


VOLUME TEN NUMBER TWO

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INDICIM SOUTSIJTIFLIC II QUARTERLY REPORT

# VOL. 10 NO 2

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# Editorial notes

The national budget, multi-party talks and civil violence shared the headlines in the first quarter of 1993. In South Africa's dance of the seven veils, the major parties have revealed their latest models for economic, political and educational revival.

Behind the scenes, the main players appeared to be making progress towards what Winnie Mandela has so astutely identified as an *elite political settlement*. In our cover article, Hennie Kotze describes the process as a model case of a pact-driven transition between contending elites. There is evidence of growing consensus in his innovative poll of elite attitudes between 1990-1993, the first longitudinal survey to be conducted in South Africa.

In a penetrating essay, Kotze comments on the convergence of attitudes in the centre on constitutional models, minority rights, political tolerance and fundamental values. The concept of a *tolerance index* should intrigue our readers. He is optimistic that South Africa's formerly disunified elites are systematically developing *consensual unity* on important and substantial policy issues.

In other major "scoops", *Indicator SA* releases, for the first time, the findings of two new reports into constitutional negotiations and hostel/township conflict:

- In our *Political Monitor*, Stack, Friedman and Humphries present an overview of a comprehensive investigation into negotiation trends conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies.

- In our *Industrial Monitor*, Anthony Minnaar summarises the findings of an HSRC investigation into the conflict between hostel and township residents on the Reef, a new study commissioned by the Goldstone Commission.

South Africa is walking a tightrope between compromise and conflict in a topsy-turvy transitional phase which has lasted longer than anticipated. In the editor's own contribution to this edition, the cycles of civil violence in the Natal region are located in the context of negotiations and pre-election politics. The metaphor of the *Trojan Horse* is explored in terms of the disruptive impact of the Natal conflict on the broader geo-politics of South Africa's transition.

Negotiation trends and conflict trends are the dominant themes which link the contributions to this edition. *Indicator SA* recently published a new paperback, *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region, 1986-1992*. In this special issue, a panel of key analysts contrast different interpretations of the dynamics in the Natal conflict. Our readers should find their commentaries authoritative - they draw on a joint CSDS/Indicator SA/HSRC data base on 7 000 incidents of violence.

We also enclose a new catalogue of our publications between 1983-1993. Our back issues provide comprehensive coverage of South African issues in the 1990s - a special offer is available on a complete set of *Indicator SA*. Why not order some of these titles now, while they are still in print?

Graham Howe, Editor  
March 1993

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
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# POLITICAL


## MONITOR

### Political Tolerance among South Africa's Elite

Tolerance index by Political Party Support



Tolerance Index by Sector




See cover article by Hennie Kotzé in *Political Monitor*.

Source: Kotzé H. *Transitional Politics in South Africa: An attitude survey of opinion-leaders*. Research Report No3, Centre for International and Comparative Politics, University of Stellenbosch, 1992.

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F o o d I n d u s t r i e s

# Opinion Poll

## i\* — Uonsiiori TOWARDS AN ELITE SETTLEMENT

By Professor Hennie Kotze,  
Centre for International and Comparative Politics, University of Stellenbosch

*A novel longitudinal survey of the changing attitudes of the South African elite is being conducted between 1990 and 1993. The data for the 1992 survey reported here was collected during May-August last year in the critical period after the deadlock in the Codesa talks. In this overview, the author of the survey comments on the attitudes of opinion-leaders on key aspects of the transition to democracy in South Africa.*

Since January 1990 the political process in South Africa has been characterised by explicit though not always public agreements between contending elites. Indeed, it is almost a model case of a pact-driven transition.

Initially, the pacts were directed at achieving an elite political settlement. Beacons along the way were the Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), Pretoria Minute (August 1990), the DF Malan Accord (February 1991) and the National Peace Accord (September 1991), which all dealt with aspects of organisational security. These pacts were followed by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa I) in December 1991 which marked the official commencement of multilateral negotiations.

The process of negotiated transition has not always been easy. Codesa II, which was a continuation of Codesa I, ended in deadlock in May 1992 when the African National Congress (ANC) suspended bilateral negotiations. One of the most important stumbling-blocks was the demand made by the National Party government and its allies for minority representation in a new constitution. Nonetheless, the ANC and the government resumed bilateral talks after the Bisho massacre. In September 1992 they signed the Record of Understanding, which again influenced negotiations positively.

In addition to these political pacts are the attempts on a wide front to conclude, for example, military pacts and economic pacts. By definition all such pacts are undemocratic and conservative in nature - they are negotiated at leadership level, they are an attempt to control the process as well as to create order and movement, and they do not include grassroots participation.

But for most observers, political pacts - negotiated agreements that remove from the political agenda sources of potentially destabilising conflict - are one of the most acceptable forms of democratisation. There can be at least three types of pact:

- The first is purely political in nature, where the participants are divided and driven to compromise for political reasons only. The political elite, primarily the party leaders, whose differences are based primarily on self-interest, are forced to suppress their competition for votes and state resources by mass pressure or the general interest or both.
- The second type of pact uses politics to resolve (ethnic, religious, etc.) conflicts which do not stem from political competition. The European consociational democracies, instead of majority rule, use guarantees of minority representation such as executive power-sharing, balanced bicameralism and minority vetoes over proposed constitutional changes.
- In the third type of pact, the policy agenda is limited in order to increase the possibility for socio-economic reform for the consolidation of the democracy.

Of these three pacts the latter seems to be the most difficult to sustain over the long term. Hagopian (*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol23/No2, 1990: 150) notes that, 'In all three cases - by providing guarantees to various politically, socially and economically defined minorities (who stand the most to lose from democracy) that their interests will not be trampled by the majority - pacts strengthen otherwise fragile democracies'.

*The reform process in South Africa is almost a model case of a pact-driven transition negotiated between contending elites*

## Why elites?


Are they the 'switchmen of history'? Social science provides ample proof that:

- elites are the societal agents through which broader forces such as ethnicity, class, religion, etc, are filtered to ordinary people;
- elites give predictable thrusts to the functioning of political regimes;
- elites have played crucial roles in transitions towards democratisation in most countries.

## Who are the elites?

Social science suggests that they are those persons who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organisations and influential movements, and who are therefore able to affect strategic decisions regularly.

Figure 1: Racial composition of elites by institutional sector



## Transition!

There are two possible transitions by means of a political pact, namely the more 'elitist' approach where the symbolic impact of a founding election occurs at the end of the pact process, or the more 'democratic' approach in which the election precedes all steps towards democracy. South Africa has chosen the former route, whereas Namibia opted for the latter mode of transition.

The most important agents in the South African transition are the political leaders, who form an important part of the country's elite. In recent studies on transition and pact-forming the role which powerful actors or elites play in this process and the end-product, a democratic system, is increasingly emphasised. One must not lose sight of the fact that the structural circumstances, *inter alia* the economic growth rate, violence and ethnic mobilisation, are in many cases the heritage of decisions taken by previous leaders.

The importance of elites in the process of transition is described by Higley and Burton (*American Sociological Review*, Vol54/No1, 1989:290): 'We urge those who study democratic breakdowns and

democratic transitions to look first at elites and to investigate basic patterns and transformations of elite relationships'. A number of writers have shown that in stable democracies it is necessary for elite groups to participate in decision-making and to agree on the informal rules of the game and the value of political institutions.

Opinion-leaders or the elite play an important role in the transition of states from authoritarian to more democratic systems. The attitudes of these groupings in society, especially the degree of change and overlap in the attitudes of opposing elites, provides an indication of the potential success of the transition process.

## EiSf® Survey

The assumption is made in this report that the values, skills and decisions of previously conflicting elites make a significant contribution to the success or failure in the transition to democracy. Salient features of elite attitudes on important aspects in the transition, categorised under political, constitutional and tolerance issues, are reported on below.

The South African national elite as surveyed in this study (a sample of 2282: see figure 1) are an unusual mix, but reflect features not unlike those dominant in South African society as a whole. For example, whites represent only 13% of the total population yet 72% of all respondents (1008) in this survey were white persons; and although more than half of the total population are women, a staggering 96% of all respondents were males. The conclusion is therefore inescapable: the South African elite reflects the white oligarchic nature and the 'iron law of andrarchy' (rule by males) of society.

### on political preferences

The disproportionately small composition of the black respondents in the survey makes it difficult and unfair to extend any generalisation to the black elite with regard to political support. With this constraint in mind, the National Party (NP) attracted the most overall support (59%), with the Democratic Party (DP) in second place (20%). This kind of distribution is naturally to be expected given the predominance of whites among the positional elite in all the major sectors.

A breakdown of party support by race (see figure 2) shows that though the Conservative Party (CP) received 31% of

*South Africa has chosen the more 'elitist' approach where the symbolic impact of a founding election occurs at the end of the pact process*



white voter support in 1989 and the 'No, ie' drew 33% in the referendum of March 1992. The CP's support amongst the white elite was only 10%. The implication is clear - CP support is decidedly non-elitist, strongly committed to white survival, and in status terms, lower class in social orientation.

Figure 2 also shows that the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), with 4% support, had a very small cross-section of support among white, coloured and Indian respondents. In contrast, the NP had 6,4% black, 37,5% coloured and 17,3% Indian support. The only other organisation which had a high cross-section of support among the elite of all population groups is the ANC-SACP alliance.

An interesting factor concerning the intensity of party support or intensity of loyalty is that no fewer than 94% of the respondents who support the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) regarded themselves as strong supporters (see main survey). The same high intensity is found among the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) supporters, with 83% regarding themselves as strong supporters. In contrast, the NP and DP only showed 49% and 40% strong support, respectively.

A particular feature of NP support among elites is that it has strong bases among the military (93%), bureaucrats (77%) and the white farming leadership (76%). The DP draws a great deal more support from those sectors which have traditionally adopted more liberal views - business (39%), media (39%) and academic (30%) sectors.

Although respondents who identify with the NP have the greatest sympathy (89%) for the Mafikeng (a sympathy index consists of the SABC, House of Assembly, SADF, Civil Service, State President, Courts and SAP), almost 90% of the supporters of right-wing parties show the same high degree of sympathy. With 40% support from DP supporters, an underlying white group cohesion shows up which is important to make negotiated pacts stick. Interestingly, over 70% of the IFP supporters are sympathetic to the state.

#### • on constitutional models

The constitutional proposals which most 'white' parties put forward in South Africa propose either that the present unitary state be broken up to escape domination by the majority or that power be decentralised. The basic principle in most models is division of power (*magsdeling*) - in other


words a system that prevents a 'winner takes all' situation.

It is the view of established parties such as the NP, DP and the IFP that a federal form of government is necessary for the protection of minority groups. Especially the NP, IFP and various homeland parties made regionalism ('federalism' was seldom used) the core of their negotiation strategy at Codesa.

The anti-federalist grouping at Codesa, under the guidance of the ANC, was of the opinion that the constitutional model should be laid down by the constituent assembly after an election and that it should not be bound by guidelines laid down by Codesa. The ANC-SACP, which appears to enjoy the support of the majority of South Africans, would have the majority in such a case and thus the federal model could disappear as a choice.

*The elite play an important role in the transition of states from authoritarian to more democratic systems*

Figure 2: Support by the different race groups for the political parties



It was disagreement on the powers of the central government to exert control over the second and third tiers that was one of the most important reasons for the problems experienced at Codesa II in May 1992 and over which negotiations were temporarily suspended. Furthermore, there was also no consensus on the delimitation of regions.

In the survey, no less than 68% of all respondents preferred a federal system as a first constitutional choice, with a unitary state as the second choice (18%). This pattern, shown in figure 3, is to be expected given the predominance of whites and NP supporters among the respondents. Only 4% preferred 'partition', and a paltry 2% preferred 'white domination'.

The differences between the parties are not so deep that some kind of compromise on a model could not be reached

If the preferences which respondents have for certain constitutional models are correlated with party support (figure 4), it is clear that it is particularly among ANC-SACP and PAC members that there is resistance to federalism.

In the survey 75% of the ANC-SACP and 44,8% of the PAC supporters placed a unitary state model as their first choice. In the case of both organisations there are also respondents who support a *class state* (see explanation in box), especially amongst the PAC. What is more interesting, however, is the relatively high number of ANC-SACP (16%) and PAC (17%) supporters who chose a federal model as their *first* choice. Has the regionalism debate impacted positively on some ANC-SACP and PAC supporters?

In the survey, five constitutional models were presented to respondents, who had to indicate which model was the most acceptable to them:

**White Domination**

- A geographically undivided South Africa, entirely controlled by whites, with blacks having only regional and municipal powers subject to a white parliament.

**Partition**

- A geographically divided South Africa, the smaller part outside the major metropolitan areas, under white control, and the bigger part designated as the 'common area' under non-racial control.

**Federalism**

- A federal system dividing South Africa into a number of multiracial regions vested with considerable autonomy, but at central level a mixed parliament with proportional representation, a Bill of Rights, and checks and balances on the executive branch of government.


**Unitary State**

- A centralised system in a united South Africa, providing for majority rule, but also checks and balances by the strongest party in parliament.

**Class State**

- A unitary system in which class distinctions are of primary importance, and where the black working class controls the central government.

Figure 3: Preference for different constitutional dispensations



Federation is the *first choice* of supporters of the parliamentary parties (excluding the CP) by a considerable margin: support varies between 81% (DP) to 85% (NP). Most supporters of the Indian parties (85%) and the IFP (96%) also prefer a federal model. This is not unexpected - Inkatha took a strong stand against the Declaration of Intent at Codesa, alleging it preempted negotiation by prescribing a unitary state.

Predictably, 66% of CP and other right-wing supporters gave partition as their first choice, while 17% preferred a model of white domination.

If one looks at the *second choices* of the respondents, it emerges that a unitary state is acceptable to 65% of the NP, 76% of the DP and 79% of the IFP. In the case of the ANC-SACP, 41% of the respondents indicate that their second choice is a federation. Even among respondents who support the right-wing parties there is considerable support for a federation (31%).

It is clear that the differences between the parties are not so deep that some kind of compromise on a model could not be reached. The ANC-SACP has already expressed its support for elected regional bodies. Against this background of changing attitudes, it appears possible for the most important parties to reach a compromise on enshrining the powers of regional governments in the new constitution.

**on minority rights**

With the exception of CP supporters, the majority of respondents have no problems in accepting liberal constitutional devices such as a bill of rights, judicial review, regular elections, a guaranteed multi-party system and proportional representation.

On devices for minority protection to prevent a 'winner takes all' situation - guaranteed minority party representation in the executive, veto powers vested in Upper House of Parliament, maximum regional autonomy - the level of acceptability varies. The NP (89%), DP (66%) and the IFP (over 90%) felt that these devices were essential; the ANC-SACP (82%) and PAC (91%) found these devices unacceptable. It seems as if a compromise on minority protection is essential if the transition process is to maintain its momentum.

What the survey's index on minority protection measures shows (see main survey) is a very general feeling that groups which are numerically in the minority still

want to have a say in decision-making - that there must thus be a form of 'power sharing'. It seems improbable at this stage that numerical minorities can be convinced that a great deal of their freedom is likely to be rooted in the interdependence of groups and their own indispensability. A compromise on this important constitutional issue is essential if the transition process is to maintain its **momentum**. The so-called *sunset clauses* proposed by Joe Slovo for a period of power sharing in an interim government provide the basis for a compromise between **the NP** and ANC-SACP.

**j on political tolerance**

One of the greatest threats to South Africa's transition to democracy and the creation of national reconciliation is the continuing and endemic violence. It is often alleged that the phenomenon of political intolerance lies at the root of the political violence which has been afflicting the country in recent years.


During the apartheid era, the political process in South Africa did not exactly cultivate a climate of tolerance. The reasons for the violence, however, are multiple and cannot be explained with reference only to the apartheid system. But politics and crime can be seen as important precipitating factors. The high level of unemployment creates poverty which leads to frustration and insecurity which, in turn, promote gangsterism. What is even more disturbing is the large number of incidents which are clearly inspired by one or other political motive.

The answer of the political leaders to the increasing violence was the National Peace Accord signed on 14 September 1991. In terms of the Accord, a National Peace Secretariat was established which was responsible for forming regional and local dispute resolution committees throughout the country.

In most cases, the general public has remained uninformed about the peace process. But in spite of communication problems the Peace Accord has succeeded in involving a wide variety of local community leaders in the decentralised negotiating forums. The mere fact that people from across the political spectrum are talking at local level about defusing potentially violent situations helps to create it climate of tolerance.

In a democracy the right to opposition is seen as a fundamental part of civil liberty. It is thus one of the outstanding

**Figure 4: Preference for constitutional model by party support**



characteristics of a democracy that parties in opposition to the government and its leaders should be accepted. In other words, the rules of the game, such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of association, must be accepted.

In South Africa, the violence at grassroots level between the supporters of the various political movements, and the involvement of the state in some of these acts, reveals a high degree of intolerance.

It is clear from figure 5 that the levels of political intolerance among the South African elite are disturbingly high. For instance, measured on a toleration index consisting of six items (see figure 5):

- the supporters of the right-wing political parties are undoubtedly the most intolerant of all the respondents: 73,9% show an intolerant tendency;
- almost 48% of rightwing supporters - the highest of all the groups - fall into the category of extremely intolerant;
- the IFP respondents also show a high level of intolerance (52,1 %);
- in *decreasing* order of intolerance are the Indian parties (40,9%), NP (37,2%), the PAC (28,5%) and the ANC (15,7%)
- the NP has the largest number of respondents who fall into the uncertain category, namely 18%.

In comparison with the toleration index compiled for the 1991 survey, it appears that there is a slightly higher level of intolerance in the 1992 survey among the CP, IFP, NP and ANC-SACP. Supporters of the first two parties, however, show the greatest increase in intolerance - 7% and 10%, respectively. In the case of the DP and the PAC there is a decline in intolerance. (The number of respondents of

*One of the greatest threats to South Africa's transition to democracy is the endemic violence and political intolerance*

The levels of political intolerance among the South African elite are disturbingly high

the CP and IFP was too low in 1991, however, to draw any significant conclusion from the rise.)

ANC supporters are divided as follows: about 16% fall into the intolerant category; 8% are uncertain; and 76% fall into the tolerant category. The only group which shows a very clearly tolerant attitude are the supporters of the DP (83,1 %). Only 8% of respondents who identify with the DP qualify in terms of the index as intolerant, while 8,8% fall into the uncertain category.


The pattern which emerges also shows how intolerant the 'non-political' community in South Africa is. If one omits the sectors in which there are largely politicians, such as the extra-parliamentary groups and the legislative authority, it is possible to gain an impression of the appearance of intolerance among opinion-formers - if it has a very high incidence at the elite level then one can accept that it occurs at the same or even higher levels in the general public because the elite-mass linkage transfers and intensifies it.

On the intolerant side of the index the pattern among the different elite sectors in descending order is: Military (67,5%); Agriculture (52,9%); Labour (40,9%); Churches (33,3%); Bureaucracy (31,3%); Parastatal (27,8%); Academic (21,6%); Business (12,2%); and Media (10,1%). The most intolerant sector is thus the military; the most tolerant, business and the media.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they would definitely allow, perhaps allow, perhaps not allow or definitely not allow the following actions to be taken against the organisation to which they were most strongly opposed:

- (1) Members of... to hold a public protest in your town/city today
- (2) A member of... to make a speech critical of your own political beliefs in your neighbourhood
- (3) Members of... to teach at a South African university
- (4) My friends to associate with members of the ...
- (5) The... to be banned
- (6) Security Services to wiretap the telephones of leaders of...

Figure 5: Tolerance index by political party support



What are the implications of these tolerance patterns for the transition process in South Africa?

Firstly, elites in a society which is undergoing a process of transition should probably be more tolerant, because for the first time there are new freedoms for a large group in the society, freedoms which were previously unknown. In the process of exploring new civil liberties the boundaries of what is regarded as 'acceptable' could possibly be tested - tolerance is necessary so that these civil liberties could become ingrained. The survey findings reveal a pattern which spells danger. In fact, a great deal of the violence could possibly be ascribed to this very high degree of intolerance among certain groups.

Secondly, tolerance is a prerequisite for a democratic society. The expression of personal freedoms is an important part of democracy and without it a democratic society cannot be established. Yet it is difficult to determine what level of tolerance is necessary to comply with the requirements of a democratic system. In the more established democracies such as Britain and the USA a higher level of intolerance could be endured for a while without the system being placed under pressure - in a society which is in the process of democratising it could lead to political violence. The pattern of tolerance found in the survey creates a limited opportunity for 'democratic values' to become established in South Africa.

Thirdly, a relatively high degree of tolerance is also necessary in a deeply divided society such as South Africa because there are natural cleavages. It appears as if the intolerance is aimed primarily at the peripheral groups in politics and these groups themselves often also show a high degree of intolerance, which can create a spiral of increasing intolerance. In such a case the more moderate groups would be inclined to limit the peripheral groups' outbursts of intolerance in an undemocratic way - in South Africa this can influence the process of democratisation negatively.

Fourthly, the high level of intolerance among the opinion-leaders of certain groups usually spills over to their followers. Once again, this creates the climate for political violence.

Greater emphasis should probably be placed on the acceptance of the rules of the political game in a constitution which has



... rificacy In this way a framework of procedural consensus can be created within which intolerance could be dealt with in a non-violent way. Political organisations and individuals should in the interim create a climate which promotes an understanding of the necessity of political tolerance.

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To steer the transformation in South Africa successfully towards a democratic system requires skillful political engineering. A central point of departure for this study is that the possibility of a transition which can lead to a consolidated democracy is going to be determined to a large extent by the development of elite *consensual unity*.

The most important structural aspects necessary for an elite settlement have already been established, *inter alia*:

- ⇒ almost all the politically important actors have already been involved in the process. On those on the far left-wing and far right-wing poles;
- ⇒ a series of accords incorporating the most important players into the transition process have been concluded;
- ⇒ compromises on important procedural rules were reached during the 'bargaining' phase; progress has also been made on reaching compromises on substantial policy matters such as economic policy.

What is important is that the patterns of attitudes show that the disunited elites which became involved in the transition process in 1990 are systematically developing a value consensus on important and substantial policy matters. However, one can still not talk about a consensually unified elite because there has not been much progress on the path towards the structural integration of elites.

Looking ahead, if the climate of violence which has characterised the transition continues, the entire democratisation process and especially any planned election in late 1993 or early 1994 will come under tremendous pressure. The ongoing political violence coupled with the high levels of intolerance among the opinion-leaders are retarding factors in the transition because they reduce trust between the various political groupings.

It is relative peace cannot be achieved, the strategy of the power groupings in the year to come is going to be based on political

calculation rather than on principle. The emergence of strong leaders on the side of the ANC-SACP who have the ability to impose unpleasant compromises on the masses and the ability of the cohesive white elite to also accept unpalatable concessions will be the keys to positive progress. The leadership of complex mass movements such as the ANC seem to have less autonomy than political parties such as the NP, DP and IFP. The pace of negotiations and the urgency added by structural factors such as the weak economy are forcing the importance of leadership autonomy onto the mass organisations. An elite settlement coupled with pact forming cannot, be arranged in a mass-media fishbowl.

An important new realisation acts as a driving force in the transition process: the government (the NP and supporters of the 'core state') on its own is not strong enough to provide the necessary economic growth and strong government, but the challengers (the ANC-SACP and PAC) are also not strong enough to enforce a 'people's democracy'. These realities of power, the growing convergence of elite attitudes and the structural conditions interact in complex ways, forcing the transitional process in the direction of acceptance of democratic institutions - the *process* is more certain than the *timeframe*, however.

Moreover, elite fragmentation is slowly disappearing and with that also the fear that compromising moderates, especially on socio-economic issues, will be outflanked by more extreme groups. This moderation will be possible because supporters of the populist idiom will find that, particularly as far as the international political economy is concerned, the playing field is steeply inclined against populist policy priorities.


These trends may create the opportunity for a centrist alliance among political leaders to develop which may in turn enforce political stability in less democratic ways, marginalising peripheral elites and social groups, in order to stimulate economic growth. The end result may be a limited democracy for South Africa where all the trappings of a democracy exist but the contestation of important political, social and economic aspects are regulated by pacts, the constitutional, social and economic contracts.

