


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FALL/WINTER 1989

INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A



BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS..... THE DEATH OF IDEOLOGY
NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS REGIONAL CONFLICT



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Editorial Notes

A review of the closing months of the 1980s conveys a dramatic sense of contemporary history in the making.

Internationally, the crumbling of the iron curtain has led to reconciliation between East and West, and perhaps, to the eventual reunification of Europe. Nationally, the movement towards a negotiated political settlement in South Africa and Namibia is also breaking down traditional ideological divisions. It could bring peace to the sub-continent and the reintegration of South Africa among an African community of nations.

On the threshold of a new decade, there is a new optimism and a new pragmatism about the resolution of international and regional conflicts.

NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

This bumper edition of *Indicator SA* looks at the impact on South African politics of the thaw in cold war politics. The contributors to our *Political Monitor* include:

- Philip Nel, Director of the Institute for Soviet Studies, who explains the implications of glasnost and perestroika for Moscow's revolutionaries allies. He discusses the new Soviet policy on conflict in southern Africa and the pressures brought to bear on the ANC/SACP and Pretoria to negotiate a political solution.
- Lawrie Schlemmer, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, who compares the change dynamics at work in Eastern Europe and South Africa. Both apartheid and communism are the subjects of intense international exposure which is intended to promote domestic reform agendas. He warns that this spotlight can distort expectations and time sequences of change.
- Alexander Johnston, a political scientist, who contrasts the strategies of the ANC and the IRA. The worldwide shift from armed confrontation to co-existence may constrain the ANC's guerilla campaign and encourage a negotiated truce. Nevertheless, the IRA experience shows that violence and negotiation are not mutually exclusive options in a pre-negotiation phase.
- Fatima Meer, Director of the Institute for Black Research, who comments on the role of Nelson Mandela as international symbol and internal catalyst. She offers insights into his earlier ideological influences, his current stance on conditions for negotiation and his call for the resolution of violent conflict between black resistance groups.

REGIONAL CONFLICT

If the momentum toward negotiations at the national level gives cause for some optimism, the deep and violent conflict at the regional level in Natal/KwaZulu gives cause for great pessimism. The *Urban Monitor* of this edition is devoted entirely to coverage of the civil war of 1987-1989 in the urban townships and peri-urban settlements of Pietermaritzburg, Hammarsdale and Durban.

Stavrou and Shongwe, two researchers from the Centre for Social and Development Studies, report on a current survey of the violence in the Greater Edendale Complex of Pietermaritzburg. They provide the first map of the township battle-zones, showing the areas of political influence fought over by the warring groups of 'comrades' and 'vigilantes'. They conclude that the deeper causes of the conflict lie in intense competition over material resources and facilities.

John Aitchison of the Unrest Monitoring Group explains why township conflict intensified in Natal between 1987-1989 while the national violence of 1984-1987 receded elsewhere. He documents the spread of Natal's political feuds into the Hammarsdale/Durban corridor and into the shack settlements and rural areas during 1989.

Gavin Woods, Director of the Inkatha Institute, looks at the dominant role of youth in the violence. Derived from extensive surveys with township respondents, he presents a causal model of the conflict which emphasises the impact of negative environmental circumstances on a volatile and alienated youth. He warns that political solutions are rapidly moving out of reach.

MONITORING TRENDS

Besides these in-depth reports, the *Economic*, *Rural* and *Industrial Monitors* offer the usual features and topical essays.


With this edition, we celebrate the fortieth publication of the Indicator Project SA in our Quarterly Report and Issue Focus series. We take this opportunity of thanking our sponsors and subscribers for their support and interest over the past eight years. In the new year, we intend to conduct a readership survey.

Indicator SA has gone from strength to strength in the 1980s, developing a unique role in monitoring data trends on the major change and conflict issues in South African society. As we enter a new decade, a fluid political climate will increase the need for the publication of reliable indicators, data trends and informed commentary.

Graham Howe, Editor
December 1989

POLITICAL

M O N I T O R





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The New Export

Perestroika and Negotiated Settlements

By Professor Philip Nel, Institute for Soviet Studies,
University of Stellenbosch

The new Soviet approach to international relations stresses the role of universal human values and negotiated political settlements in the place of class conflict and military solutions. At the same time that these barriers are being dismantled between East and West, there are growing signs of rapprochement between government and opposition in South Africa.

Philip Nel speculates on the likely impact of the 'death of ideology' in Europe on the socialist rhetoric of the ANC/SACP, their position on negotiations and commitment to armed struggle.

The current Soviet approach to international relations, officially termed 'new political thinking in foreign policy', is still developing. Like 'perestroika', it was not present as policy waiting to be implemented when Mr Gorbachev took office in 1985. Rather, it reflects a sequence of discoveries concerning the changing nature of global politics, and the increasing awareness that Soviet economic survival, let alone recovery, depends on a trade-off between domestic and global commitments.

Reform, both in Soviet domestic life and international behaviour, thus represents a pragmatic learning process. Day-to-day policy formulation is sometimes tentative and ambiguous so as to pre-empt unwelcome or unforeseen consequences. Such ambiguity is much in evidence in the unfolding of Soviet policy towards a political settlement in South Africa.

Unpopular Message

The new approach, as far as Southern Africa is concerned, contains three basic elements. Firstly, the Soviet leadership at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 committed itself to the principle that all regional conflicts in the third world should be solved by diplomatic-political means. Two considerations supported this principle. On the one hand, continued Soviet involvement in some of the conflicts placed an increasing burden on scarce Soviet resources needed for domestic renewal. On the other hand, the Reagan and Thatcher era proved beyond doubt that the West would

not be prepared to sponsor another round of East-West d'etente if Soviet behaviour in the third world was not adjusted to 'the spirit of d'etente'.

The second element of 'new thinking' developed during 1987 and early 1988, consisting of a willingness to cooperate with Western countries in stabilising the third world. While Soviet diplomacy became more active, care was taken not to undercut perceived Western interests. These two elements exposed Soviet decision-makers to the realities of third world developments in an unprecedented fashion. Regional conflicts were no longer explained in terms of 'imperialist machinations' but were identified as the result of local socio-political, ethnic and historical causes. In a similar vein, capitalism and not socialism (or 'socialist orientation') was perceived as the dominant developmental model for the third world.

Positive Western responses (in the form of disarmament proposals and commercial ties) to greater Soviet circumspection concerning the third world, tended to reinforce the new elements in Soviet behaviour. In this context, a third element of the new Soviet foreign policy was unveiled during the all-important party conference in June 1988. There it was officially proposed that *class interests* be replaced by other more universal human values as the basis for international relations. In December 1988, Gorbachev spelled this out to the UN General Assembly. Moscow would no longer prescribe the road of development that should be taken by third world countries.

A new principle in Soviet foreign policy is that all regional conflicts in the third world should be solved by political settlements

Moscow has put discreet pressure on the ANC/SACP to abandon the notion of a revolutionary take-over and to prepare for a negotiated settlement

The era of the export of revolution is over - the quicker that Soviet allies adjust, whether states or dissidents, the better

With this address, Gorbachev signalled the death of the traditional Soviet belief that 'socialism' is a 'natural choice' for newly-independent countries.

Naturally, not all of these developments completely overlapped with the interests of liberation movements or states which, for one reason or another, regard the USSR as their ally. While diplomatic settlement of conflicts did provide Afghanistan, Angola and eventually Cambodia and Nicaragua, with a way out of their own impasse, the new emphasis placed on 'domestic causes' for regional conflicts put pressure on these governments to consider eventual reconciliation with their bitterest enemies.

The Soviet shift from ideology as the determinant of foreign policy has implicitly questioned the legitimacy base of these movements and governments. It drove home the unpopular message that continued Soviet support, if there was to be any, would no longer be based on 'proletarian internationalism'. Some groups, such as Frelimo in Mozambique, quickly adjusted to this new reality. Others, less constrained by factors outside their control, raised doubts about Soviet intentions and trustworthiness. This, in turn, added a note of caution to Soviet pronouncements and actions, compounding the already ambiguous nature of Soviet foreign policy.

Negotiation Initiative

Soviet policy towards South Africa has evolved through three phases, comparable to that traversed by the three general principles of 'new political thinking'. It is also exposed to similar ambiguities. These ambiguities are complicated by the international condemnation of apartheid and the fact that the USSR has only limited levers, historically circumscribed by its close alliance with the SACP and the ANC, to influence developments in the Republic.

Within a month of the Soviet Communist Party congress of 1986, the Soviet leadership (Gorbachev 1986) made it clear that it included the South African conflict among third world conflicts to be solved by political means. The 'successes' of the South African state in brutally suppressing internal resistance between 1985-1986 seemingly convinced Soviet officials and commentators that a revolutionary take-over was not on the agenda. But Soviet thinking went further than simply a tactical assessment. South Africa was identified as being one of the 'flash-points'

where Soviet and Western interests could clash head-on. Since conflict was to be avoided in order to open Western technological and commercial flows to the USSR, reconciliation between 'black and white', and a negotiated settlement were promoted.

Soviet commentators subsequently identified the factors inhibiting a political settlement in South Africa and those which could contribute to a negotiated resolution if sufficiently nurtured. These factors were:

- the legitimate fears of 'whites' as an impediment, but also the divisions among white opinion as a positive factor;
- the intransigence of the white-minority government as an impediment, but, on the other hand, the near total isolation of this government as a positive factor;
- the self-confidence of the ANC (and the SACP) to develop a political strategy which could consolidate gains made in stature both inside South Africa and internationally. This would also allow the ANC to exploit divisions in the white community effectively.

The second phase in the evolution of the new Soviet policy towards South Africa now began. In order to break down white intransigence, Soviet propaganda became less aggressive and Soviet officials started to meet regularly, if discreetly at first, with their South African counterparts from 1987 onwards. (A desire to improve trade with South Africa, although kept well out of sight, also played a role). While the isolation of South Africa was still viewed as a desired means to the goal of facilitating eventual negotiations, the Soviet government became more discerning in distinguishing between functional and counter-productive measures in this regard, viz. its unwillingness to support a Nigerian proposal to have South Africa barred from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the same time, Western cooperation in putting increased pressure on Pretoria to mend its ways was also sought.


