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
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# Editorial Notes

It is a mere seven months ago that South Africa entered its present period of fundamental societal change. Most South Africans - commentators and activists included - are astounded by the rapidity and scope of the process.

More particularly, actors and stakeholders in the country are bewildered by the uncertainties, the contradictions, and the centrifugal forces they are experiencing in their different environments. If politics is defined as the art of the possible - and politics is indisputable paramount at the moment - it would seem that a wizard is required to keep these forces from pulling the country apart.

The current issue of *Indicator SA* captures a number of these conflicting currents and pressures:

- the delicate balance between political polarization and the search for alliances;
- the contradictions within Marxist thought regarding state and nation;
- the rejection by a number of political actors of the negotiation process.
- the rising expectations of black youth

Simultaneously, a number of critical developments and related economic challenges within the country are analysed and recommendations proposed: the AIDS crisis, small scale agricultural development and the population explosion.

As captured by the cover design, moreover, the South African worker, in particular, is being sorely tested by these seemingly opposing forces. Being mainly black, largely unionised and living most often in urban townships, these workers are experiencing pressures

and inducements from various quarters: from political movements, from organised management and labour, from their home communities, and from the state. These issues, perhaps, capture the main theme of this issue of *Indicator SA*.

- Clive Thompson takes the current labour ministry to task for attempting to introduce controversial labour legislation during transition and after an historic meeting in Harare between South African government officials and the ILO.

- The newly constituted Workers Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA) spells out its approach to worker action in the transition period.

- Chris Gregory discusses the continuing overtly political role which Cosatu has decided to play after February 1990.

- Charles Meth and the NPT's Roelf du Plooy enter into a debate on productivity statistics: an issue close to the heart of collective bargaining and of differing strategies used during this process.

## ERRATUM

Peter Gill contributed an article on anti-squatting legislation to the *Urban Monitor* of the last *Indicator SA* (IPSA Vol7/No3: Winter 1990). In this piece, one paragraph referring to a BLA survey (Para 5, p66) is ambiguous. The information in that paragraph was in fact supplied by the TPA rather than flowing from survey results, and the figure of 104 173 refers to shacks, not squatters.

*Simon Bekker, Acting Editor  
September 1990*

*Since Graham Howe is on extended leave,  
Simon Bekker and Rob Evans edited this issue of Indicator SA*

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
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
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


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## BETWEEN POLARISATION AND PACTS

### WHAT KIND OF TRANSITION DOES SOUTH AFRICA HAVE?

By Lawrence Schlemmer, Director, Centre for Policy Studies,  
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*Today there is more speculation than ever before about what kind of society South Africa is to become. The active and confident debate about major economic and constitutional policy alternatives both illustrates and in a way re-inforces the uncertainty. Expectations of 'third world' decay in the social and economic fabric alternate with hopes for a return to high growth rates and rising prosperity.*

The anticipation of 'democracy' is ubiquitous but its interpretation varies from that of the dominance of mass sentiment orchestrated by a commanding, hegemonic post-liberation party (the ANC?), through some form of ethnic power-sharing, to a balance of parties in stable and orderly competition, constrained by legal and constitutional measures which protect rights and ensure freedom. All these simple expectations, however, suffer from a certain conceptual purity which is lacking in the real world.

The outcomes of political change in all societies depend to a lesser or greater degree on two broad sets of factors. One set of factors comprises the socio-economic conditions within which a new system will take root, usually referred to as the pre-requisites. A second influence is the mode of transition: how the political system changes and the forces and constraints which arise in the strategic process of transition.

#### Process or pre-requisites

There is an extensive debate in political literature about the relevance of 'preconditions' or pre-requisites for democracy, like economic growth or democratic culture. One accepts that often the assumed 'pre-requisites' may have developed precisely because both they and the associated democratic characteristics have been facilitated by a third factor. It is also difficult to know for example, whether emerging economic development facilitates democratic evolution or whether the latter facilitates economic growth.

Caution is indicated, but some preconditions seem so obvious in their relevance that they cannot be overlooked. Similarly one must be cautious about the

determining effects of the process of transition. Even the most consolidated of processes towards democratic rule may fail in the end because all popular expectations, except those of the new ruling elites, are dashed by economic setbacks or strong sectional hostility. Prerequisites can usurp process.

Space does not allow these theoretical dilemmas to be explored. At the risk of considerable simplification, however, one has to venture the proposition that the nature of the process of transition will be more definitive in the short to medium term, but that underlying pre-conditions will have their effect in the longer term. In other words what de Klerk, Mandela, Buthelezi, Treurnicht and the other actors are doing at present will obviously determine the shape of the initial 'settlement'.

The viability of that settlement over time will be influenced by social conditions. The simplification must not, however, obscure the fact that the actions and strategies of these actors are in themselves influenced by social conditions and that the wisdom of their social and economic judgements will affect the durability of their conjoint solution.

It is appropriate however, to focus on the characteristics of the process at hand in order to understand what kind of initial outcome or settlement this country will enjoy or be burdened with.

Pre-negotiations between major protagonists are obviously well-advanced. Substantive constitutional and policy-directed negotiation will commence early in 1991.

Local analysts have begun to compare the process occurring in South Africa with

*Even the most consolidated of processes towards democratic rule may fail because of economic setbacks or strong sectional hostility*

*Pacts and even political alliances are expected between divergent political elites, forced on them by their inability to exclude each other*

transitions which have occurred in a variety of Eastern European, Southern European and Latin American societies. Parallels are drawn between the internationally established phenomenon of early signals of transition in the form of political liberalisation, usually conceded under popular pressure, and the lifting of restrictions on political movements in SA.

Also influenced by precedents elsewhere, 'pacts' and even political 'alliances' are expected between the divergent political elites, forced on them by their inability to exclude each other. In the resulting situation of mutual inclusion of formerly combative elites, democratisation is expected to flow from an acceptance by former elites that authoritarian control is no longer possible and that one or another form of popular endorsement has to provide the basis for government authority. (The keynote reference in this regard is G O'Donnell, *et al*: 1986).

The literature certainly enriches our knowledge of a large variety of processes and outcomes but offers very little basis for predictions in our specific situation. A very useful subsequent 1990 paper by T L Karl and P Schmitter, unfortunately prohibiting quotation or citation, accomplishes all that is possible by providing a conceptual framework within which a very large mixture of possible outcomes may be plotted and understood, and containing only very broad predictive propositions. For South Africa one has to work from the salient features of the process at hand, and predict on the basis of the emerging strategic dynamic.

Some of these salient features are assessed in the brief and selective propositions below:

- the government is negotiating from a position of ambiguity but not weakness. As Jack Spence (1990), among many others, argues convincingly, the present government has never been in danger of losing control of the broader, over-arching agencies of administration and control. The military and the police-force, some modest fragmentation at the margins notwithstanding, have been fundamentally loyal to the principle of the maintenance of the system of government, if not to the government's precise policies. The ambiguity has arisen from a breakdown of administration in localised spheres of life affecting non-voters in black local

areas and black education rather than the government's own constituency.

- the 'costs' of continued minority dominance since 1987, while serious, have been those of degree rather than being categorical pressures. Social protest and instability have lowered investor confidence, internal economic sanctions have reduced the prospects of external investment but have left exports relatively unaffected. The lack of external capital, more due to external perceptions of credit risk than anything else, acting through the balance of payments, has led not to economic decline but to a variable ceiling on growth. Hence the government was not faced with a need to avoid absolute economic shrinkage but rather with an incentive to raise the ceiling on growth;
- the major protagonist of government, the ANC, is likewise negotiating in a situation of ambiguity. Its popular legitimacy is untested although probably large (according to most recent opinion-polls between 38 and 45 percent of the total adult population of all races would choose the ANC above other parties). Its reputation is largely derived from its symbolic leadership of the struggle against apartheid. After the Namibian settlement process which led to the loss of its base camps in Angola its military-strategic potential was hugely reduced. The summary withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the international promotion of socialist transformation and its manifest economic crisis have left the ANC dependent on Western endorsement, predicated on an expectation of compromise and integration rather than 'liberation' or the transformation of South Africa;
- it has always been true, but never more clearly than in recent months, that the ANC has not only to seek a compromise with government. It must to some degree or another also make concessions to black homeland elites and bureaucrats, some black local authority leaders, black religious elites who are rising above party-political divisions in the black community (especially Archbishop Tutu) and with some parties in the existing parliament (the Labour Party and the Democratic Party, or parts of them) in order to avoid stark opposition from these quarters;
- the ANC and its alliance partners enjoy

*Both the government and the African National Congress are negotiating in a situation of ambiguity*

virtually no penetration of support into the middle and senior ranks of the relatively large and coherent bureaucracy and security establishment. Without support from the National Party they could not assume the government of the country. The notion of an autonomous take-over by the ANC is far-fetched;

- both the government and the ANC (should) realise that if, in the process of settlement, they weaken or fragment each other, they will have to deal with less-reasonable and less-conciliatory alternative protagonists, among most of whom even the principle of compromise is at this stage unacceptable.

Space does not allow many other features of the process to be introduced and therefore those mentioned above will suffice. Taken together they illustrate a cardinal feature of the negotiating process. Both the ANC and the government are 'gatekeepers' to each other. Neither can achieve what they have set as objectives without cooperation from the other.

The government cannot run the townships and the black schools without cooperation from the ANC, unless it uses massive force and risks heightened conflict, which will collapse economic growth. The ANC could not remotely anticipate governing the country without its participation being 'sponsored' by the National Party government.

Revolutionary take-over is impossible in South Africa. The government and the ANC are already locked in strained interdependence, which, after all, is the fundamental reason why they are negotiating with one another at all.

Parallels in the reviews of international literature mentioned earlier would most definitely suggest that, given the interdependence mentioned above, whether constitutionally formalised or informally agreed in a 'pact', an interim period of co-responsibility in government by the ANC and the National Party is virtually the only conceivable outcome. This is quite aside from any imperatives which might arise because different racial or ethnic categories in the population would demand to see political representatives with whom they could identify serving in government. The requirements of inter-ethnic accommodation simply complement what is pragmatically required for the successful governance of the country in transition.

In a recent television broadcast (SABC TV, 14 August 1990) Mr Mandela, in response to a question, said ... 'we already have an alliance', referring to a joint committee established to administer the negotiation process and related matters. This was denied by Mr F W de Klerk the next day, but understandably so, since the suggestion put to him was one of a substantive political alliance. Such an alliance is premature, but the existence of the joint committee would strengthen the conclusion that its emergence is fairly inevitable. Breytenbach (1990) observes that 'the process towards building an interim government involving the state and the ANC is well-advanced'.

Obviously one must concede that possible outflanking of both the ANC and the NP by militant or resistant political forces could derail the present process. One would suggest, however, that the derailment, if it occurs, would amount to a delay. The essential stalemate in political forces, or the mutual 'gatekeeper' effect, will resurrect the process in due course.

### Beyond the first gate

The prospects of conjoint rule, or a form of co-determination, at least for a while, say nothing about its likely democratic content (leaving aside the fact that participants will use this sadly overworked term to describe their participation anyway). From the literature two ideal-types of conjoint rule can be identified.

One would involve extensive commitments, popular mobilisation and active participation among constituencies falling under the cooperating elites. Membership, rallies, congresses and democratic selection procedures for public representatives would channel the effects of participation upwards to the leaderships but along separate channels. This is usually called consociation.

Another would shift the emphasis away from popular mobilisation to the networks and associations of influential people surrounding the cooperating leadership and to their relations with one another. Labour elites, top business organisations, political churchmen, the Broederbond, key professional associations and local party-bosses would constitute the effective 'constituency', and the mass base would be typically encouraged to become passive; soothed by rhetoric and socio-economic reform. This is usually called corporatism; in effect it would be a corporate alliance.

*An interim period of co-responsibility in government by the ANC and the NP is pragmatically required for successful governance of the country in transition*

*Militant or resistant political forces could derail the present process, but the mutual 'gatekeeper' effect will resurrect it in due course*

*In a pact, the NP and the ANC might have sufficient control over political and bureaucratic intermediaries to become rather undemocratic*

*Compared with the relative interest coherence which whites, Indians and many Coloureds enjoy, the ANC has hardly the basis for a party programme*

The latter is more integrative, the former more democratic in its accountability to the grass-roots.

It is often optimistically assumed that mass pressure for democratic participation will be too strong to resist. The sobering fact is that, if they cooperate in a pact or corporate alliance, the National Party and the ANC together might have sufficient control over political and bureaucratic intermediaries to become rather undemocratic - an authoritarian elite cartel. If partnered by the ANC the present government, in its new formation, could even re-impose the State of Emergency without the slightest risk of sanctions. Overseas pressure groups are manifestly concerned with racial symbols rather than with the democratic quality of government.

In the context of constituency support, the National Party probably has fewer problems and more leeway than the ANC. Conservative opposition to the NP may have grown substantially in recent months but it is because of a fear that there could be a hand-over of power to a new government with different standards of public administration and control. If, however, the NP appears to be ensconced in the ruling 'alliance' and carries with it the powerful symbolic reassurance of the support of the security agencies, it will emerge with unchallenged popularity among a clear majority of whites, probably most Indians, the stable employed adult generation of coloured people and, according to some recent opinion polls, some 20 - 25 percent of blacks. (See a May 1990 Poll by Marketing and Media Research, for example). This would amount to some roughly 35 to 45 percent of the total electorate, sufficient to at least deprive the ANC of an overall majority.

In other words, it would be to the advantage of the NP to cultivate its grass-roots constituencies as well as its corporate links and organisational networks. It could conceivably even re-emerge as the 'senior' partner in the 'alliance'. Thus the NP does not have any critical strategic need to make a choice between 'corporatism' and mass-based consociationalism. It can achieve both together.

The ANC has larger problems. At present conflicts are occurring on the ground between black factions which could lead to the alienation from the ANC of many traditionally-orientated Zulus. Even if this does not occur in the near future, ethnic sensitivities are being stimulated and these

traditional-nationalist Zulus may start to question the political culture of the ANC when it finally displays its composition of leadership to the full public gaze. This leadership is very strongly dominated by Xhosa-speakers and non-Africans.

Even more importantly, perhaps, is the fact that the sub-categories among its potential constituents have not only very intensely-felt expectations for economic redress and policy-change but that the expectations are far from uniform. Formal sector unionised workers have intense commitments to higher wages and occupational protection. The superficially radical white collar classes (sometimes called 'intelligentsia') want promotion, job-advancement, perks and psychological re-assurance. Hence they are closer to black consciousness ideology than to the ANC's symbolic socialist egalitarianism. The unemployed want job opportunities and the informal sector wants more deregulation. Township residents want urban services whereas shack-dwellers want cheap housing and freedom to establish residence in convenient and compatible locations. The very active young adult and youth street committees, area committees and student organisations have built their organisational rewards on various kinds of local hegemonies. They may want to retain power on the streets and in schools.

Compared with the relative interest coherence which a majority of whites, Indians and many Coloureds enjoy because of shared middle class values and status, the ANC has hardly the basis for a party programme. If it is to avoid fragmentation and severe internal dissent the ANC will have to adopt a style of what can be politely-termed 'imperative co-ordination'. It will have to use its middle-level activists, committee personnel, shop-stewards, and street gangs to impose discipline. As any cynic knows, this does not contradict a very wide and corrupted definition of 'democracy', but it makes responsiveness to grass-roots expectations difficult.

In parenthesis, this picture does not take account of possible additional dissent in the ANC if the SA Communist Party were to break cover fully and start pursuing more purist, longer-run socialist strategies (vanguardism) in collaboration with or with support from the labour movement leadership.

The nature of the initial 'settlement' must be assessed against the background of the factors discussed above. One might

conclude that:

• both the ANC and the NP are not going to substantially scale down claims to executive power. The compromise is unlikely to involve power for one and merely protection of rights for the other. Given the interdependence between the two parties it also cannot involve the displacement of one or the other. Compound executive authority of one kind or another seems inevitable to preserve the governability of the country;

• the relatively more coherent electoral organisation underneath the National Party will make it possible for the NP to establish a reasonably clear mandate for a power compromise (probably confirmed by a referendum or electoral text). The ANC and other majority-based parties, with grass-roots constituencies unused to formalised politics, might find that their mandate is partially an endorsement of compromise and partially a mandate to seek redress and to fight for political ascendancy;

• the distinction can be put differently. There will probably be a majority consensus among minority voters that the NP should use its power to preserve the *status quo ante* as much as possible and in as many ways as possible. This will be a clearer mandate than the ANC and majority-based parties will receive. Here the expectation will be to achieve fairly dramatic rewards of different kinds for different sub-constituencies. If one assumes that the right-wing will remain a minority, the articulation between the NP and its constituency will be more comfortable than that between the ANC and its base;

• hence, as co-participants in the initial settlement one will expect that the ANC will continue to be more ambiguous in its claims and policies than the NP. The initial political coalition, therefore, will be an uneasy affair, accompanied by considerable uncertainty and contradictory rhetoric, and appearing very brittle at times.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to draw at this stage, however, is that the settlement is going to involve some very tough choices and options. The expectation that the settlement will be an all-purpose package of trust, democratic accountability and compromise is far-fetched.

The toughest trade-off of all will arise because of the contradictions between

democratic accountability and the viability of the NP-ANC 'alliance'. If the initial settlement is largely informal, based on a pattern of ongoing trade-offs and agreements between the top leadership of the NP and the ANC, it will tend to become a cartel; a joint political corporation. The parties, and particularly the ANC, will have to pay more attention to accommodating each other than to their support-bases. Hence it will tend to become authoritarian (the less-democratic corporate option).

If the settlement is formalised in rigid constitutional guarantees of rights and participation for the majority and minority constituencies, less attention will be paid by the ANC and the NP to accommodating each other than to their respective constituencies. There will be more democratic accountability to the grass-roots but probably also more conflict and strain at the top. The strain will in fact result from the strength of constituency demands.

This uncomfortable contradiction thus raises the question of whether the wisest course is not to dispense with both consociation and high-level pacts and alliances and to proceed immediately to competitive elections to identify a clear electoral winner, with no more than a bill of individual rights as a safeguard. This sounds attractively legitimate and uncluttered.

Regrettably this loses sight of the original reasons why South Africa has to go through an 'accommodation' between minority and majority forces; it is an equally problematic option in our political reality. Firstly it is unlikely that the white constituency and the NP will accept the uncertainty involved. Equally seriously, there is a distinct possibility that the National Party, with support from smaller groupings, will either narrowly win the election or prevent the ANC from gaining an absolute majority. Will the ANC accept this final, frustrating set-back? Will democracy not collapse in violence and conflict, all over again?

It would seem as if uneasy coalitions and qualifications of popular expectations are inevitable in South Africa's difficult transition. Given the nature of our divided society, as the saying goes, 'no one promised us a rose-garden'. (IPA)

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*If the right-wing remains a minority, the articulation between the NP and its constituency will be more comfortable than that between the ANC and its base*

*Perhaps the wisest choice is to dispense with high-level pacts and to proceed immediately to competitive elections, with a bill of rights as a safeguard*

# Multi-nationalism

## How Many Nations In The New SA?

By Rowley Arenstein

**B**ecause in South Africa there is at present a failure to draw a clear distinction between racism (the outlook that certain people are superior to others because of their genetic outlook) and nationalism, there is a denial of the rights of nations (in this country) to equality and self-determination. The cry is that we are a one-nation state (the Democratic Party) or that we must build one nation in South Africa (the SACP).

There is a fear in this country that any suggestion of there being different nations is a backhand plea for the retention of apartheid in another form. It is believed that the existence of different nations in South Africa can lead only to the division of the country both spiritually and territorially.

Such is the scourge of apartheid that it causes myths to replace reality, and even though the Freedom Charter clearly states that 'all national groups shall have equal status' the modern commentators of the Freedom Charter attempt to play down the meaning of this demand. At a national conference on the Freedom Charter (organised by Idasa in Cape Town on 15/16 July 1988) this aspect received little attention (see *The Freedom Charter and the Future*: Idasa).

In this publication Giliomee implies that nationality is a subjective concept 'where any group must be comprised of people freely associating themselves with the group' and Dr Ntatho Motlana rejects the concept of national groups as follows: '1955 (when the Freedom Charter was framed) is a long time ago. The National Party and its organs especially the SABC had been drumming into our collective psyche the concept of national groups. Clearly demands like our founding fathers (of the Freedom Charter) cannot be used to preserve the divisions that such a concept as 'National Group' would perpetuate.'

In other words, to admit the existence of different nations is to cause disunity. Dr Motlana forgets that in the world there are one-nation states (such as Germany, France, Cambodia, Laos etc.) and that there are multi-national stable states (such as India, Nigeria, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland etc.).

The initial refusal of the British Government to give Ireland the right of secession led to the rise of the Irish question and drew the attention of the struggle for socialism. In the early 1850s Marx thought that the problem could be solved only after Britain became a Socialist state, but in the middle 1860s he changed his mind and came to the conclusion that Britain could never become Socialist without freeing Ireland first.

In 1913 the Bolsheviks studied the national question and Stalin wrote his famous article 'Marxism and the National Question' where he gave the following definition of a nation: 'A nation is a historically constituted stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture.'

Stalin states that none of the above characteristics is by itself sufficient to define a nation, but if a single one of these characteristics is absent, a nation ceases to be a nation. (In terms of this definition, therefore, there are a number of nations in South Africa and even the whites do not form one nation, as the whites do not have one language or one common tradition - the English speaking whites and the Afrikaners are therefore two different nations).

Not every person belongs to a nation because some nations are in embryonic form, and others are realising a potential. As the Soviet Union is a *multi-national state*, Lenin insisted on safeguards for national minorities and in the Soviet Union there are two houses, one of which has representatives on the basis of nations, the other on universal franchise. Thus the Soviet constitution is not based solely on one man one vote. All laws have to be passed by both houses. (In practice this system has not worked because of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state, but the principle is important in considering how to safeguard the rights of nations.)

Yugoslavia, also a multi-national state, has a constitution similar to that of the Soviet Union. If South Africa is to bring about changes to establish democracy peacefully it is not enough to demand

universal suffrage as the only condition for such a democracy (coupled perhaps with a bill of rights). There has to be effective power-sharing where the rights of minorities are effectively guaranteed. There is a chasm between the principle of self-determination as practiced in democratic countries and the policy of the Nationalists as regards their understanding of power-sharing.

The Nationalist policy is presently based on a form of segregation as, for example, in the Tricameral Parliament. The government is now apparently planning for a number of high-level authorities for Africans with decision-making powers in many fields, and joint governmental institutions in which all groups could be represented. This all points to decision making in separate entities.

However on the Marxist and democratic principle of self-determination of nations (and of two houses) each house is integrated, with each house having a difference in voting strengths for the different nations.

For example in the House of Soviets in the Soviet Union the Russians practically dominate this house because their representation is about 50%. This house is elected on the principle of universal franchise. However in the second house (The House of Nationalities) where nations are given equal treatment, the Russian representation is less than 5%. The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has similar provisions in its proposed constitution.

### The National Question

The draft constitution produced by the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, however, has been attacked by the South African Communist Party (SACP) as 'an extraordinary and complicated hotch-potch ... (which) ... far from eliminating the racial categories, the constitution entrenches and protects them.'

*... the big bourgeoisie seeks transformation of South African society which goes beyond the reform limit of the present regime but aims to pre-empt the objectives of the revolutionary forces ... (and) ... the ultimate solutions are always references to group rights ... which ... implies various forms of protection of the accumulated privileges of the white group.*

Joe Slovo's views are not shared by certain Soviet theorists, as quoted by Colin Legum in *The Sunday Star Review* (25/01/1987):

*'A leading Soviet theoretician has urged the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in South Africa, and has warned against over-confidence in accepting the irreversibility of the present stage of the struggle. ... More remarkably, he advocates far-reaching compromises to make it easier for the white*

*minority to abandon apartheid and to lessen the level of racial conflict. ... These surprising views are contained in a report submitted to the Second Soviet-African Conference of Peace, Co-operation and Social Progress by Mr Gleb Starushenko, a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. ... His report contains four major proposals that, in some respects, came closer to the views of President Botha and his advisers than to the ANC and the South African Communist Party.*

*His first proposal endorses "the programme of the anti-racist forces" which does not envisage "a broad nationalisation of capitalist property as an indispensable condition". ... His second proposal is that the ANC "might work out comprehensive guarantees for the white population which could be implemented after the elimination of the apartheid regime". ... His third proposal is the most remarkable of all: the idea of a parliament consisting of two chambers - one formed on the basis of proportional representation, and the other possessing the right of veto on the basis of equal representation for all four major racial communities ...*

*Mr Starushenko's third proposal is that the post-apartheid state might take the form of a unitary system with "autonomous components". The form and substance of such autonomy, he adds, should be defined with due regard being given to the "will of the population", for instance, through referendums and negotiations. ... Concrete issues related to the functioning of such a system might become the subject of a national conference whose components would be the government of the Republic of South Africa and the true representatives of the non-white population.*

*Finally, Mr Starushenko, stressing the need for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in South Africa, suggests this might be expedited by resorting to international guarantees, with the different sides each selecting guarantors by agreement from among prestigious international organisations or individual states.*

*The proposals make perfectly good sense in terms of the Soviet Marxist analysis of the situation in South Africa. First, they see the deepening of internal contradictions with the "upper strata of society" no longer able to rule by their own methods and having to find some ways out of their dilemma. ... The need is now to deepen these structural differences by encouraging the "ruling class" to advance the idea of a negotiated settlement'. ... Secondly, the proposals advocate a two-phase struggle 'Only after the success of the "liberation struggle" in ending apartheid can the struggle begin for the "national democratic revolution". ... Thirdly, they make a realistic analysis of the stage*

reached in the struggle so far. Warning of the possibility of the struggle losing its momentum and "even getting bogged down in the present pre-revolutionary stage", they point to experience elsewhere that if a revolution fails to keep up its momentum and to register appreciable results, 'it is bound to suffer defeat'.

If one studies the history of the Soviet ideologues on the national question one will not be surprised by the sentiments expressed by Mr Starushenko.

There is a vast difference between 'Nat thought' and Starushenko's proposals, which explains why the NP so far has tended to reject the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba option.

Lenin in his pamphlet *The Discussion on Self Determination summed up* (collected works Vol 19) states that the liberation of oppressed nationality presupposes a two-fold change in this sphere of politics:

- complete equality of all nationalities; and
- freedom of political secession.

Lenin argues that it is impossible, under capitalism, to abolish national (or any political) oppression. 'By transforming capitalism into socialism, the proletariat creates the possibility for the abolition of national oppression, this possibility will become reality 'only' when complete democracy is introduced in all spheres, including the fixing of state boundaries in accordance with the 'sympathies' of the population and including complete freedom of secession. This, in turn, will in practice lead to the complete elimination of all national suspicion and to the speedy establishment of intimacy between amalgamation of nations culminating in the 'withering away' of the state.'

Further in the same pamphlet Lenin states:

*Try as you will, you cannot avoid this conclusion: Annexations violate self-determination of nations : they establish state boundaries against the wishes of the population. ... Being opposed to annexations means being in favour of the right to self-determination*

Lenin then quotes Marx : 'No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.'

In 1928 the Communist International (Comintern) adopted a resolution on the South African question. It there called for:

*the slogan of an independent native South African Republic as a stage towards a workers and peasants republic, with full rights for all races, black, coloured and white. ... the national question in South Africa which is based upon the agrarian question, lies at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa. The black peasantry constitutes the basic moving force of the revolution in alliance with and under the*

*leadership of the working class. ... This slogan does not mean that we ignore or forget about the non-exploited elements of the white population. On the contrary, the slogan calls for 'full and equal rights for all races'.*

*The white toiling masses must realise that in South Africa they constitute national minorities, and it is their task to support and fight jointly with the native masses against the bourgeoisie and the British Imperialists. The argument against the slogan for a native republic on the grounds that it does not protect the whites is objectively nothing else than a cover for the unwillingness to accept the correct principle that South Africa belongs to the native population. Under these conditions it is the test of the Communist Party to influence the embryonic and crystallising national movements among the natives in order to develop these movements to national agrarian movements against the white bourgeoisie and British Imperialists.*

*The failure to fulfil this task means separation of the Communist Party of South Africa from the native population. The Communist Party cannot confine itself to the general slogan of "let there be no whites and no blacks". The Communist Party must understand the revolutionary importance of the national question.*

*Only by correct understanding of the importance of the national question in South Africa will the Communist Party be able to combat effectively the efforts of the bourgeoisie to divide the white and black workers by playing on race chauvinism and to transform the embryonic nationalist movement into a revolutionary struggle against the white bourgeoisie and foreign interest ...'*

## Multinationalism

Following Stalin's definition of a nation there are at least eight nations in South Africa. The Nguni speaking tribes of South Africa - the Zulus, the Xhosas and the Swazis could be the basis of an Nguni nation. The three Sotho nations could form the Sotho nation, the Vendas the third nation and the Shangaans the fourth.

Among the whites there are two nations - the English and the Afrikaans speaking - and finally the Indians and the Coloureds (particularly in the Western Cape) bring the total to eight nations.

On the basis of self-determination and powersharing at least two houses would be required as in the example of the Natal-KwaZulu Indaba proposals.

The suggestion made by the SACP and by certain leaders of the ANC that all that would be required



would be a Bill of Rights in a future constitution safeguarding the rights of individuals, is illusory as has been shown by the experience of American blacks who have all the safeguards as individuals in the American constitution but are discriminated against in every way.

In a front page article in the *Sunday Star Review* (March 11, 1990) it is stated that America's thirty million blacks learn less, earn less, live worse and die sooner than the rest of its citizens. Why can't they catch up?

*The United States buried legal segregation a quarter of a century ago. But Americans remain as self-consciously black and white in their thoughts as an old movie. Racial stereotypes survive, embalming a diffuse racial prejudice. A black American may not be prevented because he is black from going where and doing what he pleases. And many go far.*

*Yet overall in America's mobile society, which has allowed immigrants of all colours to edge - or flash - ahead, the American-born black population remains stuck at the back of the line. Why?*

*The numbers are grim. Blacks are more than twice as likely as whites to be jobless. The median black family income is 56% of a white family's. Nearly one third of all blacks, as against 10% of whites, live below what is officially reckoned as the poverty level; among them 45% of all black children, as against 15% of white ones. A black baby is twice as likely as a white one to die in its first year.*

*The 31 million or so blacks are 12% of America's population. A black man is six times as likely as a white one to be murdered; homicide is the leading cause of death of young black men. The dismal litany drones on, and on ..*

In India, the failure of the Indian National Congress to grant safeguards to the Moslems resulted in the demand of the Moslems for partition of India into 2 parts - India and Pakistan. As a result of demands by the different nations of India, (after India had been given independence), the whole political map of India was redrawn to a pattern of 14 states representing *linguistic* regions.

Today India still faces difficulties because of its failure to recognise the rights of the Sikhs to self-determination and to the right of secession.

