

VOLUME THREE NUMBER ONE

WINTER 1985 (86)

INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A

SOUTH AFRICA'S CRISIS

Pre-Conditions for Stability

THE INFLUX CRUCIBLE

Towards Informal Settlement

MIGRANTS

Recruiting a Geopolitical Order

MINERS

The Underground Safety Debate

POPULATION AND POVERTY

Proper Planning for Prosperity

Two Perspectives on African School Results
The Social Market Option
Cycles of Revolt – Counting the Costs
ANC Insurgence on the New Frontier

(86)
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
Centre for Applied Social Sciences.
Indicator Project South Africa.
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THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS

ISSN = 142931

INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA QUARTERLY REPORT

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Note: In keeping with current academic practice, the following words are used to denote membership of the respective racial groups: African; white; coloured; Indian. The term 'black' is used to collectively denote those people referred to by the government as 'non-white'.

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
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POLITICAL

M O N I T O R

INDICATOR VOL. 3 No 1

SOUTH AFRICA WINTER 1985



Cycles of civil unrest, in ever increasing frequency, have come to form an intricate pattern of black protest politics in South Africa over the last twenty-five years.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S URBAN CRISIS

The Need for Fundamental Solutions

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

The widespread urban riots that plague South African society today inevitably invite comparison to the earlier, shorter-lived and more fragmented militant black protests witnessed during 1976/77. In the following diagnosis, Prof Schlemmer identifies the most disturbing features of the current civil unrest - which set it distinctly apart from earlier periods of instability - as the increased role of disaffected adult householders alongside the angry youth, and the explicit political nature of their joint activity. In the context of revolutionary street politics, African town councillors and policemen have become the principal victims of politically motivated attacks on perceived 'collaborators'.

In the midst of social turmoil, the familiar 'agitation' bogeyman, linked to exiled black nationalist manipulation, raises its head once more. Prof Schlemmer dismisses such single-stranded theories of civil unrest because of their inherent tendency to crudely reduce a complex matrix of social, economic and political conditions to an overly simplistic relationship of cause and effect. In looking for ways out of the maze of violence, he identifies the many variables which shape African townships as social 'pressure cookers' prone to simmering instability. He concludes that a unified government approach presented as a package of reforms, rather than an incremental reformist response to single issues, is more likely to reduce urban conflict levels and alleviate social stress.

UNREST

The unrest hit a new peak in April 1985 when 1 549 incidents were reported. The costs of visible riot damage and hidden costs are very high

The fact that African leaders in local government have been made scapegoats reflects the dominant political character of the current unrest

Everyone is aware of the serious violence in the townships at present. Since August of last year there have been many thousands of reported cases of unrest or confrontations between rioters and the police. Mobs of youths and young adults of up to 3 000 strong have been involved in the confrontations. Serious damage has included the destruction by fire or otherwise of over 160 public buildings, some 300 private homes of black city councillors or police and 1 600 buses and vehicles.

Speaking in Cradock on 23 May 1985, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, reported that in April alone there were 1 549 incidents of unrest throughout the country. In the nine months to the end of April, 381 people died and 1 497 people were wounded in the unrest. Most of the deaths and injuries occurred as a result of police action but 82 deaths and 559 injuries occurred as a consequence of civilian violence on others. Most tragic have been incidents of demonstrators killing and publicly burning fellow community members loosely accused of siding with the authorities.

The costs of the unrest are very high. In the period R31 million damage was done to buildings and R12 million to vehicles. The hidden costs to the country are even higher, including the unavoidable disruption of worker transport.

Unlike the unrest of 1976/77, adult householder protests over rents and busfare increases have been a substantial feature of the current unrest in its early stages. Also unlike the 1976/77 disturbances, the unrest has acquired a highly political flavour; the initial escalation of the unrest was a response to the elections for the new tricameral parliament. Furthermore, a more audible articulation of revolutionary aims is characteristic of the current unrest than was the case in 1976/77.

The highly political character of the current unrest is seen also in the scapegoating of the local level institutionalised leadership and authority figures. Some 240 urban councillors have resigned following the deaths of five councillors in various parts of the country, and attacks upon the homes of well over 100 councillors.

Research conducted by *Indicator SA* (Vol2/No4, 1985) suggests strongly that coercive mobilisation or intimidation are not very prominent features in the current unrest. The participants appear to be very willingly mobilised to act in a way so as to produce a situation of urban turmoil. Unlike the disturbances of 1976/77 the majority of the participants in the unrest are adults rather than children. According to the Minister of Law and Order, only 12 percent of those wounded and 19 percent of those killed in the unrest have been under the age of 18 years.

These patterns all lend credence to the view that there is a fairly concerted and well-



The casspir vehicle, dubbed as the 'hippo', is used by police to patrol the troubled townships in the course of quelling riots.

supported campaign in the townships to create a situation of turmoil and ungovernability. In the areas in which the unrest is most sustained, notably the Eastern Cape and the Witwatersrand, the established formal community leadership has all but collapsed under the impact of the campaign.

The Matrix of Interacting Factors

Any political movement or pattern of political unrest must be analysed at two levels. One level is that of the manifest goals and objectives among leading participants. Another level is that of the conditions, frustrations and motivations existing among the rank and file members of communities which create the propensity for unrest or the inclination to participate in the pattern of behaviour prescribed by the leading figures. The previous research of *Indicator SA*, to which reference has already been made, indicates clearly that the propensity exists.

It would be futile to diagnose the current unrest only as a well-coordinated attempt to create ungovernability and chaos in the townships. It is as important, perhaps more important, to analyse township conditions within the wider structure of South African society.

In any event, all single-stranded theories of urban unrest are inevitably wrong or oversimple. Some people argue that the unrest is entirely due to agitation and intervention by expatriate movements, most importantly the ANC. This explanation would be akin to blaming the troubles in Ulster solely on the IRA or the soccer violence in Britain solely on liquor.

Others argue that the unrest is due entirely to a lack of political rights, to a resistance to white rule or to a quest for political liberation. The political dimension is important, but as a sole explanation it hardly accords with the fact that there have been long periods of tranquility during South Africa's history of white rule. Violent urban unrest has also occurred in a number of countries with a democratic franchise.

In trying to understand unrest one has to consider a complexity of interacting factors — a matrix of conditions. This analysis will not attempt to assess the weight of all the relevant variables, but they can be listed for the sake of illustration (some require more explanation than others):

- Youth and young adult unemployment.
- Bitterness about the failure to reach desired educational levels in a school system with critically high failure rates.
- The economic recession and inflation leading to severe restrictions on spending money.
- Irritants of rental and busfare increases.
- Mobilisation by activists in political movements, more focussed than but nominally under the umbrella of the UDF, and perhaps the National Forum.
- Feelings among Africans of being relatively more deprived than before due to the introduction of parliamentary rights for coloureds and Indians.
- The stress of overcrowding in township housing.
- The opportunities which unrest offers for more mundane anti-social behaviour like looting, vandalism and displays of public aggression.
- Corruption and/or ineffectiveness in township local leadership creating popular resentment.
- The absence of a respected and legitimate local leadership in the townships to assist in inculcating respect for authority.
- Counter-reaction by police units too thinly spread and sporadically present to deter and calm the rioters down by strength of numbers.
- Absence of internal law enforcement agencies in the townships which can immediately recognise individuals and distinguish between leaders and followers, hence discouraging activism.
- Boredom-stress: stress occurs as a result of boredom. Juveniles observed to suffer social malaise or boredom often respond to the situation by acts of aggression done for kicks (Newman 1979: p234, commenting on a US headline 'Youths drench woman with gasoline, torch her to death'). This process is particularly relevant in South African black townships which, having been established as 'locations' or dormitories for working populations, have a low level of variety and social diversion as a consequence of their ecological structure.
- Encapsulation: populations or groups, forced closely together by residential circumstances, tend to have a higher propensity to collective dissidence and protest than groups which are intermingled with others in heterogeneous circumstances. The clearest illustration of this is among encapsulated workers (stevedores, miners etc), but the principle applies to segregated and ghetto populations as well.
- Urban reforms and promises of reforms by the authorities which have raised

In the Eastern Cape and Witwatersrand, the formal community leadership has all but collapsed in a concerted campaign to make townships ungovernable

Any pattern of political unrest should be analysed at two levels: the manifest goals of leaders and the conditions/motivations of the rank and file

As there have been long periods of tranquility under white rule, the unrest cannot only be linked to a quest for political rights

Population groups forced into segregated ghettos are more likely to engage in collective dissidence and protest than more heterogeneous communities

URBAN BLACK SA: *A Model*

Socio-Economic Patterns

Consequences

● EARLIER ERA ●

Low urbanisation
 Relatively effective influx control
 Urban populations a homogeneous superior working class and lower middle class, protected from competition
 Low pressure on services, amenities and housing

Low aspirations for social mobility
 Aspirations deflected to rural areas
 Urban communities relatively content

● CURRENT ERA ●

High rates of 'illegals'
 Influx control operates on job access rather than residence, hence 'illegals' tend to be unemployed
 Some 'illegals' find work eventually — increasing competition for jobs
 Increased pressure on services and housing
 High densities in 4-roomed houses (11-14 in Soweto)
 All public expenditure goes on maintenance of service levels. Little development of variety and choice in urban life

Stress of overcrowding on aspirant lower-middle class and original dwellers
 Lifestyle threats to established residents
 Lack of development of variety in amenities plus unemployment equals boredom and propensity for youth violence
But, illegals still constrained by their insecurity. Display submissive or dependent reactions
 Status protest among middle class elites

1985

1985

Propensity for unrest

● IMMEDIATE FUTURE ●

Higher rates of in-migration
 More competition for jobs — rising unemployment
 More and more crowding in townships
 Townships acquire low status third world character
 Informal sector grows to cope with low status unemployment

'Illegals' more confident, become politically oriented
 Lifestyle and boredom stress increases
 Lower-middle class/middle class feels more intensely deprived because status of townships declines
 Primary aspiration of elites to escape ghetto. Actively discredit local government leadership because latter cannot influence life outside township ghetto
 Political strife between new and older residents — youth violence scapegoats conservative leadership
 Encapsulated deprived middle class youth become increasingly solidary and violent


Unrest peaks

● REFORM ERA ●

Softening or Removal of Group Areas and Adequate Provision of Land for Self-Help Housing

Poorer urbanising people go to self-help areas
 Pressure on services alleviated
 Most elites move out of townships

Older townships start regaining homogeneity as lower-middle and working class areas
 Formerly encapsulated dissident groups spread over city
 Township leaders can re-establish authority in absence of dissident elites
 Social stability returns to townships



Langa township outside Uitenhage, Eastern Cape. A confrontation between police and crowds on 21 March 1985, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville shootings, left at least twenty residents dead in a macabre replay of the historic tragedy.

expectations without providing definite information on results and outcomes. Universally, reform has tended to operate as an accelerator of unrest and violence in societies with a high degree of relative deprivation among substantial parts of the populations (Gurr 1970; Taylor 1984: p32).

- Urbanising populations are not necessarily inclined to unrest or violence, but the pressure of urbanisation can tend to incline others in urban communities to turmoil or violence. This has been a finding in regard to American urban riots and is also indicated by findings elsewhere (Schlemmer 1968). Urbanisation by lower status individuals tends to increase awareness of status differentiation within urban communities. More successful or aspiring groups tend to become more aware of their particular situation and interests (Berelson and Steiner 1964: p605). Under these circumstances, the aspirations of higher status groups in the subject communities tend to sharpen, as does their awareness of deprivation, because their situation becomes increasingly *dissonant* (Gurr 1970: p22/56).

These factors are all in one way or another, and in interaction with one another, contributors to the social instability in townships. One particular set of processes, among all these others, is probably sufficiently important to require further discussion.

The Failure of Local Level Leadership

Any community or society requires established authority figures to propagate norms of behaviour and to promote social order. Of particular relevance, then, is the failure or refusal of local level leadership in the townships in some parts of the country to establish norms of orderly political behaviour.

Several specific factors have affected, demotivated or undermined this leadership. Firstly, there is the lack of adequate provision for the funding of local government in African areas. Secondly, formal African local leadership has become too closely associated with a class of small businessmen (some not so small) among which many individuals have appeared who have carried business interests into the political arena. Thirdly, there has been no adequate training provided for a new group of politicians who have had to deal with a particularly tough white bureaucracy in the former Administration Boards, now Development Boards.

Over and above these factors, however, is one very important dynamic. Within the constitutional constraints of African local government and the Group Areas Act, the African local authorities have symbolised for the African elites in the township their *inability to aspire beyond the 'township', both socially, residentially and politically*. The framework of local government has been perceived as an impediment to the real aspirations of the rising African middle class and to the political idealism of the leadership of voluntary organisations. Whether conscious or not, the African local authorities probably appear to exist as a contradiction of African progress beyond the 'ghetto', and hence have had to be discredited.

Urbanising populations are not necessarily inclined to violence, but a combination of pressures might turn some people in this direction

'Ghetto' government is perceived as impeding both the aspirations of the rising African middle-class and the political idealism of the informal leadership

Activists leading voluntary organisations are drawn from the ranks of the educated class, who desire to break out of the drab township confines

Threats to status, esteem and identity rather than material poverty, have tended to universally generate more militancy

The real problem is that too many classes with conflicting aspirations are forced to live side-by-side in the overcrowded townships

Appropriate policies must address the entire matrix of problems rather than alleviating single issues through piecemeal reforms

The township environment, with its overcrowding, lack of variety and drab, restricted working class flavour is quite probably a constant threat to the status and esteem needs of the more educated residents, from whose ranks the activists are drawn. In a recent article, the black associate editor of City Press, Percy Qoboza wrote: 'One of the problems of President Botha's reform programme is the failure to recognise the frustration of the people in Diepkloof Extension in Soweto who spend up to R300 000 on mansions, but are not allowed to break out of Soweto and spend that money in more acceptable and serene surroundings. In other words, the Group Areas Act and a multiplicity of other laws decree that they must live and die in Soweto in spite of their financial ability to break out of that ghetto' (Sunday Times 26/5/85).

It is apposite to note that threats to status, esteem and identity have tended universally to generate more militancy than material poverty (Huntington 1977). These 'blocked' status elites in African townships will probably never allow a local level leadership, oriented mainly towards the township and its day to day problems, to gain recognition and legitimacy.

The Propensity to Unrest: A Model

Given all the factors mentioned above, one may assume that the African townships in South Africa have a propensity for unrest and dissidence. The diagram (figure 1) combines these factors into a hypothetical model which suggests that the potential for unrest and dissidence will actually tend to increase under current legislation.

The model suggests that the real problem in South Africa's townships is the fact that they are formally created ghettos which have become social 'pressure cookers'. Too many classes, categories and conflicting aspirations are contained within increasingly over-crowded residential locations from which there is no escape — internal colonialism epitomised.

Appropriate policy formulation must address itself to the matrix of problems rather than alleviating issues singly, in a series of piecemeal reforms.

Changes to some elements in the system will throw other elements into sharper relief. Some strains may be eliminated but others will be intensified. Above all, perhaps, the collective consciousness of the past system and general mistrust will condition African reactions to the changes. A period of flux lies ahead which will test the urban stability of South Africa to the limit.

An Appropriate Policy Response

The analysis given above should *not* be misunderstood to imply that reforms should not be granted. The removal of influx control legislation is essential, if for no other reasons than that it does not work, it is the greatest single frustrator of the entire black population, for humanitarian reasons and the fact that South Africa cannot become an efficient modern industrial society while severe legal impediments to free labour mobility exist (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1985).

The analysis, if reasonably accurate, however, does imply that the current process of reform is totally inadequate if not highly dangerous to stability. We need a *package of reforms* which will alleviate the social stress in the African urban communities *in addition to* single incremental reforms which necessity and political morality dictate.

Such a package must include the interrelated requirements of:


- More land for township expansion;
- The establishment of a basis for differentiated residential areas for urban blacks. As regards the elites this implies at least some form of relaxation of group areas legislation like the formal classification of some suburbs as 'grey' areas;
- The increased provision of services, amenities and other lifestyle facilitators which given the constraints on state spending, implies a privatisation of as many functions as possible;
- Particular attention to youth unemployment, post-school youth training schemes and the possibility of voluntary youth service organisations;
- The granting of African rights on a negotiated basis at central level. Only this step can provide the overall framework of legitimacy within which firm and responsible community leadership can emerge sufficiently quickly. **UPQA**

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Cycles of Civil Unrest 1976/84

Triggers, Targets & Trends



September 1984: A delegation of Sharpeville residents comes forward to meet officials of the Oranje/Vaal Administration Board to demand the scrapping of rent increases.

'No man should just agree to be a leader if he has no true qualities of leadership, and no one should feel easy on the throne he has been nominated to occupy if he has not been freely elected by the public . . . if you keep on ruling defiant hearts, the time they revolt against you not one piece of your belongings together with your life will remain yours.'

Black journalist, Johannes Rantete, 'An eye-witness account of the Sebokeng Rebellion of September 1984', p5.

By Indicator SA Researcher Graham Howe

Rushing headlong from one crisis to another, political violence in South Africa has gradually worsened over the past twelve months, escalating to levels not experienced in this fragile society so far. Surveying the urban terrain of reform and revolt from a comparative perspective of civil unrest here and elsewhere, Graham Howe disentangles the most noticeable structural features, short-term triggers and internal momentum of the contemporary wave of township dissidence. He suggests that the nationwide assault on African local government by township dissidents could well reflect a proactive extension of the militant non-collaboration tradition, representing a major shift from its more passive tactical forms, the boycott and stayaway.

Although the several waves of rioting in South Africa's black townships have peaked and abated at different moments in particular areas, these shifts are essentially variations on a similar theme. Since mid-1984, election, student, worker and consumer boycotts and stayaway strikes have converged to form a multifaceted pattern of endemic social unrest, wherein individual riot triggers for specific incidents become increasingly difficult to identify or separate.

Since 1976, the amorphous nature of black protest has resulted in it being generically tagged as 'unrest' by the media and political commentators alike. The hidden implication of this catch-all description is that these traumatic cycles of violence and counter-violence simply form part of the larger, age-old political dilemma that plagues South Africa. The

fact that neither the paths of reform nor repression seem to hold out current prospects of a return to social stability have invited comparison to other unstable and dangerously divided societies in the throes of protracted low-level urban violence, such as Northern Ireland (Matthews 1984), Lebanon (Hanf 1981 and 1984) and Iran (Hallett 1985).

Contributory Factors

Ever since the political upheaval of 1976/77, the state's security forces have for the most part managed to contain the several cycles of devastating riots within African residential areas, where most of the damage to property has consequently been wreaked (see table). The most vivid expressions of black protest have thus been removed from the eye of many white commentators, who often tend to view these developments

Neither the paths of reform nor repression seem to hold out current prospects of a return to social stability

A growth in youth militancy and in the political confidence of urban African 'insiders', among others, partially explain the new unrest cycle

The suppression of initially peaceful demonstrations can be linked to the later anti-authority tendencies by township dissidents

Regular army/police action to seal off the townships seems to have had an exacerbating effect on existing conflict levels

But for the geographic isolation of most African townships, conflict would undoubtedly be located in or near the inner 'white' cities

from an abstract distance as symptoms of a general malaise. From these theoretical perspectives, the civil unrest is deemed to be indicative of alternately, South Africa's industrial revolution and modernisation process; the 'violent evolution' of reform; the group tensions of a plural, racially structured society; black perceptions of relative deprivation; or lastly, of class struggle within a capitalist crisis made of historic, economic contradictions.

These models provide a useful historical overview, but their simultaneous limitations stem from a complacent acceptance of massive violence as an inevitable social phenomenon in a time of transition. Unfortunately, these macro-theories concentrate on structural causes and pay little attention to the need for an urgent, practical problem-solving exercise by government and its opponents, in terms of reconciling political and socio-economic demands across a vast ideological spectrum and ending the tragic violence. Destabilising aspects of the surrounding socio-economic environment should not be construed as direct causes of political revolt per se. Instead, they serve to contextualise the current riots and attempt to demonstrate how structural factors, in combination, increase the likelihood of reactive social unrest.

At the political level, the following primary factors partially explain the emergence of a new cycle of regional unrest between 1984/5:

- continuous African rejection of the tenets of the bantu education, influx control and homeland policies since the 1950s, related to inadequate opportunities for upward social mobility or political expression
- the upsurge in youth militancy since the Soweto revolt of 1976, associated with a resurgence of black nationalist activism, organisation and sentiment; accompanied by a second urban guerilla, sabotage campaign
- the renewed growth in the political confidence of urban African 'insiders', akin to the 1950s era, expressed through the multiple formation of civic, student and labour organisations since the late 1970s.

Short-Term Triggers

The increased spiral of violence since August 1984 has naturally given rise to its own dynamic, wherein other short-term issues emerge and have their own spin-off effect. For example, critics of the government's coercive response to the expression of black grievances over a broad range of legitimate political issues - particularly the early resort to use of the army in joint operations with the police and the blanket banning of political meetings in many areas - maintain that where 'orderly organised protest is

prevented planned disciplined non-violent resistance becomes disorganised, with disorganised violence cropping up in all directions' (BS 5/85).

In other words, the legislative and de facto suppression of initially peaceful demonstrations can be linked to the later manifestation of anti-authority tendencies by township dissidents, in the form of attacks on perceived collaborators (African councillors, policemen and businessmen). In the context of a cyclical pattern of action, response and counter response, the short-term and recurring riot triggers have come to include:

- the levying of rent and service charge increases by the newly constituted African town councils, to raise self-finance
- police and army conduct, especially the alleged excessive use of force against mobs armed with petrol bombs and stones, rather than the incremental escalation of a security response (see Baynham article: p17)
- the arrests and detentions of community leaders and others in response to the coordinated organisation of boycotts, stayaways and protest marches/demonstrations
- activist factionalism and internal power struggles within urban black communities, over organisational loyalties and tactics.

The internal momentum of the unrest cycle is reflected in the approximate correlation of riot peaks and massive security force intervention. In mid-October 1984, after the initial wave of rioting had subsided somewhat, two major joint police/army house-to-house searches of PWV townships witnessed an immediate upsurge of civil unrest. Also, after the police shootings on a funeral march in Langa township (Uitenhage) on 21 March, Sharpeville Day, which left between 20 (official figures) to 43 people dead (CP 24/3/85), a fresh wave of defiant protest swept through the Eastern Cape and elsewhere. Subsequently, regular army/police action to seal off the townships through erecting security cordons seems to have had the same exacerbating effect on existing conflict levels.

The Political Scale

But for the geographic isolation of most African townships and the effective security cordon created by apartheid policies over time, the site of conflict would undoubtedly be located in or near the inner 'white' cities. And if this were the case, terms of classification on a political scale from revolt, insurrection, uprising to civil war would be more appropriate to measure the extensive nature of the current unrest. The question of terminology may seem to be a rather academic point, but the West



Bishop Desmond Tutu and Dr Allan Boesak lead the funeral procession of the Langa shooting victims to the Kwanobuhle cemetery. Eighty thousand people attended the funeral.

Rand Administration Board and their insurers ended up in a lengthy wrangle over the appropriate definition of the political crisis of 1976.

The severity of the current crisis has also been underlined by the steady persistence of widespread rioting ten months after the initial outbreak (see map). The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, has accused the exiled ANC of fermenting civil war through turning local black communities into 'no-go' zones, while training 'terrorists' internally in rural areas (NW 30/4/85). The ANC has indeed recently called on township residents to move from a supposedly planned ungovernable stage and to now set up people's political committees (BD 29/5/85).

However, both government and ANC pronouncements largely constitute a rhetorical gesture for maximal propaganda effect and ignore the complex ideological melting-pot of internal and external based organisations linked to the urban protests. These conspiratorial allegations offer an overly mechanistic picture of a complex pattern of civil unrest, which has irrefutably picked up a random, spontaneous dynamic of its own.

Two Major Cycles

The first cycle of township unrest between September/November 1984 (see IPSA Chronology UM Vol2/No4), with its epicentre in the PWV industrial heartland, coincided with ongoing school and election boycotts. The immediate spark which set three months of tumultuous unrest in motion in the Transvaal and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere, was identified by the van der Walt investigation into the unrest as the levying of unaffordable rent increases by the unpopular town councils (RDM 4/1/85). A rent boycott by 350 000 township residents in the Vaal Triangle

has still not been resolved and enters its tenth month in June 1985, with arrears in the region of more than R20 million (BS 5/85).

A second cycle of unrest beginning in January 1985 and continuing today, with its epicentre in the Eastern Cape, reflects a broader regional pattern compared to the earlier cycle. A wide range of actions have been directed against similar targets, but in an atmosphere of increased use of violence by all protagonists, whether security forces or township dissidents, especially directed against those township residents perceived to have a vested interest in the overarching 'system'. Furthermore, as many African students returned to school after the lengthy 1984 boycott and the rioting spread to the Eastern Cape, adults rather than alienated youth appear to be at the forefront of the angry crowds roving the townships (see age/fatality correlations: p2). In short, a lumpenproletariat, the unemployed and unemployable, seem now to be the driving force behind the unrest.

The major new feature of the second cycle has undoubtedly been the fatal display of intra-opposition factionalism. Pre-existing tensions between the multi-racial United Democratic Front (UDF) and the black consciousness-orientated Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), emphasised by Senator Edward Kennedy's mixed reception in January this year, broke out into open war in the Eastern Cape in April, leaving at least four activists dead and 21 injured (mostly AZAPO members) and 35 houses damaged (Star 19/5/85). After two meetings convened by Bishop Desmond Tutu failed to reconcile rank-and-file tensions between the UDF, National Forum (NF) and Inkatha movements, their leaders called a truce at a peace prayer service in Soweto on 19 May. Black nationalist divisiveness has resurrected the Unity Movement of South Africa

The ANC has recently called on township residents to set up people's political committees.

The first unrest cycle, sparked off by rent increases, coincided with ongoing school and election boycotts.

The major new feature of the second unrest cycle has been the fatal display of intra-opposition factionalism.

UNREST

(UMSA), traditionally a loose umbrella-type of 'united front of all democratic forces' aimed at creating common ground on the basis of a minimal, non-collaborationist platform (UMSA President Dick Dudley, Star 28/4/85).

The Regional Spread

A common feature of both recent unrest cycles has been the extent to which militant organisation and protest has penetrated the rural hinterland in the Cape and Free State provinces, bringing hitherto unknown townships into the political limelight (see map). In the second cycle beginning in January this year, the rioting spread quickly to the northern, south-west and Karoo Cape interior, and continued to simmer in the central and northern Free State, with renewed outbursts in the Transvaal also (SAIRR 10/5/85). Altogether, incidents related to the general unrest have already been reported in more than 155 townships during the 1984/85 period, equitable in number to the total 160 trouble spots affected by the 1976/77 unrest.

Apart from limited election violence in coloured and Indian suburbs in August 1984, the current riots have wholly occurred in the African community. This is in striking contrast to the events of 1976, when intense rioting broke out over August/September in coloured suburbs in the Western Cape, leaving 50 people dead and 191 schools damaged (Kane-Berman 1978). Otherwise, there have been isolated incidents of unrest in Natal, basically related to Inkatha/UDF tensions and also at the Crossroads squatter camp on the outskirts of Cape Town. In general though, as demonstrated by the map, both Natal and the Western Cape have been relatively quiescent compared to the riots in these regions in 1976 or to the rest of the country today.

Riot Control

One of the most qualitative differences between the unrest cycles of 1976/77 and 1984/85 in terms of the security response, has been the open and regular use of the army to suppress rioting, in an increasingly direct policing role. Although the defence force played an unacknowledged support role to the police then, today soldiers have been used in large numbers on patrol, to cordon off townships, and to conduct house-to-house searches. Since early November 1984, the police have refused to comment on 'the day-to-day activities of the army in the townships' (IPSA Vol2/No4, UM:P9). During the course of massive security raids conducted between September 1984 and March 1985, 10 000 people were arrested in connection with the unrest (SAIRR 11/5/85), compared to the equivalent total of 5 930 arrests in

1976/77.

The high profile of army intervention in the volatile townships is an unmistakable indicator of the extreme severity of the current unrest. On 4 April, the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, announced that, 'the SAP, the SADF and the SA Railways Police will combine in order that law and order can be restored in areas affected and to maintain internal security' (NM 5/4/85). And later in the month, a police spokesman confirmed that soldiers were being issued with live ammunition and had already opened fire on a mob on one occasion, killing a man in Langa township (NM 19/4/85).

There are too many variables involved to make for accurate comparison, but considering that the police now have the advantage of extensive preparation and proper riot control equipment, the injury and fatality rates (see Schlemmer: p1) produced by security force intervention remain extremely high. Between June 1976 and February 1977, the official unrest death toll was 575 persons (unofficial estimates ranged from 700 dead), with 78 percent of the fatalities attributed to police action (CT 15/5/85). In comparison, between August 1984 and April 1985, the official death toll was 381 persons, with 78 percent of the fatalities due to police action (Le Grange 22/5/85), representing no comparative reduction in civilian casualties sustained during the security force response to riots.

Because tough security action has self-evidently failed to bring the townships under control, police shootings have been described as a counter-productive 'policy of elimination without trial, amounting to summary execution' of rioters (CT 4/5/85). In this regard, Northern Ireland's civil war is often presented as an appropriate analogy of what South Africa's security situation could degenerate into. However, this parallel is of more value in illustrating the relative restraint shown by British security forces under more extreme conditions of urban guerilla war. Since 1969, official security action has led to 150 deaths only, half of the 2 400 total fatalities have been civilians and the Loyalist and Republican paramilitary factions have been responsible for 1 050 of these fatalities (GW 2/12/84).

Comparative Targets 1976/85

Writing before the outbreak of internecine conflict between extra-parliamentary opposition groupings, Witwatersrand University Law Professor Tony Matthews warned against reading too much into the inward expression of black violence: 'The elaborate system of legal controls and enforced geographical separation means that blacks lack the

Common to both unrest cycles is the extent of militant organisation and protest in the rural hinterland in the Cape and Orange Free State

The open and regular use of the army to suppress rioting sets the present unrest cycle apart from the 1976/77 unrest cycle

Between September 1984 and March 1985, 10 000 people were arrested in connection with the unrest, compared to 5 930 arrests in 1976/77

Injury and fatality rates due to security force intervention remain extremely high, considering that police now have proper riot control equipment

UNREST

Whereas in previous cycles of unrest attacks were on government institutions, attacks now centre on property owned by the small urban African middle class

The targeting of police vehicles and busses, but especially of perceived collaborators are significant dimensions of the riots

In the light of the proposed integrated regional bodies, the consequences of a political vacuum at third tier level are especially grave

The latent conflict will only be properly resolved if the government is prepared to initiate open-ended negotiations with authentic black leaders

ACRONYMS

BD Business Day
BS Black Sash
CP City Press
CT Cape Times
GW Guardian Weekly
IPSA UM Indicator SA
Urban Monitor
NM Natal Mercury
NW Natal Witness
RDM Rand Daily Mail
SAIRR SA Institute of Race
Relations
Sow SM Sowetan Sunday Mirror

capacity to strike out much beyond the confines of their community, even if they wanted to' (op cit: p25). However, other commentators have pointed to the politically motivated attacks and assassinations on African councillors and policemen as the most disturbing feature which sets the current level of violence distinctly apart from the 1976/77 cycle (Du Toit 1985).

The major noticeable trend is obviously the shift from attacks on government institutions manned and controlled by white officials (administration board and post office buildings, etc), to attacks on the public and private property manned or owned by members of the small, urban African middle-class. By March 1985, at least 255 homes of town councillors and policemen had been damaged in mob attacks, already surpassing the 'catch-all' figure of 250 riot damaged houses of unspecified township residents for the 1976/77 cycle. In addition, 12 councillors and six policemen have been killed during the course of at least 109 murderous attacks on African officials, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs (RDM 12/4/85).

Over the last year, another significant dimension of the riots has been the increased targeting of police vehicles and busses by mobs throwing stones and petrol-bombs. In comparison to 1976/77, when 599 buses and 466 official vehicles were badly damaged by rioters (Cillie Commission figures), by April 1985, 1 088 buses and 3 156 police vehicles alone had been damaged (CT 15/5/85). The escalation of this kind of militant activity is probably accountable to the greater confidence and mobility of the much bigger crowds of dissidents in those townships which have been commonly described as 'ungovernable'.

The Collapse of Co-optation?

However, there can be no disputing the most persistent and consequential political strand running through the almost year-long spate of rioting witnessed in South Africa's townships. Since September 1984, dissident wrath has been focussed on perceived collaborators and in the process has exacted a terrible vengeance. In the wake of vicious attacks on persons and property, at least 240 African councillors had resigned by June 1985, leaving between three to six town councils operative nationwide (DN 14/6/85). Without functioning local authorities, the most basic civic services such as rubbish removal and sewerage have been suspended for long periods in some townships. Even worse, due to the collapse of this latest local government initiative in urban African areas, the security forces have stepped in and imposed the most

direct, coercive form of rule.

The targeting of African participants by township dissidents would appear to reflect a proactive extension of the traditional non-collaboration strategy, which to date has stressed relatively passive, reactive protest tactics, such as the community boycott and stayaway strike. Political scientist Andre du Toit, of the University of Stellenbosch warns that the new ruthless form of activism signals the failure of 'the government's strategy of divide and rule, coupled with the selective and progressive co-optation of various sectional elites' (CT 27/4/85). In the light of fresh constitutional manoeuvres to integrate all ethnic groups into new regional bodies, the consequences of a political vacuum at the third tier level, ie local government, are especially grave.

Conclusion

In mid-June 1985, the deadly state of deadlock reached between the security forces and dissident mobs continues, and running street battles and barricades are the order of the day in townships throughout many parts of the country. The recent anniversary of 16 June 1976, commemorating the day that saw the rebirth of militant black political activity, generated further confrontation between government and its extra-parliamentary opposition. The unrest cycle has come full circle, as the tumultuous events of the past twelve months and fresh tragedies give rise to yet more commemorative landmarks on South Africa's political calendar.

At the time of writing, it is an impossible task to predict whether the current riots will yet run a fuller course or if incoming reports of further rioting reflect the tailend of the unrest. However, the latent conflict which periodically and with greater frequency breaks through the surface will only be properly resolved - rather than simply contained - if the government is prepared to initiate open-ended negotiations with a range of authentic black leaders. Until then, an untenable dilemma will continue to face constitutional planners, no matter how innovative their designs are. Essentially, the major import of the intractable political crisis is that the houses that Minister Heunis built, as chief coordinator of the political reform process, are missing one of their principal foundations: local and national African participation.

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BRUTAL LESSONS IN TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATION

Mr Steven Kgame, President of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA) speaks to Indicator SA Copy Editor Graham Howe, on the experiences of the Town Councillor Class of 1983/85

The rent and service charge increases levied by the newly constituted black local authorities undoubtedly formed the immediate trigger for the township riots which broke out in the Transvaal and Orange Free State from mid-1984 onwards. Although the widespread civil unrest has since gathered an anarchic momentum of its own in 1985, African participants on the revamped community councils remain a primary target for mob assassination and assault. By June 1985, as ongoing waves of regional revolt continued to engulf the Eastern Cape, at least 240 councillors had resigned in response to brutal physical pressure, and only between three to six out of a planned 103 new town councils were actually in operation (SACC/Urban Foundation estimates). In short, many African townships have simply become 'ungovernable', as daily street clashes occur between security forces and mobilised township dissidents.