On the other side of the divide, discreet pressure was put on the ANC and the SACP to take leave of the notion of a revolutionary take-over and to prepare itself for a negotiated settlement. In meetings with ANC leaders, Soviet officials, including Mr Gorbachev, even went as far as publicly stating what they thought ANC policy should be. One example was Gorbachev's re-interpretation of ANC policy at his first meeting with Mr Tambo in late 1986 (Gorbachev 1987:187).

Soviet academics proposed that the ANC should grant guarantees to white interests as part of a pre-negotiation strategy (Starushenko 1986). Although the details of these proposals reflected the idiosyncracies of individual academics, Mikhail Gorbachev endorsed their general message in August 1987 when he called for a solution in South Africa which would safeguard the interests of both black and white (*Izvestia*, 5 August 1987). Although similar statements have not emerged since from the top leadership, Soviet commitment to a negotiated settlement has been reaffirmed by Anatoli Adamishin, until recently Deputy Foreign Minister responsible, inter alia, for Southern Africa, and Yuri Yukalov, head of the restructured African section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

re-establishment of diplomatic ties with South Africa (broken off in 1956) was even touted, provided certain domestic changes took place in South Africa.

ANC/SACP Displeasure

These developments imply that Soviet policy towards South Africa has also entered the third phase of 'new thinking'. This involves the proposed 'de-ideologisation' of inter-state relations, which takes leave of the notion that there is an ideologically preferred path of development for the third world. While Soviet spokespersons have been careful not to create the impression that the USSR is turning its back on the ANC and SACP, the implications are clear: the era of the 'export



Negotiations on Angola and Namibia reinforced both the Soviet desire to expand its ties with the South African government (and other interest groups in South Africa apart from the ANC), and its belief in the desirability of a negotiated settlement. By early 1989, Soviet officials, especially in the Foreign Ministry, had seemingly become convinced that Pretoria could be pushed or cajoled into domestic compromises. While some hesitancy remained, given the uncertainty about the outcome of the November elections in Namibia, and about Mr FW de Klerk's real agenda, by late 1989 Adamishin suggested that the Soviet Union would be prepared to act as a mediator between the ANC and Pretoria if requested to do so. The

of revolution' is over, and the quicker Soviet allies adjust to this, the better.

In the early 1980s, Soviet interests and perceptions of South Africa coincided largely with that of the ANC and the SACP. Like the ANC, Moscow was prepared to patiently help prepare the way for a national democratic revolution as the first step towards a socialist transformation as foreseen by the SACP. While Moscow was never prepared to challenge Western interests head on, a gradual maturation of the revolutionary process, with Soviet aid, ensured the recognition of the USSR as the 'natural ally' of downtrodden people without running the risk of confrontation with the West.

ANC President Tambo stated in 1987 that negotiations could only take place when sufficient pressure is exerted on Pretoria to hand over power

The joint platform on negotiations agreed to by the ANC/MDM in mid-1989 displays greater receptiveness to the idea of negotiations

The evolution of 'new political thinking' since 1985, however, introduced some factors into the equation which have led to a gradual divergence between Soviet interests, and those of the ANC and SACP.

Signs of this divergence had emerged in 1986 when *The African Communist*, mouthpiece of the SACP, repudiated statements made by a Soviet academic concerning proposed guarantees the ANC should be providing to white interests as part of a political programme to prepare the way for negotiation. Since this academic reflected some official Soviet thinking, this was the first sign that Moscow's new attitude did not fit well with at least the Stalinist sentiments of the editorial staff of *The African Communist*. Such displeasure with signals emanating from Moscow grew in 1987 as the Soviet Union, firstly, acted in contravention of ANC wishes and supported South Africa's continued membership of the IAEA, and, secondly, in August 1987 supported a negotiated settlement.

In its statement of 9 September 1987, the National Executive Committee of the ANC declared itself in principle *not* against a negotiated settlement, but made it clear that it believed the circumstances prevailing in South Africa were not conducive to negotiations. During his speech at the festivities in Moscow in 1987 marking the 70th anniversary of the October revolution, Mr Tambo reiterated that negotiations could only take place when sufficient pressure had been exerted on the South African government to hand over power to the people.

This standpoint contrasted with that expressed in December 1987 at the ANC's Arusha conference by a senior Soviet government official. He had admonished the ANC for not doing enough to prepare the ground for negotiation. Again, the SACP found it necessary to challenge the Soviet position, especially the tendency to equate the South African conflict with other regional conflicts. An article in *Umsebenzi* (No2 1988), made it clear that the SACP regarded Soviet suggestions concerning negotiations as premature and harmful to the revolutionary cause.

While sticking to their position, Soviet officials were clearly taken aback by ANC and SACP resistance, and by accusations from other quarters in Africa that Moscow was turning its back on the ANC. Overtures made by the South African government towards the Soviet Union in early 1988

increased this uneasiness. Consequently, care was taken to underline continued Soviet support for the ANC. This resulted in the upgrading of the ANC's office in Moscow (opened in 1987) to a diplomatic mission accredited to the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (SAASC).

Soviet Divisions

Matters were further complicated by the fact that 1987 and 1988 also witnessed a divergence of opinion between different interest groups in the USSR over the issue of South Africa. Two positions emerged. The one, represented by some elements of the Africanist community in the USSR and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was in the vanguard of applying 'new political thinking' to South Africa. The other, represented by people with long standing links with the ANC, such as the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and the SAASC, continued to promote exclusive ANC interests.

This divergence over South Africa also reflected differing viewpoints on internal reform in the USSR (*perestroika*). Given the already vehement divisions in Soviet society on domestic policy, the top leadership preferred not to push tensions to the limit by choosing sides in a high profile debate over foreign policy. Apart from some statements by Adamishin, Soviet leaders have since refrained from making the kind of statements on South Africa that Gorbachev made in 1986 and 1987. While in private discussions Soviet leaders increased pressure on the ANC to become more receptive to the idea of negotiation, the public image was one of continued solidarity with the ANC and SACP.

Despite some backtracking and deliberate ambiguity, the ANC and SACP did get the message that the Soviet Union was adamant that negotiations must take place eventually. Soviet pressure in this regard dovetailed with those from influential black spokespeople in South Africa, and from Western governments, including some traditional ANC supporters such as the Scandinavian countries. While the debate on negotiations continues within the ANC, the joint ANC/MDM negotiations platform agreed on in mid- 1989 (see document:17), displays evidence of a greater receptiveness to the idea of negotiations.

A fear that other actors, i.e. the USSR, may wrest the initiative from ANC hands is,

however, also evident. Whereas Tambo could still, in 1987, confidently challenge the Soviet position on 'negotiations as soon as possible', the ANC has since gained the impression that Moscow may be losing its patience with the movement, especially as the Angola-Namibia negotiations may have convinced the Soviet government that compromises with Pretoria could be found. The *Sechaba* edition of May 1989 consequently went to considerable lengths to convince its readers that the Soviet Union still supported 'the struggle'. An interview with Alfred Nzo and a joint ANC-SAASC statement were intended to pre-empt accusations that the ANC was not taking the new Soviet policy seriously enough.

Although slow in response, the SACP has also moved marginally closer to the Moscow position. Joe Slovo was the first to respond to new signals emanating from Moscow. In mid-1987, he published an important article in *Kommunist* (the theoretical journal of the CPSU) in which he echoed the accommodating position of the Soviet leadership on white interests. In a number of interviews since then, he has also modified his position on the need for a speedy transition to socialism in South Africa, arguing that 'this question must be settled by debate and not 'on the streets'. During its recent congress in mid-1989, the SACP also accepted something of *glasnost* in revealing figures concerning its membership composition, and in acknowledging 'mistakes' of the past.

SACP Resistance

Yet, judging by its new programme, 'The path to power' (1989), the SACP still seems to be far removed from the spirit and letter of the most recent phase of Soviet policy. This document makes no reference to *perestroika*, *glasnost* or 'new political thinking'. Nor does it once refer to Mr Gorbachev. Its argument about the continued struggle between capitalism and socialism is reminiscent of Soviet publications from the Brezhnev era. There is not a single echo of the current Soviet acceptance of the integrated and interdependent nature of the world system.

On negotiations, the SACP has not moved from its 1988 viewpoint, arguing that it is an imperialist plot to push 'the liberation movement into negotiations before it is strong enough to back its basic demands

with sufficient power on the ground'. As if to underline its resistance to 'new political thinking', the editorial staff of *The African Communist* chose to preface this new SACP document with a trenchant review of Boris Asoyan's study, *South Africa: What lies ahead?* As is the case with some of his other recent Soviet publications, Asoyan, a senior member of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, argues that a negotiated settlement in South Africa is urgently required to prevent the escalation of tension between East and West.

To the SACP reviewer (1989), 'Asoyan seems to reduce the liberation struggle to some nuisance factor in the international fight for peace'. Responding to Asoyan's suggestion that white and black is involved in a civil strike (note, not a revolutionary struggle), the reviewer claims that 'he does not appreciate and understand the CST (colonialism of a special type) thesis'. If ever there was a repudiation of a Soviet official by the SACP, this allegation encapsulates it.

This divergence between the SACP and the CPSU is not only the result of conflicting assessments of the South African situation. It is rooted in the different experiences these two parties have had during the past few years. While the CPSU has been a party under pressure, fighting for its economic and political life as the 'vanguard of Soviet society' (Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution), the SACP has experienced an increase in support, especially amongst the black youth. The SACP is, therefore, still riding a wave of confidence. One can expect that this wave will carry it further and further away from the Soviet government. Ironically, it may be no longer true that the SACP represents the Soviet viewpoint in the ANC, but rather that the ANC does, as it draws closer to Moscow and *perestroika* than does the SACP. **TPA**

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The new SACP programme (1989) is far removed from the spirit and letter of Soviet reforms

The ANC, rather than the SACP, more closely represents the Soviet viewpoint as the ANC draws closer to Moscow and perestroika

TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

FRONTSTAGE AND BACKSTAGE

*By Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, Director, Centre for Policy Studies,
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The transition to democracy in South Africa is occurring in a political pressure chamber of internal expectations, media attention and international involvement. In his quarterly review of political trends for Indicator SA, Prof Schlemmer shows how this spotlight offers some opportunities for rapid progress but also creates complex and fairly unique challenges to government and opposition movements. As a consequence, the process of change is likely to be less predictable than it otherwise might have been.

In Eastern Europe, with the exception of Poland, the build-up to the recent dramatic events was largely hidden behind a screen of bureaucratic disinformation, pervasive state repression and relative unconcern in the popular Western media about societies whose languages could not be understood and whose problems had no ready parallels in the popular passions of Western politics.