In Sri Lanka the Tamil majority has been in conflict (often erupting in violence) because the majority Sinhalese have also refused to allow the minority Tamilians to have their own homeland.

In Canada at one time there was a demand from the French speaking Canadians for the right of Quebec (where the French speakers are in the

majority) to secede, but this demand faded away when the Canadian government practically allowed the French Canadians to govern their province as much as possible.

Other major trouble spots where different nations have clashed are Cyprus (which today is effectively partitioned between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots), Fiji (where the indigenous Fijians are practically driving out the Indian population in that country). In Belgium (a two-nation state - the Walloons - French speaking and the Flemish - Dutch speaking) there is power-sharing and a peaceful community.

Switzerland, which has four nations and three official languages, also has safeguards for minorities and is one of the most stable countries in the world.

## Summary

- Nations are *objective*, historical entities that cannot be wished away subjectively. Nations cannot be created artificially, as so many academic and political leaders wish to do. If such a possibility existed (in our time) then how is it that the different nations of Great Britain, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, India, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc. etc. have not formed one nation?
- In multi-national states it is not democratic merely to rely on universal franchise without conceding the equality of all the nations in such states and the right of such nations to self-determination and to power sharing. Recognising the right to self-determination does not mean demanding that each multi-national should be dismembered into its national units just as in the case of marriage while there is a right of divorce married couples are not encouraged to separate.
- Safeguards in the form of a bill of rights for individuals is not a sufficient substitute for the right of self-determination of nations and for the recognition of power-sharing.
- A future post-apartheid South Africa should not be characterised merely as a non-racial country but rather as a non-racial multi-national state where all nations are to be treated equally with structural safeguards and with the right of self-determination (which includes the right of secession).

Lenin in all his writings on the national question stressed this latter right and it is ironic that his heirs in the Supreme Soviet regard Lithuania's decision to secede from the Soviet Union as being 'unlawful'. **IPVA**

# The Soul of the White ...

## Negotiables and Non-negotiables

By Dr C P Mulder, Conservative Party M.P.

*Views and stances on negotiations of a number of South African political actors have been canvassed in the past two issues of Indicator SA. To add to the picture, the current view of the Conservative Party was obtained. In this article, Dr Corné Mulder points to the strands of the negotiation process which are acceptable and those which are unacceptable to his party.*

*Negotiation itself cannot be presented as policy: it is rather a tool to achieve a goal*

It would seem that negotiation politics has suddenly become the catchphrase used to solve all of South Africa's present political problems. After the National Party government's recent about-face regarding its previous principles and policies, 'negotiation politics' is the last term left with which the ordinary NP supporter can defend his party. Ask a NP supporter about some aspect of his party's present policy and the most likely answer will be 'We will negotiate on that'.

But what does the dictionary say about the word 'negotiate': 'to treat or bargain with others in order to reach an agreement'. To negotiate in that sense is nothing new. On the contrary, the idea of negotiation is as old as mankind itself. In fact, it is clear that negotiation in itself cannot be presented as policy: it is rather a tool or strategy to achieve an ultimate goal. The goal makes up policy, the tool a way to reach the goal.

### The NP and the ANC

It is common knowledge that the NP and the ANC have already effectively entered into negotiations with one another. Each believes that it is not powerful enough to ignore the other, whilst each also believes itself to be strong enough to extract concessions from the other. On the one hand, we have the government of the day with its control over the Defence Force and the South African Police; while on the other hand we have the ANC with its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and its continuing threat of protracted armed struggle.

What however are the different goals of these organisations; goals with regard to which negotiations are being promoted? The ultimate goal of the NP is the sharing of power among the chief political actors, together with an unambiguous protection of minorities. The ultimate goal of the ANC remains the transfer of power to the people, as represented by the ANC. Neither the NP nor the ANC can afford to compromise on their ultimate goals unless they are prepared to lose their powerbases and become virtually irrelevant as a result.

Accordingly, it is completely naive to think that the proposed negotiation process is going to be an opportunity to place all kinds of constitutional models on the table in front of a very susceptible audience. First, we must remember that there will be no neutral referee. Second, it is ludicrous to expect political opponents to go to the negotiating table without a clearly defined bottom line which each is willing and able to enforce with all the means at its disposal.

In South Africa today, we have yet to reach the position where the various parties are obliged to compromise their stands because they believe there is no alternative, and therefore are obliged to agree with opponents on a settlement. That is typically the position after a protracted war.

As a consequence, neither the ANC nor the NP nor any other party to the negotiations are likely to compromise today on their ultimate goals though each may be prepared to compromise on minor issues. The real question regarding national negotiations among these parties is not

what the ultimate goals of the parties are - for these are clear enough - but whether the parties have any real commitment to the process of negotiations itself.

### Conservative Party View

The South African Communist Party (SACP) released a document entitled 'SACP directive/discussion' to its cells in May 1986. This document described how SACP and ANC members needed to have a uniform approach to negotiations and to interaction with white South African liberals. On negotiations, the document said: 'We must not mechanically dig in our heels against any future possibility of negotiations. We must remember that virtually all revolutionary struggles in the post war-period (Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, etc.), [and now Namibia] reached their final climax at the negotiating table. But the question of negotiations usually arrives at a time of a major revolutionary climax involving the transfer of power based on the massive strength of the people's offensive ... The main thrust of our present strategy remains a revolutionary seizure of power.'

In the light of this SACP stance on national negotiations in South Africa, where does the Conservative Party stand? We do not have any objection in principle to the idea of dialogue or negotiation. On the contrary, dialogue and negotiation have always been part of the history and culture of the White Nation in South Africa. Piet Retief negotiated with Dingaan as did President Paul Kruger when a delegation was sent to the United Kingdom to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the ZAR (the South African Republic of the Transvaal).

But in both these cases, negotiation was merely a method or strategy employed to achieve a specific goal. In both these instances, furthermore, negotiation did not ensure peace - the negotiation processes were followed by bloody conflicts.

While we in the Conservative Party say we do not have any objection in principle to dialogue and to negotiation, we also say that we do not have unqualified belief in the negotiation process. We believe that it would be unacceptably naive not to recognise that politics is in its heart about

gaining and controlling power. You either govern or you are governed. Given different ultimate goals, national negotiations in South Africa have a good chance of becoming deadlocked. The NP and the State President seem to have the attitude that the process must simply start all over again if deadlock occurs. This does not change goals.

We are also not obsessed with the notion of negotiation. There are certain values, freedoms and rights we hold which are simply non-negotiable. There are certain demands and conditions which have been put to us to which we answer with a straight-forward *no*. Negotiation is not at issue.

Under the heading 'Negotiation', the Conservative Party set out its policy clearly in its Manifesto for the election of 6 September 1989 as follows: 'The Conservative Party is prepared to negotiate with the democratically elected leaders of other communities but regards the White community's right to self-determination as non-negotiable. The Party will not negotiate with the ANC or any other terrorist organization which practices violence and Communism, nor will the Party allow any such negotiations to take place.'

Accordingly, the Conservative Party will not take part in the present process of negotiation. The Conservative Party will never go to the negotiation table to talk about the surrender of the Whites. It does not matter whether the government which requests negotiation be controlled by the ANC, the SACP or the NP. The Conservative Party will not negotiate White surrender.

We demand for the White Nation of South Africa the universally accepted right to be allowed to govern ourselves in our own fatherland, and that right is non-negotiable. We view the present negotiation process between the NP and the ANC as nothing less than a preparation to surrender power to a Black majority government. The Conservative Party is not prepared to take part in that. It is for the government and the ANC, therefore, to assess the chances for peace in South Africa without the adequate accommodation of the aspirations of the White Nation as represented by the Conservative Party. ~~IPDA~~

*The Conservative Party has no objection in principle to negotiation, since this is part of the white man's history*

*However, the CP will never go to the negotiation table to discuss the surrender of the white people*

## Turmoil in the Homelands

Although a number of South Africa's homelands were already in ferment during the last decade, the unbanning of popular political organisations on the 2nd of February this year led to mass political protest and escalating violence in most of these ten 'states'. It has become clear that independence - the fruit which were held up as attractive by the architects of the system - is rejected by large numbers of homeland residents. The fact that these homelands need to rely on South African security forces further underlines this point. Instead, reunification within a broader South Africa promising a more democratic political dispensation is fast becoming a tangible goal. Leaders from both self-governing and independent states conformed to the recent ANC call not officially to meet with State President de Klerk and thereby signalled their willingness to enter into an alliance with one of the main political players in South Africa. The matter of a referendum on the reunification of Transkei which has recently been raised by Major General Bantu Holomisa, is another case in point. The data base below itemises incidents of protest, mass action and violence which have taken place in these homelands since February this year. Incidents occurring within KwaZulu require a separate context to do justice to them, and a data base on its own.


LOCATION, DATE & ORGANISERS	DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES/RESPONSES
<b>BOPHUTHATSWANA</b>		
GaRankuwa 7 February MDM, Azapo, ANC, Cosatu and Naclu	To demand the resignation of the Bophuthatswanan government and reincorporation into SA.	10 injured, 1 dead when police attack crowd of 7 000, the dead and worst injured run over by a Bop police vehicle. Later, SA Min. Barend Du Plessis declares the constitutional future of TBVC states negotiable. Then Pres. Mangope negates reincorporation.
Mmabatho 12 to 17 February Unknown saboteurs	To destabilise the homeland.	Four bombs rock Bophuthatswana's capital city.
GaRankuwa 7 and 8 March MDM and unknown saboteurs	To demand the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana into SA.	7 killed, over 400 injured in police action on 50 000 crowd. Arrests and detentions follow. SA troops aid Mangope. Pitched battles ensue; phone lines to SA destroyed. Mass stayaway begins.
Itsoseng 13 March Unknown saboteurs	To destabilise the homeland.	Four limpet mines explode along a railway line, causing damage and disrupting train services.
GaRankuwa 14 March Odi and Moretele Residents' Committees	To protest against police action and the homeland system.	Residents start a three day long stayaway and a month long consumer boycott.
GaRankuwa 19 March Independent officers of the court	To protest against the system of law under the state of emergency.	Two magistrates and a prosecutor are arrested for refusing to serve warrants on people who had contravened terms under the state of emergency.
GaRankuwa 9 and 10th April Medical workers	To protest discriminatory practices and demand the firing of 2 administrators for racism.	25 are arrested and 10 injured when police attack strikers with rubber bullets, dogs, batons and teargas.
Bophuthatswana 30 April People's Patriotic Front	To overthrow the Mangope regime and reincorporate Bophuthatswana into SA	Planned coup called off due to the mass mobilisation of SADF forces in Bophuthatswana. Later, President Mangope states that Bophuthatswana will never reincorporate into South Africa.
Ramatlabana 17 June Azania(BCMA military wing)	To destabilise the Bophuthatswanan government.	Five Bophuthatswanan Defence Force (BDF) members are killed by guerrillas.
Bophuthatswana 24 June Unco-ordinated	To protest against President Mangope, and homeland system.	Hundreds of protesters dispersed by police while heckling Pres. ANC say they will never recognise Bop as an independent country.
Mafikeng 25 June Apla(PAC military wing)	To destabilise Bophuthatswana.	A guerrilla and a number of BDF members are killed when Apla ambushes an army patrol.
Phokeng 31 June Phokeng Action Committee	To demand the return of their exiled chief.	4 000 villagers institute a consumer boycott of white and certain black business and urge the return of their chief, Molotlegi.
Braaklaagte 31 July Unknown Assailants	To destabilise the homeland.	While on patrol, four Bophuthatswanan policemen are killed and two injured by assailants in a hit-and-run attack.

LOCATION, DATE & ORGANISERS	DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES/RESPONSES
<p><b>CISKEI</b> 4 and 5 March Brig. Gqozo and uncoordinated</p>	<p>To protest against the homeland system.</p>	<p>After a successful coup by Brigadier Joshua Gqozo, promising re-incorporation into SA, anarchy erupts. The looting and burning of shops and factories result in 40 million Rands worth of damage. MDM activists are seen 'arresting' looters. On the 5th and 6th, SADF troops and SAP move into five central areas in support of Gqozo.</p>
<p><b>GAZANKULU</b> Giyana 18 to 22 February Giyana Youth Congress</p> <p>Nkwankowa 21 February Tzaneen Education Crisis Committee</p> <p>Gazankulu 19 March MDM</p> <p>Gazankulu 22 April MDM aligned organisations</p>	<p>Protesters call for the disbanding of the homeland government organisations and educational demands.</p> <p>To call for the resignation of the chief minister of Gazankulu and reincorporation into SA.</p> <p>To demand the resignation of Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwisi.</p> <p>To protest against the homeland system.</p>	<p>Thousands march on state buildings; the following days thousands stayaway and demonstrate, fifty injured in resulting police action. After the discovery of an activist's body the stayaway spreads. SADF troops sent in. Later, 2 killed in police action against rampaging mobs looting shops, attacking police vehicles.</p> <p>Four are killed when police fire on a crowd of 30 000 protesters. The following day 2 are killed by Lebowa police; riots and burning continue.</p> <p>A two week general stayaway is initiated.</p> <p>The stayaway is called off and workers, teachers and students return to work.</p>
<p><b>KWANDABELE</b> Kwandabele 12 June SRC of Slyabuswa College</p> <p>Davel (KwaNdebele) 1 July Uncoordinated</p> <p>KwaNdebele 5 July Community Organisations</p>	<p>Educational demands.</p> <p>To destabilise the homeland.</p> <p>To protest against fare increases.</p>	<p>1 400 students stage a sit-in and chase away their rector when he announces that students must leave campus.</p> <p>A policeman's home is petrol bombed and police are stoned by a large group. One policeman and one member of the group is injured when police use birdshot and teargas to disperse the group.</p> <p>4 000 march on government offices and are dispersed by teargas fired by police. During the protest a car ploughs into the crowd killing five; the driver is dragged from his car and beaten to death.</p>
<p><b>LEBOWA</b> Lebowa 18 March Lebowa Civic Association</p> <p>Lebowa 19 March Lebowakgomo Civic Association</p> <p>Lebowa 24 April Sekhukhuleni Teachers Trade Union</p> <p>Lebowa 24 June College SRC Co-ordinating Committee</p>	<p>In support of teacher's defiance.</p> <p>To call for better educational facilities and more teachers.</p> <p>To protest against the non-provision of school books.</p> <p>To protest against educational grievances unresolved by the government.</p>	<p>Civil servants start an indefinite stayaway.</p> <p>Civil servants in Lebowakgomo start an indefinite stayaway. On the 21st the Lebowa Chief Minister announces a plan to consolidate homeland chiefs to scrap the Homelands Act.</p> <p>Teachers decide to embark on a defiance campaign against education authorities.</p> <p>Students at 11 training colleges decide not to pay their fees.</p>
<p><b>QWAQWA</b> Qwaqwa 15 May to 10 June Public workers</p>	<p>To protest against low wages in the homeland.</p>	<p>Almost the entire public force of Qwaqwa institute a work stoppage that lasts for almost 5 weeks and results in workers claiming victory, one of these being the right to join Cosatu aligned trade unions. On the first day of the strike, the government announces that independence for the remaining homelands is not a viable option.</p>

LOCATION, DATE & ORGANISERS	DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES/RESPONSES
<b>TRANSKEI</b>		
Umtata 19 and 22 April ANC	To demand reincorporation into South Africa.	Nelson Mandela, vice-president of the ANC makes the call for reincorporation to tens of thousands of people.
Transkei 22 June Major General Bantu Holomisa	To determine whether Transkei should reincorporate into South Africa.	Transkei's military ruler announces that a referendum is to be held in Transkei to determine public opinion towards reincorporation.
<b>VENDA</b>		
Venda 16 February Azapo and Azayo	To protest against the homeland system and 'witchcraft' killings.	Venda security forces clamp down on activists, 30 arrested, allegedly tortured and a ban on further meetings imposed.
Venda 13 February UDF	To protest the homeland system and to demand reincorporation.	Thousands protest as part of the UDF's anti-homeland campaign. That night ritual witchcraft killings continue, including that of an activist. The house of a Venda MP is petrol-bombed.
Venda 12 March MDM	To call for the suspension of land tenure, local government and the arrest of an alleged murderer.	Over 10 000 march on the local police station, one is killed by a policeman who is later arrested along with Cabinet minister. On the same day the ANC, PAC and SACP are unbanned in Venda.
Venda 13 March Uncoordinated	To protest against the Homeland system.	Violence continues in Sibasa and Thohoyandou. Chief Minister announces that his government accepts reincorporation.
Mukhada 21 March Azasm SRC of local college	To protest against police action.	3 000 students and residents deliver a petition to the local police department.
Ha-Mashau 21 March UDF and Azapo	To denounce independence and demand the release of youths.	40 000 march on the local police department and deliver a petition.
Venda 30 March Unknown Saboteurs	To destabilise the homeland.	Three bombs go off destroying a homeland minister's bottle store and damaging two government buildings in Venda's capital.
Venda 3 April Venda police	To demand an inquiry into police action.	Venda police start a sit-in and cause the suspension of the Police Commissioner.
Venda 4 April MDM	To call for reincorporation into SA and release of political prisoners.	Thousands march on the South African embassy in Venda.
Venda 5 April Colonel Ramushwana	To call for reincorporation into SA.	The existing cabinet is forced to resign after a coup led by Colonel Ramushwana who vows to retain power until reincorporation.
Venda 1 May Prisoners from Matatshe Central	To protest against bad treatment by prison wardens.	150 prisoners overpower their guards and deliver a petition to the Chairman of Venda's ruling council, Colonel Ramushwana.
Venda 10 July Venda Public Service Association	To demand the dismissal of 20 director-generals for corruption.	The calls are made in the light of alleged corruption during the rule of the previous Ravele government.
<b>NATIONAL</b>		
National 27 February Stop Incorporation Campaign	To demand reincorporation of the independent homelands into SA.	43 000 signature petition handed to President De Klerk.
Johannesburg 8 May Heads of Non-ind. homelands	To protest their inclusion on the government's side in negotiations.	5 Chief Ministers meet ANC in Johannesburg; loose pact formed amongst the five while Lebowa and KwaNdebele claim a mandate by their people to form alliances with the ANC.
Johannesburg 3 June African National Congress	To pre-empt SA gov't's attempts to woo homeland leaders.	At a rally in E Transvaal an ANC official announces that ANC is to 'embrace' all homeland leaders except Chief-Minister Buthelezi.
Johannesburg 17 July Bafokeng Tribe and UDF	To demand reincorporation into SA and the return of exiled chief.	The Bafokeng tribe call for reincorporation into South Africa and the return of their exiled Chief: call backed by the UDF. <b>DEPA</b>

# ECONOMIC MONITOR

## Major Aids Transmission Routes



Source: Economic Research Unit, University of Natal.

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
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# AIDS Update Southern Africa

By Alan Whiteside, Senior Research Fellow,  
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal

Two years ago, Indicator published an article warning of the impending AIDS epidemic in South Africa. This discussed the available data and estimating the likely costs. The article made predictions as to the projected number of cases of AIDS in the country. The most recent data shows that so far the predictions have been accurate. This article will show that the position is likely to change as AIDS is now hitting the black population. The disease is having the greatest impact in the countries to the north and this will be discussed. The article will look at the key features of the pandemic; examine and discuss data and data problems; assess AIDS and HIV in South Africa; evaluate the implications of the epidemic and, finally, will look at the response to the disease.

AIDS is the final manifestation of Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) which is transmitted through blood and other body fluids. Once a person is infected with the virus he is said to be HIV positive and can infect others. Current thinking is that all persons who are infected will eventually fall ill and die.

What is particularly significant about AIDS are the time periods involved. The period from infection until the antibodies to the virus are detectable, (the point of seroconversion), in the blood varies between three weeks to nine or more months. During this 'window' period, blood is contaminated and infective but this can't be detected. Thus, blood supplies can never be completely safe. In South Africa the risk is probably 1 in 1.5 million, in Central Africa it may be as high as 1 in 100.

The second phase is from seroconversion until symptoms actually appear. It is generally accepted that the mean time in the West will be seven to eight years.

Finally there is the period when the person will be ill and, although there may be remissions, this will end in death. In the West, this period is between one and three years. Infants infected with HIV will generally die within three years.

The distinction is made between the West and Africa as the periods may be very much shorter in Africa. It may take less time for

people to fall ill and die as they are generally less healthy, more undernourished and are exposed to many more diseases.

Four distinct patterns in the spread of AIDS have been identified. Only two need concern Southern Africa. Pattern I characterises AIDS in the West and up to 1990 was the position in South Africa. The key features of pattern I are:

- It began to spread mainly from the late 1970's to the early 1980's.
- Most cases are homosexual/bisexual men and intravenous drug users, with few being heterosexually transmitted.
- Male:female ratio is 10:1 thus paediatric AIDS is uncommon.
- The level of HIV infection is low.

Pattern II AIDS is the epidemiologic pattern found in Africa. Here the key features are:

- It began to spread in the late 1970's to early 1980's.
- Most cases are among heterosexual men and women.
- The male:female ratio is about 1:1 thus paediatric AIDS is common.
- Transmission via contaminated blood and blood products remains significant in many of these countries.
- National prevalence of HIV infection can exceed 1 per cent and in some urban areas up to 25 per cent of 15-49 age group are infected.

*The risk of contaminated blood supplies in South Africa is probably 1 in 1,5 million, and in Central Africa may be as high as 1 in 100*

**TABLE 1**  
**AIDS Cases in Southern Africa**

Country	AIDS cases	AIDS cases per million pop.	Date
Angola	104	13	31/12/88
Botswana	87	73	17/01/90
Lesotho	11	6	27/04/90
Malawi	7,160	998	08/01/90
Mozambique	93	64	19/04/90
Namibia	232	178	31/03/90
South Africa	455	13	08/08/90
Swaziland	14	20	16/06/88
Zambia	2,709	366	29/01/90
Zimbabwe	2,357	261	31/03/90

Source: All data from Update: AIDS cases reported to Surveillance, Forecasting and Impact Assessment Unit, Global Programme on AIDS, 1 June 1990. Except South African Data which is from the Department of National Health and Population Development.

In South Africa, 1990 will see a rapid growth in heterosexual AIDS, with a male/female ratio of 1:1 and growth in paediatric AIDS.

To date, two strains of the HIV virus have been identified. These are HIV I, the common in the West and most of Africa; and HIV II found mainly in West Africa. The HIV II virus is more difficult to detect and may take longer to affect the carrier. Worryingly there are a growing number of HIV II cases reported in Mozambique and it has been seen in South Africa.

### Understanding AIDS Data

Reporting on AIDS and its likely consequences is generally sensationalised and sometimes misinformed. Headlines frequently have statements such as '60 percent of black population HIV positive by 1995'. It is therefore important to understand what data is available and how it may be used. Data may be divided into two types.

- **AIDS Cases**  
These are shown on Table 1 for all the Southern African countries. If these figures are to be believed then there would not appear to be a problem. Unfortunately, these data misrepresents the true picture for a number of reasons.
- AIDS cases are greatly under-reported in Africa. The reason is that there is simply neither the medical coverage to identify the disease nor the facilities to confirm that people have AIDS. The data is not collected and sometimes not collated when it has been collected. The data problem is illustrated by the dates of reports in Table 1.

It is estimated that in the USA cases are under-reported by up to 25%. In Africa it is inevitable that the level of under-reporting is higher, and the WHO suggests that it may be 90%. For example, in Mozambique there is virtually no medical coverage outside the main urban centres. Clearly their Ministry of Health has no idea of the true number of AIDS sufferers. In Swaziland doctors avoid reporting AIDS and HIV cases for fear of discrimination against these people.

- Secondly, a number of countries are covering up the AIDS problem. These countries include Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The reasons for this include a fear of putting off tourists and investors; concern over the political implications; and a simple denial of the problem. In Zimbabwe doctors were instructed not to record AIDS as a cause of death.

- **HIV Positivity**

A better indicator of the magnitude of the problem can be gained from data on HIV positivity. This data is particularly valuable when it is available in the form of surveys over time. Generally, much of the data comes from surveys of specific groups - by geographic area or occupation. For example, surveys have been carried out at specific hospitals, on prostitutes and truck drivers. These data are of limited value in predicting the level of HIV infection throughout a country, but nonetheless give a bleak picture of the position in much of central Africa. In Malawi in 1988, 19 percent of women attending the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Blantyre were HIV Positive, as were 92 percent of truck drivers travelling to South Africa and 67 percent of adults surveyed in villages in the East.

Data from Zambia indicated that level of HIV Positivity in patients at the University teaching hospital was between 23 and 30 percent in 1989, in blood donors from the copper belt it was 23 percent. Zimbabwe has been most reluctant to reveal or discuss its AIDS problem. It faces a serious problem though. In 1990 the Financial Gazette reported that between 15 and 20 percent of the general population and 60 percent of the uniformed services were HIV Positive. AIDS is the commonest cause of infant death.

- **Interpreting Data**

The key to understanding how the disease will impact on economies and societies is knowing how quickly it will spread. Most

*The World Health Organisation suggests that Aids cases in Africa may be as much as 90% under-reported*

predictions assume the rate of infection will be constant into the foreseeable future. (See for example, Edelston, 1988). This obviously is oversimplifying the situation. The rate of infection will change as the pool of potential infective people declines, and as education campaigns begin to take effect. Secondly, there will be a leveling off of infection. There will be people who, because of lifestyle, will not be infected. What the percentage will be is unknown, at present there is no population that has seen the level of infection peak, but guesses range between 35 and 70 percent.

There can be no doubt that Southern Africa is facing a crisis. This crisis will affect the economy, development and indeed all facets of life. The conclusion of many observers is that the magnitude of the epidemic and its consequences will be worse in Africa than in the rest of the world. One author writes "The continent certainly suffered tragic misfortune in being exposed to HIV before it made inroads in many other parts of the world. However, it is also indisputable that features of African social life encourage multiple sexual partners and frequent partner change that make Africans especially vulnerable to a deadly sexually transmitted disease" (Larson, 1990, p16).

### AIDS & HIV in South Africa

South Africa probably has the best data in the region. The blood banks have been testing blood for as long as anywhere in the world. The clinicians are aware of the symptoms associated with AIDS and generally ensure that possible cases are tested. The data on AIDS cases is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2  
AIDS Cases in South Africa. (As at 24 April 1990).

Year of diagnosis	South African Cases	Foreign Cases	Cumulative SA Cases	All Cases
1982	2	1	2	3
1983	4	0	6	7
1984	8	0	14	15
1985	8	1	22	24
1986	24	10	46	58
1987	39	9	85	106
1988	88	6	173	200
1989	157	3	330	360
1990	125	2	455	418

Source: Department of National Health and Population Development, Update AIDS in South Africa. 24/4/90 and 8/8/90

As South African legislation now prevents HIV Positive people and AIDS victims from entering the country, foreign cases will be excluded from the analysis.

Predicting the trend is vital if the impact of the disease is to be assessed. As has been discussed, this is unfortunately not easy to do. The simplest method is to extrapolate from existing data as is done in Figure 1. This would, on the basis of past data give a cumulative total of 21 700 cases in 1995 and 1 370 000 by the year 2000.

Any prediction beyond five years must be treated with the greatest of care. However, it is likely that the predictions for 1995 may be conservative. The reason for this is simply that most of the cases (on which the extrapolation is based) are white homosexuals. The April update from the Department of National Health and Population Development showed that for the first time since AIDS was reported in South Africa, the number of cases among the black population exceeded those

*The magnitude of the epidemic and its consequences will be worse in Africa than in the rest of the world*





FIGURE 1  
A Forecast Based on Case Totals

SOURCE: Department of Health and Population Development

FIGURE 2  
AIDS cases:  
Main  
Transmission  
Category by  
Year of  
Diagnosis



SOURCE: Department of National Health and Population Development, 1990

reported in white homosexuals. Figure 2 illustrates how the focus of the AIDS epidemic has shifted.

A second source of data from which predictions can be made is the level of HIV infection in the population. In specific population groups, the level is alarming for example, 2.9 percent of VD patients in Johannesburg and 3.6 in Durban are HIV positive. Among blood donors the level has gone from 0.11 percent among black donors between January and June 1988 to 0.42 between June and July 1989. The doubling time appears to be about 8.5 months.

Predictions by two medical researchers, based on existing HIV levels, suggest that by 1991, six percent of the black population between the ages of 15-60 may be HIV Positive by 1991 rising to 18 percent in 1992 (Padayachee and Schall, 1989). The questions that then arise, are how long will it take for these people to develop AIDS, how many will die in any given year, and how will HIV infection progress. At this point these cannot be answered.

There is growing evidence to suggest that AIDS will have considerable impact. The economic impact will be felt first. Work done by the World Bank estimate the direct cost per AIDS case in Zaire at between US\$132 and \$1 585 and in Tanzania it ranged between \$104 and \$631. In countries with comparative income levels to South Africa are Brazil and Mexico where the expenditure per AIDS case is US\$2 150 and \$8 500 respectively. The best estimate of the direct cost per AIDS case in South Africa is \$6 000 or R15 000.

This means that AIDS could cost R162 million in 1995 and at worst it might cost R2.9 billion. The Bank stated that the direct cost of AIDS was only 20 percent of the true cost making it clear that AIDS would be a major drain on the economy.

Other areas in which AIDS might impact have not been fully assessed but nonetheless there are some pointers that may be identified.

- *Demography.* AIDS could lead to a slowing in the rate of population growth and this could be followed by an actual decline in the numbers. The groups most affected would be those between the ages of 15-60 and infants. (See Anderson, 1989).
- *Urban impact.* Evidence from central Africa suggests that urban elites are among the first to be hit. This means that experienced educated manpower will be lost.
- *Rural impact.* Rural areas may face labour shortages resulting in reduced food production, changes in cropping patterns and a potential loss of control over ecological systems. This is being studied in Uganda and Rwanda (Barnett and Blaikie, 1989 and Gillespie, 1989).
- *Political impact.* If AIDS kills the elite and the armed forces, it could create power vacuums and lead to increased instability.
- *Responses.* The epidemic could lead to a siege mentality with some groups identifying others as the source of the problem. This is a particularly serious problem in Southern Africa where the press coverage has suggested that the disease will decimate the black population implying that whites are

Although AIDS will have a major draining effect on the economy, there are several other areas in which the disease might impact

somehow immune. The propaganda and destructive value of the disease is immense goes far beyond its medical and economic impact.

## Solution and Responses

In much of the region the World Health Organisation has been active. Its Global Programme on AIDS has two programmes, a Short Term Plan (STP) and a Medium Term Plan (MTP).

The Short Term Plan (STP) runs for six to twelve months and calls for activities in the field of information, education, and communication addressing the public at large as well as specific target groups and persons. It includes the strengthening of blood transfusion facilities, and ensures that blood for transfusions is made as safe as modern technology would allow. While the STPs were implemented, planning missions resulted in the formulation of national Medium-Term Plans (MTPs) covering three to five years.