Indicator SA approached UCASA president Steven Kgame at a recent 'in-house' conference on local government reform, held at the University of Durban-Westville for the benefit of municipal officials from throughout South Africa. Mr Kgame is the chairman of the Dobsonville community council on the West Rand and is acknowledged by government as a prominent spokesperson for urban Africans within an unfolding political framework of reform. During the current unrest, he too has been subjected to rough treatment by rioters, who have stoned and petrol-bombed his home in the township, like the many other government participants they have victimised.

In the following interview, Graham Howe discusses some of the central issues of the conference with Mr Kgame - the politics of finance and revenue distribution, the prospects for some measure of integration of segregated local authorities, and the role of party politics at the municipal level. In addition to these problem areas common to incumbents of local government in all communities, Howe also invites comment from Kgame on conflict issues of particular relevance to local authorities in the African community. These touch on aspects of African political rights, township underdevelopment, and the problem of legitimacy encountered by town councils in raising revenues from unwilling township residents. Lastly, Kgame speculates on the prospects for ridding these bodies of their stigma and rebuilding viable local authorities from the ruins of the government's most recent constitutional initiative for urban African participation.

UCASA views itself primarily as a civic association, rather than a political force, and aims at improving the quality of life for urban Africans

The new system of local government is unworkable because ethnic groups cannot be integrated at the regional level, while segregated at the lower level

Even the proposed employee and turnover taxes will be inadequate for the purposes of financing general services as well as township development

Apartheid policies necessitate the wasteful duplication of services, an extravagant luxury, especially in a time of economic recession

Howe: UCASA is a relative newcomer on the national political scene. Can you give me some background on the origins of UCASA?

Kgame: It was formed in 1968, within the old Urban Bantu Council system. I was the founder of UCASA.

Howe: How has it sustained itself? What sort of recognition have you had from the government over this period?

Kgame: UCASA has carried itself through very well, in spite of all the difficulties over the years we have had. We struggled for recognition ever since 1968 until only last year in September, when the government recognised us. About three weeks ago (March 1985), the State President announced that UCASA would be fully recognised as an organisation which the government is prepared to work with.

Howe: What is the need for UCASA? What political function does it fulfil?

Kgame: Well, UCASA does not play so much of a political function but it fulfills a role in civic matters. It is a civic association which must provide for the improvement of the quality of life of people in the black residential areas of the Republic.

We must not be seen to be filling up the political vacuum. That political vacuum will be dealt with by political institutions. Nevertheless, we do not keep aloof from politics, because politics is part and parcel of the daily life of the people.

Howe: Now where do African town councils fit into - or do you anticipate fitting into - the new local government dispensation and the regional service councils?

Kgame: Room has been made for African participation. We really knocked hard on the door of Pretoria in order that we might be admitted into the regional service councils. We form part of these regions . . . therefore we must also enjoy the benefits from those regions, through the redistribution of monies levied.

Howe: UCASA made a joint statement with six homeland administrations and other leaders in mid-1983, rejecting the new constitution. There were two major points made in that statement. Firstly, UCASA supported the concept of a National Convention.

Kgame: Correct.

Howe: To what extent does the informal multi-racial forum, announced by PW Botha at the opening of parliament in 1985, go towards meeting this demand?

Kgame: Well, there is no way in which the government can avoid a roundtable conference -- there is no way in which they can avoid that. In fact, in the present unrest African people are 'dying hard' in order that such a thing should take place. There is no way in which we can talk apart . . . we must talk together!

Howe: But does this informal forum meet your demands?

Kgame: It is building up towards that.

Howe: A second aspect of your mid-1983 statement was that the new constitution was rejected on the grounds of it being based on racial forms of government. Yet surely the new regional service councils are based on the premise of general (multi-racial) affairs, which can be dealt with at a regional level, and own (segregated) affairs, which are handled by the different types of authorities at a local level. So you have a separation of local government according to ethnic communities. Are you still dissatisfied with these political arrangements?

Kgame: The new system of local government won't work. It won't work in the sense that you can't try and separate races or nations, yet still try to bring them together through the back door via the regional service councils. It must be worked out in a more suitable and equitable manner. However, we have elected to go into the regional services councils, but not because of political aspirations . . . we would simply like to get a share of the money that is being collected, so that we can also develop our areas.

Howe: Self-finance is obviously the most crucial issue when it comes to the autonomy of local authorities. Do you think that the various forms of financing which have been proposed by the Croeser finance liaison committee - employee and industrial floor space levies, GST redistribution, etc - would go some way towards solving the current problems that African town councils have experienced in raising revenues?

Kgame: The proposals can't solve the present setup because that money is still inadequate if it has to be shared by so many local authorities. The majority of the local authorities are not viable and there are many things that money is going to have to do . . . after it is distributed for transport and essential services, there will be just peanuts left! Revenues won't be sufficient in order to provide for township development.

Now the other issue which is more important is the money which is being wasted on duplication of services, all of which is unnecessary. You have a toilet here . . . one for coloureds, one for Indians, one for Africans, one for whites. Unless the government sees the necessity of dismantling apartheid in total, they cannot go on talking about the present economic recession when they themselves are extravagant spenders.

Howe: What alternative is there for constituting local authorities? You say you reject having three townclerks, three treasurers - that such duplication is a waste of revenue. What sort of unified local authority would meet the demands of UCASA?

Kgame: Well, let's say for instance in Durban there must be one local authority. The solution is as simple as that. Why have separate coloured, Indian, white and African local authorities? They should be geographically based instead.

Howe: The regional services council may be removing some decisionmaking functions - including the key financial power that

currently resides at the various provincial and city council levels – out of local hands, so that you have a centralisation of power. Some critics argue that one should devolve power rather than centralise. Do you have any strong feelings on this issue?

Kgame: No, I don't think the regional service councils are taking any power from the local authorities. They are just there to collect the new sources of revenue which have been identified and can be redistributed . . . therefore you must have a regional kitty. From there you can distribute it to the local authorities. I have said to the Minister (of Constitutional Development and Planning) – the blacks, because they are underdeveloped, they must get the biggest share of revenues which will be collected in that particular region. The whites must get less.

Howe: Yet what would seem likely to happen is that the regional service councils will – on the basis of the revenue that is collected in the different areas – return those revenues to the same communities they came from, with some marginal redistribution.

Kgame: No, no, no! That is not the idea. We have dealt with this in depth and we have said in no uncertain terms that the whites must not tell us that the bulk of the money comes from them. They must not tell us that because we say, 'they have had their towns and their cities developed by us, the blacks'. It is their turn now to develop the black towns. That is agreed upon and I think legislation is going to indicate that.

Howe: Yes, so that you would redistribute GST paid by black consumers who spend their money in the white cities. Do you think these are viable mechanisms?

Kgame: Yes. When you talk of GST, who spends more? The blacks spend more, even if the money is spent in the white areas. It is still the black person who spends the money.

Howe: Mayor Sam Buti of the Alexandria Town Council has proposed that some of the big industrial park areas should be incorporated into the townships, so that the land rates would then come to the African town council. What is your response to this suggestion?

Kgame: Well, I fully supported that statement. I would say that neighbouring land adjacent to the black areas owned by white farmers should be expropriated to make room for industry. That would generate money for the particular local authority.

Howe: But ideally you would like to see that the local authority is part of an integrated local unit of government. Do you think that is on the cards?

Kgame: Well of course. It must of necessity be an integrated society. Much apartheid legislation must be scrapped to defuse the dynamite in our hands . . . and make us come together.

Howe: Are we not first of all going to go through a series of motions where these local

authorities are tried out?

Kgame: There is no time for motions — there is only time for action.

Howe: Talking of action, if we can turn to the ongoing instability in the Eastern Cape and Transvaal African townships since last September. One of the first steps that many of the new town councils took was to increase rent and service charges. In the context of anti-election and school boycott activity in 1984, do you not think there was a serious miscalculation as far as timing? I don't know whether the rent boycotts are over, but there was an extensive rent boycott in the Vaal Triangle last year?

Kgame: Yes, it is still going on even now.

Howe: Was it not a major miscalculation on the part of the town councils – overestimating the extent of their popular legitimacy and raising rent in the middle of a political crisis?

Kgame: No, I would not say so. The town councillors have done so in good faith, but they did it at a time when there was unrest in the country. I would not say that people have rejected the councils as such, but because of intimidation that is going on. In spite of the physical intimidation, the people still went to the polls and if the people were left by themselves — either to go or not to go — there would have been a better turnout. (Ed: the overall poll for the 1983 town council elections was 21%, dropping to 10.7% for Soweto).

It is just because of the political connotation attached to African local authorities. They are based on foundations which were very bad right from the beginning. You have had the advisory board — very bad. You have the urban bantu council — very bad. You had the community council — very bad. It is now

Because African areas are underdeveloped, they should receive the lion's share of the revenues to be distributed by the regional service councils

Local authorities should be multiracial entities within a larger integrated society

West Rand Development Board police. Since the outbreak of unrest in September 1984, many African town councils have created their own police force.



M Goldblatt/A Gordon

The raising of rents by African town councils during election and school boycotts was perhaps a serious miscalculation of timing and popular legitimacy

Earlier African local government initiatives, the advisory boards and urban bantu/community councils, have all been stigmatised

The present town councils can get rid of their stigma if they are perceived as being economically viable and produce material results

Even if local authorities are integrated, the civic associations are unlikely to participate in government created institutions

the local authorities . . . (the village and town councils). But the people do not see the difference between the local authorities and those three stages in the past. They still think it is the same thing and yet it is not.

Howe: In the context of the very deadly expression of opposition to the town councils . . . councillors have been brutally killed in townships both in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape. And taking into account the same stigma that the town councils now have, do they have a future?

Kgame: The town councils can get rid of that stigma as long as they can get economic viability and produce results. Now that the councils are starting to produce results, the United Democratic Front (UDF) has heightened opposition. They can get rid of that stigma if they can be seen to be really in charge, because the people think that the blacks are not in charge yet. Yet they are in charge.

Howe: The van der Walt investigation into the township unrest - it was alleged that there was a lot of misunderstanding amongst residents about the new town councils. Would you agree that there was miscommunication of what constitutes rent?

Kgame: Oh yes, there is a misconception there. You see site rent is static, but what the people are paying for is service charges. Those are the things that escalate. For instance, we get water from the Rand Water Board and if they say this service is running at a loss . . . we have no option but to accept the increase. But the people do not understand — they just take the whole package and say it is rent.

It is a lack of education, but we are trying to set up a system whereby we can show in the receipts for rent and services that, 'Now look, this month your rent is so much, it is still the same. What has changed here is service charges. You paid 10 cents three months ago, today now you are paying 25 cents'. We must explain that because Escom has increased its tariff, we cannot afford Escom's account. That, 'Now we must increase also and you, the consumer, must therefore accept the service charge increase. If you do not, Escom is going to cut your electricity supply and we will then fold our arms'.

Howe: I see. Now you also mentioned in a lecture this morning that you thought employers had an important role to play in explaining to their African employees what the nature of rents and electricity accounts are . . . among other civic responsibilities. Do you think this is something you could take up with an employer body?

Kgame: Employer participation is very, very important because here you talk to one person at a time, rather than talking to people at a meeting where people do not understand, where there is going to be a lot of heckling and misunderstanding. But if employers talk to an employee and say: 'Now you see, these are my rent, water and electricity charges, this is my refuse removal account' . . . then the employee will realise

that it is not just a question of saying 'the black people pay for everything'. They will see in white areas that the whites pay more than the black areas. They would want to know, 'But why do you pay so much for electricity, for water, for rubbish removal?' I mean it is all to do with the way in which local government works.

Howe: Is this not something that could be institutionalised, in the same way that when new safety and income tax legislation is introduced, employer bodies discuss it with their workforce and establish communication channels and programmes. Could UCASA not play a role in promoting this very pragmatic suggestion?

Kgame: We have already approached the minister (of Co-operation, Development and Education) on that issue, to introduce legislation to make civics a compulsory subject in the schools. The children must learn from school, then they can educate their parents and things like that.

Howe: There are many alternative civic associations that have sprung up in South Africa since the early 1980s. Do you think they have a role to play in local government?

Kgame: Well, they have rejected playing a role in local government — the whole lot of them. They say no, they do not want to be seen to participate in government created institutions, and that is the long and the short of it.

Howe: But perhaps within a seriously revised, new local government framework, such as the integrated one you are suggesting, where race does not play such a determining role . . . then is there any way of integrating the civics? They seem to have become a political force on their own. I suppose that's open to debate of course!

Kgame: Well, I am rather sceptical, because you know you can lead a horse to the well, but you can't make it drink! The civics see the good that the councils do. They see that they can advise the councils on what to do, but they don't want to do the job themselves.


Howe: Do you see them in any way as emerging as rivals, as political representatives?

Kgame: No. They are not political representatives. They are self-appointed people.

Howe: Do you see any way of closing the divide between those extra-parliamentary opposition groupings and the town councils?

Kgame: No, there is no way because they spring up all the time. Every morning you find out there is another association with the same ideas. What the hell is all this? What do you achieve with 20 organisations trying to do the same thing?

Howe: So you think local politics should be left in the hands of the town councils?

Kgame: No, not necessarily in the hands of the town councils, but do we need so many organisations? Do we need Azapo, do we need Azaso, do we need Cosas, do we need them in the cause of fighting for our rights? 

THE SLEDGEHAMMER & THE NUT

The South African Security Forces & Riot Control

*By Dr Simon Baynham, Department of Political Studies,
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Over the last decade the South African Defence Force (SADF) has come to the fore in the dual roles of civilian law enforcement and policy formulation. Political scientist, Dr Simon Baynham claims that the current use of the SADF to suppress domestic unrest in the country's African townships threatens to undermine the supposed political neutrality of the military.

Although he sees no easy way out of the dilemma, Baynham suggests that increasing the size of the police force to its authorised complement and creating a new paramilitary unit might offer ways of alleviating heavy-handed riot control techniques.

The regular deployment of troops in the African townships since September 1984 has provoked fiery protest that the South African Defence Force (SADF) is being thrust into an explicitly political role. At last year's Transvaal National Party Congress, Minister of Law and Order Mr Louis le Grange announced that army cooperation with the police was to be increased, a major step which UCT sociology professor Michael Savage categorised as 'a tragic manifestation of a country that is at war with itself' (End Conscription Campaign press conference). Later, in November, came a government ban on information relating to the SADF's role in combined police/army operations, a decision that added fuel to the anti-conscription movement in the white community.

Most white South Africans regard the SADF as an instrument of defence against external aggression, but in this country, as in most others, the armed forces are also trained to undertake internal security duties. And this is where the paradoxical position of the military is thrown into sharp focus. For while Napoleon's maxim that 'without an army there is neither independence nor civil liberty' may be true, Edmund Burke's warning that 'an armed, disciplined body is in its essence dangerous to liberty' is equally valid. What then is the answer to this apparently intractable dilemma?

Assistant Role

A basic premise of democratic government is that as long as democracy is allowed to flourish, the police force is the only proper agency to maintain law and order. They are constitutionally designed for, and publicly recognised as the proper agent for dealing with individual or collective law-breakers.

The armed forces' direct role in this regard should be restricted to certain cases where their training and equipment may be more appropriate. One instance would be the use of military forces to handle violent confrontations with heavily-armed hijackers or terrorists, such as the British Special Air Service assault on the Iranian Embassy in 1981, which involved split-second timing, unorthodox skills and a very high level of training.

There are other occasions when the military is legitimately called upon to provide specialist skills and equipment over and above those familiar to the police, eg in cases of bomb disposal or electronic eavesdropping. The use of military personnel and facilities in a peripheral capacity to enable the police to fulfill their role is publicly acceptable if this reduces the element of risk and the likelihood of casualties. But the occasional provision of assistance is of a qualitatively different nature to the more delicate issue of using troops alongside policemen for maintaining public order in the face of violent demonstrations and riots.

Joint Operations

In South Africa, the precedent for joint army and police operations stretches back more than 70 years. Violent worker strikes led to the restoration of order by burger commandos under General J H de la Rey in both 1913 and 1914. The 1922 Rand Revolt is probably the best known case, when armed workers were subdued in an operation that involved artillery, aircraft and thousands of troops. There were more than 1 200 casualties, with 200 fatalities. Until October 1984, the SADF had been used to assist policemen in the suppression of civil unrest on isolated occasions, especially during the 1976

The use of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in an explicitly political role has given rise to much controversy

Within the democratic tradition, the police force is publicly recognised as the proper constitutional agency to maintain law and order

In South Africa there are a number of valid objections to the deployment of the SADF in the suppression of domestic unrest

Military weaponry and training are designed for killing on a battlefield, not for subduing crowds

In the final resort the SADF has an internal security role, but the use of troops in the last quarter of 1984 was unusually premature

The use of SADF conscripts in African townships could split the loyalties of national servicemen and undercut morale

upheavals, when it was alerted mainly for stand-by duties as a 'second line of defence'.

In mainland Britain, as distinct from Northern Ireland, troops have not been utilised in a law and order role since the 1919 August Bank Holiday disturbances in Liverpool. During the early 1960s in the United States, part-time national guardsmen were used in the southern states to enable black people to exercise their electoral rights in the face of widespread white opposition. However, in the socialist bloc and throughout most of the Third World, the armed forces are regularly deployed in an internal security role.

Criticism and Response

In contemporary South Africa there are a number of valid objections to SADF deployment in the suppression of domestic political protest. In the first place, there is the problem of increased force. Where highly trained and powerfully armed soldiers — who are equipped for a combat role and thus may take on the appearance of an army of occupation — are called in to support the civil power, it is almost inevitably going to escalate the level of violence. Military weaponry and training are designed for killing on a battlefield, not for subduing crowds. Using a sledgehammer to crack a nut is unlikely to achieve the desired result.

Indeed, as Lord Haldane, British Secretary of State for War, said as long ago as 1908: 'The soldier is a person who is armed with a deadly weapon . . . if he appears unnecessarily, he is apt to create an impression of a hostile character. His menacing appearance may lead to the very thing which it is his purpose to prevent: civil disturbance'. On the other hand, South African police spokesmen argue that often the need to use weapons does not arise, since the mere appearance of camouflaged troops is frequently sufficient to disperse a hostile crowd. In any case, they point out, SADF personnel are rarely involved in frontline duties, but rather perform a back-up role to assist the police in duties such as cordon operations and road blocks.

A second problem area relates to the wider constitutional implications of deploying a putatively apolitical force not against external enemies but to quash internal dissent. This course of action undermines the alleged political neutrality of the Defence Force. In fact, a number of senior military officers are clearly reluctant to see troops cast once again in the role of an auxiliary police force, as it diminishes their public credibility and undermines the thrust of the SADF's civic action programme to win the 'hearts and minds' of black people. Rather than being perceived as in conflict with ordinary people, the SADF would like to be perceived as society's protectors.

Thirdly, deployment of a citizen army to patrol African townships is not a task that

many conscripted soldiers relish. Riot-control strains and in some cases splits the loyalties of national servicemen, thereby undercutting morale and discipline within the SADF. This argument may be all the more apposite if attempts are still to be made to conscript coloured and Indian males.

Finally, there is also the danger of fuelling international rejection of the new constitutional dispensation, as army aid to the civil power is presented as another manifestation of the supposed authoritarian influence of the military and intelligence establishment.

Premature Deployment

Few would dispute that the SADF has an internal security role in the final resort. And many would support the existence of contingency plans for military assistance to deal with situations of protracted violence or armed insurrection beyond the capacity of police containment. What is worrying is that the initial deployment of troops in African townships during the last quarter of 1984 appeared to be unusually premature. Since then, especially after the tragic Sharpeville Day shootings at Langa in the Eastern Cape, the military has been regularly utilised to actively support the police. Unless this worrying trend is quickly reversed, the overall result will be counter-productive, rather than conducive, to the restoration of peace.

So long as the government enjoys a measure of consensus, upholding the law and public order should be a police matter. The police must have the capability to match and beat anything that mobs of rioters or urban guerillas can do, but they should creep up slowly on the use of responsive force. There are four overlapping stages in the gradual escalation of police force to deal with corresponding forms of public violence:

- the issue of special protective clothing (shields, visors, helmets), accompanied by anti-riot drills
- the use of non-lethal missiles such as fire hoses
- the further resort to incapacitating riot control agents such as plastic bullets and tear gas
- the use of live ammunition and normal military weapons.

A Third Force

If the police are to deal successfully with the several stages of escalating civil unrest, then perhaps a new paramilitary unit should be established. The existence of a separate riot squad — independent of both the military and the police — is common in Western Europe: the French '*Compagnies Republicanes de Sécurité*' (CRS), the Dutch '*Koninklijke Marechaussee*', the West German '*Bereitschaftspolizei*' (police alert units), etc. This would enable the regular police to cultivate an image of serving the interest of all members of the community, thus

divorcing them from those duties that have given the SAP an unfortunate stigma as enforcers of internal order.

On the other hand, paramilitary bodies like the French CRS, unmellowed by daily contact with the public, tend to develop an aggressive character of their own. They are only deployed under conditions when disorder has reached an advanced stage, so enter a hostile situation whereupon their very appearance tends to further escalate violence levels.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is no simple solution to the issues confronted here. However, one appropriate course of action might be to adopt and adapt the London Metropolitan Police model. There, specially-trained riot reserves are made up of normal constables, each with at least three years' regular service and each returning to conventional duties after a maximum of three years in the riot unit. This procedure ensures that riot

policemen do not become insulated from conventional police duties and public contact, a syndrome which appears to affect the special reaction squads within the SAP.

The Minister of Law and Order should also take immediate steps to implement his recently announced intention of bringing the SAP from its actual complement of about 47 000 personnel to its authorised establishment, in the context of a rapidly growing population to be policed. Measures should also be implemented to upgrade the quality of recruits, including a special scheme to attract more university graduates from all communities.

Ultimately, however, none of these measures will be of much moment unless concurrent political and socio-economic policies are introduced to alleviate the grievances that trigger off violent unrest in the first place. The South African government should address itself more keenly to the roots of civil conflict instead of concentrating on administering the bitter medicine that follows in its wake. *IP/A*

To cope with a rapidly growing population, the police should take immediate steps to increase its actual complement to 47 000 personnel

THE PRAETORIAN MARCH 'ON PRETORIA

*A review of Philip Frankel's study of
'Civil-Military Relations in South Africa',
by Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel*

Political scientist Philip Frankel's treatment of the changing composition and role of the South African Defence Force (SADF) is an important and timely contribution to an understanding of the gradual militarisation of South African society. The publication of this overdue study coincides with growing public controversy over the military's present incursion into the realm of civil law enforcement and political decisionmaking in South Africa (see preceding article by Dr S Baynham).

Unfortunately, Frankel completed this study prior to the outbreak of widespread township unrest in August 1984, which has since witnessed the regular involvement of SADF troops and equipment in maintaining internal security. His speculative conclusions on the prospects for further military involvement, through maintaining and possibly directing South Africa's turbulent reform process, may already have been overtaken by recent events.

The extensive role played by the SADF and SAP in imposing a direct form of martial rule in the townships was reflected in Minister of Defence Magnus Malan's recent request to parliament for a supplementary defence budget (Natal Mercury 27/4/85). At the time, he remarked that 'if outside threats, coupled with internal revolutionary threats, continue to increase at the present rate, there can be no cuts in the Defence Budget'.

Predictions

The evaluations of the political and civil performance of the military offered in the book are firmly set in the context of most 'non-western' nations confronting socio-political crises. Frankel's short-term prognosis is one of a low-key movement by the military into civil affairs, a process promoted by 'continued executive support, social crisis and/or basic shifts in the coalition

structure of white politics' (p182).

For the longer term, he discounts the possibility of the SADF being willing or capable of installing itself in power on a relatively permanent basis, for purposes of either reform or reactionary control. He notes instead that most defence forces, if they do go this far, 'civilianise' government a short while after taking power, through frustration at their inability to shape society according to military dictates and practice.

Total Strategy

Frankel gives detailed attention to a central dynamic which, he argues, explains why military and political leaders have adopted a total strategy approach to security (pp14/28). Simply stated, this is the 'Kommando' ethic inherited from the Boer War, with its blurred distinction of civil and military roles in the governing of a garrison state.

The book astutely traces the reappearance of this traditional defence ethic within an unfolding siege culture. Frankel shows how international and domestic pressures since 1960 have effectively promoted the modernisation of the SADF and shifted the inter-play of civil and military relations away from the liberal, Commonwealth model based on a separation of functions. Frankel observes that the SADF advocates coordinated action between all government departments and institutions to counter the perceived multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the ideological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields. Today, the military is dependent on promoting the total strategy concept in order to lay claims to both political influence and fiscal resources.

Responsive Militarisation

The dynamics of responsive militarisation in South Africa, especially the management of the Defence Budget, are gone into in great detail. Although the funds allocated by government for defence spending have remained relatively stable in real terms over the past eight years, Frankel points out that 'the building blocks of South Africa's garrison state are far more complex and wide-ranging . . . than the relatively simple and publicly visible process of soldiers tapping the public coffers'.

The study documents the growth of South Africa's military-industrial complex and the receptivity of the private sector to the burgeoning defence industry. It locates Armscor alongside Anglo-American and Barlow Rand as the three biggest financial undertakings in South Africa (pp81/90). The most striking example of joint military/private enterprise is the development of the G6 (a motorised cannon), produced and marketed by Armscor and some 50 private companies, which is based on a range of technologies supplied by various western states.

The implications of the 'Kommando' ethic are further explored in terms of SADF participation in the civil defence system and in executive struggles over the formulation of state policy. Those forces promoting approachment between the civil and military powers in this regard are well covered in the book, particularly the inroads made by SADF officers in promoting the State Security Council as the country's top decisionmaking body at present (p104/7). Other linkages between the two spheres have included:

- the assistance provided to the police by SADF units

in counter-insurgency operations conducted in rural areas of South Africa, Namibia and further afield

- the role played by military intelligence in determining development priorities and managing regional politics
- joint SADF/SAP efforts to maintain internal security (see Baynham for historical examples).

Black Recruitment

Another critical area investigated by Frankel is the incorporation of black manpower into the SADF, their occupational mobility and the paradoxical security problem they may come to pose for the white state. A recruitment programme, associated with the 'hearts and minds' counter-insurgency strategy, has reached the extent where some 40 percent of the SADF (including the South West African Territorial Force) are black soldiers (p121). Furthermore, a pool of potential recruits in excess of requirements exists, probably because of the equitable employment prospects offered. Numerous ethnic units and an elite, 'multi-racial unit' are described in the book.

Frankel notes that military decisionmakers are hesitant to continue enrolment in the African community, while the citizenship issue is still unresolved and a growing body of negative black opinion exists towards participation in 'the system'. Nevertheless, he foresees an increasing racial dilution of the SADF, resulting perhaps in the military playing an increasing role in promoting reform within South Africa's broader political structures. However, the study does not discount the prospect of black soldiers 'turning their weapons on the State structures they have been armed to defend' and concludes that this Pandora's box reflects on the ultimate fragility of the garrison state (p160). In an unstable society going through the violent throes of change, the loyalty of the defence forces to government and the prospects of disaffection by black soldiers or policemen is a strategic area worthy of further comparison and discussion.

Conflict and Concession

In the final chapters, Frankel sets out to develop more fully some of the issues raised in his treatment of total onslaught, the 'toenadering' of civil-military relationships and particularly the militarisation process. He examines both the social conflict resulting from the SADF's greater role in society and the positive impact exerted by the 'integrating and homogenising forces' of the military with regard to improving race relations in South Africa itself. Unfortunately, as publication of the study pre-empted SADF suppression of township unrest, the impact of domestic operations on black attitudes and potential white conscriptees is insufficiently explored.

Ultimately though, the South African parliament has had little experience of the predatory praetorian tradition, in striking contrast to South America where military domination of government is an 'accepted element of political life and social thought'. A tradition of debate has ensured an ambivalent public response to 'total strategy', a conspiracy theory which, as Frankel warns, reduces society's complexities 'to a few easily graspable and stereotypical formulae from which only the security of the white state emerges'. □

P Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, Cambridge University, 1984. Price R30,95.



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up and up - thanks
to some professional
advice!**

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"Gerry's a Sanlam consultant," he said, "and there's nothing he doesn't know about financial planning. They're highly scientific about it too."

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"Mr Gordon," he said, "I did your Finplan analysis, but I'm afraid it's not all good news."

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I phoned my friend and thanked him for putting me on to a good thing. "I really needed some professional advice — and I didn't even know it! That Sanlam man was even better than you made him out to be."

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
INDICATOR VOL.3 No 1

SOUTH AFRICA WINTER 1985



In African communities, education and urbanisation - the major forces generating modernisation - have lagged significantly, resulting in the persistence of traditional beliefs, one of which places a high value on having a large number of children.

- 1** *Population & Poverty: The Truths and Truisms behind High Growth Rates*
- 7** *Economic Outlook*
- 12** *The Great Free Market Debate*
- 13** *Marketing Private Enterprise*



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
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Diagnosis

POPULATION & POVERTY

The Truths & Truisms Behind High Growth Rates



P. Alberts

POPULATION GROWTH

*By Prof Jill Nattrass, Head of the Development Studies Unit
at the University of Natal*

Jill Nattrass examines some of the linkages between poverty and population growth, and concludes that in South Africa, a general change in overall government policy will ultimately have a far greater hope of success in decreasing population growth rates than any population programme based on existing policies.

It is often said that a major cause of poverty in third world countries is their rapid population growth. The recent report of the President's Council (PC) on South Africa's demographic trends went so far as to state that, 'Leaders in general and particularly those in communities with a high population increase are not sufficiently aware of the misery in store for their communities should present growth trends continue' (PC1/1983).

It is undeniably true that a given bundle of goods and services shared out equally amongst a large population will yield less per head than would be the case if it were shared amongst a smaller community. At the same time, it is also true that one cannot simply project this simple equation into a dynamic situation where a host of complicating factors come into play. In a developing country, the linkages between poverty and population growth are extremely complex and this makes it very difficult for planners to plot the future with any degree of accuracy.

In South Africa's case, the links are made even more convoluted by the fact that the institutionalisation of apartheid has distorted predictable development patterns and their relationships with demographic change.

Population Growth Rates

In general, although there are a number of categorical statements made by so-called 'authorities', other demagogues and politicians on the subject of demography, we know very little about either population growth or poverty. There are actually no definitive

In South Africa, the institutionalisation of apartheid has distorted predictable development patterns and their relationship with demographic change

Changes in the rate of population growth are the result of changes in the underlying demographic forces of fertility, mortality and migration rates

conclusions, despite the fact that a great deal of research has been undertaken in this area.

There are some generally accepted 'truths' though in relation to population growth in a developmental context. These research findings can be summarised as follows:

- Population growth is the outcome of three demographic forces — the mortality or death rate, the fertility or birth rate, and the migration rate. All of these forces react differently to changing levels of economic and social development.
- Population profiles (age and sex structures) differ, depending on the degree of modernisation of the population and the level of economic development.
- Population growth rates are higher in poor regions and countries than they are in wealthy regions and countries.
- Population growth rates are also higher in rural areas than in urban areas.
- Rapid population growth rates will lead to increasing poverty.

It is clearly no more than a mathematical truism to explain that changes in the rate of population growth are the result of changes in the underlying demographic forces of fertility, mortality and migration. Beneath the surface, the actual causes of changes in these three primary demographic forces themselves are of far more interest.

Development and Mortality Rates

Although a great deal of emphasis is always placed on the role the birth rate plays in population growth, the actual impact that changes in mortality rates have had on the

Fertility Rates

It has been argued one should make a clear-cut distinction between the sexual and medical factors that physically affect fertility; and the structural factors that influence the choices of potential parents in respect of the number of children they would like to conceive.

Factors affecting fertility per se are:

- The level of general health, nutrition and medical care in the population. Improved standards of health advance the age of puberty, increase the frequency of sexual intercourse and the general level of fecundity, and reduce the percentage of children that are stillborn.
- The average age at which marriage takes place and the existence of practices that make births out of wedlock socially acceptable, such as the African practice of proving fertility before contracting marriage.
- The extent to which contraception is practiced, which in turn is related to parental choice regarding family size.

Factors that will affect a couple's choice in relation to the number of children they will plan to have are:

(1) *The degree of urbanisation*

In general, the costs to a family in an urban situation of having an additional child are higher and the returns lower than they are in a rural area. In urban society, housing and care costs are higher, as are the indirect costs that stem from the mother's loss of mobility. Furthermore, in a rural area children represent a significant source of labour, whereas in a town there are virtually no opportunities for child labour.

In addition, because most urban labour markets require more sophisticated labour supplies than their rural counterparts, there is pressure on urban parents

to assume the added cost burden of providing their children with sufficient education and training to be able to enter this labour market. Moreover, family ties are usually weaker in the urban situation. The economic implications of this trend are that the chance of the parents being able to recoup some of this financial outlay, through securing care in their old age by their offspring, is also significantly less than it is in the rural situation.

All in all, because the costs of raising a child are higher and the returns from the child to the parents are lower in towns, urban parents are more likely to choose to have smaller families than rural parents.


(2) *The educational level of the parents*

It is generally accepted that the average family size declines as the educational level of parents rises. This effect is particularly noticeable in respect of the rising educational levels of women in society.

Firstly, exposure to education develops a realisation of the benefits that flow from it, and consequently increases the determination of parents to educate their children — thus increasing the care costs per child produced. Furthermore, education itself develops rationality and reduces the impact that superstition and fatalistic attitudes have on fertility patterns.

(3) *Mortality*

Studies in developing countries have shown clearly that child and infant mortality rates have a feedback relationship with fertility patterns. This process occurs through the impact that the expectation of successfully raising a child to adulthood has on the parents' choice of the number of infants they will produce. In many cases, it seems that a reduction in infant and child mortality rates is actually a prerequisite for any reduction in the birth rate to take place.



A migrant worker collects his pay. This type of migration, where the worker leaves his family behind in the rural area, puts upward pressure on the population growth rates in the rural areas.

world population over the past 50 years is in fact significantly greater than that of changing birth rates.

In poor communities, life expectancy at birth is low, not usually because people live short lives on average, but because the chances of survival beyond the age of five years are poor. Due to poor nourishment and inadequate social conditions, both infant mortality rates (deaths amongst those under one year) and child mortality rates (deaths amongst those 1-5 years) are high. The reduction of these death rates usually yields dramatically to relatively small improvement in the average quality of life. This is largely as a result of the impact of modern medicine through the introduction of such things as vaccination programmes, malaria eradication, antibiotic treatment, oral rehydration practices and improved overall hygiene standards.

Reducing the infant and child mortality rates not only reduces the overall mortality rate, but also has a very significant second round impact on the birth rate, because these children will now grow to adulthood to raise their own families. Exactly how large this impact could be, can be gauged from the fact that in Brazil in 1975, 48 percent of all registered deaths comprised children under five years, whereas the equivalent percentage for Sweden was only one percent! The South African mortality statistics, incomplete as they are, also contain some telling data. In 1979, 25 percent of all recorded African deaths comprised infants, and another 33 percent comprised children under five years old.

