


VOLUME EIGHT NUMBER TWO

AUTUMN 1991

# INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A



**Natal/KwaZulu  
Negotiating the Future**

THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS

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


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**INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA** QUARTERLY REPORT

**VOL.8 No 2**

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# SPECIAL EDITION

The time is ripe for considered debate of the long-term prospects for peace and redevelopment in Natal/KwaZulu. The peace accord reached between the ANC and Inkatha on 29 January 1991 will become a key landmark on the scarred landscape of this region. Although the violence has not yet ended, now is the time to begin negotiating the shape of the future, to look positively to the immense tasks of reconstruction ahead.

After four years of intense civil violence, what has become known as *the Natal conflict* is not simply a parochial concern of the region's inhabitants. On this point there is surely consensus. The fresh outbreak of violent political rivalry in the Transvaal in mid-1990 visibly showed that developments in Natal and KwaZulu echo far beyond their boundaries. Indeed, the scale of this conflict has at times threatened to derail the national reform process itself during the last twelve months.

At last, however, there is the tantalising prospect of securing political stability in the region. We hope that this *Indicator SA* focus on Natal/KwaZulu will assist to open a window on a future which is no longer overshadowed by violent civil discord. If the peace holds, the region could become a model for the rest of the country - in regional negotiations between homeland, provincial and opposition groups, in the creation of post-apartheid arrangements in local government, and in the laboratory of socio-economic development to improve the quality of life for all.

In a series of interviews with *Indicator SA*, Inkatha and ANC leaders stress the virtues of political reconciliation, freedom of association and democratic contestation for constituencies. In our *Political Monitor*, Inkatha's Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Frank Mdlalose, the ANC's Jacob Zuma and Harry Gwala, and Oscar Dhlomo, discuss *inter alia* the critical transitional issues, regional administrative linkages, federal and local autonomy, multi-party principles, and their aspirations in the national negotiations towards a new South Africa.

The sooner the leadership message of political tolerance reaches grassroots supporters and enables the peace accord to take practical effect on the ground, the sooner reconstruction of the region's socio-economic infrastructure will get underway.

Many commentators argue that the impoverished material conditions found in formal and informal settlements throughout Natal/KwaZulu make communities, once politically mobilised, susceptible to intense conflict over scarce resources. We have been careful not to avoid this dimension of the civil violence. In our *Industrial Monitor*, for instance, Don Mkhwanazi shows how the strategic injection of development funds by the private sector and participation by the recipient communities could break this cycle of under-development and violence.

This special edition also emphasises the need to go beyond monitoring the causes and consequences of the violence. In a series of linked articles in the other three monitors, researchers identify the basic needs of people in the spheres of employment, settlement, water, health, education and telecommunications. These contributions by prominent social scientists draw on a unique planning instrument which collects and maps data on human resources for Natal/KwaZulu in a spatial form.

An interdepartmental project, the *Geographic Information System* (GIS) has been developed at the University of Natal by the Institute of Natural Resources and the Centre for Social and Development Studies. The maps on two of our monitor covers demonstrate how data on employment and literacy in a particular area can be represented in a spatial form. The variable access enjoyed by a rural, peri-urban or urban community to *inter alia* schools, hospitals and shelter will determine quality of life. In this way, the provision and satisfaction of basic needs is ultimately linked to socio-political stability.

It may be of some interest to our readers to know that the work on this special edition began some nine months ago. It has been a long haul from conception to completion. The historic meeting between Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela in January 1991 has laid the groundwork for returning peace to the region. We sincerely hope that through the exchange of ideas and information, linking current political developments with a review of socio-economic needs, *Indicator SA* might make a small contribution to the reconstruction efforts now underway in Natal/KwaZulu.

Graham Howe, Editor  
March 1991

# POLITICAL

## M O N I T O R

### The Natal Conflict: Estimating the Material Costs, 1987-1991

Compiled by Antoinette Louw, INDICATOR SA Research




#### Economic Costs

- ⊕ Incalculable losses in investment, production infrastructure, reduced business confidence
- ⊕ R900m in manpower/training losses through 4 500 'premature deaths', 1987-1991
- ⊕ R500m in direct losses in Natal, one-sixth of R3bn national total, 1990
- ⊕ R100m planned industrial complex relocated from Natal to Transvaal

#### Commercial & Industrial Losses

- ⊕ R51m in insurance claims in Natal, 1989-1990 (PWV: R32m; PE: R35m)
- ⊕ R500 000 per day in production losses, 7 stayaways between 1989-1990
- ⊕ R100m in production/retail in 2 July 1990 stayaway (R750m national cost)
- ⊕ R10,5m lost profits for Hammarsdale industry, 1989
- ⊕ R15m in cancelled civil engineering contracts, 1990




#### Housing Losses

- ⊕ 20 000 homes destroyed between 1987-1990
- ⊕ R600m in approximate replacement cost
- ⊕ R54m to replace 1 800 houses in Mpumalanga, 1987-1990

#### Transport Losses

- ⊕ R1,7m in KZT fares in bus boycotts
- ⊕ R1,6m in insurance claims for damaged KZT buses, 1987-1990
- ⊕ R3,4m in damages to Putco buses, 1987-1990
- ⊕ R205 000 in KZT/taxi fares in 2 July 1990 stayaway



#### KwaZulu Government Losses

- ⊕ R3,3m damages to buildings, furniture and vehicles
- ⊕ R1,2m damages to buildings in Mpumalanga, 1989

#### Health Costs

- ⊕ R32m in unrest-related services and supplies for NPA, 1991 budget
- ⊕ R2,5m on weekly treatment of 156 gunshot victims, one hospital, 1990
- ⊕ R200 000 per month for increased ambulance workload, 1990
- ⊕ R50 000 per weekend for ambulance service alert



#### Refugee/Homeless Costs

- ⊕ R500 000 to feed 6 000 Pmb refugees, six month budget, 1990
- ⊕ R3,3m to feed 20 000 refugees in Natal, six months in 1990

#### Education Losses

- ⊕ Only 1,6m of 2,7m children of schoolgoing age in KwaZulu schools, 1989
- ⊕ 60 000 children in Pmb area have no 'effective' education, 1991
- ⊕ 6 000 - 8 000 refugee children in Pmb area without schooling, 1990



#### SOURCES

Indicator SA newscippings  
Midlands Crisis Relief Committee  
Democratic Party Monitoring Group

SATOUR  
SASRIA  
PUTCO

#### Tourism Costs

- ⊕ R10m in lost foreign exchange in 1990 (National decrease of 5 000 tourists)
- ⊕ No figures available for loss in domestic tourism to Natal

#### RESEARCH NOTE

These figures provide approximate indicators of the material costs of the conflict in Natal. They are not intended to be fully comprehensive. The duration of the conflict and the overlap with criminal actions makes it impossible to calculate the real, total costs of ongoing civil violence over a four-year period. Monitoring has been fragmented on a regional basis and hampered by the inaccessibility of some of the affected areas. IPQA





## TOWARDS THE NEW NATAL Reconstructing The Region

By Graham Howe, Editor, Indicator SA

*Contemporary South African politics are characterised by two simultaneous processes which appear to be undercutting optimism about negotiations at the national and regional levels. Firstly, there is the mounting civil violence which is linked both to heightened expectations of reform and to struggles for power. Secondly, there is the uncertainty about the new ground rules which the actors should observe on the ambiguous terrain of transitional politics.*

*In this overview, Graham Howe locates civil violence in Natal/KwaZulu and the new ANC/Inkatha ground rules for political contestation in the context of transitional politics. He also introduces the main themes of the policymaker interviews and expert contributions to this special edition of Indicator SA on the dynamics of political conflict and socio-economic reconstruction in the region.*

A host of participants exchange places around the negotiating table which shapes the future of Natal/KwaZulu. Negotiations between the ANC and Inkatha to set rules of democratic contestation for power. Negotiations between KwaZulu, Natal and central government to rationalise a new regional administration. Negotiations between local authorities and civic groups to construct a non-racial metropolitan council for Greater Durban. Negotiations within divided communities to return peace to devastated peri-urban settlements.

The linkages of negotiation issues, negotiation levels and negotiation parties are complex. The stakes for the contenders for power and their constituencies are high. Political mobilisation in a climate of violent conflict further exacerbates tensions. Yet, nationally and regionally, negotiations at this critical juncture appear to hold out better prospects of resolving a perennial conflict about the distribution of power and resources in society than ever before in South Africa's history.

### Transitional Rules

It is often observed that for negotiations to commence, the costs of sustaining the conflict must be perceived to be higher by the parties to the conflict than the respective costs of political settlement. Four years of intense civil violence in Natal/KwaZulu have seen the costs of conflict mount higher and higher. The data compiled by *Indicator SA* (see political monitor cover) indicates that between 1987-1990 more than 4 500 lives have been lost in the region, with calculable material losses estimated at well in excess of two billion rands.

Consensus, at least on the awful costs of this conflict, has at last brought about compromise through negotiations between the ANC and Inkatha. The negotiating table superimposed on a map of Natal/KwaZulu is shown on the main cover of this special edition of *Indicator SA*. It symbolises the organic growth of negotiations since the 1980s between institutional actors at the first, second and third tier levels in the region. It also represents the emergence of extra-institutional participation in the 1990s, involving opposition groups and disenfranchised communities in negotiations at the national, regional and local levels.

The various peace accords reached in Natal between the ANC, Inkatha and local community leaders form an integral part of these negotiation processes. They establish some of the important ground rules for transitional politics through, for instance, seeking to prohibit the use of violence to resolve political differences. In terms of the peace agreement of 29 January 1991, they aim to develop a code of conduct which will *inter alia* promote freedom of association, multi-party contestation and mutual respect between rival political groups.

Although it is the outcome of violent political conflict, the ANC/Inkatha accord may ironically provide the beginnings of a framework for peaceful negotiations towards a New Natal in a New South Africa. In the interregnum, 'when the old authority is dying and the new cannot be born' (Gramsci, 1971), it is imperative that the political actors reach prior agreement on transitional rules. They must, for instance, regulate competition for constituencies.

*The ANC/Inkatha peace accord establishes some important ground rules for transitional politics through acknowledging principles of multi-party contestation*

*The failure to substitute peaceful contestation for violent struggle in the region may threaten the reform process itself*

*Implementing the peace accord is hampered by inadequate organisational infrastructure, poor internal discipline and low political education*

Indeed, the events of the last twelve months suggest that the failure to substitute peaceful contestation for violent struggle may threaten the reform process itself.

Negotiations within the region are explicitly linked to broader national political processes at work. The uncertainties embedded in transitional politics again come to the surface. Should the region 'follow the leader' and await the outcome of national negotiations? Or should interest groups seize the initiative and engage in exercises which deal with (hypothetical) federal and local options?

### Negotiation Issues

In the following series of interviews with *Indicator SA*, Inkatha's Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Frank Mdlalose, the ANC's Jacob Zuma and Harry Gwala, and Oscar Dhlomo look at a wide range of issues under negotiation, *inter alia*:

- linkages between national and regional reforms
- transitional ground rules for all parties
- post-accord relations between the ANC and Inkatha
- unitary versus federal constitutional frameworks
- the administrative integration of Natal/KwaZulu
- the future role of the homeland civil service
- the relative merits of constituent assemblies and an interim government.

As key figures in the peace talks, these ANC and Inkatha leaders discuss practical as well as principled measures to implement the peace accord. They stress that the accord will take time to take effect after four years of intense intra-community violence. They warn of unrealistic expectations that the spiral of vengeance and the climate of lawlessness will be broken overnight. But through joint ANC/Inkatha tours of trouble-spots, through the formation of joint ANC/Inkatha area committees to closely monitor developments and through effective crisis management, they believe the situation can slowly be brought under control.

Despite the commitment to peace by ANC and Inkatha leaders, practical implementation of the accord is hampered by their strategical differences (boycott and stayaway tactics), aggressive recruitment drives, inadequate organisational infrastructure, poor internal discipline and the low political education of their

membership. Then there is the shadowy role of allied 'supporters' who fall outside of the two organisations' control but often act in their name. Lastly, there are the criminal gangs (*comsotsis*), warlords and other 'third forces' which have a vested interest in maintaining a climate of lawlessness as they profit in various ways from the spoils of war.

In an atmosphere of internecine feuding, the resort to violence to resolve political differences appears to have become an acceptable practice at the grassroots level. Since the accord was reached, civil violence has continued unabated in contested areas in Pietermaritzburg (KwaShange), the Midlands (Richmond, Greytown) and on the South Coast (Umgababa). There were 98 fatalities recorded throughout Natal in January 1991, and preliminary estimates show a further 94 fatalities since the peace accord was reached on 29 January.

The assassination of Contralesa's Chief Maphumulo and the attempts on the lives of Harry Gwala and David Ntombela further raised the stakes in late February 1991. Although 140 Inkatha branch organisers and an unknown number of UDF/ANC area organisers had been killed in earlier conflict, the attacks on the higher leadership echelons by unknown forces was an ominous new development. These incidents underline the critical role of the security forces in the critical months ahead. By bringing the perpetrators to book and enforcing impartial policing in general, they can make an important contribution to returning law and order to the region.

It appears that the peace accord will take months to take effect at the local level and probably years to nurture a popular commitment to democratic values. In an interview with *Indicator SA* that follows, Oscar Dhlomo discusses the intended role of the newly launched 'Institute for Multi-Party Democracy'. Their goals are to promote a democratic culture in a South Africa marked by political tolerance, free and fair competition, and national reconciliation. To promote common values and political skills, they will initiate a training programme for young black leaders from all political groups and promote a national communications campaign on democratic education.

At the third tier level, there are more optimistic prospects of achieving reconciliation between the representatives of greater Durban's communities. But

groundrules, procedures and mandates must be broadly defined before substantive negotiations about the future structures of local government can begin. The lessons of the earlier KwaZulu/Natal Indaba are documented by Councillor Peter Mansfield in the closing contribution to our political monitor. A case study extrapolates the lengthy and complex steps involved if progress is to be made in the metropolitan 'talks about talks' embarked upon recently by the Durban City Council.

### Socio-Economic Stress

Although there is no direct causal linkage between socio-economic conditions and civil violence, the combination of these material stresses makes it more likely that people, *once politically mobilised*, will come into conflict. It is even more probable that they will resolve their differences through violence where political channels either do not exist or where political institutions inadequately represent their interests and aspirations. Once again, the ambiguities of transitional politics complicate conflict resolution. The legitimacy of the old order is challenged but new political arrangements are yet to be negotiated to take its place.

The stresses of poverty and under-development in a rapidly urbanising region are inextricably linked to the political conflict in Natal/KwaZulu. Demographic scenarios presented here (Bekker; Fincham & Piper) show that the population of the DFR has more than trebled from under 1 million in 1979 to more than 3 million in 1989. This massive influx of people and the lack of peri-urban infrastructure intensifies conflict over scarce resources in densely populated settlements, for instance, over access to land, housing, jobs, basic utilities, social services and the patronage of local leaders.

The twin processes of modernisation and reform will be a feature of South African society for the foreseeable future. They may produce even deeper faultlines in the transitional period. By the year 2000 the total population of the DFR will more than double, growing to between 6,5 to 8 million people (the March 1991 census should produce a more accurate estimate). Inevitably, social problems such as poverty, high unemployment rates and high crime rates may well increase. But effective planning by representative political institutions at all levels can anticipate and manage these stresses.

Economic growth is a prerequisite for successful negotiations towards a redistribution of resources in South African society. In a regional context, contributors to this special edition of *Indicator SA* focus on selective aspects of socio-economic reconstruction in Natal/KwaZulu, from employment creation (Krige) to telecommunication projects (Stavrou). They emphasise the need to reduce a complex of racial (white/black), spatial (urban/rural) and gender (male/female) inequalities in the provision of infrastructure (Fincham & Krige), education (Ardington, Moulder) and health (Hambridge & Krige).

If implemented, these practical proposals would help to improve the quality of life of the region's disadvantaged communities. The large-scale provision and coordination of development funds by the private and public sectors (Spies; Godsell) in conjunction with the active participation of the recipient communities (Mkhwanazi) could break the vicious cycle of under-development and violence. Responses to this immense challenge are already underway in the DFR in the form of initiatives such as the Independent Development Trust (see IPSA Update), 'Operation Jumpstart' and the Tongaat-Hullet Planning Forum.

It is an ambitious project to produce a review of political conflict and socio-economic needs in contemporary Natal/KwaZulu. The limitations of final deadlines and editorial space mean that this special edition of *Indicator SA* covers certain social needs while excluding others. In reviewing basic needs, for instance, we focus on the fields of employment, education, health and telecommunications. There are other aspects of development, of land and of housing, issues which we have monitored in earlier editions of our quarterly report. It is not our intention to obscure these equally important needs.

The real challenge for all the actors in Natal/KwaZulu is to stabilise the political environment so that the massive tasks of socio-economic reconstruction may begin. There has been enough wastage, rolling back development efforts, destroying precious resources and reinforcing poverty. Negotiations at all levels will build better political institutions to meet the needs of all of the region's diverse communities. The interviews with policymakers which follow approach these urgent transitional issues in this new spirit of reconciliation ...

*The legitimacy of the old order is challenged, but new political arrangements are yet to be negotiated to take its place*

*The real challenge for all the actors in Natal/KwaZulu is to stabilise the political environment so that socio-economic reconstruction may begin*

IPSA

# Which Way to Parliament?

*An Interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party*

*Conducted in Ulundi by Dr Yvonne Muthien, a guest researcher with the Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal*

*YM: What were the major points of conflict between Inkatha and the ANCI/UDF leading up to the meeting in Durban of 29 January 1991?*

*Buthelezi:* Tactics and strategies in our common goal of smashing apartheid. The Inkatha Freedom Party advocated a multi-strategy approach to this aim with all organisations being free to pursue their objectives, each in their own way, and free from domination of a single organisation dictating ultimate allegiance to its campaigns.

The reason behind IFP thinking was that if there was forced obedience to one line of action directed by one body, if it failed, all would fail. Ongoing South African governments had shown an ability to ruthlessly crush anti-apartheid organisations within the country - especially those with little broad-based constituency support. Once the leadership was smashed, they ceased to function effectively.

Also, we believed that South Africans had a democratic right to choose how they best could, in their own circumstances, defeat racism. They should not be forced to support programmes they disagreed with.

The IFP eschewed, for instance, the so-called 'armed struggle', the call to make South Africa 'ungovernable', the decision to 'eliminate' all those perceived as 'enemies' and 'collaborators', the targeting of town councillors, the 'liberation before education' campaign and the use of children

as the 'Young Lions' in the forefront of the struggle, sanctions, disinvestment and the forced coercion of workers to participate in stayaways and boycotts. The disastrous results of these campaigns are all too evident today.

First and foremost we advocated peaceful change and negotiation. We wanted decency and democratic behaviour in black politics. We saw no profit in violent confrontation. We believed the destruction of the South African economy to achieve political goals would, in the end, be a hollow victory for the masses with long-term disastrous results ...

There was endless vilification, war-talk and, tragically, sides were taken in various quarters. Political leaders here and abroad, and others stepped in and stirred the pot of black disunity. Money was funded to certain organisations and specifically used to mobilise action against Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. Arms and ammunition suddenly proliferated in communities that had previously enjoyed harmony. Strangers came into the midst of many and sowed bitter seeds of division. The stage was set for conflict on the ground.

At no stage, I must emphasise, did the leadership of Inkatha in any way support, encourage, direct or facilitate the ongoing murderous clashes which we denounced when they started and have done so ever since. We were horrified that Inkatha members and supporters were drawn into the carnage. To date we have lost more than 140 Inkatha branch leaders as well as thousands of members and supporters. It is sickening and barbaric.

*YM: Why have the political differences between Inkatha and the ANC found expression in violence? Has intolerance been the sole cause of the violence?*

*Buthelezi:* Definitely not. I think it is simplistic. While prominently of course, we bill the violence as political I think it is multi-dimensional. I mean, there's been violence caused by socio-economic conditions, which has been caused by poverty. There's been violence which has been caused by rapid urbanisation. After all, the informal population of Durban now is 1.7 million, which is more than the formal population of Durban. And that is why there has been a lot of looting in the violence, people taking away people's furniture and television sets. That is not political at all. Then you've got groups like the *Sinyoras* in KwaMashu and so on, *Comtsotsis* (comrade tsotsis). And unemployment.

Apartheid divided, it destroyed communities, it broke down family life. It was insidious and evil, it pervaded every aspect of the existence of black South Africans.

We have poverty and deprivation blighting millions of lives and racism is responsible to a major degree. All kinds of socio-economic determinants have a direct link to the violence. The 'have's' versus the 'have-nots', criminality, ignorance, revenge, family and community feuds, gang warfare, competition for scarce resources - even the floods and the drought which ravaged the country. This list is endless.

All the pain and anguish caused dangerous political divides too. Apartheid dehumanised, it obviously politicised. Cleavages, intolerance, lack of respect, were a by-product. A mentality developed of either you were 'for' or 'against' and either way, if you were on the 'wrong side', you were doomed. A winner-takes-all attitude developed in the minds of some.

There were those who had access to massive funding which helped them propagate their viewpoints and, at the same time, slam who they perceived to be their opponents. Tension proliferated. The resulting violence is mindless and horrific.

*YM: How would you describe the relations between Inkatha and the ANC after the meeting?*

*Buthezi:* I am encouraged. The leaderships are now talking, interacting and honestly trying, I believe, to stop the violence. We are, of course, taking the first steps in what will no doubt be a process of reaching out by all concerned to supporters and others and trying to inculcate the noble objectives we are both committed to. My meeting with the Deputy President of the ANC, Dr Nelson Mandela, renewed and reaffirmed the friendship and mutual respect we have always had.

*YM: What kind of follow-up meetings are planned between Inkatha and ANC?*

*Buthezi:* These are set out in the joint ANC/IFP statement although specifics will be mutually agreed upon as we go along. It was agreed that it was imperative that the decisions taken and proposals adopted between us should 'permeate down to the grass-roots through the use of all available channels of communication ...' We will have further discussions and use all the resources at our joint disposal. There will also be a joint tour of all affected areas by Dr Mandela and myself.

*YM: Given the February outbreak of violence at Umgababa, would Inkatha be able to implement the Peace Accord on the ground? What practical steps can be taken to ensure that the Peace Accord is adhered to?*

*Buthezi:* It is not only up to the Inkatha Freedom Party but all concerned to try to achieve peace. The 'practical steps' are being mutually worked out and it is not for me to pre-empt any decisions



being made by all involved. We must all co-operate in this endeavour. We must all try to do what we can to get our members and supporters to believe us when we say that the violence must stop. I do not think it will be easy. There has been too much hatred and heartache. Divisions in some areas run deep. The IFP is going to do its best. What more can we do?

*YM: Has sufficient groundwork been laid for the ANC and Inkatha to tolerate each other in the same region, given that fundamental differences in strategy remain?*

*Buthezi:* Surely we must express genuine political tolerance. We must respect the rights of all to support the leaders and organisation they wish to. This has always been the position of the IFP. If that groundwork is not there, it must be laid so that freedom of political expression can proliferate.

Personally, I think people are exhausted by what has been going on. I think the groundwork is already there to a very large degree in the hearts and minds of the vast majority of decent people in the region. They want peace. They want democratic choices. They want to be left alone to make up their own minds.

Trouble-makers should be revealed for what they are. I am not saying it will be easy. We all have to

deal with the bitterness felt by many who have the capacity to wreak havoc. There are a lot of damaged human souls out there ... Now is the time for cool heads, clear thinking, and above all civilised behaviour. Leaders must set an example.

*YM: What are your hopes for the outcome of these meetings? Could it potentially lead to an alliance between the Inkatha and the ANC?*

*Buthlezi:* ... When people talk about an alliance between the ANC and the IFP it is as though because our organisations are predominantly black, we must be monolithic. Must we? Why is it acceptable for western countries to enjoy multi-party democracies, and yet time and time again I am asked why all black forces do not join together in South Africa?

Would that be healthy? Would it be in the best interests of this country? Is it possible for a single organisation to encapsulate all the desires of the people? Should people not have a choice to put various parties into power and to remove them from power should they wish to do so?

As I see it, organisations form alliances when they share common goals and values. The ANC has an alliance with the South African Communist Party. The IFP will have no truck with communism. Why are we being pressurised to jump into bed with them when it is politically impossible for us to do so? The IFP would cease to exist if we did. Its members would seek or form a more compatible political home elsewhere.

That doesn't mean the ANC/IFP cannot respect each others right to exist. Surely we can agree to disagree and leave it up to the people of South Africa to decide who they want to govern them.

I see no reason why the IFP should not form alliances in the future. We already have affiliations with various like-minded bodies. I must also state that I believe democratic political competition to be healthy.

The IFP is against primarily racial blocks ganging up against each other. If we are going to build a new South Africa based on non-racialism and equality, all parties must make sure they have platforms that appeal to the vast majority. Checks and balances in politics are only produced when there are those who can act as watchdogs. This is why the IFP seeks devolution of power in South Africa, not concentration of power.

*YM: What is your position on reincorporation into South Africa? Although KwaZulu has not opted for independence, it nevertheless exercises a considerable degree of autonomy in administration.*

*Buthlezi:* KwaZulu, unlike the other homelands,

is not a creation of the homelands policy. When the Zulus were conquered in 1879, they were actually a sovereign state, with a king and so on. When the whole policy of creating ethnic nationalisms, ethnic autonomy, arose, we should naturally have opted for it because we were a nation long before. But because history had made us South Africans, we didn't take it on our own until we were compelled to do so.

In 1979/80 I appointed the Buthelezi Commission to look at the whole region of Kwazulu/Natal because it was a lot of nonsense to regard KwaZulu as separate from Natal. After all, it's one region! The Commission made recommendations for one legislature for all the people of this region, white, coloured, Indian and African. They suggested a consociational formula but the government rejected it.

Still we were not discouraged because we always believed that we must move away from what the government was trying to establish, that is to fragment us and denationalise us as South Africans. So further negotiations followed with the provincial administration, which resulted in the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba where we sought to establish a joint legislature for all the people of the region. The participants sat there for nine months and produced these proposals, which included a bicameral system with one-person-one-vote for the first chamber, also a proportionate system, and a second chamber where people were elected on the basis of either their Afrikaner, English, Indian, African or broad South African identity. Some of our coloured brothers did not want to be categorised as 'coloureds', so a fifth category of 'South African' was created for them.

These proposals were again rejected by the government because the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, said that the whole thing was based on a majoritarian model; as if there's no black majority. Since then, however, the Joint Executive Authority, which includes both the Province and KwaZulu, has been established by law, where we have to deal with certain matters as one administrative unit. That's the direction we shall always move, my politics have always moved in that direction.

*YM: So you've always considered KwaZulu to be part of South Africa?*

*Buthlezi:* Quite correct. I'm in favour of devolution of power on a regional basis, but not on an ethnic basis, rather on a geographic basis.

*YM: How do you see the role of KwaZulu in the process of negotiation and a changing South Africa?*

*Buthlezi:* I've told the state president that KwaZulu, as KwaZulu, will be represented; but

that I'll represent my organisation, Inkatha, as a political party, separate from KwaZulu. But KwaZulu as KwaZulu has a seat at the negotiation table, which the state president has acknowledged.

*YM: Given the options of either a unitary state, a federation, or confederation, what would you prefer?*

*Buthlezi:* I think I prefer a federation. Quite clearly in a country like South Africa, if one looks at what's happened in Russia, for example, one must realise that a federal formula is nearer. We tended to be prejudiced against anything other than a unitary state, *a la* Westminster. This country was a colony of Britain and people tended to think that was the only way. But there are many big democracies, like France, the United States and Germany, which are all federal states. So there's nothing really we should be shrinking away from.

*YM: So federation will allow at least a greater measure of regional autonomy?*

*Buthlezi:* Yes, personally I'm against a centrist government, like Russia, or even the powers that the South African State President has at present. I think there should be more power devolving on a regional basis.

*YM: What about the so-called citizen certificates issued to homeland residents, does this not contradict your refusal to accept independence?*

*Buthlezi:* In fact it helped many people. During the time when Transkeians and Xhosas and others could not get South African passports, because we rejected independence they applied for KwaZulu citizenship, as a convenience, and therefore they got South African passports. Those legal certificates did quite an important thing, in preventing the denationalisation of many South Africans, who were not even Zulu-speaking.

*YM: Do you have any formal relations of cooperation with any of the other self-governing territories?*

*Buthlezi:* It would really be pretentious to say that we have relationships because we're all part of South Africa. Well, Pretoria would have wanted us to regard ourselves as budding foreign countries, but we have never looked at ourselves as that. For instance, I've always done whatever I could do through the KwaZulu Investment Corporation, to establish about three or four industrial estates which create employment for people. But without any intent of having an economy for KwaZulu, because there's only one economy here. The whole of Southern Africa have their economies interwoven with this economy.

*YM: What are your views on a constituent assembly? Will your participation in the national political process come through elections?*

*Buthlezi:* Yes, then multi-party democracy works like anywhere else. People are given choices, then they vote for the party they support, whose ideals coincide with their own ideals and policies.

*YM: What about the future of the KwaZulu administration, the bureaucracy, in a new South Africa?*

*Buthlezi:* The most unitary of all governments of course is the Westminster model, isn't it? But you still have home government for Wales and Scotland, not so? In the United States in a federal formula you've got senators, you've got capitals in those states and so on.

*YM: Will there be a restructuring of positions when you have for instance a single health portfolio, or education portfolio, for Natal and KwaZulu?*

*Buthlezi:* A certain measure of merging is taking place already. We order, for instance, medicines under the same administrative framework and we've saved a lot of money.

*YM: Perhaps some of the jobs in the civil service might disappear?*

*Buthlezi:* How can they? I mean, whether it's in education or in health, there are many posts that are frozen here because our funds are not enough. In other words I can't see that there are jobs that are going to disappear. The need exists, people who get pensions, for instance, they'll always get them. Services have got to be administered.

*YM: What about the loss of executive capacities, the ability to decide on the allocation of funds, etc? Do you foresee this to be a problem when KwaZulu and Natal merge?*

*Buthlezi:* What is the loss in fact? The main thing is to serve as far as I'm concerned. If people get better services because we have merged, that's all I'm really concerned with. I wouldn't have started these initiatives if I was concerned about any loss of power. **IPRA**

#### **Acknowledgement**

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## Between Brittle Constituencies

*An Interview with Jacob Zuma,  
ANC NEC Chief of Intelligence,  
ANC Chairperson, Southern Natal*

*Conducted in Durban by Dr Yvonne  
Muthien, a guest researcher with the  
Centre for Social and Development  
Studies, University of Natal*

*YM: What is the current strength of the ANC in Natal?*

*Zuma:* The ANC has just been unbanned. The process of building the ANC is still vigorously underway. The support of the ANC in Natal is very large, firstly because of its own history in this region. At the time of its banning the ANC was very strong here. President Albert Luthuli was well respected and from this province. Its support is not only based in the cities. There are many people in the rural areas who were involved in the anti-pass campaigns in the 1950s, who still have those memories today and who regard themselves as part of the ANC.

The adoption of the armed struggle made our people feel that the ANC was indeed representing them, in the highest form of struggle against the racist regime. This has been one of the important factors which has earned the ANC popular support. When Inkatha emerged, it used the same colours and in so doing spread the message of the ANC. Some people, much as they would be ANC, would not want to show that they are ANC because of the unfortunate fact of violence. But the ANC certainly enjoys considerable support. The rate at which the branches are being established is an indication of the kind of support that the ANC has. What we are trying to do is to translate that popular support, which is evident, into actual membership.

*YM: What is the position of the ANC in areas under the control of KwaZulu?*

*Zuma:* There have been difficulties in the outlying areas. We are hoping that those difficulties will be overcome, in view of our discussions with Inkatha.

*YM: What were the main points of conflict between Inkatha and ANC. Why in particular have those differences found expression in violence?*

*Zuma:* The points of differences between Inkatha and the ANC were basically our methods of struggle, the disinvestment or sanctions campaign and the armed struggle. But these differences developed against the backdrop of a very vicious apartheid system, which was in fact responsible for the violence that finally emerged between the two organisations; having to operate in a violent society, facing violence by the regime. That people tended to solve their problems in a violent manner, was the product of apartheid in itself.

The violence was not only the property of Inkatha and ANC. But between Inkatha and the ANC it tended to carry on longer, to be more deep rooted and more destructive. We have differences with other organisations, but these differences were not necessarily factors leading these organisations to violent conflict. People who were involved in Natal tended to be more militant in the sense of being violent, of dealing with everything in a violent manner. I think it is important for us to see it in context, that there have been problems of violence between other organisations as well.


*YM: Has sufficient groundwork been laid between Inkatha and ANC to operate in the same territory?*

*Zuma:* I think sufficient groundwork has been laid for these two organisations to tolerate each other. The culture of violence is endemic in South Africa. What is happening serves the apartheid regime. We therefore need to address the fundamental issues that have made people violent. The emphasis today is to deal with the politics of change, of discussing our future. The very fact that we have been able to discuss our differences, lays sufficient groundwork for tolerance. After all, some of the issues that we might have differed over for a long time, are not going to remain on the agenda if South Africa changes.

*YM: Does the ANC have the capacity to implement the peace accord on the ground?*

*Zuma:* Yes. The ANC does have the capacity to implement the peace accord on the ground, there is no doubt about that. The fact that there has been a clearer understanding between the two organisations and the fact that we are committed to peace, should enable us to do so. What has made efforts fail before was that there was no sufficient commitment on either side. At times the commitment would be shown by people in different localities without support from other localities or their headquarters. Since the entire





organisation is now committed to peace, we don't see a difficulty in dealing with this.