#### Acknowledgement

Extracts from *Transitional Politics in South Africa: An attitude survey of opinion-leaders*, by Hennie Kotze, Research Report No 3, Centre for International and Comparative Politics, University of Stellenbosch, 1992.

*The pattern of tolerance found in the survey creates a limited opportunity for 'democratic values' to become established in South Africa*

*The disunited elites which became involved in the transition process in 1990 are systematically developing a value consensus on important and substantial policy matters*



## THE BEST

SETTLERS

W

• I d i m e © for Iranshon

*Louise Stack, Steven Friedman and Richard Humphries  
Centre for Policy Studies*

*The recent multi-party talks appeared to overcome the hurdles of Codesa Two and put negotiations back on track. Drawing on interviews with key political analysts, the co-authors of this special report project the likely shape and time frame of a transitional government of national unity led by the ANC and NP. They discuss the 'buffer period' of power-sharing, the pressures on a grand elite coalition and the diminishing options for the CP, IFP and PAC, while speculating on the outcome of an eventual transfer of power.*

Since the hosannahs of February 1990, negotiations have proceeded in South Africa amidst alternating waves of euphoria and despair. For much of the second half of 1992, after the failure of Codesa Two, despair was in vogue. Now, with renewed multi-party talks on hand again after a series of bilaterals between the major players, is it once again the season for optimism?

Are political conditions now more favourable for reaching an accord than they were up until Codesa Two? Public perceptions and the views of most analysts would seem to suggest that they are. And what about the prospects for a transitional government if this view is correct?

During the period of formal negotiations breakdown, all the faultlines in South African society and politics which had been papered over during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) became more than evident, revealing the potential

for prolonged conflict and instability well into the future.

Revelations about alleged military and police conspiracies and 'dirty-tricks'; exposes of violence and torture in African National Congress (ANC) detention camps in exile; increasing violence and crime; all pointed to the danger that the centre, over which both adversaries hoped to rule, might come apart. The economy, already severely battered, was a continuing victim. The centre seemed to be unravelling and the possible consequences were all too clear. This realisation, together with severe international pressure for a settlement, has served to concentrate the parties' minds on a compromise.

The ANC's mass action campaign, launched after Codesa, floundered with the massacre of protesters at Bisho in the Ciskei. The political analyst, Dr van Zyl Slabbert, notes that it provided 'a salutary lesson of confronting a fairly weak element of the state which could simply turn around and put an end to mass mobilisation'. Jeremy Cronin, from the different vantage

• f n f the South African Communist CWSACP), suggests that mass action oht the ANC alliance grassroots into Stations for the first time, perhaps bringing home its necessity.

**Slabbert** also argues that the ANC's **Hnrument**, *A strategic perspective*, provides the most compelling evidence that the ANC has fully committed itself to a negotiated transition. The document recognised that 'an approach that aims to secure a negotiated surrender from the regime will entail a protracted process with tremendous cost to the people and country'.

Its stress on a government of national unity to achieve stability during the transition and to commit all major parties to maintaining it marked a watershed; it meant that the ANC was 'beginning to address the problem of sharing responsibility for maintaining stability during the transition, for without consensus on stability, there will not be a transition. You can look at any transition - that's the turning point'.

As for the National Party (NP), despite its attempt in early September 1992 to warn the ANC that it could negotiate without it if necessary, the turmoil had shown again that its major opponent was indeed indispensable if international approval was to be retained and social order preserved. In late November 1992, State President FW de Klerk announced a timetable for negotiations which culminated in the holding of elections in March or April 1994. Even if the schedule is not met, the government's willingness to set dates to the transition gave the transition a sense of purpose which had been lacking in the past.

All this suggests that the nightmare which followed the breakdown of Codesa instilled a sense of humility, sobriety and realism in both government and ANC leaders, impressing upon them the severity of the consequences of delaying a settlement.

What of the other parties? The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) rejoined negotiations after its own series of *bilaterals*, despite its threat to stay out until the ANC's military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, was disbanded. The Conservative Party (CP) had split in 1992 on this issue, deciding later to follow its dissenters into negotiations. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) joined the talks, though its refusal to disavow ongoing action by its military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), remains at issue.

## Transitional M@©fianisms

The leaders of the negotiating teams of the two 'major parties' had indeed seemed to create a new momentum which left other parties with little option but to join the talks or face life on the peripheries, pursuing unattainable dreams. The ANC-NP *bilaterals* seemed to have resolved most of their differences with both sides making concessions in the process.

The reported parameters of the agreement are that:

- a transitional constitution will be written by a multiparty conference;
- the existing Parliament, stripped of the racial 'own affairs' departments, will govern alongside an expanded cabinet and a Transitional Executive Council;
- they will prepare the way for the election of a constitution-making body which would replace parliament and choose a transitional government which would rule for about five years;
- during which time a final constitution would be framed by the elected body, taking decisions by a two-thirds majority.

Yet according to a senior government constitutional planner, two aspects remain unresolved - the manner in which the post-election interim government and cabinet will be constituted and the powers and functions of the regions. On the former, the NP seems to prefer a higher percentage than does the ANC; another analyst argues that the NP hopes thereby to maximise its influence in a cabinet consisting of fewer rather than more parties while for the ANC the opposite holds.

On regional issues it would seem that agreement has been reached to leave decisions about the powers and functions of regions to a constitution-making body. The prospect seems to have alarmed many in the NP, let alone the IFP. They insisted that this key issue had thus been left to a body likely to be dominated by the ANC; however since decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority, parties in favour of strong regions were likely to wield a veto.

Certainly the failure to settle so crucial a question does raise the spectre of new deadlocks on a major issue. Also the arrangement for a transitional executive seems open to damaging conflicts about interpretation: how precisely would Parliament govern alongside the transitional executive?

*The ANC's stress on a government of national unity to achieve stability during the transition and to commit all major parties to maintaining it marked a watershed*

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*If a settlement is achieved, the outcome will inevitably be a grand coalition of the major parties*

If a settlement is achieved, the outcome will inevitably be a grand coalition of the major parties. An arrangement which expects parties still deeply suspicious of each other, still representing constituencies whose divisions often seem deeper than those between their leaders, to take joint responsibility for order and efficient government, faces obvious perils.

The first challenge will be posed by the nature of the coalition itself. If it 'turns out to be (or is seen to be) a thinly disguised victory for one side, then stability - and democracy - may be out of reach no matter how vigorously the new administration commits itself to making the settlement work'.

In other words if the arrangement is, or seems to the other parties to be, an African National Congress government adorned with a few faces from other parties or - which is more likely - a continuation of the old order with ANC participation, it may not endure.

Even if the coalition does balance the contending interests, it is unlikely to be free of conflict, and this may damage its effectiveness. The temptation to blame coalition partners for the inevitably unpopular decisions which the transitional government will have to take, will severely test the leader's commitment to the partners. Heavy demands will be placed on the leadership abilities of its key figures if it is to avoid this outcome.

The danger is heightened by the possibility that, whatever details are recorded in a settlement, the parties may hold very different expectations of the intended lifespan of a joint government. In early 1993, the NP seemed to have reconciled itself to five years of power-sharing, followed by majority government. But for a party, still deeply suspicious of majority government, a five-year breathing space seems slim protection against the perils it fears ahead.

To be sure, some NP strategists have suggested that majority rule may be inevitable after a buffer period. But they have suggested ten years, not five, as a minimum and their view may not enjoy majority support within the party. While evidence is lacking, it seems reasonable to suggest that the NP may nurse strong hopes of extending power-sharing beyond its agreed life-span.

This would obviously require the agreement of its partners. The NP may be banking on making itself so indispensable during the first five years that it will persuade them that it and its constituents are as necessary to stability as they were when the arrangement began. The ANC could accept this proposal when and if it is made (presumably towards the end of the 1990s).

But even if it does the parties may be entering a power-sharing arrangement with very different expectations; one of laying the ground for a five year 'transfer of power', the other of cementing longer-term power-sharing.

The divide between them would be little different from that when Codesa began; if differing expectations crippled the first round of negotiation, it takes little imagination to suggest what they might do if imported into government.

## Grand Goalifem

A grand coalition implies that the major parties accept joint responsibility for the stability of society. But even if the political leaders accept this, they may be unable to maintain the loyalties of their constituencies as they take decisions which run directly counter to the expectations of those they represent. Stability might be maintained only by an authoritarian style of government - or not at all. Since neither the NP nor the ANC are steeped in democratic tradition, there is a real danger of a reconciled governing elite becoming increasingly isolated from a discontented and fragmenting society.

The danger of elite isolation will be heightened if the idea among ANC constituencies that mass action is an essential ingredient of democracy remains alive after a settlement. If the new government takes unpopular decisions, it could face fresh bouts of mobilisation from trade unions or civic associations once the likely honeymoon is over.

Were the ANC to rule alone it might bring enough credibility to prevent deferred expectations triggering rent and school boycotts, strikes and stayaways. But the NP's presence in government makes it more likely that they will continue. Decisions to clamp down on them are likely to be resented by people whose expectation of liberation are not likely to coincide with what is possible for a future government.

*The parties may hold very different expectations of the intended lifespan of a joint government*



For the minority who stand to gain by the ANC'S accession to power and for the majority who are tired of violence and long for a return to normality, more effective government will come as a relief. But there will be many activists for whom it will seem a burden, and they could find a willing audience from the unemployed and homeless.

In theory the PAC is ideally situated to play this role. There are some who believe that the PAC already has more support than the IFP but that it is badly organised. But its ability to take advantage of disaffection with a transitional government is questioned by analysts, including some who are sympathetic to the PAC. They suggest that its lack of effective organisation, and perhaps a public perception that the movement is ineffective, will limit its potential, whatever a joint government does.

But there is at least a prospect of a threatening challenge to a unity government. The SACP's Chris Hani has said that he will not serve in a government of national unity, but will organise outside it. There are also ANC individuals and branches who are clearly disenchanted with power-sharing. The prospect of a reincarnated version of the United Democratic Front, bringing together a range of groups, to the new government's left and mobilising against it in much the same way as the UDF did against the NP government, cannot be excluded.

The SACP's old programme of action - the two phase revolution - does provide for an attempt to achieve socialist transformation once a democracy is secured. Whether this is still its strategy - in practice rather than theory - is not clear. But there clearly is support for the idea that the 'fight for liberation' should not end once universal franchise is achieved.

White response to a post-settlement government is probably one of the most unpredictable questions partly since there are no real precedents on which to base predictions. Slabbert points out that the largest example of white flight in Africa occurred in Algeria, where 800 000 left; even if double that number left South Africa, it would still leave some 2,5m whites.

Many whites are already adapting to change, albeit reluctantly. Would enough

resist to offer militant white leaders a fertile recruiting ground? The evidence suggests not. Repeated threats by the CP and its allies to mobilise against the prospect of majority government have come to naught - there have been no general strikes or tax revolts and relatively few marches or demonstrations. Enthusiasm for a military struggle will be even less ardent.

This may explain why the trend among the white right, in early 1993, was to move towards accommodation and an attempt to carve out the best deal possible within a non-racial framework. The Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) strategy is perhaps the best example, but the CP's apparent attempt to build an alliance with the IFP based on a shared interest in regional powers illustrates the point.

A transition which makes no attempt to soothe fears among those to the right of NP negotiators will raise the costs of maintaining stability and creating a climate for economic growth. But the rightwing threat, even from disgruntled security personnel, will probably be eminently containable unless the right can forge an alliance with a significant black force. Its most significant potential ally is the IFP.

If the IFP stays out of a negotiated settlement it could seek to mobilise against the new arrangement. But even if it agrees to participate, prospects for a smooth transition might improve only marginally. IFP hostility to the ANC and deep suspicion of collusion between it and the NP may abate if and when it joins them in government, but this is hardly assured.

It is possible to imagine a government in which the tensions of mid-1992 simply play themselves out within a national administration. These dangers would abate if the IFP's terms were met. But it is not clear what these terms are. The IFP's public position suggests that it will demand an arrangement which allows the central government to exercise only those powers which the regions allow it.

If this is the IFP's non-negotiable position, it is hard to see the other parties accommodating it. But if it is merely holding out for a compromise on regional powers it should gain enough to participate in a new constitutional order.

Perhaps a part of the answer depends on how strong the IFP really is. Here, opinions of analysts differ. One view warns that the IFP cannot simply be boiled down to an

*There is a real danger of a reconciled governing elite becoming increasingly isolated from a discontented and fragmenting society*

*White response to a post-settlement government is probably one of the most unpredictable questions*

*The forces holding the society together are greater than those tearing it apart*

extension of Chief Buthelezi's personality. It is buttressed, they say, by a powerful array of tribal chiefs with immense power over their subjects, traditionalist supporters, important white allies and a police force. This view also suggests that secession, as a last resort, would have important support amongst important elements of the Natal establishment.

The contrary view suggests that the IFP's battalions are greatly overstated. They argue that the power of the chiefs, to take one example, is dependent on resources derived from relationships with Ulundi.

The answer may lie somewhere in-between. Thus the real challenge to the 'major parties' may be to find a formula which accommodates the IFP but does not overstate its real and potential power.

Whether or not a power-sharing government faces an organised challenge or these sorts, it is still likely to be a fragile arrangement, marked by repeated tensions between the parties. It will also face threats from within the NP constituency which might pose a more direct challenge, namely a nervous security establishment and civil service which is deeply embittered from its fall in status as an elite within an elite.

Some analysts however believe that it can endure and provide a centre of stability. The SACP's Cronin argues that, 'the ANC would prefer to govern alone but in practice this is not possible. Sharing power will probably involve bickering over policy formulation and implementation, but it will have the advantages of continuity and expertise'.

The political commentator, Lawrence Schlemmer, goes further. He acknowledges that power-sharing will be subject to great stress and that it would be unrealistic to predict harmony within the government. But the forces holding the society together are greater than those tearing it apart.

Despite these real dangers, the threat of insurrection or civil war seems small. South Africa is not a Yugoslavia, in which ethnic groups clustered together in virtually self-contained and autonomous collective were united by the illusion of a nation state.

While racial distrust may run deep, the society is underpinned by an almost assumed sense of interdependence; blacks and whites share a common economy and are doomed to live with each other and - more importantly - they know it.

Opinion polls show, for example, that even most ANC supporters believe power-sharing to be necessary and that most CP supporters believe that their party's policies are unworkable. Many on both sides may well prefer a future without the other but the vast majority know that they cannot have it.

Even if that is a possible guarantee that the society will cohere, it is no assurance that it will soon become a stable democracy. The political scientist, Dankwart Rustow, has argued that democracies are usually borne out of deep conflict between warring parties who accept it as a 'second best' option.

This seems rather reassuring for South Africans. But he adds a less comforting note: conflict, he suggests, can produce democracy only if the society has a 'sense of community' so deep that it is unstated. The sense of interdependence which South Africans share falls far short of this sense of community. In societies which meet Rustow's criterion, the parties, by accepting second best may ensure for their compatriots first prize. Here, the society itself may have to accept second best too. (BOSS)

#### Acknowledgement

This article is a condensed version of the concluding chapter of a forthcoming study of the Codesa negotiations process, written by researchers at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.

*Democracies are usually borne out of deep conflict between warring parties who accept it as a 'second best' option*

## ALLOCATION OF THE 1993/1994 BUDGET

	1993/1994 (Rm)	1992/1993 (Rm)
Regional and Land Affairs	25 193,0	21 647,0
Finance	22 688,5	17 882,6
Defence	9 335,3	9 704,5
House of Assembly: Administration	8 764,2	9 784,7
Foreign Affairs	7 060,5	5 995,2
Police	6 451,5	5 644,7
Education and Training	5 720,0	4 469,8
House of Representatives: Administration	5 241,9	4 853,3
Transport	3 216,3	1 998,2
Trade and Industry	3 019,6	3 059,9
National Health and Population Development	2 243,0	1 224,0
Public Works	2 220,9	1 909,7
House of Delegates: Administration	1 824,0	1 659,0
Correctional Services	1 744,5	1 484,0
Improvement of conditions of service	1 470,5	2 283,0
Agriculture	1 319,0	452,5
Justice	965,5	777,8
Local Government and National Housing	841,6	977,5
Mineral and Energy Affairs	707,6	687,1
State Expenditure	682,0	606,2
National Education	432,7	284,1
Water Affairs and Forestry	409,3	389,0
Manpower	325,9	295,3
Home Affairs	317,6	288,7
Environmental Affairs	221,0	207,0
Parliament	113,7	86,5
Constitutional Development	66,3	41,2
Commission for Administration	56,4	53,5
SA Communications Service	54,0	51,6
State President	23,1	21,3
Public Enterprises and Privatisation	8,2	7,5
Central Economic Advisory Service	4,9	4,3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>112 742,5</b>	<b>98 830,7</b>

Note: The allocations for 1992-93 do not always match the allocations as originally printed in the Budget estimates because of a shift in the functions and a reclassification of expenditure during the year. The amounts may also differ from departmental allocations printed in other Budget documents.

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*Professors Mike McGrath and Merle Holden  
Department of Economics, University of Natal,  
Pietermaritzburg and Durban*

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The South African economy has now entered the fifth consecutive year of economic downturn, after a sharp drop in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1992 of 2,1% compared with declines of 0,6 and 0,5% in 1991 and 1990 respectively. As shown in Table 1, real per capita incomes have fallen by almost 10% since 1989. The sources of the prolonged recession in South Africa are by now familiar:

- depressed world markets and a stalled recovery in the economies of members of the Organisation for Economic Community and Development (OECD);
- depressed domestic consumer and domestic investor demand.

Real private consumption expenditure fell by 2,6% in 1992, while real gross domestic investment has declined by 0,9% per annum since its high level in 1989. As a ratio of GDP, real fixed gross domestic investment has declined to its lowest ever level of 16,1%. In the 1980s, by contrast, the average ratio for the South African economy was 31%. Private investment has been severely damped by under-utilisation of capacity in manufacturing, drought conditions in the agricultural sector, political uncertainty and by contraction in the public corporations.

In itself a severe drought resulted in a massive 24% decline in agricultural output in 1992, contributing over 50% of the 1992 decline in GDP. When agriculture is excluded, the South African economy contracted by 0,9% in 1992.

From the start of the recession to the third quarter of 1992, 170 000 jobs were lost in non-agricultural employment. These high unemployment statistics

have to be contrasted with the changes in real wages which occurred over the period, for, with the exception of the first quarter of 1990, real wages rose.

Notwithstanding the adverse effects of rising food prices, the inflation rate moved downwards from the annualised 16% at the commencement of 1992, to below an annualised rate of 10% at the end of 1992. Some of this decrease is attributable to the reversal of the effects of the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT), and about 2,5% of the decrease has occurred because of lowered interest rates. On balance it is clear that inflationary pressures have been broken by the depressed state of the economy. A further reduction in inflationary pressure from the supply-side is expected as price increases in agricultural goods are moderated.

The balance of trade was adversely affected by the drought, by weak commodity prices, a weak gold price and the recessionary conditions in the economies of South Africa's trading partners. The net effect in 1992 was a sharp drop in the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. The adverse trade conditions and the eighth consecutive year of continued haemorrhaging on the capital account caused the foreign reserves to fall R2,7 bn to cover only 1,8 months' imports by December 1992.

A major casualty of the unexpected prolonging of the recession and drought was the government's budget plans. The 1992/93 Budget was based on the expected positive growth of GDP of 1 - 1,5%. With the fourth year of collapse of GDP, revenues fell some R9 bn short of the estimated R85 bn. Expenditures were budgeted at R100,78 bn, whereas the need for drought relief caused them to burgeon to R105 bn.

The net increase of the actual over the planned expenditure and the shortfall in revenue caused the deficit to increase from an expected 4,5% to a realised 8,6% of GDP. The rise in the deficit is understandable as a result of the cyclical behaviour of government revenues during a recession. If the deficit was entirely due to cyclical factors it would not be a cause for undue concern, especially when coupled with falling inflation levels and growing control over the expansion of the money supply by the Reserve Bank.

Table 1: Real growth of GDP 1989 -1993

	Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP %	Real GDP per Capita (Constant 1985 Prices)
1989	2,3	R3 685
1990	-0,5	R3 585
1991	-0,6	R3 487
1992	-2,1	R3 330
1993	0-0,5	R3 260

Concern with the deficit arises from:


- the increase in the proportion of current expenditure in the total government budget, with the result that the deficit increasingly represents dissaving by government. This dissaving represented 7,1% of GDP in 1992/93.
- the public debt (resulting from accumulated deficits) has grown markedly as a percentage of GDP since the early 1980s, as shown in Figure 1. Interest payments on the deficit have started to approach 20% of total government expenditure. Shri11 alarm bells have started at the possibility of an impending debt trap if economic growth does not revive.

The Minister of Finance has recently released for discussion the Normative Economic Model (NEM), which contains the government view about how the South African economy can be returned to a higher growth path - the model envisages an annual growth rate of GDP of 4,5% by 1997, with an almost doubling in the share of income of the poorest 40% of the population. The model proposes a wide-ranging and frenetically paced programme of structural adjustments. The basic strategy is outlined here.

According to the normative model, on the fiscal front the corporate tax rate should fall from 48 to 40% and the highest personal marginal rate should fall from 43 to 40%. This will reduce the contribution of direct tax to government revenue to 50% by 1997. At the same time, government current expenditure should be financed by current tax revenue at 24% of GDP by 1997, reduced from the current 31 % of GDP. The share of capital expenditure by general government needed for reconstruction works in urban and rural areas should rise from 1,7% of GDP at present to near 3% of GDP by 1997.


We believe that the growth targets of this model should not be taken too literally. The model should be seen as an economic allegory illustrating economic conditions and consequences which, if fulfilled, will produce the higher growth outcome in a manner consistent with current IMF and World Bank policies.

Figure 1: Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP



Source: Old Mutual Economic Monitor, 1st quarter, 1993:14

Figure 2: An Outline of the Normative Economic Model



Notes: 1. Preliminary estimates 2. Incremental ratio 1992- 1997

# THE 1993/94 BUDGET

This year the Budget is set against a backdrop of expected zero growth or at best growth of 0,5%. Coming at a critical time in terms of political developments, several different goals could have been given priority:

- The Budget could have been seen as the start of a process of redistribution, involving enhanced benefits to the poor, expansion in rural and urban services and housing, and the start of redistribution through the taxing of wealth and profits.
- The Budget could have been used to stimulate the economy to start the upswing. This would require

a stimuli to consumer spending and would require the maintenance of the high deficit - an old-time Latin American scenario.

- The painful option was to curtail the growth of government expenditure, and reduce the deficit, at the cost in the short term of zero growth and a further drop in per capita income.

The Budget as presented (see *Economic Monitor* cover) acts to implement many of the strategic directions of the Normative Economic Model. The deficit is reduced to 6,8% of GDP, by reducing the

th of government expenditure to 8,8% for 1993. Current expenditure increases by 6,5%, and a 1% increase in interest relief and interest payments on the public debt is excluded, current expenditure actually falls. Initial spending accounts for R27,6 bn of the expenditure and rises to an expected 2% of GDP.

Revenues are budgeted to increase because:

- Bracket creep within the existing tax structure will yield an additional R6,5 bn.
- The VAT rate is increased from 10 to 14% (with a widening in the range of basic foodstuffs exempted). The expectation is that an additional R6 bn revenue will be generated.
- Increased customs and excise duties in the form of increased levies on fuel and increased taxes on a wide range of drinks and tobacco products will yield an additional R1 bn.

Notable features on the expenditure side of the budget are a general increase of 7,5% in old-age pensions, with general parity in pensions attained by September 1993. African old-age pensions will therefore increase over the year from the present R293 per month to R371 per month, representing a 27% increase overall.

On the revenue side of the Budget the innovative change in the Company tax rate from 48 to 40%, combined with a new tax of 15% on all income distributed as dividends, was a surprise. It is not expected that this change will have any net effect on the revenue garnered from companies - it should

stimulate and encourage investment by the faster growing companies.

