than parliamentary government has become more prominent. The relationship between the executive president, parliament and party caucus, is substantially different to that of the previous prime

minister, parliament and party caucus. The location of sovereignty is not constitutionally clear and major policy speeches and important decisions appear to be confined to a small circle surrounding the president. Consequently, security matters have dominated, as the interaction between the president and heads of military and police has increased and shaped the nature of the conflict. Ironically, the tricameral constitution has decreased rather than increased the relevance of parliament.

Overall, the new dispensation has undermined the idea of constitutional, non-violent change and precipitated the violence inherent in our circumstances into the open. As long as it continues, the politics of negotiation will not get off the ground. Getting rid of the tricameral parliament is seen by a broad spectrum of opponents as part of the package of getting rid of apartheid. Until the government is prepared to make that commitment, there is no likelihood of negotiation and every likelihood that violence will continue and increase.

### Troops in the Townships

The decision to deploy the defence force around Sebokeng township in late 1984 was a crucial shift. Whether this was done in a supportive capacity to the police or not, it immediately politicised the role of the defence force much more than before and militarised the nature of the domestic unrest. Given the political consequences of tricameral politics, bringing the troops 'from the border to the townships' was loaded with a symbolism which greatly polarised the internal debate into two competing ideologies: liberation vs oppression or law and order vs revolution.

Firstly, the domestic use of the SADF blurred the conventional distinction between army and police, and the excesses of the one were automatically transferred to the other. The army seeks out the enemy and destroys it: the police apprehend criminals and prevent crime. Words such as 'enemy', 'freedom fighter', 'terrorist', and 'comrade' are currently used in a manner that implies that two armies are now at war inside the country.

Secondly, it is pointless for the government to refer to urban riots in Britain to show how normal our own supposedly are. In South Africa, resistance or opposition to the security forces as the agents of law and order has a totally different dimension. The use of the defence force in the townships has romanticised violent opposition as part of an ongoing 'liberation struggle' against tyranny. The clear distinction between criminality and thuggery, and organised protest and opposition, has become



blurred.

The overall consequence of SADF involvement in the civil unrest is increased polarisation. This development has fundamentally eroded the middle ground of South African politics - those who steadfastly maintain a non-aligned position on violence (whether from or against this state) are increasingly challenged to choose sides. If they do not, moderates are branded as sell-outs by either extremes of the spectrum. The greatest challenge facing those who would bring about some negotiated resolution to the conflict is to create new strategies and forums for doing so. Under the prevailing circumstances it is not going to be easy.

### The Offer to Mandela

The conditional offer of release by the state president to Nelson Mandela at the beginning of the 1985 session of parliament was a straightforward political offer of enormous significance. In effect, the president said, not only to Mandela, but to the ANC, 'If you give up violence (ie the armed struggle), we can talk'. The response of Mandela as well as the ANC was an equally straightforward political one. They in effect responded with, 'If you give up apartheid, we will give up violence'.

The ANC won the propaganda war on the state president's offer hands down. Mandela's personal stature grew enormously because of his refusal to accept conditional freedom after decades of imprisonment. So much so, that his unconditional release became the issue of debate between the government and external sources of pressure, be they bankers or foreign governments. The ANC in exile established quite clearly that the initiative for peace lies with the government, because only it can dismantle apartheid and thus remove the cause of violence. If any clear signal came from both the international community as well as inside South Africa, it was that apartheid must go! Whatever it meant and irrespective of what was to replace it.

Nothing outlines the dynamics of violent evolution in South Africa more clearly than the circumstances surrounding the offer to Mandela. Consider some of the following:

- It established clearly that violence was at the extreme poles of the spectrum for maintaining and changing the status quo, and that the government recognises this.
- It led to an enormous upsurge of visible support internally for the ANC as a liberation movement. This is quite evident from the funerals of unrest victims.
- It immediately affected whatever role other black political organisations could play.

To put it differently, the way in which the relationship between the military/- executive government and the ANC develops will have a direct bearing on the status and effectiveness of any other extra-parliamentary organisation. The ANC is not the only extra-parliamentary organisation of consequence. But its history, leadership and particular commitment to change does mean that the ANC, together with the government of the day, define the boundaries within which our violent evolution takes place. The violent relationship between the government and the ANC will increasingly contaminate all other attempts at finding a solution to our internal situation.

### Taking the Risk

The rational and reasonable choice must be to reduce violence and begin effective negotiation. However, as long as the cycle of violence intensifies, rationality and sanity will be under siege. The polar extremes will ideologise their commitment to violence and build in their own propositions of historical inevitability. Increasingly, those committed to liberal democratic values will be reduced to the role of helpless spectators agonising at the collective madness and senselessness of it all.

The cycle of violence can only be broken if one of the key actors in the drama changes its position. Historically and practically speaking, the government is the only key actor that can do so effectively. The National Party put apartheid on the statute books; only it can take it off. This also means re-establishing freedom of choice and organisation, thus calling the ANC's bluff on their commitment to violence and allowing it to operate legally with their leaders released.

This could present the ANC with totally new challenges which it does not have to confront while being a banned organisation in exile. It would then have to be an internally based political organisation, competing openly for a constituency in the political market against Inkatha, the PAC and any other political movements.

Obviously there are risks involved. There may quite possibly be an increase in strikes, boycotts and other forms of organised protest. But these prospects are all preferable to a further increase in violence levels. If violence continues, then the government still has an enormous armoury at its disposal and would be able to use it with greater justification than it can do now. However, the simple question is - is violence more or less likely with apartheid gone? All the evidence points to the direction that it is well worth the risk to find out. **IPJA**

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*The ANC has established quite clearly that the initiative for peace lies with government, who must remove the cause of violence by dismantling apartheid*

*Nothing outlines the dynamics of violent evolution more clearly than the political circumstances surrounding the release offer made to Mandela*

*The cycle of violence can only be broken if one of the key actors in the drama changes its position and redefines its relationships with the others*



PART II  
November 1985/  
Early March 1986

# A NATIONAL CIVIL DISORDER

## A Chronology of the Emergency

By Indicator SA Researcher Debbie Quin

CIVIL UNREST

	<b>Non-Collaboration Politics</b> <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaway Strikes</i>	<b>General Civil Unrest</b> <i>Sustained Revolt Homeland Flashpoints and Vigilante Clashes</i>	<b>Government Response</b> <i>Emergency Extended, Continued Crackdown and Court Challenges</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Guerrilla Attacks on City, Township and Rural Fronts</i>	
<b>November</b> 1st & 2nd week	<p><b>1 Nov</b> Matric exams at black schools start under armed guard in many areas. In W Cape no African pupils write, E Cape 5 percent, and in Soweto 25 percent. Average attendance at coloured matric exams in W Cape is 56 percent; 5 teachers at Mitchells Plain schools detained after protesting presence of troops. Students at 5 training colleges nationwide tear up exam papers. University of Bophuthatswana reopens after 4 week closure following unrest.</p> <p><b>6 Nov</b> In Cape Town (CT), residents of 6 coloured suburbs begin candlelight vigils in solidarity with unrest victims and detainees. In Victor Verster and Pollsmoor prisons (W Cape) detainees begin hunger strike, joined by prisoners in Oudtshoorn, and workers at 2 factories in Athlone (CT). 23 Organisations picket in CT to protest clamp on press under emergency regulations - 1 arrest.</p> <p>Third Lekoa (Vaal Triangle) town council elections - only 1 candidate for 12 vacancies. Council to selectively prosecute rent boycotters.</p> <p>In E Cape, consumer boycott in Adelaide peters out after negotiations; in Port Alfred, organiser Nkwinti refuses to negotiate while 10 other residents still in jail.</p> <p><b>15 Nov</b> Boycotts called off in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth (PE) after organiser Mkhuseleli Jack and 16 others are released and troops withdraw from townships.</p>	<p>In unrest since Jan 1985 death toll is 761, and property damages total at least R100m. Damage to 126 DET schools between 1 Sep 1984 and 31 Oct 1985 estimated at R8m.</p> <p>Widespread civil disorder continues in Cape Peninsula and inland, particularly Paarl and Worcester, as students boycott schools and end-of-year exams. In CT suburbs fatalities due to police action since August rise to 69, and a soldier is shot dead in Mitchells Plain. 34 Teachers and an entire school (510 pupils) in Lotus River (CT) are detained.</p> <p>Severe disturbances in 10 Karoo towns as well as Upington (N Cape) continued unrest in PE/Uitenhage townships leaves at least 4 dead. In PE townships between 22 March and Nov, 145 reported arson attacks on schools; in Queenstown township, 700 are detained in pre-dawn raid.</p> <p>In Natal, sporadic unrest in Chesterville and Umlazi (Dbn), Hammarsdale, Edendale (PMB) and Mpopomeni (Howick).</p> <p><b>13 Nov</b> In Soweto, student nurses protesting working conditions are baton charged and 840 staff arrested at Baragwanath hospital; 1800 are dismissed after strike and troops called in to help staff hospital. In central JHB, large security patrols after downtown riots.</p>	<p>Total number of detentions this year, including under ISA, now exceeds 500. So far 5857 people detained under emergency regulations and 3561 released; and between 12 668 (Le Grange) to 25 000 (DPSC) arrested. 250 children in detention, and 68 killed since state of emergency declared. In the Transkei 1840 detained since 5 May.</p> <p><b>2 Nov</b> Government bans photographs of unrest in emergency areas, except with police permission. Only accredited journalists to be granted access to unrest areas. A CT city hall meeting of 23 organisations and a UCT conference on UDF are banned. Stringent funeral restrictions imposed in Paarl East.</p> <p>Malmesbury court (Boland) relaxes Boesak's bail conditions after Pollsmoor march. Judge allows that he retain his passport but it is then removed. On 13 Nov charges against him and 5 others for illegally entering township are withdrawn. In Pietermaritzburg (PMB), residents of Imbali township obtain interim interdict preventing 10 Inkatha members from assaulting them.</p> <p><b>8 Nov</b> In Dbn, Justice Milne reprimands Deputy Minister of Law and Order, for blaming unrest on SACP and its alliance with ANC, UDF and National Forum - as it prejudices treason trial in PMB.</p> <p>In Pretoria's townships all white police are withdrawn after negotiations, and in Soweto SPCC meets police commissioner and deputy ministers of Law and Order and Education, to demand removal of the SADF. In CT, PW Botha and tricarmeral education ministers meet heads of UCT, UWC and the Peninsula Technikon to discuss regions' education crisis.</p>	<p><b>1 Nov</b> In central JHB, building housing Institute of Bankers damaged by bomb blast.</p> <p><b>5 Nov</b> Planned visit by clergymen to ANC in Lusaka cancelled after Department of Home Affairs refuses to provide travel documents.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>ISA</b> Internal Security Act  <b>DPSC</b> Detainees Parents Support Committee  <b>SADF/SAP</b> South African Defence Force/Police/SASO South African Students Organisation  <b>UCT/UWC</b> Universities of Cape Town and Western Cape  <b>UDF</b> United Democratic Front</p>	<b>November</b> 1st & 2nd week
<b>November</b> 3rd & 4th week	<p>Students, parents and teachers in W Cape agree to discuss return to school if exams are postponed to March 1986 and all detainees released. 8 principals in W Cape and 50 in Soweto face dismissal, and staff at some schools are unpaid for refusing to administer internal exams. Large police presence at CT schools to enforce exams. WECTU treasurer sacked from school after 2 weeks suspension. 155 Organisations sign document blaming government and the harsh action of SADF for the region's education crisis.</p> <p><b>21 Nov</b> Consumer boycotts launched in Alexandra (JHB) and Pietersburg; Lebokagomo, Feshago and Mankweng (Lebowa); and called off in King Williams Town and East London though few demands met. Queenstown ratepayers call on government to withhold emergency food aid to break boycott there.</p> <p><b>25 Nov</b> Residents of CT's African townships begin rent boycott to protest township conditions and emergency. In the Temba area of Bophuthatswana, police and youths clash over bus boycott. Some residents in Tumahole (Parys), the first township to withhold rentals, are prosecuted.</p> <p>Detainees in Diepkloof prison (Tvl) launch a hunger strike, and more school pupils and teachers join sympathy fasts. DPSC calls a day of fasting and prayer for detainees on hunger strike.</p>	<p><b>17/19 Nov</b> In Queenstown, police disperse township meeting, killing 14 people. In other police shootings, 3 people die in Leslie (Bethal) and 3 in Leandra (E Tvl), where 1 person is killed by shopowner during stayaway to protest forced removals (repeated on 25 Nov).</p> <p><b>20 Nov</b> At Malukazi (Natal S coast), 8 die in faction fighting between Pondos and Zulus, and 5 die in Umbumbulu over 23/24 Nov.</p> <p><b>21 Nov</b> In Mamelodi (Pretoria), stayaway called to protest army presence, high rents and restrictions on unrest funerals. When crowds gather to speak to township mayor, police open fire killing 13 and injuring 79 people. In all Pretoria townships, large scale withdrawal of SADF. Minister of Law and Order Le Grange also announces removal of police from the border, to be replaced by SADF - to free more police for riot control.</p> <p>In Zwelitsha, 54 vigilantes, allegedly led by Ciskei MPs, in court after death of ex-SASO member. In Queenstown, coloured residents form vigilante group with police approval after several houses near African township attacked.</p> <p><b>29 Nov</b> In Bongoletu (Oudtshoorn), 226 are arrested in massive military operation. In CT, police prevent over 2000 youths from staging lunchtime protest.</p>	<p><b>15 Nov</b> Almost 6000 people detained under emergency regulations so far. Numerous new banning orders issued, including UDF publicity secretary Trevor Manuel. In CT and JHB, many protest meetings are banned. Strict restrictions imposed on unrest funerals in Mamelodi - no weekend funerals. In JHB, 3 PFP MPs visit jails to investigate 35 complaints of assaults on detainees. Three medical bodies reject medical panel for detainees because of government control, and only MASA members may sit on it.</p> <p>In Zwelitsha, 3 policeman suspended after shooting of a 13 year-old. In Pretoria, inquest into unrest fatality of 4 year-old child in Atteridgeville finds no-one to blame, and a PE inquest acquits police after shooting of 14 year-old in Zwile.</p> <p><b>21 Nov</b> In Grahamstown, Supreme Court reserves judgement on validity of retrospective amendment of emergency regulations. In Dbn, Judge rules detention under section 29 of ISA is unlawful if detainee is incapable of being interrogated. In Wynberg (CT), charges are withdrawn against 48 who marched to Pollsmoor on 28 Aug. Rand Supreme Court rules dismissal of 940 student nurses at Baragwanath hospital invalid and orders reinstatement. In Pretoria, Supreme Court rules that 2 senior police must submit affidavits on arrest of missing man.</p>	<p><b>16/18 Nov</b> In Guguletu and Bellville South (CT), hand-grenade attacks on two policemen's homes leave one injured. Other grenade attacks damage vehicles at Mannenburg police station and Woodstock bank. Later, in Crossroads 3 soldiers are injured in grenade attack. 21 Grenade attacks in Cape Peninsula since 20 July.</p> <p>In Mochudi (Botswana), 4 exiles die in car bomb blast - 17 people killed so far this year in violence directed against SA refugees.</p> <p><b>19/22 Nov</b> In JHB parcel bomb explodes in hands of MD of Omega Coal.</p> <p><b>26/28 Nov</b> In Soutspansberg (N Tvl) landmine explodes and 5 other mines found - 1 man killed and 8 injured including 4 soldiers. In Tlhabane (Rustenburg) Bophuthatswana security forces kill 4 and injure 2 insurgents in contact. After rocket attack on Sasol oil plants at Secunda, 3 insurgents killed. In Klipfontein (CT) handgrenade explodes near mission, 7th attack in 2 weeks.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>COSATU</b> Congress of South African Trade Unions  <b>MASA</b> Medical Association of South Africa  <b>WECTU</b> Western Cape Teachers Association  <b>PFP</b> Progressive Federal Party</p>	<b>November</b> 3rd & 4th week
<b>December</b> 1st & 2nd week	<p><b>1 Nov</b> In Dbn, 10 000 attend launch of COSATU, uniting 33 trade unions. Consumer boycotts: resumed in Adelaide as no demands met; continue in JHB, Reef and Pretoria areas; abate in De Aar, though 5 month rent boycott continues; in East London boycott meeting ends in mass walkout over refusal to allow Nkosi Sikelela anthem; in Oudtshoorn 2 organisers appear in court over 2 month boycott. Call for 'Black' Xmas - a boycott of white-owned shops and all festivities.</p> <p><b>3 Nov</b> In Mamelodi, mass stayaway for funeral of 12 unrest victims attended by diplomats and Winnie Mandela. In Queenstown, 7 community leaders detained at funeral of 11 unrest victims, COSATU president warns of black tax boycott if government does not meet popular demands.</p> <p>Police in CT continue to take action against candlelight vigils for detainees, spreading to white suburbs. FAFOD announces campaign of fasting to protest detentions. Teachers are finally paid after threatening court action because salaries withheld over exam issue.</p> <p>Kathlehong town council uses SADF to evict people refusing to pay rents.</p>	<p>Unrest breaks out for first time in Knysna where police shootings leave 1 dead; 8 arrested. In KwaZakele (PE) 2 policemen are killed, and another dies in Mamelodi.</p> <p>In W Cape, 140 people detained in Crossroads in joint SADF/SAP 'crime prevention' operation, 136 in Guguletu, 26 in Mfuleni (Kulsriver) and 24 in Khayelitsha, where a soldier is killed by mob.</p> <p><b>12/15 Dec</b> In PE, UDF and AZAPO have second peace meeting in a week after 3 die in intra-opposition clashes. In Soweto, vehicles are damaged after unrest funeral, and SADF shoots dead 1 man during clashes between residents over consumer boycott. In Krugersdorp, 3 bodies found in Kagiso township after tension builds up over boycott. Nearby in Westonaria, a man is shot dead by police during unrest on mine premises, and another in Munzieville.</p> <p>In Chesterville (Dbn) 2 people die in clashes between the 'A Team' vigilantes and the 'comrades' (township youth); another is killed in police action.</p>	<p><b>1/2 Dec</b> In Zwelentemba (Worcester) police forbid attorneys and MPs/MPCs from entering township to help residents claim damages against security forces. In Cathart (E Cape) out-of-court settlement reached with government, who pay costs and undertake that none of its agencies will abuse residents.</p> <p><b>3 Dec</b> Government lifts state of emergency in 8 out of 38 declared magisterial districts; on Dec 10th, freeze on repayment of foreign debt extended for 3 months.</p> <p>In CT, Supreme Court dismisses application for release of detainees, judge rules that evidence need not be heard from both sides. Government ordered to pay costs of temporary interdict restraining police from assaulting union detainee. In Dbn, Justice Milne appointed to head investigation into unrest briefings given earlier to prosecutors and magistrates by security police. In PE two policemen fined R150 for common assault after charges laid by Molly Blackburn and Di Bishop.</p> <p><b>9 Dec</b> Charges of treason against 12 UDF leaders on trial in PMB dropped. In Pretoria, Supreme Court sentences 6 Sharpeville residents to death for murdering deputy mayor in Sep 1984.</p>	<p><b>1/5 Dec</b> US government representatives reputed to have met ANC in Lusaka twice. In Harare South African church leaders, UCT and Stellenbosch students meet with ANC and PAC representatives. In Soweto, grenade attack on SADF vehicle. In Escourt, 7 men convicted of terrorism under ISA - 6 of accused acquitted, and judge refers torture claims while in detention to Minister of Law and Order.</p> <p><b>7/13 Dec</b> In Dbn 8 people injured by limpet mine at Moberi post office and in nearby Chesterville a grenade attack on policeman's house. In Chatsworth magistrate's court is bombed. In Parden Eiland (CT) a handgrenade explodes on business premises. In Lusaka a parcel-bomb injures an ANC member. In Benoni 5 PAC members found guilty of terrorism.</p> <p><b>14/16 Dec</b> In KwaThema (Springs), one person dies, policeman and 2 others injured in AK47 and grenade attacks. In Soweto 3 people are injured in grenade incident. In Messina 6 people die in 7th landmine explosion in area since 27 Nov, ANC claim responsibility.</p>	<b>December</b> 1st & 2nd week
<b>December</b> 3rd & 4th week	<p>Violence in PE/Uitenhage area drops off with withdrawal of troops from townships and lifting of consumer boycott - no recorded unrest deaths for two week period.</p> <p>In Vaal Triangle townships, 2000 residents are issued with summonses as rent boycott begun in Sep 1984 continues.</p> <p><b>17 Nov</b> 21 Leaders of consumer boycotts detained nationwide, including Soweto and Mamelodi organisers, and several businessmen. Boycott in Grahamstown is re-imposed from 23 Dec until 4 Jan, and in Uitenhage, suspended for 2 weeks.</p> <p><b>28/29 Nov</b> Wits meeting of 312 organisations under SPCC decides pupils should return to school on 28 Jan instead of 8th. Other demands to be met by end-March are: reschedule exams to end of March; reinstate all teachers, repair damaged school buildings; remove SADF from townships; allow SRCs; lift state of emergency and unban COSAS. Parents to refuse to pay school fees or provide materials.</p>	<p>Disturbances spread in Karoo towns and in E Cape, unrest deaths in Queenstown, Hanover, Fort Beaufort; and 222 arrested in Molteno. In the N Cape, riots break out in Phillipstown.</p> <p>In CT townships, 4 people burned to death including a community councillor, and police shootings leave 13 year-old dead. In coloured suburbs, police baton charge people having candlelight vigils. In Boland, unrest in Wellington, Robertson, Stellenbosch and Paarl, where 3 UDF members die in clashes with AZANYU supporters, 1 UDF activist killed by police.</p> <p><b>16/21 Dec</b> Violence erupts in Moutse (Lebowa) over incorporation into KwaNdebele; in vigilante attacks, 4 people die and scores arrested in nearby Dennilton.</p> <p><b>23 Dec</b> In Soweto 4 people die after police fire on funeral procession. In clashes with youth over consumer boycott, 4 hostel residents die in Dobsonville, and at Westonaria mine, two white men stabbed to death and 3 black workers killed by police. Unrest spreads to surrounding mining towns.</p> <p><b>24/27 Dec</b> In Natal, faction fighting between 3000 Pondos and 2000 Zulus in the KwaMakuta and Umbumbulu areas leave 58 dead and thousands homeless.</p>	<p><b>18 Dec</b> SADF powers extended, given right to search, seize articles, detain people and disperse crowds in unrest situations. Three foreign TV men banned from entering CT's African townships for 2 months. In PE, 93 more affidavits filed in Supreme Court alleging assault of detainees. CT Supreme Court dismisses with costs application for release of 6 detainees, and Rand Supreme Court for 13 detainees.</p> <p><b>21 Dec</b> Winnie Mandela arrested for defying her banning order by returning to home in Soweto a day after her banning order is relaxed - no longer restricted to Brandfort (OFS).</p> <p><b>30 Dec</b> In CT, 45 detainees released, mainly UDF executives, all with restrictions - many confined to their magisterial districts, prevented from working on publications, participating in political activities or attending educational institutions.</p> <p><b>31 Dec</b> Le Grange extends previous ban on political meetings - places 6 month ban on indoor gatherings by 74 organisations in 30 districts.</p>	<p><b>16/18 Dec</b> In Soweto, 2 grenade attacks on houses, in Umlazi (Dbn) a mine damages Putco bus depot. In London Tory MPs meet with ANC.</p> <p><b>20/23 Dec</b> In Maseru, 6 South Africans and 3 Lesotho nationals killed in alleged SADF assassinations. In Amanzimtoti (Dbn) bomb blast in shopping centre kills 5 people, injures 61, in retaliation for Maseru raid. Grenade attack on holidaymakers' kombi in central Dbn.</p> <p><b>24/31 Dec</b> DRC minister meets ANC in New York and SPCC meets with them in Harare to discuss education crisis. In Soweto a policeman is injured in grenade attack and in Crossroads (CT) 5 people injured when grenade explodes in vigilante/youth clashes.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS:</b>  <b>ANC</b> African National Congress  <b>AZANYU</b> Azanian National Youth Union  <b>AZAPO</b> Azanian People's Organisation  <b>DRC</b> Dutch Reformed Church  <b>FAFOD</b> Friends and Families of Detainees  <b>PAC</b> Pan-Africanist Congress  <b>SPCC</b> Soweto Parents Crisis Committee</p>	<b>December</b> 3rd & 4th week



	<b>Non-Collaboration Politics</b> <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaway Strikes</i>	<b>General Civil Unrest</b> <i>Sustained Revolt Homeland Flashpoints and Vigilante Clashes</i>
<b>January</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd week</i>	<p>During 1985, 230 out of 328 African secondary schools were disrupted by boycotts. PE township residents heed call to stay indoors and boycott beaches over festive period. Consumer boycott called off in most Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) areas.</p> <p>2 Jan In central PE, 20 000 attend funeral of PFP MPC Molly Blackburn, killed in car accident with civil rights activist Brian Bishop on 28 Dec.</p> <p>6 Jan 40 000 Attend education meeting in Zwijde (PE), decide to return to school, and ratify SPPC demands. An education meeting in Lenasia is banned. DET reopens schools on 8 Jan, although pupils can register until 28 Jan. Coloured department of education drops most teacher suspensions. Gencor dismisses 23 000 workers after strike and police open fire on gathering, injuring 27 miners. In other police shootings, 3 people die in Khutsong (Oberholzer) in clashes over school and consumer boycotts.</p> <p>13 Jan Pretoria Council of Churches appoints commission of inquiry into deaths of at least 13 people in Mamelodi massacre of 21 Nov - town council summons more than 24 000 residents who have refused to pay rents since.</p>	<p>1/3 Jan In Dbn on new years day, 2 people die in clashes on Lesmore, blamed on overcrowding. Umbumbulu (S Coast) death toll in faction fighting rises to 63 since Xmas Eve. In Moutse, 2 policemen, 16 tribesmen and 4 youths die in 2 days of clashes after incorporation into KwaNdebele. 30 arrested. In KTC shack area (CT) 3 days of fighting between 'fathers' and 'comrades' leave 4 dead.</p> <p>Widespread unrest in Karoo townships, with fatalities in KwaNdebele (Middelburg), Jansenville, Sandbult (Burgersdorp); in E Cape, 9 in Stutterheim, 4 in Queenstown. Daily reports of violence in Soweto, 2 ANC members shot dead by police and one 'informer' killed at unrest in Alexandra, two die in Zulw/Pondo clashes. Unrest on W Rand spreads to Orkney, Meyerton, Bekkersdal and Munsieville townships.</p> <p>11 Jan Chief Mayisa of Leandra Action Committee (UDF) killed by police hours before he was to meet Chester Crocker. Unrest spreads throughout E Tvl to Kabokweni (White River), Watervalboven, Bethal, Witbank, Nsi and Trust (Kangwane) and Belfast, with attacks on government property. Fresh outbreaks of unrest in OFS after long period of calm.</p>
<b>January</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th week</i>	<p>In CT, 4 coloured schools decide to return on 2 Jan. At Rylands high school soldiers force pupils back to class after walk-out to protest presence of 14 'scab' teachers.</p> <p>Soweto cultural festival organised as COSCO receives widespread support for boycott of JHB centenary celebrations.</p> <p>21 Jan CT consumer boycott called off but demands remain. In E Cape only 17 of 45 community councils operating - white municipalities now administer Oudsthoorn, Kwanobuhle and Lingelihle townships after mass resignations. In Vaal Triangle, Lekoa Town Council loses more than R500 000 per month in unpaid electricity charges alone; Atteridgeville town council cuts off electricity as residents owe more than R1 million in rent and service charges as boycotts continue. In Watervalboven, Belfast, Carolina, Piet Retief and Ermelo (E Tvl) townships, residents begin rent boycotts.</p> <p>27/28 Jan DET announces changes in 1985 exam schedule: pupils to write in February and 1986 academic year to begin in March. Schools reopen with high turnout in W Cape, OFS and KwaZulu, but in E Cape, Soweto and Soshanguve (Pretoria) attendance at high schools is low.</p>	<p>Unrest abates in W Cape and in PE/Uitenhage townships. In the Karoo, 3 die during continued disturbances in townships of Sandbult, Pearston, Mottena and elsewhere. In Soweto, 2 people are killed amid daily crowd confrontations with police. Unrest on W Rand flares up where at least 20 people die, mainly in police action.</p> <p>17/21 Jan In Westonia, 7 die (4 in police shootings) and 73 injured during faction fighting on mine between Podos and Zulus. In nearby Bekkersdal 2 white policemen killed by miners after tension over beerhall boycott and ban on unauthorised meetings. Another 8 killed by police and 86 charged with murder as township is cordoned off. Also on W Rand, in Khutsong, 2 people killed by police after unrest funeral where severe restrictions imposed. Another 2 die in Munsieville where unrest spills over into white suburb of Dan Pienarsville.</p> <p>Upsurge of unrest in E Tvl, where police and community councillors attacked; 41 arrested in Breyton after policeman is shot. At Mayisa's funeral in Leandra, a man accused of killing chief is hacked to death and 8 others are injured in clashes between youths and vigilantes. Unrest spreads in OFS, Kangwane and in KwaNdebele, where police kill two.</p> <p>22/23 Jan In Natal faction fighting continues with heavy death toll of 108 since Xmas; 36-50 people in Umbumbulu, 6 in Port Shepstone and 10 in Shongweni/Hammarsdale area. Sporadic unrest in other Dbn townships and Mpopomeni (Howick).</p>
<b>February</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd week</i>	<p>4 Feb Work stayaway in Soshanguve to protest arrest of 120 at church meeting on 3 Feb.</p> <p>10 Feb Work stayaway in Mohlakeng (W Rand) to enable residents to attend unrest funeral - all media people removed by police.</p> <p>11/13 Feb In Mamelodi, pupils observe school stayaway to protest fatal police shooting of fellow scholar, 50 Detainees, 13 under the age of 18, stage protest fast at Diepkloof prison. In Jouberton (Klerksdorp) students abandon classes in wake of severe unrest which leaves up to 8 dead.</p> <p>In GaRankuwa (Lebowa) class boycott begins for duration of trial of pupils charged with public violence. In Atteridgeville 2 day stayaway called to mark anniversary of first unrest fatality pupil killed on school grounds in police action.</p>	<p>1/2 Feb Widespread township unrest continues in E Tvl, East and West Rand, with at least 6 fatalities; in Randfontein white businesses are attacked. A youth dies in Soweto (PE), with other disturbances in Clermont and Lamontville (Dbn).</p> <p>6 Feb At Randfontein mine, 5 workers die and 14 injured in clashes with police. At Winterveld shack area, scores of people are detained at unrest funeral.</p> <p>8/9 Feb In Umbumbulu, 3 policemen are hacked to death and 6 others die as faction fighting continues. UDF/Inkatha clashes in Kwandengezi (Pinetown) leave 3 dead, and a murder docket is opened after policeman kills youth. In Alexandra youths launch anti-crime campaign after local AZAPO leader is murdered. Violence continues in Pretoria, W Rand and E Tvl townships, where 3 people die in police shootings at unrest funerals.</p> <p>10/13 Feb In Soweto (PE), 8 die in UDF/AZANYU clashes. Wilgespruit Ecu Centre is raided by SADF/SAP who open fire on youths seeking sanctuary after violence in Leslie; 3 injured and over 50 arrested.</p>
<b>February</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th week</i>	<p>17/19 Feb Residents of Lynneville, Ackerville and KwaGuqua (Witbank townships) begin 7 day stayaway to protest arrests of 820 people. In Atteridgeville, pupils and workers observe second stayaway for funeral of unrest victim.</p> <p>In Mabopane (nr GaRankuwa), pupils boycott schools for unrest funeral. Family halt funeral because of police presence, even after interdict restrains them from interfering. In KwaZulu school boycott continues - in KwaMashu 5 000 parents and pupils demand immediate delivery of free stationary and textbooks; in Umlazi pupils at 3 schools demand refund of fees. Government later hands out R5.7m to KwaZulu for stationary.</p> <p>21 Feb In Lawaakamp (George), 400 municipal workers dismissed for stayaway after unrest in which police killed 5 people.</p> <p>24 Feb Krugersdorp's African townships decide to call off consumer boycott from end of month; boycott of community council liquor stores and buses continues, with new campaign to socially isolate 'collaborators'.</p> <p>In Kangwane, boycotts at 5 high schools, to protest high failure rate of std 8 pupils in 1 school; cabinet meeting decides to promote all. In PE a 3-day class boycott starts; pupils attend school but not lessons, to protest detentions and support demands for free text books.</p>	<p>15/18 Feb In Alexandra, police and mourners battle at unrest funeral, township sealed off and press barred. Death toll mounts to 27, including 2 policemen, at least 57 injured and 123 detained. Church leaders meet with deputy ministers of police and defence, and address meeting of 45 000 residents. In Edendale (PMB) violence erupts at unrest funeral.</p> <p>20/23 Feb After Witbank stayaway, 11 patients with gunshot wounds arrested by police. In Lawaakamp, 5 people killed by police during week-long disturbances. Severe unrest in Soshanguve continues.</p> <p>24 Feb In Brits (nr Pretoria), several buildings and vehicles attacked by residents after police open fire on meeting. In Soweto pupils go on rampage, commandeer 51 cars and burn several. Security forces in Odi and Moretele districts (BOP) are accused of atrocities - at least 9 people have died since mid-Nov and many abducted. In Lebowa unrest claims at least 4 lives.</p> <p>26/28 Feb In Atteridgeville an activist's house is petrol-bombed, the 10th in 2 weeks. In CT, schools disrupted in Bonteheuwel, Heideveld and Arcadia over presence of security guards. In KwaNdegezi (Pinetown), 3 die and 3 seriously injured in faction fighting.</p> <p>Several incidents of random shooting attacks on blacks by whites; in St Albans (E Cape), Krugersdorp, near Schweizer-Reneke. In Krugersdorp, 3 white men are arrested after a burnt body is found; and in nearby Kagiso 2 AZANYU leaders are injured by masked white vigilantes.</p>
<b>March</b> <i>Last week of emergency</i>	<p>1/3 Mar In Bella Bella (Warmbaths), township residents stage successful consumer boycott to protest rent hikes and corporal punishment in primary schools, police arrest 70. Consumer boycott in East London resumed.</p> <p>5 Mar Another work stayaway in Alexandra for mass funeral of 17 unrest victims, 40 000 attend. Police search all people entering township - no cameras allowed, 3 foreign newsmen issued with expulsion orders for illegally filming funeral.</p>	<p>1/2 Mar Mamelodi residents defy weekend ban on unrest funerals for 4 victims, police seal township and refuse press entrance. In Nkqabela (Robertson) vigilantes kill advice centre organiser and another person burnt to death. Three people die in Chesterville (Dbn) in intra-opposition violence.</p> <p>3/7 Mar Violent clashes continue in W Rand townships, Atteridgeville and Soweto with 6 fatalities in police shootings. In Border region new wave of unrest - 4 people die in Duncan Village (East London); 2 people shot dead by police in Clermont (Dbn).</p>