Most developments occurred 'backstage', as it were. Only when mass-killings occurred in Tiananmen Square, Jews were prevented from emigrating, or the Soviet Union intervened in Middle America or the Middle East was media-consciousness aroused beyond relatively obscure in-depth discussions in the better media services. Recent events are now big news, but the real 'struggles', the sullen resistance, the painful and hazardous mobilisation of intellectuals, the psychiatric commitment of dissidents and the economic decay were all largely backstage.

South Africa (and Namibia) have been opposite cases. Our political transitions have been both local drama and international theatre simultaneously. The reasons for our international status are obvious - inter alia, we speak English of a sort, General Smuts was among the top Commonwealth and Western statesmen, our recent government leaders are easily misperceived as 'Teutons', our political priests bear an uncanny resemblance to Martin Luther King, and the capitalists in South Africa are just like the capitalists that the new liberal intelligentsia finds a need to dislike in the United Kingdom, Holland, Germany and the USA.

Our furious and intense internal debate stems from the fact that we have had three very diverse and contradictory political cultures welded into a

troubled unity by colonialism, by a powerful economy and by an equally powerful centralised bureaucratic state. We have had a white ethnic nationalism in a middle-European mould, a liberal middle-class Anglo Saxon world view, and a populist third-world, peasant/proletarian protest culture all operating on assumptions nearly completely different to each other.

Our recent progress to transition reflects in part a convergence of these traditions under the impact of modernising industry and urbanisation. The contrasts and intellectual contests, however have left us one of the most politicised societies on Earth today.

Thus our transition is very much a 'frontstage' event. Most democracies today have had the relative luxury of muddling through to greater freedom and participation for their citizens in obscure, messy, often brutal and stop-start incremental processes. We too have been messy, brutal and inconsistent, but our developments have not been obscure. From now on, however, the status of our transition as a frontstage world event is going to create simultaneous pressures for posturing, image management, diplomacy and consistency which will quite markedly influence the process. The policy challenges for government and opposition groups have to be seen in this light.

First Challenge

In an interview by SABC television on 5 December 1989, Mr Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, gave a mature and sophisticated interpretation of the time which transition is likely to take in South Africa. Immediately afterwards, however, he said that his administration would judge the progress of Mr FW

de Klerk in terms of de Klerk's own promises. Given its relevance to the sanctions programme, this statement was of enormous significance.

Throughout the world, and particularly in the third world, promises and commitments are made and broken with relative equanimity. In fact, broken promises is one humorous definition of the art of politics. The South African government in the past has blithely fallen into the trap of believing it has the same luxury. Remember Mr BJ Voster's plea to 'give us six months'? The signal danger of making commitments or even of suggesting commitments beyond the government's capacity to deliver, was of course, best illustrated by the 'Rubicon' disaster of 1985. The South African economy has still not fully recovered from the external reaction to Mr PW Botha's decision to disabuse the expectations which his own reform rhetoric had created.

The lessons are clear and have been absorbed by government. Yet our frontstage status simultaneously demands that the government use reform and negotiation rhetoric to address ever-reappearing and understandable suspicions that its goal is to maintain white supremacy under a different guise.

There is no resolution to the dilemma other than to deepen the performance on the frontstage. Since South Africa has the world's attention, the government should redouble efforts to use and create opportunities to debate the change process in depth. One detects that state communications have come a long way from the superficial propaganda of the seventies, yet the well-intentioned simplicity of many external expectations of the change process are still breathtaking.

The last thing required is more sophisticated propaganda. The audiences are by now too well-informed and well-served by alternative interpretations. What is required is a high key but scrupulously honest and expert debate about opportunities for and constraints on change and negotiation in South Africa.

Second Challenge

A second challenge for government concerns change itself and policies directed to that end. The issue is incremental versus comprehensive restructuring of our society.

Most historical precedents, barring situations of a collapse of state administration or revolutionary turmoil, neither of which are likely in South Africa, favour the incremental process. Formerly undemocratic societies tend to change by a combination of underlying changes in values, increasing overlaps in social interest, protests, moral pressure and a type of rearguard adaptation

to problems which become too costly to repress. A slide from precedent to precedent occurs. The power elites co-opt or do deals with parts of their oppositions. People who are enemies of the state one day become agents the next.

Gradually, the process accumulates with the zone of participation in power expanding to cover the majority of interest groups and former activists. At a certain stage there may be an apparent 'break' in the structure but it is usually a symbolic illusion, or threshold, in a process of which the most important part is not the 'breakthrough' but the preceding incremental processes.

Similar incremental processes have occurred in South Africa. Reverend Alan Hendrickse was an 'enemy of the state' but is now a cabinet minister. Mr John Mavuso was a persecuted antagonist of government and now is a senior provincial MEC. These are simply examples of wider and more pervasive processes which, in the wake of the partially 'successful' revolutionary failures of 1976-77 and 1984-86, would soon be occurring at a quickening pace.

If one could conceive of a coldly rational strategy for change and democratisation in South Africa, it would probably consist of finding ways of facilitating or 'pushing' the already occurring, incremental processes.

The government itself, advertently or otherwise, has been playing the same game. Influx control was a structural cornerstone of the previous major policy of political fragmentation of the society. When it was abolished as a rearguard action, the legitimating theory turned into pragmatic 'orderly urbanisation'.

No political fanfare accompanied what was a major shift in constitutional thinking until the process of decay in controls over movement had proceeded beyond recovery. Free Settlement Areas (FSA), an obvious but obscure transition to general desegregation, (if for no other reason than the very problems the interim policy will create) have not been introduced as a major shift away from the supposedly fundamental political model of 'own affairs', yet given the new intention of government to extend the FSA principle, it has far-reaching political consequences.

As for change agents, so also for government, a coldly rational strategy for transition is available - call it 'change by institutional stealth'.

Frontstage Pressures

Three major factors create pressures on all South Africans and external observers to think 'non-incrementally' about change, however. All three flow from the 'frontstage' situation. Firstly,

the appearance of continuing drama created by the media debate induces a subtle sense of crisis (which most of the time does not actually exist) and pervasive anxieties. Hence thoughts turn to comprehensive 'solutions', 'settlements', etc.

A second factor is that the South African situation has become internationalised. Being remote and very complex, however, it is most easily understood in terms of scripts which have played out elsewhere - independent Africa, Zimbabwe, the Phillipines, the US Civil Rights movement, and now Eastern Europe. With the partial view of fashionable hindsight, these cases all appear as 'transformations'.

A third factor is that the frontstage is seen as a morality play. Although the players know otherwise, the audiences respond to the moral discourse, not the discourse of power.

For government, among all the detailed policy dilemmas, there is the basic issue of whether to pursue a policy of negotiated comprehensive restructuring of society, a policy of managed incremental change, or both.

There is nothing wrong with this frontstage status provided it can speed up a process of change and ensure that fundamental conditions are established for a workable democracy. Most people make the assumption that more rapid change with constructive consequences will be facilitated. This is not necessarily the case.

The high-key image of change encourages promises and commitments which cannot be honoured. It also encourages posturing and a definition of the choices in the idiom of a morality play - good and evil. The options are held as zero-sum choices until the players become tired. Because comprehensive negotiation is so much in the spotlight, realpolitik, which never sounds good in the media, becomes underplayed. Yet realpolitik and pragmatism are the factors which will make the process succeed.

Incremental processes which are today occurring more rapidly in the backstage, and which are all too frequently written off as irrelevant or even counter-productive, are very necessary. They blur the stark contrasts in the conflict which are presented in the debate about comprehensive solutions and transformation. If whites had more former members of the resistance as their provincial executive councillors, for example, or better still, as cabinet ministers (albeit specially appointed - some would say co-opted), then coming to terms with the ANC or the MDM as political parties contesting ordinary elections would be made much less frightening. Even better would be interim or local alliances or pacts, firmly negotiated and without the taint of so-called co-optation.

Fears of a so-called weakening of unity or solidarity in the opposition as a consequence of this process are probably not only exaggerated but distinctly inappropriate. Democracy does not flourish under conditions of mandatory mass-unity or normative consensus. It is precisely advanced by competing interests and divergent views. Furthermore, if non-racialism is to have full meaning there should be black and white membership of all the major competing interest groups as soon as possible.

This is most certainly not to suggest that pressure on the government to create a climate and framework for negotiation with all organisations of the voteless or partially voteless, should be lifted or reduced. At the same time, however, for the sake of continuity, balance and to avoid a 'frontstage performance crisis' in the change process, the government should pursue an internal agenda of incremental reforms and local or interim negotiation as well.

The Other Side

Some of the same principles apply to the external ANC as well. Recently, a newspaper editor who is normally a useful cynic became unusually impressed by the high-key status afforded the ANC by the French socialist government during the Paris conference in early December 1989; another frontstage phenomenon. The benefits are mixed, however.

To the extent that such treatment increases the impetus for negotiation, it is useful. To the extent that it encourages delusions or overly hopeful expectations in an opposition organisation of being a complete and untrammelled government-in-waiting, it may be problematic. South Africa's first 'post-apartheid' government is not only likely to be, but should be, a very mixed formation capable of being seen as legitimate by all sections of a still very divided society.

For the sake of balance in this assessment, it should also be noted, however, that the high-key international status of the ANC has offered it diplomatic and political alternatives (see document:17) to internal rebellion and the armed struggle, both of which were strategically and politically damaging to itself and to everyone else. Thus, in regard to social change, most evidence has mixed implications. This is appropriate because change is, and should be, a mixed and multi-faceted process.

South Africa is destined to be on the frontstage for some time to come, with both good and bad consequences for democracy. It is most important, therefore, that all participants in the process of resolution not allow themselves to be disorientated by the spotlight. **IPA**

Participation & Para-Military Options

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Now that the South African political system appears to be opening up, due to a variety of domestic and international factors, there is a possibility that for the ANC participation might supplement if not supplant armed struggle. The idea of negotiation seems set, at least temporarily to dominate the political agenda. Under these circumstances we take a close look at the issues of violence, negotiation and participation in the comparative context of ANC strategy in South Africa and IRA strategy in Northern Ireland.