On the expenditure side, R2 bn is allocated towards export promotion with R1,7bn going to the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS). Selective encouragement is being given to Tourism (R25m increase), Regional Development (R491m), Job creation (additional R60m for the National Economic Forum and R73m to Manpower for training). Small business is encouraged with R 112,6m allocated. The vote to Education increases by 19,2%, while Defence expenditure decreases by 3,8%.

Seen only in terms of its tax aspects the budget has to be judged to be redistributive, as it increases the income of those poorest households who depend to a large extent on old-age pensions and zero rates a wide range of essential foodstuffs. The tax burden on the middle-classes by contrast rises through the 4% increase in VAT and through fiscal drag.

The budget is certainly consistent with the Normative Economic Model. The deficit is reduced as a share of GDP, and the share of capital expenditure rises. Provision is made for a reduction in the rate of company tax to 40%, if dividends are not distributed, and there is a shift in the balance of indirect to direct taxation with indirect taxation rising from 39 to 43% of total revenues. The share of the poorest households in all probability will increase.

The Budget is only mildly stimulatory for if the deficit is computed assuming a 2,5% rate of growth for one year with the same level of expenditure, the deficit shrinks to near 2% of GDP.

## PROSPECT

The prospects for growth in the coming year are poor, with forecasters ranging on the side of negative growth to very small increases. These forecasts rely on the very moderate rates of growth expected in the OECD countries of 2% for 1993, so that merchandise exports will grow but not sufficiently to overcome the dampening effects of a depressed gold price and a modest rise in imports.

The smaller surplus on the current account of an expected R3,5 bn for 1993 will be insufficient to cover the scheduled R4 bn required to be paid to foreign creditors under the Third Interim Debt Arrangements Agreement for 1993. This forecast makes further reduction in interest rates quite improbable. In addition, it is estimated that the latest increases in the VAT and the petrol price levy will raise the rate of inflation by 3% which will leave little room for a relaxation of monetary policy.

Although it is not expected that investment will increase during 1993 it is expected that the fall in real gross domestic investment will be moderated. The beneficiation projects under Section 37E incentives will start, public investment projects will increase, agriculture should have a better year and export growth may stimulate new investment.

During the coming year, South Africans will have to tighten their belts further as poor growth prospects combined with the growth in population results in a fall in the average standard of living. This does not auger well for the upcoming constitutional negotiations for transition, as a successful political transition may well depend vitally on the prospects for and actual enjoyment of the fruits of economic growth. ~~Q&A~~

**99 We are committed  
to democratic principles^  
individual freedom  
and a socially  
responsible  
free enterprise economy/1**

An extract from  
. AECI "TOWARDS 2002"

Sustained growth through diversification





# Development Trends



*Patrick J McGowan,  
Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University  
Visiting Fulbright Professor,  
Wits Departments of International Relations and Political Studies*

*Twelve months ago, Indicator SA reviewed the prestigious annual reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank which highlighted global trends in 1991. Writing before the UN Earth Summit held in mid-1992, David Korten warned of the dire environmental consequences of the inequitable relationship between the developed North and the under-developed South. This sequel on the UNDP's recent report for 1992 echoes these concerns and proposes ways in which South Africa might participate as a more equal partner in the global marketplace.*

One of the least well-known components of the United Nations system is its Development Programme (UNDP) headquartered in New York city. This is sure to change as more policy-makers, politicians, business leaders, academics, students, and concerned citizens read the third edition of the UNDP's *Human Development Report 1992* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

In the post-Thatcher/Reagan/Bush world, debates on how to promote the economic and social development of the poor South, where some four billion people live, are dominated by conventional economic theory as found in such places as *The Financial Times* and by the institutional priorities of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank. The notorious structural adjustment programmes have put countries like Zimbabwe in bondage to these Washington-based powerhouses. The World Bank's annual *World Development Report*, which is now in its fifteenth edition,

has dominated these discussions as the embodiment of the conventional wisdom.

When viewed in the context of this discourse, the UNDP's own *Report* is a self-conscious antidote aiming to put people first, ahead of markets and rates of increase in Gross Domestic Products. To paraphrase Abe Lincoln, the UNDP Report advocates human development *of, by and for* the world's 5,3 billion people.


The *Report* was written by a team of UNDP staff members under the guidance of Mahbub ul Haq, a distinguished economist, former Minister of Planning and Finance of Pakistan, and presently special advisor to the director of the UNDP. A panel of six eminent academic specialists in economic development - including internationally renowned Keith Griffin and Paul Streeten - served as consultants. While the UNDP does not have the experience and resources of the World Bank, the quality of the authors and consultants of the UNDP's

*Economic growth must be participatory, distributed well and environmentally sustainable*

Report compares well with the Bank's Report. Indeed, much of the most interesting statistical information contained in the UNDP's *Human Development Report* was contributed from the vast, computerised archives of the World Bank.

The UNDP *Report* is particularly interesting because of its topical focus on how the operation of the world economy works to keep the South poor, how it reproduces the infamous North vs South gap. The *Report* paints a grim picture wherein global disparities are massive and getting worse. A short overview is followed by five chapters analysing:

- the concept and measurement of human development
- the relationship of human freedom to human development
- the widening gaps in global opportunities and welfare
- how global markets keep poor people poor, and
- a proposed agenda of global action to create a more just and sustainable world economy.



ffaaiaee

The main text is followed by pages of technical notes and a bibliography that will prove of much interest to academic and student readers. Finally, there are many statistical tables reporting on an amazing variety of social and economic conditions within and between almost all countries.

The *Report* defines human development as 'a process of enlarging people's choices' by increasing their opportunities in such areas as education, housing, health care, income and employment. Economic growth and increasing personal incomes are essential to this process, but not sufficient. Economic growth must be participatory, distributed well and environmentally sustainable. For this to happen human development must be accompanied by growing human freedom.

Using an innovative and convincing methodology, the *Report* presents a human development index for 160 countries based upon 1990 data covering life expectancy, educational attainment, and personal income. By this measure the six most developed countries in the world were Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and the United States. The five least developed, or most underdeveloped, countries were Niger, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and at the very bottom, Guinea.

The African country with the best performance on this human development index was Mauritius, which ranked 48th out of 160 countries. South Africa only ranked 70th, just behind Thailand and just ahead of Turkey. The *Report* demonstrates that this country is a middle-income, developing country. This supports the present government's initiative to have South Africa reclassified as a 'developing country' by the European Community so that it will have greater access to European markets and technical assistance.

Equally interesting and far more controversial is the UNDP *Report's* attempt to create a human freedom index for 102 countries in 1992 based upon their performance in 21 distinct areas of freedom covering personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of opportunity. Developed industrial countries had an average score of 90% on this index, while southern developing countries averaged only 51%. This illustrates the fundamental linkage between human development and

- man freedom; they go hand in hand  
 "freedom releases the energies of  
 because of cooperative enterprise and secures  
 for them the fruits of that enterprise."


reason for the lacklustre performance  
 of the South African economy during the  
 1980s and 1990s is that it is such an unfree  
 environment for the majority of its people.  
 See in the 1991 edition of the *Report*  
 where a somewhat different methodology  
 was used to estimate the extent of human  
 freedom in 1985, South Africa scored three  
 out of a possible forty points, making it tied  
 with the Soviet Union and only ahead of  
 China, Ethiopia, Romania, Libya and Iraq.)  
 Of course, South Africa's score in 1992  
 would be somewhat higher due to State  
 President de Klerk's reforms.

The UNDP *Report* clearly demonstrates  
 that the world is a very unequal place, much  
 more unequal than individual countries like  
 Brazil and South Africa:

- During 1990 the richest 20% of the  
 world's population, some one billion  
 persons, earned 83% of global income,  
 whereas the poorest 60, some three  
 billion people, earned only 5,6%.
- In 1988 the richest 20% earned average  
 incomes of US\$ 22 808 while the  
 poorest averaged merely US\$ 163, a  
 ratio of 140 to 1.
- This same ratio within Brazil, the most  
 unequal society for which we have data  
 to make this comparison, is 26 to 1 -  
 politically dangerous and morally  
 wrong, but far better than for the world  
 as a whole.
- Even more troubling, this gap is getting  
 worse, both relatively and absolutely -  
 using 1989 dollars to control for the  
 effects of inflation, the *Report* estimates  
 that the income gap between the richest  
 and poorest 20% of the world's  
 population grew from US\$ 1 864 in  
 1960 to US\$ 15 149 in 1989.

This happened in spite of the fact that the  
 world economy and international trade and  
 investments grew enormously between  
 1960 and 1989. Something is very wrong in  
 our world, for conventional economics as  
 propounded by *Business Day* and *The*  
*Financial Mail* argues that growing  
 economies and world trade should result in  
 an equalisation of factor prices and personal  
 incomes.

*The UNDP Report reaches five conclusions  
 regarding growing global disparities:*



*First, economic growth does not  
 automatically improve people's lives within  
 nations or internationally. Those who think  
 that if South Africa's economy can be made  
 to grow at five to six per cent per annum  
 then all our social and political problems  
 will gradually disappear, are deluding  
 themselves and their readers and listeners.  
 The fact of the matter is that growing, free  
 markets are necessary, but not sufficient  
 to promote genuine human development and  
 freedom. Government, the state, must adopt  
 correct policies to sustain market-driven  
 growth and to ensure that it is participatory,  
 well-distributed, and sustainable.*

*The world is a  
 very unequal  
 place, much  
 more unequal  
 than individual  
 countries like  
 Brazil and South  
 Africa*

*Second, rich and poor countries compete in  
 the global marketplace as unequal partners.  
 South Africa is neither rich nor poor - it is a  
 middle-income developing country. If it is  
 to become rich and avoid sinking into the  
 poverty that characterises most of Africa,  
 labour, business, the state and the  
 institutions of civil society must cooperate  
 to ensure that the basic human needs of  
 primary education and literacy, health care,  
 housing, and employment are assured for  
 all South Africans. At the same time,  
 massive investments must be made in*

*Growing trade and immigration restrictions are imposed by the developed countries against the commodities, manufactures and labour of developing countries*

technological and managerial skills and the infrastructure of communication and transportation so that this country can gain control over the expanding 'knowledge industry'. This is the only way in today's competitive international economy to escape the global backwaters of low-valued added production and to gain competitive advantage.

*Third*, global markets do not operate freely. This, together with the unequal partnership costs developing countries like South Africa an estimated US\$ 500 billion a year, ten times what they receive in foreign aid. The problem here is growing trade protectionism and immigration restrictions practiced by Northern developed countries against the commodities, manufactures and labour of Southern developing countries. (Paradoxically, political democracy in the North is anti-developmental for the South, just as white democracy in South Africa produced apartheid.) The foreign economic policy of the 'new' South Africa must coordinate with other developing countries to reduce these restrictions and to work towards a free Southern African Common Market as far North as Zaire and Kenya.

*Fourth*, the world community needs policies in place to provide a social safety net for poor nations and poor people. The 24 Northern countries which belong to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recycle an average of 25% of their national incomes to support the poor members of their societies, yet these same countries 'give' only 0,35% of their incomes as foreign assistance to the poor South. In the USA the most publicly unpopular programme of the federal government in Washington is foreign aid, even though the United States spends only > 0,19% of its national income this way.

The foreign aid programmes of the rich, Northern countries must be reformed if human development is to have a chance in the South. In particular, both Japan and America should spend a fair share of their wealth in this way. South African diplomacy should become a leader in making this case in bilateral negotiations and in international fora.

*Fifth*, with the end of the Cold War, industrial and developing countries have the opportunity to design a new global compact on human development - a negotiated agreement to put people first in national policies and international development cooperation.

*With the end of the Cold War, industrial and developing countries have the opportunity to design a new global compact on human development*

A Global summit on human development should be called by UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali to begin this process. Dr Mandela, President de Klerk and other leaders should do the same in South Africa.

Internationally, a United Nations Economic Security Council should be created just as President Bill Clinton has created a National Economic Security Council for the United States. South Africans should explore doing the same thing.

Internationally, the World Bank should become accountable to the 22 member-nations of the Council and should become a genuinely environmentally concerned development bank. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) should become a truly regional development bank for the nations belonging to a Southern African Common Market and it should work in conjunction with the African Development Bank and the World Bank. The DBSA should be transparent and accountable to the governments of the region in which it operates.

The International Monetary Fund should become an international reserve bank with strength to impose structural adjustments on Northern countries like the United States as well as on poor, Southern countries like Zimbabwe. South Africans need to negotiate a social and economic compact promoting human development and freedom consistent with sustainable economic and financial policies.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) should have its mandate enlarged to cover most international trade, applying GATT principles to trade in agricultural products, textiles, and trade-related aspects of services, intellectual property rights, financial services and investments. South Africa should dismantle its highly statist and protected economic structures as rapidly as possible.

To conclude, the UNDP's *Human Development Report 1992* should be required reading by all South Africa's leaders and concerned citizens. The past failures of global and South African development must not produce political paralysis, but should serve as lessons for analysis and debate as this country and our common world move into the twenty-first century. flt^



# Regional Trends



*Donald Sparks, Associate Professor of Economics, The Citadel, South Carolina*

*A regional specialist argues that the normalisation of economic, commercial and diplomatic relations between South Africa and southern Africa is a first step on the road to growth and development in the region. In looking at the impact of renewed foreign investment and "the peace dividend", he concludes that the SADCC states are not trapped in a typical dependency relationship on a post-apartheid South Africa - instead, they enjoy an interdependent, albeit unequal, relationship.*

**T**he abolition of apartheid in South Africa could return some obvious and some not so obvious costs and benefits to the region.

If the transition is smooth and there is little capital or skilled manpower flight, South Africa will attract significant foreign investment, potentially to the exclusion of other candidates such as Zimbabwe or Namibia. However, increased foreign investment may find its way throughout the region and raise the level of development throughout southern Africa. But if the transformation becomes violent in South Africa, foreign investment will no doubt flee and then maintain a 'wait and see' attitude toward the entire region, thus denying it much-needed investment necessary for growth.

Many stable economies such as Botswana and Malawi have suffered because of the regional political and economic instability common in the 1970s and 1980s which tended to lump all of the SADCC states together into a 'risky' investment category. Even though a particular country may have its economic policies on target, its performance is affected by external factors such as perceptions, which may be more important than reality. In the eyes of investors, South Africa may suffer from the same legacy of instability.

Although South Africa is a small country by world standards, it is the region's powerhouse: its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 was about US\$ 100 billion. South Africa has an annual population growth rate of 2,5%, and will need a GDP growth rate of about 5% to accommodate the unemployed and the newcomers seeking employment during the next decade (Bethlehem, 1988). Such a growth rate will be necessary also to help reduce some of the income disparities between whites and

blacks. To generate this growth, several studies have estimated that South Africa will need at least US\$ 100 billion in foreign capital during the 1990s (Suckling and White, 1988).

South Africa has good prospects of attracting foreign investment as its economy will remain linked to the industrial nations, and as it is likely that South Africa will develop some form of market system (possibly of a social democratic kind). While US\$ 100 billion is not an inordinate amount of capital in global terms, it would be a staggering target for the region, particularly given the net disinvestment over the past two decades by the industrial nations. Given the nature of any kind of transition, however, foreign investors may be wary of putting their venture capital into an uncertain South African economy.

Foreign investment in South Africa - or the lack of it - will have a number of impacts on the region as a whole. Annual total foreign investment in South Africa has ranged from a high of US\$ 400 million in 1985, matched by more than US\$ 400 million in disinvestment 1986, to virtually no net gain in foreign investment through 1990.

Total investment in all member states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is less than US\$ 50 million per annum. It is clear that the region can grow best not at the expense of South Africa's growth but because of such growth. If South Africa is denied - for whatever reason - much needed foreign capital, its economy will be constrained to very low growth rates; indeed, it could experience negative

*If the transformation becomes violent in South Africa, foreign investors will no doubt flee and then maintain a 'wait and see' attitude*

*The SADCC states could suffer from too much South African participation in the region at the expense of their local industry*

growth. Slower growth in South Africa will spill over its regional borders in terms of decreased trade, investment and commercial opportunities. There will be a downward growth spiral in southern Africa as a whole.

For a country to grow, it ultimately has to increase its productivity. Poor countries generally demonstrate low levels of productivity due to low levels of capital available for investment, which, in turn, is the result of low savings and low incomes. In short, incomes are low because of low productivity. It is possible, even likely, that positive 'spill-overs' from South Africa could arrest this downward spiral and start the region on the path toward higher levels of investment and productivity.

Given the world's focus on Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the prospects for massive assistance to South Africa of the order of US\$ 100 billion per decade are slim at best. Nevertheless, if some such aid materialises, South Africa's neighbours could benefit in two ways. First, they would obtain direct capital investment as many of the projects would, by their very nature, have to straddle borders (e.g. energy enhancement, rail improvement). Second, they would also receive external spill-over benefits from South Africa's growth.

*Multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or UNDP may determine South Africa to be ineligible for economic support*

The SADCC member governments will no doubt want increased South African investment after the abolition of apartheid. They are in desperate need of capital inflows. However, the major reasons for the lack of capital in the region have not necessarily been political or sanctions or war. In fact, '...for straightforward business reasons, nobody else has wanted to invest in SADCC either. The big exception is Botswana, where there are dozens of investors from various countries - especially South Africa. The wretchedness of Angola, Zambia and Mozambique makes most investors shudder' (*The Economist*, 3 November 1990).

## **Prisoner's Dilemma**

Small countries in southern Africa have, until recently, faced something similar to *the prisoner's dilemma*. In terms of this analogy, if two prisoners are questioned separately, one may confess in order to receive a lighter sentence than his compatriot. The small economies, which tried at times to obey sanctions against South Africa realised that they could not fully comply, but if all states did not

comply, the sanctions would be ineffective.

Compliance with sanctions in the 1990s cost many of the region's states considerably. Perversely, after these sanctions are lifted, the states will face costs of a different nature. Before, the loss of South African trade and other commercial and financial opportunities delayed economic development: now, there will be a chance that the SADCC states could suffer from too much South African participation in the region at the expense of their local industry.

In the past, South Africa was anxious to offer economic and technical assistance to its neighbours in order to buy friendship. South Africa has continued to provide assistance to the region, from veterinary research and soil conservation to transport and tourism development. 'Pariah South Africa was prepared to pay for friends. Black-ruled South Africa will not need to' (*The Economist*, *ibid*).

On the labour front, South Africa is employing fewer foreign migrant workers on its mines, and, the miners who are employed are more skilled and more highly paid. As they retire or their contracts expire in the 1990s, they will not be replaced by workers from their countries. Instead, more and more labour is coming from the homelands in South Africa itself.

Thus, after majority rule is achieved, South Africa's neighbours will experience falls in jobs and income. While a majority-ruled South Africa will no doubt be sensitive to the problems it will create for states such as Mozambique or Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (BLSN), it will have little latitude to do much to help. The developments in labour relations in South Africa have begun a trend which will not be changed in the short-term, nor would it be in South Africa's interest to change them soon.

Given South Africa's high GDP per capita by African and other Less Developed Country (LDC) standards, many multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) may determine South Africa to be ineligible for economic support. In short, it may prove difficult for a post-apartheid South Africa to obtain concessionary funding.

Should capital inflow be geared toward supporting regional economic development, however, the chances of South Africa



foreign aid would increase. There are suggestions of a regional initiative (Ibiche, 1990). Many other schemes have been suggested. For example, a regional tourism organisation and forms of cooperation with SADC. In fact, not now. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has proposed a common regional currency since apartheid goes' (*The Economist, ibid*).

There has been speculation that South Africa will apply to join the Organisation for Promotional Cooperation and Development (OECD). While such an indication would probably be turned down because of South Africa's low per capita National Product (GNP) and for other economic and political reasons, it does suggest that South Africa's economy is much different from its neighbours. It views itself as an industrialised country, and as such could attract industrial investment at the expense of its less developed neighbours.

There is no doubt that South African-inspired or supported wars and destabilisation have cost the region in direct economic costs and indirect opportunity costs (see data base).

The region will reap a significant 'peace dividend' in the form of reduced military expenditures, more reliable transportation and alternatives, increased trade and commerce, domestic and international investor confidence, increased government revenues, increased employment and general economic growth. Such a dividend should boost regional GDP by as much as 1 - 1,5% annually above the World Bank-projected growth of perhaps 2,5 - 3,0%. This growth would stem in large part from the transfer of capital resources from military sectors to more directly productive sectors.

Thus, under the most favorable scenario for the medium-term, the southern African region should expect growth in the 3,0 - 4,5% range, still above population growth. Of course, Botswana, with the continent's highest GDP growth rate (11,4% during 1980-88) combined with potential oil-revenue induced high growth in Angola (if a new political settlement is reached) could skew the average growth rate up by another one per cent. However, Botswana's percentage of the region's total output (only 0,1%), Angola's return to civil war in

late 1992 and the unlikely prospects for increased oil prices in the medium-term, would all tend to discourage a higher growth estimate for the region.

The region might also rightly expect to benefit from South Africa's advanced training, research and technology. For example, South Africa has more university agricultural and technical facilities than all of the SADC countries combined. Sharing research and training schemes between South Africa and its neighbours will not be easy, however. Firstly, while South Africa has more advanced research and training than SADC, South Africa itself complains about shortages in certain skills. Secondly, as expectations in South Africa rise, it will need all of its skills to facilitate domestic economic growth.

Since the 1970s, South Africa has been under pressure to become more self-sufficient due to actual sanctions or the threat of increased sanctions. Its military, for example, has had to develop much more expensive parts for equipment, and many times these costs have been passed on to the civilian sector. The Sasol oil-from-coal project boosts fuel costs which has a multiplier effect throughout the economy. 'Thus when neighbouring states buy from South Africa, they are often paying high prices to support an inefficient and increasingly militarised industry. And often paying for the expansion and modernisation of South African industry instead of their own' (Hanlon, 1986).

There will be no need to evade sanctions after apartheid. This will provide benefits as well as costs to the region. South Africa will gain as much at the expense of European and perhaps American and Japanese suppliers because African states will no longer shy away from trade with the Republic. There will be some reduction of domestic suppliers, but in many areas of light and heavy manufacturing, South Africa faces no African competition.

Interestingly, James Cobbe (1990) makes a convincing argument that South Africa has benefited from international aid to the region. His major argument is that economic assistance often is spent on third party procurement, and in some cases that is South African.

Although much aid in the region is 'tied' to the original donor, some nevertheless is spent on South African-produced goods because South Africa is the closest and cheapest supplier. It also helps South Africa

*Should capital inflow be geared toward supporting regional economic development, the chances of South Africa obtaining foreign aid would increase*

*The region might also rightly expect to benefit from South Africa's advanced training, research and technology*

... to page 32 kt

# Data Basi

## Southern Africa's Peace Dividend

Analysis by Donald Sparks

*It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the economic costs to the region of South Africa's destabilisation strategy of the 1980s. A number of organisations and scholars have tried to do so:*

A SADCC (1986) study estimated the cost at some US\$ 1 Obn between 1980-1984, in terms of direct war damage, extra defence expenditure, higher transport/energy costs, lost exports/tourism, reduced production, lower economic growth, boycotts, etc.

A UNICEF (1989) study estimated the cost at US\$7bn in 1985 and rising to US\$10bn in 1988.

The most comprehensive attempt to determine the actual cost was made by the United Nations in 1989. According to the UN, South Africa cost its neighbours US\$10,6bn in 1988 alone and some US\$62,4bn between 1980-1988.

### THE UN STUDY

The US\$62,4bn was calculated by the UN study using Angola's and Mozambique's estimated GDP growth rate over war and non-war years and the impact on the other states' GDPs which were direct or indirect targets of South African military and economic actions. The study estimated Angola's total GDP loss for the period at \$30bn, Mozambique's at \$15bn and the rest of SADCC at \$17bn. (This loss can be compared with the approximately \$5bn which SADCC was able to attract in the form of new economic assistance.)