We cannot implement the accord overnight, that would be naive. It is going to be difficult, simply because people have lost their beloved ones and their property, and people are very angry. It is going to take a lot of effort, politically and materially, to deal with the question. I have no illusions that it is going to take a long time for people to forget the violence in Natal. We need to work hard to see to it that people are able to tolerate one another.

*YM: What triggered off the violence in Umgababa and KwaShange at the same time as the two organisations were embarking on peace talks? Is it mere coincidence?*

*Zuma:* The violence was taking place at Umgababa as we were meeting. So it was not triggered afterwards, it was actually a continuation of what was happening. KwaShange then erupted. The Midlands, in particular Pietermaritzburg, is one of the areas that has been ravaged by violence for many years. I don't think that you can say overnight, that because people have talked, the conflict will be over. People will still be suspicious for some time and will mistrust the behaviour of others, because they are not yet sure.

There have been accords in the past at the local level in Pietermaritzburg which were not respected or were broken. We have to work hard to convince people that this peace accord is different from the others. What we have to do is to quicken the process of dealing with violence, to pre-empt it where it is beginning to show.

*YM: Are you hopeful that the violence will end during the course of this year?*

*Zuma:* I have no doubt that by the end of this year there will be peace in this province. I don't think there is anyone who thinks that we are benefitting politically out of this violence. Instead we are actually causing untold misery and pain. I think this is a recognition which is being made by all sides. I have seen some people, including some chiefs, and I feel that the message is getting through. Everybody is ready to work very hard to end the violence.

*YM: The role of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) has been very controversial in the violence. Is the ANC still calling for its disbandment?*

*Zuma:* The ANC never accepted bantustans in the first instance. So there was nothing strange for the ANC to have problems with those kinds of institutions. They were imposed, like the whole superstructure in South Africa has been imposed upon us. There have been specific problems and perceptions that the KZP, in the minds of the people who were on the other side, were taking sides. When the KZP emerged, nobody said that they did not want the KZP to exist in any way.

The call for the disbandment of the KZP only emerged when violence was at its peak, when the perceptions of the people and their own experiences were that the KZP participated in the violence. Now that we are in discussion with Inkatha, those issues will certainly be addressed. The KZP was actually a signatory to the Lower Umfolozi Accord. We did not have a problem with the KZP signing the accord.

*YM: Could the meetings between Inkatha and ANC potentially lead to an alliance in the future?*

*Zuma:* It is not easy to predict the question of alliances. Those are questions that are determined by political developments and the reshaping of tactics and strategies. It would certainly be determined by the march of time, particularly as we begin to discuss the issues of change, of a new constitution. One may find that where we have disagreed before, as we discuss the issues, we actually become closer, and then why not come together?

*YM: Has the violence in any way forced the ANC into talks with Inkatha?*

*Zuma:* The ANC has not been forced by the violence to talk to Inkatha. Inkatha had relations with the ANC in 1979 when there was no violence. The ANC has been in discussion with many organisations, without there being any violence at all. Violence became one of the issues to discuss with Inkatha, perhaps an issue that could precipitate a particular meeting, but it cannot be seen as the only issue for talks with Inkatha. The ANC has had discussions with Azapo and the PAC. Why is the question not asked of those two organisations?

*YM: Do the talks between Inkatha and ANC include discussion of ANC strategies, such as the defiance campaign, to prevent potential clashes in the region?*

*Zuma:* These issues were touched upon in the discussion, but not in any detail. Certainly, one may not rule out such discussions in the future, particularly if there are perceptions that certain strategies or tactics influence the question of violence. Some misconceptions are caused by the fact that there is no explanation or discussion of strategy. The government itself has a lot of misconceptions. At times they don't even differentiate mass action from the armed struggle. I don't see how we can avoid talking about these issues in order to clarify our position. We may find that we can even agree to support each other in some actions.

*YM: As the ANC Chief of Intelligence you have also participated in the ongoing talks between the ANC and central government. Would the ANC be prepared to compromise on its demand for a constituent assembly and an interim government?*

*Zuma:* We cannot say that we will back down on this issue. I don't think it is ever done in discussions or negotiations. Each party comes with its own demands and you listen to what other people are saying, to see whether that makes sense in terms of the interests of the people. The Nationalist government has been ruling by the will of the minority, they must now be ready to listen to

the changing situation. It is our firm conviction that the body that will draw up the constitution and that will have the support of the majority of the people of this country, should be the constituent assembly. So far we have heard no counter-argument that is convincing. We are ready to listen and we hope they will listen to us.

*YM: Would the ANC be prepared to negotiate a new constitution with all political parties first before it goes into elections? It has been said that one cannot have elections in the absence of a constitution.*

*Zuma:* The ANC's position is that political groupings, no matter how small they are, should voice their views. That is why we have called for an all-party congress, to work out some rules, some understanding of how we get there. So it is not about one party dominating the others, but about parties representing their constituencies. We don't want to prescribe anything on a hard and fast rule right now. An all-party congress would be crucial in dealing with those kinds of issues.

*YM: What is the ANC view on the future South African state? How will the issue of regional autonomy be dealt with?*

*Zuma:* We certainly believe that a unitary state is the model for South Africa and that any kind of local government should flow from that. We don't want to see regional autonomy being so promoted that the central government ends up not actually governing. We cannot have a situation where we have too many governments. We want a unitary state, which will work out how either provinces or regions are handled by the central government.

*YM: What are your views on the future of KwaZulu as a homeland?*

*Zuma:* I don't think there is much of an argument because the KwaZulu homeland has always regarded itself as part of South Africa. Whatever constitutional arrangements we arrive at in relation to the provinces, I think KwaZulu will just automatically follow suit. We want an efficient government that is well managed. The tendency in the past was that government was concentrated in the big cities. So when the new constitution is evolved we will have to see how those regional or provincial governing institutions will fit in.

*YM: What role do you foresee for Inkatha in the national negotiation process?*

*Zuma:* We believe that everybody in this country has the right to belong to a political party, to propagate political views in whatever way. Inkatha is one such organisation. As a political party it will therefore play a part in the negotiations. No political parties will be excluded from the political process to bring about a new constitution. That

will certainly be a recipe for another struggle. So Inkatha will play a role. I would say it is actually determined to do so.

*YM: Does KwaZulu have a place in the national negotiation process?*

*Zuma:* I do not think so, because the people who are supposed to be negotiating are the political parties, not the governing institutions. Even the Nationalist Party has begun to realise that the Party, not the government, will be involved in the negotiations. The party that wins the elections then governs. We cannot have a situation where there is no dividing line between the government and the party, as has been the case with the National Party. That certainly has been the shortcoming of the politics of this continent, there has been a tendency towards one-party governments ... I don't see any of the homeland governments negotiating as governments. The political parties which emerge in the homelands can participate.

*YM: Would the ANC become involved in the joint administration of Natal, such as with the Joint Executive Authority or the proposed Joint Services Boards?*

*Zuma:* We have a very difficult situation in the country. The existing apartheid structures are still operating at this point in time, irrespective of the National Party's declaration of change, perpetuating what they have been doing before. If the ANC became part of that, it will be like saying that we want to be co-opted. We are not at all ready to be co-opted. We want change, we want to participate in shaping new structures which will evolve as a result of the new constitution. The quicker we arrive at a new constitution the better for everybody, because we are very sensitive to the question of co-option.

There are of course specific things that we must begin to influence, but not by sitting in executives and becoming part of the government. A way must be found where we begin to influence processes in one way or the other. For example addressing the squatter issues around the city, because our people are in that plight right now. In being part of that kind of process, we begin to show what kind of a new South Africa we want. So our participation is at that level.

*YM: Would the ANC consider compromising on their demand for one-person one-vote, by accepting proportional representation?*

*Zuma:* In keeping with our policy, it is our firm view that we need one-person one-vote in this country. We don't look at ourselves as groups. Unfortunately the demand for proportional representation pushes forward the question of groups once more. We have had enough destruction and mistrust caused by the notion of

groups. We do not look at colour, if we did, it would be taking us backward politically. We have cut across group barriers. We regard ourselves as South Africans and we think that an electoral system should reflect that. We don't want to disguise what before was a naked kind of racism, by now putting it in comfortable words.

*YM: What is the position of Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres inside and outside the country, following your recent agreement with the government?*

*Zuma:* Let us make the position very clear. The ANC has suspended, not terminated, the armed struggle. Suspension does not mean that MK cadres have to surrender their arms. We recognise the fact that we are working for change in South Africa. We don't look at the suspension as something that will remain for thirty or forty years to come. We are looking at it relative to the political process, to the working of a new constitution in this country. We have therefore not changed the position since August last year. All we did was to work out some details for the period of suspension, because the issues could not have been left unattended.

The MK cadres are going to remain where they are with their weapons. The cadres outside South Africa will remain in their camps, they are not going to come in. The ones inside are not going to be operating or conducting armed action. The security forces also have to behave in a particular way towards them. We have the liaison group that will be monitoring both parties. We had to work on the details of those kinds of things so that we don't have a situation where there are unfortunate accidents, where we cannot refer to any agreed position. With MK guys inside, what would happen if a clash ensued, or if people bumped against them? We will not train people inside, but we will maintain the underground, and we will be in constant discussion.

We are looking at the situation as it moves, in a phased manner. There must be movement on the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. We are looking forward to a situation where we can move quickly into constitutional discussions. Until you have the new constitution, you cannot say that you have solved the problems. These agreements are therefore to deal with the period of suspension. The pace of the phasing out of armed struggle will certainly be encouraged by what happens on the political scene.

Of course, people do have different interpretations of things. When we talked about 'related activities' in August we had a particular view of what it meant, but the government had its own understanding of it. This is usually the case when people interpret things, particularly if they are coming from two different sides. **IPIA**

# A Marriage of Convenience

An Interview with Dr Frank Mdlalose,  
KwaZulu Minister of Health,  
National Chairman of the Inkatha  
Freedom Party

Conducted in Durban by Dr Yvonne  
Muthien, a guest researcher with the  
Centre for Social and Development  
Studies, University of Natal



*YM: What role will KwaZulu play in the national negotiation process?*

*Mdlalose:* KwaZulu is part and parcel of Natal/KwaZulu. The role of KwaZulu is the role of participant in South Africa, like the other regions. We are all segments of different sizes, but we are all segments of South Africa. So we will all be participating in the negotiations.

*YM: Will KwaZulu be participating in negotiations as part of Natal, or as KwaZulu?*

*Mdlalose:* We negotiate from where we are. We don't negotiate from where we want to get to. We believe that Natal and KwaZulu should be integrated as one, but it has not yet been formed. So we shall negotiate as KwaZulu - we cannot abdicate from our position of responsibility as the KwaZulu government.

The issue of who participates at national level has not been resolved fully. We have Inkatha Freedom Party, which would be a participant in negotiations as a political party. We believe it should be parties that negotiate there. But once you've got the national scene aired, then the second tier comes in. There KwaZulu will negotiate, not to maintain KwaZulu as such, but because it is a *de facto* regional, second tier structure.

*YM: Is the commitment in the Inkatha Manifesto to redistribution and to free enterprise not somewhat contradictory?*

*Mdlalose:* We don't think so. We think the free enterprise system manufactures the biggest cake. Blacks have been deprived from taking part in the division of that cake. So we have to open opportunities to everybody, black and white. To us these two things are not inconsistent. Blacks must be integrated into the free enterprise system. If you nationalise everything and everybody is a civil servant, he's not likely to make his best contribution.

*YM: Do you see the nature of the future South Africa state in unitary, confederal or federal terms?*

*Mdlalose:* In unitary terms, with regionalisation. I don't believe in fragmenting South Africa into a hundred and one little titbits of independent countries. I don't believe in confederal structures. I believe in one unitary South Africa, with regional structures, second tier government. These things must come to the table and we must negotiate it.

*YM: What are your views on a constituent assembly?*

*Mdlalose:* I don't really think highly of a constituent assembly. I think it will be very counterproductive if you were to have elections now; that would pre-empt negotiation. In fact the results of that election will then be the new government. I don't see how we can then say, 'We now negotiate a new constitution'. It will already be in place. So the constituent assembly is jumping the gun.

*YM:* So you think that political differences between parties should be settled at the negotiating table, rather than through elections?

*Mdlalose:* In the final analysis there must be elections. But first we must negotiate a new constitution. Then we will be at the negotiating table without anybody coming in as the boss ... With different political parties it is an open game of sharing ideas. At the moment we need cool, steady construction of a constitution, that will effectively bring out the best in South Africa. We have to establish that constitution first and then people will vote afterwards for their different political parties.

*YM:* KwaZulu enjoys a considerable degree of regional autonomy. Given that you believe in a unitary South Africa, would not KwaZulu have to forgo that autonomy?

*Mdlalose:* It might mean that, but we want the first tier government to be sorted out by national constitutional negotiations, then what happens to the second and third tier will fall in line with that. So whether we lose power or not, is not important. I have no problem with the loss of autonomy. I'll be taking part in the negotiations. We will be in a position to say what belongs to the region, KwaZulu/Natal, whose powers are negotiable.

*YM:* What will happen to the KwaZulu civil service if there is one KwaZulu-Natal region? Do you foresee a loss of jobs with the creation of single departments and rationalisation?

*Mdlalose:* Administration requires so many people, because there are jobs to be done. So I don't see why there should be any loss of jobs because of restructuring or putting KwaZulu and Natal together. We have this Joint Executive Authority where civil servants in Natal and KwaZulu all work together. Take medicine, we have doctors in KwaZulu. We don't manufacture patients for the sake of having KwaZulu, they are there, because they need care. We don't manufacture pensioners and pupils, because we are a government of KwaZulu. The pensioners are there, they need pensions, the pupils are there, they need teachers.

*YM:* How competitive will KwaZulu civil servants be in an integrated bureaucracy?

*Mdlalose:* In our administration we don't appoint people because they are black, we appoint people because they can do jobs. We have posts that require certain qualifications. If a white has a higher qualification, the position is given to the white, because we give the job to the best person. If black and white are of equal qualifications, we give the job to the black.

*YM:* Does that imply that there are more whites in the top echelons of your civil service?

*Mdlalose:* It is so. We only have two blacks as superintendents of hospitals in my 26 hospitals, the rest are white. I can mention the number of black specialists on less than one hand. We don't have a policy of promoting people because they are black. We promote people because they are capable.

*YM:* Do you think that the financial situation which faces KwaZulu would improve with the integration of Natal and KwaZulu?

*Mdlalose:* Basically, there is prejudice in this country. The central government have always undersupplied blacks. The government maintained that money comes from the white to the black man as a gift. We all contribute to the common fiscus of the country and we blacks contribute no less than whites do. But we don't get back to us what we ought to be getting ... There is a big disparity in government subsidy for beds between white Natal and white Transvaal - so even white Natal is not really heaven. We need more money from the common fiscus because we contribute towards that in our own right, not because we are hiding behind the skirts of the whites.

*YM:* What will you do with the abolition of homeland ministerial portfolios in a new South Africa?

*Mdlalose:* I could be in charge of the health services in the region of Natal/KwaZulu. Whether you call me minister or director, I have been in administration for some time. I could be number two or even number ten man. So I'm not going to lose my job. I wasn't born Minister of Health!

*YM:* What would happen to the KwaZulu Police (KZP) with integration? What is your response to the ANC's call for the abolition of the KZP?

*Mdlalose:* ... There will never be a heaven or utopia in South Africa where you don't need police. The KZP have been trained as policemen, like all the other policemen in the country. At present the KZP are under the KwaZulu government, which is in control of a region. The police will go on policing, whether in Kwa-X, Y, Z, or in the Cape Province; they've not had a special training for KwaZulu.

*YM: The role of the KZP in the violence has been contentious. There were even allegations that they were being trained at Askari bases.*

*Mdlalose:* I think it's just mere hooey. The KZP have been trained in South Africa, in training centres like Hammanskraal. They took up KwaZulu work, coming from the South African Police, even though we are now training people ourselves. In the police force I suspect some of them would be Inkatha members, I also suspect some of them would be UDF/ANC members.

*YM: What linkages of cooperation are there between KwaZulu and other self-governing territories?*

*Mdlalose:* There's more contact between KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Administration than between KwaZulu and any other structure. People say KwaZulu is fragmented, but they don't ever see the Natal Province Administration as fragmented. But KwaZulu and the Province have a lot in common, that is why we have the Joint Executive Authority. We meet every month. We also have a health standing committee, who meet every month. We have contact between the hospitals in KwaZulu and Natal on an ongoing basis. We exchange patients between hospitals. We run clinics jointly. We have Edendale hospital and next door is Grey's hospital. They have this computerised brain scanning machine at Grey's hospital, but we don't have it at Edendale. So we share.

*YM: Are there similar structures of joint cooperation in other departments which flow from the JEA, as well?*

*Mdlalose:* Yes. Let me give you the example of the department of works: Between Newcastle and Utrecht there is a road that stretches about fifty km. The first eight to ten kilometres is in white Natal; cross a river and travel 300m - you're in KwaZulu, thereafter you're back into white Natal for about 2-3 km, and then back into KwaZulu for another 15 km, and finally white Natal as you enter Utrecht. If this bridge over the Ngakane river washes away, whose responsibility is it going to be - KwaZulu or Natal? We have to plan and construct that road together. Apartheid was not born of us. That is the stupidity of separating KwaZulu from Natal. We have been fighting apartheid and fragmentation all this time.

*YM: What about educational cooperation?*

*Mdlalose:* There has been a lot of contact. The problem was that after 1986, the educational portfolio was removed from the province. We have had lots of contact with private schools in Natal. We got blacks into Edgewood College in Pinetown. We have established libraries at black schools in Natal through the Joint Executive

Authority. If we had been allowed to implement the Indaba proposals for Natal/KwaZulu, we would have gone a long way ...

*YM: You have been a key figure in the peace talks between Inkatha and the ANC. What are your impressions of this process?*

*Mdlalose:* I think it has been a worthwhile exercise. Since we spoke to ANC-NEC members directly we found that we could cover more ground and reach conclusions a little quicker, than when we were speaking with their surrogates, UDF/Cosatu. We spoke with UDF/Cosatu over years, but we could get nowhere. We would have long delays, while they were trying to communicate and get instructions from Lusaka. Another thing, when we spoke with the ANC people we could establish personal relations. We felt we were influencing people who could make decisions about issues. That to me was the basis for the cessation of violence, the basis from which we can move on towards the acceptance and tolerance of one another.

We got the feeling with the UDF that they were always fearing what others would say if they were seen to be talking to us. With the ANC we don't get that impression at all. That was the main obstacle, why talks between Inkatha and UDF/Cosatu broke down. We were talking to boys of a family where there were old men at the back. The boys wondered what the old men would say at home if they appeared to be talking to us and getting friendly with us, so they'd rather be enemies with us; whereas if you talk to the parents, you have an open channel of communication. At the November conference the UDF/Cosatu were blaming the ANC-NEC members, saying, 'how can you talk to these "Inkatha devils"?' They had been taught that it is not right to talk to us. That is why our talks with the ANC scheduled for 8 November 1990 had to be cancelled.

*YM: There is still some resistance in the lower ANC ranks against meeting with Inkatha.*

*Mdlalose:* It's more a case of resistance from Natal UDF/Cosatu structures who are now absorbed into ANC, not Natal ANC as such. But people in the high echelons of ANC have no problems with me. I can ring Zuma up, we can share jokes ...

*YM: Dr Buthelezi appeared very sceptical about the all-party conference called by the ANC.*

*Mdlalose:* I'm not going to say a word which might be misinterpreted. It's something that is current and delicate. I know there are many people who would grasp at anything to bedevil the relations between Inkatha and ANC. There are many who didn't want Mandela to meet Buthelezi. I don't want to destroy that which is good. ~~FOIA~~

# Spear of the Midlands

An interview with Harry Gwala, ANC Chairperson, Natal Midlands

Conducted in Pietermaritzburg by Dr Yvonne Muthien, a guest researcher with the Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal

*YM: What are your views on the future of the KwaZulu homeland?*

*Gwala:* It is not correct to talk of the KwaZulu homeland. These so-called homelands are a creation of the apartheid regime, to serve the political and economic interests of the ruling class in this country. They were not intended as homes for the African people, they are the reservoirs for cheap labour.

*YM: Apartheid has created these relatively autonomous territories. Would they simply be reintegrated into South Africa?*

*Gwala:* To what extent are they autonomous? In form they are, but in reality they are not. Who controls the investments in those territories and who based the infrastructure there? Pretoria! And when the chips are down, Pretoria chips in to prop up these institutions. So we cannot actually talk of autonomy, these are bantustans in the true sense of the word.

*YM: So you do not recognise their status as homelands?*

*Gwala:* Perhaps it would not be quite correct to look at it that way. The fact of the matter is that they are there. Now the question is how to integrate them into a unitary South Africa. The people from these territories regard themselves as South Africans. Some of these leaders, like Holomisa and Enos Mabuza, say that they want to come back to the fold, they too regard themselves as South Africans. For that matter, even the chief minister of KwaZulu has up to now refused independence. I think it is a recognition of the fact that the territory that KwaZulu occupies is part of

South Africa. If you look at the so-called homelands, like Bophuthatswana, it's thrown all over South Africa, it's not one integral territory. The KwaZulu homeland is strewn all over Natal.

*YM: Do you think KwaZulu should have a position at the national negotiation table?*

*Gwala:* No. I think we must look at it in the light of political parties. The Inkatha Freedom Party has every right to exist and every right to participate in the future shaping of this country. If we lay emphasis on KwaZulu we seem to be excluding all the other bantustans.

*YM: Could you give us an idea of the strength of the ANC in Natal at present?*

*Gwala:* In the past thirty years, the ANC was taboo. Then, although the ANC became so popular, it had to do a lot of work to build up its structures. The ANC has its own culture, i.e. membership cards, belonging to branches, regional structures. In the mass democratic formations you did not have all these things, this was something new to the young generation. We must therefore not run away from the fact that on the grassroots level, apart from popularity, our actual numbers are still very low. That is worrying us a lot. We are trying to build our membership and our branches in this province. On the other hand, Inkatha cannot be dismissed; it has its membership, its following and we have to recognise that.

There is certainly a gap in translating our popular support into actual membership. The membership of the ANC is largely the working masses of this country. Many of them are unemployed and many earn very low wages. While they would all love to be members of the ANC, it is so difficult to find that twelve rand for membership.

*YM: Is ANC support mainly confined to the urban areas of Natal?*

*Gwala:* In its initial start it has been confined to urban areas. We do not have the means to get to the rural areas. Taking into account the hostility of those who administer the bantustans, i.e. the chiefs, they don't take kindly to the ANC, except a few. Now for that you would need an outlay, transport, money to employ organisers. We don't have all those means. Therefore we are still very weak in the rural areas, but are nevertheless making satisfactory headway.

*YM: What were the main points of conflict between Inkatha and ANC and why did it in fact express itself in violence?*

*Gwala:* I don't think that it is correct to say that there is conflict between ANC and Inkatha *per se*. The conflict was there long before the ANC was unbanned. For a long time chiefs were members of

the ANC, until 1951 when the government passed its Bantu Authorities Act which excluded chiefs from membership of the ANC. The Nationalist government built apartheid institutions and the chiefs were integrated into these institutions. A rift arose between the people and those manning these institutions, and anyone working in these institutions was regarded as part of the system.

Long before the ANC was unbanned, there had been working relations between the ANC and Inkatha. The violence broke out in 1986 when hostel workers wanted to attack homes in Soweto. Even the chief minister of KwaZulu went there to tell those people not to attack the Soweto residents. Following that, violence erupted in places like Ongoye, Lamontville, Hambanathi, which did not involve the ANC. The people concerned in trying to find solutions to this was not ANC and Inkatha, it was the UDF and then afterwards, UDF and Cosatu. The ANC only became involved later. So we cannot talk of the conflict being between ANC and Inkatha.

*YM: Has sufficient groundwork been laid for ANC and Inkatha to operate in the same territory?*

*Gwala:* No, sufficient ground has not been laid. It will take a very long time. We have not reached out to the masses yet. There are still many people who are nursing the wounds of this conflict, the loss of the next of kin, the loss of homes. We have to convince them that it is necessary to live side by side peacefully. There are those in authority who are very hostile to the ANC, for example in the Natal Midlands, in Ncwadi, where people have been driven out of their homes merely because the induna does not want ANC there. At Richmond, people are fleeing their homes and are being accommodated in other places, like Edendale here. In some schools, for example at Wembezi, children have not been allowed in schools because they don't carry membership cards of Inkatha. We tried to hold a meeting out at Matimatolo in the Kranskop area and at Swayimani, but the chiefs would not allow us to hold a meeting there, they did not want an ANC meeting. So we still have to reach all these areas and try and convince the people there, but that can only be done jointly with Inkatha itself. It can't be a one-sided affair.

*YM: What is being done about the recent violence at KwaShange?*

*Gwala:* First the version of Inkatha members was carried by the newspapers, then the version of the ANC, which received very little attention from the local newspapers, was published in the *Sunday Tribune* in full. Hot on that was the meeting of IFP and ANC, where it was decided that in order to solve this problem we should not make statements to the press. A joint committee is to be appointed to go to all these flashpoints like KwaShange, Umgababa, Empangeni, Ndwedwe, etc.

*YM: What practical steps are being taken to halt the violence?*

*Gwala:* We are trying to find mechanisms to implement the agreement. There are hopes for peace, but there are other elements which would not like to see peace, who want to see the people divided in their thrust against apartheid. This must not be seen in the light of conflict between the ANC and the IFP. Violence is inherent in the apartheid system itself and state forces have been directly or indirectly involved in this violence. The violence comes in many forms. Where you don't have conflict between the ANC and IFP, you find conflict taking the form of elements, called *Comtsosis*, who run around with guns and are never accosted. Where do they get the guns and bullets to run around shooting? Why are they not arrested? As Mandela said, there is 'a third force', which is much more powerful because it serves its own political interests. I have in mind the venomous leaflets that you often see in various parts of the country. We have considerable experience of this in Pietermaritzburg: incitement of African people against Indian people, trying to single out a particular individual for this type of attack. As long as you have all these things you cannot hope to resolve the violence. There are even the *Askaris* and hit squads who participate in promoting violence. So this question is not a simple one, it is a complicated question.

*YM: You have been particularly vilified in the press for allegedly being against the peace talks.*

*Gwala:* If the so-called liberal press were to praise me and write nice things about me, I would have to sit down and ask myself, 'where have I gone wrong'? The press represents vested interests in this country and as long as we are fighting for a new society we are threatening their interests. So they are going to vilify you. I enjoy it, very much, and I'm going to do nothing to make myself acceptable or presentable to this honourable press. I'll be myself! When people start denouncing me, then I'll know that I have betrayed my people.

*YM: Why have you missed some of the peace meetings?*

*Gwala:* I don't even want to answer. I just laugh, because I was at those two meetings on the 28th and the 29th (January 1991). I was not present at the Oribi meeting, not because I did not want to go there, but because my own organisation never expected that we should have been at that meeting. But the press has gone out of its way to say that 'he is the one trying to sabotage the peace efforts'.

*YM: Yet the press said you were not at the meeting of 29 January?*

*Gwala:* Only because I was not at the press conference ...



*YM: The role of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) has been very controversial in the violence. Is the ANC still calling for its disbandment?*

*Gwala:* We have called for that. We still feel that they should not be there, because they merely exacerbate the situation. There is the South Africa Police, which does not serve the interests of the people, but nevertheless it is under one control. There is absolutely no need for another police force, no need for a state within a state.

*YM: Could the ANC-Inkatha talks potentially lead to an alliance in the future?*

*Gwala:* It is too early to talk about that. It is not the leaders who decide issues, it is the masses on the ground who finally decide. What do the masses of this country want? The aspirations of the people of South Africa are enshrined in the Freedom Charter. If we as the leadership of the ANC depart from that, then we will have problems with our own constituency. The Freedom Charter is not Inkatha's document, they don't want it. If there is any agreement at all on certain matters, those are not fundamental agreements. The policy and strategic differences between Inkatha and the ANC are too wide at this moment. But it does not mean that we should start fighting among ourselves.

*YM: It has been said that the violence established Inkatha as a national political actor. Has the violence in any way forced the ANC into talks with Inkatha?*

*Gwala:* Precisely not, because there had been talks there before there was violence between the ANC and Inkatha. The ANC has held talks with other organisations with whom there is no violence. It is the strategy of the ANC to unsettle the apartheid regime. That is why we have gone out to canvass the international community, with the view to isolate the apartheid regime. We do it internally as well.

*YM: Did the talks between Inkatha and the ANC include discussion of the ANC's mass mobilisation strategy in the region, to avoid clashes?*

*Gwala:* It would lead to no clash. There would still be mass action here. We are not governed by how Inkatha will look at us, we are governed by what will promote change in this country.

*YM: Would the ANC be prepared to back down on its demands for a constituent assembly and an interim government during the negotiations?*

*Gwala:* Once the ANC loses sight of the fact that its strength rests on the people of this country and that we interpret their aspirations, then the ANC would lose its own substance. People don't just

like the name, because they are 'ANC'. The popularity of the ANC came from the fact that its leaders, its membership were prepared to make big sacrifices, including life imprisonment and exile. The stature of the ANC was enhanced, not simply by the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, but by the operations of Umkhonto. People felt that here was something that expressed their aspirations.

Now why a constituent assembly? Because the people will elect those they trust to draw up a constitution for this country. In the meantime there will be a transition from a minority apartheid regime to a broad democratic non-racial government in this country; elected, not on a racial basis, but elected by all the people of this country, both black and white. If the ANC changed that, it could not do it without a mandate from the people. It has to go to the people, debate the matter with them, and then get a new mandate from the people.

*YM: Would the ANC be prepared to negotiate a new constitution for South Africa first, before it goes into elections?*

*Gwala:* That is why we want to have a constituent assembly, to draw up a new constitution that would lead to democratic elections. But what positions do we find today? You have two parties in the field. Who is the referee? It is one of the participants. And on whose playground are they playing? His playground. And when you go towards the posts, he pulls up the posts and puts them somewhere else. We cannot have this sort of thing.

*YM: Who will be the referee, the UN?*

*Gwala:* South Africa is very different from Namibia and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe they said it was the responsibility of Britain, hence the Lancaster Agreement. In Namibia they said UN, hence Resolution 435. We say the solution lies with the people of South Africa themselves. In the Gulf War the UN has not been an honest broker. The UN serves the interests of American imperialism - fighting over oil, American interests, not Kuwait. We will mediate ourselves.

*YM: Would the ANC consider compromising on their demand for 'one person one vote' by accepting proportional representation?*

*Gwala:* Whose proportion? That suggests group rights, vested interests. Racism serves vested interests, it is not something ingrained in the veins of the people. That is why we talk of the South Africa people, not as this group or that. That does not mean that cultural heritages will have to be discarded. We are all South Africans, practising our cultural heritages within the framework of the South Africa nation. **IPWA**

# Towards Multi-Party Politics

*An Interview with Dr Oscar Dhlomo,  
Executive Chairman, Institute for  
Multi-Party Democracy*

*Conducted in Durban by Dr Yvonne  
Muthien, a guest researcher with the  
Centre for Social and Development  
Studies, University of Natal*

*YM: How do you see the future of KwaZulu. Will it simply become part of South Africa again, or will it retain its autonomy?*

*Dhlomo:* It has always been the policy of the KwaZulu leadership that KwaZulu would remain part of South Africa, it would not take independence. But I would expect that its present geo-political boundaries will change. It will get reintegrated into the Province of Natal and will form one multi-racial single geographic region with Natal in the new South Africa.

*YM: Why did you opt to work within the homeland system?*

*Dhlomo:* I accepted an invitation to join Chief Buthelezi because I supported his stand against homeland independence. At that time homeland independence brought with it all sorts of hardships for the people. I felt it was a worthwhile sacrifice to go and join that campaign.

*YM: Why did you resign from the KwaZulu administration?*

*Dhlomo:* I resigned because there was no longer any danger of KwaZulu taking independence. The government itself had already conceded that the homelands policy was wrong. I felt after twelve years that I had made my contribution, and I could leave and pursue my other interests.

*YM: Why did you feel it necessary to resign from Inkatha as well?*

*Dhlomo:* My 'other interests' entailed working in a broader national scene, trying to promote political tolerance, national reconciliation and multi-party democracy. My rationale was it would be very difficult for me to do this if I were a senior member of Inkatha. I would not have been acceptable to other political groups. So I decided that I should be seen to be non-aligned, by not being a member of any political organisation.

*YM: Did your resignation have anything to do with the conflict between the ANC and Inkatha?*

*Dhlomo:* No, not at all. The conflict between the ANC and Inkatha, also ANC and PAC, sharpened my determination to do what I'm doing now, because what was lacking in our political organisations was political tolerance. We failed to tolerate an opposing point of view and failed to encourage freedom of association in our politics.

*YM: What role do you foresee for KwaZulu within the national negotiation process?*

*Dhlomo:* It is Inkatha, rather than KwaZulu, that will have a role in the negotiation process. Inkatha will be one of the significant players in the negotiation process, alongside the National Party and the ANC; possibly the PAC, if it eventually decides to negotiate.


*YM: Do you think that Inkatha will be able to win a national election?*

*Dhlomo:* It is really difficult to say which party will win an election. We have never had a genuinely democratic election that involves the majority of the people. There has not been a climate where political parties could unequivocally tell us what they stand for. The voters will be the judges.

*YM: What are your views on the nature of the future South Africa state, unitary or federal?*

*Dhlomo:* I am not dogmatic about the nature of the future state. I would look at a balance between the two. A highly centralised unitary state has its shortcomings, because it denies people self-determination at local and regional level. I would be happier with a reasonably strong government at the centre which is able to devolve sufficient power to the regions, so that people are participating fully in government at regional level, bringing the government closer to the people.