The republican movement in Ireland and the black nationalist movement in South Africa both conduct armed struggle as part of a wider movement of political dissidence against authorities dominated by settler-descended interests. Each society has been structured by a colonial history, and is marked by competing claims to self-determination, social inequalities and by ethnic conflict. There is at least a superficial similarity between the two movements. Given the limited repertoire open to practitioners of political violence, a marked familiarity about the means of insurgency and counter-insurgency is evident in both contexts.

In addition to the genuine similarity, which ought to stimulate a search for dispassionate insights, there is also the tempting prospect of political advantage to be gained in linking and cross-referencing the two movements and their campaigns. When the South African government stresses alleged similarities between the African National Congress (ANC) and movements like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) it 'normalises' itself in the context of Western states which face 'terrorist' threats, and legitimises the terms on which it will negotiate.

More specific attempts at linkage between the two movements have surfaced recently. Claims that ANC and Provisional IRA (PIRA) cadres have cooperated in training and operations were made by a British Conservative Party MP, Mr Andrew Hunter during a recent Westminster debate, and these were widely reported in South Africa (*Natal Mercury*, 4/11/88). Among other things, it showed that the determination to

link the PIRA and the ANC is not confined to direct supporters of the South African government.

Dissimilar Causes

It is not only the direct comparison of violence that has been stimulated, however. In Northern Ireland, it has been well-established for some time, especially since Sinn Fein's decision to enter electoral contests, that violence, negotiation and political participation are not mutually exclusive but exist in a complex and tenuous pattern of violent politics. Participation and negotiation have of course been important strategic issues in the anti-apartheid struggle and there are clear signs that the Sinn Fein example has entered the debate. Parallel aspects have been noticed by, among others, Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein (Taylor 1989).

Both movements adopt armed struggle out of a sense of the magnitude of grievances suffered by the communities they claim to represent. Catholics in Northern Ireland have suffered from various forms of discrimination, notably in employment, since the foundation of the state. Recent research papers have testified to the tenacity of such practices, despite government efforts to redress them. Whatever the nature of these grievances, however, they are entirely dwarfed in scale by the wholesale, deliberate and formally imposed, social, economic, and political inequalities visited on black South Africans.

Linked to this, is a second point, the possibilities for peaceful change. Catholics in Northern Ireland, whatever their disabilities, have full, formal political rights on the same basis as other citizens of the United Kingdom (except as limited by special security legislation applicable there, and bearing on all inhabitants). Most importantly, Catholics have the franchise which is denied black South Africans, and which is the latter's principal demand.

In a strong sense, political rights and economic and social justice have always been secondary (though not irrelevant) in

Sinn Fein's decision to contest elections shows that violence, negotiation and participation are not mutually exclusive options

Irish nationalism primarily focuses on the issue of occupied territory rather than on civil rights for disenfranchised, exploited people

Differences in status and rights between Irish Catholics and South African blacks afford the ANC's armed struggle greater legitimacy than the IRA's

The sterility of armed struggle in a political vacuum led to the launch of Sinn Fein into political action to strengthen the IRA's community base

PIRA's campaign. It is irredentist nationalism, focused on the idea of *occupied territory*, rather than *rightless and exploited people* which provides the dynamic. For PIRA, the issue of political rights in the Northern Ireland context is a meaningless one, since, they argue, the state is constructed in an artificial and cynical way, to ensure an entity with a Protestant majority in which the exercise of political rights by Catholics can never bring closer their legitimate aspirations to a united Ireland.

The differences in status and rights between Northern Ireland Catholics and black South Africans are important. Firstly, they afford the ANC a much stronger claim to legitimacy in its armed struggle than Sinn Fein/IRA in theirs'. Secondly, the differences in rights and status make impossible a straight comparison on the violence and participation issue. If black South Africans possessed the rights and status that Irish republicans use to prosecute their 'ballot box and armalite' strategy, there would be no need for armed struggle at all in South Africa.

Any comparison then, has to be a skewed one, envisaging a scenario where black political movements might participate on terms of less than full equality, or in a group-based system. Bearing this in mind, it might be instructive to look at Sinn Fein's decision to participate in elections in Northern Ireland while the armed struggle went on, assuming that any parallel development in South Africa would principally involve the United Democratic Front (UDF) or some derivative such as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM).

Participation Incentives

There were several reasons why in 1981 Sinn Fein began to contest elections in Northern Ireland:

- it was clear that armed struggle alone was not going to achieve a British withdrawal;
- it was necessary to demonstrate some sort of mandate for violence from the people the IRA claimed to represent; and,
- the issue of the hunger strikers provided a decisive moment whose urgency could override any embarrassment at an apparent departure from principle.

More important than any of these is the fact that Sinn Fein is in competition with the Social Democratic and Labour Party

(SDLP). This constitutional opposition party, which seeks through negotiation the immediate participation of Catholics in power-sharing institutions, and the eventual unification of Ireland by peaceful means, was attracting in the late 1970s up to 23% of Northern Ireland's electorate and a large majority of Catholics. In short, in the absence of Sinn Fein candidates at elections, the SDLP could claim to be the sole legitimate vehicle for the aspirations of Northern Ireland Catholics. It was treated as such by the British government, by unionist politicians, and by the government of the Irish Republic.

By the early 1980s, two other things were clear. Firstly, the SDLP had lost more than anyone else from the prolonged stalemate following the failure of the power-sharing executive (brought down in 1974 by a Protestant workers' strike) and so was vulnerable to challenge from Sinn Fein at the polls. Secondly, the IRA, with no immediate military victory in sight, and no coherent and workable ideology had to acknowledge the sterility of armed struggle in a political vacuum, and launch Sinn Fein into political action which would strengthen its community base.

Turning to South Africa, it is clear that if competition with the SDLP was the main incentive for Sinn Fein to participate in elections, there is no analogy to encourage black anti-apartheid groups. There is no 'peaceful alternative' to make a bid for the aspirations and allegiances of the majority of South African blacks. Perhaps Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha could fulfil this role, if they were not themselves so confined and excluded by the system in which they operate. But under present conditions, the circumstances which forced Sinn Fein to change course do not obtain here.

Another important incentive for Sinn Fein was to be able to act as a credible and effective political force at local level, in distributing benefits and articulating grievances. But they have done so under a uniform system. If anti-apartheid organisations were to distribute benefits under any extension of the tricameral system it would require an enormously greater shift of principle.

Lastly, Sinn Fein could take its action with no thought for wider implications because it is isolated internationally. Apartheid is an international issue, however. Any question of participation could have important consequences in the area of sanctions, and for the boycott of South Africa generally.

Militarist Strains

The peculiar nature of the 'ballot box and armalite' strategy is best explained in terms of the Provisional IRA's experience of negotiation with the British government. In 1972, and again in 1975, the IRA declared ceasefires in order to negotiate. In the latter case especially, the results were traumatic. No major concessions were extracted, and the period of inactivity was very harmful to organisation and morale. The present generation of leaders is convinced (Bishop and Mallie 1987) that while military action is not enough, political action unsupported by violence will mean an indefinite postponement of the movement's aims. The leadership of the ANC seems to appreciate this point about negotiation, that it is dangerous for a guerrilla movement to accept a ceasefire, on conditions short of imminent victory, since it is very difficult to restart a campaign after a period of peace.

The central point of comparison arises in the two movements' commitment to violence, and here there are significant differences between Sinn Fein/PIRA and ANC/MK. Firstly, it could be argued that Irish Republicans are historically and ideologically committed to violence in a way that the liberation movement in South Africa is not, or is not yet (see box:21).

There is a strain of militarism in the republican movement which ensures that PIRA sees itself, not as a movement of legitimate political protest, driven reluctantly and recently by the intransigence of those in power, to take up arms, but as the heir to a seven hundred year tradition of resistance to foreign rule. In its members is invested all the enabling authority, and on them all the constraining authority is laid, of centuries of soldiers, heroes and martyrs, in a community of the living and the dead. One result of this ideology of violence has been that PIRA has been willing to risk civilian casualties with reckless indifference, if not actually to set out to cause them, and it has taken twenty years before the republican movement has publicly acknowledged the seriousness of the issue.

In terms at least of its own self-image, and of the way it presents itself to the world, the ANC does not have this ideological dynamic of violence, although possibly it is in the process of acquiring it. There are emerging signs of a mythology, a pantheon of martyrs (a legion of the dead, who have a right to influence policy as much as the living), and a tendency to revolutionary

Document

Extracts from new guidelines for negotiations adopted by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) after a special meeting of its committee on Southern Africa, Harare, 21 August 1989. The document has been widely interpreted as constituting a set of approved ANC proposals for a negotiated political settlement in South Africa:

Statement of Principles

We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing preference of the majority of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement.

We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the negotiations. We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order ...

Climate for Negotiations

Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any negotiations can take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created. The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least:

- release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;
- lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons;
- remove all troops from the townships;
- end the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and
- cease all political trials and political executions.

Guidelines to the Process of Negotiation

We support the view of the South African liberation movement that upon the creation of this climate, the process of negotiations should commence along the following lines:

- Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.
- Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a new constitution by agreeing on, among others, the principles enunciated above.
- Having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new constitution.
- The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order.
- The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections.
- After the adoption of the new constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally terminated.
- For its part, the international community would lift the sanctions that have been imposed against apartheid South Africa.
- The new South Africa shall qualify for membership of the Organisation of African Unity.

The Irish experience shows that it is dangerous for a guerilla movement to accept a ceasefire on conditions short of imminent victory

The ANC's new political strategy is aimed at achieving recognition of its indispensable role in the transformation of South Africa

militarism. The dominant myth remains, however, that the ANC turned to military struggle only reluctantly, belatedly, and without any prior commitment to violence as historically necessary. Those who subscribe to this view of the ANC will argue that this is why there have been relatively few civilian casualties, that the military campaign will remain under control, and subordinate to political objectives and demands.

Another point of difference between the two movements follows directly from the former. PIRA grew out of a split in the republican movement (formalised in January 1970) which was the result of two linked factors. The first was the tendency of the movement in the 1960s to adopt a political rather than a military strategy, and to formulate a marxist political programme which traditionalists saw as being contradictory, rather than complementary to the goal of national liberation. Secondly (and as a result, traditionalists argued) the IRA was unable to fulfil its second important function (the first is to wage war on British imperialism), that of protecting the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and especially in Belfast, against attacks from Protestant extremists. When this eventuality happened in August 1969 the widely perceived failure of the 'political' and 'marxist' IRA triggered the split.