The UN study also suggests that South African-supported destabilisation has been the principle cause of economic setbacks for the region and that in 1988 the combined GDP would have been 40% higher in the absence of South Africa's actions. The study goes on to estimate that some:

i® 6m people have been displaced

1,5m people have had to leave their home country

Table: UN Estimated GDP Loss in SADCC Region: 1980-1988 (US\$m in 1988 prices)

Country	1988		1980-1988	
	Loss (US\$m)	% of Actual GDP	Loss (US\$m)	% of Actual GDP
Angola	4500	90	30000	600
Mozambique	3000	110	15000	550
Zimbabwe	1350	25	8000	145
Malawi	550	30	2150	133
Zambia	500	20	5000	200
Tanzania	500	10	1300	26
Botswana	125	10	500	40
Lesotho	50	7	300	42
Swaziland	30	5	200	33
<b>ALLSADCC</b>	<b>10 605</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>62 450</b>	<b>210</b>

V^Noie: Does not include Namibia

1,5m people have died In war-related incident\*

® 750 000 children under age five would have had it not been for war

isr 50% of the population of Angola and Mozambique have been displaced.

### BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRY

A country-by-country summary follows of the costs to UN study attributed to South African destabilisation actions:

#### • MOZAMBIQUE

Because of its key transport sector, Mozambique has been a major target of South African destabilisation particularly at Nacala, Beira and Maputo, the major ports. During 1980-88, Mozambique suffered some 1m war-related deaths, 1 m people fled to other countries and 4,6m people were displaced. During 1983-84, there was a war-induced famine, and the grain food deficit was 2m tons in 1988. Mozambique lost about US\$1,7bn in reduced exports between 1980-88.

#### • ANGOLA

The war from 1980-88 was responsible for nearly 500 000 deaths and the displacement of over 1,5m people. The major actions were against the transport sector - in Angola's case, the Benguela Railroad. Defence spending cost at least US\$8,5bn during the period, and the export loss was estimated at \$3,5bn. Angola also lost about \$750m in forgone transit revenues

#### • BOTSWANA

Botswana lost about US\$300m as a result of higher South African prices for essential goods and services, and excess transport costs totalled some \$50m. Excess defense spending reached about \$250m for 1980-88.

#### • LESOTHO

Direct economic costs were estimated at US\$100m in 1980-88, and excess defence spending at \$100m.

#### • MALAWI

The major cost between 1980-88 was in increased transport costs of US\$1,2bn, as Malawian trade was forced to go via South Africa rather than via more direct and less costly alternative routes. Nearly 700000 refugees cost least \$100m, and excess defense spending probably reached \$100m during 1980-88,

#### • NAMIBIA

Estimated losses to Namibia due to South African occupation were US\$1,7bn alone on the 11 ethnic local government authorities. The military effort in Namibia exceeded the transfer of payments by South Africa into Namibia of about \$800m during 1980-88.

#### a SWAZILAND

Swaziland captured increased revenues from South Africa's use of its transport system during 1980-88.

port cost the Swazi government about  
y, v/hile excess defense spending cost

low and middle income sub-Saharan Africa as a  
group grew by only 0,8 percent during 1980-88.

Except for Botswana the fastest growing economies  
In sub-Saharan Africa grew by only 5,5% in Burkina  
Faso, 5,4% in Cameroon and 4,3% in Burundi during  
1980-88. It is unlikely that, even under the best of  
circumstances. Angola or Mozambique could have  
done significantly better. Indeed, sub-Saharan  
African countries 'at peace' and with similar levels of  
economic development or, in fact, higher levels of  
development include Kenya which had a 4,2%  
growth and Ivory Coast whose *economy grew* by 2%  
during the period. South Africa itself grew by only  
1,3%.

- **high military costs**

Further, the study over-estimates the cost of the  
military on the region. Although high, the military  
burden is not out of line with the continent as a whole  
or with other developing regions. For example, in  
1988 on average the low-income countries spent  
10,6% percent of their total central governmental  
expenditures on defence, and low and middle  
income countries averaged 13,6% of total  
government spending on the military. South Africa  
spent 15,2% of central government revenues on  
defence (CIA, 1990; UNDP, 1990).

Even if military spending could decrease, there is no  
guarantee that it would be matched by increased  
social or development spending. Paradoxically,  
reductions in military spending, if not accompanied  
by increased domestic or national security, could  
reduce foreign investor confidence.

As Mary Kaldor (1991:18) has demonstrated:

*Continued debt burden would continue to fall most  
heavily on poor people, even where military  
spending reductions have taken place. This may well  
contribute to violent crime, to communal, ethnic  
and social tensions ... creating situations which  
threaten fragile democracies and strengthen the  
position of the military and the police. In so far as this  
constitutes a barrier to reductions in military  
spending, governments will tend to reduce social  
consumption, thereby imposing further burdens on  
the poor and/or cut back on public investment  
thereby reducing the prospects for economic  
regeneration.*

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o' '80-88.

>

DCG's most distant state from South  
direct war-related losses have been  
rtheless, Tanzania incurred Increased  
if perhaps US\$550m in 1980-88, due to  
s stationed In Mozambique and 6 000  
3ops deployed along its southern  
i

ic.od some US\$3,5bn in 'excess'  
nding during the 1980-88 period. It

deploys" u- 12 000 troops in Mozambique to  
help guard rnsport facilities, and had to post  
additional troop;, along the border. Excess transport  
costs were au^Lit \$750m and trade losses were  
\$250m.

- **ZAMBIA**

Although nirk...:t damage to Zambia's economy  
between 1980-88 was estimated at only US\$10m,  
extra defen-o costs probably reached \$1,25bn.  
Re-routing trade v^a South Africa away from Angolan  
and Mozambican links cost about \$250m in 1980-88.

Other trade routes were estimated at \$125m.

*The UN study has serious flaws which suggest its  
analysis could be in error by as much as 50% - indeed,  
the study ih-Ji admits that it could be "off" by 25%.*

The methodology used has problems; the study  
employed a number of methods to try to estimate  
the war costs. The first two methods were:

(1) to compute direct costs themselves, including  
increased l'ansport costs, military expenses, higher  
energy costs, relief and reconstruction spending.  
These cos ls were estimated at some US\$45bn.

(2) to compute non-war growth rates for GDP and  
compare them with actual results. The study  
estimates that a non-war GDP growth would have  
been in the neighborhood of 5-6% compared with  
the actual 2,2% growth rate.

The study suggests that, 'In the cases of Angola and  
Zimbabwe, healthy per capita growth of up to 8% a  
year could have been achieved, and in the cases of  
Mozambique, Tanzania, probably Malawi and  
perhaps Zambia, GDP growth could have been held  
at levels equal to or in excess of population growth'  
(UN, 1989:4).

The UN study's GNP growth estimates are high  
indeed. For example, for 1980-88 the average GDP  
growth rate for all low-income developing countries  
(a category under which most of these states fall)  
was 2,0% (UN *World Development Report*, 1990). Yet

*In a post-apartheid era without tariffs, the region may buy much less from South Africa than today*

because SADCC citizens trained with the use of donor technical assistance often migrate to South Africa instead of staying at home to assist in local development. The reason is simple: salaries in South Africa are often two or three times as much as in their home countries. Thus there is a brain drain which is being unintentionally supported by western and international donors.

In the final analysis, apartheid has inhibited the long-sought after goal of regional economic integration. The linkages which do occur are only those with the least political cooperation and costs involved. These are not necessarily 'natural', e.g. witness South Africa's attempts to co-opt Malawi and the BLSN states by economic bribes and by its economic destabilisation actions. With attention geared toward economic cooperation (notwithstanding legitimate commercial competition), the region potentially can arrest the downward spiral and begin to turn around.

(B hm

Many economic changes will take place in the region which are not related to the end of apartheid. Population growth will continue, as will declining infrastructure. Less official development assistance and reduced levels of private investment would have occluded any way. Other changes will occur despite what countries want; others because of such actions.

Some changes will happen because of historical circumstances over which the countries of southern Africa will have but limited control. The region remains subject to trends and cycles in the industrial nations\* such as recessions and declining terms of trade.

In a post-apartheid era without tariffs, the region may buy much less from South Africa than today. South Africa is a high-cost producer because of its protective tariffs, particularly in manufacturing.

The region as a whole will undertake political and economic reform which could set an enabling environment for growth. These states realise the importance of their actions, regardless of change (or the lack of) in South Africa. Governments will seek reduction of budgetary deficits, relax foreign exchange controls, streamline bureaucracies and generally try to encourage greater regional cooperation. I -luliuti apartheid, establishing majority rule

and allowing South Africa into the full economic community of nations will no doubt bring significant benefits to its neighbours. Paradoxically, those with the weakest ties will probably be helped most, and those with the closest ties today will probably gain least. The potential gainers include Mozambique and Angola, plus probably Malawi and Tanzania. For example, South Africa and Angola have been meeting since 1990 to try to agree on South Africa purchasing and refining Angolan oil. Angola's oil minister emphasised 'an indisputable logic to oil links' between the two countries (*Christian Science Monitor*, 27 February 1991).

There will probably be very little change for the BLSN states. Their ties are so strong and extensive that it will take years to lessen them, even if there is sufficient economic rationale to do so. Except in the area of trade diversion - being able to buy from the least cost producer - and possibly import substitution, there will be little gain for these states. Zimbabwe will also probably gain little. Indeed. South Africa, once commerce becomes normalised, may well 'out compete' Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe's own back yard.

A majority-ruled South Africa will have no incentive to be particularly generous to its 'mini-neighbours' and will no doubt pursue sound economic policies designed to enhance South Africa's own well-being, not necessarily those of its neighbours. In fact, such development may be mutually-exclusive.

Much as Kenya did in the old East African Community, Southern Rhodesia in the Central African Federation or Nigeria now in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), southern Africa will face the reality of a dominant economic power, on whose success the rest of the region is dependent to a large degree, but whose very success at times will damage their own small, fragile economies.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

An excerpt from a special report by the author, entitled, 'The Economic Consequences for Southern Africa: The Regional Costs and Benefits', unpublished.

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
*Those states with the weakest ties to South Africa will probably be helped most, and those with the closest ties today will probably gain least*

# RURAL REGIONAL


M O N O R

## Conflict Trends in Natal/KwaZulu 1987 - 1992

PROPORTION OF VIOLENT EVENTS RECORDED WITH FIVE OR MORE DEATHS AND INJURIES



WEAPON TYPES USED IN VIOLENT EVENTS IN WHICH FIVE OR MORE DEATHS AND/OR INJURIES WERE RECORDED



See cover article by Graham Howe in *Rural and Regional Monitor*.

Source: Bekker S and A Louw (eds). *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986 - 1992*.

Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992.

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


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# Conflict Trends

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Graham Howe  
Editor, Indicator SA

Trojan  
Horse

A new Indicator SA report, 'Capturing the Event', reported on the seminal findings of a new data base established on some 7 000 incidents of civil violence in the region. In this commentary on the main data trends, Graham Howe outlines some of the principal political, social and economic trends of the Natal conflict during South Africa's turbulent transitional phase.

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Ciirit W€%r  
1 9 8 7- 71 ^

In a sense, the Natal conflict is the Trojan horse of South African politics. Until peace is secured in the Natal/KwaZulu region, the contagious spread of civil violence to the rest of the country will continue to undercut progress in constitutional negotiations towards a national political settlement.

What has become known as the *Natal conflict*, linked primarily to violent political contestation between rival opposition parties, ultimately has no spatial or geo-political boundaries. The outbreak of hostilities between 'ANC' supporting township residents and 'Inkatha' supporting hostel-dwellers in the Transvaal between July 1990 and April 1992 visibly demonstrated the export of what had hitherto been a regional civil war. Attacks by hostel residents on surrounding townships claimed the lives of more than 1 200 people on the Reef in this two year period (see Minnaar in this edition).


Since mid-1992, the struggle for political ascendancy between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) appears to have returned from the Transvaal to the Natal/KwaZulu terrain. The wheel has turned full circle. In the last fight months, more than half of all fatalities in political violence occurred in the Natal

region (972 out of a national death-toll of 1 772 between August 1992 and February 1993) - political fatalities in the Transvaal accounted for about one-third of the national total (568 out of 1 772) (Human Rights Commission, March 1993).

The lessons of the last three years have been that the IFP will not allow itself to be marginalised as a regional force in bilateral national talks between the government and the ANC. As the major features of a multilateral political settlement have taken shape, the National Party and the ANC have increasingly cultivated a status as the major powerholders on centre stage. In response, on several occasions, Chief Buthelezi has warned that, 'We are going to take our place at the negotiation table or there will be no negotiations'.

The recent collapse of multi-party elections in Angola and the relapse into civil war between the MPLA and Unita casts a long shadow over the peace process in the sub-continent. Commenting on the role of Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, one astute observer said recently, 'Angola is being held hostage by one man and his ambition'. In November 1992, the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, announced defiantly that 'Zulus will never allow themselves to be ruled by an ANC government'. By early

Figure 1: Fatalities in Political Conflict in Natal & Transvaal, 1991-1993



Source: Black Sash, Human Rights Commission

Note: \* The Transvaal figures for November 1992 to February 1993 refer to the PWV region only

1993, Natal's Trojan horse was firmly encamped in the national political arena on the eve of new multiparty negotiations.

The arrival of five international observer missions - from the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community, the Organisation for African Unity, and the World Council of Churches - in South Africa since late 1992 to monitor the civil violence provides a clear indication of the scale and intensity of the current political conflict. The overriding concern the international community shares with many concerned domestic observers is that the violence has the potential to derail the fragile negotiation process, or even worse, that it may strengthen the hand of the securocrats and return South Africa to the repressive pre-reform era of the 1980s.

In workshops held by representatives of these missions and domestic monitoring agencies, the inevitable question was again raised, 'What is the cause of the violence?' There are so many relevant dimensions to Natal's low-intensity civil war that it is difficult to pinpoint a simple yet convincing answer. The conflict also requires a search beyond causes to solutions - to stop the endless spiral of allegation and counter-recrimination as to which party is responsible for particular incidents in the sequence of violence. It is a futile if not impossible task to separate truth from propaganda as to which organisation bears moral responsibility, in what proportion and in which particular instance.

Transitional politics in South Africa are characterised by three simultaneous processes which appear to be undercutting optimism about the successful outcome of constitutional negotiations at the national and regional levels. The dynamics of the conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the Natal/KwaZulu region, and in the Transvaal, must be situated within this framework.

*Firstly*, there is the sustained nationwide civil violence which is linked both to the legalisation of open political organisation and to struggles for constituencies on physical terrain in a pre-election period. *Secondly*, there is suspicion and uncertainty about the new 'democratic' groundrules for political contestation which all the actors should observe on the ambiguous terrain of transitional politics. *Thirdly*, many observers doubt the commitment to reform of the de Klerk administration and other forces - they fear the existence of a hidden security agenda on the leftwing and rightwing linked to ongoing internal destabilisation of the negotiation process.

The unbanning of African nationalist organisations, the freeing of political prisoners and recognition of freedom of political expression on 2 February 1990 ushered in a new era in South Africa. The legalisation of political protest after decades of suppression allowed mass

*The nationwide civil violence is linked both to the legalisation of open political organisation and to struggles for constituencies on physical terrain in a pre-election period*

ulisation to take place in the form of  
 after wave of marches, rallies and  
 NvaVE a c ij ma te of euphoria and  
 camh?ened expectation, many of these  
 • "ties spilled over into a violent test of  
 aC11V th firstly in volatile Natal, then in the  
 Transvaal (see figure 1).

it is an appalling fact that almost 10 000  
 ople have died nationwide in incidents of  
 Political conflict between President de  
 Klerk's landmark speech of 2 February  
 IQ90 and 28 February 1993: some 3 400  
 fatalities in 1990, 2 580 in 1991, 3 446 in  
 1992 and 341 in the first two months of  
 1993. (For comparative purposes, there  
 were some 2 450 fatalities in political  
 conflict between September 1984 and  
 December 1988 at the height of the national  
 unrest.) An upsurge of violence has  
 accompanied four key events: the release of  
 Nelson Mandela in February 1990, the  
 Inkatha/ANC peace accord of 29 January  
 1991, the national peace accord of 14  
 September 1991 and Codesa I (see figure  
 2).

The stakes for the contenders for power and  
 their constituencies are high in a climate of  
 violent political conflict. The pre-election  
 campaigns for some form of interim  
 government or constituent assembly  
 expected to take place over the next  
 eighteen months, will further exacerbate  
 tensions. Yet, nationally and regionally,  
 negotiations toward a peaceful settlement  
 for the resolution of a perennial conflict  
 about the distribution of power and  
 resources in South Africa are the only  
 alternative to a growing civil war in the


Natal/KwaZulu region. The Angolan option  
 or secession are not viable options,  
 politically or economically.

It is often observed that for negotiations to  
 succeed, the *costs of political settlement*  
 must be perceived to be lower by the parties  
 to the conflict than the respective *costs of*  
*sustaining the conflict*. Six years of intense  
 civil violence in Natal/KwaZulu have seen  
 the costs of conflict mount higher and  
 higher. The data base developed by  
*Indicator &4/CSDS* indicates that between  
 January 1987 to February 1993 almost  
 7 000 lives have been lost in political  
 violence in the region, with calculable  
 material losses to the economy estimated at  
 well in excess of two billion rands. Both the  
 ANC and IFP have lost hundreds of their  
 middle-level leaders and thousands of their  
 activist cadre in the violence.

Consensus, at least on the costs of this  
 conflict, has brought about a series of  
 on-off negotiation initiatives involving the  
 ANC and the IFP. The legalisation of the  
 left-wing political opposition on 2 February  
 1990 has facilitated the growth of  
 negotiations between institutional and  
 extra-parliamentary actors at the first,  
 second and third tier levels. The emergence  
 of extra-institutional participation in the  
 1990s has involved a broad spectrum of  
 opposition groups and disenfranchised  
 communities in negotiations. Tragically,  
 however, few of these initiatives have  
 lasted.


*Almost 7 000  
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 violence in the  
 region, with  
 calculable  
 material losses  
 to the economy  
 estimated at well  
 in excess of two  
 billion rands*

Figure 2: Events of Collective Action and Fatalities in Natal/KwaZulu, 1986-1992



Source: *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992*.  
 S Bekker and A Louw (eds). Indicator SA Issue Focus, December 1992.

Figure 3: Proportion of Violent Events where Lethal Weapons were used



Source: Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992. S Bekker and A Louw (eds). Indicator SA Issue Focus, December 1992.

In this regard, the costs of political settlement for the parties must also be carefully considered:

- From the IFP's perspective, a negotiated national settlement leading to a unitary state might well mean *inter alia* the dismantling of its KwaZulu power base (along with the other 'homelands'), integration of the KwaZulu security forces (and civil service), loss of regional autonomy to a centralised government dominated by an NP-ANC alliance, and forfeiture of fiscal patronage.

- \* From the ANC's perspective, the costs of settlement leading to a federal state could mean *inter alia* the regional diffusion of power, entrenchment of the homeland administrations, costly fiscal transfers from the centre to the periphery, or marginalised ANC participation in an interim government of national unity dominated or paralysed by a conservative CP-IFP-Natal alliance.

Whether a compromise can be reached which will accommodate the very different political objectives of the two parties remains open to question. To date, the stand-off between the ANC and IFP and the strategic eruption of violence (eg. large-scale massacres) have been two of the principal factors which have bedeviled progress in national negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and the recent multi-party talks in early March 1993. For both parties, the *costs of political settlement* on the above, unfavourable terms may appear to be higher at present than the *costs of continued violent conflict*.

*The failure to substitute peaceful contestation for violent struggle to establish territorial hegemony, may threaten the reform process itself*

The various peace accords reached between the ANC, Inkatha and other parties form integral part of the negotiation processes' underway. They establish some of the important groundrules for transitional politics through, for instance, seeking to prohibit the use of violence to resolve political differences. In terms of the ANC/IFP peace agreement of 29 January 1991 and the National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991, they aim to develop code of conduct which will *inter alia* promote freedom of association, multi-party contestation, mutual public respect between political leaders and tolerance between rival political groups. The Natal/KwaZulu Dispute Resolution Committee reaffirmed this code of conduct at important meetings held in Durban in the first quarter of 1993.

Although the outcome of violent political conflict, these accords may ironically provide the beginnings of a framework for peaceful negotiations. In the interregnum, 'when the old authority is dying and the new cannot be born' (Gramsci, 1971), it is imperative that the political actors reach prior agreement on transitional rules. They must, for instance, regulate competition for constituencies. Indeed, the events of the last two years suggest that the failure to substitute peaceful contestation for violent struggle to establish territorial hegemony, may threaten the reform process itself.

A wide range of practical as well as principled measures to implement the peace accords have been implemented over the last two years. The accords will take time to take effect after six years of intense intra-community violence, and the spiral of vengeance and the climate of lawlessness will not be broken overnight. But through *inter alia* impartial law enforcement, through international (UN, EC, etc.) and domestic monitoring (eg. by the Goldstone Commission and National Peace Secretariat) of the activities of all parties, and through effective crisis management by the new Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs), the security situation may be slowly brought back under control.

## Practical Problems

Despite the verbal commitment to peace by ANC and IFP leaders, practical implementation of the various peace accords is hampered by:

- strategic differences (boycott vs participation politics)

- . puressive recruitment drives in
- \* jested communities
- inadequate organisational infrastructure
- . rival factions in all camps
- v poor internal party discipline
- \* [he low political education of their membership
- the proliferation of lethal weapons (see figure 3)
- « random massacres which disrupt negotiations (see *Monitor* cover).

In an atmosphere of internecine feuding in Natal/KwaZulu, the resort to violence to resolve political differences appears to have become an acceptable practice at the grassroots level. According to the IFP, for instance, there are fifty 'no-go zones' throughout the region where the IFP has been ousted by pro-ANC residents. The ANC similarly complains that it is prevented from politicking in large areas of KwaZulu. There is also the shadowy role of allied 'supporters' who fall outside of the two organisations' control but often act in their name. Lastly, there are the criminal gangs (*icnmitsotsis*), warlords and other 'third forces' which have a vested interest in maintaining a climate of lawlessness as they proln in various ways from the spoils of war.

The assassination of the ANC's Midlands Deputy Secretary, Reggie Hadebe, en route from an AMC/Inkatha dispute meeting in the troubled Richmond area in October 1992 v, a further setback for the peace process. Although 241 IFP office bearers (IFP sources) and an unknown number of UDF/AMC' area organisers have been killed in conflict between 1985-1992, the attacks on the higher leadership echelons by unknown forces is an ominous new development. This event and ongoing massans in shack settlements on the south coast and in the midlands led to the deployment of 4 000 more security force members\* in the region in early November 1992.

These features of the conflict underline the critical role of the South African security forces in the uneasy months ahead. By bringing more of the perpetrators to book, by protecting witnesses from intimidation, and by enforcing impartial policing in general, they can stop the killings and return a semblance of normality to community life in the region. Once the security situation is stabilised, there may be a more facilitating climate for the politicians to negotiate longer term solutions. However, this begs the question of what can be done to control the KwaZulu


Police, Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC) cells, and private 'warlords', all of whom play a major role in stoking the violence.

*The resort to violence to resolve political differences appears to have become an acceptable practice at the grassroots level*

Gandhi maintained that 'Poverty is the most extreme form of violence'. Although there is no direct causal linkage between conditions of socio-economic deprivation and civil violence, the combination of these material stresses makes it more likely that people, *once politically mobilised* around physical resources, will come into conflict. It is even more probable that they will resolve their differences through violence where political channels either do not exist or where political institutions inadequately represent their interests and aspirations.

Once again, the ambiguities of transitional politics complicate conflict resolution. The legitimacy of the old order is challenged but new political arrangements are yet to be negotiated to take their place.

Figure 4: Political Conflict Events by Settlement Type in Natal/KwaZulu 1986-1992



Source: *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992*. S Bekker and A Louw (eds) Indicator SA Issue Focus, December 1992.