On the other hand, I would not support a central government that turned out to be a lame duck because all power was concentrated in the regions. Policy formulation and implementation would be a nightmare under those circumstances. So I would prefer a healthy balance between centralism and devolution.



*YM: Why was there never any real opposition to Inkatha in the KwaZulu Assembly?*

*Dhlomo:* It is not Inkatha's wish that there should be no opposition. There is no clause or law in KwaZulu that prohibits political parties. There are people who stand in the KwaZulu elections as independents, who reject Inkatha policies. But they have not fared well.

*YM: Were they to the left or right of Inkatha?*

*Dhlomo:* Most of them would be disgruntled people, who perhaps lost a nomination contest, or there is an aspect of policy which they don't agree with. The fact that there was a difference of strategy between Inkatha, ANC and UDF, also minimised chances of a opposition, because their strategy was against participation in homeland politics. This ruled out any possibility of a viable and serious opposition, because they would have been the natural opposition.

*YM: What is the position of the ANC in KwaZulu?*

*Dhlomo:* There is an ANC presence in KwaZulu, especially in the townships, the urban areas. My observation would be that in the rural areas and areas under the control of chiefs, there has not been a great deal of ANC influence.

*YM: Would it be fair to say then that the ANC is the most dominant force in the urban townships of KwaZulu?*

*Dhlomo:* They are perhaps neck-and-neck in the townships at this point, remembering that the ANC has started late and has not been able to organise openly. I would say that the fiercest struggle for support would be in the urban areas.

*YM: What do you estimate the strength of the ANC to be in the whole of Natal?*

*Dhlomo:* It is difficult to say, possibly because ANC support does not seem to tally with ANC membership. I am told that the ANC has enlisted only 200 000 members in the country. But when they stage their marches and mass mobilisation campaigns they attract greater numbers of supporters. So it is difficult to be specific on what their real support is. The challenge they face in fact is, to what extent they will succeed in converting the general support that they clearly have into voter support in an election.

*YM: What were the main points of conflict between Inkatha and ANC before the meeting on 29 January 1991?*

*Dhlomo:* The main issues were political competition and a failure on the part of both to accommodate their differences in strategies in the struggle against apartheid. For instance, the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance tended to use defiance campaigns and stayaways, which Inkatha felt were incorrect strategies. The clash of the two strategies, which would happen in the morning at the train stations and bus stops when some wanted

to go to work and others wanted to stay away, would then generate physical conflict. Finally, they were not able to talk about these issues because they were not able to meet.

*YM: Why did the political differences between ANC and Inkatha find expression in violence though?*

*Dhlomo:* It is a failure on the part of both organisations to manage their political differences democratically, lack of political tolerance, lack of an appreciation of an opposing viewpoint. If you oppose me politically, you are my enemy in the literal sense of the word.

*YM: Do you think that sufficient groundwork has been laid for the ANC and Inkatha to tolerate each other in the same territory?*

*Dhlomo:* I think so and hope so. At least these two organisations can now talk about their differences. We have seen the good results of this new development, where for instance the Southern Natal ANC decided that there would be no stayaway in Natal on the opening of parliament, having discussed the problems with Inkatha. The second was the reaction of the two organisations against the violence in Umgababa. Unlike in the past, when they would trade accusations and counter-accusations, this time the leaders of the two committees called a joint press conference and without placing any blame agreed to send a joint team to investigate. So even though strategies might still be different, at least those differences can now be democratically managed.

*YM: Will the ANC and Inkatha be able to implement the peace accord on the ground?*

*Dhlomo:* Well, the willingness to do so cannot be doubted. The capacity to do so we will have to wait and see, but certainly the determination is there.

*YM: What sorts of practical steps will ensure peace on the ground?*

*Dhlomo:* They did lay down the guidelines. One bone of contention on Inkatha's side was vilification. If they can find a way of controlling name calling, that would be one serious step. Secondly, they will need a viable communications strategy which will enable them to reach out to the people who are in conflict in the various areas. They would need to communicate with radio, television, the press, and then of course maintain a physical presence in these areas - going there together to address peace rallies, to assist in the establishment of local joint peace committees, etc. Thirdly, they need to establish a working relationship with the police, so that accusations that the police either do not act or side with other groups, could be jointly tackled.

*YM: Often the violence has been the result of a fierce competition over scarce resources, such as land. What has been the role of landlords as a source of conflict in the shack areas?*

*Dhlomo:* The peace accord has the potential to deal with that as well, under the provision for socio-economic reconstruction. The scarcity of resources could be attended to. People who have no shelter or who lost their shelter during the violence could be assisted. The exploitation and corruption in the shack areas, where some people install themselves as authorities and exploit the poor people, needs to be rooted out. It is the greed and corruption of some people who are taking advantage of the plight of poor people and intimidating them. These are just criminals that need to be dealt with by the law.

*YM: Are you hopeful that the violence between ANC and Inkatha will eventually end, and when?*

*Dhlomo:* I think we should not be too euphoric and expect miracles within a short time. The peace strategy has not been operationalised yet. The mere fact that the leaders met, must have had an effect on the members psychologically. Now they need to follow that up. I hope before the end of the year we will see an end to the violence, especially if there is also movement in the negotiating process and more resources become available to improve the quality of life of the people.

*YM: The role of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) has been controversial in the violence. What are your comments on the ANC's call to have the KZP disbanded?*

*Dhlomo:* That is a controversial issue! My view is that there is a need in the future to address the problem of law and order in a coordinated fashion, both nationally and regionally. Create one coordinated law enforcement force of KZP, South African Police and ANC inputs, and train these people properly. Even nationally you need that joint cooperative law enforcement agency, which would be psychologically reoriented towards the new situation in the country, put them under one command structure.

*YM: Does not the fact that Inkatha has de facto control over the KZP give them an edge over their opposition in this region?*

*Dhlomo:* I would not know about that, because the KZP claim that they are a law enforcement agent in the region and they say they don't take sides. I have no evidence, I am not close to the problem. Even when I was still in KwaZulu, I did not know what the police were doing, I was in education.

*YM: Could the meetings between ANC and Inkatha potentially lead to a political alliance?*

*Dhlomo:* Nothing is impossible. There are certainly possibilities of cooperation on specific issues, like this all-party conference. But an all-embracing alliance would be very speculative. There are still serious differences on strategy and even ideology between them. So I wouldn't say an alliance is an immediate possibility.

*YM:* It has been argued that the violence has established Inkatha as a major political actor.

*Dhlomo:* The violence, as far as I can observe, has in fact weakened Inkatha. They lost the propaganda war in the violence, to the extent that all sorts of blame was heaped on them as the initiators of the violence. Inkatha believed in peaceful change and could not have moved away from that position and still expect to be stronger. If the assumption is true that they wanted to flex their muscle by using violence, that would have been a very shortsighted strategy.

As far as I'm aware the initiative for the talks came from the ANC. Inkatha expressed many times that they wished to meet the ANC, so the ball was in the ANC's court, until the ANC themselves decided that they would meet. For that reason I would not think that Inkatha forced the ANC's hand into a meeting. I would say that the ANC consciously decided that it was the right thing for them to be seen to be talking to other organisations. It was not only Inkatha which they talked to; they talked to other organisations with which they were in conflict, Bophuthatswana, the PAC.

*YM:* What were the main motives for establishing the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy?

*Dhlomo:* The Institute wants to work in three areas: promoting multi-party democracy, political tolerance and national reconciliation. The main motive is my belief that we should not take for granted that after apartheid a democratic system of government will emerge. The world has seen vicious socio-political systems replaced by systems far more vicious than the ones that were overthrown. It would be shortsighted for us to assume that the destruction of apartheid is an end in-itself. The second motivation is that I feel that a democratic culture does not just grow on its own, it has to be inculcated. Thirdly, there is no guarantee that if we started with a democratic system, that it will be in place forever.

*YM:* What programmes have you undertaken in this regard?

*Dhlomo:* On multi-party democracy we want to liaise with various political players to produce a charter for multi-party democracy, spelling out the rules of the game, as it were. We will endeavour to get political groups to sign this charter and conduct their political affairs in terms of the charter and we

would monitor that. On political tolerance, we are starting a political leadership training programme for young up and coming leaders in various political organisations. Thirdly, we will start a national communications campaign on democratic education. Finally, on reconciliation we would begin to develop common national symbols.

*YM:* Given the exclusivity of white nationalism and the majoritarian tradition of black nationalism, what are the prospects for multi-party democracy in South Africa?

*Dhlomo:* The hopes are quite real. I was encouraged when talking to various parties across virtually the entire political spectrum. Not a single leader did not support multi-party democracy. What we now need to do is to ascertain that we understand the same thing by multi-party democracy. Although there is a predominantly white exclusive clique, there are a variety of political parties. Similarly on the other side there are a number of black parties. So already we have a situation of multi-partyism in our political culture. The struggle is to protect this multi-partyism, to see that it goes into the post-apartheid era, that it does not disappear.

*YM:* What are your views on the ANC's demand for a constituent assembly?

*Dhlomo:* These are my own views, because I have ANC supporters on my board. Whilst one understands the rationale of the ANC for a constituent assembly, one cannot ignore the fact that it would have serious problems. First, the assembly would be elected on the basis of one-person, one-vote. There are parties, including the NP, that feels that the electorate system is one of the important points on the agenda for negotiation. The second problem is that, if the ANC won that election with 60% majority, the parties representing 40% of the population will not participate in drawing up the constitution. Thirdly, an election held now would be very chaotic, because you would be attempting to sell a constitution that is not there. You will be holding an election without anything to sell to the voters, except to say, 'elect me and I will write a democratic constitution, once you elect me'. The alternative is to negotiate a constitution, produce a draft collectively and then present it to the electorate.

*YM:* What if parties were to come up with their own draft constitutions for a new South Africa and contest the elections on that basis?

*Dhlomo:* It would be very difficult to sell an entire constitution to an electorate and expect them to understand it. You might end up with twenty constitutions. It would be a sham really, because supporters of the ANC will vote for the ANC, not necessarily the constitution they've produced. **IPWA**

# Talks About Talks

## Third Tier Negotiations

By Peter Mansfield, Durban City Councillor, former Executive Director of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba

*Drawing on some of the lessons of KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, the author makes proposals for negotiations to establish a new post-apartheid system of local government for greater Durban. The case study provides a practical point of departure for 'talks about talks' preceding local negotiations.*

The Indaba was an eight month conference that took place in Durban in 1986 and focused on the need for 'non-racial, power-sharing' second-tier government in the combined area of KwaZulu and Natal. As such the *content* of its proposals have limited relevance to new political structures at national or local government levels. Lessons from the Indaba *process*, on the other hand, have much to offer those who seek to promote negotiations at either the national, regional or local government level.

Will national negotiations result in a 'bottom-up' approach in which powerful local and regional governments are the building blocks on which central government stands, or will second and third tier government be dependent on the whims of the decision-makers at the centre? The answer will, to a significant degree, be determined by the success of local negotiations about the future of local government in the various metropolitan areas of South Africa.

### Windows of Opportunity

There is a growing danger that campaigns to destroy black local government structures, local affairs committees (LACs), management committees, and ultimately, white city councils, will result in the appointment of 'interim' city administrators. If successful, the campaigns will, presumably unintentionally, have struck an important blow not for democracy but for autocracy.

Systems and methods inherited from a transition or pre-transition period often become the norm in the post-transition era. Within a relatively short period of time, government-appointed commissars could become an endemic part of South Africa's system of local government. If they do so, representative local government may become emasculated and have to take a back seat for a long time to come.

Cities, even major cities, could find themselves dictated to by the government of the day.

There currently exists, however, a unique window of opportunity for local negotiations leading to real devolution of power - especially to major local authorities. This 'window' for local democracy will close once national negotiations have been completed. Even more significantly in the short term, the window will close if the anti-BLA/LAC campaigns push white local government into a defensive mode. It is important that white local authorities and central government avoid falling into such a defensive trap, and understand the frustrations behind the campaigns.

The urgent challenge facing supporters of democratic local government - from the establishment and from the liberation movements - is to set local negotiations in progress and ensure they succeed in time for them to entrench democratic local government in the New South Africa. For success to be achieved, local 'talks about talks', albeit about new interim arrangements for local government, are an urgent national necessity.

All-party 'talks about talks' are not just another think-tank or seminar. These pre-negotiation talks must clear the way, set the stage and establish the agenda for full-scale negotiations about the future of local government in the various metropolitan areas of South Africa. It is not accurate to describe such talks as 'agendaless'. The overall agenda is to set the scene for full-scale negotiations at the third-tier level.

Third-tier government refers to the local city or town council level, including metropolitan arrangements (JSBs, RSCs or future structures) which seek to coordinate the provision of services at a sub-regional level. It is likely that some city councils will have more powers, greater significance, and bigger budgets than some second tier (regional) structures. The creation of 'one city' in metropolitan Durban would produce an entity with greater financial significance than either the Natal Provincial or KwaZulu administrations.

Clearly, 'One City, One Tax Base' is a slogan which, if uncritically implemented in the Durban Functional Region (DFR) and other parts of South Africa, could lead to the creation of ungovernable metropolitan nightmares. It might, for example, be

more appropriate for the DFR to become two, three or four, integrated cities with a system of metropolitan coordination. Whatever the 'boundary' outcome of negotiations, it cannot be allowed to result in vast poverty-stricken dormitory 'suburbs' being expected to pick themselves up by their own bootstraps - without a common or shared tax base or massive central government assistance.

There is a world of difference to the problems facing metropolitan Johannesburg/Soweto and metropolitan Durban. Nothing can change this reality; and there is much to be gained in terms of democracy, functionality, and financial efficiency from recognising it. Fortunately, many local leaders in different parts of South Africa appear to be coming to this conclusion. But they will still have to work hard to persuade national leaders of the benefits of the 'creative confusion' of many different conferences producing varying outcomes.

Sub-national negotiations, whether at a local or regional level, must be negotiated within a non-racial 'one city' or 'one area' framework. There is no room for hidden agendas, to slip racism and continued discrimination through a 'local option' back door'. New structures, new processes, new boundaries and new priorities are all likely to be negotiable. But the principles of non-racialism and non-discrimination will not be up for debate.

What is required is the parallel development of an overall national framework for local and regional government. In this way, local and regional negotiations and the development of a national framework can symbiotically inform and assist each other.

### Indaba Lessons

One of the Indaba's mistakes was to fail to consult sufficiently prior to the beginning of the conference. This made it even more inevitable that a number of important potential participants would refuse to attend. It not only damaged the Indaba process but affected the credibility and implementability of the Indaba's proposals. To date, this mistake has not been repeated by President de Klerk at a national level, nor by the Mayor of Durban, Cllr Jan Venter, at a local level.

In this regard, it is important to recognise a powerful human tendency for people to support processes which they have helped to design and to oppose those from which they are intentionally or *unintentionally* excluded. It is vital for the organisers of such negotiations 'to go the extra mile' in efforts to ensure that all significant parties become involved at an early stage and stay 'on board'.

Two new approaches are needed in order to avoid these difficulties. Firstly, to proceed with care and caution (more haste, less speed) while keeping in regular contact and consultation with all significant stakeholders. Secondly, it is necessary to identify the significant stakeholders and gatekeepers. It would also be prudent to continually scan the political horizon for new stakeholders that may emerge or develop during the process. In greater Durban, for instance, they could emerge in the massive, out-of-sight, squatter communities or from amongst the growing army of unemployed youth.

Inevitably, somebody must initiate such a negotiation process - in the case of the proposed Durban metropolitan talks, the Mayor has taken the lead. What gives him the right? There is no apparent hard and fast rule. Obviously the 'leader' must be credible and there does seem to be a good case for the 'core' city to take the lead in its metropolitan area.

But whoever takes the lead is probably not nearly as important as how quickly, effectively and genuinely, ownership and control of the process is transferred to a broadly-based steering committee representative of the major stakeholders and gatekeepers in the area. If this transfer of ownership occurs the 'talks about talks' will clearly be on track. But if this transfer does not occur there is little hope of success.

Stakeholders are those who have a significant interest in the outcome of the negotiation process. To a large extent they will be self-identifying but a distinction should be drawn between stakeholders who have the 'clout' to act as 'gatekeepers' and those who do not. It is particularly important to identify such gatekeepers and fully involve them in the process from the beginning.

Gatekeepers have significant constituencies which give them the potential power to block or seriously disrupt attempts to implement new structures and processes. Another lesson from the Indaba was that the power of gatekeepers cannot be significantly 'diluted' by the participation of large numbers of minor stakeholders. Real gatekeepers have real power - this is true no matter how the players are selected and no matter how the rules of the game are interpreted.

Another important issue will be whether or not participation should be restricted to political parties. The Indaba did not restrict participation to political parties. Whatever the case for 'political exclusivity' at national negotiations, I believe third tier negotiations would benefit from broader participation. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of important municipalities, for example, being excluded from talks about their future.

## Step-by-Step Process

Drawing on both the positive and the negative experiences of the Indaba, a number of separate, and to some extent sequential steps on the road to negotiation can be identified:

Some body or organisation must take the initiative. The first, separate steps are to define, identify and make contact with the the major stakeholders and gatekeepers. An informally networked agreement should be reached about the purpose of the 'talks about talks', e.g. 'to discuss the desirability of negotiations on post-apartheid local government structures and processes in the Durban Metropolitan Area'. Other issues involve *inter alia* the 'appointment' of an informal but widely representative 'convening committee' to issue invitations, etc.

Next, an agenda must be established. What should the 'talks about talks' achieve? Would they focus on future political arrangements or would they also cover issues such as the provision of services, economic development, crime and security? Is it envisaged that the structures negotiated will be of a permanent or an interim nature?

In essence, the 'talks about talks' must produce widely acceptable consensus on a wide range of questions, preceding actual negotiations about the future shape of local government:

- What would be the conference's geographic area of jurisdiction? For example, would the conference focus on the existing Durban Municipality (including Chatsworth, Lamontville, Chesterville, Phoenix and Newlands), plus include those parts of 'Old Durban' such as KwaMashu, or would it focus on the DFR? Will it be left an open question to be resolved by the conference itself?
- Which organisations will be invited and how will delegates be selected? How many delegates and advisors will each participating organisation be allowed? In the case of the Indaba it was left to each organisation to decide the identity and mandate of its delegation. There does not seem to be an alternative .
- Who will chair the proceedings? As at national level, the local authority should not assume that other participants will be happy for it to play the roles of both important player and controller of the process. A widely disparate group of participants is more likely to agree on a group of three 'wise people' than on a single individual.
- Where will the conference be held? When will the negotiations start? How frequently will plenary and sub-committee meetings take place? How long will the conference last? It

may be agreed to delegate some of these decisions to a steering committee (if appointed) or even to an inevitably less representative executive committee.

- Will meetings takes place in public or behind closed doors? In practice it is much easier for delegates to negotiate out of the public eye. But there is a cost. The more negotiation takes place in private the more likely delegates are to run ahead of their constituencies and have to face 're-entry' problems when they report back to their constituencies.
- What decision-making processes will be used? For example, will decision-making be by majority vote or by consensus? In the case of the Indaba decision-making was by 'consensus or as near consensus as possible'. Where this proved impossible it led to an 'overwhelming majority' vote. Where votes led to small majorities issues were again re-discussed.
- Will conference conclusions be submitted to the public for ratification by way of an elected assembly, a referendum or some other means? The Indaba, at times rather indistinctly, proposed to government that its proposals should be put to a referendum.
- What will the negotiations be called? Who will provide the secretariat and bear the costs?

These proposals are based on some of the lessons, largely process lessons, that local government negotiations can draw from the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. Inevitably, this would involve learning from other people's mistakes.

There is an urgent need for local negotiations about the future of local government to take place in the various metropolitan areas in South Africa. Without such negotiations, local government is unlikely to make its full contribution to good government and democracy in the new South Africa.

Such local negotiations will need to be preceded by 'talks about talks' in order to make decisions about who will attend the negotiations themselves and the agenda for such negotiations. Even in the process leading up to such talks, it is extremely important that all gatekeepers and major stakeholders who are identified, are fully involved in and take ownership of the process leading to and through such talks. **IP/A**

### Acknowledgement

*This paper forms one of a series which seeks to draw lessons from the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba of 1986. It is written under the auspices of CSDS at the University of Natal. It is sponsored by a grant from the Human Sciences Research Council.*




# ECONOMIC

M O N I T O R

## A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR NATAL/KWAZULU

### MALE EMPLOYMENT

ENUMERATOR SUB-DISTRICTS OF  
NEW HANOVER CENSUS DISTRICT



PERCENTAGE OF MALES AGED  
BETWEEN 15 AND 64 WHO ARE  
IN EMPLOYMENT


- NO DATA
- ▣ LESS THAN 75
- ▤ 75 - 89
- ▥ MORE THAN 89

SOURCE : 1985 CENSUS

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# Job Creation

## Making the Region Work

By Dulcie Krige, Centre for Social & Development Studies  
and Institute of Natural Resources, University of Natal

*In planning for the creation of employment opportunities, decisionmakers need sound information on the spatial and demographic characteristics of workseekers. Drawing on the Geographic Information System ('NU Stats') devised at the University of Natal, this part of our special Indicator SA focus on Natal/KwaZulu looks at the region's employment needs. Access to employment opportunities is analysed by using indicators of inequality such as urban/rural (spatial), male/female (gender) factors.*

Employment is widely recognised as one of the most fundamental of all basic human needs. It is axiomatic that the availability of work opportunities and a regular income enable people to realise their other basic needs more easily. The socio-economic implications of current changes in South Africa mean that both the state and the private sector will have to play a positive role in increasing employment opportunities.

In the past, state intervention has greatly influenced job availability, particularly for the African population. In the past, many legislative and policy measures have tended to limit African employment opportunities in urban areas through offering financial incentives to promote decentralisation, restricting informal economic activity, promoting capital intensive methods of production, restricting education and skill attainment opportunities, and enforcing job reservation.

Until recently, African women have had limited participation in the mainstream economy, apart from as domestic workers. Their improving education levels and increasing role as chief bread-winners means that more attention must be paid to gender segmentation of the labour market. Moreover, women's domestic responsibilities, particularly where family disorganisation results from the migrant labour system, means that the mobility of women is more restricted than men. There is thus an urgent need to consider the employment needs of African women on a spatial basis.

While unemployment of the African population in Natal/KwaZulu in 1985 was 19%, this statistic masks wide divergences in different parts of the region and by gender. Table one shows the differences in levels of employment (based on 1985 census data) for the African population of Natal and KwaZulu, for the urban and rural components, and for the males and females living in the region.

Spatial and gender differences in the region have important implications for the expanding labour pool. It is contended that planning for expanded job opportunities requires the kind of complex breakdown of information presented here, to be updated and in as much detail as possible from the 1991 census.

Dividing Natal/KwaZulu into the four spatial categories used in table one shows clearly not only the difference in employment levels between Natal and KwaZulu but the even more extreme difference between urban Natal and rural KwaZulu. Whereas 69% of the 15-64 age cohort in both urban and rural Natal is employed, only 24% of this age group in rural KwaZulu is employed locally. (In KwaZulu, however, migrants away from home on the night of the census are not regarded as being part of the household although they contribute to household finances.)

In analysing these indicators, it should be noted that part of the reason for high employment in rural Natal is that family members who are not in employment

*Whereas 69% of the 15-64 age group in urban and rural Natal is employed, only 24% of this group in rural KwaZulu is employed locally*

**Table 1**  
**Differences in Employment Levels between Natal/KwaZulu, Urban/Rural and Male/Female**

	Urban Natal	Rural Natal	Natal	Urban KwaZulu	Rural KwaZulu	KwaZulu	Natal/KwaZulu
Employment/Econ Active <sup>1</sup>	87	93	91	81	73	75	81
Emp/15-64 <sup>2</sup>	69	69	69	50	24	32	40
Dependency Ratio	53	41	45	32	11	16	21
Female Employment/Economic Activity	86	88	87	75	65	69	75
Male Emp/Econ Act	88	95	93	85	78	81	85
Females Emp/15-64	63	51	56	37	14	20	26
Males Emp/15-64	73	86	81	63	40	48	57

**FOOTNOTES**

1 Emp/Econ Active: Employed as a percentage of the economically active population.

2 Emp/15-64: Employed as a percentage of the 15-64 age cohort.

**KEY**

- The 'employed' according to the census includes all persons in employment on the day of the census.
- The 'economically active' according to the census includes those categorised as either 'employed' or 'unemployed'.
- The 'unemployed' are those who classify themselves as such in the census.
- The '15 - 64 age cohort' includes all those in the economically active age cohort, i.e. all those who are potentially economically active. It also includes scholars, housewives, the infirm and others who may choose not to be employed, but it does give some idea (in the absence of a more useful definition of the 'economically active') of the potential labour pool.

**SOURCE**

This data was obtained from Central Statistical Services since it does not appear in their published reports.

*Spatial differences in employment levels also show that 53% of urban Natal and 11% of rural KwaZulu is employed locally*

cannot reside in the area. High employment is therefore frequently at the expense of family life since the families of the breadwinner are relegated to KwaZulu. High employment levels may also be misleading since in Natal's rural areas, where salaries are very low, the fact that a person is employed actually gives no indication as to whether or not they are able to support a family.

A difficulty in analysing employment levels in Natal/KwaZulu is the phenomenon of migrant labour. Since many of those employed in Natal have families resident in KwaZulu, it is not really possible to regard the two areas as separate entities. However, the fact that the remittances sent home by migrants are usually only a small percentage of their wages indicates that there is an analytically useful distinction between a local wage earner and a migrant.

Whereas 53% of the total population of urban Natal is employed (giving a dependency ratio of one dependant for each person employed) only 11% of the total population in rural KwaZulu is employed locally (giving a dependency ratio of 8 dependants for each person employed if

urban migrant's remittances are ignored). Thus, spatially, there are large discrepancies in employment levels.

These discrepancies are greatly increased if gender differences are included. Females in rural KwaZulu, where an average of 14% of the 15-64 age cohort are employed, are particularly disadvantaged compared to males in urban Natal where 73% of the 15-64 age cohort are employed. If the levels of employment are disaggregated still further, so that instead of four general types of area the 62 magisterial districts are used, the spatial and gender disparities in employment levels are even greater.

A labyrinth of magisterial districts is found in Natal and KwaZulu. Some examples of the spatial and gender inequalities in employment levels reflected within these administrative boundaries are:

- Babanango has only 35% of the 15-64 age cohort in employment (the lowest in Natal but this comprises 61% of the males aged 15-64 in employment compared to only 17% of the females aged 15-64 in employment).
- Of the 26 KwaZulu magisterial districts, 21 have employment levels lower than the above 35%.
- Of Natal census districts, three have over 70% of their *total population* in employment, whereas in only two KwaZulu magisterial districts is the level as high as 34%.
- In many KwaZulu areas the percentage in employment is appallingly low e.g. in Msinga it is 4% - i.e. one wage earner supports 24 dependants.
- Msinga also has the lowest percentage of rural women aged 15-64 in employment in all magisterial districts (a mere 4%) but then it also has the lowest percentage of men aged 15-64 in employment (16%).

Census data can be disaggregated still further into enumerator areas (the smallest units into which census districts are divided). The *Geographic Information System* (GIS) developed by the Institute of Natural Resources at the University of Natal has mapped these units for the 1985 census. This computersied data base can import from the census magnetic tapes details such as the ages and education levels of the unemployed in each enumerator area.

The cover of the economic monitor illustrates the kind of spatial breakdown possible, in this particular instance showing

the Natal census district of New Hanover and the KwaZulu census districts of Mpumalanga and Ndwedwe. This data would be most useful for planning detailed job-creation policies, especially as the 1991 census data should be available by early 1992. Moreover, since the 1991 census will contain information on income it will have distinct advantages over the 1985 census.

### Relative Distribution

African unemployment (the unemployed as a percentage of the economically active) in Natal/KwaZulu is 19%. This average figure cloaks very wide regional and gender disparities, however, which need to be acknowledged and analysed if they are ever to be decreased. One of the most notable changes in the South African labour pool is the increasing participation of African women and it is necessary to know where these women are located, their ages and their education profile. Moreover, there is every reason to expect that a similar analysis undertaken for South Africa as a whole (using the 1910 boundaries) would produce equally disquieting results.

The accuracy of the employment figures for the African population produced by the 1985 census has been much criticised. The author does not take issue with this claim but would contend that it is not the absolute numbers which are being examined here but relative distributions, and there is no reason to expect that census error regarding employment would vary greatly from one area to another.

It is the spatial differences in the levels of employment, particularly of women, which are of concern here - in some Natal magisterial districts over 70% of the women aged 15-64 are employed, whereas in some KwaZulu census districts fewer than 10% of the rural women in the 15-64 age group are employed. Both the very high levels of employment in some parts of Natal as well as the very low rates in parts of KwaZulu need further investigation.

Without employment, people cannot provide for the health, education and security of their families. They must inevitably become an economic burden on society. The plight of South Africa's rural poor whites in the 1930s resulted in a concerted state response. Equally dramatic steps are needed in the 1990s to prevent rural unemployment in the homelands, especially of women, becoming an even greater political and economic problem.

### STRATEGIC PLANNING AFTER 1991 CENSUS

The 1991 census, the principal means of enumerating the South African population has just taken place. Concurrent censuses are also occurring in the TBVC homelands. Information obtained in this census includes demographic data (age, gender) as well as education levels, occupation, employment status and, unlike the 1985 census, income levels.

Census data is made available to the public in the form of published reports some two years after the completion of the census. These reports contain data aggregated to a macro-level (provinces, planning regions or census districts). The Central Statistical Services (CSS) also make available the magnetic tapes of the census results, which permit data to be analysed at the micro-level of enumerator areas (EA: the smallest subdivision of the census districts).

The Institute of Natural Resources (INR) has virtually completed the digital mapping into a *Geographic Information System* (GIS) of the 1985 enumerator sub-districts (ESDs). The project is known as *NU Stats* and is in the process of digitising the EA boundary changes from the 1985 to the 1991 census. This will permit maps of the 1991 census data to be drawn for the EAs in Natal/KwaZulu as soon as CSS make the magnetic tapes available. Census data in tabular form, as well as map form, or only for particular areas, will also be available.

The project was initially funded by the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission as part of a far-sighted initiative to construct a framework in which analysis can take place and infrastructural development be planned. Many planning questions are posed by the 1991 census and the other data compiled and collated by the *NU Stats* project of the Centre for Social and Development Studies and the INR at the University of Natal. These include:

- Where does the population live, what is the demographic profile and where are the clinics? Strategic planning using this data could lead to the establishment of outreach centres providing counselling and condoms within reach of the at-risk population, thus bringing Aids under control.
- At which schools are maths and science successfully being taught and how can they be duplicated? The collection of such data will establish whether technical education is necessary to move South Africa from farming and mining into a high-tech world.
- Where are the malnourished children who must be targeted with food supplements if they are to avoid the permanent mental and physical damage of malnutrition?
- What have the population movements been between 1985 and 1991 and what are the demographic profiles of the population at the inflow and outflow areas of migration? Strategic planning for the provision of site-and-service housing in the areas of in-migration depends on this information.

The answers to all of these questions and other major issues will depend on the census, and the quality of the census. Finding the appropriate answers will depend also on the quality of analysis of the census data, a quality which technology can now provide.

The kind of job-creation now being suggested is not the enormously expensive, politically motivated, decentralisation policies of past decades but rather small-scale, informal sector and craft type occupations which permit women to fulfil their domestic responsibilities while being gainfully employed at reasonable levels of remuneration. Increasing urbanisation in Natal/KwaZulu and South Africa is inevitable and most job-creation will naturally occur in urban areas. Nevertheless, many policy decisions - regarding improved rural transport, electricity supplies, education and health facilities, and commercial agriculture - can increase employment opportunities for those in the rural areas who are presently most disadvantaged. **IPWA**

## DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS

### Monitoring Migration

By Professor Simon Bekker, Director, Centre for Social & Development Studies

Most of the issues raised here, were identified and discussed at a workshop organised late last year by the Town and Regional Planning Commission of the Natal Provincial Administration. When assessing and developing future scenarios for a given region, planners and policy-makers typically begin with a demographic analysis. This analysis usually addresses the following kinds of questions: How many people live and work in the region? Where in the region do they live and work? What are the vital statistics of this population? In particular, how fast is this population changing or growing in size?

The total South African population will have grown from 36 million in 1989 to some 47 million by the year 2000. The population at the turn of the century will be more urbanised than at present, and the black proportion will have grown from around 74% to 79% of the country's total population.

The population of the Natal/KwaZulu region made up about 21% of the country's total population in 1989, and by the year 2000 its proportion will have grown to 23%. The DFR also will have grown relative to the rest of Natal/KwaZulu. It made up 45% of that population in 1989, and this proportion will have grown to approximately 54% by the turn of the century.

Thus, in South Africa the issue of changes in population size is a vital one. Not only is the component of natural increase in population change fundamental, but the spatial mobility of people within and between regions also needs consideration. We know that our *space economy* is dominated by a few metropolitan regions which draw people from rural areas and outlying towns; that the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) and the erstwhile policy of influx control have skewed this flow of people to cities; and that a complex set of *push and pull* factors operate in different areas of the country.

In short, migration is a vital component of demographic analysis. It is therefore also of vital concern to users of a *Geographic Information System (GIS)*. Whether considering productive activities (job creation, for example), welfare activities (education and health, for example) or organisation activities (new local government arrangements, for example), planners and policy-makers must pay attention to probable migration patterns in the region under analysis.