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Emergency Extended, Continued Crackdown and Court Challenges</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Guerilla Attacks on City, Township and Rural Fronts</i>	<b>January</b> 1st & 2nd week
<p>Original death toll from police action during 1985 unrest is 763 people, including 16 juveniles. 16 policemen were killed and 330 injured. 6 733 people were detained under emergency regulations, of whom 118 juveniles were subsequently hospitalised. 3 637 people were detained under ISA and 1 900 people arrested for 'political' offences died in police custody. At least 17 court actions relating to assault and torture of detainees were brought and police paid out R845 000 for their unlawful actions.</p> <p>Supreme Court dismisses with costs an application by CTPA and 12 others to allow students to write supplementary exams; 95 schools and 11 other training colleges affected. In CT and Tvl education crisis meetings held, the latter in 8 areas for 4 days.</p> <p>Applicant application to search police station for torture equipment dismissed by Supreme Court. In Dbn, Justice Milne and 5 others decide magistrates who attended security briefing on unrest should not be allowed to preside at political trials.</p>	<p>1 Jan South Africa imposes blockade on Lesotho's borders; no goods allowed through and massive border queues.</p> <p>4/7 Jan In Ellisras (nr Botswana) a landmine kills 2 people and injures 2; in East London and Soweto, police kill 2 suspected insurgents. In Pretoria a transformer is damaged by a limpet mine.</p> <p>9/13 Jan On 74th anniversary of ANC, President Oliver Tambo announces plans to escalate guerilla actions into full-scale 'people's war'. In Wentworth (Dbn), an electricity substation is blown up and a delayed booby-trap kills 1 policeman and injures 5 people. In CT, a parcel-bomb explodes at railway station, injuring postal sorter.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>COSCO</b> Community Support Committee  <b>CTPA</b> Cape Teachers' Professional Association  <b>DET</b> Department of Education and Training</p>	
<p>16 Jan At Fort Hare University (Alice) several student activists refused re-admission prior to Ciskeian take-over; and the University of Transkei excludes all foreign students.</p> <p>18 Jan Pretoria Supreme Court grants temporary interdict to protect residents of Alexandra, including the Action Committee, against vigilantes. Evidence is that police did not respond to chief Mayisa's call for help before he was murdered.</p> <p>19 Jan In New Brighton (PE) 3 policemen in court on charge of murder arising out of unrest are released without bail. In Zweilwitsa charges of murder against 5 men after death of Ciskeian soldier at Victoria Mxenge's funeral are withdrawn. PE court finds police acted in self-defence at inquest of 3 unrest victims.</p> <p>25/27 Jan Education crisis meetings banned in Zwijde and Soweto. In the Cape Peninsula a blanket ban on visual display of any political viewpoints - including placards, banners, stickers and clothing - is lifted before it is implemented. In Kagiso (Krugersdorp) 3 people die and many injured in police action during house-to-house raid over bus boycott.</p> <p>31 Jan Parliament opens - PW Botha in second Rubicon speech announces limited package of reforms for black people.</p>	<p>18 Jan In Westville (Dbn), substation damaged by limpet mine, and in Stockport (nr Botswana) 2 undetonated landmines are found.</p> <p>20 Jan Coup in Lesotho, General Lekhanye topples ruling Chief Leabua Jonathan. In Dbn, electricity pylons are bombed, again with second delayed limpet mine.</p> <p>22/26 Jan UDF leaders meet ANC in Sweden. In Mamelodi, a policeman dies in hand-grenade attack on his house, and in Kallahong a community councillor's home is also damaged by grenade. In Swaziland 28 ANC refugees are deported, and the blockade on Lesotho is lifted after ANC and PAC office-bearers leave. Lekhanye orders all flights leaving the country to pass through SA airports.</p>	<b>January</b> 3rd & 4th week
<p>4 Feb E Cape development boards disclose they are R20m in arrears after rent boycotts and other non-payments.</p> <p>10 Feb In Fort Beaufort, magistrate extends interdicts to restrain 3 community councillors from assaulting children and to order policeman not to hamper high-powered investigations into assaults. Nationwide last year there were 40 complaints made against SADF, and nearly 500 against SAP - another 141 assault charges laid by detainees.</p> <p>7 Feb I.e. Grange estimates riot damage bill at R138m to date. State of emergency is lifted in 7 Cape districts. PFP's Dr Van Zyl Slabbert resigns as Opposition Leader and as MP. In Cradock (E Cape), consumer boycott meetings by 3 organisations banned for 2 days.</p> <p>13/14 Feb Child Welfare in Jhb reports that since the emergency was declared they have treated 100 child detainees. In PE regional court, 4 policemen charged with assault during unrest are given 6 month - 2 year prison sentences.</p>	<p>1/3 Feb In Lamontville (Dbn) a police vehicle is damaged by a handgrenade, and in Guguletu (CT), 4 soldiers are injured by a grenade attack on a buffet patrol.</p> <p>4/7 Feb After PW Botha's speech at opening of parliament, rumours fly about imminent release of Mandela in East/West spy swop. In Engcobo (Transkei), a car-bomb kills 1 person and injures 4.</p> <p>10/11 Feb Limpet mines explode at police station in Umlazi and a sub-station in Durban. A soldier and an insurgent die in clashes near Botswana border.</p> <p>13 Feb Another 42 ANC/South African refugees expelled from Maseru and flown out to ANC HQ in Lusaka, Zambia.</p>	<b>February</b> 1st & 2nd week
<p>15/16 Feb In Atteridgeville, weekend funerals for 2 unrest victims are banned.</p> <p>17/18 Feb Residents of Kagiso and Munsieville appeal to Supreme Court for relief from SADF/SAP abuse - court rules that no allegations in over 100 affidavits may be published. SAP undertakes in court to release 41 of 48 minors arrested at Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre after urgent application for their release. None of the 10 policemen prosecuted after unrest deaths have been found guilty; 17 suspended after torture allegations and activities during unrest.</p> <p>19 Feb The Pretoria Supreme Court acquits 5 people on charges of murdering a Sebokeng (Vaal Triangle) councillor in Sep '84.</p> <p>22/23 Feb In PE, large contingent of security forces enforce 'whites' only beaches after General Motors offer to legally support any of 8000 black employees prosecuted for swimming there. Confrontations witnessed by members of Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group.</p> <p>24 Feb In Steytlerville inquest, verdict of justifiable homicide after 20 year-old killed by police in unrest. Supreme Court grants interdict to Black Sash, restraining vigilantes from preventing them from setting up unrest advice offices in Ashton, Worcester and Robertson.</p>	<p>15/17 Feb In Mamelodi, a casspir is damaged by a landmine. In Lamontville, a policeman's house and Inkatha Womens Brigade's house are damaged in handgrenade attacks. Police kill 2 suspected ANC members in New Brighton (PE) and Soweto, arrest another in Zwijde (PE) - 2 policemen injured in grenade attacks.</p> <p>18/23 Feb In Edenpark (Alberton), a mobile police station is damaged by a grenade; a bomb explodes in Cambridge (East London) police station toilet. On W Rand, an electricity substation is damaged by a limpet mine and in Meyerspark (Pretoria) a bomb explodes in a shopping centre.</p> <p>25 Feb SA and Botswana governments reach informal accord - Botswana undertakes to prevent transit of ANC combatants. In the Rand Supreme Court, a white ANC guerilla, Eric Pelsler (21) is convicted of treason and given a 7 year prison sentence.</p> <p>26 Feb In Dbn, Andrew Zondo is indicted on 5 charges of murder for Amanzimtoti bomb blast on 23 Dec. Police kill a suspected ANC member in Soweto, and in Dinokana Village (Zeerust) a community councillor's house is damaged in grenade attack.</p>	<b>February</b> 3rd & 4th week
<p>7 Mar LAST DAY OF STATE OF EMERGENCY as government lifts restrictions in all affected magisterial districts. Death toll of about 600 people during 7 month emergency period since 21 July 1985, totalling 1 237 fatalities in over 18 months of unrest - police responsible for +441 deaths, +273 township residents killed by other residents (1985). Over emergency period, 7 992 people detained under regulations and 4 152 under other security legislation; 292 remaining emergency detainees released, leaving 241 still in detention.</p>	<p>3/4 Mar In Guguletu, police ambush minibus and kill 7 suspected ANC insurgents - 2 policemen injured. In Assagay (nr Dbn), a substation is bombed. Bomb explodes in toilet of John Vorster Square, police headquarters in JHB. In Atteridgeville, 1 person dies and 2 injured in grenade attack on house.</p> <p>7 Mar Bomb explodes in toilet of Hillbrow police station, Jhb.</p>	<b>March</b> Last week of emergency

**CIVIL UNREST**



# A Peacemaker in T r o u b l e d T i m e s

*Professor H W Van der Merwe, Director of the Centre for Intergroup Studies, University of Cape Town, speaks to Indicator SA Researcher Graham Howe*

POLITICAL CONFLICT

*Against a backdrop of escalating political conflict in South Africa the middle ground for intergroup conciliation and mediation seems to be fast vanishing into an arid no-man's land. H W Van der Merwe converses on the current work of his institute in the vital sphere of conflict accommodation and conflict resolution, and illustrates what practical contribution their current projects can make to reduce alarming violence levels.*

*A key 'behind the scenes' figure in last year's contacts between the ANC-in-exile and business, church and student leaders, Prof Van der Merwe identifies the preconditions which could eventually lead to a breakthrough in the government/ANC stand-off on direct negotiations. He is particularly well placed to discuss this topic - in early 1986 he again met with ANC leaders, while present as the only white South African at an international conference on 'Peace and Security in Southern Africa', held in Tanzania. To allow this peacemaker to attend, the Tanzanian government waived a strictly enforced 25 year-old ban on South African passport holders.*

**H**owe: During 1985, a national training programme in negotiation and mediation skills, initiated by the Centre, came into operation. What are the origins of this new project?

VDM: It grew out of a larger 'Conflict and Peace Studies' (CAPS) programme first developed by the Centre in 1981. The idea of conflict studies comes from the United States, where there are over 200 organisations concerned with conflict on a community level and in macro-political relations - besides universities that offer courses on the subject. In formulating the CAPS programme, we have been very much influenced by the American experience of conflict accommodation.

*Howe: The Centre has brought in several British and American academics working in the field - to what extent are the conditions of conflict in South Africa unique, so that these advisors perhaps draw on incomparable experiences of conflict management?*

VDM: Certainly one has to be careful not to propose solutions for South Africa based on the experiences of other societies. Yet I have found that the basic principles of conflict resolution apply fairly universally, and the methods and techniques of successfully handling conflict seem to apply here. The Centre has been fortunate in having a number of experts from abroad, who have almost religiously refrained from coming with readymade proposals ....

*Howe: From the Centre's earlier monitoring of social crises in the Western Cape - the District Six forced removals, the mass demolition of shack settlements, etc - a fully fledged national programme seems to have developed.*

VDM: Yes. Over the years the Centre's work has perhaps been rather amorphous, or diverse, and we were not able to do justice to any specific conflict issue. So we decided in the early 1980s to give the Centre's work a more definite focus - this became the CAPS programme.

*Howe: UCT originally set up your research institute on the basis of a grant made by the Abe Bailey Trust, specifically to improve relations between racial groups in society. How does the current programme represent a continuation of the Centre's founding aims and objectives?*

VDM: Well initially the Centre focussed largely on relations between the white Afrikaans and English communities, and then more and more on white/black relations in the 1970s. As class becomes the fundamental divider in our society, we have come to broadly interpret and investigate 'intergroup' relations on various levels. Today, the CAPS programme deals not only with the analysis of intergroup conflict - we are also concerned with its active resolution or accommodation ....

One should in no way underplay latent conflict. Very often, people in the 'establishment' tend to preach peace where there is only what one might call an 'apparent peace'. What is necessary is for people concerned with injustices in society to articulate the needs and aspirations of oppressed people. This brings us to the seeming anomaly that those who wish to promote conflict resolution must at the same time provide channels for the expression of protest - which in a way suggests that the peacemaker is disturbing the peace!





Ian Bassett

*Howe: The Centre has always stressed the value of organising problem-solving workshops, which bring together representatives from opposed groups or parties. Have these activities been effective?*

VDM: In an attempt to reduce violence levels and instead promote communication and the democratic process, the Centre has organised several workshops - eg, during the 1976 disturbances we made special efforts to bring together local government officials and black community leaders (not government appointees). In that respect, our focus was already on local conflict accommodation.

*Howe: Since August 1984, there has been renewed and far more severe civil unrest - in what ways can elite bridge-building or communication exercises through such workshops possibly filter down to the rank-and-file?*

VDM: The conflict has picked up a momentum of its own, and even if one brings national leaders together, they are simply not in control of the situation anymore. Although the Centre obviously has limited resources, we are very much aware of the need to involve local and regional leadership as well as the top echelons in our activities. This is why our CAPS programme is especially concerned with the development of negotiation skills, an area that requires nationwide action - one needs to train people in the professional handling of conflict situations.

*Howe: Are we talking about preparing 'mediators' here?*

VDM: Well, I distinguish between mediators and negotiators. A mediator is a neutral person who does not take sides. A negotiator could belong to an interest or partisan group in a conflict situation, who wants to negotiate with the other party, his 'enemy'. The Centre offers courses in negotiation skills to people from these two broad categories: to community organisations or churches, and to interest groups like political organisations.

*Howe: Has the Centre succeeded in attracting extra-parliamentary groups who are prepared to meet with their major protagonists? Does this include opponents locked in fatal intra-left factionalism, a disturbing development since April 1985?*

VDM: Admittedly we have met with some opposition - in a state of polarisation there are many who believe that you cannot achieve anything through communication and dialogue. Furthermore, the whole idea of being 'neutral' in these times is rejected as one is supposed to take sides, and neutrality suggests that you are siding with the 'establishment'. So the Centre inevitably encounters problems of political 'credibility'. Nevertheless, our ongoing workshops do have participants including UDF and Inkatha members for instance.


Our fundamental approach is that the Centre does not see negotiation as replacing other strategies. I see dialogue as complimentary to whatever other tactics political pressure groups might use. This is consistent with international conceptions of CAPS, where the negotiation process is seen as complimentary to military strategies - eg, international arms negotiations are not necessarily opposed to the idea of armament itself, they aim at limitation.

*Howe: A big gulf appears to be opening up between an accountable and authentic black leadership, and more militant township dissidents left leaderless by mass arrests. In this context, what practical impact do you expect your projects to have?*

VDM: Firstly, the scope and competence of the Centre is self-evidently limited. We have no leverage to bring about major change in society but the Centre can promote debate over ideological conflict. There is scope for an exchange of views and over the years I have been encouraged by the fact that the exposure of activists to a friendly workshop atmosphere has brought new insights to them.

Secondly, to return to your earlier point, yes, to bring about changes in attitudes among elites does not





necessarily have any effect on society at large. Yet the mere idea of promoting dialogue suggests that interest groups have more in common than what appears from rhetoric. The fact that their representatives meet, engage in political debate, and that this is publicly known, contributes to some kind of negotiation politics.

*Howe: Presumably an appropriate example here would be Bishop Tutu's role during 1985 as a neutral broker, bringing together UDF/AZAPO leaders to try to stop physical in-fighting among opposition groups. Is this a form of conflict accommodation?*

VDM: I believe that his actions in this regard have made a very important contribution in reducing political violence in South Africa. The mere fact that there are people of high standing who promote contact instills in the rank-and-file an acceptance of communication between conflicting parties. In a similar manner, if people read in a newspaper about the Centre's workshops - where say a National Party MP meets with the Soweto Civic Association head (1984) - when opponents are willing to meet on the same platform, this has a tremendous impact on the 'public mind'.

*Howe: The Centre's use of the phrase 'conflict resolution' has apparently provoked some criticism, especially in left-wing quarters. What are the politics of this debate and why is the term considered to be so provocative?*

VDM: Some critics tend to interpret 'conflict resolution' as an attempt to pacify the oppressed by suggesting that we will actually resolve all conflicts. The Centre does not mean to imply this. Realistically, conflict on a national level will remain in South Africa, which means that we have to live with it through learning how to best accommodate it.

For various reasons, conflict in South Africa can never be resolved as such. Conflict is endemic in all societies and will never simply disappear - our own society contains tremendous inequalities and injustices. Even if we could overcome some of these - racial discrimination for instance - other issues will still divide society as we move towards multiracial government. The eventual achievement of majority

rule is unlikely to eliminate structural economic inequalities.

*Howe: So your CAPS programme is an attempt to de-escalate conflict levels, while acknowledging that there are going to be a range of ongoing conflicts?*

VDM: That is correct. So therefore I distinguish between the constructive as opposed to destructive accommodation of conflict. By the latter, we usually have in mind the structural, physical or psychological use of violence, all of which cause damage of some kind. In other words people are prevented from realising their full potential. Instead, we must learn how to constructively handle conflict so as to cause as little damage as possible.

*Howe: In your writings on the subject, you maintain that conflict 'can serve useful social functions'. With reference to the alarming escalation of conflict levels in contemporary South Africa, how does one define 'normal' or acceptable (compared to dangerous) stages of conflict in society?*

VDM: It is difficult to clearly distinguish between different stages or levels of conflict. I would rather simplify the issue by distinguishing between conflict and violence. While violence is the most destructive manifestation of conflict, I would not necessarily see the escalation of conflict as so bad - what is unfortunate is the increase in violence in South Africa. This includes not only physical violence, but also structural forms of violence committed by the government, through enforcing discriminatory laws, forced removals, etc ....

*Howe: Structural sources of conflict, the unequal distribution of material resources and life-chances, obviously call for macro-constitutional and socio-economic reforms. Instead of intense competition over resources, you favour 'the co-operative process - the win-win principle'.*

VDM: This is a concept that we took from overseas. A 'win-win' solution really means that one tries to resolve a conflict in a way in which nobody loses. It is difficult to apply this principle in the case of scarce and limited resources because if you have too many people competing, some simply cannot get a large enough slice of the cake. Where resources are finite, an equal distribution is impossible. For instance, with regard to resources for education in South Africa, it is not feasible to achieve a 'win-win' solution as

equal expenditure on African schoolchildren must mean that whites would get less.

*Howe: Ideological or value conflict seems to be the area where the Centre is best placed to promote conflict accommodation - in the sense that it has a history of bringing together groups from diverse backgrounds.*

VDM: Yes, the 'win-win' principle is better applied to cases of inter-personal conflict - where it is possible for two parties in conflict to sit down and through rational debate, come to terms with their differences. Values are not finite resources and people can more easily agree not to impose their will on others.

On the other hand, where activists adhere to ideological values with a certain fanaticism - which excludes rational discussion - their preconceptions and commitments can be reinforced rather than broken down when confronted with opposite viewpoints! In short, some types of conflict are more amenable to accommodation, and others cannot be resolved at all ....

*Howe: You have publicly categorised the government's total strategy policy base as a negative response which promotes the mismanagement of conflict. Would you expand on this statement?*

VDM: One could call total strategy an ideology, as it has gradually replaced the apartheid ideology in certain government circles. It is based on a certain perception - which in my view is not based on good grounds - that our country is a victim of a total (communist inspired, universal anti-South African) onslaught. In terms of a responsive total strategy, almost every form of opposition to government is perceived as part of this total onslaught, and therefore becomes 'the enemy'.

I have a major problem with this exclusive approach because it leaves no room for negotiation or for debate. In fact the most efficient way of implementing the total strategy is invariably in a military manner - to counter all opposition through superior power.

*Howe: Could you illustrate how total strategy exacerbates existing conflict levels and hampers negotiation politics?*

VDM: A case in hand is the prospects of talks between the government and ANC in exile. Government spokesmen say they cannot come to terms with the ANC because of two problems - their use of violence and their communist connections. Yet Pretoria was able to come to terms with Frelimo in Mozambique (the 1984 Nkomati Accord) despite their socialist orientation and support for violent struggle against white minority rule! I cannot see the need to ask any political group in South Africa to denounce violence prior to negotiations and under all circumstances ....

*Howe: Your personal attempts to facilitate contact between interest groups inside the country and the ANC represent a good example of ways to de-escalate conflict through communication. What is the background to these moves?*

VDM: Since my first visit to the exiled ANC in 1963, I have tried to convey to both pro-government people and the ANC the fact that there is more goodwill on both sides than either perceives. After more than twenty years of contact, I was specifically invited to Lusaka in 1984, and instead of

the usual scepticism there was executive ANC support for the prospects of talks with cabinet ministers. I cannot go into the more confidential contacts but the meeting I arranged in December 1984 between Dr Piet Muller, Assistant Editor of the 'Beeld' and senior ANC members represented an important compromise meeting.

To repeat an earlier point, the advantage of this and subsequent high profile meetings is that you bring to the public's attention the fact that key parties have more in common than is supposed. Simultaneously, other private contacts behind-the-scenes mean that political representatives are less inhibited and can talk more freely.

*Howe: Do you think that Nelson Mandela's refusal of the government's offer of conditional release and President Botha's rebuttal of contacts have nipped National Party/ANC contact in the bud?*

VDM: I was not discouraged - their reactions do not seem to be the final word at all. But I do think that the State President will have to rethink the terms of his offer. Until both parties are ready for negotiations, I see my role as paving the way for further contacts.

*Howe: The issue of which party is to suspend or renounce violence first seems to be a catch-22 dilemma. Might current reform initiatives lead to a breakthrough?*

VDM: Well, a year ago the government would probably not have responded to the challenge to suspend forms of structural violence. Yet more recently, we have seen the government take the initiative in freezing influx controls, forced removals and some aspects of group areas, while also repealing a number of apartheid laws. These moves surely are evidence of an intention to eventually stop violence in some areas of government policy.


*Howe: What role can international pressures play in bringing the major protagonists in the South African conflict to the negotiating table?*

VDM: A western government, acceptable to both parties, could offer its services as a mediator and bring the two parties together - as was achieved in the case of SWAPO and South West Africa. The point is that the South African government must be able to say 'we have suspended violence out of our own convictions .... not because outside parties have demanded this'. In order to retain their integrity and credibility with their own supporters, the government must appear to take the initiative rather than respond to ANC demands.

*Howe: Lastly, you seem optimistic that the stage is being set for a direct meeting between ANC and government representatives, despite the gathering conflict. What are the likely preconditions?*

VDM: Yes, the era of negotiation politics has undoubtedly arrived despite the upsurge in violence. Both parties have set the same broad conditions for talks - they will not participate unless the other refrains from using violence. The President cannot ask Nelson Mandela to renounce violence, but the ANC leaders might agree to temporarily suspend or conditionally stop it. I have no doubt that the ANC would undertake such an agreement, but they in turn will have their own preconditions - the government too will have to suspend structural and coercive violence. *UPA*





## THE NEIGHBOURHOOD COUP

A fall from grace in the mountain kingdom

By Patrick Laurence, Indicator SA Correspondent

The recent military coup in Lesotho highlighted the fragility of government in a region caught in the throes of contagious political conflict. Freelance journalist Patrick Laurence, who completed an MA thesis on the politics of Lesotho, investigates the web of foreign, regional and domestic intrigue that rapidly entangled Chief Jonathan's former regime.

**The actual sequence of events, especially the border blockade and ANC expulsions, invited speculation that South Africa had engineered the coup**

**Pretoria's economic siege undoubtedly brought latent tensions within Lesotho to the surface, setting the scene for the coup**

The fall of the 20-year regime of Chief Leabua Jonathan in Lesotho on 20 January 1986 benefitted white-ruled South Africa as much as it disrupted the lives of the ousted prime minister and his lieutenants. Within a week of the coup, the new regime of General Metsing Lekhanya, Commander of the Lesotho Para-military Force (LPF) and Chairman of the Military Council, complied with South African demands to deport named members of the outlawed African National Congress from Lesotho.

Fifty-seven exiled members of the ANC were immediately rounded up and flown to Zambia on a Zimbabwean plane. Later, a further 42 ANC exiles were flown out of the mountain kingdom on the orders of the new regime. While the second batch of South African exiles was rounded up as a prelude to their expulsion, 19 North Korean 'technicians' were also deported.

### South African Approval

South Africa did not wait for the second deportation of ANC members to take place before manifestly signalling its approval by lifting the blockade it had imposed on Lesotho on January 1. Border restrictions, as South Africa euphemistically labelled its economic siege of Lesotho, were imposed in protest against the Jonathan regime's connivance with ANC operatives in their guerrilla war against the South African government.

The sequence of events — coup, expulsion and lifting of the blockade — triggered speculation that South Africa had engineered the coup, the more so as General Lekhanya was in Pretoria for talks with South African officials only three days before Jonathan was toppled.

In his first interview after the coup, Jonathan bluntly blamed South Africa for his overthrow, charging that the United States, Britain and West Germany had 'collaborated' with Pretoria. Even before that, on the day that Radio Lesotho announced the military take-over, Jonathan's Information Minister, Desmond Sixishe, whispered in a hurried telephone interview: 'The Boers are behind it'.

But there is no evidence of direct South African involvement in the coup, although South Africa *may have* — it is no stronger than that — given Lekhanya a wink at the talks in Pretoria on 17 January. What is certain, however, is that the blockade, by depriving Lesotho of vital supplies and disrupting the lives of ordinary Basotho, brought underlying tensions within Lesotho to the surface and set the scene for the coup.

Jonathan's friendly relations with the ANC had earlier brought retribution and hardship to Lesotho. In December 1982, South African commandos struck at 'ANC targets' in Maseru, killing 30 South African exiles and 12 Lesotho nationals. In December 1985, another nine people were gunned down in Maseru by men armed with weapons fitted

with silencers. Five of the victims were ANC exiles, another a South African national, and three were Lesotho citizens. Lesotho charged that the assassins were South African commandos acting incognito, a claim that South Africa denied. This denial did not convince the world and the United Nations security council censured South Africa for the raid.

### Rumbles of Discontent

Between these two attacks was a partial South African blockade in the second half of 1983, a forerunner to the January 1986 siege. Supplies of petrol and food from South Africa were reduced to a trickle. Basotho who wanted to consult South African doctors in towns across the border were told to see 'Dr Jonathan', a sarcastic reference to Jonathan's honorary doctorate and a not so subtle way of telling Basotho who to blame for their plight.

The blockade of January 1986 was tighter and the rumbles of discontent correspondingly louder. Bennet Khaketla, an opponent of Jonathan's and now Minister of Justice and Prisons in the new council of ministers, noted in an interview that the Basotho nation had to bear the brunt of the costs of Jonathan's cordial relations with the ANC and South Africa's consequent displeasure.

Jonathan, whose regime lacked popular legitimacy because it had aborted the first post-independence election in January 1970 rather than accept defeat, had earlier embarked on a course which rendered his government vulnerable to popular pressure. When Jonathan started out on his political career he adopted a strongly anti-communist stance, vowing never to allow communist countries to establish embassies in Lesotho. It won him the support of the powerful catholic church, a factor which was probably critical to his narrow victory in the pre-independence 1965 elections.

But in 1983, Jonathan, after visiting five communist countries, invited them and the Soviet Union to establish embassies in Lesotho. This volte-face led to the resignation of his former foreign minister and old ally, Charles Malapo, and to a joint statement by Lesotho's catholic bishops expressing disquiet at Jonathan's change in policy. Shortly before, the catholic weekly newspaper 'Moeletsi oa Basotho' had pointedly re-published Jonathan's earlier pledge not to allow the establishment of communist embassies in Lesotho.

While not on its own strong enough to topple Jonathan, his partial realignment was an under-rated and under-publicised, contributory factor to the people's alienation from him and to his overthrow.

Associated with Jonathan's resolve to establish diplomatic ties with communist countries was his decision to arm the Basotho National Party (BNP) Youth League and to



Steve Hiron Barber - AFP/PIX

allow the North Koreans to train the young zealots. There is no doubt that the emergence of the BNP Youth League as a rival source of power precipitated anxiety and concern in the military establishment, particularly as the youth leaguers were wont to swagger and boast of their devotion to the radicalism, and to question the loyalty of the more conservative LPF.

Discontent generated by three distinguishable though not necessarily separate factors — the blockade, the catholic church and the LPF — coalesced to bring about the fall of Jonathan.

### Course of the Coup

The first sign that something was amiss came on Wednesday January 15th, when a contingent of troops surrounded Jonathan's office in Maseru. Exactly what transpired is still not clear, but Lekhanya is thought to have delivered an ultimatum to Jonathan to disband the Youth League.

The next critical event came on Friday January 17th, when a faction within the LPF, sensing that a right-wing coup was imminent, tried to pre-empt Lekhanya with a coup of their own. Led by Colonel S Sehlabo, about 35 soldiers rebelled. They were said to be pro-Jonathan and pro-BNP Youth League. At least five soldiers were killed, Colonel Sehlabo was captured and by evening it was all over. The stage was set for the final step. On the Monday, Jonathan was toppled by General Lekhanya in a bloodless coup.

Lekhanya, a British-trained soldier, was careful enough to secure the co-operation of the Lesotho monarch, King Moshoeshe, who was reaffirmed as head of state. The first formal, legal step by the new regime was to issue an order, No 1 of 1986, legalising its


*In a symbolic act, the Cuban flag comes down at their Maseru embassy. Chief Jonathan's volte-face in establishing relations with the communist bloc in 1983 alienated some of his supporters.*

*Jonathan's armed youth league, trained by North Koreans, was perceived as a rival source of power by an anxious military establishment*

LESOTHO



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
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
SOUTH AFRICA AUTUMN 1986



*The economic interdependence of all states in Southern Africa - with interlocking transport, employment, technical and trade links - overshadows the complex political cleavages between South Africa, its homelands, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and the frontline states.*

- 1** *Black Business: On the Cutting Edge of Change*
- 5** *The Southern African Nexus: Dependence or Interdependence?*
- 11** *The Big Business of Reform: Bringing it all Closer to Home*
- 14** *Economic Outlook*





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
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# BLACK BUSINESS

## ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF CHANGE

*By Prof Jill Natrass, Head of the Development Studies Unit  
at the University of Natal*

*Select economic and labour reforms introduced over the past five years have been offset by a recession which has affected all strata of society. When the economy picks up again, the growing black business sector can be expected to flourish in an increasingly unfettered and responsive environment. Prof Jill Natrass discusses the implications of the new political leverage of key urban black interest groups – especially the ways in which they might use this to de-escalate the social conflicts inherent in capitalism and inherited racial inequalities.*



*In the volatile township environment, unless black business is very clearly perceived to be a force for social progress, this emerging class of entrepreneurs will inevitably be one of the first targets during incidents of unrest.*

**EMPLOYER LOBBY**



*An adverse economic climate has obscured important institutional changes which will improve black access to the economy in more prosperous times*

*The inherited gap between the living standards of urban Africans (the fortunate 'insiders') and those of the other race groups continues to narrow*

*On the negative side, the gap between these insiders' living standards and African outsiders (both rural and the unemployed) has widened*

*New black interest groups have increased economic and political leverage - black businessmen, unionised labour, bureaucrats, and even black consumers*

Since 1980, the news on the economic front has been poor. Economic growth has been slow or non-existent. Gross domestic product has been static or declining in real terms. Unemployment levels have increased dramatically. Average real wage earnings started to fall in 1985. It is inevitable that poverty levels, too, have risen, given the role that wages play as a major component of total income.

However, there have been changes on the institutional side of the economy which will improve black access to the economy and be to their advantage in more prosperous times. Conditions governing the operation of black business have been significantly improved through the removal of such things as the limitation to one trading site. Also, the provision of funding for African businessmen is growing, through the Small Business Development Corporation and homeland development corporations. In the labour market there have also been a number of important legislative reforms: indeed it is here that the single most significant change has been made - the legal recognition of Africans' right to organise.

## Adverse Economic Conditions

The immediate results of the introduction of these institutional reforms have been somewhat anomalous - due mainly to the adverse economic climate. The reforms have significantly improved the relative economic position of African people inside the system vis-a-vis that of the other race groups. However, at the same time the current recession makes it increasingly difficult for some to stay inside the modern economic sector, and virtually impossible for those trapped outside the system to enter it at all.

Between 1980 and 1985 unemployment rose rapidly, not simply because the workforce grew at a rapid rate, but also because employment levels actually fell in a number of sectors. The number of registered unemployed among the white, coloured and Indian communities more than doubled between October 1984 and September 1985 alone. Equivalent official records of African unemployment show no real increase, but these estimates are undoubtedly far too low. The number of unemployed Africans has probably risen even more rapidly, reaching an estimated 1 to 1,205 million people by September 1985, or 16/20 percent of the African workforce.

On the positive side, the gap between the living standards of Africans inside the modern sector and those of the other race groups has continued to narrow. But it seems that the gap between these insiders' living standards and those of Africans who are unable to find jobs - the outsiders - has widened. Indeed, at present the average income ratio between urban and rural African families continues to grow and is almost as wide as that between Africans and whites. Evidence suggests that the latter is in the process of narrowing.

## New Political Leverage

Political and economic progress are often linked together. Any economic growth process implies changing power relations among the various groups involved in the economy, whose political aspirations inevitably differ. Indeed, in some senses political change may be a prerequisite for continued economic growth.

In South Africa, the groups that have become more powerful in the economy are semi-skilled and skilled labour, unionised labour, black bureaucrats, the small but growing class of black businessmen; and to a lesser extent, black consumers. Their increased economic leverage can be used to back up general demands for political and social change as well as to foster their particular economic interests. This dual role places a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of these groups.

The role to be played by black businessmen is a particularly crucial one. In South Africa the forces of capitalism have been overlaid by race discrimination for decades, and recent trends reflect an increasing gap between 'the have's' and those who are excluded from the system. It is inevitable that a large proportion of black people will reject capitalism as an economic system and search for a seemingly more attractive alternative, thus threatening the very existence of entrepreneurship - whether black or white.

Violence and social unrest have escalated since 1980, particularly in the townships, as has foreign opposition to apartheid. This has recently spilled over into the economic system, through increasing voluntary sanctions and the attempted withdrawal of some short-term loans by foreign banks.

If black business is to survive through these changing times, it will have to face up to the inequalities perceived to be generated by capitalism itself, as well as those



Phil Weirberg: AFRAPIX

**EMPLOYER LOBBY**

that result from racial discrimination. They will have to do this more rapidly and more openly than their white business colleagues.

### Capitalism and Conflict

What is needed in South Africa is the creation of a system of 'concerned capitalism' - a system that is concerned both for its own long-term survival and for the impact that it has on the social environment. While such a change in the face of South African capitalism cannot be achieved by black business alone, it is clearly situated on the cutting edge of social change. Unless black business is very clearly perceived to be a force for social progress, it will inevitably be one of the first targets in social unrest.

At the general level, the overall aim of black business should be the reduction, amelioration and ultimate elimination of those forces of capitalism that inherently generate conflict. The two major, inherent conflict areas are firstly between owners/managers and workers; and secondly between producer and consumer. Experience in other countries suggests that there are a number of methods to channel conflict in a way that reduces the threat it poses to the capitalist system as a whole.

It might be argued that the right to institute large scale reform measures is the preserve of the state. Yet in South Africa, the state, far from having a blueprint for reform, instead appears to yield to the pressures of social unrest and international opinion. As these forces become intolerable, government introduces reform measures on an ad hoc basis. In their own interests the private sector as a whole and black business in particular should add their weight to the cause of change, in an attempt to control both the pace and direction of the process - while this is still possible.

### Employee Participation

The private sector can, by unilateral action, achieve a great deal in ameliorating conflict. For example, the introduction of pension fund rights and health schemes for all black workers - regardless of the size of firm they work for - would increase black incomes substantially. A great deal can also be done to increase job security and to improve working conditions and job satisfaction.

Greater use of profit-sharing schemes would also benefit black workers and could do a great deal to reduce conflict. Not only would such schemes increase worker

*A shop steward addresses a trade union meeting. The emergent black labour movement, representing semi-skilled and skilled workers, is becoming a powerful new force in the economy.*

*The black business sector should aim to reduce, ameliorate and ultimately eliminate those aspects of capitalism that inherently generate conflict*



*Through unilateral action the private sector can ameliorate conflict, by increasing job security, and improving working conditions and job satisfaction*

*Greater use of employee profit-sharing and ownership schemes would help to make the black workforce feel an active part of the enterprise*

*Good public relations allied to a clear business presence in the social sphere helps to reduce conflict, which often spills over into violent unrest*

*The private sector as a whole and black business in particular should develop a strong political voice and generate conditions for their own survival*

incomes in line with changing productivity levels, but they would also help to make the black workforce feel that they are an active part of the enterprise, with a stake in its future growth and profitability.

Employee ownership schemes are another method that can be successfully used to reduce management/worker conflict in a firm. Under these schemes employees agree to the withholding of a small proportion of their wages in return for the purchase, over a period of time, of a share in the business. Alternatively, shares can be earned in lieu of bonus payments. Genuine employee ownership schemes can develop employee interest in the long-term welfare of the business. In turn, management is encouraged to develop an interest in the employee's long-term career prospects because of the buy-out implications of terminating his/her contract.

Employee ownership schemes could be particularly valuable in the South African context since they can generate a black ownership stake in the capitalist system that may not be possible through more conventional means. For black management they have an added advantage - they give a wider range of outsiders an interest in the welfare of the business, which might well prove an effective form of insurance in times of substantial social unrest.

In consumer/producer relations, conflict is also a way of life. The history of Zulu/Indian relationships in Durban has shown that this can spill over into particularly unpleasant social violence. It is not an easy area to reduce conflict but good public relations can certainly help. So can a clear business presence in the social sphere, through the provision of bursaries; the sponsorship of schools, clinics, community centres, water provision schemes; and even support for sporting and social occasions.

## Amelioration and Reform

Injustice can be fought on two fronts - amelioration and reform. Although dramatic improvements in the lifestyles of black people in South Africa can be obtained by measures aimed at ameliorating the present situation, lasting improvements are only likely to be achieved through macro-reform. Economic injustice in South Africa springs from three main sources:

- the uneven development patterns
- the institutional controls over the movement of Africans; and
- racial discrimination in the labour markets.

It is vitally important for black business to contribute towards improving the lot of urban African 'insiders', and thereby to be seen as active participants in the change process. The amelioration of inequalities and disadvantageous conditions through social expenditure can do a great deal to overcome the natural hostility between those outside the system and the business insiders.

However, such actions can do little or nothing to decrease the growing urban/rural income gap, to narrow the black/white average educational gap, or change the distribution of wealth within the community. Change in these areas is harder to achieve and will only result from substantial social, economic and political reform. Reform directed not merely at the alleviation of present hardships, but also at altering selective racial access to economic power, which spring from the private accumulation of wealth, the control of corporate power, power in the labour market and power through the political process.

## The Caring Face

The private sector should develop a strong political voice in an attempt to generate conditions that will ensure its own survival. In the past both black and white members of the South African private sector have been notably silent on most political issues. This is presumably because, by and large, the outcomes from the political system have been functional to the growth and profitability of the sector itself. It seems, however, that this is no longer the case and continuing racial economic injustice could now lead to the extinction of private enterprise if it should act as tinder in the fires of revolution.