The violence is concentrated in the region's crowded shack settlements and townships (see figure 4). The stresses of poverty and under-development in a rapidly urbanising region are inextricably linked to the political conflict in Natal/KwaZulu. Demographic scenarios for the region show that the population of Greater Durban has more than trebled from under one million in 1979 to more than three million in 1989. This massive influx of people and the lack

*The stresses of poverty and development in a rapidly urbanising region are inextricably linked to the political conflict in Natal/KwaZulu*

of peri-urban infrastructure intensifies conflict over scarce resources, for instance, over access to land, housing, jobs, basic utilities, social services and the patronage of local leaders.

There are several important dimensions to the socio-economic landscape of the region which are directly related to the Natal conflict. More recently, some commentators have argued that placing emphasis on conflict over material resources depoliticises and obscures what is essentially a political conflict in the first instance. Nonetheless, the following four contributory causes of the conflict are often advanced by other commentators:

- **rapid urbanisation**

The influx of new arrivals into shack settlements which lack urban infrastructure intensifies conflict over material resources in densely populated areas. Further, the efflux of refugees from the formal townships who flee the violence there often replicate political divisions in the shack settlements where they settle. At present, there are an estimated 26 permanent refugee camps in the Natal/KwaZulu region.

- **rapid modernisation**

In the melting-pot of mixed rural/urban communities on the fringe of Durban, the values of the traditionalist Inkatha-aligned elders clash with the militant, ANC-aligned youth. (A youthful interviewee comments: 'They have beaten our fathers, they have not beaten us'. A traditional leader comments, 'I am Zulu ... we know where we have come from and are going to'.)

- **territorial mobilisation**

Competing political movements and independent 'patrons' undertake aggressive recruitment drives in these poverty-stricken areas. They are not prepared to tolerate rival groups on their 'turf', and create fierce loyalties to partisan symbols and traditions to regulate their fiefdoms.

- **high unemployment**

Uneducated, poorly qualified and unlikely to find work in an economy in deep recession, the black youth are extremely alienated from society. Research has shown that some 75% of recorded acts of violence are perpetrated by youths in the 14-25 age group (Gavin Woods, Inkatha Institute).

The twin processes of modernisation and urbanisation will be a feature of South African society for the foreseeable future. They may produce even deeper faultlines in the transitional period. By the year 2000

planners calculate that the total population of Greater Durban will more than double growing to between 6,5 to 8 million people. Inevitably, social problems such as poverty, high unemployment rates and high crime rates may well increase. But effective planning and management by representative political institutions at all levels can anticipate and confront these stresses.

Economic growth is a prerequisite for successful negotiations towards a redistribution of resources and an improved quality of life of the region's disadvantaged communities. The large-scale provision and coordination of development funds by the private and public sectors in conjunction with the active participation of the recipient communities could help to break the vicious cycle of under-development and violence. Responses to this immense challenge are already underway in the form of initiatives such as the Independent Development Trust and 'Operation Jumpstart'.

To conclude, the real challenge for all the actors in Natal/KwaZulu is to stabilise the political environment so that the massive tasks of socio-economic reconstruction may begin. We need to rein in Natal's Trojan horse. There has been enough wastage, rolling back development efforts, destroying precious resources and reinforcing poverty. Negotiations at all levels will build better political institutions to meet the needs of all of the region's diverse communities in a new spirit of reconciliation. The region could yet prove to be a laboratory for a successful experiment in building the new South Africa. fl@3fi\

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Excerpts from a paper delivered at the thirty-fifth annual meeting of the African Studies Association of the USA, Seattle, 20-23 November 1992. All data on political violence is taken from a data base on over 7 000 incidents of political collective action between 1986-1992 in Natal/KwaZulu, an ongoing joint monitoring project of the Centre for Social and Development Studies, the Indicator Project South Africa and the HSRC's Centre for Conflict Analysis.

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*The twin processes of modernisation and urbanisation will produce even deeper faultlines in the transitional period*



# Negotiation Trends.



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y i t n ( i m m m m

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*Regionalism lies at the heart of the constitutional debate in contemporary South Africa. The compromise by key players on this new concept appears to have broken the stalemate between the polarised positions of unitarism versus federalism. However, two specialists in regional government argue that the debate has not gone far enough to break bureaucratic interests and strengthen local level democracy.*

Entering the great South African regionalism debate is like walking into a hall of mirrors - where everything is not quite what it seems to be, positions are deliberately distorted and from one moment to the next the appearance of things changes dramatically.

When the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) issues 'The Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal' and gets it adopted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (IFP, 1992), or the African National Congress (ANC) and the government release their most recent regional government proposals (ANC, 1992c; RSA, 1992), one cannot be absolutely sure that these are statements of fundamental principles or the first gambits in a negotiating strategy which might end up with very different final positions.

Furthermore, besides the public debate *between* these organisations there are equally intensive arguments *within* them, which means that initial public pronouncements are not necessarily accurate indicators of what positions will finally be adopted either.

Given the limitations of such an exercise, the data base (see 44-45) captures some of the dynamics of the regional government debate. The ANC's position can be characterised as a unitary state with regional elements. The National Party's proposals can be described as a highly decentralised form of federalism, while the IFP's draft constitution amounts to secession. Despite these vast differences,

we would argue that there are certain common starting points and therefore common *lacunae* in their positions.

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
First, the major focus is on the relationship between the *centre* and the *region* - and not on the relationship between the *region* and the *locality*. In this regard it is interesting to note that the IFP, which projects itself as the defender of decentralised government, proposes to vest virtually all power in the region, to the detriment of local areas.

It is hardly surprising that the centre-region nexus should be privileged in this way, given that the major prize in this debate is central power. Nevertheless, the failure to introduce localities into the regional debate is unfortunate because international and South African experience suggests that strong regional government is generally not conducive to local empowerment (cf Wittenberg and Mcintosh, 1992). Given the fact that many of the most vibrant development initiatives are locally based (e.g. 'Operation Jumpstart'), the preservation and extension of that space for local initiative seems imperative.

Second, the models operate with conventional ideas of public administration. The terrain of the debate is that of *inter-governmental relations*, i.e. how to allocate functions to different state agencies and establish chains of command and accountability - i.e. that of classical

*The ANC's position is a unitary state with regional elements, the NP's a highly decentralised form of federalism, while the IFP's amounts to secession*

Figure 1: The hierarchial approach to regional government



## New Prindples

We want to suggest that the following principles are necessary to create a " responsive and relatively trim regional government system, which makes due allowance for local initiative:

(1) *Regional institutions must be based <»\ local control*

Instead of being seen as transmission belts for central authority, or as sites of autonomous regional interests and projects, regional government should be seen as a mechanism by which local interests can influence the way in which national policy is implemented within the locality.

Concretely, this could be reflected in a number of ways:

- Regional government structures could be *indirectly elected* from local government institutions.
- Local interests could be represented on the management structures of regional servicing organisations (see below).
- A certain proportion of the budgets of regional (and central) line departments could be vested with localities - so that these departments would need to provide a service tailored to local needs in order to persuade localities to pari with this money.

(2) *Specific central government institutions must be created to boost local capacity*

In order to effectively base regions on localities, it is essential that local institutions work. This requires institutional support. While the regions might be able to provide some of this in the form of skilled personnel and regional capacity, it seems crucial that central government plays a direct role in supporting local government.

Practically, what this might involve is the following:

- A central state ministry of local and regional government, with deconcentrated officials at the local level, whose major task it is to support local government with technical advice and with access to higher levels of government.
- A central forum (like the current Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs) which brings together different interest groups with a stake in local and regional government to create cross-cutting information flows (between localities in different regions, between localities and the

Weberian bureaucratic organisation. Whether this is the appropriate idiom within which to look at the relationship between state agencies, let alone between state structures and the rest of society is not considered.

Bureaucratic forms of organisation have increasingly come under attack in the literature (cf Murray, 1992). Two kinds of problems have been particularly highlighted. Firstly, bureaucratic systems have the habit of continuously growing in size, because people outside the system do not have effective information to determine how productive or necessary the work performed by the bureaucracy is. Secondly, bureaucratic systems are good at handling routine issues and delivering a standard product to a mass clientele. But they are very bad in responding to rapid change in their environment or in providing non-standardised products to specific 'niche markets' (e.g. single working mothers).

Given the fact that South Africa is a relatively poor country which has to compete in the international markets and which faces rapidly changing environments, it is questionable whether South Africa can afford a bureaucratised inter-governmental system. Nevertheless many of the proposals would precisely lead to such a situation - through the proliferation of layers of government, the rigidifying of decision-making processes (h) splitting up competencies) and the lack of cross-cutting information flows.

*The major focus of debate is the relationship between the centre and the region - and not the relationship between the region and the locality,*

... etc.).

9 specialist central institutions tasked with  
lik- (raining of local (and regional)  
officials and councillors.

*?! Institutions must be flexible and have  
soft boundaries*

One of the problems of the old apartheid  
unified government system was that it  
mattered a great deal in which particular  
region one was based - services in the  
provincial administration areas were better  
than those in the 'homelands', and there  
were even differences between 'homelands'.

This experience has led to the call for *soft  
boundaries* (cf ANC, 1992c), i.e. the idea  
that service delivery should not stop at  
some arbitrarily drawn line on a map. On  
the one hand, this objective can be  
interpreted quite easily - it means that if  
someone living in one region (say Transkei)  
wants to go to a hospital in another region  
(say Natal) this should not be prohibited.

There is another way of interpreting this  
objective, however, and that is that service  
delivery organisations should be able to  
operate across boundaries - i.e. if it were  
deemed appropriate, the Natal Health  
Department should be able to open a clinic  
across the border in the Transkei. Such a  
conception of soft boundaries clearly  
cannot operate in the current bureaucratic  
vision of inter-governmental relations,  
where regional (and other) institutions are  
assumed to operate only within particular  
boundaries and with a careful demarcation  
of competencies.

There are good reasons for adopting a more  
broad-minded approach. In the first  
instance, different regions have very  
different capacities in terms of skills and  
resources (this is particularly true if one is  
moving away from the framework of the  
four provinces and talking about  
development regions). A rigid approach  
which suggests that every region must be  
assigned exactly the same powers and  
institutional infrastructure would not only  
result in the duplication of bureaucracies,  
but would in all probability not work.

In the case of health, for example, there is  
at present a very unequal regional  
distribution of teaching hospitals. A rigid  
approach would probably insist on the  
creation of additional teaching hospitals in  
the Eastern Cape, Eastern Transvaal and


Far Northern Transvaal. Such an approach  
is simply not economically feasible, nor is it  
clear that South Africa has the skilled  
personnel to implement it.

There are certain other infrastructural  
investments which it also does not make  
sense to duplicate. The Cape Provincial  
Administration has recently acquired the  
hardware and software for a very  
sophisticated Geographical Information  
System (GIS), which is designed to serve  
the entire Cape Province (interview, A  
Olivier). It would be a major waste of  
resources to duplicate such technology,  
particularly since it can easily be made  
accessible to people based in other  
locations.

The advantages of flexibility do not reside  
only in the fact that it prevents the  
ballooning of the bureaucracy, but for some  
support services (e.g. GIS) it might make  
very good sense to concentrate skilled staff  
in one location, in order to achieve the  
necessary threshold to make the service  
viable.

*A rigid approach  
which suggests  
that every region  
must be  
assigned exactly  
the same powers  
would only result  
in the duplication  
of bureaucracies*

Figure 2: The flexible, decentred approach to regional government



This raises the question, of course, how  
such a flexible set of arrangements could be  
made to work. A key idea in this regard is  
that the service or support organisations  
within the regional authority should be  
given separate controlling structures. In  
other words, the Department of Health and  
the unit controlling the GIS would have  
independent management boards, but with  
regional government representation on it (cf  
van Ryneveld, 1992). If such structures  
needed to operate in other areas, those  
regional authorities could then be brought  
into the management structure. In this way  
a core regional administration could utilise  
spare capacity existing in other regions.

... to page 46

**ANC, NP AND IFP PROPOSALS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION**

	African National Congress (ANC)	Government/National Party (NP)	Inkaiha Freedom Party (IFP)
<b>CENTRE</b>			
<b>Institutions</b>	Legislative Assembly (elected by proportional representation - PR) Senate (elected from the regions) Constitutional Court Fiscal Commission	Legislative Assembly (PR) Senate (based on regions, every party having supporting region gets equal number of seats) Multi-party Executive Constitutional Court	Legislative Assembly Senate Constitutional Court
<b>Powers</b>	Defence, Foreign Affairs, Fiscal & Monetary Policies Administration of Justice, Law and Order, Mining, Commerce, Agriculture and Land  All residual powers	Defence National Security Foreign Affairs Constitutional Planning	Defence, Foreign Affairs Monetary system General principles in regard to environmental protection & economic development
<b>Relations To the regions</b>	Certain regional powers entrenched, but centre has concurrent and overriding powers in all matters	Regional powers entrenched Functions carried out at the lowest possible level (subsidiarity)	Sovereignty vested in the State of KwaZulu/Natal, i.e. exercise of virtually all national powers subject to approval of the State of KwaZulu/Natal
<b>REGIONS/ STATES</b>			
<b>Institutions</b>	Administrator (elected by Council) Regional Council (elected by proportional representation)	Provincial Assembly (elected proportionally from multi-member electoral districts) Multi-party Provincial Cabinet	Two Chamber General Assembly: <sup>1</sup> House of Delegates (elected from 350 single-member constituencies) Senate (elected from sub-regions) Governor (directly elected) Constitutional Court of KwaZulu/Natal
<b>Powers</b>	Some Taxes, Education, Health, Welfare, Housing, Transport, Environmental protection, Industrial development, Town and Regional Planning	Finance, Taxation and Commerce, Education, Health, Police, Welfare, Cultural Affairs, Mining, Roads, Nature Conservation, Water, Local Government	All powers, except those explicitly vested in the Federal Republic of South Africa  The final arbiter of what these are is the Constitutional Court of KwaZulu/Natal
<b>Relations To Lower Tiers</b>	Local government controlled by means of ordinance, within the framework of a national Local Government Act. Relationship to metropolitan authorities unclear	Local government to have entrenched powers, but to operate in terms of the framework of a national Local Government Act (presumably under provincial supervision)	State (i.e. regional) legislation is supreme - the legislative powers of sub-regions to be exercised within overall framework of regional legislation. Regional government can dissolve sub-regional governments
<b>SUB-REGIONS</b>			
<b>Institutions</b>	Metropolitan Councils in Johannesburg Durban, Cape Town (part PR, part indirectly elected from local authorities)	Non-political (i.e. non-elected) councils in development areas	Administrator appointed by regional government. Sub-regional Congress (elected from no less than 38 constituencies)

<b>of POWERS BETWEEN TIERS OF GOVERNMENT</b>			
	African National Congress (ANC)	Government/National Party (NP)	Inkatha freedom Party (IFP)
<b>SUB-REGIONS</b>			
<b>Powers</b>	<i>Inter alia</i> planning & growth management, land use control, bulk service provision, primary health care, promotion of economic development	The powers of these councils is not specified, but their function is to promote development	Determination of municipal boundaries, environmental protection, infrastructure provision, zoning, economic development, promotion of sports, arts and culture
<b>Relations To Localities</b>	Major taxation and planning powers vested at the metropolitan rather than at the local scale		Local authorities do not have original powers. Functions delegated by sub-regional (or regional) government
<b>LOCALITIES</b>			
<b>Institutions</b>	City/Town Councils, Rural District Councils (elected by PR or on ward basis)	City Councils (elected on ward basis, weighted with property franchise)	Municipalities (not specified whether these are elected - but they 'shall ensure and promote the democratic participation of citizens')
<b>Powers</b>	Same as for metropolitan councils	Planning and growth management, land use control, bulk service provision, etc.	Delegated powers from region/sub-region
<b>Relations To Neighbourhoods</b>	No formal provision for sub-local structures is made, but neighbourhood/development committees might be informally created, particularly in rural areas	Autonomous powers given to neighbourhood councils - i.e. local authority jurisdiction circumscribed by neighbourhood decisions	No provision for sub-local tier
<b>NEIGHBOURHOODS</b>			
	Not formally provided for	Elected neighbourhood councils to have powers such as the regulation of norms and standards for the residential environment; granting of licences and permits in regard to use of property; security matters and civil protection; provision of communal facilities.	Not provided for
<b>PROVISIONS</b>			
	A delimitation commission appointed by a Constituent Assembly to determine boundaries of regions, metropolitan areas and local authorities. Powers of regions/localities to be fixed by Constituent Assembly	Multi-party talks to decide on boundary demarcations and on powers and functions of tiers of government	'Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal <sup>1</sup> to be put to the Joint Executive Authority for approval, thereafter to a referendum of residents of KwaZulu/Natal. If it is approved, it would be deemed to be in operation, irrespective of negotiations at the centre.
Sources: ANC 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; IFP 1992; NP 1991; RSA 1992			

*Flexibility and pluralism in the construction of regional government would counteract monopoly control characterising current bureaucracies*

A further advantage of such an approach is that it could increase the choice available to regional decision-makers and local people - if services could be supplied by a variety of regional agencies, the responsiveness of those agencies to local needs would tend to increase. Flexibility and pluralism in the construction of the regional government system would therefore counteract the monopoly control characterising current bureaucracies.

According to the present practice of public administration the end-users of government services are conceptualised as passive recipients of state action. The only input that they have to make is *via* their political representatives.

This model has two consequences. On the one hand it encourages the passive welfarist mentality that the state is simply there to hand out goods. On the other it promotes the provision of standardised forms of state service delivery on a 'take it or leave it' basis. This has been dubbed the *Model T* approach to state intervention (Chambers, 1992). (In the words of Henry Ford, people could have their Model T Ford in any colour, provided it was black.)

*However, strengthening local democracy does not necessarily mean that all sections of the local community will benefit equally*

If the state is to play a truly developmental role, this relationship between state agencies and their clients needs to be restructured. One way of bringing user groups directly into the process of service provision, is by incorporating representatives of user interests directly on the management structure of the servicing agencies envisaged above.

A further step in this direction would be to decentralise certain servicing functions directly to community organisations. This could be seen as a form of *privatisation*, but not to the private profit-making sector, but to the voluntary non-profit organisation sector. Where it would be necessary to do so, the state could continue to provide financial support for the activities of such bodies.

Strengthening local democracy does not necessarily mean that all sections of the local community will benefit equally. Indeed, experience suggests that local elites are adept at using the powers granted to them to bolster their privileges.

In order to address this problem, specialised agencies need to be created whose task it is to facilitate the empowerment of marginal groups. This will require improving the access of such groups to skills and information. In particular it means enabling such groups to transcend their entrapment within their locality/region and access supra-local resources (cf Wittenberg and McIntosh, 1992:33-36).

It is unlikely that regional or national state structures will be very good at performing this function. One way of dealing with this is to leave this task to specialised organisations (either NGOs or QUANGOs), but perhaps funded by regional and national government. Indeed, the constitution could impose a duty on regional governments to devote a certain percentage of resources to this kind of marginal group targeting.

In essence, all of the above principles propose not only a restructuring of the relationships between different state agencies but also in the way in which the state as a whole interacts with the population it is intending to serve. (The contrast between the two visions of the inter-governmental system is graphically presented in Figures 1 and 2.)

Unless the terms of the current regional government debate are widened to take into consideration this alternative vision, South Africa is likely to be saddled with rigid, unresponsive and expensive institutions in a context where both domestically and internationally we cannot afford this.

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
# URBAN MONITOR

## Comparison of Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) and Education Renewal Strategy (ERS)

ISSUES	Education Renewal Strategy (ERS)	National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI)
Nature of document	Policy recommendations Product-oriented	Policy options Product + process-oriented
participants	State bureaucrats	Political leaders, academics, practitioners
Structure of system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One department</li> <li>• Decentralised system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One department</li> <li>• Mixed system with local level</li> </ul>
Free + compulsory schooling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nine years</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nine or ten years</li> </ul>
Human Resource Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated system</li> <li>• Employer-led strategies and structures</li> <li>• Privatisation and voluntarism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated system</li> <li>• Tripartism</li> <li>• Private sector provision and state regulation</li> </ul>
Teachers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distance Education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconstruction of institutions</li> </ul>
Curriculum and Medium of instruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Core curriculum</li> <li>• Vocationalisation</li> <li>• Medium of instruction choice of school</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Core curriculum</li> <li>• High level of general education</li> <li>• Phased bilingualism</li> </ul>
Adult Basic Education (ABE) and Literacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreasing state responsibility with greater roles for employers, NGOs and community groups</li> <li>• ABE is for job specific training</li> <li>• Articulation between formal and non-formal sectors to be facilitated</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong interventionist state or enabling state</li> <li>• ABE is to provide a general basic education</li> <li>• Articulation between formal and non-formal section to be facilitated</li> </ul>
Post Secondary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rationalisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access and mobility</li> </ul>



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
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# COMPETING STRATEGIES

## The NP and NEPI Options

D. Chetty, L Chisholm, Z Mkwana, S. Motlana and L. Tikly  
Education Policy Unit, Wits University/National Education Coordinating Committee

*This overview contrasts the NECC's National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) options of March 1992 with the policy recommendations of the government's revamped Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) unveiled in parliament in February 1993. The authors provide a preliminary guide to some of the contrasts and similarities between the two models.*

In March 1993 there were two major policy statements for the reconstruction of education and training in South Africa: the government's *Education Renewal Strategy* (ERS), and the NECC's *National Education Policy Investigation* (NEPI). These two documents (including the NTB's *National Training Strategy*) provide the most coherent statements from the side of the state and the democratic movement on possibilities for the rebuilding of education and training in South Africa. They each represent dominant trends in thinking on the different sides in the negotiation process. A closer analysis of the divergences and convergences between their positions provides an insight into what might emerge in a new education dispensation.

### Is it a tussle or a clash?

The principles and values guiding the work of both the ERS and NEPI provide the key to what the main areas of difference and convergence might be. The ERS commits the state to deracialisation, national unity, freedom of association and diversity, decentralisation and partnerships in governance. The work of NEPI, by contrast, was directed by the principles of non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equality, a unitary system and redress.

The principles and values elaborated at the National Education Conference in March 1992 (see Box 1) are the most recent statement covering the point of departure for the democratic movement as a whole. Whereas both the ERS and NEPI are concerned to provide feasible and workable policies which pay due attention to affordability and efficiency, the contrast

between the ERS's emphasis on making up *backlogs* and NEPI's concern with *redress* makes NEPI, by definition, a more radical document overall than the ERS.

The NEPI reports, however, are not a set of policy recommendations as is the ERS, but an analysis of feasible options for the short to medium-term future. The NEPI is also not a single document, but twelve reports, each covering a major educational sector, with a thirteenth document, the 'Framework report', providing a conceptual and historical analysis of the NEPI process and products. Whereas the ERS was produced solely by state bureaucrats, the NEPI reports were produced outside the state, in civil society, by more than 300 volunteers consisting of political leaders, academics and practitioners.

Given these differences, and the form of presentation of NEPI as compared with the ERS, it is difficult to compile a straightforward list of divergences and similarities (see *Urban Monitor* cover). Different readings, interpretations and syntheses of the NEPI reports are possible. Moderate and radical strands can be pulled through all the reports. This article provides a particular reading or selection of the NEPI options, which will undoubtedly provide a rich resource for negotiations. Much work remains to be done on the philosophical, political and economic assumptions and approaches used in ERS and NEPI.

Overall, there appears to be convergence over the necessity of deracialisation and the establishment of a single Ministry. Differences between the proposals of the ERS/NTS and the NEPI options would appear to relate primarily to the emphasis throughout the NEPI reports on the role of

*The ERS commits the state to deracialisation, national unity, freedom of association and diversity, decentralisation and partnership*

*The NEPI, by contrast, was directed by the principles of non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equality, a unitary system and redress*

*The ERS and NEPI converge on the necessity of deracialisation and the establishment of a single Ministry*

the state and private sector, the structures, mechanisms and processes necessary for the achievement of equality through redress and affirmative action and on democratising governing structures. These will be highlighted in the sections that follow.

### Three or Four Tiers?

Inequitable financing, undemocratic control and racial division underpin South Africa's system of education and training. Efforts to move away from these inequalities have included proposals for different forms of governance and financing of general, technical and vocational education and training.