What these statistics mean is that family planning campaigns and social change may succeed in reducing fertility rates fairly rapidly. However, the impact of improved living conditions on the mortality rate are sufficient in themselves to counteract such gains and instead generate a significant increase in the population growth rate. The complex relationship between these factors illustrates how misleading it is to simplistically link poverty to rapid population growth.

Development and Migration

Because development tends to be concentrated from a spatial viewpoint, it usually generates significant movements of people who are drawn by the new opportunities opening up in the developing region. Migration undoubtedly affects population growth rates. Most importantly, the direction and size of its impact is related to the nature of the migration process itself. Three distinct types of migration — in-migration, out-migration and circulating-migration — can be identified and their effects on population growth differ.

Clearly, net in-migration will increase the rate of population growth, simply because of the increase in numbers due to the migrants themselves. There may, however, also be

The average family size declines as a result of increasing urbanisation and rising educational levels

Family planning campaigns and social change may succeed in reducing fertility rates fairly rapidly

Improved living conditions however, can counteract these gains and instead generate a significant increase in the population growth rate

The migration process is age and education selective, favouring young well-educated men

Feedback loops between birth, mortality and migration rates affect the population growth rate in various subtle and diverse ways

Although population growth rates are lowest in the industrial economies, the second lowest group is constituted by the poorest countries

secondary demographic effects from migration. International statistics show that the migration process is age and education selective, favouring young well-educated men. Consequently, the size of the secondary impact will depend upon whether or not the migrants affect the overall adult sex ratios in a manner that is conducive to the production of more children. Married migrants at the start of their reproduction cycle will be a force for a secondary increase in the birth rate, whereas older migrants or those who do not find a long term partner, will probably not have this.

Permanent out-migration from an area, on the other hand, will reduce the rate of population growth quite significantly. Not only does it too directly affect population numbers, but it also tends to be concentrated amongst the age groups most likely to produce children.

Circulating migration such as we have on a large scale in South Africa between the towns and the African rural areas, is a system under which only the worker (usually the man) goes to town to seek work. He leaves his family behind in the rural area, to live on what subsistence they can eke out of tribal agriculture and the remittances he may send back to them. This type of migration puts upward pressure on the population growth rates in the rural areas:

- Firstly, remittances from migrants will help to curb infant and child mortality rates
- Secondly, this form of migration perpetuates the tribal system, which itself has a value framework which encourages large families
- Thirdly, it also effectively prevents women from urbanising and thus insulates them from the social forces in the towns that would lead them to elect to have smaller families.

Overview

In general terms, whilst one must accept that the population growth rate is indeed a function of the birth, mortality and migration rates, one must also realise that the relationships are not simple ones. A number of feedback loops exist between the three sub-components which affect the final outcome in various subtle and diverse ways.

Poverty and Income Distribution

A well-established view of the relationship between poverty and population growth relates two factors in a fundamental way. There are two versions of this relationship:

- The more acceptable interpretation holds that population growth rates can be expected to be higher in poor countries and regions than they are in wealthier ones.
- The alternative is a Malthusian view of the poorer areas of the world, which argues that these areas are poor largely because people living there have too many children.

In actuality, statistics do not support either of these views in a concrete form, although as a loose generalisation, the first view could be accepted. The accompanying table gives some data illustrating these points.

Table 1 **INCOME LEVELS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES IN SELECTED REGIONS IN 1981**

Region	Average income per head US\$	Population growth rate %	Fertility rates %	Mortality per 1 000 (crude)	Life expectancy at birth (years)
Low income countries	270	1.9	4.3	12	58
Middle income countries	1 500	2.4	4.8	11	60
Lower middle	850	2.6	5.2	12	57
Upper middle	2 490	2.2	4.2	9	65
High income oil	13 460	4.9	7.1	12	57
Industrial market	11 120	0.7	1.8	9	75

SOURCE: World Development Report 1983. World Bank.

From the table, it is clear that although population growth rates are lowest in the industrial economies, the second lowest group is in fact constituted by the poorest countries rather than those in the middle income group. Indeed, the highest growth rates are instead found in the group of countries which have the highest average per capital incomes, ie the oil-producing nations.

An interesting view of the way in which fertility declines as a society progresses relates this process to the direction of the net flow of wealth transferred between children and parents. In primitive and traditional societies, the direction of this net wealth flow is nearly always from child to parent. As long as this remains true, high fertility rates are entirely rational. It is only when societal changes reverse the direction of this net flow in favour of the children, that one can realistically expect fertility rates to decline.

Apartheid Policies and Demography

The effects of racial discrimination from all sources on South Africa's demographic structure flows from the impact that it has on the economic variables that will, under more normal circumstances, be set to generate demographic change. Specifically, racial discrimination has slowed down both the rate of urbanisation and modernisation of the African community in general, and probably even more importantly, of African women in particular.

Apartheid and Urbanisation

The group of laws known collectively as the influx control system have, together with the earlier historical patterns of economic development, institutionalised a vast system of circulating rural-urban migration among the African groups in South Africa. This in turn has resulted in a substantial degree of African under-urbanisation. One of the most detrimental effects of apartheid policies of influx control and resettlement is that too low a proportion of the African population lives in the urban areas, in terms of the average level of economic development.

Not only is the overall level of African urbanisation lower than one would normally expect but, in addition, the under-allocation of state revenues for the development of the black urban areas has resulted in the generation of an urban environment for black people that is of a very poor quality. The unattractiveness of conditions in the African townships reinforces the purpose of the influx control laws and tends to further discourage urbanisation.

Since empirical studies have shown a clear link between a reduction in the fertility rate and urbanisation one must expect that a policy such as apartheid, which discourages the urbanisation of the African group, will inevitably also encourage the persistence of high population growth rates. Indeed all the studies done on African family structures in South Africa have shown that rural families are larger than urban families and that rural women have significantly more children.

Another negative by-product of apartheid policies, in terms of impact on demographic patterns, stems from the way in which the laws are actually applied. In practice, while an African man from the rural areas has at least a 60/70 percent chance of legally getting into the town, it is extremely difficult for African women to obtain the necessary permission. Rural African women are, therefore, effectively cut off from the modern sector labour market and the relatively high returns offered there. For them, the returns from wage labour dramatically increase the cost of having children, in terms of income loss during the maternity cycle. In other words, the exclusion of rural African women from the urban labour market significantly reduces the cost of child bearing to them and again encourages high population growth rates.

The impact of circulating migration on the rural labour supply also reinforces this tendency. The high absentee rate among men in the rural area resulting from the high rate of male out-migration puts extreme pressure on the labour supply. This in its turn places a premium on child labour, which must again exert an upward pressure on the rural birth rate.

Apartheid and Modernisation

The practice of race discrimination in general and the effect of influx control in particular has also significantly retarded the process of modernisation among the African communities. Education and urbanisation are the major forces generating modernisation and both development processes have lagged significantly among the African groups. The result has been the persistence of a set of tribal or traditional beliefs, one of which places a high value on a large number of children.

Although racial discrimination has retarded the modernisation process among the African group, it has not prevented it entirely. It is somewhat ironic that, to the extent to which modernisation has permeated these communities (in a partial form), it has

High fertility rates are related to a flow of wealth from child to parent. To lower these rates, the direction of the flow must be reversed

Influx control laws have resulted in African under-urbanisation, which in turn has encouraged the persistence of high population growth rates

To the extent to which modernisation has permeated rural communities, it has acted to increase rather than decrease the population growth rate


Modern medical care and income from migrant remittances have reduced child mortality rates and lengthened average life expectancy, thereby increasing the population growth rate

Rural-urban migration, concentrated as it is among men, has virtually no modernising effect on the women who remain behind

acted to increase rather than decrease the rate of population growth. This is largely because limited though it may be, the impact of modern medical care and the increase in rural incomes flowing from migrant remittances have acted to reduce infant and child mortality rates and to lengthen the average life expectancy.

Rural-urban migration, concentrated as it is among men, has virtually no modernising effect on the women who remain behind. Their only direct contact with the changing values of the modern industrial and urban environments has been through:

- the medium of the radio, a limited exposure due to the lack of electric power and the high cost of batteries
- their schooling experiences
- conversations with returning migrants
- the impressions gained from any temporary visits they make to the towns.



M Goldblatt/A Gordon

Education and urbanisation, the major forces generating modernisation, have lagged significantly among the African group.

A Population Policy for the Future

One of the first tasks assigned to the President's Council was to study demographic trends in South Africa and to make recommendations in respect of their findings. The Council's major finding was that present population growth rates would generate a population too large to be sustained in the long term, given South Africa's resources. Water was seen as the binding constraint and a population ceiling of 70 million people was estimated to be the cut-off point, beyond which water shortages would be increasingly felt.

The Council recommended the adoption of a population policy based upon the development of the people. In this context, they correctly emphasised the need for increased spending on education, health care and the general social upliftment of the poorer segments of South African society. The Council was indecisive in its recommendations regarding urbanisation. While accepting that urbanisation had a negative influence on the rate of population growth, the Council did not recommend the adoption of a policy to encourage further rapid urbanisation in South Africa. It tended instead to emphasise the negative aspects of urbanisation and made recommendations designed primarily to alleviate these, rather than to encourage urbanisation per se.

Since urbanisation plays a key role in generating demographic change, a comprehensive urbanisation policy must be one of the cornerstones of any population programme. However, it must also be evident from the preceding discussion that present government policies actually encourage a rapid population growth rate. A general policy change will ultimately have a far greater hope of success on the demographic front than will any population programme that is grafted on to existing policies. Of particular importance will be measures to encourage the modernisation of African women and their participation in the modern industrial work force. **IPIA**

Since urbanisation plays a key role in generating demographic change, a comprehensive urbanisation policy must be one of the cornerstones of any population programme

By Dr Merle Holden and Prof Mike McGrath
of the Department of Economics, University of Natal

RETROSPECT

Changes in the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) show the course of the business cycle in the South African economy. The years from 1979/81 were characterised by positive rates of growth of output, stimulated by the high price of gold in this period. During 1982 and the first half of 1983 the economy was in recession, due to the falling gold price, world-wide recession, and the severe drought. The economy then experienced what was called a 'mini-boom' in the second half of 1983 and the first half of 1984. The gold price had risen somewhat and both fiscal and monetary policy had been expansionary.

Unfortunately, the revival in the economy was shortlived. Real output declined in the manufacturing, commerce, transport and construction sectors in the last two quarters of 1984. The index of gold and non-gold mining production increased by 2 percent and the real output of the agricultural sector grew by almost 14 percent over the year. The increased output of the agricultural sector, largely caused by an above average wheat crop, was the main factor behind the increase in overall real GDP in the last quarter of 1984. Overall real GDP increased by 4.5 percent in 1984 compared with the decline of 3 percent in 1983.

Gross Domestic Expenditure

A consideration of the components of the GDP provides some understanding of the changes that have occurred. Gross domestic expenditure, which is the sum of consumption, investment and government expenditures, displayed similar cyclical patterns to GDP. Consumption expenditure declined sharply in the third quarter of 1984, followed by a further decline in the fourth quarter. The decrease was largely due to the restrictive monetary policy of August 1984, the increase in general sales tax (GST) and

tighter hire-purchase regulations.

Economists are now in agreement that the earlier buoyancy of consumption expenditures in the previous four quarters had largely contributed towards the mini-boom. Real government consumption expenditure, which too had contributed substantially to the mini-boom, also declined in the third quarter before increasing once again in the fourth quarter of 1984. Real gross domestic fixed investment started declining earlier in 1984, with an overall decline of 2.5 percent for the year. Both high interest rates and the slowdown in economic activity led businessmen to curtail their plans for expansion.

During the downswing in 1984 the volume of exports grew by 12 percent, while their value increased by 28 percent and acted as a dampener to the recession. The depreciated rand and world-wide economic growth were the catalysts for this export growth. Over the year, substantial increases in the value of exports of mineral products (64%), base metals (57%), textiles (41%) and Chemicals (52%) occurred.

Employment Trends

Trends in employment and unemployment also reflect the changes in GDP. From 1979 to 1981 non-agricultural employment increased steadily, whereas in the recession of 1982/83 declines were registered. During the mini-boom employment in non-agricultural activities once again increased, but during the latter part of 1984 employment in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy fell by 1.1 percent. Over the whole period between 1982/84, the level of non-agricultural employment declined by 0.2 percent. This decrease was unevenly spread across race groups, however, for white and Indian employment actually increased by 2.0 percent and 1.8 percent respectively, while coloured

The increased output of the agricultural sector was the main factor behind the increase in overall GDP in the last quarter of 1984

During the downswing in 1984, the depreciated rand and world-wide economic growth were catalysts for an export growth of 12 percent

Between 1982 and 1984, employment levels fell in the manufacturing, construction, wholesale, retail and transport sectors

Some cushioning of the workforce from the current recession was provided by employment expansion in the mining, banking, insurance and public sectors

The unemployment problem is, however, more severe, for the natural growth of the workforce must also be taken into account

The wage ratio disparity between whites and Africans has reduced from 4.72 in 1975 to 3.87 in 1984

The choice of economic policy in South Africa is complicated by the existence of a disenfranchised African labour force

and African employment fell by 0.2 and 1.5 percent respectively.

The decline in total employment was a result of falling levels of employment of all the race groups in the manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade and transport sectors, in which 130 700 jobs were lost between 1982 and the end of 1984. This is not yet as large as the decrease in employment which occurred in these sectors in the post-Soweto economic slump, where 134 000 jobs were lost between the second quarter of 1976 and the last quarter of 1977. However, an expansion in employment in the mining, banking and insurance sectors of 26 000 jobs and an increase in public sector employment of 84 000 jobs, provided some cushioning of the workforce from the current recession.

Notwithstanding these increases, the downswing in the business cycle has been so severe that the level of employment in the economy has actually fallen. The unemployment problem, however, is more severe than these numbers indicate, for the natural growth of the workforce, which results from population growth and the persistence of underemployment in black rural areas, must also be taken into account. Between 1982 and 1984 (for South Africa and all the independent and self-governing homelands), this population growth would have increased the workforce by approximately 77 000 whites, 59 000 coloureds, 13 000 Indians, and 391 000 Africans.

First Quarter, 1985

The results of the Bureau for Economic

Research (BER) Economic Opinion Survey for the first quarter of 1985 shows that the number of firms reporting lay-offs has increased in the manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, which are the sectors covered by the survey. Moreover, this reduction in employment will not be tempered in 1985 by increasing levels of public sector employment. The BER reports that in the first quarter of 1985:

- in manufacturing, 37 percent of firms surveyed reported reductions in the number of factory workers
- in wholesaling, 56 percent of firms reported staffing cuts
- in retailing, 30 percent of firms reported staffing cuts.

African/White Wage Ratios

Although employment fell during 1984, real salaries and wages increased. In real terms, average remuneration per worker in the non-agricultural sectors was 3.9 percent higher in the first nine months of 1984 than in the corresponding period in 1983. Although African unemployment increased markedly between 1982 and 1984, African real wages rose by 2.2 percent per annum. In comparison, white real wages rose at a slower 0.8 percent per annum and as a consequence, the ratio of white to African real wages continued to fall. Indeed, over the decade between 1975 and the end of 1984, African real wages in the non-agricultural sectors (excluding domestic service) rose at a faster real rate than white real wages, thereby reducing the wage ratio disparity between whites and Africans from 4.72 in 1975 to 3.87 in 1984.

THE BUDGET

At the present time, the South African economy exhibits all the characteristics of stagflation — real output is falling, unemployment is rising, and it is likely now that real wages are also falling. Yet despite these deflationary trends, the rate of inflation has accelerated. We are in a situation not unlike that which both the United States and Britain faced in the late 1970s. It will be recalled that at this time there was disagreement as to the remedy for this form of economic malaise. Conservative policymakers favoured strongly deflationary monetary and fiscal policy to deal with the problem of inflation, whereas those of a more liberal bent were concerned about the costs of rising unemployment which would ensue.

In the event, conservative policies in the form of Reaganomics and Thatcherism prevailed, unemployment soared, but eventually inflation was significantly reduced to 3.6

percent in the United States and 5 percent in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the choice of economic policy in South Africa is complicated by the existence of a disenfranchised African labour force which, as we have seen, bears the brunt of the high levels of unemployment. Policymakers here have declared that a reduction of the inflation rate is indeed the target of policy, and to this end the cost of money has soared, with a prime rate of 25 percent. This has been coupled with increased taxes and a 1985/86 budget which is strongly deflationary in its stance.

Restoring Business Confidence

This approach has been applauded by businessmen as a step in the direction of restoring economic health. Business

Table 1

● GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, REVENUE AND DEFICIT ●
(R Million)

	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86
Total Expenditure	13 642	16 455	19 532	22 954	27 194	30 892
Total Revenue	13 310	14 416	17 172	19 081	23 835	28 322
Deficit	332	2 039	2 360	4 028	3 359	2 570
Deficit/GDP %	0.5	2.8	2.9	4.4	3.4	2.2
Expenditure/GDP %	20.5	22.6	24.0	25.1	27.5	26.4

Table 2

● BUDGETED VS ACTUAL EXPENDITURES ●
(R Million)

	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85
Actual Expenditure	11 506	13 642	19 532	22 954	27 194
Budgeted Expenditure	11 190	13 083	18 238	21 276	24 945
Overspending	316	559	1 294	1 778	2 249
Overspending/Budgeted %	2.8	4.3	7.1	8.4	9.0
Overspending/GDP %	0.5	0.8	1.6	1.9	2.3

confidence had been eroded by rising inflation rates, a rapidly depreciating rand and a depressing recession. The Business Times/Markinor Top Executive Survey shows that more than half of the top 69 executives interviewed rated the 1985/86 budget as good or very good, and 67 percent of them viewed the attempt to restrict government spending as the best aspect of the budget. On the other hand, 71 percent expected the budget to affect their company's profitability adversely and 72 percent felt that it would depress the economy. Verbal self-flagellation seems to have become the order of the day, with corporate spokesmen making frequent use of metaphors about 'biting the bullet' and 'tightening their belts'.

The spokesmen of the emerging black unions are far less enthusiastic about the state's economic policies. They have pointed out that whereas management can tighten their belts for a considerable time without feeling the pinch, that is not the case for their union members, especially those who have lost their jobs.

The budgeted decrease in real government expenditure will undoubtedly contribute to reducing the rate of inflation and the deficit as a proportion of the GDP. It will also ease the level of upward pressure on interest rates. These factors will contribute positively towards restoring business confidence. However, increasing unemployment has undoubtedly raised the level of social tension in the already explosive township situation, and this must have an adverse effect on local and foreign confidence. Direct police intervention only seems to exacerbate the situation.

Reducing the Deficit

The budgeted reduction in the absolute size of the deficit has been achieved at the expense of rising taxes and a reduction in real terms of expenditure. Total state expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 20.5 percent of GDP in 1980/81 to an historic high of 27.5 percent in 1984/85, increasingly diverting resources from the private sector to the public sector (see table 1).

Furthermore, as shown in table 2, overspending by government (the excess of actual expenditure over budgeted expenditure) has contributed towards increasing the deficit as a percentage of the GDP since 1980/81. In 1984/85, overspending amounted to 2.3 percent of GDP and was solely responsible for raising the proportion of state expenditure to GDP over that of the previous year. It is to be hoped that at least budgeted expenditures will be controlled this year and that the new finance minister will be more effective in this regard than his predecessor.

The two most negative aspects of the budget relate to taxes and the level of unemployment. The tax burden has been increased by 20 percent, taking the rate of GST to 12 percent. In combination with the introduction of a surcharge of 7 percent on income taxes, these rates must place South Africa in the ranks of high tax countries. At a time of increasing unemployment and rising prices, economic burdens on low income households become severe and it is shameful that the state should place an additional tax burden on them. The budget also did nothing towards extending the coverage of the social security network.

Black union spokesmen are less enthusiastic than businessmen about the state's economic policies, as workers are less able to 'tighten their belts'

The most negative aspect of the budget is the increase in the tax burden at a time of increasing unemployment and rising prices

In view of high interest rates, increased personal taxes and other factors, exports are the only likely source of economic growth

Assuming that the rand maintains its real effective value, exports should remain competitive and will continue to increase in real terms

In 1984, the Reserve Bank once again demonstrated its inability to control the growth in the money supply

If the government deficit is kept below 3 percent of the GDP, the crowding out effect of government expenditure in the capital market will be minimised

PROSPECTS

Attempting to predict the individual components of the GDP will enable us to arrive at a rough assessment of the future course of the economy. If we assume that interest rates are likely to remain high for the rest of the year, and take into account the increases in personal taxes and the 2 percentage point increase in GST, private consumption expenditures are not likely to increase in real terms. Investment expenditures will also remain depressed as a result of high interest rates and low economic activity. Real government expenditure is also budgeted to decline. Therefore the only likely source of growth in the economy is via exports.

The International Monetary Fund has predicted that the United States' growth rate should fall from 6.8 percent last year to 3.4 percent in 1985, and that the average growth in 20 other industrial countries will slow a little from 3.5 percent to 3 percent. As approximately 11 percent of our non-gold export trade is with the US, the slowdown in the US economy will cause South Africa's exports to grow more slowly than in 1984. However, assuming that the rand maintains its real effective value, exports should remain competitive and will continue to increase in real terms. Overall, the immediate outlook for the economy is not good and at best, we will bounce along the bottom until at least early next year.

Inflation Rates

Current inflation had its origin in the consumption based mini-boom, which was fuelled by easy money policies and state spending. Although the pressure of demand eased in the last two quarters of 1984, prices continued to rise, reflecting the 'feed-through' of the depreciated rand into import prices. Consumer price increases accelerated from 10 percent per annum in February 1984 to 13.9 percent in January 1985 and predictions of the inflation rate by forecasters for 1985 vary from 15 percent to 20 percent. The acceleration or deceleration of the inflation rate will depend heavily on the future level of exchange rates and also, on the growth in the monetary aggregates.

In 1984, the Reserve Bank once again demonstrated its inability to control the growth in the money supply. During the second half of 1984 the various monetary aggregates accelerated as follows:

- M3 accelerated from 12 percent per annum in December to 24.7 percent in November 1984
- M2 accelerated from 16.5 percent per

annum in December 1983 to 28.9 percent in November 1984.

The Bank defended itself by reflecting that the more rapid rise in the money supply during this period did not reflect an increase in monetary demand, as the velocity of circulation had declined. Here we find the Reserve Bank implicitly using what Nobel Prizewinning economist James Tobin has called 'the velocity adjusted money supply'. In November 1984 the annualised increase in M2 was 28.9 percent, while velocity decreased by 5.7 percent, giving a velocity adjusted increase in the money supply of 23.2 percent. Thus the increase in bank credit far outweighed the decline in velocity, with an inevitable upward pressure on the price level.

Interest Rates

Short term interest rates generally increased over 1984. This trend was briefly interrupted in November 1984, when the Reserve Bank felt that the economy had cooled sufficiently and the rand strengthened. In December, however, the price of gold declined further and the rand depreciated yet again. In response to this, rates were again raised. Short term interest rates, in particular, depend upon the Reserve Bank's policy as to monetary control and on the demand for money.

Economic activity has slackened off, but expectations as to the price level are such as to maintain fairly high interest rates. A prime rate of 25 percent is not excessive in the face of an anticipated rate of inflation which may be as high as 20 percent. If the size of the government deficit is kept to below 3 percent of the GDP, the crowding out effect of government expenditure in the capital market will be minimised. There may even be a reduction of interest rates toward the end of the year, provided that deflationary policies are successful in reducing the inflation rate.

Balance of Payments

The current account of the balance of payments, which had been in deficit for most of 1984, moved into surplus in the last quarter of 1984, reflecting the dampening down of economic activity. Although merchandise imports increased in rand terms, due to the depreciated rand, this was outweighed by the increase in rand terms of both merchandise exports and gold.

Over the course of 1984 on the capital account, there was a substantial long term inflow (R2 671 million) to purchase securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, plus net borrowing on the part of the Treasury,

banks and public corporations. However, the net outflow of short term capital amounted to R3 059 million. Combined with the deficit on the current account of R1 041 million, this implied for the year a sizeable decline in net gold and foreign reserves of R1 429 million. The outward movement of short term funds has been attributed to unfavourable leads and lags, which occurred as a result of traders and investors anticipating a further depreciation of the rand. This phenomenon also explains why it is possible for high interest rates and high rates of growth in money supply to coexist.

Depreciation of the Rand

The most notable economic feature of 1984 was the depreciation of the rand. Before September 1983, the Reserve Bank had actively intervened in the foreign exchange market to maintain the value of the rand. After September, the Reserve Bank stated that it would only intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to smooth out erratic fluctuations in the value of the rand. Since then the effective exchange rate of the rand has declined, in particular since July 1984.

In January 1985, the announcement by the Western Group of Five of policies to prevent further appreciation of the dollar, and the introduction of measures to alleviate pressure on the South African spot market, supported the value of the rand and led to some appreciation of the domestic currency. The varying value of the dollar continued to affect the value of the rand, with a further depreciation and then an appreciation after February.

It is often said that the depreciation of the

rand is not excessive, given the differences in the rate of inflation between South Africa and her trading partners. South Africa's inflation rate in 1984 was 11.7 percent, as compared with a median inflation rate for developing countries of 10 percent and for the mature industrialised economies of 4.1 percent. Recent calculations of the real effective exchange rate for the rand show the same trends. In other words, the rand has declined in value in real terms, as well as in nominal terms. This means that the competitive position of exporters is greatly enhanced, as is also the position of import-competing producers in South Africa.

The Gold Price

Something should also be said about the determinants of the price of gold. In the past, political events played a significant role, as illustrated by the invasion of Afghanistan when gold hit \$800 an ounce. In recent times it has been the world rate of inflation, US interest rates and the value of the dollar which have become important factors. The size of the US budget deficit has pushed up US interest rates, which has attracted capital into the US and away from gold, with a concomitant drop in the price of gold.

Any hint of a decline in US interest rates has affected the value of the dollar and the price of gold. As to the future, US policymakers have warned of a decline in the size of the US deficit and a fall in interest rates. This will discourage capital inflows, and with the very large trade deficit on the US's Balance of Payments will leave the dollar overvalued. We can conclude therefore that the price of gold is likely to rise in the future. When this might happen is a matter for conjecture.

The outward movement of short term funds in 1984 was the result of traders and investors anticipating a further depreciation of the rand

The decline in value of the rand in real and nominal terms has enhanced the competitive position of exporters and import-competing producers

To alleviate the burdens of unemployment, the social security network should be extended and work-sharing schemes could be created

Trade unions could assist by concentrating on employment creation as a goal, rather than demanding higher real wages

POLICY DIRECTIONS

If it is the intention of policymakers in South Africa to reduce the inflation rate substantially, one year of deflationary policies will be insufficient. Inflationary expectations have become so engrained that several years of stringent monetary policy would be required to eradicate these expectations. Even then, close control would have to be exercised over the velocity adjusted money supply, so as to ensure no further refuelling of the inflation rate.

The cost of this policy will inevitably be an increase in the rate of unemployment. The big questions which remain are:

- whether South Africa can afford similar increases in the rate of unemployment
- what do policymakers intend to do to alleviate the burdens of unemployment?

One possibility which must be considered is to extend the social security network for workers unable to find employment. The

announcement in May by the state of an emergency relief programme of R100 million is to be welcomed, although the benefits which can be paid from this scheme may be as small as R170 per head per annum. Extending the social security networks would have a mediating effect on the most harshly felt effects of monetarism and would undoubtedly contribute to restoring social stability in the townships.

Another possibility is for work-sharing schemes to be created, which could be negotiated between the state, employers and unions. In this the state might be able to use the negotiating platform which the unions provide, as a force for creating social stability. Some reduction in real wages will be necessary before employment growth can occur without inflation, and here too trade unions could assist by concentrating on employment creation as a goal, rather than demanding higher real wages. UJWA

THE GREAT FREE MARKET DEBATE

Over the past century, the South African economy has developed on the basis of a set of economic and political rules that have produced an economic system best described today as a mixed market economy. Although it is a system predominantly based upon private enterprise or capitalism, the state not only sets and administers the background rules for the economic game, but has come to be a major economic player itself.

South Africa is not unique in this respect, since all supposed free market, private enterprise or capitalist economies are in actuality mixed market economies in which government plays a significant role. Where the South African economy is unusual, however, is in the fact that the rules governing access to the economy are significantly biased against the black group in the society.

The past decade has seen a growing and ongoing discussion on the exact nature of the South African economy and on the ways in which it should be changed. There are two distinct aspects to these discussions, which are often subsumed under the heading of 'Moving to a Free Market Economy', and their amalgamation causes some confusion. The first aspect is the need to generate a set of non-racial rules to give South African black people equal access to economic opportunities at all levels. The second aspect relates to the economic role of the state itself. The questions asked in this respect are:


- *is the government playing too great an economic role?*
- *are the present rules governing the economy appropriate to the needs of the society of today?*

The debate has ranged widely and has called into question a variety of economic institutions in particular, including the agricultural marketing boards, the public corporations, the urban labour markets, the urban property markets, the public services and even the role of big business and the banking sector.

The nature and direction of the debate varies almost as widely as the issues under discussion and not surprisingly, there is often a strong link between the line taken and the economic, racial circumstances of the contributors. In general, South African whites treat the continuation of the capitalist system as axiomatic and focus their criticisms on the perceived excesses of government intervention in the economy. Many black people, on the other hand, question the continuation of the capitalist system itself but take the need for government intervention in an economy as axiomatic.

There is also a small but growing middle group comprised of somewhat unlikely bedfellows, including very big business, liberal white academics, middle-of-the-road trade unionists of all colours and black entrepreneurs with small businesses. They argue that what is needed in present day South Africa is a South African solution that will set up social and economic rules to create a 'Just Economic Order', described variously as a caring society, a social market economy, caring capitalism and social democracy. The following article by Professors van der Ross and Thomas is essentially a discussion in this vein. Since the black challenge to the continued existence of capitalism, economic libertarianism or private enterprise (call it what you will) is gaining momentum daily, they raise crucial issues that must be faced.

Marketing Private Enterprise TOWARDS A 'SOCIAL MARKET' ECONOMY



By Rector
R E van der Ross
and Professor
Wolfgang Thomas
of the University of
the Western Cape

In the white-centred business community of South Africa, few doubts are expressed nowadays about the economic system described as 'private enterprise', a 'free market economy' and so on. In fact, the larger economic system which these terms encompass is currently being lauded to such an extent in the media by government and business leaders, that the impression might almost be given that South African society has only recently been converted to this ideology and is now in the midst of implementing it.

The truth is, of course, that it is only since the late 1970s that the necessity for the full and unhampered participation of South Africa's black majority in the economic system has been officially recognised. Following the Good Hope and Carlton Conferences of 1981 and 1982, the government and private sector have sought actively to market the private enterprise philosophy, through constantly reiterating the need for the development of small business in the urban black community and for industrial development in the homelands.

Image and Reality

Among middle-class, black South Africans, who are generally positively inclined towards

institutions which enshrine the profit motive and genuine competition, the fervour of this ideological advertising campaign raises both expectations and suspicions. Hopes that they may be allowed to participate effectively in the market economy remain tempered by the hereditary and statutory restrictions that continue to hamper the growth of private enterprise outside of the townships. Black businessmen can hardly fail to notice that even the cautious recommendations of the Riekert Commission of 1978 with regard to the opening of segregated central business districts have not yet been implemented.

Whilst there have always been 'ways around' these restrictions and other racial barriers, it should be clear that the enthusiasm of black people for the 'free' enterprise system is likely to be seriously dampened as long as it seems to operate in a selective manner. The expectations of black businessmen are that they may (at last) also be able to participate effectively in commerce and industry, as long as:

- certain key legislative stumbling blocks in the way of the expansion of black business are removed
- determinate steps are taken to rectify the adverse effects of past restrictions, through some sort of 'affirmative action'
- the Group Areas Act is abolished, opening up access to commercial, industrial and

Since the late 1970s, attempts to market private enterprise have aimed to promote black participation in the South African economy

The Carlton and Good Hope conferences resulted in government and private sector initiatives to promote the free market philosophy

BLACK ATTITUDES

Recent government efforts to promote free enterprise have created suspicion in the black business community

Instead of promoting black business, the Small Business Development Corporation seems to favour small white enterprises

Some black trade unionists, student leaders and intellectuals believe that private enterprise is responsible for racial inequalities in South Africa

Working-class blacks are looking for better wages, housing, education and health services, and are not impressed by glib public relations efforts

The connotations of the free market philosophy are not sufficiently linked to the welfare aspects of society

agricultural land and services.

Until the lifting of these barriers to market access is effectively accomplished, a justifiable and healthy scepticism may be expected to remain in the black business community. Unfortunately, recent steps taken by government to implement the supposed move towards the free market system have tended to fuel prevailing scepticism. One of the early steps in the evolution of the private enterprise drive in the late 1970s was the establishment of the Small Business Development Corporation. However, closer observation of the lending programme of the SBDC indicates that relatively more loan support is now given to white small businesses than to black businessmen, because their track record often indicates a proven profitability. Furthermore, in contrast to the old Coloured Development Corporation, there is now no body constituted to promote commercial enterprises in coloured townships.

Working Class Perceptions

Among the black working class and the population at large, a far tougher and less equivocal set of attitudes as regards the private enterprise philosophy is observable. The 'free market' concept raises strong emotional reactions, which might be visualised as the 'we-they' syndrome. The black man struggling to meet the basic needs of his household — in times of high inflation, tightened hire purchase and widespread unemployment — sees himself as the powerless, economic and political underdog, as opposed to the economically secure and politically powerful (white and wealthy) 'capitalist' stereotype.

The rise of black trade unions has heightened the general awareness of this 'we-they' relationship and the constant exhortation of the media, business and government spokesmen about the virtues of this system make many black people even more suspicious. They cannot but note that the rise in the free market ideology occurred at more or less the same time that food subsidies started declining, a general sales tax was introduced and rapidly increased to 12 percent, rentals on council houses escalated, hospital admission fees increased, train and bus fares doubled and so on.

The black working class is to a certain extent influenced by highly articulate criticisms of the capitalist system as a whole, advanced by black student leaders, trade unionists and other leading intellectuals in urban black communities. These radical critics argue that private enterprise is not merely incapable of solving the social and economic problems of the masses, but is in fact the very cause of black/white inequality and of racialism per se in South Africa.

The influence of this critique in black communities, which may be identified as 'the Left' on the political spectrum, should not be underestimated. Because these groups play an

important role in black society, a dual approach seems to be called for, based on:

- the pursuit of a more serious dialogue with these leaders, with the intention of breaking new ground
- the concurrent development of a new concept for an overarching socio-economic system, to reconcile some of the opposing sentiments.