Black business leaders in particular must take a very clear stand on reform issues. Black people make up by far the majority of the deprived groups who question the desirability of the capitalist system. If they link private enterprise with apartheid, as is increasingly the case, they may well question with increasing violence. Black business is very much in a frontier situation, which puts both the enterprise and its employees at high risk. It is essential for survival that black business shows the caring face of capitalism to the community it serves and not the ugly exploitative one.

# THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEXUS

## *Dependence or Interdependence?*

By Prof Gavin Maasdorp, Director of the  
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal (Durban)

South Africa occupies a dominant position in Southern Africa as the major supplier of goods, services and expertise to a network of frontline and surrounding states. Faced with the threat of world sanctions, Pretoria has warned that any such economic pressures will also invariably affect neighbouring economies. Should South Africa decide to retaliate, a counter-sanctions package could, however, further depress its own industries, besides jeopardising the important formal economic links that the Republic has forged with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in particular. Professor Gavin Maasdorp, an authority on the region's political economy, examines the maze of economic treaties and arrangements that intricately connect the states of the region. He argues that a South African counter-sanctions initiative would cause irreparable harm to this set of interdependent relationships - South Africa should be aware that it is as dependent on other African states for political links and the efficient operation of its own economy, as its neighbours are similarly reliant on the Republic's massive economic infrastructure.

**S**outhern Africa is a region of clear political cleavage between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbours. Pretoria has exchanged ambassadors only with Malawi and remains politically isolated because of its racial policies. Yet South Africa is the economic giant of the region and its economic links with the sub-continent have persisted, if not strengthened, both formally and informally.

Neighbouring countries have attempted to detach themselves from these perceived links of dependence by setting up alternative economic organisations and concluding agreements which exclude South Africa. Pretoria enjoys similarly exclusive relationships with its four 'national states' - Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei - but the rest of Southern Africa does not recognise their independence and they remain politically isolated also.

Aside from agreements that exist between South Africa and her homelands, three types of arrangements to facilitate economic co-operation may be identified in Southern Africa (see data base), namely:

- organisations in which South Africa and neighbouring countries are formal members
- sectoral working agreements between South Africa and neighbouring countries
- organisations from which South Africa is excluded.

### Formal Integration: SACU

The most important organisation in which South Africa participates with surrounding states is probably the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

(see data base). Almost a century old, SACU is an exception to the rule that arrangements for the economic integration of polities have seldom proved durable.

Given the problems experienced with customs unions elsewhere (Robson 1980; Hughes 1982), especially those involving countries at different levels of economic development, how can SACU's success be explained? Firstly, SACU accounts for a large proportion of government revenue in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) and the revenue-sharing agreement is attractive to them. Secondly, South Africa is the cheapest source of basic consumer goods for their low-income populations.

However, the customs union also disadvantages the BLS states. They have found it difficult to industrialise because of their limited domestic markets, potential competition from more efficient South African industries, and their sheer inability to match the incentives available to investors under their richer neighbour's industrial decentralisation policy (Selwyn 1975). Fortunately, their small economic size limits the potential for competition, so that they probably have less to lose from preferential-trade relationships with South Africa than would countries with larger economies.

Despite the success of SACU, negotiations have been under way for five years at the behest of the BLS states to amend the revenue-sharing formula. They have proposed that the BLS rate of revenue be increased from the bottom end of the 17/23 percent range to 19/25 percent.

Perhaps a more important issue is the

*In efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa, neighbouring states have established alternative economic organisations that exclude the Republic*

*The century-old SACU is an exception to the rule that arrangements for the economic integration of polities have seldom proved durable*



*SACU, the customs union with South Africa, benefits Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) as it provides a large proportion of their governments' revenues*

*Industrial decentralisation in the homelands has counteracted integrated economic development in the larger Southern African region*

*SADCC will admit South Africa once it abandons its domestic race policies, and accept Namibian membership when it becomes independent*

*Despite SADCC members' intentions to reduce links with South Africa, their trade, employment and transport ties have strengthened with the south*

time-lag in payments from the common revenue-pool operated by the South African Reserve Bank. Payments to the BLS states are spread over three years and they are therefore always owed money by the pool (Hudson 1981: p144/145). Despite the fact that the BLS proposals for a new method of determining the first payment were accepted by the SACU Commission, they were rejected by Pretoria, which argued that the existing formula was already more than generous.

### Instrument for Development?

The South African government believes that too little emphasis has been placed on the use of the agreement as an instrument for promoting economic development. However, its provisions are not broad enough to adequately promote such aims as the diversification of the BLS economies. In particular there is no mechanism for distributing new manufacturing plants among the four countries.

The emphasis in economic integration schemes today is on the planned distribution of manufacturing industry among member countries. In practice however, it is not easy to reach agreement on such allocation. Moreover, other initiatives are required, for example, to strengthen intra-union transport links, and to provide investment incentives and funds.

Pretoria's industrial decentralisation incentives and the creation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa have tended to further internal political restructuring while channeling funds to the homelands. Since the BLS states do not recognise these new 'states', it is unlikely that the SACU agreement can be amended in such a way as to promote an integrated industrialisation programme in the region. However, monetary integration - the Rand Monetary Area - at least assures capital mobility among three of the four SACU members (Botswana is not a member).

Despite their failure to renegotiate the agreement, it would be best for BLS as members of SACU to persist with their attempts. The BLS states take 5 percent of South Africa's exports and are therefore useful markets. South Africa's interests appear to be more political than economic, as it would still be the major supplier of goods were the BLS states to leave the customs union. Yet Pretoria wants to be on good terms with the rest of Africa in general and its neighbours in particular, and the SACU is a visible sign of co-operation. In short, BLS withdrawal from the SACU to form a new economic integration arrangement with other Southern African countries would not be in either party's interests (Maasdorp 1984a).

### Excluding South Africa: SADCC

Two alternative groupings to the SACU exist for African countries (see data base): the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA).

One of SADCC's aims is to reduce dependence on South Africa, but official SADCC communiqués repeatedly state that the Republic would be welcomed as a member if it were to change its domestic (race) policies. SADCC's main objective stems from an opposition to apartheid rather than from any real or imagined problems of economic dependence per se.

SADCC's economic links with the south have in fact increased since its formation, illustrating that South Africa's non-membership need not necessarily be an obstacle to economic and technical co-operation across the regional divide. The integration of South Africa would be beneficial to the other countries only if SADCC remains a loose arrangement: formal economic integration with South Africa would be unattractive for SADCC countries. For instance, SADCC is currently attempting to promote trade among its members along informal lines, though there is talk of formalising preferential-trade agreements. Should SADCC lower tariff barriers, it is difficult to see how South Africa could be welcomed into the organisation as her exports would be likely to overwhelm markets.

The only way for SADCC to admit South Africa under preferential trade conditions would be to wring concessions out of Pretoria. A good example is the preferential trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe which heavily favours the latter's products. The problem, however, is that certain industries in South Africa are already strongly opposed to terms of the agreement. Further opposition to an extension, on concessionary terms, of such an agreement to the entire SADCC area, would emanate from a wide spectrum of the manufacturing sector. In such circumstances, Pretoria would hardly be able to negotiate SADCC membership.

### Continued Co-operation: SADCC's Links

Despite SADCC members' strong anti-South African stance, many have close links with the Republic in the fields of transport, trade and employment.

#### Transport

The dependence of countries north of the Limpopo on South Africa's port and rail network is artificial as these are not the

natural or traditional outlets for their foreign trade (Maasdorp 1984a, 1984b). South Africa's railway system has traditionally carried most of the imports of the BLS states and the export traffic of Botswana and Lesotho. Over the last ten years, it has also been handling an increasing proportion of the foreign trade of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire and Malawi. However, this is because guerilla warfare has effectively closed the railway from Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito and also undercut the Mozambique transport system.

The relatively new dependence of the latter countries on the South African transport system could be eliminated if the rail and port systems of the maritime SADCC states were to function efficiently, their infrastructure improved, and security problems overcome. At this stage there appears to be little hope of natural flows through Angola and Mozambique occurring for the next few years. In the meantime Zambian and some Malawian traffic might be diverted to Dar-es-Salaam, provided that operations on the Tanzania-Zambia (Tazara) line improve.

Those observers who have described the Nkomati Accord as a blow to SADCC can be challenged (Maasdorp 1984). The maritime countries hold the key to reducing SADCC's perceived dependence on South Africa. In this respect the port and rail systems of Mozambique are of critical importance. If the Accord leads to stability in Mozambique, and if this is accompanied by increased efficiency in the transport sector, normal SADCC trade routes could be resumed.


### Trade

Trade relations are another major field of dependence on South Africa as perceived by SADCC countries. The fact is that SADCC countries have to engage in international trade anyway. In fact the key economic issue should be: which goods can be obtained from which country at the lowest total delivery cost?

Direct exports to Africa account for about 10 percent of the South Africa's total exports (Maasdorp 1984a: p60). The greater part of this amount is accounted for by trade with SADCC countries. South Africa is the major trading partner of the BLS states and Zimbabwe, the main supplier to Mozambique and Malawi, and the second largest supplier to Zambia. Intra-SADCC trade may be increased, but it is unlikely that some of the countries, especially BLS, would be able to obtain a wider range of basic consumer goods, delivered quicker or more cheaply, than from South Africa.

### Employment

For decades South Africa has attracted migrant labour from neighbouring



countries, principally to work its mines. In 1984 more than 280 000 workers from Mozambique, Malawi and the BLS states were employed in South Africa. The number of SADCC migrant workers has declined largely because of the Chamber of Mines' policy of increasing the proportion of labour recruited internally to 60 percent.

The Southern African Labour Commission (SALC) aims to standardise and coordinate migrant labour policies and practices, to eventually eliminate the flow of labour to South Africa (see data base). But the talk of voluntary withdrawal is mainly rhetorical because of the importance of employment opportunities in South Africa, to absorb labour and to earn foreign-exchange. For example, Mozambique, currently chairing SALC, has recently begun negotiations with Pretoria for the signing of a new labour agreement and has indicated it wishes to at least double the number of its nationals employed on the mines. There is in fact no unified approach on the part of the SALC, and most bilateral agreements suit South Africa.

More than twice the number of Lesotho nationals are employed in South Africa than in their local wage sector, and migrants' earnings account for more than 40 percent of GNP. Faced with rapid population growth, the best arrangement for all the BLS states might well be to form a common market with South Africa, to enable free movement of labour (Maasdorp 1984a).

*The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) offices in Maseru, Lesotho. The agency recruits foreign black workers for South Africa's mines, a critical source of employment in the sub-continent.*

*The dependence of frontline states on South Africa's transport network would decline if port and rail systems in Angola and Mozambique were improved and made secure*



As South Africa's neighbours provide valuable outlets for its exports, the Republic also depends on the efficient operation of their transport systems

Pretoria applies the provisions of the customs agreement to its four independent homelands even though the BLS states do not recognise their political status

If sanctions were imposed against South Africa, it has threatened to take retaliatory measures against its neighbours to protect its own economic interests

The eight members of the Southern African Labour Commission hope to reduce and eventually eliminate the flow of all migrant labour to the Republic

## Interdependence and Sanctions

There is a tendency to emphasise SADCC's dependence on South Africa at the expense of the interdependence of all countries in the sub-continent, including South Africa. Most economic relationships involve interdependence. While there is on balance an asymmetry in favour of South Africa, it is also sensitive and perhaps in some cases vulnerable to changing circumstances in the rest of the region (Maasdorp 1984a). South Africa depends on rail and road access through neighbouring countries for its exports; export markets in those countries are important and so is migrant labour for the mines.

South Africa has recently threatened that, should its economy decline as a result of the imposition of sanctions, it might be compelled to retaliate by taking certain steps against its neighbours, particularly in the fields of employment and transport. Little regard has been paid by the proponents of sanctions to the impact they would have on the rest of Southern Africa. Certain neighbouring countries have remained publicly mute on the issue, with the exception of Swaziland and Mozambique, who voice concern about the spill-over effect of such actions. Only Zimbabwe has called for tough sanctions measures.

The extent to which the adverse impact of anti-South African sanctions would spill over to the rest of the sub-continent depends on the severity of the measures themselves. The impact of a general economic decline would be manifested in South Africa's declining effectiveness as a supplier of goods and services (including transport) to the region. For neighbouring states, obtaining alternative sources of supply would not only be costly but also (in the case of transport services), downright impossible. Further, if sanctions were to prove effective, South Africa might have little option but to put its own interests first, eg by repatriating foreign workers should domestic unemployment increase.

## Costs of Retaliation

However, these spill-over effects must be distinguished from retaliatory steps taken by Pretoria out of sheer pique. It would seem that the cost of deliberately retaliating against its neighbours would outweigh the gains for South Africa. The following examples are good illustrations:

- the Chamber of Mines would, in the short-term, probably find it both difficult and costly to replace experienced foreign miners
- trade embargoes, which would result in the loss of 10 percent of South Africa's exports, would be opposed by organised commerce and industry

## Data Base

## BUILDING OR BREAKING BARRIERS

*Economic Treaties in Southern Africa*

ORGANISATION OR AGREEMENT <i>Date established/concluded</i>	MEMBERS/PARTIES & EXCLUSIONS	FUNCTIONS & FEATURES
Southern African Customs Union agreement (SACU). Formally signed in 1969 replacing the agreement signed in 1910 between South Africa and the British High Commission Territories (now Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS)).	South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (by virtue of it being under the jurisdiction of Pretoria). The four independent homelands are not members due to opposition from the BLS states but South Africa applies the provisions of the agreement to them.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administered by South Africa, which collects customs and excise duties and import surcharges on behalf of the SACU and then pays the BLS nations a share based on an agreed formula.</li> <li>• These payments account for a large proportion of government revenue in the BLS countries.</li> <li>• Negotiations between the BLS countries and South Africa aim to amend the revenue-sharing formula. The BLS countries demanded: (1) increased levels of revenue and (2) a restructuring of the payment schedules.</li> <li>• South Africa believes that the revenue-sharing-dispute obscures other provisions in the agreement to promote economic development.</li> </ul>
Energy agreements (various)	South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South Africa draws 8 percent of its power needs from Cahora Bassa hydro-electric power station in Mozambique.</li> <li>• The ESCOM power-grid supplies electricity to BLS, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.</li> </ul>
Labour agreements (various)	South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main SA-Mozambique agreement signed in 1964 and amended in 1970. In the post-Nkomati era it is being renegotiated; by June 1985, about 68 500 Mozambicans were employed in SA.</li> <li>• Main agreement with Malawi signed in 1967; in June 1985, there were 30 000 Malawi citizens employed in SA.</li> <li>• The BLS countries all signed agreements with SA in the early 1970s. Botswana has 28 000 citizens employed in SA, Lesotho 140 000, and Swaziland 22 000 respectively.</li> <li>• Zimbabwe has 7 500 nationals employed in SA on an informal basis.</li> </ul>
Transport agreements (various)	South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The South African Transport Services has working agreements with railway and airways administrations throughout Southern Africa.</li> <li>• Road transportation agreements are currently being negotiated with the BLS countries.</li> </ul>
Trade agreements (various)	South Africa with Zimbabwe and Swaziland.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SA signed a preferential trade agreement with the then Rhodesia in 1964, renewed with Zimbabwe in 1982 and 1985.</li> <li>• A trade agreement and an exchange of trade representatives was concluded between SA and Swaziland in 1984.</li> </ul>
Water agreements (various)	South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint technical committee with Botswana, Mozambique, SA and Zimbabwe exists to consider the use of the waters of the Limpopo river.</li> <li>• SA is negotiating with Lesotho over the joint use of water from the Kingdom's highlands.</li> </ul>
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Formed 1979.	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADCC will admit Namibia once it gains independence, and South Africa once it abandons its domestic race policies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To co-ordinate economic development and co-operation among member countries.</li> <li>• To reduce the dependence of the grouping on the rest of the world, particularly South Africa.</li> <li>• Despite member country opposition to South Africa, links with the Republic have increased since its formation.</li> </ul>
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). Formed 1983.	Burundi, the Camoros Islands, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Ruanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (potential membership 20 countries).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seeks to loosen traditional trade ties with rich industrial countries and to promote local business through economic integration in the region.</li> <li>• It intends to evolve into an organisation that would eventually establish a common market for the entire African continent.</li> </ul>
Southern African Labour Commission (SALC). (Not Affiliated to the SADCC.)	Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to standardise and co-ordinate policies and practices concerning the supply of labour to South Africa — to reduce and eventually eliminate the flow.</li> <li>• In practice, the SALC nations don't have a united approach in their dealings with SA. Most still have bilateral labour agreements with the Republic.</li> </ul>
<b>SOURCES</b> Jaffe G. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. in <i>South African Review One</i> (ed) South African Research Service, Johannesburg, Raven Press 1983 Maasdorp G. <i>Economic and Political Aspects of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa</i> . paper presented at the Economic Society of South Africa conference, University of Natal 1985 South African Institute of Race Relations. <i>Annual Surveys 1980 to 1984</i>		





The Victoria Falls rail bridge connecting Zimbabwe and Zambia. Most of the frontline states' export goods carried over this bridge are eventually destined for export through South African ports.

South African counter-sanctions against its neighbours would threaten important economic and political ties and thus increase the Republic's isolation

- a transport embargo would mean a not insignificant loss for South African Transport Services of 2.76 percent of its total revenue for 1982/83 (Maasdorp 1984b: p248)
- a trade embargo against the BLS states would contravene the SACU agreement, South Africa's most important formal agreement with independent African countries
- the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique would almost certainly collapse
- South Africa's isolation on the continent of Africa would be complete and world opprobrium would grow.

Further attempts to isolate South Africa for political reasons might leave neighbouring countries with some projects which are economically unviable and a financial burden. In the long run, given the inevitability of political change in South Africa, SADCC projects such as international airports and other facilities undertaken with the express intention of bypassing South Africa, are likely to become white elephants.

An appreciation of the interdependence which exists in Southern Africa is reflected in official attitudes regarding SADCC-South African relationships, which have thus far been pragmatic. Pretoria has closer working relationships with most SADCC countries than is generally recognised. Since SADCC's formation in 1980, these relationships have been extended through security (1982) and trade (1984) agreements reached with Swaziland and, most notably, the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984.

### Strengthening Relationships

Some measure of economic co-operation in Southern Africa is a necessity of life despite political differences. Future

relationships depend on the adoption of non-racial policies endorsed by black leadership within South Africa. However, even with a black government installed in Pretoria, the question of South African economic dominance might be a sensitive one to neighbouring countries.

Current economic and political relationships would be enhanced if Pretoria were to show itself to be genuinely concerned with the economic advancement of neighbouring countries rather than extending its hegemony over them. Continued co-operation in the fields of transport, tourism, power, water and other technical fields, and increased two-way trade, would be preferable to grand ideas of closer economic and political integration.

Within the existing area of economic integration (SACU), relationships would be strengthened by the adoption of a policy of industrial allocation among the member countries. However, in the case of Lesotho the optimal long-term arrangement would seem to be a higher form of economic integration such as a common market. The different kinds of relationships that will evolve ultimately depend on South Africa's white and black potential leaders, who now hold the key to the future of economic co-operation and development in Southern Africa. 1984

\* An abridged version of a paper delivered at the Economic Society of South Africa conference, September 1985. The full version will appear in the June 1986 edition of the 'South African Journal of Economics'.

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# THE BIG BUSINESS OF REFORM

BRINGING IT ALL CLOSER TO HOME

By Dr Christopher J Saunders, Chairman,  
The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd

*Indicator SA presents another perspective in an ongoing series by leading decisionmakers on the relationship between the business world and political reform. Although a diverse conglomeration of political persuasions is found within the employer lobby, Dr Christopher Saunders reflects on the emerging consensus among businessmen, the product of urgent pressures for substantial change. He locates the additional concerns of business in the major black community and industrial issues of the day, and warns that democratic solutions should be sought in the local and regional spheres as well as at the national political level.*

**R**eform is the correction of abuses, while revolution is a transfer of power. Given the enormous pressures on the South African economy and government, both from within the country and abroad, any undue timelag before instituting the reform process is dangerous. It already threatens irreparable damage to the road of reform, and could lead to the road of revolution instead.

There is an urgent need, therefore, for certain key steps to be taken by the South African government in order to restore faith in the reform process and to help rebuild the economic confidence. The commencement of visible negotiations between the government and significant black leaders will be one such step. The private sector must strongly support those parties attempting to initiate processes of negotiation, consensus and reform. It is already apparent that these steps can be advanced quickest and with less acrimony if they are produced by regional consensus rather than imposition by central government.

## Consensus on Reform

Organised commerce and industry has become involved in the democratisation process, and can in small but important ways assist it. For a start, more than any other operation, business deals with the future - it is a continual calculation, an instinctive exercise in foresight.

The degree of prominence and the deliberate raising of the political profile of organised business are new developments. Traditionally, these organisations have operated behind the

scenes to promote the specific concerns and interests of business in the councils of government. It has only recently been possible to achieve any real consensus among businessmen on the major political issues of the day. Nevertheless, organised business remains essentially a slow moving train of diverse interests representing a wide spectrum of private political persuasions.

Politics impacts upon business all the time and big business can hardly help being involved in politics. The conduct of economic policy is political - whether one is talking about expenditure budgets or taxes, tariffs or subsidies, or even the manipulation of interest and exchange rates. But apart from such relatively 'business-specific' political concerns, business today finds itself right in the middle of the crucible of political development, namely industrial and community relations. Some of the critical areas concern:

- A long history of social segregation of the races in South Africa has meant that the different race groups now have few interests in common. Yet there is no room for ethnic separation in the economic sphere, where overlapping and shared interests are primarily found.
- Residential segregation has meant that common interests and values are eclipsed by differences which are perceived to exist. This is so even if Indians, coloureds and Africans are able to achieve the same lifestyle, and similar occupational, educational and material achievements as are typical in white communities.
- The structure of the economy, where

*Whereas organised commerce traditionally worked behind the scenes to promote only business interests, today it has a prominent political profile*

*Business remains a slow moving train of diverse interests, which represents a wide spectrum of political persuasions*

EMPLOYER LOBBY

*Business has to contend with the political aspects inherent in economic policy, industrial and community relations*

*Black advancement programmes may be honest attempts to improve the lot of blacks, yet business cares little for the world outside of the workplace*

*Much more can be done at local and regional levels to resolve social and political grievances and to improve the life of the disadvantaged*

*A successful regional initiative in KwaZulu/Natal could set an example to the rest of South Africa, thus contributing to the democratisation of the country*

the state rigidly administers the lives and welfare of black people, almost guarantees widespread rejection and a crisis of discontent. However, a sluggish economy will constrain the growth of the black private sector and delay the emergence of social preconditions for the kinds of natural checks, tolerance and overlaps between political groups, which are so essential for the functioning of a democracy.

- Industrial relations have been transformed over the last decade or so by trade unions, who are among the most important forces in the democratisation process that is at work in our society. Trade unionism represents a grassroots participatory activity for working people in South Africa, which contrasts all the more with the absence of parallel political institutions enjoying the same kind of legitimacy and degree of participation.

### After Hours Neglect

In pursuing enlightened solutions to some of the major conflict issues, employers have done a good deal to promote principles such as equal opportunity in employment. Affirmative action and black advancement programmes are all honest attempts to respond appropriately to the considerable disadvantages encountered by black employees vis-a-vis their white counterparts. Employers, as a general rule, accept these high principles during the hours of work. However, once the factory gate or shop door closes, black employees emerge from the work environment and re-enter a depressing world about which business has cared comparatively little.

Yet almost everything about this private world in which black workers are forced to live does much to destroy employee productivity, and even undermines the very foundation of our capitalist society by denying people a decent family life. As it is, not enough is done at the work place to directly promote the principles of the free enterprise ethic. The employer effectively ensures that the employee remains alienated from capitalism, and identifies it with a system of government that imposes an intolerable lifestyle upon him.

Some of these matters can only be resolved in the national political arena. For instance, after intensive lobbying of government by many parties, influx regulations are to be repealed by mid-1986. Nevertheless, various other obstacles facing a black family in the normal course of their lives do not derive necessarily from laws which can only be changed at the national level. In fact, much more could be done at the local and regional levels to resolve problems that have become grievances, and to improve the quality of life of our most disadvantaged communities.

The key to success in such endeavours will not, however, be found in an attitude of 'stand-offish' paternalism, in charitable hand-outs, or even in occasional consultative meetings between representatives of white and black communities. In simple language, these forms of contact signify the preservation of two separate worlds. Instead, the voices of all those who will be affected by decisions must be heard in the councils where those decisions at local and regional level will be made.

If municipalities are to collectively form a much firmer foundation for regional co-operation of the kind envisaged in the proposed regional services councils, then representation of all people and all groups is essential. Unfortunately, the regional services councils are deeply flawed as things stand at present - black people were never truly consulted either about the principle or the detail of their constitution.


### A Regional Initiative

In this context, the initiative for the establishment of a single regional, legislative and administrative authority in KwaZulu/Natal is gathering momentum on the basis of the very real support from its communities. A map of this region looks like a jigsaw puzzle, and the politically separate units of Natal and KwaZulu are totally and inextricably interdependent from any realistic point of view. Money is without question a colourblind commodity and the common economy of Natal and KwaZulu supercedes any political ideology or ideas of consolidation of this area into two individual and independent units.

The details of how such a regional authority should be constituted, how many representatives should be elected, or even the details of what powers it should have, are currently being debated. At this stage, particular emphasis must be placed on the correct process whereby it should be established. It is very important that all those who are to be represented, or all those whose interests such a regional government is intended to serve, should be involved (not merely consulted) in the process of reaching agreement on all issues of detail.

Equally important is the fact that those who live in KwaZulu/Natal claim no more than what is their legitimate right, when they ask that central government should not stand in the way of a promising regional initiative. People of goodwill from all communities in this part of South Africa wish to get together and negotiate a basis on which they propose to conduct their regional affairs together. We do not wish to withdraw from South Africa, secede, or necessarily go it alone, and be treated as an exception. On the contrary,





**EMPLOYER LOBBY**

we would welcome moves by like minded South Africans in other parts of the country who would wish to pursue similar objectives for their own regions.

Natal/KwaZulu has already been held back too long, merely because those in authority in central government do not believe that the rest of the country is ready for what has been proposed. Although we do not wish to prescribe, we do want the right to go ahead with innovative plans for the Natal/KwaZulu region, which could also be a major step to the democratisation of our country as a whole. One has to establish consensus before one can hope to achieve peace, progress and prosperity.

**Step-by-Step-Democracy**

Open democracies on the western model are by no means the final answer to problems of human development. However, no alternative system appears to offer a superior combination of general quality of life, freedom of expression, protection from anti-authoritarian government, and restraint on abuse of power than democracy. Because it has produced widespread equality of circumstances and power, the western democratic system offers people in a plural society the necessary conditions to

mobilise against inequality and constraints. In short, all the ills of democracy can be better cured by more and not less democracy.

As ethnic separation is not tolerated by international bankers or by western governments, our choice in South Africa is limited to the establishment of structures and policies of middle ground politics. A strong centrist coalition remains the only option to the polar alternatives of being pro-apartheid or pro-violence. If these two latter courses continue to be pursued, a marxist state will inevitably arise from the ashes of destruction, borne out of intransigent white attitudes to democracy.

The longer that it takes the people of South Africa to realise this fundamental point; the longer government vacillates along the road of reform; and the longer the democratisation process takes; the less chance will democracy have through whatever mechanisms. I am firmly of the belief that the varying regions of South Africa should hold conventions on the broadest democratic base, in order to involve the greatest number of people and groups on a regional basis. This would enable change to occur in a step-by-step process, towards the ultimate solution of accepting the complete democratisation of our country. UPPA

*Under the shadow of the Drakensberg - Between the polarities of pro-violence and pro-apartheid, the employer lobby must promote a centrist coalition, starting with the current KwaZulu/Natal talks.*

*A strong centrist coalition remains the only option to the polar alternatives of pro-apartheid or pro-violence*

# Economic Outlook

By Dr Merle Holden and Prof Mike McGrath  
of the Department of Economics, University of Natal

## Retrospect

### THE ECONOMY

The economic downswing which began in mid-1984 probably bottomed out during the third quarter of 1985. In April 1985 the index of leading indicators foreshadowed an upturn, which was reflected in a moderate rise in gross domestic product (GDP) in the third quarter. However, this rise was only experienced in the mining, agricultural, electricity, gas and water sectors. Over the entire year real output was about 1 percent lower than it was in 1984, with the result that real per capita incomes declined markedly.

During the downswing all the components of real gross domestic expenditure declined. This decline was moderated in the third quarter of 1985 by increased consumption expenditure on durable goods and increased real government expenditure. The 7.5 percent decline in real gross domestic expenditure during 1985 signified that excess demand had been eliminated from the economy.

The recessionary state of the economy was also reflected in the marginal growth of remuneration to employees. Rising unemployment and falling output led to wage increases of 8.5 percent in the first half of 1985 and 3.5 percent in the latter part of the year. Given the high inflation rate in late 1985 this represented a severe decline in real earnings per worker. Profits, on the other hand, increased markedly from the second half of 1984 to early 1985 but then subsequently showed lower rates of increase in 1985. The sharp decline in profits in manufacturing and construction was partially counterbalanced by increased profitability in the mining sector, due to the higher rand prices of its exports.

Although gross domestic saving increased in the latter part of 1985 to 30 percent of GDP, this performance is not remarkable in the face of the large surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. Gross domestic saving also exceeded gross domestic investment, providing funds for the reduction of the country's growing foreign indebtedness.

Recessionary conditions saw a decline in non-agricultural employment, with registered unemployment rising by 75 percent. Yet in the mining and electricity generation industries, employment increased in the third quarter of 1985. Significantly, labour productivity as measured by real GDP per worker in the non-agricultural sector declined, which indicates that employment levels did not fall as rapidly as GDP.

### Inflation

During the 1980s the inflation rate, as measured by the consumer price index, has averaged out at 14 percent. It declined to 11 percent at the end of 1983, but subsequently increased to an annualised high of 20.7 percent in January 1986. Undoubtedly, the

depreciation of the rand since 1983 has contributed substantially to this marked increase. February 1986, however, saw a sharp decline to 18 percent in the annualised inflation rate, largely due to lower food prices. Over time, the appreciation of the rand, coupled with the decline in world oil prices, should have a further beneficial effect.

### Balance of Payments

Since the fourth quarter of 1984 there has been a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. In 1985 this amounted to R7.1 billion (6 percent of GDP), as compared with a deficit of R1.5 billion in 1984. Exports have increased (excluding gold) by 58 percent in value and 22 percent in volume, while the value of gold increased by 32 percent. In turn imports have decreased 16 percent in volume and increased 6 percent in value terms. The dollar price of gold steadily strengthened over the year from \$300 to \$350 an ounce in March, which equivalently in rand terms was an increase from R657 to R757 per ounce. The improvement in the current account during 1985 can be attributed to the low level of economic activity as well as to the severe depreciation of the rand.

Over the past year, the balance of payments has been characterised by excessive volatility. There was a substantial net outflow in the first quarter of 1985 and a small net outflow in the second quarter. The further large net outflow in the third quarter was mainly due to the withdrawal of short term credit facilities by foreign banks and net sales by foreigners of securities quoted on the stock exchange.

After the debt standstill was arranged, large repayments were made on exempted loans and the net outflow of R3 billion in the third quarter was followed by one of R5 billion in the fourth quarter. In December the exchange control regulations were tightened, requiring exporters to cover forward a week after shipment and thus reversing unfavourable leads and lags. Furthermore, the gold mines were paid entirely in rands, which left the Reserve Bank with a larger pool of foreign currency to intervene in the foreign exchange market.

The effective exchange rate of the rand declined uninterruptedly from September 1983 to January 1985. The rate then stabilised in the first half of 1985 until July, after which the rand depreciated sharply until the end of November in response to disinvestment by investors and creditors. In response to the change in exchange control regulations and the rise in the dollar price of gold in January 1986, the commercial rand strengthened dramatically from 36 cents to 50 cents. Between 18 December 1985 and 14 March 1986, the rand appreciated 29.9 percent against a basket of other currencies, and 36.1 percent against the dollar. However, as the US dollar has been moving downwards simultaneously, the rand's





Adele Gordon/PHOTOTEACH

The 1986/87 budget increases expenditure on African township infrastructure and housing by R631m.

## THE ECONOMY

gains against other currencies has not been as impressive.

### Monetary and Fiscal Policy

In August 1984 monetary policy shifted toward combatting the accelerating inflation rate. The prime overdraft rate went to 25 percent, and harsh hire-purchase conditions were implemented to cut private consumption expenditure - which was considered partly responsible for the rise in prices. This was followed in 1985 by a budget which was considered to be deflationary.

Yet in May 1985, despite the high inflation rate, the Reserve Bank eased monetary policy through successive declines in interest rates, leading to a prime rate of 15.5 percent. The growth in M2 (money and near money) slowed from an annual rate of 28.9 percent in November 1984 to 11.8 percent in December 1985, reflecting the decline in real domestic expenditure, despite the lower interest rates.

In September 1985 further stimulatory measures were announced. In particular R600m, financed in part by an import surcharge, was put aside to relieve poverty and create low wage jobs. Hire purchase conditions were also relaxed and by the end of the year mortgage rates were cut by the building societies. Despite the decline in short term interest rates, long term rates remain high and range between 17 to 18 percent, which reflects a continuing high rate of inflation.

### The Budget

The budget for 1986/87 was billed by the Minister of Finance as one 'for the needs of all South Africans'. Is this an accurate representation of the budget?

- There now appears to be a widely accepted belief that the most pressing economic issues in South Africa are the related problems of unemployment,

underemployment and poverty. The alleviation of these problems requires sustained economic growth, the imaginative use of economic development policies and considerable expenditures on infrastructure in black areas.

The magnitude of the problems to be confronted is vast. In 1980 the average per capita incomes of whites were almost 13 times greater than the African average. Poverty is widespread in the African population. Even conservative estimates have found that 30 percent of African households in metropolitan regions are poverty stricken, and this rises to more than 70 percent in the black homelands and rural areas.

The economy has been unable to absorb its growing population in modern sector employment over the 1980s. Between 1980 and July 1985, the index of modern sector employment (including agriculture and domestic service) rose from 108.4 to 110.9, representing a net increase in employment of 114 400 jobs. There were approximately 300 000 potential new entrants to the labour market in each year alone.

- Disinvestment pressures, together with South Africa's default on its short-term debt, have effectively cut its access to foreign capital markets - until internationally sanctioned political reforms are made. Foreign capital inflows have always been important in allowing the economy to grow at a rate faster than either domestic savings or balance of payments considerations would have otherwise allowed. The need to repay foreign debt places additional strains on the economy, since resources have now to be channelled abroad. Until these debts are repaid, or creditor sentiment changes abroad, real economic welfare in the South African economy (as measured by the level of domestic expenditure) will not increase as fast as the growth rate of the real GDP.

- Government has exceeded its budgetary expenditure targets every year since 1976, and in the 1985/86



year overran its budgeted expenditure by almost 7 percent. Any assessment of the probable effects of the budget must question the ability of the government to control its expenditures.

### Planned Deficit

Government expenditure and revenues are planned to increase over the year by 13.9 percent and 13.1 percent respectively, while the budgeted deficit of R3 944m is estimated at 2.7 percent of GDP for the coming year. The Minister of Finance appears to expect an inflation rate of 14 percent for 1986 and therefore both the level of real government expenditures and taxes will be lowered.

The budget has been described as mildly stimulatory. Firstly, a deficit budget must always be more stimulatory than a balanced budget. Secondly, in order to achieve the 2.7 percent deficit, personal income taxation has been lowered. At the 1985/86 levels of taxation the deficit would have been a lower 1.9 percent of GDP. Seen against this counterfactual, the budget is certainly stimulatory. In judging the stimulatory effects of the budget, the accommodating stance of the monetary policy and the renewed spirit of optimism in the business community are also important.

The financing of the budget deficit is entirely confined to domestic capital markets - recognising the impact of the disinvestment pressures - and it requires new stock issues of R893m. Indeed its total demands on domestic savings are reduced from R5 373m to R5 368m, and as a consequence it should not cause upward pressures on interest rates.

Government has set itself the task of keeping expenditures within the budget, and has announced internal procedures to this end. The introduction of money supply targets was also announced in the budget, and these should provide early warning of government use of the banking system as a source of finance.

GDP is expected to grow at a real rate of 3 percent per annum. Because of the repayment of foreign debt, however, domestic absorption will grow more slowly and the growth of real personal incomes will be consequently lower than growth of GDP. At best therefore, the prospects for growth in real personal incomes for 1986/87 will only be sufficiently high enough to prevent real per capita incomes from falling.

The growth rate of GDP is not subsequently high enough - 5.5 percent per annum is needed - to absorb the natural increase in the labour force. Thus the stimulatory stance of the budget cannot be seen as a factor which will cause a redistribution of incomes through economic growth in 1986/87. Moreover, it is highly probable that the gains in employment will accrue mainly in urban areas. It is likely that rural unemployment will continue to increase over the year, and rural per capita real incomes will continue their decline in 1986, further widening the urban-rural income differentials, and deepening poverty in the rural areas.