Common wisdom regarding the spatial mobility of South Africans has it that migration streams accord

to the gravity flow principle: people leave rural areas for urban areas and subsequently leave those urban areas for the metropole. In the second place, this common-wisdom explanation typically applies a standard model of urbanisation to demographic change in societies. As urban-industrial development speeds up, rural-urban flows follow a horizontal 'S-curve': as a proportion of the total population growth, urban growth first speeds up, reaches a peak, and subsequently slows down to stabilise once urban 'maturity' has been reached.

In South Africa, where researchers have found that demographic change has not conformed to this 'S-curve', the deviation has been put down largely to ideological, rather than other more permanent, factors in the South African space economy: hence, influx control, removals, etc., are given as primary reasons for 'retarded urbanisation'.

Both these 'common wisdom' assumptions need to be questioned. Some evidence suggests that the one-direction flow of people toward metropolitan areas is far too simple a picture, and that the 'S-curve' is far too blunt a model for explaining demographic shifts in the country.

A more sophisticated approach is needed which would focus on a series of migration strands. If we use a number of settlement categories as the point of departure (homeland rural, white-designated rural, closer settlements, towns both within homelands and white-designated regions, and metropolises), we then are able to construct a new migration model by looking at migration flows along a complicated set of strands:

- from white-designated rural to homeland rural;
- from homeland rural to closer settlement;
- from homeland rural to town;
- from homeland rural to metropole;
- from town to closer settlement;
- from metropole to closer settlement, and so on.

Furthermore, we need to identify circulatory processes which take place along a number of these migration strands. Hence, it may be that mobility between closer settlement/urban area/closer settlement may, under certain circumstances, form such a migratory process.

This approach implies that we need to question how permanent a move people in fact make when migrating from one area to another. The phenomenon of a family maintaining two homes in different areas is increasingly common. It raises the question whether migration from one form of settlement to another is a fixed or fluid move.

A new model of multiple strands of migration should give particular attention to the notion of stabilising circulation between specific types of settlements. The overall process in all likelihood will emerge as multiplex rather than as simple (Mabin, *General Models of Migration*, NPA workshop 1990). The policy implications flowing from this approach are many. Implications for transportation systems, for land reform in rural areas, and for housing delivery processes (the issue of investment by residents in housing in particular) are three examples.

Three macro-issues and one micro-issue relating to a specific category of household are of relevance in Natal/KwaZulu. In the first place, the region needs to be viewed as open: migration may well take place from Natal/KwaZulu into other regions of the country. Potential increased migration toward the Transvaal deserves special consideration since perceptions of opportunities in the PWV are common, particularly in the northern sub-region of Natal/KwaZulu.

In the second place, the particular distribution of Natal/KwaZulu borders within the region, with provincial-homeland divides being found at virtually all urban points, creates a number of unique and daunting planning challenges. Thus, the local differentials in land costs, rent curves and access to (formal and informal) residential land - typically found not only in the metropolitan area but also in most Natal/KwaZulu towns - underline the dualistic character of local towns.

Outside the Durban-Pietermaritzburg conurbation, three types of urban growth may be identified:

- secondary towns including Richards Bay, Ladysmith, Newcastle and Isithebe;
- large closer settlements located within KwaZulu; and
- smaller coastal towns.

A key question regarding future regional migration trends revolves around the proposed amendment of the government's Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP). It is probable that there will be a reduction in the number of industrial growth points in the region, if not also in the form of state support to both existing as well as aspirant industries. What effects will this have on migration streams into the metropolitan region?

At micro-level, a question may be raised regarding the formation of a new 'have-not' group of households. It is hypothesised that there are an increasing number of households which suffer from lack of access to information and to resources required to migrate. One reason is their inability to develop networks which they need to use to enter urban areas. Thus, even if they aspire to move to areas offering them greater life chances, they find themselves trapped in their present closer settlements or rural areas.

It is generally assumed, in reports on migration, that two-thirds of demographic growth within the Durban Functional Region (DFR) results from the natural population increase within the DFR, and one-third results from extra-DFR in-migration. This assumption - which is based upon studies undertaken in the mid-eighties - needs contemporary verification. It is of interest to note that a recent study in Mariannhill found that growth over the past five years was due more to in-migration than to natural increase (or, in other words, that an important component of out-migration was also present).

In the second place, it is possible to hypothesise, within the DFR, that a predictable relationship exists between the circulation of migrants, on the one hand, and the form of tenure arrangements found in different settlements, on the other. Thus, migrants who become tenants in DFR freehold areas may be more inclined than other migrants to maintain their earlier home on a permanent basis. Accordingly, one way to address the issue of stabilised circulation of migrants is to analyse the specific tenure arrangements found in different settlement areas.

In the third place, migration into a settlement is deeply influenced by the form of voluntary associations operating in that settlement. Civic and residents associations, particularly those which are well-organised and locally respected, manage the process of in-migration into their communities. Typically, priority in the allocation of plots and houses is given to insiders. The nature and functioning of these associations is fundamental to an understanding of the migration process at settlement level.

Migration streams within the DFR and Natal/KwaZulu region are complex: some households and some individuals move into and some out of the region; others move from one town to another and from one settlement to another; and yet others move out of their town or settlement only to return some time later.

Decisions to move are influenced by social, economic and political factors, by family networks, and by constrained choice or by coercion. Decisions are also fashioned by the type of tenure in the migrating household's sending area as well as by the type of tenure and anticipated reception in the receiving area. Finally, decisions to migrate need to be understood within the planning and managerial contexts of both local civic associations as well as of formal authorities.

A deeper understanding of this multiplex migration process is of direct importance to planners and policymakers alike, particularly in a region which has been categorised as one in dire need of development and planning initiatives. **IPDA**

# The Fragmented State

## KwaZulu in Profile

By Dr Yvonne Muthien,  
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*The fortunes of the KwaZulu administration have been closely tied to three critical issues over the past twelve months: joint Natal/KwaZulu development initiatives, Inkatha political initiatives, and the devastating recurrence of political violence. This overview forms the second part of a new Indicator SA series on the role of the homelands in a changing South Africa (see Transkei focus in Vol 8/No 1, December 1990). These in-depth profiles combine interviews with leadership figures on key political issues with updated data on regional socio-economic development.*

Within the regional political economy of the greater Natal region, separate administration, development planning and conflict management by Natal and KwaZulu within their fragmented boundaries have proved to be completely unviable. Development initiatives in the region have increasingly taken the form of joint efforts between the Natal Provincial Administration and the KwaZulu government.

The rapid growth of African 'informal settlements' in the Durban Functional Region (DFR) and the recurring political violence in African residential areas have placed an urban crisis right on the doorstep of the Durban municipality. An estimated 48% of the African population of Durban live in squatter camps or informal settlements. While the dramatic increase in the number of shackdwellers is largely due to natural urban growth, the large-scale displacement of refugees due to political violence has certainly swelled the ranks of the urbanising population.

Two major studies published in 1990 have had a direct bearing on the urban issues which have reached crisis proportions in the DFR. The Tongaat-Hulett Report produced an alternative multiracial vision for Durban towards the year 2000, and the Urban Foundation attempted to correlate urban planning with demographic trends in its reports on 'Policies for a New Urban Future'. On the ground, a number of joint development initiatives have been launched in the region, of which the RSA/KwaZulu Development Project (RKDP), the Joint Executive Authority (JEA) and the Joint Services Board (JSB) are perhaps the most important.

The RKDP has launched infrastructural and community upgrading projects, including the establishment of 86 000 housing sites to the tune of R2bn for the next five years. The JEA, established in 1986 and consisting of equal representation of KwaZulu and the NPA, has proceeded to identify and undertake common areas for joint administration of KwaZulu and Natal. Recent developments include cooperation between hospitals run by the different authorities, which has involved cost-cutting joint bulk medicine orders, mutual patient treatment agreements and the sharing of hospital equipment.

Other forms of cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal include an agreement between their respective departments of works, so that a single road running through both areas is constructed jointly by the two authorities. An agreement has also been reached between their departments of education to enroll 100 KwaZulu students at the white Edgewood teacher training college. The KwaZulu and Natal Amendment Bill due to be piloted through Parliament this year, will empower the JEA to secure funding and loans from the Development Bank for joint projects and to establish a Joint Services Board to provide bulk service delivery in the region.

### Alliance Building

The launching of the Inkatha 'cultural liberation movement' as a political party in 1990 has had a significant impact on the national political arena. This appeared to be a calculated political move, following central government plans to include



'parties with a proven support' in national negotiations. The emphasis on party-political credentials has seen a scurrying to establish formal parties in the homelands.

Inkatha has furthermore opened its membership to other races and employed international marketing expert, David Kingsley, to revamp its image in preparation for a central national role. One of the first changes has been to move Inkatha headquarters from Ulundi to Durban.

In March 1990 the Inkatha Declaration was issued as a direct counter to the ANC's Harare Declaration. The Inkatha Declaration commits its members to multi-party democracy and free enterprise (an 'enterprise driven economy') and differs significantly from the Harare Declaration in its protection of minority rights. Inkatha has since attempted to build alliances with other parties, including Indian parties in the tricameral parliamentary system. One rather surprising feature of Inkatha's new strategy has been its recent meetings with the racially exclusive Conservative Party.

A number of bills were introduced in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly during 1990 which increased the powers of the KwaZulu government or in some cases, of the chief minister directly. The Bill relating to Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa which was passed in July last year, brought all chiefs and local authorities under the control of the chief minister of KwaZulu. They now have to report all 'unauthorised' political activities or distribution of 'undesirable literature' to the KwaZulu government and are restricted from participating in activities or organisations which aim to overthrow the government.

Powers are vested in the chief minister to impose a fine of up to R500 for misconduct and to suspend or dismiss any chief, as well as 'redefine the boundaries of any tribe or community'. The chief minister remains in charge of finances for chiefs through the Department of Finance. Contralesa has protested to the State President against the Bill. Other legislation, the KwaZulu Public Service Amendment Act, bans civil servants from joining trade unions, excluding the KwaZulu Staff Association.

In September 1990 KwaZulu enacted the KwaZulu-Police Amendment Act to allow for cross-border operations by the KwaZulu police and to encourage greater cooperation between the KwaZulu and SA police. The Bill which was signed by President De Klerk in April 1990 drew strong criticism against granting KwaZulu the power to extend security operations outside its territory. Legal experts were of the opinion that the law violated the National States Constitution Act which excludes homelands from effecting laws outside their territories.

## Political Violence

Political violence assumed catastrophic proportions in 1990 as the clashes between ANC and Inkatha supporters continued throughout the region and spilled over to the Reef. Since the decade-old conflict resurfaced in physical clashes in March 1987, more than 4 000 people have died in civil violence and countless people have been rendered homeless in the region. An estimated 1 500 people died in internecine violence in Natal/KwaZulu during the course of 1990 alone.

The material costs of the ANC/Inkatha conflict have also been high, destroying infrastructure and further setting back development efforts in communities which were already under-resourced. *Operation Hunger* has estimated that between 50 000 and 70 000 people were left homeless by the violence in Natal during 1990. Shops, homes, schools and other facilities have been looted and destroyed on a scale that will require a major reconstruction effort to rebuild ravaged communities.

The ANC and Inkatha meeting in Durban on 29 January 1991 followed a number of aborted attempts to arrange a reconciliatory meeting at the leadership level between Nelson Mandela, Mangosutho Buthelezi and their respective delegations. A historic agreement was reached to take steps to end the violence between the two organisations, to facilitate local peace initiatives, to develop a code of conduct and to initiate non-partisan programmes to reconstruct devastated areas. The real test of these negotiated principles will occur at the grassroots level over the coming months.

A series of ongoing peace meetings have also taken place since October 1990 between Inkatha and the regional ANC leadership. Among the local peace initiatives which have had some success are the Lower Umfolozi Peace Accord, but in many areas local truces have proved to be rather tenuous and vulnerable. In February last year peace agreements between Inkatha and UDF were suspended in Mpumalanga and Hammarsdale, with violence escalating in those areas.

The role of some Inkatha chiefs and the KwaZulu police has proved to be controversial and they have been criticised often for partisan involvement in the conflict. A number of court interdicts were issued during the course of 1990, restraining KwaZulu police from assaulting or harassing township residents. In April 1990, for example, the Durban Supreme Court granted a restraining order preventing the KwaZulu police from assaulting or intimidating KwaMakutha residents. The KwaZulu Deputy Minister of the Interior, Samuel Jamile, is currently on trial for murder in a civil violence case. For its part, Inkatha has blamed the violence on the political intolerance of ANC supporters.

If political stability is to be secured in the long-term in Natal/KwaZulu, development efforts and aid will have to redress the alarming levels of poverty and unemployment found in the region. The poor socio-economic conditions in black communities provide fertile ground for imploded violence and intense conflict for access to scarce resources. For peace to return, effective solutions will have to address the material pre-conditions which made these communities so susceptible to violence in the first place.

## BACKGROUND

KwaZulu has been administered as a self-governing territory since 1977, and has not opted for homeland-style independence. The area has been governed by Chief Minister, Dr MG Buthelezi, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party, the sole political party participating in the KwaZulu Assembly since 1977. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is very large and consists of 141 members, of whom 72 are chiefs, 4 are ex-officio which includes the king, and 65 are elected.

## DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

KwaZulu has the largest *de facto* or resident population of all the homeland areas, at nearly 5m. KwaZulu accommodates more than 60% of the total 'Zulu' population of over 7m living in South Africa.

DE FACTO POPULATION			
1970	1980	1985	1990#
2 280 454	3 808 157	4 389 517	4 978 123
(# estimate)			
Average Annual Percentage Increase			
1970-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1980-1990
5,3%	2,9%	2,6%	2,8%

As is the case with most of South Africa's homelands, KwaZulu experienced its most rapid population growth during the 1970s. The growth was artificially boosted by the forced relocation of 'superfluous' Africans from urban areas of 'white' South Africa, during 'grand apartheid'.

POPULATION STRUCTURE 1990			
URBAN	RURAL	MALE	FEMALE
22%	78%	46%	54%
under 15 years	15-64 years	over 65 years	
47%	49%	4%	

Only 22% of KwaZulu's population is considered to be urban, according to population statistics. This is not however, an accurate depiction of the level of urbanisation in the area, since large numbers of people live adjacent to the towns and squatter

camps have mushroomed on the fringes of Durban, especially in the last few years.

Recent estimates of the so-called 'functionally urbanised' population in and around the Durban Functional Region range from 1,5m to over 2m. Some districts also have higher degrees of urbanisation, such as Umlazi, Ntuzuma and Madadeni, where the rates of urbanisation reach up to 95%. In 1988 the housing shortage in KwaZulu stood at 100 000, which, given the high living densities in many areas, would have been an under-estimate.

The gender composition of the population is approximately 46% male and 54% female, while the age composition reveals 47% of the population to be under 15 years, with 49% in the 15-64 year age bracket, and 4% in the over 65 year age category. The proportion of people in the under 15 age group is considerably lower than that of, for example, Transkei and QwaQwa.

A higher proportion of people in the economically active category (15-64 years), are settled in the more urbanised districts. In Umlazi for instance, nearly 70% of the population fell into the 15-64 year category. Clearly, economically active people migrate to these highly urbanised areas, which are often close to industrial zones and allow for commuter employment. The absence of a significant economically active population in many of the rural areas of KwaZulu is attributable to high levels of migration from these areas to industrial points in South Africa. Nearly 60% of males in the economically active group were absent from KwaZulu in 1986.

## LAND

KwaZulu is one of the largest and certainly the most fragmented of all the homelands. It consists of some 3 607 320 ha stretching over 26 districts across the Natal Province, with a tiny portion lying in the South-Eastern Transvaal. The whole area has an estimated population density of 138 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. However, districts like Ntuzuma and Umlazi, given its high degree of urbanisation, have startlingly high population densities of 7 429 and 6 368 persons per km<sup>2</sup>, respectively.

## AGRICULTURE

While over 40% of KwaZulu can be classified as land with a high agricultural potential and another 18% of medium potential, agricultural output is limited by the fragmentation of land and small size of farmholdings, the lack of farm labour, physical and technical infrastructure in the rural areas. Hence the agricultural sector contributed some 22% of the GDP, amounting to R315,9m at current prices in 1986. While it is low relative to the potential output possible in KwaZulu, it is nevertheless higher than most other homelands.

In 1986 there were approximately 6 349 private commercial farmers in KwaZulu, employing some 16 996 farm labourers. Subsistence farming mainly took the form of community gardens. In 1986 there were 831 gardens, over an area of 2 190 ha, involving up to 25 369 people. These were primarily located in the Emzumbeni, Mahlabatini and Ezingolweni districts, producing mostly maize, sorghum and vegetables for own consumption.

A third form of agricultural production is that of agricultural projects, managed mainly by parastatals such as the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The sugar cane industry has shown reasonable growth, particularly due to private sector involvement, yielding an average of 33 tons per ha in 1986.

While over 60% of KwaZulu is suitable only for grazing and livestock farming forms an important part of agricultural production, there has been very little growth in this area. The number of cattle was estimated at 1,4m in 1986. Clearly, the KwaZulu economy is more centrally integrated with the urban economy of Natal.

## MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing was the third largest sector in KwaZulu in 1986/87, contributing some 15% of the Gross Domestic Product. In 1987 there were 138 large industries located in Isithebe employing 20 443 workers, 47 large industries at Ezakheni and 12 at Madadeni/Osizweni. These three areas, together with Ulundi, had been designated as industrial development points. Small industries were also located at those points and at Edendale, Umlazi, KwaMashu and Nqwelezana.

In 1987 there were a total of 455 industrial enterprises in KwaZulu, employing an estimated 34 500 people. Currently, some 283 industries operate at industrial estates created by the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation (KFC), and they employ over 40 500 people. Isithebe, the largest industrial estate of 239 ha near Mandini on the North Coast, is to be increased by a further 113 700 m<sup>2</sup>; and Ezakheni, near Ladysmith, about 213 ha, will be increased by a further 57 800 m<sup>2</sup>.


Of the overall industrial investment in KwaZulu, over 70% came from the South African private sector, more than 20% from the KFC and some 14% from overseas investors. These manufacturing industries produced predominantly textiles, clothing and leather products.

## EMPLOYMENT


In 1986 the KwaZulu labour force totalled 1 883 000 people. This constituted about 41% of the *de facto* population of KwaZulu.

Approximately 23% of the total labour force were daily commuter labourers to places of employment in adjacent Natal, with only 33% commuting to the Pinetown-Durban industrial zones.

Of the labour force, 18% were migrants, but in this instance, 63% of the migrant workforce were employed in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg areas, with only 22% on the West Rand and 5% on the East Rand. In other words, the predominant form of migrant employment is short distance migratory labour. The service sector and manufacturing employ an almost equal number of the labour force, at 27% and 26% respectively. As expected then, some 30% of the labour force were production workers and 25% service workers.



The GDP of KwaZulu was R1,52bn at current prices in 1986. The service sector is the most important contributor to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of KwaZulu, as is the case in the other homelands. Between 1970 and 1986 the contribution of the services sector to the GDP increased from 30% to 33%, which coincided with the expansion of the KwaZulu administration, following its achievement of self-governing status. Agriculture contributed the second largest share to the GDP (22%), followed by manufacturing (15%).



The Gross National Product (GNP) of KwaZulu was R4,84bn at current prices in 1986, the highest of all the homelands. The GNP per capita however, averaged at R964 in 1986, which was the second lowest of all the homelands. Migrant and commuter earnings contributed an astronomical 71% to GNP. Between 1970 and 1986 the share of commuter income to GNP increased from 25% to 42%, while that of migrant income decreased from 45% to 29%.

## INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

In 1989/90 KwaZulu received an estimated R1,8bn in 'budgetary aid' from Pretoria, an increase of 22% on the previous financial year. Its estimated budget for 1989/90 amounted to R2,4bn; an increase of 23% on the previous year. This implies a budget deficit of R555m for 1989/90.

Of its total income for 1989/90, KwaZulu estimated that R1,8bn would come from government sources, R129,5m from loans and R435m from 'own sources'. Hence KwaZulu

	1988/89	1989/90
CENTRAL GOVT	R1 462 545 000	R1 798 911 000
LOANS	R 118 341 000	R 129 522 000
INTERNAL REVENUE	R 386 663 907	R 435 000 000
TOTAL	R1 967 549 907	R2 363 433 000

\* estimates

	1988/89	1989/90
Health & Welfare	R603 901 780	R789 000 000
Education & Culture	R599 383 000	R774 777 800
Works	R410 408 537	R437 300 000
Finance	R126 962 340	R140 000 000
Chief Minister & Econ Affairs	R 91 240 970	R124 451 000
Agriculture & Forestry	R 72 968 000	R 63 994 000
Police	R 35 454 000	R 46 515 000
Interior	R 14 515 000	R 22 300 000
Justice	R 12 716 280	R 17 000 000
TOTAL	R1 967 549 907	R2 415 337 800

	1988/89	1989/90
Health & Welfare	31%	33%
Education & Culture	30%	32%
Works	21%	18%
Finance	6%	6%
Chief Minister & Econ Affairs	5%	5%
Agriculture & Forestry	4%	3%
Police	2%	2%
Interior	0,7%	0,9%
Justice	0,6%	0,7%


generated only 18% of its total income from own sources. Furthermore, taxes formed an estimated 84% of internal revenue in 1987/88, the bulk of which was paid to KwaZulu in the form of transfer payments from the central government as income tax deducted from migrants and commuters working in South Africa.

KwaZulu had a debt of R62,5m in 1988, of which R58,5m was attributable to overdraft. Clearly, health, welfare and education were prioritised in the KwaZulu budget, as jointly these departments received 65% of the KwaZulu budget in 1989/90, the highest of all the homelands. In the 1990 budget of central government, R2,2bn was allocated to KwaZulu, an increase of R359,4m on the previous year. KwaZulu received 28% of the total figure of R7,8bn allocated to the six non-independent homelands in 1990.

## HOUSEHOLD INCOME

The average household size in KwaZulu consisted of seven persons in 1986. More recently, studies for 1990 reveal that each breadwinner had to support as many as 12 dependants in KwaZulu. Wages and remittances formed about 90% of income in urban areas and 72% in rural areas in 1986. In the rural areas pensions formed some 14% of household income at that time. There was very little income from subsistence and informal sector activities.

The average household income in KwaZulu was R7 327 per annum in urban areas and R3 018 in



rural areas in 1986. This is considerably higher than the average household income in urban Transkei, for example, which was R3 450 in 1986. This is partly attributable to employment patterns in the region where the predominant form of employment outside KwaZulu is commuter and short distance or weekly migration. The closer proximity to home allows for stronger ties in remitting parts of wages home. Also, the larger household size of KwaZulu residents increases the potential number of earners per household, which in turn could boost the total average household income, though not necessarily the average per capita income.

## EDUCATION

Educational expenditure accounted for nearly one-third of the KwaZulu budget in 1989/90, which in itself was a 29% increase on the previous year. An estimated 32% of KwaZulu residents possessed no education in 1990, while 46% have had access to some primary school and 22% to high school education. A miniscule 0.2% have received tertiary education, a decline from 1985, which leaves the KwaZulu bureaucracy with very little skills to draw on.

The per capita expenditure per KwaZulu pupil in 1987/88 was R355, compared to R503 on African pupils in 'white' South Africa. The pupil:teacher

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS 1985 & 1990		
	1985	1990
none/unspecified	42%	32%
primary education	41%	46%
secondary education	17%	22%
tertiary education	0.4%	0.2%

PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 1987		
	primary schools	high schools
pupil-teacher ratio	55:1	41:1
pupil-classroom ratio	59:1	55:1

ratio was very high in primary schools, at 55:1, and the pupil:classroom ratio was overall high in schools, at an average of 57:1 in 1987. This compared unfavourably to the pupil:teacher ratio of 41:1 in African schools in 'white' South Africa in 1987.

## HEALTH

An estimated R789m was allocated to health and welfare expenditure in 1989/90, which constituted the largest share, 33%, of the KwaZulu budget. This is the highest proportionate expenditure on health and welfare of all the homelands. Of this total amount however, only 36% (R285 637 204) was allocated to health expenditure. Over R496m or 64% went towards welfare expenditure, with 96% or R475 787 498 going to pension payments.

In 1987, there were 30 hospitals, 191 clinics and 405 mobile clinics under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu. The population:bed ratio in KwaZulu hospitals was 502:1 and the population:doctor ratio 14 916:1. KwaZulu faces a severe shortage of medical personnel. In 1990, 57% of the posts for medical doctors were unfilled, due to funding shortages and unwillingness among doctors to serve in rural hospitals. SADF doctors were assisting at rural hospitals, but after 1988 their numbers dwindled drastically. ~~UPA~~

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## Transitional Issues

*An element missing in South African dialogue today is an explicit consideration of ethics. The critical issue in the country is the very nature of a future South African society. Current debate revolves around technical details of preconditions for negotiations, alternative constitutional options, types of economic systems, and other procedural matters.*

*In this essay it is argued that the fundamental problem for South African reform is ethical, not procedural. The contest is being fought over the route to the future without first choosing the destination. Both the means of change and its ultimate result must be grounded in what Rawls calls society's 'basic moral character'. This character, the collective ethic of the populace, has yet to be clearly articulated in South Africa.*

A society, in spite of, or more exactly because of its diversity, needs to define its moral identity. Ethics is moral reflection on who we are and who we should be.

There have been vast changes in attitude in South Africa since 3 February 1990. Perhaps for the first time, many people are looking beyond the present, seeking to build the basis for their collective futures. It would seem the time has arrived to place the ethical basis for that future squarely on the agenda for open discussion.

### Time for Dialogue

Three justifications support a dialogue on ethics at this time. First, all South Africans are being asked to re-examine their most fundamental beliefs about each other. Clearly the prejudices and misinformation, the fears and antagonisms of the apartheid era are an unacceptable basis for future interaction.

Both black and white find themselves searching their souls on this issue. Those who have turned the corner have had to reach down within themselves to find a deep rooted humanism, an ethic that often differs substantially from their early socialisation and life experience. Even individual introspection is insufficient. What is needed is to communally forge an ethic that supplements, deepens and extends some fundamental assumptions which then become starting points for a framework of values, laws and practices. An open dialogue could accelerate and focus this needed transition.

## National Dialogue

*Towards an Ethics Charter*

*By Jerry Eckert, Professor of Development Economics, Colorado State University, and visiting Fulbright Professor, School of Economics, University of Cape Town*

Second, if all contesting parties could put their basic ethics explicitly on the table, how different would they be? Might not all South Africans, white and black, find that they share a common humanism? In the bedrock of an ethical dialogue could lie shared values concerning human worth that can support an egalitarian, non-violent future. If this were recognised, one could hope for movement toward a common set of general ethical principles. Constitutional negotiations could then move on efficiently to giving these principles specific form for South Africa's pluralistic society. The most significant impact of agreement ethical principles could be the initial structure of a bill of rights.

The third justification derives from the international climate and the serious constraining impact of present sanctions on any potential future reforms. Sanctions are defined as actions taken by a collective of nations against another nation found to be in violation of internationally accepted norms. Thus, the justification for sanctions rests squarely on ethical grounds.

In the absence of visible ethical dialogue and a joint commitment to a shared ethic in South Africa, the international community would impose its own solutions. That the nations imposing sanctions have not solved their own discrimination and inequality problems has not kept them from implementing coercive, judgemental policies concerning South Africa.

One case that South Africa has not made well is that in the final analysis, the right to self-determination must be respected. One must

accept that certain norms regarding human rights have international support. Compliance is expected from any country seeking acceptance in the community of modern nations. And there can be little doubt that this international expectation is widely accepted as just.

Yet there exists the reciprocal right which South Africa has not yet exercised. Indeed, part of the international ethic is the presumed importance of national self-determination. However, this right applies to a process and is secondary to ethical concern for the end result. Commitment to a moral result, however, should earn the right to find the means and form through a nation's own internal processes.

In short, the foreign community probably has the right to insist on rapid movement toward a just society in South Africa, but they do not have the right to specify how that society will be constituted or function.

### Contemporary Ethics

In her book, *What's Fair*, Jennifer Hochschild describes the ethical norms of equality and equity in American views on distributive justice. They apply, she says, to different domains of life:

- Equality is the expected norm in social and political domains. This includes equal access to social services and public goods, equal rights under the law and equal participation in society and politics.
- In the economic domain, however, the norm is equity - rewards in proportion to some socially accepted measure of effort such as time, effort or productivity.

The above can be considered the first and most fundamental level of ethical belief. Simply stated, the equality proposition in social and political domains asserts that every human being is of equal worth merely as a result of their humanity and that the fabric of society and the polity must be woven to fit each person in equal measure.

Rawls, in his fundamental work, *Theory of Justice*, translates this ethic specifically into equal rights to freedom of thought and speech, freedom of conscience (religion, and cultural affinity), freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, freedom to hold office, the right to vote, freedom of movement and choice of occupation and residence. Differentiation or equity in economic reward captures the western work ethic that rewards ought to be proportional to effort, or better yet, to results.

These are not just American values. They constitute widely held beliefs in the modern world. They also form the ethical standards which apartheid was accused of violating. How might

these generic propositions be applied to South Africa's situation?

### Economic Domain

Turning first to the economic domain, the basic expectation is the right of equal opportunity. All persons should have the opportunity to advance themselves, following directions set by their aspirations, to the full limits of their capabilities. To be consistent with the right to a cultural identity discussed below, aspirations may differ. But the labour market must be differentiated by merit and performance and on no other basis. There should be no barriers to job and entrepreneurial opportunities, promotion and salary advancement, training and skill enhancement, etc.

The goal of equal opportunity raises a derivative concern in South Africa. Enormous differentials in capability exist today, as the result of apartheid, its precursor of social discrimination, widespread poverty and other social limitations. Simply ensuring an equal chance in the future is not enough when the capabilities of many have been artificially lowered by past practices. In South Africa one must supplement equal opportunity with the right to an equal start. Not only does everyone run life's race on the same track, they also must start from the same line.

This cannot be achieved easily or quickly as it implies massive redistribution of education, training and opportunities toward those previously excluded from the mainstream. However, accepting this goal would redirect future government programmes toward comprehensive affirmative action investments. The challenge, therefore, reaches far beyond removing apartheid to include erasing its legacies of inequality and constrained capabilities.

In addition, there is the realisation that economic efficiency depends on the redistribution of access. Skewed access leads to efficiency being defined in favour of those with preferential positions. The result, visible in South Africa today, is an economy constrained by the marginalisation of the majority of its participants. In this sense, affirmative action to ensure equal access is required for economic efficiency and growth as well.

The concept of affirmative action in the South African context requires careful definition. Given the magnitude of differences that stand in the way of an egalitarian society, affirmative action must imply a highly proactive policy. Simply granting equal rights does not necessarily imply utilisation of rights.

Given the importance of a buoyant economy in meeting human needs and creating opportunity, preserving vitality and strength in that economy

becomes an important expectation. The economic ethic of proportionality is essentially a guarantee of reward to honest individual effort. This value is essential to a productive incentive structure. Equally important is security of expectations, the right to wake up in the morning and know that the ground rules have not been abruptly or arbitrarily changed.

Contemporary beliefs about distributive justice include one important modification to the ethic of rewards in proportion to productivity. It is now accepted that, for whatever reason, there can be large numbers of people whose maximum efforts fail to meet their most basic needs of food, shelter, clothing and a minimum of social experience. Intervention in otherwise proportional economic processes to ensure basic needs for all people is considered a just mandate for modern nations and a just expectation on the part of their constituencies.

A related concern that arises in South Africa and many other developing countries is whether or not there ought to be limits to the income differentials above the basic needs threshold that can arise naturally in an economy. Certainly, large differences lead to *de facto* economic segregation with large portions of society remaining outside the mainstream. These gaps undermine both equal opportunity in the economic sphere and equal political liberty. The question is whether society should intervene in the economic rewards system on the upper as well as the lower end. Existing inequalities in South Africa are sufficiently paralysing to require that the question at least be considered.

Finally, important among economic expectations is the right to private property and to legal protection against its unlimited redistribution. When social justice requires redistribution, some compensation is also a just expectation. It is obvious that there are redistributions of several kinds ahead for South Africa.

### Political Rights

At the beginning of the 1990s, we affirm two fundamental ethic principles for the political sphere.

First, the people have a right to be heard. Government, in whatever form, must be representative in significant measures and must recognise the moral mandates of their constituencies. As events in Eastern Europe attest, the days of an omnipotent central government making decisions, benevolent or otherwise, on behalf of trusting but uninvolved masses are gone forever. Even in Africa, this ethic is gaining ground as a basis for organising societies.

Second, the right to political activity and the right to vote are globally accepted principles. The rights to recall elected officials and to initiate legislation are less frequently discussed but also important, and whatever the government system, whatever decisions rest on the public will, accepted ethics insist that all individuals must have equal access to participation.

The ultimate goal is that each person should have substantial and equal means of influencing decisions and policies that govern their lives. Failing this, political rights are violated and stability becomes questionable.

Recent discussions in South Africa suggest another important right, that being security of expectations, or freedom from ugly political surprises. Suddenly suspended constitutions, states of emergency and other rude shocks which erase carefully crafted ethical structures have been too frequent in the world's recent history. The constitutional route to human rights is predicated on the primacy of law and the assumption that the constitution is a bedrock, amended only infrequently and then only with the strongest public support.

For legitimacy, the formation, implementation and adjudication of law must rest on processes which most people trust. Widespread participation is a prerequisite for that trust. In South Africa's pluralistic setting, each minority, however defined, must feel they have adequate access to the process. Another necessity is a system of checks and balances which prevent unwanted unilateral action by one individual, political party or branch of government. By definition there must be clear separation of powers. A strong, independent and totally objective judiciary will be especially important in the South African context.