**Box 1: Values and principles established at the National Education Conference, March 1992**

The framework of values were determined as being human dignity, liberty and justice, democracy, equality and national development.

The conference determined that *education is a basic human right, and education and training should be:*

- provided to all on a democratic and unitary basis, opposing any discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, class and age;
- Q extended to all disadvantaged groups including women, adults, students, youth and rural communities, in order to redress historical imbalances;
- Q integrated within a coherent and comprehensive national development policy.

Arising from these core values, a set of key principles were determined:

- The state has the central responsibility in the provision of education and training.
- A nationally determined framework should ensure that employers observe their fundamental obligation for the provision of educational resources.
- Education and training policy and practice shall be governed by the principle of *democracy*, ensuring the active participation of various interest groups, in particular, teachers, parents workers and students.
- All people (children, youth and adults) shall have *access* to education
- There shall be special emphasis on the *redress* of educational inequalities among historically disadvantaged groups such as youth, the disabled, adults, women, the unemployed and rural communities.
- \* There shall be mechanisms to ensure horizontal and vertical *mobility and flexibility of access* between general formative, technical, industrial and adult education and training in the formal and non-formal sectors.
- There shall be *nationally determined* standards for accreditation and certification for formal and non-formal education and training, with due recognition of prior learning and experience.
- 3 • Education shall aim at the development of a *national democratic culture* with an accommodation of diversity which does not conflict with other key principles.
- The provision of education and training shall be linked to the development of human resources with *national development* aimed at the restructuring of the economy, redistribution and the democratisation of the society.
- The education process will encourage national *peace, justice and stability*.
- Education shall be based upon the principles of cooperation, critical thinking and civic responsibility, and shall equip individuals for *participation* in all aspects of society.

Both the ERS and NEPI appear to provide a unitary system of education and training under a single Department. In **practice** however, this means different things to different players. In the first instance the ERS says very little about how the education bureaucracy has to be restructured. The NEPI reports are full of proposals for the establishment of new institutions at national, regional and local levels which would cut across current, racially-constituted, departmental bodies and across the divide between education and training.

The ERS provides for *three tiers of governance*: the central, **regional and institutional**. A consequence of the emphasis on decentralisation and devolution of power and authority to the institutional level is that these are vested with a great deal of power and authority.

In terms of the ERS principle of decentralisation, different models providing for varying degrees of 'management autonomy' for schools are proposed. These include state-run and -financed schools, state-aided schools which receive a subsidy to cover teachers' salaries but have the power to run and manage their own finances, and private schools. **State-aided** schools, will operate more or less along the lines of schools currently constituted as 'Model C'. Management Councils are to be established at all schools. Parents, who are given greater powers than teachers, are to be educated about their role on management councils.

One of the central NEPI criticisms of the ERS proposals has been that (here is a need for an additional tier of governance at the local or district level. The ENS proposals as they stand lend themselves to the perpetuating inequalities by not providing for equalising and redistributive mechanisms. This is especially so in view of the different levels of management autonomy accorded to the different levels of schools.

To counter-balance the inequities that may arise, NEPI governance options explore the possibility of an education system with four tiers: the central, regional, local or district and institutional. Although a central state is envisaged to coordinate, regulate and intervene in all aspects of the system to ensure equity and integration, the commitment to democratisation of the system has led to proposals where the central, regional and local or district levels greater power than the institutional.

concern with overcoming the **closed**, bureaucratic, hierarchical authoritarian nature of the education system. The process resulted in proposals that may have greater openness and transparency. The proposals also include monitoring structures, public participation in education wherever possible, and democratic representation at all levels. **Key role-players.** Lack of democracy, accountability and efficiency at the local level are addressed by NEPI in its proposals for representation of the interests of parents, teachers and students.

**The proposals** of both the ERS and NEPI do not specify the nature of regional and local boundaries. It is accepted that both should be derived from and fit in with new constitutional proposals.

The HKS would commit the state to the provision of at least nine years of general compulsory education for which the state would take primary responsibility. The state would assume 95% of the costs of this period. Post-compulsory education in the senior secondary phase would be partially funded by user fees of 25%. There is no proposed change in the school cycle and the lower primary, upper primary and junior secondary divisions will be retained.

The Nkomo has also proposed that the state take responsibility for nine or ten years of free and compulsory education. Like the IRS it anticipates that the post-compulsory phase will require contributions in the form of user fees. Given the distortions in the current system, NEPI pays close attention to the articulation between the compulsory phase and what follows. Unlike the state's inclination towards *vocationalising* schooling early on, the NEPI proposals are on the basis of a commitment to the highest possible level of *general education* - before the student is trained for a vocation.

Although both the ERS and NEPI recognise the potential advantages of pre-school education in improving efficiency and performance of the primary school phase neither makes a substantial commitment to the area. The ERS rejects the option of providing pre-school education on a national basis on the grounds of cost and the anticipated high learner:teacher ratios. No general policy currently exists for pre-school education.

In the case of NEPI there are two issues

worth noting. NEPI suggests that the state should explore ways of providing pre-school education through community-based decentralised options. At the same time, there appears to be an unresolved question about the long-term effect of pre-school education. Few education systems, even in the advanced countries, have provided pre-school on a national scale. Although the contribution of pre-school education to improving school readiness amongst children and the gender implications are recognised, the trade-off may have to be in favour of improving primary education first.

On the issue of *compulsory schooling* there is convergence between the ERS and NEPI. For the state this represents a major shift since no prior entitlement existed for African children. However, the ANC has proposed that the state should be responsible for at least ten years of compulsory provision. From the viewpoint of curriculum planners the issue of the number of years spent in compulsory education has different implications. The challenge for a transformed system will be in the implementation of a curriculum geared to redressing and overcoming past inequalities, and providing school-leavers with the highest possible level and quality of general education.

While there is a commitment to equalisation of resources on both sides, questions of difference arise over how this is to be done. The state has advocated *equal expenditure* up to standard seven. The NEPI planning, system and structure report explores a variety of options in the financing, organisation or ownership, and regulation and control of schools on the assumption that total education spending will not be increased, but there will be equal per capita expenditure, and that reallocations within the budget provide basic starting points for improved quality and efficiency of schooling.

The NEPI sees *redistribution* from white to black as the principal redistributive strategy; a mix of private and public financing options for different types of schools are consequently explored. It is acknowledged that privileged communities should bear a greater burden of the cost of schooling. Policy options investigated include the expansion and desegregation of formerly white schools; subsidised transport; local rather than institutional financial control and subsidisation of low-income areas.

*The ERS and NEPI would commit the state to the provision of at least nine to ten years of general compulsory education*

*The NEPI sees redistribution from white to black as the principal redistributive strategy*

## Box 2: Curriculum Renewal

### *Education Renewal Strategy (ERS)*

A uniform or core curriculum which is followed by all learners, with one exception in the junior secondary; in grade eight and nine a learner may opt for a language or vocationally oriented subject.

Vocational orientation as early as the junior primary phase.

A structure of three educational phases: junior primary, senior primary and junior secondary.

The establishment of an assessment body to ensure corresponding certificates and one which will be responsible for issuing certificates as from 1992.

The establishment of a national certificate of vocational training at the pre-tertiary as well as tertiary level.

The introduction to all learners of at least three languages (Afrikaans, English and a regionally dominant African language). The choice is left to the school to choose the medium of instruction.

### *National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI)*

A national core curriculum which is combined with features of differentiation in a number of ways and which is compatible with the guiding principles of the democratic movement.

The establishment of a National Curriculum Council with structures at regional and local levels.

A curriculum which is underpinned by a commitment to progression and student learning in order to improve retention rates.

The establishment of an assessment board which adopts automatic progression of year groups particularly in the primary phase.

The options explored in the financing of schooling include a strategy of privatisation on the grounds that a decline of standards in currently privileged schools will have adverse affects. It is therefore essential that redistribution to suburban schools be accompanied by what amounts to privatisation of the privileged sector in education.

This option clearly speaks to the interests of the current and aspirant middle class, which is both black and white. It is not the only option, however. Other options which the democratic movement would need to explore in greater depth include disallowing private schooling and privatisation, or state provision which does not allow a privatisation route although allowing for a private sector to maintain itself. Neither are fully elaborated by NEPI, but deserve greater attention. NEPI presents options for the short-term, but none for the realisation of the long-term goal of equal state provision for all.

## Curriculum Focus

The NEPI options for curriculum renewal (see IJo\ 2) consider tensions between commonality and diversity, resourcing and

redress, and progression and assessment. Redress for rural schools, resourcing the curriculum and guidelines to promote gender equity all differentiate NEPI from the ERS proposals.

Both the ERS proposals and NEPI options share the ideal of a core curriculum (see box) that is structured in *three educational phases*. Although they differ in their differentiation of the phases it is clear that both proposals are concerned with the intellectual, social and moral aspects of the curriculum, even though their focus differs in the way in which they envisage doing this. The establishment of an assessment body is a joint concern. However, they both propose different structures to facilitate assessment.

Definite points of divergence also apply in the commitment to the democratic participation of interest groups in curriculum matters, medium of instruction, and vocationalisation of the curriculum.

As far as medium of instruction is concerned, many options are considered although the NEPI language group appears to consider a bilingual approach which involves a gradual transition from mother tongue to English as being the most promising and widely acceptable option.

## Integrated! Training

Integration of education and training are high on the agenda for both the ERS (and NTS) and NEPI.

Whereas the ERS may backtrack on its strong stance towards vocationalisation of the school curriculum, NEPI proposes that the principles which should govern a coherent, state regulated system of technical and vocational education include:

- a high level of general education;
- an integrated academic and vocational curriculum;
- strategic but limited vocational diversification; and,
- building bridges across previously fragmented modes of vocational education and training delivery).

There is a high degree of convergence between the state and NEPI around the need for *coordination of training* and the need for greater articulation and learner mobility between education and training. Both agree on the need to rationalise the certification system to create a nationally recognised set of qualifications, and for a

*The ERS and NEPI part on commitment to the democratic participation of interest groups in curriculum matters, medium of instruction, and vocationalisation*

three-phase schooling system with **certificated** exit points.

The main difference between the ERS and NEPI is on the creation of an integrated system of vocational education and training. The NEPI emphasises the differential emphases given to the role of the state and private sector. NEPI options favour a stronger role for the state in providing frameworks and guidelines than does the ERS and *National Training Strategy*. Whereas the ERS and NTS do not specify the nature of participation in decision-making bodies at a national level, the NEPI reports give less credence to employer-led strategies and greater weight to tripartite structures including the state, private sector and labour and/or communities and civil society educational interest groups in decision-making processes.

The NEPI also explored options which would deracialise and upgrade technical, commercial, agricultural, nursing, forestry and teacher education colleges and training centres. These involve, amongst others, stronger incentives for their deracialisation and the implementation of a unified system of nationally recognised vocational education and training qualifications which should be articulated with formal qualifications.

Broadly speaking, the NEPI human resource development report has characterised the state's proposals as leading to a 'low participation, low skill' system characterised by limited access, voluntarism, privatisation and fragmentation. NEPI for its part has based proposals on a the long-term goal of developing a 'high participation, high skill' model. Such a model corresponds with the ANC and Cosatu model of 'growth through redistribution'.

## Teachers' Role

Teachers and educators at all levels of the system are arguably the most important grouping to target in reconstruction of the system. Without capable and innovative teachers at all levels, it will be difficult to implement meaningful changes.

The ERS proposals affecting teachers illustrate most starkly the differences between it and NEPI. The ERS *excludes teachers* from governing bodies at school levels, hinges a strategy for upgrading teacher education on distance education and advocates a streamlined and simpler

qualification structure based on a minimum of three years of appropriate teacher education after completion of the senior certificate.

The NEPI advocates *inclusion of teachers* in school and curriculum governance structures, and focuses on the reconstruction of institutions and breaking of the 'stranglehold' of fundamental pedagogics and its sub-disciplines as the basis for improving the quality of teachers. The NEPI report on teacher education also makes a series of recommendations which go far in showing how Inset (in-service education and training) can make a meaningful contribution to improving the quality of teachers.

The NEPI report specifies the legislation to be repealed, shows how the education budget can accommodate both pre-service and in-service training, what kind of structures are necessary to ensure national coordination of and equitable distribution of Inset resources and how local schools can strengthen support for teachers through the establishment of education development centres or teachers' centres. These would provide for Inset, local support services, materials production and curriculum development, adult basic education and non-formal education.

Another striking difference between ERS and NEPI is in their approach to Adult Basic Education (ABE) and literacy.

Two features of state thinking on adult basic education are reflected in the ERS. First, the state does not have funds available for non-formal education and provision is therefore the responsibility of other parties such as employers. Second, the main purpose of non-formal education is to lay the basis for job specific vocational training.

The NEPI, by contrast, had two commissions in the non-formal sector (adult education and adult basic education) which considered a range of policy issues such as the role of the state, institutional arrangements, curriculum and training of educators. NEPI firmly situates adult basic education within a commitment to strategic integrative planning in the fields of education and training, economic growth, employment creation and political democratisation.

The NEPI puts forward three policy options

*The state and NEPI agree on the need for coordination of training and the need for greater learner mobility between education and training*

*The ERS and NEPI, on the creation of an integrated system of vocational education and training, differ on the roles of the state and private sector*

### Box 3: Post-secondary Education Objectives

#### *Education Renewal Strategy (ERS)*

rationalisation of the courses offered in this sector  
 upgrading teacher education through new forms of provision,  
 restructuring courses and increasing mobility  
 the quality of post-secondary education and criteria governing access  
 the articulation between institutions and levels  
 the financing of post secondary education by both the state and users

#### *National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI)*

the internal governance structure must be non-racial, non-sexist and democratic  
 provision must be made for student mobility, support and development  
 a balance between the demands of access, quality and development  
 equitable access, education and research of an adequate standard  
 meet the needs of national development;  
 redress of gender, class and racial inequalities in institutional and staffing policies  
 a fixed allocation (of about 20%) of the national education budget for this sector  
 the balance of funding from private investment sources and user fees - those students with the means will contribute from family incomes and those who cannot will be provided for by a national education bank  
 independent accreditation and evaluation units  
 a new college level (in the form of community and bridging colleges)  
 the sector will be expanded along the lines of a 'high participation, high skill' human resource development model.

*Adult basic education will face stiff competition with other education sectors such as primary education, for even a small part of the education budget*

for adult basic education. These are the development of new institutional forms for large-scale provision of adult basic education, strengthening and developing current provision on the basis of expanding a differentiated system, and the development of a 'second-chance' system of organised provision based on an extension of current state provision.

The first option of a strong interventionist state is supported by Cosatu and the ANC. In this option the state is required to regulate standards, ensure proper coordination, redress inequalities, redistribute resources to the most disadvantaged sectors and maximise the flow of adult learners to further education and training. It is clear however that even in a new constitutional dispensation with a revised education agenda, adult basic education will face stiff competition with other education sectors such as primary education for even a small part of the education budget.

### if s

The ERS concerns itself mainly with the areas in the post-secondary education sector (see Box 3). The NEPI options are concerned with change on a systemic level and are not like the piecemeal reforms being adopted by the state for specific levels and institutions. NEPI puts forward fundamental components of future policy options for the post-secondary education sector.

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In contrast to the NEPI options for major restructuring, the ERS appeals to be more concerned with trimming the sector, rationalising it and redirecting students away from high-cost educational opportunities. It is especially wary of those whom it sees as unqualified and inefficient users of post-secondary resources.

From the evidence presented in Ml'Il, post-secondary education in South Africa is grossly distorted and unlikely to meet the needs of the near future in its current shape. Until such time as the school system provides the majority of students with secondary educations of a sufficient standard, the post-secondary sector will have to accommodate and provide maximum mobility for the majority of students who cannot enter universities. The reservation of costly places to specific-language groups and the effect of fees as an exclusionary mechanism will have to be addressed by new state-directed policy which ensures equitable access to all areas of the system.

*To conclude, given the wealth of ideas, information and options in NEPI, different readings and syntheses are possible. The above interpretation has identified areas of considerable convergence, though Ley differences remain in:*

- the meanings and mechanisms by which equity is to be achieved
- centralised and decentralised control
- vocationalisation of the curriculum
- vocational education and training
- the organisation of higher education
- education finance and management
- policy-making processes.

The next step for South Africa's democratic movement in negotiations will be to select from the options policies which will frame a negotiating position. The final shape which the future education system takes will be determined, however, not only by the policy positions and compromises struck, but by the role played by all actors inside and outside the negotiation process. DC



*Bongekile Nxumalo, Indicator SA Researcher*

***This firsthand investigation aims to provide some detailed insights into the erosion of a 'culture of learning' in African schools. The survey of student, parent and teacher perceptions in KwaMashu also attempts to make a practical contribution to efforts to reconstruct education in African communities.***

... has been written on the negative repercussions of the educational deprivation of Africans during the decades of 'Bantu education'. Instead of improving in recent years, the learning culture in many African schools has continued in break down. The anti-academic and destructive attitudes and behaviour found amongst many African youths are manifested in the chaos, lack of discipline and demoralisation found in many township schools.

This exploratory study utilised a qualitative research method. The survey had three phases, namely interviews with students, parents and teachers.

In the initial phase, in-depth interviews were conducted with 27 youths (14 females and 13 males) in Durban's KwaMashu township, where the disintegration of learning is severe and conspicuous. A follow up to the interviews was conducted through a group discussion with nine youth from KwaMashu.

Material deprivation appears to be a major cause of the disintegration of learning in township schools. The student respondents in this study identified problems such as the lack of slantage of resources such as, textbooks, desks, windows, electricity, laboratory equipment, libraries, sport facilities and so forth. They also voiced concern about the poor knowledge, poor instruction and shortage of teachers with certain subject expertise (e.g. science).

Lack of discipline and morale were identified repeatedly as a severe barrier to effective learning. The respondents said that a profound disrespect prevails amongst

students in KwaMashu schools, and that many students are unruly, aggressive and rude towards teachers and other students.

High absenteeism and latecoming are major problems. There is also irregular attendance where some students are at school but do not attend some lessons - they simply stand outside the classroom, talking, playing dice and cards, smoking and idling. The students' behaviour demonstrates their severe demoralisation and indifference to learning.

There is serious concern about the substantial abuse of dagga, mandrax and alcohol in KwaMashu schools. Students even come intoxicated to school. Some students had the following to say:

*Linda: There is no discipline in our schools. Boys just go to the 'smoking saloon' even if the teacher is busy teaching ... I think there is a lot of bad influence amongst students in schools, such as the high abuse of dagga and drugs.*

*Thandi: I think it is usually the girls who lack discipline ... during morning break, some girls abscond to drink alcohol. They come back intoxicated and disturb us.*

The respondents expressed concern over the apathy and indifference in KwaMashu schools amongst many students as well as teachers. There is a sense of fatalism, hopelessness and even bitterness. The students seem to lack inspiration, they have no sense of direction and they do not take their learning seriously.

***Students on Teachers***

Students perceived a number of teachers to be poor or even bad role models as they are openly undisciplined or even corrupt in schools. Teachers have open love affairs

***Material deprivation appears to be a major cause of the disintegration of learning in African schools***

Some teachers are concerned with upgrading their own qualifications at the expense of the students

with schoolgirls, mix too freely with students to smoke, talk and drink alcohol with them, and use vulgar language in class. Such behaviour contributes to student disrespect for teachers:

*Muzi: Some men teachers have love affairs with young schoolgirls at school. This really lowers the dignity of teachers amongst students.*

*Bongi: The teachers are not secretive about these things. They do not respect themselves and do not respect students.*

Other frequent problems are teacher absenteeism, abscondence during school hours and irregular class attendance. Even when the teacher is present in school, she or he does not come for the lesson but chats in the staffroom or is busy with his/her studies and with marking. It is a common occurrence in KwaMashu schools that a teacher abandons the class for a week or longer when students have irritated a teacher or a quarrel has taken place:

*Thandi: Sometimes a teacher just leaves if the students are making noise and does not even try to establish quiet... We go to school to learn - instead we sit in class maybe for five periods in succession without any teacher to teach us. In the meantime you lose interest.*

*Linda: Students start playing and lose interest... Students learn all types of corruption whilst no learning is taking place.*

The students feel that some teachers do not encourage and inspire students as they are not committed to their work. Some teachers come unprepared for their lessons - they talk about non-academic subjects and crack jokes with the students. Instead of teaching, some simply give students notes to write or tell them to study on their own.

The respondents also feel that some teachers are concerned with upgrading their own qualifications at the expense of the students. They said that teachers have taken advantage of the students and the chaotic conditions in the schools in order to pursue their own studies.

Further, teachers and principals are fearful in KwaMashu schools and are often scared to exercise discipline over students. They have predominantly lost control and authority. Chaos prevails because there is so much space for students to express their anti-academic behaviour. There is loss of

discipline and morale amongst many teachers as well as students because of <sup>n,s</sup> void in accountability.

Students mentioned the dominance of the Student Representative Councils (SRC). They feel that though the views...! smdm have to be represented, this sometimes tends to be done in a disagreeable and unconventional manner in the schools. Others feel that the SRC members are not effective and are partial in schools, while some SRC members abuse power for personal interest.

In the interviews, the concern with insecurity and fear in KwaMashu schools repeatedly came out clearly. Assaults, harassment of students and teachers still happen in the schools. Some students are rude and aggressive - they conic to schools carrying dangerous weapons such as knives and firearms. These assaults are predominantly committed by school drop-outs, who sometimes have friends in the schools.

#### • *Students on Parents*

There appears to be a general communication breakdown between the parents and many students. Consequently, parents hardly know what their children are doing in schools.

The students said that a large number of parents are not supportive or responsible to their children. Many parents do not discipline their own children - usually the unruly students in schools come from homes with poor parental discipline. The students feel they had no role models in the community or schools to inspire and motivate them. Further, some community members do not respect the schools, and steal and destroy school equipment.

#### • *Students on Solutions*

Some students feel very pessimistic and believe that nothing can be done to restore a culture of learning in KwaMashu schools. There is serious social disintegration in the whole of KwaMashu, not only in the schools. The whole communit} is rife with crime, substance abuse, povem. conuptinn and fear. Another distressing factor is that those elements who were verj activ e in the community, in establishing community discipline and unity, have become demoralised and inactive.

*However, some solutions were si/^ecs/cJ:*

- restructure the system of education
- improve equipment and facilities
- build more, well-provided schools

Teachers and principals are fearful in KwaMashu schools and are often scared to exercise discipline over students

- improve teacher training
- bring parents, teachers and students together to discuss problems
- establish strict regulations for students and teachers, to be agreed upon by the three parties
- provide scholarships, bursaries and career guidance
- review the role and powers of SRC's
- hold local Saturday and supplementary classes
- use street committees to discipline unruly community elements.

The students were also asked to find practical ways in which they, as individuals, could try to learn under current school conditions. The interviewees were encouraged to help themselves and endeavour to create positive outcomes out of disadvantageous circumstances. *They made the following suggestions:*

- study seriously and aim high
- join study groups
- use study aids and read books
- attend weekend or other extra classes
- be active, join sport or youth groups to reduce boredom and idleness
- watch less television
- approach people for help and advice, e.g. learned people, those in higher classes or higher institutions
- stop comparing oneself to others, e.g. those who come from very poor families and cannot afford certain things.

The second phase of the survey aimed to find out what parent perceptions are of the breakdown of learning in KwaMashu schools, particularly, the role parents can play. In general, the parents echoed student concern and distress at the crisis situation in the schools.

A group discussion was held with seven parents in KwaMashu. The participants all belonged to a *stokvel* (informal savings clubs) group and had gathered in one of the members' homes for a meeting. The discussion took place after the *stokvel* meeting. The main criterion for participating in the group discussion was that the parent should have a child (or children) at a higher primary or secondary school in KwaMashu.