### Government Expenditure

In the budget social services still constitute the single largest category, with education comprising 50

percent of the total, followed by the security establishment. Expenditure on defence, police and justice is budgeted to increase by 13.6 percent, while expenditure on education is budgeted to increase by 19.3 percent. The racial distribution of many areas of expenditure has never been easy to infer from budget estimates, and the own affairs concept has made this task impossibly difficult. We cannot therefore arrive at a racial allocation of items of expenditure such as housing, health, area development, welfare expenditures and constitutional development.

The Minister singled out certain features of the planned expenditures:

- Expenditure on infrastructure and housing for Africans outside of the independent states is to increase by R631m, thereby also providing a boost for informal sector employment. Expenditures for job creation and training of the unemployed are budgeted at R235m. Of this total R160m is allocated to job creation, which it is estimated will generate approximately 34 000 jobs, as compared with the 112 000 jobs provided between October 1985 and March 1986. In addition the Small Business Development Corporation will receive a R30 million boost to its capital.

However, in total these three items do not account for more than 2.4 percent of budgeted expenditures. Indeed, it must be questioned whether the expenditures for housing and infrastructure in African areas are sufficient enough to allow for the population growth which will follow the promised scrapping of influx controls.

- Social pensions are also to be increased, although neither the rate of increase nor the racial allocation has been announced, despite the fact that African pensions are a general affair. Bread subsidies are to be reduced by 25 percent (R50m), but bread prices are not to be increased before October 1986.

- The public service wage bill will increase by 10 percent, which is not excessive for it is 27 months since a general cost of living adjustment has been given to the civil service.

### Taxation Features

On the tax side, the budget's major features are:

- An effective reduction of 11 percent in the rate of personal income taxation and some tax relief to married couples. The first 20 percent of the incomes of working wives are now exempt from taxation, with a minimum deduction of R1 800 per annum.

- Provisional tax collections from companies and high income taxpayers have been speeded up, by introducing three payments per year, and by requiring that the total payments equal 100 percent of the tax liability. This will speed up the rate of tax collections in the 1986/87 year, and may have the effect of depressing some of the stimulation given to consumption by tax reductions.

- A dramatic lowering of effective rates of estate duty.

The wisdom behind the reduction of the rates of estate duty is most questionable since estate duty is a non-distortionary tax, which can contribute valuably to revenues. In the 1960s it contributed as much as 5



percent of government revenues. By contrast it now yields a meagre 0.2 percent of the total. In the period 1978/79, had the rates of the estate duty for South Africa been set at levels equal to those prevailing in the United States, the duty could have yielded an amount equal to 33 percent of the government's grant to all the black states. A valuable source of finance for development expenditures, and a non-distortionary instrument for the redistribution of incomes has now almost been wiped off South African tax schedules.

The reductions in personal income taxation, which amount to R1 210m, will undoubtedly worsen the

post-tax distribution of incomes. An alternative might have been a decrease in the level of GST by an equivalent amount. This could have lowered the rate of GST from 12 to 10 percent, and improved the distribution of welfare. With taxation levels unchanged, expenditure on township infrastructure and African housing could have been increased by a further 135 percent.

The tax side of the budget is unquestionably to the advantage of the higher income groups in society. It offsets some of the burdens of fiscal drag for the higher income groups, while the poor are still left to bear the full unadjusted burden of GST.

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## Prospect

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The growth rate for the economy is forecast at slightly more than 3 percent per annum. The budget was described as 'moderately expansionary', while at the same time not overstimulating the economy into a new round of demand inflation, or damaging the required surplus on the current account to finance the foreign debt repayment. The business mood, in contrast to the 1985 mood of post-budget depression, is now more optimistic. A Markinor poll has shown that 68 percent of top executives expect sales to increase over the next six months, and 58 percent expect increased profits.

No substantial difficulties seem to stand in the way of achieving the growth rate of 3 percent, provided the budgetary expenditure and revenue targets are achieved. Export markets should grow abroad as a result of the recent fall in the world market price of oil, and South African manufactured exports still remain competitive at current levels of the real effective exchange rate of the rand. At this growth rate there is scope for repayment of the scheduled 5 percent of the short term foreign debt, and for increases in consumption and investment, without engendering a severe depreciation of the exchange rate of the rand.

The monetary targets for M3 will allow a growth rate of real balances approximately in line with the growth of aggregate demand, with the result that nominal interest rates need not increase. The money supply targets will be consistent at the lower bound with an inflation rate of approximately 13 percent per annum. The upper bound will allow for a maximum inflation rate of 17 percent, providing that the velocity of circulation of money remains unchanged.

A pessimistic scenario for economic growth could develop, however, if a budget over-run of the almost traditional level of 7 percent occurs. Additional nominal growth of demand of over 4 percent would result, providing that interest rates do not rise as monetary policy accommodates the expansion. This increase in demand would place overbearing strains on the surplus of the current account of the balance of payments, at the present exchange rate. A depreciation of the exchange rate of the rand could follow, with escalating pressures on domestic costs and

the inflation rate. The almost inevitable result would be a sharp reversal of the expansionary directions of fiscal and monetary policy, and a consequent sudden end to the upswing.

If the stance of monetary policy is not accommodating (ie if the monetary targets are adhered to), interest rates will be forced upwards as government competes for a larger share of loanable funds, crowding out some of the expected growth in private expenditure. The projected growth in GDP may now be achieved, but the share of government in GDP will have been increased.

Throughout this analysis the price of gold has been assumed to remain unchanged in the year ahead. However the gold price could decrease if inflation rates in the western economies are reduced as a result of lower oil prices. In the short term therefore, on economic grounds, there does not appear to be a strong chance that a large gold price increase will enable the South African economy to escape the binding constraints which now inhibit its growth.

### Problem Areas

Two problem areas remain unresolved:

- A growth rate of 3 percent of GDP will not stem the rise in unemployment. At first, the revival in the economy will herald a return to a normal working week in many industries and an increase in labour productivity, as output rises more rapidly than employment. The growth in employment will thus lag behind the growth in income.
- Rates of inflation, even if reduced to 14 percent per annum, are still alarmingly high by comparison with South Africa's major trading partners. The monetarist deflationary policies that were followed in 1984/85 could not succeed because of the existence of the disenfranchised and now highly politicised urban African population. As the economy recovers, wage demands and strikes will undoubtedly increase, as economic and political tensions are expressed in the market place. The prospects for significantly reducing the inflation rate below 14 percent in the medium term thus appear to be bleak.






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
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
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
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*Advocates of the established system of industrial council bargaining are opposed by a caucus of newer unions who believe negotiations should occur at company, sector and industry levels. In the metal and associated industries, a failure to resolve the impasse between employers and their unions could well result in widespread labour conflict during 1986.*

- 1** *The Industrial Council in the Metal Industry*
- 2** *Beyond Minimum Wages: The Logic of Multi-Level Bargaining*
- 5** *The Ins & Outs of COSATU*
- 11** *Of Invention & Intervention: Collective Bargaining after Wiehahn*



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## Comment

# FORGING OR FOUNDERING?

## *The Industrial Council in the Metal Industry*

Until 1979, African trade unions were denied the opportunity of participating in industrial council proceedings. The challenge posed by an emergent black labour movement to existing industrial relationships in the 1970s persuaded government to review, adapt and open the statutory bargaining apparatus to African unions (see Jowell review: p11/16). However a new conflict then emerged from the Wiehahn labour reforms – should negotiations on the terms and conditions of employment take place at council level, as most employers demand; or at plant level, as many of the new unions insist?

Today, after considerable debate within labour circles, many union strategists have recognised that the system of IC bargaining has some positive features. Some of the most important black unions have recently joined the councils, although they certainly do not consider this to be an acceptable substitute for plant-level negotiations. The ongoing debate is best illustrated by the dispute between some parties in the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry. In the metal IC, the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of SA (SEIFSA) represents 45 employer organisations; and a group of unions, affiliated to the International Metal Workers Federation, represents workers belonging to the new labour movement.

In the following cover article, Indicator SA presents one of the main protagonist's perspective on the pros and cons of IC bargaining in the metal industry. Geoffrey Schreiner, an executive official of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), puts forward a convincing case for multiple-level collective bargaining, from the shop-floor to industrial councils. Unfortunately, SEIFSA's Director, Sam van Coller withdrew from the exchange of views initiated by Indicator SA because of the sensitive negotiations the employer organisation is currently involved in with a range of trade union groupings. However, SEIFSA's position on ICs is well known and has been prominently articulated on various public platforms and in the Industrial Court.

SEIFSA insists that all negotiations over 'substantive' issues should take place within the forum of the metal IC, and has rigorously resisted union efforts to bargain over wages at plant-level. It argues that a fragmentation of bargaining will lead to instability in the industry and could, ultimately, harm employee interests. The organisation claims that it has responded to the newer unions' rejection of ICs by taking steps to restore worker and union confidence in the system.

These measures include:

- bargaining in 'good faith' with employees, and narrowing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers
- improving 'shop-floor justice' by streamlining the IC dispute procedure so it could be used at the company level; by encouraging employers to introduce effective grievance and disciplinary procedures; and by encouraging member companies to establish sound working relationships with trade unions
- 'accepting the principle of freedom of association' by liberalising stop-order facilities for those unions not yet party to the IC
- restructuring the metal industry's pension fund, so as to allow representation of the newer unions on the Fund's board of management.

MAWU, an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, rejects SEIFSA's stance and seeks to establish a dual system of bargaining. The union wants to retain existing industry-wide bargaining in order to peg minimum wages, but also demands that individual SEIFSA members should negotiate substantive issues like wages, hours of work and bonuses at the plant-level. In the following article, Schreiner claims that SEIFSA's current reformist initiatives do not address MAWU's demands for the restructuring of bargaining institutions and that if implemented, they could result in a strike-wave that will cripple the metal and associated industries.

# Beyond Minimum Wages

## THE LOGIC OF MULTI-LEVEL BARGAINING

By Geoffrey Schreiner of the Metal and Allied Workers Union

MAWU has challenged the system of centralised bargaining in the Industrial Court, by trying to get a company to directly negotiate wages and other benefits

The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) has waged an intense battle for many years to maintain all collective bargaining on wages and conditions of employment in the industry within the forum of its national industrial council. The employer association argues that any deviation from the current bargaining arrangement would lead to industrial anarchy and would prevent the development of a structured industrial relations system. SEIFSA's position is rigorously (and often ruthlessly) defended in practice at the shop-floor level by SEIFSA's giant affiliates: Anglo American, Dorbyl, Metkor and the like.

One significant dissenting voice is the Barlows group of companies, whose emphasis on decentralised collective bargaining is as strongly defended as is SEIFSA's policy. While Barlow's position is certainly a progressive advance, its rigid implementation has up to now largely excluded effective company and sectoral

negotiation. In its present form it is an unsatisfactory model for a more general collective bargaining arrangement within the industry.

This short article is however limited to the 'mainstream' SEIFSA position. It argues, from a non-academic, non-legal position, that this approach is not only untenable but also likely to lead to serious industrial unrest in the industry.

### The Hart Case

In the Industrial Court case of Hart Ltd vs MAWU (Metal and Allied Workers Union) (1985), for the first time, SEIFSA representatives were actually required to illuminate and intellectually defend their policy of centralised collective bargaining. The applicants, MAWU, sought an order from the Court to require Hart Ltd to negotiate directly with the union on wages and a funeral benefit scheme.

MAWU argued that such relief would have


In February 1986 workers at four Asea plants went on strike to demand that the company negotiate wages at plant-level. The stoppages could be the prelude to a major strike-wave in the industry.




Steve Hillon/AFRPIX



**METALWORKERS**  
\*PLANT LEVEL BARGAINING



**MAWU**



**CAPITAL**

- \* a minimum "living wage" of R3,50 per hour and a 50c across the board increase;
- \* May Day to be a paid holiday;
- \* employers to double their contribution to the industry's pension fund. This to be invested in black housing;
- \* four weeks paid holiday (presently 3 weeks);
- \* maternity leave.

The following demands were made in response to mounting retrenchments:

- \* increased overtime rates to curb overtime working
- \* a reduction of 5 hours on the working week to 40 hours
- \* retrenchment pay calculated on the basis of 4 weeks wages for every year of service.

**DEMAND**

*Pamphlet distributed in January 1986 outlining MAWU's main demands.*

the effect of limiting industrial action against the company. The union's counsel argued at great length that an order of this nature was not to require of the company that they make any specific offer in relation to the two matters in dispute, nor that they necessarily reach agreement with MAWU. It was merely to ensure that the management negotiating team should seriously endeavour to reach agreement with the applicants on wages and funeral benefits.

The Hart case was effectively run by SEIFSA in the guise of 'interested third parties'. Firstly, the respondents contended that the industrial relations system in South Africa was structured on the notion of 'voluntarism', and that it was improper for the Court to interfere in the 'relationship' between a company and a trade union by compelling one party to negotiate with the other against its will. Secondly, it was argued that it was improper to compel the company to negotiate substantive issues directly with MAWU when such issues could be handled through the national industrial council.

It is not clear whether these arguments persuaded the court on their merits alone or whether it was the deadweight of existing structures and practices that finally influenced the Industrial Court decision. However, from the point of view of the future of industry-wide bargaining we should look at these arguments more closely.

### Contradicting 'Voluntarism'

SEIFSA's 'voluntarism' is premised on the free enterprise principle that third-party compulsion on an unwilling partner in an industrial bargaining relationship should be prohibited. Therefore, such intervention by the state or the courts should only take place where the parties are in agreement therewith or where an agreement has in fact been breached.

In gazetting the Council's main agreement, however, SEIFSA's own activities are

not consistent with this principle. On an annual basis SEIFSA asks the Minister of Manpower to extend the provisions of the main agreement, not only to unwilling non-SEIFSA companies but also to members of unions who have specifically rejected it.

The effect of extension as far as the unions are concerned is that their members are prohibited by law from taking industrial action against SEIFSA affiliates for the duration of the agreement. The other obvious benefits for capital are that it prevents undercutting and 'regulates' industrial relations in the industry. In short, where compulsion in the collective bargaining relationship is considered to be in the interest of capital, SEIFSA is very quick to take up the opportunity.

A consistent voluntarist approach would also require that trade unions be entitled to take effective industrial action in order to protect or advance their members' interests. In South Africa, however, the right to strike is severely restricted and third-party intervention prohibits freedom of association and the right to picket. Moreover, it facilitates mass dismissals and the arbitrary detention of strike leaders.

Despite these contradictions, SEIFSA has never called for the lifting of restrictions on the right to strike. On the contrary, its affiliates have all too often ruthlessly exploited every available third-party mechanism to break strikes and crush union leadership. These examples alone should demonstrate that voluntarism is not a principle upon which South African industrial relations are founded. SEIFSA's stated commitment to this 'principle' is wholly expedient and as fickle as PW Botha's announcements on the reform process.

### Minimum Wages

The second strand of SEIFSA's argument in the Hart case was that the company should not be compelled to negotiate on substantive issues which had already been negotiated or could be negotiated through the national industry council. It

*SEIFSA believes it would be unfair if third parties compelled its members to negotiate with unions outside of the industrial council (IC)*

*If SEIFSA's 'voluntarism' was consistent, it would recognise the right of non-party unions who reject the main IC agreement to take strike action*

**INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS**

*MAWU would support Council bargaining if the wage levels set were only considered a minima for the industry, to be supplemented through other negotiations*

*Companies and sectors who generate large profits should pay wages in excess of the IC rates as they can afford them*

*SEIFSA's attempts to restructure Council bargaining will antagonise black unions as it will allow even lower wages to be paid in some areas*

*The conflict centres on MAWU's demands for IC fixed minimum wages, coupled with company and sectoral bargaining, and the right to strike*

was argued that the substantive agreement negotiated at the national level reflected 'fair averages', which were determined after much consultation between SEIFSA's various affiliated associations.

This is just palpable nonsense. The annual industrial negotiations involve 9 000 companies (some indirectly) and over 350 000 employees from widely divergent sectors such as foundries, electronics, cables, minerals, light engineering and the like. As such, SEIFSA's proposals can never reflect more than what is within the capabilities of the least profitable, most impoverished section of a massively divergent industry. For SEIFSA ever to offer more than this lowest denominator would put major sections of the industry out of business - an unthinkable step for a major employers' association.

Therefore, substantive agreements reached (or enforced) through the national industrial council can never be regarded as more than minima for the industry. Viewed in this context, MAWU has no problem with the Council and would support its continued functioning for this purpose.

But what of those companies and sectors which have generated profits that justify wages far in excess of industrial council minima? Direct supplementary wage level bargaining with representative trade unions, based on ability to pay, would make inroads into the massively high profit margins of various powerful companies and sectors in the metal industry.

SEIFSA's defence of centralised collective bargaining is therefore ultimately just a defence of exploitative wage rates. If this is intended to maintain industrial peace and industrial council stability it is just a little naive, especially so in the present environment of high inflation and unemployment.

### Imminent Change?

It does appear that SEIFSA is reconsidering its position, largely due to pressure from MAWU and the growing advances of other unions as to the inadequacies of the national industrial council. This is manifested in the willingness of a number of important companies to negotiate a whole range of substantive issues outside of the Council, though the crucial area of wages still remains unresolved.

Furthermore, SEIFSA has committed itself to negotiate a restructuring of the Council with trade union parties. Unfortunately, SEIFSA is moving far too slowly in this regard. Secondly, indications are that it only intends to introduce a geographical redefinition of the main agreement, coupled with limited collective bargaining in some low margin sectors.

The effect of such changes would accordingly be to permit even lower wages being paid in those areas where the mechanisms of apartheid have created vast reservoirs of cheap black labour, or in those sectors where profit margins are tightest.

These proposals would of course only antagonise the unions and escalate the potential for massive industrial unrest on a national scale. MAWU has in fact already declared disputes with over 35 companies in the Transvaal over a refusal to bargain effective wage rates based on ability to pay. The first in a series of strikes has already begun at Asea's four Transvaal plants over the issue of multiple-level bargaining - more strikes will follow as pressure grows for more effective wage bargaining among rank-and-file union members.

Such a head-on confrontation would naturally be immensely costly to the industry and SEIFSA will undoubtedly (as it has done in the past) use every available means of third party intervention, such as Supreme Court orders, artificial disputes, police intervention etc, to break these strikes.

But if SEIFSA does not move quickly to resolve the current crisis by bona fide negotiations aimed at realistic restructuring of the Council, then a massive industrial conflict is on the cards. Moreover, MAWU and other unions may well reassess their position as members of the national industrial council. While MAWU does not at present favour this latter option, SEIFSA's lethargic 'too little too late reformism' may well cause the baby to be thrown out with the bathwater.

### Untenable Position

SEIFSA's position is clearly untenable, and the quicker it accepts minimum wage bargaining through the industrial council; coupled with effective company and sectoral bargaining, and the right to strike; the better are the chances of avoiding a massively costly industrial dispute.

Perhaps SEIFSA could draw inspiration from MAWU vs Natal Die Castings (1986), which held that the company had committed unfair labour practices through:

- its failure to negotiate in good faith on substantive issues directly with MAWU (despite the existence of the Council); and,
- its mass dismissal of workers after two days of a lawful strike. While the reasons for the order have not yet been given, suggestions are that the Industrial Court may be seriously rethinking its earlier decision in the Hart case.

Indeed, a little realism and clear-sightedness by SEIFSA on this matter could still save the day. *TRM*




# THE INS & OUTS OF COSATU

## *The New State of the Union*

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), launched in Durban in December 1985, has formally established itself as the most broadly representative labour federation in South African history. After five years of complex and difficult negotiations, the predominantly black labour movement has succeeded in uniting 33 of the diverse newer unions, with a paid-up membership of nearly 450 000 workers.

In this focus, the first in a series of articles analysing the competing strengths of the major trade union groupings, Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett analyses the probable mergers that will occur between some COSATU affiliates in four sectors, namely in the textile, food, paper and metal industries; and the major union rivals they will face.



TRADE UNIONS

*The diverse political allegiances of COSATU's membership will make it difficult for the federation to evolve common policy and strategy*

*The ultimate test of COSATU's strength will be determined by the success it has in integrating its 33 overlapping affiliates into 10 industrial unions*

*A structural priority for COSATU will be to assist rival unions to merge and to get general unions to reconstitute themselves as industrial components*

*Unionists argue that only concentrated worker organisation from the shop-floor to the industrial sector can challenge corporate power*

The blaze of populist rhetoric that accompanied COSATU's launch was certainly not unexpected, given the highly-charged political environment into which the fledgling federation was born. The federation now faces more substantial demands, as it rationalises union affiliates, consolidates support, challenges rivals and expands into new sectors.

Yet the eventual launch of COSATU can only be considered a partial success. During the lead-up, a number of important trade union federations, who were party to the original unity negotiations, opted out of the unity initiative. Both the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU), with a combined membership of almost 200 000 workers, stated that they would not join any organisation that allowed white intellectuals to occupy leadership positions. Currently, all 12 CUSA and nine AZACTU affiliates are involved in their own unity negotiations.

### Further Difficulties

It has become clear that there will be no rapprochement between COSATU and factions of the established trade union movement. Although the Trade Union Council of South Africa's (TUCSA) membership declined from 478 420 workers in 1983 to less than 300 000 by 1985, it has managed to retain a significant black membership that would be a prize for any of COSATU's affiliates. TUCSA has acquired a new lease on life, becoming more critical of government policy, intensifying its organising efforts on the shop-floor and making extensive use of closed-shop agreements.

A further difficulty facing COSATU stems from the broad ideological diversity of the various unions affiliated to it. Various groupings within the federation tend to part company over organising styles, tactical attitudes towards union participation in government-created bargaining structures, and political alliances with community groups and extra-parliamentary organisations, from the United Democratic Front to Inkatha. The extent to which COSATU can unite such disparate factional interests will be a major factor in determining the future success of federation policy and strategy. However, it is likely that COSATU will adopt a more flexible approach towards its affiliates than the highly centralised, 'disciplined unity', that was characteristic of the former Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU).

The ultimate test of COSATU's shop-floor and national industrial strength will be determined by the success it has in ensuring the integration of its 33 affiliates into large, industrially-based unions. A

cornerstone of the entire unity initiative was that affiliate unions should commit themselves to the formation of a number of strategically situated industrial unions; as opposed to the more traditional craft and general forms of South African unionism.

### Industrial Unionism

Industrial unions attempt to organise all workers in a single industry irrespective of their craft, occupation, grade or skill (Bell 1974: p110). Usually they are all affiliates of some larger umbrella coordinating body. In South Africa, FOSATU's organisational style has been the best example of tight, professionally structured unionism to date.

COSATU Vice-President, Chris Dlamini, has stated that the first priority of COSATU will be to assist rival unions operating in the same sector to merge, while helping general worker unions to construct themselves into industrial unions (FM 29/11/85). At COSATU's inaugural congress it was optimistically proposed that the federation should establish ten industrially-based affiliates before the end of March 1986. According to a motion carried, if the moves towards industrial unionism do not materialise soon a special national congress will be convened in mid-1986 to assess progress made.

Union strategists believe that industrial unionism, especially in time of recession, offers a better powerbase from which to pursue their 'living wage' goal and to narrow the white-black wage gap. Once large industrially-based unions develop, those industrial sectors with the lowest wage levels are expected to come under sustained attack.

Industrial unionism also provides the most effective form of organisation to counter the increasing concentration of capital in South Africa. The labour movement is increasingly finding that whichever company they negotiate with, they are usually connected with a very small group of conglomerates (SALDRU 1983: p16). Unionists argue that only concentrated worker power on the shop-floor within each industrial sector can provide effective opposition to corporate power (COSATU resolution at launch).

Dlamini further claims that the establishment of 'one union for each industry will stop managements from playing unions off against each other' (FM 29/11/85). The planned mergers of overlapping COSATU affiliates will aid this process - a reduction in the number of unions competing to represent workers at a particular factory will make it easier for majority unions to sign recognition and other agreements with management. It will also remove the destructive tendency of some competing unions to outdo each other in militancy or obduracy; a factor



which has often militated against some unions reaching settlement of any kind with management.

With the existence of a coordinating federation, industrial unions will also be able draw on a centralised pool of labour resources and skills. Firstly, worker strategists will be able to share experiences and tactics that have been used by other unions, thus facilitating the formulation of future union strategy. Secondly, industrial affiliates will be able to take advantage of the economies of scale made possible through the joint provision of a number of essential services. These might include worker education and shop-steward training facilities, legal and medical services, and research projects on critical labour issues.


Should industrial unions be successful in negotiating improved conditions of employment and wages with managements, they will prove to be a powerful attraction for non-unionised black workers. Sustained growth in membership of industrial unions will ensure that they do not mushroom and collapse as general unions have done in the past, while it will pressurise other unions with a presence in the same sectors to reassess their roles in the broader labour movement.

### Backseat Politics

The birth of COSATU is widely regarded to be the precursor to a new era of black politics in South Africa. Many union strategists and worker leaders believe that the emergent labour movement has a definite role to play in the political arena. Because the majority of the working population is denied the franchise and other universal human rights, many black workers have come to view the union movement as an important political vehicle.

However, COSATU spokespeople appear to recognise that the current organisational capacities of the new labour movement, including the nascent industrial unions, are not yet mature enough to make any significant or sustained impact in the political arena. They are also aware that should they venture too far from the shop-floor in order to champion political causes, the federation will not be able to withstand an almost certain state crackdown. The harsh lessons of South African history have been invaluable for the black union movement.

Partly because of its pre-occupation with political campaigns directly dominated by the Congress Alliance leadership, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) lost its cutting edge as a labour force and eventually was forced into exile. SACTU's political activities in the turbulent 1950s not only elicited a repressive state counter-response, but



Mark Bennett

TRADE UNIONS

also meant that it neglected basic organisation on the shop-floor.

Joe Foster, the last general secretary of FOSATU, claimed that the movement's main task was the construction of 'an effective organisational base for workers to play a major political role as workers' (MacShane 1984: p150). Indeed, at the launch of COSATU it seemed that this strategy was still dominant. National Union of Mineworkers' leader Cyril Ramaphosa, warned that 'without strong shop-floor organisation, the political rhetoric would boil down to empty sloganising' (WM Vol1/No26 1985). A stronger shop-floor base, based on industrial unionism, will allow unions to gradually become more assertive in the political arena, as they will have a greater capacity to resist the disruptive effects of state intervention.

In many respects, COSATU's future prospects depend upon how successful the intended transition to industrial unionism is, coupled with further expansion. However, this process will not only be determined by the sincerity of its affiliates' commitment to industrial unionism, but also by the capacities of outside unions operating in the same sectors to resist COSATU's initiatives. In the following Indicator SA database, the competing strengths of COSATU affiliates and their rivals in four broad industrial sectors are analysed.

*Worker confidence in COSATU as a vehicle for attaining political rights will be enhanced should it successfully campaign to improve wages, working and community conditions.*

*Should COSATU venture too far from the shop-floor to champion political causes, a state backlash could destroy nascent union organisation*

## ORGANISED LABOUR'S TRIAL OF STRENGTH

Comparative Breakdown of Trade Unions in Four Industrial Sectors

### ● THE PAPER, WOOD AND PRINTING INDUSTRY ●

#### FEDERATION AFFILIATES/INDEPENDENTS

	Paid-up Membership
<b>COSATU</b>	
Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU)	11 856
SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)	<25 032
<b>TUCSA</b>	
National Union of Forestry and Allied Industries Employees	
SA Typographical Union (SATU)	43 145
<b>INKATHA</b>	
National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NSRAIEU)	<13 000
<b>United Democratic Front</b>	
National Union of Printers and Allied Workers	841
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWASA)	<1 400
National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers of SA	24 432
South African Society of Journalists	<781
Amalgamated Engineering Union	} artisan unions
SA Society of Boilermakers (SABS)	
SA Electrical Workers Union	

#### ANALYSIS

##### Diverse Sectoral Organisations

PWAWU is the only major COSATU affiliate active in the industry. SAAWU claims to have an active interest in the industry, but it is thought to be marginal. Although PWAWU has no other nationally operative, industrially-based opposition, it will face a long hard battle as it has decided to recruit workers from three large sectors of the industry, ie the paper manufacturing, printing and wood-working industries.

In the pulp and paper industry, the union has signed a number of important plant-level recognition agreements with the country's major pulp and paper manufacturers, eg with Mondi, Sappi, Nampak and Carlton. Its major opponents in the industry are three artisan-based unions: the all-white Amalgamated Engineering Union, SABS and the SA Electrical Workers Union. All of these have members operating in the pulp and paper industries, as well as NSRAIEU which has organised a number of unskilled African employees in two Natal paper mills.

In the printing industry, it seems that PWAWU's strongest opposition will come from the TUCSA affiliate SATU, which has entrenched many closed-shop agreements, as well as from MWASA, which has a presence in some of the major newspaper printing companies. However, current ideological battles within MWASA, and the imminent threat of further factions breaking away and establishing a rival union, does not augur well for its future.

### THE METAL, MOTOR ASSEMBLY AND COMPONENTS INDUSTRY

#### FEDERATION AFFILIATES/INDEPENDENTS

	Paid-up Membership
<b>COSATU</b>	
General Workers Union (GWU)	<10 000
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU)	36 789
Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union of SA (MACWUSA)	3 100
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU)	20 338
National Iron, Steel and Metal Workers Union (NISMWU)	976
SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)	<25 032
SA Tin Workers Union (SATWU)	581
United Metal, Mining and Allied Workers Union of SA (UMMAWUSA)	<8 335
<b>CUSA</b>	
Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers Union (SEAWU)	9 000
United African Motor and Allied Workers Union (UAMAWU)	4 841
<b>TUCSA</b>	
Iron Moulders Society of SA	2 203
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
Motor Industries Combined Workers Union (MICWU)	36 000
Motor Industries Employees Union of SA (white only)	21 794
SA Boilermakers Society (SABS)	
SA Metal and Engineering Employees Union	2 067

Once merger discussions between eight COSATU affiliates are complete, the federation is set to dominate the metal, motor assembly and allied industries.



Mark Bennett



## ANALYSIS

### Cosatu Mergers

Moves are well underway within COSATU to combine MAWU, NAAWU and the as yet unaffiliated MICWU, into a single industrial union. When the mergers eventually occur, there will be little that any other union can do to usurp COSATU's dominant position in the automobile industry. The biggest threat will come from the sustained economic recession, which led to thousands of auto-workers being retrenched during 1985.

NAAWU has already established itself as the only fully industrial union in the country, despite the fact that it has been fighting mass retrenchments country-wide. Roughly one-third of its membership is active in the tyre, rubber and motor components industry. In the past, NAAWU has managed to out-organise and displace CUSA's lacklustre UAMAWU, notably at the Nissan assembly plants in Pretoria and at a PUTCO-owned components plant in Brits. The disaffiliation of MICWU from TUCSA in July 1984 and its subsequent realignment with COSATU affiliates will add a further 35 000 coloured members to the new federation.

### The Metal Industry

In the metal industry, the former FOSATU affiliate MAWU is by far the largest union recruiting unskilled black workers. MAWU has a heavy presence in the large metal industries situated in the East and West Rand and in Natal.

Since 1982 it is estimated that more than 100 000 jobs have been lost in the metal and allied industrial sectors through the recession. However, MAWU's performance has been exceptional, for unlike other unions with a flagging membership, its presence in the metal industry has grown (IR Data Vol5/No4 1985: p20/24). The merger of UMMAWUSA will reunite a significant section of workers in the metal industry, as the union broke away from the East Rand branch of MAWU in late 1984.

The main opposition to MAWU and other COSATU metal worker unions is bound to come from some of the artisan unions that are operative in the industry, such as SABS. Many of these unions have recruited a large number of semi-skilled workers which they guard with closed-shop agreements. Although there has been co-operation in the past between MAWU and other craft unions, particularly through the offices of the South African local of the International Metalworkers Federation, renewed tensions between MAWU and SABS have become apparent recently.

## • THE FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY •

### FEDERATION AFFILIATES/INDEPENDENTS

	Paid-up Membership
<b>COSATU</b>	
Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU)	26 455
Retail and Allied Workers Union — Cape Town (RAWU)	3 830
SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)	<25 032
Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU)	19 596
<b>CUSA</b>	
Food and Beverage Workers Union (FBWU)	15 859
National Union of Wine, Spirits and Allied Workers (NUWSAW)	4 496
<b>TUCSA</b>	
African Tobacco Workers Union	2 167
National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers	579
National Union of Operative Biscuit Makers and Packers of SA	1 321
Sweet Workers Union	2 384
<b>Inkatha</b>	
National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NSRAIEU)	<13 000
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
Bakery Employees Industrial Union	2 181
Natal Baking Industries Employees Union	1 534
National Union of Dairy Industries Employees	7 000
Pretoria Baking and Confectionery Employees Union	773
Western Province Sweet Workers Union	313
Witwatersrand Baking and Confectionery Industrial Union	2 052

### Analysis

#### Cosatu Merger

Negotiations involving a merger of the three major COSATU unions active in the food, food processing and beverage industry are at an advanced stage. It is likely that a single industrial union, with more than 50 000 paid-up members organised in over 250 factories, could be established before June 1986. SAAWU has a presence in the food industry, but as the union is a general union it is difficult to accurately determine how many members it has in the food industry itself.

Long before the launch of COSATU, both FCWU and SFAWU had established a good working relationship, agreed not to poach members from each other and in some ways could already be regarded as a single negotiating unit. Although FCWU operates nationally, it has tended to concentrate its organising efforts in the fruit processing industry in the Western Cape. SFAWU has a heavy concentration of worker support on the Witwatersrand and in Natal, with a marginal presence in the Eastern Cape. RAWU's main support is found in the dairy industry in the Cape Peninsula.

Once unified, the COSATU food and beverage unions will face little national opposition because most of the other unions active in the industry represent only narrowly defined sectoral and regional interests.

#### Rivals and Arrivals

In 1983, SALDRU estimated that there were more than 34 unions operative in the food and beverage (manufacturing and processing) industries. COSATU's main opposition will probably come from the



Exuberant SFAWU members at COSATU's Durban launch in December 1985.

two nationally organised CUSA affiliates, FBWU and NUWSAW, with whom the chances of co-operation seem remote. FBWU general secretary, Leonard 'Skakes' Sikhakhane was at one time a leading figure in SFAWU until the union decided to affiliate to FOSATU, whereupon he left to form the FBWU.

Recently, SFAWU has scored impressive victories over the FBWU, whose membership in relative terms has been shrinking. Recently, after a two-year battle with FBWU, SFAWU negotiated a recognition agreement with Irvin and Johnson at their plant in Springs. SFAWU has also managed to win over a number of FBWU organisers on the East Rand.

During 1985, in Natal, before the COSATU launch, SFAWU managed to out-organise SAAWU's food affiliate, the FBWU, and the Inkatha-affiliated NSRAIEU. NSRAIEU's presence in some Natal sugar mills has shrunk rather dramatically due to the organising efforts of SFAWU. Because of present political tensions between Inkatha and COSATU, it is likely that the intense competition between the two unions may be settled more by political sentiment than by union appeal to rank-and-file workers.

Lastly, it is unlikely that any of the TUCSA affiliates will pose any threat to the better organised COSATU food unions as many of their unions represent workers from a number of localised factories. However, TUCSA unions maintain a significant presence in the tobacco industry.

## ● THE TEXTILES, CLOTHING AND LEATHER INDUSTRIES ●



COSATU's textile and clothing workers' union is faced with an uphill battle if it is to usurp TUCSA dominance in this industrial sector.

### FEDERATION AFFILIATES/INDEPENDENTS

	Paid-up Membership
<b>COSATU</b>	
General Workers Union of SA (GWUSA)	<2 205
National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW)	23 241
SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)	<25 032
SA Textile and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU)	1 900
<b>CUSA</b>	
Textile Workers Union — Transvaal	2 850
<b>TUCSA</b>	
Garment Workers Union of the Western Province	58 693
National Union of Clothing Workers — SA	24 862
National Union of Leather Workers	24 978
SA Canvas and Ropeworkers Union	234
SA Canvas and Ropeworkers Union — Cape	656
Textile Workers Industrial Union — SA (TWIU)	22 225
Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Industrial Union	3 125
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
Garment Workers Industrial Union — Natal (GWIU)	50 000

### ANALYSIS

#### NUTW Successes

The NUTW was one of the first major industrial unions to develop out of the 1973 Durban strike-wave and has made outstanding gains over the last decade. Initially it confined itself to organising workers in the large textile mills centered around Durban and Pinetown, but has gradually extended its sphere of influence to the Transvaal. More recently, it has moved into the Western Cape, where it opened a branch in 1983. At the same time, it has extended its scope of operation through recruiting workers employed in the knitting, clothing and footwear industries. Once the mergers are complete

within COSATU, the textile, clothing and footwear workers in SAAWU, SATAWU and GWUSA will only add minor pockets of support.

NUTW's major victory to date has been to win recognition from the gigantic Frame empire after ten years of shop-floor battle. In the two years preceding NUTW's recognition agreement signed with one of Frame's mills, the union was involved in 52 related legal cases. Although the NUTW has proven that it is the majority union at the largest of the five Frame factories in New Germany, TUCSA's TWIU still has recognition agreements with three other smaller factories within the group. Many of the NUTW's gains in the Transvaal have been at the expense of CUSA's Textile Workers Union (Charney 1983: p5).