The order of priority of each of the MTP components has varied with the prevailing country situation. In low prevalence areas, for example, the priority is often given to education and surveillance and its prompt integration with other primary health care activities. In areas of moderate prevalence, the priority is education of the general public and targeting of information and education to sexually transmitted disease patients, prostitutes, and others with high-risk behaviour for HIV infection. In areas of high prevalence, such as those areas in East and Central Africa, education tends to focus more on those who are sexually active.

South Africa has been excluded from WHO activities because of the United Nations position on apartheid. However, in March of this year, the government and ANC jointly requested WHO assistance in combatting AIDS. At the same time a conference of health professionals meeting in Maputo drafted a statement on AIDS and HIV which included suggestions as to how it should be tackled and proposed a mass based task force.

Without doubt, the most effective response is to provide appropriate education, something that is best done by community organisations. It is reported that the South African government is showing remarkable flexibility and is offering funds to such bodies to provide the necessary education.

The response of commerce and industry has also been interesting. There can be few boardrooms where AIDS has not been a topic. A growing number of firms are considering AIDS in their strategic planning. There has also been a boom in the AIDS prevention industry with companies offering education packages, videos and condom vending machines.

An increasing number of firms offer education to their workers. They face a problem here as there is no point in educating the workers if they do not also reach into their families and communities. It is possible that firms may begin to develop regional activities with concerted and coordinated efforts.

The businesses facing the crisis most immediately are the insurance industry and medical aid schemes. They have responded to the crisis by putting exclusionary clauses in their policies. Unfortunately, claims may still be considerable. In Zimbabwe, the insurance industry has warned that it is to give up life insurance underwriting.

## Conclusion

The AIDS crisis has hit Central Africa. It will impact on South Africa and many gloomy predictions have been made. South Africa is fortunate in that the epidemic is just beginning. The doom and gloom predictions can be avoided because AIDS cases can be prevented if action is taken now. **IPDA**

## Acknowledgement

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*The propoganda and destructive value of the disease go far beyond its medical and economic impact*

*Firms face a problem in educating workers about AIDS if they do not also reach into their families and communities*

# Post-Apartheid Statistics

## A Case of Common Census

By Charles Simkins of the Urban Foundation

*The future repeal of apartheid laws will bring a measure of intellectual relief to South African demographers struggling with disjointed census counts. Among other more obvious problems, territorial apartheid, from statutory racial classification to the excision of the 'homelands', has confused and politicised population statistics. Were there methods in this madness? Charles Simkins looks at the need to reconcile past and future methodologies in terms of statistical continuity, units of analysis, racial categories, migration estimates and integrated models.*

For demographers, it has always been clear that 'South Africa' refers to the territory defined at Union in 1910. Any subdivisions should be treated as regions within the country. This creates two problems:

Firstly, in 1980 and 1985 censuses, the 'independent homelands' (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were given responsibility for conducting their own censuses. Central Statistical Services provided technical assistance, but the design of census forms and the reporting of results were not standard, giving rise to problems of comparability and completeness.

In one case - the Transkei - interesting new questions were asked. There exist a series of reports on demographic trends in the Transkei, not widely circulated, but of considerable interest from a demographer's point of view. As a general principle, however, the sooner all parts of South Africa are reintegrated into one system as far as demographic information is concerned, the better.

Secondly, movements of population across South Africa's borders must be identified if fertility and mortality among the resident population is to be analysed accurately. The convention at present - established by Professor Sadie in his various studies - is to analyse white international migration statistics in some detail, to ignore it in the case of 'coloureds' and 'Asians' (Indians), and to assume that it is confined among Africans to identified movements of contract labour on the mines.

One has the impression at present that there are considerable movements of African people in other ways across South Africa's boundaries, especially from Lesotho and Mozambique, but also from other neighbouring states. This movement may well increase in a post-apartheid South Africa. Given the illegality of most of this movement, it is extremely hard to trace. A question

about country of birth should always be asked in the population census, but inaccurate answers can often be expected.

Another dilemma for demographers in South Africa derives from the statutory system of racial classification. While the Population Registration Act remains in force, respondents to any census and survey are expected to answer questions about racial identity in terms of a statutorily imposed definition. There are interesting issues to be faced in a future South Africa about the admissibility and use of an ethnic identifier.

That this particular problem is not unique to South Africa is made evident by reference to the practices of the Census Bureau in the United States. They have not been able to work in an entirely non-racial way, especially in respect of Hispanic and black Americans.

In a post-apartheid South Africa more reliance will have to be placed on religious and linguistic information, but this data will probably not suffice to answer questions which will continue to be asked. The current racial groups most likely to fragment and disappear are the so-called 'Coloureds' and - to a lesser extent - 'Asians' (South Africans of Indian descent).

### Complete Census

A complete set of population statistics should include at least:

- periodic censuses of the population recording age, sex and marital status;
- annual counts of births (by sex, age and marital status of mother) and deaths (by sex and age at death); and
- annual counts of immigrants and emigrants by age, sex (and preferably by marital status).

As the results of each new census appears, the level of consistency between it and the census before with regard to births, deaths and migrations data should be checked. This reconciliation can be done in a number of ways. Fertility and mortality can be calculated directly from annual counts of births and deaths in relation to the estimated population in each year. They can also be estimated indirectly from two successive censuses with the effects of international migration removed. Data from special surveys can also be incorporated.

There has been a great deal of progress in methods of indirect analysis in the last decade - this progress has not yet been reflected in systems of data collection and techniques of analysis in South Africa. A few simple questions added to the population census can help greatly with estimation of fertility and mortality. Furthermore, fertility, mortality and marital status data and estimates can be checked against model schedules. A good set of population statistics is one that yields consistent estimates of key demographic magnitudes when these are calculated in a number of different ways.

The most coherent set of demographic statistics are those for white people. The quality of the data and the consistency of estimates is less satisfactory in the case of coloureds and Asians. For each of these three groups, long-standing and reasonably reliable registrations of births and deaths are available. When it comes to Africans, the data are very unreliable.

### African Demography

Census under-enumeration is probably much greater among African (i.e. black) people than among any other group. Depressingly, the coverage in the 1980 and 1985 censuses appears to be significantly worse than in any other census since 1936. Registrations of births and deaths are also seriously incomplete. The treatment of international migration is inadequate too.

The current approach to estimating the size and vital statistics consists of a simultaneous consideration of all population censuses since 1936, complemented by a few spotty studies of fertility and mortality. The most accomplished practitioner in the census field is Professor Sadie, whose most recent projections were published by the Bureau of Market Research in 1988.

The trouble with this method is that one can produce updated estimates only once new population census data become available. It also relies very heavily on judgement; erroneous judgements cannot easily be corrected in a situation where under-enumeration is believed to be high. Instead, the census figures are adjusted to reproduce a view held in advance.

Better and more continuously produced information is needed, especially to track the course of the black fertility transition, on whose speed the prospects for economic development depends in considerable measure. There are two information systems which, with technical improvements, could assist our understanding considerably.

Regional surveys of black fertility and mortality are being carried out by the HSRC for processing by the Department of National Health and Population Development as part of its Population Development Programme. But it is very hard to get a coherent series of estimates from this source and impossible to get a statement of methodology, including statements about the questions asked, the sample size and the techniques of estimation. Until this work is written up in an appropriate form for scientific appraisal, one cannot be sure of its use for the demographic information system. Nor can suggestions for improvement be made.

In principle, the Current Population Survey (CPS) - designed to measure unemployment - can be used for demographic purposes. The sample is large and is interviewed each month (It is a fascinating source of information about black household structure, for instance). Addition to and subtraction from households by birth, death and migration is supposed to be recorded. If this were done more accurately at present and if the CPS sample was changed as frequently as it should be, instead of once every few years, it could become a very important current demographic source.

As far as the 1991 census is concerned, it is important that there should be sample check-backs stratified by type of area. A comparison of check-backs with the original returns at least supplies some reasonable basis for estimates of under-enumeration. It is also important that elementary questions be asked so that direct and indirect measures of fertility and mortality can be based on the census itself, something which has not been possible since a question about fertility was asked in the 1960 census.

### Internal Migration

When it comes to the study of internal migration, urbanisation and the spatial distribution of the population, things become even worse. The only data on gross migration ever recorded officially was based on a question in the 1980 population census about where respondents lived five years before that date. To the author's knowledge, only one paper has been published (by Zietsman) using those data. Of course, net movement in and out of regions can be estimated by comparing two accurate successive censuses, providing regional fertility and mortality rates are constant or the variations in them known.

Where under-enumeration is high, the degree of undercounting is likely to be regionally variable, with no guarantee that the pattern of regional variation will remain constant from one census to the next. Given this factor and that fertility and mortality (at least at some ages) varies considerably across regions, any estimates of net migration must be highly uncertain. It follows that one can at best track major movements in the rapidly changing spatial distribution of the African population.

Of course, one has to be clear about the distinction between migration measured in this way and the institution of migrant or contract labour. In the first sense, migration looks at movements in the *de facto* population only; a study of migrant labour must look at disparities between *de facto* residence and the (rather misleadingly named) *de jure* residence. One can do this by study of household lists if the question is asked whether there are people regarded as members of a household who are away at the time of the census.

The evidence suggests that about a quarter of all married African women live apart from their husbands during the working year and about a sixth of African children live away from their mothers. Interestingly, the latter magnitude is not far off the position for a number of other African countries.

One important source of information about African people in metropolitan areas comes from periodic counts of dwellings and estimates (based on sample surveys or guesses) of the average number of people occupying dwellings of a particular type. These studies tend to be done in an *ad hoc* way by agencies who require the information, often with different spatial definitions of the functional metropolitan region in question.

Dwelling counts often come from aerial photography, which is expensive, time-consuming and gets rapidly out of date in certain areas. Sometimes they come from on-the-ground counting of dwellings or (worst of all) from township plans, which are invariably obsolete. There is also a penumbra of uncertainty about exactly who gets counted in occupancy surveys: a considerable number of African people commute frequently between different homes and these people may or may not be included in a count of occupants. Also, it cannot be assumed that occupancy rates remain constant even over quite short periods of time.

In areas where incomes are rising or where control over backyard shack construction is suddenly relaxed, households may erect shacks in their backyards in order to give the same number of people more room. On the other hand, where accommodation is particularly scarce, the emergence of shacks may be wholly devoted to

house the increase in population. One has also to distinguish between backyard shacks in areas of formal housing and free-standing shack areas, where change can occur very rapidly.

Despite all the difficulties, work of this kind can render our knowledge of the African population in metropolitan areas more precise. On the basis of a CPA/HSRC study, one can be reasonably sure that the black population of the settlements on the Cape Flats (all part of Wynberg district) was half a million in 1989. Before the survey was undertaken, one had to make a judgement within a much wider range.

### Integrated Models

To meet the planning needs of the future, two sorts of models are needed to integrate the various sources of demographic models.

Firstly, a model of the national population desegregated by sex and (for the time being) by race. This model would strive to locate as accurately as possible the position and shape of the Lexis surface, defined in a three dimensional space by age, date and population size. For the time being, population projections are the best approximation we have to this model.

Secondly, a model of the spatial distribution of the population. Such a model has been developed within the Urban Foundation. It helps to produce realistic estimates of the spatial distribution of the population by constraining the system to reproduce the total population obtained from the best current population projections. By looking at population growth rates and net movements it renders certain population estimates much more plausible than others.

The great advantage of models is that they force consideration of how the demography of South Africa is working as a whole. At each stage, a broad account of the process should emerge from them. Obviously, the models should be updateable as new (and hopefully better) information comes in. Particularly in relation to black demography, one's understanding of what is going on may have to be reoriented substantially over a period of time. But at least the process is cumulative.

In this field, as in all other branches of science, the enemy of truth is not error, but confusion. **IPQA**

### Acknowledgement

*The Economic Research Unit at the University of Natal organised a Socio-Economic Statistics Symposium where the above paper was delivered, 3-4 May 1990, Durban.*



# The Balancing Act

## Of Population, Power & Poverty

By Professor Simon Bekker, Director, Centre for Social & Development Studies  
Alan Mountain, Development Consultant

*The need to balance population growth, urban and rural settlement, and economic growth poses an immense challenge to governments in developing societies. Drawing on comparative experience in other countries, Bekker and Mountain discuss the implementation of a population development programme in South Africa. In assessing three strategies for population control, they emphasise the need for community participation and empowerment.*

The unprecedented explosion in human population is commonly regarded as one of the most serious threats facing mankind today. Three years ago, on 11 July 1987, when the international community celebrated the birth of the world's 5 billionth inhabitant, the world's population was growing at a rate of 88 million people a year. Today, the rate is over 91 million a year.

At the recent International Forum on Population in the Twenty-First Century, held under the auspices of the United Nations Population Fund in Amsterdam from 6 to the 9 November 1989, concern was expressed in the final Declaration 'that with the continued rapid growth in world population, especially in the developing world, the processes of uncontrolled migration and urbanisation and the increasing degradation of the environment everywhere threaten to darken our vision of the world we will leave for posterity in the Twenty-First Century'.

It is also widely held that South Africa's future is darkened by this vision of unsustainable population growth. At the current rate of growth, South Africa will probably find that, within a mere two generations, its natural resources and socio-economic capability will not be sufficient for its population. This is likely to result in total social disintegration, unemployment, poverty and misery 'which could become unmanageable even in the best of constitutional dispensations' (Prof J P de Lange, chairman of the Council for Population Development).

### Divergent Views

To avert this disaster, concerted action is required from the total community. The issue of population

development, however, is one over which important differences in conceptualisation exist. We will look at what are probably the most important two approaches to defining the issue.

The first approach emphasises the balancing of population growth against socio-economic development in the short term, and natural resources in the longer term. This approach was endorsed in the Amsterdam Declaration. It is fundamentally the approach that has been followed in South Africa by the Population Development Programme (PDP) of the Department of National Health and Population Development.

The second approach may be loosely termed the population, poverty and powerlessness approach. This second approach argues that the balancing approach is mistaken for several reasons:

Firstly, it tends to use a theory of demographic transition during the industrialisation phase of a given country which could be interpreted to imply that it is the poor alone who are to blame for the population explosion.

Secondly, it assumes that a particular area has an absolutely limited amount of resources. This view, it is argued, does not acknowledge the relationship between technological development and resource availability. It is argued that technology can indefinitely overcome increasing shortages of natural resources so that the future vision of overcrowding and resource shortages is groundless - providing that policy makers allow for this optimisation of technology to take place.

Thirdly, it assumes that scarce resources are equally distributed in society, and the approach accordingly leads to policies which maintain established inequalities in society.

Fourthly, in South Africa, the indicator of 'balance', which was chosen by the Science Committee of the President's Council and upon whose recommendations the PDP is based, is the availability of water. Critics question this and ask whether the problem is an absolute shortage of water, or whether there is a problem in water management. They ask whether all alternative options have been fully explored and conclude that since these questions cannot satisfactorily be answered today, the central argument of the PDP is probably flawed.

### Strategic Options

Irrespective of which approach one may wish to use in conceptualising the problem, the realities of increasing poverty, unequal distribution of resources and unsustainable population growth must be faced. The evidence is clear for all to see. What is needed is an equitable and workable strategy that will regulate the problem at worst or resolve it at best.

In evolving a strategy for fertility decline, three requirements are usually noted:

- fertility must be within the range of conscious choice of parents;
- reduced fertility must be advantageous to parents; and
- effective techniques of fertility reduction must be available.

These requirements imply that any strategy must be applied in close cooperation with, and in agreement with, the target community.

Choice of strategy needs to be analysed at two levels. In the first place, at the societal level, the issue of state intervention to promote population development is one which is inherently politicised. In line with a motion taken in 1974 at the World Population Conference held in Bucharest, proponents of the population, poverty, and powerlessness lobby argue that satisfactory population development cannot take place before national independence and liberation have occurred. Political legitimacy is needed before a state programme (including an important community participative strand) will succeed.

In the second place, at a more pragmatic level, during the transitional phase of constitutional change in South Africa, three strategic options may be identified:

- *quality of life strategy*  
Fertility reduction is assumed to be directly related to improvements in the general quality of life of members of a particular community. Thus, the strategy aims, through collaborative state and private sector activity, to improve the quality of

life via activities within a range of terrains (which include job creation, housing and family planning). This is the methodology used by the PDP in South Africa.

- *the indirect strategy*  
This strategy is intended to improve access to resources of the target population, thereby improving their quality of life and so indirectly limiting population growth without there being a specific component in the programme which explicitly deals with population control. This strategy has been followed in Cuba.

- *the direct strategy*  
This approach aims to tackle the issue of population size directly, and to implement programmes which are specifically aimed at reducing the fertility levels of the target community. The direct strategy has been successfully implemented in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China.

### South African Strategy

During the transitional phase in South Africa, it is unlikely that a *direct* strategy, on its own and implemented by the state, will succeed in developing adequate legitimacy among the wider South African population. The strategy chosen accordingly should include aims which address the phenomenon of poverty and inequality in a particular community, as well as the issue of community empowerment. Hence issues over a range of 'quality of life' domains - including the domain of fertility reduction - need to be addressed.

Implementation should embrace the 'triad' of the state, influential institutions in the private sector, and the community itself, each on an equal basis as possible. This will guarantee that community participation is maintained, whilst enabling development over a spectrum of life domains to take place.

In launching such a programme, moreover, close links with state programmes which are perceived to be successful need to be made. In fact, it is probable that the highest impact of a fertility reduction programme in a given area will flow from the 'piggy-backing' of this programme by the more effective state service delivery programmes in that area.

Finally, in the light of the chronic shortages of resources and trained manpower in South Africa today, it will probably be advisable to introduce new programmes initially in a limited number of carefully selected areas, on an experimental basis, in order to test their suitability and viability. Regular monitoring and evaluation must necessarily be built into the programme design. **IPDA**

By Professors Mike McGrath and Merle Holden  
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## RETROSPECT

The Reserve Bank in its Annual Economic Report describes the current economic recession as being 'unusually mild' with respect to production and spending. Comparing this downswing with the two previous downswings of 1981/83 and 1984/86, the first five quarters saw mild decreases in output and expenditure. Gross Domestic Product displayed a slightly negative rate of real growth into the middle of 1990 while spending even recovered in the second quarter of 1990 after weakening in the second half of last year. The Bank attributes the 'mild' decline in domestic output to the continued strength of merchandise exports, the relative firmness of real private consumption expenditure and a limited decline in real gross domestic fixed investment over the five quarters.

Seasonally adjusted and annualised, GDP fell at a rate of 1,3% in the first quarter of 1990 slowing to a fall of 0,8% in the second quarter. On the other hand, if year-on-year figures are taken between the first quarter of this year and the same period last year, small real growth was achieved. In the second quarter of 1990 a year-on-year drop of more than 1% was recorded. On the basis of the year-on-year figures it would appear that the recession worsened rather than improved in the second quarter of 1990.

However, whichever figures one consults it is plain that the economy is in the grips of a recession not of the order of the 1981/83 recession where real GDP declined by 2% in one year, but of an order of magnitude closer to the 1984/86 recession where real GDP declined by 0,8% in a year. Liquidations surged 67% from May to June and were 51% higher in June compared to the same month last year. Insolvencies jumped 32% from April to May and were 9% higher than during May 1989. The most affected sectors of the economy in June were manufacturing, construction, wholesale, retail and financial services, the major sectors of the economy aside from agriculture.

The performance of agriculture during the downswing was erratic. Real agricultural output in seasonally adjusted annualised terms increased by 15% between the first and second quarters of this year. It had increased 67,9% in real terms in the third quarter of 1989 followed by real declines of 42,7% in the fourth quarter of 1989 and 7,5% in the first quarter of 1990. If agriculture is excluded from the statistics, in the second quarter of 1990 the annualised decline in GDP is almost 2% as

compared with 0,8% including agriculture. This means that the recession deepened in the non-agricultural sectors in the economy as was demonstrated by the liquidation statistics.

It hasn't been possible to reliably track the corresponding trends in the rate of unemployment during the recession. Early in August the Central Statistical Services suspended the release of its unemployment statistics for blacks pending an investigation of the Current Population Survey. In 1990 the March statistics showed an 11,8% (750 000) unemployment rate for blacks compared with 11,6% for the same period last year. The reliability of these statistics has been questioned in the face of other indicators showing a deepening recession for the South African economy.

The Reserve Bank notes that 'in the past five quarters to mid 1990 real gross domestic expenditure retreated on balance at a fairly modest annualised rate of nearly 3%. This may be compared with annualised rates of contraction of 9,5% and 5% over comparable periods in the preceding two downswings.' The relative firmness in real private consumption and the limited decline in real gross domestic fixed investment were contributory factors to the milder decline in GDP. However, the report points to what is termed a 'disquieting' longer-run trend in which South Africa appears to be becoming a consumer society. 'The shares of real private and real government consumption expenditure in total real gross domestic final demand rose from some 55% and 16% in the early 1980s to approximately 60% and 19% towards the end of the decade.' It is also noted that the share of real gross domestic fixed investment fell from 29% to 21% during this period.

From the middle of 1989 the slowdown in the economy has been reflected in a lower rate of increase in all the price indices. The reduction in import surcharges coupled with a firmer exchange rate led to a reduction from 26,8% in the second quarter of 1989 to 2,9% in the second quarter of 1990 in the quarter-to-quarter rate of increase in the price of imported goods. For the same period the rate of increase in the price of domestically produced goods declined from 18,1% to 14,2%. The rate of increase in the consumer price index also fell from 18,0% to 13,1%.

Concomitant with the decline in the rate of increase of prices, the twelve month growth in the

money supply (M3) decelerated from 27.5% in August 1988 to a provisional figure of 16.3% for July 1990. The lower gold price and slower economy was reflected in a lower demand for money, while higher nominal and real rates of interest reflected the stricter application of monetary policy.

The Reserve Bank remains of the opinion that 'stopping inflation is no more difficult than adequately curbing the rate of increase in the money supply.' The Reserve Bank sees as its mission the formulation of monetary policy so as to protect the internal and external value of the currency. At the present time in its fight against inflation the Bank has been able to maintain higher nominal and real interest rates without succumbing to demands by central government for lower rates of interest. In the past, government has responded to cries of hardship from various sectors of the economy and forced the Reserve Bank to back down on monetary policy with the inescapable consequence of a subsequent rise in the rate of inflation. It is interesting that at a time of considerable political change in South Africa the Reserve Bank at last appears to have a measure of autonomy.

At the same time government appears to have kept control over spending in the first six months of this year. Compared to the same period last year it has been able to reduce its real expenditure by 7.5%. However, Finance deputy director general Estian Calitz points out that fiscal policy may be more expansionary than originally anticipated especially once the spending of the R3bn social backlog spending begins.

In the first quarter of 1990 the current account on the balance of payments registered an annualised surplus of R5.6bn. Despite a decline in net gold exports, this remarkable result was achieved

through vigorous growth in merchandise exports and a modest decline in imports. In the second quarter the annualised current account surplus declined to R3.6bn as the value of merchandise exports declined and merchandise imports rose. These events meant that the annualised current account surplus for the first months of 1990 amounted to R4.6bn.

Continued repayments of the foreign debt both inside and outside the standstill net were mainly responsible for the continued net outflow of capital from South Africa. South Africa's foreign debt was reduced from \$23.7bn in August 1985 to \$20.6bn in December 1989. Debt within the net was reduced from \$13.6bn to \$7.3bn while debt outside the net rose from \$10.1 to \$13.3bn as short term debt inside the net was converted into longer term debt outside the net. Repayments under the Interim Arrangements also accounted for a reduction of \$2.5bn in the debt inside the net, as well as a small reduction with the conversion of a small amount of the debt into equity investments.

Despite a surplus on the overall balance of payments there was a decline of R1bn in total gross gold and foreign reserves over the year to June 1990. Repayments on reserve-related liabilities and valuation adjustments were responsible for this decline. Gross gold and other foreign reserves stood at R6.4bn in June 1990 - equal to about six weeks of imports - but given the flexibility of the exchange rate adequate for smoothing fluctuations in the exchange rate.

There was downward pressure on the exchange rate in the first six months of 1990 as the US dollar price of gold declined and debt repayments were made. Nevertheless the exchange rate remained relatively stable from July 1989 to mid August 1990 with the effective exchange rate in August only 1.7% above its low point of September 1989.

## SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

The Governor of the Reserve Bank remarks that the South African economy is 'now in a delicate stage where a change in direction of monetary policy has to be considered. It is, however, extremely important that any switch in policy should be carefully timed - a premature relaxation of the restrictive measures can easily nullify the progress made over the past year towards restoring financial stability.'

Any predictions as to the future course of policy and the economy have been further complicated by the events in the Middle East which initially led to increases in the prices of oil and gold. South Africa was able to benefit from the crisis, for by selling less gold in July the Reserve Bank had more gold to sell in August at the higher price. Furthermore, before the oil price rise there was a fortuitous 123% surge in the July 'unclassified' imports,

consisting mainly of lower price oil. As tensions in the Middle East have eased, prices of both oil and gold have fallen. Nevertheless, while the Middle East situation remains unresolved uncertainty exists as to the future course of the terms of trade for South Africa. Uncertainty has also been heightened by the expanding social and industrial unrest in the country. These factors will continue to exert a depressing effect on the growth potential for the economy through their depressing effects on investment.

We are of the opinion that in the short run the Reserve Bank will continue with the maintenance of high nominal rates of interest, that inflation will continue to moderate despite the oil price rise and that economic growth will remain disappointingly low to the point that we will be fortunate if negative real growth is not the outcome for 1990.

## LONG TERM PROSPECTS

The long term prospects of achieving political and economic stability, once a new constitution has been negotiated, will be severely diminished if the South African economy does not grow rapidly.

Given the projected labour force growth for the next decade of 2,6% per annum, an economic growth rate in excess of 5% per annum is necessary simply to hold the proportionate level of job scarcity, namely unemployment and underemployment constant at the 1980 level of 30%. At an annual 5% growth of GDP the residual labour force outside modern sector formal employment rises from 3,3 million people to 5,5 million by the year 2000.

Very large increases will also be demanded in government expenditures. In order to eliminate racial gaps in the level of pensions, education and health services and to increase the supply of housing to the poor in order to eliminate the backlog in housing within a decade, annual government expenditure would have to rise to over 50% of the current level of GDP. Increases of expenditure on this scale will not be attainable.

However a less ambitious programme of expansion can be introduced. Levels of

expenditure can be held back by requiring those with higher incomes to pay for services which are not essential. Government can curtail (and reduce) the growth of expenditure on administration and defence, thereby allowing for a growth in necessary economic services without any other additional increases in total government expenditure. Realistically, an egalitarian supply of educational, health, housing and pensions to all householders can be attained by increasing total government expenditure by approximately 35% above its present level.

A simulation of the growth rate of the economy at 5% per annum on a base year of 1989, with output of manufactured exports growing at 7% per annum, can illustrate the macroeconomic constraints on achieving this goal. The projected growth path of the economy is shown in the Table 1. In the simulation, the level of investment is determined by the capital/output ratio obtained from historical data, consumption is assumed to rise in 1990 by the full increase in expenditures on services and pensions, and thereafter at 6,5% per annum; the value of exports of minerals and agricultural goods remains fixed, but exports of manufactured goods increases at 7% per annum for the first 5 years and 10% per annum thereafter.

TABLE 1  
SIMULATION OF THE GROWTH PATH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 1990 - 2000  
UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OF A POST-APARTHEID REGIME

		PER CENT PER ANNUM		
		1990	1994	2000
Growth rate of:				
Gross Domestic Product (Y)		5	5	5
Investment (I)	16	5	5	
Government Expenditures (G)	7	7	0	
Exports (X)	2,3	4,3	5,3	
Gross Domestic Expenditure	11,3	4,6	4,9	
<b>ANNUAL VALUE (CONSTANT 1989 PRICES) R000 000</b>				
	1989	1990	1994	2000
Y	232676	244309	296960	397955
(G - G1989)	-	4563	23238	26238
PSBR	1,6	2,6	4,4	- 3,4
G/Y	28	29	31	21
Deficit on Current Account of Balance of Payments	4097	-5499	-14038	-20726
Foreign Debt/Y	24	25	35	50

Imports are a constant 30% of GDP. Government expenditure is assumed to be increased by 7% per annum for a period of 5 years, and the full increase is allocated to the supply of education, health, housing and pensions; increases in the supply of the necessary economic services is found by reducing other expenditures. The tax regime is unaltered and government revenue grows at 5% per annum, and the exchange rate of the rand is assumed to be fixed.

The significant features are:

- Despite the rapid rise in government expenditure the share of government in GDP does not rise to an unacceptably high level, not exceeding 31%, and the ratio of the deficit before borrowing to GDP is also not a problem rising to 4,4% in 1994.
- The increased level of expenditure needed to bring about a substantial level of equality in social services is attained within 5 years, with government expenditure growing at 7% per annum. Thereafter the growth of government expenditure must be curtailed dramatically.
- The current account of the balance of payments is in deficit as soon as economic growth accelerates and foreign borrowing is needed to make up the shortfall and to supplement domestic savings. Huge capital inflows are required in the first few years, and the ratio of foreign debt rapidly rises from its present level of 24% to 35% of GDP within the first five years. Even this proportion is well below the current levels of foreign debt of many semi-industrialised economies. A 'Marshall-Aid' plan without an obligation to pay back grants, would be most desirable, but is not absolutely necessary. South Africa's access to international capital markets must be restored.
- Disturbingly, the need for foreign borrowing and the weight of foreign debt continues to increase through time. This indicates the need for policies to increase domestic savings, hold back money wage increases, limit the growth of other areas of government expenditure, and promote the rapid growth of exports. The simulation, does however, show that the growth rate of the economy and government expenditure can be stimulated dramatically in the short-term without the burden of foreign debt becoming intolerable.

- At the growth rates envisaged sectoral bottlenecks, rising food prices and skill shortages may well cause inflation and defeat the goals of the policies. The more time the economy is given to grow onto its higher path while at the same time expanding the supply of skills, exports and food, the greater will be the economic chances of success. This also means that it will be preferable to defer increases in government expenditure on social services until the growth process is well underway.

Thus there is an urgent need in the present to raise the level of investment and the economic growth rate in order to increase the capacity of the economy for redistributive measures after the new government takes control. Increasing the growth rate of GDP requires an increase in investment and an inflow of foreign capital in the short-term, and sustaining these processes in the long-run requires the growth of exports and an increase in savings propensity. However at the present time socialist rhetoric is causing great uncertainty, undoubtedly causing some capital outflows, retarding potential capital inflows and retarding investment, and this uncertainty will continue until the intentions of the major political actors about economic policy have been clearly spelled out.