Delivering The Goods

In short, irrespective of what statistics and carefully analysed trends claim to prove, the man in the street tends to associate the private enterprise system with wide, racially-based income and wealth inequalities, which in turn are seen as the very cause of black poverty and unemployment. This view may not be in line with current thinking among economists, that a certain degree of income inequality is an inevitable side-effect of rapid economic growth, which itself is the pre-condition for any serious efforts to overcome mass poverty. Yet the sentiments outlined above undoubtedly exist and one should not expect that they can be easily drowned by public campaigns conducted by the SABC or other organisations to promote the free enterprise system.

People at the lower end of the socio-economic scale, as is the case with all other communities, are convinced by results, not by glib public relations efforts. At best they may find sympathy for a system if it explicitly takes into account their needs and has some programmatic content relevant to them. After all, very few individuals in this group can visualise themselves as the future business owners. They are looking instead for better wages, housing, education and health services, stable employment and some say in the economic and political decisionmaking processes. The free market philosophy does not emphasise the welfare aspects of society, and many black workers believe that the achievement of their priority goals may be made even more difficult within such a system.

Positive Connotations

Before proceeding with an evaluation of what kind of compromise might be embodied in the new socio-economic order, it should be stressed that a significant number of people in the black community have welcomed government reform in South Africa over the past few years. In their eyes, the influence upon government of the white private sector may be linked to changes such as:

- the liberalisation of the labour market
- the broadening of scope for black entrepreneurs in black townships
- the lessening of and the gradual abolition of petty apartheid measures
- the recent formal abolition of the coloured labour preference policy
- the extension of the 99-year leasehold concession.

Where the free market encourages the further development of black trade unions and the expansion of black residential rights in urban areas, it obviously has positive connotations. On the other hand, it would be rather naive to assume that the incremental extension of long-overdue 'rights' such as the freedom of movement, association and domicile — which should be taken for granted as the cornerstones of any democratic society — will be perceived by the black community as the benevolent granting of 'privileges' by government under pressure from white commerce and industry. Black South Africans feel, and there can be few exceptions, that they have been historically deprived of rights owed them by society, which have never been withheld from their white compatriots.

The private sector has undoubtedly played a progressive role within white society to help deregulate the economy and pave the way for some measure of deracialisation. Nevertheless, the concept of 'free enterprise' will never capture the imagination of South Africa's black majority, except to give rise to feelings of hostility. From their point of view the free market system as we know it is not regarded as an acceptable basis for the future restructuring of our society. The progressive role played by the private sector in contemporary South Africa cannot be expected to remove overnight from the minds of many black people their historical association of business with the development of the apartheid system.

The President's Council Report

In a memorandum presented to the President's Council (PC) in 1983, the authors suggested that the concept of a social market economy would be more appropriate for South Africa at this stage than either capitalism (private enterprise/free market) or socialism (as implicitly proposed by supporters of the Left). In a recently completed report (PC 1/1984), the PC Committee for Economic Affairs has for the first time replaced the free market concept by the more realistic term 'market-orientated' economy, at least in some parts of the report.

Furthermore, the key second chapter consists of a lengthy discussion of legitimate reasons for and forms of government intervention, linking them to the need to redistribute income, stimulate development and overcome the racial discrimination of the past. In laying down guidelines and criteria for evaluating government policy, the report emphasises that legitimate criticism of the perceived inefficiencies of bureaucratic action by government should not be equated with government action per se, which may be fully justified in the light of the particular needs of society.

Unfortunately, later chapters of the report show less signs of such a differentiated

approach. In fact, the final chapter contains detailed proposals as to how the free market system should be publicised. After recommending that the Economic Advisory Council of the Prime Minister should be requested to undertake the task of publicising the market system, the committee elaborates (ibid, chapter 10.35) on the following possible courses of action and concludes that:

- normal marketing, advertising and promotion methods are inappropriate for publicising the system
- there should first be an in-depth preliminary investigation by the Human Sciences Research Council as regards a suitable publicity programme for each population group
- specialist educationalists should be approached for advice on how to use the school syllabi to stimulate the interest of the child as well as the school
- the media should be used extensively, augmented by lectures, discussion groups and seminars, to promote a coordinated campaign of a market economy year or a slogan of 'prosperity through market participation'.

Widespread Misconceptions

Underlying these recommendations and much of the PC report is the assumption that black people do not seem to understand the free market economy and therefore, do not appreciate the virtues of the system. This is particularly ironic when one considers the range of non-market, racial restrictions which virtually suffocate black households. The report (chapter 6 and annexure 10) also reveals a vast array of restrictive policies, many of which hamper the evolution of market-oriented activities in the black community. However, the committee does not suggest that these be dismantled, probably in the light of certain restrictive terms of reference of the investigation itself.

The widespread misconception that black people do not easily accept the realities of a market economy is largely unfounded both in South Africa and in much of black Africa, if one looks at grassroots behaviour in rural as well as urban areas and takes into account the wide range of market-restricting practices. Any close observer of the day-to-day life in poverty stricken communities will know that people of all ages (including even small children) are intensely aware of the principles of supply and demand, market and prices, etc. Informal sector activities are most prevalent in these strata of society, and it is here that the economic model of the free market still has some relevance — if only local and other authorities would allow it to function.

If one looks at the multitude of restrictions placed on informal sector activities in terms of hundreds of laws, the question arises as to exactly who should be the target of such a campaign. One shudders at the mere thought that conventional school books include 'Our

The progressive role played by the private sector in the deracialisation of the economy is acknowledged in some quarters of the black community

In a major report, the President's Council (PC) Committee replaced the 'free market' concept by the more realistic term 'market-orientated economy'

The PC report suggested that the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council should actively market the free enterprise system

The widespread informal sector activities of black entrepreneurs explodes the myth that they are unfamiliar with free market mechanisms

Adding the epithet 'social' to the 'market economy' concept will signal that business and government are sensitive to the welfare needs of black people

A 'social market' economy would symbolise a synthesis of socio-economic systems and legitimate the market as the basic mechanism of the South African economy

Denial of the development needs of black communities could well produce widespread rejection of the present mixed economy system

To maintain political stability, decisionmakers should cultivate an overarching socio-economic goal which will secure black and white commitment

free market economy' as a prescribed topic for black school children in townships like Soweto, Sebokeng and Nyanga.

A Social Market Economy

The adoption of a new concept symbolising a synthesis of socio-economic systems could give credence to the existence and legitimacy of the market as the basic mechanism of our economy. Judging by the experience of black Africa, where socialist experiments have on the whole ended in disillusion if not disaster, we neither have nor desire either a planned economy or a socialist economy. As a market economy we obviously want to retain a major private sector, since markets are usually (though not exclusively) associated with competition and private enterprise. On the other hand, there can be no serious talk of largely dismantling the public sector, neither in South Africa nor in other industrialised countries.

By adding the epithet 'social', one signals an awareness among the private sector and government of the social dimension of our economic life. White voters have learned in the past that government does have their social needs in mind, after decades of political action originating in the socio-economic upliftment policies of the 1920s and 1930s during the 'Poor Whites' era.

In this context it seems only natural that black people from all social strata are now looking upon government and the private sector for an explicit sensitivity and responsiveness to these issues. Denial of their social needs could well result in a rejection of the present economic system itself.

Two Dimensions

The juxtaposition of 'social' and 'market' economy indicates the need for a balance between two dimensions:

- the social responsibility of government and the private sector, which inevitably costs money and will use up scarce resources
- the demands of the market economy to finance all activities in a non-inflationary way and to mobilise all possible resources.

It may sound overly simplistic to just link these two concepts. Alternatively, one may argue that such a balance is impossible. Yet, in essence government continuously strives for a compromise in order to meet social demands within the framework of a functioning, mixed market economy. The compromise has to be negotiated every day, with black and white interest groups actively participating. This task cannot be left up to the magic free market, an illusion entertained by the free marketeers who ignore the realities of income inequalities, racial discrimination, influx control and poverty cycles; nor can we leave it to government or parliament.

To achieve compromises all citizens will have to be aware of the stakes involved and the

implications of their demands. For example, demands for subsidised housing should be judged in the light of higher taxes and possibly lower economic growth. Or, a radical deregulation of our towns may result in a lot of messy developments, including squatting and informal sector activities, but this may be the crucial step to reduce the population pressure on our black rural areas, thereby facilitating much faster growth in black agriculture. However, in order to bridge the wide gap between white and black perception of the status quo and of policy priorities, a commonly acceptable socio-economic framework for the future should include elements with which both communities can identify. A social market economy might make this possible, given the fact that social concerns currently dominate black society, whereas concern about market efficiencies seems to dominate in the white community.

Conclusion

The social market concept, first propagated in post-war West Germany under its Economic Minister, Ludwig Erhard, also embodies a dual purpose. After the war the implementation of a free market economy would have been unacceptable to all those who lost almost everything during the war, and trade unionists and socialists would have rejected such a framework altogether. Under its system of 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft' the government steered a fairly liberal, market-orientated course, but also maintained a broad range of social policies aimed at particularly underprivileged groups in society.

In South Africa, we find ourselves at a rather strange and complex turning point in our political and economic history. While potentially far-reaching reforms are in the pipeline, rapid urbanisation and a severe economic recession coincide with escalating political demands among our black communities. At the same time, it is true that no single identifiable 'black man's view' exists on the merits or demerits of the free enterprise system. Attitudes range from pragmatic accommodation to outright scepticism, with a highly critical and combative outlook prevalent among certain leading groups within the black working class.

The unqualified propagation via advertising techniques, however sophisticated, of the 'free market' concept will fail to overcome present cleavages and will not be able to provide the integrating ideology necessary to prevent further polarisation. To maintain peace in such an atmosphere will require, among other things, the emergence of some overarching socio-economic goal which is acceptable to both black and white people. Business leaders in particular, must seriously contemplate the need for a more acceptable socio-economic system for all South Africans and should take steps to facilitate the necessary debate among policymakers. *INDIA*




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
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SOUTH AFRICA WINTER 1985



Western Deep Levels Mine, Carletonville. Safety hazards and the high underground fatality rate in the South African mining industry have become controversial labour issues in the 1980s.

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THE LOSS CONTROL SCHEME

Worker Safety Undermined

By Paul Benjamin, Labour Lawyer,
Legal Resources Centre (Johannesburg)

Government statistics show that over 8 500 miners were killed in accidents on South African mines between 1974/83

The emergence of an active black miners union has brought home the intensity of worker feelings about safety conditions on the mines

The last two years have witnessed the emergence of occupational health and safety as an industrial relations issue of major importance. Nowhere has this development been more marked than in the mining industry. The prominence of safety as a labour issue in this industry reflects the high level of exposure to hazard and risk faced by workers employed on the mines. In the ten years from 1974 to 1983, over eight and a half thousand workers were killed in accidents on South African mines (GME/DMEA Annual Reports).

The current profile of industrial health and safety (IHS) is also related to the presence of an active black trade union aware of the intensity of worker feelings on the issue. According to the General Secretary of the rapidly expanding National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Cyril Ramaphosa, 'In the mines, health and safety is the top priority — it is more important than wages. You have got to be alive or uninjured to earn the wages' (SA Labour Bulletin Vol 9/No 7:p66/7).

In addition, a number of incidents related to

IHS have focussed attention on the mining industry.

- In September 1983, the NUM organises a 30 minute work stoppage in the mining industry to protest the deaths of 68 coalminers in the Hlobane colliery disaster. The inquest reveals disquieting evidence as to the implementation of safety measures at the mine.

- In January 1984, workers at the opencast Rietspruit colliery near Witbank down tools twice after two workers are killed when a pylon collapses. An inquiry holds the shift boss and a more senior employee responsible for the accident.

- In July 1984, Hlobane colliery is fined R400 for failing to maintain safety equipment in flame-proof condition and two employees are fined R200 each for breach of safety regulations.

- In February 1985, 1 000 workers at Rietspruit stop work after a disagreement between NUM shaft stewards and management over a memorial service for a miner who had died in an accident two weeks earlier. Seventy miners are subsequently fired.

The Mines and Works Act

The Act still retains many of the features found in the original statute of 1911 and the regulations had their most recent major revision in 1970. The most notable requirements of the Mines and Works Act are:

- the mines inspectorate must hold an enquiry into all accidents causing death or serious bodily harm
- mine managements are obliged to report a wide range of accidents to the inspectorate
- any organisation of workers active in the industry may request the Government Mining Engineer (GME) to hold an enquiry into unsafe conditions at a mine
- the GME is obliged to then investigate, but has a discretion as to whether to subsequently hold an enquiry.

To apply to the differing circumstances of different mines IHS regulations must, of necessity, be very general. Many of the regulations issued in terms of the Mines and Works Act are thus devoted to minimum standards to be complied with in mining. While this is the most common legislative method of regulating IHS, it is not without its disadvantages and limitations.

In the mining industry itself, there may be a tendency to view what are intended to be minimum standards as maximum standards instead. As a result, actual mining practice often does not comply with the strict letter of the law as found in the Mines and Works regulations. At the Hlobane Colliery Inquest, the mine ventilation officer said he did not know of a colliery in Natal that complied fully with the regulations concerning ventilation (Inquest Record: p414).

The inquest also revealed a lengthy catalogue of inadequate safety procedures at the mine,

including irregularities in all three major areas of safety precautions in coalmining aimed at preventing methane explosions. Yet those methods of ventilation and gas detection used complied with the appropriate regulations. However, draft regulations have since been published which significantly increase the range of safety equipment required to be used in coal mining.

The Mines Inspectorate

The legal provisions for IHS in the mining industry are laid down in the Mines and Works Act. The regulations promulgated in terms of the Act are enforced by the GME and his inspectors. From a comparative perspective, the mines inspectorate in this country is understaffed. A recent study (Eisner 1984) shows that in 1981 there were the same number of qualified inspectors in South Africa (98) and the United Kingdom, in spite of the fact that the local mining industry employs over three times as many people as its British counterpart.


Even though the authorised complement of inspectors in South Africa was increased by some 30 percent in November 1983 and the size of the workforce has declined, the ratio of inspectors to workers remains considerably worse than in the United Kingdom. The size of the inspectorate has a distinct impact on safety standards. The GME noted that a previous increase in the number of inspectors 'had a beneficial effect on discipline and on mining personnel's compliance with the Mines and Works Regulations' (Annual Report 1982). Despite the lack of resources the mines inspectorate performs valiantly in policing an enormous and hazardous industry, as demonstrated by its investigation into the Hlobane Colliery disaster.

In the mining industry, there may be a tendency to view statutory safety regulations as setting maximum instead of minimum standards

The Hlobane disaster inquest found fault with major safety precautions at the colliery which aim to prevent methane explosions on coal mines

Despite inadequate resources, the government mines inspectorate performs a valiant task in policing an enormous and hazardous industry

Maclear, Transkei. A former migrant labourer, who was paralysed from the waist down in a mining accident, was sent back to the independent homeland, where he is now looked after by his family. After medical treatment, he was given a disability grant of approximately R1 000 in cash and receives a small pension.



Underqualified and inexperienced on average, the white miner bears frontline responsibility in the safety hierarchy and performs the crucial pre-shift safety test

With additional earnings made up from production bonuses, the white miner reflects the conflict between safety supervision and production goals

The Mines and Works Act focusses on objective aspects of safety performance and does not deal adequately with worker perceptions of hazards

A recent Industrial Court case drew attention to the need for improved in-house procedures to resolve safety disputes on the mines

The Safety Hierarchy

The Mines and Works regulations institutionalise a hierarchy of command and responsibility running from the mine manager down to the white miner. Although general responsibility resides with the manager, all of these officials are obliged to 'take all reasonable measures to provide for the safety and proper discipline of mine employees' (regulation 2.9.3). With the exception of the ventilation officer, all officials with responsibility for safety are engaged in production-related or technical activities.

The white miner bears frontline responsibility for safety levels, as he performs the crucial pre-shift safety examination and is obliged to withdraw workers from a workplace that becomes unsafe. In many ways the miner is the least able to perform these functions. The qualifications and experience required to become a miner in South Africa are, by international standards, exceptionally low. Consequently, a high proportion of prosecutions for breaches of the Mines and Works Act are against white supervisory staff (Eisner, op cit). In addition, the white miner bears most critically the conflict between safety supervision and production. He is employed in both of these capacities, and a large part of his income is made up from production bonuses.

Under regulation 8.3.2, workers have a limited individual right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions. A mineworker who believes a mining area to be dangerous may inform the miner in charge, who must then withdraw the workers, investigate and, if necessary, make the area safe. The white miner is not required to call in senior mine officials, however, and African workers who remain apprehensive have no right of recourse to such officials.

Job Reservation

African employees in the mining industry are unable to gain access to the hierarchy of safety positions. At present, 'non-scheduled persons' — the Mines and Works Act's euphemism for African workers — are unable to obtain a blasting certificate, the qualification for becoming a miner [Section 12(2)(a)]. However, the GME is empowered to exempt mines from job reservation provisions, and a wide range of tasks that would normally be performed by white miners are therefore carried out by African employees. This exemption system has profoundly negative consequences for safety on the mines. It can result in African workers performing work they are not formally trained to perform at rates lower than those paid to white workers.

In this respect, IHS standards will undoubtedly improve once the remaining legislative provisions for job reservation in about 13 categories are repealed. In March 1985, the Director-General of Mineral and

Energy Affairs (MEA) called on mine owners and unions to advise the government on how to amend statutes. A legislative shift from the current, racially determined 'scheduled' person, to a non-racial definition of a 'competent' person will be initiated by the cabinet in August this year (MEA Minister, RDM 12/4/85).

Unfair Labour Practice

In November 1983, the status of the miner's right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions was at issue in the Industrial Court case, NUM versus Driefontein Consolidated Ltd. In the landmark case, it was argued on behalf of 17 miners who were fired after a work stoppage, that a dismissal where an employer had failed to assuage worker fears for their safety amounted to an unfair labour practice (ULP).

In ordering the temporary reinstatement of the workers, the Court did not rule out the possibility of an ULP involving company conduct of safety disputes in the mining industry, even where there had been compliance with the regulations. Furthermore, the Court found that 'the strange reticence' of the company to inform the workers and NUM of an impending inspection of the area by the Chief Inspector of Mines had contributed to a 'wide chasm of distrust' between the parties (ILJ Vol5/no2: p84/92).

The judgement was an attempt to harmonise the Labour Relations and the Mines and Works acts, which failed to distinguish sufficiently between different aspects of safety. The Mines and Works Act is essentially concerned with objective aspects: the setting of minimum safety standards and the allocation of responsibility for compliance with them. It does not deal with the perception of hazard and risk by employees in a work situation, or with the communication of these perceptions. Although NUM eventually withdrew the subsequent ULP case, the initial court action has had a seminal effect on the mining industry, focussing attention on the need for adequate statutory or internal company procedures for the resolution of disputes about safety.

Noise Levels

The Mines and Works regulations do not exhaustively cover the IHS hazards faced in the mining industry. One of the most prominent safety areas left unregulated is that no maximum level or exposure period to noise is stipulated. This is in contrast to the Factories Act, which sets a limit of 85 decibels (db/A) over an eight-hour day, in keeping with international standards. In the American mining industry the limit is 90 db/A for the same period and no exposure in excess of 115 db/A is permissible (J McAteer, Miner's Manual: p84).

According to the Chamber of Mines' Research Organisation, 'the high noise levels

Noise levels are one of the most prominent safety areas left unregulated by the Mines and Works Act. Unlike other South African industrial sectors or the American mining industry, no maximal levels or exposure periods to industrial noise are stipulated for local mines.



P. ALBERTS

associated with certain occupations in the mining industry are a source of concern, especially as noise-induced deafness may compromise safety standards (1982 Annual Report). A study of sound levels in gold mines conducted in 1980 found that 68 percent of all noise levels measured at drilling points in development ends and an equivalent 60 percent in stopes were in excess of 100 db/A (Schroder and van der Walt 1981). The authors concluded that, 'This indicates a high exposure of drillers to noise and hence a high risk of noise induced hearing loss . . . in conformity with previous findings' (ibid).

For workers exposed to levels of 100 db/A, the possibility of impaired hearing, assuming a working life of ten years, is one in three (SABS Code of Practice). In addition, workers in these areas are the most exposed to hazards such as pressure bursts and rockfalls, which cause many fatalities in the goldmining industry. A miner's capacity to detect warning signals of impending danger is vastly reduced by high noise levels. In short, the effects on the victim's quality of life, of continued, unregulated exposure to industrial noise are extreme (Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace: p74/5).

The Loss Control Approach

The Mine Safety Division (MSD) is the central IHS organisation for the Chamber of Mines. In order to promote safety consciousness in the industry, it runs safety competitions and administers the International Mining Safety Rating System (IMSR). This system has been developed since 1978 by the Chamber's MSD in conjunction with Mr Frank E Bird Jnr, Head of the International Loss Control Institute of Atlanta, Georgia.

The IMSR embodies the approach to IHS which is known as 'total loss control', a term that Bird has registered with the American

government. Its rationale is that accidents in which workers might be killed or injured actually constitute only a small percentage of all unplanned events causing financial loss to a company. Safety in the canon of loss control is the control of all accidental loss. The philosophy's central tenet is that safety improvements will increase productivity and profitability.

The trouble with industrial safety is that it has earned itself a bad name: people think it costs money. To the contrary, Bird writes, 'When administered with the unified approach in mind (there is a right way, not a safe way to do the job), the objectives of safety — quality and production — are best achieved' (Loss Control Survey, May 1983). The Chamber and its representatives have embraced the gospel of loss control and the IMSR with the fervour of new converts. The chairman of the Chamber's executive committee has stated that, 'Improved safety, productivity, mutual trust, team spirit and peace of mind are benefits which flow from one all-embracing discipline, namely the IMSR scheme' (1981 Annual Report).

Profits and Safety

The inevitable linkage of productivity and safety is the cornerstone of the loss control philosophy and there are times when this linkage is valid. But there are equally times when the two factors must come into conflict with each other, a point which has been made in a number of critical analyses: 'Industrial safety is only profitable when the direct and indirect costs associated with accidents (ie production shut-downs, damaged equipment and materials, increased workers' compensation assessments, etc) exceed the cost of eliminating these accidents' (Sass). The system has also been criticised because it undermines the democratic process by denying any need for worker or public participation in the setting of IHS standards

Continuous exposure to high noise levels reduces a miner's capacity to detect warning signals of impending rockfalls or pressure bursts

The loss control approach to safety management tends to subordinate safety standards to production goals

'Industrial safety is only profitable when the direct and indirect accident costs exceed the cost of eliminating these accidents' (R Sass)

SAFETY MANAGEMENT

'Conditions and practices that could result in accidents may very well be tolerated consciously after proper risk evaluation'
F Bird, Loss Control Founder)

In accepting the loss control dogma, a managerial approach to safety, the government mining engineer abandons his role as arbitrator of standards

Underground miners and those who undertake particularly hazardous tasks are exposed to far more risks than surface workers

The contrasting pattern of declining accident rates and static fatality rates shows the loss control scheme to be ineffective

(T Ison, Accident Compensation).

The aim of loss control is to identify the point of optimum safety up to which the cost of eliminating accidents will be less to the company than the cost of the accident had it occurred. Within this realm there will be no conflict between safety and production. According to Bird, 'The safety professional recognises that it is neither economically feasible nor practical to prevent all accidents . . . Certain conditions and practices that could result in certain accidents may very well be tolerated consciously after proper risk evaluation' (op cit).

The overall effect is to subordinate safety to the demands of productivity and to ignore the inevitable conflicts between the two factors, among other tensions:

- between the pressure to meet production goals and the safe performance of tasks
- the time consumed in making the workplace safe and the production time available
- the conflicting perceptions of danger that have their roots in differing exposures to risk
- the basic conflict of interest between workers and management over priorities, eg profits or safety.

The GME and Loss Control

The Government Mining Engineer and his department have entirely accepted the dogma of 'loss control' (1981 Annual Report), a managerial approach which undercuts his department's supposed objective arbitration of safety standards in the mining industry. The fullest statement of the GME's duties was made by the Marais Commission (RP 21/1963), appointed in the wake of the Coalbrook disaster of 1960 in which over 400 miners lost their lives. The commission's sophisticated appreciation of conflict over IHS standards stands in sharp contrast to the simplistic approach of loss control ideologues: 'A perpetual conflict of interest arises between employer and employee as to the nature and extent of the safety measures that may be considered reasonably practical and necessary . . . the arbiter whose duty it is to hold the scales evenly is the GME' (paraphrased, *ibid*: p3).

Fatality/Accident Rates

The comparative analysis of fatality and injury statistics is often an unrewarding activity because of differences in mining conditions from country to country. As the Chamber of Mines constantly points out, there is no equivalent to South African deep-level gold mining. However, more accurate comparison is possible in the coalmining sector, as reflected in the notes with graph 1.

With reference to the accompanying table and graphs, it needs to be emphasised that the fatality and accident rates are expressed in relation to the total workforce employed in the mining industry. As table 1 demonstrates, for underground miners and those workers

employed in particularly hazardous occupations and areas, the levels of exposure to risk are considerably higher.

Although the reportable accident rate in the mining industry has been halved in the last ten years (see graph 2), the fatality rate has not declined since the introduction of the IMSR system in 1978 (see graph 1). The contrasting pattern of declining reportable accidents and static fatality rates raises serious questions about the effectiveness of loss control approaches to IHS on the mines.

The Chamber's Vice-President, Mr G T Nisbet, describes IMSR as 'the most advanced of its kind in the world and has proved its effectiveness in reducing accident rates and improving efficiency both in South African and overseas countries' (Mining Week 29/2/84). However, accident rates are internationally regarded as a poor measure of safety performance because a number of socio-economic factors tend to distort the reportable accident rate (Senneck 1975). These include pressure from supervisors and colleagues, bonus and incentive systems, improved medical and nursing services and the like. Consequently, the fatality rate is the most accurate indicator of the safety hazards faced by miners.

Conclusion

The consistency of fatality rates over the last seven years in both gold and coal mines indicates that there has been no significant decline in the hazards in either sector. Yet 24 mines in South Africa had received a five-star IMSR rating as of August 1983, even though no overseas mines have been given this top rating. And at the time of the Hlobane disaster, the colliery had a four-star IMSR rating.

The consistently high fatality rate is ultimately the best indicator of the ineffectiveness of the loss control approach to safety in the mining industry. Loss control, with its stress on the linkage between safety and profitability, cannot assist the mining industry in addressing those deep-rooted and systematic features that are the cause of so many of the fatalities. The mining industry might well consider whether loss control principles, which were originally developed for use in continuous process industries, are appropriate to the far more complex and changeable industrial safety problems encountered in an extractive industry. *IPJA*

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
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Data Base

Graph 1

FATALITY RATES ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD AND COAL MINES, 1975/84

(Statistics for Chamber of Mines only)



Graph 2

REPORTABLE INJURY RATES ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD AND COAL MINES, 1975/84

(Statistics for Chamber of Mines only)




Table 1

COMPARATIVE UNDERGROUND AND SURFACE FATALITY RATES, 1978/84

(Statistics for Chamber of Mines only)

	GOLD MINES				COAL MINES			
	Underground		Surface		Underground		Surface	
	No. of Fatalities	Rate per 1000 employees	No. of Fatalities	Rate per 1000 employees	No. of Fatalities	Rate per 1000 employees	No. of Fatalities	Rate per 1000 employees
1978	613	1.93	32	0.35	69	1.46	19	0.63
1979	531	1.59	32	0.33	80	1.72	15	0.53
1980	582	1.69	37	0.34	61	1.37	18	0.62
1981	560	1.60	43	0.41	72	1.58	21	0.65
1982	573	1.66	23	0.22	72	1.58	21	0.61
1983	607	1.70	23	0.22	104	2.46	12	0.44
1984	560	1.56	32	0.29	48	1.03	6	0.21

- In South Africa, the fatality rate in the coal mining sector has ranged from a low of 0.67 per thousand employees to an equivalent high of 1.32 employees, between 1975/84.
- In the United Kingdom, the fatality rate of the coal mining sector has ranged from a low of 0.18 per thousand employees to an equivalent high of 0.25 employees, over the same period.
- All the tabulated fatality and injury rates are based on the Chamber of Mines statistics, because the DMEA records include workers employed at the parastatal SASOL's three oil-from-coal plants.

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THE MINE RATING SYSTEM

Improving Safety Performance Over Time

By Gordon Grange, Technical Adviser, Chamber of Mines

It would be much more difficult to make safety a major issue if the mining industry was seen to be improving its safety record

The facts are that the South African mining industry has actually managed to halve the rate of serious injuries over the past ten years

The case for the South African mining industry rests on the fact that it has succeeded in dramatically reducing the number of serious injuries in mining over the past decade.

Paul Benjamin's paper, as the author himself notes, was written against a background in which the National Union of Mineworkers has been campaigning to make safety a major issue. It would of course be that much more difficult to make safety a major issue if the mining industry was actually seen to be improving its safety record.

Benjamin disputes that it is in fact doing so, with an argument that hangs on a single slender thread, namely that one cannot judge safety performance on the basis of the incidence of injuries. Confronted with the only measurement of safety performance available and utilised internationally — the number of people who are injured and the number who are killed — he arbitrarily and illogically asserts that the one measurement (fatality rates) is valid and the other (injury rates) is not.

Acceptance of injury statistics as a valid measure of the industry's performance would of course destroy his case, because the South

African mining industry, in the face of expansion and increasing depths of mining, has actually managed to halve the rate of serious injuries over the past ten years.

Safety Indicators

Given the vast size of the industry — it employs over 700 000 people — and its consequently relatively large number of injuries, no expert statistician or any reasonable person can surely conclude that a reduction of 50 percent in the injury rate is not statistically significant and that it does not reflect an improvement in the industry's safety performance.

Yet Benjamin asserts that injury rates are 'a poor measure of safety performance', without giving any supporting evidence beyond an unsubstantiated claim that such statistics are distorted by a number of socio-economic factors. He maintains that these include 'pressure from supervisors and colleagues, bonus and incentive systems, improved medical and nursing services and the like', and goes on to say that 'the fatality rate is

the most accurate indication of the safety hazards faced by miners'.

On the contrary, fatalities, because of the much smaller numbers involved and the random nature of their occurrence, do not give as accurate a picture of overall trends as do injuries which relate to tens of thousands of accidents. For example, one major accident such as the Hlobane colliery disaster of 1983 can distort the whole year's figures.

Objective statistical analysis shows that as safety management improves, there is a commensurate improvement in the incidence of the type of accident over which management can exercise control. In South African gold mines, as in other mining industries in the rest of the world, accidents caused by human factors are to a very large degree controllable by good management and safety practices.

Rockburst Fatalities

South African gold mines, because of their great depths and the rock pressures encountered, have long experienced a phenomenon which is less controllable. This is the rockburst, which has only recently appeared in other mining industries and accounts for about one half of all fatalities, including rock falls.

Even allowing for this factor, Benjamin is still wrong in his assertion that 'the fatality rate in the mining industry has not declined since the introduction of the IMSR system in 1978'. In fact, the South African gold mines have witnessed a considerable reduction in their fatality rate, from 1.48 fatalities per 1 000 people in service in 1978 to 1.18 last year — a reduction of no less than 20 percent.

What Benjamin does not mention in his article, is the tremendous effort being put into tackling the uncontrollable factor in mine accidents, namely rockbursts. The Chamber of Mines research organisation is leading the world in expenditure and research in this field and its expertise is sought after by the Canadian and other mining industries.

Reduced Accident Rates

However, I must now move on to Benjamin's second major unsubstantiated allegation, namely that the loss control or International Mining Safety Rating (IMSR) system is an ineffective approach to safety performance in the mining industry.

As indicated earlier, the dramatic reduction in the reportable injury rate and the downward trend in the fatality rate has in fact coincided with the introduction of the IMSR system.

The mining industry is firmly convinced that this is no coincidence, and that the improvement in the industry's safety performance can largely be ascribed to the widespread use of the IMSR system. If one looks at the results achieved by individual



mines which have successfully implemented the system, there is clear evidence of its effectiveness.

A study, undertaken in 1981, showed that mines with three, four and five-star ratings under the IMSR system had significantly lower fatality and reportable accident rates than all other gold mines. An examination of the fatality rates on the gold mines for the period 1982-1984, shows that the five mines with the lowest rates are all either five or four star mines. For the year 1984 alone, the picture is even more positive with 10 of the first 11 mines, including the first six, having four or five stars.

IMSR Standards

But what is the IMSR system? The system identifies and sets standards for the work which has to be done to control injury to people, damage to property and unplanned interruption of operations. It enables the performance of this work to be measured by

Controlled blast at Rietspruit Colliery, Witbank. Three fatalities at surface level between 1984/5 have led to considerable labour unrest, including a work stoppage by 1 000 NUM members in February this year.

The dramatically reduced reportable injury rate and the decreased fatality rate can be ascribed to the widespread use of a safety rating system

Loss control techniques provide a means for the more efficient management and control of safety standards

The Chamber of Mines' safety policy states that accident prevention must take precedence over production demands in cases of conflict

Experience and research show that human fallibility, rather than inadequate legislation, is the major cause of industrial accidents

means of internal and external audits or inspections.

Contrary to what Benjamin implies, the IMSR system was introduced with the express purpose of reducing accidents. Although it is built on the concept of loss control, it is not built on the concept of total loss control which is strongly geared to productivity.

Loss control techniques developed, principally in the United States, provide a means for the more efficient management of safety. Its principles were adapted into the IMSR system, with the help of Mr Frank Bird, to suit South African mining conditions. In the past, safety management was concerned with exhorting people to work safely and to try to analyse the causes of accidents. Today, loss control is concerned with identifying and analysing risks, and creating management controls to ensure that the work is carried out according to predetermined safety standards.

It is logical to assume that adherence to mining safety standards, as well as to accepted mining practice, will bring about safer working conditions. The IMSR system ensures this adherence to standards. The use of such standards and training in their use is even more important in the South African context, where the vast majority of mineworkers are poorly educated and illiterate.

By comparison, 75 percent of the coal miners in the United States have at least a high school education ('Towards safer underground coal mines', National Academy Press, 1982). In the face of this vast training problem, the most effective way of making sure that a man works safely is to train him in 'the right way to do the job', rather than confusing him with two approaches, one involving his job and one safety. In this way, safety is built into the job. And this is what the IMSR system aims to ensure — that work must be carried out to, and can be measured against standards.

Production/Safety Conflict

At the same time, it would be naive to pretend that there is never a conflict between production and safety in a working environment. But this does not negate the principle that safety management can be an integral part of the overall management system.

While there is a definite productivity spin-off from the implementation of a loss control programme such as the IMSR system, it is primarily concerned with the prevention of personal casualties. Therefore, there can be no conflict between safety and production, as safety and not productivity is the system's objective. In fact, the Chamber of Mines' safety policy issued by the executive committee on behalf of all its members, states that accident prevention must be an integral part of production and in case of conflict

should take precedence.

The IMSR system is certainly no universal panacea nor an instant solution for all safety problems. It is a tool whereby management can control adherence to safety standards and accident prevention measures through more effective monitoring. Its basic tenet is thus, safety through good management.

Human Fallibility

In the regulations laid down in the Mines and Works Act, the safety standards referred to are not regarded as 'minimum' or 'maximum'. They are simply the standards which are acceptable. Furthermore, and as Benjamin states, 'To apply to the differing circumstances of differing mines the regulations must, of necessity, be very general'.