#### *Parents on Teachers*

Some parents expressed discontent about the poor teacher morale and irresponsibility in KwaMashu schools. They felt that this was a major or contributory factor to the erosion of

a culture of learning. They said that teachers had brought themselves down to the level of students and had taken advantage of the poor conditions in the schools:

*Mrs Mkhize: I think the furthering of studies by teachers has really contributed to this problem in the schools... Other teachers are simply not serious about their work even if they are not furthering their qualifications.*

*Mrs Ndlovu: There are no longer any student boycotts ... One would expect the results to have really improved, yet they are worse. How can there be improvement in learning if the teachers are in a hurry to attend classes? One cannot be a student and a teacher at the same time.*

*Mrs Dlamini: It is the teachers who have really brought the standard of education down. They put themselves down to the level of students. They smoke dagga with students and drink alcohol with them.*

#### • *Parents on Parenting*

The parents acknowledged a number of mistakes on their part. They fear to exercise discipline over their children and frequently do not have time for them. Further, they are unsupportive and lack interest in school issues. The fact that the fathers were the most uninvolved in schooling was also seen to be a great problem:

*Mrs Ndlovu: Yes, teachers always complain that we do not attend school meetings and only a few parents turn up.*

*Mrs Zulu: We must not have excuses about church and wedding ceremonies, when the school meetings need us. Rather miss all that for the sake of the children.*

#### • *Parents on Students*

The interviewees believe that the children do as they want to because parents tend to be defensive when their children do something wrong or cover up for them:

*Mrs Zulu: If the children know that we will be strict and not defend them when they are wrong, then all these things will soon be over ... We should not be scared of our children. We even tell the children that we are scared of them because they will shoot us or whatever. Rather my child kills me for telling him or her the truth ...*

The parents also talked about how much the youth have contributed to the problems in the schools because of their disrespect for

*The parents expressed discontent about the poor teacher morale and irresponsibility in KwaMashu schools*

*The parents acknowledged that they fear to exercise discipline over their children, they are unsupportive and they lack interest in school issues*

All the parents agreed that they have a crucial role to play in reconstructing a culture of learning in KwaMashu schools

adults and teachers. This disrespect has effectively created barriers between parents and the youth in the community. The same disrespect has divided teachers and students in schools and has demoralised the teachers:

*Mrs Dlamini: I remember in a school meeting at Mzuvele, the students were so fiery that we left before the meeting was finished. When a parent stood up and spoke in strong words, the students retaliated in angry words, criticising teachers and inspectors. I really felt how much respect students have lost...*

*Mrs Nthembu: The children nowadays do not respect adults ... they only listen to their own parents.*

The parents also discussed other community problems which they feel pose serious handicaps and contribute to social disintegration in the township, e.g. poverty, violence, unemployment, drugs, corruption, crime, theft and destruction of school equipment:

*Mrs Dlamini: These young men who build up the shacks are not even working. That is what the school equipment is stolen for... to build up the shacks.*

*Mrs Zulu: We know that a number of children are roaming around in the streets, homeless and without families ... A number of problems do not stem from inside the schools, but from the community. People are poor, hungry, there is violence, unemployment and all sorts of frustrations. Yet, we must do something.*

#### • **Parents on Solutions**

All the parents agreed that they have to play a crucial role in reconstructing a culture of learning in KwaMashu schools. Even though there were doubts and a lack of clarity about exactly what they could do, they made a number of constructive suggestions. For instance, they felt that parents and children should come together and discuss their problems before calling a school meeting. Parents should also make the necessary contact with teachers.

They felt that parents should take responsibility for their children, to guide and offer practical support to them at home. For instance, they should make sure that their children prepare for school, check their schoolwork and attend school on time. Parents should seriously practise their role as disciplinarians at home. They should not be afraid of their children because it only reinforces their lack of control.

Parents also, to a lesser extent, discussed certain issues which need to be tackled directly by the authorities. The education authorities should deal with the problem of teachers furthering their studies while on-the-job. Parental concern over teacher neglect of their responsibilities was extensive, especially where teachers further their studies to the extent that the education of their students is jeopardised.

It was also suggested that the delay in salaries for newly qualified teachers should be dealt with urgently. The delay in paying salaries for new teachers can be as long as eight months or more during which period the teacher is dependent on his/her family. It is a serious problem because it effectively demotivates a number of teachers who have just started teaching.

## TEACHER PERCEPTIONS

The third phase of the survey involved finding out the teacher perceptions of the breakdown of learning. Two group discussions were conducted with a total of nine teachers from two different schools in KwaMashu. Six teachers participated in the first discussion, three in the second discussion.

The main objective was to find out why the erosion of learning in KwaMashu is so severe compared to many other African townships which are similarly deprived in education. Overall, the teachers expressed deep concern and distress over the problems in the KwaMashu schools.

#### • **Teachers on Conditions**

The teachers felt that the whole system of 'Bantu education' is the core of all the problems facing the schools. They said that what is happening in the schools is the result of years of oppressive education and deprivation in the community as a whole. In the words of one teacher, 'Students have expressed their frustrations for years, but nothing has happened ...'

The respondents felt that although all African children experience poor schooling conditions, the incentives for learning are particularly lacking in KwaMashu schools and in the township. They tended to make comparison to Umlazi township which they felt has far better provision and development in terms of schools as well as the community as a whole.

The teachers showed great exasperation at the severe overcrowding in the schools.

The teachers said that what is happening in the schools is the result of years of oppressive education and deprivation in the community as a whole

Overcrowding is the direct result of the severe shortage of schools in KwaMashu. The extremely high numbers of students in each of the classrooms seriously cripple effective learning. It results in lack of control, poor communication and loss of interest amongst the students and teachers:

*Mr Sithole: We have classes of 120, 130 or more. You just do not know your students ... To know a student's name has an effect of its own but that is very hard in our schools.*

A factor which is closely related is the severe shortage of special schools, (science, technical, etc.), science teachers and technical facilities. This has forced a number of students into the general stream, with the monotony of learning making many children lose interest in schooling.

A number of students do not know what career they are going to follow in future. They have lost hope because of the limited tertiary opportunities for African matriculants, particularly those with general subjects.

It is mostly the general stream matriculants who stay for years without access to tertiary institutions and end up unemployed or in menial jobs. The poor prospects for school-leavers seriously deter the aspirations of a number of scholars in KwaMashu. Amidst these difficult conditions, there is no-one in the schools to counsel and guide the students.

The teachers also expressed great concern at the unequal treatment that KwaMashu have been receiving for a long time from the KwaZulu Government. They point to the severe neglect and underdevelopment of schools and the township as a whole compared to other townships under this same authority.

Constant comparison was made to Umlazi, the nearest township to KwaMashu, under the KwaZulu government. They feel that the social conditions there are much more conducive for a learning culture than the destitution one observes in KwaMashu schools and the township itself:

*Mr Cele: What contributes to the chaos in KwaMashu is that those factors which are incentives in motivating students are lacking in our schools. Children in Umlazi are better provided for... they can see commercial-technical, comprehensive, technical, technikon, university institutions and so forth. In KwaMashu children see no life after matric.*

#### • *Teachers on Morale*

Teachers said that low teacher morale and discipline also contributes to the erosion of learning in KwaMashu schools. A number of teachers have developed negative attitudes over the years because of the severe material deprivation in the schools, harassment by students, students' destructive attitudes and behaviour, and the low financial rewards in teaching. These stressful conditions have demoralised many teachers:

*Mr Nduli: Teachers are irresponsible and undisciplined... they know that the blame for problems will always be put on the children, they know that everyone blames the students.*

Although these reasons were collectively understood, there was a strong feeling that teachers should always strive to uphold their responsibility, identity and morale. Some teachers were sharply critical of the irresponsible behaviour of many of their colleagues in the schools. They strongly felt that teachers can do much to help students gain something positive despite the difficult conditions. They should not take advantage of the conditions, thus worsening the situation.

Many principals have lost control not only over the students but over the teachers as well. There is low accountability amongst the teachers because there is no functional authority which monitors teacher behaviour and responsibility in the schools. The departmental structures, the teachers felt, do not operate on the ground and are unrepresentative. The formation of such a body would also provide teachers with a forum to discuss their problems and possible ways to deal with them.

Furthermore, there is no uniformity in the way the schools are administered. There is need for the centralisation of administration to a certain degree in order to decrease problems in the schools, such as registration, payment of school fees, and the management of examinations and results.

Teachers also feel that fear and insecurity in the schools is another factor which has eroded the culture of learning. The schools are highly volatile and unpredictable places. One teacher commented, 'For many students, school has no value - there is no sense of belonging'. This affects students as well as teachers. There was a strong feeling that the disruptive elements from outside the schools are the main source of fear.

*There is low accountability amongst the teachers because there is no functional authority which monitors teacher behaviour and responsibility*

*Teachers also feel that fear and insecurity in the schools is another factor which has eroded the culture of learning*

*Teachers and students should make use of the few resources that are available as a means of self-help instead of bowing down to their deprivation*

These youngsters are usually school drop-outs who have become criminals.

• **Teachers on Community**

The teachers stressed that a number of problems experienced in the schools actually stem from the home. Many parents neglect their parental responsibilities and expect the schools to do everything, such as taking care of the children, guiding and disciplining them. The poor upbringing in many homes causes problems in the schools. However, there was general understanding that many parents work and are thus unable to fulfill some of their parental duties.

Many students come from poor and unstable families. Many of them are born out of wedlock. Usually they are raised by a grandmother who may be too told to exercise sufficient discipline and care. Sometimes the real parents live-in with someone else or stay elsewhere and do not have time for their children. Consequently, a number of children are vulnerable to negative influences, such as, dropping out of school, crime, substance abuse and so forth. Their vulnerability is reinforced when many come to school only to encounter disheartening and hopeless conditions.

The teachers also highlighted community problems which, they felt, erode the learning process in the schools. Violence in KwaMashu, for instance, has severely affected student and teacher morale. It has also resulted in violent and aggressive behaviour among many youths. Political intolerance and political ignorance has also played its part. A number of youths link destruction and disruption to being part of 'the struggle', for instance.

Poverty and unemployment in KwaMashu were also considered to have resulted in social disintegration. A number of the children have no positive role models in their lives. This, in turn, affects the motivation and learning of many children.

A number of grassroots community structures are hardly operating in KwaMashu. It is therefore very hard to deal with a number of problems that originate from the community. There is a communication breakdown within the community itself and between the community and the schools.

*There is a communication breakdown within the community itself and between the community and the schools*

## SOLUTIONS

Teachers emphasised that as the foundation for all the problems is 'Bantu education' and the apartheid system, these need to be done away with very urgently. Adequate provision of education requires that the state should:

- build more schools and classrooms
- provide school equipment, learning facilities (particularly, science and technical) and teaching aids
- increase tertiary institutions and opportunities
- provide guidance and counselling services
- establish and centralise satisfactory administration, e.g. for exams and exam results, school fees, registration and age restrictions.

Teachers and students should make use of the few resources that are available as a means of self-help instead of bowing down to their deprivation. School fees could be used to buy some of the basic school facilities. Some teachers stressed that they had also studied under inadequate conditions, but it did not mean that they had accepted an oppressive education. Teachers should constantly strive to look beyond the prevalent conditions for the sake of the children and try to be a source of inspiration to students instead of demotivating them further.

The teachers emphasised that the schools and the community of KwaMashu should be shown equal treatment by the KwaZulu government, like other townships under its authority. In the search for solutions, they stressed the need to improve teacher/student morale and discipline and to re-establish teacher structures on the ground. The fact that satisfactory remuneration and efficient payment would increase teacher morale was emphasised.

The teachers also highlighted the need for parent and community involvement in KwaMashu schools, so that they may work together with students to re-establish a culture of learning. Towards this end, they emphasised the role of building up recognised parent and community structures. Lastly, there is an obvious need for educating parents on parenting and the significance of supporting and participating in their children's learning.

*Acknowledgement*


I would like to thank the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Indicator SA which sponsored my traineeship, thus enabling me to conduct this research project. I would also like to express my gratitude to my mentor, Professor Valerie Moller, who supervised my research, and to Themba Mzimela who facilitated the group interview. Pseudonyms were used to protect the identities of the survey respondents.

# INDUSTRIAL MONITOR


## AMC/IFP support in Reef Townships and Hostels

Percentage


ANC SUPPORT  
Township Residents




Member | | Supporter



ANC SUPPORT  
Hostel Residents



IFP SUPPORT  
Hostel Residents




### SURVEY METHOD

- Data from quantitative survey conducted in late 1992 in 22 hostels and 29 surrounding townships on the Reef.
- Random sample of 750 hostel residents and 750 township residents.
- Correlation of ANC/IFP support with low, medium and high conflict areas was done on the basis of the number of conflict incidents reported by respondents in their hostel/township area.

Source: De Kock C, C Schutte, N Rhodie & D Ehlers. 'A quantitative analysis of some possible explanations for the hostel/township violence', in A Minnaar (ed), *The dynamics of hostels in South Africa with specific reference to present-day violence*. Pretoria: HSRC, 1993.



# LOCATION OF HOSTELS ON THE REEF



No.	Town	Hostel Name	No.	Town	Hostel Name	
1	Tembisa	Vusumuzi New Vusumuzi Ehlanzeni Sethokga	16	Vasloorus	Nguni Sotho	
2	Daveyton	Oaveyton	17	Duduza	Duduza Duduza new (1991)	
3	Alexandra	Alexandra men 1 Alexandra men 2 Alexandra women	18	Khutsong	Khutsong (Municipal) Blyvoor Timber General Erection Sybrand Construction Concor Construction	Swazicon Carletonville Wearne Stone GFC Mining HL & H
4	Johannesburg	Center MBA City Deep Klipspruit Northern Sewerage Orlando Olifantsvlei Sewerage	19	Ratanda	Ratanda 1 Ratanda 2	
5	Actonville	Vlathville	20	Sebokeng Kwa Masiza	Kwa Madala Amatola (Isacor) Lebombo (Isacor) Chaleni (Isacor) Dele (Isacor) Intizwe (Isacor) Fega (Isacor) Hluhluwe	
6	Dobsonville	Sipiwe		Sebokeng south	Hostel 1 Hostel 2 Hostel 3 Hostel 4 Hostel 5	
7	Kagiso	Old Kagiso	21	Vereeniging	Lethabo	
8	Mohlakeng	Mohlakeng	22	Zamdela	Zamdela (Municipal) Umgababa Thembaletu (AECI) Phomolong (Fedmis)	Boiketling Kwa Zola Lerato AECI
9	Soweto	Nancefield Orlando West Lifateng Mapetla	23	Referngotso	Referngotso	
10	Bekkersdal	Bekkersdal (Municipal) Bekkersdal (Private)				
11	Meadowlands	Meadowlands				
12	Diepkloof	Diepkloof				
13	Kathlehong	Buyafuthi Kwa Mazibuko NCP				
14	Kwa Thema	Kwa Thema 1 Kwa Thema 2 Bisa				
15	Thokoza	Thokoza 1 (Soji) Thokoza 2 (Zihlangu) Thokoza 3 (Masbano)				

Credit: Map drawn by Trevor Keith.

Source: A Minnaar (ed), *The dynamics of hostels in South Africa with specific reference to present-day violence*. Pretoria: HSRC, 1993.

## HOSTELS ON THE REEF

### THE GOLDSTONE REPORT

*Dr Anthony Minnaar, Centre for Conflict Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council*

*This article is based on a report released in March 1993, entitled, 'The dynamics of hostels in South Africa with specific reference to present-day violence', which was undertaken by the HSRC at the request of the Goldstone Commission. It examines some of the findings and explanations for the intense conflict between hostel and township residents, particularly in the PWV Region, between 1990-1992.*

There were signs of rising tensions on the Reef at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, though the black townships in the PWV area had been 'relatively' peaceful since the end of 1986.

The severity, extent and duration of the 'Reef Township War', whose outbreak is usually recorded as July 1990, surprised many observers. The most identifiable participants in the violence were the migrant workers resident in the many hostels on the Reef, on the one side, and the inhabitants, mostly youth, of the townships and the squatter settlements in particular, on the other side.

This township war has been marked by numerous attacks, preemptive strikes and reprisals during the course of the past three years. It is difficult to identify who *initiated* each separate incident let alone to identify with any accuracy who the *actual participants* or perpetrators are.

However, since July 1990 there have been a number of specific 'massacres' (a single attack in which more than ten people are killed) which have made news headlines throughout the world. These events mark the course of this 'war'. For example, the massacre at a Sebokeng funeral vigil on 12 January 1991 (40 people killed); the attack on Swanieville squatter camp on 12 May 1991 (28 killed); the attack on Crossroads squatter settlement on 3 April 1992 (21 killed); the JBoipatong massacre of 17 June 1992 (39 killed) and many more.

*A number of explanations for the ongoing violence on the Reef have been put forward. These are examined in turn:*

Township residents look down on hostel residents. This social divide has come about with increasing urbanisation, whereby the lifestyles of township residents have become more sophisticated and their links with traditional authorities in the rural areas ever more tenuous.

Not so with many of the migrant workers in the hostels who renew these links every year when they return for a visit to their home areas. Some visit their homes in the rural areas as often as once a month. More regular contact than an annual visit has become possible with the development of the minibus taxi network between the Reef and the rural homeland areas.

In the hostels, the rural/urban links are reinforced by local chiefs appointing *indunas* to look after the hostel residents from a particular rural area, to assert control and to protect the particular chief's interests in the cities. The role of elders in the hostels also coincides with forms of control in the rural areas. The behaviour of township youth, for instance, is anathema to many of the rural traditionalists occupying the hostels. The generation gap is a significant factor in the alienation between hostel residents and surrounding communities.

Since the hostel residents are not considered to be part of the community by township residents, the hostel residents tend to participate in any recreational activities on their own. Most hostels only have an open space, usually used as a soccer ground, while a few have a mini-arena for events like athletics. The lack of

*The generation gap is a significant factor in the alienation between hostel residents and surrounding communities*

## Counting the Hostels

In the HSRC study on hostels in South Africa (1993) a total of 411 hostels were identified countrywide: 214 owned or controlled by local authorities/provincial administrations and 197 privately owned. Of the total, 153 are in the Transvaal; 162 in the Cape Province; 68 in the Orange Free State and only 28 in Natal.

This figure excludes mine company hostels and some privately-owned ones since not all privately-owned hostels are registered by their owners with local authorities. Further, there is some confusion about the total number of hostels since some estimates count a hostel complex as one while others count units within a complex as separate hostels.

The exact number of hostel beds in South Africa also cannot be pinpointed with complete accuracy:

- The Department of Local Government & National Housing records a total of 308 345 beds in the 402 hostels they listed - 207 158 in the Transvaal, 50 158 in the Cape, 26 125 in Natal and 24 904 in the OFS.
- A recent CSIR survey records a total of 529 784 beds for all hostels in South Africa, with 312 581 beds for the greater PWV region (or 59% of the total number of beds countrywide).
- The De Loor Task Group provides an estimate of 604 000 beds (for all races).

Thus the actual number of hostel residents in South Africa cannot be accurately quantified either. Most beds are utilised in the form of shift sleeping whereby beds are used by more than one occupier. On this basis, the total number of hostel residents in South Africa would be in excess of 1 million.

*The system discourages any social contact between hostel residents and township inhabitants*

recreational facilities leads to each's hostel ubiquitous beerhall being patronised extensively by hostel residents, especially over the weekends.

So the system discourages any social contact between hostel residents and township inhabitants. Since their contact<sup>s</sup> with surrounding communities is minimal, hostel residents are usually the last to know about any major community decisions such as work stayaways, consumer boycotts or days of mourning - at which stage it is very often too late to do anything about observing or participating in these actions.

This situation has often made hostel residents the victims of angry groups of township youth who try to ensure that stayaways or boycotts are observed by blockading the routes to railway stations. Inevitably, clashes have occurred between hostel residents and these groups. The clashes sometimes escalate into revenge or retaliatory attacks that turn bloody with fatalities on both sides. In this way, the seeds of lasting ill-feeling and violence

have been sown between the 'nirais' and the 'urbanites'.

Community struggles, particularly boycotk and stayaways, have often crystallised the existing antagonisms between township inhabitants and hostel residents along stark battle lines. A case in point was the & situation in Thokoza at the begiiviiin" or 1990.

## a Case Study

Relations between the local hostel residents and the township inhabitants became strained when the hostel residents initiated their own rent boycott in an effort to get the local town council to improve conditions in their hostels. However, no sooner had they resolved the issue than a township **boycott** was initiated.

Township activists pressurised hostel residents to join this rent boycott. While hostel residents agreed that boycotts were an acceptable form of protest they strenuously objected to being pressganged into joining. For hostel residents, boycotts were only acceptable if they carried the consent of all those participating.

Hostel residents particularly resented any interference in their affairs. The hostel rent boycott had been a response to the deteriorating conditions in the hostel. The reasons for the rent boycott in Thokoza were not so clearcut and had been decided upon by the Thokoza Civic Association without consulting the local hostel committee. The township civic had simply ordered the hostel residents to join in the boycott.

When it became obvious that the Thokoza Civic Association was aligned with the African National Congress (AND. the hostel residents resented the former's highhanded actions even further. They maintained that any association purporting to represent the entire community should not be affiliated to any political organisation, i.e. it should be a neutral body accommodating all people **regardless** o! their political affiliations.

These community struggles mereI\ exacerbated the existing antagonisms between hostel residents and the youth. Hostel residents felt being forced to participate in a work stayaway \\ a<sup>l</sup>- **unfair** to them since they had come to ihe Keel lor one reason only: to work and earn money for their families in the rural areas.

The actions of the civic association and township youth emphasised for the hostel residents the fact that they were never consulted or informed about anything, even when it specifically affected their own wellbeing. In simple terms, the hostel residents felt neglected and forgotten, and these resentments found expression in the violence that erupted in mid-1990 (Segal, 1991).

## political Rivalry

A number of political factors have been put forward as underlying catalysts for the ongoing violence on the Reef.

The lifting of political restrictions and the unbanning of certain political organisations like the African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress in February 1990 allowed their supporters to organise openly for the first time in decades. In the first six months of 1990, numerous branches, particularly of the ANC, were launched in the townships on the Reef. There also arose expectations that large numbers of exiles would return to South Africa in the near future.

Concern was expressed by the unbanned political organisations about employment and accommodation for all of their members who would be returning from abroad. (Figures as high as 60 000 were mooted in connection with these returnees.) From April 1990 onwards, there were persistent public calls by civic and political leaders at rallies and community meetings on the Reef that hostel residents should vacate hostels to make way for the exiles (this was linked to the call for the conversion of the hostels into family units).

Hostel residents in the PWV region resented these calls and organised themselves to resist any attempt at eviction. One of the results of their fears was an Inkatha recruitment campaign inside the hostels which attempted to build hostel resident solidarity in order to present a united front to such threats. A consequence of the moves to ensure solidarity was the expulsion of non-Inkatha supporters from the hostels.

At the end of July 1990 Inkatha had launched itself as a formal political party, becoming the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In an effort to start the first IFP branches on the Reef, the IFP launched a recruitment campaign in the hostels. These were the logical and natural places for the IFP's

recruitment campaign to begin since the hostels were dominated by Zulu-speaking workers who were largely from the rural areas of KwaZulu and Natal.

Another event which considerably exacerbated tensions on the Reef was the stayaway called by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) on 2 July 1990 to specifically protest against the continuation of high levels of violence in Natal/KwaZulu. Allied to this initiative, a number of pro-ANC organisations, notably the South African Youth Congress (Sayco), tried to isolate Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha as a result of the ongoing violence in Natal. Inkatha was proclaimed an 'enemy of the people' and the houses of many IFP officials in the Transvaal (specifically those town councillors who had turned to Inkatha for support) were petrol-bombed (Seekings, 1991: 11).

Between May and September 1990, a series of anti-Zulu pamphlets were distributed anonymously in the East Rand townships, which led to further polarisation within the communities affected. All this provided the rationale for IFP organisers' rhetoric as they went from hostel to hostel calling meetings of Zulu-speaking hostel residents. The hostel residents were told that the hostels were going to be demolished and that they needed to defend themselves from attack by 'the Xhosas' living in the squatter settlements.