### Social Expectations

To a large extent social ethics reflect the interaction of political and economic rights. Applying the basic ethic of equality in this sphere has several implications. Among first principles is equal access to public goods and social services. If government is to be fully representative, and indeed draws revenue from all people, then each has the just expectation of sharing in the results of government expenditure.

The right to free association is frequently articulated in present dialogue. In its most general application, this specifies the right of all people to come together around causes, ideas and needs, whether in the social, economic or political realm. Closely related is the right to a cultural identity and to processes that protect and nurture cultural values and practices.



An additional just expectation on the part of all South Africans is the right to the privacy of home and family. The sanctuary of the household is fundamental to civilised society. Enforceable legal constraints on violating that sanctity are part of building such a society.

### Redistribution

Redistribution will come in South Africa in all of the above domains: in property, in incomes and wealth and in social opportunity. These changes will occur through time in many large and small ways. It seems likely that this process is the one that will most clearly galvanise people into taking positions and formulating their underlying values.

Ethical issues arise at two distinct points; the process and the extent of reallocation. Just how much redistribution is fair and what criteria will govern the process? Without answers to these questions, the fear of unrestrained and arbitrary expropriation may paralyse and inflame the reform process, creating uncompromising resistance on the part of present holders of wealth, position or power.

It seems essential to peace and continued progress that needed reallocations be bound by a legally or constitutionally defined process, governed by mutually agreed criteria and limits, and subject to checks and balances; a process embedded in the public will in ways that ensure minority protection.

An additional issue of values will influence this process. Individuals value presently owned or controlled resources or rights differently, and more highly, than those which might be forthcoming at some future date. Conventionally, reallocation of future incomes is more feasible politically than redistribution of present assets or resources. Hence, the World Bank's standard strategy of redistribution from growth, using future increments to change the balance.

In South Africa, those with wealth or property may see it as justly earned through honest effort, while those without may see these same assets as unjustly expropriated in the past. In this simple observation may lie the crucible that will determine whether a peaceful transition is possible and what will remain in place thereafter. Negotiating this issue will test the mettle of all participants.

Perhaps the needed moderation can come from the twin realisations that firstly, not all transfers need be accompanied by immediate or monetary compensation, and secondly, not all inequities are best settled by transfers. For example, in income transfers, the rich from whom transfer funds are derived are benefitted in the longer run by the stability that results when the poor view society as

fair and thus comply with its norms. The rich also come to share in the economic benefits that arise as the poor shift to more active roles as consumers and savers. Similarly, redistributing wealth is questionable if, after redistribution, resource productivity declines substantially to the serious detriment of society as a whole.

When discussing redistribution, an important distinction exists between property and wealth versus access and opportunity. Redistributing the former is a zero sum game, subject to all the issues of winners and losers, compensation, etc. Redistributing opportunity can be a positive sum game in that there need not be losers. With opportunity, access and participation, growth can be dramatic since it rests more on institutional change than on economic dynamics. In this thought lies the chance to improve welfare of all groups.

### Timing Issues

A common ethic faces three timing issues. The first of these concerns the question of balancing out gains and losses over time. The ideal of limiting adjustments to those in which no one is ever worse off is plainly impractical in the world of *realpolitik*. Most major changes have winners and losers. It seems, however, that a system can be judged fair by its participants if, over time, each perceives that they are sharing equitably in society's overall gains or losses.

Single issue politics is the enemy of people living together. When one person must win a particular issue regardless of what another offers in return for cooperation, there can be only subjugation. More viable as an approach is to recast the dominant interests through intellectual and emotional dialogue, elevating the importance of common goals. Peace, law and order, halting environmental degradation, sustaining the economy, food security are certainly long run common interests. Once perceived and valued, the possibility of attaining these broader goals in the foreseeable future makes some short-term sacrifices acceptable.

A second temporal issue is society's view of 'the discount rate' for previous injustices. Neither side in South Africa is blameless, each having brought trauma to the other, albeit in unequal measure. Yet, if South Africa seeks lasting peace, one might suggest a negative discount rate such that the perceived severity of past grievances diminishes over time.

'Let bygones be bygones' captures this issue in a conventional idiom. To achieve this in any significant measure, a commitment to a policy of 'affirmative action' designed to offset past injustices is a necessary and just expectation.

Programmes disproportionately skewed towards the victims of discrimination will be necessary in the short run if all people are to realise their right to an equal start on the future. This presumes that such intervention is accompanied by the requirement for progress to end the state of disability and, therefore, does not become permanent.

In the South African context, it would be grossly unrealistic to expect the past to be forgotten. Indeed, today's cultures and attitudes are very much a product of recent experience. One could hope, however, for a measure of forgiveness under certain assumptions. These are that each side openly accepts responsibility for their past actions, sets out to correct undesirable results and commits itself to a future molded around humane ethics. Of these, the dominant expectation is an open admission of culpability without which the prospects of forgiveness are slim.

The third timing question is the speed with which ethical positions can be defined. Ethics are the expression of deeply rooted values and beliefs about what is proper or just. One cannot expect overnight answers. Rather, an ethical charter requires extended periods of soul searching, difficult communal dialogue, even testing in the heat of contest and confrontation. Given the polarisation and animosities of the apartheid era, feeling one's way toward a new, non-racial ethic could take considerable time. Forcing concurrence prematurely risks a superficial or coercive solution which might not be sustainable in the longer run.

### Rights & Responsibilities

With rights come responsibilities. Most important in the present context is that the exercise of rights is bounded by the restriction that doing so does not infringe on the rights of others. This mutual limit to freedoms underlies the prospect for a peaceful, stable future.

Second, South Africa is, and will remain, highly pluralistic; in thought, culture, aspirations and values. Part of the needed collective ethic is to reach agreement on how much diversity, even with respect to incompatible or antagonistic values, is permissible or encouraged within society. It could be that a dialogue on ethics will discover not so much a common humanism as supposed above, but a set of overlapping values that can be accepted as more important than the non-overlapping values, that are also found. Accentuating the common while de-emphasising, but still making room for, the divergent will be a key dimension.

Finally, assume that an ethic for the future is agreed upon and expressed as a Bill of Rights. One fundamental change must then occur in the way government functions. South Africa must move from the relatively passive stance of removing or suspending the laws of segregation to the proactive position of outlawing discrimination and then enforcing that stance.

Much *de jure* discrimination has been scrapped but *de facto* constraints remain. In the difference between 'the government shall not discriminate' and 'the government finds discrimination illegal' lies the final foundation stone in South Africa's acceptance among nations.

We have mentioned a few specific policies or legal structures in this essay which are the rightful domain of representative leaders in negotiations with each other. However, the new future, towards which all South Africans must now look, requires that these and other ethical agreements be given form in a constitution, law and regulation.

Peace among peoples requires that these basic values be shared as articles of faith by individuals and groups. We feel that most South Africans can find much in these thoughts with which they can agree. If South Africa succeeds in the transition to a society as envisaged above, there will be lessons from both the processes and the end result that should interest many nations the world over. **UPWA**

### NOTE ON CO-AUTHORS

*While attending the International Association of Agricultural Economists in Swakopmund, Namibia, in August 1990, a group of concerned scholars began an examination of ethical principles that might support and speed a peaceful evolution in South Africa. This essay is the initial result.*

*In addition to Jerry Eckert, the Swakopmund Group includes, Allan Schmidt of Michigan State University, Peter Söderbaum of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Tommy Fenyés of Vista University and Nick Vink, Johan van Rooyen, Luther Sibisi and Graig McKenzie of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. Important additional contributions were received from Alewyn Burger of South Africa, David Crocker, David Allen, R K Sampath and Grace Bell at Colorado State University and Susan Eckert of the National Geographic Society. Jerry Eckert assumes responsibility for remaining errors of omission.*


# RURAL & REGIONAL

M O N I T O R

A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM  
FOR NATAL/KWAZULU

## FUNCTIONAL LITERACY (1)


NEW HANOVER CENSUS DISTRICT



PERCENTAGE OF ADULTS AGED  
20 OR OVER WITH AT LEAST  
STD IV EDUCATION

- ▨ MORE THAN 40
- ▤ 30 - 39
- ▥ 20 - 29
- ▧ 10 - 19
- LESS THAN 10

SOURCE : 1985 CENSUS



With leading brand names like: Snowflake flour, Iwisa and Impala maize products, Epic oil, Blossom margarine, Kraft margarine and dressings, Epol pet and live stock feeds, Peck's Anchovette and Redro Fishpastes, Mama's pies, Nice 'n Easy convenience foods and Blue Ribbon breads to choose from; your shopping basket will certainly be loaded with premium quality Premier Products.

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
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# (D)Urbanisation Data

## Testing a new technology

By Dr Robert Fincham, Acting Director, Institute of Natural Resources, and Steve Piper, Department of Psychology, University of Natal

Planning for socio-economic development or for business growth requires good information. Given relevant, accurate and up-to-date data, it is still necessary to convert it into useful and accessible information through, for example, the creation of a 'Decision Support System' (DSS) and a 'Geographic Information System' (GIS). The following article demonstrates the specific utility of these new systems in planning for the housing, settlement and broad needs of greater Durban's expanding population.

The influx of people to urban South Africa is causing many economic, social and political problems. Unless addressed, these problems threaten to make our land bereft of any real potential to provide an adequate quality of life for its inhabitants. While urbanisation may seem to bring with it an overwhelming set of problems, however, it also makes possible a wonderful opportunity for economic growth. In short, 'black urbanisation ... (must become) an instrument of national development and personal betterment' (Bernstein, 1990).

A *Punch* magazine cartoon of the 1960s shows two portly capitalists looking at their factory's chimney belching polluting fumes and asking 'How can we make money out of smoke?' Today, pollution control is a major industry and their sardonic humour has been translated into lucrative profit.

Good business requires opportunity and creativity. The large influxes to our cities have provided the opportunity. To maximise these opportunities we must identify the needs. The appearance of the independent 'spaza' stores and taxis conglomerates which sprang up in the 1980s are good examples of individual and group abilities to identify and satisfy needs.

### Decision Aids


The use of a *Decision Support System* (DSS) for planning large urban developments needs an additional component: the spatial dimension. It is important to know how many people are where, as well as their associated social and economic characteristics.

The often unrealised need for spatial information in decision-making has been strikingly demonstrated in a number of aid-operations in Africa, Asia and more recently in eastern Europe and Russia. The supply of valuable food, and medical aid, has invariably not reached the people most in need because no cognisance was taken of the spatial distribution of the needy, and of the logistical difficulties of getting aid to them.

The development of a *Geographic Information System* (GIS) has given rise to appropriate conceptual tools for adding the spatial dimension to DSS. A GIS may be defined as a formalised method of collecting, storing, manipulating and portraying spatial and non-spatial data, using human, technical, computational and organisational resources (see figure one overleaf).

*The need for spatial information in decision-making has been demonstrated by the logistics of aid operations in Africa*

To provide health services, the GIS would tell us which area in the DFR has a population of over 50 000 but is more than 10km from a hospital



There are two ways of looking at a GIS: technical and institutional. As with all new technologies there is a tendency to concentrate on the technical, the 'gee whiz'. A 'technical' GIS of the Durban Functional Region (DFR), for example, based on an accurate data-base, could answer questions relevant to planning issues. For the provision of health services it could be asked: 'which census tract in the DFR has a population of over 50 000 and is more than 10km from a hospital?' Or for planning a hawkers-based cosmetic marketing scheme: 'where is there a concentration of more than 5 000 women in the age-range 16-25, within 2km of a tar road?'

While it is possible to construct such a GIS, given adequate financial, technical and human resources, it is certain that it would fail as a planning tool if the institutional aspects were not first considered. It has been the experience of many organisations around the world, according to such authorities as Burrough (1986), Antenucci (1990) and Goodchild (1990), that a GIS instituted for its own sake fails because it has not been integrated into the organisation's work philosophy, or way of doing its work, and the costs of data collection were under-estimated.

Managers need data, in appropriate formats, upon which to make decisions about strategy and tactics. They will use those systems which prove to be accurate, reliable, appropriate and cost-effective. So, unless the GIS is integrated into the DSS and in a way which gains management's

trust and support, it will not be successful. It must appear 'user-friendly' right from the beginning. The more obvious reason for GIS failure in many contemporary applications has been the prohibitive cost of data-collection. Experience with developing GIS applications suggests that about 70-75% of system costs are incurred at the data capture stage.

### GIS at Work

The Institute of Natural Resources (INR) at the University of Natal, in conjunction with Umgeni Water, the largest water utility in Natal, are busy assessing the role that GIS can play within the decision making process of this utility.

The initial brief from Umgeni Water was for the INR to develop a Rural Areas Water and Sanitation Plan (RAWSP) as part of Umgeni Water's commitment to long-term planning for water delivery in its area of jurisdiction. In developing the plan we took note of the substantial numbers of people to be affected by the implementation of the plan; that they were likely to be dispersed and located in rugged terrain; that their incomes would be low and that not all would be served by reticulated systems, that boreholes and springs would be additional means of making clean water available to them.

Furthermore, the tenuous social fabric within many of these rural communities meant that the strategy would have to incorporate processes to facilitate the

Planners and managers need data in the correct format upon which to make decisions about policy and strategy

grassroots involvement of communities. Facilitating community involvement within RAWSP is vital, but at this stage the GIS component of the study has been directed at making information available to the planners. It is contended that the availability of better information will be an important component in making RAWSP relevant and acceptable to local communities and in engendering community participation.

Given the short space of time for developing the GIS for this project, good progress has been made. The system now allows for meaningful interrogation of, for example, population distributions and age and educational structures as they relate to the availability of and access to existing infrastructure such as schools, health facilities and road networks.

An example of the ability of the system to further sound planning is illustrated through initial analysis of literacy rates of the population in the Mpumalanga area within the DFR. Spatial variation in literacy levels compared with other factors within the database suggest that those areas with highest literacy rates in Mpumalanga are found to border on the metropolitan area and have the greater accessibility to it.

The database developed for this project has the rudiments of a DSS and ongoing work is designed to strengthen the data base management capabilities and its role as a monitoring tool for assessing progress in

implementing RAWSP. There is every reason to believe that the system capabilities can be readily transposed into the requirements for urban analysis so vital to the future wellbeing of the DFR.

### Mapping Data

If the ongoing planning for the DFR is to succeed it is important to have a reliable estimate of the demography. The population estimates of the people in the informal settlements must be reliable in both space and time.


If the standards of the state's census of this region were equal to those of the formal areas then it is likely that there would be little need for anything more than a transfer of the Department of Statistics' data to the GIS. But these data are not acceptable because the DFR crosses the imaginary RSA-KwaZulu boundary, there was a significant under-count in previous censuses, and the growth of the region is phenomenal. Over the past two decades, the DFR's population has more than trebled from less than one million in 1970 to more than three million in 1989 (Planning Forum, 1989). By the year 2000, just nine years from now, it could be as high as 6,5 to 8 million people.

Thus, we must ask the questions what demographic data are required and what precision in space, time and content are required?

*For planning in the DFR to succeed, population estimates of informal settlements must be reliable in both space and time*

*Over the past two decades, the DFR's population has more than trebled from less than one million to above three million by 1989*

Figure 2: A Multi-participant Geographic Information System



*The last decade of the twentieth century finds metropolitan Durban in dire need of a coordinated plan for its future development*

From discussions with the planning fraternity and representatives of the commercial community, we would suggest that the following demographic data-sets are needed for the informal settlements:

- the location of new communities, with boundaries accurate to about 100m is needed at least once a year;
- the number and type of dwelling units in each square kilometre, accurate to about 5% is needed every three to five years; and
- the number of people, broken down by age and gender is needed once every five to ten years.

To provide these data for a number of important planning initiatives, the University of Natal is involved in four projects:

The first project makes the Department of Statistics' previous census data available to a GIS with a fine spatial resolution. All the enumerator sub-districts (ESD) have been digitised, enabling the 1985 census data to be displayed spatially and allowing spatial computations to be made.

The second project aims to calibrate the 1991 census. The ESD boundaries for the new census are being digitised and a series of parallel surveys will be run to estimate the degree of under-count and the lie-factor.

In a third project, the spatial distribution of dwelling units has been mapped for all the informal settlements of the DFR for 1979, 1983 and 1987. This was achieved using aerial photography which was manually photo-interpreted and captured using a digitiser.

The fourth project will locate new settlements rapidly and map them at low cost. Modern satellite-based imagery is currently being evaluated by a team from the Universities of Natal and Oxford. This last described technique is known as remote sensing and is likely to become an important source of spatial data for future GIS.

Thus we are of the opinion that systems will be in place in the early 1990s for the provision of accurate demographic data adequately referenced in spatial and temporal terms.

### Spatial Planning

The post World War II experience has been that new technologies encourage high

expectations but often fail to produce the desired products and usually cost much more than budgeted. For the successful development of GIS it is going to be necessary to design and build systems to produce useful products early on and to justify the costs by selling these products.

An excellent example of this approach is that employed by the Johannesburg Municipality. To construct the GIS data base for the city it has been necessary to capture the cadastral records and all the sewage, road, water and electrical reticulation maps. These data in the GIS have replaced previous manual maps and have generated savings in materials and manpower that compensate for the costs of installing the GIS (Vosloo, personal communication).

Data collection and validation costs are high. It is certain that the only way that these data costs can be contained is by spreading them across all those organisations needing spatial data for their operations in the DFR. The electricity, water and sewage utility authorities, major municipalities and regional authorities all require similar information. A distributed or multi-participant GIS network (see figure two) makes possible the assembly of the data as well as keeping it current in that each participant in the network has a specific data set(s) to maintain and contribute.

The last decade of the twentieth century finds Durban and its surrounds in dire need of a coordinated plan for its future development. A GIS is an essential component of a spatial DSS required for adequate planning. The cost of establishing and maintaining a GIS for the DFR is too great for any one organisation to bear and must be shared among all involved. Cooperation between University, public sector and private sector organisations can work to initiate such a system. **IPWA**

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*A Geographic Information System is an essential component of a spatial Decision-making Support System*



# DEVELOPMENT FORUM

## TOWARDS INTEGRATED DFR PLANNING

*Marius Spies, Chairman of the Planning Advisory Committee of the Joint Executive Authority, responds to the article entitled, 'Will Too Many Cooks Spoil Durban's Development Broth?' by Simon Bekker and Pravin Singh, published in Indicator SA, Vol 8/No 1, Summer 1990:59-63.*

As with all your articles relevant to KwaZulu/Natal, I read the review by Messrs Bekker and Singh with particular attention and interest.

At the outset, I would like to compliment your publication on yet another excellent article, which, albeit briefly, nevertheless succeeds in pinpointing and highlighting the crucial issues. Had the article appeared a mere eighteen months ago, I would have endorsed it, without reservation. As matters stand at present, however, I believe that it does not paint an entirely accurate picture.

I would, therefore, like to take this opportunity of bringing to your attention certain recent official initiatives, which were not featured in the article, but which I believe to be of considerable relevance to the question raised.

There is little doubt that effective development planning in KwaZulu/Natal has indeed been hampered by the multiplicity of planning authorities, resulting from the political fragmentation and consequent duplication of government structures, which typify our region. Early attempts to redress this problem took the form of various joint bodies, established by and between the KwaZulu government, the central government and, sometimes, the Province, to act as mechanisms for co-ordinating and integrating the various planning activities and projects.

Subsequently, during the early part of 1990, consensus was reached between the three main governmental role-players that there should be a single joint planning body for the region, capable of performing an integrated planning function. It was agreed that such a body should properly reside under the Joint Executive Authority (JEA), but it was also recognised that it was vitally important for the inputs of not only KwaZulu and the Province to be integrated, but also those of the central government.

Accordingly, the existing Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) of the JEA was restructured, to include three permanent representatives nominated by the Department of Planning and Provincial Affairs, in addition to the three representatives nominated by each of the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Administration. Furthermore, the PAC's terms of reference were expanded, to read as follows:

- to advise the JEA on general planning aspects concerning KwaZulu/Natal;
- to co-ordinate a guide planning programmes and projects of common concern to KwaZulu/Natal, which have been referred to it by the JEA;
- to make recommendations to the JEA as to what programmes and projects should be referred to it;
- to initiate such planning activities and responsibilities as may become necessary as a result of such programmes and projects as have been referred to it by the JEA; and
- to undertake investigations as initiated or requested by central government and to advise the central government on such issues via the JEA.

Further to the above and since it is not mentioned in the article, I would like to record that a vehicle does exist for mobilising and collating the private sector's inputs in development planning, in the form of the Regional Development Advisory Committee (RDAC's). These regional bodies report to the National Regional Development Advisory Committee (NRDAC); however, because of the singular situation created in KwaZulu/Natal, through the establishment of the JEA, the RDAC for this region agreed to submit its inputs to the PAC, for information and comment. There is thus an important linkage between these two bodies, which, if used and managed effectively, can provide a dynamic basis for shared planning and action - not only as between the various government administrations, but also across the divide which separates public and private sector activities.

Against the above developments, I would like to draw your attention also to certain initiatives specific to the Durban Functional Region (DFR). Whilst I appreciate that it may perhaps not be generally known, an official study on the planning and development of the DFR was commissioned jointly by the RSA and KwaZulu Cabinets, together with the Natal Provincial Administration. The resulting report was submitted in February 1990, but, although its contents were accepted in principle by the three principals, the report has not yet been released to the public. Latest indications are that this will take place during the early part of this year.

In the interim, the Department of Planning and Provincial Affairs has instructed the PAC to process further the results of the study. For this purpose, the PAC is establishing a special working-group to focus on resolving the problems and issues facing the DFR. Whilst the contents of the official study will obviously provide the 'backbone' for the working group's strategic direction, cognisance will certainly be taken of the various studies and proposals put forward by other private and public stakeholders in

the region and efforts will be made to achieve joint action and a participative approach.

Whilst I would not be so naive as to suggest that the abovementioned initiatives will of themselves provide an automatic cure for all the ills facing the DFR, I do believe that they are of sufficient importance to warrant mention in an authoritative publication like *Indicator SA*. I am aware that these developments have not received much publicity and that they may well have escaped the notice of all but a few and I trust, therefore, that my comments will be taken in the spirit intended.

#### *Editor's Note*

*We thank Dr Spies for his useful comments on the revamped role of the JEA in promoting integrated development planning in the DFR. An article on the functions of Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDAC's) appears in this edition of Indicator SA. We would welcome any other responses from readers on development issues and hope to maintain this new letter forum on a regular basis in future editions.*

### **EMPLOYER/UNION ROLE IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

*Extracts from an address by Bobby Godsell of the Anglo-American Corporation, delivered at the Durban Economic Development Conference, Durban, 7-8 November 1990.*

In the pursuit of social engineered goals, South Africa's regional development programmes are in no way unique. For many decades now, and in most parts of the world, money, effort and regulation have been invested in such programmes. The vast majority of these programmes have been magnificent failures. Why?

Firstly, most regional development programmes are launched for the wrong reasons and with impossible (and often undesirable) objectives.

From the 1950s onwards, for instance, the South African government engaged in massively expensive regional development programmes. All of these originated out of a desire to redraw the racial and political geography of South Africa. More recently, many of these ideological and grandiose objectives have been abandoned. However, the goals have remained to create new growth and deconcentration points (some 43 of them) - i.e. these programmes still seek to 'play' God, albeit in a less explicitly racial way.

Secondly, most regional development programmes are planned and executed by quite the wrong people. In South Africa (as has often been the case elsewhere) a *decentralisation* of industry has been conceived, planned and implemented by *centralised* government departments.

Development cannot be induced from the top-down. The only realistic goal of regional development is to meet the needs and expand the opportunities of the people presently living in the region - not to drive people away, or shift boundaries, or restrict freedom. And the only people who can plan effective regional development programmes are those from the region concerned. They know their needs, and they can identify and mobilise the resources needed to meet these needs.

For their part, employer associations and trade unions can make a major contribution to successful regional development strategies. For instance, what can they do to promote labour peace - the promotion of co-operation and the effective management of conflicts - in a regional context?

- firstly, they can seek to reach agreement on the basic principles, the rights and responsibilities which should characterise the worker/manager, union/employer relationship; values, which if reciprocally acknowledged will promote peace;
- secondly, they can promote bargaining, through supporting the institutions which sustain it, and through acknowledging its success;
- thirdly, they can actively promote conflict resolutions, where bargaining fails by mutually agreeing to the goals of mediators and arbitrators - by offering venues for mediation and by working proactively to enhance relationships, even before conflict occurs.

Another clear source of wealth creation and a major comparative advantage influencing the location of new investment is both the skill and productivity base of a region. There is a limit to what employer bodies and unions can achieve unilaterally in these areas. There is much more that they can achieve together.

For example, they can jointly identify scarce skills and seek to increase them on a cooperative, cost-effective basis. They can enlist the support of public authorities at all levels to address productivity barriers, e.g. transportation, services, input factor, availability of industrial land, etc. They can publicise those companies which achieve excellence in this area.

One cannot run a productive economy in an unstable society. Recent events in South Africa have painfully and graphically demonstrated that social development needs more than the commitment of financial resources. We need money to build houses, but we need more than money to develop stable communities. Employer bodies can help to mobilise financial resources. Unions (together with community organisations) can mobilise the community resources (and discipline) to construct societies as well as physical structures. These are both novel and ambitious ideas in the South African context - yet my experience in labour relations suggests that the time has never been more propitious to explore them.

## THE INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT TRUST

### Ipsa Update

Since the Independent Development Trust (IDT) under the chairmanship of Mr Jan Steyn was announced in March last year, various development projects have been earmarked. Some of the projects have already begun whilst other priority projects are still to be identified, specifically in the field of housing, informal settlement, education, job creation and health.

Whilst there were earlier reports of a R3bn trust, R2bn falls under the direct administration of the IDT which will focus on general socio-economic upliftment and wealth creation projects. The remaining R1bn, income raised from the government's privatisation programme, will stay in government hands to be used to 'eliminate capital backlogs in education and to acquire land for black urbanisation'. Of the R1bn, Natal is ranked as high priority for development aid. Of the 2bn in IDT funds, Natal is set to receive priority as well with an allocation of about R500m. Thus far the following projects have been initiated:

- *August 1990*

IDT announces contribution of R11.3m towards economic upgrading of the Bester Camp informal settlement in Inanda, Durban. The upgrading programme entails the introduction of essential urban services such as water, sewage disposal, roads, drainage and refuse removal.

- *November 1990*

Outside of Natal, the IDT allocates R4m towards the Vusisizwe Trust's programme in the Eastern Cape to rebuild schools and classrooms which have been destroyed. R35m will be allocated in 1993 for the second phase.

In *December 1990*, the IDT allocates R160m for a range of housing, education and health projects to be undertaken throughout the country. These include:

- R11m allocation in support of a credit company to provide small loans for the supply and upgrading of informal housing.
- R70m loan to the Urban Foundation to help provide shelter for the very poor.
- R10m allocation for technical education and an investigation into a national loan scheme for funding tertiary education for disadvantaged students.
- R6m allocation for health projects.
- Tens of millions of rands expected to be invested for preschool/educare.

- *January 1991*

IDT announces R600m housing project to provide improved living conditions for more than 750 000 low-paid people nationally over the next two years..

- *February 1991*

The IDT offers to assist returning exiles either within existing programmes or new projects.

## SHAKING THE PILLARS OF DEVELOPMENT SCHOOLS

*Abridged rejoinder by Professor Julius Jeppe, Department of Development Administration, University of Stellenbosch to 'The Fall of Centralism? Popular Mobilisation for Post-Apartheid Development' by Catherine Cross, Frik de Beer, Peter Stewart and Linda Cornwell, in Indicator SA, Vol7/No3, Winter 1990:47-52.*

At the time of writing their article, the authors had all been teaching in the Department of Development Administration at the University of South Africa. They expressed their concern over the teaching of development studies and development administration.

I fully share the authors' concern that development studies is not making a sufficient contribution to the evolution of South African society at this crucial point in its history. I would agree that the disciplinary basis for the organisation of our universities is largely responsible for the present situation.

More attention should generally be given to popular initiatives in development. In fact, this is exactly the direction in which the discipline of development administration has been moving for some time. Other disciplines are following suit, and this should be beneficial to the evolution of the field of development studies in general.

I am also in agreement with the importance attached to 'issues of institutional weakness', 'ecologically-sustainable development', 'management skills', 'efficiency of administration', and the need for teaching 'development-related concepts and practices', even though these aspects are mentioned by the authors almost in passing. Apart from these, several other issues could be added, such as a critical analysis of current development strategies, problems of implementation, the integrated nature of the development problem, and so forth.

Further good points are made where the authors state that 'popular initiatives and mobilisation' play key roles; that 'freedom and democracy' are burning issues; that 'justice and acceptable levels of equity' are integral to development; and that (presumably) these should receive more attention in teaching - teaching (I would like to add) of development studies/administration.

To a certain extent I could also agree that politics should receive more attention in development (administration). But it is at this point that the authors seem to lose their perspective completely. Their opening statements place the article in perspective for the reader: 'development is pre-eminently a political process ...', and '... all of politics may ultimately be a development study'. No-one could deny the influence of politics in development but to define politics as the focal point of development studies is to don disciplinary garments again and return to square one. Inexplicably, this is what the authors apparently propose to do.

At face value the authors' statement, 'Approaches to development ... must be holistic', is in line with development thinking worldwide. But then they say that '... in South Africa this means taking aboard far more critical socio-political reflection'. Read together with their statement that development is a political process, and that politics may ultimately be a development study, there is nothing holistic in their view of development. In fact, their approach seems to support the fragmentation of the social sciences.

Turning to their own discipline, development administration, the authors take up a position which is, to put it mildly, difficult to understand. To them, development *studies* is the 'discipline', and development *administration* 'represents the older, outmoded shape of the discipline'.

Thirty years ago this view might have held water. The authors selected the earliest period in the history of their discipline (development administration), referring to the immediate post-war years in order to describe the present nature and function of the discipline in pejorative terms: outmoded, top-down, elitist, uncritical, supporting the status quo. However, they refrained from saying that their historical facts were used selectively, and that the discipline had gone through several successive stages of evolution since the post-war period.

This is astonishing in view of the fact that the authors are or were all teachers of development administration. This raises the possibility that they are ignorant of the evolution of their own discipline.

The evolution of the discipline shows a clear trend from central to local-level issues, without losing sight of the broader context. The authors' suggestion ('the fall of centralism') to the contrary is without foundation and misleading (see *note below - editor*). Development administration has gone through several evolutionary phases, starting with institutional transfer to the 'non-Western countries' (as they were called at the time), and successively emphasising bureaucratic reform, local-level institutions and development practices, and people's participation in development.

I can, *inter alia*, mention a few of my own writings in which central themes are participatory

development, social development management, and bureaucratic dominance versus local empowerment. It is most significant that the authors simply ignore these and other colleagues' writings because it glaringly disproves their selective criticism.

In the evolution of development administration, it has steadily grown towards development studies and away from typical *first world* thinking and arrogant prescriptiveness. The authors may do well to ponder on the latter. This growth, and the dynamism inherent in the discipline, emanate from the fact that development administration deals with a problem (development), and not with a sector of social science. In its current phase of evolution the discipline is establishing itself more firmly than ever before within development studies without claiming the entire field for itself.

Development administration is now the only discipline in South Africa that defines itself explicitly within the broad field of development studies, adopting interdisciplinary and holistic points of departure. There remain many disciplinary inputs in the field of development studies, but in the final analysis all of them are focused inwardly towards their respective disciplinary focal points. Their disciplinary boundaries restrict them, and their theoretical baggage slows them down.


While development administration is not free from criticism regarding its contribution to development in South Africa, it is sheer nonsense and transparent academic mischief to say that 'the results (of its teaching) can be seen in the way in which the former "homelands" have been administered'.

Development administration was perhaps the first South African academic discipline that equipped students to recognise the ills of South African society and the destructive nature of its policies. Perhaps this is one reason why development administration had to fight for survival over so many years.

The authors' insinuations against the discipline must be rejected emphatically. It is indeed lamentable that such selective, mischievous, and polemical argument about an academic discipline can come from its own academic kin. Rationality and the scientific method must be protected as the pillars of academia.

**Editor's Note:**

*The editor takes full responsibility (and credit) for the choice of the main title of the article by Cross et al. This title, 'The Fall of Centralism', was meant to provoke debate on possible parallels between the practice of centralised planning in Eastern Europe and development administration in South Africa. The article was selected for publication on the obvious merits of the authors' global approach to development issues in South Africa, a serious critique in which commentary on development teaching per se forms but one strand.*



### RDACs & Regional Development

By Professor Bill Davies, Institute of Social & Economic Research, Rhodes University

**T**he Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDACs) are non-statutory institutions intended to advise the state regarding the needs and priorities of regional community interests in the country. Nine such bodies have been established, one in each of the development regions defined in the Good Hope Plan (GHP) of 1982. They are essentially second-tier institutions charged with reflecting the development aspirations of a network of Regional Development Associations (RDAs) which operate one notch down the planning hierarchy at the regional level.

Below the RDACs, at the local authority and magisterial district level, provision is made for the existence of District Development Associations (DDAs) - ostensibly giving a voice to the 'grassroots' communities. The establishment of DDAs has seldom been actively pursued and very few, if any, exist.

Thus, the lowest tier of the hierarchy actually occurs at the RDA level. RDAs have a much longer history than RDACs, dating back to the 1920s when they emerged as loosely structured pressure groups, sometimes called public bodies associations. These bodies sought to advise and influence officials and politicians in order to secure benefits and advantages for particular interests in the areas in which they operated.

In their early days, RDAs were a nuisance to the state, mainly because of their pressure group function and because they were not subject to any formal state control. It was probably for this reason that they were brought into the state's regional development structures; first, in terms of the 1975 National Physical Development Plan which accorded them an official status, and subsequently, as entities nominally subordinate to RDACs in terms of the GHP.