In any event, legislation cannot provide for every possible eventuality no matter how comprehensive it may be. Just as laws cannot eradicate crime, legislation cannot eliminate all accidents. Sub-standard acts or human fallibility have been shown by experience and research to be the major cause of accidents (Heinrich, etc). The mining industry is tackling this aspect of safety performance through emphasis on management controls, motivation and training.

The Hlobane accident is a case in point. Although it was a freak occurrence on a mine which hitherto had maintained a good safety record, human negligence was evident. Let it be said, too, that this was by far the worst accident in the coal mining industry since the Coalbrook disaster more than 20 years earlier and the whole industry should not be judged on the basis of one incident. Accidents occur not because of but in spite of regulations.

Other Safety Issues

Benjamin raises several other issues related to safety standards, which are open to dispute:

- On the question of the ratio of government inspectors to workers, figures supplied by the Government Mining Engineer (GME) indicate that in the one sector where reasonable comparisons are possible, ie coal mines, South Africa (with a ratio of 1:2521) compared to the UK (with a ratio of 1:2793) would appear to be better served, contrary to Benjamin's assertion.
- Regarding the 'scheduled persons' clause of the Mines and Works Act, the Chamber has publicly stated that it is anxious to see the removal of this last remnant of labour discrimination. It looks forward to the conclusion of negotiations currently under way, which are aimed at achieving the final abolition of racial job reservation in the mining industry.
- Where lines of communication are concerned, workers do in fact have the right of recourse to senior officials. Non-scheduled workers are certainly not incommunicado

A black miner assists white surface officials to weigh gold, Welkom Gold Mine. Current labour negotiations aim at the final abolition of racial job reservation in the mining industry.



P. Alberts

should they have doubts or fears about safety conditions in a particular work situation. In fact, anyone who makes people work under dangerous conditions is liable to prosecution, either in terms of the regulations or the common law.

- Regarding Benjamin's allegation that the exemption system 'has profoundly negative consequences for safety on the mines', regulation 2.10.2 stipulates that: 'The manager . . . (shall) not permit any incompetent or inexperienced worker to be employed on dangerous work, or work upon the proper performance of which the safety of persons depends'.

The institution of a satisfactory training course is required as a condition of the exemption which now allows non-scheduled (black) workers to perform some of the tasks allocated to the certified (white) miner. The mines, incidentally, have extensive training facilities covering all aspects of the jobs to be performed. Additional courses are also offered on most mines to enable workers to upgrade their skills and thus move up the promotional ladder.

Noise Level Code

On the question of industrial noise levels, as Benjamin's quotations from Chamber of

Mines research organisation publications show, the mining industry is concerned about noise levels and has been investigating the issue. Following a pilot study on noise-induced deafness by the Chamber's research organisation, a committee was appointed to draw up a code of practice for the implementation and control of a hearing conservation programme in the mining industry.

This code of practice has now been completed and a draft regulation on noise control is being prepared for submission to the GME. This regulation will be promulgated as soon as practicable. The industry's task has not been helped by the lack of worldwide consensus on noise control. But it is the intention that the South African legislation on noise control will be in keeping with practices in developed countries.

In conclusion, let me say that the accident figures for 1984 were the lowest ever recorded in virtually every category, as the accompanying tables show (see p7). While the figures are encouraging and are proof that we are on the right track, there is obviously much room for improvement.

Through the continuing research efforts, which are already bearing fruit, and through more effective management of safety, the mining industry is confident that it will continue to improve its safety performance.

The Chamber of Mines puts all workers through extensive training programmes which cover all aspects of the job to be performed

The mining accident figures for 1984, the lowest recorded in virtually every category, are proof that the Chamber is on the right track

1984

SHOP STEWARD TRAINING

In the context of increased unionisation and the negotiation of complex recognition agreements, shop stewards have a crucial role to play in facilitating a constructive management/worker interface in modern labour relations. In fact, the trained communication skills of the shop steward at the negotiating table should enjoy equal status with the trained technical skills of the worker on the job. Trade unionist Mike Morris argues a persuasive case that it is in management's own interests to both allow and pay for workers to have time off to attend union-organised training seminars.

LABOUR ISSUES

The need for workers to have paid time-off to attend union-organised shop steward training seminars is seldom met by management

Negotiating complicated agreements with an unrepresentative shop steward committee is a waste of time for all parties

By Mike Morris, former Branch Secretary of the General Workers' Union (Natal)

Shop steward training continues to be a fairly contentious issue in industrial relations. The demand by unions to have time off to attend training seminars run by trade unions has become a standard part of most recognition agreements. However, the necessity for shop steward training is often not recognised by management. Or, if it is, then the right to have paid time off in order to attend such training courses is not accepted.

Even if these two principles are accepted, managements often still do not perceive that for such training to be effective the training courses have to be run and directed by the union. This attitude can be summed up in the words of a manager when confronted with these training courses in a recognition agreement. 'Why', he said, 'should I provide paid time off for union officials to teach my workers to fight me. I'm not in the business of assisting to cut my own throat!'

An industrial relations manager who adopts this sort of attitude is heading straight for confrontation with whatever union his company is involved with. As the unionisation of black workers proceeds apace in South Africa, industrial relations issues become more complicated and recognition agreements become more sophisticated. Consequently, shop steward training will be even more necessary and trade unions will be even more insistent in their demands for formalised rights.

Trained Negotiation Skills

As management faces a future of complex negotiation with its work force, it is better to negotiate with union representatives who:

- have the necessary skills to acquire a proper mandate from their members
- present the wishes of their members in a clear and concise fashion

- prioritise these demands in order to negotiate solutions based on compromise
- understand the issues agreed upon in all their complexity.

If these conditions are met, orderly and efficient industrial relations are facilitated in the particular factory floor or industry level context. Of course this does not mean that such relations will take place to managements' ideal satisfaction or according to their perceived interests though.

Negotiating complicated and sophisticated issues with a shop steward committee that is unable to adequately represent its members is often a waste of time for all concerned. Negotiations take twice as long to complete and there is also absolutely no guarantee that the settlement reached has the acceptance of anyone else apart from the shop stewards sitting around the negotiating table. Unless the shop stewards fully understand what the various procedural agreements entail, they cannot hope to ensure that such agreements are stuck to.

Furthermore, the main point in setting up a negotiating forum with a representative trade union is, as far as is possible, to avoid the situation of having to resolve a dispute after it has already blown up. But this presupposes that the shop steward committee is sophisticated enough (ie trained) to negotiate problems with management before they become crises.

The problems that most concern factory managers are the daily problems of individual grievance and disciplinary procedures. Management needs to resolve these issues with the shop steward committee members without having to involve union officials all the time. If they are to be resolved at all then the shop stewards have to feel that they have been given the opportunity to present all their arguments

and counter management positions. This obviously requires some substantial prior training in the details of applying and handling a grievance and disciplinary procedure.

Why Paid Time Off?

While accepting all the above advantages, management might well still ask why paid time off should be granted for the training of shop stewards. Firstly, there are considerable benefits for management in ensuring that shop stewards receive training. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate for the union to require management to bear some of the costs.

Secondly, paid time off is granted to shop stewards in order that they may perform their duties effectively. Caucus time is granted to shop stewards before meetings with management in order that the shop stewards may be properly prepared. This is done to facilitate negotiation and ensure that proper communication, the essence of sound industrial relations, occurs. Training is similarly part and parcel of effective preparation and the acquisition of sound communication skills is the very foundation upon which effective negotiation rests.

Thirdly, communication skills are just as important as technical skills. If they have equal status, then there is no sound reason why such training should not be on the basis of paid time off.

Finally, given the highly inadequate educational opportunities available to black workers in this country, the private sector has a social obligation to upgrade the education and training levels of its employees wherever possible. Therefore management cannot ethically refuse to assist, by granting paid time off, in upgrading the communication skills of certain of its employees at the request of the union.

Unions and Shop Stewards

A shop steward committee is not a liaison committee or, in the words of the workers, 'a bosses committee'. Trade unionisation results in a fundamental break with the labour practices, policies and relations of the past. If management, or an industrial relations agency on their behalf, were to attempt or to insist on doing the training or having a part in such training, then the shop steward committee would immediately be discredited in the eyes of the workers.

The collective bargaining situation presupposes the complete independence of both parties involved in it. In every industrial relations encounter, management has to acknowledge it is facing an independent negotiating force. If management attempts to blur the clearly delineated line between itself and the union, it lays itself open to the perfectly reasonable charge of subverting the collective bargaining framework.

Since shop stewards are an essential part of the union's primary activities, they cannot be

separated from the matrix of relations and priorities that defines a trade union. The organisational imperatives, priorities, duties and responsibilities of the union are therefore central to any shop steward training programme. Only the union can effectively and responsibly undertake or delegate such training under its direction and in line with its policies and practices.

The relationship between workers (hence the union) and management is fundamentally one of conflict. The two parties have different interests and for the most part these interests are diametrically opposed to each other. Management, or a management inclined industrial relations agency, could no more objectively train the shop steward committee than the union officials could objectively train the management in industrial relations.

Finally, some managements agree that the union should be responsible for the training of shop stewards, but still request that they attend such training programmes as 'neutral observers'. Clearly the very terms are meaningless. Management can be neither neutral nor observers in such a situation without violating the need to maintain the independence of the two parties in the collective bargaining situation. Certainly, no worker is seriously going to freely discuss the problems they are having with line management if the very same management is present in the discussion.

Conclusion

The responsibility for ensuring that the union keeps its side of the bargain struck with management lies with the shop stewards. They in effect have to 'carry the can' and take the consequences, whether these be beneficial or negative. But these same shop stewards are simultaneously the union representatives in the factory who are directly answerable to the worker members themselves.

The break from the liaison committee system to the trade union system has to be a full and complete one if a credible negotiating forum is to be established. It is the most extreme form of paternalism for any management to engage in an equal relationship of collective bargaining, with all the duties and responsibilities that this implies for the shop stewards as union representatives, but to simultaneously claim the right to train these very same shop stewards or say who should in fact train them.

The emergent trade unions are committed to the development of a worker leadership. The most fundamental aspect of such development is the unions' emphasis on shop steward training. The shop stewards are the worker leaders of tomorrow and the union leaders of the future. The responsibility for their actions rests on the union as an organisation. Hence the training of these worker leaders must be the responsibility of the union as well.

Because management also benefits from ensuring that shop stewards receive training, they should bear some of the costs

Given the inadequate educational opportunities for black workers, management cannot ethically refuse to grant them paid time-off to upgrade communication skills

Management could no more objectively train the shop stewards committee than union officials could train management in industrial relations

The shop steward is responsible for ensuring that workers adhere to the conditions of any agreement negotiated with management

LABOUR ON THE INDUSTRIAL PERIPHERY

The Homelands & South Africa

By Alan Whiteside, Development Consultant

There is an increased awareness that the policies of grand territorial apartheid are having impractical consequences which were not anticipated by ideological planners. In particular, the development of a legislative gap between the African homelands and South Africa in the sphere of labour relations has fallen under the spotlight in recent months. The first comprehensive investigation into the separate constitutional development and problematic co-existence of different bodies of labour law in each of the ten homelands was published in the previous Industrial Monitor (Indicator SA Vol 2/No 4).

Alan Whiteside of Natal University's Economic Research Unit concludes the focus on homeland labour issues with a summary of his own seminal research findings on the actual 'nuts and bolts' of legislative provisions for trade union activity, wage determinations, health and safety, and worker training in the industrialising homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu. He has recently completed a major two-volume study of 'Labour Relationships between South Africa and Neighbouring States' (including the homelands), commissioned by the HSRC for the National Manpower Commission.

The divergent nature of labour legislation in the homelands and South Africa raises the costs of implementation for government and industry

Homeland labour policies affect the unionisation of workers in these areas, and of migrants and commuters in South Africa

South Africa and the homelands constitute an economic entity with a high degree of interdependence. The policy that brought about the homelands as separate polities has also given rise to the fragmentation of labour legislation within the larger economic entity. Because the homelands inherit diverse bodies of labour legislation which are 'frozen' on reaching self-government and thus fall out of date, they subsequently adopt or formulate new legislation. This is an expensive and time consuming process, however, which is not always successful. The diversity in legislation also means that the cost of implementation is increased for government or industry.

Homeland labour legislation is beginning to make a considerable impact on labour relations in South Africa itself and the activities of national trade unions. Ultimately, the labour policies of the homeland governments will affect both union activity within these areas and the unionisation of migrants and commuters. This article focuses on labour legislation in Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, two homelands which have attained constitutional independence, and the self-governing homeland of KwaZulu. These three areas are the most industrialised of all the homelands and present a clear picture of the problems resulting from the diverse bodies of labour legislation.

Bophuthatswana


It can be seen from the accompanying table that Bophuthatswana has passed a fair

amount of its own legislation. Although it has passed its own Shop Hours Act, it has not altered the Shops and Offices Act it inherited from South Africa. A separate Bophuthatswana Act was necessary because shop hours are governed by provincial ordinances and Bophuthatswana is located in three provinces. Most of the other legislation passed by Bophuthatswana is based on the South African legislation without subsequent amendments.

The biggest difference between the industrial legislation of Bophuthatswana and South Africa is in the field of labour relations. In 1984 Bophuthatswana promulgated the Industrial Conciliation Act, a statute which differs considerably from the equivalent South African Labour Relations Act:

- the industrial court in Bophuthatswana does not have the power to decide on unfair labour practices
- not more than one union is permitted to operate in one industry
- the conciliation process is intended to be industry-based rather than plant-based
- the process that must be followed before a strike can become legal is even lengthier than in the central economy
- the president can prevent a strike by declaring a determination binding.

The most important feature of the homeland's Industrial Conciliation Act is that it will only permit a trade union to operate in Bophuthatswana if its headquarters are located within the country and its officials are employed there. This



Rustenburg Platinum Mine. Because the Bophuthatswana/South Africa border intersects the mine property, workers fall alternately under homeland and central labour legislation, depending where they work for the day, an irresolvable problem for management and unions alike (see case study, p18)

effectively prevents South African based unions from expanding into Bophuthatswana. As might be expected, this statute has had a very negative impact on those South African unions who had begun to organise in Bophuthatswana. Unions affected include the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA), and the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU).

Union Attitudes

The attitude of national trade unions towards the effective banning of their activity in Bophuthatswana is that they do not recognise homeland governments as politically legitimate bodies. They are not prepared to negotiate on the issue or to set up new, separate unions, thus complying with Bophuthatswana's legislation and implicitly recognising the homeland. They argue that South Africa, including the homelands, is one economic unit and should therefore be one political and legislative unit.

Industrialists do not appear to have formulated a position on these issues yet. For example, employees on a Union Carbide mine located in Bophuthatswana are joining NUM, a national trade union which is organised in the company's plants in South Africa (see accompanying database). The union is not actively recruiting workers but is allowing them to join. Management is adopting a Nelsonian posture. The crunch will come if and when the union tries to negotiate for all employees including those working within Bophuthatswana.

It is clear that the Bophuthatswana government expects homegrown unions to develop. There is evidence to suggest this process is indeed happening, that the unions will be depoliticised and tightly controlled and that there is likely to be a clash between the homeland and South African trade unions.

The position of migrants and particularly commuters is also unsatisfactory. The attitude of the Bophuthatswana government is that these categories of workers may join trade unions at their place of work, as they are legally entitled to under South African

legislation. However, the homeland government is not prepared to allow these national unions to hold meetings within the borders of Bophuthatswana. This obviously creates major logistical problems for the labour movement in general.

Ciskei

The Ciskeian government initiated a spate of labour legislation in 1984 when it passed the Conditions of Employment, the Machinery and Occupational Safety and the Manpower Training Acts. All this legislation was based on the equivalent South African legislation as it stood in 1984. Although it appears that Ciskei intends to partially keep its labour relations in step with South Africa in certain areas, it has not introduced any legislation to regulate collective bargaining as such.

Ciskei claims to be adopting a free enterprise policy to encourage investment and employment creation. It is interesting to note that the 1984 legislation is based on the South African acts and does not make any major changes to reflect this philosophy. However, the enactment constitutes a progressive step as it reduces the diversity in labour legislation.

Trade unions are not tolerated in the Ciskei in any form and there is no legislative framework within which they can operate. Commuters who join unions at their place of work are liable to be harassed or imprisoned in Ciskei, although there is no legal provision for such action. The Ciskeian government reacts violently to union activity and it is clear that the Ciskei and its borders will become the scene of considerable industrial conflict.

KwaZulu

As the table shows, the KwaZulu government has passed very little labour legislation of its own. KwaZulu does, however, provide a very good example of how confusion can arise out of the legislative gap which has evolved between the homelands and South Africa. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (ICA) passed by the homeland government,

While KwaZulu tolerates unionism, legislation and repression in Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei prevent national trade unions from operating there

Anti-union policies in the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana are bound to cause labour unrest in border industry as well as the homelands

**COMPARISON OF LABOUR LEGISLATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA & THREE INDUSTRIALISING HOMELANDS**

AREA OF LEGISLATION ¹	SOUTH AFRICA	BOPHUTHATSWANA	CISKEI	KWAZULU
Health and Safety, Conditions of Employment	Basic Conditions of Employment 3/83 Machinery and Occupational Safety 6/83	Shops and Offices 75/64 Factories, Machinery and Building Work 22/41; <i>Shop Hours 25/79</i>	<i>Conditions of Employment Regulation 35/84</i> <i>Machinery and Occupational Safety 35/84</i>	Shops and Offices 73/64; Factories, Machinery and Building Work 22/41 ⁴
Labour Relations	Labour Relations 28/56	<i>Industrial Conciliation 8/84</i>	Black Labour Relations Regulations 48/53	<i>Industrial Conciliation 28/56</i> <i>Industrial Conciliation Amendment 10/81⁵</i>
Vocational Training ²	Manpower Training 56/81	Training of Artisans 38/51 <i>Apprenticeship 4/74</i>	<i>Apprenticeship 7/73</i> <i>Manpower Training 33/84</i>	Training of Artisans 38/51 <i>Apprenticeship 9/78</i> Black Employees In-service Training 86/76
Wages	Wage 5/57	None	Wage 5/57	Wage 5/57
Placement of Work-seekers	Black Labour 67/64 Guidance and Placement 62/81	<i>Labour 4/79</i> Registration for Employment 34/45	Black Labour 67/64 Registration for Employment 34/45	Black Labour 67/64 Registration for Employment 34/45
Social Welfare	Unemployment Insurance 30/66 Workmen's Compensation 30/41	<i>Unemployment Insurance 17/78</i> <i>Workmen's Compensation 12/79</i>	<i>Unemployment Insurance /83³</i> <i>Workmen's Compensation 11/82</i>	Unemployment Insurance 30/66 Workmen's Compensation 30/41
Levies	Contribution in respect of Black Labour 29/72	None	Black Services Levy 64/52 Contribution in respect of Black Labour 29/72	Black Services Levy 64/52

KEY

- Name of act, number and year are given: Labour Relations 28/56.
- Acts passed by the homeland legislature are indicated by italics: *Conciliation Act 8/24*.
- Inherited acts have name, number and year given according to the South African act at the time of attaining self-government: Shops and Offices 75/64.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 All acts inherited from South Africa were 'frozen' as they stood on the date that each homeland attained self-government: Bophuthatswana (June 1972), Ciskei (August 1972) and KwaZulu (February 1977), respectively.
- 2 All three homelands also inherited the Electrical, Wireman and Contractors Act No 20 of 1939, in identical form.
- 3 This Act was not numbered by Ciskei.
- 4 KwaZulu passed a Factories, Machinery & Building Work Continuities Act in 1977.
- 5 As stated in the text, until the anomaly is sorted out the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act will apply.

KwaZulu has declared that the South African Industrial Court should sit in Ulundi when necessary and its national judgements should apply

which also legislates the intent to incorporate future South African amendments, enjoys dubious legal status. In fact, the South African act it is modelled upon cannot be utilised by a non-independent homeland, in terms of South African proclamation R84 of 1970.

The KwaZulu version of the ICA would have brought the homeland into line with South Africa in the area of labour relations. The only significant difference between the two governments is that KwaZulu allows a union to affiliate to a political party. In 1984, the homeland government commissioned a study

into the problems posed by labour law. KwaZulu subsequently passed a cabinet resolution declaring that:

- all South African legislation, except for discriminatory or repressive clauses, would be adopted
- the South African Industrial Court should sit in Ulundi when necessary and national precedents would apply.

Because of the legal anomaly with regard to KwaZulu's attempted adoption of the ICA, there is no legislative framework for union activities. However, the cabinet resolution of November 1984 will certainly go a long way

in meeting the resultant problems in labour relations. The KwaZulu government probably has the best record with regard to labour rights and union activities. South African unions are allowed to operate in KwaZulu and their presence is tolerated if not encouraged by the KwaZulu authorities. Although the unions do not recognise the KwaZulu government, it is likely that some form of working relationship will develop and that union activity will increase in KwaZulu.

Industrial Decentralisation

It is likely that the complicated divergence of homeland labour legislation vis-a-vis the central economy will have an impact on decentralisation policies. This can be illustrated by looking at a number of labour issues and problems encountered in the three homelands.

Health and Safety

In South Africa these areas are governed by two 1983 acts: the Basic Conditions of Employment and the Machinery and Occupational Safety Acts. Ciskei has passed very similar acts, so legislatively it is in much the same position as South Africa. Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu on the other hand inherited archaic South African legislation in this sphere.

Examples of some of the differences between the older and modern statutes are:

- under the old Shops and Offices Act, overtime is limited to 6 hours per week, whereas under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, overtime may not exceed 3 hours per day or 10 hours per week
- casual workers may only be employed for 8.5 hours under the old act, compared to 9 hours and 15 minutes under the new act
- the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act sets up a system of safety representatives and committees. The archaic Factories Act, however, makes no provision for such a system
- a pregnant woman is allowed 12 weeks maternity leave in South Africa, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, but only 6 weeks in Ciskei.

These discrepancies will clearly create problems for an industrialist who decentralises to a homeland, as he will probably have to operate under a different set of legislation there. If he has plants in more than one homeland, he may have to operate under as many sets of industrial health and safety legislation as there are homeland governments.

Worker Training

In theory, an industrialist moving to a homeland is eligible for a training grant which is provided in terms of South African legislation. However, as equivalent legislation does not apply in these homelands, it is unclear on what basis these grants are made. A more practical problem concerns apprenticeships. In terms of homeland

legislation, all apprentices must be African. This means that it is impossible for an industrialist to transfer or employ an apprentice of another race in the relevant homeland.

Wage Determinations

Bophuthatswana has no Wage Act, having repealed the inherited legislation governing wage levels. Although Ciskei and KwaZulu inherited the South African Wage Act, in terms of Proclamation R84 of 1970, wage determinations set for the central economy do not apply in the homelands.

In order for Ciskei or KwaZulu to set their own wage determinations they would have to establish a Wage Board. As these homeland governments have shown no signs of doing so, this effectively means that an employer based in these areas can pay his employees as little as he wishes. Considering that over 30 percent of strikes in the country as a whole are caused by grievances over wages, it is clear that this situation is likely to lead to considerable labour unrest in these states.

Conclusion

The likely trends are that the legislative gap between older and modern South African labour statutes, providing contrasting models for homeland inheritance or adoption, will continue to grow within these separate political entities. The growth of unions and their politicisation has spread to the border industrial areas and will probably penetrate the homelands too, unless this is preempted either by legislation, as has occurred in Bophuthatswana, or by repression and violence as in Ciskei. The most likely trend will be towards increasing conflict between the independent labour movement and homeland governments.

Industrialists operating within the central economy in South Africa have gradually learned to live with and deal with trade unions. It is an open question as to whether they are willing to live with trade unions and the political tensions that are arising in the homelands and border areas. The practical problems associated with differential labour legislation and the resultant tensions in labour relations will have to be increasingly considered when making investment decisions.

It seems that almost all are losers as a result of the co-existence of differential labour regimes within a common economy. The best solution would be to introduce uniform labour legislation, but this would be impossible without simultaneously decreasing the powers of the homeland governments. The stage is therefore set for the legislative balkanisation of South Africa.

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The diversity of labour legislation within a central, unified economy has a problematic impact on industrial decentralisation policies

For example, an industrialist with plants in more than one homeland may have to operate under different sets of health and safety legislation

Homelands demand that apprentices be African, consequently an industrialist cannot transfer an apprentice of another race to a plant situated there

The practical problems of differential labour legislation will have to be considered by industrialists when making investment decisions

MINERS & MIGRANTS

Case Studies of Labour Conflict

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Case Study 1

NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS AND THE HOMELANDS: *Union Carbide and NUM vs Bophuthatswana's ICA*

The detrimental impact of Bophuthatswana's new labour laws on relations between homeland employers and employees became evident in the strikes which wracked Union Carbide's (UCAR) vanadium mine in the homeland in early 1984. The problem began when miners, assisted by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), attempted to negotiate for higher wages, better working conditions and recognition of the union and shop steward's committee (SALB Vol9/No4: p103). In December 1983, UCAR management had indicated that they were prepared to recognise NUM, but warned that the Bophuthatswana authorities were openly hostile towards independent trade unions based in South Africa, particularly NUM.

After meeting with the Bophuthatswana government to negotiate the issue, UCAR informed NUM in mid-January 1984 that the homeland had indicated that:

- South African trade unions would not be allowed to operate in the territory
- A Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) would be passed, with retrospective effect, to ratify this ban (ibid: p101).

A suggestion by UCAR that NUM should make representations to the Bophuthatswana authorities in order to solve the impasse was rejected by the union, because they do not recognise the homeland's status as an independent state (Cooper 1984: p176). Although UCAR undertook at this point to verbally assure the miners that it would recognise the union, the workers were not convinced and downed tools for two hours until management agreed to discuss formal recognition. On the

following day, however, the Bophuthatswana Department of Manpower telephoned UCAR to warn them that they should not deal with NUM. Although UCAR's hands were now tied, the workers responded by downing tools for a further three days. What should have been a simple case of negotiating a recognition agreement had turned into an acrimonious industrial dispute.

At the same time, NUM, together with other national trade unions such as the South African Allied Workers Union and the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union, received letters from the homeland authorities forbidding them from operating in the homeland. The homeland's Minister of Manpower, Mr Rowen Cronje, argued that it was inconceivable that 'foreign' unions should be allowed to operate in a sovereign country (RDM 24/1/84). NUM, on the other hand, rejected the notion that while foreign multinationals were allowed to operate across international borders, South African based unions were prevented from doing so.

In the meantime, UCAR has managed to temporarily restore good labour relations at the mine. It has circumvented the ban on NUM by recognising the shop steward's committee. The committee in turn has been negotiating wages, grievance procedures, grades and other working conditions, while simultaneously retaining links with NUM by telephone and by holding its meetings outside the homeland (SALB op cit: p99). Unfortunately though, it is probably only a matter of time before the Bophuthatswana authorities clamp down on NUM activities, souring employer/employee relations once more.

Case Study 2

TWO LABOUR SYSTEMS GOVERN MINE : *The Dilemma at Rustenburg Platinum*

The dissimilarities between homeland and South African labour legislation is predictably causing serious problems for national companies with plants based either at border growth-points or inside the homelands (see Whiteside article). The headaches for labour relations at JCI's giant Rustenburg Platinum Mine (RPM) began when South Africa's constitutional planners decided to arbitrarily zigzag the national/homeland border right through the centre of the mine's property. This resulted in four of RPM's shafts being situated in South Africa, while two others, and the main administration building, were officially located in Bophuthatswana.

However, in terms of the homeland's ICA, 'foreign' unions are outlawed from operating inside the territory, and unions that want to function in Bophuthatswana have to situate their head offices there. Consequently, when the mine owners signed a recognition agreement with the non-racial, South African based Federated Mining Union (FMU) in January 1985, many legal complexities came to the fore. In the process of establishing the same union at the same mine located on both sides of the border, either the mine owners, the FMU or the miners would be breaking the law.

On the surface of the mine it is relatively easy to establish which trade union mineworkers may belong to, but underground, workings weave back and forth across the border. Consequently, a miner could go down a shaft located on the South

African side, yet find that he spends most of his working day in a tunnel that is technically part of Bophuthatswana.

As an interim response to the ludicrous problem, mine management has apparently erected signs underground to inform workers when they are leaving or entering Bophuthatswana (RDM 1/2/85). RPM's consulting engineer, Mr Bruce Sutherland, says the company is waiting for the homeland authorities to agree on whether the actual point of work, or the location of the shaft where the miners go down, determines which labour laws should be observed. But, even if there was a strict determination on this technical point, RPM would still have to deal with two sets of labour laws: Bophuthatswana's and South Africa's.

It appears that the Bophuthatswana authorities are not going to let the issue rest. RPM has already been approached by the Bophuthatswana National Union of Mine Employees (BONUME) for access rights. The union, according to the territory's industrial registrar, Mr E V McCormack, will be receiving assistance from his government 'in every way possible' (ibid). RPM management have no objection to recognising a homeland union, provided that all the South African and Bophuthatswana laws applicable to the mine are complied with. But how the mine will cope with future labour scenarios where, for example, two different unions might ask for two different wage increases remains to be seen.

At Rustenberg Platinum Mine, miners at work underground cross into a different labour relations zone as they enter neighbouring Bophuthatswana (see case study 2).



Case Study 3

THE LEGAL STRIKE OF SEPTEMBER 1984 :
NUM and Police Intervention

When African mineworkers embarked upon their first ever legal strike in September 1984, the Chamber of Mines negotiated a last-minute agreement to settle the dispute, but in ensuing confrontations between miners and police ten miners were killed and scores of others injured. In February 1985, 164 miners who were injured in these clashes initiated a law suit against the Minister of Law and Order for personal damages. The case also represents a collective attempt by NUM to dissuade the police from similar future intervention (RDM 18/2/85).

Since the formation of NUM in 1982, many labour disputes on the mines have involved the extraneous intervention of the police. Even the less dramatic activities of the union, such as the recruitment of hostel dwellers on mine property, has led to police action and prosecution under trespass and security laws (see *Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 2/No4: p8/10*). The 1984 mine strike was interpreted by some as a victory for collective bargaining, but other labour commentators noted its violent nature and argued that the loss of life and limb made a mockery of the conciliation mechanisms which, in principle, seek to achieve consensus between employers and employees (IIR: p2/6).

After a series of wage increase negotiations, beginning in May 1984, NUM reduced its demands from an average 43 percent to an across-the-board increase of 25 percent, while the Chamber upped its initial offer from 8 percent to between 13 and 15 percent. After negotiations deadlocked, a conciliation board appointed by the Minister of Manpower failed to settle the dispute. The Chamber then revised its offer with a range of increased fringe benefits, but the union rejected these increments and dropped its final wage demand to 18 percent.

NUM's next move was to hold a strike ballot, even though as an unregistered union it was not legally required to do so. The outcome was a foregone conclusion: 43 271 miners voted in

favour of a strike while only 207 were against such action. Two days before the strike was due to begin NUM approached the Chamber stating that their members still wanted to avoid any conflict. In renewed negotiations NUM accepted the Chamber's revised offer on behalf of its members, but the strike could not be called off in time.

Even after painstaking negotiation and the proper conduct of a legal strike, there were violent confrontations between the police and tens of thousands of African miners. History seemed to be repeating itself:

- in the 1922 white miners' 'Rand rebellion', the government declared a state of emergency and called in the army and the police
- in 1946 a strike by 60 000 black miners was crushed by the police
- in July 1982, after a series of illegal wildcat strikes, ten miners were killed during bloody confrontations with the police.

The regular intervention of the police in the realm of collective bargaining, a sphere which should be left up to employers and employees, has caused concern among both groups. Workers and their unions view the trend with much suspicion; often one hears allegations from workers and unions that their bosses collude with the police. The Institute of Industrial Relations has succinctly noted that, while it is the duty of the police to protect both life and property, authoritarian intervention may actually incite the very violence it is trying to suppress (IIR op cit: p4).

In 1985, there have already been numerous confrontations between miners and the police. Within days of the announcement that 164 miners were suing for damages, a massive strike at the East Driefontein mine resulted in further violence. Barely a month later, some of the more than 40 000 miners at the Vaal Reef's gold mine were involved in another violent confrontation with the police.

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INDICATOR VOL.3 No 1

SOUTH AFRICA WINTER 1985



Migrant dockworkers employed in Cape Town's harbour rest in Breakwater prison, a converted single-quarter hostel. The migrant labour system draws in workers from throughout the sub-continent.

- 1 *The Geopolitics of Labour Supply*
- 6 *Bophuthatswana's State Farming Projects*
- 10 *Out on the Border – Botswana, Bophuthatswana & the ANC.*
- 13 *The Valley Trust – Changing Horizons*

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF LABOUR SUPPLY

Redefining Migrant Boundaries in Southern Africa

By Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel

'Political boundaries have been established which cut across an order which is being perceived as a single economic entity and which has developed as such.'

Dr Cornelius Human, Chairman, Federale Volksbeleggings (RDM 25/10/84).

A high level of interest and negotiation is currently taking place in Southern Africa over important economic areas of common interest and mutual dependency. The historic Trade and Investment in South Africa conference held in October 1984, saw delegates from every country in the region rub shoulders at an occasion which would have been considered an impossible event before the signing of the Nkomati Accord.


At this significant juncture, when a major re-think is occurring among leaders of neighbouring countries who have long distrusted the South African government, Jeff Zingel considers how geopolitical developments affect one of the more enduring features of the Southern African economy. He documents the supply of labour from both frontline states and the homelands, and shows how South Africa will continue to manipulate local and regional labour supplies to mining and industry, in order to protect the interests of people in its urban areas. Zingel concludes that this will occur at the expense of the growing labour force in the homelands and frontline states, who clamour for employment in South African industry.

Until the 1970s, the supply of labour to South Africa's mining industry was dominated by a singularly important, post-war trend. The development and expansion of the industry relied considerably on the utilisation of increasing numbers of black mineworkers from neighbouring countries. By 1973, about 475 000 foreign black people were employed in the country, the majority (70 percent) as contract migrants on the mines (Wilson 1976: p457). Table 1 documents this trend.


Local Labour Policy

The decade saw a number of significant, interacting events, however, which contributed to changing this pattern of regional interdependence, with long term consequences for both the supplier countries and South Africa. Major developments which effected the redistribution of local and regional labour supplies at the time included:

- a three-year long series of unprecedented violent confrontations between both foreign and domestic mineworkers, leaving about 300 people dead
- a labour shortage in 1974, when Malawi withdrew 100 000 contract workers after a recruiting aircraft crashed, killing 71 people



Crowding for recruitment. Workseekers present documentation for possible jobs on diamond mines. Ondangwa, Namibia.



The Labour Onion: A schematic representation of South Africa's geopolitical labour hierarchy, after F Wilson, SA Outlook 1980.

- Mozambique obtained independence in the same year, creating further uncertainty over labour supplies
- South Africa experienced increased political isolation after the collapse of the colonial power bloc in the region, along with Pretoria's detente efforts.