For the next decade of armed struggle, PIRA had virtually no credible political programme, and scarcely any interest in political struggle. The idea of politics either as a substitute for, or a complement to violence had been completely discredited. As a result, PIRA's inflexible militarism and simple-minded philosophy of 'one last push to victory', prevented it from taking advantage of significant events like the fall of Stormont, the introduction of a power-sharing executive, and two truces with the British. All of these were seen merely as preludes to imminent military victory, rather than as political opportunities to be skilfully exploited in a long drawn out struggle.

By the time a new leadership emerged and an opportunity to 'politicise' the movement came, in struggles over political status for PIRA prisoners (events which coincided in the hunger strikes at the end of the 1970s), the possibilities of politics had been complicated and fouled by years of intense and ruthless armed action.

ANC Harmony

By contrast, the ANC has since 1955 always had the rudiments of a political, economic and social programme in the Freedom Charter. Now, when its armed campaign is escalating but, by comparison with PIRA's, is still at a relatively low level of intensity, the ANC is embarking on an ambitious strategy of formulating and propagating political goals and tactics in much more detail (see box:17), with a strong emphasis on becoming recognised as a responsible and indispensable element in the transformation of South Africa. Its regular and wide ranging contacts with political and other groups from the white community are an important part of this. The PIRA/Sinn Fein partnership has never seemed able, nor indeed particularly willing to embark on anything of this sort.

The ANC enjoys an international credibility and legitimacy which the IRA conspicuously lacks. With the exception of Libya, European terrorist groups, and certain sections of the Irish diaspora in America, the IRA enjoys no substantial international support, although there is sympathy for the idea of Irish unity if peacefully pursued. By contrast, the ANC enjoys a high degree of legitimacy which is clearly important to it. The ANC seems anxious to maintain this by trying to distance itself from 'terrorism', in associating itself with the Geneva Convention, for instance.

It remains to be seen whether the ANC can keep political and military imperatives in closer harmony than the republican movement, and whether it will be able to respond more flexibly to political opportunities. Will the military policy of forcing negotiation on a reluctant South African government, through costly and destructive violence, prove as counter-productive as it has been in Northern Ireland? In summary, it might be said that on the basis of these comparisons the specific conditions which motivated Sinn Fein/PIRA into direct political activity do not exist in South Africa, at least not yet. On the other hand, it may reasonably be argued that the ANC may well be able to take more creative advantage of political opportunities when they do arise. ~~IPRA~~

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Mandela

The Man behind the Myth

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Enormous hopes have been pinned on the release of Nelson Mandela as a catalyst for a negotiated political settlement in South Africa. His isolation over the last three decades has placed him above opposition factionalism, and only rare insights are provided of his doctrinal, analytical and practical responses to contemporary political developments. Fatima Meer, his official biographer and close confidant, looks at Mandela's different roles as traditional and modern leader, resistance symbol and political strategist.

It is the hope of all South Africans that the transition to the new order will be through peaceful negotiation, and that the government will be forced by international pressure and internal realities to release Nelson Mandela and unban the African and Pan African Congresses and the Communist Party. The necessary climate will thus be created to negotiate a new constitution, so that we may begin our new society.

But we cannot live on hope alone. For though the National Party leaders know their interests are best served by negotiating while they still retain the initiative, they will withdraw into the apartheid mode on the slightest sign of relaxation on our part.

The central figure in this process of negotiation is undoubtedly Nelson Mandela. The enormous charisma that has gathered around him gives Mandela a remarkable authority within the political community of Southern Africa. The indications are that he will use that authority constructively and in the best interests of the country if he is released timeously.

Mandela's vision of the future coincides with that of many South Africans. His impulses are moral and he is far from self-centred. These qualities bear the promise of a statesman of outstanding calibre. He appears to be the best negotiator we have for a non-racial democratic future. To understand Mandela's style as a national leader, it is firstly necessary to understand his traditional leadership role.

The Traditional Leader

Mandela was not born into leadership; he did not inherit his father's chiefdom, nor his father's patriarchal authority - that went to his elder brother, born of his father's senior wife - Mandela is the only son of his father's third wife. The authority that he derived in his family, he derived primarily through his mother over her children and her grandchildren. But it was an authority that was bound to impinge on the extended family, for relieved of responsibility in the rural base, he was destined to assume it in the urban.

Once Mandela set up his home in Orlando West in 1941, no matter how small or how humble, that home became the place to which both family and clan laid claim. Mandela was the educated, Westernised member, and a lawyer. These factors raised his status enormously in his lineage, though they never undermined the deference due to the extended family. It balanced his authority between the modern and traditional, the urban and rural, the patriarchal and political, because the family in the African context is not a private conjugal unit; it spills into the clan, and multiplies into the 'nation' through the guardianship of the Paramount Chief.

Mandela's sense of authority and the leadership derived thereby is in the first instance tempered by his position in his kinship group as a subordinate son, and secondly, by his training at the hand of his elders at Mqekwezweni in the Transkei, the great place of Jongintaba, Acting

To understand Mandela's style as a national leader, it is necessary to understand his traditional leadership role.

Mandela's concept of democracy is based on the traditional 'indaba' - a balanced participation in decision-making processes

Paramount Chief of the Thembu, who became his guardian after his father's death. A growing boy was not allowed to participate in the discussions of his elders, but he was expected to sit in, to listen and to learn, to be patient with their shortcomings, to be tolerant of differing views, to strive no matter how long it took to arrive at a consensus. That was the meaning of 'indaba'. It is the meaning Mandela gives today to the concept of democracy - a balanced participation in decision-making.

Mandela is a modern leader but an old-fashioned family man, and the one influences the other. His modernisation as a leader tempers his patriarchy, and his patriarchy colours his leadership: his sense of authority is a derivative of the two. It is a tempered authority and those who have worked with him politically say that they have rarely experienced it as overbearing. In his personal family relationships, however, he can be authoritarian ... father knows best.

The Modern Leader

Mandela's first initiation into the modern urban politics of the African township started at Healdtown and Fort Hare where he first encountered the African National Congress and the All African Convention. Later, in Johannesburg in the early 1940s, he was drawn into the small group of young college-educated African men who constituted the intellectual powderkeg on the Rand.

Mandela was among those who in 1944 founded the ANC Youth League. The records that survive do not project him as an initiator or catalyst. One gets the impression of a listener, weighing up ideas articulated by others.

Though critical of their predecessors, the Youth Leaguers remained deeply respectful. They worked 'with' them, never 'against' them. Instead, they joined forces and moved the ANC into militant action. In Mandela's own words, 'It is admitted that in the process of our political development, our leadership made certain blunders ... But it does no good to stop at being noisy in condemning African leaders who went before us'.

This continues to be Mandela's approach. Despite Bulhoek and Sharpeville, despite the bloodletting in the Midlands of Natal, he does not store up personal rancour. He

sets these events within their historical context. Consequently, his approach to the National Party and to Inkatha remains that, 'We must put our heads together to build what has been damaged and to find a way out of the present suffering'. He is prepared to do so with FW de Klerk because he believes that to be necessary; but he will not do so without the ANC, and without the full support of his people.

Mandela has not been known to take a doctrinal position. Although he identified with Africanism, Mandela never internalised it as a doctrine. He saw it as a process of self-realisation, an affirmation of roots, as an exorcism of missionary indoctrination that inferiorised and heathenised the African. He moved quickly from Africanism to humanism, incorporating the one doctrine into the other. He sees socialism itself as intrinsically African. He is open to discussing its modern forms, to consolidating a policy securing mass freedom from want, rather than serving prosperous elitist pockets.

His real authority was born when he assumed full responsibility for the resolve of the 1 500 delegates at the Pietermaritzburg Convention in 1961 to challenge the government into calling a national convention. It is some measure of Mandela's commitment that he assumed that responsibility at a time when apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism were at their peak, with the liberatory struggle at its weakest and apparently on the retreat. It was in the forbidding gloom that Mandela ignited new hope through his breathtaking personal sacrifice. He had everything to lose, his family, his lucrative legal practice, a range of creature comforts, and substantial social prestige. To the popular mind he gave up all of these when he chose the bitter path of the underground.

In terms of political strategies to achieve the goals to which they committed themselves, both Mandela and the ANC have always adhered to the tradition of their movement, placing negotiation ahead of any other strategy. The tradition of peace for which Albert Luthuli was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize was cherished by Mandela. When asked by the prosecution in his trial if he would concede to reform over a period of 10 or 20 years, Mandela answered: 'We demand universal adult franchise (and) are prepared to exert economic pressure, launch defiance campaigns and stay at home to realise that demand, but if the government said,

In terms of political strategies, both Mandela and the ANC have always adhered to the tradition of placing negotiation ahead of other options

"Gentlemen ... lets talk" ... I would say "Yes, lets talk".

At his trial Mandela also stated that, 'If the whites are not ready for a type of government where there might be a domination by non-Europeans, we think we should give you sixty seats in parliament ... We will review it at the end of five years. In my view that would be a victory - we would have taken a significant step towards the attainment of universal adult suffrage for Africans, and we would then suspend civil disobedience ... We would devote the intervening period for the purpose of ... bringing about better racial harmony in the country'.

The Symbol

Black power is symbolised above all today in Mandela. He has grown into South Africa's consciousness like a messianic presence, embodying our dreams and aspirations of a prosperous and peaceful country. Individuated and isolated, downtrodden and deprived, the man on the assembly line, the woman on the factory floor, the housewife in her shack, find their unity in Mandela. He is the leader of the disenfranchised, who see exemplified in him their own power to overcome their oppression. They see the government dwarfed and diminished in his presence, they experience his own magnification as theirs'.

Mandela consecrates in his person the unity that deludes the masses in the fractionalising violence of the townships. His very isolation in the last 28 years has placed him above factionalism, so that those whose hopes are today reflected in him range from members of Inkatha and Uwusa to members of the MDM and Cosatu, and as the newest signals reflect, even include members of the National Party.

This charisma has grown in Mandela's absence, perhaps in part one might even say that it is rooted in his absence. We have in Mandela a leader whose very physicality is in the nature of a myth. He cannot be represented in any form; he cannot communicate with us, or we with him.

In his incarceration, Mandela has little sense of the super-myth which surrounds him. He is a youthful seventy-one, who would easily pass for sixty. He is tall, lean, handsome and very much in control of his physique. He is a non-smoker and non-drinker. He overcomes imprisonment,

STATEMENT

Extracts from the first addresses by three senior members of the congress alliance at the mass rally held to celebrate their release, Johannesburg, 29 October 1989. Speaking publicly for the first time in three decades, the former security prisoners comment on negotiation issues, reforms and resistance strategy.