Export growth is required in the medium term to service interest payments on foreign borrowing, sustain the import capacity of the economy, and reduce the need for foreign borrowing. Exports must be diversified into manufacturing and expanded. In South Africa in the 1970s, export incentives were introduced for the manufacturing sector, while the policy of import substitution was continued through the structure of import tariffs. Recently, Holden has shown that the protection given to imports by the structure of tariffs has been the equivalent of a net 34% implicit tax on exports (when gold exports are excluded from the analysis). Moves to promote exports of manufactured goods have been made with the recently introduced General Export Incentive Scheme. However, Holden's findings show that the excessive protection of the domestic South African market must also be addressed if successful export led growth is to be achieved. The time has now come for the removal of all trade sanctions, so that the process of expanding production for exports can commence. IDA

# RURAL & REGIONAL

O N I T O R

Local Government

Option 1




Separate local authorities for the various population groups with own areas of jurisdiction

Upgrading of Indian and Coloured into autonomous LAC where viable

Similar to existing local authority/ government

Local Government

Option 2



A Local Services Council with a joint administration constituted by autonomous local authorities and local bodies

- Also include local bodies which do not possess the necessary viability to be converted into autonomous local governments
- Nature and range of functions negotiable
- Makes decisions for the town or city as a whole
- Similar to Regional Services Council

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## THE GREENING OF BLACK AGRICULTURE

By Rob Melis and Brian Garman, Crop Improvement Research Unit,  
University of Natal

*Plant breeding programmes in South Africa are traditionally aimed at the commercial producer. Crop cultivars developed by these programmes, however, are generally poorly adapted to the low-input farming systems of black agriculture. The use of cultivars that are susceptible to disease is a major technical constraint to agricultural development as many small farmers do not apply agro-chemicals. Over the past five years the Crop Improvement Research Unit in the Faculty of Agriculture has selected and promoted high-yielding, disease-resistant crop cultivars in the black farming sector. The authors assess the progress achieved in the dry bean research programme and its impact on agricultural development in southern Africa.*

A large number of government and non-government organisations, including university groups, church and charity organisations and government departments, promote development in the black farming sector. An important part of their activities concerns the introduction of modern technology such as irrigation, fertilizer, improved cultivars and agro-chemicals into a subsistence farming economy. Farmers are assisted with purchasing modern inputs, and in some cases these are distributed free of charge.

Seldom, however, are these programmes based on research to establish what technology is needed and at what level. The impact of the recommended technology is rarely studied. The technology often has been developed for an agricultural system within a completely different socio-economic context.

Improved crop cultivars, for instance, are an important part of development programmes and the focus of much extension activity. In South Africa new cultivars are generally developed by commercial seed companies and government research stations serving the white commercial sector and are often selected under high-input conditions.

These cultivars are also promoted in black agriculture but often fail to perform in this low-input farming system. One of the reasons is that black farmers cannot manage or afford the inputs, such as fungicides and irrigation, which have to be used in association with the new cultivars. For example, the potato cultivar BP1 is widely

promoted in the black farming sector but is highly susceptible to fungal diseases. Few farmers are in a position to use a fungicide and this results in low yields (Melis, 1988). Many black farmers still prefer the traditional open-pollinated maize cultivars to the modern hybrids.

The above example highlights the need for plant breeding research that is specifically aimed at the small-farm system in the South African context. The best example of a large-scale introduction of First World plant breeding technology in developing countries is the much-debated green revolution which started with the release of high-yielding wheat and rice cultivars in Asia.

Although this intervention did indeed increase the agricultural productivity in most Asian countries, many researchers have reported on the slow adoption or even rejection of new cultivars by some third world farmers (Oasa, 1987). Others pointed out the differential adoption rates within the farming community, with the wealthier farmers being the first to use the new cultivars (Whyte, 1986; Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1982). This led in some cases to smaller farmers having to sell their land.

### Holistic Approach

The far-reaching social and economic implications of the 'green revolution' emphasised the importance of interaction between social and natural scientists in cultivar introduction programmes for two reasons:

*Technologies recommended to the black farming sector have often been developed within a completely different socio-economic context*

*There is a need for closer cooperation and coordination of the efforts of social and natural scientists in rural development*

- Plant breeders serving the small-farm system have to take social and economic constraints into consideration in order to develop well-adapted and acceptable cultivars (Hildebrand, 1982).
- Plant breeders need feedback from their colleagues in the social sciences to design breeding programmes and to evaluate the long-term impact of the technology that is being introduced.

Chambers (1977), in discussing the role of plant breeding in developing countries, criticised scientists of both camps, saying: 'Social scientists have failed their natural scientist colleagues, and indeed the community as a whole. There is no adequate theory of rural development; no analytical framework for categorising rural situations which can be used prescriptively.

For their part, natural scientists engaged in agricultural, irrigation and seed-breeding research have been reluctant to learn from social scientists. Partly this has been based on their appraisal of lack of competence and versatility among social scientists. Partly, too, they have seen economists and others as threats to their decision-making autonomy.'

Over the past decade plant breeders and social scientist have worked closer together in farm-system studies. Furthermore, the farming household as a whole is studied rather than certain aspects in isolation (Norman, 1978).

Plant breeding is often seen as a cost-effective approach in improving Third World agriculture. The danger, however, is that it can lock highly trained specialists up in their research stations where they develop super cultivars which are later rejected by the recipient farmers for some unexpected reason. Over the years the Crop Improvement Research Unit at the University of Natal has developed a programme whereby the target-community is involved at the different stages of the field research. The farmers play a vital role in the final selection of cultivars.

### New Cultivars

The emphasis of our programme is on the selection and breeding of improved crop cultivars for the small-farm system. The research is concentrated in the moist hinterland of the Vulindlela district of KwaZulu (outside Pietermaritzburg) in an area where conditions favour the incidence of plant diseases.

The major food crops in the district include maize, dry beans and potatoes (Lea and Stanford, 1982). The present research programme was started approximately eight years ago and initially concentrated on dry beans. This crop is an important source of protein and a potential cash crop that can easily be stored. Dry bean yields among farmers in KwaZulu were often low as a result of plant disease infestation and the use of poorly-adapted cultivars susceptible to diseases.

Good disease-resistant genetic material was available from the international research programme of CIAT (Centro Internacional d'Agricultura Tropical) in Colombia, and the potential for yield improvement was good. A large number of lines were screened and evaluated in cultivar trials, and some were used at a later stage as parents in the breeding programme. Recently, other crops such as potatoes, maize and tomatoes have been included in the programme.

The following community-integrated approach was adopted:

- *Phase 1*  
Germplasm, introduced through CIAT, and breeding lines from the local programme, were tested for several seasons in scientific, low-input field trials at the KwaGubeshe Community Training Centre in the Vulindlela district. The trials were conducted under conditions simulating those under which the local farmers were working.

- *Phase 2*  
The most promising cultivars emerging from the trials were introduced to a selected group of farmers in the Vulindlela district. Each farmer was asked to try out the new cultivars on a small scale. Most farmers were given no more than two cultivars and were visited regularly during the season to monitor their crop and obtain their opinion on the cultivars.

For a number of seasons, observations were made on the farmer's attitude towards the new cultivars. If after three years the farmer was still growing the cultivar and had increased the area planted with this cultivar, this was considered a good indication of suitability. Some farmers would sell seed to neighbouring farmers which also confirmed popular acceptance.

- *Phase 3*  
Cultivars which were identified by the farmers in the on-farm programme as

*There is a danger in plant breeding of neglecting the target community and having super cultivars rejected by recipient farmers after years of research*

acceptable were subsequently distributed in small packets (usually 200g) or as demonstration trials in KwaZulu and other areas in South Africa. The response from farmers was monitored and the information used to decide on the general release of the cultivar.

**Phase 4**  
The final step involves the official release and registration of the cultivar.

### Farmer Feedback

Apart from assisting the researchers in deciding on the most suitable and acceptable cultivars, the programme has supplied information on the factors to consider in plant breeding. Several cultivar characteristics, which the researcher had not considered previously, could now be taken into account. Some of these were:

- preference for seed type
- upright growth habit
- ability to recover after stress periods
- cooking time.

One of the interesting aspects was the apparent local preference for cultivars. Farmers in the Transkei, for example, had no problem with the red-seeded cultivar Loteni, while farmers in KwaZulu readily accepted the cream-speckled Mkuzi (see plate 1). However, their colleagues in the Umzumbe district on the South Coast were resisting new cultivars and preferred (probably for good reasons) their traditional speckled sugar beans.

An important observation made by the farmers was the short cooking time of the Mkuzi beans, which they considered to be very important. Zulu housewives generally cook their beans without pre-soaking and it was found that under those conditions, the Mkuzi bean has a shorter cooking time than the traditional sugar beans. This was later confirmed by scientific trials.

Cultivar Mkuzi has become widely adopted throughout KwaZulu. When entered in the national cultivar trials conducted over 22 sites, it out-yielded all other entries. This was despite the fact that diseases were controlled in these trials (which was not necessary, in any case, for the disease-resistant Mkuzi bean).

All staff members at the Crop Improvement Research Unit have been involved in a range of extension activities such as:


- Training of student extension officers at the Owen Sithole College of Agriculture

## The Volunteer Programme

To further improve the contact between plant breeding researchers and the community, a programme was introduced by The Crop Improvement Research Unit in 1987 whereby the farmers were involved in the field trials. A selected group of forty farmers from different farmers associations were invited to take part. The farmers plant, maintain and harvest the trials. Their only compensation was the training and the produce at the end of the season.

This volunteer programme has helped the research team to become more familiar with the needs of the farmers while the farmers feel more involved with the research programme. An additional objective has been to make the farmers aware of the need for experimentation and to encourage them to experiment with different techniques and cultivars on their own farms.

The total programme has now taken the format shown in the diagram below:



The diagram illustrates the process of feedback at all levels of the cultivar selection and introduction programme. This enables the breeder to choose the right cultivar for introduction while it gives him at the same time information to design his breeding strategy.



**PLATE 1** On-farm trials in the Vulindlela district of KwaZulu. Mkuzi, on the right, is widely accepted. Enseleni, on the left, is a new rust-resistant sugar bean cultivar which the farmer is trying out for the first time.

Those involved in rural development should be careful not to enforce modern inputs for which the farmers have not asked, and are not ready

on experimental and demonstration trials. Students were involved in conducting a cultivar trial and thus were made familiar with new cultivars and the concept of experimentation with new technology.

- Courses for extension officers in which the officers were informed on the latest cultivars and the associated production techniques.
- Contact with a number of rural development organisations and government departments.

Apart from the training aspect and the promotion of the new cultivars, the different extension activities have kept the researchers in touch with the wider farmer community. This has given the researchers additional feedback to design the research programme.

Based on the experience over the first years of the programme, a local breeding programme was started in 1985. While the hybridisation was carried out in the glasshouses, the field selections were done under the same low-input conditions in Vulindlela. The feedback from the farmers was used to design the breeding programme and determine which characteristics were to be improved.

### Integrated Transition

Modern agricultural technology is part of the commercial farming system where finance and land is in ample supply, infrastructure is well-developed and farmers are educated. The same technology is now offered to and promoted in the black farming sector operating under completely different conditions. Improved cultivars often constitute the first technology adopted by the subsistence farmer but seldom are these cultivars adapted to the low-input farming system.

In our research model, the farmers themselves have been instrumental in identifying the most suitable cultivars. The system can be applied to research on the development and introduction of any technology and is simple, practical and inexpensive. As the technology is tested by the farmers themselves at all stages of the programme it prevents the introduction of inappropriate technology.

The cultivar development programme has had a direct impact in the Vulindlela district where farmers have increased their bean production and have started to sell their

surplus within this peri-urban community. More research and the involvement of social scientists is needed to determine the adoption rate among the different categories of farmers in the area.

The Unit has purposely limited its involvement with the farmers to cultivar-related research. Staff members were often approached for assistance with the purchase and transport of inputs such as fertilizer while visiting farmers in the field. Such requests were consistently turned down in order to prevent farmers becoming dependant on the unit and to encourage them to use their farmers associations.

The transition to a modern agriculture in the First World has been generated by the momentum created in the farming community itself, by the growth of the market due to industrialisation, by improved education, by urbanisation and by the manufacturing of farming inputs. Not all development has been beneficial, however. This is becoming more and more evident through the unwanted side-effects of degeneration and pollution of agricultural lands found in Europe at present.

The present day subsistence and peasant farming communities in South Africa have their own momentum for development. Those involved in rural development should be careful not to enforce modern inputs for which the farmers have not asked, and are not ready. The integrated system of cultivar selection and transfer in the black farming systems enables researchers to look through the eyes of the farmers, while making some farmers into researchers. Lastly, the cultivars selected by the farmers of Vulindlela are presently grown by peasant farmers throughout Africa. **UPWA**

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# Data and Technology Transfer

## A Strategy for Sharing Knowledge

By Peter Alcock, Department of Economics, University of Natal

*One of the many difficulties of development work in black rural and peri-urban areas concerns the exchange of information, especially between aid agencies and government departments. A similar problem concerns the transfer of development data to organisations not directly involved with development per se, although they may be working in related spheres (e.g. the upliftment of black staff living on white farms).*

*In the third part of his series of resource guides, Peter Alcock explores two information transfer possibilities for both sectors (see Indicator SA, Vol6/No1-2:64; and Vol6/No3:55-58).*

Experience with research and extension work in KwaZulu has shown that some of the central government departments involved with development work are not aware of the existence of many of the smaller aid agencies. (Only work undertaken by the more prominent agencies, such as the Valley Trust, is generally known.) Direct experience and data derived in the field by the aid agencies are often not available to the large state departments which have the necessary funds *vis-a-vis* aid agencies as well as relatively abundant manpower.

The aid agencies are evolving a low cost and appropriate approach to rural development whereas some central government departments still tend towards First World thinking in their development work. For example, the Valley Trust and other aid agencies as well as the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry have been involved in the protection of springs in KwaZulu for a decade.

Spring protection is a simple, inexpensive and effective procedure, involving excavation of the eye of the spring and the building of a v-shaped concrete protection chamber with plastic outlet piping. The chamber is backfilled with boulders, gravel and soil which is then planted with grass. The protection area is sometimes fenced to prevent the ingress of cattle. Spring protection helps to prevent surface contamination of the water.

While spring protection is a standard water improvement method in KwaZulu, it is only within the last two years, however, that a major government department has accepted that protection is an appropriate water technology system for black rural and peri-urban areas.

### Exchange Methods

One method of increasing the spread of knowledge (by 'lateral linkage') is to draw

*Some government departments involved with development work are not aware of the existence of many of the smaller aid agencies*

One major advantage of a database is that synthesis of development experience derived by several workers in the region then becomes possible

up a directory of all the organisations involved in a particular sphere of rural development. This is then distributed to the agencies and government departments listed in the directory as well as to other interested persons. A two-way exchange of information is then possible between aid agencies and government departments.

The release of a directory is no guarantee that information will spread any faster or indeed at all. At the very least, however, the common 'excuses' of lack of knowledge about exactly who is involved in rural development and the difficulties of deriving suitable data, are no longer valid.

A water and sanitation directory for black areas in 'white' Natal as well as KwaZulu was recently compiled with the general aim of improving the flow of technical information and sociological practice in rural and peri-urban areas (see directory overleaf). An example of a general directory is the *Prodder's Development Annual* produced by the Human Sciences Research Council. The annual lists several development organisations active in southern Africa (van der Kooy, 1990).

Another method of improving the exchange of information involves the compilation of a regional literature database for given topics. The WATSNU (Water and Sanitation - Natal University) literature database on KwaZulu is an example of a regional literature file (Alcock, 1989).

Relatively little written information on black areas appears in the formal journals and in other sources where access is easy. Most of the data are found in unpublished (internal) reports and in occasional or working papers released by research groups. The unpublished reports are virtually impossible to obtain a few years afterwards. Working papers, while more accessible often require a sustained search and a knowledge of where to look for the required titles. The net outcome is that information is often 'lost', important data or research conclusions are not known about or work is duplicated.

One major advantage of a database is that synthesis of development experience derived by several workers in the region then becomes possible where such data are otherwise hard to come by. This can have important policy as well as funding implications for black areas *inter alia* by avoiding previous mistakes learned the hard way.

Another advantage of a directory as well as a regional database is that both may help to re-discover or establish the 'invisible college' of people often physically located at some distance from each other, who are working in the same field, such as water supply (Alcock, 1989). Isolation is sometimes a problem for the smaller aid agencies who may feel that their development programmes are unknown and unappreciated. Publicity might help to counteract this perception. Some additional funding for aid agencies is also possible following exposure of projects through a directory or a database.

### Farmworker Projects

While the spread of knowledge on rural and peri-urban development is one avenue requiring attention, another possibility concerns organisations attempting to upgrade the skills and quality of life of black workers on white farms.

There are several privately funded organisations in Natal concerned primarily with the training of black workers, either for the formal industrial or agricultural sectors. Two agricultural training centres in the Natal Midlands were visited by the author as part of a small extension programme to obtain information on the training courses provided. Both centres are perhaps unlikely to interact with mainstream development work and associated techniques.

The Midlands Centre For Further Education at Nottingham Road is mainly involved with the upgrading of employees sent for training courses such as tractor maintenance, building and fence erecting by their farmer-employers. Some courses depending on demand are also provided at selected farms in the Natal Midlands. In addition the centre, using Department of Manpower funding, trains unemployed people in welding, building and sewing skills.

Problems are experienced, however, in finding work for trained and previously unemployed people. A recent venture undertaken by the centre is the training of people within KwaZulu (near Impendle), as part of a rural development project. Training is largely for women of the area and concentrates on knitting and sewing programmes.

Training provided at the Baynesfield Training Centre near Thornville follows an

Isolation is sometimes a problem for the smaller aid agencies who may feel that their development programmes are unknown and unappreciated

essentially similar pattern, although no sewing or knitting courses are available. Unemployed people, using Department of Manpower funding, are trained in skills such as brick and block laying. No rural extension programmes are provided in KwaZulu by the Baynesfield Centre.

A third organisation involved with training, namely, the South African Prisons Service in Pietermaritzburg was also visited. Prison staff are active with health education and skills training of black prisoners.

The various agencies undertaking water and sanitation programmes in black areas of Natal and KwaZulu were discussed with staff of the three centres. Copies of the water and sanitation directory were also provided by the author. General background information on spring protection and ferroement reservoirs for rainwater or springwater storage as well as VIP (ventilated improved pit) toilets was given to centre personnel. The techniques described are all standard practice in development work in KwaZulu.

VIP toilets are based on a simple but effective ventilation principle which virtually eliminates odour and fly problems. Both ferroement reservoirs as well as VIP toilets are low cost technologies requiring little or no maintenance if properly built. The Valley Trust has developed a corrugated iron mould which depending on the configuration required, can be used to erect 4 800 litre capacity reservoirs or to form a spiral-shaped superstructure for VIP toilets.

Superstructures made from concrete blocks or other materials are equally effective, provided that the ventilation principle of the VIP toilet is observed. There is considerable potential for spring protection, ferroement reservoirs and VIP toilets on white farms which could lead to improved conditions for black staff or to upgraded water supplies on some farms in the case of spring protection and reservoir construction.

Dissemination of water and sanitation techniques as well as some health knowledge, is possible through the training of suitable farm labour drawn from a given

farm or groups of farms, or possibly in the longer term, by involving black entrepreneurs. Alternatively, publicity given to the techniques through the centres may create an additional demand for better water and sanitation which is fulfilled by aid agencies already active in black areas.

Practical examples of the techniques are the best advertising medium. Adoption of the techniques by the white agricultural sector would be an example of 'reverse' technology transmission in the sense that most information transfers take place from white to black areas rather than the other way around.

### Delayed Application

The timespan between scientific innovation or publication of research findings and general adoption by livestock farmers in the advanced agricultural sector of South Africa is believed to be approximately 14 years (Field, 1989). The widespread acceptance of improved water and sanitation techniques in the less developed areas of southern Africa, as well as an understanding of the necessity for the appropriate techniques by the advanced sector, may well take longer.

The time lag between research and the application of new technologies is often due to several factors, not excluding manpower and financial constraints. Any procedures, however, which reduce the period between discovery, extension and general adoption are worth considering and will hopefully lead to improved standards of living and general welfare. A directory on specific topics as well as a literature database are two examples of such methods. ~~WPA~~

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*Any procedures which reduce the period between discovery, extension and general adoption of new technologies are worth considering*

# Agencies in KwaZulu/Natal

## A Domestic Water and Sanitation Directory

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AGENCY	CONTACT	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE
<b>AID AGENCIES</b>			
Africa Co-operative Action Trust (ACAT)	The Director Mr P Heber-Percy (nominally attached to ACAT)	Africa Co-operative Action Trust, PO Box 2763, Pietermaritzburg 3200 14 Edgecliff Park, 14 Battle Road, Gillitts 3610	0331-8465 031-754290
Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA)	Mr R Clacey	Association for Rural Advancement, PO Box 2517, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-5760
Built Environment Support Group (BESG)	Mr C Forster	Built Environment Support Group, UND, King George V Ave, Durban 4001	031-816226
Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre	The Director	Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre, PO Box 63, Plessislaer 4500	0331-8100
KwaZulu Water Development Fund	Mr R Bales	South African Sugar Association, PO Box 507, Durban 4000	031-9056
Rural Water Trust	Mr T Comfort	Rural Water Trust, PO Box 10823, Marine Parade 4056	031-3050
South African Red Cross Society	Mrs I Mars	South African Red Cross Society, PO Box 1680, Durban 4000	031-3050
Urban Foundation	Mr N Wood / Mr R Taylor	Urban Foundation, PO Box 1808, Durban 4000	031-3050
Valley Trust	Mr C Mann / Dr I Friedman	The Valley Trust, PO Box 33, Botha's Hill 3660	031-7710
World Vision	Mr G Bailey / Mr F Diener Mr G Whyte	World Vision can be contacted via Training and Resources for Early Education (TREE) PO Box 35173, Northway 4065 Emmaus Community Project, Private Bag X16, Winterton 3340	031-8450 03682-67 or 70
<b>GOVERNMENT &amp; MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS</b>			
<b>Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch (Natal Provincial Administration)</b>			
Headquarters region	Mr V de Klerk	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, Private Bag X9037, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-8500
Northern Natal region	Mr J Storm	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 620, Vryheid 3100	0361-1000
Natal North Coast region	Mr A Grobler	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 2123, Stanger 4450	0324-2550
Midlands region	Mr P du Toit	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 101, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-946683
Tongaat region	Mr L Klusener	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 260, Maidstone 4380	0322-7420
Durban region	Mr D de Beer	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 10163, Ashwood 3605	031-7840
<b>Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch (Natal Provincial Administration)</b>			
Headquarters region	Mr M Gunthorp	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-700200
Northern region	Mr K Bense	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	0341-8100
Inland region	Mr A Barnes / Mr G Mitchell	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, PO Box 17, Plessislaer 4500	0331-811645
Coastal region	Mr V Hansel	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-707150
Southern region	Mr T Platts	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-907400
<b>Directorate: Physical Planning, Community Services Branch (Natal Provincial Administration)</b>			
	Ms E Hicks	Directorate: Physical Planning, Community Services Branch, Private Bag X9038, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-952000
<b>Department of Development Aid</b>			
Headquarters region	Mr T Badenhorst / Mr W Uys	Department of Development Aid, PO Box 384, Pretoria 0001	012-312810
Natal region	Regional Engineer Mr N Todd	Department of Development Aid, Private Bag X9083, Pietermaritzburg 3200 Department of Development Aid, Private Bag X9083, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-941900 0331-842000

AGENCY	CONTACT	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE
<b>Department of National Health and Population Development</b>			
Headquarters region	Dr P Truter / Mr M Botha	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X54318, Durban 4000	031-3056071
Zululand region	Mr R Short	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag 1019, Richards Bay 3900	0351-42611
Northern Natal region	Mr J van Straaten	Department of National Health and Population Development, PO Box 295, Dundee 3000	0341-23116
Natal North Coast region	Mr J Maniram	Department of National Health and Population Development, PO Box 1093, Tongaat 4400	0322-28038
Midlands region	Mr R Winter	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X9067, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-941901
Rural South Coast and East Griqualand region	Mr A Bezuidenhout	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X54318, Durban 4000	031-3056071
<b>Department of Water Affairs</b>			
	Mr L Gravelet-Blondin	Department of Water Affairs, PO Box 1018, Durban 4000	031-3061367
<b>Development and Services Board</b>			
	Mr T Browne	Development and Services Board, PO Box 416, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-58041
<b>Durban Corporation, City Engineer's Dept</b>			
	Mr A Davis	City Engineer's Department, PO Box 680, Durban 4000	031-3002911
<b>KWAZULU GOVERNMENT SERVICE</b>			
<b>KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry</b>			
Ulundi (headquarters) region	Mr K Fourie / Mr P Berridge	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag X05, Ulundi 3838	0358-203008 or 0358-203016 respectively
Mpandeni region	Mr E Immelman	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 9905, Ladysmith 3370	0361-341105
Mabedana region	Mr H Spiret	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag X5079, Nongoma 3950	038282-26
Durban region	Mr J van Rensburg	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 552, Eshowe 3815	0354-42163
Ulundi region	Mr R Buller	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 9053, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-52484
<b>KwaZulu Department of Economic Affairs</b>			
	Mr D Totman	Regional Planning Division, KwaZulu Department of Economic Affairs, 367 Loop Street, Pietermaritzburg 3201	0331-946696
<b>KwaZulu Department of Health</b>			
	Dr M Short / Mr Z Ndlovu Dr D Prozesky Mr I Xaba	KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X014, Moberni 4060 KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X2113, Nyoni 3802 KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X507, Esikhawini 3887	031-9071030 0020-Nyoni No 6 0357-94803
<b>KwaZulu Department of Works</b>			
Ulundi (headquarters) region	Mr D Dunstan / Mr S Barretto	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X03, Ulundi 3838	0358-203503 or 0358-9400 respectively
Northern region	Mr J van Niekerk	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X5030, Nongoma 3950	038282-88
Midlands region	Mr C Liddell	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X9963, Ladysmith 3370	0361-341055
Coastal region	Mr D Lowton	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X584, Eshowe 3815	0354-42144
Southern region	Mr B Treadway / Mr Z Paszek	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X1013, Hammersdale 3700	0325-62119 or 0325-62113 respectively
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<b>GOVERNMENT AIDED RESEARCH AGENCIES</b>			
<b>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)</b>			
Pretoria	Mr I Pearson / Ms S Mogane	Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001	012-8412254 or 012-8412272 respectively
Pretoria	Mr J Wium / Mr J Coetzee	Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001	012-8412283 or 012-8412253 respectively
Durban	Mr K Charles / Mr W Behrens Mr D Simpson	CSIR Regional Laboratory, PO Box 17001, Congella 4013 Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 17001, Congella 4013	031-922561 031-815851
<b>Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)</b>			
Pretoria	Dr H Strijdom / Dr A Emmett	Institute for Sociological and Demographic Research, Human Sciences Research Council, Private Bag X41, Pretoria 0001	012-2029111
Pretoria	Ms A van Aswegen / Ms E Hall	Institute for Communication Research, Human Sciences Research Council, Private Bag X41, Pretoria 0001	012-2029111
Pretoria	Dr J Kvalsvig	Institute of Educational Research, Human Sciences Research Council, PO Box 17302, Congella 4013	031-815970
<b>South African Medical Research Council</b>			
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Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre	The Director	Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre, PO Box 63, Plessislaer 4500	0331-81018
KwaZulu Water Development Fund	Mr R Bates	South African Sugar Association, PO Box 507, Durban 4000	031-3056161
Rural Water Trust	Mr T Comfort	Rural Water Trust, PO Box 10823, Marine Parade 4056	031-379985
South African Red Cross Society	Mrs I Mars	South African Red Cross Society, PO Box 1680, Durban 4000	031-3062626
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Natal North Coast region	Mr A Grobler	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 2123, Stanger 4450	0324-25504
Midlands region	Mr P du Toit	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 101, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-946683/4/5
Tongaat region	Mr L Klusener	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 260, Maidstone 4380	0322-71156
Durban region	Mr D de Beer	Settlement Services Division, Directorate: Land Affairs, Community Services Branch, PO Box 10163, Ashwood 3605	031-784343
<b>Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch (Natal Provincial Administration)</b>			
Headquarters region	Mr M Gunthorp	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-7002211
Northern region	Mr K Bense	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	0341-81353
Inland region	Mr A Barnes / Mr G Mitchell	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, PO Box 17, Plessislaer 4500	0331-81164/5/6
Coastal region	Mr V Hansel	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-7071891
Southern region	Mr T Platts	Directorate: Physical Development, Community Services Branch, Private Bag 9021, Pinetown 3600	031-9074655
<b>Directorate: Physical Planning, Community Services Branch (Natal Provincial Administration)</b>			
	Ms E Hicks	Directorate: Physical Planning, Community Services Branch, Private Bag X9038, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-952385
<b>Department of Development Aid</b>			
Headquarters region	Mr T Badenhorst / Mr W Uys	Department of Development Aid, PO Box 384, Pretoria 0001	012-3128911
Natal region	Regional Engineer Mr N Todd	Department of Development Aid, Private Bag X9083, Pietermaritzburg 3200 Department of Development Aid, Private Bag X9083, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-941956 0331-942889