The simultaneous, rapid rise in the price of gold extended the life of many mines and allowed uneconomic, marginal mines to be brought into a more viable position. This 'freeing' of the gold price also prompted the mining industry to increase wages and in conjunction with the above factors, to embark on a policy of employing more labour from within South Africa (ibid: p464/7). In 1975, a government commission of enquiry set a target of 60 percent local labour and 40 percent foreign labour. Finally, the granting of independence to Transkei in 1976, and subsequently to Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei focussed attention on the political implications for the central government of the employment crises in these areas.

The Labour 'Onion'

Cumulatively, one result of these major policy changes and institutional developments has been to change the format of South Africa from an essentially labour absorbing economy to a highly regulated labour extruding economy. A process of contraction and relocation of traditional labour supply sources occurred during this period, reflecting the changing relationship between political boundaries and labour supplies which has been well illustrated by Francis Wilson (SA Outlook March 1980). Peeling the symbolic onion from the core outwards (see fig 1) each ring, or area of

potential labour supply, represents a decreasing priority in terms of Pretoria's allocation of job opportunities in South Africa's industrial areas.

In the model outlined by Wilson, the central core of the geopolitical hierarchy includes the mines, factories, cities and towns of South Africa surrounded by white farming areas. The first ring represents the non-independent homelands and the second, the independent homelands. The third ring represents the former High Commission Territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, while the outer ring includes Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Within greater South Africa (the first three rings of the diagram), a process of increasing state management of the labour supply system has occurred, characterised by three main trends.

Three Main Trends

Firstly, a selective process of granting residence and employment privileges to those South African workers with legal rights to live in the common core has been adopted by government. One estimate suggests that 5 300 000 urban Africans, including many local migrants, might qualify in terms of the now renowned Section 10 legislation (Lacey 1984).

Secondly, through changes in citizenship tied to the granting of homeland independence, an 'international' commuter workforce has been created, travelling daily to work in South Africa's commercial and industrial core. The policy of urban removals, whereby an estimated 750 000 Africans have been relocated from metropolitan and other areas into townships within designated homelands (Baldwin in Spies 1983), constitutes an essential part of this process. Table 2 details the massive increase in the number of commuters per homeland.


Thirdly, with the establishment of the homeland programme, the labour market in rural areas has been subject to two distinct forces. On the one hand, the continuing policy of rural removals and resettlement has placed about three million people (Surplus Peoples Project Report 1983) within the boundaries of independent and semi-independent homelands. On the other hand, labour recruitment and allocation procedures have been systematised and centralised for these areas. These mechanisms ensure a supply of labour to sectors in the central economy which require categories of workers unavailable in urban areas.

The Homelands

Table 3 demonstrates that the trend is for the homelands to remain absolutely dependent on incomes from this allocated migrant labour workforce. At the same time, the homelands are placed in a disadvantaged position with no claim to the central economy, as their citizens are considered to

During the 1970s, a series of uncannily interlocking events changed the face of the regional labour supply system

The selective granting of urban residence rights and mass removals to the homelands characterise the new priorities in job allocation



Aspirant miners, no longer assuming available migrant contracts in South Africa undergo health checks in recruiting offices. Maseru, Lesotho.

be guest workers or foreign citizens. Available statistics for the period 1979 to 1981 indicate a trend of increasing dependency (Spies 1982).

At present, urban workers have greater occupational and residential mobility within this geopolitical hierarchy, and in combination with a local labour preference policy and the re-zoning of labour supply areas, the number of workers recruited from homelands is likely to be reduced. The homelands are effectively becoming 'the repository for the spent and redundant' (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1985: p19).

Homeland government concern over their predicament is reflected in a recent development plan for the Ciskei which proposes that 'Ciskei pursue as a matter of

policy with the South African Government that all migrant labour should be drawn exclusively from the four national states, and that the present procedure amongst mining and other industries to import labour from neighbouring independent states should cease' (Swart Commission Report 1983: p83).

Neighbouring States

The neighbouring independent states have clearly suffered a reduction in traditionally secure employment prospects in South Africa, due to the relocation of labour supplies outlined above. By 1982, the Chamber of Mines had almost reached its target of 60 percent local supplies, a dominant trend which is reflected in table 4.

The supplier countries' response has been to form, in 1980, the Southern African Labour Supply Commission (SALC), in order to

Homeland administrations are in competition with neighbouring states for available employment prospects in the central economy

A regional Labour Supply Commission, with members from all frontline states, devises projects to redeploy labour withdrawn from South Africa

Table 1 LOCAL AND REGIONAL SOURCES OF MIGRANT LABOUR SUPPLY FOR CHAMBER OF MINES, 1946-1975

	1946		1960		1970		1973		1975	
	(000)s	%	(000)s	%	(000)s	%	(000)s	%	(000)s	%
South Africa	126	41.3	145	36.7	97	24.1	86	20.4	122	33.4
Lesotho	38	12.5	51	13.0	71	17.7	87	20.7	86	23.6
Botswana	7	2.3	16	4.0	16	4.0	17	4.0	17	4.6
Swaziland	6	1.8	6	1.4	5	1.3	5	1.1	7	1.9
Mozambique	96	31.5	95	24.1	113	28.2	99	23.6	118	32.3
North of Lat. 22°S.	32	10.6	83	20.9	98	24.5	128	30.3	16	4.3
TOTAL	305	100.0	397	100.0	401	100.0	422	100.0	365	100.0

Source: F Wilson, International Migration in Southern Africa. *International Migration Review* Vol10/No4 1976.

As employment opportunities in South Africa dwindle, Lesotho faces perhaps the most radical changes in its history

The numbers game: South Africa's ability to manipulate regional labour supplies to achieve political goals emerged again at Nkomati

coordinate policies with regard to the supply of labour to South Africa. Member countries include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. With the aim of reducing and later eliminating the supply of migrant labour, the SALC is attempting to develop a uniform approach to bilateral agreements with South Africa. It concentrates on recruitment, employment and living conditions in South Africa, as well as on projects for the redeployment and training of labour withdrawn from South Africa (Maasdorp 1984: p69).

Further Reduction

Prospects for the achievement of the SALC goals of reduction vary from country to country. Lesotho's predicament is the extreme case, having been, at times, dependent on South Africa for employment of 75 percent of its adult male labour force. In 1982, miners deferred pay and remittances amounted to R111,8m (ibid: p71). Decreases in the number of jobs available in South Africa threaten Lesotho's already limited

potential for internal growth and development.

The human side of this predicament is vividly described by Guy and Thabona in a Carnegie Conference paper. They note, 'the fact that able bodied men can no longer assume that they can obtain contracts to work in South Africa is potentially, perhaps, the most radical change in Lesotho's history since its loss of political independence and incorporation in the South African economy at the end of the 19th century' (Paper 114: p1).

Of the other supplier states, Botswana's registered labour complement in South Africa has fallen from 13 percent of its total labour force in 1971, to seven percent 11 years later (Whiteside 1985). Studies undertaken there, however, indicate considerable potential for expanding the local use of labour (Maasdorp 1984: p71). Swaziland and Malawi received R9,2m and R18,9m respectively from the deferred pay and remittances of miners in 1982, and the South African labour market continues to

Homeland Data

Table 2

HOMELAND COMMUTERS: INCREASES DURING 1976/81

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Transkei	7 100	7 100	7 600	8 900	9 000	9 100
Bop	136 400	148 200	151 800	155 400	161 200	162 200
Venda	3 700	4 500	5 100	5 600	5 600	5 700
Ciskei	34 200	34 600	36 200	37 100	38 100	38 400
KwaZulu	279 200	291 300	321 700	352 300	363 900	384 200
Qwaqwa	1 800	2 100	2 000	2 500	6 800	9 500
Lebowa	44 000	46 000	54 400	57 900	65 800	72 200
Gazankulu	6 300	6 300	6 700	7 800	8 800	9 700
KaNdwane	23 000	25 200	28 500	33 100	35 600	40 000
KwaNdebele	—	1 100	1 300	3 500	5 900	8 700
TOTAL	536 100	567 000	615 300	664 100	700 700	739 700

SOURCE: P. H. Spies (Ed), *Urban-Rural Interaction in Southern Africa*. Unit for Futures Research, Stellenbosch 1982.

Table 3

INCOME DEPENDENCY IN SELECTED NATIONAL STATES

National State	Gross Domestic Product as a Percentage of Gross National Income in Year					
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Transkei	38	39	39	40	42	43
Bophuthatswana	37	39	34	35	40	41
KwaZulu	24	25	25	22	22	21
Lebowa	36	34	30	28	32	30
Gazankulu	30	32	32	32	35	33

SOURCE: J. Natrass, *Fiscal Aspects of Dependency*, Indicator SA Vol2/No4.

Table 4

REGIONAL REDUCTION IN LABOUR SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1975-1983

Year	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Total	152 188	160 634	173 876	155 623	152 032	140 746	150 422	140 719	145 797
...	150 738								
...		111 257							
...			68 232						
...				49 108	61 550	56 424	59 391	59 323	61 218
...	39 308	43 159	43 527	38 525	35 803	32 319	30 602	27 558	29 622
...	37 016	32 716	37 919	34 664	32 463	32 319	30 602	27 558	29 622
...		20 750	18 195	27 494	21 547	23 200	29 169	26 262	25 697
...	16 390	12 761	12 412	14 054	13 006	19 853	16 965	13 659	16 773
...	8 897					10 377	13 417	11 332	7 742

SOURCE: S A Yearbook 1975/1983.

fulfil a most useful role for these countries in providing foreign exchange (ibid: p73).

In contrast to the stated SALC objectives outlined above, SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) has stressed a different strategy in a report on labour and employment. It favours a policy of maximising benefits from the migrant labour system, while preparing contingency plans to reduce the costs of a sudden reduction or termination of opportunities for migrant labour supply to South Africa (ibid: p73).

Conclusion

Today, the neighbouring frontline states face an ambivalent predicament. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of Mozambique. Medium term needs for employment opportunities in South Africa and the resultant foreign exchange earnings undoubtedly formed an important part of the Nkomati negotiations. Recent reports on the granting of legal status to the 150 000 Mozambican farmworkers in the eastern Transvaal, and the increase in recruitment of mineworkers (Natal Mercury 15/11/84), indicate South Africa's ability to manipulate labour supplies to provide its own brand of

geopolitical cooperation in the sub-region.

Current efforts to promote trade and investment in Southern Africa can contribute to increasing employment prospects both within and without South Africa. However, Pretoria's ability to manipulate labour supplies to achieve short-term goals of detente with the frontline states and medium-term goals of establishing a relatively privileged urban African group is likely to continue to occur at the expense of the needs of the homeland states. The inherent limitations of this intricate, shifting system of geopolitical priorities and labour allocations in an unstable subcontinent will have ramifications far beyond the neat political and legislative boundaries constructed to date. *JPA*

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The employment needs of the homeland states were neglected in the recent Accord negotiations, which emphasised political stability

BOPHUTHATSWANA'S STATE FARMING PROJECTS

An Aggro Business?

By Monty J Roodt of the Development Studies Unit,
University of Bophuthatswana

There has been very little informed analysis of the large-scale capital intensive agricultural projects undertaken in South Africa's homeland areas. These projects, a major part of the development initiatives of the South African government and homeland administrations, represent a particular kind of rural development. They require substantial financing and highly centralised management, with a primary goal of increasing gross agricultural production.

Monty Roodt, a researcher at the University of Bophuthatswana's Development Studies Unit, describes the context for the two largest dryland maize projects in the homelands, presently being developed in Bophuthatswana's Ditsobotla region. Drawing on a cost-benefit analysis of prior conditions and project inputs/outputs, he argues that programmes of this type are incapable of supporting the costs of production and the colossal management infrastructure involved. Roodt notes that local project participants fail to gain an equitable or even sufficient supplementary income.

His sober conclusion is that these projects provide an expanded market for agribusiness and agrimanagement, while for individual landholders, the schemes represent yet another more sophisticated method of dispossession of the little land over which they had control prior to implementation.

Project initiatives are directed at proving the viability and self-sufficiency of homeland regions

Government, private sector companies, white-owned cooperatives and local white farmers are involved in the financing and management of projects

In 1977, the central government amended the Promotion of Economic Development of the National States Act (No 46 of 1968), in order to scrap provisions for the Bantu Investment Corporation and replace it with a Corporation for Economic Development (CED). Legislative revision allowed for an almost uninhibited flow of capital investment from the central economy into the homelands, by scrapping a number of racial prescriptions. This move represented a major policy shift from government attempts to create a black entrepreneurial class in the homelands, as the statutory compulsion to include Africans directly in any of the undertakings was dropped.

The CED's efforts were to be concentrated on the development of large agricultural and industrial projects, transport and financial support, while other functions were transferred to the National Development Corporations. The new development initiatives, particularly the establishment of large agricultural projects, have been aimed at boosting the viability and self-sufficiency of South Africa's independent homelands. In retrospect, however, they need to be seen against the background of the expulsion and restriction to homeland areas of a mass of unemployed and urbanising people, by means of the government's relocation policies.

Structural Changes

The decision to develop the agricultural sector of the homelands by means of large-scale capital intensive projects has been influenced by changes in structure and form of the South African economy since the 1960s. Together, the increase in foreign investment and the centralisation of mining, manufacturing and agricultural capital have promoted the organisational and financial infrastructure required for large-scale investment in homeland agriculture.

Of particular relevance here is the growth in the Transvaal and Orange Free State of large food processing/milling companies and white-owned agricultural cooperatives, headed by the central retail organisation, Vetsak. The cooperatives have become involved in the financing and management of projects since a decision in 1976 by the Cooperatives Board of the South African Agricultural Union to aid homelands in the development of their agricultural potential.

Prior Conditions

The stateland farms on which the large Mooifontein and Sheila dryland maize projects are situated make up nearly 48 percent of Ditsobotla region. The farms were

bought from white farmers and the African European Investment Company by the South African Native Trust, after the amendment of the Released Areas Act (No 18 of 1936). Today, the resident population partly consists of former employees of white farmers, who chose to remain in the area and were allocated land rights and small plots.

The majority of residents are the victims of evictions from urban areas in the western Transvaal and from white farms in the surrounding districts. After the land had been subject to betterment planning in the late 1950s, variously sized plots emerged:

- most residents received ten morgen arable allotments
- older residents retained or were allocated half morgen plots
- newcomers received a quarter morgen. (One morgen = 0,856 ha.)

Redelinghuys (1981 study) ascertained that 56 percent of farmers in the Ditsobotla region cultivated their own land prior to project implementation. The rest, many consisting of households headed by females, relied on

contractors for sharecropping arrangements.

The Sheila-Verdwaal Project

In 1976, the relatively smaller Sheila-Verdwaal dryland maize project was initiated by the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture, who approached Noordweslike Kooperatiewe Landboumaatskappy to act as financiers and agricultural advisors. Ministerial permission was granted through the South African Registrar of Co-operatives, and a firm of agricultural consultants was appointed to provide management and technical advice. A committee of four local white farmers was appointed to give practical advice during the planning stages.

Each of the 200 landholders who had rights on the three stateland farms comprising the project were allocated a 15 ha arable plot.

This involved the loss of some communal grazing land, yet most farmers approved of the scheme as it represented an overall increase in arable land.

Most Ditsobotla residents have been removed from white farms and urban areas in the western Transvaal

Allocated dryland and maize plots represented an overall increase in arable land for local African participants

The Sheila project promoted small farmers as contractors. After many withdrew, the cooperatives took over ploughing and cultivating

Table 1

PRE-PROJECT NET INCOME FROM MAIZE, 1979/80 PRICES

Gross Income from 15 ha	R1 059.00
Less: Cultivation costs	R 268.05
Cost treshing and transport	R 176.23
Equals: Net Income per 15 ha	R 614.72
Net Income per ha	R 40.98

ANALYSIS

- Farmers were capable of earning a net income of R41 per ha before the implementation of the programme.
- Using pre-project methods of cultivation, had farmers been given a larger allotment of 15 ha they would, on average, have earned an average net income of R614.72.

Table 2

PROJECT INPUT AND OVERHEAD COSTS, AGRICOR MOOIFONTEIN EXPANSION PROJECT

Average input costs per ha per farmer		Average overhead costs per ha per farmer	
Item	R/ha	Item	R/ha
Seed	7	Management costs	9
Fertiliser	57	Management fees	5
Herbicides	3	Interest	9
Pest control	6	Training fee	1.20
Labour	7	Total	24.20
Transport	10		
Tractor and implements	75		
Harvesting	17		
Total	182		

ANALYSIS

- The study took a yield of 2.4 tons per ha as the average yield, at R100 per ton, giving a per ha income of R240.
- Subtracting production costs leaves a gross margin of R58 per ha.
- Subtracting overhead costs leaves participants with a net income of R33.80 per ha, or R507 per 15 ha allotment.
- In the second year of operation the contractors fee would further lower net income by R4 to R29.
- During the first few years the participants had to pay an additional R22 per ha for phosphates, further reducing the average net income which farmers received to R7 per ha.

Management systems on Mooifontein have been strongly influenced by Israel's Moshav system

The production process has moved out of the hands of local participants, with committees becoming a rubber stamp for white management decisions

Recent surveys showed 57 percent of local farmers wished to leave the scheme, as the small plots cannot provide an adequate income

The tables detail factors contributing to the effective decrease in incomes. Phosphate costs are a major drain

The first stage of the project involved the contractor system, whereby certain farmers were given a 'package' of tractors and implements, as well as an extra 15 ha. In return, these farmers undertook to plough for other farms. By 1982, however, twelve of the original farmer contractors had withdrawn from the project and much of the ploughing and cultivating was taken over by the cooperatives. It is too early to tell whether they will be successful as small groups of semi-independent private farmers.

The Mooifontein Project

The Mooifontein project, constituting half of all the land presently under development by Agricor, has grown into the largest dryland maize project in Southern Africa. Covering a total 22 940 ha, mainly under maize, the project serves 1 305 participating households. Here the management system has been influenced by Israel's Moshav system. Instead of using contractors, machinery is owned by 15 production cooperatives which make up the project and employ drivers to operate machinery at hire charges to farmers.

Participants are also allocated 15 ha arable allotments. Agricor is responsible for seasonal inputs such as seed fertilizer, weed killers and fuel, and all capital costs are shared by Agricor and the CED. The 15 primary cooperatives are said to form the basic units of Agricor's 'Temisano' strategy for rural development, which has four thrusts:

- agricultural production
- community development
- a training function
- promotion of secondary industries.

Each primary cooperative has a management committee, elected on an annual basis, which is officially in control of the projects. In practise, however, the committees seem little more than a rubber stamp for decisions made by white management. The original intention was that local participants should become responsible for the supervision of cultivation

of their allotments, yet it has become clear that the majority are not actively involved in the actual production process. This is due to a number of reasons, the most important being that an adequate living cannot be made from the 15 ha of maize cultivation.

Approximately 40 percent of participants also work outside of the project on a permanent basis. The remaining participants are older and retired people, who are in any case incapable of making a full contribution to the aims of the scheme. The survey investigation (Roodt) carried out into both projects revealed that participants, other than contractors and hired drivers, are farmers in name only. Consultation as to choice of crops, fertiliser applications, crop spraying, weeding and harvesting is virtually non-existent. Furthermore, 87 percent of respondents are dissatisfied with the way deductions for these operations are made (see table 2). The survey revealed that 57 percent of farmers wished to leave at the end of 1983 and attempt to farm on their own account instead.

(1) Pre-Project Income Estimates

From a survey conducted by this author, it was established that maize yields obtained prior to project implementation were 12.5 bags per morgen, or 1.04 tons per ha. Figures from four other studies were obtained (Ardri, Seobis, Redelinghuys, Pretorius) and a computed total average of 8.9 bags per morgen, or 0.706 tons per ha, emerged as the reputable norm. This estimate would give the average grower a gross income of R70.60 per ha. As the project participants have since been allocated a 15 ha allotment, for the sake of comparison, it is estimated that the pre-project gross income from maize yields for this area size (see table 1) would have been R1 059.

Using Seobis' figures for average costs incurred during cultivation, harvesting and transport in an agricultural season, the picture set out and analysed in table 1 emerges. It needs to be stated that the yield estimates are rough averages which, in

Table 3

COMPARATIVE INCOMES PER HA ; PRE-PROJECT AND PROJECT STAGES

Ditsobatla farmers (pre-project)	R40.98
Agricor project (including phosphates)	R 7.00
Agricor project (excluding phosphates)	R29.00

Table 4

ACTUAL AVERAGE NET INCOMES OF PARTICIPANTS FOR WHOLE PROJECT

Total income from 15 ha	R2 970.00
Total income per ha	R 198.00
Total average costs: Sheila and Mooifontein	R 233.39
Net income loss per ha	R 35.99
Net income loss per 15 ha	R 539.85

reality, would vary from year to year, depending on the climate and other factors such as time of ploughing, the calibre of contractors and so on. Another consideration is that while all farmers grew maize, the majority also grew crops such as sunflowers, grain sorghum, beans, wheat, watermelons and pumpkins as dietary supplements as well as for sale. Thus it is conceivable that some farmers might have received higher pre-project incomes than the net R41.00 per ha calculated in table 1.

(2) Project Costs and Benefits

The incorporation of two farms into the Mooifontein project in 1979/80 provides a good example of the costs and benefits incurred by participants. The calculations in tables 2 and 3 are derived from details of this expansion programme, which were documented in a study prepared by the planning and development division of Agricor at the time. All prices recorded in tables 2-4 are for the 1979/80 season, unless otherwise stated.

The figures here represent project income for participants under ideal conditions, and in reality yields have often been much lower. Even with the advantages of modern methods of cultivation, yields obtained on Mooifontein between 1978 and 1983 have been a low 1.86 tons per ha. On the smaller Sheila project, however, due to its closer proximity to the maize triangle, yields of 2.4 tons per ha were obtained (see tables 2/3). On the basis of these actual average yields for both projects, a total average of 1.98 tons (on a ha ratio basis) was obtained. This provides project participants with a gross income of R2 970 per 15 ha allotment. Table 4 sets out the actual average gross and net incomes for the project as a whole.

(3) Pre-Project/Project Comparison

Taking the calculations in table 4, it is argued that participants in the schemes have lost (until 1983) an average of R36.00 per ha, as opposed to the R41.00 they were making before the implementation of the project. These figures represent averages, and in reality debts vary enormously. In many instances participants owe over R10 000, and the 1984 drought has contributed to even greater debt burdens.

Agricor has stated that the aim is to provide each participant with a net income of R5 000 (at present prices), the amount considered necessary to keep a full-time farmer on the land. With present input costs as high as they are, particularly those of phosphate application, this appears an impossible task to accomplish on 15 ha allotments. As in other homeland areas (see Ingwavuma article, Indicator SA Vol 2/No 4), project planners seem willing to decrease individual net incomes in order to achieve gross production targets. This pervasive inclination would appear to be prompted by the desire to prove in the eyes of the world, the agricultural viability of the economies of the independent homelands.

Implications

What are the implications of the negative or very low net incomes achieved on these major projects so far? It has become increasingly obvious that 15 ha arable allotments in a marginal maize area — where drought is the rule rather than the exception — are unable to support the capital intensive production techniques and the cost of the management infrastructure, as well as provide project participants with an equitable or supplementary income.

On the advice of the major investor, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Agricor has decided to reduce inputs on its new project, in order to suit the real potential of the area. It has also been decided that maize farmers need 71 ha to earn R5 000 per year. Far fewer farmers would thus be accommodated. In Ditsobotla region, for example, where 70 000 ha of high potential arable land has been identified as suitable for dryland summer grain crops, 71 ha sized farms would mean that only 986 farmer families could be accommodated in fulltime crop farming.

It has been calculated that 27 000 livestock units may be kept on the remaining 166 000 ha, giving a further 90 to 100 cattle-farmers a living. Feasibility studies by the CED propose related agro-industries which would create only 483 basic job opportunities. Backward and forward linkages, infra-structural projects and other small informal sector activities would not provide many more employment opportunities in the long term.

At the end of 1984, Ditsobotla's population was approximately 148 000 people, and is expected to double in 24 years at present growth rates. This implies that under optimal conditions of employment, utilising arable land and cattle production, agro-industries and the few civil servant jobs available, less than 35 percent of inhabitants will be able to find full-time employment in the region in the near future.

Conclusion


The inherent limitations and intrinsic pitfalls in the programmes demonstrated here, and their irrelevance as total solutions for long term goals of the central and homeland governments, should be taken note of. In the early 1950s, the Tomlinson Commission showed that at least 80 percent of the then 'reserve' population would have to find employment outside agriculture. Since then, however, Bophuthatswana has witnessed the relocation of viable urban communities into rural sub-regions such as Ditsobotla. This reversal of the urbanisation process has further exacerbated the crisis of poverty, employment and expectations. The alternative means of employment creation within the confines of the homeland system have since proved to be an expensive pipe dream. *PPA*

Participants have lost an average R36 per ha, a considerable amount when compared against the R41 made prior to implementation

The wisdom of concentrating on dryland maize initiatives in an area where drought is the rule must be questioned

Recent assessments indicate the need for larger individual allotments, and a reduction in the number of farmer families

Even under optimal planning conditions, only 35 percent of the region's people would find jobs there, emphasising the pipe-dream vision of homeland self-sufficiency



OUT ON THE BORDER

Botswana, Bophuthatswana & the ANC

By Patrick Laurence, Indicator Correspondent

One immediate consequence of the Nkomati Accord signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984, has been to shift political and military attention to security problems on the Botswana-South Africa frontier. Senior members of the South African government allege that the country's north-western border has since become an infiltration point for guerillas of the outlawed African National Congress.

The ongoing war of words over security breaches has put diplomatic relations between South Africa and Botswana under the spotlight again. Caught in the regional crossfire, Bophuthatswana's ethnic composition and interceding boundaries form a significant complicating factor amidst white and black nationalist struggles for political autonomy in South Africa. Freelance journalist Patrick Laurence reports on the recent border incidents involving ANC guerilla movements in the western Transvaal platteland.

At least 15 incidents have occurred near the Botswana border since August 1984

On the eve of the first anniversary of the signing of the Nkomati Accord, a Swartruggens farming couple, Mr and Mrs Hannes Joubert, were murdered by three men in their isolated rural store near a Bophuthatswana homeland border. On the same day Mr Louis Le Grange, Minister of Law and Order, informed the South African Parliament that the killers were suspected African National Congress (ANC) insurgents. Abandoned AK-47 rifles, the standard firepower of ANC guerillas, were said to have been found near the scene of the attack. A

burnt-out vehicle belonging to the murdered couple was found 30 kilometres from the Derdepoort border post, between South Africa and Botswana.

In the same address, Mr Le Grange disclosed that at least 15 incidents, involving some 48 suspected black nationalist insurgents, had occurred near the Botswana border since August 1984. Members of the banned Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a smaller nationalist faction in exile, were involved in six of these incidents according to a report published in Beeld.

The New Conduit

These developments added fuel to earlier statements made by senior military and police officers, who allege that Botswana has become the main conduit for trained ANC guerrillas re-entering South Africa. The negotiation of security pacts with Mozambique and Swaziland has apparently resulted in the closure of the older infiltration routes on the north-east border.

Similarly, South Africa's Foreign Minister, 'Pik' Botha, warned in October last year that there were 'indications that Botswana is increasingly being used as a channel for sabotage, or as a refuge for sabotage' (RDM 14/9/84). In January 1985, he again bluntly warned Botswana that the situation could not continue (Star 14/1/85) and gave a catalogue of confrontations with insurgents in transit in Bophuthatswana on their way to South Africa. Since September last year,

- five insurgents have been arrested in Bophuthatswana
- two have escaped back across the border to Botswana
- three have died in shoot-outs with security forces
- two Bophuthatswana policemen have been killed in anti-insurgent operations (ibid).

Two Batswana States

The involvement of Bophuthatswana in these incidents has increased tensions between the Batswana people of this fragmented

homeland state and their kinsmen located in Botswana. There is considerable potential for civil war, in the strict fratricidal sense of the word. In terms of the wider African kinship system, the number of Tswana brothers — in literal terms — on both sides of the border probably runs to tens of thousands. The maiden home of the wife of the Botswana President is situated in Bophuthatswana.

These border anomalies have their roots in the last century, when the Batswana people were arbitrarily divided by a colonial boundary which established the British Protectorate on the one hand, and the Cape Colony and the old South African Republic on the other (see map).


Hot Pursuit Raids

A colonial legacy of geo-political configurations in Southern Africa undoubtedly infringes on current events. In late 1984, Bophuthatswana's Foreign Minister, T M Molatlhatwa, warned Botswana that his government reserved the right to conduct hot pursuit operations against insurgents fleeing from the homeland territory back to Botswana. Dr G Chiepe, Botswana's new Foreign Minister, reacted sharply to the warnings and labelled them as 'invasion threats'.

Such 'hot pursuit' raids could easily precipitate clashes between the South African trained Bophuthatswana forces, and the British and Indian trained Botswana Defence

Recent guerilla insurgency via Bophuthatswana raises the spectre of fratricidal violence, as Batswana people live on either side of the border

'Hot pursuit' warnings are labelled as 'invasion threats' in the historical context of colonial border anomalies



The strained relations between Pretoria and Gaborone have a long history related to the presence of suspected ANC refugees in Botswana

Bophuthatswana is committed by treaty to prevent its territory from becoming a springboard for ANC attacks on South Africa

Botswana feels that the combined SA/Bophuthatswana forces should be capable of effectively sealing their borders against ANC infiltration

The recent SADF attack on alleged ANC bases in Gaborone will sour diplomatic relations far beyond the Botswana/South Africa frontier

Force. In spite of these political tensions, however, relations between Batswana people, on both sides of the border, are essentially pragmatic and friendly at the grassroots level.

The problems arising from the cross-border ties of Batswana ethnicity and kinship are further compounded by international rejection of the Bophuthatswana homeland's parochial, 'independence' status. Therefore, the non-aggression treaty negotiated by South Africa with Bophuthatswana after the homeland attained independence in 1977, enjoys dubious legal validity beyond South African frontiers. The treaty commits the homeland to preventing guerillas from using its territory as a springboard to launch attacks on targets based in South Africa itself.

Non-Aggression Treaties

Since March 1984, South Africa has put constant pressure on Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact similar to the high profile Nkomati accord (Africa Report July/Aug 1984). Relations between the two countries have long been strained, principally due to Botswana's perceived tolerance of an ANC presence. Pretoria has accused the Botswana government of conveniently showing a blind eye to ANC activities, through refusing to negotiate formal measures to combat terrorism in the region (RDM 14/9/84).

Botswana's contrary position was formally stated by President Masire in mid-1984: 'Botswana's policy towards refugees derives from our international obligations as specified in the Geneva Convention. All those who come to Botswana and qualify as refugees are specifically prohibited from using Botswana as a base to attack their countries of origin. This policy has been implemented successfully for the past 18 years and applies to all refugees, irrespective of their political affiliations' (Press statement).

Masire's government accuses Pretoria and Mafikeng (Bophuthatswana's capital) of unfairly holding it responsible for ANC fighters who may have slipped through Botswana en-route to South Africa, without the knowledge of the frontline state's security forces.

Subsequent Developments

South Africa is reported to have since changed its approach. Instead of trying to persuade Botswana to sign an accord, Pretoria has sought to reach a less formal 'working agreement', providing for cooperation between their respective security and intelligence forces (RDM 11/9/84). In theory, the policy shift is aimed at trying to help Botswana enforce its avowed policy of preventing ANC guerillas from crossing its

borders en-route to South Africa. In earlier statements, President Masire has argued that, 'South Africa and Bophuthatswana, with their large security forces and armies, should be able to seal their boundaries against ANC infiltration, which Botswana, with its small police force, army and severely limited resources, is unable to do' (Botswana Daily News).

In February 1985, after a meeting between foreign ministers Dr Chiepe and 'Pik' Botha in Pretoria, Mr Botha declared that South Africa had accepted an assurance by Botswana that it would not allow 'subversive elements' to operate from its territory. Therefore, he added, there is no need for a formal pact of any kind (Star 23/2/85). Chiepe's assurances at this year's meeting were a mere restatement of Botswana's previously applied policy, which had been consistently rejected by Pretoria. It is unclear why they should have suddenly become acceptable to South Africa in early 1985, unless an informal understanding had been reached in the interim.

Subsequently, the fact that in March this year South Africa apparently submitted a list of Botswana-based ANC members whom it wanted expelled, would seem to substantiate such speculation. A similar list of black nationalist exiles, too close for comfort on Pretoria's terms, was submitted to the Lesotho government in 1983. According to Lesotho, South African pressure at the time, including a threatened economic squeeze, led to the 'voluntary exodus' of about 24 ANC members. A similar strategy would seem to have been applied to Botswana, as the frontline state had earlier expressed regret at Mr Botha's 'oblique suggestion' that economic ties between the two countries depended on the signing of the non-aggression pact (RDM 14/9/84).

Conclusion

A dramatic turn of events in June 1985 has since overtaken the steady diplomatic progress made by the governments of Botswana and South Africa towards reaching an informal security understanding. Following handgrenade attacks on two coloured parliamentarians' homes in Cape Town – presumed to be the work of ANC guerillas – the South African Defence Force carried out a reprisal attack on alleged ANC bases in Gaborone. On 14 June, a lightning strike on ten homes located in Botswana's capital left 14 people dead, including three exiled South African artists, two Batswana domestic servants, a visiting Dutch academic, a child and several other refugees. International outrage over the apparent indiscriminate nature of the attack, which seemed to be misdirected at civilians and ANC sympathisers rather than activists, will no doubt sour diplomatic relations far beyond the Botswana/South Africa frontier. ■■■



D Cleaver/Valley Trust

THE VALLEY TRUST

Changing Horizons

Social and technical organisation around communal projects is a major priority of the Trust.

By Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel

Since its establishment on the edge of Natal's famous Valley of a Thousand Hills in 1950, the Valley Trust has developed into a multi-faceted welfare and development organisation. The programmes of this 'socio-medical project for the promotion of health' are also gaining increased national and international recognition.

At the same time, the social context in which the Trust operates is changing rapidly. Since the valley has become a dormitory suburb of the Durban-Pinetown complex, divided by the Natal/KwaZulu boundary, the environment can no longer support a 'traditional', subsistence-based way of life. At the Trust's request, Jeff Zingel interprets findings from recent surveys of 100 households in the valley, undertaken in order to determine the changing priorities and purposes in the agricultural sector of their overall programme.

Over the past thirty years the scope of the Valley Trust's (VT) activities have expanded considerably, making it one of the more renowned development institutions of its kind in Natal. Presently, the major commitments are in the field of health care and prevention, which involves a primary health centre (50 883 attendances in 1984), eight subcentres (26 981 attendances) and an eye clinic (175 consultations), as well as the training of health care nurses in association with numerous centres in Natal/KwaZulu. In addition, VT runs a Nutrition Education Unit (14 098 referrals and visits) with an associated Relief and Rehabilitation Programme directed largely at mothers and children living in the valley (all statistics are for 1984).

Apart from health matters, a resources section

promotes 'bridging education', to assist local black teachers to obtain matric through arranging weekly courses at a white Teachers Training College, and provides practical science education and tuition in English to local schools. It is estimated that nearly 90 percent of local teachers do not have a matric. Another new development at VT is an Ecology Education Unit, which is attempting to scientifically rehabilitate 25 acres of hillside. There is also a technical section, which has extended VT water supplies to about 60 families and is now engaged in building pit toilets, water storage tanks and protecting springs (87 projects in 1984).