It is unclear as to who started the process of ethnic labelling in the violence on the Reef. However, Inkatha used perceived threats against Zulus as a way of facilitating the mobilisation of Zulus as members of the IFP. Later, Inkatha's recruiting rhetoric was aimed more specifically at the ANC/Cosatu alliance (Everatt, 1992).

Hence it was only after July 1990 that any particular *ethnic* (affiliation according to language and culture) grouping within the hostels became a factor in the ongoing violence. After the mid-1990 clashes, Inkatha-supporting hostel residents were specifically asked why Xhosa-speakers had become targets for their attacks. They simply responded that the ANC 'is a Xhosa organisation' (Anon, *Sunday Star*, 19 August 1990) and that they had 'to fight to survive and protect the Zulu nation' (Elsas & Nicholson, 1990). In September 1990 Chief Buthelezi was reported to have informed a meeting of chiefs in Ulundi that,

*In an effort to start the first IFP branches on the Reef, the IFP launched a recruitment campaign in the hostels*

*Inkatha was proclaimed an 'enemy of the people' and the houses of many IFP officials in the Transvaal were petrol-bombed*

*Intentionally or otherwise, there no doubt that the violence on the Reef has strengthened the IFP*

'we as Zulus will resist any attempt to demolish our unity and to make us feel ashamed of our past' (Grange, 1990).

Not all those who live in the hostels have been involved in the violence. Nor are all members of the IFP. Many hostel residents became involved in the violence as a means of survival. In the conflict on the Reef people often became categorised according to where they come from and what language they speak. Many Zulu-speakers residing near the hostels in Alexandra, for instance, were forced to enter into an alliance with the hostel residents because they feared attack from other township residents who seem to categorise all Zulu-speakers as the enemy.

Intentionally or otherwise, there is no doubt that the violence on the Reef has strengthened the IFP. One reason for this has been the labelling and identification of Zulus with Inkatha, irrespective of Zulu speakers' political affiliations. This development has been buttressed by the IFP's willingness to mobilise along ethnic lines. The IFP's major drawcard has always been its propagation of ethnic, cultural, and, in particular, Zulu values, the so-called 'ethnic nationalism' line.

Initially, in 1990, the violence had started out clearly as between certain Zulu and Xhosa groups. It was only later that it changed to an ANC versus Inkatha struggle, becoming overtly political in the process. On the ground people had blamed rumour-mongering for the first attacks. Some blamed criminals for spreading word that the Zulus were going to attack the Xhosas and *vice versa* - apparently criminals wanted to sow divisions in the communities so that they could exploit these for their own gain.

Ethnic political mobilisation has deepened and exacerbated the divisions between hostel residents and township residents along rigid ethnic lines. The hostel residents are now all perceived by the media, conflict monitors/observers, and participants in the violence to be Zulu and therefore Inkatha supporters, while the youthful comrades and squatters in the surrounding informal settlements are predominantly labelled Xhosa and therefore perceived to be ANC supporters.

The perception today is that the ANC is dominated by Xhosa-speaking leaders like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Chris Hani and Thabo Mbeki, which, in the eyes of opposition groupings,

makes the ANC a 'Xhosa' or **«anis-iti.»** According to a report by the independent Board of Inquiry (1992), this **was** also a ploy by the IFP to attach an ethnic label to the ANC in the same manner as **their** opponents have attached one **to the** IFP

Living in a hostel helps to **foster** a group identity, firstly, because **hostels have** historically been run along **ethnic lines** and secondly, because the hostel **residents share** a daily experience. All of this **makes them** extremely amenable to being **recruited**.

Inkatha has used the hostels **as bases for** organising their foray into **national power** politics in the Transvaal (up **until this stage** Inkatha had largely been a **regional** organisation based in Natal). They were not only centres for recruitment **if** Zulu-speakers but also centres **for further** mobilisation. Throughout all **this, the** emphasis on Zulu ethnicity **has been one of** the dominant themes in hostel **mobilisation** since July 1990. However, with **the influx** of refugees (some of whom **are not** Zulu-speakers at all) into certain **Reef** hostels the position has changed **somewhat**.

The ANC has tended to see the **violence as** a power-play by the IFP and **the** government. In township after **township** the ANC has seen its branches and ANC-aligned civic associations lose support. Township residents **see the ANC** 'as being powerless to stop the **violence**'. The fact that ANC leaders in **the townships** have lost authority has added **to (lie** speculation that it is the ANC "**rivals (the** IFP and National Party) who **are behind the** violence (Anon, 1992b).

The call by certain organisations **for the** conversion of hostels into family units **for** even their outright demolition **if further** drew the battle lines between the **hostels and the** townships on the Reef.

Some sources believe that family housing **is** a prerequisite for stable communities within the black townships on the Reef. Immediately after the July/August 1990 conflicts between hostel residents and township inhabitants, there were urgent calls for the immediate conversion of the hostels to family units. Besides the tremendous expense involved, however, there were other complicating factors.

The majority of residents remaining in the hostels were Zulu-speaking migrants since

*Ethnic political mobilisation has deepened and exacerbated the divisions between hostel residents and township residents*

**Xhosa**-speakers and other language groups had largely been driven out by IFP

Loiters. They feared being left without Vv alternative accommodation and that the Lflily units would be given to v\,osa-speakers, many of whom had already taken wives on the Reef and moved out of 'he hostels and into squatter jcttlements (most Zulus were more likely to have a wife waiting for them back in ^inland). The Zulu migrants also feared that they would be forced out of the hostels, out of their jobs and back to the homeland.

Since the calls emanated largely from civic organisations and Cosatu-aligned unions, they v» ere seen by Inkatha- supporting Zulu migrants as a thinly disguised 'ANC/Xhosa .strategy' in the political struggle for hegemony on the Reef. The conversion of **hostels** into family units was interpreted as a deliberate onslaught on ,the solidarity of **Zulus** living in the hostels and as a ploy to **remo**\c them from the townships.

At meetings called by Inkatha officials, hostel residents were told that their 'home', i.e. the hostel, was under threat. Appeals were also made for them to 'protect the Zulu nation'. Even though hostel residents live in appalling conditions, they have become suspicious and antagonistic towards any plans for upgrading. One of their major complaints in this regard is that they have not been consulted about any of the planned upgrading (Khuzwayo, 1991; Koch, 1992).

In political terms, the IFP saw the plan to convert the hostels into family units as an attempt to weaken its main support base in the Transvaal (Pogrand, 1991). Although the IFP supported the moves to upgrade the hostels, inclusive of providing family accommodation, their support was qualified. They maintained that all single-sex hostel accommodation could not be summarily changed to family units since, although many workers required family units, there were many more who did not wish, or were unable for various reasons, to relocate their families from the rural areas to the cities.

The IFP believed the ANC was actively campaigning to remove and disperse the 'single' men from various hostels. The IFP were fearful that this would leave many 'single' workers homeless. They have emphasised that single-sex quarters should also be included in any upgrading programme in order to make provision for these men, since there was no-where else for them to go (Vos, 1991).

At the start of the violence on the Reef, it appears that in the various flashpoints rumours played a role in heightening tensions by sowing divisions within communities (see box also).

Rumours of impending attacks by 'Zulu impis' from the hostels on squatter settlements or, *vice versa*, rumours of

msS

## Media Hype

The fact that the media persisted in identifying the violence as being 'traditional tribalism rampant' or merely the expression of the 'age-old Zulu/ Xhosa rivalry' or 'feuding Zulu and Xhosa warriors'; or their choice of terminology such as 'Zulu impis of fearsome warriors armed with assegais and singing provocative war songs' led by '*indunas*', reinforced the idea of ethnicity in the minds of many of the participants as well as of observers.

Headlines or titles to articles in which the hostels were dubbed as 'death factories', 'breeding grounds of violence', 'fortresses of fear', 'dormitories of despair', 'hostels of hate', 'hostels from hell', 'hostels of horror', etc., certainly did not ease the tensions. These labels were particularly resented by the hostel residents who felt they were being unfairly judged by the emotive choice of words by sensationalist journalists.

Journalists were also blamed for irresponsible reporting. There have been a number of cases of journalists stating that violence had occurred in certain areas whereas in actual fact the particular community was peaceful. Such incorrect reports were self-fulfilling since the local residents would mobilise, believing that violence was occurring in their community. Very often, an incident would then occur, setting off actual violence.

There have also been instances where particular reporters have reported on incidents without actually having been to the specific area or community. In this case, they are guilty of fanning existing rumours. Finally, some journalists have been equally guilty of misquoting or attributing statements that were never uttered to representatives of both sides to the conflict.

'Xhosa fighters' in the squatter settlements mobilising to demolish hostels led to both sides in the conflict keeping themselves in a constant state of armed readiness, with guards posted and armed patrols continually patrolling the hostel or squatter settlement thought to be under threat. Such a volatile situation inevitably led to clashes or attacks whose reason had long been submerged in the ongoing violence.

Rumours about alleged abductions of young girls by hostel residents to serve as 'sex slaves' or of young men being tortured or children killed for *muti* purposes exacerbated township fears. Hostel

*In political terms, the IFP saw the plan to convert the hostels into family units as an attempt to weaken its main support base in the Transvaal*

residents, in turn, feared going alone anywhere in the townships since rumours abounded of their fellow residents being led into traps in shebeens or being ambushed and necklaced by comrades. (One hostel resident said that the violence had made him a prisoner in the hostel compound: 'I cannot walk in the streets. We are always being threatened.')(Anon, 1992a).

In an atmosphere of suspicion, townships and hostels were fertile soil for any agitation. It took only a few rumours and some misrepresentation of the facts to get the violence going. Once real injury had been traded for imagined insult, the process became self-perpetuating. One of the tactics of agitators was to use thugs and criminals to spread fear and insecurity. Another was to use the name of the IFP as a threat and front for the activities of criminals and agitators.

Fear became tangible in the hostels and in the surrounding communities. For example, prior to the outbreak of violence on the Reef in 1990 relations had been cordial between the residents of the Nancefield Hostel and the neighbouring township dwellers who visited friends in the hostel, held parties together, bought at the same store or often played soccer together. After 1990 they became mortal enemies.

*Is the Reef violence the result of the deliberate and systematic export of political violence from Natal to the Transvaal?*

Residents of the nearby Klipspruit township, separated from the Nancefield Hostel by an open piece of veld and the railway line, would regularly walk to the end of their streets and fearfully look across this dividing line to see if there was any sign of an *impi* massing near the hostel. At the Nancefield Hostel complex, housing an estimated 15 000 men, a stranger entering the hostel had his presence heralded by whistles blown throughout the hostel. By 1991 the fear had become all pervasive as well as corrosive, poisoning any intentions to restore good relations (Smith, 1991).

### 88Us<sup>oo</sup> and "Tinem<sup>80</sup>

Broadly, the blame for the Reef violence has been laid at the door of tribalism, political rivalry between the ANC and Inkatha, gangsterism (criminals), poverty, conditions in the hostels and perceptions by some parties of police partiality to one side (namely, Inkatha).

One school of thought also maintains that the Reef violence is the result of the deliberate and systematic export of political violence from Natal to the Transvaal. This

theory holds that **Chief Bulimic/ resrn**, the perceived attempts by **the ANC7 Cosatu/SACP alliance to mar»in-i)is**o h- in terms of national politics. **According** the violence has stemmed **from IFP** y' to show that they have a **significant now!?** base on the Reef and that **Chief Buthde/** should be accorded status **as a national** ' player and not only as a **regional one** (see Howe on Natal's *Trojan !torse in his* edition).

The start of the Reef violence **is also** blamed in some quarters on covert **actions** by the military and police (**i he at leged** secret destabilisation of political **opponents** by the apparatus of the state). Some eyewitness accounts of the violence **seem** to attest to the fact that there **was nothing** spontaneous about the conflict, **that it was** carefully orchestrated and **that it had** nothing to do with tribalism.

Another factor mooted in the **later stages of** the conflict is the so-called **"third force"** thought to be made up of **right-wing** while extremists who organise **themselves into** mobile death squads to sow **terror in the** townships. There were a **number of reports** of whites in a minibus in **olved in random** shootings in a number of **black townships**. Some suspected that these **whites were** racists within the security **forces w ho were** bent on undermining talks **between the** government and the ANC.

The randomness of some **ol the attacks** emanating from certain **hostels has been a** puzzling feature of the conflict. (One explanation is that hostel **residents consider** all township dwellers as **being •WC-** orientated. On this assumption, **it would he** justified to attack all township **residents**, even when the attacks haw **been carried out** at random on commuters **on trains**.

Township dwellers, i.e. perceived 'ANC-supporters', became targets where certain policy linkages were made, namely that strikes cause unemplnv meni: thai business boycotts and stavawavs lead to further economic hardship: or that it the unions (Cosatu/ANC) thai sa\ lhal foreign investors should not investi in the counlr>. which results in the non-cicaaiion of more job opportunities. Furthermore, it is ilie ANC-sympathetic civic associations w liieh say that township residenis should nol pav rent, and ANC-supporting siudcnis and pupils who lead the school bo\ colls. Finally, it is the township v ouili (*the comrades*) who show no respect lor their elders, are in the forefront of the

... to page 71



## Like Fish in a Tin: The Hostel Residents Speak

Catharine Payze and Trevor Keith, HSRC Centre for Conflict Analysis

*This brief report focuses on contemporary life in South African hostels. It allows the hostel residents themselves to voice the major problems they face in their working lives. These issues were selected to provide the reader with an insight into some of the living conditions in the hostels.*

### • 'SINGLES' VS 'FAMILIES'

Some hostels house 'singles' - these are single male and female persons as well as married migrant workers, erroneously labelled single by the apartheid system's influx control regulations - and families in the same hostel. In one of the hostels, families and singles have formed two groups and there is evidence of friction between them. The singles believe that the hostel was never meant to house families and is therefore not equipped to do so.

For example, they lack ablution facilities and running water in the family sections of the hostel. Because the families have no ablution facilities of their own, they are forced to use the public facilities, the facilities of the singles, or to carry buckets of water to their rooms. This leads to overcrowding of public facilities and to health hazards as well as a lack of hygiene.

The lack of recreational and educational facilities in the hostel is seen to encourage children to trespass in the singles' areas because these children have nothing else to do. The singles view this as an invasion of their privacy and as the reason for the theft of their belongings. Use of the ablution facilities in singles' areas by families adds to existing friction between the two groups.

Conversely, families believe that the singles do not respect their privacy and that it would be better if the entire hostel were converted into family units. The families are also angered because they believe that singles steal young girls away from their families in the hostel.

In spite of these differences, there were respondents who believe that the time has come to build a relationship of trust by beginning to identify common problems. These residents feel that upgrading will solve many of the problems experienced by both sides, since it is envisaged that an upgraded hostel will offer sufficient facilities for both families and singles.

### *The Survey Method*    *Tell us about life in the hostel!*

The data was obtained during research conducted in twelve hostels countrywide in 1992. The aim of the project was to obtain an insight into hostels as a whole and to place the current violence in some hostels into perspective. Some of these hostels are privately owned, while others are controlled by local town councils or

provincial administrations. The research phase included visits by the research team (consisting of the authors, as well as an interpreter). An attempt was made to ensure that the interpreter was also trained in qualitative interviewing techniques. During each visit, the research team undertook a guided tour of the hostel

### • UPGRADING

Some hostel residents want an upgraded facility which will cater exclusively for families. One of the motivations for this is the perception that the hostel system is a racist one. The residents point to their white colleagues who are given houses and are not expected to be separated from their families for the greatest part of their working lives. There is also a call for the provision of houses in the townships and an adequate living allowance.

Residents of two hostels would like them to be upgraded, retaining their current status as single-sex facilities. (Funding for this has already been allocated.) Upgrading will entail providing accommodation to fewer people per room, improved ablution and cleaning facilities, more privacy to residents and more hygienic living conditions in general.

Upgrading is also seen by many residents as a way to improve or provide facilities such as sportsfields, undercover parking, libraries and recreational facilities. For many respondents, the provision of educational facilities for pre-school children, schoolchildren and adult residents who want to become literate or complete high school is also very important.

All residents stressed the fact that they should be consulted and their input heeded, before the upgrading process begins, and during its implementation. For example, in one of the hostels, upgrading has been delayed because all parties could not agree on an appropriate chairperson to lead negotiations. The complexity of the process not only requires that the hostel residents and the community meet each other on common ground, but also that the residents reach consensus among themselves.

Another of the problems encountered with upgrading is a rent increase. Even when the rent for an upgraded section is negotiated, some residents may not be able to afford it. Some residents had previously lived in a hostel which was upgraded, but after completion, they could no longer afford the rent and subsequently lost their accommodation.

Furthermore, people seem unwilling to pay an increased rent towards the upgrading of facilities which were meant to be maintained in the first place. For example, they feel that it is unfair to pay for the upgrading of ablution facilities which were allowed to deteriorate to their current state as a result of negligence on the part of controlling bodies.

Rumours surrounding the misappropriation of rent payments also contribute to residents' unwillingness to pay for upgrading, since

property in order to contextualise the data. Various interviews were also conducted. Some consisted of individual interviews or meetings with large groups (up to forty people), but most were focus-group interviews, comprising 8 to 16 residents. The only question we asked was: 'Tell us about life in the hostel?'

In order to ensure accuracy, interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Video recordings were also made as a means of providing access to interactional patterns emerging from interviews. However, permission for the use of these devices could not always be obtained, and in those cases the research team relied on notes.

people feel that they have already paid enough and that their money may have been wasted. However, there does not seem to be much opposition to the principle of a negotiated rent increase associated with the building of new structures.

#### • OVERCROWDING

The issue of overcrowding came to the fore in four provincially-controlled and one privately-owned hostel.

In the first three hostels the general living conditions are severely affected by overcrowding. Two of these hostels currently house families and this means that each family only has access to one cement structure which is used as a bed. There are usually three or more of these beds in a room, meaning that three or more families must share the living space originally intended for three individuals. Residents blamed the overcrowded conditions on poverty and stated that they feel like prisoners.

In the hostel where overcrowding is the most obvious, an average of 30 residents must share a single kitchen facility which can only accommodate two people at a time. Since there is no electricity, residents have to use primus stoves, but they are limited to one each because of the lack of space. Only one item can be cooked at a time, so meals are cold by the time they are served.

At this hostel the ablution facilities are an even bigger problem, because they serve a number of surrounding squatters in addition to the 16 families. This facility consists of one room only which is subdivided into four square partitions comprising a shower, basin and toilet. Because many people squat in shacks around the hostel complex, residents have nowhere to hang their laundry and a great deal of theft occurs.

In another hostel many residents are sleeping outside in the courtyard or in the passages. The dormitories, where 22 people share one room provide no space between beds and clothes hang on the walls. However, these women have a roof over their heads and their rent is less than half that of women sleeping in the passages and courtyards.

#### • FENCING

Fencing was identified by residents of five hostels as a problem. Of these, three are demarcated to be fenced according to the Record of Understanding (between the government and the ANC). Respondents stated that fencing makes it impossible to flee during an attack and that the police can get in easier to assault them. In the case of privately-owned hostels, they also believe that management can control them more easily, should they wish to strike.

Residents of hostels demarcated for fencing were both puzzled and angry about the Agreement. In the first place, they were excluded from a decision which affects their lives directly. They also believe that only animals are fenced. They fear becoming completely isolated because the fencing would, for all practical considerations, remove them from the township community.

Finally, a great deal of anger was provoked by the fact that money set aside for the essential upgrading of sub-standard living conditions was now to be wasted on fencing.

#### • THE POLICE

Respondents in three hostels talked about the South African police (SAP). In the first of these, allegations were made that the SAP assaulted residents and shot at them.

In the second hostel, the SAP was generally disliked and distrusted. Residents told of being searched by the police and then being attacked by unknown assailants as they left the hostel. Because the SAP places barbed wire around hostels, they are also identified as siding with those who want the hostels to be abolished. Lastly allegations were made that members of the SAP steal from residents during searches.

In the third hostel, residents wanted the SAP or the SADF to protect them from attacks by the outside community. Some of these attacks had demolished whole sections of this particular hostel.

*It is obvious that most hostels are subject to similar living conditions. However, the residents' perceptions and reactions to these conditions vary widely. It is thus important to consider the issue of contemporary hostels both from a national broadly-based perspective, and an individual perspective. This is especially important when looking at problems, solutions and proposals.*

- us\* Some hostels accommodate both families and singles. In these cases it is imperative that adequate services which would cater for everyone's needs, should be provided.
- is" In these cases, money allocated for upgrading must be used to meet the needs of both families and singles.
- its- when family housing is provided, sufficient recreational and educational facilities should be provided if these do not exist.
- US' Upgrading requires careful research into the needs of residents as well as negotiation between all parties concerned, especially amongst the hostel residents themselves.
- ra<sup>5</sup> No money for upgrading should be spent without consulting the hostel residents themselves. Residents are in dire need of more essential services not barbed wire fences.
- us Fencing should not be done without consulting the residents of those hostels to be fenced. If fencing is required by residents, absolute clarity should be obtained as to what exactly is to be fenced. The fencing of a car park for security reasons is not the same thing as the fencing of an entire hostel complex.
- \*sr Responsible as well as accountable structures to ensure maintenance and upkeep are imperative.
- its- Hostel residents' committees often perform a valuable problem-solving function within hostels, and their establishment in all hostels could be useful.

Improved communication with existing societal structures such as the police are necessary to promote trust within whole communities.

if-defence units and are involved in the Jacks on the hostels.

For hostel residents, *township dwellers*, whether they actually support certain political organisations or not, have become indubitable supporters of the policies of the mass organisations which control the townships. For hostel residents, the situation is a simple case of 'us' (hostel residents) and 'them' (township dwellers). In such a situation, it becomes relatively easy for anyone to manipulate the fears and prejudices of migrant workers from the rural areas and, in turn, to provoke a response from fearful township inhabitants.

One of the first principles which should be accepted in making any recommendations is that of 'process-breaking'. In other words, gearing practical efforts towards breaking the cycle of violence and reducing levels of fear.

*First*, one needs to address some of the factors involved in maintaining the cycle of violence. These are, for example, the high frequency of rumours and threats, the failure of state organisations to contain violence or to protect victims, the resulting fear, and the loss of confidence (i.e. mistrust) in the ability of the state to maintain law and order. Accordingly, the highest priority must be to establish an effective system of rumour control, possibly making use of existing local dispute resolution committee structures.

*Second*, the existing conflict between hostel residents and township inhabitants has been fuelled and fanned by distorted perceptions. Efforts will have to be initiated to correct the negative stereotypes.

One way that this can be achieved is to get the parties together to work out local peace accords and encourage joint community meetings (as has been successfully implemented in Mpumalanga township in Natal). The holding of social and sport gatherings is also recommended to build up points of contact and to allow trust to grow within individual communities. Furthermore, the mutual sharing of all facilities available to all inhabitants of townships should be the accepted basis of cooperation.

All these initiatives, however, must avoid abrogating responsibility by leaving it up to politicians 'to do something about the

situation'. Genuine commitment from broad sections of the community must be instilled through community-based initiatives - participants must be encouraged to take 'ownership' of their problems.

*Third*, a constant theme in the conflict between hostel residents and township inhabitants has been the violent use of all forms of dangerous weapons. The proliferation of arms, especially of automatic weapons, has been a factor in the high death-toll. Strict measures banning the possession, carrying and use of dangerous weapons must be enforced. Furthermore, the security forces should enforce a strict but impartial policy of disarming the combatants from both sides.

*Fourth*, the parallel upgrading and formalising of the surrounding squatter settlements ('tandem development') will have to go hand in hand with any changes to the hostel system. Efforts at upgrading will also have to be directed at addressing the acute housing shortage and making suitable land available for further settlement.

*Fifth*, educational programmes should be launched in the townships and in the hostels to explain to inhabitants and residents the causes of destructive conflict (e.g. violence). This will assist in providing them with the skills to transform such destructive conflict into constructive conflict, and to prevent the current predominantly party-political conflict from escalating into ethnic conflict. OSO

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*The security forces should enforce a strict but impartial policy of disarming the combatants from both sides*

*Efforts at upgrading will also have to be directed at addressing the acute housing shortage and making suitable land available for further settlement*



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
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
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