*The central state has created a semblance of devolution and citizen participation in regional development by building an hierarchical structure of advisory institutions that extend from the 'grassroots' level to the heady heights of cabinet committees and development councils. New administrative creatures, the Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDACs) created in terms of the 1982 Good Hope Plan (GHP), are intended to play a pivotal role in 'integrated regional development'. In this focus on RDACs, the author suggests that the whole process is effectively beyond the influence of most regional community interests.*


Within this institutional maze (see diagram), the RDACs are responsible to a National Regional Development Advisory Council (NRDAC) on which they are represented, usually in the form of their chairmen. The NRDAC is a national body dominated by officials representing government departments, though it does have representation from the major national-level private sector organisations. It was also established in terms of the GHP, and replaces the previous Planning Advisory Council.

The NRDAC acts effectively as a filter through which regional proposals are 'co-ordinated' and re-prioritised in 'the national context'. This often means that such proposals are buried or become subject to an interminable sequence of referrals to committees, sub-committees or working groups from which they seldom emerge in a form which suits the intent of the original sub-regional proposal. Despite their representation on the NRDAC, individual RDACs have very little influence to accelerate the process of NRDAC deliberations - which often results in frustration and a loss of confidence in the capacity of the system to deliver.

#### Advisory Processes

Two other elements of the regional development advisory process impact on the activities of the RDACs (see diagram). The first of these, also a product of the GHP, is the complex Multilateral Co-operation System (MCS) with its plethora of multilateral technical committees, sub-committees, working groups, task teams and other bureaucratic instruments tenuously held together and orchestrated by the Secretariat for Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa (SECOSAF).

## THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY SYSTEM



The MCS was devised to accommodate the 'sovereignty' of the TBVC homelands - now, together with the South Africa and the non-independent homelands, referred to as the Economic Community of Southern Africa (ECOSA). At the regional level, the MCS is connected to the RDACs through Regional Liaison Committees (RLCs), which consist of the chairmen of the RDACs and a range of supporting officials and bureaucrats.

The RLCs are intended to address development issues which 'transcend political boundaries'; i.e., affect the interests of 'independent' homelands and those of portions of South African territory which may adjoin them. RLCs are also advisory bodies, and their deliberations are directed to a 'decision-making' Development Council of Ministers, via the labyrinthine MCS structures driven by SECOSAF. Development proposals which enter this system are often subject to the same fate as those which are referred to the NRDAC by the RDACs.

A point of clarification is needed here: since regional participation in an RLC takes place through an RDAC, a number of new RDACs had to be created in order to accommodate the interests of the TBVC states where these, or portions of them, occur in a development region. Thus, whilst nine RDACs were originally established, the imperatives of macro-apartheid have subsequently necessitated the creation of at least six new ones; e.g. RDAC-Ciskei and RDAC-Transkei, of which there are two because Transkei straddles the boundary between development regions D and E.

The second element of the regional development advisory process which impacts on the RDACs is the newly created National Co-ordination Mechanism (NCM), which has a regional level manifestation in the form of Joint Co-ordinating Centres (JCCs) and Local Co-ordinating Centres (LCCs). JCCs operate at the planning region level and coincide roughly with RDACs; although eleven JCCs have been established, as opposed to nine RDACs. The LCCs, which are responsible to the JCC level, are approximately coincident with RDAs. An interacting relationship between RDACs and JCCs on the one hand, and between RDAs and LCCs on the other, is expected to emerge in each development region.

The original specification for the NCM made provision for another level below the LCCs, to be called Joint Liaison Forums (JLFs) which should have incorporated the 'grassroots' community organisations and individuals. As is the case with the 'grassroots' DDAs, however, very few, if any, JLFs have ever been set up and activated.

The JCCs report to a committee of department heads and, through the cabinet secretariat, directly to the cabinet. Nominally, therefore, the JCC system has the most direct line of reference to the highest authority in the land - unlike the RDACs which must traverse the NRDAC and the Department of Planning and Provincial Affairs (and, often, other government departments) before they have access to the cabinet level.

JCCs consist of regional representatives of central government departments and provincial

administration representatives, and they are intended to 'co-ordinate' the development-related activities of state departments and other agencies in a development region. They have considerable capacity and authority to ensure that the development-related operations of government departments and provincial administrations are properly implemented, and to promote inter-departmental co-operation at the regional level.

LCCs operate at the local level and consist of representatives of government departments at that level, local authorities and private sector interests. They are responsible for 'co-ordinating' government actions at the RDA/planning region level, and are also intended to mobilise private sector involvement in the implementation of development projects and programmes.

The close similarities between the NCM and its JCC/LCC structures and the much discredited National Security Management System (NSMS), which it has replaced, has not gone unnoticed amongst many regional interests - not least of which are the RDACs and the RDAs.

### Evaluating Performance

Recent opinion surveys conducted in the Orange Free State, the Eastern Cape and Natal (development regions C, D and E) suggest that RDACs and their associated RDAs are widely considered to be neither effective nor useful institutions, lacking in credibility and legitimacy, and having very little influence on regional development policy formulation and implementation.

RDACs are perceived to be instruments of the state by virtue of their dependence on state funding for their administrative and operational activities. Moreover, they are often overlooked or ignored - sometimes treated with disdain and even derision - by regional private sector interests. Indeed, such attitudes are also evident amongst public sector officials at the national and regional levels; including the very interests which created them, and which they are meant to advise.

The prevalence of such opinions regarding RDACs - which, in fact, extend to the entire regional development advisory hierarchy and to the parallel MCS and NCM structures - suggests that there is a widespread view that the state has deliberately contrived to create the impression of decentralised decision-making through its GHP, whilst effectively retaining power and control at the centre. Confirmation of this view is contained in the Physical Planning Bill of 1990 which, *inter alia*, makes provision for the compilation of 'regional development frameworks' and 'regional structure plans' for the development regions in

which RDACs and their RDAs operate.

The Bill is replete with injunctions to the effect that the Minister determines the policy and how it is to be implemented. In the event of doubt concerning the interpretation of the Bill's 'policy directives', the Minister is the sole arbiter, 'and his decision shall be final'. Whilst the Bill makes provision for 'public participation' which, presumably, would involve the advisory functions of the RDAC/RDA networks, the authority to determine directives regarding the extent and nature of such public participation is firmly vested in the Minister.

This is hardly the stuff to persuade regional committees or institutions like RDACs and RDAs that they have any real influence over their destiny. In short, the Bill does not auger well for decentralisation and devolution. It would probably render the RDAC/RDA institutions even more subservient to the central state, thereby further eroding their credibility and effectiveness at the regional level.

### Imperatives for Survival

There is little doubt that the principle of an RDAC with a network of RDAs through which it can access the hopes, fears, aspirations and priorities of micro-regional communities is sound. There will always be a need for advisory institutions through which the people can communicate with higher echelon authorities. However, there is equally little doubt that the GHP-created RDAC/RDA structures cannot, in their present form and operational manifestation, fulfil that role.

On the other hand, there seems to be little point in trying to create new institutional structures to do what is necessary - there are already too many organisations and agencies involved, all of which simply add to the complexity of the system. It would make a great deal more sense to find a way of adapting and using the existing structures to play a more effective role. This means changing the RDACs, and allowing the implications of those changes to percolate through to the RDAs because that is where the potential strength of RDACs is located.

The most important change which is required has to do with the image of RDACs. Whilst much is made of the apolitical nature of RDACs, and of their independence and autonomy, the fact of the matter is that they were created by the state and established to participate in and promote regional development policies which have turned out to be fatally flawed. Thus, RDACs are commonly perceived to be an integral part of the state's bureaucratic machinery and to be closely associated with discredited policies.

In order to become more effective and relevant, therefore, it would seem that a minimum requirement for RDACs is that they must begin to shed their widely received image as instruments of the state. One way of doing this might be for them to work towards becoming non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which are beyond the control of the state but which have sufficient credibility and legitimacy amongst their regional constituencies to ensure that they cannot be ignored by the state - either in the form of the present government or whatever form of government emerges in the 'new' South Africa.

Shifting to an NGO mode of operation, though, may have unfortunate consequences for RDACs. Whilst their disengagement from the state would add to their relative credibility and autonomy, it would also mean having to forgo the financial resources which they receive from the state, and on which they depend. It is quite probable, however, that to the extent that RDACs diminish their financial dependence on the state, they will find it easier to secure resources from other regional interests - notably those in the private sector.

More seriously, the adoption of an NGO role may result in a progressive loss of influence with the state as it becomes apparent that RDACs are, in fact, successfully independent; and that they do turn out to be useful instruments for promoting regional autonomy with substantial support from influential regional constituencies. Much depends on the extent to which an RDAC Directorate has used its members and, particularly, its chairman, to develop an effective networking system amongst government departmental representatives at the local and regional levels as well as at the national level, where this is possible.

Thus, whilst the loss of influence issue is potentially serious, it need not be - if it is properly managed. In fact, as the RDACs begin to establish important regional contacts, denied to them as instruments of the state, their NGO role may turn out to be of critical importance in organising and facilitating the negotiation process required for the transition to a democratic South Africa.

Whether RDACs pursue the NGO route or not, however, the ultimate imperative for their survival is the broadening of their constituencies to secure a wider community participation in their activities. In particular, they must actively seek *and secure* the involvement of black interests in their regions, including civic associations, labour movements and other extra-parliamentary organisations. Without the participation of these interests, RDACs will become increasingly sidelined and irrelevant - used only to reflect a token measure of regional consultation as and when it suits the purposes of the central state. Securing such participation, though, will not be easy - not least

because it has been overlooked, ignored and sometimes deliberately excluded in the past.

Moreover, the extent to which RDACs are likely to attract willing, useful and committed involvement by legitimate black interests will vary amongst the nine development regions. Whilst much depends on the degree of enthusiasm and honesty with which RDACs approach the matter, in some regions the inordinate complexities of local black political divisions will undoubtedly serve to bedevil the most sincere of initiatives.

In region E (Natal/KwaZulu), for instance, the Inkatha/African National Congress (ANC) division will make it extremely difficult to secure non-partisan involvement; whilst in region D (Eastern Cape), the presence of the two 'independent' homelands of Transkei and Ciskei, both with recently installed military councils determined to secure maximum benefit for their own territories, is likely to muddy the waters considerably in an environment characterised by ANC-driven politicisation.




There are many other aspects of the structure, organisation and operational style of RDACs which require to be addressed before they can become effectively useful institutions in the regional development process. These include the following:

- the specification of RDAC membership criteria, which are currently decided by the central state
- RDAC relationships with the central state, which are currently directed and managed by and through the NRDAC
- RDAC (and RDA) relationships with the JCC/LCC structures, which if not firmly controlled and managed by the RDACs could result in their losing even further status and credibility. Indeed, the very existence of JCCs and LCCs should be subjected to a close critical scrutiny by the RDACs
- the formulation of appropriate roles for RDACs in promoting and facilitating relative regional autonomy, which, in turn, ensures that regional interests are accorded an increasing authority and responsibility for decision-making regarding their own destiny.
- the boundaries of the development regions and what they mean need to be reviewed; and RDACs should be closely involved in that process.

These represent minimum requirements for the survival of RDACs. If they do not begin to fashion new roles for themselves it is doubtful that they will emerge from the transition as useful or effective institutions. They will not necessarily disappear from the scene; but, what is worse, they will simply continue to muddle along. **IPDA**



# URBAN MONITOR




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
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# DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT

## Meeting Basic Needs

*By Dulcie Krige, Centre for Social & Development Studies and INR, and  
Dr Robert Fincham, Institute of Natural Resources, University of Natal*

A recent *Time* magazine article focusing on the role of children in society, concluded that, 'No society can afford to forget that on the backs of its children ride its future prosperity and integrity'. We would like to affirm the importance of these sentiments. Our concern is to stress the necessity to satisfy basic needs at a grassroots, community level. We argue that sound information, kept current and in a readily available form, will best promote aggregate planning for such needs satisfaction now and for future generations.

When we consider the quality of life of the poorer residents of Natal/KwaZulu, we need to remember that it is the investment made in the children of the present that determines the economic advancement, the political decisions and the social security of the society of the future. Placing the focus on *children* does not neglect the quality of life of their parents - *parents* must be in employment if children are to be economically secure; *parents* must be educated if they are to be employable and able to invest in their children's education; and *mothers* must attend ante-natal clinics and understand the imperatives of preventative health care in order to give birth to healthy children.

The United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), in its second policy review of 1990, presents proposals for goals and strategies for child wellbeing and development in the 1990s. In South Africa we need to share with and learn from the experiences of the rest of the developing world. We must form part of Unicef's

proposal 'that the development of human capabilities and meeting basic human needs should be the focus of ... (our)... contribution to the fourth United Nations development decade' (Unicef:5).

Unicef stresses the need for reliable statistics regarding poverty, mortality, child and maternal health, nutrition, water, sanitation and education. Furthermore, to set specific targets to improve the situation and to understand that these targets will differ from country to country and within countries depending on circumstances i.e. targets will be area specific.

In order to contribute to Unicef's vision, it is necessary that data be assembled in a form that is readily retrievable, and, through appropriate processing techniques, provides information needed by decision makers. Most importantly, the resultant information must be geographically referenced so that data can be disaggregated to a specific location to permit informed, proactive planning to take place. So often, existing databases provide non-spatial information output. Planning goes ahead with little regard to variation in such factors as access to primary health care, level of schooling and functional literacy rates of the population.

During the 1950s and 1960s, many development theorists postulated that as the Gross National Product of a country grew, all the population would begin to benefit. It became apparent, however, that even where countries grew richer the population as a whole did not necessarily profit. In other

*Current planning pays little regard to spatial variation in access to primary health care, schooling and functional literacy rates*

*Computers are able to store large quantities of data and assist analysis of population, health and education distribution*

words, the increasing wealth did not 'trickle down' to the whole population - in fact, there is ample evidence to indicate that income disparities often increased and while the rich became richer the poor also became poorer. The search for and articulation of alternate development paradigms in the 1970s was, as a result, concerted. One of the theoretical frameworks which replaced that of the Rostowian type linear 'growth' model was that of 'basic needs'.

The basic needs paradigm holds that all members of society are entitled to the fulfilment of their basic needs of nutrition, shelter, health care, education and employment. While this may sound somewhat like a revival of the largely outdated welfare-state policy, it is evident that people who are malnourished, diseased and illiterate cannot play purposeful roles in either the economy or in their own personal lives.

If the means of fulfilling basic needs are to be made available by the state then the population in need must be targeted. Targeting requires a knowledge of who, needs what, where - this in turn necessitates a regularly updated information base which relates disaggregated data to its location and can output it in tabular (see employment and health data:pp 34 and pp 68/69), graphic (see education data:pp 63) or map form (see employment and literacy maps:pp 31 and pp 49). In so doing, it provides the information framework (see GIS diagrams:pp 52/53) within which timeous grassroots interventions can take place.

Ongoing developments in computer technology mean that computers are increasingly able to store large quantities of data in such a way that it can be readily retrieved and used in the analysis of such issues as population distribution, health services provision and access to, and the nature of, education facilities. Data is routinely collected by all government departments and many non-government organisations. Nevertheless, the data typically remains confined to the specific department or organisation that generated it and are not generally available for inter-departmental, large-scale, more visionary and holistic planning.

In other instances different departments and organisations collect similar data, update it at different times, in different formats and

with varying levels of accuracy. The end result is conflict about situations on the ground. Such data duplication or redundancy is unacceptable given the scarce resources available for data acquisition and forward planning.

The point is that much basic needs data should be coordinated and analysed by organisations that have access to appropriate computer technology, a sound grasp of the social, economic and political issues involved in applying 'basic needs' development strategies, and are situated in research environments perceived to be politically non-aligned. These organisations are then in a position to provide information in the form of policy recommendations that can be used or consulted by strategic planning organs within the public sector responsible for the delivery of basic needs.

The Institute of Natural Resources at the University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) is acknowledged as having considerable skills in the area of *Geographic Information System* (GIS) research, development and application. The Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal (Durban) has an excellent reputation with regard to its social and economic research capabilities, particularly in the Natal/KwaZulu region.

Together, the two institutions have the ability to develop the data-bank to provide the information to answer the question 'who, needs what, where'. The articles in this special edition of *Indicator SA* illustrate the utility for planners of the spatial data collected on employment and migration, urbanisation and basic needs, education and health, and in other key socio-economic spheres.

The satisfaction of basic needs is a complex issue involving the nature and quantity of societal and physical resources available for distribution, as well as the philosophy for the participation of the public and private sectors in basic needs provision. The attitudes and abilities of the people themselves and their degree of participation in basic needs provision is also vital.

Finally, information to describe and plan for the basic needs of the population of this region is vital and must form part and parcel of strategies for basic needs satisfaction. IDA

*Satisfaction of basic needs is a complex issue involving the nature and quantity of resources available for redistribution*

### HEALTH CARE

## In Search of A Cure

By Maria Hambridge (National Project Coordinator, Planned Parenthood Association) and Dulcie Krige (CSDS and Institute of Natural Resources)

**R**esearch into health care is still underdeveloped in South Africa as a whole. In the past, research and data collection on the provision of health care in Natal/KwaZulu has been further complicated by the fragmented character of health care in the region. One possible route to compiling a data base of comparable use throughout the Natal/KwaZulu region is to examine spatial accessibility to health facilities; another route is the use of Thiessen polygon research which establishes, for example, the population resident in a hospital's catchment area.

One qualitative study was undertaken in 1989 to investigate patterns of health care utilisation amongst women and children in Groutville, an urbanising African freehold area north of Durban. A total of 39 women from a shack settlement there were interviewed to find out what form of health care they used. The interviews suggest that a number of perceptual factors affect women's utilisation of health services and that provision is inadequate from the users' point of view.

The research has highlighted problem areas which need to be considered in the formulation of primary health care programmes. At present, primary health care consists of preventative care such as child health care, mother's health education, family planning, immunisation and screening for certain diseases. It also includes certain curative aspects such as treating minor ailments, tuberculosis, and venereal disease. The primary health care worker plays an important educational role so must understand and empathise with the local community.

Preventative health care is emphasised at the mobile and clinic level, while curative health care dominates at the hospital level. One major consideration arising from the research is that if primary health care is to have a positive impact on health status, the two approaches must be integrated in such a way that curative services help people to gain access to preventative health care.

*This article reports on coordinated efforts to generate quantitative and qualitative research into spatial accessibility and utilisation of health care in Natal/KwaZulu. It forms part of an ongoing inter-departmental project at the University of Natal which aims to collect key development information on the region. Called 'NU Stats' - Human Resource Statistics for Natal and KwaZulu - this unique data base has been designed as an instrument to assist policymakers and planners in making informed decisions.*

### Fragmented Provision

South Africa's history of racial and territorial segregation has left health service provision in Natal/KwaZulu fragmented along racial, administrative, financial and spatial lines. State hospitals were generally racially segregated until early 1990 when legislative changes opened up facilities to all race groups.

Hospital provision for Natal's African population is administered by the NPA and that for KwaZulu by the KwaZulu Department of Health and Welfare. KwaZulu, in many instances, subsidises health care for the African population of Natal, and in other instances, Natal subsidises KwaZulu. Administrative and funding arrangements are complicated as may be seen from table one.

In many Natal census districts, Natal Provincial Authority (NPA) hospitals have long provided hospital services for African people, albeit in a separate section of the hospital. In some magisterial districts there is no provision for a African person to receive hospital treatment: in Hlabisa, Lower Umfolosi, Pietermaritzburg, Ngotshe and Newcastle the nearest hospital for a African person would be one in KwaZulu.

In the past, separate branches of the Department of National Health and Population Development (DNHPD) administered the primary health care and family planning mobiles. At present, the primary health care mobiles in Natal are administered by the NPA and the family planning mobiles by the DNHPD. Frequent attendance by both mobiles at the same point at the same time indicates a costly duplication of services.

In addition, the five NPA hospitals on South African Development Trust land, previously controlled by DNHPD, also administer permanent and mobile clinics funded by KwaZulu. This points to a separation of administration and funding. Lastly, while the control of mobiles and hospitals is separated in Natal, in KwaZulu

**Table 1  
Health Services in Natal/KwaZulu \***

Facility	Region	Responsible Authority	Funding	Service Available
Hospitals	KwaZulu	KZ Dept Health & Welfare NPA Hospital Services (prev. DNHPD)	KZ	Curative with some preventative
	Natal	NPA Hospital Services	NPA	
Clinics	KwaZulu	KZ Dept Health & Welfare NPA Hospital Services (prev. DNHPD)	KZ	Preventative largely with some minor curative services and referral to hospital
	KwaZulu	NPA Hospital Services	NPA	
	Natal	NPA Hospital Services	NPA	
	Natal	Local Authorities	LA <sup>1</sup>	
	Natal	Development Services Board Welfare organisations	DSB <sup>1</sup> WO <sup>1</sup>	
Mobiles Health Points	KwaZulu	KZ Dept Health & Welf	KZ	Preventative with very elementary curative services & referrals to hospital
	Natal	NPA Hospital Services	NPA	

**FOOTNOTES**

\*The Umzimkulu enclave of the Transkei has its own hospitals, clinics and mobile health points.  
1 Subsidised by the Department of National Health and Population Development (DNHPD)

primary health care mobiles are administered by local hospitals, which in turn are controlled by the KwaZulu Department of Health and Welfare.

Permanent clinics, all of which are accessed at the intermediate health care level, are administered by a variety of different bodies such as local authorities, the NPA, welfare organisations and the Development Services Board (DSB). In many areas Natal's local authorities provide the only health care: 45 local authority clinics compared to 11 NPA health centres, 13 welfare clinics, 6 DSB clinics and 20 NPA hospitals.

All clinics are subsidised by the DNHPD for the service they offer Africans, but there are no specifications set down for the service offered. There are 147 permanent clinics in KwaZulu which are administered through the local hospitals. Fragmented administration leads to clinics offering different services and different fee structures.

Spatial fragmentation means that people travel across administrative boundaries to gain access to health provision in other areas. This is one of the reasons why Natal and KwaZulu subsidise one another, and why their funding cannot be separated. The existence of the Transkei 'island' in Natal introduces a third administrative authority. Transkei residents move freely to Natal and KwaZulu hospitals and vice versa. Table two illustrates Emerson's (1988:ix) research, which monitored cross-border flows to all state hospitals on one day in February 1987.

The table illustrates that, for approximately a quarter of the people in KwaZulu seeking hospital care, an NPA hospital is either the most accessible or is regarded as the best health service. Conversely, a quarter of the people in Natal seeking health care cross into KwaZulu for hospitalisation. The DNHPD hospitals, which are on South African Development Trust land and are

now administered by the NPA, draw patients from Natal and KwaZulu. These cross-border flows show that it is impossible to separate the two regions on a financial and administrative basis.

**Table 2: Cross Border Flows**

Attending hospitals under the jurisdiction of:	Patients normally resident in:		
	Natal	KwaZulu	Transkei
NPA	66,7%	26,4%	5,8%
KwaZulu	25,9%	73,0%	1,1%
DNHPD (now NPA)	55,0%	36,8%	7,7%

NPA Natal Provincial Authority  
DNHPD Department of National Health and Population Development

**Spatial Access**

Health facilities vary greatly in number and distribution between Natal and KwaZulu and also between urban and rural areas. Access for African people was quantified by applying criteria of geographical accessibility of 5km distance from a mobile point, and 10km distance from a permanent health facility. The World Health Organisation (1981:59) endorses this method in compiling indicators of physical accessibility. Areas within 5km and 10km of health facilities were then mapped and correlated with population densities. The results of this spatial analysis are shown in table three.

Table three shows that much of Natal's African population and that of KwaZulu is within 5km of a mobile health point. In general, the urban areas have considerably better access to mobile and permanent health care facilities than rural areas, and KwaZulu better than Natal. While virtually all the urban African population has access to health facilities, 30% of the rural African population in

**Table 3 : Access to Health Care Facilities in Natal/KwaZulu**

Distance from facility	% in Natal			% in KwaZulu		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Within 5km of mobile or other health facility	93	70	77	100	78	83
Within 10km of permanent health facility	96	33	53	100	83	87

Natal and 22% of the rural African population in KwaZulu are more than 5km from mobile points.

The situation is markedly better in KwaZulu than in Natal in the case of access to permanent health care. Eighty-three percent of KwaZulu's rural population is within 10km of a permanent facility whereas only 33% of the rural population in Natal has adequate access. Access is much better along Natal's north and south coasts, and the Durban - Pietermaritzburg - Estcourt axis than in the rest of Natal. Much of rural Natal is a veritable desert as far as permanent health facilities are concerned.

Spatial accessibility of health services is a precondition for health service utilisation, but it is not enough in itself. The health services also have to be able to cope with demand. Other indicators are needed to determine the adequacy of health care provision.

Densely populated areas may have spatially accessible health facilities but numbers seeking health care may be so great that people are not attended to. Adequacy of curative health care provision can be measured by using person/bed ratios.

Using Thiessen polygon research, hospital catchment populations have been calculated in table four. This method works on the assumption that people will attend the closest hospital, and thus polygons are based on boundaries equidistant from two hospitals. Person/bed ratios are calculated by dividing the catchment population by the number of beds in the closest hospital.

**Table 4  
Person/Bed Ratios in Natal/KwaZulu Hospitals**

Hospital	High Ratios	Hospital	Low Ratios
Christ the King	604:1	Northdale	185:1
Estcourt	624:1	Taylor Bequest	71:1
St Appollinaris	902:1	East Griqualand	130:1
Hlabisa	588:1	Benedictine	156:1
Church of Scotland	834:1		

The Natal/KwaZulu average person/bed ratio is 264:1 persons per bed in general and referral hospitals. The Thiessen polygon research shows that there are many areas where the adequacy of

hospital services is particularly poor, while there are other areas where there is an excess of hospital beds. Moreover, this analysis has not taken into account the desperate shortage of health personnel in KwaZulu, which compounds existing inadequacies. (Similar research on the adequacy of preventative health care provision at clinics and mobiles will be undertaken in the near future.)

### Groutville Study

Health needs are also addressed by the different types of services available. Information from the Groutville interviews shows how research on actual utilisation patterns can point to problem areas for policy and planning from the users' point of view.

As far as spatial accessibility is concerned, the Groutville population has better than average access compared to other magisterial areas of Natal/KwaZulu:

- 100% of the Lower Tugela population, which includes Groutville, has access to mobiles within 5km, compared to 77% for all Natal's African population;
- 83% have access to permanent clinics within 10km, compared to an average of 53% for the rest of Natal.
- The nearest hospital for Groutville is 7km away in Stanger; a welfare clinic, subsidised by the DNHPD, is located in Groutville itself, and mobiles from Tongaat Clinic visit regularly every month.

In open-ended interviews, 39 women were asked what health provision they used on a regular basis for themselves and their children. The results are set out in table five.

**Table 5: Utilisation of Health Care**

Provision	Specific Facility	Responses on Use	Total Number Interviewed
Hospital	Stanger	38	39
Clinic	Groutville	5	39
	Others	5	
Mobiles		8	39

Of those interviewed, 97% regularly used Stanger Hospital, while only 12,8% used the local clinic, with the same number using other clinics at more distant locations. A slightly higher percentage of 20,5% used the mobiles. The results suggest that the referral system presently advocated in policy, in which users are expected to attend local clinics and only use hospitals for referral, does not operate in Groutville.

Female users point to a number of reasons for this: Groutville clinic is thought by the squatters to be a clinic for landowners only; there is no doctor in attendance, only a nurse; there is no point

attending because cases are referred to Stanger hospital; the sister in charge is from outside the area and does not know the people; and lastly staff are not available outside of normal working hours in cases of emergency.

It appears that the women users interviewed have certain expectations of the clinic that are not fulfilled. In the first place, health provision is thought to be curative, evidenced by the way the women expect to be referred to Stanger, whereas Groutville Clinic tends to provide preventative health care and only treats minor ailments in twice weekly sessions. Hence women use Stanger hospital outpatients as a general clinic and for emergencies. The women who used the mobiles did so on a routine basis every month and expected to receive free medicine for the symptoms presented, indicating that the mobiles are also being used for a curative service.

Thus the over-utilisation of the hospital and the under-utilisation of the clinic and mobiles may be in part explained by the women's perception that the facilities should all offer curative health care. If this is so, then it points to the need to use curative health care as a vehicle for providing people with access to preventative health care. The implications are that if permanent and mobile clinics are to deliver primary health care efficiently, their curative dimension needs to be strengthened.

### Health Policy

The Groutville study suggests that perceptions as well as spatial accessibility affect people's decisions about health care, and that people's expectations of health services are crucial factors to be considered. The study also suggests that people think of health care mostly in terms of curative aspects.

International research has shown that curative and preventative health care cannot be separated if the health status of the population is to be improved. But the Groutville research indicates that if preventative health care is to be made socially acceptable, the fact that people expect curative health care must be exploited through programmes which integrate both approaches.

Health care is an expensive part of any country's budget. Rather than the state rationalising health care through cutting costs and privatisation, it would be preferable to increase expenditure on relatively inexpensive and standardised primary health care. The research indicates that Natal's rural African population does not have adequate access to permanent health care facilities. Thus the present need for health services may be met by providing relatively inexpensive permanent clinics complemented by a good ambulance service rather

than by spending large sums of money on hospital facilities.

Preventative health care and minor curative services need to be available at all health facilities, with a higher level of curative services made available at hospitals since they have in-patient facilities. Good referral and ambulance services are necessary to link the clinic and the hospital services.

Further changes are needed in the division of labour and allocation of responsibility in permanent and mobile clinics if curative medicine is to be the vehicle for implementing preventative health care. Skills, responsibilities and qualifications of nurses should be upgraded to ensure that they gain the legitimacy and support of consumers. Nurses would then fulfil the role now exclusively occupied by doctors, be able to take on a stronger curative role and be responsible for facilitating integrated health care.

Planning decisions need to be made about the location of new clinics, bearing in mind that the client population needs to be numerically adequate for a clinic's services to be utilised efficiently. A study of the African population of Natal/KwaZulu based on the 1985 census shows that there are many areas where clinics could be established, and where the overall access to health services can be greatly improved.

The *Geographic Information System* presently being developed by the Institute of Natural Resources (INR) as part of the 'NU Stats' project at the University of Natal will facilitate spatial planning. The constantly changing demographic profiles of rural and urban areas of Natal/KwaZulu indicate the need for constant monitoring to allow different planning scenarios to be explored. Lastly, qualitative and quantitative research on utilisation patterns needs to be developed further to ensure that policy and planning considers health care problems from the consumer's point of view. **UPWA**

#### Co-author's Note:

*This article is based on research undertaken by Maria Hambridge at the Centre for Community Organisation Research and Development (University of Natal), and research undertaken by Dulcie Krige with funding from the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission.*

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# TELECOMMUNICATIONS

## *The Urban*

## *Rural Link*

*Stavros Stavrou, Centre for Social & Development Studies, University of Natal*

*Research findings link the growth of a telecommunications network in a region with corresponding economic development. They also show that increased access to telephones in underdeveloped areas leads to an improved quality of life for rural communities. In Natal/KwaZulu, the Geographic Information System will enable telecommunication planners to calculate, for instance, the population living in proximity to a school, hospital or other nodal point, so that areas where a telephone service would serve the largest number of people can be given priority.*

A majority of people in the Third World and, to a lesser extent, the newly industrialised countries reside in rural areas, which in many instances remains underdeveloped. Until recently, the provision of public sector goods in these areas has been, at best, rudimentary. In particular, the telecommunications systems have suffered even greater neglect than many other services.

Not only is the state to blame for this course of development, but so too are rural development planners since telecommunications has been largely ignored as an input into rural development programmes. The need to modernise and link remote, under-developed rural areas with the more rapidly developing economic centres, makes it clear that the implications of this neglect could well be serious.

The general neglect of telecommunications issues as inputs into development planning stems partly from the fact that, until very recently, social scientists have not really come to grips with the role that

communication plays in the development process. Moreover, they have also failed to consider the impact that access to a means of conveying information, or the lack of it, will have on development performance. However, there is evidence to indicate that the situation is now changing, albeit slowly, and an increasing amount of research is being conducted in this area.

The peri-urban and rural sectors of Third World and, to a certain extent, newly industrialised countries, are usually characterised by the basic lack of clean and adequate supplies of water, food, fuel, shelter, roads and power. It is difficult therefore to even attempt to prioritise telecommunication development until these basic needs have been satisfied. Most of these peri-urban and rural areas in Natal/KwaZulu are impoverished, lacking even the most rudimentary infrastructural services and utilities.

Such a state of affairs would suggest that the extension of a telecommunications network is not a priority, indeed an

*We need to modernise and link remote, under-developed rural areas with rapidly developing urban economic centres*

*A cost-effective and viable telecom network would stimulate economic development in rural areas and undercut poverty*

*Most rural homesteads in KwaZulu lie close to a transport nodal point, shop or school, facilitating a public telephone system*

investment that would be better served directed towards some other basic necessity, such as education or health. This however, is a short-sighted strategy, for at the core of rural poverty lies underdevelopment, and it is generally acknowledged that economic development in these areas should be stimulated by the introduction of a cost-effective and viable telecommunications network.

### Reverse Charges

The development of an appropriate system of telecommunications requires not only technical choices but also social ones. Unless the socio-economic dynamics underlying rural society are understood, the technical choices that are made may well prove to be wholly inappropriate. Further, in installing an appropriate telephone service, the urban-rural link is critical in terms of the need for urban subsidisation of user costs in rural areas.

An assessment of rural infrastructural, service and utility needs and their affordability must take into account the attitudes and perceptions of the urban-based members of rural households. In most instances, the rural sectors are subsistence economies whose primary function is to provide labour to a more advanced and usually urbanised sector.