#### Strong TUCSA and Independent Competition

Although NUTW has gained some ground on TUCSA affiliates, it is still dwarfed by other unions operating in the textile, clothing and associated industries. TUCSA represents more than 120 000 workers in all the major textile and clothing centres of the country — though the 50 000-strong GWIU (Natal) disaffiliated in July 1985.

TUCSA unions have become the repeated targets of strategically-planned NUTW poaching forays, and many affiliates have used closed-shop agreements to maintain their positions. Although by early 1985 NUTW had organised more than 2 500 workers in seven factories in the Cape Peninsula, it has avoided organising plants already organised by the TWIU.

Yet, all has not been plain sailing for NUTW. In May 1985, after a series of industrial court battles, the NUTW was defeated by the GWIU (Natal) in a ballot to determine who had majority membership at Natal Overall Manufacturers in Pinetown. At present the GWIU still has a number of closed-shop agreements with members of the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association.

### NOTES

● COSATU and CUSA membership figures correct as of end-1985, and TUCSA's membership correct as of end-1984. Most unaffiliated unions' membership figures are derived from SALDRU's 'Directory of South African Trade Unions' and are correct as of end-1983.

● The symbol < denotes that a general union has recruited members in that sector, but that the exact number is not yet determinable.

● Although all COSATU, TUCSA and CUSA affiliates are listed in each industrial sector, only the major unaffiliated unions operative in each sector are listed.

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IPRA



# OF INVENTION & INTERVENTION

## *Collective Bargaining After Wiehahn*

*By Kate Jowell, Assistant-Director,  
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*The growing success of South Africa's post-Wiehahn collective bargaining machinery is reflected in the increasing number of industrial disputes being resolved by institutional and procedural methods rather than strike action. Yet the advances made in stabilising labour relations could well be threatened by government intentions to 'reform' the statutory apparatus so as to ensure 'orderly development'.*

*National Manpower Commission member, Kate Jowell, argues that current legislative moves threaten to undercut the work-place relationships that both capital and labour have developed, and to upset the delicate balance between formal (statutory) and informal (non-statutory) bargaining mechanisms. In the following review, Jowell takes a critical look at the various dispute-handling mechanisms that have developed since 1979. She demonstrates that they provide an ideal basis on which to allow organised business and labour to refine the system further without more state intervention.*

**T**he labour relations system in South Africa is based on the 'plural model' common to industrialised western societies. The business enterprise, 'the company', is regarded as a coalition of different interests rather than the embodiment of a common goal (Fox 1975: p304). Thus conflicts of interest between management and labour are considered legitimate and not abnormal in any way - the challenge is to find ways to reconcile conflict and keep it within accepted bounds, so that dissension does not destroy the very enterprise itself.

The major labour statute, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) implicitly acknowledges that an innate conflict of interest exists. It attempts to institutionalise and channel disputes through collective bargaining and formalised procedures such as conciliation, arbitration, recourse to the Industrial Court and the legal strike. Furthermore, it is understood that the essence of our labour relations system is self-government by capital and labour.

The legitimate rights of the owners of capital and also those of organised groups of workers in the workplace are acknowledged in the LRA's legal framework. With some notable exceptions, the state avoids getting directly involved in labour conflict and acts largely as scribe and ring-keeper. In this role, government makes an effort to set some of the ground-rules for the parties, through formulating legislative mechanisms such as the Basic

Conditions of Employment Act, the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act etc.

The success of any system of labour relations is best judged on how well it achieves its aims of channelling and reducing conflict between labour and management. A measure of success must be that the statutory channels are actually used. The following assessment of the South African labour relations system reviews the successes and shortcomings of its major institutions and procedures over the past five years, and the development of non-statutory procedures that have supplemented them.

### The Registration Issue

Before 1979, African unions were unable to register and be part of the formal labour relations system. When the Wiehahn Commission proposed that they be allowed to register, political rhetoric and conventional wisdom suggested that many of the newer black unions would decline to participate. However, the real picture of today is of a continuing growth in the number of registered African unions, with their membership showing an increasing willingness to be part of the official framework (see table 1).

Although the growth in the number of unregistered unions has also been substantial, several of the more important unions formerly in this camp,

*Labour legislation should encourage management and unions to jointly resolve workplace disputes, with the government as a neutral arbiter*

*Despite initial political reservations about the Wiehahn reforms, more than 106 unions with 600 000 African members have since registered*

*Many unions have registered and are subjected to government controls even though they are unable to force companies into recognition agreements*

*Some black unions accuse industrial councils of being bureaucratic and unresponsive to the needs of unskilled and semi-skilled workers*

*In spite of conflict within the metal council, some of the newer unions retain membership in the hope of reforming it from within*

*Between 1973 and 1983 council agreements have increased the minimum wages of most labourers by up to 150 percent in real terms*

such as the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the General Workers' Union and the Food and Canning Workers' Union, have all recently plumped for registration - despite the somewhat limited rights they will be offered in return.

Registration does not make it much easier for unions to pressurise companies to sign recognition agreements or to engage in collective bargaining. Because registration is not synonymous with 'open sesame', unions that apply for registration probably do so largely to put themselves within the formal institutional framework. On the other hand, registration potentially opens up access to existing Industrial Councils (IC) or the possibility of helping to build a new one. Presumably, this was an important consideration for Cyril Ramaphosa, NUM General Secretary, when the union recently decided to apply for registration.

A further benefit stemming from registration is that it allows unions to negotiate stop-order facilities for union dues with companies. Although IC agreements have been used to preclude new stop-order agreements, recent judgements in the Supreme Court (Table Bay Spinners) and the Industrial Court (James North) have overturned these powers. According to the Department of Manpower (DOM), stop-order facilities have also now been granted to 56 of the 62 unregistered unions that asked the Minister of Manpower for permission (Van der Merwe 1985).

### Industrial Councils Adapt

Despite all the rhetoric, the Industrial Council (IC) system remains largely intact (see table 2). The wide-ranging criticisms levelled at ICs, specifically attacks on them as moribund institutions, relate largely to their inadequacy as dispute-settling bodies and as mechanisms for ensuring 'fair' wage levels. They are variously accused of being:

- unrepresentative and bureaucratic
- remote from the shop-floor
- dominated by vested white, coloured and Indian interests
- unresponsive to the real needs of largely unskilled or semi-skilled African workers.

Many of the councils indeed embody all of these things and as a result they are under severe stress. However, some ICs have opened their doors to the newer black unions, despite the power of individual council members to veto the admission of new parties. Others have responded to competition from non-party unions with more frequent wage settlements and with quicker, more streamlined, dispute-handling procedures. Some existing union parties are attempting to rebuild and revitalise the shop-floor links, attenuated by years of IC centralisation (Jowell 1984).

The IC for the metal industry is an instructive example. It represents more than 380 000 workers across a range of industries that differ widely in their technology and markets, and is arguably the most cumbersome and potentially bureaucratic of all the ICs. Yet this council has broadened its membership to include several new black unions, who have now participated in their fourth set of negotiations on industry wage rates. The negotiations have not been entirely successful - one union, the Metal and Allied Workers' Union, has refused to sign the agreement for the third successive year (see preceding debate: p1/4).

However, along with this unresolved conflict, the Co-ordinating Council of the International Metalworkers' Federation has developed a coalition of unions across colour lines represented on the metal industry's IC. New unions now serve on the industry pension fund and the International Metalworkers' Federation Council is in the process of putting forward recommendations on ways to restructure the metal IC in order to make it more manageable and responsive to its constituents' needs. All three events indicate a commitment to the institution and to its reform rather than to its destruction.

### Wage Rate Controversy

A comprehensive study of IC agreements (SALDRU 1984) has shown that minimum wage rates set by the councils for more than 80 percent of labourers (mostly African) rose in real terms between 1973 and 1983, by amounts ranging up to 150 percent. In the same period, 70 percent of artisan wage rates (mostly white, coloured and Indian workers) fell in real terms. Despite the inadequacies of the system, IC negotiations have undoubtedly contributed to a narrowing of the white/African wage gap.

The media reports on the SALDRU study claimed that the IC system was a failure because the wage rates negotiated were virtually all below the supplemented living-level. However, this is hardly a valid criticism of the bargaining forum - wage levels have as much to do with South Africa's political and economic order as they do with the labour relations mechanisms. In an economy characterised by massive unemployment, with a polity built on race discrimination and inequality, bargaining power cannot be equalised by the labour relations system alone.

The unions themselves have been more pragmatic than some critics of the system. Unions seeing jobs disappear to the unregulated homelands and who attempt to organise in such hostile territory are well aware that the IC system at least provides a floor to wages across a wide front. Far from working to destroy the IC system,




## COMING IN FROM THE COLD

*Black Union Participation in State Bargaining Institutions*

Table 1

### Registered and Unregistered Unions with African Membership 1979-1984



**FOOTNOTES**  
 1 Includes two unions with unspecified membership  
 2 Includes four unions with unspecified membership

Table 2

### Industrial Council (IC) Bargaining 1978-1985

Year	Number of ICs	Number of IC Agreements	African Workers Party to IC Agreements	African Workers Not Party to ICs but Affected by Agreements <sup>1</sup>	Total Number of African Workers Affected by IC Agreements	Total Number of All Employees Affected by IC Agreements
1978	102	99	—	—	539 397	995 299
1979	101	102	—	—	568 292	1 045 929
1980	105	98	—	—	602 854	1 095 472
1981	104	99	512 357	207 462	719 783	1 265 008
1982	104	79	455 938	183 516	639 454	1 103 455
1983	104	87	550 620	112 680	663 300	1 171 724
1984	102	94	505 200	159 300	664 500	1 183 399
1985	—	86	—	—	—	1 085 000

**FOOTNOTES**  
 1 Section 49(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act allows the Minister of Manpower the discretion to extend IC agreements to 'non-parties', ie groups of workers or employees who do not belong to ICs.

**SOURCES**

Department of Manpower, *National Manpower Commission annual reports 1979 to 1984*, and *Annual Reports of the Director-General of Manpower 1979 to 1984*.

To resolve disputes, the Industrial Court has been extensively used by those unions that will not deal with most government institutions

these unions have used it as a base from which to exert pressure on companies at plant-level, where they have greater resources and bargaining clout.

### Industrial Court Flaws

Since its halting start in 1979, the Industrial Court has been embraced with great enthusiasm by unions and workers alike; even by unions that will have no truck with other statutory labour relations institutions. The use of the Court to resolve labour-management disputes has increased phenomenally over the past six years (see table 3), eliciting criticism that it undermines other collective bargaining forums.

Some commentators claim that the IC

and conciliation board system, and the arbitration of disputes by a third party, are becoming mere conduits to the Court. Yet most of the Court's work has been in deciding status quo applications, which by definition give the parties time to jointly work out a collectively bargained solution.


The Industrial Court does have flaws of course, as the National Manpower Commission (NMC 1984: p272/345) and the financial press have pointed out. While these flaws have created uncertainty for both parties, the major contribution of the Court has been to instil a greater concern among both managers and union leaders for fair practice, for constitutionality and for dialogue. For the broad mass of workers, the fact that it may secure a fair

## THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

Settling Disputes the Official Way

Table 3

Selected Functions of the Industrial Court 1979-1985





deal for them has helped to establish a rare trust and confidence in a government institution.

### Few Legal Strikes

The considerable respect that currently exists for the institutions of labour relations is not shown towards those legislative procedures governing strikes. Few strikes in the country are legal, and the handful of legal strikes in the past few years were perhaps designed by union leaders more to make a propaganda point about the futility of striking legally, than to give the organisers safety from prosecution. It is doubtful that they were conducted in a constitutional way out of respect for the statutory procedures governing strikes.

### The Informal System

The efficacy of the informal system of collective bargaining that has grown around the statutory framework is a source of greater comfort. The proliferation of recognition agreements and other collective bargaining procedures at plant-level have no formal legislative standing at present. Yet the development of formalised recognition agreements, with written procedures for discipline and retrenchment, has exercised an important stabilising influence on industrial relations in South Africa.

The recognition agreement by definition implies an acknowledgement by both management and labour that each has legitimate rights and duties. Importantly,

*Collective bargaining in South Africa is regulated by the Labour Relations Act (LRA) as well as by informal plant-level procedures*

Table 4

### Conciliation Boards (CB)

After negotiations have deadlocked or resulted in some form of industrial action, either party to the dispute may ask the Minister of Manpower to appoint a temporary CB. However before the Minister appoints a CB he must ensure that certain conditions prevail:

- that a dispute actually exists
- that the dispute is not just a legal matter that could be settled in court
- that the applicants requesting the establishment of a CB are representative of either workers or employers
- that no industrial council exists that can solve the dispute
- that no other statutory agreement is already in existence made for example by an industrial council, another CB, an arbiter or a Wage Board.

### The Performance of Conciliation Boards 1978-1985

Year	Total Applications for CBs	Applications for CBs Refused by Minister of Manpower	Applications for CBs Withdrawn by Parties <sup>1</sup>	Applications for CBs Not Considered, Still in Progress or Deadlocked	Statutory CB Agreements <sup>2</sup>	Non-Statutory CB Agreements
1978	—	—	—	—	2	—
1979	29	3	8	12	2	4
1980	23	2	7	12	2	0
1981	24	5	11	4	2	2
1982	60	14	15	27	2	2
1983	113	22	27	56	1	7
1984	279	80	59	81	0	59
1985	514	—	—	—	—	—

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Most applications that are withdrawn are settled by the disputing parties.

<sup>2</sup> Most CB settlements are observed as 'gentlemen's agreements' by both parties. These figures concern only those cases where both parties asked for the agreement to be gazetted in order to make it legally binding.

#### SOURCES

Department of Manpower, *National Manpower Commission annual reports 1979 to 1984 and Annual Reports of the Director General of Manpower, 1979 to 1984*.  
Jones R A, *Collective Bargaining in South Africa*, MacMillan, 1984.

*Recognition agreements between management and unions are informal mechanisms that attempt to reduce shop-floor conflict*

*As South African strike data does not analyse all industrial conflict, it is difficult to judge the success of bargaining institutions in reducing conflict*

*Amendments to the LRA in 1984 are inexplicable if the government wishes to encourage management and labour to resolve disputes on their own*

*The Minister of Manpower's discretionary power to appoint conciliation boards should be handled by a more neutral arbiter - the Industrial Court*

the agreements also show that both parties accept collective bargaining as a means of resolving their problems. It will take time for some groups to really understand and act on the meaning of that commitment. The mere presence of a recognition agreement does not in itself resolve conflict - it merely focuses it.

In an early study of the contents of recognition agreements (Lizamore 1984), when less than 200 were thought to be in existence, two-thirds of the sample had some form of 'peace clause' restraining the parties from industrial action until certain procedural steps had been taken. Since then, the range and ingenuity of newly designed clauses has been considerable. Most have been designed to bolster the bargaining power of the strikers, whose common law weakness in the form of breach of contract cannot easily be offset by the moral virtues of undertaking a strike that is legal in labour law.

Former members of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (now affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions) have been steadfastly pressing employers into agreeing to fire all or none of their members in the event of a strike. Various companies have agreed to moratoria of anything from 24 hours to four weeks before firing workers. The agreement reached between Rowens and the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (July 1985) provides for a four-week stay of execution for union members if they honour a five-day cooling-off period and various arrangements for bargaining over the problem.

### Measuring Industrial Conflict

Has the preceding combination of formal and informal bargaining institutions kept outbreaks of industrial conflict to a minimum, thus achieving the system's real objective?

South African strike statistics are incomplete and the measure of industrial disruption by man days lost is in any case somewhat crude (Levy 1985). The number of strikes has escalated annually, but the measurement of unresolved industrial conflict by strikes alone is incorrect. It ignores the cost at which the absence of strikes is bought - either by management paying higher wages or by agreeing to more restrictive practices than they would like, or by workers turning their frustrations in other directions. Voluntary labour turnover, absenteeism, demotivation and industrial sabotage are just some of the manifestations of seldom measured frustration and conflict levels.

From one viewpoint all strikes are a sign of breakdown and disorder. From the opposite view, they signify industrial democracy at work (Kornhauser 1954: p267). Ultimately, given good economic

management by government, the true measure of successful industrial relations machinery is to be found in economic growth, ie how well do the main parties cooperate for the good of the enterprise and ultimately for the good of the country at large?

### Inappropriate State Intervention

In a system of self-governance where management and unions are implicitly encouraged to resolve their own difficulties through collective accommodation, interventions by government are often inappropriate. For instance, amendments made to the LRA in January 1984 are inexplicable in terms of the Act's overall objectives. For government to have the power to exempt parties from IC agreements bargained by representative groups is contrary to the spirit of the system.

Ostensibly, the Minister of Manpower retrieved this discretionary power from the Industrial Court partly so that he could protect small businesses or exempt decentralisation and homeland areas, where job creation might be hindered by IC wage levels. This may be both desirable and a legitimate objective of DOM's overall manpower policy. Nevertheless, the power to grant exemptions should properly lie with the Industrial Court, and should be exercised chiefly to fulfil the objectives of the labour relations system - to encourage bargaining and minimise unresolved or overt conflicts.

### Conciliation Boards

The Minister also has the power to decide whether to establish a conciliation board (CB) or not. While some control obviously needs to be exercised - if only to ensure that there is a legitimate labour dispute - long delays in waiting for a ministerial response can stretch the patience of the disputing parties beyond breaking point. Nor does the failure to explain why an application for a CB is refused inspire confidence in its value as a dispute-settling mechanism (see table 4).

If the Industrial Court has the power to grant status quo applications and does so when it believes that a prima facie case has been made out for temporary relief, then it would seem logical for it to have concurrent power to appoint a CB - in those, if not all cases. While it is not suggested that the Minister has exercised his discretion improperly, a more neutral arbiter would be more appropriate in a self-governing system.

For the handful of unregistered unions who have failed to provide records required by the Act, the LRA now provides that the agreements they make will be unenforceable in the courts. The



government thus directly intervenes in the common law contractual relationship between companies and their employees or unions. The anomaly stems from the government's imposition of compulsory duties on all unions in 1981, before which a voluntary framework for bargaining had existed.

One of the problems of imposing duties in law is that defaulters have to be punished eventually; in this case by a combination of stick or carrot rather than direct criminal sanctions. In short, the recent LRA amendment casts further doubt on the government's resolve to allow full self-government in the system. These reservations inevitably bring one to the current debate about possible labour reforms.

## Labour Reforms

Argument over the policing role of the state in labour relations centres on whether the system should remain voluntary and whether certain non-statutory practices should be made compulsory. For example:

- should the registration of unions be made compulsory?
- should companies be precluded from making plant-level agreements where IC agreements exist?
- should plant-level agreements be made statutorily binding, with criminal sanctions for infringements?
- should the LRA be prescriptive about unfair labour practices, rather than leaving it to the Industrial Court to decide?
- should the legal position of strikers be addressed?

In essence, these issues concern whether the statutory system and parties in the workplace should be protected from what is seen as the disordering influences of non-statutory labour practices. Some commentators argue that these informal practices should be brought within the ambit of statutory labour law to create more certainty and less instability. Other protagonists of formal regulation believe that conformity with the existing system is a desirable end in itself.

On the contrary, plant-level collective bargaining can secure an ordered, procedural settlement of disputes and is a stabilising influence in this period of change. Any government reforms should encourage this trend and buttress change rather than try to impose legislation and sanctions on either party. South Africa could learn from the failure of Mr Edward Heath's administration in the United Kingdom to reform informal industrial relations practices and impose an artificial consensus. In the early 1970s, British business refused to co-operate with the government to bring about structured change and thereby risk the system of plant-wide bargaining they had

nurtured with unions (Soskice 1984).

## Conclusion

Instead of pursuing 'orderly development' through more legislation and therefore more criminal sanction, there is much to be gained from letting organised business and labour find a modus vivendi in the immediate post-Wiehahn era - with a little help from the Industrial Court.

Our labour relations system, the product of dialogue and accommodation through collective bargaining, is now being reformed from within to make it more responsive to the needs of all parties. So far it has stood up remarkably well in the face of the most fundamental contradiction. In most western plural societies, industrial and political conflict have been largely separated - political conflict is being channelled by the vote and parliamentary government, while industrial conflict is resolved through collective bargaining procedures and industrial democracy.

Theoretically, the current South African industrial relations system is supposed to operate along the lines of this plural model. However, because the majority of the working population is still denied political representation, and because capitalism is seen by certain groups as synonymous with racism, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain a distinction between industrial and political conflict. In the current volatile political environment, union strategists are being forced to place a number of macro-political and economic issues on union agendas, most of which are beyond relief by industrial democratic means.

Today, the labour arena is one of the few genuine negotiating forums where blacks and whites are sitting around a table, learning the art of compromise and thrashing out new relationships from approximately equal power bases. Hopefully, we can begin soon on the same learning curve in the political arena, of beginning to hear and to accommodate conflicting interests. Otherwise, the positive relationships that have blossomed in the past six post-Wiehahn years will fade into oblivion after their brief moment of hope and glory. *IPWA*

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*If the LRA is to be further amended, should all plant-level agreements be made legally binding? Should unfair labour practices be spelt out?*

*Without further government interference, informal plant-level bargaining will help to stabilise labour relations instead of formal regulation*

*Our labour relations system is being reformed from within through daily practice and experience, to make it more responsive to the needs of all parties*

*In the current political climate, union strategists have been forced to place macro-political issues on their agendas, thus overloading bargaining channels*



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
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# RURAL & REGIONAL

M O N I T O R

INDICATOR VOL.3 NO.4  
SOUTH AFRICA AUTUMN 1986



After five controversial years of homeland independence under Life-President Lennox Sebe, the Ciskei's two contradictory public images are that of entrepreneurial growth and industrial investment versus massive unemployment and political repression.

- 1** *State Old-Age Pensions: A Blessing or a Burden?*
- 6** *Developing the Ciskei: In Search of a Strategy*
- 7** *States of Independence: Sebe's Ciskei*
- 15** *Industrialising the Ciskei: A Costly Experiment*
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Diagnosis

# STATE OLD-AGE PENSIONS A BLESSING OR A BURDEN?

By Dr Valerie Moller, Senior Research Fellow,  
Centre for Applied Social Sciences,  
University of Natal (Durban)

*The state pensions issue cannot be dismissed lightly; demographic trends spell out this message very clearly. It is estimated that the number of elderly people in South Africa will double between the year 1980 and the turn of the century, and will nearly quadruple by 2020. All over the world the over-sixties group is growing disproportionately faster than other age-groups, due to rising life expectancies and declining birthrates.*

*These trends have far-reaching implications for state expenditure on the provision for the aged in South Africa. Dr Valerie Moller investigates the progress made in reducing racial inequalities in pension benefits and appraises some of the solutions advanced to rationalise the controversial means test. In discussing the varying popular perceptions of old-age pensions found in different racial communities, Moller emphasises the critical family support role played by pension income, especially in rural black areas.*

Once a year South Africa's old folk become a national concern when the Minister of Finance awards increases to social pensioners in his budget speech in March. Very often, the plight of the elderly is conveniently forgotten during the rest of the year. The aborted Preservation of Pensions bill and the industrial unrest which followed in its wake during 1981 serve as reminders that this uncaring attitude may be dangerously complacent indeed.

Pensions were originally conceived as a basically urban institution to cope with the care of the aged in an urban-industrial setting. Rural pensions were instituted later, were more difficult to obtain, and until the 1960s, also paid at a lower rate. Rural pension rates were raised between 1966/68, mainly to discourage black urbanisation. Today the majority of the aged without means are African people who are domiciled in rural areas as a result of influx control regulations. The pensions issue is fast becoming a rural concern as growing numbers are claiming their rights in the homelands.

## Right or Privilege?

In South Africa the state makes provision for 'the indigent

aged' of all communities, although unequal pensions are payable to members of different race groups. State pensions were first instituted as a white privilege early in the century and gradually became a civil right which was extended to other race groups. All South African men over 65 years and women over 60 now qualify for a state pension if they pass the means test that stipulates an income and assets ceiling for prospective pensioners.

The obvious corollary of this social progress is the rising cost of pensions payments in South Africa, which is cause for concern. In 1983 about ten percent of South Africa's budget went towards social pensions, making care of the aged the third largest item of expenditure after defence and education. Although social pensions make provision for the indigent aged, the blind, war veterans, and disability grants, old-age pensions constitute the major type of pension. Unless otherwise stated, pensions refer only to old-age pensions in this article.

The burden of caring for the aged tends to be even greater in the fledgling independent and self-governing homelands. For example, 53 percent of the budget of KwaZulu's Department of Health and Welfare and 19 percent of KwaZulu's total annual budget is spent on social pensions, of which some 80 percent are old-age pensions.

KwaZulu pensioners at a rural pay-out point. Pension payments in the independent and self-governing homelands constitute a significant proportion of total welfare expenditure.  
Libby Ardington

PENSION INEQUALITIES

A select committee on pensions appointed by the South African parliament in March 1985 reported that state expenditure on pensions had increased by 315 percent in the nine year period before 1984, to R1 207 million. The committee estimated that central government would have to quadruple its 1984 pensions bill in order to maintain payments by the year 2 000 based on the present system of unequal pensions. It would have to spend almost 6,5 times as much if parity in pensions were to be achieved by then.

At a time when South Africa's economic future is uncertain, the prospects of increasing expenditure on the economically inactive does not appear to be a sound or attractive investment. This raises a number of questions: Are social pensions to be regarded as a right (a basic need), or as a privilege? Who shall be called upon to pay the pensions bill?

## The Legacy of Apartheid

The unequal pensions paid out to members of different race groups are a reflection of their perceived economic status in South African society. Over the last few decades pensions have regularly been paid out according to the formula 4:2:1 to white, coloured and Indian, and African pensioners, respectively (see data base). As recently as 1980, the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions justified this pensions formula in terms of the differential living standards of the four population groups. It is further argued that pension increases should be linked to the cost of living of the group concerned.

Although a pensions formula based on disparities in living standards may appear reasonable in the first instance, it is bound to perpetuate the basic inequalities inherent in South African society. In an era where subsidised housing for black people is gradually being phased out and all communities share the tax burden equally, anything short of pension parity is unacceptable. More progressive factions go so far as to recommend negative discrimination of white pensioners in order to rapidly narrow the gap in pension benefits.

Theoretically, the South African government is committed to achieving pension parity as soon as feasible. Table 1 demonstrates that since 1976/77, the percentage increases granted to black pensioners have been greater than those granted to whites. However, increases described in terms of percentages tend to disguise the slow progress made in narrowing the pensions gap and disguise the real hardships caused by absolute differences in pension benefits. As one spokesperson for pensions matters put it: pensioners cannot eat percentages; they are interested only in the rands and cents.

However, more rapid progress may be predicted for the future with the tricameral parliament. In 1985, after tough negotiations the new parliament, in its first year of operation, announced equal pension increases of R14 and bonus payments of R36 for old-age pensioners of all race groups.

## The Unequal Means Test

Members of the diverse lobby concerned with the care of the aged have at one time or another called for a complete revision of the means test formula. They argue that the means test as it presently applies to all communities contains discrepancies and anomalies, which are incompatible with the principle underlying social pensions. The means test effectively acts as a disincentive to save for old age and to use one's own initiative to supplement a meagre state pension with extra cash earnings. In African

communities, it may even further erode traditional patterns of family support for the aged.

It is clear that the means test has discriminated against Africans even more harshly than other race groups. For example, Pollack (1981) points out that during the period 1944 to 1972 there was no change in the free income allocation for Africans, while free means for whites had increased eightfold, and for coloured and Indian pensioners sevenfold. Since the late 1970s the income limits appear to be fixed at the racial ratio 4:2:1, which is even more discriminatory than the 1944 ratio of 2.5:1.6:1. Moreover, African income is defined more broadly than for other race groups and may even include support from children. Assets such as cattle and land which do not necessarily provide a living in the longer term may disqualify some needy elderly.

In inflationary times, erratic revision of the means test has caused the ceilings to get out of step with actual pension benefits. After each review period pensioners and would-be pensioners may suddenly be thrust into a completely new financial equation. For example, in 1977 when the means test was revised after a period of five years, the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions found it necessary to provide assurance that anyone receiving a government pension at the time would continue to do so even if his other private means exceeded the ceiling of the means test. In 1983 a substantial revision of the means test made state pensions accessible to an additional 5 000 white voters from one day to the next.

In particular, the means test has caused extreme financial hardship during those periods when the means ceiling has been set substantially below the maximum pension benefit. In 1982, white persons in receipt of a small private pension of R117 were disqualified from becoming social pensioners, whereas their counterparts with no income could receive up to R135 in state pension benefits. Similarly, in 1983 terms, a black pensioner earning a private pension of R29 was substantially worse off than his or her black counterpart with no income other than a full state pension of R57.

The inflexible means test may have played an important role in ringing the death-knell for the fledgling voluntary pension schemes which were introduced for domestic workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1983 the Old Mutual group pension plan was discontinued due to lack of support. By virtue of their typically low contributions and late age of joining, many domestic workers will receive just enough benefits to disqualify them from receiving even a basic state pension.

## Diverse Solutions

The Black Sash organisation recommends that in order for private pensions to be worthwhile they should pay substantially more than the state pension. An alternative recommendation by the Human Awareness Programme is that private pensions should pay just enough so that pensioners can slip through the means test and earn a basic state pension, which together will add up to the maximum state pension payable.

What are the solutions to an equitable application of the means test? Extremists call for the complete abolition of the means test, but the majority opinion is that universal old-age pensions, one of the basic characteristics of the welfare state, would be too costly for South Africa at this stage. However, if the means test is to remain, regular revision is essential so that free income and asset allocations are realistically linked to current standards of living. Until parity in pensions is achieved careful



## RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN OLD AGE PENSIONS


Table I Comparison of state old-age pensions for four race groups, 1973/84

Year	AFRICAN*		INDIAN		COLOURED		WHITE		TOTAL	
	Number	Expenditure R000	Number	Expenditure R000	Number	Expenditure R000	Number	Expenditure R000	Number	Expenditure R000
1973	280 278	17 416	10 632	2 586	66 987	16 161	114 563	59 715	472 460	95 878
1974	299 670	22 021	10 933	3 049	71 300	19 608	112 216	74 020	504 119	118 698
1975	310 607	32 610	12 201	4 311	73 748	25 630	128 627	93 044	525 183	151 595
1976	323 416	46 734	13 411	4 980	75 936	28 060	132 419	100 335	545 182	180 109
1977	346 289	63 653	14 527	6 688	78 347	33 366	134 548	114 852	573 711	218 559
1978	359 398	78 429	15 383	7 812	81 612	38 698	137 482	149 390	593 875	274 329
1979	371 921	89 291	17 125	10 232	86 843	52 486	139 761	163 463	615 650	315 472
1980	398 294	116 590	18 377	12 797	89 768	61 802	141 154	186 973	647 593	378 162
1981	418 811	135 928	19 480	15 529	91 849	74 461	142 137	208 557	672 277	434 475
1982	434 929	187 100	20 583	18 678	93 785	87 047	140 039	233 006	689 336	525 831
1983	448 599	234 372	21 611	22 153	96 068	100 489	142 764	261 627	709 042	618 641
1984	471 007	286 000	21 981	24 503	101 129	112 848	143 576	268 201	737 693	691 552
Percentage increase 1973-1984	68,0	1 542,1	106,7	847,5	51,0	598,3	25,3	349,1	56,1	621,3


\*Including non-independent homelands

SOURCES  
SA Institute of Race Relations Surveys  
Press statement by the Select Committee on Pension Benefits, Cape Town,  
May 1984

### Per Capita Annual State Expenditure: Old-age Pensions 1982/83



### State Old-Age Pensions: Individual Maximum Monthly Payments 1977/84



FOOTNOTES  
1 Double the amount cited for Africans is payable bimonthly (see text).  
2 Each group also receives an additional cost-of-living bonus, amounting to R36 in 1985.

SOURCES  
Race Relations Surveys,  
Daily News 19/3/85

PENSION INEQUALITIES



*Informal trading on pension day. Until the 1960s rural pensions, which were more difficult to obtain, were paid at a lower rate than the urban equivalent.*

consideration must be given to the lowest pension earners, ie elderly black people.

One typical recommendation is that free income should always be slightly in excess of pension benefits to prevent the type of anomalies cited above. Furthermore, in the case of the poorest category of elderly, the emphasis of a means test should be placed on income from assets rather than on assets as such. For example, rural pensioners may have access to land which they neither have the strength nor the financial means to work. They may own cattle which they are not at liberty to sell. In the urban areas, home ownership may similarly become a liability rather than an asset for the elderly with no visible means of income.

### Pensions Policy Debate

The progressive elimination of current shortcomings in the pension system will add to the steadily increasing pensions bill. Practical solutions to raise revenue for state pensions include additional taxation or the controversial state lottery, to cite but a few examples. A more radical solution debated is to reverse the trend and declare a pension a privilege rather than a right, ie to abolish state pensions altogether. Not surprisingly, this type of recommendation has proved a very unpopular one among the elderly of all communities.

In the white community, the concept of a state pension as a right is well-established. Even the reduction of the existing pension benefit is unthinkable. Widespread indignation met the remark made in 1981 by Dr Munnik, then Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions, that white pensioners could eat well on as little as R20 a month. Dr Munnik's remark was considered in poor taste and touched individual sensibilities.

A proposed reduction or withdrawal of state pension benefits for black people would undoubtedly have more severe repercussions. South Africa has taken on a social responsibility towards its old folk which it cannot easily shrug off, for political and humanitarian reasons. This is especially so at a time when external pressure calls for the lifting of discrimination in all spheres of life, including state pensions.

The government's declared intention to share the responsibility of pensions with the private sector clearly represents a middle-of-the-road solution. Similarly, in other areas such as housing and education, the public sector has come to realise that it cannot meet the needs of a growing population single-handedly and must face the challenges of the future in a joint venture with the private sector. To cite the case of housing, the response of the private sector has been slow but positive in some instances. In contrast, the reaction to the proposed Preservation of Pensions bill has been resoundingly negative (see Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 1/No 3; and Issue Focus No 4).

### Popular Perceptions

Historically, the pensions concept has held different meanings among the diverse communities making up South Africa. Under financial pressure, there are visible signs that pensions might revert to becoming a privilege for the few again. The organisations concerned with the care of the elderly are adamant that this should not be the case; that pensions should be regarded as the right of every elderly South African with limited means.

Unless the elderly establish consensus on the role of pensions for their welfare, pensioners will be unable to promote their own interests. Because Africans are the largest and fastest growing group among the elderly, it is imperative that their perception of pensions is given due consideration. The popular view is that owing to its novelty, the pension concept is radically different among this community.

Neither the principles nor the practice of the pension system may be clearly understood among African people, but the right to a pension as such appears to be widely known. Research conducted by the author (Moller 1984) suggests that urban workers perceive a pension to be a right which is earned for services rendered and taxes paid throughout a working lifetime. As regards rural perceptions, Ardington of the Development Studies Unit at the University of Natal points out that the return on taxes in the form of pensions is one of the only types of improvements in their standard of living that many black rural folk will ever see.

However, pension rights are not seen by African people to be granted automatically to all needy aged. In response to a survey item asking black urban workers to outline a success story related to the retirement phase of life, the ordeal of applying for an old-age pension emerged as a distinctive theme (Moller 1984).

### A Family Affair

In African communities, pensions are a family and a community concern rather than an individual matter. In making application, the community (in the person of the local headman or other influential person) must vouchsafe for the circumstances of the elderly person — that he or she is indeed entitled to a pension. In addition, the social circumstances of the family are taken into consideration when applying the means test. By the same token pension money is also regarded as a benefit for the entire family.

The conception of a pension as a family rather than an individual affair has a number of implications of great consequence for the beneficial effects of the pension system. On the negative side, there is the danger that pensioners may be taken advantage of and their personal needs and aspirations neglected, if a pension is seen as a family income. It has been observed that pensioners attract adult dependents who shirk their duties as independent breadwinners. It is also a well-known fact that black



parents working in town expect the grandparents — if they earn a pension — to support and care for grandchildren.

However, these cases are likely to occur under any pensions system. To attempt to eliminate abuse by restricting pension rights may only prejudice the thousands who receive real benefits.

On the positive side, access to a pension in a rural community has a status-enhancing effect for the elderly individual, which may improve morale. Black pensioners are considered to be credit-worthy members of the community. In extreme cases families may have a greater incentive to care for the physical needs of an elderly member of the family, to ensure that he or she continues to live to a ripe old age. In rural areas hard hit by drought and unemployment, pensions have become the only means of subsistence for entire families.

### The Unemancipated Pensioner

In most societies age is a great equaliser. Within the limits imposed by racial inequalities, South Africa is no exception. The general plight of the elderly of all races was highlighted during the Year of the Aged in 1982. This was a time when civil pensioners living on a fixed income and social pensioners living on meagre state pensions began to feel the bite of inflation very intensely (see graph).