• Walter Sisulu, former ANC Secretary-General:

The ANC has consistently, throughout its history, been committed to the politics of peace and negotiations ... In spite of countless bitter experiences, we will not allow the past to stop us from constantly searching for the shortest possible path to freedom. We are in agreement with the recently adopted Harare Declaration ... If such a climate is created, the ANC is prepared to discuss the suspension of hostilities on both sides. There can be no question of us unilaterally abandoning the armed struggle.

To date, we see no clear indication that the government is serious about negotiations. All their utterances are vague. Now the government talks about ethnic elections to choose the leaders of the black people. This is unacceptable to us. We are looking forward to the election of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. This is where the true representatives of the people will discuss the future.

If the government is serious about a permanent and lasting solution, they will agree to this logical step. In the meantime, our duty is to intensify the struggle until we are able to get the regime to discuss the issue of the normalisation of the situation in South Africa. At this stage we cannot relax on the basis of mere statements ...

• Ahmed Kathrada, former member, Transvaal Indian Congress:

Now, 27 years later, we have come back to a South Africa where racialism is still firmly entrenched. There have of course been changes - and many of these have been for the good. Hotels and parks, public transport, libraries, cinemas, lifts, beaches, have to a considerable extent been desegregated. The Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts have been done away with and so have the hated Pass Laws.

These are all to be welcomed, just as we welcome any move away from racialism. But the fundamental corner-stones of apartheid still remain firmly in place. What we have seen are changes in terminology, and in this respect the Nats are past masters ... Stripped of all the nice phrases, they are simply once again changing their language and style in order to perpetuate white domination.

White South Africans must know that we are very much aware of fears that exist among them, fears that have been deliberately fermented by the rulers and which have reached paranoid levels ... What the ANC and MDM will certainly try to eliminate is each and every vestige of racism whenever and wherever it raises its ugly head.

From this stadium today we want to send a message to our white compatriots. We are as keen and determined as you are to preserve and propagate the best in the rich cultural heritage of all our people. We wish to convey our strong belief that this cannot be done by placing reliance on concepts such as the so-called group rights and group guarantees that are being peddled by the regime and its supporters ...

• Govan Mbeki, former ANC organiser, Eastern Cape:

Many people ... have consistently sought to destroy the alliance [of the ANC and the SACP] against apartheid. The attempt to do so has emanated from the government as well as their supporters in the imperialist countries. The same sources have sought to drive a wedge between what they claim are the Nationalists and Communists within the ANC.

They also attempt to draw a line between 'the ANC in exile' and 'the internal ANC'. This shabby attempt is aimed at deflecting the attention of the people from the fight against apartheid, the fight against national oppression and exploitation, to focusing their attention on the internal problems, which are created by the perpetrators and supporters of the racist system of apartheid ...

This alliance, which was entered into by the ANC and SACP, is going to continue until apartheid, which is the scourge that seeks to destroy democracy in South Africa is eliminated ...

SOURCE: *New Nation*, Vol 4/No 43:9-14, 3/9 November 1989.

Mbeki's address delivered by Sidney Malumadi

Today, Mandela gives the impression of being a man with an open and pragmatic mind, committed to a broad non-doctrinal humanism

Mandela places black unity above the political stigmatisation and in-fighting resulting from the vulgar doctrine dividing people into 'collaborators' or 'liberators'

it seems because of a capacity to expand his constricted environment. At Victor Verster, he reaches out to guests like a lord of a manor house, but with a geniality and warmth which endears him as a friend. He fills the room with his presence, yet leaves enough space for his visitor. It was the same on Robben Island and the same at Pollsmoor.

In 1976, when a Red Cross team sent out to investigate the condition of political prisoners visited some of us imprisoned at the Fort in Johannesburg (after they had visited Robben Island), we asked, 'How is Mandela?' The reply was, 'He is the King'. Ten years later, General Obasango of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group described his meeting with Mandela in awe-struck terms. Mandela enjoys meeting people. Subjected to long years of control over his time, he gives the impression that he savours every moment spent with visitors.

Mandela's most outstanding quality is perhaps his conviction that what he represents is just and right for himself, his people, and his country. Today, he gives the impression of a man with an open mind, committed to a broad inclusive humanism, untrammelled by any narrow doctrine. He is essentially a pragmatist with a sense of immediacy rather than a theorist.

The Strategist

Mandela's success as a leader lies in his ability to take bold and decisive action when the necessity arises, to resort to new strategies when the old fail. He has not been known to be rash and impulsive, however. When legislation made non-violent protest violent by state definition, he was one of the first to counsel change in strategy as early as 1953.

His first priority is that there should be peace and unity among the people, and he will go to great lengths to secure this. While it is true that in the past our political life has been characterised by divisions, the liberatory ethos managed in the past to maintain these on a rhetorical level. The political integrity of dissidence was respected.

In more recent history a divisive tendency has been created by a vulgar doctrine of irreconcilable conflict which classifies people into either 'collaborators' or 'liberators'. This categorisation - in a sense name-calling - has been affixed today to all

incumbents of apartheid institutions, homeland governments, community councils, and the two inferior houses of the tricameral parliament. These incumbents, in most cases, deserve the stigmatisation. Yet, the fact remains that they resent it enormously.

In Natal this kind of stigmatisation and distancing of people has reached enormous proportions, resulting in mass bloodshed that seems to be uncontrollable. Mandela's much-publicised letter to Chief Buthelezi is the most clear indication of his position on the issue. Mandela is not restrained by artificial caricaturing of people. He does not see people as politically stigmatised. He sees them as playing out roles in the positions in which they find themselves, believing they are able to change.

At the same time, Mandela does not see the actions of the individual as being entirely determined by external circumstances. He believes in the initiative of the individual, and so he plans, even in prison, to personally influence the course of history. This accounts for his versatility, his ability to size up situations and to take firm, precise and momentous decisions. But he always does so in consultation with others, for he knows that effective implementation demands co-operation and commitment, neither of which are possible without consensus. He insists in moving with the people, for without them he believes he cannot move at all.

If we are to succeed in forcing the National Party to the negotiating table (see box: 17), we must try and gather together all our forces, be they homeland governments or community councils. We need the broadest and the strongest black resistance against the government. We must try and find ways and means to deprive the ruling party of every black ally. To draw the most benefits from negotiations, we must go there with the strongest possible bargaining position.

The establishment of a position of strength by the disenfranchised should not arouse fear. At the height of their activism, both Mandela and Luthuli were prepared to give consideration to white fears. It is my belief that even today, Mandela and the ANC will find a solution for those fears. It is now up to the National Party government to create the climate for peaceful negotiation. **WPA**

Acknowledgement

Extracts from two addresses - to, respectively, Human Rights Trust conference (Port Elizabeth, 29 September 1989) and a Human Rights seminar (Lenasia, October 1989).

Engaging the State

Dealing with Civil Service Culture

By Professor Simon Bekker, Director, Centre for Social and Development Studies,
University of Natal, Durban

When the issue of negotiations is discussed, attention inevitably turns to the major parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actors in the country. Little is said about the South African state: about its bureaucrats or about its many institutions in Pretoria, in provincial and homeland capitals, and within its local authorities. In looking at the changing nature of the state, Professor Bekker identifies its potential role as envisaged by each of the main political challengers. He concludes by arguing that it is necessary to engage both the politicians and the state bureaucrats over this country's future.

The universal condemnation of the South African state derives largely from its perceived support for the apartheid system. A series of epithets is applied, each of which judges state action to be inappropriate, if not morally unacceptable. Thus, the state is charged with being ethnic, white, bureaucratised, centralised, and militarised. In discussing what each of these epithets implies, we need to remember that the South African state is not static. In fact, over the last ten years, it has undergone a number of basic changes.

The particular use of the concept of 'the state' is intended here to convey a reference to its bureaucracy: to its public servants and their organisations, to its police and military and to its institutional cultures. An important distinction is thus drawn between the ruling government and the forms of state organisation which it uses to give effect to its policies.

Ethnic Fusion

The South African state has often been called an Afrikaner state. During the fifties and sixties, the Afrikaner nationalist movement used state power to reward their Afrikaner followers. This led to the virtual fusion of government and state. By the early 1970s, the South African state did seem, largely, to be an ethnic state, fused to an Afrikaner nationalist government, and acting to safeguard the economic and social interests of whites in society.

The 1970s heralded a number of changes in society, however, changes which forced this fused government-state to reshape its ideology. The demands of the developing urban-industrial economy forced

modifications in the labour market (leading to the scrapping of influx control) and modifications in industrial relations (leading to the development of the black trade union movement). These economic demands also led to an acceleration in the process of urbanisation. Changes in the Southern African region, moreover, resulted in a heightened sense of military and security vulnerability. Finally, the eruption of unrest country-wide in the mid-seventies shook the confidence of the government to the core.

These changes had three important consequences for the South African state. The first was the development from within the military establishment of the notion of 'total onslaught' from the communist world. This led to the creation of a formidable bureaucratic and technological infrastructure designed to convince opponents inside the country as well as without that violent opposition to the South African state was futile. Secondly, power under Mr PW Botha moved significantly from the National Party - its caucus and congresses - to state bureaucrats. The new power base within the state rested upon three pillars: the office of the State President, the security bureaucracy, and the technical and financial bureaucracy.

The third consequence was the acknowledgement by the state of legitimate community grievances, which required state intervention aimed at the improvement of residents' basic and material needs. This was significant for several reasons:

- it located at least part of the cause of resistance and unrest within the communities concerned (rather than solely within external agitator circles);
- it recognised the increasing service

The South African state is not static. It is undergoing a number of basic changes, shifting from being white, ethnic, bureaucratised, centralised and militarised

Policy implementation by the state depends on the cooperation of its two million employees, of whom 56% are black and 32% are white

- needs of the ever-growing urban communities in the country;
- it accepted the role that the state was required to play in redressing socio-economic grievances in such communities;
- it soon learnt, moreover, that the mere delivery of certain material services was insufficient to meet the scale of need;
- it meant that priorities had to be identified; and increasingly, that planning and service delivery required community participation.