Major and minor personal and administrative problems of valley residents are dealt with by a community liaison section, which also runs an

In promoting an impressive range of development projects, the Trust's overall programme gives visible evidence of the concept of 'integrated development'

PERI-URBAN PROJECTS

Survey Data

AGRICULTURAL NEEDS SURVEY

The Trust recently asked INDICATOR SA to publish results from a survey initiated in order to determine felt needs and thus facilitate priorities for extension work by the VT agricultural staff. Interviews were undertaken at 100 randomly selected households, some belonging to VT projects, others not. At both the Qadi and Nyuswa areas, five places were picked randomly and a sample of ten households were interviewed.

FIELD SIZES

The first table indicates the scale of field crop/vegetable production in terms of the average field size cultivated.

RESPONDENTS	AVERAGE FIELD SIZE
51	1-2 Tennis courts
47	1 Football field
2	2 Football fields

The limited size of land used may be explained by a combination of factors:

- overall land pressure
- the costs of hiring mechanical or animal drawn cultivators
- shortages of domestic labour
- the costs of time and effort expended in agricultural labour relative to investment in other activities, which provide a higher cash or status return.

CULTIVATION

The second table indicates the mode of cultivation. Ownership of machinery and animals is extremely limited in this sample, with a select minority making a small living from hiring out their animals and tractors.

RESPONDENTS	MODE	HIRE	OWN
44	Oxen	38	6
8	Donkeys	7	1
38	Hand	0	38
10	Tractor	10	0

YIELDS

Seasonal estimates of yields for both maize and beans were also requested in the survey. The results are difficult to quantify exactly, as households obviously do not keep records, and it is unclear whether the estimates are for proportions of the crops consumed, or consumed and stored. Overall, the low yield levels are a source of concern.

MAIZE		BEANS	
Respondents	Average yield	Respondents	Average yield
39	0 - 1 bags	63	0 - 1 bags
61	2 - 5 bags	37	1 - 5 bags

EXTENSION AND ADVISORY SERVICES

Inquiries were made into the major requirements for extension advice and are tabulated thus:

RESPONDENTS	TO BE ADVISED ON
75	Improving soil fertility
57	Weed control
40	Pest control
17	Livestock control
6	Timing of planting
4	Ploughing
3	Soil conservation
3	Crop rotation
2	Good seed varieties
2	Timing of harvesting

POULTRY KEEPING

Some 70 percent of respondents keep chickens, the majority for egg and meat consumption at home, with only five percent selling live chickens. Fifty percent buy week old chicks, whereas 20 percent hatch their own birds. The major problems encountered are theft and diseases. Sixty percent would like to keep more fowls, through buying more one week old chicks.

FRUIT TREES

Seventy two respondents have fruit trees planted around their homes and in gardens, and would like to plant more, either in a fenced orchard (50 percent) or with a small fence for each tree (22 percent). Those without trees cited reasons such as ignorance about where to obtain them (22 percent) or lack of capital (6 percent).

WOOD LOTS

Wood comprises the most important source of fuel. At the time of the survey, 30 percent had used open wood fires the previous day for cooking. Fifty five percent had used a wood and coal stove and 15 percent a paraffin stove. Fifty percent buy their fuel wood, largely from those who collect firewood and sell locally, and 37 percent collect it themselves from the dwindling natural bush.

Alcoholics Anonymous course. A youth club has been set up, with more than thirty members, dealing with a range of personal, community and recreation issues.

Overall, the Trust offers practical educational courses to individuals from the area, (as well as to seconded people from all over Southern Africa) in nutrition education, primary and secondary health promotion, gardening, spring protection, fencing, and water tank and toilet building. One indication of the considerable impact and interest aroused by VT is the number of visitors: during the course of 1984, 2 220 outsiders, including 970 members of the medical profession, visited the Trust.

Agriculture

The other major involvement of the VT programme in the area is in the field of agriculture. The Valley of a Thousand Hills is unsuitable for fulltime subsistence agriculture, consisting largely of steep, rocky slopes interspersed with valleys and gullies, and a population density now approaching the level of peri-urban settlements. Despite this adverse environment, the Trust has promoted, with considerable success, its own concept of appropriate agricultural development. The system, comprising the development of the now internationally acclaimed terracing and composting methods, essentially serves as an ancillary programme to the health and nutrition projects. It also involves promoting the establishment of both individual and community run gardens on suitable sites in the

valley.

By last year a total of 15 communal gardens had been built, representing an involvement of people from over 250 households. Each year 15 to 20 individual gardens are established. These achievements are a practical expression of the VT's efforts towards 'education for nutrition'.

Survey Summary

The (selected) results presented in the accompanying box imply low returns from sustained engagement in agricultural production. The shortages of land, domestic labour, capital and implements, combined with perceived low levels of soil fertility reflect the constraints facing ordinary households in any attempt at increasing agricultural production.

The survey results need to be viewed within the changed context of modern conditions and circumstances affecting the area. Over the past two decades, the renowned valley has changed considerably, beginning with an influx of families evicted from farms as far afield as Estcourt, Newcastle and Richmond. The local community has also been augmented, as have most areas surrounding Durban, by further rural-urban migration as well as by people from the overcrowded townships of Durban and Pinetown. Familiar shack settlements, although small, proliferate, indicating the changing nature of the rural or 'tribal' system, and the ecology and resource base of the area.

Internationally acclaimed terracing and composting methods form the focus of agricultural development strategies in the valley

Agricultural survey results indicate shortages of land, domestic labour, capital and implements as major factors constraining production

Primary health care, nutrition education and a relief/rehabilitation project for mothers and their children form an integrated programme.



D. Cleaver/Valley Trust



D Cleaver/Valley Trust



D Cleaver/Valley Trust

The Trust's new ventures promote the construction of necessary facilities for valley residents and provide educational advice in various fields.

The learning of social organisation, technical management and democratic procedural skills assists adjustment to rapid modernisation

16 Rural & Regional Monitor

The area has seen a fragmentation and disruption of 'traditional' outlooks, as people have become reliant on desperately needed wage labour opportunities available only outside the valley. This process of change is accentuated by the effects of the current economic recession. With dependence, an urban orientation has developed, along with a range of consumer requirements and tastes out of keeping with the actual or potential returns from intensified agricultural production. Perhaps the high proportion of treated cases for both adult hypertension and sexually transmitted diseases at the VT Centre could be said to be an indicator of the changed socio-economic profile of the area. Indeed, the recent widespread 'unrest' has not bypassed the valley and bus boycotts occurred not far away.

Broader Implications

These circumstances have implications

elsewhere, and emphasise that development strategies undertaken in areas beyond the cities can no longer be directed at only agriculture and rural subsistence. Instead, the most appropriate response to the inevitable encroachment of a modern environment would encompass a combination of the following approaches:

- The Valley of a Thousand Hills, like many other peri-urban and rural areas, reflects the need for multiple development strategies, which take into account household dependence on wage labour in the cities and on non-agricultural methods of survival, for example through the creation of small businesses.
- Agricultural strategies might be more successfully directed at identifying those individuals who can farm, and concentrate on promoting these entrepreneurs as local suppliers of produce.
- Others who are incapable of sustained agricultural production might successfully be drawn into the construction of a supportive infrastructure – markets, irrigation, roads, as well as more modern facilities such as water supplies, housing, electrification and so on.


Conclusion

As an experienced agency of intervention in the field of overall community development, the role of the Valley Trust is successfully expanding in step with the changing context already outlined. In the area of agricultural production, participation levels and the survey results would seem to indicate further changes in the role of the Trust, which are evidently being accommodated by VT personnel. Their projects are no longer motivated by a founding strategy aimed at the holistic promotion of agricultural production and domestic health, as the Trust adjusts to local socio-economic circumstances which are of a completely different order today.

Present VT initiatives are now directed at the demanding but rewarding process of developing the important skills of social organisation, technical management and democratic procedure through the implementation of projects by the community. The learning of these skills is an invaluable exercise for households that are forced to adopt multi-faceted survival strategies – of which agricultural production is but one – to cope with a modern commercial and industrial environment. Other modern priorities in the valley call for the coordinated provision of appropriate facilities such as roads and transport, electricity, sewerage and housing. In combination, all of these initiatives would promote successful adjustment by the people of the valley to the demands of the modern world over the hill. **UPTA**

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
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URBAN

M O N I T O R

INDICATOR
S O U T H A F R I C A

VOL. 3 No 4
A U T U M N 1 9 8 6



As the tide of anti-apartheid opinion has grown to global dimensions over the last two decades, the sport tour boycott and the larger isolation campaign of South Africa have become inseparable in their political interests and objectives.

- 1** *Sport & Society: The Real Boycott Issues*
- 7** *An Unfinished School Crisis in the Cape of Storms*
- 11** *Handling an Own Affair: Tricameral 'Coloured' Education*
- 14** *Beyond the Blackboard: Teacher Associations & Politics*
- 18** *The New Frontier: Rebellion in the Eastern Cape*




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
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Perspective

SPORT & SOCIETY

The Real Boycott Issues



An overgrown and unlikely football 'pitch' at a high school in Umlazi township. Durban.

Douglas Booth

By Douglas G Booth, Development Studies Unit,
University of Natal (Durban)

For South Africa, the advent of each new sports season seems to bring a cancelled or surrogate international tour, producing a slow action replay of the opposed pro-tour and pro-boycott argument. Douglas Booth, a visiting Australian sportsman studying over here, takes a firsthand look at the apartheid in sport controversy. Although his approach is undeniably partisan in support of the boycotters, Booth persuasively demonstrates the inextricable linkages between broader racial and sports inequalities in our society.


Commenting on the article, Prof Lawrence Schlemmer points out that 'it is an interesting example of the type of social analysis which South Africa's formal racial divisions invite and make legitimate. In any society, access to sporting opportunity is to a lesser or greater degree influenced by social status and privilege. The writer barely concedes that the children of the ghettos in the US, the slums of Latin America or the far flung hinterlands of the Soviet Union probably do not have remotely the recreational privileges of their compatriots in urban middle class suburbs!

'In one sense the pattern of sports inequality in South Africa is not unique, in qualitative if not quantitative terms. Yet whites in South Africa have allowed themselves to be defined as unique because our categories of inequality are formally defined in terms of the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Separate Amenities Act. Thus while the article is perhaps lacking in comparative perspective, our laws make this kind of analysis inevitable and necessary. Until South Africa takes meaningful steps to eradicate formal racial differentiation - as well as informal disadvantages of a more universal kind - Indicator SA has a duty to carry this kind of comment.'

In the townships, exposure to and participation in sports activities are severely curtailed by social conditions at school or at home

Contact with sports requires affordable expenditure, leisure time, recreational facilities, proper diet and good health

The Umlazi cycle and athletics track, a barren recreational dustbowl in one of Durban's townships.



2 Urban Monitor

The recent cancellation of rugby tours of South Africa by the All Blacks and the British Lions, and the unofficial 'rebel' tour by Australian cricketers this summer have once again highlighted the issues surrounding the Republic's sporting isolation. Is the sports boycott a meaningless strategy that does more harm than good or is it an important weapon in the war on apartheid?

Pro-tour supporters claim that sport in South Africa is fully integrated and multiracial, and that sport fulfils an important role as a racial equaliser cutting across artificial barriers. They argue that the denial of international sporting contact is grossly unfair and hypocritical in the face of buoyant trade links. The anti-tour protesters dismiss these claims out of hand and add that international sports tours of South Africa in fact aid government propaganda.

Pre-Conditions for Participation

Wider social, economic and political forces undoubtedly prevent people from utilising multiracial sporting resources, which in turn do not automatically guarantee clubs a multiracial membership. Participation in sport requires exposure to sport and a disposable income large enough to include expenditure on leisure. An individual's exposure to sport will take place either at school or at home. In the African townships, opportunities for contact with sporting activities are severely curtailed in both milieux.

Family life is typically disorientated in the townships, mass worker migration to the white cities is a daily phenomenon, and unemployment among Africans is exceptionally high. While the townships are chronically underserved in general, community and other recreational

resources (eg parks and playgrounds) are particularly scarce. The prospects for youth involvement in organised sport are poor under these conditions, where parental support, guidance and supervision are retarded by the long hours spent away from home, and low wages.

Of the basic health status indicators, nutritional status among children is explicitly related to sporting apathy and sporting performance. Mortality patterns among Africans indicate that diseases related to low socio-economic and poor environmental conditions are the major killers:

- kwashiorkor, marasmus, pellagra, rickets and scurvy - specific syndromes of malnutrition - have been widely reported among Africans (Scragg and Rubidge 1977: p265)
- malnutrition is reported to be the cause of a third of African child deaths in Durban
- more than 30 percent of African pre-school children and almost 60 percent of African school-age children are underweight for age (Jinabhai et al 1984: p60)

Sport Inequalities

In the actual school environment, the gross inequality in per capita government expenditure on education between white and African school children (in the order of a ratio 7:1) is reflected in sport (see table 1). White schoolchildren are exposed to a wide variety of competitive sports and recreational games in both physical education classes and in compulsory extra-curriculum activities. The majority of white secondary schools and many primary schools have several well-kept playing fields, a swimming pool and tennis courts, plus a range of other sports equipment.

In stark contrast, African children (for whom school is not even compulsory) are denied these resources and opportunities. Numerous factors mitigate against sport in African schools: the lack of qualified staff; the lack of financial resources to purchase equipment; and the lack of playing space. In the absence of libraries, where shortages of textbooks and stationary are common, and where computers and video equipment are non-existent, it is not difficult to understand why sporting equipment is scarce.

There is a prevalent bias against sport in African schools, which stems not only from wholly inadequate resources but is related to a high examination failure rate. There is a natural tendency among dedicated staff to allocate time to extra lessons as opposed to sport. Also, older staff and headmasters who were not educated in a tradition of physical education place little emphasis on it today. From interviews conducted by the

INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

Table 1 **Some Comparative Statistics on Government Expenditure**

	SPORT EXPENDITURE	
	Total	Per Head
White schoolchildren	R9 900 000	R10.14
African schoolchildren	R14 700	R0.39
Department of National Education	R5 700 000	R4.16 ¹
• Sports Budget	R1 700 000	R1.24
• Grants-in-aid to Sports Administration	R250 000	R0.18
• Sports Facilities	R129 000	R75.88 ²
• Cruising (Yachting)	R47 000	R35.98
• Cycling	R20 000	R33.33
• Fencing	R35 000	R35.98
• Tug-of-war teams		
	Total	Per Head

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Refers to expenditure on total registered sportspersons.
- 2 Refers to departmental expenditure on visiting teams, divided by registered number of South African participants

SOURCES

Republic of South Africa, *House of Assembly Debates (Hansard)* 1983, Vol 106 cols 6122/23; and Vol 110 cols 395/400.
SAIRR *Race Relations Survey* 1982: p473 and 491.

Case Study: Sport in KwaZulu Schools

The KwaZulu Department of Education has allocated physical education one period (35 minutes) per week to pupils in standard 6 and above, and two periods per week for standard 5 and below. Out of ten schools the author surveyed in Umlazi and KwaMashu, however, three did not include physical education in the curriculum. For the remaining seven schools, the period was devoted to basic physical exercise. Only four out of 93 schools in Umlazi have what is commonly referred to as a playing field — areas without marked boundaries, bare of turf, strewn with stones, and littered with weeds. Upkeep and maintenance is financially impossible.

The department employed its first fully trained physical education teacher in 1981, and today there are 15 fully qualified physical education teachers. While schools in peri-urban areas struggle to offer, at best, meagre resources, those in remote homeland areas are considerably worse off. Although all schools allocate one afternoon per week to school sports — invariably soccer, netball and athletics — given the lack of both space and equipment, it is estimated that sports afternoons effectively include only ten percent of pupils. (Personal correspondence with circuit inspector.)

Table 2 **Recreation Resources in the Durban Metropolitan Region**

	UMLAZI	LAMONTVILLE	DURBAN
Population	220 000 ¹	30 000	211 711
Soccer fields	1 ²	5	146 ³
Tennis courts	6 ⁴	1	all privately owned
Swimming pools	1	1	15
Cricket pitches	Nil	Nil	46 ⁵
Other	Golf course; cycling and athletics track ⁶	Bowling green	

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Unofficial estimates range between 300 000 and 312 000. Umlazi is bordered by two densely populated squatter settlements, Malukazi (estimated at 55 000), and Kwanagaga (78 000), neither of which have any sporting resources.
- 2 Official figures list 10 fields but only the Umlazi stadium is fit for competition. The remaining 9 'fields' are stone-strewn dust bowls without delineated boundaries, nets, changing or toilet facilities.
- 3 Refers to venues, some venues having more than one field.
- 4 These have not been resurfaced since they were built in 1966.
- 5 Refers to venues.
- 6 Both are in advanced state of deterioration.

SOURCES
Various personal communications.
Durban Publicity Association

Survey

Table 3 White Opinions on Sports Integration

	Yes	No
'Do you believe that sport is integrated at all levels?'	42%	56%
'Do you think that South Africa will ever enjoy normal sporting contacts under a white government?'	45%	52%

(n = 1 000)

SOURCE 'Sports integration poll', *Business Day*, 4/12/85. Conducted by Markinor Research Group among 1 000 urban white adults

Table 4 African Opinions on International Sporting Tours

	Right	Wrong
'Do you think that international sporting organisations are right or wrong not to play against South African teams unless the apartheid system is changed?'	83%	17%

(n = 400)

SOURCE *Sunday Tribune* 25/8/85. Commissioned by the London *Sunday Times*, and undertaken by Markinor (a South African affiliate of Gallup International). Interviews conducted among urban Africans in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.

The emergence of some multiracial facilities and clubs has not resulted in the integration of sport in South African society

author with ten local headmasters, it appears that sport in black schools has largely evolved into a token and unsystematic exercise.

A comparison of recreational resources offered in Umlazi, Lamontville and Durban reveals a gross maldistribution of these resources (see case study). It also illustrates a pronounced hierarchy of facilities that favours whites and gives preferential treatment to Africans living in white-administered townships, over those living in homeland townships. White authorities can afford to finance 93.1 percent of their expenditure on sport, but black authorities only 12 percent (Institute for Recreational Studies 1985).

A consequence of this unequal distribution of resources is that Africans living in Umlazi (administered by the KwaZulu government) and the surrounding shack areas depend on the sport facilities provided in either Lamontville or Durban. A total of 286 teams compete for use of the ten soccer fields in several townships under the Natalia Development Board's jurisdiction.

Multiracial Sport

To argue that the emergence of some multiracial facilities and clubs has integrated sport in South Africa is invalid (see survey box). Firstly, the few existing multiracial facilities are unevenly distributed and concentrated in white metropolitan areas, which forces black sportspersons to commute at their own

expense in terms of time and money. Secondly, mixed sport is played in the main at senior and/or professional level. A barrage of red tape prevents government schools from playing multiracial interschool sport.

Resistance to multiracial sport is still strong and in some white communities, segregation is reinforced rather than relaxed. For example, in early 1984 the Potgietersrus Town Council banned multiracial cricket at the municipal cricket grounds (RDM 11/2/84). Later that year, the Middelburg Town Council threatened to withdraw its annual R16 000 subsidy to the golf club if it continued to allow Indian golfers to use the course (STimes 9/12/84).

Inter-racial comradeship developed during the course of a game is rarely nurtured in a multiracial post-match social setting because of other restrictive racial legislation and the customary practice of segregation, so carefully fostered by the government. The not unexpected result of all the above circumstances is token black membership where white facilities are now multiracial.

Universally, there is a natural tendency for people to gravitate towards the sport that is most accessible socially and financially, ie individual sports have a specific class base. In South Africa, apartheid works to channel the majority of blacks away from sport and the majority of black sportsmen into virtually one sport. Soccer has developed as the predominant black sport in response to township conditions - soccer is a low cost sport,

Statutory and customary segregation has the effect of limiting multiracial contact between sportspeople in a post-match social setting

attracts numbers and at a social or recreational level, it can be played on almost any surface and in confined areas. Also as a professional sport, soccer enables players to make a living.

The Pro-Tour Lobby

Pro-tour lobbyists advance several arguments in favour of international sporting contact with South Africa. Most of these propositions are easily refuted and are summarised below:

- *Sport is a racial equaliser that aids in the alleviation of racial tensions.*
The vast majority of black people simply do not have the opportunity to meet whites on common sporting ground. They are precluded from many sporting opportunities by poor health, limited opportunities and meagre resources. How can contact with international sporting teams improve race relations when other efforts, such as social contact in the workplace, have not indented racial prejudices?

In South Africa, the only sport that in fact transcends racial barriers on any significant scale, albeit small, is black administered professional soccer - where players in integrated clubs live together in multiracial five star hotels while on tour. Despite the pleas by white administrators for foreign sportsmen to tour South Africa to help improve race relations, the greatest progress in desegregation has been made by black sportsmen. If sport is such a powerful catalyst for change, then why are sporting bodies not at the forefront lobbying the government for multi-racial school sport?

- *Sporting tours benefit the wider community.*

On the contrary, visiting sportspersons are cocooned in white South Africa - they play on or in white facilities; they are accommodated in white areas; and they use private city transport. Coaching clinics conducted by visiting sportspersons are most often held in white areas. These are superficial exercises for black sportspersons because the infrastructure that enables practice and competition is non-existent in the townships.

Revenue raised by international tours is used to cover costs and few, if any, tours generate surpluses for sports development. Tours promote competitions between sporting elites, who exchange ideas among themselves on such things as training methods, strategies and techniques, diet, equipment, injuries and fitness. This information is not quickly disseminated to the ordinary recreational sportsperson to enable them to improve their game. Any sport advantage will only accrue over a number of years of repeated touring, which is why the South African Tennis Union has publicly denounced tennis exhibitions as being detrimental to the game and fans in the



There are ten dilapidated 'football fields' used by countless amateur sides in Umlazi.

long term (STimes 25/8/85).

- *Governments should not dictate where sportspersons should play and against whom sportspersons should compete.*

By its own actions the South African government has done more to politicise sport than any other nation. The most infamous cases occurred in 1965, when Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd banned Maori rugby players from touring South Africa with the All Blacks. Then in 1968, Prime Minister B J Vorster banned Cape Town-born coloured cricketer Basil d'Oliveira from touring South Africa with the English team. These incidents, and many like them since, riveted world attention on South African sport.

In the isolation 'war' in which South Africa finds itself, sport has since become an offensive weapon and international tours are encouraged by the government. The Minister for National Education, Dr Viljoen, has made it clear that government expenditure on sport is decided upon in terms of the overall publicity generated for South Africa (see table 1). Commenting on the West Indian 'rebel' cricket tour in 1983, he commented that, 'The tour struck an important blow not only in the sporting field but also in general against the concentrated efforts to isolate South Africa internationally' (Hansard 1983 Vol106: Col 6194/50).

The government has directly aided the financing of sporting tours by offering tax concessions to companies sponsoring such events. In early 1986, after intense lobbying by the SA Cricket Union (SACU), the government (acting without parliamentary approval) increased the rebate for international sporting events from 50 percent to 90 percent.

Government priorities need challenging when more is spent on a touring tug-of-war team visiting South Africa than on sporting activities for black school children; and when only 4.4 percent of the

Apartheid works in a manner which channels black people away from most sports, while developing soccer as the predominant township sport

The only sport that transcends racial barriers on any scale is professional soccer, where sportspeople play in integrated clubs

SPORT INEQUALITIES

Sport has become an offensive weapon in the isolation campaign, and the South African government is keen to encourage international tours

To prevent apartheid from dividing international sport, the boycotters must remain united - if only for the sake of sport itself

Inside South Africa, although most whites oppose boycotts, many black people appear to support the isolation campaign

The UDF maintains that international sporting tours serve white interests only and invariably increase racial polarisation

Department of National Education's sports budget is spent on sports facilities.

Quest for Legitimacy?

Tours of South Africa are not merely games between sports enthusiasts - any international contact raises white public morale, and enormous amounts of money are spent each year by the government, business and sporting bodies on 'Freedom in Sport' lobbyists, to attract international sportspersons to South Africa. The apolitical stance frequently adopted by visiting sportspersons also allows the government to project an image of a 'normal society'. Visitors on tour are easily trapped into making innocuous statements on arrival, such as 'looking around things don't seem too bad'. These comments are readily seized upon by the state media for use in the counter propaganda war.

South African sporting administrators, with their ability and will to plunder the world's best sportspersons, have caused divisive cracks in several international sports-controlling bodies. In January this year, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh refused entry permits to four members of the England B cricket team because they had played in South Africa. When the English Test and County Cricket Board challenged Zimbabwe and Bangladesh with an 'all or nothing' ultimatum, the tours were cancelled. To prevent apartheid from dividing international sport, the boycotters must remain united, if only for the sake of their sport.

Further manifestations of the government's anti-boycott offensive are efforts by the state to crush critics of South African participation in international sport, especially leading officials of the South African Council On Sport (SACOS). In 1973, Mr M Naidoo, then president of a SACOS swimming affiliate, had his passport withdrawn to prevent attendance at the world swimming body's (FINA) conference in Belgrade. After the (white) South African Amateur Swimming Union was expelled from FINA at the conference, Mr Naidoo was banned under security legislation for five years.

Black Boycott Lobby

How widespread is the support for international sporting boycotts among South Africans? Although most white South Africans oppose the sports isolation campaign, international sporting boycotts appear to have been given a popular mandate by black people inside the country (see survey box).

The pro-boycott organisation, SACOS, has won international recognition and represents 24 national sporting bodies and eight councils of sport. It coined the

boycott lobby's renowned sign, 'No normal sport in an abnormal society'. The UDF argues that sporting tours generate racial polarisation as they invariably serve white interests. Prior to the proposed 1985 All Blacks tour of South Africa, SACOS, the UDF, and other opposition groups sent a telex to the New Zealand's rugby football union. They warned that the tour 'will be regarded as a complicity in the crime of apartheid and a total disregard for the inhuman killings of innocent black people' (Rand Daily Mail 26/6/84).

A representative of the UDF, the Reverend Arnold Stofile, gave evidence to the New Zealand high court during an application for an interim injunction to block the All Black tour. A rugby player himself, he pointed out that white South African Rugby Union (a SACOS affiliate) players had been prosecuted for illegally playing for black clubs and that the issue of multiracial permits to white, African and coloured clubs, could not be construed as integration (Daily News 10/7/85).


In South Africa, black solidarity is frequently demonstrated on sports issues and sporting fixtures coinciding with commemorative political services have been cancelled. On 10 July 1985, 3 500 workers at Volkswagen's Uitenhage plant downed tools for six days after management refused their union's request that the company should not lend 12 minibuses for use by the All Blacks (DN 15/7/85). During last year's black consumer boycott of white businesses in Port Elizabeth, one white trader, Dan Watson, was exempted. This political gesture was in recognition of his own anti-apartheid stance in earlier quitting a local whites-only rugby club and then joining an African township club.

Conclusion

Sport cannot be compartmentalised in any society. Firstly, to argue that multiracial sporting facilities and clubs exist in South Africa, denies the complexity of forces operating to channel black sportspersons away from them. Secondly, it ignores the fact that in some areas discrimination in sport and recreation has actually been reinforced rather than reformed. Neither international tours nor domestic sport can fulfil any meaningful role as a racial equaliser as long as apartheid persists throughout South African society. **JZJA**

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An Unfinished School Crisis

In the Cape of Storms

By Prof Owen van den Berg and Senior Lecturer Brian O'Connell,
Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape

After a staggeringly low poll in 1984 for the House of Representatives, especially in the greater Cape Town area, events in 1985 contrived to further seriously damage the little credibility enjoyed by the new tricameral parliament.

The unrest at black schools, which have since 1976 been a major flashpoint of resistance to state policies, has seriously divided the coloured community in the Western Cape. In this article, Prof Owen van den Berg and Brian O'Connell discuss the developments leading up to the extensive education crisis of 1985, the major thrust of which was aimed, for the first time, against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from their own ranks.

Apartheid has always been characterised as a system which divides. In the Western Cape, own affairs in 'coloured' education has turned a community upon itself. School staffs are tense, divided and suspicious. Student communities are wracked with similar strains, and for many the cost of the 1985 civil strife is unlikely ever to be redeemed.

Politicians, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, are viewed with even more resignation or distrust than before. Parents are sharply divided on the most inflammatory issue possible - the life chances of their children. Community

organisations face vast dilemmas of affiliation and internal cohesion. And the police have suffered a total collapse of legitimacy - even to report an ordinary crime to them is likely to excite suspicion and hostility.

In the coloured community the tricameral architects are viewed, if anything, as worse than their 'baasskap' predecessors. For the city of Cape Town, which prided itself on something called 'a more relaxed racial atmosphere', last year's events have laid bare the realities of division and self-protection. Apartheid has done its separating well.

Muslim youth wearing the Kalfiyeh head-dress douse teargas cannisters during a confrontation with police at a Peninsula school. August 1985

The planned march to Pollsmoor prison gave students the opportunity to display their dissatisfaction with unequal and segregated education

One of the dramatic consequences of the aborted march was the closure of coloured schools in the Cape Peninsula for about three weeks

Through brutal actions, the 'forces of law and order' radicalised the population far more effectively than any other agency did or could have done

Thousands of coloured students did not write end-of-year exams, setting an agenda of unresolved conflict and division for 1986

Build-Up to Crisis

Initially, the extensive incidence of anti-government activity in various parts of the country during the early months of 1985 left the Western Cape strangely unaffected. This hiatus was especially apparent given the volatility of the region during the lead-up to the elections for the tricameral parliament in August 1984.

Two national events in mid-1985 served, however, to spark an always simmering situation in the Cape Peninsula. The first event provided the mood for action - the assassinations in late June of the Eastern Cape civic leader Matthew Goniwe and three of his UDF associates. The decision to send local representatives to the funeral was coupled with a growing feeling that school boycott action should be instituted. The political temperature of the Western Cape soared.

The second issue provided the focus for action - the declaration of a partial State of Emergency on 20 July. In a fascinating way the government called into question the commitment of the people of the Western Cape to the liberation struggle, for the magisterial districts of the region were not regarded as sufficiently dangerous to the state to be placed under emergency regulation. A widespread and immediate feeling among activists was that the state had to be proved wrong.

The arena for action was provided by Reverend Allan Boesak's call in mid-August for a march on Pollsmoor prison to demand the release of Nelson Mandela. In this event all the unfinished business of the past would again coalesce. It would provide tangible evidence of the region's commitment to fighting apartheid in its new manifestation, the tricameral parliament. It would give the UDF the opportunity to flex its 'coloured' organisational muscles and display its political credibility.

In 'coloured' schools and colleges, and the two local universities these events would give the students of the region the opportunity to resume their display of dissatisfaction with an unequal and segregated educational dispensation, now in the hand of a 'coloured' minister in the new House of Representatives.

Resistance and Crackdown

The consequences of the planned march on 28 August were dramatic and visible. Boesak was detained, and marchers and bystanders were harshly treated by the police, plummeting the streets of Cape Town into mayhem. Only a few days later, the responsible minister, Carter Ebrahim (see following interview), closed most of the Peninsula schools under his jurisdiction for about three weeks.

The rest of 1985 witnessed a tragic

continuation of unrest and confrontation, with a combination of approaching examination dates, government 'kragdadigheid' and excessive police reaction to public protest serving to perpetuate and deepen the regions' crisis. The Labour Party appeared to be committed to establishing by coercion the legitimacy denied them at the previous year's election polls. It systematically closed down all face-saving escape routes either for themselves or their adversaries.

Large numbers of students, now so close to examinations that to write on appointed days seemed futile, felt that a continuation of resistance was as good an option as any, and acted accordingly. Other students, believing that the process of 'conscientisation' now demanded the sacrifice of academic progress, also refused to participate in the seemingly fraudulent examination exercise. Yet others feared recrimination, and stayed away too.

The 'forces of law and order' stoked the flames of endemic violence and radicalised the population far more effectively than any other agency did or could have done. Riot police mayhem on 15 October in Thornton Road - the infamous box-crate ambush - sickened the people of Cape Town and appalled the watching world. So brutal was the state response and so deep the impact that clergymen now advocated civil disobedience and Muslims began debating 'jihad' (a holy war).

Extension of Emergency

The extension of the state of emergency to Cape Town on 26 October created the circumstances for some students to decide to go through the motions of writing examinations, at venues secured by large concentrations of guards. Thousands did not write, however, setting an agenda of conflict and divisions for 1986. Systematic action followed against sympathetic teachers who were in breach of contract when they refused to conduct or invigilate examinations.

Any pretext of democracy disappeared and countless organisations were banned from holding meetings, while several gatherings that were called by 'unbanned' organisations were also stopped. Hundreds were taken into detention from a wide section of the political spectrum, many of whom were young children. Amidst the riots and street confrontations, the death toll rose steadily.

Ever since the Soweto uprising of 1976, South Africa's schools have been a major flashpoint of resistance to the policies of the state. Schools constitute both a major manifestation of apartheid and one of the few places of congregation and organisation left in a society pared of civil liberties. As a venue perceived as both a principal instrument of state ideology and a prime



The 'coloured' suburb of Athlone was at the centre of civil strife in the Peninsula between August/November 1985.

Cape Times

distributor of life chances, resistance in and around schooling is of major symbolic significance. When the principal actors are vulnerable young people, a further edge is given to this symbolic struggle.

The all-pervasive rejection of apartheid in and around the school is therefore a drama of many acts, constituting a major dimension of unfinished business in the forging of a new South African society. The schools boycott of 1985 in the Western Cape was significant in a number of ways. It all points to a continuing unresolved conflict, which is likely to be repeated, in some or other form, in the near future - for there is no indication that the political fundamentals at the heart of the protests are to be changed.

Boycott Brinkmanship

One way in which the boycott was significant was that for the first time its major thrust, in the schools under the House of Representatives, was directed against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from the ranks of the excluded. Its central figures, in their first year in office, made strenuous efforts to show that they could control the situation. The major consequence was the perpetuation of a situation over which they in fact had little or no control, for far longer than might otherwise have been the case.

In the past, other school boycotts have also indulged in brinkmanship, only to withdraw from the precipice in time for the examination and credential ritual to recur. The business of 1985, however, having been allowed to remain unfinished, immediately became the agony of the start of 1986. The new ministers eventually gave in on virtually every issue, but only when the new year was already shuddering to a start, and only when irreparable

damage had already been done.

For the boycotters, over-the-edge brinkmanship has also had consequences which are as yet unclear and unresolved. A vigorous debate now rages about boycotts as a strategy for bringing about change. The question of solidarity, which binds all participants to end a boycott together in spite of the fact that different institutions join the action at different times, is a further potentially divisive aspect.

The mix of student-parent-teacher solidarity on the issues is a development seemingly very different from school boycotts of 1980 in the region. Nevertheless, this linkage occurred so unevenly that it is hard to ascertain its significance in terms of a possible new direction in the strategies of resistance.

Surrogate Apartheid

For the politics of reform, the events of 1985 contrived to destroy the credibility of the new constitutional design even further, if that were possible. Mandela remained in Pollsmoor and the new members of parliament in the Western Cape largely remained in hiding.