A number of action groups were formed during this period which cut across racial divisions, at least in name if not in practice. The aim was to increase pensioner power, to



Many of the rural elderly do not receive the pensions they are entitled to, as a result of ignorance, and a complicated payout system.

preserve the rights of the elderly, and to fight for a decent lifestyle for the aged during inflationary times.

Representations were made to the minister in charge to regularly update the means test and to scrap the system of bimonthly pension payments for blacks.

Elderly black people have felt the inflationary times intensely and joined the chorus of protest. In 1984, Soweto pensioners staged a demonstration to protest against the high cost of living, in spite of the fact that their rent debt had been written off the previous year. In a symbolic gesture, braziers were set up in Soweto to warm overanxious pensioners who spent the night at the pensions payout centre. In another urban area a community centre was planned, with a huge verandah to provide shelter for pensioners on pay days. Service organisations came forward to assist the needy by distributing food parcels to the aged on a regular basis.

More substantial measures have since been taken to improve the situation of the urban black elderly in the longer term. These include the formation of societies for their care, which aim among other things to develop service centres for the township elderly along the lines of those in white areas. Advice offices have also been established for pensioners who require information, assistance and legal support in securing pension rights. A forthcoming case study (Rural and Regional Monitor Vol 4/No 1) will investigate current efforts to reform the present pensions payout system in KwaZulu.

### Conclusions

Black pensioners have found new friends in the tricameral parliament. At the same time there is a danger that treating pension issues as an 'own (community) affair', while passing the responsibility of administering African pensions to the homelands, will dilute the fragile solidarity in the ranks of South Africa's pensioners.

Some quarters argue that developing nations can ill-afford to pay any formal state pensions when the bulk of their population is under fifteen, and infrastructure and social services for people of all ages are generally underdeveloped. It is further argued that the introduction of social pensions for whites was a lack of foresight, an historical error which has unnecessarily raised expectations among the contemporary black elderly. Another point of view is that developing countries of all ideological persuasions are encountering similar problems caring for their aged. It is primarily the changing structure of the family and increased geographical mobility which has affected traditional solutions applied to the care of the aged.

Whichever view one takes, South Africa has developed a social pensions system which is well-advanced. Ideally, it may even serve as a vehicle for the social development of the poorer sectors of its population. As will be discussed in a sequent article, better use of the administrative structures of the pensions payout system, together with the regular cash injections of pensions into the poorer sectors of the economy, may act to stimulate development and to reduce some of the spatial inequalities which exist in South Africa.

### IPIA

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# DEVELOPING THE CISKEI

## IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY

*In the first five years of independence since 1981 the Ciskei has remained consistently in the public eye. The repressive and turbulent rule of Sebe's administration, and contradictory reports of severe rural poverty and dramatic economic progress, have made it one of the most controversial of all South Africa's homelands.*

*This Indicator SA focus on the Ciskei includes both a broad overview of changing conditions in the homeland since independence, and two articles dealing with the specific issue of industrialisation in the region, but from two very different perspectives. The success of decentralisation initiatives in the Eastern Cape has been the subject of much heated debate, particularly among development planners. This debate is significant not only at the regional level, but also in terms of its consequences for the decentralisation programme in South Africa as a whole.*

*In the first article, Indicator SA researcher Vicki Cadman draws on a major study of the Ciskei recently published by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, as well as several other statistical sources, to review the progress made in the Ciskei over the past five years. She identifies several major demographic and economic trends, locating them in the broader context of the South African government's policy of territorial apartheid. Basing her evaluation on the ambitious 10 point plan Life-President Lennox Sebe spelt out at independence, Cadman concludes that severe overcrowding, rural poverty, high unemployment and a significant urban/rural divide in living standards are the deteriorating features that characterise the Ciskei today.*

*The second contributor, economic historian Alan Hirsch, recently completed his masters thesis on industrialisation in the Ciskei. Hirsch traces the history of the South African government's decentralisation programme, focuses on a case study of industrial growth at Dimbaza, and critically examines investment incentives. The abuse of incentives and the exorbitant cost of funding this policy, prompted the 1983 Swart Commission to recommend the creation of a tax-haven in the Ciskei as an alternate means of attracting investors. Hirsch refutes this strategem, maintaining that the no-tax option seems unlikely to stimulate adequate employment growth, or any kind of integrated long-term economic development in the region.*

*The third contributor, Leon Louw of the Free Market Foundation, takes up the cudgels in defense of the Ciskei's contemporary laissez-faire experiment in industrial development. One of the architects of Ciskei's economic reforms and a member of the Swart Commission, Louw claims that many critics have chosen to examine selected issues and thus tended to misinterpret the larger policy package. He disputes many of Hirsch's criticisms, and claims that privatisation, deregulation and the elimination of company tax are already showing dramatic positive results. Louw concludes that these policies will cumulatively boost economic growth in the Ciskei, while helping to reduce unemployment through attracting mostly labour-intensive industry.*



# STATES OF INDEPENDENCE

## Sebe's Ciskei

By Indicator SA Researcher Vicki Cadman



THE CISKEI

On 4 December 1986, Ciskei will celebrate its fifth year of homeland independence. When Chief Minister Lennox Sebe accepted independence for the newly created republic in 1981, he spelt out an ambitious 10-point plan for his homeland's future. Among his goals were:

- the establishment of a free society, 'in which Ciskeians can live in safety with self-respect and dignity'
- the institution of sound democratic government
- to establish a sound economic base, through developing the agricultural sector; and most importantly
- to attempt to overcome widespread poverty and provide each Ciskeian with 'a meal a day'.

Whether it has pursued or overturned each of these goals, the Ciskei government has attracted considerable attention from both the local and international media. The fledgling state's turbulent political course and

President Sebe's increasingly repressive rule have earned it a certain notoriety, while its classical laissez-faire efforts at promoting economic development have also aroused considerable interest.

Reports over the past five years have painted conflicting pictures of life in an 'independent' Ciskei. Studies documenting the miserable conditions in rural resettlement camps contrast starkly with optimistic reports of dramatic industrial progress. The following review evaluates present day conditions in the Ciskei in terms of the progress made towards Sebe's goals since attaining 'independence'.

### Rapid Population Growth

By 1984, after some land consolidation, the Ciskei covered an area of 755 990 ha, inhabited by a de facto population of 912 161. Table I indicates that a tremendous increase in population took place between 1980/84, constituting over 71.6 percent of the total population growth recorded for the

*A queue for jobs outside a factory in Dimbaza. Unemployment is a major problem in the Ciskei.*

*One of President Sebe's key independence goals was to overcome poverty and provide each Ciskeian with 'a meal a day'*

*Ciskei's population has increased tremendously since 1980 due to a high birth rate, forced removals and return migration from white rural areas*

*Many Ciskeians are moving to local towns, forced from the rural areas by overcrowding, unemployment and growing rural poverty*

*Large peri-urban squatter settlements are emerging as a result of the inability of Ciskeian towns to absorb the influx of new jobseekers*

*Rural overcrowding is a serious problem in the Ciskei. It has a higher population density than any of the other homelands except QwaQwa*

previous decade. The major factors responsible for this increase are the high birth rate (resulting from an almost total lack of family planning), the continued resettlement of Ciskeians from South Africa, and return migration from white rural areas.

Besides forced removals, Hirsch and Green (1983) attribute the influx of Africans from white rural areas to several trends, including the increased mechanisation of white agriculture, the consolidation of farms and subsequent rationalisation of labour. Also, there are still an estimated 47 600 people living in seven 'black spot' communities in the 'white' South African corridor between Transkei and Ciskei. These communities, while subject to a government moratorium, may still be removed if not granted a permanent reprieve from the dictates of territorial apartheid.

An examination of population movement and settlement within the Ciskei itself (see box 1) reveals two major trends, both typical of all South Africa's homelands. Firstly, overcrowding, unemployment and the growing impoverishment of the rural areas are increasingly pushing Ciskeians in search of employment towards both homeland towns and surrounding 'white' towns. For example, the population of Dimbaza in the Ciskei soared from 20 000 to 50 000 between 1980/84 (Hirsch 1985: p3). The second major trend in population movement is the emergence of closer settlements in the rural areas.

#### Homeland Urbanisation

The selection of Dimbaza as a

decentralisation point and the subsequent development of industry there, explain its attraction as a source of employment. Similarly, although exact figures for Zwelitsha and Mdantsane are unobtainable, the number of people living in planning region 1 (which includes these major townships) rose steadily from 52.5 percent of the total Ciskeian population in 1980, to 61.3 percent in 1984. Zwelitsha and Mdantsane have effectively become 'dormitory suburbs' for the industries of East London, located inside South Africa.

Peri-urban squatter settlements are increasingly found on the outskirts of Ciskei's towns because the urban areas do not have the infrastructure or resources to absorb the steady influx of workseekers. The Surplus Peoples Project (SPP 1982: p41) identifies the emergence of substantial shack settlements at Phakamisa (3 000 people) and Ndevana (40 000 people) outside Zwelitsha as examples of this trend. The Swart Report (1983: p49) has confirmed observations that, 'Squatting is occurring on a large scale, particularly on the peripheries of the Mdantsane-Zwelitsha complex at Blue Rock, Ndevana, Phakamisa and elsewhere.'

#### Closer Settlements

A large number of former South African residents resettled to the Ciskei end up in closer settlements, of the type defined as 'areas where people live at urban densities without access to arable or grazing land' (Simkins 1985: p79). In 1982, an estimated 70 000 Ciskeians were living in such communities (SPP 1982: p41).

### Data Base

#### DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE CISKEI

Table 1 ● POPULATION INCREASE 1970/84 ●

	De facto population	% increase	De jure population <sup>4</sup>
1970	350 741 <sup>1</sup>		
1980	677 820 <sup>2</sup>	93	1 073 449 <sup>5</sup>
1984	912 161 <sup>3</sup>	34.5	Between 1 412 161 — 1 912 161 <sup>6</sup>

**SOURCES**  
 1 Hirsch and Green, 1983  
 2 Ciskei Development Information, 1985  
 3 Op cit  
 4 The de jure population of the Ciskei includes migrants who were working in South Africa during the census, and any other people who qualify as Ciskeian citizens but live beyond the homeland's borders  
 5 Trovisan I, Independent Homelands: An analysis of selected issues in South Africa — Homeland Relations, MA thesis in Political Studies, UCT 1984.  
 6 Swart Report 1983

Table 2 ● POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ●

1984	Number of inhabitants	Percentage of total population
Large urban areas	330 000	36.2%
Small urban areas	51 944	5.7%
Rural areas	530 000	58.1%

**SOURCE** Ciskei Review Supplement to Daily Dispatch 3/12/85



Serious rural overcrowding is one of the fundamental problems facing the Ciskei (see table 2). In 1980, the estimated population density of the homeland was 118.9 per km<sup>2</sup> (Charton 1985: p261). By 1984, despite the addition of extra land through consolidation, the vast increase in population had pushed population density up to 127 people per km<sup>2</sup>. As only about 12 percent of the land is arable, the amount of arable land per family of six is 0.7 ha. The only other homeland with a lower figure is QwaQwa, at 0.2 ha per family, while in 'white' South Africa the equivalent ratio is 4.2 ha per family (Tapson 1985: p237).

### Small Urban Areas

Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Sada/Whittlesea and Dimbaza constitute the only large urban settlements in the Ciskei, while 'small urban areas' make up the remaining ten proclaimed towns. The small urban areas are remarkable for having a lower average household income than either the large urban or rural areas (see box 2). The inhabitants of these areas are doubly disadvantaged. They do not have any access to arable or grazing land, and they lack the employment opportunities available in the large urban areas.

At least five of the ten small urban areas are

*Small urban areas are the poorest communities in the Ciskei - they lack both access to arable land and the job opportunities available elsewhere*

## Data Base


### THE CISKEI'S GREAT URBAN/RURAL DIVIDE

Studies on the Ciskei (eg Bekker et al 1982) have revealed a significant difference between urban and rural incomes in the homeland. This may be partly explained by the increasing inability of the agricultural sector to provide a viable income for rural Ciskeians. More and more rural communities have come to resemble 'displaced urban communities', where people have little or no access to arable or grazing land and rely almost entirely on wage labour.

Pensions and migrant remittances already constitute a major part of household income in the rural and small urban areas. It is increasingly apparent that a major priority of Ciskei's economic planners should be the provision of wage labour for the vast reservoir of unemployed and underemployed inhabitants in these areas.

*The gap between urban and rural standards of living reflects the growing impoverishment of the agricultural sector*

Table 3 AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD (BY AREA)



● For comparative purposes, the Household Subsistence Level for an African family of six in East London was R219,45 and R268,91, in 1981 and 1983 respectively.

#### ANALYSIS

- In 1983 the average monthly income of a rural Ciskeian household (R282,66) was 60 percent of that of an urban Ciskeian household (R465,94).
- The average household income for families in both the small urban and rural areas was less than the very basic Household Subsistence Level calculated for an African family living in East London's townships.
- The gap between rural and urban incomes has narrowed slightly from 1981 to 1983, because of an increase in other sources of income (eg wages and salaries; and 'contributions received', ie migrant remittances, etc).
- Earnings from agriculture have decreased dramatically (see table 4).

*Reduced earnings from agriculture has meant that rural communities have become dependent on wage labour and migrant remittances*

*Pensions also constitute an increasingly significant part of household income in the small urban and rural areas*

*Rural overcrowding has been exacerbated by influx control and, before the recent moratorium, by forced removals*

*The severe drought of 1981/83 killed much animal stock, and was partly responsible for the current rural economic crisis*

*The bulk of the Ciskei's gross national product is earned by migrants and commuters working outside the homeland's borders*

*High decentralisation incentives and an abundant supply of unorganised labour initially attracted industry to the Ciskei*

resettlement sites where studies (eg SPP 1982; Hirsch and Green 1983) have shown that conditions are often considerably worse than elsewhere in the Ciskei. A survey of conditions in three resettlement camps (Ellis et al 1982) revealed a total monthly household income of R55, which constitutes about a quarter of the total average monthly income in the Ciskei. The breakdown of average household incomes presented in tables 3-4 does not indicate these extremes of poverty that exist in parts of the Ciskei.

### Rural Poverty

In the homelands, rural poverty, intimately linked to overcrowding, is exacerbated by the influx control system and forced removals. In February 1985 the Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Dr Viljoen, declared a moratorium on removals, which seems to have been observed in the Eastern Cape. However, an ironic twist to the resettlement controversy are Sebe's recent attempts to resettle 'troublesome' Ciskeians back in the Republic. In February 1986 an entire village was dumped on the South African side of the border because, according to the Ciskeian authorities, they had been 'spreading instability in the area by killing people, assaulting government officials and burning their properties' (Weekly Mail 6/2/86).

Nattrass (1985: p17) identifies several other factors contributing to the growing levels of poverty in black rural areas:

- the lack of capital
- the failure to adapt farming techniques to meet changing needs.

Some aspects of the rural economic crisis in the Ciskei can be attributed to natural causes. The severe drought of 1981/83 almost destroyed subsistence agriculture in the territory and severely affected animal production, as thousands of stock died. In 1980 the Quail Commission (p73) estimated that the Ciskei had about 195 000 beef cattle and 430 000 sheep and goats, the only major food item in which the homeland was self-sufficient. But by 1984 thousands of stock had died during the drought, reducing numbers to 74 897 cattle, and to 402 815 sheep and goats.

### The Economics of Dependence

The economic dependence of the homelands on 'white' South Africa has been extensively documented, highlighting the essential weakness of the Ciskeian domestic economy (see box 3). Table 5 shows that the number of migrants and commuters working outside the Ciskei increased from 84 000 to 110 000 between 1981 and 1984. In 1984 the Ciskei's gross domestic product (which excludes migrant earnings) was estimated at R293,2 million. This represents only 43 percent of the gross national product (which includes migrant earnings) at R681,8 million, and

indicates that the homeland is largely dependent on the export of migrant labour to the central economy.

The large scale export of labour from the Ciskei has extensive ramifications for the area. The influx control system ensures that the homeland bears the responsibility for housing, educating and supporting the family of the migrant or commuter, while the South African economy reaps the benefits of the workers' labour. In addition, the Ciskei serves as a 'dumping ground' for the old, disabled and unemployed. The South African fiscus does, however, make a considerable financial contribution to the provision of the above services, amounting to R186 million in 1984/85. Much of the considerable development aid South Africa provides to the homeland is spent on health, education and welfare.

Nevertheless, this assistance clearly illustrates another fiscal aspect of Ciskei's economic dependence on South Africa (see table 7). In 1984, only 38.6 percent of the Ciskei government's total revenue came from 'own sources'. As long as the homeland economy remains so heavily dependent, both directly and indirectly, on the core economy, the Ciskei will never be able to exercise true autonomy in its political and economic decisionmaking.

### Industrialisation and Employment

In five years of homeland independence, Ciskei's economic planners have introduced innovative, albeit controversial strategies for promoting industrial and agricultural development in the homeland. These strategies constitute an important part of the homeland's battle against poverty and unemployment, as it pursues the elusive 'meal a day' goal.

Enticing loan, wage and tax incentives and an abundant supply of cheap non-unionised labour initially attracted investors to the Ciskei. As industrialisation in the homeland progressed, it appeared to many that here, at least, South Africa's decentralisation policy was succeeding — by March 1985 over 109 industries had been established in the Ciskei, providing jobs for 24 350 workers (Ciskei Review in Daily Dispatch 3/12/85). But there have been many disadvantages. Incentives have been abused by some investors, and the Ciskei government is increasingly unable to fund the huge expenditure on incentives required by this policy.

One of the recommendations of the Swart Commission (1983) was the introduction of a no-tax option, which could eventually replace the incentives scheme. The abolition of company tax, it was argued, would attract highly profitable firms. But critics argue that it would also tend to attract capital intensive industries (see following article). In addition, a survey of existing firms in the Ciskei (Tomlinson and Addleson 1985) revealed that





Alan Hirsch

## THE CISKEI

a majority far preferred the incentives option, and only 75 percent of respondents felt that they would be able to continue to operate profitably if incentives were withdrawn.

In any case, neither policy seems to carry the potential to solve the escalating unemployment problem. In 1985, 170 000 Ciskeians, comprising 47 percent of the economically active population, were unemployed — excluding underemployed subsistence farmers — and an estimated further 7 million job seekers will enter the job market by 2010 (Swart Report 1983: p7).

The Swart Report identified the development of industry as providing the 'spearhead' for economic development and job creation in the Ciskei, thus implicitly acknowledging the failure of Sebe's initial plans for the agricultural sector to fulfil this role. The commission did propose wide-ranging land tenure reforms, through introducing freehold title to tribal land. These measures are designed to concentrate land into commercially viable units, farmed by the most efficient farmers. However, if pursued, one of the consequences of this strategy could well be to push poorer farmers off their farms and leave even more Ciskeians landless and unemployed (Zingel 1984: p4).

### Education and Health

An important priority in poor, developing countries is the provision of adequate social services, particularly in health and education. In the Ciskei, central government expenditure on health and education has actually dropped over the past three years, in both real and proportional terms. In 1982/83, the Ciskeian government spent R105.6 million on these services, which constituted 34.1 percent of total expenditure. In 1984/85 the amount was R96.6 million, or an equivalent 22 percent.

Tomlinson and Addleson (1985) postulate that expenditure on health and education has been reduced to allow for increased budgeting for decentralisation concessions.

Although the majority of Ciskeians have access to educational facilities, these tend to be very inadequate. In 1983/84, the per capita expenditure on education in the Ciskei (R161,24) was lower than that for any of the four race groups in South Africa (R1 511,00 for whites, R905,00 for Indians, R501,11 for coloureds and R166,63 for Africans, respectively). It was also less than that for any of the three other independent homelands, ranging from R171,00 (Venda) and R171,97 (Transkei), to R245,64 (Bophuthatswana).

The Ciskei has been less affected by the school boycotts that have disrupted black education throughout South Africa since 1980. Yet in 1983, the percentage of candidates who actually obtained their Standard 10 certificates (without matric exemption) out of the total number writing matric, was only 39 percent. This proportion has decreased at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent since 1979. The comparable figure for African pupils in the Republic, including the self-governing homelands, was a significantly better 48 percent.

The 1980 census figures reveal that 255 060 Ciskeians (37.6 percent of the total population) had either no education, or their level of education was unknown, and a further 295 200 (an equivalent 43.6 percent) had not reached standard 6. These low levels of education are yet another drawback that further disadvantage the Ciskeian workseeker and serve to hinder development in the homeland.

In 1984, Prof G de Klerk, chairman of the Medical Association of South Africa, said that while the white health services in South

*The failure of the agricultural sector led the Swart Commission to identify the development of industry as the basis for economic growth*

*Government expenditure on health and education dropped between 1982/5, despite the glaring inadequacy of existing facilities*

*Local authorities have used their control over the allocation of scarce resources as an effective tool for political manipulation*

*Harsh security legislation and a powerful security force have effectively suppressed any opposition to the Sebe government*

*Despite dramatic industrial growth in the Ciskei, limited local ownership means that few profits remain in the homeland*

*Recent laissez-faire reforms may eventually benefit local entrepreneurs, but are unlikely to improve the lot of most ordinary Ciskeians*

Africa compared with the best in the world, the health services of the homelands were either in a state of collapse or totally inadequate. In the Ciskei there is an average of 4 428 people per doctor and a ratio of 352,3 people to every hospital bed. Compared with 61,3 people per hospital bed in white hospitals in South Africa, the homeland's health services can hardly be described as adequate. Africans in the common area fare slightly better, with a ratio of 337 people to every hospital bed.

### The Politics of Repression

A one-party legislative assembly dominated by Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) chiefs, and a local government structure of traditional authorities, comprise the 'free and democratic' government of the Ciskei. An attempted coup within the ruling Sebe family, and a high turnover of cabinet ministers and senior government officials have characterised the workings of the Ciskeian government over the past five years, besides allegations of corruption (Sunday Times 14/7/85; Lelyveld in London Times 30/12/85). At a local level, loyal CNIP chiefs and headmen have effectively used their control over the allocation of scarce resources such as jobs, land and housing to secure allegiance to the Sebe government (Hirsch and Green 1983).

Harsh security legislation and a large, effective security apparatus have successfully suppressed any form of opposition. With no parliamentary opposition since 1978, reports abound of Life-President Sebe using the security forces to harass and detain critics and opponents without fear of political consequence. Disaffected Ciskeians have increasingly turned to extra-parliamentary organisations to advance their interests, only to witness the ruthless repression of trade unionists and community leaders (Haysom 1983).

The Mdantsane bus boycott provides a clear example of opposition and repression. On 18 July 1983, commuters boycotted buses in response to an announcement of fare increases. The government response was immediate and harsh. The security police and CNIP vigilantes were brought in, a state of emergency was declared in Mdantsane, and by September at least 60 people had been detained. The Ciskei authorities also banned the South African Allied Workers Union.

There were widespread reports of the beating and torture of detainees (RDM 23/9/83; Sunday Tribune 18/9/83) and a subsequent study (Haysom 1983) has alleged gross violations of civil rights in the Ciskei. The repression of opposition has continued, with 98 people being detained in the Ciskei between June and November 1985 alone.

### Conclusion

On the fourth anniversary of Ciskeian independence, President Sebe informed his

countrymen: 'You have an obligation to celebrate', and warned them that if they failed to do so with sufficient enthusiasm, he would cut off their water and electricity (Natal Mercury 6/12/85). A somewhat inappropriate remark from a man who had four years earlier committed himself to a free society, but a revealing comment on the true nature of Ciskeian politics. Five years of independence have brought forward a repressive government, intolerant of any form of opposition. For those in positions of power, patronage is an effective and widely used political tool, manipulated as a further deterrent against dissent (Hirsch and Green 1983).

In the economic sphere, Sebe's aim to develop the agricultural sector as the foundation of a sound economy has failed dismally, and rural poverty has reached crisis proportions. Although industrialisation policies have had some success in terms of job creation and wealth generation — from 1980/1984 the growth rate of the Ciskei's gross domestic product was 5.7 percent — little of this seems to have reached the average Ciskeian or gone very far to solve massive unemployment.

Furthermore, the Ciskei government has turned its back on intervening in the economy to facilitate the process of some indirect redistribution of wealth. Expenditure on already inadequate health and education services has dropped since independence, and the creation of a tax haven in the homeland does not bode well for future increases. Poor backward and forward linkages characterise industry in the Ciskei and the very limited level of local ownership means that the bulk of profits leave the country.

Recent moves to unleash free market forces may eventually have beneficial economic effects for local entrepreneurs, but these benefits are unlikely to extend beyond the small, developing African middle class. The truth behind the glossy advertisements depicting a union-free tax haven under the tropical sun, is that Sebe's grandiose schemes have had little effect on the lives of the average Ciskeian. For most, the illustrious independence goals remain as elusive as ever.

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## THE ECONOMICS OF DEPENDENCE

In its pursuit of the policy of separate development, the South African government established African 'homelands' in poor, underdeveloped areas, where they are expected to support large and growing populations. This has resulted in a very unbalanced relationship between the developed South African economy and its satellite regions. The Ciskei represents a typical homeland economy, heavily dependent on the central core for development aid and employment opportunities.

Table 4

### ● AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 1983 ●

Breakdown of sources for three main types of areas

Area	Salaries & Wages (including commuter income)	Agriculture	Domestic Production	Own Business	Pensions	Contributions Received	Income from Boarders	Imputed Rent	Other	Total
Large Urban Areas	R4 735,89	R5,59	R78,27	R251,61	R106,23	R139,78	R 39,13	R150,96	R89,46	R5 596,92
Small Urban Areas	R1 620,27	R14,60	R46,29	R 56,03	R248,52	R431,26	—	R 21,92	—	R2 438,89
Rural Areas	R2 082,63	R47,48	R37,31	R 40,70	R291,70	R620,72	R 10,17	R206,90	R54,27	R3 391,88

#### ANALYSIS

- Wages and salaries have become the major source of income for all Ciskeians, including rural inhabitants.
- Pensions constitute an increasingly significant percentage of the total average income of households in the small urban and rural areas.
- 'Contributions received', which include migrant remittances, make up almost 20 percent of household income in the small urban and rural areas. (Commuter incomes are included in 'salaries and wages').
- In contrast, in the large urban areas 'contributions received' constitute only 2.5 percent of household income, probably because many of these areas are close to East London, and workers are able to commute daily.

SOURCE: Ciskei Development Information 1985

Table 5

### ● NUMBER OF MIGRANT AND COMMUTER WORKERS ●

	Migrants	Commuters	Ciskei's Total Labour Force
1981	47 000	37 000	—
1984	60 000	50 000	191 000

#### ANALYSIS


- The Ciskeian economy is clearly unable to provide adequate employment for even half of the homeland's inhabitants.
- In 1984, 57.6 percent of the Ciskei's total labour force were employed beyond the homeland's borders.

#### SOURCES

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Table 6

**● COMPARATIVE INCOME PER CAPITA ●**  
The Four Independent Homelands



SOURCE Development Bank of Southern Africa

**ANALYSIS**


- In 1982, per capita income from GDP in the Ciskei was only 43 percent of per capita income from GNP.
- Despite accelerated industrialisation, of all the independent homelands, the Ciskei has consistently had the lowest per capita GDP income.

Table 7

**COMPOSITION OF CISKEI'S TOTAL NATIONAL REVENUE**

● 1982—1983 ●

● 1983—1984 ●



**ANALYSIS**

- 'Own sources' of revenue have improved considerably from 26.4 percent of total revenue in the 1982/83 fiscal year to 34.7 percent in 1983/84.
- Funding from the South African government (in the form of development aid — including transfers), continues to comprise the bulk of total revenue.

SOURCE: Ciskei Development Information 1985

IPDA



# INDUSTRIALISING THE CISKEI

## A Costly Experiment

By Alan Hirsch, Lecturer, Department of Economic History,  
University of Cape Town

**B**y the beginning of 1986 there were over 22 000 industrial workers in the Ciskei, employed in over 100 small factories. Thirteen years ago there were only two small factories, both situated in Alice, which had just been incorporated into the homeland. Reports are already applauding the Ciskei's 'economic miracle'.

Yet the Ciskei is better known for poverty, civil unrest and intrigue within the ruling clique than for its economic boom. The expansion of industry, spectacular as it may have been, has not turned the tide on unemployment, nor has it prevented outbursts of civil unrest in the homeland since mid-1985. But it is not for these reasons alone that the Ciskei's industrialisation programme is open to criticism. Funding of incentives has proved very costly — the price of bolstering territorial apartheid.

### Politics of Decentralisation

Initiatives for an industrial decentralisation programme in South Africa can be traced back to the 1930s, but the first coordinated programme began in 1960. This was the 'border industries' scheme which aimed at providing employment on the borders of the homelands in order to slow down, or even reverse, black migration to the 'white cities'. The programme provided financial incentives for private industrial investment and frequently exempted employers from statutory wage controls. It was never very heavily financed, achieved a few minor successes in particularly well located growthpoints, but certainly did not change the face of South Africa's demographic history.

By the end of the 1960s, the government's approach to decentralisation began to shift. Industrial growth was now designed to take place within the homelands, instead of on their borders. The new underlying rationale was to add weight to the emerging homeland administrations by giving them a semblance of economic viability, while creating economic opportunities for a nascent, conservative black middle class. The major homelands, the Transkei, Bophuthatswana

and KwaZulu, received attention first. The Ciskei's turn came in 1974 when the infrastructure for an industrial park was laid down in Dimbaza. However, relatively rapid industrialisation has occurred in the Ciskei only since 1982, when investment incentives were dramatically increased under the new regional development strategy.

### Three Phase Industrialisation

Industrialisation in the Ciskei can be divided into three phases. The earliest phase, between 1974 and 1978, saw slow growth characterised by the establishment of small, labour intensive factories, with tiny capital bases. These concerns were dependent on loan finance from the former Ciskei National Development Corporation and the Corporation for Economic Development. By 1978 there were 15 factories with an average capital investment of R550 000 — of which well over half was usually state funded — and an average labour complement of 65.

Incentives were steadily stepped up during the course of the 1970s and by the end of the decade larger companies began to move into the Ciskei. Among the firms that had established interests by the early 1980s were Anglo American and De Beers, and the Dutch multinational Van Leer. A number of Taiwanese firms also moved in, setting up labour intensive clothing, textile and metalworking plants.

The real boom came after the South African government implemented its regional development strategy in 1982. Although this strategy boosted decentralisation incentives in general, it particularly benefitted the Ciskei. The homeland was now favoured with the highest incentives in the country. Most dramatic was the employment incentive, in terms of which firms would be repaid 95 percent of wages paid to all workers, up to a maximum of R110.00 per month. Other short-term (seven year) incentives have included various forms of government subsidised loans. Within three years, the number of factories and industrial jobs in the Ciskei increased by more than 200 percent

*A border industries scheme was launched in the 1960s to promote decentralisation and reduce black migration to the common area*

*The economic base of the emerging homelands was boosted by a shift to promoting development within their borders*

*Industrialisation really took off after 1982, when a new development strategy dramatically increased investment incentives for the Ciskei*

*Dimbaza was selected as the Ciskei's first industrial park, partly to counter adverse international publicity about the resettlement camp*

and 400 percent respectively.

Though they were undoubtedly the central draw card, it was not only massive incentives that were attracting investors to the Ciskei. The other major factor was the availability of cheap unorganised labour, a consequence of very high unemployment and the repression of trade union activity. Wages in the Ciskei are generally pegged at around 50 percent of East London levels, which are in turn about 25 percent below South Africa's national average. Since the recent fall of the rand, these wages are low even by third world standards (though inflation will force them to rise somewhat).

Trade unions were never actually allowed to operate in the Ciskei and SAAWU was officially banned in 1983. Ironically, trade unions grew in strength across the border in East London during the early 1980s. Consequently, several East London firms either moved some operations into the Ciskei or, as in the case of Western Province Preserving, moved their whole factory across the border.

## Development of Dimbaza


Dimbaza became internationally notorious as a symbol of South African population relocation policies not long after it was established as a resettlement camp in 1967. Forced resettlement swelled its population from close to zero to nearly 7 000 in its first four years of existence. Its new inhabitants were largely those expelled from Eastern Cape farms because of land consolidation and the shift to capital-intensive agricultural production. Many died in the settlement's early years for want of food, adequate shelter and medical attention, as they did in similar settlements elsewhere in the Ciskei, and in other homelands.

Fortuitously, Dimbaza was the site selected for the Ciskei's first industrial park. It was selected partly as a counter-propaganda gambit to the controversial British film on forced removals and rural poverty entitled 'Last Grave at Dimbaza'. However, Dimbaza also lay on a branch line of the East London-



Alan Hirsch

*The large supply of cheap, unorganised labour and the high wage incentives have attracted many labour-intensive companies to the Ciskei, including hand-weaving and spinning plants.*



Alan Hirsch



Johannesburg railway, and was in easy commuting distance from King Williamstown, where white managers could live in relative comfort. The presence of a captive reserve of unemployed people was another major factor in choosing the site.

Competition from more favourably sited homeland growth points, such as Babelegi in Bophuthatswana and Isithebe in KwaZulu, resulted in Dimbaza receiving some of the dregs of decentralising firms.

Undercapitalised plants came to the Ciskei because of the availability of loan capital, which no bank would have considered providing to them. Several folded before long.

One curious consequence of the easy availability of cheap capital for Dimbaza-based firms, was the establishment of a few relatively capital-intensive firms such as a steel foundry. But most firms were relatively labour-intensive and included hand-weaving and spinning plants, electronics assembly, wood and steel furniture makers and garment manufacturers. By the late 1970s, the few small firms that had been established in Dimbaza were attracting an influx of poverty-stricken workseekers from surrounding districts.

When the 1982 incentives were introduced and firms rapidly set themselves up in Dimbaza, the trickle of people into the settlement became a flood. Between 1979 and 1985 it is estimated that the population of the town grew from 12 000 to 50 000, yet no more than about 300 new houses were built. Conditions deteriorated as Dimbaza did not have the physical infrastructure for a large and dense human settlement. Roads are untarred and poor, and no waterborne sewerage system exists, though both are provided in the industrial area. While the level of employment has improved significantly, social conditions have developed in such a way that Dimbaza has become a volatile working class town.

## Abusing the Incentives

Employment incentives are often open to unscrupulous exploitation. Even before the introduction of the 1982 incentives, managers acknowledged in private that their plants were over-manned in order to take advantage of employment incentives. A little over-manning may be acceptable, contributing to the absorption of unemployment, but the degree of abuse of incentives precipitated by the generous 1982 incentives moved some managers into the realms of large-scale fraud.

The classic instance of incentives fraud is the Disa/Engelhardt scam which came to light in 1985. In 1984 a clothing factory housing Disa Garments and Engelhardt Manufacturing was commissioned at Mdantsane in the Ciskei. The owners, operating through a Hong Kong subsidiary, were actually Play Knits Inc and Steven Barry Inc, based in New York. According to the original proposal, the

factory would employ 2 510 people, of whom 2 470 would be black Ciskeians.

By September 1984, 3 190 Ciskeians were in the employ of the two firms. Of these 520 were cleaners and 326 security guards! Not content with merely exceeding the original planned employment level by 600, head office bombarded the managing director with telegrams insisting that he employ a hundred new workers each week and that a target of 5 000 employees be achieved by November. The simple explanation for this unusual business behaviour is that workers were being paid substantially less than the company claimed for incentives purposes, and the company took the difference.

Not content with this, it appears that firms have engaged in some sharp practices concerning the 125 percent training allowance, again pocketing the profits. By the end of 1984, even Life-President Sebe, not known to be keen to cross swords with foreign investors, complained that economic concessions to investors 'were being abused'. The matter reached the courts in 1985.

It is clear that government funds devoted to industrialisation incentives intended to combat unemployment were not being efficiently utilised, and were being drained at a geometrically increasing rate. The new formula for investment incentives was proving very expensive. Although maladministration was clearly an important part of the problem, the Ciskei government decided to completely revise its approach to economic development, and to appoint a commission of inquiry to formulate a new policy.

## Abolishing Company Tax

Appointed in July 1983, the Swart Commission worked fast and presented its report before the year was out. It embodied no new research and much of it was culled from the controversial Page Report of the mid-seventies. The Quail Report of 1980, unpopular with the Ciskei government as it had opposed independence, was practically ignored.

The moving spirit behind what became known as the Swart Report was Leon Louw of the Free Market Foundation (see following article). The essence of the much debated report (see Development Southern Africa) is encapsulated in the terms, 'deregulation' and 'privatisation'. Deregulation, in this context, means the abolition of a wide range of government controls over business activity. Three important examples of the commission's proposals are:

- the exemption of small industries (employing less than 20 people) from all existing laws and regulations other than those existing in a simple Companies Act
- the abolition of all company tax
- the deregulation of controls over conditions of work, health and pollution for

*The growth of industry in Dimbaza has attracted a tremendous influx of jobseekers, overloading its already inadequate social infrastructure*

*Several firms abused the employment incentives, overmanning their plants and paying wages less than the amount claimed for incentive remuneration*

*The increasingly high cost of industrial incentives prompted the Ciskei government to appoint the Swart Commission to formulate a new development policy*

*Deregulation, privatisation and the creation of a tax haven were some of the major recommendations of the Swart Report*

Critics have expressed doubts about the long term advantages of the no-tax option. They fear that it will attract capital-intensive and 'dirty' industries to the homeland

all businesses.