In short, by the early eighties, the fused government-state had shed its earlier ideology, and had recognised the permanence of black persons living in non-homeland South Africa. As a result, the state was compelled to maintain a high security profile, for its role as taxation, police and service authority was rejected by many of its citizens. Thus, it found itself increasingly ruling from the centre and, simultaneously, required to deal with interest groups it had traditionally ignored: black trade unions, community organisations, town councillors and business groups, all of whom could now legitimately and repeatedly call for citizenship and other rights.

Transitional State

Does the South African state still deserve the epithets we earlier used? Firstly, if by militarised we mean that the state's military and security might is still in place, that the use of state of emergency and other coercive means continues, then the label clearly seems valid. If, on the other hand, we mean that the state is increasingly forced to resort to overt coercive power - to force - to maintain order, then the label fits less well.

The state has succeeded in containing the unrest cycle of the mid-eighties, and seems able, if called upon, to do so again. But it wishes to find means other than coercion to contain future challenges to its authority. Its image abroad has suffered tremendously as a result of its actions during the mid-eighties. Calls for national negotiations have come as often from the military as from other public servants, for they have learnt that the use of force loses effectiveness the more often it is employed.

What of the epithets, centralised and bureaucratized? Again, if we mean by these that the state is presently run on highly centralised lines, and that its form of

decision-making is highly institutionalised, then undoubtedly these labels are accurate. Simultaneously, this should not imply that the state is structured, is fixed as it were, in a mould to the point where political changes will make little difference to bureaucratic power.

People outside the National Party fold are increasingly being drawn into decision-making roles within the state: within, for example, the Houses of Delegates and Representatives, the provincial executives, Regional Services Councils, and black town councils. Together with homeland politicians, their participation clearly points to the dissolution of a fused government and state. Further, the government's intention of devolving substantial power over certain state affairs may become reality in future.

Finally, is the South African state white and ethnic? Certainly, a cursory glance at the new cabinet suggests strongly that the epithets are valid. Some cautionary comments, however, need to be made.

Though senior decision-makers within the South African state are virtually all white, rank-and-file public servants are not. If the South African state is defined to include both the self-governing and independent homelands, close to two million persons were in its employ in early 1988. Of these, 32% were white, and 56% - over a million workers - black. If we exclude all the homeland public services, state employees number close to one-and-a-half million persons, of whom 42% were white and 43% black.

This staffing profile points to the fact that the South African state is already clearly dependent upon black cooperation to play its many roles in society. A recent defiance campaign and bus drivers' strike in Durban by black employees of the Durban City Council is instructive in this regard. These members of the local state in Durban decided against carrying out directives from the Council since they considered the directives to be apartheid-related. The recent actions of a police lieutenant who criticised police behaviour against civilian protest action in Mitchell's Plain in Cape Town, are equally instructive.

Simultaneously, it is worth noting that, in the heart of the country's administrative capital, the white constituency of Pretoria West with its high preponderance of public servants, was won for the first time by the Conservative Party in the September

election this year. White public servants are certainly no longer all National Party supporters.

If we use the strict definition of an ethnic state, it is clear that the label no longer fits. Ethnic exclusivity has waned both within the state and within the society envisaged by the ethnic state.

Party Visions

Where does this leave the South African state in 1989? First, members of the state bureaucracy have less accord with the ideas of the ruling party than earlier. In the National Party's five-year plan, the new South Africa will be a society in which neither individuals nor groups will dominate or be dominated, and in which each person will enjoy negotiated participation. The party also promises an independent judiciary, the protection of human rights, and adequate welfare provision.

What is significant about these new policies is less their content, than the role the state is expected to play in their implementation. It is clear that the South African public service will not act simply as a neutral body in carrying out the new directives. For, while some public servants undoubtedly remain loyal to a party which has radically changed its ideology, others have remained loyal to the earlier ideology and have broken from the party. Others still have been recruited from fundamentally different political cultures, with little sympathy for government ideology of either the past or present.

Accordingly, the state itself is likely to become a major arena of dissension as these different groups of public servants conflict with one another over the application of new policy: which is, at face value at least, nothing less than non-discriminatory and welfarist in thrust.

The present government and its public service are not the only actors who envisage a new role for the state. Major political challengers to the South African government do so as well.

The Conservative Party proposes that the state should act primarily in the interests of white South Africans, Afrikaners in particular. Revenue raised by the state - which comes mainly from white taxpayers - should be used to ensure that whites do not become impoverished. The police and

military should act decisively to suppress internal resistance and unrest. The state should consistently promote a policy of partition, which will result in the development of separate states within each homeland, each with its own sources of revenue and public service.

The future state proposed by the Democratic Party may be described as a mixture of features drawn from models of a welfarist state (where accommodation, health and welfare are primary), of a free enterprise society (where the state plays a minor role, with taxes strictly contained, and redistribution promoted largely through the private sector), and of a security state based on non-racial lines (with a vigilant permanent Defence Force and a police force double its present size).

The ANC assigns to the future state which it envisages, the central role in the restructuring of South African society. Thus, the state will be unitary and centralised; will intervene 'speedily' in the economy 'to eradicate economic social inequalities produced by racial discrimination'; will implement land reform; and will outlaw 'racism, fascism, nazism, and (other forms of) ethnic or regional exclusivism'. The aim of this restructuring is to create 'a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans'.

For the PAC and other Africanist groups, the future state will also play the central role in restructuring South African society. In contra-distinction to the ANC state, however, it will be explicitly socialist and opposed to 'racism' and 'capitalism'. It aims to establish one national culture inspired by socialist values. These socialist values should evolve from the experience of black communities rather than from those of foreign cultures and societies. In sum, this Africanist state will act in the socialist interests of the black working class of South Africa.

Engagement Tactics

From this rapid survey it is clear that the principal challengers of the National Party all have a guiding vision of the South African state of the future. None, however, has clarity on how to bring about the change it seeks. Moreover, the emphasis of all these actors is primarily on how to bring about a change of constitution or a change of government, either through the overthrow of what is ambiguously called

The state itself is likely to be a major arena of dissension between different groups of public servants over implementing new policies

The major political challengers to the throne, from the CP to the DP and ANC, envisage very different roles for the future state

The nature of today's state - its public servants, its security forces and its institutional cultures - will not dissolve with a change of government

Engaging political actors (the senior decision-makers) and engaging the state (the policy implementors) are separate and equally important tasks

the present 'regime', through the ballot box, or through a protracted process of national negotiations. All implicitly assume that a new constitution and a new government will herald new policies which the state will then implement: thus bringing about the new South Africa desired.

This objective and these strategies are, however, inadequate. For they overlook the role of the state (as opposed to the government) and, in particular, the fact that the state has a life of its own, with its own interests, values, conflicts and power. Hence, the state itself will have to be changed if a new government's policies are to take effect. Quite simply, the nature of the state today - its public servants, its police and military and its institutional cultures - will not dissolve away as governmental power changes.

The sole objective of changing the government overlooks important opportunities provided by the state itself for incremental transformation. Thus, for example, there are enlightened public servants, some at senior level, who can play a vital role in persuading the ruling party to change its policy. These public servants have 'hands-on' working experience of the effects of government policy, acquired over years. They have an expertise, accordingly, which is compelling to politicians.

Engagement can also bring a new perspective to those presently ambivalent or resistant to change. It can help to overcome fear, counter prejudice and generate a new openness to change. It can also help to strengthen the influence of black public servants within the state.

Undoubtedly the area most open to engagement today is that of public service delivery. Why is this so? It is common wisdom in South Africa that urbanisation is proceeding apace and bringing with it escalating demands for serviced land, residential units, adequate water, education, transport and health services. Those requiring these services are, and will remain, largely the urban poor: unable to afford, on an immediate cost-recovery basis, the services which are so vital.

It is evident that only the state has the resources to provide many of the services so urgently required (see pp47-50). Critically, the state is also beginning to recognise that it cannot properly achieve this goal without community participation. Community participation, however, lies usually beyond its grasp.

New Opportunity

This opens up an opportunity for those with relevant experience to seek to engage and influence the state. Such engagement may take many forms, such as providing accurate information on the real scale of need as well as on alternative approaches that may be marshalled to meet it. It may also consist in demonstrating to the state the benefits of community self-help projects, in order to bring home the realisation that such endeavours are usually more successful than top-down state aid. Most importantly, however, it should seek to build a vital link between the state and the communities it is expected to serve.

The benefits of such engagement could be manifold: an improvement of the quality of life for those in need; empowerment of communities through involvement in planning and decision-making. Most importantly, for present purposes, it would help to change the state. It would make it more aware of the needs and interests of the wider society and make it more amenable to transformation (where it remains resistant), whilst simultaneously strengthening its enlightened elements, both black and white.

In advocating such engagement with the state, the intention is not to imply that the objective of changing the government is misconceived. However, it must also be acknowledged that overthrowing the present government and state, if at all possible, will take a long time, especially since this strategy seeks to confront the state in the very area (its military and police presence) where it is strongest. In addition, a takeover, under present constitutional conditions, through the ballot box is also highly unlikely.

In conclusion, over the next few years, attempts will be made by the National Party and its main political challengers to engage one another over national negotiations on the country's constitutional future. More engagement is needed. State action will critically affect the direction of change in the country. And the state is not the government and does not always, and will not always, act as the government of the day instructs. Engaging political actors and engaging the state are separate and equally important tasks. **UPA**

Based on an Inaugural address entitled 'Engaging the State', delivered at the University of Natal in October 1989.

ECONOMIC

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


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
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


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Heads or Tails?



Rescheduling the Debt

*By Alan Hirsch, Department of Economic History,
University of Cape Town*

In mid-October the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis, triumphantly announced that a new debt rescheduling agreement had been negotiated. The local press hailed the agreement to reschedule short-term debts till the end of 1993 as a triumph in the campaign against sanctions. Pro-sanctions forces abroad bemoaned the agreement as 'tragic news'. Commenting on these reactions, Hirsch stresses that though the agreement has strengthened the government's position, the debt crisis will continue to be used as a lever to engineer political change.

The current rescheduling agreement was to end on 30 June 1990, but the Governor of the Reserve Bank, as head of the South African debtors committee, negotiated a new deal well in advance of the deadline. South Africa was forced to conclude a rescheduling agreement eight-and-a-half months before the current agreement lapsed because of international efforts to use the country's financial weakness as a lever against apartheid. The Commonwealth had been preparing to launch a financial sanctions campaign at its Kuala Lumpur meeting in October. An African National Congress-led international campaign planned to block rescheduling until South Africa was well on the road to democracy.