AGENCY	CONTACT	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE
<b>Department of National Health and Population Development</b>			
Headquarters region	Dr P Truter / Mr M Botha	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X54318, Durban 4000	031-3056071
Zululand region	Mr R Short	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag 1019, Richards Bay 3900	0351-42611
Northern Natal region	Mr J van Straaten	Department of National Health and Population Development, PO Box 295, Dundee 3000	0341-23116
Natal North Coast region	Mr J Maniram	Department of National Health and Population Development, PO Box 1093, Tongaat 4400	0322-28038
Natal Midlands region	Mr R Winter	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X9067, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-941901
Natal South Coast and East Griqualand region	Mr A Bezuidenhout	Department of National Health and Population Development, Private Bag X54318, Durban 4000	031-3056071
<b>Department of Water Affairs</b>			
	Mr L Gravellet-Blondin	Department of Water Affairs, PO Box 1018, Durban 4000	031-3061367
<b>Development and Services Board</b>			
	Mr T Browne	Development and Services Board, PO Box 416, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-58041
<b>Durban Corporation, City Engineer's Dept</b>			
	Mr A Davis	City Engineer's Department, PO Box 680, Durban 4000	031-3002911
<b>KWAZULU GOVERNMENT SERVICE</b>			
<b>KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry</b>			
Ulundi (headquarters) region	Mr K Fourie / Mr P Berridge	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag X05, Ulundi 3838	0358-203008 or 0358-203016 respectively
Mpandleni region	Mr E Immelman	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 9905, Ladysmith 3370	0361-341105
Mabediana region	Mr H Spiret	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag X5079, Nongoma 3950	038282-26
Ogwini region	Mr J van Rensburg	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 552, Eshowe 3815	0354-42163
Umzansi region	Mr R Buller	KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Private Bag 9053, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-52484
<b>KwaZulu Department of Economic Affairs</b>			
	Mr D Totman	Regional Planning Division, KwaZulu Department of Economic Affairs, 367 Loop Street, Pietermaritzburg 3201	0331-946696
<b>KwaZulu Department of Health</b>			
	Dr M Short / Mr Z Ndlovu Dr D Prozesky Mr I Xaba	KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X014, Mobeni 4060 KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X2113, Nyoni 3802 KwaZulu Department of Health, Private Bag X507, Esikhawini 3887	031-9071030 0020-Nyoni No 6 0357-94803
<b>KwaZulu Department of Works</b>			
Ulundi (headquarters) region	Mr D Dunstan / Mr S Barretto	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X03, Ulundi 3838	0358-203503 or 0358-9400 respectively
Northern region	Mr J van Niekerk	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X5030, Nongoma 3950	038282-88
Midlands region	Mr C Liddell	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X9963, Ladysmith 3370	0361-341055
Coastal region	Mr D Lowton	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X584, Eshowe 3815	0354-42144
Southern region	Mr B Treadway / Mr Z Paszek	KwaZulu Department of Works, Private Bag X1013, Hammersdale 3700	0325-62119 or 0325-62113 respectively
<b>KwaZulu Bureau of Community Development and Youth Affairs</b>			
	Ms E Clarke	KwaZulu Bureau of Community Development and Youth Affairs, Chief Minister's Office, Private Bag X01, Ulundi 3838	0358-202067
<b>GOVERNMENT AIDED RESEARCH AGENCIES</b>			
<b>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)</b>			
Pretoria	Mr I Pearson / Ms S Mokane	Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001	012-8412254 or 012-8412272 respectively
	Mr J Wium / Mr J Coetzee	Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001	012-8412283 or 012-8412253 respectively
Durban	Mr K Charles / Mr W Behrens Mr D Simpson	CSIR Regional Laboratory, PO Box 17001, Congella 4013 Division of Water Technology, CSIR, PO Box 17001, Congella 4013	031-922561 031-815851
<b>Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)</b>			
Pretoria	Dr H Strijdom / Dr A Emmett	Institute for Sociological and Demographic Research, Human Sciences Research Council, Private Bag X41, Pretoria 0001	012-2029111
	Ms A van Aswegen / Ms E Hall	Institute for Communication Research, Human Sciences Research Council, Private Bag X41, Pretoria 0001	012-2029111
Durban	Dr J Kvalsvig	Institute of Educational Research, Human Sciences Research Council, PO Box 17302, Congella 4013	031-815970
<b>South African Medical Research Council</b>			
	Professor C Schutte	Research Institute for Diseases in a Tropical Environment, South African Medical Research Council, PO Box 17120, Congella 4013	031-251481

AGENCY	CONTACT	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE
<b>QUASI-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>			
Development Bank of Southern Africa	Mr B Jackson	Development Bank of Southern Africa, PO Box 1234, Halfway House 1685	011-3133911
KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Ltd	Mr R Hannington / Mr K Röbbertse	KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Ltd, PO Box 2801, Durban 4000	031-9071055 or 031-9071155 respectively
RSA/KwaZulu Development Project	The Director	RSA/KwaZulu Development Project, PO Box 1816, Pinetown 3600	031-720783
<b>Water Boards/Regional Water Services Corporations</b>			
	Mr B Walford	Umgeni Water, PO Box 9, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-64395
	Mr D Vorster	Mhlatuze Water Board, PO Box 1264, Richards Bay 3900	0351-31341
	Mr B Pretorius	Dundee-Glencoe Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 310, Glencoe 2930	0341-31838
	Mrs J Earl	North East Zululand Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 31, Empangeni 3880	0351-26716
	Mr W Broughton	Amanzintoti Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 89, Amanzintoti 4125	031-90323458
	Mr A Tanner	Umzinto Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 76, Park Rynie 4182	03231-21333
	Mr T Millward	Lower South Coast Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 33, Port Shepstone 4240	0391-21158
	Mr R Mills	Pinetown Regional Water Services Corporation, PO Box 33, Pinetown 3600	031-721367
<b>UNIVERSITIES AND TECHNICAL COLLEGES</b>			
University of Cape Town	Mr K Wiseman	Energy Research Institute, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7700	021-6509111
University of Natal, Durban	Professor D Arbuckle / Dr K Naidoo	Department of Community Health, University of Natal, PO Box 17039, Congella 4013	031-2504111
	Mr P Derman	Community Organisation Research and Development (CORD), University of Natal, King George V Avenue, Durban 4001	031-8113601 or 031-811370
	Professor L Roberts	Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Natal, King George V Avenue, Durban 4001	031-8169111
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg	Mr P Alcock	Department of Economics, University of Natal, PO Box 375, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-955911
	Mr D Crawford	Institute of Natural Resources, University of Natal, PO Box 375, Pietermaritzburg 3200	0331-68317
University of South Africa	Dr J Mills	Department of Sociology, University of South Africa, PO Box 392, Pretoria 0001	012-4294116
University of Zululand	Professor J de Clercq / Mr S Dimba	Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Zululand, Private Bag X1001, KwaDlangezwa 3886	0351-93911
	Mr C Louw	Centre for Social Research and Documentation, University of Zululand, Private Bag X1001, KwaDlangezwa 3886	0351-93911
Umlazi Technical College	Mr C Nortje	Umlazi Technical College, Private Bag X04, Isipingo 4110	031-9072666
<b>SMALL CONSULTING ENGINEERING FIRMS</b>			
Appropriate Technology Information	Mr J Rivett-Carnac	Appropriate Technology Information, PO Box 11070, Dorpspruit 3206	0331-442430
Rural Advice Centre	Mr L Abrams	Rural Advice Centre, PO Box 358, Johannesburg 2000	011-3376170
<b>PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS</b>			
	Mr and Mrs H Botha	PO Box 1, Mtwalume 4186	03239-747
	Rev M Glover	Private Bag X5048, Nongoma 3950	038282-44
	Mr G Holland	PO Box 64, Bulwer 4575	03822-82
	Mr D Mackenzie	PO Cramond 3420	03393-606

#### NOTES

1. Firms manufacturing items of water or sanitation equipment are not listed in this directory. Also not listed are the major consulting engineering firms (largely involved with contract work in urban KwaZulu).
2. The degree of practical involvement of the various organisations outlined in the directory varies with some organisations such as the Department of National Health and Population Development providing an advisory service only. The KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry by contrast undertakes numerous water projects in non-urban areas of KwaZulu.
3. The people listed within each organisation serve as points of contact and the list of names is not claimed to be exhaustive for a specific agency.

# Distorted Images

## *Al Venter's Africa Revisited*

By Douglas and Gaye Booth

*Africa is often referred to as the 'Fourth World'; a continent of environmental disaster and social conflicts, civil wars, refugees, despotism, military coups, tribalism and superstition. Pestilence, famine and malnutrition are written about as the perpetual scourges of the dark continent. Development is said to have failed amid exploding population growth, foreign debt and trade deficits. Are these accounts accurate or are they caricatures?*

*The authors recently spent six months travelling across Africa. In recording their impressions and recounting their experiences, they assess the white South's predominantly negative image of black Africa.*

*'When a man is tired of Africa, he is tired of life, for there is in Africa all that life can afford'*

*(With apologies to Samuel Johnson)*

Our images of Africa are often shadowed by innocence and nescience. Western images of 'the dark continent' are more than a common failure to grasp the rationale and aesthetics of different cultures; they have been exploited for material gain. In the colonial period, European missionaries played a critical role in resocialising Africans. They chided every aspect of African culture while simultaneously extolling the new material values of labour, private property, frugality and accumulation. African religion was presented as 'barbaric', ancestral beliefs as 'witchcraft', polygamy as 'evil', and African economic organisation as 'lazy' and inefficient' (Okpewho, 1983).

Nor are contemporary notions of enlightenment eroding these distorted images. On the contrary, they are being reinforced by stereotyping and prejudice for political gain. 'Tarzan', one American boy told the 1988 Children's International Village in Iban (Nigeria) 'gave the impression that Africa was a kind of jungle all full of different tribes and frightening scenes. But ... this place is quite civilised'.

Foreign journalists, colluding in search of stories, are preoccupied with shortages of toilet paper and washing powder rather than contextual analyses. Who will forget Al J Venter's documentary series *Focus on Africa* shown on SABC television. Venter's casting of Africa north of the Limpopo as 'a chronicle of despair' was crude (but no doubt successful) justification of white minority rule by showing the disastrous consequences of African government'.

African efforts to counter these fabrications are restricted and the dissemination of African perspectives and opinions is limited. Indigenous publishing houses, news agencies and film industries are few and African practices are obscured by European values.

### Firsthand Travels

The authors have also witnessed Africa's miseries and endured its frustrations. But to perceive Africa solely in these terms is to ignore a vast continent of geographical splendour, cultural richness and diverse social and political organisation.

Of course, the nature of travel (the fleeting glance, the overnight stay) facilitates misinterpretation. Our journey through eastern Uganda provides a good example. Between Tororo and Iganga (92 kilometres) we were stopped at 14 roadblocks, manned by soldiers and gun-toting children who asked for 'presents'. In terms of personal experience we were impinged upon by undisciplined 'soldiers'. From a disengaged perspective, however, we were foreigners scrutinised by government Village Defence Units created to stabilise a region divided by political and religious factions.

Moreover, 'presents' are not extortion but rather an integral part of a second economy which ensures the survival of poorly paid wage earners. In this economy, public servants - bank-tellers, police, health and customs officials, park guides - seek payment before undertaking their duty. Thus, in recounting our experiences we are aware that objectivity frequently lies outside our personal experiences and perspectives.

For the traveller, Africa's first prize is its wildlife. The highlight of our trip was observing mountain gorillas in Zaire in the Virunga Park. Yet, as elsewhere, the African environment is threatened.

Equatorial forests are besieged by loggers, farmers, and even 'acid' rain from the man-induced fires that burn for months across thousands of kilometres of adjoining savannah.

Between 1958 and 1979, demands for farmland resulted in the mountain gorilla habitat being halved in central Africa. In one episode in the early 1970s, 10 500 hectares of forest in Rwanda was cleared to grow pyrethrum from which a natural insecticide is distilled. By 1973, however, after the area had been converted, the market for pyrethrum had collapsed and the gorillas of Rwanda had lost 40 percent of their habitat.

Roads and rivers in the Congo Basin define ribbons of human settlement. Thus it is difficult to gain an accurate impression of the primal forest, and we had to walk several kilometres before entering the forests. Similarly, the fragile pastures and woodlands of the Sahel are being transformed into desert by overgrazing while the savannahs of east and west Africa face competition from agriculture and mining.

Yet, there is some hope. In particular, the concept and management of National Parks is being reappraised. Parks are no longer seen as unproductive wildernesses pandering areas requiring to a few foreign tourists. Rather they are recognised as diverse areas requiring special management, areas in which the ecosystem is protected while allowing controlled hunting, grazing, afforestation, tourism and recreation. One of Africa's success stories has been the preservation of the mountain gorilla in the Volcanoes National Park, Rwanda.

In 1981 the gorilla count was 254, a marked decrease from a 1960 estimate of 450 animals. In Rwanda an integrated conservation programme, including anti-poaching patrols, education and economic incentives, was launched to save the gorilla. Conservation was added to the school curriculum, teachers sent to conservation workshops and the public was introduced to the gorillas and their habitat by radio and mobile audio-visual presentations. Attitudes are being changed: in 1980, 51 percent of farmers surveyed said that the Park should be converted to agriculture. In 1984 only 18 percent held this view.

Gorilla numbers are increasing. The 1986 census revealed 293 animals, with a large number of immatures indicating a healthy population, and projections that by 2010 the population will have recovered to 1960 levels.

Tourism is the fourth largest earner of foreign exchange in Rwanda, with gorillas the main attraction. Parties comprising a maximum of six people are allowed to observe a habituated gorilla family on any one day with each visitor paying US \$120 (US \$100 in Zaire).

Fascinating, and in some instances unique, geographical features are unveiled in Africa: the Rift valleys, sheer escarpments (Mau and Kabasha) and deep lakes with fjord shorelines (Edward, Kivu); snowcapped volcanic domes (Mount Cameroon and Kilimanjaro); and active volcanoes (Mount Nyirangongo and Nyamuragira). The sand seas (*ergs*) and even the great voids of the Sahara, the gravel, sand and dust plains and empty horizons, hold the traveller in awe. Rugged, barren mountains (e.g. Ahaggar, southern Algeria) and oases (e.g. Tamanrasset - a redeveloped tourist centre, In Salah, Benni Abbes) complete the desert's aspects.

Africa is culturally chequered with over 1 500 languages and religions. Artistry - jewellery, sculpture, dance, music and poetry - is the key to deciphering these cultures. Body art, including elaborate coiffures, headdresses, painting, scarification, cicatrisation and tattooing, convey information about beliefs, age, achievements, social position and wealth.

Vernacular, colonial and religious architecture varies between regions and is revealing of lifestyle, history, custom and social change. In Zaria (Nigeria) mud-built houses are decorated with low relief ornament, typical of Islam, and with vibrant 'African' designs. Ancient cities along the Mediterranean fringe, including the Moroccan imperial cities of Marrakech, Fes and Meknes which we visited, derive from Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Christian, Jewish, Turkish and Muslim influences. Another distinctive architectural form is the European colonial city, which dates from Accra (1482) and includes nineteenth century styles such as Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala and Kinshasa.

Finally, Africa's political structures include 51 independent states (including Namibia). Important differences in government and administration exist between these states (Tordoff, 1984). Three types of politics are found in Africa:

- Afro-Marxism (eg Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia);
- populist-socialism (eg Tanzania, Zambia); and,
- African capitalism (eg Nigeria, Uganda).

This classification allows for few generalisations about regime performance. For example, if rapid growth has eluded Afro-Marxist states, growth among populist-socialist states has varied from 'mediocre' (eg Ghana, Mali) to 'respectable' (eg Algeria), and among capitalist states from 'disastrous' (eg Zaire) to 'fair' (eg Ivory Coast, Kenya, Gabon).

## Africa Travelled

Africa's poor development record is reflected in its infrastructures and bureaucracies. These are dilapidated and inefficient to the extent that even

under highly favourable conditions Africa could not undergo rapid economic revival. Zambia's state-owned United Bus Company, for example, has less than 300 working buses in the whole country of a planned fleet of 2 500. Inappropriate policies and rampant corruption are further obstacles to development.

Public transport in Africa is unreliable, uncomfortable and always crowded. It is a physical game of long waits and human stampedes and crushes. Time and time again on our trans-continental journey we were stuffed into already jam-packed vehicles. But always there was room for more. Travelling from Goma to Rumangabo (Zaire) we shared a twelve-seat taxi with 25 adults and four babies!

One of our few comfortable journeys on public transport was on the ultra-modern Yaounda-Douala (Cameroon) express train which was the only time the fare included a guaranteed seat - a problem which even some airlines have not overcome. On a domestic flight between Jos and Lagos (Nigeria) more tickets were issued than boarding passes and more boarding passes than seats. In the ensuing rush to embark about twenty people missed out on seats and occupied the aisles. Sensibly, the pilot refused to depart until they left the aircraft.


Tarred roads are found in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Morocco. The sealed trans-Saharan highway north of Tamanrasset in Algeria is an engineering feat, while Central Africa Republic (CAR) maintains high speed gravel roads. In contrast, the trans-African highway through Zaire is a narrow dirt track and the desert route between Arlit (Niger) and Tamanrasset is marked by an occasional cairn. Soft sand, alternating with gravel piste, has turned this track into a vehicle graveyard. In Zaire, CAR and Cameroon, roads are closed during rain to preserve their surface. They are reopened between two and six hours after the rain ceases, depending upon the intensity of the rain and the vehicle's weight.

In isolated rural areas, long periods, sometimes days, can be spent waiting for transport, usually private trucks and utilities whose drivers are willing to add paying passengers to their overloads of animals and goods. Body and soul are slowly but relentlessly drained by jarring roads, mud, dust, sun, wind and rain. Comfort is elusive. Cabins, coveted for their shelter, are crammed with bodies contorted around levers and pedals and, of course, the driver.

Our most 'memorable' experience on public transport was on the Zaire River boat (two days between Kisangani and Bumba). Boarding the river boat (six barges lashed together with steel ropes and pushed by a tug) before the official

gangway was in place was a dangerous exercise: the reward was a vacant cabin - a rusted cage with broken bunks and barred windows. Most cabins are claimed by traders who second them for conversion into shops: the boat is less a mode of transport than a floating market.

Under steam the boat is transformed into a noisy, vibrant and colourful theatre; traders and shoppers rub shoulders with entertainers, preachers, beggars and officials (who check tickets and round up 'stowaways'). People living along the river board mid-stream from pirogues, a skilful exercise which occasionally ends in the pirogue sinking in the boat's wake. They barter fresh produce (fish, crocodiles, antelope, monkeys, fruits and vegetables) for cloth, clothing, toiletries and cosmetics.



### Africa Corrupted

African governments and bureaucracies are notoriously corrupt and inefficient. Repeatedly we encountered evidence of government abuses and engaged bureaucrats living by the secondary economy.

Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko is the archetypal corrupt dictator. Denying allegations of a personal fortune worth US \$5 billion, he recently said: 'I have less than US \$50 million in my European bank accounts. Is that such an exorbitant sum for someone who is, for the last 22 years, the head of state of such a great country?'

Mobutu's excesses are evident at Gbadolite, his home in the north of the country. Gbadolite is 'a Versailles in the jungle'; a city of wide boulevards and parkways replete with airconditioned patisseries, supermarkets, butcheries and banks, luxurious guest houses, a modern hospital and airport (complete with glass and aluminium terminal) and, of course, the presidential palace.

Outside the city, Zaire's rural destitute have been evicted, their plots replaced by palm oil, coffee and coconut plantations, orange and grapefruit groves and beef and dairy cattle ranches. Nearby,

on the Oubangui River a massive dam is under construction to provide electricity to Gbadolite. The World Bank cites the project as a white elephant which will disrupt river transport. Despite all this, Mobutu insists Gbadolite is a 'responsible investment' of benefit to Zaire.

In Africa corruption is a naked power relation bred in poverty. It is an unequal exchange relationship, a product of social inequalities and political illegitimacy: those with power exploit the coercive potential of their positions to accumulate wealth and buy support; those without power must defer to its holders to ensure their survival.

Grassroots political participation is rare in Africa. Most regimes are more concerned with political and social control. There is a tendency to centralise power in a single party and to personalise power in the hands of the President.

Restrictions on movement are another important aspect of political control which we confronted. For example, Bangui, capital of CAR, is effectively an island: movement across the city's boundaries requires a passport. Bangui is an important source of visas for trans-African travellers and passports must be lodged with visa applications at foreign embassies. But this effectively 'imprisons' visitors. Winston Churchill's description of Calcutta is equally applicable to Bangui: 'I shall always be glad to have seen it ... for the reason ... that it will be unnecessary for me ever to see it again'.

Similarly, in Morocco we innocently travelled to Agadir, a coastal resort, after depositing our passports at the French Embassy in Marrakech. Arriving in Agadir we were told that we needed either original documents or a police pass to stay. The latter, we were informed, was 'a simple ten minute formality'. After four hours and interrogation by the commissioner of Police we were permitted to stay one night. The police then escorted us to a hotel!

It is important, however, to distinguish behaviour associated with the second economy form unacceptable behaviour such as theft, fraud and embezzlement which is subject to legal prosecution in nearly every African state. In the context of the second economy the 'difficult' bureaucrat, with whom we came in frequent contact, is highly rational.

One classic encounter occurred at the Rwanda/Zaire border. Leaving Gisenyi at 6.00pm with assurances that Zaire border was still open, we crossed the frontier and arrived at Goma shortly thereafter. 'No, you cannot enter Zaire', an immigration official told us, 'the border closes at 6.00pm. We are open, but not to foreigners. You will have to go back to Rwanda'. 'But we don't have multiple entry visas for Rwanda', we said.

'Then you will have to camp in 'no-man's' land', muttered the official with his face buried in a newspaper.

Apparent indifference disguised the custom officer's real intentions and we eventually 'negotiated' our entry. But, unsuspectingly, further hurdles awaited us. During the immigration process we became aware of pending duplicity: our visas, issued at the Zaire embassy in Nairobi, had identical numbers which exposed us to accusations of 'forgery' and all its ramifications.

Among embassy staff, assigning one number to two visas is a common practice to speculate visa application fees. On the other hand, forgery is also widespread with made-to-order rubber stamps freely available in many African cities. In Nairobi, informal rubber stamp businesses are found on every block. Fortunately, before presenting our passports for examination at the Zaire border, we were able to surreptitiously change the last digit on one visa and thus avoid 'difficulties'.

In the final analysis, however, run-down infrastructures and inefficient bureaucracies are not the causes of underdevelopment but the symptoms. The causes are embedded in colonialism, in the clash between irreconcilable social values and norms. In the case of inherited colonial bureaucracies, there are tensions between neutrality and anonymity (versus communality and particularism), dependency and patronage relationships (the bureaucracy versus the ruling party), accompanied by the problems of a gross lack of resources, personnel and training.

Examples of neo-colonialism include the United States' connivance in Mobutu's plunder in exchange for a military base at Kamina (southern Zaire); CAR's total dependency on France - President Andre Kolingba is merely a titular head with national affairs being controlled by French Colonel Jean-Claude Mansion; and the dumping of European and North American toxic and radio-active wastes in Africa.

Ultimately, our images of the world are coloured by subjective experiences and outlook. But if these images are accepted uncritically at face value, then there is every likelihood that they will be inaccurate and distorted. In the case of Africa, negative images have too often been conveyed through stories barren of context and by politically motivated statistics. Samuel Johnson seemed to appreciate this when he wrote: 'So it is in travelling; a man must carry knowledge with him if he would bring home knowledge.' ~~DDA~~

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
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# URBAN

## M O N I T O R

### Local Government


### Option 3




- A joint local authority constituted by neighbourhood management committees (NMCs) on a non-racial and geographical basis
- Local communities establish NMCs at sub-municipal level for geographical autonomy, whilst the joint local authority decides on 'general' city/town affairs
- Comparable to all local authorities having representation on Durban City Council

### Local Government

### Option 4



- A Simple majoritarian model with or without protection of minorities
- Historical local government areas are divided into wards of the town, including the residential areas of all population groups
- Councillors, directly elected by residents of a ward, have direct representation to the city/town council
- Division of wards according to number of voters and/or financial criteria



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# NEGOTIATING DURBAN'S FUTURE

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPTIONS

*By Professor Simon Bekker, Director,  
Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, and  
Pravin Amar Singh, IPSA Researcher*

**T**hree separate city government processes of transformation are discernible in the city of Durban at present. In the first place, the establishment of a Joint Services Board (JSB) at the wider Durban metropolitan level is expected. This JSB shares many features with Regional Services Councils already established in the other three provinces of the country. Legislation is in place and the demarcation procedure is due to begin in the second half of 1990.

In the second place, established local governments in Durban are making their choices on the 'Kriel' proposals - defined earlier this year in the Thornhill report by the Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs - and have thereby signalled their intention to become proactively involved in the transformation of present city government arrangements.

Thirdly, civic associations are rapidly mobilising support in the city and are moving toward the definition of a city-wide coordinated stance on the issue of city transformation.

Any prognosis of the future of Durban's governmental arrangement needs to consider all three of these processes. Various analyses regarding the first two processes, the first government-driven and the second government-inspired, are already available. This article accordingly will highlight the main features of these analyses before turning to the third process, a process which is driven by civic bodies.

### The City Of Durban

Before beginning this discussion, however, a brief overview of present governmental arrangements in the wider Durban Functional Region needs to be given. Over the next decade, Durban will grow from three and a half to five and a half million people - an increase of two million in ten years. By the turn of the century, over half of all African residents of KwaZulu/Natal will be living in Durban. The informal or shanty settlements within which approximately one half of African Durban residents presently live will, in all probability, further expand, and will continue to accommodate no less than half of these Durban residents.

An overview of the present public institutional situation in the Durban Functional Region (DFR) reflects :

- a mosaic of uncoordinated local authorities ('own affairs' local bodies within Natal and a variety of tribal and other bodies within KwaZulu);
- a resultant fragmentation of service delivery to the DFR's different communities;
- a highly diversified political culture in the region;
- a number of rapidly expanding informal settlements with high priority development needs;
- centralised governmental control over planning in the region (rather than devolved and participative planning); and

*Three city government change processes are discernible: the establishment of the JSB, choices around the Kriel proposals and civic mobilisation*

*Given the division and diversity of local government in the DFR, it is clear that a more satisfactory institutional arrangement is urgently needed*

- deep division over alternative future scenarios for the city of Durban and the wider metropolitan region.

Given this division and diversity, it is clear that a more satisfactory institutional arrangement is urgently needed.

The DFR contains a diversity of local state bodies. These are not only structured along racial lines but differ in size and in terms of the duties which they undertake. Local authorities under the control of the Natal Provincial Authority (NPA) differ in status. There are Boroughs, Town Boards, Town Committees, Health Committees and the City Council. Two Indian areas within the region have obtained borough status. African townships under NPA control have not yet reached either town or city council status, in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act, 1982. The Development and Services Board is responsible for development areas and regulated areas. On trust land, there is a township committee and a non-operative advisory board. The Indian and 'coloured' local affairs committees are advisory structures. There are also certain urban areas with no formal representation, which are served by the NPA. Local authorities in KwaZulu are controlled by the Department of the Chief Minister under proclamation 263/62 and are therefore subject to a different system of local government (Pistorius 1989, Evans 1988).

### The JSB

The KwaZulu and Natal Joint Services Act (84 /1990), is closely modelled on the Regional Services Council Act of 1985. The purpose of the 1985 legislation was described as three-fold:

- to rationalise service provision through bulk supply
- to enable joint decision-making on matters of common concern
- to provide for infrastructural development in areas of 'greatest need' from new levies on employment and turnover.

The JSB Act reflects these purposes. There are, however, two major differences. Firstly, the pivotal role played by the administrator in the RSC system is instead assumed by the Joint Executive Authority (JEA) (which incorporates representatives from both KwaZulu and Natal). Secondly, the new metropolitan authorities will include from the outset local bodies in KwaZulu as well as in Natal.

The history leading up to the promulgation of the JSB Act is a long and complicated one (Bekker *et al* 1990, McCarthy 1988). Suffice it to say that the KwaZulu Legislative Authority, after years of opposition, has agreed to the Act; that criticisms of the Act have been voiced regarding, *inter alia*, the 'own affairs' local authorities underpinning the JSB, and its link to the JEA; and that the first JSBs, due for establishment early in 1991, will be launched in a period of change, of transition politics, which will undoubtedly deeply affect their foundation.

### The 'Kriel' Proposals

A direct consequence of this change in political climate is the new approach to local government policy formulation which the South African government is revealing. The responsible minister has recently announced the 'Kriel' proposals (Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs 1990). These include a list of five options for city government arrangements. The minister requested all interested parties in different South African cities to identify, by October 1990, which option they believed would be most suited to their city and their interests.

The five options comprise:

- a continuation of the present 'own affairs' and 'general affairs' local government system;
- a local services council with joint administration constituted by autonomous local bodies;
- a joint local authority constituted by neighbourhood management committees on a non-racial basis
- a single majoritarian model
- any other arrangement negotiated at local level.

Durban City Council have already identified one of these options for their city and have informed central government of their choice. This choice is yet to be made public. It is expected that a number of other local and regional authorities operating in Durban will do the same before the October deadline.

In addition, an announcement has recently been made by the Member of the Natal Provincial Executive responsible for local government affairs signalling the possible expansion of the municipal areas of jurisdiction of established white local authorities to include neighbouring black residential areas (Miller 1990). This

*The possible expansion of the jurisdiction of white local authorities to include neighbouring black residential areas has been signalled*

## CIVIC INITIATIVES AND DEMANDS

Whilst 'established' local government structures have focussed their attention on the Thornhill report as they made their bid on the 'Kriel' options, civic organisations, many aligned to the Mass Democratic Movement have not been totally inactive on the issue. The initiatives of these civic organisations, although articulated at a general level, reveal serious thinking on local government alternatives. Although not presented as a consensual or official position, statements of senior officials within civic organisations point towards the following initiatives and demands:

- Consolidating organisation at street, local, regional and national levels under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front. (*UDF decision at April workshop*)
- Coordinating popular demands which emerge from community grievances, with the aim of formulating a 'civic charter'.
- Demanding the establishment of local constituent assemblies whilst calling for the scrapping of existing local government structures and legislation. (*Thomazile Botha, Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation*)
- Demanding, and often being granted, representative status in local governing structures.
- Calling for the suspension of existing local government officials and for the appointment of interim administrators who are 'democratically elected' whilst a 'democratic and equal' local government alternative is being negotiated. (*Transvaal*)
- Throwing their weight behind the MDM in demanding structural change along nationally accepted principles.

executive announcement effectively places a number of these municipalities in a position from which the formation of non-racial urban local authorities could rationally be established.

### The Civics

The emergence and consolidation of civic and civic-related community action in Durban was sparked off by the Durban City Council and the Port Natal Administration Board decision in March 1980 to effect a 15% rent increase.

In an effort to consolidate protest action against these increases, various civic bodies active in these areas proposed the formation of umbrella organisations which finally resulted in the establishment of the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) in 1980, which concentrated its efforts mainly in 'coloured' and Indian areas, and the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) in 1983 which coordinated the rent campaign in the African townships of Durban. Despite their geographic, and seemingly racial emphasis, these organisations worked closely together, and were further united through their affiliation to the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983.

DHAC, in June 1989, claimed 23 affiliated civic bodies (although many were not consistently operational). A number of civic bodies, moreover, while sharing DHAC

objectives, preferred to remain outside the umbrella. The Durban Central Residents Association and the Cato Manor Residents Association are examples.

Although also initially formed to oppose rent increases, JORAC rapidly manifested deep opposition to the policy of incorporation of African townships into KwaZulu - a stance which set the scene for conflict with Inkatha.

JORAC enjoyed considerable support in Durban and its surrounding townships: Lamontville, Klaarwater, KwaNdengezi, St Wendolins, Umlazi, Chesterville and Hambanati. This support, however, has fluctuated, notably as a result of state repression during the second state of emergency (particularly during 1987), and as a result of more recent cycles of communal conflict which have deeply affected communities living in these areas.

In areas where civic bodies do not exist or have not persisted, informal elected *ad hoc* committees which are often issue-related, have been formed. These bodies assume names like 'Peace Committee', 'People's Committee', 'Co-ordinating Committee' and so on. As in the case of DHAC, a number of civic bodies outside the JORAC umbrella also function: the Clermont Residents Association, a UDF affiliate and the large Greater Marianhill Coordinating Committee are notable examples.