The report was endorsed by the Ciskei government and many proposals were rapidly translated into law. Firms which did not make use of the 'short term' incentives would be exempt from company tax, and liable only to a withholding tax of 15 percent on all funds sent out of the Ciskei, in the form of dividends, interest or transfer payments. Income tax reforms left annual incomes greater than R8 000 subject to a flat 15 percent.

### Impact of Reforms

The dust has not yet settled on the Ciskei's tax reforms and subsequent developments have been reported in a confusing and contradictory fashion. At the end of June 1985, the managing director of the Ciskei People's Development Bank announced that, apart from firms 'that can convince us that they will attract others' (Eastern Province Herald 28/6/85), no further potential investors would be offered the short-term incentives of 1982. Yet further reports suggest that this conditional clause is being interpreted quite broadly. In fact, it appears that a large number of new firms are in the process of setting up in the Ciskei, most probably in the retail and service sectors (Sunday Times 22/12/85).

Research conducted in the Ciskei before the implementation of the new tax regime

indicated that very few of the existing firms would have been established in the Ciskei under the no-tax scheme. It also was clear that the types of firms attracted to the Ciskei under the no-tax regime, 'efficient' as they might be, would not be labour intensive and would not employ large numbers of workers (Personal interviews with Ciskei plant managers 1984; Black et al 1985: p167). Firms attracted on these terms are likely to be either capital intensive, possibly 'dirty' industries that import their raw materials and export their products, or perhaps profitable enterprises in the tertiary sector seeking to avoid South African tax.

It is more difficult to establish how much the people of the Ciskei, or more properly, of the region, have to gain from the abolition of company tax. Escape from maladministered incentives would certainly be a relief if it was clear that the investment administration was now completely clean. But whether the people of the Ciskei are prepared to wait for the 'Laffer Curve' to take effect and watch state revenues slowly rise after the tax cuts (assuming an efficient tax administration) is dubious. Government revenues will be small, employment is unlikely to grow rapidly, and economic growth is unlikely to lead to any kind of integrated regional development.

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Response

# CISKEI'S ECONOMIC REFORMS

## Correcting the Critics

By Leon Louw, Director of the Free Market Foundation

Ciskei has recently converted from extreme government interventionism to unfettered laissez-faire economic policies

The debate on development strategy in Southern Africa would be enhanced if it were separated as far as possible from the political biases of those who engage in it. Many critics of apartheid and the homeland policy seem to be unable to distinguish between the existence of the homelands per se and the development policies they adopt. There can hardly be a more striking example of such misplaced criticism than the Ciskei. Since 1984, Ciskei has been in the process

of converting from extreme interventionist and socialist development strategies passed down to it from the central government. Instead, the Ciskeian administration has adopted the diametrically opposite approach of laissez-faire economic development. Lamentably, Ciskei's policy has remained the subject of ill-informed condemnation, as if nothing has changed.

Alan Hirsch's analysis is a typical example of this tendency. In the previous



article he condemns the two very different development strategies, shifting effortlessly from one to the other, apparently because he opposes 'the price of bolstering territorial apartheid'. At the outset, it should be noted that all overtly discriminatory legislation in Ciskei has been repealed. In discussing Ciskei's remarkable economic growth, Hirsch fails to make a clear distinction between the pre and post reform eras.

### Free Market Reforms

Prior to implementing the present reforms, Ciskei had a typically dirigist (ie state control of economy and society) development policy. Its features included perhaps the most generous and costly decentralisation incentives in the world, accompanied by extensive state ownership or control of virtually all resources, comparable with that in most socialist countries.

The architects of Ciskei's reforms, including myself, are in general agreement with Hirsch's critique of these former policies. For precisely this reason, the new policy, based on the recommendations of the 1983 Swart Commission Report, aims to:


- dramatically reduce investment incentives
- abolish a network of restrictive regulations governing business activities
- dismantle one of the most extensive systems of government ownership, through a systematic process of privatisation; and
- reduce complex, costly and 'sophisticated' standards and procedures to the simplest and cheapest, consistent with civilised standards.

These reforms were based on the Swart Commission's belief that, while costly interventionist strategies have generally failed throughout the underdeveloped world, free market strategies have been successful in promoting development. Typically, the costs of state control far exceed either intended or real benefits. Instead, the commission was concerned with reducing costs both to the government and the public.

Commentators on these proposals have tended to focus on individual points, taken out of context, rather than the whole policy package. This necessarily leads to poor analysis and conclusions. The development policy that was recommended is like a bell: if struck in one place, it rings all over.

### The No-Tax Option

For various historic and administrative reasons, the amount of income tax collected from internal sources in Ciskei has been a negligible proportion of that which was technically due to government coffers. For instance, by the time the



Alan Hirsch

Swart Commission was formed, no company tax had been collected. Similarly, other forms of taxation such as stamp, transfer and bond duties, had produced zero to little revenue. In other words, the abolition of all these taxes - as proposed in the Swart Report - will result in a negligible loss of revenue.

The commission recommended that all personal incomes below R8 000 per annum should be exempt from taxation. The loss of revenue this will incur would be roughly equivalent to the actual cost of collecting taxes from 90 percent of taxpayers in this lower income group. It was also proposed that higher incomes should be taxed a simple flat rate of 15 percent on that portion of personal income exceeding R8 000.

These and other tax reforms have cumulatively converted Ciskei into a 'tax haven', while streamlining the tax system and making it much easier and cheaper to administer. It has been estimated that the maximum loss of revenue will be R9.2 million, but additional growth will more than offset this loss. Contrary to Hirsch's

*Small business deregulation has greatly boosted the informal sector, which provides numerous, if unrecorded, job opportunities.*

*Dramatic tax reforms, including the abolition of company tax, have converted the Ciskei into a 'tax haven'*

THE CISKEI



Workers in an electronics factory in Dimbaza. The tax-free option is likely to attract more labour-intensive industries to the Ciskei.

Alan Hirsch

pessimistic predictions, there are indications that revenue will in fact increase even during the first year of the implementation of tax reforms. The effect is that each rand will be taxed more frequently, but at a lower rate, as it circulates more frequently and productively through the economy.

of health regulations in the past has had any adverse effects.

Discretionary regulation such as licensing inevitably leads to real or suspected corruption and political patronage. In all the critiques of Ciskei's policies to date, there has not been a single attempt to establish a case for retaining the regulations from which small business is now exempted in Ciskei. Instead, there are unsubstantiated assertions that deregulation will not provide an effective stimulus to development.

### Industrial Deregulation

In the commission's view, common law protection against the violation of certain rights - as in the case of fraud, pollution, and the undue endangering of public health and safety - is vastly superior to the monstrous jungle of statutory rules and regulations built up over many years. For various reasons a favoured option is 'small business' deregulation, which is in any event more urgent and important to facilitate development. Accordingly, the application of common law is being restored to small business first, with a view to extending it to big business later.

Third world societies can only benefit from deregulation policies. Health regulations in the Ciskei provide a clear example of this. Statutory regulations governing the production of dairy and meat products have the effect of doubling or trebling the cost of these sources of protein, making them difficult for poor people to obtain and thus exacerbating malnutrition in many areas. Yet, the commission found no evidence to suggest that the non-application

### Land Tenure Reform

Few aspects of the recent reforms have been more misinterpreted and misunderstood than the land reform policy. The Swart Report recommended the systematic privatisation of state owned land by, for example, the sale of agricultural schemes and government owned housing. The sale of this land would release millions of rands which could be utilised to finance other projects such as further housing, irrigation schemes, rural development etc. In the process many Ciskeians would get the opportunity, hitherto reserved for whites, to use their land as security to raise private capital.

The commission did not recommend the conversion of all tribal land to freehold title. It recommended that tribal authorities and allottees of tribal land rights be granted the additional option of

*Proposed land tenure reforms include privatising state-owned land and converting tribal land rights into freehold or leasehold rights*



converting tribal land rights into dynamic rights that could be sold, mortgaged, leased, consolidated or sub-divided. This entirely voluntary system would provide a variable and effective response to the serious problem of land underutilisation and abuse, and enable the tribal authority to earn revenue from the land under their jurisdiction. They would be legally bound to use this revenue for development.

### Depoliticisation

In describing the Ciskei, Hirsch makes various references to 'repression', 'intrigue' and its alleged 'internationally notorious' image. In the circumstances, he should have applauded the reforms as being the best known method of depoliticising society and de-escalating political conflict. He concedes that the expansion of industry has been 'spectacular', but argues that it has not 'turned the tide on unemployment nor ... civil unrest'.

While in 1983/84 the level of unrest in Ciskei (especially Mdantsane) was higher than anywhere else in South Africa, in 1985/86 it has been markedly lower. This contrasts dramatically with the situation in the surrounding Eastern Cape. These events may not necessarily be attributable to Ciskei's economic reforms, but the coincidence is inescapable.

### Labour Deregulation

Much has been made by critics of the Ciskei government's 'repressive' labour policy. The Swart Commission recommended that labour relations be deregulated. This is presently official policy, although the draft legislation has not yet been passed. Once it becomes law, labour relations will, like other economic transactions, be governed by freedom of contract and common law.

### Further Criticism

Hirsch makes several other points which require further comment.

- The high cost of funding investment incentives.

It is precisely because of the excessive cost of the incentives and all the attendant problems (such as abuse, and the attraction of non-viable industries) that an alternative low tax policy was proposed. Why, then, does Hirsch not endorse the reforms? The saving of expenditure on incentives, which may exceed R30 million per annum, would far exceed any potential loss of revenue.

- Some academic research supposedly discredits the no-tax option. It also presumes that the policy is intended to entice existing firms into converting to it. In fact, the object of the policy is to

entice new investors without costly concessions, and to attract forms of investment that go beyond narrowly defined types of non-locality bound manufacturing industries. Contrary to the critics, with the tax free option one is assured that all investments are genuinely viable in the judgement of the investor. Seven existing factories have already opted for the tax free scheme and 20 new firms have come in on a no-tax basis.

- The expansion of industry has failed to reverse increasing levels of unemployment.

On the contrary, industrialists in Dimbaza have reported a labour shortage and they have had to recruit elsewhere. A total of 68 new industries were either established or approved in 1985. When these are all fully operational, 7 800 new jobs will have been created. In Ciskei as a whole, labour bureaux have reported a dramatic decline in unemployment, with the exception of Mdantsane which is essentially a dormitory town for East London.

- Workers in Ciskei receive particularly low wages.

Increased competition and development has undoubtedly had the opposite effect - a significant rise in wages. As a result of declining unemployment and the improved labour market, there is now a net influx of jobseekers to Ciskei.

- Firms attracted by the tax free status are likely to be capital intensive.

In response, surely where there are no government capital incentives and where there is maximal deregulation - including in labour markets - the tendency would be for new businesses to be labour-intensive? Economic theory and practical experience certainly suggest this.

### A Final Word

The system of government in all of South Africa's homelands has entailed an extraordinary degree of state ownership of resources. Undesirable as this might be, it does provide the Ciskei administration with a unique opportunity to generate revenue, reduce taxes, increase opportunities and increase government spending all at the same time. On top of this, there will probably be enormous gains in the transfer and efficient use of resources - by virtue of the superior incentives provided (by private enterprise) and through effective competition.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the full implementation of the reforms would constitute one of the most dramatic and extensive policy changes ever attempted. Key aspects of these reforms are still to be implemented. Hopefully, critics will restrain themselves from attributing perceived problems to a policy not yet fully implemented. *IPRA*

*The Swart Commission proposed the deregulation of labour relations, so that they would be governed by freedom of contract and common law*

*Unemployment in the Ciskei has declined dramatically with the expansion of industry. Employers in Dimbaza report a labour shortage in the area*

*Wages have risen significantly over the past few years because of the development of a labour market and increased competition*

*For the moment, extensive state ownership of resources enables the Ciskei to generate revenue, reduce tax and increase government spending*



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


# URBAN

M O N I T O R

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*As the tide of anti-apartheid opinion has grown to global dimensions over the last two decades, the sport tour boycott and the larger isolation campaign of South Africa have become inseparable in their political interests and objectives.*

- 1** *Sport & Society: The Real Boycott Issues*
- 7** *An Unfinished School Crisis in the Cape of Storms*
- 11** *Handling an Own Affair: Tricameral 'Coloured' Education*
- 14** *Beyond the Blackboard: Teacher Associations & Politics*
- 18** *The New Frontier: Rebellion in the Eastern Cape*








# SPORT & SOCIETY

## *The Real Boycott Issues*



An overgrown and unlikely football 'pitch' at a high school in Umlazi township. Durban.

Douglas Booth

By Douglas G Booth, Development Studies Unit,  
University of Natal (Durban)

*For South Africa, the advent of each new sports season seems to bring a cancelled or surrogate international tour, producing a slow action replay of the opposed pro-tour and pro-boycott argument. Douglas Booth, a visiting Australian sportsman studying over here, takes a firsthand look at the apartheid in sport controversy. Although his approach is undeniably partisan in support of the boycotters, Booth persuasively demonstrates the inextricable linkages between broader racial and sports inequalities in our society.*


*Commenting on the article, Prof Lawrence Schlemmer points out that 'it is an interesting example of the type of social analysis which South Africa's formal racial divisions invite and make legitimate. In any society, access to sporting opportunity is to a lesser or greater degree influenced by social status and privilege. The writer barely concedes that the children of the ghettos in the US, the slums of Latin America or the far flung hinterlands of the Soviet Union probably do not have remotely the recreational privileges of their compatriots in urban middle class suburbs!*

*'In one sense the pattern of sports inequality in South Africa is not unique, in qualitative if not quantitative terms. Yet whites in South Africa have allowed themselves to be defined as unique because our categories of inequality are formally defined in terms of the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Separate Amenities Act. Thus while the article is perhaps lacking in comparative perspective, our laws make this kind of analysis inevitable and necessary. Until South Africa takes meaningful steps to eradicate formal racial differentiation - as well as informal disadvantages of a more universal kind - Indicator SA has a duty to carry this kind of comment.'*

*In the townships, exposure to and participation in sports activities are severely curtailed by social conditions at school or at home*

*Contact with sports requires affordable expenditure, leisure time, recreational facilities, proper diet and good health*

*The Umlazi cycle and athletics track, a barren recreational dustbowl in one of Durban's townships.*



Douglas Booth

The recent cancellation of rugby tours of South Africa by the All Blacks and the British Lions, and the unofficial 'rebel' tour by Australian cricketers this summer have once again highlighted the issues surrounding the Republic's sporting isolation. Is the sports boycott a meaningless strategy that does more harm than good or is it an important weapon in the war on apartheid?

Pro-tour supporters claim that sport in South Africa is fully integrated and multiracial, and that sport fulfils an important role as a racial equaliser cutting across artificial barriers. They argue that the denial of international sporting contact is grossly unfair and hypocritical in the face of buoyant trade links. The anti-tour protesters dismiss these claims out of hand and add that international sports tours of South Africa in fact aid government propaganda.

### Pre-Conditions for Participation

Wider social, economic and political forces undoubtedly prevent people from utilising multiracial sporting resources, which in turn do not automatically guarantee clubs a multiracial membership. Participation in sport requires exposure to sport and a disposable income large enough to include expenditure on leisure. An individual's exposure to sport will take place either at school or at home. In the African townships, opportunities for contact with sporting activities are severely curtailed in both milieux.

Family life is typically disorientated in the townships, mass worker migration to the white cities is a daily phenomenon, and unemployment among Africans is exceptionally high. While the townships are chronically underserved in general, community and other recreational

resources (eg parks and playgrounds) are particularly scarce. The prospects for youth involvement in organised sport are poor under these conditions, where parental support, guidance and supervision are retarded by the long hours spent away from home, and low wages.

Of the basic health status indicators, nutritional status among children is explicitly related to sporting apathy and sporting performance. Mortality patterns among Africans indicate that diseases related to low socio-economic and poor environmental conditions are the major killers:

- kwashiorkor, marasmus, pellagra, rickets and scurvy - specific syndromes of malnutrition - have been widely reported among Africans (Scragg and Rubidge 1977: p265)
- malnutrition is reported to be the cause of a third of African child deaths in Durban
- more than 30 percent of African pre-school children and almost 60 percent of African school-age children are underweight for age (Jinabhai et al 1984: p60)

### Sport Inequalities

In the actual school environment, the gross inequality in per capita government expenditure on education between white and African school children (in the order of a ratio 7:1) is reflected in sport (see table 1). White schoolchildren are exposed to a wide variety of competitive sports and recreational games in both physical education classes and in compulsory extra-curriculum activities. The majority of white secondary schools and many primary schools have several well-kept playing fields, a swimming pool and tennis courts, plus a range of other sports equipment.

In stark contrast, African children (for whom school is not even compulsory) are denied these resources and opportunities. Numerous factors mitigate against sport in African schools: the lack of qualified staff; the lack of financial resources to purchase equipment; and the lack of playing space. In the absence of libraries, where shortages of textbooks and stationary are common, and where computers and video equipment are non-existent, it is not difficult to understand why sporting equipment is scarce.

There is a prevalent bias against sport in African schools, which stems not only from wholly inadequate resources but is related to a high examination failure rate. There is a natural tendency among dedicated staff to allocate time to extra lessons as opposed to sport. Also, older staff and headmasters who were not educated in a tradition of physical education place little emphasis on it today. From interviews conducted by the



## INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

Table 1 **Some Comparative Statistics on Government Expenditure**

	SPORT EXPENDITURE	
	Total	Per Head
White schoolchildren	R9 900 000	R10.14
African schoolchildren	R14 700	R0.39
Department of National Education	R5 700 000	R4.16 <sup>1</sup>
• Sports Budget	R1 700 000	R1.24
• Grants-in-aid to Sports Administration	R250 000	R0.18
• Sports Facilities	R129 000	R75.88 <sup>2</sup>
• Cruising (Yachting)	R47 000	R35.98
• Cycling	R20 000	R33.33
• Fencing	R35 000	R35.98
• Tug-of-war teams		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Per Head</b>

### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Refers to expenditure on total registered sportspersons.  
<sup>2</sup> Refers to departmental expenditure on visiting teams, divided by registered number of South African participants

### SOURCES

Republic of South Africa. *House of Assembly Debates (Hansard) 1983*, Vol 106 cols 6122/23, and Vol 110 cols 395/400.  
 SAIRR *Race Relations Survey 1982*, p473 and 491.

### Case Study: Sport in KwaZulu Schools

The KwaZulu Department of Education has allocated physical education one period (35 minutes) per week to pupils in standard 6 and above, and two periods per week for standard 5 and below. Out of ten schools the author surveyed in Umlazi and KwaMashu, however, three did not include physical education in the curriculum. For the remaining seven schools, the period was devoted to basic physical exercise. Only four out of 93 schools in Umlazi have what is commonly referred to as a playing field — areas without marked boundaries, bare of turf, strewn with stones, and littered with weeds. Upkeep and maintenance is financially impossible.

The department employed its first fully trained physical education teacher in 1981, and today there are 15 fully qualified physical education teachers. While schools in peri-urban areas struggle to offer, at best, meagre resources, those in remote homeland areas are considerably worse off. Although all schools allocate one afternoon per week to school sports — invariably soccer, netball and athletics — given the lack of both space and equipment, it is estimated that sports afternoons effectively include only ten percent of pupils. (Personal correspondence with circuit inspector.)

Table 2 **Recreation Resources in the Durban Metropolitan Region**

	UMLAZI	LAMONTVILLE	DURBAN
Population	220 000 <sup>1</sup>	30 000	211 711
Soccer fields	1 <sup>2</sup>	5	146 <sup>3</sup>
Tennis courts	6 <sup>4</sup>	1	all privately owned
Swimming pools	1	1	15
Cricket pitches	Nil	Nil	46 <sup>5</sup>
Other	Golf course; cycling and athletics track <sup>6</sup>	Bowling green	

### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Unofficial estimates range between 300 000 and 312 000. Umlazi is bordered by two densely populated squatter settlements, Malukazi (estimated at 55 000) and Kwamagaga (78 000), neither of which have any sporting resources.  
<sup>2</sup> Official figures list 10 fields but only the Umlazi stadium is fit for competition. The remaining 9 fields are stone-strewn dust bowls without delineated boundaries, nets, changing or toilet facilities.  
<sup>3</sup> Refers to venues, some venues having more than one field.  
<sup>4</sup> These have not been resurfaced since they were built in 1966.  
<sup>5</sup> Refers to venues.  
<sup>6</sup> Both are in advanced state of deterioration.

**SOURCES**  
 Various personal communications.  
 Durban Publicity Association.

## Survey

Table 3 **White Opinions on Sports Integration**

	Yes	No
'Do you believe that sport is integrated at all levels?'	42%	56%
'Do you think that South Africa will ever enjoy normal sporting contacts under a white government?'	45%	52%
	(n = 1 000)	

**SOURCE**

'Sports integration poll', *Business Day*, 4/12/85. Conducted by Markinor Research Group among 1 000 urban white adults

Table 4 **African Opinions on International Sporting Tours**

	Right	Wrong
'Do you think that international sporting organisations are right or wrong not to play against South African teams unless the apartheid system is changed?'	83%	17%
	(n = 400)	

**SOURCE** *Sunday Tribune* 25/8/85. Commissioned by the London *Sunday Times*, and undertaken by Markinor (a South African affiliate of Gallup International). Interviews conducted among urban Africans in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.

*The emergence of some multiracial facilities and clubs has not resulted in the integration of sport in South African society*

author with ten local headmasters, it appears that sport in black schools has largely evolved into a token and unsystematic exercise.

A comparison of recreational resources offered in Umlazi, Lamontville and Durban reveals a gross maldistribution of these resources (see case study). It also illustrates a pronounced hierarchy of facilities that favours whites and gives preferential treatment to Africans living in white-administered townships, over those living in homeland townships. White authorities can afford to finance 93.1 percent of their expenditure on sport, but black authorities only 12 percent (Institute for Recreational Studies 1985).

A consequence of this unequal distribution of resources is that Africans living in Umlazi (administered by the KwaZulu government) and the surrounding shack areas depend on the sport facilities provided in either Lamontville or Durban. A total of 286 teams compete for use of the ten soccer fields in several townships under the Natalia Development Board's jurisdiction.

### Multiracial Sport

To argue that the emergence of some multiracial facilities and clubs has integrated sport in South Africa is invalid (see survey box). Firstly, the few existing multiracial facilities are unevenly distributed and concentrated in white metropolitan areas, which forces black sportspersons to commute at their own

expense in terms of time and money. Secondly, mixed sport is played in the main at senior and/or professional level. A barrage of red tape prevents government schools from playing multiracial interschool sport.

Resistance to multiracial sport is still strong and in some white communities, segregation is reinforced rather than relaxed. For example, in early 1984 the Potgietersrus Town Council banned multiracial cricket at the municipal cricket grounds (RDM 11/2/84). Later that year, the Middelburg Town Council threatened to withdraw its annual R16 000 subsidy to the golf club if it continued to allow Indian golfers to use the course (STimes 9/12/84).

Inter-racial comradeship developed during the course of a game is rarely nurtured in a multiracial post-match social setting because of other restrictive racial legislation and the customary practice of segregation, so carefully fostered by the government. The not unexpected result of all the above circumstances is token black membership where white facilities are now multiracial.

Universally, there is a natural tendency for people to gravitate towards the sport that is most accessible socially and financially, ie individual sports have a specific class base. In South Africa, apartheid works to channel the majority of blacks away from sport and the majority of black sportsmen into virtually one sport. Soccer has developed as the predominant black sport in response to township conditions - soccer is a low cost sport,



attracts numbers and at a social or recreational level, it can be played on almost any surface and in confined areas. Also as a professional sport, soccer enables players to make a living.

### The Pro-Tour Lobby

Pro-tour lobbyists advance several arguments in favour of international sporting contact with South Africa. Most of these propositions are easily refuted and are summarised below:

- *Sport is a racial equaliser that aids in the alleviation of racial tensions.*

The vast majority of black people simply do not have the opportunity to meet whites on common sporting ground. They are precluded from many sporting opportunities by poor health, limited opportunities and meagre resources. How can contact with international sporting teams improve race relations when other efforts, such as social contact in the workplace, have not indented racial prejudices?

In South Africa, the only sport that in fact transcends racial barriers on any significant scale, albeit small, is black administered professional soccer - where players in integrated clubs live together in multiracial five star hotels while on tour. Despite the pleas by white administrators for foreign sportsmen to tour South Africa to help improve race relations, the greatest progress in desegregation has been made by black sportsmen. If sport is such a powerful catalyst for change, then why are sporting bodies not at the forefront lobbying the government for multi-racial school sport?

- *Sporting tours benefit the wider community.*

On the contrary, visiting sportspersons are cocooned in white South Africa - they play on or in white facilities; they are accommodated in white areas; and they use private city transport. Coaching clinics conducted by visiting sportspersons are most often held in white areas. These are superficial exercises for black sportspersons because the infrastructure that enables practice and competition is non-existent in the townships.

Revenue raised by international tours is used to cover costs and few, if any, tours generate surpluses for sports development. Tours promote competitions between sporting elites, who exchange ideas among themselves on such things as training methods, strategies and techniques, diet, equipment, injuries and fitness. This information is not quickly disseminated to the ordinary recreational sportsperson to enable them to improve their game. Any sport advantage will only accrue over a number of years of repeated touring, which is why the South African Tennis Union has publicly denounced tennis exhibitions as being detrimental to the game and fans in the



Douglas Booth

long term (STimes 25/8/85).

- *Governments should not dictate where sportspersons should play and against whom sportspersons should compete.*

By its own actions the South African government has done more to politicise sport than any other nation. The most infamous cases occurred in 1965, when Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd banned Maori rugby players from touring South Africa with the All Blacks. Then in 1968, Prime Minister B J Vorster banned Cape Town-born coloured cricketer Basil d'Oliveira from touring South Africa with the English team. These incidents, and many like them since, riveted world attention on South African sport.

In the isolation 'war' in which South Africa finds itself, sport has since become an offensive weapon and international tours are encouraged by the government. The Minister for National Education, Dr Viljoen, has made it clear that government expenditure on sport is decided upon in terms of the overall publicity generated for South Africa (see table 1). Commenting on the West Indian 'rebel' cricket tour in 1983, he commented that, 'The tour struck an important blow not only in the sporting field but also in general against the concentrated efforts to isolate South Africa internationally' (Hansard 1983 Vol106: Col 6194/50).

The government has directly aided the financing of sporting tours by offering tax concessions to companies sponsoring such events. In early 1986, after intense lobbying by the SA Cricket Union (SACU), the government (acting without parliamentary approval) increased the rebate for international sporting events from 50 percent to 90 percent.

Government priorities need challenging when more is spent on a touring tug-of-war team visiting South Africa than on sporting activities for black school children; and when only 4.4 percent of the

There are ten dilapidated 'football fields' used by countless amateur sides in Umlazi.

Apartheid works in a manner which channels black people away from most sports, while developing soccer as the predominant township sport

The only sport that transcends racial barriers on any scale is professional soccer, where sportspeople play in integrated clubs

## SPORT INEQUALITIES

*Sport has become an offensive weapon in the isolation campaign, and the South African government is keen to encourage international tours*

*To prevent apartheid from dividing international sport, the boycotters must remain united - if only for the sake of sport itself*

*Inside South Africa, although most whites oppose boycotts, many black people appear to support the isolation campaign*

*The UDF maintains that international sporting tours serve white interests only and invariably increase racial polarisation*

Department of National Education's sports budget is spent on sports facilities.

### Quest for Legitimacy?

Tours of South Africa are not merely games between sports enthusiasts - any international contact raises white public morale, and enormous amounts of money are spent each year by the government, business and sporting bodies on 'Freedom in Sport' lobbyists, to attract international sportspersons to South Africa. The apolitical stance frequently adopted by visiting sportspersons also allows the government to project an image of a 'normal society'. Visitors on tour are easily trapped into making innocuous statements on arrival, such as 'looking around things don't seem too bad'. These comments are readily seized upon by the state media for use in the counter propaganda war.

South African sporting administrators, with their ability and will to plunder the world's best sportspersons, have caused divisive cracks in several international sports-controlling bodies. In January this year, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh refused entry permits to four members of the England B cricket team because they had played in South Africa. When the English Test and County Cricket Board challenged Zimbabwe and Bangladesh with an 'all or nothing' ultimatum, the tours were cancelled. To prevent apartheid from dividing international sport, the boycotters must remain united, if only for the sake of their sport.

Further manifestations of the government's anti-boycott offensive are efforts by the state to crush critics of South African participation in international sport, especially leading officials of the South African Council On Sport (SACOS). In 1973, Mr M Naidoo, then president of a SACOS swimming affiliate, had his passport withdrawn to prevent attendance at the world swimming body's (FINA) conference in Belgrade. After the (white) South African Amateur Swimming Union was expelled from FINA at the conference, Mr Naidoo was banned under security legislation for five years.

### Black Boycott Lobby

How widespread is the support for international sporting boycotts among South Africans? Although most white South Africans oppose the sports isolation campaign, international sporting boycotts appear to have been given a popular mandate by black people inside the country (see survey box).

The pro-boycott organisation, SACOS, has won international recognition and represents 24 national sporting bodies and eight councils of sport. It coined the

boycott lobby's renowned sign, 'No normal sport in an abnormal society'. The UDF argues that sporting tours generate racial polarisation as they invariably serve white interests. Prior to the proposed 1985 All Blacks tour of South Africa, SACOS, the UDF, and other opposition groups sent a telex to the New Zealand's rugby football union. They warned that the tour 'will be regarded as a complicity in the crime of apartheid and a total disregard for the inhuman killings of innocent black people' (Rand Daily Mail 26/6/84).

A representative of the UDF, the Reverend Arnold Stofile, gave evidence to the New Zealand high court during an application for an interim injunction to block the All Black tour. A rugby player himself, he pointed out that white South African Rugby Union (a SACOS affiliate) players had been prosecuted for illegally playing for black clubs and that the issue of multiracial permits to white, African and coloured clubs, could not be construed as integration (Daily News 10/7/85).

In South Africa, black solidarity is frequently demonstrated on sports issues and sporting fixtures coinciding with commemorative political services have been cancelled. On 10 July 1985, 3 500 workers at Volkswagen's Uitenhage plant downed tools for six days after management refused their union's request that the company should not lend 12 minibuses for use by the All Blacks (DN 15/7/85). During last year's black consumer boycott of white businesses in Port Elizabeth, one white trader, Dan Watson, was exempted. This political gesture was in recognition of his own anti-apartheid stance in earlier quitting a local whites-only rugby club and then joining an African township club.


### Conclusion

Sport cannot be compartmentalised in any society. Firstly, to argue that multiracial sporting facilities and clubs exist in South Africa, denies the complexity of forces operating to channel black sportspersons away from them. Secondly, it ignores the fact that in some areas discrimination in sport and recreation has actually been reinforced rather than reformed. Neither international tours nor domestic sport can fulfil any meaningful role as a racial equaliser as long as apartheid persists throughout South African society. *JWA*

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# An Unfinished School Crisis

## In the Cape of Storms

By Prof Owen van den Berg and Senior Lecturer Brian O'Connell,  
Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape

*After a staggeringly low poll in 1984 for the House of Representatives, especially in the greater Cape Town area, events in 1985 contrived to further seriously damage the little credibility enjoyed by the new tricameral parliament.*

*The unrest at black schools, which have since 1976 been a major flashpoint of resistance to state policies, has seriously divided the coloured community in the Western Cape. In this article, Prof Owen van den Berg and Brian O'Connell discuss the developments leading up to the extensive education crisis of 1985, the major thrust of which was aimed, for the first time, against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from their own ranks.*

**A**partheid has always been characterised as a system which divides. In the Western Cape, own affairs in 'coloured' education has turned a community upon itself. School staffs are tense, divided and suspicious. Student communities are wracked with similar strains, and for many the cost of the 1985 civil strife is unlikely ever to be redeemed.

Politicians, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, are viewed with even more resignation or distrust than before. Parents are sharply divided on the most inflammatory issue possible - the life chances of their children. Community

organisations face vast dilemmas of affiliation and internal cohesion. And the police have suffered a total collapse of legitimacy - even to report an ordinary crime to them is likely to excite suspicion and hostility.

In the coloured community the tricameral architects are viewed, if anything, as worse than their 'baasskap' predecessors. For the city of Cape Town, which prided itself on something called 'a more relaxed racial atmosphere', last year's events have laid bare the realities of division and self-protection. Apartheid has done its separating well.

*Muslim youth wearing the Kaffiyeh head-dress douse teargas cannisters during a confrontation with police at a Peninsula school, August 1985.*

*The planned march to Pollsmoor prison gave students the opportunity to display their dissatisfaction with unequal and segregated education*

*One of the dramatic consequences of the aborted march was the closure of coloured schools in the Cape Peninsula for about three weeks*

*Through brutal actions, the 'forces of law and order' radicalised the population far more effectively than any other agency did or could have done*

*Thousands of coloured students did not write end-of-year exams, setting an agenda of unresolved conflict and division for 1986*

## Build-Up to Crisis

Initially, the extensive incidence of anti-government activity in various parts of the country during the early months of 1985 left the Western Cape strangely unaffected. This hiatus was especially apparent given the volatility of the region during the lead-up to the elections for the tricameral parliament in August 1984.

Two national events in mid-1985 served, however, to spark an always simmering situation in the Cape Peninsula. The first event provided the mood for action - the assassinations in late June of the Eastern Cape civic leader Matthew Goniwe and three of his UDF associates. The decision to send local representatives to the funeral was coupled with a growing feeling that school boycott action should be instituted. The political temperature of the Western Cape soared.

The second issue provided the focus for action - the declaration of a partial State of Emergency on 20 July. In a fascinating way the government called into question the commitment of the people of the Western Cape to the liberation struggle, for the magisterial districts of the region were not regarded as sufficiently dangerous to the state to be placed under emergency regulation. A widespread and immediate feeling among activists was that the state had to be proved wrong.

The arena for action was provided by Reverend Allan Boesak's call in mid-August for a march on Pollsmoor prison to demand the release of Nelson Mandela. In this event all the unfinished business of the past would again coalesce. It would provide tangible evidence of the region's commitment to fighting apartheid in its new manifestation, the tricameral parliament. It would give the UDF the opportunity to flex its 'coloured' organisational muscles and display its political credibility.

In 'coloured' schools and colleges, and the two local universities these events would give the students of the region the opportunity to resume their display of dissatisfaction with an unequal and segregated educational dispensation, now in the hand of a 'coloured' minister in the new House of Representatives.

## Resistance and Crackdown

The consequences of the planned march on 28 August were dramatic and visible. Boesak was detained, and marchers and bystanders were harshly treated by the police, plummeting the streets of Cape Town into mayhem. Only a few days later, the responsible minister, Carter Ebrahim (see following interview), closed most of the Peninsula schools under his jurisdiction for about three weeks.

The rest of 1985 witnessed a tragic

continuation of unrest and confrontation, with a combination of approaching examination dates, government 'kragdigheid' and excessive police reaction to public protest serving to perpetuate and deepen the regions' crisis. The Labour Party appeared to be committed to establishing by coercion the legitimacy denied them at the previous year's election polls. It systematically closed down all face-saving escape routes either for themselves or their adversaries.

Large numbers of students, now so close to examinations that to write on appointed days seemed futile, felt that a continuation of resistance was as good an option as any, and acted accordingly. Other students, believing that the process of 'conscientisation' now demanded the sacrifice of academic progress, also refused to participate in the seemingly fraudulent examination exercise. Yet others feared recrimination, and stayed away too.

The 'forces of law and order' stoked the flames of endemic violence and radicalised the population far more effectively than any other agency did or could have done. Riot police mayhem on 15 October in Thornton Road - the infamous box-crate ambush - sickened the people of Cape Town and appalled the watching world. So brutal was the state response and so deep the impact that clergymen now advocated civil disobedience and Muslims began debating 'jihad' (a holy war).

## Extension of Emergency

The extension of the state of emergency to Cape Town on 26 October created the circumstances for some students to decide to go through the motions of writing examinations, at venues secured by large concentrations of guards. Thousands did not write, however, setting an agenda of conflict and divisions for 1986. Systematic action followed against sympathetic teachers who were in breach of contract when they refused to conduct or invigilate examinations.

Any pretext of democracy disappeared and countless organisations were banned from holding meetings, while several gatherings that were called by 'unbanned' organisations were also stopped. Hundreds were taken into detention from a wide section of the political spectrum, many of whom were young children. Amidst the riots and street confrontations, the death toll rose steadily.

Ever since the Soweto uprising of 1976, South Africa's schools have been a major flashpoint of resistance to the policies of the state. Schools constitute both a major manifestation of apartheid and one of the few places of congregation and organisation left in a society pared of civil liberties. As a venue perceived as both a principal instrument of state ideology and a prime





The 'coloured' suburb of Athlone was at the centre of civil strife in the Peninsula between August/November 1985.