The 1984 poll for the House of Representatives had been staggeringly low in the Greater Cape Town area. What little credibility the new dispensation had rested in the attitude that perhaps one should 'wait and see'. What was available to be seen during 1985 was, however, by no means edifying - the tricameral parliament had faced its first test and failed disastrously. Apartheid at the hands of 'whites' was one thing, its perpetuation by surrogates entirely another.

For the teachers employed by the House of Representatives, the impact of the events of 1985 was complex. The leadership of their established organisation, the Cape Teachers Professional Association

For the first time, the school boycotts were directed against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from the ranks of the excluded

A vigorous debate now rages about boycotts as a strategy for change, and the question of tactical solidarity is a potential cause of division

The tricameral parliament faced its first test in 1985 and failed disastrously, losing the little credibility the new dispensation had accrued

CALCULATED EDUCATION

If the education department regains its previous grip, the status of teachers could become further emasculated due to increased unilateral policy-making

Last year's school unrest left so much unfinished business that education may be embarking on an uncharted path in the forging of a new society

(CTPA), did some behind-the-scenes negotiating and also tested Ebrahim's decision to proceed with examinations in the Supreme Court. For the rest, the CTPA confined itself to press statements rather than community action and involvement in the crisis. By the end of the year, any change in its standing in the region was hard to ascertain.

A new body, the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WCTU), emerged and grew quickly, but without making any serious dent in CTPA membership. This was perhaps because it was composed of those, of more radical persuasion, who had never been prepared to join the CTPA. The CTPA stuck to its policies of professional negotiation with the authorities and remained uncomfortable with progressive bodies such as SACOS and UDF. In contrast, WECTU was non-racial, and took an avowedly SACOS and non-collaborationist stance. By the end of the year, however, WECTU had yet to resolve the issue of how it could function without being prepared at least to admit to the existence of the employing authority for purposes other than denigration.


Both organisations are faced with the likelihood that if the education department were to regain its previous grip, it would be the status of the teachers that would become increasingly emasculated under a steady increase of unilateral policy-making. Few doubt that the department has 'black lists' - not only of

supposedly errant principals - and that retribution is likely to be spread out evenly over a number of years. The settling of scores by an 'own affairs' ministry is a daunting prospect, given the fact that the new dispensation offers a whole new avenue of patronage for the faithful by the new mainstream politicians.

An Unfinished Drama

For most parties, like the peace-makers of Versailles, there is the hope that it will not happen again. The dislocation of the schooling system and its credentials by brinkmanship for a while was a tactic understood by both sides in previous periods of confrontation. It was a passion play always enacted against the backdrop of an unwritten rule that the situation would not be allowed to become irredeemable.

The unfinished drama of 1985, however, sketched for the first time the prospect of the collapse of the entire educational order. One year of muddling through may just be possible, but two or three years of similar scenarios cannot but profoundly atomise the social order. The events of last year left so much unfinished business that education may now be embarking along an uncharted path. What the educational future holds is uncertain, but it will probably depend less on the architects of apartheid than they would like to believe. *DDA*



Street barricades, mob stonings, arson and police retaliation brought mayhem to the streets of Cape Town and surrounding suburbs in 1985.

Cape Times

Handling An Own Affair

TRICAMERAL 'COLOURED' EDUCATION

Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Carter Ebrahim, from the House of Representatives, speaks to Indicator SA Researcher Monica Bot

Coloured education was hit by turmoil from the middle of 1985, the first year that its institutions fell under the control of a tricameral 'own affairs' Department of Education and Culture, headed by Minister Carter Ebrahim. The schools were closed for one and a half months during this period and end of year exams were organised under difficult circumstances. Many, including principals, teachers and parents, were critical of the fact that exams were being written at all after three months of school boycotts in the Cape Peninsula.

Minister Carter Ebrahim has been at the receiving end of a volley of criticism because of his 'hard-line' handling of the crisis. Dr Stuart Saunders, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, described the Minister's and the department's approach as 'confrontational', and alleged that 'the crisis had been fed by ministerial threats and ultimatums, and police and military action employed to handle it' (Daily News 11/12/85). In March 1986, Indicator SA researcher Monica Bot spoke to Minister Ebrahim about last year's crisis, and the impact the new department hopes to have on the quality of education provided to coloured pupils and students.

Could you describe the problems encountered in maintaining order and discipline in coloured schools last year? How widespread was it, and were pupils 'willing converts' or was there pressure and coercion?

Minister Ebrahim said that various factors contributed to last year's unrest:

- Too few principals realised that the responsibility for ensuring discipline at schools rested on their shoulders. Instead, they had delegated power to the staff and student representative councils (SRCs).
- Both pupils and teachers had been the victims of intimidation, although many pupils had been 'easy prey' to radicals (often university students).
- The state of emergency was another factor. Teachers had made the mistake of

allowing pupils into teacher/parent meetings addressed by people such as Reverend Allan Boesak, who had talked of 'turning the country on its head'.

- The unrest was mainly confined to the Peninsula, where a fundamentalist Islamic movement had also contributed to the unrest.

As a result of the schools unrest in 1985, some pupils and students did not write their year-end exams. What numbers were involved, and how many pupils were writing the postponed exams in March?

According to the Minister, 11 052 pupils wrote the senior certificate exams at the end of last year, out of a total of 16 334 candidates. Of this number, 7 115 (64.4%) passed, of which 1 381 obtained matric exemption and 15 pupils an A-

After the 1985 school unrest, some 4 000 out of 16 334 coloured matric pupils did not return to write their finals

To cope with the boycott's backlog, individual schools were given the option to promote pupils, repeat the year or give an exam

Now that coloured schools are open to all, the 'local option', whereby schools can set quotas for other races, seems the most likely solution

Minister Ebrahim feels that the new tricameral system will accelerate a process of eliminating the education backlog for coloured pupils

aggregate.

Of those matric pupils who did not write, 1 162 applied before 6 January 1986 to write the March exam, and 977 have in fact since written. More pupils had applied to sit for the exam, but gave certain conditions which could, said Minister Ebrahim, not be considered. About 4 000 pupils did not return at all.

At teacher training colleges, exams were postponed for a fortnight. Students who failed or did not write in 1985 have been given the opportunity to write in May. Those who wrote and passed some subjects are teaching at a lower level this year and must rewrite their exams at the end of 1986.

In February 1986 you said that principals and staff would be responsible for either promoting std 6-9 pupils on the basis of their previous academic record, or to let them write an exam instead. How has this plan of action to overcome last year's disruptions worked out?

In response, the Minister said that three options were given in fact, 'left to the careful decision of the staff in consultation with the inspector':

- promotion to the next standard
- repetition of the year
- writing of an exam.

The aim is to avoid bottlenecks, and therefore it has been left to the individual schools to decide which option to choose. Minister Ebrahim felt that these options have defused the situation, especially in those instances where parents and pupils have been consulted. In March, school attendance was quite high, with well over 90 percent of pupils present in the various schools. The situation at the teacher training colleges and the University of the Western Cape has also stabilised for the moment.

In February 1986, coloured schools were opened to all races. How has this move been received?

According to Minister Ebrahim there have been no negative responses from any quarters. He felt the move was welcomed by parents and pupils. Furthermore, white teachers presently teaching in coloured schools have been fully accepted and are generally good teachers. The other education ministers have given no official reaction yet but none have been hostile, while teacher associations had welcomed the move. Concern has been expressed about the possible implications of the new policy for the vast number of underqualified coloured teachers, whose 'upward mobility' might be threatened by increasing numbers of better qualified white teachers. A policy of 'affirmative action' was introduced in 1985, though to be ensured of 'permanent employment', all teachers have to meet academic standards of course. A meeting of senior

officials had been planned to work out a mechanism agreeable to the various parties.

Does the Department expect a large increase in the number of African pupils as a result of this move, and how will schools cope?

The Minister replied that there are obviously limits to the number of pupils that can attend a school. There are still a number of coloured schools where the system of 'double shifts' takes place due to lack of accommodation. Furthermore, the geographical factor must be taken into account, in that a school serves a certain area.

A number of coloured schools have in the past already accepted African pupils, with a maximum per school of approximately 12 pupils. Therefore, Minister Ebrahim felt that the 'local option', where an individual school can decide on quotas, seemed the most likely option at present. The admissions policy is going to be discussed at a meeting of the Ministers Council.

What are the advantages of having an 'own' minister for coloured education?

The Minister feels that more impact can be made on two levels:

- a more effective articulation of needs at parliamentary level, where one is in a position to trade off, bargain and veto;
- one can more effectively make demands on the treasury. The budget, however, runs in five year cycles, and the present budget was started prior to the present tri-cameral system.

He feels that the new tri-cameral system will accelerate the process of eliminating the educational backlog. Group politics are the most effective way to move forward despite opposition to the segmental tricameral system.


The priorities set by his Department are:

- teacher training and upgrading, in order to build up an adequately trained teacher corps, and
- accommodation, especially on the secondary level, where there was an upswing in pupil numbers.

Is one department of education essential?

Although a move towards one system would have symbolic value, the Minister believes that it will not solve all the problems and should not have the status of 'a holy cow'. It would be difficult to decide, for example, which race group the minister would be drawn from. Also, because educational needs vary across the country, one department would be impractical.

In Natal, for example, coloured student teachers had asked for less emphasis on Afrikaans language instruction, whereas in other areas in the country English was hardly used and the opposite option was asked for. Similarly, the department had been asked to decentralise some supply



Chris Timms

COLOURED EDUCATION

functions. He sees his primary task in parliament as to get rid of statutory race legislation, and 'after that ... if Germany has 11 education ministers, why not us?'

With regard to the quality of education, (coloured) Minister of Health Services and Welfare, Chris April, said in January 1985 that 48 percent of coloured pupils left before or at the end of standard 2. What are the reasons for this and what is being done about the drop-out rate?

The Minister replied that the recession, coupled with poverty among the coloured community, forced children to work at an early age in order to augment family income. Little could be done about this, but attention was being given to shifting the content of syllabi from their heavy academic bias to more technically-based education, because the former did not make people capable of being productive. Another contributory factor to the drop-out rate was the lack of school readiness, and attention was being focussed on pre-primary education, to 'lay foundations'.

Last year, you said you were appalled by the lack of dedication among some teachers. Is this a serious problem, what are the causes and what is being done to address it?

The Minister replied that there were a tremendous number of factors causing low motivation among teachers, among others:

- the limited job opportunities open to the coloured community before job reservation was lifted, resulting in many people who were not necessarily motivated going into the teaching profession
- the lower salaries paid to coloured teachers before parity was implemented. Salaries to underqualified teachers have

also recently been increased to make the profession more attractive.

Furthermore, the department hopes to improve teacher motivation through 'tightening up' their teacher guidance and support system. In addition, teachers were being encouraged to upgrade their qualifications, either through in-service training programmes, part-time colleges of education or correspondence courses.

In October you said that you will continue to take a hard-line attitude to school boycotts. Earlier this year you reaffirmed that your primary aim would be to restore order and discipline to the schools. How is this being done, and do you foresee trouble in 1986?

In response, the Minister said that he felt the options given to the schools with regard to the current academic year have defused the situation to a certain extent. Furthermore, some 'hard-line activists' were surprised at being allowed back to school this year, which he felt had had the effect of 'softening' them and their followers.

In addition, a series of meetings are held countrywide for the headmasters to inform them 'on the basis on which heads must act, their powers of suspension etc'. At last year's 'trouble spots', school security guards have been employed to protect the property.

Although he does expect trouble this year, especially on commemorative days such as 16 June and Sharpeville day, which 'could be used as spark-off points', he does not think it will be as effective as in 1985. The likelihood is lessened by the failure of last year's boycotts, as evidenced by the high exam attendance figures, and the disillusionment and demoralisation among pupils, many of whom now have to repeat the year.

A predecessor to the tricameral institution - the administration of coloured affairs - was the target of protestors during the 1980 school boycotts.

An improved salary structure, teacher guidance, and in-service training and upgrading, aim to improve teacher motivation

Beyond the Blackboard

TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS & POLITICS

By Roger Burrows, PFP MP and Former Professional Secretary of the Natal Teachers' Society

EDUCATION

Professional teacher societies have had to define more clearly their role in South African society amidst the turmoil in black schools over the last ten years. In the classroom and the community, teachers are caught between the traditional viewpoint that politics should be kept separate from education, and the increasing pressure, especially on black teachers, to join in condemning and actively opposing 'apartheid education'.

At the last conference of teacher associations, held in Cape Town in July 1985, the secretary of the Federal Council of Teachers Associations, Mr J F Steyn, said that 'it is undeniably true that teachers' organisations in South Africa are in many cases directly or indirectly involved in the politics of the day'. Despite the fact that teachers and their organisations must function within the parameters of official institutions, he acknowledged that there are many who 'claim that the structures . . . have been unilaterally arranged by the white sector and are therefore unacceptable'.

At the same conference, the president of the African Teachers Association of SA, Mr R L Peteni, stressed that 'the mood of our members, especially the younger members, is that the teachers' associations should adopt militant methods to supplement the usual methods of memoranda and deputations to the Education Department'. He recommended that teacher associations should try and work together, and negotiate with student organisations in searching for 'a just South African society . . . otherwise we are in danger of becoming the targets of the anger of our own students, as all supporters of the system have become the victims of our angry young people'.

During the schools unrest of 1985, some teacher associations did in fact strongly oppose certain departmental decisions. In November, the newly-formed Western Cape Teachers Union decided not to administer exams because the school year for coloured pupils, disrupted by widespread boycotts, had not been held according to sound educational practice, and further, there were alleged irregularities in the exams (Cape Times 3/12/85). Similarly, the Cape Teachers Professional Association threatened court action over the exams, to force Minister Carter Ebrahim, House of Representatives, to allow supplementary exams to be written in 1986 (Cape Times 2/12/85). In January, however, their application was dismissed with cost.

Also indicative of the rapid politicisation of educational issues is the Union of Teachers Associations' call for the release of all political detainees, the implementation of a uniform, equal system and for fundamental political change (City Press 24/11/85). This organisation also sought a Supreme Court interdict asking for an order nisi to stop the Minister from implementing 'provocative' new regulations at boycott-torn schools (Sunday Tribune 6/11/85).

On the other hand, while various other organisations called for non-racial education and a single ministry of education, the Transvaal Onderwysersunie warned that this would meet with determined resistance from Afrikaans-speaking teachers. It is obvious that viewpoints differ strongly between the various teachers associations with regard to the role they could and should play in South African society. In this article, PFP MP Roger Burrows, former professional secretary of the Natal Teachers Society, takes an in-depth look at the political leanings of the various teachers associations in South Africa (see list of organisation acronyms in box).

Teachers are often seen as neutral figures manning the educational establishment

The complex education situation in South Africa has created an equally intricate structure of teacher bodies. These are divided one from another by race, by language, by principles, by geographic areas served and by educational constituency. The views of each teacher association are determined by their leadership, interpreting the positions of

members as expressed at congresses or general meetings. Political views are sometimes susceptible to fairly rapid change as leaders come and go, or as the overall political position in South Africa alters.

The political stance of an organisation is generally not reflected in classroom relationships or in individual member

behaviour. In fact, teachers, in their everyday work situation, are widely seen by observers as neutral figures manning the educational establishment. Increasingly, however, as individual teachers adopt overtly political positions, they are perceived as extremely threatening to those in authority and action has been taken against them.

Teacher associations can be easily grouped into two broad areas - those recognised by the state and those not; and secondly according to membership of the four major racial groups. Several of the recognised teacher bodies have open membership but none has more than a scattering of members outside of the major racial group it is perceived to represent. Their diverse positions on political and educational issues are briefly discussed in the following outline of the many teacher associations operating in South Africa today.

Recognised by Government

ATASA: African Teachers Association of South Africa

This is the largest teacher body in South Africa, seen as representing all African teachers, including the independent homelands. ATASA has been in existence for over fifty years, during which time political events and pressures have caused many difficulties for the organisation and its various provincial bodies. ATASA is a federation of geographically based organisations, wherein homeland boundaries are not recognised for purposes of representation.

In general terms, ATASA's goals are the same as those of most black political movements - representation of all South Africans in a single parliament in one country. The association has constantly stressed its belief in a democratic political solution for South Africa and totally opposed apartheid, striving for its abolition in education. It has not followed the trade union route and sought to remain a professional association. Nevertheless, ATASA has reiterated its belief in the political aims of a grouping of teachers, and placed conditions of service as a secondary matter.

ATASA has been under fairly regular attack both within and without South Africa for not adopting a far more radical political position. Yet it has been remarkably successful in remaining in touch with all sides in South Africa - except for those of its provincial groups viewed as being too close to the homeland administrations. The association has accepted the need to represent their members on various government structures, and participates on the South African



Council of Education (SACE), a research committee (RECES), and on Department of Education and Training (DET) committees. On the other hand, ATASA representatives have also been in contact with student organisations such as COSAS (before it was banned), and attempted to intercede on behalf of protesting students, supporting many of their demands.

It is the only teachers organisation recognised by the international body (WCOTP) as representing South Africans, and as such attends both world and Africa teachers conferences and congresses. There is no strong full-time administrative organisation, the secretary-general (Mr H H Dlamlenze) being a Soweto school principal. The long-standing president is Mr Randall Peteni and other leaders include Prof A J Thembela (NATU), Mr F M Tonjeni (CATU) and Mr L M Tuanyane (TUATA).

Rector R E van der Ross of the University of the Western Cape leads 2 000 staff and students on a protest march, 19 September 1985.

ATASA has constantly stressed its belief in a democratic political future and strives for the abolition of apartheid in education

When overtly political matters arise and the (white) federal council of teachers cannot establish consensus, no single view is forced through

The English-speaking associations support the concept of one education ministry, but have slightly differing stances on school admissions

The Transvaal Onderwysersunie, previously a staunch National Party supporter, is now far more critical because of possible government reforms

UTASA's total rejection of the tricameral constitution has brought it under the severely critical gaze of Minister Carter Ebrahim

FEDCO: Federal Council of Teachers Associations

This all-white body consists of representatives of the eight white teacher bodies recognised by the provincial and central government. They divide themselves into two language groups - three into the English-speaking Teachers Association (ESTAS), and the three Afrikaans and two other bilingual associations into the Federasie van Afrikaanse Onderwysersverenigings (FAO). The Federal Council is dominated by matters of conditions of service, and when overtly political matters arise on which the Council is deeply divided, no single view is forced through. In fact, very few votes are taken at all.

Federal Council administration is outstanding and its secretary, Mr Koos Steyn, is renowned for his ability in administration and in the preparation of documents. The chairmanship of FEDCO is occupied on a two-year cycle with English and Afrikaans speakers alternating. The current chairman is Prof Hennie Maree (TO) and vice-chairman is Mr Dudley Schroeder (SATA). There are two very small teacher bodies with observer status on the Federal Council, who represent white teachers in African and coloured schools.

English-Speaking Teacher Assoc's

These three, the Natal Teachers Society (NTS), the South African Teachers Association (SATA) and the Transvaal Teachers Association (TTA) can generally be termed as 'anti-apartheid' in outlook, and support the concept of one ministry of education. On school admissions they have slightly differing stances, which broadly centre on the issue of parental control of school admissions.

The three bodies are strong administratively, and a large amount of their energies is devoted to conditions of service and limited professional matters. However they are generally weaker in research and in developing theoretical principles for their positions. An umbrella body, ESTAS, provides a non-formal link with no administrative structure or statutory recognition.

Afrikaans and Afrikaans-Majority Associations

This group is made up of three provincial associations (TO, NOU and OFSTA), a national union (SAOU), and an association for technical educationalists (SAATVE). The latter body and OFSTA are representative also of a small group of English-speaking teachers.

The largest white teacher body, the Transvaal Onderwysersunie, is critically placed at the current interface between National Party and Conservative Party politics. Previously a staunch government

supporter, the association is now far more critical of the government of the day. There is little doubt that the TO represents one of the most significant forces retarding progress towards one ministry of education and free association in education. This is the only teachers' group to refuse to join in the signing of a Teachers Charter drafted by JOCTASA, which explicitly condemns apartheid in education.

SATC: South African Teachers Council

The SATC, with which all white teachers in white departments have to register compulsorily, is a further dividing point between the English and Afrikaans language groups. The ESTAS bodies have consistently called for a multiracial teachers register and council, while FAO groups want a racial council. There are currently discussions in progress on linking SATC and the Federal Council into one white umbrella body, with possible legislation pending. The various associations' positions on this issue are still developing.

UTASA: Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa

This body represents the provincial 'coloured' teacher associations. The major force is the Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA) under Mr Franklin Sonn, who is also leader of UTASA. UTASA is strongly committed to a non-racial future for South Africa. It is the most recently created of the national teacher bodies and stems from a history of community division over the issue of participation in state structures. UTASA's current position is that it has to take its place in certain official institutions such as SACE and RECES, in order to represent the views of its members.

The CTPA is at this time under especial pressure from more radical elements within the education community. There is a state of flux and stress within the teacher community, reflected within the teacher associations. The relationship between UTASA and the House of Representative's Department of Education and Culture is formal and frequently strained. UTASA's total rejection of the tri-cameral constitution has fairly naturally brought it under the severely critical gaze of Minister Carter Ebrahim.

UTASA and its affiliates have a strong organisational and administrative base. More than any other teacher body, it has a strong research department and theoretical base to its positions. UTASA and ATASA are linked in a loose affiliation, JOCTASA, which holds intermittent meetings.

TASA: Teachers Association of South Africa

TASA is a strong unitary body, representative of eight thousand Indian teachers in South Africa. It is the smallest but most highly organised of national teacher organisations. With solid assets and a skilled financial benefit operation for teachers, TASA has developed an important mediating role. On occasions this is tangibly evident, as at its most recent congress where representatives of all other recognised South African teacher bodies were present; or through the efforts of its president, Mr Pat Samuels, to promote contact and teacher unity.

Traditionally, it has had good relations with the Natal Indian Congress and remains strongly opposed to the tri-cameral constitution. It clashed publicly on a number of occasions with the South African Indian Council and its leader, Mr Amichand Rajbansi. Currently (like UTASA) it has decided to work with the House of Delegates' Department of Education and Culture. The fact that Minister Kassie Ramduth is an ex-school principal perhaps tempers contact at the moment.

Non-Recognised Teacher Groups

The bodies named here are merely representative of a number of others which exist across South Africa. Generally they are splinter groups from existing bodies, but one or two have an independent, and long-standing basis. They suffer the dual disability of not having a good funding base nor being able to offer efficient delivery on members' individual problems. Their political profile is generally greater than that of recognised bodies.

NEUSA: National Education Union of South Africa

This body developed in the aftermath of the 1976 student uprising in Soweto and its suppression. Initially based in Johannesburg only, and then with only a few hundred members, it has gathered many more adherents to its strong non-racial, anti-apartheid, non-participatory stance. It does not seek recognition by the state authorities and is developing an alternate organisation to all existing teacher bodies.

NEUSA has strong links with the United Democratic Front and its affiliated organisations. Since the suppression of COSAS in late 1985, NEUSA has taken up the cause of student demands. While not yet taking a high public position against the recognised associations, this reticence cannot be expected to continue much

A GUIDE TO TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA	
<i>The Racial, Language and Political Divide</i>	
<i>For African Teachers</i> ATASA African Teachers' Association of South Africa	
NATU	Natal African Teachers' Union
CATU	Cape African Teachers' Union
TUATA	Transvaal United Teachers' Association
OFSATA	OFS African Teachers' Association
<i>For White Teachers</i> FEDCO Federal Council of Teachers' Associations	
FAO Federasie van Afrikaans Onderwysersverenigings (Afrikaans)	
TO	Transvaal Onderwysersunie
NOU	Natalse Onderwysersunie
SAOU	Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie
OFSTA*	OFS Teachers' Association
SAATVE*	SA Association for Technical and Vocational Education
ESTAS English-Speaking Teachers' Association (English)	
NTS	Natal Teachers' Society
SATA	South African Teachers' Association
TTA	Transvaal Teachers' Association
<i>For Coloured Teachers</i> UTASA Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa	
CTPA	Cape Teachers' Professional Association
SONAT	Society of Natal Teachers
OFSTA	OFS Teachers' Association
TAT	Transvaal Association of Teachers
<i>Independent or Non-Racial</i> JOCTASA Joint Council of Teachers' Associations of South Africa	
TASA	Teachers' Association of South Africa
NEUSA	National Education Union of South Africa
TLSA	Teachers' League of South Africa
WECTU	Western Cape Teachers' Union
<i>Other Educational Bodies</i>	
WCOTP	World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
RECES	Research Committee on Educational Services
SACE	South African Council of Education
SATC	South African Teachers' Council

* These also represent a small number of English-speaking teachers.

longer. It generally draws members from ATASA's base.

TLSA: Teachers League of South Africa

TLSA is an 'underground' body of coloured teachers which exists in the Western Cape area. It is underground to the extent that it was suppressed in the 1950s because of its political links with the Congress and Unity movements. It still regularly prints a publication of its views which could be characterised as strongly socialist in tone. TLSA regularly attacks the apartheid education system and any body participating in its structures.

WECTU: Western Cape Teachers Union

A newly established body drawing members from CTPA, CATU and some from TASA and SATA. It has received particular attention during 1985 for articulating the radical position in opposition to authoritarian measures implemented in DET and House of Representatives administered schools. **IPAA**

The political profile of non-recognised teacher groups such as the newly established NEUSA and WECTU is generally greater than that of recognised bodies



George Luse/EASTERN PROVINCE HERALD

THE NEW FRONTIER

Rebellion in the Eastern Cape

By Mandla Tyala of the Eastern Province Herald

A widespread stayaway strike in the Eastern Cape on 21 March 1986 commemorated the first anniversary of last year's infamous police shootings in Langa township outside Uitenhage. Although some community demands have been met - the formal state of emergency was recently lifted on 7 March, many detainees have been released, and the March banning orders placed on local civic leaders are being lifted - the major conflict issues remain. Mandla Tyala, a seasoned journalist, reports on the ferment of 1985/86 in the region, as the powerful black consumer boycott is resumed in East London and elsewhere - even before the all-pervasive April deadline for negotiations expires.

PEBCO has re-emerged as a political force, with UDF affiliates in the region rallying behind its consumer boycott and other defiance campaigns

Two of the most significant developments during the months of disquiet in the Eastern Cape have been the emergence of the United Democratic Front (UDF) as a political force to be reckoned with, and the discovery by Africans of the consumer boycott as an effective weapon in the struggle to have inequalities redressed.

The regional superstructure of the UDF, despite being hard-hit by mass detentions of its members and leadership, failed to collapse during the state of emergency. Street and area committees were formed instead as the resistance movement consolidated its position in townships throughout the Eastern Cape. UDF affiliates, from the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) to trade unions like the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union (MACWUSA) and youth groups, succeeded in putting the clock back to the peak of the African National Congress defiance campaigns in the 1950s.

PEBCO's Revival
The beginning of 1985 saw PEBCO

emerge from relative inactivity to declare war on the community council system. With all the UDF affiliates in the region rallying behind it, PEBCO put its newfound clout to effective use. It did not confine its fight to affordable rents and demands for decent housing but tackled other issues too, such as bus fare increases and hikes in the price of petrol. By early 1986, after months of rent and service charge boycotts, the East Cape Development Board acknowledged that arrears owed to it by township residents stood at R12 million.

Port Elizabeth was to get its first real taste of black consumer power when a PEBCO call in March 1985 for a 'black weekend' (a stayaway strike) received overwhelming community support. For a whole weekend the city was virtually devoid of black faces. At the time, the first indications of the consumer boycott that was to strangle smaller white businesses surfaced. PEBCO president, Qaqawuli Godolozzi, disclosed at a mass meeting that 'We have another ace up our sleeve'.

Meanwhile, African community councillors had come to bear the brunt of community anger at the system they

represented. Certainly the most hounded councillor was Mr T B Kinikini, the KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) councillor who refused to resign after all his colleagues stood down in mid March 1985. For five months his funeral parlour had been boycotted, his home stoned and his family threatened. After the Langa shootings, he was beaten to death and then set alight by an incensed mob.

Bowing to Pressure

Since the outbreak of unrest nationwide, African councillors have been attacked, forced to resign, and had their houses and businesses burnt down. During 1985, the dreaded necklace emerged - a means of eliminating people perceived to be collaborating with the system, by placing a burning tyre around their necks.

In two months of civil unrest, from 21 March, the day of the Langa massacre of 20 funeral marchers, to 29 May 1985, 108 people died in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage district. During this stormy period, councillors finally bowed to the pressure. Entire councils resigned in Cradock and Uitenhage townships. Many disrobed for keeps in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown but a few chose to cling to their positions, carrying pistols on their persons and having their homes placed under police guard.

By the time the state of emergency was declared on 21 July - covering 16 magisterial districts in the Eastern Cape alone - at least 240 beleaguered African councillors had handed in their resignations nationwide. In small towns like Despatch, Beaufort West and Somerset East, councillors resigned en bloc.

The government, determined to keep an evidently detested system intact, has since appointed white administrators for Cradock, Uitenhage and Oudtshoorn townships, to assume the functions of the councils. The councils in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown continue with a limp. In the Eastern Cape today, only 17 out of 45 community councils, and two out of four fully-fledged local authorities, are functioning, and there are vacancies in 173 of the 284 wards.

Opposition Feuding

The feud between the UDF and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) erupted at the beginning of May 1985. Although there is decades-old tension between the rival ideologies of black consciousness and non-racialism, no single leader has ever been able to say exactly what ignited the clash in Port Elizabeth's townships which went on to claim scores of lives.

Personality clashes between prominent figures in both camps were cited as one possible reason. It was also widely held that

a third force was playing a catalytic role. While no conclusive evidence was forthcoming, all fingers pointed at the security forces, who had everything to gain while resistance groups had their energies misdirected. In early July, government rejected the UDF's accusations of complicity.

The struggle for power has left AZAPO a spent force in Port Elizabeth. Following the expulsion in early 1986 of AZAPO's 'Reverend' Mzwandile Ebenezer - who was frequently accused of stirring up trouble between AZAPO and the UDF - it seems as if the UDF is set to further expand its support. Currently, AZAPO which has been plagued by internal squabbles and adverse public opinion, is further being destabilised by escalating tension between Africanist and black consciousness elements within its ranks.

Cradock's Revolt

Since 1984, Cradock has been another boiling cauldron in the Eastern Cape. A school boycott started in February 1984 in support of educational demands and to protest the dismissal of prominent community figure and respected school teacher, Matthew Goniwe. He had been instrumental in establishing the Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA), which under his presidentship brought about the collapse of the Ilingelihle Community Council there.

Goniwe's involvement in civic issues had apparently perturbed his employers, the Department of Education and Training

Only 17 out of 45 community councils and two out of four black local authorities are operational in the Eastern Cape today

The feud between the UDF and AZAPO centred on personality clashes, political differences and manipulation by an unknown third force

Community advisor and mediator, Molly Blackburn, at the site of the Langa killings. After her fatal car accident, 20 000 black people attended the funeral on 2 January 1986.



CIVIL UNREST

Faceless death squads have been linked to the disappearance and killings of leading anti-apartheid activists, a chilling development

The consumer boycott was suspended in December after local business tried to meet those demands that were within its power

April has been set as the deadline for government to meet other demands that supersede the influence of local authorities

Anger is again rising because of the redeployment of troops in the region's townships, the banning of meetings and activists, and police shootings

(DET). A move to transfer him to Graaff Reinet in late 1983 was widely construed as a bid to decapitate CRADORA, and Goniwe refused to move. After his subsequent dismissal, Goniwe became a rural organiser for the UDF. One of his primary functions was to organise affiliates in the conservative platteland towns.

He was detained for nearly six months. Some time after his release, Goniwe was brutally murdered in mysterious circumstances, together with two other Cradock community leaders. An estimated 40 000 people attended their funeral on 20 July 1985, which drew worldwide attention. The murders sparked consternation in the Eastern Cape as it became apparent that unknown 'death squads' were out to annihilate any active opposition to apartheid policies. This chilling development was evident elsewhere in the country - by early July, 11 opposition leaders had been assassinated and another 27 activists had disappeared.

Earlier in Port Elizabeth, three executive members of PEBCO, including president Qaqawuli Godolozzi, disappeared mysteriously while driving to the local airport on 8 May. Their families made vain attempts to secure court orders, to force the police to produce them, if they had in fact been detained. Yet they have never been seen since, and again the faceless death squads are held responsible by the black community at large.

The Consumer Boycott

A fragile peace was achieved in the AZAPO-UDF feud in the second half of 1985, following a series of peace talks which began in May. The UDF and its affiliates now concentrated their energies on organising a consumer boycott of white businesses, which was to bankrupt scores of small-scale entrepreneurs, especially in Port Elizabeth and Queenstown.

The aim of the boycott, according to its organisers, was to withhold trade from white businessmen until they brought pressure to bear on the government to meet certain demands. These include:

- the release of political prisoners and leaders detained in terms of emergency regulations
 - the scrapping of Black Local Authorities
 - the bringing to justice of the Goniwe murderers
 - the production of missing community leaders
 - the removal of troops from the townships;
 - the lifting of the emergency; and
 - the consideration of student demands.
- With their profit margins drastically reduced, white traders were forced to sit up and pay attention to the black community's grievances. They scurried

about setting up meetings with boycott leaders, made representations to the police and took up certain issues at central government level. 'I think white businessmen have finally come to understand the frustrations of detention without trial and the general suffering in the black community', observed a boycott committee spokesman in Port Elizabeth.

With boycott leaders having satisfied themselves that the local chamber of commerce was genuine in its efforts to meet demands that were within its power, the boycott was conditionally suspended in late 1985. The move was mandated by 50 000 township residents at a rally on 1 December, at the Dan Qeqe stadium in Zwide, outside Port Elizabeth. A tumultuous year of black challenge and protest tapered off with relative calm.

The April Deadline

An uneasy lull hangs over Port Elizabeth as 1986 takes tentative shape. The consumer boycott received more than 90 percent support in 1985, and now that it has drawn blood, the community sees it as an effective tool for 'getting at them'. At last year's rally, April was set as a deadline for the government to address certain demands which are not within the power of the local authorities.

If the government fails to deliver the goods by then, the organisers have threatened to launch a consumer boycott coordinating committee, which would call for a national boycott. This is planned to coincide with the economic sanctions that Commonwealth leaders have threatened to impose, if their demands for reform are not met.

With student bodies also looking at April as a deadline for resuming student protest action, black communities in the Eastern Cape are holding their breath. Students returned to school on 28 January 1986 after last year's widespread classroom boycotts.

Anger and resentment has been building up in the townships because of the redeployment of troops which were withdrawn in December 1985. Much to the irritation of many activists, the authorities have also continued to ban gatherings, including church services. The level of anger was evident when the police detained more than 70 UDF marshals, after enforcing stringent restrictions on the funeral of a 13-year old victim of a police shooting earlier this year.

In the next few months, pressure will almost certainly be on community leaders to call for some act of defiance, to appease those who are already hot under the collar and to resume the momentum of last year's resistance campaigns. *IPA*

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