In KwaZulu, the migrant labour system creates a structural imbalance in most black rural households and, to a lesser extent, black urban and peri-urban households in terms of both the social composition and the ratio of employed to unemployed. In short, a significant proportion of all rurally based economically active and unemployed males work and reside in urban and peri-urban areas. The majority of these are men, household heads and the major income earners.

In many rural areas of Kwazulu, migrant remittances account for over 80% of all household incomes. A great deal of the decisions concerning rural domestic issues are made by these migrants, who spend the majority of their time working and residing in urban and peri-urban areas. Their attitudes and perceptions on rural telecommunications are a vital ingredient in planning. The decision to install a particular type of telephone system in a rural household is in a great number of cases, most likely to be made by a family member based in an urban area.

### The Demand

The most realistic system, in the context of the rural need but inability to bear too high a cost for telecommunication links, is a general and widely distributed public telephone system. The residential pattern of rural settlements favours the systematic installation of a public telephone system accessible to all. The majority of homesteads in KwaZulu are located in villages or ribbon type settlements alongside roads. Most rural homesteads are within a few kilometres of a transport nodal point, shop or school.

Rural telecommunications surveys conducted in KwaZulu show that, depending on the proximity of the rural area to a 'white' community, the average distance of a private telephone from a rural home is approximately 2,5 km. However, in the majority of cases this is not the telephone most frequently used. Most rural residents use a telephone other than the one closest to their household, usually an average of 5 km away. The reasons given by respondents included no access to the nearest telephone, usage tariff was prohibitively high, and lack of secrecy.

Although public telephones are very scarce and far between, they account for between one-quarter and half of all outgoing calls in rural areas. Over 90% of rural homes are located within 1,5 km from a trading store. Many of these stores are no more than a small shack, lacking electricity and telephones, and stocking a few rudimentary goods. But a fair number of these stores and shops, which act as community centres, do have telephones. The research found that these are the most frequently used telephones in rural KwaZulu.

Furthermore, the surveys reveal that over two-thirds of all households indicate a willingness to possess a private telephone, if they could afford to. The level of demand expressed was found to vary depending upon the nature of the existing service and with the distance of the rural community from the Greater Durban Metropolitan Region (GDMR).

In areas close to the GDMR the demand for telephones was moderately elastic, while in the more remote and sparsely populated rural areas demand was relatively inelastic. Households located on the periphery of the GDMR or in larger villages made approximately twice as many telephone calls than those located in sparsely populated rural areas.

This demand for a private telephone, however, was on average a third or fourth priority in the household, after reticulated water, electricity and bigger houses. The surveys show that the majority of telephone calls made in rural areas are to relatives and friends, primarily in order to discuss domestic, financial and social issues.

Almost unanimously, members of rural communities emphasise a specific need for telephones during times of emergency. The lack of access to a telephone has almost certainly resulted in the premature death of many a rural dweller. People in rural areas often travel great distances, either on foot or using public transport at considerable cost (both in terms of time and money), to make a telephone call.

Without the help of migrant remittances or an urban subsidy (financial help from permanently urban-based household members), less than 10% of rural homesteads could currently afford to install and maintain a private telephone service. The inhibiting factor in terms of affordability was not the issue of installation, but the monthly maintenance of the telephone. Current usage would amount to just under 40% of the monthly rental costs, above which individual telephone calls would have to be charged.

### Keeping Lines Open

Urban-based telecommunications research revealed that at least three-quarters of all GDMR households display rural links, of which the majority maintain fairly regular contact with their rural homes. These households are well established in the urban areas, with just over half having been in the GDMR for over 10 years and one-quarter for over 20 years. This is significant because it indicates both stability in terms of migratory patterns and that rural links are retained into the next generation.

Underlining levels of underdevelopment in rural areas is the fact that three-quarters of all the urban household heads moved into the city primarily in order to gain access to employment opportunities, and secondly, because of a poor quality of rural life. A negligible number of households relocated because they were attracted to 'the way of life', emphasising the fact that people are driven out of rural areas rather than attracted to urban centres. In many rural areas, state welfare grants in the form of pensions and urban remittances account for the majority of income.

Over three-quarters of all urban households interviewed were emphatic that there was no chance of future migration back to a rural area. Furthermore, nearly all were equally adamant that, although individual household members would depart from the rural homestead, there was no likelihood that the entire household would move from their present place of residence, either to another rural area or to an urban area.

The research emphasis on these links is important because of substantial urban-rural telecommunications needs and because without an urban financial subsidy, a rural telecommunication network is unlikely to succeed. Equally important is the finding that decision-making, particularly where it involves the installation of a technological utility or service in the rural home, is a process that occurs in both the urban and rural components of that household. Where telephone installation is concerned, two household members are entrusted with the final decision, the household head and/or the highest male income earner.

When all decisionmakers are taken into account, the final decision to install and maintain a telephone in a rural homestead will in 60% of all cases be made by an urban member of the linked urban-rural household. This does not mean that there are numerous rural households without a resident head nor that there is no consultation within the rural homestead and between the urban and rural families. It does mean that the final decision will be endorsed by an urban-based household head or by an important income earner.

Current urban-to-rural telephone calls are few and little money is spent in this way. Given the low frequency of telephone calls between the urban and rural households, it can be said that a case for extending the rural private telephone network does not exist. It would be difficult to argue otherwise. However, before dismissing the notion, it is important to identify the size of the market that can afford urban-financed telephones in rural areas.

From a number of surveys, it was established that one-quarter of all urban households with rural links could afford to install a private telephone in their rural homesteads. Of these, about half were willing to actually to do so. A further 10% of all such urban households are both willing and can afford to assist in the installation and maintenance of a rural telephone, if the rural household also contributed to the cost. One in six urban

*People in rural areas often travel great distances at considerable cost to make a public telephone call*

*Rural and urban members of the same household use public telephones to jointly discuss pressing family issues*

*Financial support by the urban based members of the family represents an urban to rural redistribution of income*

households would invest in a telephone in a rural home if a practical system is found to ensure smooth operation, control costs and prevent abuse.

### Redistributing Resources

Notwithstanding the more urgent pressure from the rural household, the decision to install a telephone in a rural household is most likely to be made in an urban area. The cost of installation and maintenance for many rural households also could be borne by the urban-based members of rural households.

Since telecommunication traffic generated during the initial stages will be largely subsidised by the urban side of the network, this would represent an urban to rural redistribution of income. The emphasis on redistribution is important, for although in many rural areas migrant remittances constitute the bulk of incoming wealth, a very small proportion of all urban-earned income is sent to rural households.

With the passage of time, intra-rural telecommunications usage may well be able to justify the existence of a rural telecommunications system on its own, whether for the purposes of social, domestic or business matters. Current research shows that in areas where telephones are more established and accessible to the rural population, the extent of intra-rural telecommunication traffic increases markedly.

In summary it is important to reiterate the fact that decisions by governmental agencies and private companies about the cost-effectiveness of a viable rural telecommunications system cannot be taken solely on the basis of rural demand, the affordability of rural households and likely intra-rural flows.

It is imperative to move beyond a cost-benefit analysis calculated upon possible financial returns within the rural economy, to the fact that the rural and urban economies are inextricably linked. It is unlikely that a substantial number of rural homesteads could currently afford to

install and maintain a private telephone. However, if the urban-rural link is taken into account, there exists a substantial potential demand for the installation of some system of rural private telecommunications, to supplement an improved public telecommunications network.

The research shows that there is a great need for a rural telecommunication network to be extended to KwaZulu. This requires a commitment on the part of the South African government, since it is unlikely that a privatised supplier would be able to provide such a system if it was not wholly cost-effective. The cost-effectiveness of providing an extensive rural network is greatly increased if the urban-rural link is taken into account, however, for the urban areas will effectively subsidise a substantial part of rural usage. IDA

### Acknowledgements

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*Urban subsidies would be vital for the installation and maintenance of a telecom network in a rural area*

## EDUCATIONAL PLANNING New Spatial Approach

The focus on education, health and telecommunications in the *Indicator SA* urban monitor clearly demonstrates the myriad uses of a spatial data base that shows *where* as well as *what* specific needs exist in Natal/KwaZulu. The following articles draw on an inter-departmental project undertaken at the University of Natal - *NU Stats: Human Resource Statistics for Natal/KwaZulu* - which has devised a *Geographic Information System (GIS)* to promote effective planning of social services and facilities in the region.

In the educational field, Libby Ardington illustrates the need for a knowledge of demographic patterns and migration trends in order to ensure that urgently needed secondary schools are built in areas of population in-migration. James Moulder's article interprets information on teacher:pupil ratios (TPRs) in the various education departments, within the circuits of those departments, and at individual schools. To assist planning, it is necessary to know whether these schools are urban or rural, primary or secondary, in relatively poorer or wealthier areas, and whether lower TPR ratios correlate with schools with good matriculation results.

The GIS education data base developed at the Institute for Natural Resources includes information gained from the census and other sources on location, education department, inspector's circuit, level (primary or secondary), pupils per standard (by gender), number of teachers, teacher qualifications, number of classrooms, pupils per subject at secondary level, etc. It will even tell us whether each school has a library, a science laboratory, science equipment, audio-visual equipment, electricity, running water, sports fields, or a telephone.

It is therefore possible to produce maps of Natal/KwaZulu which show, for example, all the black secondary schools which go up to standard ten or offer technical subjects; or all the black primary schools which have a library, science equipment and electricity. Or, instead of examining the entire Natal/KwaZulu region, it is possible to produce a map of a particular census district showing the census population of school-age children by enumerator area, as well as the black schools in the area and their TPRs, the number of pupils, and whether it is a state or a farm school.

The two maps on the monitor covers (see pp: 31,45) demonstrate the kinds of census data available, in this case for the Natal census district of New Hanover. They show how very low the level of functional literacy is for much of the area, but since this is an agricultural area with much unskilled labour, that employment levels are nonetheless high. In contrast, the adjoining KwaZulu areas of Mpumalanga and Ndwedwe have much higher functional literacy but lower employment levels, possibly resulting in politically explosive unfulfilled expectations.

Alternatively, certain information is more readily analysed in tabular rather than map form. The GIS data base can produce this information just as readily.

National changes in educational policy necessitates improved access to reliable information. But the political unrest in Natal/KwaZulu during 1990 impeded the collection of data for the school data base, leaving gaps which will continue to take time and effort to fill. Even under less adverse circumstances, the poor communications (inadequate telephones, poor postal services, and frequently impassable roads) between most rural schools and departmental head offices generally produce poor statistics.

If the GIS data base is to reach its full potential, many existing gaps will have to be filled. It must be widened to include all education departments in the region, non-formal and formal, pre-primary and tertiary, as well as primary and secondary education. The data base on which the development of a skilled, literate, numerate labour force is dependent will be further developed at the University of Natal once further private sector funding is made available.

# UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES

## Teacher:Pupil Ratios

By Professor James Moulder, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies,  
University of Natal

*Educational planning can be transformed by the Geographic Information System (GIS) created at the University of Natal as part of 'NU Stats' - Human Resource Statistics for Natal/KwaZulu. In this article, the author shows how a fully developed version of the system will transform the debate about how to achieve adequate teacher:pupil ratios (TPRs).*

The Geographic Information System (GIS) is a tool for capturing, analysing, displaying and managing information about what happens in a specified slice of space. It enables educational planners to create digital maps that integrate information from a wide variety of sources. They can be used to identify trends and decide how to allocate resources.

The implications of the three TPR options are shown in table one. These figures explain why we have to decide what counts as an adequate TPR.

The NEB raised two problems: reducing the TPR for primary schools and schooling 441 000 additional pupils. A solution to these problems that uses a ratio of 1:30 requires 14 200 more teachers than a solution that uses a ratio of 1:40. And this is a significant reduction in the size of the problem because of what it costs to educate teachers.

### A CASE STUDY

In November 1990, the Natal Education Board (NEB) released some alarming figures. Using a teacher:pupil ratio (TPR) of 1:30, it called for 32 000 additional teachers to staff primary schools in Natal/KwaZulu. They are required to reduce the TPR in the region's primary schools from 1:51 to 1:30 (17 300), as well as to provide schooling for about 441 000 children in rural areas who are not at school (14 700).

The NEB also calculated that a TPR of 1:35 reduces the number of additional primary school teachers that are required to slightly less than 24 000. If the NEB had used a TPR of 1:40, the shortfall that it was alarmed about would have been reduced even further to less than 18 000.

**TABLE 2: Five estimates, based on 1987 figures, of what it would cost to fund the NEB's call for additional primary school teachers**

Department	1987 Per Capita Cost	Total Annual Cost (Rm)		
		1:30 32 000	1:35 23 900	1:40 17 800
Delegates	18 000	576	430	320
Assembly	12 500	400	299	223
DET	11 000	352	263	196
Representatives	8 800	282	210	157
KwaZulu	5 500	176	131	98

SOURCE: Department of National Education, 'Education in the RSA 1987', NATED 02-215 (90/02):33 and 127.

**TABLE 1: Three ratios for calculating the number of primary school teachers required in Natal/KwaZulu**

Ratio	Additional teachers required: to improve the TPR	Additional teachers required: to school additional pupils	Total
1:30	17 300	14 700	32 000
1:35	11 300	12 600	23 900
1:40	6 800	11 000	17 800

It is not easy to calculate what it will cost to produce the additional teachers that the NEB called for. In 1987, the most recent year for which audited figures are available, the five education departments that operate in Natal/KwaZulu had alarmingly different per capita costs for teacher education. These differences are recorded in table two. They range from a total annual cost of R576m to educate 32 000 teachers to a total annual

cost of about R98m to educate 17 800 teachers. The difference of R478m is the difference between what is affordable (R98m) and what is not (R576m).

### New Approach

For all these reasons we need a new approach to the NEB's call for additional teachers. Mark Twain's conviction that statistics lie is a good place to begin.

In one sense, Twain was right. If one divides the number of pupils who were at school in 1987 (6 706 175) by the number of teachers (212 418), one gets a TPR of 1:32. But most schools had a higher or a lower ratio.

In another sense, Twain was wrong. Although statistics do not paint an accurate picture of what is happening, they do reflect trends and suggest possibilities. The fact that the TPR was 1:32 in 1987 tells us that we may have had sufficient teachers, but that we had not distributed them fairly. And if we ask why they were not distributed equally, we will discover some thorny problems that tend to be neglected when 'the education crisis' is discussed.

**Table 3: Actual and possible TPRs for the education departments in 1987**

Department	Actual ratio	Teachers required for a 1:35 ratio	Teachers required for a 1:40 ratio
Assembly	18	27 270	-25 418
Delegates	21	6 699	-4 314
Represent.	23	23 225	-11 612
DET	37	53 878	+3 547
Homelands	44	80 533	+16 984
TOTAL	32	191 605	-20 813

#### KEY

- A plus (+) indicates the number of additional teachers that are required for a ratio of 1:35 or 1:40.
- A minus (-) indicates the number of teachers that have to be removed from a department, or from the system, to get a ratio of 1:35 or 1:40.

**SOURCES:** SAIRR Survey, 1988/89:266, 273. Department of Education and Training, Annual Report, 1987: 252-254.

In almost all Third World countries, including South Africa, more money has been invested in teachers than in textbooks. But the World Bank (1988:40, 45) has argued that if we want to improve the quality of primary school, and in 1987 74% of our children were being schooled at this level, 'the safest investment' is to provide adequate textbooks. It has substantial evidence that 'within broad limits (between 25 and 50 pupils) changes in class size influence pupil achievement modestly or not at all'.

**TABLE 4: Actual and possible TPRs in the seven regions of the DET in 1987**

Region	Actual ratio	Teachers required for a 1:35 ratio	Teachers required for a 1:40 ratio
Johannesburg	31	5 784	-835
Natal	37	5 836	+342
N Transvaal	37	9 376	+594
Cape	38	7 971	+656
Highfield	38	9 413	+754
OFS	39	7 602	+862
Orange Vaal	41	7 896	+1 174
DET Total	37	53 878	+3 547

Source: Department of Education and Training, Annual Report, 1987:252-254.

This is why TPRs of 1:35 and 1:40 were used to calculate tables three to five.

### New Perspectives

Table three highlights two points:

- Firstly, if we had used a TPR of 1:35 to allocate the teachers that we had in 1987 to the ten departments that fall under the Department of National Education (DNE), we would have had 20 813 more teachers than the school system required. If we had used a ratio of 1:40, we would have had 44 764 extra teachers.
- Secondly, nobody knows exactly how many children, who should be at school, are not being educated. But Table 1 tells us that in 1987 we had sufficient teachers to educate either 728 455 additional pupils (on a ratio of 1:35) or 1 790 560 additional pupils (on a ratio of 1:40).

Tables four and five point to the unequal inequalities within our segregated systems of education:

- Table four highlights inequalities between the seven regions of the DET in 1987. At one extreme, its Johannesburg Region had an adequate TPR of 1:31. At the other extreme, its Orange Vaal Region had an unsatisfactory ratio of 1:41, although even this figure is well below the ratio of 1:50 that the World Bank regards as unproblematic.
- Table 5 highlights the inequalities between the six homeland education departments in 1987. At one extreme, QwaQwa had an adequate TPR of 1:32. At the other extreme, KwaZulu had a ratio of 1:50, which is where the World Bank draws the line. Lebowa had an unsatisfactory ratio of 1:42. And the ratio of 1:44 for all the homelands was very much higher than the DET's overall ratio of 1:37.

**TABLE 5: Actual and possible TPRs in the six homeland education departments in 1987**

Department	Actual ratio	Teachers required for a 1:35 ratio	Teachers required for a 1:40 ratio
QwaQwa	32	2 791	-302 2 442 -651
KaNdwane	39	4 981	+530 4 358 -93
KwaNdebele	39	4 424	+453 3 871 -100
Gazankulu	40	7 502	+918 6564 -20
Lebowa	42	23 124	+4 038 20 234 +1 148
KwaZulu	50	37 711	+11 347 32 997 +6 633
Homeland Total	44	80 533	+16 984 70 466 +6 917

**SOURCE:** Department of Education and Training, Annual Report, 1987:252-254.

All three tables warn us to be careful, as well as specific, when we call for more teachers. We should be careful, because, in the light of the World Bank's evidence, the only TPRs that can be construed as problematic are KwaZulu's 1:50, Lebowa's 1:42 and the Orange Vaal Region's 1:41.

We should also be specific, because the segments of the education system that are controlled by the Houses of Assembly (1:18), of Delegates (1:21), and of Representatives (1:23), by Qwa-Qwa (1:32), as well as by the DET's Johannesburg Region (1:31), have TPRs that are either ridiculously low (the House of Assembly at 1:18) or completely adequate (QwaQwa at 1:32).

All three tables therefore tell us to move from a quantitative to a qualitative analysis of TPRs. Instead of throwing up our hands in horror about unequal and relatively high ratios, we must tackle a set of thorny questions about whether the teachers that we had in 1987 could have been distributed more equally and fairly.

### Nine Key Questions

It is impossible, as well as undesirable, for one person to identify all the management problems that created the unequal inequalities which are displayed in the tables. This is why I am asking questions instead of providing prescriptions.

In addition, my questions and comments are incomplete because they focus on primary schooling. They also assume that, although the money that we have for education can and must be distributed more fairly, it cannot be increased significantly.

With these qualifications, here are nine questions that get neglected in calls for lower teacher:pupil ratios.

- What is an adequate TPR for a Third World country like South Africa?
- Who will campaign for family planning and abortion on demand?
- How will AIDS change TPRs?
- How many teachers cannot be moved to other circuits or departments because of their family circumstances, linguistic limitations or racial prejudices?
- How many schools refuse to have teachers who do not come from the local community, or who belong to a different tribal, racial or ethnic group?
- Who can discourage teachers from demanding small classes (less than 35 pupils) and resisting placement in rural schools?
- If teachers refuse to teach large classes (between 35 and 40 pupils) and cannot be moved from better to worse segments of the system, what alternatives are there to a reduction in student teachers?
- What can other Third World countries teach us about how to educate primary school teachers more quickly and less expensively?
- If teachers are going to have large classes, how should they be educated?

None of these questions are easy to answer. In most cases, we do not have the information that is required for an answer. In some cases, the information is available, but it has to be integrated, analysed and displayed in a user friendly format. Until this has been done, it is impossible to decide how to achieve adequate TPRs throughout the education system.

I want to ask one more question: How serious are we about having an intelligent and well-informed debate about adequate TPRs, as well as about other aspects of 'the education crisis'?

This question takes us back to the case study, which asks us to decide how many additional teachers are required in Natal/KwaZulu and where they can be found.

But we cannot make these decisions until we have answered questions of the kind I have listed. And questions of this kind cannot be debated intelligently until we have pulled together information from a wide variety of sources and presented it in a way that enables us to make intelligent management decisions about where to employ the reasonably adequate number of teachers that we have.

This is one of the things that a fully developed version of the *Geographical Information System* that *NU Stats* has created will help us to do. **IPQA**

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## Education For All

### *Spatial Dimensions*

By Libby Ardington,  
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*The educational data loaded into the Geographic Information System (GIS) enables us to map the physical location of persons of schoolgoing age, the location of schools, the level to which schooling is offered, the availability of certain services, etc. One can then establish which areas or potential pupils in Natal/KwaZulu are within an acceptable distance of educational facilities, and whether these adequately meet recognised needs. By taking into account transport, housing, services, population and employment trends, it would then be possible to plan the most efficient and fair allocation of resources.*

Education for Africans in the region is supplied by two departments - the Department of Education and Training (DET) and the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture (DEC). The DET is responsible for the provision of education for Africans in 'white' Natal, and the DEC for the provision of education in KwaZulu. Within both these departments there are further differences in the way education is supplied. Although the difference is not explicitly expressed as such it amounts to an urban/rural divide, with the state providing education facilities in urban areas and leaving it to individuals or communities in rural areas.

*There are significant spatial inequalities in the provision and standards of education in KwaZulu and Natal*

### *Spatial Inequalities*

**T**he overwhelming feature of African education in Natal/KwaZulu is the fact that although education is widely considered to be a state responsibility, the provision of educational facilities in the area is generally left to individuals or communities. Although the state ultimately controls such schools through its various education departments, with regard to the initial provision of schools the state merely subsidises buildings which have been erected either by private individuals (generally farmers) in Natal or community members in KwaZulu.

In the 1983 White Paper on Education it was stated that 'equal opportunities for education, including equal standards in education for every inhabitant irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State' and that 'the provision of formal education shall be the responsibility of the State'.

In Natal/KwaZulu neither of these aims has been achieved - nor could they be under the existing legislation. Education is supplied to each race group by different departments, each of which supply education of differing standards in different ways, and receive budget allocations which vary widely when viewed on a per pupil basis.


In 1985<sup>1</sup> the Natal Region of the DET controlled from its office in Pietermaritzburg 759 schools in Natal which were subdivided into five circuits. The KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture based in Ulundi controlled 2 630 schools divided into 26 circuits. Of the 759 schools controlled by the DET 654 were farm, hospital, scheduled, private, factory or mine schools (all of which were state-aided but had been established by private initiative) and only 105 were state schools. In KwaZulu approximately 97% of the schools were community schools which had been erected on the initiative of the local community.

In order to understand the spread of responsibility for education in the region it is necessary to look at pupil as well as school numbers:

- although only 14% of DET schools were state schools, 57% of DET pupils were in state schools - this is because 80% of DET schools were farm schools which tend to be very small, having on average only 107 pupils;
- in 1985 there were 131 562 African pupils in Natal DET schools whilst there were 1 176 789, or almost ten times as many in KwaZulu schools.

*The outcome of apartheid in education is that schools are randomly and unequally distributed in Natal/KwaZulu*

**Percentage of Total Primary & Secondary Pupils in Natal/KwaZulu by Race : 1988**



SOURCE: The Education Foundation, 1990.

In white Natal the DET has usually only provided schools in declared African townships or on land owned by the South African Development Trust (SADT). This it does according to certain norms and within the restraints of budgetary allocations. Elsewhere in Natal the provision of education for Africans has been left to the initiative of the landowner - farmers, churches, hospitals, mines etc. Under the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 it is impossible for such land to be owned by Africans, with the exception of those pieces of land which were owned by Africans prior to 1913 and from which they have not subsequently been removed. Accordingly, those who would naturally be most concerned with such education, i.e. the African communities resident on the land, have not been able to take the action necessary to make education available to their children.

In Natal 14% of DET schools are state schools, but a mere 4% of rural schools are state schools. The majority of these schools are on SADT land and are either ex-farm schools which were acquired when farms were purchased by the state for subsequent incorporation into KwaZulu, or schools which were erected by the DET on SADT land prior to the intended incorporation of that land into KwaZulu. Their existence does not indicate an acceptance by the DET of responsibility for the education of rural Africans.

In KwaZulu the DEC has taken the initiative and provided schools in certain declared urban areas and, in a limited number of cases, rural areas, but such state-established schools account for only approximately 3% of the 2 630 schools which fell under the DEC in 1985. Schools in KwaZulu are normally provided by the community which, having obtained the necessary permission and built the school,

then applies to the DEC for a building subsidy.

The outcome of the methods of education provision operating in Natal/KwaZulu is that schools are randomly and unequally distributed throughout the area - or at least in rural areas; that there is no correlation between the provision of primary and secondary education; and that as many as a third of children of schoolgoing age are not at school.

There are moreover marked differences in access to and levels of education between rural and urban areas, and between Natal and KwaZulu (these spatial inequalities are graphically illustrated on the cover of the urban monitor):

- Half the African population of rural Natal has had no education. The equivalent figures for urban Natal and KwaZulu are 26% and 40% respectively.
- 71% of pupils in rural schools in Natal are in standard two or below and 96% in standard five or below. Equivalent figures for urban areas are 43% and 71%, and for KwaZulu 57% and 81%.
- In rural Natal of those aged 20-24 (the age group which would have most recently completed their education) 32% had had no formal education as compared with only 12% of urban dwellers. Of those in this age group in rural areas only 27% had received any post-primary education whereas 63% of urban dwellers had.
- A mere 0,8% of Natal's African rural population have been educated to standard ten level or higher as compared with 2,4% of Africans in KwaZulu, 16% of whites, 8,7% of coloureds and 13% of Indians in the RSA.

### Urban/Rural Divide

According to the 1985 Population Census, 69% of Natal's African population was rurally based, as was 76,7% of KwaZulu's. If the 5-15 age cohort<sup>2</sup> is taken to represent potential schoolgoers then according to the same Census 79% of Natal's and 83% of KwaZulu's potential schoolgoers were rurally based. The initiative for the education of approximately three-quarters of potential schoolgoers is accordingly expected to be provided by private individuals or communities, with the state subsequently accepting responsibility only if the former do so.

The outcome of this policy is that it appears that in 1985 only 44,4% of potential pupils<sup>3</sup>

*There are marked differences in access to and levels of education between rural and urban areas*

in rural Natal were in DET schools, whereas in urban Natal 98,5% of potential pupils may have been in school. The latter figure has clearly been inflated by rural dwellers who attend schools in urban areas in order to overcome the lack of schools (particularly secondary schools) in rural areas.

Similarly, it is known that many Africans resident in Natal (and a significant number from outside of Natal, particularly the Transvaal) attend schools in KwaZulu. These pupils are included in the DEC reports of the numbers enrolled in KwaZulu schools. Calculating the percentage of potential pupils in DEC schools, making use of KwaZulu population figures alone, accordingly gives a higher percentage (77,9%) than is in fact the case. A more accurate picture is achieved by looking at Natal and KwaZulu as one. If this is done, it appears that 75% percent of potential pupils in Natal/KwaZulu are at school. In 1987 the Research Institute for Education Planning (RIEP) estimated the total enrolment of potential African pupils throughout South Africa at 65,3%.

These figures make it clear that the position where the state provides equal education for all is far from being achieved in Natal/KwaZulu, and that the situation is worst in the rural areas. Secondary education is shown to be a rare commodity in rural areas.


Until relatively recently, farm schools were not permitted to provide education beyond standard four without special permission. Subsequently certain farm schools were granted permission to open standards six and seven, and today there are a couple which plan to offer schooling to matriculation level. In 1985, however, the position was that one third of farm schools only offered schooling to standard two level, and two-thirds to standard four. A mere 2,4% had standards six or seven, and none offered any higher standards.

To add to the difficulties of these overcrowded and undermanned schools, it is estimated that over 90% of them do not have electricity and that few have piped water. Accordingly, they are denied access to modern teaching aids which have so much to offer schools with overworked and underqualified teachers. They also cannot be used at night as adult education centres.

The policy of leaving the provision of African rural education to farmers is presumably based on the view that all

African rural dwellers are farmworkers or their dependants. This is not so. There are numerous settlements of Africans, whether formal or informal, legal or illegal, in rural areas outside of areas which have been declared Black Settlement Areas, where the population consists neither of farmworkers nor their dependants. With the imminent repeal of the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act the racial and occupational structures of the so-called rural areas are likely to change, resulting in an increase in the percentage of the rural population who are neither farmworkers nor their dependants.

*State policy is to leave the provision of African rural education in 'white' South Africa to farmers*



### Informed Planning

Although the reasons for providing education on a differential basis for different race groups in different areas were unacceptable in the past, they will become all the more so in the future. In order to ensure adequate and fair access to education for all it will be necessary to establish not only the current demographic position but what changes in the population structure are likely to occur in the future.

The numerous legitimate calls on limited resources demand that the best use is made of existing resources and future financial allocations. Planners need to know where existing schools are; what levels of education they offer; what services they have access to; where the potential schoolgoing population is and will be located; what type of education is required; etc. In view of the fact that most schools in the past were not 'planned' by the education departments but simply erected at random in accordance with the wishes and capability of private individuals or communities this type of information has not been available to or used by planners.

*It is estimated that over 90% of farm schools are overcrowded, understaffed and do not have electricity or water*

*Opening all schools to all race groups would do little to reduce the schooling backlog in South Africa*

In the urban and SADT areas schools were erected in accordance with departmental norms and on the basis of demographic and other information. But the limited budgets allocated to regional and homeland offices have ensured that although access to schooling may be superior to that in rural areas and although there is a better correlation between primary and secondary schooling, educational facilities for Africans are still far from adequate.

It is most unlikely that the current crisis in education could be addressed until all the country's education departments are brought together in one department. However care should be taken not to fall into the trap of believing that many of the problems would be solved merely by opening the schools which are currently available to the other race groups. The pie charts above (which only take into account those African children currently in school and not the thousands of potential pupils who currently are not at school) indicate clearly that, in terms of numbers, opening all schools to all race groups would do little to reduce the schooling backlog.

Similarly, opening the three white, one Indian and one coloured teacher training colleges would do little to help turn around the shortage of teachers (estimated at approximately 33 000 in Natal/KwaZulu) who are currently being trained only in the ten training colleges for Africans. However such a move would have enormous political significance and would make possible the rational and economic planning of education in the region which is currently not possible while education is supplied by six different authorities<sup>4</sup>.

It will also be necessary to address the allocation of resources and the bureaucratic requirements for the provision of education. It will clearly be impossible to maintain the levels of expenditure currently applying in the various departments. Standards will have to be adjusted in order to make it possible to provide adequate facilities for all. Procedures will also have to be adjusted. The existing crisis demands immediate action. Those in need of education now cannot be expected to wait for seven years after their need is first established before it is met.

Rural poverty has given rise to rapid urbanisation. Informal urban and peri-urban communities were springing up overnight even before the repeal of influx control regulations. These communities are without services of any sort. The poor educational

levels of the rural areas from which the people come make the provision of educational facilities essential.

Current bureaucratic requirements, where the facility is to be supplied by the state, generally mean that seven years pass between the official acceptance of the need for a school in a particular location (where the authorities have eventually accepted the inevitability of the settlement becoming permanent) and the opening of the school doors to pupils. The state must be able to respond to urbanisation and the burgeoning informal populations' undoubted needs in a far more flexible and rapid manner.

The inevitability of urbanisation and the decline in farm employment opportunities further makes it essential that rural children receive the type of education that will enable them to compete for urban employment. This more diverse and higher level of education can only be supplied through secondary schools. The pressing need for secondary education in rural areas must be addressed immediately and *by the state*. Farmers and communities have failed to provide adequate, let alone equal, primary education. They cannot and will not provide secondary education. **1990A**

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The latest available population figures for Natal/KwaZulu are those contained in the 1985 Population Census. Although it is possible to obtain more recent figures from the education departments, where education statistics are related to population statistics it is necessary to make use of 1985 figures in both cases. Once the population figures are available from the proposed 1991 Population Census it will be possible to make use of the most up-to-date educational statistics.
2. For the purpose of calculating the size of the potential pupil population, the age cohort 5-15 was extracted from the 1985 population census for Natal/KwaZulu. As the school curriculum is designed to span 12 years (with some pupils needing to repeat one or more years); as many Africans only start school aged 7 or older; and as a significant percentage of scholars are older than 15 (16,4% in Natal/KwaZulu in 1988), it must be pointed out that the age group 5-15 is an arbitrary one and one which under-estimates the number of potential pupils. The Research Institute for Education Planning (RIEP), when calculating estimated possible enrolment, uses the age group 5-19.
3. By relating the size of the 5-15 age group to the number of pupils enrolled in DET or DEC schools in a particular area, it is possible to calculate the percentage of potential pupils who may be at school in a particular year.
4. Department of National Education, Natal Education Department (House of Assembly), Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates), Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), Department of Education and Training and the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture.