*In areas where civic bodies do not exist or have not persisted, informal elected ad hoc committees which are often issue-related, have been formed*

*Durban civics, although still in a state of disarray, are considering the formation of a Durban coordinating body to develop strategies and proposals for future local government*

*The confrontational standoff between the ANC alliance and Inkatha in Natal will decline once agreement has been reached on the national and regional rules of the political game*

Accordingly, at the beginning of 1990, civic bodies in the DFR found themselves in a state of disarray. A number had managed to continue to perform their stated functions, despite the state of emergency and continuing conflict, but effective coordination and consolidation proved to be an overwhelming challenge to their leaders.

Initiatives aimed at regional and national coordination and consolidation of civics (though dating back to the late eighties) have multiplied rapidly since February 1990:

- at its second national consultative conference in July 1989, Cosatu adopted a resolution aimed at the formation of a national civic structure.
- the UDF has been named 'South Africa's first national mass-based umbrella civic organisation' by Patrick Lekota, national publicity secretary of the UDF. Lekota said that this title was agreed to after consultation with UDF civic affiliates (*New African*, 4/06/1990).
- at a workshop in the Western Cape in April 1990, a regional civic structure drawing together civic bodies from more than 100 towns in the area, was formed. It is called the Western Cape United Civic Association.
- in August 1990, 700 delegates convened in Johannesburg to launch a regional body of civic bodies in the Southern Transvaal (*New Nation*, 3/08/90).

In Natal, comparable developments began in March 1987, when civic bodies first discussed such a formation. The Durban Civic Movement was informally launched in December 1989, and subsequent meetings in the region have resulted in the formation of the Southern Natal Interim Civic Co-ordinating Committee in June 1990 (*New African*, 04/06/1990)

In short, as in other regions of the country after February 1990, Durban civics - though still in a state of disarray - are seriously considering the formation of a Durban coordinating body which will comprehensively draw together like-minded civic bodies with a view to developing strategies and proposals from a Durban-wide base. Durban's future governmental arrangement will figure prominently on their agenda.

### Conclusions

It is clear that a process of city-wide negotiations over the future of Durban and

of its form of government is needed. The existence of the three processes described above reveals that most of the preconditions for this city-wide process of negotiations are being met. In particular, all the significant actors appear to be prepared in principle to enter discussions regarding their preferred city governmental model. The major precondition not met is a political one: the standoff which exists between the two major, predominantly black political movements in the region, the ANC alliance and Inkatha.

The cycles of confrontation and of violence produced by this standoff, the authors believe, have a better chance of declining once agreement is reached on both national and regional rules of the political game: in short, on political procedural issues within the future national constitution. Such agreement will facilitate the assessment by constitutionally entrenched and legitimate means of support for the different movements, and will thereby obviate the need for mobilising and assessing support by other, essentially destructive, means.

Accordingly, any prognosis of the future of Durban's governmental arrangement must necessarily remain a tentative one. Negotiations at city-wide level - involving all three processes described above - will address differing options regarding both city as well as metropolitan government forms, and will probably place the JSB structure itself squarely on the negotiation agenda. Simultaneously, the continuation of cycles of violence in the city, the region and the PWV identify the urgent requirement for a parallel process of national and regional negotiations aimed at establishing a constitutionally entrenched and legitimate set of political procedures. The future of Durban and its government-to-be depend in equal measure on the rapid outcome of these parallel and interdependent processes of city-wide and of national negotiations. **END**

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# A Community in Transition

## Westville & Group Areas

By Keyan & Ruth Tomaselli,  
Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit, University of Natal

*This is a case study of the hopes and fears of a 'white' community residing in a 'white' group area in de jure terms but a slowly integrating area in de facto terms. The Durban suburb of Westville may be described as middle- to upper class in character, with well-established properties, facilities and services, and with boundaries in close proximity to segregated Indian and African suburbs.*

*An unusual civic association was formed in this suburb, to represent a multiracial membership and lobby for the repeal of residential segregation. To further its objective of building a non-racial neighbourhood in a new South Africa, the association conducted an attitude survey on socio-political issues. It found that the majority of white residents in Westville are in favour of abolition of the Group Areas Act, support multiracial schooling, feel that change is normal and inevitable, and want to help to shape a positive future for all South Africans.*

**T**he Westville Residents Support Group (WRSG) is an association of people which crosses all the usual boundaries which so often divide South Africans from one another: politics, culture, race and religion. Members belong to the Jewish, gentile, Moslem and Hindu faiths. Yet members have two important aspects common to all: they are all residents of Westville; and all believe that the Group Areas Act is morally wrong, economically and socially restricting to all 'racial groups', and therefore, that it must be abolished.

The Association's aim is to replace the fear that 'racial groups' in South Africa have about living in proximity to, and sharing facilities with each other; with the reassurance that comes from knowing people as neighbours, rather than as the racial stereotypes created by apartheid.

WRSG's basic broad objectives are threefold:

- to demonstrate that there is a great deal of tolerance in Westville and that the majority of residents are in favour of opening the suburb to all races;
- to recognise the apprehensions of some whites in Westville and to develop strategies to reassure this group about their future and security;
- to scientifically measure the support of fringe right-wing racists hostile to the abolition of the Act, who claim to have majority support in Westville.

Westville is a solid, middle-to-upper class residential suburb of Durban. This will not change

when the racial and religious composition of the Borough alters substantially. The 'community' envisaged by WRSG is a community of common areas of residence, linking people of similar standards of living, interests, values and norms. The Association itself is a microcosm of such a community, and its members have all been enriched by the experience of working and socialising with each other.

Since the emergence of WRSG in mid-1987, the Association has believed that the majority of people who live in Westville share the perception that the Group Areas Act is unnecessary and must be repealed. To find out more about what Westville residents think about the Act, WRSG cooperated on a Survey conducted by Research International in conjunction with CCSU at the University of Natal. The results released in early 1990 were extremely encouraging, and justify optimism. Some of the highlights of the study are presented below.

### Survey Sample

A structured interview schedule was administered facilitating spontaneous open-ended responses. Trained interviewers regularly used by Research International were employed. Respondents were interviewed personally in their homes.

The sample size consisted of 251 residents and home owners. The statistical reliability is at a 95% confidence level. Only 50 people contacted refused to be interviewed, 29 because they were

not interested in taking part in a 'political' survey, and the other 21 because they were going out, did not have the time, or were too busy.

Of the respondents, 55 in the sample lived in or close to Stanhope Crescent, Rhodes Avenue or Westville North. These areas are close to the two Indian group areas bordering 'white' Westville and where Indians have moved into the 'white' Group Area.

For the balance of the sample, four or five starting points were randomly selected within each of Westville's nine wards. A maximum of five interviews were conducted from each point.

Only home owners and residents were interviewed. The assumption was that these ratepayers would be more concerned about changes that might occur through opening Westville than people who were renting their accommodation. Lastly, only whites were interviewed, ensuring that age quotas and gender representations were properly spread.

### The Findings

(1) *Most Westville residents have a progressive attitude towards social change across a wide variety of issues:*

When asked the general question of whether they felt that residential areas within South Africa should be open to all races, 63% of the Westville residents polled said they should, while 34% thought they should not.

Other questions about social change in South Africa investigated by the survey showed similar proportions: almost two-thirds of Westville respondents were in favour of progressive moves away from discriminatory racial legislation (see figure 1). When it came to questions which related

to them directly, Westville residents were equally prepared to stick to their convictions.

(2) *Most residents in Westville agree that Westville should be opened to other races:*

62% of all respondents polled agreed with the principle of opening Westville to all races; this was broken down into 40% who agreed without reservation, 22% who partially agreed, and 28% who completely disagreed.

The profile of those who agreed were:

- 73% of the 'agrees' were between the ages of 30 and 34 years old;
- 80% were Democratic Party Voters (which meant that many National Party voters also agree!); and
- 73% live in wards 5 (Wandsbeck: near Indian residences), 7 (Beverley Hills) or 9 (Roosfontein).

The profile of the 'disagrees' were:

- 49% were over 45 years old;
- 54% were Afrikaans-speaking; and
- 46% lived in Chiltern Hills (near 'Indian' Reservoir Hills).


(2.1) *Reasons for opening Westville:*

Respondents who agreed with the opening of Westville were asked for their spontaneous, unprompted reasons. A summation of the most frequent answers follows:

- If I can afford to live in Westville others who can should also be allowed to do so: 30%
- I don't believe in discrimination/I believe in equal rights: 20%
- It is a natural process and has to come: 15%

(2.2) *Reasons against opening Westville:*

Respondents who disagreed with the opening of Westville were asked for their spontaneous, unprompted reasons for this decision. A



summation of the most frequent answers follows:

- Because of cultural, religious, etc differences: 24%
- The influx of large families/take-over/overcrowding: 24%
- They have their own areas: 19%
- Because of different standards of living: 19%

(3) *Feelings about children of home-owners (other races) and of domestic workers attending local schools:*

- The survey showed that 71% agreed that children of other races should be allowed to attend local schools.
- This figure dropped to 32% for the admission of children of domestic servants.
- It seems that 39% of the total sample do not view domestic servants in the same light as they do middle and upper class migrants of colour into Westville.

Furthermore, 43% of the sample was in favour of allowing domestic servants to have their children living with them. (47% were opposed to this.) Of the 109 respondents in favour of domestic workers living with them, 72% were happy that their children be allowed to attend local schools.

(4) *Relevance of experiences in other countries:*

Of the total sample:


- 52% believed that experience in other countries where desegregated residential areas exist would be useful in assessing what may happen in an open Westville.
- Of the 47% positive responses, 28% stated that we can learn from both the good and bad experiences of other countries; 15% stated that integrated residential areas work worldwide and that few problems have occurred.
- Of the 47% negative responses to the question on the relevance of overseas experience, only 18 people said that mixed residential areas 'don't work'.
- The incidence of negative reasons was highest amongst respondents over 45 years of age (66%), females (55%) and National Party supporters (58%).

(5) *Consequences of opening Westville to other races:*

In an open-ended question addressed to all respondents, the following spontaneous negative responses (86 of 251) were noted, derived from those respondents against the opening of Westville:

- People not wanting to live next door to 'non-whites' would leave/whites would move;
- Whites would not get on with other races;
- There would be a decline in social standards;
- There would be an influx of Indians; Westville would 'degenerate' into 'another Chatsworth' (see figure 2: middle box).

FIGURE 2: Consequences of opening Westville to other races (spontaneous)



These fears can be subsumed under two strands: firstly, blatant racism (whites not wanting to live near other races); and secondly, misunderstanding of the class of person who is likely to want, or afford to be able, to move into Westville.

Negative fears were offset by responses from people agreeing to Westville being opened. In an open-ended question addressed to the 98 respondents (39% of the total sample) in areas deemed to be in close proximity to 'Asian' (Indian) residents, the majority were **not** antagonistic to the removal of the Group Areas Act. Only 17% of this group were unhappy about the situation. Of the remainder, most comments indicated that no problems existed between neighbours of different colours.

In a series of overlapping responses among the 39% sub-sample, the most frequently cited remarks were:

- 59% said that living close to Indian households did 'not worry them at all';
- 21% observed that Indians 'never bother us'
- 20% commented on the 'quiet' nature of Indian households and that they 'keep their properties clean'; while
- 15% didn't even know that Indians lived near them.

(see figure 2: bottom box)

In a spontaneous question on the perceived consequences of opening Westville, other positive trends were identified. These included the perception of a harmonious society, in which all races would mix and understand one another, and in which the whole community would benefit. One result of this would be to show the world that South Africa is making efforts to integrate the country.

Another clear theme was that only a few rich Indian families would move into Westville, rather than many poor black families, and as a result, there would be no major changes in social standards.

*(6) Awareness of appropriateness of current by-laws:*

In a question aimed at all respondents:

- 39% felt that the present bylaws are inadequate to protect the existing character of an open Westville.
- In contrast, a larger number (46%) felt the present bylaws to be adequate if Westville were to be opened to all races.
- Overall, 56% of the sample were aware that the by-laws prohibited more than one family per household.

### Survey Evaluation

Although the survey identifies numerous internal contradictions held by respondents (for example, a minority of Democratic Party supporters want to retain the Act), certain clear trends can be identified. Contradictions are important indicators of how common sense and prevailing myths over-rule actual voting choices in everyday life but not at the polls.

It would appear from the survey that the Association has been partially successful in countering the myth that property values would drop if Westville were to be opened to all races. However, the WRSG has not yet succeeded in allaying fears relating to cultural/religious differences, overcrowding, standards of living or crime/security (see figure 2 above) expressed by respondents opposed to the abolition of the Act.

This is not surprising now that the government has replaced the discourse of 'racial' difference with that of 'cultural difference'. This discursive shift underlies the government's new five-year plan which places even more emphasis on the idea of 'groups' and 'non-group groups', the latter being permitted to live in Free Settlement Areas.

Of those respondents 45 years and older, 49% were against the opening of Westville. Significantly, only 41% of National Party supporters in this age group were against the

opening of Westville. An unanticipated 56% of NP supporters agree with the opening of Westville.

The parroting of state discourse by negative respondents - e.g. 'each race has the right to preserve its own culture' or 'friction between races' - encodes the assumption that the Group Areas Act cannot be equated with racial discrimination. This contradiction must be contested and evidence provided of the inherent violence to families caused by this so-called 'right'. It is a 'right' only claimed by fearful whites who have been fed incorrect information on the effects of opening Westville to anyone who can afford to live in it.

Polls conducted on the Witwatersrand by Marketing and Media Research in October 1988 found that almost half of white respondents wanted the Group Areas Act scrapped: 36% immediately, 16% in time. This survey finding corresponds closely with the 40% pro-Group Areas repeal identified by Research International in Westville.

On the Witwatersrand, 16% of respondents wanted to see the Act scrapped 'in time': this corresponds to the 22% in Westville who partially agreed with the opening of Westville to all races. In this respect, Westville shows a slightly more optimistic outlook (6%) than the Witwatersrand, though below the figures obtained in Sandton, where 70% of a snap poll would vote in favour of Sandton becoming a Free Settlement area (*Sunday Star*, 2/3/89).

Many people have very real fears about the future. This is understandable. For so long, South Africans of different, enforced racial categories have lived separate lives. When people do come together, they are pleasantly surprised to discover that instead of the difficult experience they imagined, such encounters turn out to be mutually enlightening and rewarding.

Westville is not Hillbrow, and neither is it Boksburg. Either/or choices of this kind do not have to be made. The present character, status and development of Westville will be ensured by progressive thinking, and a courageous faith in the future. The demise of the Group Areas Act (which now seems inevitable), and more importantly, the demise of the old entrenched attitudes which gave rise to the Act in the first place, will go a long way to nurturing a more prosperous and harmonious neighbourhood for all. **IPDA**

### Acknowledgement

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## ASPIRATIONS OF BLACK YOUTH

# We Are the Future!

By Phinda Kuzwayo, IPSA Researcher

Three groups of black youths were recently interviewed on matters concerning their personal lives. Phinda Kuzwayo reports on this Durban attitudinal study which was commissioned by the Tongaat-Hulett Group.

It has become virtually axiomatic to point to the concerns and fears of white South Africans on the one side, and expectations and aspirations of black South Africans on the other, after the landmark parliament opening speech on February 2 this year by President FW de Klerk.

Whether de Klerk intended it or not, the announcement of the unbanning of the African National Congress and other black political organisations, has unleashed deeply charged emotions of trepidation (among those who have benefitted from the *status quo*) and of hope and expectation (among those demanding change).

Compared to the equivalent period in the last two years, this year has seen more strikes on the labour front; a sharp rise in white rightwing activity; a new upsurge of Natal-type violence in other parts of the country; and more deaths in Natal itself.

These events may help explain why polls conducted after February this year found that the deepest fears among white (particularly Afrikaner) South Africans revolved around possible loss of property, loss of security, and possible physical harm to members of their families, particularly wives and daughters.

Another survey conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs before de Klerk's February 2 speech found that substantial numbers of white youth in the 16 to 24-year-old age group are more resistant to change than their older generation. Their attitudes have hardened towards the conservatism of the rightwing (*Weekly Mail*, 13/7/90).

But what are the perceptions, aspirations, hopes and needs of young blacks, the

largest and the dominant grouping of South Africans who have a deep vested interest in a new South Africa?

The views of black youth tend to be expressed, today, in ideological terms, particularly through youth organisations whose proclamations address core national political issues rather than changes in individuals' opinions.

Few studies have been undertaken to evaluate the personal needs and aspirations of black youth. Where surveys have been undertaken, they have tended to focus upon youth preferences and youth support for the differing black liberation organisations presently competing for the 'main actor' role in the national liberation struggle.

### The Durban Youth Study

The study discussed in this article had a more specific purpose. In late February 1990, CSDS researchers interviewed 30 young black people from Durban townships in groups of 10 each. Two of these groups were drawn from the pupils from two schools in Umlazi. One, where the outlook and political affinity could be said to be inclined toward Inkatha and the other, a high achieving school in the township. The other group was made up of 'comrades' from Clermont and Klaarwater townships.

Participants from the two Umlazi groups volunteered to be interviewed while members of the 'comrades' group voluntarily agreed to take part after being approached individually. Except for three 'comrades' who were no longer school pupils, all participants were currently matric scholars between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two.

*The views of black youth tend to be expressed publicly in ideological terms, and address core national political issues*

*The desire underpinning all the responses about school and careers was the yearning for knowledge and education*

*Although there was agreement that the Group Areas Act would not survive, many indicated that they would remain in the townships*

The survey was designed to enable participants to reflect on their probable careers and chosen life-styles over the next decade. They were asked to identify both their expectations and aspirations regarding:

- their educational and future work careers;
- their residential circumstances; and
- their social lives.

Besides aiming to identify these personal view-points, the study also provided an opportunity for group participants to define what they saw as the major problems presently facing black youth. In addition, questions were also posed regarding the roles which a Durban city government, and a large private sector corporation should play over the next ten years so as to contribute toward the well-being of the city.

### School and Career

Respondents were asked which personal goals they hoped to have achieved by the end of the decade, and how they planned to reach these goals. All three pupil groups responded to these questions with broad optimism.

The prime aspiration that all three groups expressed both strongly as well as eloquently arose from their yearning for knowledge and education. This desire underpinned all their responses and it is clear that respondents believe knowledge and education to be essential tools for empowerment.

When asked about personal career choices, respondents from all three groups set themselves ambitious levels of academic achievement and of career goals. Almost all aspire to achieve full professional status and high academic qualifications. One wants to be a nuclear physicist, another a chartered accountant. Many aim to become engineers (of diverse kinds); others lawyers and law lecturers. All were adamant that each respondent had the potential within himself and herself to achieve these ambitions.

When requested to discuss problems presently facing black youth in the country, moreover, pupils raised issues directly related to these tools of empowerment. The Umlazi groups identified peer group problems like:

- 'ignorance, not knowing what is happening in the country';
- 'joining organisations on the basis of the toyi-toyi';

- 'being more concerned with politics than their studies'; and
- 'the usage of drugs'.

As with the Umlazi groups, the 'comrades' group raised the drug problem as well as the higher priority politics tended to be given above studies. 'Comrade' pupils added that teenage pregnancies and low motivation for schooling were additional major problems in their peer groups.

They also expressed disquiet about the administration of black pupils matriculation examinations, citing last year's failure rate of 58 percent. Such results, they argued, discouraged youth from putting extra effort into their studies.

### Residential Questions

The survey also included questions relating to residential matters and preferred lifestyles. The scrapping of the Group Areas Act was raised, and personal preferences regarding choice of residential area within Durban were subsequently probed.

Significantly, despite the fact that there was close to unanimous agreement that the Group Areas Act would not survive the next decade, a large number of respondents did not intend leaving their townships for the sake of living in what they consider will become an open city.

They wish to stay in the township because:

- 'that's where I was born and bred';
- 'it will be out of choice'; and
- 'the township will have improved'.

Others thought that a move into open Durban would not be compatible with African customs such as slaughtering a beast to communicate with ancestral spirits.

Those who felt that they would like to change living area wanted to experience life in an open residential area so as to be able to learn more about other races. These respondents insisted that they were not motivated to go and 'expropriate' whites by occupying the 'privileged places' which had been denied to blacks over the years.

In short, all respondents believed that choice regarding residential area would become an unhampered individual decision in the near future - apartheid-related restrictions would soon fall away. Most respondents moreover believed they would prefer to remain where they are living at present - for family and neighbourhood



The general white view of black youth is one of a politicised rabble with little idea of their own future. This article presents a decidedly different scenario.

Source: Afrapix

reasons, particularly because they foresee that physical and administrative conditions will have improved in townships.

Their bottom line rationale is that the general economic situation among blacks will have improved and only the individual's financial means will ultimately determine where he or she decides to reside. In other words, there will be a class determinant as opposed to a racial one which will determine residential areas.

### The National Question

Inevitably discussion cropped up on the present prospects for national political negotiations and whether they will result in a transformation of the South African order by the end of the decade.

Unlike some white youth, respondents in all groups believe that an irreversible process culminating in a new constitutional order has started and will result in a new government before the year 2000.

Simultaneously, contrary to what may be expected from a generation which has mounted severe resistance to continued white minority rule, only a small percentage of the youth interviewed thought the present government should be replaced by a totally black government.

The majority foresee a 'democratic government' chosen by 'South African citizens' constituted by a 'multiracial' or 'mixed' parliament wherein 'everyone will have a say'. A significant number of respondents, particularly among the 'comrades' group, saw blacks as a majority in the new government.

Once such a legitimate government was established, the call for economic sanctions against South Africa would no longer be pursued. This would ensure that the new government could then concentrate on addressing the material deprivation of the underprivileged.

It was on posing the question as to who would constitute a majority in a new parliament that political inclinations of the respondents emerged. A minority within one of the Umlazi pupil groups believed Inkatha would achieve substantial representation in a future national government whereas the 'comrades' believed such a government would be predominantly represented by the African National Congress (ANC).

The Inkatha minority argued that the ANC would lose an election because of their alliance with communists - an alliance these pupils believed to be unpopular with the people of South Africa. Members of the 'comrades' group pointed out that the ANC

*The majority of respondents foresee a multiracial democratic government in which everyone will have a say*

*All groups had expectations of local government and big business to meet basic needs and redistribute wealth*

would have widespread appeal because of its non-racial membership.

### City And Business

All groups reflected high expectations regarding the responsibility of local government and on business corporations in the areas of meeting basic needs and of redistributing wealth. Respondents saw it as the function of city government and of big business - in equal measure - to ensure that essentials like housing, quality schooling and jobs are provided.

Participants were asked to imagine themselves as either the mayor of Durban or the executive head of a business corporation, and were then asked to discuss what changes they would introduce in the city of Durban.

The youth groups saw the responsibility of both these institutions as:

- building schools like technikons, technical colleges, etc;
- offering bursaries to those who want to further their education;
- improving the quality of education;
- building homes for employees and the homeless;
- improving housing (particularly playing a role in eradicating squatting); and
- increasing job opportunities for blacks.

The 'comrades' group who agreed with the thrust of these recommendations, expressed the following additions:

- the establishment of one local government for the greater Durban metropolitan area;
- allowing Africans to trade in the city centre;
- the upgrading of housing in the townships; and
- the building of schools, hospitals, shopping malls in the townships and the improvement of the sewage system.

The onus of all these responsibilities was placed upon the shoulders of business and of local government because these institutions, in the minds of youth respondents, had been protected for a long time under classic apartheid. During this period, their activities had been to the direct benefit of the white minority whilst their wealth and power had been increased by the sweat and contribution of all South Africans.

This argument captures the youth view of what is understood to be 'redistribution' of

wealth in the new order. Far from calling for classical socialism, most youth respondents believed that private enterprise should continue to operate whilst playing the role of corporate social responsibility referred to above. In the words of one respondent: 'firms should not be owned by the government, but by the people - not by the community, but by the capitalists'.

This paper has attempted to test the theory that blacks, particularly black youth hold unrealistic views and expectations about the shape of the future South Africa.

According to research findings from its study of attitudes towards change, the South African Bureau of Information says that it has found that since 1986 there has been greater acceptance among all groups of the concept of a negotiated settlement to redress the South African problem. A spokesman of the Bureau, Mr David Venter, also claimed that there are some blacks who have unrealistic expectations. They want change to take place within months. This, the Bureau spokesman rules out as not feasible (*Daily News*, 9/8/90).

The aspirations of black youth, as shown in this study, derive from their past and present life circumstances, circumstances which they hope will rapidly change for the better. This, they believe, will take place after negotiations and once a new constitution has been written.

While all respondents were very optimistic that apartheid is finally going to be dealt a death blow, they simultaneously believed that this would not lead to intolerance towards those who have enjoyed unfair privileges at the expense of the majority of South Africans.

Respondents have a clear understanding of their own educational and residential circumstances and acknowledge the many negative aspects of life in black youth groups. Drugs, teenage pregnancies and violence are examples. Many respondents expressed a shared commitment to eradicate these problems.

The respondents' bright outlook for their own and their country's future is not a sentimental one. It is underscored by the understanding that prosperity and personal advancement may be guaranteed only with a sound education. All pupil respondents were highly motivated in this regard, and highly ambitious both for their own individual careers as well as for the well-being of their country. *TEVA*

*The respondents bright outlook for their own and their country's future is not a sentimental one*

# INDUSTRIAL

M O N I T O R



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**CARES**

- FOR ME • FOR YOU • FOR HEALTH
- FOR MOTHERS • FOR HOUSEWIVES
- FOR BABIES • FOR CHILDREN • FOR SCHOOLS
- FOR GOLFERS • FOR RUNNERS • FOR HYGIENE
- FOR COMMUNICATION • FOR EVERYBODY
- FOR PARENTS • FOR DRIVERS • FOR TAXIS
- FOR WORKERS • FOR STUDENTS
- FOR BUSINESSMEN • FOR BUSINESSWOMEN
- FOR HOSPITALS • FOR NURSES
- FOR PATIENTS • FOR CYCLISTS
- FOR MINERS • FOR PLUMBERS • FOR PEOPLE
- FOR GRANDPARENTS • FOR FARMERS
- FOR THE COUNTRY AND THE FUTURE
- FOR TEACHERS • FOR DOERS
- FOR FRIENDS • FOR JIVERS • FOR SHOPPERS
- FOR HOUSEHOLDERS • FOR RELIGION
- FOR T.V.ADDICTS • FOR COOKS • FOR HOMES
- FOR DOG OWNERS • FOR THE YOUNG
- FOR THE OLD

**FOR EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING**



*Softline*

by

**MAN ABOUT TOWN**

## The NMC and SCN Initiatives

# The Saga Continues ...

*By Professor Clive Thompson, Director,  
Labour Law Unit, University of Cape Town,  
and Member, Legislation Committee, National Manpower Commission*

*Labour relations legislation introduced in 1988 has caused widespread dissension and labour action over the past two years. Institutional responses have included an historic meeting in Harare between management, labour, and government with the ILO. At present, it would seem that the government is dragging its heels on the appropriate amendments. Clive Thompson discusses the matter.*

Conventional wisdom has it that labour relations figured as a cutting edge for such reforms as the Botha administration was prepared to countenance in the eighties: for the first time persons defined as black were afforded not only the freedom to associate as workers, but the legal right to assert claims through statutory institutions and the judiciary. This legal platform undoubtedly enlarged the power of unions on the factory floor. All of this occurred over a period when political demands were being stifled by methods which had become the signature of the minority government. It is ironic, then, that at a point when the country is moving into a phase of accelerated transition with the prospect of a new constitutional order at hand, the current labour ministry is cleaving to a controversial piece of legislation introduced only shortly before the changing of the presidential guard.

The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1988 was a product reflective of government temper at the height of the state of emergency. Political opposition had been largely suppressed but the labour movement remained defiant, with the bloody railway and mineworkers dispute of 1987 uppermost in the minds of many. Labour's resilience could be explained in terms of its

entrenched position in factories country-wide and its ability to wield power in a form - the strike weapon - not readily checked by security measures. The amending statute sought to attend to this obduracy by ensnaring trade unions in a tangle of dispute-resolving mechanisms presided over by a fortified judiciary. The unfair labour practice definition was greatly expanded to regulate, often to prohibit, strikes and other forms of economic action such as product boycotts.

A legal presumption was created to the effect that unions were deemed to be the instigators of illegal strike action and could be held financially accountable for losses suffered by employers. The position of minority unions was bolstered at the expense of the emerging industry unions and earlier industrial court jurisprudence, favourable to workers on matter such as retrenchment procedures, was pared down.

Labour's reaction on the ground to the new law - stayaways, overtime bans and the like - has been well-documented. Dissatisfaction with the new legal framework also elicited two institutional responses: the Saccola/Cosatu/Nactu (SCN) initiative and the National Manpower Commission (NMC) initiative.

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*In an historic three-day consultative seminar convened by the ILO in Harare in May, a new labour dispensation for SA was discussed*

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Talks between the employers' federation and the union federations commenced in June 1988, even before the new law was enacted. During August that year the parties reached agreement on a joint recommendation to government to hold back the contested provisions of the Bill pending further deliberations. The labour ministry spurned the recommendation and the Bill became law on 1 September 1988. The SCN forum was kept alive, however, and further rounds of discussions were held throughout 1989 and the first half of 1990.

### NMC Initiative

In the meantime, a new minister of Manpower, Mr Eli Louw, took over from his predecessor (discredited on grounds not connected with labour matters) and resolved to bring the debate within his control. During mid-1989 he appointed a specialised committee of the statutory advisory body, the National Manpower Commission, to reappraise the entire statute. The committee was comprised essentially of labour lawyers and industrial relations practitioners. That committee called publicly for submissions on a new statute and met several times in 1989 and early 1990.

At the beginning of April this year the NMC released its working document containing proposals for a new labour statute. They were generally regarded as progressive in character. The document proposed that:

- in principle, all employees - industrial workers, farmworkers, domestic servants and state employees (with the exception of the police and members of the defence forces) - should be covered by the statute;
- the National Manpower Commission itself should be reconstituted to ensure a much greater level of representativity, that the system of registration be greatly simplified;
- further safeguards be incorporated to enhance the representative character of industrial councils;
- the time limits for the bringing of disputes under the statute be substantially extended;
- a duty be cast upon employers to bargain with representative trade unions;
- the dismissal provisions of the unfair labour practice definition be brought in line with the standards of the International Labour Organization;

- greater protection against dismissal be given to workers who strike under legitimate circumstances; and
- the various divisions of the Labour Appeal Court be consolidated into one tribunal with no further appeal lying to the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein (in order to expedite the adjudicative process and to curtail litigation expenses).

Close on the heels of this document followed the SCN accord. This agreement was more limited in scope than the working document of the NMC, but was broadly consistent with the latter's terms. It also introduced additional features such as closer controls on the rights of employers to interdict strike action in the industrial court.