Cape Times

distributor of life chances, resistance in and around schooling is of major symbolic significance. When the principal actors are vulnerable young people, a further edge is given to this symbolic struggle.

The all-pervasive rejection of apartheid in and around the school is therefore a drama of many acts, constituting a major dimension of unfinished business in the forging of a new South African society. The schools boycott of 1985 in the Western Cape was significant in a number of ways. It all points to a continuing unresolved conflict, which is likely to be repeated, in some or other form, in the near future - for there is no indication that the political fundamentals at the heart of the protests are to be changed.

### Boycott Brinkmanship

One way in which the boycott was significant was that for the first time its major thrust, in the schools under the House of Representatives, was directed against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from the ranks of the excluded. Its central figures, in their first year in office, made strenuous efforts to show that they could control the situation. The major consequence was the perpetuation of a situation over which they in fact had little or no control, for far longer than might otherwise have been the case.

In the past, other school boycotts have also indulged in brinkmanship, only to withdraw from the precipice in time for the examination and credential ritual to recur. The business of 1985, however, having been allowed to remain unfinished, immediately became the agony of the start of 1986. The new ministers eventually gave in on virtually every issue, but only when the new year was already shuddering to a start, and only when irreparable

damage had already been done.

For the boycotters, over-the-edge brinkmanship has also had consequences which are as yet unclear and unresolved. A vigorous debate now rages about boycotts as a strategy for bringing about change. The question of solidarity, which binds all participants to end a boycott together in spite of the fact that different institutions join the action at different times, is a further potentially divisive aspect.

The mix of student-parent-teacher solidarity on the issues is a development seemingly very different from school boycotts of 1980 in the region. Nevertheless, this linkage occurred so unevenly that it is hard to ascertain its significance in terms of a possible new direction in the strategies of resistance.

### Surrogate Apartheid

For the politics of reform, the events of 1985 contrived to destroy the credibility of the new constitutional design even further, if that were possible. Mandela remained in Pollsmoor and the new members of parliament in the Western Cape largely remained in hiding.

The 1984 poll for the House of Representatives had been staggeringly low in the Greater Cape Town area. What little credibility the new dispensation had rested in the attitude that perhaps one should 'wait and see'. What was available to be seen during 1985 was, however, by no means edifying - the tricameral parliament had faced its first test and failed disastrously. Apartheid at the hands of 'whites' was one thing, its perpetuation by surrogates entirely another.

For the teachers employed by the House of Representatives, the impact of the events of 1985 was complex. The leadership of their established organisation, the Cape Teachers Professional Association

For the first time, the school boycotts were directed against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from the ranks of the excluded

A vigorous debate now rages about boycotts as a strategy for change, and the question of tactical solidarity is a potential cause of division

The tricameral parliament faced its first test in 1985 and failed disastrously, losing the little credibility the new dispensation had accrued

*If the education department regains its previous grip, the status of teachers could become further emasculated due to increased unilateral policy-making*

*Last year's school unrest left so much unfinished business that education may be embarking on an uncharted path in the forging of a new society*

(CTPA), did some behind-the-scenes negotiating and also tested Ebrahim's decision to proceed with examinations in the Supreme Court. For the rest, the CTPA confined itself to press statements rather than community action and involvement in the crisis. By the end of the year, any change in its standing in the region was hard to ascertain.

A new body, the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WCTU), emerged and grew quickly, but without making any serious dent in CTPA membership. This was perhaps because it was composed of those, of more radical persuasion, who had never been prepared to join the CTPA. The CTPA stuck to its policies of professional negotiation with the authorities and remained uncomfortable with progressive bodies such as SACOS and UDF. In contrast, WECTU was non-racial, and took an avowedly SACOS and non-collaborationist stance. By the end of the year, however, WECTU had yet to resolve the issue of how it could function without being prepared at least to admit to the existence of the employing authority for purposes other than denigration.


Both organisations are faced with the likelihood that if the education department were to regain its previous grip, it would be the status of the teachers that would become increasingly emasculated under a steady increase of unilateral policy-making. Few doubt that the department has 'black lists' - not only of

supposedly errant principals - and that retribution is likely to be spread out evenly over a number of years. The settling of scores by an 'own affairs' ministry is a daunting prospect, given the fact that the new dispensation offers a whole new avenue of patronage for the faithful by the new mainstream politicians.

### An Unfinished Drama

For most parties, like the peace-makers of Versailles, there is the hope that it will not happen again. The dislocation of the schooling system and its credentials by brinkmanship for a while was a tactic understood by both sides in previous periods of confrontation. It was a passion play always enacted against the backdrop of an unwritten rule that the situation would not be allowed to become irredeemable.

The unfinished drama of 1985, however, sketched for the first time the prospect of the collapse of the entire educational order. One year of muddling through may just be possible, but two or three years of similar scenarios cannot but profoundly atomise the social order. The events of last year left so much unfinished business that education may now be embarking along an uncharted path. What the educational future holds is uncertain, but it will probably depend less on the architects of apartheid than they would like to believe. *IPA*



*Street barricades, mob stonings, arson and police retaliation brought mayhem to the streets of Cape Town and surrounding suburbs in 1985.*

Cape Times



# Handling An Own Affair

## TRICAMERAL 'COLOURED' EDUCATION

*Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Carter Ebrahim, from the House of Representatives, speaks to Indicator SA Researcher Monica Bot*

Coloured education was hit by turmoil from the middle of 1985, the first year that its institutions fell under the control of a tricameral 'own affairs' Department of Education and Culture, headed by Minister Carter Ebrahim. The schools were closed for one and a half months during this period and end of year exams were organised under difficult circumstances. Many, including principals, teachers and parents, were critical of the fact that exams were being written at all after three months of school boycotts in the Cape Peninsula.

Minister Carter Ebrahim has been at the receiving end of a volley of criticism because of his 'hard-line' handling of the crisis. Dr Stuart Saunders, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, described the Minister's and the department's approach as 'confrontational', and alleged that 'the crisis had been fed by ministerial threats and ultimatums, and police and military action employed to handle it' (Daily News 11/12/85). In March 1986, Indicator SA researcher Monica Bot spoke to Minister Ebrahim about last year's crisis, and the impact the new department hopes to have on the quality of education provided to coloured pupils and students.

**C**ould you describe the problems encountered in maintaining order and discipline in coloured schools last year? How widespread was it, and were pupils 'willing converts' or was there pressure and coercion?

Minister Ebrahim said that various factors contributed to last year's unrest:

- Too few principals realised that the responsibility for ensuring discipline at schools rested on their shoulders. Instead, they had delegated power to the staff and student representative councils (SRCs).
- Both pupils and teachers had been the victims of intimidation, although many pupils had been 'easy prey' to radicals (often university students).
- The state of emergency was another factor. Teachers had made the mistake of

allowing pupils into teacher/parent meetings addressed by people such as Reverend Allan Boesak, who had talked of 'turning the country on its head'.

- The unrest was mainly confined to the Peninsula, where a fundamentalist Islamic movement had also contributed to the unrest.

*As a result of the schools unrest in 1985, some pupils and students did not write their year-end exams. What numbers were involved, and how many pupils were writing the postponed exams in March?*

According to the Minister, 11 052 pupils wrote the senior certificate exams at the end of last year, out of a total of 16 334 candidates. Of this number, 7 115 (64.4%) passed, of which 1 381 obtained matric exemption and 15 pupils an A-

*After the 1985 school unrest, some 4 000 out of 16 334 coloured matric pupils did not return to write their finals*

*To cope with the boycott's backlog, individual schools were given the option to promote pupils, repeat the year or give an exam*

*Now that coloured schools are open to all, the 'local option', whereby schools can set quotas for other races, seems the most likely solution*

*Minister Ebrahim feels that the new tricameral system will accelerate a process of eliminating the education backlog for coloured pupils*

aggregate.

Of those matric pupils who did not write, 1 162 applied before 6 January 1986 to write the March exam, and 977 have in fact since written. More pupils had applied to sit for the exam, but gave certain conditions which could, said Minister Ebrahim, not be considered. About 4 000 pupils did not return at all.

At teacher training colleges, exams were postponed for a fortnight. Students who failed or did not write in 1985 have been given the opportunity to write in May. Those who wrote and passed some subjects are teaching at a lower level this year and must rewrite their exams at the end of 1986.

*In February 1986 you said that principals and staff would be responsible for either promoting std 6-9 pupils on the basis of their previous academic record, or to let them write an exam instead. How has this plan of action to overcome last year's disruptions worked out?*

In response, the Minister said that three options were given in fact, 'left to the careful decision of the staff in consultation with the inspector':

- promotion to the next standard
- repetition of the year
- writing of an exam.

The aim is to avoid bottlenecks, and therefore it has been left to the individual schools to decide which option to choose. Minister Ebrahim felt that these options have defused the situation, especially in those instances where parents and pupils have been consulted. In March, school attendance was quite high, with well over 90 percent of pupils present in the various schools. The situation at the teacher training colleges and the University of the Western Cape has also stabilised for the moment.

*In February 1986, coloured schools were opened to all races. How has this move been received?*

According to Minister Ebrahim there have been no negative responses from any quarters. He felt the move was welcomed by parents and pupils. Furthermore, white teachers presently teaching in coloured schools have been fully accepted and are generally good teachers. The other education ministers have given no official reaction yet but none have been hostile, while teacher associations had welcomed the move. Concern has been expressed about the possible implications of the new policy for the vast number of underqualified coloured teachers, whose 'upward mobility' might be threatened by increasing numbers of better qualified white teachers. A policy of 'affirmative action' was introduced in 1985, though to be ensured of 'permanent employment', all teachers have to meet academic standards of course. A meeting of senior

officials had been planned to work out a mechanism agreeable to the various parties.

*Does the Department expect a large increase in the number of African pupils as a result of this move, and how will schools cope?*

The Minister replied that there are obviously limits to the number of pupils that can attend a school. There are still a number of coloured schools where the system of 'double shifts' takes place due to lack of accommodation. Furthermore, the geographical factor must be taken into account, in that a school serves a certain area.

A number of coloured schools have in the past already accepted African pupils, with a maximum per school of approximately 12 pupils. Therefore, Minister Ebrahim felt that the 'local option', where an individual school can decide on quotas, seemed the most likely option at present. The admissions policy is going to be discussed at a meeting of the Ministers Council.

*What are the advantages of having an 'own' minister for coloured education?*

The Minister feels that more impact can be made on two levels:

- a more effective articulation of needs at parliamentary level, where one is in a position to trade off, bargain and veto;
- one can more effectively make demands on the treasury. The budget, however, runs in five year cycles, and the present budget was started prior to the present tri-cameral system.

He feels that the new tri-cameral system will accelerate the process of eliminating the educational backlog. Group politics are the most effective way to move forward despite opposition to the segmental tricameral system.

The priorities set by his Department are:


- teacher training and upgrading, in order to build up an adequately trained teacher corps, and
- accommodation, especially on the secondary level, where there was an upswing in pupil numbers.

*Is one department of education essential?*

Although a move towards one system would have symbolic value, the Minister believes that it will not solve all the problems and should not have the status of 'a holy cow'. It would be difficult to decide, for example, which race group the minister would be drawn from. Also, because educational needs vary across the country, one department would be impractical.

In Natal, for example, coloured student teachers had asked for less emphasis on Afrikaans language instruction, whereas in other areas in the country English was hardly used and the opposite option was asked for. Similarly, the department had been asked to decentralise some supply





Cape Times

**COLOURED EDUCATION**

functions. He sees his primary task in parliament as to get rid of statutory race legislation, and 'after that ... if Germany has 11 education ministers, why not us?'

*With regard to the quality of education, (coloured) Minister of Health Services and Welfare, Chris April, said in January 1985 that 48 percent of coloured pupils left before or at the end of standard 2. What are the reasons for this and what is being done about the drop-out rate?*

The Minister replied that the recession, coupled with poverty among the coloured community, forced children to work at an early age in order to augment family income. Little could be done about this, but attention was being given to shifting the content of syllabi from their heavy academic bias to more technically-based education, because the former did not make people capable of being productive. Another contributory factor to the drop-out rate was the lack of school readiness, and attention was being focussed on pre-primary education, to 'lay foundations'.

*Last year, you said you were appalled by the lack of dedication among some teachers. Is this a serious problem, what are the causes and what is being done to address it?*

The Minister replied that there were a tremendous number of factors causing low motivation among teachers, among others:

- the limited job opportunities open to the coloured community before job reservation was lifted, resulting in many people who were not necessarily motivated going into the teaching profession
- the lower salaries paid to coloured teachers before parity was implemented. Salaries to underqualified teachers have

also recently been increased to make the profession more attractive.

Furthermore, the department hopes to improve teacher motivation through 'tightening up' their teacher guidance and support system. In addition, teachers were being encouraged to upgrade their qualifications, either through in-service training programmes, part-time colleges of education or correspondence courses.

*In October you said that you will continue to take a hard-line attitude to school boycotts. Earlier this year you reaffirmed that your primary aim would be to restore order and discipline to the schools. How is this being done, and do you foresee trouble in 1986?*

In response, the Minister said that he felt the options given to the schools with regard to the current academic year have defused the situation to a certain extent. Furthermore, some 'hard-line activists' were surprised at being allowed back to school this year, which he felt had had the effect of 'softening' them and their followers.

In addition, a series of meetings are held countrywide for the headmasters to inform them 'on the basis on which heads must act, their powers of suspension etc'. At last year's 'trouble spots', school security guards have been employed to protect the property.

Although he does expect trouble this year, especially on commemorative days such as 16 June and Sharpeville day, which 'could be used as spark-off points', he does not think it will be as effective as in 1985. The likelihood is lessened by the failure of last year's boycotts, as evidenced by the high exam attendance figures, and the disillusionment and demoralisation among pupils, many of whom now have to repeat the year. UPWA

A predecessor to the tricameral institution - the administration of coloured affairs - was the target of protesters during the 1980 school boycotts.

An improved salary structure, teacher guidance, and in-service training and upgrading, aim to improve teacher motivation

# Beyond the Blackboard

## TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS & POLITICS

By Roger Burrows, PFP MP and Former Professional Secretary of the Natal Teachers' Society

EDUCATION

Professional teacher societies have had to define more clearly their role in South African society amidst the turmoil in black schools over the last ten years. In the classroom and the community, teachers are caught between the traditional viewpoint that politics should be kept separate from education, and the increasing pressure, especially on black teachers, to join in condemning and actively opposing 'apartheid education'.

At the last conference of teacher associations, held in Cape Town in July 1985, the secretary of the Federal Council of Teachers Associations, Mr J F Steyn, said that 'it is undeniably true that teachers' organisations in South Africa are in many cases directly or indirectly involved in the politics of the day'. Despite the fact that teachers and their organisations must function within the parameters of official institutions, he acknowledged that there are many who 'claim that the structures . . . have been unilaterally arranged by the white sector and are therefore unacceptable'.

At the same conference, the president of the African Teachers Association of SA, Mr R L Peteni, stressed that 'the mood of our members, especially the younger members, is that the teachers' associations should adopt militant methods to supplement the usual methods of memoranda and deputations to the Education Department'. He recommended that teacher associations should try and work together, and negotiate with student organisations in seaching for 'a just South African society . . . otherwise we are in danger of becoming the targets of the anger of our own students, as all supporters of the system have become the victims of our angry young people'.

During the schools unrest of 1985, some teacher associations did in fact strongly oppose certain departmental decisions. In November, the newly-formed Western Cape Teachers Union decided not to administer exams because the school year for coloured pupils, disrupted by widespread boycotts, had not been held according to sound educational practice, and further, there were alleged irregularities in the exams (Cape Times 3/12/85). Similarly, the Cape Teachers Professional Association threatened court action over the exams, to force Minister Carter Ebrahim, House of Representatives, to allow supplementary exams to be written in 1986 (Cape Times 2/12/85). In January, however, their application was dismissed with cost.

Also indicative of the rapid politicisation of educational issues is the Union of Teachers Associations' call for the release of all political detainees, the implementation of a uniform, equal system and for fundamental political change (City Press 24/11/85). This organisation also sought a Supreme Court interdict asking for an order nisi to stop the Minister from implementing 'provocative' new regulations at boycott-torn schools (Sunday Tribune 6/11/85).

On the other hand, while various other organisations called for non-racial education and a single ministry of education, the Transvaal Onderwysersunie warned that this would meet with determined resistance from Afrikaans-speaking teachers. It is obvious that viewpoints differ strongly between the various teachers associations with regard to the role they could and should play in South African society. In this article, PFP MP Roger Burrows, former professional secretary of the Natal Teachers Society, takes an in-depth look at the political leanings of the various teachers associations in South Africa (see list of organisation acronyms in box).

Teachers are often seen as neutral figures manning the educational establishment

**T**he complex education situation in South Africa has created an equally intricate structure of teacher bodies. These are divided one from another by race, by language, by principles, by geographic areas served and by educational constituency. The views of each teacher association are determined by their leadership, interpreting the positions of

members as expressed at congresses or general meetings. Political views are sometimes susceptible to fairly rapid change as leaders come and go, or as the overall political position in South Africa alters.

The political stance of an organisation is generally not reflected in classroom relationships or in individual member

behaviour. In fact, teachers, in their everyday work situation, are widely seen by observers as neutral figures manning the educational establishment. Increasingly, however, as individual teachers adopt overtly political positions, they are perceived as extremely threatening to those in authority and action has been taken against them.

Teacher associations can be easily grouped into two broad areas - those recognised by the state and those not; and secondly according to membership of the four major racial groups. Several of the recognised teacher bodies have open membership but none has more than a scattering of members outside of the major racial group it is perceived to represent. Their diverse positions on political and educational issues are briefly discussed in the following outline of the many teacher associations operating in South Africa today.

### Recognised by Government

#### ATASA: African Teachers Association of South Africa

This is the largest teacher body in South Africa, seen as representing all African teachers, including the independent homelands. ATASA has been in existence for over fifty years, during which time political events and pressures have caused many difficulties for the organisation and its various provincial bodies. ATASA is a federation of geographically based organisations, wherein homeland boundaries are not recognised for purposes of representation.

In general terms, ATASA's goals are the same as those of most black political movements - representation of all South Africans in a single parliament in one country. The association has constantly stressed its belief in a democratic political solution for South Africa and totally opposed apartheid, striving for its abolition in education. It has not followed the trade union route and sought to remain a professional association. Nevertheless, ATASA has reiterated its belief in the political aims of a grouping of teachers, and placed conditions of service as a secondary matter.

ATASA has been under fairly regular attack both within and without South Africa for not adopting a far more radical political position. Yet it has been remarkably successful in remaining in touch with all sides in South Africa - except for those of its provincial groups viewed as being too close to the homeland administrations. The association has accepted the need to represent their members on various government structures, and participates on the South African



Council of Education (SACE), a research committee (RECES), and on Department of Education and Training (DET) committees. On the other hand, ATASA representatives have also been in contact with student organisations such as COSAS (before it was banned), and attempted to intercede on behalf of protesting students, supporting many of their demands.

It is the only teachers organisation recognised by the international body (WCOTP) as representing South Africans, and as such attends both world and Africa teachers conferences and congresses. There is no strong full-time administrative organisation, the secretary-general (Mr H H Dlamlenze) being a Soweto school principal. The long-standing president is Mr Randall Peteni and other leaders include Prof A J Thembela (NATU), Mr F M Tonjeni (CATU) and Mr L M Tuanyane (TUATA).

Rector R E van der Ross of the University of the Western Cape leads 2 000 staff and students on a protest march, 19 September 1985.

ATASA has constantly stressed its belief in a democratic political future and strives for the abolition of apartheid in education



*When overtly political matters arise and the (white) federal council of teachers cannot establish consensus, no single view is forced through*

*The English-speaking associations support the concept of one education ministry, but have slightly differing stances on school admissions*

*The Transvaal Onderwysersunie, previously a staunch National Party supporter, is now far more critical because of possible government reforms*

*UTASA's total rejection of the tricameral constitution has brought it under the severely critical gaze of Minister Carter Ebrahim*

### FEDCO: Federal Council of Teachers Associations

This all-white body consists of representatives of the eight white teacher bodies recognised by the provincial and central government. They divide themselves into two language groups - three into the English-speaking Teachers Association (ESTAS), and the three Afrikaans and two other bilingual associations into the Federasie van Afrikaanse Onderwysersverenigings (FAO). The Federal Council is dominated by matters of conditions of service, and when overtly political matters arise on which the Council is deeply divided, no single view is forced through. In fact, very few votes are taken at all.

Federal Council administration is outstanding and its secretary, Mr Koos Steyn, is renowned for his ability in administration and in the preparation of documents. The chairmanship of FEDCO is occupied on a two-year cycle with English and Afrikaans speakers alternating. The current chairman is Prof Hennie Maree (TO) and vice-chairman is Mr Dudley Schroeder (SATA). There are two very small teacher bodies with observer status on the Federal Council, who represent white teachers in African and coloured schools.

### English-Speaking Teacher Assoc's

These three, the Natal Teachers Society (NTS), the South African Teachers Association (SATA) and the Transvaal Teachers Association (TTA) can generally be termed as 'anti-apartheid' in outlook, and support the concept of one ministry of education. On school admissions they have slightly differing stances, which broadly centre on the issue of parental control of school admissions.

The three bodies are strong administratively, and a large amount of their energies is devoted to conditions of service and limited professional matters. However they are generally weaker in research and in developing theoretical principles for their positions. An umbrella body, ESTAS, provides a non-formal link with no administrative structure or statutory recognition.

### Afrikaans and Afrikaans-Majority Associations

This group is made up of three provincial associations (TO, NOU and OFSTA), a national union (SAOU), and an association for technical educationalists (SAATVE). The latter body and OFSTA are representative also of a small group of English-speaking teachers.

The largest white teacher body, the Transvaal Onderwysersunie, is critically placed at the current interface between National Party and Conservative Party politics. Previously a staunch government

supporter, the association is now far more critical of the government of the day. There is little doubt that the TO represents one of the most significant forces retarding progress towards one ministry of education and free association in education. This is the only teachers' group to refuse to join in the signing of a Teachers Charter drafted by JOCTASA, which explicitly condemns apartheid in education.

### SATC: South African Teachers Council

The SATC, with which all white teachers in white departments have to register compulsorily, is a further dividing point between the English and Afrikaans language groups. The ESTAS bodies have consistently called for a multiracial teachers register and council, while FAO groups want a racial council. There are currently discussions in progress on linking SATC and the Federal Council into one white umbrella body, with possible legislation pending. The various associations' positions on this issue are still developing.

### UTASA: Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa

This body represents the provincial 'coloured' teacher associations. The major force is the Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA) under Mr Franklin Sonn, who is also leader of UTASA. UTASA is strongly committed to a non-racial future for South Africa. It is the most recently created of the national teacher bodies and stems from a history of community division over the issue of participation in state structures. UTASA's current position is that it has to take its place in certain official institutions such as SACE and RECES, in order to represent the views of its members.

The CTPA is at this time under especial pressure from more radical elements within the education community. There is a state of flux and stress within the teacher community, reflected within the teacher associations. The relationship between UTASA and the House of Representative's Department of Education and Culture is formal and frequently strained. UTASA's total rejection of the tri-cameral constitution has fairly naturally brought it under the severely critical gaze of Minister Carter Ebrahim.

UTASA and its affiliates have a strong organisational and administrative base. More than any other teacher body, it has a strong research department and theoretical base to its positions. UTASA and ATASA are linked in a loose affiliation, JOCTASA, which holds intermittent meetings.

## TASA: Teachers Association of South Africa

TASA is a strong unitary body, representative of eight thousand Indian teachers in South Africa. It is the smallest but most highly organised of national teacher organisations. With solid assets and a skilled financial benefit operation for teachers, TASA has developed an important mediating role. On occasions this is tangibly evident, as at its most recent congress where representatives of all other recognised South African teacher bodies were present; or through the efforts of its president, Mr Pat Samuels, to promote contact and teacher unity.

Traditionally, it has had good relations with the Natal Indian Congress and remains strongly opposed to the tri-cameral constitution. It clashed publicly on a number of occasions with the South African Indian Council and its leader, Mr Amichand Rajbansi. Currently (like UTASA) it has decided to work with the House of Delegates' Department of Education and Culture. The fact that Minister Kassie Ramduth is an ex-school principal perhaps tempers contact at the moment.

## Non-Recognised Teacher Groups

The bodies named here are merely representative of a number of others which exist across South Africa. Generally they are splinter groups from existing bodies, but one or two have an independent, and long-standing basis. They suffer the dual disability of not having a good funding base nor being able to offer efficient delivery on members' individual problems. Their political profile is generally greater than that of recognised bodies.

## NEUSA: National Education Union of South Africa

This body developed in the aftermath of the 1976 student uprising in Soweto and its suppression. Initially based in Johannesburg only, and then with only a few hundred members, it has gathered many more adherents to its strong non-racial, anti-apartheid, non-participatory stance. It does not seek recognition by the state authorities and is developing an alternate organisation to all existing teacher bodies.

NEUSA has strong links with the United Democratic Front and its affiliated organisations. Since the suppression of COSAS in late 1985, NEUSA has taken up the cause of student demands. While not yet taking a high public position against the recognised associations, this reticence cannot be expected to continue much

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986

## A GUIDE TO TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

*The Racial, Language and Political Divide*

### For African Teachers **ATASA African Teachers' Association of South Africa**

NATU Natal African Teachers' Union  
CATU Cape African Teachers' Union  
TUATA Transvaal United Teachers' Association  
OFSATA OFS African Teachers' Association

### For White Teachers **FEDCO Federal Council of Teachers' Associations**

#### **FAO Federasie van Afrikaans Onderwysersverenigings (Afrikaans)**

TO Transvaal Onderwysersunie  
NOU Natalse Onderwysersunie  
SAOU Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie  
OFSTA\* OFS Teachers' Association  
SAATVE\* SA Association for Technical and Vocational Education

#### **ESTAS English-Speaking Teachers' Association (English)**

NTS Natal Teachers' Society  
SATA South African Teachers' Association  
TTA Transvaal Teachers' Association

### For Coloured Teachers **UTASA Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa**

CTPA Cape Teachers' Professional Association  
SONAT Society of Natal Teachers  
OFSTA OFS Teachers' Association  
TAT Transvaal Association of Teachers

### Independent or Non-Racial **JOCTASA Joint Council of Teachers' Associations of South Africa**

TASA Teachers' Association of South Africa  
NEUSA National Education Union of South Africa  
TLSA Teachers' League of South Africa  
WECTU Western Cape Teachers' Union

#### *Other Educational Bodies*

WCOTP World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession  
COSAS Congress of South African Students  
RECES Research Committee on Educational Services  
SACE South African Council of Education  
SATC South African Teachers' Council

\* These also represent a small number of English-speaking teachers.

longer. It generally draws members from ATASA's base.

## TLSA: Teachers League of South Africa

TLSA is an 'underground' body of coloured teachers which exists in the Western Cape area. It is underground to the extent that it was suppressed in the 1950s because of its political links with the Congress and Unity movements. It still regularly prints a publication of its views which could be characterised as strongly socialist in tone. TLSA regularly attacks the apartheid education system and any body participating in its structures.

## WECTU: Western Cape Teachers Union

A newly established body drawing members from CTPA, CATU and some from TASA and SATA. It has received particular attention during 1985 for articulating the radical position in opposition to authoritarian measures implemented in DET and House of Representatives administered schools. **UWA**

*The political profile of non-recognised teacher groups such as the newly established NEUSA and WECTU is generally greater than that of recognised bodies*



George Lobe/EASTERN PROVINCE HERALD

# THE NEW FRONTIER

## Rebellion in the Eastern Cape

By Mandla Tyala of the Eastern Province Herald

A widespread stayaway strike in the Eastern Cape on 21 March 1986 commemorated the first anniversary of last year's infamous police shootings in Langa township outside Uitenhage. Although some community demands have been met - the formal state of emergency was recently lifted on 7 March, many detainees have been released, and the March banning orders placed on local civic leaders are being lifted - the major conflict issues remain. Mandla Tyala, a seasoned journalist, reports on the ferment of 1985/86 in the region, as the powerful black consumer boycott is resumed in East London and elsewhere - even before the all-pervasive April deadline for negotiations expires.

PEBCO has re-emerged as a political force, with UDF affiliates in the region rallying behind its consumer boycott and other defiance campaigns

Two of the most significant developments during the months of disquiet in the Eastern Cape have been the emergence of the United Democratic Front (UDF) as a political force to be reckoned with, and the discovery by Africans of the consumer boycott as an effective weapon in the struggle to have inequalities redressed.

The regional superstructure of the UDF, despite being hard-hit by mass detentions of its members and leadership, failed to collapse during the state of emergency. Street and area committees were formed instead as the resistance movement consolidated its position in townships throughout the Eastern Cape. UDF affiliates, from the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) to trade unions like the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union (MACWUSA) and youth groups, succeeded in putting the clock back to the peak of the African National Congress defiance campaigns in the 1950s.

**PEBCO's Revival**  
The beginning of 1985 saw PEBCO

emerge from relative inactivity to declare war on the community council system. With all the UDF affiliates in the region rallying behind it, PEBCO put its new-found clout to effective use. It did not confine its fight to affordable rents and demands for decent housing but tackled other issues too, such as bus fare increases and hikes in the price of petrol. By early 1986, after months of rent and service charge boycotts, the East Cape Development Board acknowledged that arrears owed to it by township residents stood at R12 million.

Port Elizabeth was to get its first real taste of black consumer power when a PEBCO call in March 1985 for a 'black weekend' (a stayaway strike) received overwhelming community support. For a whole weekend the city was virtually devoid of black faces. At the time, the first indications of the consumer boycott that was to strangle smaller white businesses surfaced. PEBCO president, Qaqawuli Godolozzi, disclosed at a mass meeting that 'We have another ace up our sleeve'.

Meanwhile, African community councillors had come to bear the brunt of community anger at the system they



represented. Certainly the most hounded councillor was Mr T B Kinikini, the KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) councillor who refused to resign after all his colleagues stood down in mid March 1985. For five months his funeral parlour had been boycotted, his home stoned and his family threatened. After the Langa shootings, he was beaten to death and then set alight by an incensed mob.

### Bowing to Pressure

Since the outbreak of unrest nationwide, African councillors have been attacked, forced to resign, and had their houses and businesses burnt down. During 1985, the dreaded necklace emerged - a means of eliminating people perceived to be collaborating with the system, by placing a burning tyre around their necks.

In two months of civil unrest, from 21 March, the day of the Langa massacre of 20 funeral marchers, to 29 May 1985, 108 people died in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage district. During this stormy period, councillors finally bowed to the pressure. Entire councils resigned in Cradock and Uitenhage townships. Many disrobed for keeps in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown but a few chose to cling to their positions, carrying pistols on their persons and having their homes placed under police guard.

By the time the state of emergency was declared on 21 July - covering 16 magisterial districts in the Eastern Cape alone - at least 240 beleaguered African councillors had handed in their resignations nationwide. In small towns like Despatch, Beaufort West and Somerset East, councillors resigned en bloc.

The government, determined to keep an evidently detested system intact, has since appointed white administrators for Cradock, Uitenhage and Oudtshoorn townships, to assume the functions of the councils. The councils in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown continue with a limp. In the Eastern Cape today, only 17 out of 45 community councils, and two out of four fully-fledged local authorities, are functioning, and there are vacancies in 173 of the 284 wards.

### Opposition Feuding

The feud between the UDF and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) erupted at the beginning of May 1985. Although there is decades-old tension between the rival ideologies of black consciousness and non-racialism, no single leader has ever been able to say exactly what ignited the clash in Port Elizabeth's townships which went on to claim scores of lives.

Personality clashes between prominent figures in both camps were cited as one possible reason. It was also widely held that

a third force was playing a catalytic role. While no conclusive evidence was forthcoming, all fingers pointed at the security forces, who had everything to gain while resistance groups had their energies misdirected. In early July, government rejected the UDF's accusations of complicity.

The struggle for power has left AZAPO a spent force in Port Elizabeth. Following the expulsion in early 1986 of AZAPO's 'Reverend' Mzwandile Ebenezer - who was frequently accused of stirring up trouble between AZAPO and the UDF - it seems as if the UDF is set to further expand its support. Currently, AZAPO which has been plagued by internal squabbles and adverse public opinion, is further being destabilised by escalating tension between Africanist and black consciousness elements within its ranks.

### Cradock's Revolt

Since 1984, Cradock has been another boiling cauldron in the Eastern Cape. A school boycott started in February 1984 in support of educational demands and to protest the dismissal of prominent community figure and respected school teacher, Matthew Goniwe. He had been instrumental in establishing the Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA), which under his presidentship brought about the collapse of the Iingelihle Community Council there.

Goniwe's involvement in civic issues had apparently perturbed his employers, the Department of Education and Training

*Only 17 out of 45 community councils and two out of four black local authorities are operational in the Eastern Cape today*

*The feud between the UDF and AZAPO centred on personality clashes, political differences and manipulation by an unknown third force*

*Community advisor and mediator, Molly Blackburn, at the site of the Langa killings. After her fatal car accident, 20 000 black people attended the funeral on 2 January 1986.*



**CIVIL UNREST**

*Faceless death squads have been linked to the disappearance and killings of leading anti-apartheid activists, a chilling development*

*The consumer boycott was suspended in December after local business tried to meet those demands that were within its power*

*April has been set as the deadline for government to meet other demands that supersede the influence of local authorities*

*Anger is again rising because of the redeployment of troops in the region's townships, the banning of meetings and activists, and police shootings*

(DET). A move to transfer him to Graaff Reinet in late 1983 was widely construed as a bid to decapitate CRADORA, and Goniwe refused to move. After his subsequent dismissal, Goniwe became a rural organiser for the UDF. One of his primary functions was to organise affiliates in the conservative platteland towns.

He was detained for nearly six months. Some time after his release, Goniwe was brutally murdered in mysterious circumstances, together with two other Cradock community leaders. An estimated 40 000 people attended their funeral on 20 July 1985, which drew worldwide attention. The murders sparked consternation in the Eastern Cape as it became apparent that unknown 'death squads' were out to annihilate any active opposition to apartheid policies. This chilling development was evident elsewhere in the country - by early July, 11 opposition leaders had been assassinated and another 27 activists had disappeared.

Earlier in Port Elizabeth, three executive members of PEBCO, including president Qaqawuli Godolozzi, disappeared mysteriously while driving to the local airport on 8 May. Their families made vain attempts to secure court orders, to force the police to produce them, if they had in fact been detained. Yet they have never been seen since, and again the faceless death squads are held responsible by the black community at large.

## The Consumer Boycott

A fragile peace was achieved in the AZAPO-UDF feud in the second half of 1985, following a series of peace talks which began in May. The UDF and its affiliates now concentrated their energies on organising a consumer boycott of white businesses, which was to bankrupt scores of small-scale entrepreneurs, especially in Port Elizabeth and Queenstown.

The aim of the boycott, according to its organisers, was to withhold trade from white businessmen until they brought pressure to bear on the government to meet certain demands. These include:

- the release of political prisoners and leaders detained in terms of emergency regulations
- the scrapping of Black Local Authorities
- the bringing to justice of the Goniwe murderers
- the production of missing community leaders
- the removal of troops from the townships;
- the lifting of the emergency; and
- the consideration of student demands.

With their profit margins drastically reduced, white traders were forced to sit up and pay attention to the black community's grievances. They scurried

about setting up meetings with boycott leaders, made representations to the police and took up certain issues at central government level. 'I think white businessmen have finally come to understand the frustrations of detention without trial and the general suffering in the black community', observed a boycott committee spokesman in Port Elizabeth.

With boycott leaders having satisfied themselves that the local chamber of commerce was genuine in its efforts to meet demands that were within its power, the boycott was conditionally suspended in late 1985. The move was mandated by 50 000 township residents at a rally on 1 December, at the Dan Qeque stadium in Zwide, outside Port Elizabeth. A tumultuous year of black challenge and protest tapered off with relative calm.

## The April Deadline

An uneasy lull hangs over Port Elizabeth as 1986 takes tentative shape. The consumer boycott received more than 90 percent support in 1985, and now that it has drawn blood, the community sees it as an effective tool for 'getting at them'. At last year's rally, April was set as a deadline for the government to address certain demands which are not within the power of the local authorities.

If the government fails to deliver the goods by then, the organisers have threatened to launch a consumer boycott coordinating committee, which would call for a national boycott. This is planned to coincide with the economic sanctions that Commonwealth leaders have threatened to impose, if their demands for reform are not met.

With student bodies also looking at April as a deadline for resuming student protest action, black communities in the Eastern Cape are holding their breath. Students returned to school on 28 January 1986 after last year's widespread classroom boycotts.

Anger and resentment has been building up in the townships because of the redeployment of troops which were withdrawn in December 1985. Much to the irritation of many activists, the authorities have also continued to ban gatherings, including church services. The level of anger was evident when the police detained more than 70 UDF marshals, after enforcing stringent restrictions on the funeral of a 13-year old victim of a police shooting earlier this year.

In the next few months, pressure will almost certainly be on community leaders to call for some act of defiance, to appease those who are already hot under the collar and to resume the momentum of last year's resistance campaigns. *UDF*

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