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*The current education crisis in the region requires the integration of six different educational authorities*

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
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## THE CORPORATE CHALLENGE IN DFR

# More Than Trouble And Bananas

By Don Mkhwanazi, Convenor, ANC Taskforce On Economic Policy (Natal),  
National President, Black Management Forum

The shape and the form of economic development in the Durban Functional Region (DFR) will be to a large extent determined by the outcome of the final negotiations at national level. This, however, does not mean that we must wait silently for the political landscape to take final shape. What it means is that our actions and contributions must be such that they not only ensure the success of negotiations but underpin the outcome.

We must find forms of local government that give accent to the new national reality. Local level initiatives do not in any way detract from our vision of a non-racial and democratic South Africa. Natal/KwaZulu is an integral part of a united South Africa.

The importance of the Natal/KwaZulu region to the political economy of South Africa is pretty obvious. It is true that this region has been seen as the 'Cinderella' province. People associate us with trouble and bananas. They forget that this region in the pre-mid 1970's period achieved growth rates higher than the rest of the country.

By the year 2000 there will be five million people in the Durban Functional Region. The population growth will be far in excess of economic growth. About two-thirds of the black population live in abysmal conditions, having no access to the urban amenities which in civilised societies are taken for granted. The socio-economic challenges facing Natal/KwaZulu as a whole and the DFR in particular are enormous. Inertia would result in anarchy

and chaos. It is against this scenario that we need to tackle the task at hand.

The broad objective of an economic development initiative must be to:

- create new jobs and progressively eliminate unemployment;
- raise real incomes, particularly for those who are most impoverished and deprived;
- increase output and productivity, particularly but not only in those sectors producing goods and services to meet the basic needs of the majority of people;
- correct racial and gender imbalances in the economy through affirmative action policies;
- develop major new housing, education, health and welfare programmes;
- improve the provision of infrastructure to deprived areas;
- promote greater democratic participation in economic life and more equitable patterns of economic ownership.
- implement a land reform programme capable of simultaneously addressing a major national grievance and increasing food production;
- create a more democratic industrial relations framework based on full rights of workers to organise and growing participation by trade unions in policy formulation;
- develop human resource potential to optimum level; and
- ensure that growth takes place in ways which harness the environment in a constructive and responsible manner.

*Local level initiatives do not in any way detract from our vision of a non-racial and democratic South Africa*

*There will have to be more community involvement in the planning and implementation of development projects*

### Policy Prerequisites

Most development initiatives have failed in the past because they are fed from the outside. Intensive *community consultation*, co-operation, commitment, participation and mobilisation are critical. Mistrust and suspicion are the order of the day, and these must be overcome. There is also what communities call *prescription under the guise of consultation*. There will have to be more community involvement in the planning and implementation of community-based development projects. We must build trust and honesty. Communication will have to move from one way top-down command to networking consultation at the concept stage.

*Motivation* should not be based on threats and/or coercion but on commitment. Relationships must be mutually beneficial and collaborative in nature. When people have little or no control over the decisions which affect their lives, it is often very difficult to believe that there can be a road ahead. We must allow communities to own the development projects. They must feel and taste the fruits of these initiatives.

*Reconciliation and consensus* at local level are closely linked to community involvement and participation. All South Africans have a duty and responsibility to join in the national debate and make their views heard. Such debate would hopefully result not only in understanding each other's perceptions and motivations, but in consensus. South Africans must begin to find common ground. Reconciliation and consensus - given the violence, hate, destruction and dehumanisation of our people on these shores - become a great challenge. Tolerance, democratic culture, respect for humanity, self-esteem and restoration of human dignity must be ideals high on our priority list.

*Population growth* is far outstripping the economic growth which is needed in order to address economic equality. Yet it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that as socio-economic conditions improve for the better, population growth declines.

It is important to ask questions such as: 'To what extent are low levels of living an important factor in limiting the freedom of parents to choose a desired family size?' We have no doubt that as community facilities such as creches, clinics, schools, recreational facilities and formal services such as water, sewage disposal, refuse removal and formal roads are provided -

the population growth will decline in the long run. In a nutshell, we must address socio-economic deprivation to encourage effective birth control.

*Productivity* is relevant in three dimensions:

- firstly, to assist the wealth creation process and domestic savings, which are so critical given an unpromising foreign capital inflow;
- secondly, to harness and mobilise our abundant supply of unskilled labour through labour intensive manufacturing;
- lastly, to promote competition between capital and labour in productivity.

It is our contention that we can forget about productivity improvement as long as our labour force lives in squalor without basic life necessities in shanty towns and informal settlements.

The notion that *education* is for privilege rather than self-reliance, resulting in an emphasis on academic education at the expense of technical education, must be completely eradicated. Secondly, career education needs a close examination. Thirdly, the emphasis and focus should shift to pre-primary and primary education for a sound base. Without skilled people and technocrats all our development plans are doomed. Neither our plans nor institutions can function effectively.

### Social Investment

The governmental bodies at national, regional and local level cannot fund all the development necessary, especially in the socio-economic arena. A number of creative and innovative suggestions have been made to various financial institutions and business sections in this regard. For instance, a fraction of pension and provident funds could be utilised and invested in socially desirable areas such as housing. This has been met with mixed reaction and outright resistance on the basis of fiduciary duty and low returns which are below market rates.

Firstly, if we do not address the housing and other social deprivations, the high market returns will not be forthcoming in the long-run because of instability, chaos and anarchy. Secondly, any black government in a new South Africa will be forced to intervene against its will if financial institutions do not respond positively and creatively in making funds available for this national priority. In other

*The provision of community facilities and formal services will improve quality of life and reduce population growth*



words, the extent of government intervention in the economy would depend on the social responsiveness of the financial institutions and private sector.

Massive funds for development and socio-economic improvement projects are required. The large-scale injection of capital is required to transform the third world component of South Africa into a first world core. The pension funds managed by the assurance industry belong to corporate South Africa who are the main shareholders. It is time for corporate South Africa not only to enter the debate but to put forward recommendations and/or instruct Pension Fund managers to invest a fraction of their investments in socially desirable areas, into housing in particular.

The cost of raising the socio-economic status of disadvantaged communities is bound to be very high. This is perhaps one of the fears of the privileged minority. One of the difficulties in the peaceful transition to democratic post-apartheid South Africa is the immense economic costs that would have to be incurred to improve the physical and social infrastructure, if blacks are to have any hope of even minimally enhancing their economic condition.

Clearly, the short-run costs will have to be borne by 'the haves' and by the productive sector of the South African economy - the private sector and the white population. Corporate South Africa will have to make sacrifices and forego high market returns for long-term peace, stability, and security of their investments and enterprises. The movement toward a stable, non-racial and democratic South Africa will progress only if we are willing to put more emphasis on the rights of those who have been denied them rather than the privileges of those who stand to lose some of them.

Finally, if corporate South Africa does not invest in skills and management training and development, we may as well forget about development. How do we know whether corporate South Africa wants to be part of a new South Africa or not? By their investment in human resource development. There is no two ways about it.

### Transformed Workplace

If we are to address the key issues of economic equality and economic growth, management approach and philosophies need to be redefined. In short, a new breed

of manager is required. Our country requires managers who will be conscious of their society, who will be motivated to build organisational capabilities to respond to the needs of society. The ability to manage under conditions of disorganisation and unstructured reality will be a critical skill of tomorrow's successful manager.

Due to changes that are taking place in South Africa, managers may encounter a range of maladaptive reactions, values, lifestyles and work disenchantment which must be skillfully dealt with. The key to understanding the new leadership demands is to accept that the manager still has to manage, but that he/she no longer has automatic authority, that his/her authority depends on earning legitimacy.

The way in which the current corporate South Africa is structured internally, however, does not permit the manager to accept new responsibilities or meet the demands of the new evolving environment. The increasing complexity of the general business environment, combined with strained labour relations and greater freedom for people to question authority, places high premium on leadership ability. The interpersonal and socio-political skills of the manager will need to be far more extensive than is currently the case. Thus the New South Africa calls for leaders with vision in business, not just for good managers.

In the words of Nelson Mandela, 'Our fundamental premise is that progressive change has to be based on democratisation and affirmative action for the oppressed majority'. The workplace will have to change and adapt to the demands of our time. This means fundamental change and transformation, by democratisation and normalisation of the workplace. It means a change in basic attitudes, behaviour and belief systems. In short, it means a fundamental and major shift in the culture of corporate South Africa. **IPRA**

### Acknowledgement:

*Extracts from the keynote address delivered by Don Mkhwanazi at the Durban Economic Development Conference, Durban 7-8 November 1990.*

*The extent of government intervention in the economy will depend on the social responsiveness of the private sector*

*The new South Africa will require the development of a corporate culture for a transformed workplace*

# Making Amends

## The New Look LRA

By Craig Tanner, Labour Lawyer, Durban

*Last year in the wake of bitter debate, mass protest action and significant disruption to production, an agreement regarding interim changes to the Labour Relations Act was concluded between organised labour, represented by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), and capital's major actors represented by the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola).*

*For the trade union movement, the proposed amendments were intended as an immediate, short-term remedy designed to check the ill effects of some of the more destructive features of the Act, particularly those introduced by the controversial amendments of September 1988. They are not remotely regarded by the movement as ideal or designed to meet substantive long term needs but are seen essentially as a 'quick fix'.*

*The state's response to the agreement was evasive and hesitant, but much of the agreement is now to be translated into legislation. In September 1990, a Labour Relations Amendment Bill was published in the Government Gazette, setting out amendments which are scheduled to take legislative effect in the first parliamentary session of 1991. The amendments will be considered in turn.*

### Unfair Labour Practice

Just over a decade ago, labour law altered fundamentally when amendments to the Labour Relations Act introduced the Industrial Court with jurisdiction over unfair labour practices. Prior to this legislative development, the reciprocal rights and obligations of employers and employees were determined solely with reference to lawfulness viz the terms of the contract of employment and certain statutory provisions.

With the introduction of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, the fact that the conduct of one of the parties is lawful is not conclusive of the matter. The party aggrieved by such lawful conduct is able to secure relief on grounds that such conduct is unfair. The most common example is in the area of dismissal where the termination of employment of an employee which is in compliance with the requisite notice period of the contract of employment, can be reversed on the basis that no substantively fair grounds for termination exist.

The unfair labour practice definition which was introduced in 1979 was drafted in broad general terms. From these wide terms of reference, a jurisprudence was evolved by the Industrial Court in the interpretation and exercise of its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the contradictory and anomalous character of the decisions which have emanated from the Industrial Court, a number of coherent themes can be discerned as guidelines of fair employment standards.

In 1988 the unfair labour practice definition was substantially amended from the form of four general principles to a code, which although not exhaustive, purported to

define more specifically both what constituted unfair labour practices and what did not. The most significant difference between the pre-September 1988 unfair labour practice definition, and its successor, lay in the inclusion of strikes and lock-outs within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the latter. Prior to September 1988 no strike or lock-out could constitute an unfair labour practice as these were explicitly excluded from the definition.

The 1988 amendments rendered strike and lock-out action susceptible to determination by the Court as unfair labour practices. The Court was accordingly empowered to hold that a strike, notwithstanding that it was in compliance with Section 65 of the Act and therefore lawful, was unfair on the basis that the object of the strike offended the Court's sense of fairness. For the union movement, this amendment to the legislation represented an attack on the right to strike and a gross interference with the rights of workers to pursue their interests collectively.

Thankfully, the 1991 amendments are to restore the unfair labour practice definition to its pre-1988 form, with strikes and lock-outs excluded from its ambit. The Court, in the exercise of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, will, with the new amendments to the fair labour practice definition in Section 1 of the Act, have no power to interfere with industrial action which complies with the requirements of Section 65 of the Act. Accordingly, strikes in respect of demands which relate to matters which can be determined by the Industrial Court (essentially regarded as disputes of right) will not be vulnerable to interdictory action. The only basis for bringing such action to an end will be through dismissal.

The law concerning the dismissal of strikers is in a sorry state of uncertainty. Glimmers of hope have presented themselves in certain judgements emanating from the Court which have recognised strike action which is functional to collective bargaining as deserving protection. In many decisions the Court has examined the purpose of the strike in considering the claims of dismissed strikers to reinstatement and in certain instances has declined to assist strikers where adjudication of the dispute in question by the Industrial Court was an available remedy.

That approach will, presumably, continue to be adopted by the Court. However, given recent retrogressive pronouncements of the

Labour Appeal Court, which has rejected any notion of a right to strike in the sense of entailing protection of striking workers from dismissal, the distinction between strikes which are functional to collective bargaining and other strikes may turn out to be academic.

A fourth subsection has been added to Section 1 of the Act to aid in the interpretation of the amended unfair labour practice definition. A virtually incomprehensible piece of drafting reads:

*'The definition of "unfair labour practice" referred to in subsection (1), shall not be interpreted either to include or exclude a labour practice which in terms of the said definition is an unfair labour practice, merely because it was or was not an unfair labour practice, as the case may be, in terms of the definition of "unfair labour practice", which definition was substituted by section (1)(a) of the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1991: Provided that a strike or lock-out shall not be regarded as an unfair labour practice.'*

Simply put, this subsection indicates that although the various unfair labour practices detailed in the definition introduced in 1988 have been replaced by the 1991 definition, they may nevertheless constitute unfair labour practices. The former unfair labour practices in relation to strikes and lock-outs will obviously no longer be pertinent, but other labour practices specified in the September 1988 definition may well be identified as unfair by the Court with reference to the general terms of the 1991 definition.

• *Scope of Application*

Section 2 of the Act defines its scope of application, namely, the persons undertakings, industries, trades and occupations over which it has jurisdiction. The Court interpreted the section to exclude employment beyond South African territorial waters and the amendment is intended to bring persons working above the continental shelf, essentially on oil rigs, under the jurisdiction of the Act.

• *Composition of Association*

The 1991 amendments provide for associations composed wholly or partly of persons employed by the state to apply for registration, or to object to registration of other associations. The purpose of the amendments is to remove the impediment presented by the previous wording to the

*The 1991 LRA Amendments restore the unfair labour practice definition to its pre-1988 form, with strikes and lock-outs excluded*

*With the exclusion of strikes and lock-outs, the Act has required amendment to retain its power to grant interdicts restraining illegal industrial action*

# LABOUR LEGISLATION

## THE PROCEDURAL MORASS

Among the positive features of the 1988 amendments was the removal of the Minister's discretion in relation to the establishment of Conciliation Boards. The amendments provided for the automatic establishment of Conciliation boards by regional inspectors of the Department of Manpower, within 30 days of application by a party. That positive development, was, however accompanied by the introduction of a number of procedural constraints which have served to frustrate applicants in what should properly be a simple process for the resolution of disputes, and, failing resolution, providing access to the Court.

Following the 1988 amendments, an essentially similar set of steps for the processing of disputes through the conciliation phase, and, to the Industrial Court was provided for in respect of disputes falling under the jurisdiction of Industrial Councils or requiring the establishment of Conciliation Boards. Disputes which were older than 90 days required condonation by either Industrial Councils, or, in the case of Conciliation Boards, the Director General of the Department of Manpower, before they could be entertained.

A party referring a dispute to an Industrial Council or making application for the establishment of a Conciliation Board is required to address a 'Letter of Deadlock' to the Respondent party not more than 21 days before such a referral or application. Whereas non compliance with the 90 day limit within which disputes were to be referred to an Industrial Council, or application made for the establishment of a Conciliation Board, was capable of condonation, no scope for condonation in respect of non-compliance with the 21 day period was provided for in the Act.

Accordingly, where a 'Letter of Deadlock' had been sent on the day following the commencement of a dispute, but application for the establishment for a Conciliation Board had been made 22 days following service of a letter of deadlock, no Conciliation Board could be established by reason of such non-compliance with the 21 day ruling. In dismissal cases, an affected individual could thereafter not gain access to the Industrial Court. By comparison, application for the establishment of a Conciliation Board 100 days after the commencement of the dispute could be condoned, provided that the letter of deadlock was served not more than 21 days before such application.

Parties would find themselves falling foul of this fatal procedural trap through a variety of administrative errors. Having declared deadlock, application may have been made by a party for the establishment of a Conciliation Board, whereas an Industrial Council had jurisdiction. By the time this reality was brought to the attention of the applicant, the 21 day period may have elapsed. The reasons for which Conciliation Board applications would be returned to applicants on grounds of procedural non compliance were various and if these were not remedied within the 21 day period, the non compliance would have terminal effect upon the processing of the dispute in terms of the Act.

registration by trade unions with membership in both the state and private sectors.

### • Race

The 1991 amendments also preclude the assertion of race as an industrial interest and as a basis for registration of trade unions and employer associations.

## Interim Relief

In terms of the pre-1991 Act, the Industrial Court had three major functions, namely:

- to make determinations in terms of Section 46(9) as to the existence of unfair labour practices;
- to issue interim orders in terms of Section 43 pending the exercise of the Court's functions in terms of Section 46(9); and
- to issue orders in terms of Section 17(11)(a) of the Act pending the exercise of the Court's functions in terms of Section 46(9).

With the exclusion of strikes and lock-outs from the new unfair labour practice definition, the Act has required amendment to retain its powers to grant interdicts restraining illegal industrial action. Following the 1991 amendments, Section 17(11)(a) will still function as a facility for urgent interim relief pending Section 43 orders, but since strikes and lock-outs will no longer constitute unfair labour practices, that remedy will be limited. A further paragraph (aA) to Section 17(11) will give the court power to urgently grant an interdict or other order in the case of any action which is prohibited in terms of Section 65, namely the section regulating strikes and lock-outs.

Urgent interim interdicts were regularly issued by the Industrial Court prohibiting illegal strike action, without notice being given to the union or its affected members of the fact that application was to be made to the Court. The first the union and its members would know of legal proceedings would be when the Court's order was served on them. The Court would accordingly grant orders without hearing any opposing submissions of the affected party, and without that party even being aware that it was to be the subject of the Court's attentions.

The granting of orders without proper notice, is, as a matter of general legal procedure, both extraordinary and drastic. The civil practice of the Supreme Court has been to require notice and that the respondent party to be heard, save in circumstances where the giving of notice would be likely to precipitate the very harm which the interdict is designed to avert. The Industrial Court's ready granting of interdicts has served to undermine its credibility as a neutral forum, and to reduce the status of its orders. For unions who have been subjected to a barrage of interdicts granted without any prior notice, the Court's orders have come to assume the guise of products of collusion between employers and the Industrial Court.

Interdicts obtained in these circumstances have often been ignored. By contrast, where proper notice has been given of an employer's intention to make application to Court for interdictory relief, unions have in cases of genuinely unprocedural action by their members, been able to intervene and to play a constructive role in securing a restoration of production. The act of securing an interdict without notice generally serves to undermine the relationship between employer and union, to the prejudice of the co-operative role which unions are able to play in the resolution of industrial conflict.

The 1991 changes will significantly affect the manner in which interdicts in relation to illegal strikes and lock-outs are to be obtained. Through the insertion of a new Section 17(D) no interdicts or other forms of order restraining strikes or lock-out, shall be granted, unless notice has been given to the respondent. The new section requires forty-eight hours' notice to be given to a respondent. The court may however permit a shorter period of notice, provided that the Respondent is given a reasonable opportunity to prepare and to be heard, and good cause is shown as to why a period of notice which is shorter than the requisite forty-eight hours should be permitted.

It remains to be seen how the Court will interpret 'good cause', but it would seem that the irreparable consequences to an employer of losses occasioned by unprocedural strike action will be sufficient to prompt the Court to permit shorter notice than 48 hours. Importantly however, the absolute prerequisites that notice of the application and an opportunity to prepare and be heard be afforded to the respondent will critically alter the practice of the Industrial Court and the legal regulation of

industrial action. Significantly, the Supreme Court too will be affected by Section 17D, for the section applies to 'a court of law, and for the purposes of this section also the Industrial Court'.

Section 17(D) also includes a novel proviso that if a party gives notice of at least ten days of its intention to engage in a strike or lock-out, a party seeking to apply for an interdict or other order in relation to such action shall give at least five days' notice of such an application. Unlike the provisions which enable a party on good cause to reduce the forty-eight hour notice period, the five day period is not capable of variation.

### Conciliation Procedure

The Act requires parties to endeavour to resolve disputes by conciliation prior to either resorting to industrial action, or referring matters for final determination to the Industrial Court. The forums in which parties must endeavour to resolve their disputes are either Industrial Councils or Conciliation Boards. Industrial Councils are permanent bargaining forums registered for particular industries, whereas Conciliation Boards are ad hoc in nature, specifically created for the purposes of endeavouring to resolve particular disputes in undertakings not governed by an Industrial Council.

The 1991 amendments will significantly reduce the extent of the procedural minefield (see box) which has impeded access to the Act's conciliation forums and ultimately to the Industrial Court.

The period within which a party to a dispute must either refer a dispute to an Industrial Council or make application for the establishment of a Conciliation Board will now be 180 days, and will remain capable of condonation thereafter on good cause shown.

The 'Letter of Deadlock', with all its destructive possibilities will, to the relief of most, no longer be required. The certificate of a trade union or employers' organisation confirming that, the provisions of the relevant constitution have been observed by office-bearers or officials in referring the dispute to an Industrial Council or making application for the establishment of a Conciliation Board, as the case may be, will no longer need to be signed by the Secretary and President or persons specifically authorised by the constitution, but by a single office-bearer or official.

*Unlike previous amendments, the new version requires a 48-hour notice period to respondents before interdicts restraining strikes or lockouts are granted*

*A party now has 180 days in which to refer disputes to an Industrial Council, as opposed to the previous 90 days*

DATE	UNIONS	EMPLOYERS	GOVERNMENT
1 May 1984			A NMC report in parliament proposes an investigation into existing labour law.
23 August 1984			The NMC undertakes a second inquiry into certain labour laws and practices.
24 August 1987			Government announces introduction of new draft laws, the LRA Bill.
17 February 1988	Cosatu's first announcement of drastic action against employers if they do not satisfactorily oppose the LRA Bill.		
20 April 1988	Cosatu and employer organisations meet to discuss the LRA Bill.		
16 May 1988			The LRA Bill is tabled in Parliament with few concessions compared to the original draft.
24 May 1988	Nactu calls for 5 days of protest action against the Bill.		
1 June 1988	Cosatu and Nactu agree to call for a 3 day protest action against the LRA.		
3 June 1988	Nactu/Cosatu and Saccola talks reach a deadlock when the employers organisation makes last minute attempts to persuade unions against engaging in the protest action.		
4 June 1988	Pamphlets call on communities and workers to observe a 3 day stay away against the LRA Bill.	Some employers threaten tough action against protest action.	
5 June 1988		Employers threaten court action to prevent the stay away.	
6-8 June 1988	2 million workers go on a 3 day stay away to protest against the LRA bill.		
7 June 1988	Cosatu releases its objections to the Parliamentary Standing Committee.		Manpower Minister, Piet du Plessis, urges Cosatu and Nactu to talk to him about their objections to the Bill.
8 June 1988		Saccola meets with the Minister of Manpower, and accepts Cosatu's proposal for independent arbitration on the LRA Bill.	
9 June 1988	Saccola and Cosatu to discuss the LRA Bill. Cosatu and Nactu agree to meet the Minister regarding the Bill.		
11 June 1988	Cosatu vows to fight the dismissal of 2 000 workers who participated in the stay away.		
27 June 1988	Cosatu and Nactu join forces in discussing the LRA with Saccola.		
12 July 1988	Labour talks begin between Cosatu/Nactu and Saccola.		
27 July 1988			The LRA Act, signed by the President is scheduled to become law on 1 September, 1988.
13 August 1988	Unions dissatisfied with promulgations of contentious amendments in the Act before a meeting with the government to discuss objections.		
15 August 1988	Unions cancel meeting with the Manpower Director-General, following the promulgation of the LRA Act.		
1 September 1988	As the LRA Act comes into operation, Cosatu/Nactu/ Saccola talks end in deadlock after Saccola refuses to recommend to employers not to use certain rights in the Act.		
18 October 1988	Unions call a workers summit to decide on action against the LRA enactment.		
7 March 1989	Cosatu and Nactu draft its new LRA to be sent to major employers by 2 May, for a response within 30 days, failing which a national dispute would be declared.		
18 June 1989		Employers sit to consider worker demands about the LRA.	
29 June 1989	Unions and employer organisation agree to engage in a process to amend the Act.		Sect. 79(2) of the LRA relating to suing against unlawful strikes is to be amended or scrapped.
12 July 1989	Unions plan mass protest action to protest the LRA Act.		

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DATE	UNIONS	EMPLOYERS	GOVERNMENT
20 July 1989			Eli Louw, acting Manpower Minister, requests the NMC to review the LRA.
9 August 1989	Joint union rallies are planned against the LRA Act, ending in a workers summit on 26 August.		
26 August 1989	Unions agree on peaceful protest action against the LRA through a "National Co-Ordination Committee" until legislation is withdrawn.		Commissioner of Police, conditionally prohibits a meeting at Johannesburg to discuss action against the LRA Act.
5-6 September 1989	2 million workers heed 2 day stay away against the LRA and elections.		
22 September 1989	A national two-week consumer boycott against white-owned shops begins as part of sustained action to protest against the LRA Act.		
13 October 1989			Minister Eli Louw denies the need for protest marches, urging unions to discuss with him objections to the LRA.
14 October 1989	More than 100 000 workers march in 17 cities to register protest against the Act. Unions also decide to ban overtime until the Minister reviews the Act.		
14 December 1989			Minister Louw studies an amended NMC report on the Act, to be read at the next parliamentary session.
5 February 1990			Minor changes to the Act are announced by the government.
3 April 1990	Unions and employers are requested to make representations to the NMC subcommittee by May 1990 on its newly released proposals which are widely accepted by unions, employers and the government.		
7 May 1990	Saccola, Cosatu and Nactu sign an agreement calling for amendments to the LRA Act. This agreement is popularly known as the SCN Accord.		
14 May 1990			The NMC announces that it will submit its proposals on a revised LRA Act to the Minister in 1991, instead of 1990.
18 May 1990			Minister Louw meets with SCN to discuss their proposals.
20 June 1990	The dispute between the Minister and unions lead to a sit-in by senior union officials at the Department of Manpower.		The Minister's refusal to amend the LRA in 1990 lead to threats of labour action.
21 June 1990	Cosatu threatens to ask the ANC to abandon negotiations and to call for a stay away if President de Klerk refuses to discuss a cabinet decision to delay amendments to the LRA.		President de Klerk agrees to a meeting with unions, but refuses to rethink the cabinet decision to delay amendments.
26 June 1990	Employer and union representatives meet with President FW de Klerk to discuss the enactment of the LRA Act. SCN demand the enactment of the SCN Accord during the 1990 parliamentary session.		
29 June 1990			The NMC report on the proposals on the SCN Accord is gazetted for comment.
16 August 1990	The Department of Manpower, SCN and the NMC begin drafting a new set of legislation, which is soon to be finalised.		
13 September 1990	Minister Louw meets with SCN and decides to recommend amendments to the LRA Act. He agrees to put the SCN Accord before parliament in February 1991 in a bid to prevent planned stay away action by unions.		
20 September 1990			Cabinet accepts proposals regarding the LRA Act, to be legislated for submission to parliament.
6 October 1990	Cosatu calls off its planned stay away for 8 October following the Minister's announced review of the LRA.		
16 October 1990	Nactu threatens to withdraw from the Labour Minute if any changes are made to the agreement while it is being considered by the parliamentary standing committee.		
14 February 1991			After two-and-a-half years of intensive negotiations, five hours are set aside to debate the new LRA Bill in parliament. The Bill finally translates into law the Saccola-Cosato-Nactu Agreement which aimed at addressing the problems with the 1988 LRA amendments.

IPQA

*The Industrial Registrar may establish a Conciliation Board where an Industrial Council has ceased to function*

Service of the relevant documents by hand, or by registered post will no longer be necessary, as the advances of telefax have now been acknowledged and will constitute a recognised basis of delivery.

Difficulties were from time to time experienced by parties who had referred disputes to Industrial Councils which formally had jurisdiction, but were no longer operating. Because no application could be made for the establishment of a Conciliation Board where an Industrial Council had jurisdiction, parties found themselves barred from gaining access to the Industrial Court as the Industrial Council was not functioning and was unable to refer the dispute to the Court.

The 1991 amendments provide that where the Industrial Registrar is of the opinion that an Industrial Council has ceased to perform its functions under the Act, a Conciliation Board may be established, provided that the Registrar has notified the relevant inspectorate of the Department of Manpower charged with the establishment of Conciliation Boards.

An office bearer or official of a trade union or employer's organisation has been barred from acting as a representative at a Conciliation Board unless he or she has submitted a prescribed certificate issued by the Industrial Registrar confirming that the union has complied with various administrative requirements stipulated in the Act. The section will be amended to impose this obligation only on office bearers or officials of unregistered trade unions.

Where an Industrial Council had failed to settle a dispute referred to it, the Secretary of the Industrial Council or a person designated by the Council is required within a period of fourteen days to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court for determination. The Chairman of a Conciliation Board or a designate was required to make the referral to the Industrial Court within fourteen days.

If the Secretary of the Industrial Council or the Chairman of the Conciliation Board, or the designate failed to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court within the fourteen day period, the person seeking to have the dispute determined as an unfair labour practice would have no further remedy in terms of the Labour Relations Act, as such non-compliance was fatal. An action for damages against the errant official would be available to the aggrieved applicant.

The 1991 amendments cure this problem by providing for 'any party to the dispute' to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court within a period of thirty days, with the Court having the power to condone the late lodging of a referral on good cause shown.

The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction unless the dispute referred to it has been either referred to an Industrial Council or been the subject of a Conciliation Board. The Industrial Court has refused to determine certain disputes which it has regarded as falling beyond the dispute previously described in the referral to the Industrial Council or the Conciliation Board application.

Parties would find themselves faced with procedural objections and no means of obtaining a proper determination of aspects of a dispute which had not been explicitly described in the conciliation phase. The dispute at that stage of proceeding before the Industrial Court would be substantially more than ninety days old and a fresh referral or application for a Conciliation Board would not be feasible.

Section 46(9)(c) has been amended to provide that the Court may include in its determinations, alleged unfair labour practices which are 'substantially included' in the referral to the Industrial Council or in the Conciliation Board reference to the Industrial Court. The amendment enhances the Court's jurisdiction and does away with a further impediment to the determination of industrial disputes.

In terms of Section 51A a group or association of employers engaged in an undertaking, industry, trade or occupation in respect of which no Industrial Council is registered can submit proposals to the Minister of Manpower with the request that those proposals be declared binding on all employers and employees engaged in industry, trade or occupation concerned. The 1991 amendments provide for groups or associations which are subject to a registered Industrial Council which in the opinion of the Registrar has ceased to perform its functions under the Act, to similarly approach the Minister of Manpower.

### *Strike Indemnity*

Perhaps the most controversial amendment of 1988 was to Section 79 of the Act. Section 79(2) creates a statutory delict in terms of which a member, office bearer, or

*In the 1991 amendments, 'any party to the dispute' may refer the dispute to an Industrial Court within thirty days*



official of a trade union, employers' organisation or federation 'who interferes with the contractual relationship between an employer and an employee resulting in the breach of such contract', in circumstances other than a legal strike or lock-out, is liable in delict.

The 1988 amendment to Section 79 presented unions with the onus of establishing that illegal strike action by their members was without the authority of the union in order to avoid liability for damages occasioned by the strike. The amendment provided that members, office bearers or officials would, 'until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been acting with due authority'. The response of certain trade unions to this amendment was, when contacted by an employer affected by unprocedural strike action, to deny knowledge of the actions of their members and to refuse to involve themselves in assisting in the restoration of production without the employer's undertaking that its rights in terms of the amended Section 79(2) would be waived. The dependency of employers on trade unions to bring wildcat strike action to an end was bluntly brought home in these circumstances.

In 1991 amendments remove the deeming provision and restore the onus of proof to its traditional location, viz upon the party alleging that it has suffered damages in delict.

A transitional provision provides that, where prior to the amendments, proceedings in terms of the Act have been instituted in the Industrial Court, or any other Court, and where disputes have been referred to Industrial Councils or been the subject of an application to establish a Conciliation Board, those matters shall be dealt with in terms of the provisions of the Act prior to the 1991 amendments.

### Seeking Consensus

In a market economy, labour law purports to secure a balance of power between the

antagonistic forces of capital and labour, and to promote consensus. The Labour Relations Act promotes agreement in respect of matters of mutual interest to employers and employees and, seeks to avert unilateralism which is an inevitable source of industrial conflict. For that Act to function effectively, as with any industrial agreement, its content should reflect an element of consensus between the parties who are subject to it.

Although the 1991 changes to the Labour Relations Act will not wholly endorse the Cosatu/Nactu/Saccola agreement, they are historically significant, in that, for the first time, the needs of the labour movement have been addressed in the legislation which regulates that movement and its membership. The changes will, in a sense, be collectively bargained ones. The precedent is important.

After years of reliance on their relationship with the State to secure labour legislation to serve their interests, the apparent new-found willingness of employers to seek consensus with the labour movement as a basis for amendment to labour legislation calls for a degree of cynicism. It is a change of approach which comes at a time of political transition with the prospect of a state in future years having no common purpose with capital in opposition to the interests of the working class. History, however, suggests that that prospect is a remote one.

The critical question facing the labour movement is the nature of its future relationship with the state and the degree of independence from the state which is necessary in promoting the interests of working people. The Cosatu/Nactu/Saccola agreement, and the legislation which is to follow it, may well reflect a developing trend founded on recognition by employers that if the labour movement is not able to promote its interests through collective bargaining, its focus in years to come will shift to direct reliance on the state for legislative intervention. **IP/A**

*The 1991 amendments restore the onus of proof to its traditional location, viz upon the party alleging that it suffered damages in delict*

*The 1991 changes for the first time address the needs of the labour movement in the legislation which affects its membership*

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
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