### ILO Talks

Against the backdrop of these two documents an historic meeting took place in Zimbabwe in the middle of May. The International Labour Organization (ILO) convened a three-day consultative seminar in Harare to discuss a new labour dispensation for South Africa. This occasion was chaired by Sir John Wood, a member of the ILO's Committee of Experts, and a professor of law at the University of Sheffield. The general secretaries of Cosatu and Nactu headed their respective federations delegations; also present was a delegation from the National Manpower Commission which included its acting chairperson and chairperson of the legislation committee, a delegation from SACCOLA headed by its chairperson, a legal advisor to the Department of Manpower, experts from the ILO and lawyers representing both business and labour. It was the first time that the ILO had had any official contact with South African government officials since this country's effective expulsion from the organization in 1966.

Most of the seminar's time was taken up with a close analysis of the NMC's working document within the context of the ILO's Conventions and Recommendations. According to a joint communique issued by all the parties at the conclusion of the proceedings, '[t] here was a lively and constructive exchange of views on (the revision of the Labour Relations Act), with all participants welcoming the opportunity to examine the importance of international labour standards in the process of bringing about improvements in South Africa's labour laws.



Among the matters dealt with were broad principles and detailed issues relating to freedom of association, collective bargaining procedures, the right to strike and other aspects of Industrial and labour relations.... It was the view of the participants from South Africa that ILO standards should continue to inform the formulation of a new framework of labour laws of South Africa'.

The South African delegates to Harare returned with a strong sense that a breakthrough had been made in establishing a broad consensus for a new set of labour laws. The general understanding was that the friendly sentiments of the Harare event would be translated into action in two stages: efforts would be made to legislate the SCN accord before the close of the parliamentary session in June 1990 while 1991 would be a propitious time for the broader NMC proposals to become law. As events were to prove, the common ground shared by the major trade union and employer federations, the NMC and an assortment of labour lawyers and academics did not reach as far as the Department of Manpower.

### The Labour Ministry

The labour ministry's first attempt at filibustering involved a directive to the negotiating parties that the accord should first be processed and endorsed by the NMC before it could be legislated in the current parliamentary session. The NMC worked quickly and, with minor reservations, lent the SCN accord its approval early in June. The Department, complaining that there had been insufficient time to consult more broadly, thereupon asked labour to concede further derogations from the accord. When Cosatu and Nactu refused, the entire accord was effectively rejected by the labour ministry and the South African Cabinet. The Parliamentary session came to an end on 22 June and so too the prospect of new law in 1990.

The rejection of the accord caused dismay among all of the parties concerned, including members of the NMC. Cosatu and Nactu threatened to turn to labour action to demonstrate their indignation and to pressurise the government into reconvening Parliament. Following a

meeting between the SCN parties, the labour ministry and the State President, a committee (comprising representatives of SACCOLA, Cosatu, Nactu, the Department of Manpower and the NMC) was brought into being and assigned the task of finding ways around the impasse. As things stand at present, the committee's agreed plan of action is to process the SCN accord by way of further consultations with interested parties and hearings before a Parliamentary standing committee, so that by the end of the year the accord may be cast in statutory form, ready for the enactment early in 1991.

The NMC is also pressing on with its own task and also hopes to have a more encompassing pro-forma statute ready for debate by the year's end.

There are several significant observations to be made about the sequence of events to date. The first is that the major employer and labour groupings in this country have made large strides in developing a working relationship. Notwithstanding deep-seated ideological differences, there appears to be a genuine resolve to arrive at a legislative formula which both mediates conflict satisfactorily and sets the foundation for an improved quality of collective bargaining. Trade-offs are being consciously made to redress the legacies of the past and to set the tone for a quite different economic future, one in which forms of cooperation between capital and labour could play a decisive part.

Secondly, and relatedly, although all concerned hope that the substance of any new law will be consistent, functional and equitable, there is a realisation that the need to crown the current negotiation process with *any* settlement trumps the details of that settlement. It would be a severe set-back for future economic cooperation if negotiations terminate inconclusively.

Thirdly, it is evident that the gate-keeper of the legal reform initiatives, the labour ministry, is at best ambivalent about the character of the new deal that is being advocated; for so long as it performs as a choke point rather than a contributor to the process, the quest for a new labour dispensation will be driven by labour action rather than by rational debate. **IPWA**

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# THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE UNIONS AND POLITICS IN THE 1990S

By Christopher Gregory, Senior Public Affairs Education Officer, AAC

*It was common wisdom to argue, before 1990, that trade unions should play an explicitly political role. During that period, after all, extra-parliamentary political challenges to the National Party were either in exile or underground. What have trade union reactions been to changes that have taken place this year? Chris Gregory discusses the political roles presently being played by Cosatu.*

*The views expressed in this paper are held by the author, and do not represent those of the Anglo American Corporation or any associated company.*

*Cosatu has virtually abandoned its shop-floor responsibilities in favour of national-level politics*

Developments this year in the political and labour arenas have refocused attention on the somewhat hoary issue of the role of organised labour in politics; with commentators sharply divided in their predictions of the future political involvement of unions.

Following the February 2 speech, conventional wisdom had it that the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP would, in freeing up the political process, release trade unions from the political arena to concentrate on bread and butter issues. Cosatu's leading involvement within the MDM was regarded as a political role conferred upon the union federation only by default: the Government's February 1988 restrictions on the activities of the UDF and other political structures left Cosatu little option.

Recent developments have encouraged another, divergent interpretation. According to this school of thought, Cosatu, as the trade union federation with the more explicit political affiliation, has virtually abandoned its shop-floor responsibilities in

favour of national-level politics. There are even suggestions that unions have become little more than instruments of the ANC and SACP. Cosatu's tripartite alliance with the ANC and SACP, its mobilisation of workers for political ends - demonstrated most visibly in the estimated 3million-strong national stayaway of July 2 - and the emerging cross-leadership of these three organisations are cited in support of this view.

## Political Unionism

Certainly, the political visibility and activities of South Africa's largest union federation give the lie to any suggestion that Cosatu and its affiliates will abdicate what union spokesmen regard as a real and legitimate political role. Cosatu General Secretary Jay Naidoo has openly asserted, 'Non-political unionism is not only undesirable, it is impossible'.

Since the federation's launch in 1985, Cosatu's actions have matched Naidoo's commitment; what has been dubbed the 'workerist' vs 'populist' debate within Cosatu (perhaps more accurately characterised as 'charterist' vs 'socialist', though this dichotomy is far from absolute) has largely been over *how* to exercise that political role.

Thus, notwithstanding vigorous debate over the issue, the Second Cosatu Congress ratified the adoption of the Freedom Charter as a guiding political programme. By 1989 Cosatu had become, by virtue of its level of organisation and proven support, the leading component of the self-styled Mass Democratic Movement. Cosatu was a driving force behind the December 1989 Conference for a Democratic Future where delegates resolved, inter alia, to support the Harare Declaration on negotiations and the ANC call for a constituent assembly.

Since February 2, Cosatu's political profile has heightened. At a SACP/Cosatu meeting in Harare in March it was announced that Sactu (the exile trade union wing of the ANC/SACP alliance) would be phased out and that Cosatu would join the ANC/SACP alliance. In subsequent months, Cosatu has used its structures and resources to assist the newly-unbanned ANC and SACP.

Following the labour federation's endorsement of the ANC demand for a constituent assembly, ANC pamphlets calling for the setting up of such a body have been distributed through affiliates. Cosatu also helped produce 100 000 copies of the SACP newsletter, *Umsebenzi*, and assisted with arrangements for the relaunch of the SACP. Leading figures at national federation level and in affiliated unions have publicly encouraged workers to join the ANC and SACP; FAWU recently resolved at the AGM of its Eastern Cape branch to campaign for all its members to join the ANC and SACP.

Cosatu has been actively involved in the organisation and sustenance of consumer boycotts in the Vaal Triangle based around demands which went beyond local issues to include calls for a constituent assembly and the immediate institution of an interim government. Most recently, the July 1990 relaunch of the SACP revealed four senior officials of Cosatu and affiliated unions, as well as Sactu's John Nkadimeng, to be leading figures in the SACP.

However, such *toenadering* should not be interpreted to mean that Cosatu has abandoned its shop-floor responsibilities or that it is subordinate to the political programme of the ANC. While there exists a 'disciplined alliance' with the ANC and SACP, Cosatu spokesmen have consistently reiterated the principle of the continued independence of the trade union movement.

The proceedings of the LWC/LRA Conference, held in May, identified a need

to address themselves to the issues of the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance would work in practice, and how the union federation should relate to the SACP and other declared socialist organisations (Cosatu 1990a).

It also identified an urgent need to draw up a socio-economic programme to, inter alia, 'influence the structure of the future economy'. However, it was stated that, while there would and should be consultation with its 'main allies', the ANC and SACP, Cosatu should enter this process having determined its own programme.

Moreover, a task assigned the LRA/Workers Charter Commission was the investigation of ways of 'strengthening the position of institutions of civil society in a post apartheid economy' - a frequent refrain in recent Cosatu literature - and the entrenching, 'by appropriate legislative and constitutional means', of the right to strike, to information and to bargain collectively.

Workers are being informed of these issues, and their input solicited, through the vehicle of the Workers' Charter campaign. According to Cosatu, this should be enshrined in the new SA Constitution, in legal statute, and in contract. The tripartite negotiations over the amendments to the Labour Relations Act are also part of Cosatu's strategy to extend and strengthen worker rights.

### Future Economic Policy

The principle of the empowerment of trade unions by means of the creation of 'a strong civil society, independent of state and political power, with real economic and other power' has also been included in the *Recommendation on Post-Apartheid Economic Policy* which came out of the ANC/Cosatu workshop on economic policy held in Harare in April/May of this year. While these proposals do not have the status of policy, they have been submitted to the two organisations for consideration and discussion.

If the frequency of its articulation is any guide, the principle of trade union autonomy would appear to be dear to union officials. Explicit reference has been made to the poor record of trade union autonomy in Africa. As Numsa's Alistair Smith put it: 'We are concerned that things could go astray. We have seen problems in Namibia recently with Swapo and the National Union of Namibian Workers. We have also

*Cosatu has been actively involved in the organisation and sustenance of consumer boycotts in the Vaal Triangle based around demands that went far beyond the local level*

*If the frequency of its articulation is any guide, the principle of trade union autonomy would appear to be dear to union officials*

*A March 1990 Cosatu/Sactu meeting agreed that the trade union movement should remain independent and under the democratic control of its own membership*

*In its approach to national politics, Cosatu is attempting an intervention thus far unsuccessful north of the Limpopo*

learnt from Zimbabwe's experience (Rafel 1990, p38).

Moreover, while union officials defend the continued viability of socialism against criticisms based on recent events in Eastern Europe and the USSR, they agree that trade unions in that part of the world became little more than subordinate 'transmission belts' of the ruling Communist Party in each state, and that this subordination is to be avoided in South Africa at all costs. The March 1990 Cosatu/Sactu NEC meeting called to discuss the future of Sactu agreed that the trade union movement should 'remain independent and under the democratic control of its own membership' (Cosatu 1990b).

Closer to home, union officials have expressed concern at the intervention of non-union extraparliamentary officials in labour matters. At a labour seminar earlier this year, a prominent unionist related several recent instances of UDF/MDM representatives bypassing union structures in intervening in strikes. The unionist made it clear that the violation of the 'jurisdiction' of trade unions by political parties is highly undesirable - whatever their ideological persuasion. Meanwhile, in the Eastern Cape, a region with a history of tension between unions and political organisations, a joint Cosatu/UDF forum was recently set up to discourage possible future conflict.

Unionists are also apparently sensitive to the possible ramifications of cross-leaderships within the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance. The reportback on the March 1990 Cosatu/sactu NEC meeting stated that 'while Cosatu members are encouraged to join and occupy leadership positions in political parties we are allied to, there should be a separation of leadership between the trade union movement and a political party'. Numsa General Secretary Moses Mayekiso has gone a step further, reiterating the importance of maintaining union structures distinct from those of political parties (*New Nation* 3-9/8/1990).

It is clear that, at the level of the national federation at least some unionists want to avoid the slide into 'economism' so characteristic of trade unions in post-colonial Africa. Alec Erwin's construction, the 'democratically planned

socialist economy' (DPSE), calls for the 'dominance of the working class in the political process'.

Referring to the future role of the trade union movement, the recent Cosatu/Sactu NEC meeting stated that 'Cosatu must play a key role in the restructuring of the post apartheid economy (sic) and in the policy making structures on economic policies relating to investment, re-distribution, education, housing, health, manpower, development, investment and environmental policy'.

It is perhaps with this future role in mind that, following the Groote Schuur accord, labour representatives articulated a desire to sit in on future meetings with the Government.

It is clear, then, that trade unions see themselves as the custodians of workers' interests in a future South Africa, and that such a role necessitates an interventionist political position. In Alister Smith's words: 'We are not just fighting for narrow economic demands but for something broader, for worker control' (Rafel 1990, p38). It is less clear, as unionists themselves sometimes concede, *how* that role is to be exercised. The concept of 'worker control' itself lacks real specificity, while the LWC/LRA conference proceedings recently identified the need for clarity 'on what we mean by democratic socialism' (Cosatu 1990a).

Moreover, the *modus vivendi* between the three partners in the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance will, no doubt, be a fluid one as South Africa moves towards a new constitutional arrangement. For, in its approach to national politics in SA, Cosatu is attempting an intervention thus far unsuccessful north of the Limpopo. If the history of post-colonial Africa is anything to go by, the 1990s will be a particularly challenging period for Cosatu. **IPA**

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# Leading Workers

*Workers Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA)*



*The partial opening of the political situation in the country this year has freed the social energy, tensions and contradictions that have been simmering in South African politics for some time. In one stroke, all tendencies of the liberation movement faced an entirely new situation which presents new possibilities, challenges and imposes new tasks if an adequate response is to be forthcoming. Various socialist grouping and individuals active in the mass movement, seized the opportunity to constitute the Workers Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA) on the 14 April this year.*

**T**he growth of the modern workers movement in this country seen in the revival of the mass movement in the 1970s, the tremendous development of militant trade unionism, the huge mobilisations of the working class in mass struggles, the huge general strikes that have taken place, have all combined to put independent working class politics on the agenda of the liberation struggle.

WOSA was formed to take forward the political interests of the working class by uniting them under the banner of socialism and to give leadership and direction in that struggle. In forming WOSA we were sensitive to the fact that several progressive political organisations already exist.

The broad national democratic organisations (ANC, PAC, AZAPO), represent a range of classes, including the working class, the middle class and even sections of the capitalist class. Most of these organisations contain elements of socialism in their programmes and policies. However, their multi-class character means that it is inevitable that working class interests will be compromised in reaching an accommodation with these other classes.

As socialists, we believe that the interests of the working class can only be consistently defended and advanced, if they are organised independently (in a political sense) of the other classes. By 'interests' we are not simply referring to trade union demands but all matters that affect the working class. These issues include full democratic rights, land, a living wage with full employment, decent and adequate housing, and the full provision of social services such as health, education and welfare. These are basic needs that can only be met in a democratic socialist society that is controlled by the working class.

While the South African Communist Party claims to stand for the same ultimate goals, they have subordinated this programme to the limited programme of the ANC. Because the SACP believes that the ANC must lead this stage of the struggle, they are not able to put forward positions and policies that conflict with the ANC, and are therefore unable to give leadership to the working class at this crucial time in our history.

Ever since the formation in 1983-85 of the Cape Action League (CAL) and Action Youth, which called openly for socialist solutions in South Africa, the need for a national organisation with a clear-cut socialist programme became obvious. Now that negotiations between the ANC (and possibly other sections of the liberation movement) and the government of South Africa are on the agenda, an organisation that specifically voices the demands and promotes the interests of the black working class has become an urgent necessity.

The formation of WOSA on 14 April 1990 flowed from these developments. WOSA has brought together independent socialist organisations and individuals from different parts of the country. Its formation as the voice of the workers of South Africa is the culmination of more than a decade of struggle.

## *Ideology and Principles*

WOSA believes that marxism is still profoundly relevant today. The argument advanced by adherents of capitalism that the demise of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe has proved that marxism and socialism have collapsed, is false. The crisis of socialism/marxism is a journalistic catch-phrase rather than a theoretical

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*Although the word trotskyist has been used in a derogatory sense, we recognise the valuable contribution that Leon Trotsky made in the struggle of the working class*

*While we do not reject negotiations on principle, we insist that no organisation can claim to negotiate on behalf of the oppressed people as a whole*

concept. That marxism faces many challenges posed by its transformation in post-capitalist societies into a state ideology that serves to oppress the masses of its people, is very true. However, the fact that marxism has offered a theoretical explanation and systematic critique of the phenomena of stalinism since its appearance, demonstrates, on the contrary, the validity of marxism. It is not socialism that finds itself in a crisis but stalinism.

Stalinism, a decisive political phenomena of 20th century, is not a theoretical deviation. It is the formation in societies that have abolished capitalism of authoritarian, totalitarian states. In these states, power is monopolised by the bureaucracy, which uses that power to gain material privileges through skimming off part of the social surplus. As a parasitic order that was structured through an institution of the politico-ideological type it empties marxism of its critico-revolutionary content and reduces it to a shell which it then fills with its own conservative, self-serving content.

In WOSA we believe that the renovation of marxism requires the renewing of its critical dimension, its enrichment with the contributions of new social movements (e.g. anti-racist, feminist ecological) and the enrichment of the most advanced and productive forms of non-marxist theoretical thought (cf. Weber, Freund, Piaget).

Although the word trotskyist has often been used in a derogatory sense, we in WOSA recognise the valuable contribution of Leon Trotsky to marxism and the struggle of the working class. He made a substantial contribution to the development of marxist thought, fighting to keep alive marxism's liberating and revolutionary continuity in the face of stalinist degenerations.

While the politics of WOSA has been influenced by the contribution of Trotsky, WOSA does not call itself trotskyist. The essential issues that unite us are a shared conviction that the poverty and powerlessness of the working class can only be eradicated under a socialist system that puts the working class in power and democratises society as a whole.

### WOSA on Negotiations

The mainly white capitalist class holds power in South Africa by virtue of their control of the state and the economy. They own 90% of the wealth, 87% of the land,

and all real areas of state power. The negotiations between the ANC and the government are not about changing this. For the government the strategy of negotiations represents a decisive initiative to win the time and space to extract itself from the economic, social and political crisis that the system of apartheid is in.

WOSA absolutely rejects any settlement which offers 'universal franchise' based on minority or group rights (as proposed by de Klerk) which still maintains white privilege in any form. We support unconditionally the demand for one person, one vote in a unitary non-racial South Africa/Azania. A negotiated settlement that leaves wealth in the control of the monopoly corporations will not represent a transfer of power. It will provoke a rising tide of strikes and mass struggle for fundamental socio-economic change.

While we do not reject negotiations on principle, we insist that no organisation can claim to negotiate on behalf of the oppressed people as a whole. There is only one way in which the authentic representatives of the people can be determined. WOSA states categorically that this mechanism is a constituent assembly. This would give every person in our country the right to be represented in the process of drawing up a new constitution.

We must be clear that the constituent assembly is not a socialist demand in that it will not in itself lead to working class power. However, at this stage, the constituent assembly appears as the most democratic means of deciding on the future of the country and as an alternative to any attempt at preserving minority rule.

### Strategy

Socialist revolution is not on the immediate horizon, mainly because:

- the working class is not yet unified, conscious and strong enough to act decisively against the bourgeoisie;
- the state has acted at a time when it is in a relatively strong position;
- much of the political terrain has been occupied by the politics of 'national democratic demands'; and
- revolutionary socialist organisations that do exist are small and relatively weak.

We have serious misgivings that the current negotiations option will lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in our country. This means that in the current period it is



necessary to strengthen the strategic position of the working class. This requires fighting for the independence of all working class organisations from the institutions of the ruling class, the state and their political independence from all political forces, including WOSA.

Strategically, the broadest mass action is the means by which these reforms can be won. Therefore, we in WOSA put forward a programme of mass action based on the following elements:

- the building of independent, mass-based, democratic structures in the unions, the workplaces, the communities, the rural areas, the schools, among youth;
- a truly democratic negotiation process, which means no secret negotiations and that issues are discussed and democratically agreed to through accepted mass structures (unions, civics etc.). 'Negotiators' are to be mandated and recallable by these structures;
- defend and extend all class actions which consolidate the anti-capitalist and socialist content of our struggle and strengthen class consciousness. We reject class demobilisation or enforced passivity for the illusion of 'the national interest' or in the supposed interests of negotiations;
- support for any reforms or 'negotiated issues' which strengthen the working class;
- A democratic Constituent Assembly based on universal franchise. Before that happens, no organisation can claim the right to negotiate with the government on our behalf and speak in the name of all of us. Fighting for unity and democracy means *putting it into practice now* by submitting the issues to public discussion and decision-making and recognising the plurality of the struggle;
- One person one vote without any restrictions, the right of veto or 'guarantees': in this regard the immediate formation of a single electoral body including the population in the bantustans is called for;
- Immediate abolition of all racial legislation e.g. the Group Areas Act, the Population Registrations Act etc.;
- Dismantling of the bantustans
- Agrarian reform that allows distribution and the nationalisation of the big landholdings.
- The nationalisation of the banks and mines.
- The right of veto for the unions, over hiring, redundancies, working conditions and industrial restructuring.

In line with similar proposals from various trade unions and federations and others, we support:

- The building, re-building or strengthening of rank-and-file and democratic structures and independence of the trade union movement and working class structures;
- The building of Nactu, Cosatu and unaffiliated unions, towards unification in a single organisation based on the independence of the trade union movement in relation to all political forces;
- Democracy and plurality of viewpoints in the trade-union movement;
- The building, strengthening or rebuilding of democratic and representative civic organisations on the basis of street committees, area committees etc., especially around their essential class demands i.e. housing, living conditions, amenities, services and transport etc.
- These civic associations to be built on a unitary democratic basis, federated nationally on the basis of rank-and-file representation;
- The building, strengthening or rebuilding of the democratic rural organisations based on village committees.

We believe that selected targeted sanctions that strengthens the working class while weakening the state is an important strategy to fight for.

With regard to the armed struggle WOSA has no military wing. However, we do not reject the concept of the armed struggle, but recognise the futility of Frontline state rear-base actions or rural guerilla warfare given the military strength of the SADF. Yet at the same time we believe that armed self-defence structures that have emerged in the townships and rural areas will continue to spread as communities find it necessary to defend themselves from the growing number of armed right-wing groups, vigilante inspired pogroms and others.

We are convinced that in the coming period, our country is going to be shaken by class struggles in ways we have never experienced before. In such a period it will be of the utmost importance that the black working class should be able to look to its own independent political organisations if there is to be any hope that the workers are to emerge victorious. We are therefore optimistic that WOSA will be extremely relevant to the new period that has opened up in South Africa. ~~WOSA~~

*We believe that selected targeted sanctions that strengthens the working class while weakening the state is an important strategy*

*In the coming period, it will be necessary for the working class to be able to look to its own independent political organisations if it is to emerge victorious*

# The Politics of Productivity

By Charles Meth, the Department of Economics, University of Natal

*It is scarcely controversial to observe that certain statistics reflect the conflicts and inequities of particular societies, and in addition function as political weapons, especially in struggles over access to scarce resources.*

*Productivity statistics, whilst possibly not as quite as 'hot' as population statistics, are frequently at the epicentre of struggles between workers, capital, and the state. The reason is obvious - productivity forms the link between output and reward in production, and thus comes between workers and their pay packets.*

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that productivity in South Africa, conceived of as output per worker and viewed in aggregate, is satisfactory. In much of what is termed the 'modern sector', it probably is, whereas in nearly all of the so-called 'informal sector' and some significant parts of the 'modern sector', it is not. It is also not the aim of the paper to detract from the many achievements of the National Productivity Institute (NPI), the body responsible for the estimation of productivity performance and the dissemination of productivity statistics in South Africa. Improvements in productivity, mostly solid and sustained, but sometimes spectacular, have resulted from the activities of the NPI at firm-level, and in the public sector, at departmental level.

What the paper will seek to show is that where poor productivity is found in the modern sector of the South African economy, in many cases, this is merely one of the symptoms of a much deeper malaise. The economic and political dimensions of that malaise are inextricably intertwined. Although one may be able to 'measure' the magnitude of a particular economic index of the malaise, it is idle to ignore the fact that any serious discussion of productivity is, sooner or later, going to enter a political minefield.

## Inconclusive Data

The indifferent quality of the data on which all depend so crucially for their interpretations of the history of South Africa's growth path, coupled with the vested interest in which certain parties have in producing results that confirm the views that correspond with their own ideologies (and I would certainly not wish to exclude myself from this category), makes it unlikely that agreement will be reached on several important questions. Even when ideological differences have been reduced to an absolute minimum, the settling of arguments over productivity is no simple matter.

Perhaps the best demonstration of this is the inconclusive search by economists for an explanation of the so-called 'productivity slowdown' that befell most industrialised economies from the late 60s/early 70s onwards. In what could be called the 'defeat of growth accounting', the economics profession has floundered for years in an unresolved debate that has left the best practitioners 'mystified' (Denison, 1983, p68). This mystery results, at least in part, from the poverty of the statistics with which economists have to work.

It is with some relief therefore that one can turn to a body as eminent as the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, and discover there an honest assessment of the difficulties of estimating productivity. A recent article by Mark (1986) observes that the prevalence of estimates of labour productivity (as opposed to the scrutiny of the 'productivity' of the other inputs) may be ascribed to the importance of labour in the production process, and to the fact that the labour input is the '...most readily measurable of the various production factors.' As is well known however, and consequently stressed by everyone in the productivity measuring business, (NPI, 1986, p7) the resulting estimates do not:

*...measure the specific contribution of labor or any other factor of production. Instead they reflect the joint effects of many influences which affect the use of labor, including changes in technology, capital investment, utilization of capacity, economies of scale, energy substitution, organization of production, and managerial skills, as well as changes in the characteristics of the work force" (Mark, 1986, p3).*

The art of estimating so-called 'multifactor productivity' may be seen as an attempt to deal with some of these shortcomings. In their simplest and most common form, multifactor indexes are merely labour productivity estimates combined

with attempts to measure the 'productivity of capital'. More sophisticated efforts attempt to examine intermediate inputs as well. (Norsworthy and Malmquist, 1983). A moment's consideration of the conceptual hazards involved in lumping together an extremely heterogeneous commodity such as labour-power to obtain a single summary statistic called 'labour productivity' must alert one to the immense difficulties involved in the larger project of attempting to take account of the other variables listed in the statement above.

In short, multifactor productivity measures, despite their undoubted usefulness, "...do not have the same degree of precision that labor productivity measures have" (Mark, 1986, p11). This quality hierarchy must be borne in mind in any attempt to pick a way through the bog that is South African statistics.

Labour productivity estimates are produced from two sets of data - those relating to employment and those relating to output. Where these data are poor, as in the case of the informal sector, one can of course do little else but speculate, or possibly conduct detailed studies, which, when available in sufficient numbers, might permit some tentative generalisations. Formal-sector employment is, or at least should be, relatively easy to count - employers have merely to state how many people are on the payroll. There are of course conceptual and other problems involved in using mid-year employment estimates to represent average employment levels for the calendar year, (see Archer, 1984) but as long as the sample is adequate, collecting employment data should not present too much of a problem. It will however, be shown below that the authorities cannot even get these 'right' - even the 'best' official employment statistics are suspect.

A full-scale examination of South Africa's productivity statistics is no mean task and clearly cannot be attempted here (see Meth, 1987, 1990a and 1990b). Of the nine major divisions (sectors) of the economy, manufacturing has the most promise - the sector is the subject of frequent censuses; there are, as yet, relatively few informal producers; and, until fairly recently, most of the sector was located in 'South Africa', so one was not plagued by the very poor statistics produced by the so-called 'independent' bantustans. The other sectors each present some major impediment to the researcher interested in productivity. Employment in agriculture is almost impossible to measure; employment in mining is apparently very accurately measured but output is the subject of such controversy that the productivity estimates are totally unreliable (Meth, 1990a).

Employment in electricity, gas and water is so small that its exclusion from a national estimate is irrelevant; output and employment in construction are poorly estimated, and the same is true for the

trade sector - both of these sectors contain large numbers of informal and casual workers whose presence makes a mockery of any attempts to estimate productivity at the sectoral level.

Transport and communications is a little better, but not much. Whilst it may be possible to estimate productivity in the various divisions of SATS and the posts and telecommunications services, the rest of the sector is a statisticians nightmare, containing as it does the heavy transport industry and the burgeoning fleet of 'black' taxis, the majority of them apparently illegal.

Estimates of productivity in finance, real estate and business services are exceptionally poor, and not only because of the difficulties of valuing service sector output. The official statistics for this sector 'miss' some very large proportion of the workers - nearly all of the janitors, most of the security workers and many of the 'professionals' (Meth, 1987). Valuing buildings, especially non-residential buildings, is difficult, and so the estimates of capital productivity in this sector are, if anything, even worse than the estimates of labour productivity.

This is an important matter, because some very large proportion of South Africa's total capital stock is to be found in the sector. The last sector contains mainly government workers and domestics. Of the latter, one can say almost nothing - their number is not known with any precision and their output is impossible to value (as is the value of the output of 'housewives'). Numbers of government workers are known, but since the zero productivity growth assumption is used in valuing their output (ie, output is directly proportional to the number of full-time equivalents), there is little point in including them in a national productivity estimate.

It is important to be aware of what is and what is not being criticised here - at the level of the firm, the establishment or even the industry (major group), or the municipality or department in the case of government, it is possible to make valid claims about productivity when such claims rest on detailed studies. When, however, the national accounting estimates are used to examine entire sectors, the reliability of the results diminishes rapidly.

Accurate employment estimates are difficult to obtain - output estimates even more so. The aggregation problems that bedevil total output estimates are well known - the physical volume indexes devised to measure the size of a bundle of goods whose composition and quality are constantly changing, are a tribute to the skill and patience of the national accounting statisticians - but they can become seriously inaccurate.

At the height of the productivity promotion

campaign launched by the NPI, I wrote a combative paper (Meth, 1983) that pointed to several rather obvious errors in official statistics, especially in the valuation of the output of the gold mining industry. The authorities were strongly criticised for their failure to draw forcefully enough to the attention of the users of statistics the fact that revisions to the statistics could be so large as to reverse previously held conclusions on the development of the economy (Meth, 1983, p1; Swanepoel and van Dijk, 1983; NPI, 1983a).

### NPI Critique

The National Productivity Institute (NPI), is not a simple organ of the state like the Central Statistical Services, staffed by civil servants - it is a state-subsidised, private non-profit company. Its advisory body is similar in certain respects to the many tripartite institutions found in South Africa, some of which are designed to regulate conflict and to transform adversarial relations, if possible, into courses of action which allegedly advance the 'general' or 'national' interest.

A major difference however between the NPI and say the industrial councils, is that the former is not a negotiating body, answerable directly to its constituencies. Trade union representation on the NPI is token, because the independent democratic trade unions will have nothing at all to do with it - a circumstance which is of more than passing significance for the activities of the Institute.

The NPI has eight representatives from employer associations and three (or four) from employee associations (trade unions). With the exception of the Boilermakers Union, the unions represented are predominantly conservative unions. Unless the Productivity Advisory Council is structured in such a way that it has equal representation of the contending parties in South Africa's industrial relations system, and is also capable of issuing binding instructions to the Directors and hence the staff of the NPI, ie, its role is not merely 'advisory', it is extremely unlikely that the democratic unions would even consider serving on the Council.

The NPI generates both primary and secondary statistics of (at least) four different types:

- There are firm-level studies, apparently made by special request. The results of such studies are not usually published.
- Multi-firm level case studies, many of them published, some of them not, are next. Sample size in certain cases may have been large enough to permit valid generalisations about industries to be made.
- Aggregate (national) level estimates of productivity. These yield measures of productivity (of varying quality) as secondary statistics derived from basic data generated not

by the NPI, but rather by the Central Statistical Services (CSS) and/or the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The NPI obviously has little or no control over the quality of the data which go into these estimates, and in their published work show little evidence of sensitivity to the weaknesses of the data supplied by the CSS and the SARB (*Productivity Focus* 1984, for example).

- A set of international comparisons made on the basis of data culled from a variety of published sources.

Productivity improvements achieved by firms in collaboration with the NPI as a result of the firm and multi-firm level studies above appear to be impressive by any standards. The focus in this section of the paper however, is on the aggregate-level (derived or secondary) statistics produced by the NPI - here the activities of the NPI will be argued to be much more problematic. At issue is the manner in which the vigorous campaign by the NPI to create an awareness of the need to improve productivity has been, and continues to be conducted. The NPI cannot use its aggregate-level statistics to formulate or implement policy.

Whatever the performance of the South African economy, the goal of the NPI is to make it 'better' through improved productivity - too much 'good news' about the performance of the economy is likely to lead to complacency. One could almost argue that the NPI has a permanent and vested interest in demonstrating that performance has been less than satisfactory, and it will be shown below that where alternative indicators of productivity performance would lead to differing views, the NPI has opted for the indicator which showed the economy in the worst light.

Statements about productivity that appear, in business or government circles, to be eminently reasonable, may, equally reasonably, be perceived by the potential 'victims' of the implicit or explicit policy implications of such statements, to be callous beyond belief. Consider, for example, the following statement by the NPI executive director:

*'You must choose the most cost-effective technology with a balance between labour and capital. If labour has outpriced itself as an input relative to capital, then labour must simply adjust its price' (Financial Mail Supplement, 16 September 1983, p21).*

Income and wealth inequality in South Africa is said by many to be amongst the worst in the world. There may well be an element of hyperbole in the claim, but contrasts between the 'haves' and the 'haves-nots' are stark. There are arguments that unionised (black) workers have joined the ranks of the former, but for many black workers, this claim merely amounts to an acknowledgement of the fact that by comparison with the very worst-off in our

society, they are now relatively well-paid. There are no prizes for guessing what poorly-remunerated unionised black labour thinks about being told by a highly-rewarded white 'expert' that is 'must simply adjust its price'.

Attempts to discuss productivity as though it were a neutral object of scientific inquiry can only succeed in a country where worker organisation has been rendered impotent. Even though it may be uncomfortable for those involved in the debate to be constantly glancing over their shoulder, the link between productivity and wider struggles, particularly trade union struggles, can never be ignored. To typecast trade union action as irrational, uninformed or willful obstruction, as the NPI is wont to do, can only exacerbate an already serious situation.

The NPI has emerged in a low-key, adversarial relationship with the independent democratic trade union movement. This antagonism has developed because the NPI, having discovered that productivity in South Africa (as a whole) is poor, has persistently described union wage demands as unreasonable, because unmatched by productivity improvements. Unions, not unsurprisingly, see the NPI as a tool of the 'bosses' - one which threatens both their struggle for a living wage and their security of employment. In a certain sense, both are 'correct' - which party will prevail in the short- to medium-term, depends upon the outcome of power struggles currently being waged.

### Productivity Campaigns

At some point early in the history of the NPI, it was recognised that 'productivity awareness' was going to have to be created. A multi-pronged approach, using results gleaned from both the detailed and the aggregate studies, was adopted. An examination of some of the first studies conducted by the NPI reveals a somewhat surprising ability of firms to survive at productivity or efficiency levels that would, in a competitive atmosphere, have long since consigned them to oblivion. (NPI, 1975). The fact of the matter is that the 'awareness' part of the task they set themselves has translated into a widely-held perception that productivity is poor. A forceful publicity campaign created the necessary awareness, at least among those in positions of power. If media pronouncements are any guide, it would appear that shock treatment, followed by repeated doses of 'bad news' was deemed necessary to jolt employers out of the complacency which the protected South African market had engendered and to impress firmly upon the minds of the target public the appropriate sense of urgency. The NPI appears not to worry about the indifference which could result from saturation of the target audience with 'bad news'.

At the micro-level there are known to be serious problems associated with 'awareness' campaigns, especially when these are aimed at workers. An internationally recognised authority on management, William Edwards Deming, has condensed the rules for success into a 14-point set which is reproduced in the pages of *Productivity SA*, the NPI's house journal. Most of these stem from his extensive experience with Japanese industry. One of the rules states that managers should:

*'Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the work force asking for zero defects and new levels of productivity. Such exhortations only create adversarial relationships, as the bulk of the causes of low quality and low productivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the power of the work force.'* (June/July 1988, p22)

What is true of slogans and exhortations at the micro- or firm level probably holds at the macro-level as well.

### International Comparisons

The most visible manifestation of the productivity awareness drive has been the concentrated use of 'poor productivity estimates' - invariably cast in the form of set of international comparisons. Occasionally the NPI uses gross domestic product per economically active person (GDP/EAP); here is an 1982 example of such usage in which they start with GDP/EAP and then drift to gross domestic product per capita (GDP/C):

*'Figures from the National Productivity Institute (NPI) show that between 1970 and 1980 the real gross domestic product per economically active person in S.A. grew by a low 4,6% - an average of 0,2% per year. Since 1974, productivity has actually declined. Countries like Sweden, Japan and Taiwan have shown a consistent high rate of growth in per capita (sic) gdp. SA's poor performance is disturbing, particularly since its slow rate of growth is tending to fall even further behind the more industrialised countries.'* (Financial Mail Supplement, 27 August 1982, p49).

It is now standard practice for the NPI to use comparisons between the falling GDP/C in South Africa and rising GDP/C in countries like South Korea and Taiwan in articles on productivity (see for example Liebenberg, 1989). The President's Council report PC 1/89 is somewhat more sophisticated in this matter, instead of relying on the simple exchange rate conversion-type international comparison, it advocates as well the use of the more credible purchasing power parity approach. Referring to Phase IV of the United Nations International Comparison Project (ICP), it then observes the figures that include South Africa are not readily obtainable at present (PC 1/89, p16).

**Table 1 International Comparison of Manufacturing Sector Performance - South Africa and 13 OECD Countries 1975-82. Countries in rank order for each of 3 indicators. R = Rank, I = Index, 1975 = 100.**

Labour Productivity			Employment Creation/ Destruction			Output		
Country	R	I	Country	R	I	Country	R	I
Japan	1	145	South Africa	1	111	Japan	1	149
Netherlands	2	142	Japan	2	103	South Africa	2	133
Denmark	3	134	USA	3	100	Denmark	3	122
Austria	4	132	Germany	4	95	Austria	4	121
France	5	126	Norway	5	93	USA	5	118
Luxembourg	6	125	Switzerland	5	93	Netherlands	6	115
Sweden	7	120	Austria	6	92	Germany	7	113
South Africa	7	120	Denmark	7	91	France	8	112
Germany	8	119	Canada	8	89	Switzerland	9	108
USA	9	118	France	8	89	Canada	10	105
Canada	9	118	Netherlands	9	81	Luxembourg	11	100
Switzerland	10	116	Luxembourg	10	80	Norway	12	97
UK	11	114	Sweden	10	80	Sweden	13	96
Norway	12	104	UK	11	77	UK	14	88

Note: The employment and productivity for Japan given in this source are incorrect.  
Source: Data are from *Productivity Statistics 1984*, (NPI 1984a), pp65-69.

Economic development policies have as their aim the improvement of welfare. Often this has been sought through the maximisation of growth, the stated objective of policy in the much-developed capitalist world. Measurement of the progress in meeting these different goals has frequently been collapsed into a set of league tables depicting relative economic performance. This approach has been roundly criticised (Scers, 1976; Hill, 1986). Amongst the standard measures used in these comparisons are gross domestic or gross national product (GDP or GNP).

Since these gross statistics are meaningless as welfare measures unless they can be related somehow to the welfare of the recipients of the product which they represent, a suitable basis for expressing this relation has to be found. A common approach is to use gross domestic product per capita (GDP/C).

The weakness of this measure is obvious - increasing numbers of non-economically active persons, especially children under sixteen years of age, can readily offset any 'productivity' gains. It is trivially obvious that rising productivity will mean rising living standards, but in the case of rapidly growing populations, is the problem one of 'productivity', or is it something else?

Another measure which has gained a certain popularity is gross domestic product per economically active person (GDP/EAP). That it should have done so is a measure of the poverty of (some people's) economics. Because it includes the unemployed, GDP/EAP is a poor index of welfare and an even worse index of productivity.

The NPI is aware of the weakness of both measures (NPI, 1984; NPI, 1986; Ravensdale, 1985a, p14), but justifies the use, particularly of GDP/C as a productivity measure on the grounds that '...the standard of living (consumption per person) is primarily determined by production per person i.e. labour productivity.' (NPI, 1986, p80)

The relationship between the welfare of the population as a whole and the productivity of the minority lucky enough to be employed in the formal sector - for that is where the NPI concentrates its efforts, is tenuous in the extreme, at least in the short- to medium-term. This makes the use by the NPI of measures such as GDP/C on such a lavish scale even more problematic than usual. The source of the GDP/C and GDP/EAP estimates used by the NPI is a set of tables of comparative international performances that were produced and published as early as 1981. In the 1983 edition of *Productivity Statistics* they published a 24-country comparison of growth rates of GDP/C for the period 1972-81 which placed South Africa third from the bottom with a 'productivity' growth rate of only 0,56 percent *per annum* (p105).

It is this set of results, suitably embroidered upon as the depression of the period after 1982 set in, that formed the backbone of the NPI's campaign. That they chose to emphasize this result is, to say the very least, interesting, because over the page in the very same publication is an international comparison of GDP/EAP which places South Africa 13th out of 22 countries. South Africa's GDP/EAP growth rate of 1,35 percent *per annum* placed it ahead of Australia, Switzerland, Israel,

Sweden, Denmark, the UK, the USA, New Zealand and Canada (P106). I have yet to come across a press report on productivity in South Africa which refers to this.

Another international comparison performed by the NPI, but given absolutely no prominence whatsoever, was on the performance of the South African manufacturing sector in relation to 13 other OECD countries. The results are presented in the database here. The method of presentation here differs slightly from that in the NPI's *Productivity Statistics* 1984, from which the results are drawn - this has been done to make South Africa's performance visible at a glance.

It may be seen quite clearly from this table that in only two countries was there employment growth (South Africa and Japan), and hence only one country other than South Africa in which productivity improvement was not accompanied by stagnant or worse still, by declining employment. With the exception of Japan, every country in the table with a better productivity performance than South Africa's attained this position by job destruction - some of them on a grand scale. The results in this table are, of course, exceptional, representing as they do, the travails of a world economy in distress. That, however, does not relieve any analyst of the duty to relate South Africa's performance to that world, with which it is in any event, tightly enmeshed.

In one place, the NPI observe that South Africa '...does not compare too badly with Canada and the USA...' (NPI, 1986, p22), but that well-buried comment could scarcely offset the negative perception created by the ceaseless use of poor GDP/C results. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the NPI has selected from among the many statistics at its disposal the one statistic which would show South Africa's performance in the worst possible light. The act of choosing in this manner has important political implications, especially when the topic is as controversial as productivity - no matter how much certain economic agents may wish to divest economic disputes of their political baggage, analysis of the economy is inescapably political.

### Wage Factor

Summaries of the NPI results are reproduced in the annual reports of the National Manpower Commission (NMC). For those who do not understand how the NPI performs the feat of estimating to so many decimal places, the precise contributions of the various 'population groups' to total production, the NMC offers the following explanation:

*'...nominal output (GDP at prevailing prices) rose more rapidly than nominal labour remuneration (wages and salaries at prevailing*

*prices). Further analysis shows a negative contribution in respect of Blacks, Coloureds and Asians i.e. their nominal wages and salaries rose more rapidly than nominal GDP, and a positive by Whites, whose nominal salaries and wages therefore rose more slowly than nominal GDP'.* (RP 41/1984, p273)

Terms such as 'over-recovery', 'under-recovery' or 'negative cost effectiveness' have a fine scientific ring to them (and a series of powerful prescriptive connotations as well), so it is with some interest that the following interchange is reported. After giving details of the positive or negative performances of the various race groups to four decimal places (RP 41/1984, Table 7/40), the NMC notes reports that the NPI data shows that '...increases have been recorded in the labour productivity of each group' (RP41/1984, p273). Then, in a highly significant footnote, the NMC observes that:

*'Difference of opinion can exist on the question of whether it is in fact possible to make this kind of allocation between population groups'* (RP41/1984, p273n).

It is not, and it is precisely for this reason that the struggle for a living wage cannot be dismissed, as the NPI tries to, simply by asserting repeatedly that wages are out of line with productivity improvements. The question of redistribution is going to have to be tackled more openly if further conflict is to be avoided. Every time the NPI repeats the old chestnut about wealth having to be created before it can be distributed, they confirm workers' suspicions that one of the NPI's chief functions is to maintain the *status quo*.

One might well ask what has happened to 'productivity' at the aggregate level in the twenty or so years that the NPI has been active? Why, if one believes the message given by the exceedingly crude index CDP/C, it has deteriorated markedly, or at least has failed to grow at a rate that would have prevented GDP/C from declining precipitously - a recent article in *Productivity SA* refers to NPI data which suggest that GDP/C fell by 1,7 percent per annum between 1981 and 1987 (Liebenberg, 1989, p9).

A possible response from the NPI might be the claim that their efforts have not succeeded because the productivity message, although relayed with conviction by a dedicated and growing band of converts, has not reached the masses. Critics could argue that the failure of the NPI's efforts to produce satisfactory results at the macro-level suggests either that South Africa's productivity problems are so refractory as to make them impervious to the best efforts of the NPI and others, ie, the economic agents concerned are unwilling and/or unable to alter work practices or install the technologies that would give the productivity gains desired.

It is unlikely that South African managers and workers *en masse* are incapable of absorbing and implementing these relatively simple techniques, so the explanations for the failure of productivity to grow satisfactorily must be sought elsewhere. In other words, it is likely that the 'productivity' problems facing the economy are more the result of structural 'deformities' than individual incapacities. Treatment of the symptom, 'poor productivity' rather than the disease, 'structural distortion' may, in the manner of all palliatives, produce some relief, but it is unlikely to produce a cure. In addition to this, it may also be the case that the productivity performance of the economy, when appropriately measured, is not as poor as the NPI and others would have us believe.

The NPI's muddled thinking is echoed in the report of the President's Council on productivity. This document is remarkably vague on all of the really thorny questions relating to redistribution. It is worthwhile quoting in full the relevant paragraph 'More equitable income distribution' from the Section of the report on 'Productivity and social objectives', which reads as follows:

*'Most developing countries display a scrow (sic) distribution of income that reflects the scarcity of high-level manpower resources and an inadequate number of entrepreneurs. It is generally accepted that market forces will result in the equitable distribution of wealth. At the same time, as has been indicated previously wealth is largely created by means of productivity and it is therefore reasonable to say that wealth distribution that is not based on this fundamental fact will in the end lead to undesirable tensions in the economy. The same applies to increases in wages that are not accompanied by commensurate increases in productivity; these will lead to increases in unit labour costs and, in turn, in prices. The Committee agrees that the benefits derived from productivity improvement should be judiciously distributed between shareholders (in the form of higher wages) and consumers (in the form of lower prices). In this way an equitable sharing of the benefits flowing from productivity improvement will be achieved.'*  
(Para.2.75,p32-33)

It is not clear from this paragraph whether it is believed that South Africa's wealth distribution is based on the 'fundamental facts' or not, nor whether some redistribution is in order if it is not. All in all, the statement reads like a very powerful defence of the *status quo*, especially the absurd comment about market forces resulting in an equitable distribution of wealth. In South Africa the current political climate has placed firmly on the agenda, the question of redistribution, and the form of economy necessary to ensure that those

who have been excluded in the past, now share in South Africa's wealth.

Thus far, the major contribution of the NPI to the debate has been to use the statistics at its disposal to dampen the ardour of worker organisation for redistribution through the bargaining process, and to posit instead rising productivity as the key to ending the social strife endemic in our divided society. No-one disputes the link between increasing welfare and rising productivity, nor does anyone doubt that with punitive redistribution, the baby can disappear with the bathwater. The question is, how much redistribution is necessary and desirable, and how should it be achieved? The NPI's contribution to the debate is viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a staunch defence of the *status quo*. IDQA

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# Apolitical Productivity

## The NPI Responds to Meth

Prepared by Dr Roelf du Plooy on behalf of the National Productivity Institute

Charles Meth's constant criticism of internationally accepted national accounting concepts has been with us for almost a decade. Our first review article on one of his earlier papers appeared in the December 1983 issue of *Productivity SA*. His current *Indicator* article is in much the same vein of harsh criticism without offering useful solutions to the problems.

Mr Meth's article makes contradictory statements, which makes response rather difficult. For example, he states at the beginning that: 'It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that productivity in South Africa, conceived as output per worker and viewed in aggregate, is satisfactory'. Yet, from the article, one realises how much time and effort has been spent on proving the underlying official statistics wrong. The arguments and explanations of the senior officials who compile this data regarding the politically-unbiased nature of macro statistics were presumably not acceptable to Mr Meth, as a large section of his article still concentrates on discrediting the official macro statistics.

The NPI, like all those who frequently use macro economic data, is fully aware of the many pitfalls and problems that macro statisticians and national accountants face in the compilation of macro information. However, like them, the NPI does its utmost to ensure accuracy and reliability as far as macro productivity statistics are concerned. In fact our productivity measurement procedures are comparable with the methods and prescriptions of the International Labour Office, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations and many others. The NPI's policy is to use the best information and procedures available. This is therefore a public invitation to Mr Meth to supply us with the 'correct' information and procedures, since he claims that the officially published ones are wrong.

We believe that it would be far more productive to investigate ways and means of producing better statistics rather than discrediting the existing ones. If the NPI's productivity statistics are unfit for policy

purpose as Mr Meth claims, then so are all the statistics which are generally used for economic policy purposes. In any case, we do not even need macro statistics to show us that South Africa's productivity performance is unsatisfactory. Poverty, famine, millions of unemployed people, skill shortages, a poorly educated labour force and many other characteristics of South African society inescapably point to opportunities for productivity improvement. Little wonder that Mr Meth categorically decides not 'to argue that productivity ... is satisfactory' and that in his final paragraph he even says that: 'No-one disputes the link between increasing welfare and rising productivity...'. Yet, he ferociously attacks all macro statistics that suggest inadequate productivity levels and growth...

Another contradictory statement is: 'It is also not the aim of the paper to detract from the many achievements of the National Productivity Institute (NPI) ... Improvements in productivity ... sometimes spectacular, have resulted from the activities of the NPI at firm level, and in the public sector, at departmental level'. Yet, he raises the question: '... what has happened to 'productivity' at the aggregate level in the twenty or so years that the NPI has been active? Why ... has [it] deteriorated markedly...?' Does he mean that the NPI has in fact contributed to the deterioration in productivity at the macro level or does he mean that the NPI should extend its activities to make a greater impact? He appears to expect the NPI to succeed in raising per capita GDP levels in South Africa single-handed.

The NPI, which employs about 170 people, is simply not in a position to raise the productivity levels of the South African economy via its own actions. It cannot even raise the productivity performance of a single company on its own. Improving productivity is primarily the task of the management and employees of a firm. The NPI can only assist in the process.

In 1989, NPI clients indicated that for every rand spent on NPI service, they received a benefit of approximately R13 in the first

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*Growth rather than redistribution of existing income offers the key to higher living standards for all*

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year. They spent R12 million on NPI products and services in 1989, which implies a benefit of R156 million. Although a substantial amount, this is a mere 0,07% of the total GDP of R233 billion! Does Mr Meth expect that a small organisation such as the NPI should show results which are cognisable at 'aggregate level'?

### Redistribution

It is evident from the article that Mr Meth is at loggerheads with some of the statements made by the NPI and its officials, as the following indicates: 'Every time the NPI repeats the old chestnut about wealth having to be created before it can be distributed, they confirm workers' suspicions that one of their chief functions is to maintain the *status quo*'. It is not exactly clear why the 'old chestnut' irritates him so much for he acknowledges in the final paragraph: '... nor does anyone doubt that with punitive redistribution, the baby can disappear with the bathwater'.

The NPI published the following views on wealth distribution in *Productivity Focus* 1990, pp. 15-16:

*'Per capita GDP figures only serve as indications of average living standards and do not reflect differences between low and high income groups at all. Research conducted at Natal University in 1980 indicated that the top 20% of earners in South Africa earned more than 60% of all salaries and wages, whilst the bottom 40% earned less than 8%. These figures might have narrowed slightly since, but probably not much.'*

*This huge disparity in the ratio of 'haves' to 'have-nots' remains a massive obstacle that is not recognised by those who subscribe to the naive belief that everyone can prosper by cutting the existing economic cake radically differently. What is needed is a much bigger cake, because the challenge is to narrow the wealth gap between blacks and whites, while at the same time improving living standards for all... The emphasis must be on the improvement of South Africa's economic growth potential so that better social services can be afforded...*

*Economic growth can basically be obtained from either an increase in resources consumed (capital, labour, materials) and/or by using those resources more productively. In 1989, multifactor productivity (labour and*

*capital productivity combined) increased by 1,4% in the private non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Total factor inputs (capital and labour inputs combined) increased by only 0,2%. This led to an overall output growth of 1,6%. Suppose South African had achieved a 2,4% increase in multifactor productivity instead of the 1,4% actually obtained. What would that have meant?*

*Given the increase in inputs (which naturally can obviously also increase much faster than the 0,2% actually observed), the sector's contribution to GDP would have increased by 2,6% instead of 1,6%. In monetary terms it would have been R1 68,7bn instead of the R166,8bn recorded in 1989. In other words the cake would have been R1,9bn bigger. Suppose South Africa could for ten years achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of 5,0% instead of 1,0% (achieved during the eighties). This would mean (in today's money) around R124bn more for the inhabitants of this country to consume, thus improving their standard of living. Just imagine how much more quickly this would happen if the population growth rate could level off ...*

*The fact is that growth rather than the redistribution of existing income and wealth offers the key to higher living standards for all. It is the only way to increase appreciably the portion of wealth going to the poorest groups, as it will not reduce the real income levels of the better off - those who often have the critical skills necessary for growth.'*

The NPI acknowledges that much more research is needed as far as the redistribution debate is concerned. We are however in good company regarding the 'old chestnut'. Mr Hage Geingob, the Prime Minister of the youngest democratic country in Africa, Namibia, was quoted as follows in the *Beeld* of 15 June 1990: 'Om welvaart te kan herverdeel, moet jy dit eers skep. Dit help nie om armoede te herverdeel nie' (To redistribute wealth, you must first create it. It does not help to redistribute poverty).

Many endorse Mr Geingob's statement, including the *Economist*, (May 26, 1990, pp. 21-24) 'South Africa's first black government will inherit a country where a white minority lives rather well and a black majority rather badly. Eager to even things up, will it recognise that wealth must be

created before it is shared?'. We fail to understand how this view could be judged as a 'staunch defence of the *status quo*'.

## Trade Unions

The NPI would clearly like to fulfill a much more active role in the wealth distribution process. Its role in this regard is unfortunately limited by the fact (as Mr Meth correctly observed) that: '...trade union representation on the NPI is token'. This is most definitely *not* 'a circumstance which is of more than passing significance for the ... Institutec.' The NPI is fully aware of the contribution *and* the positive effect that greater trade union representation on both the Productivity Advisory Council (PAC) and the Board of Directors would have. The fact of the matter is that the NPI wanted to expand the trade union representation on its council from the present five to eight but some trade union federations blatantly ignored invitations by the NPI to serve on the PAC. We believe that a new era of negotiation and mutual respect has been entered which will encourage closer co-operation between all the parties (employers, employees and the government) represented on the PAC.

The NPI believes that in a democratic society, everybody is entitled to his own beliefs, and this naturally applies equally to Mr Meth. Nevertheless we take exception to his claim that: 'To typecast trade union action as irrational, uninformed or wilful obstruction, as the NPI is wont to do can only exacerbate an already serious situation'. We would be glad if he could supply proof of the validity of such statements as we would like to redress the situation publicly.

Another allegation is: 'Unions, not unsurprisingly, see the NPI as a tool of the 'bosses' - one which threatens both their struggle for a living wage and their security of employment'. We support the idea of a living wage to such an extent that we published an expert's opinion on the subject in *Productivity SA* (June/July 1990). As far as job security is concerned, it is the NPI's policy *not* to get involved in any projects that could result in the possible retrenchment of people. It is simple logic that nobody will strive to increase productivity if doing so means losing their job. In fact we feel so strongly about job security and job creation that the NPI's mission statement reads as follows: The NPI's mission is to make a significant contribution to the improvement of the

standard of living and quality of life of all people in South Africa *and to the creation of employment opportunities* by taking and evoking action that will result in the more productive use of all resources'.

Mr Meth is a master in the use of quotations. His quotation from an interview with Dr Visser in *The Financial Mail* supplement of 16 September 1982 is absolutely correct, but fails to give the background to Dr Visser's remark: 'If labour has outpriced itself as an input relative to capital, then labour must simply adjust its price'. The interview concentrated on the possible substitution of capital for labour and the disastrous influence which that would have on employment. Mr Meth conveniently conceals any such background but remarks: 'There are no prizes for guessing what poorly-remunerated unionised black labour thinks about being told by a highly-rewarded white 'expert' that it 'must simply adjust its price'. Isn't this a deliberate attempt to distort a person's true intentions? In fact isn't his whole article deliberately aimed at discrediting the NPI, especially among labour unions and employees?'

Granted, the NPI has often emphasised South Africa's poor productivity track record in the past. It has never insinuated, however, that the workers of this country are responsible for poor productivity growth, and it has never proclaimed, as is wrongly asserted in the article, that *labour's* productivity is too low. Consequently the NPI stated in *Productivity Focus* 1990, p.9:

*'Changes in productivity express effect and not cause... For example, it has happened in the past that labour productivity in gold mines (expressed in kilograms of gold produced per worker) declined sharply, due to the fact that sharp rises in the gold price enabled mines to mill lower grade ore profitably. This resulted in more ore being milled, but in less gold being produced... The fact that labour productivity based on kilograms of gold produced per employee... declined does not imply that mine workers became lazier or that they did not work as hard as in the past. The contrary might be true, as they could have worked much harder to recover more ore at greater depths. This drop in productivity amongst many other factors, reflected the effect of mine management's considerations. The productivity measure did not reflect the cause of the decline in labour productivity and the mine workers are in this case not responsible for the*

*The NPI is fully aware of the contribution and positive effect that greater trade union representation on its councils would have*

*Although the NPI has emphasised SA's poor productivity track record in the past, it has never insinuated that labour's productivity is too low*

The NPI has often warned about the negative effects that high wage increases could have on inflation and the creation of job opportunities

'The notion of productivity has no fatherland nor any political colour'

*productivity decline. As in the case of any productivity measure, the resource or resources concerned cannot simply be held responsible for the declining productivity trends.*

*Productivity statistics should therefore be seen as posing rather than answering questions. If South African productivity statistics compare unfavourably with those of other countries, one can indeed conclude that productivity is lower in South Africa. However, this does not automatically reflect negatively upon the productivity of South Africa's workers as such. It simply means that all of us, together with our capital resources, raw materials, energy resources, technology and many other factors, are less successful than many other countries.'*

It is true that the NPI has often warned about the negative effects that high wage increases can have on both inflation and the creation of job opportunities and we still believe that a positive relationship should exist between productivity and remuneration packages. Consider our views in *Productivity Focus* (1990, p.23):

*'It is often argued that increases in wage rates should be linked to increases in productivity. Such statements do not necessarily imply that both increases should be of equal magnitude. Various other issues (such as redistribution of income, increases in living costs, etc.) should be considered when adjusting wage levels ... However, it remains a mathematical fact that increases in wage rates which exceed increases in labour productivity result in increasing unit labour costs...*

*From a competitive and anti-inflationary point of view, it is still particularly desirable that increases in wage rates correlate positively with productivity. Efforts aimed at a fairer distribution of wealth should take this into account, because it will be in nobody's interest if the salaries and wages of all employees are simultaneously increased by significantly higher income groups receive significantly lower increases than the lower income groups in order to keep the average worker remuneration, and hence increases in unit labour cost and inflation, under control.'*

The NPI is also aware of the fact that its statements on pay increases could be

misinterpreted and seen to be applicable to black workers only. Hence we stated (*Productivity Focus* 1990, p.31):

*'There is a common misconception that only blue collar workers are responsible for the rise in unit labour cost. The reason for this is probably the use of the term 'wages' for the sake of convenience, when in fact both salaries and wages are meant. It must be remembered that increases in the remuneration of both blue and white collar workers contribute to higher unit labour cost, when such increases exceed labour productivity growth. Unit labour cost increases amounted to 12,5% per annum between 1984 and 1988. Although the salaries and wages of blue collar workers increased at a faster rate (17,1% per annum) than those of white collar workers (13,1% per annum), blue collar workers earned on average only about a third as much as their white collar colleagues. This means that only approximately 40% of the rise in unit labour cost can be attributed to blue collar workers, whereas white collar workers were responsible for the rest (60%).'*

If Mr Meth still feels that public expressions like these are likely to: '... exacerbate an already serious situation', we happily grant him his opinion. From the first paragraph and title of his article one senses his desire to politicise the issue of productivity. The NPI is an apolitical organisation and for this reason unacceptable to Mr Meth. In fact we believe like Jean Fourastie that: 'The notion of productivity has no fatherland nor any political colour; it is the only notion that is accepted by both Marxist and liberal economic theories'.

Fourastie certainly had a point, since the communist Lenin wrote in 1943: 'Productivity is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of the new social system...' and the capitalist Friedman wrote in 1980: 'Nothing is more important for the long run economic welfare of a country than improving productivity'. The NPI is not interested in 'the politics of productivity' while Mr Meth reckons that '...analysis of the economy is inescapably political'. We regard productivity growth as the only means by which all South Africans can realise a common objective - the improvement in living standards for all. Without it, we are destined to become a country of poverty. With it, and with the full support of all South African, we can beat the best in the world and prosper. **IPIA**

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
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