For those who may have believed that blocking the rescheduling was feasible, and could bring down the government, the agreement is a bitter blow. But the thrust of many financial sanctioners was not to block the agreement but to cut off new credits, and the strategy may have as much potential now as it had before 19 October. South Africa is still extremely vulnerable to

interference in its supply of capital from abroad.

Bleeding Capital

In 1985, many economists believed that the debt crisis was caused by the South African Reserve Bank not supervising foreign exchange transactions, by the private banks over-borrowing from abroad, by the collapse of the rand, or some combination thereof. It was expected that after a few years of strict management of foreign exchange the economy would return to normal. But this has not happened: four years after the 1985 debt standstill the economy still bleeds capital, preventing adequate growth.

The debt crisis was a turning point. Before, South Africa could rely on inflows of capital when the economy settled down or as soon as a political crisis ended. In 1985/86 an economic crisis combined with a major political crisis and the perspective of foreign bankers and investors, as well as of local capitalists, shifted qualitatively.

The thrust of many financial sanctioners was not to block the rescheduling agreement but to cut off new credits from abroad

South Africa has lost more than R25bn in capital outflow in the four years since the debt crisis began, and this efflux is not slowing

There would be no major influx of foreign capital until the economy began to improve, and until the government proved it had a long-term solution to the political crisis.

After the 1985 crisis, the South African government negotiated agreements rescheduling the repayment of about US \$14bn short-term debt - the immediate cause of the crisis. Loans for periods longer than one year and trade credits were not included in the agreements. The first agreement, concluded in March 1986 after the government had agreed to abolish the pass laws and end the state of emergency (temporarily, as it turned out), required debtors to repay a maximum of 5% of their debt, and interest. The interest on the remainder was raised by 1%. No further repayments on the short-term debt would be required till the end of June 1987.

A second, three-year rescheduling agreement was reached in March 1987, by which time the repressive actions of the South African government against opposition groups and the press had moved the country from the centre stage of world politics. The agreement was thus more lenient, allowing the repayment of a maximum of 8% of the debt over the three-year period, plus interest. South Africa offered creditors the option of converting their debt into financial rands, so that creditors were able to withdraw their funds at a substantial discount or leave it in South African equities. Another, more popular, escape option was the conversion of the short-term debt into a ten-year loan on which only interest would be paid until 1993.

Had new foreign capital then begun to enter the economy, the second agreement might have been the basis for the stabilisation of South Africa's position in international financial markets. Not only was there no influx of new capital, but South African capital fled too, some legally into foreign investments and sanctions-busting arrangements, and as least as much as 15% illegally, through foreign exchange fraud. South Africa has lost more than R25bn in the four years since the debt crisis, and there is no firm sign yet that the capital outflow is slowing.

The government has been forced to achieve a compensatory surplus on the current account of the balance of payments by adopting restrictive monetary policies which slow down domestic spending and slow imports, while promoting exports (or at least revaluing them) through the low

rand. Middle-class white South Africans, as demonstrated in the September elections, are increasingly aware that their living standards are declining because of growing certainty at home and abroad that apartheid cannot hold the economy together.

Political Leverage

Anti-apartheid activists recognised the political potential of the debt crisis early on. As Archbishop Tutu has since noted, 'Anything that could force big businessmen like Gavin Relly [head of Anglo American] to rush off to Lusaka and speak with the ANC had to be powerful'. As early as October 1985, Tutu, with fellow churchmen Alan Boesak and Beyers Naude, wrote a letter to all the creditor banks asking them not to reschedule South African debts until there had been a democratic transfer of power. The demand was idealistic, as Tutu now acknowledges, but it was a critical intervention insofar as it politicised the debt crisis. The banks were forced to ask the South African government for some political concessions before they were able to sign the March 1986 agreement.

In Europe anti-apartheid organisations like the British-based 'End Loans to Apartheid' and the German 'Kein Geld für Apartheid' made the debt crisis the focus of their campaigns, and targeted domestic lenders to South Africa for popular action. In the United States more city and county governments withdrew accounts from banks which lent to South Africa, spurred on by a powerful student/church/pressure group alliance which became known as the Free South Africa Movement. Campaigns were backed up by unusually thorough research, notably by church-funded Cannicor Research in San Francisco.

Governments also took up the campaign for financial sanctions. Following Pretoria's rejection of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group initiative, the Commonwealth stuck with the negotiating concept, but (with the exception of Britain) decided to apply pressure on South Africa through sanctions. The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Vancouver in 1987 decided to give special attention to the use of financial sanctions and set up an expert committee to investigate strategies. It also set up a committee consisting of the foreign ministers of nine Commonwealth countries, to pursue ways of resolving the problem of South Africa.

Until new foreign capital enters the economy, South Africa's position in international financial markets is unlikely to stabilise

At the August 1988 meeting of the foreign ministers, the Ovenden and Cole report on financial sanctions was endorsed. Ovenden and Cole were commissioned to rewrite it in readable up-to-date form in time for a mid-1989 meeting of the foreign ministers group, and for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1989.

The report called for the imposition of strenuous conditions by the banks on the new agreement, for a consolidation of the ban on medium- to long-term loans and the establishment of an expert agency to monitor lending to South Africa. It also called upon governments to discourage supplying foreign trade credits to South Africa by refusing to provide insurance cover for the credits, and upon banks to limit their trade credits to 90 days. Significantly, the report noted that the scope for pressurising South Africa through the rescheduling negotiations themselves was limited - the banks had to act in their own interests in the last instance, and that meant getting their money back, somehow. They would not drive South Africa to default.

By the time the Kuala Lumpur Statement on Southern Africa was released, South Africa had announced its new rescheduling agreement. The news was disappointing to the Commonwealth leaders who were concerned that the new agreement extended as long as three-and-a-half years, and that the interest rate and terms of repayment were relatively lenient. However, the Commonwealth had probably planned to emphasise other measures proposed by Ovenden and Cole - the focus on trade credits and the establishment of an 'independent agency to review and report on South Africa's international links ...' (initially funded by Australia). The foreign ministers group was called upon to meet again in April 1990, to exert further pressure on the South African government. (The consolidation of statutory bans on medium- and long-term loans to South Africa slipped out of the package somewhere.)

While Ovenden and Cole, and the prime movers for financial sanctions in the Commonwealth, Australia and Canada, felt that trying to stop the rescheduling agreement would be futile, some groups felt that full advantage should be taken of South Africa's vulnerability, and that the banks should be persuaded to refuse to reschedule the debt until South Africa had moved irreversibly towards change. Legislation

Data Base

INSIDE THE NET The third debt rescheduling agreement

South African debtors will be permitted to repay a total of about US \$1,5bn during the three-and-a-half years following the expiry of the second agreement, about '20,5% of the reducing balance of the affected [short-term] indebtedness'. The following payments will be permitted inside the net:

- December 1990: 1,5%
- February 1991: 2,5%
- August 1991: 3%
- February 1992: 3%
- August 1992: 3%
- February 1993: 3%
- August 1993: 3%
- December 1993: 1,5%

Short-term claims inside the net converted to long-term loans outside will initially be repayable on the same terms as the debt still inside the net, but from January 1994 no further payments of the capital will be made until 7,5 years after the conversion. At that point the remainder of the debt will be repaid in six instalments over 2,5 years. (Clearly there is an incentive for banks to convert, if at all, as soon as the agreement begins, so that the entire debt will be repaid in ten years.)

The provision for conversion of debt into financial rands for investment in equities will be retained.

Source: *Financial Mail*, 2 October 1989.

introduced in the US Congress by Walter Fauntroy in August took such a line.

A month earlier the African National Congress had convened a consultation over the debt of representatives of anti-apartheid groups, solidarity movements, church organisations and development agencies from 16 countries, including all South Africa's major debtors, and UN bodies. The meeting in London agreed it was a priority of the campaign against apartheid to prevent any further rescheduling (though it agreed on several other measures too). An international campaign to stop rescheduling would stage a world-wide day of action, targeting major creditor banks on 4 October, and a follow-up week of action from 13-19 November 1989. The South African announcement on 19 October that the debt had been rescheduled made the main focus of this campaign moot.

New Burden

The third rescheduling agreement looks generous to South Africa, but in the context of a continuing capital drain, repayment remains a heavy burden for the economy. Like the first two agreements, only South

The pressure from overdue short-term debts has been relieved, but the pressure of due longer-term debts is rising

Africa's short-term debts, excluding trade credits, are rescheduled ('inside the net'). In 1986 that meant US \$14bn out of \$24bn, in 1987 about \$13bn out of about \$22bn, and in 1990 it will mean \$8bn out of \$20bn. The amount inside the net fell from \$12bn this year when several banks took the option of converting to long-term loans (one of the 1987 escape options) to avoid being involved in the negotiations.

This may have made it easier for the South African negotiators, but it does also mean that a declining proportion of South Africa's debt is subject to rescheduling options, as currently conceived (see box).

The pressure from overdue short-term debts has been relieved, but the pressure of due longer term debts is rising. The reason the new agreement involves such a small payment in 1990 is that in that year longer term debts worth at least US \$2bn fall due. Of that, about \$900m consists of bearer bonds which are impossible to rollover without the provision of new credit. If all the debt now due next year is repaid South Africa will need, in the absence of capital inflows, a balance of payments surplus of about R6,7bn. Merely achieving a R4bn surplus in 1989 has meant real economic pain in the form of very high interest rates, yet even worse medicine will be needed next year.

In the worst case scenario, South Africa would have to repay US \$8bn over the next four years, including \$1,5bn inside the net and \$6,5bn outside

In the years after 1990 similar burdens will weigh on the South African economy, if not as heavy. In the worst case scenario (i.e. no new trade credits) presented by the South African Minister of Finance, South Africa would have to repay \$8bn over the next four years, including \$1,5bn inside the net and \$6,5bn outside.

This is little more than the \$7bn used to repay foreign debts in the four years since 1985. Relative to South Africa's gross domestic product, or to exports (the usual measures of the severity of debt burdens), South Africa's load will be lighter. If some of the longer term debts were rolled over or new trade credits obtained, the burden will be still lighter. However, in the absence of significant new capital inflows, the only way South Africa will pay the debt is through constraining domestic consumption and growth - which the government can barely afford.

The finance ministry is far from complacent. It has opened three offices abroad, most recently an office in Hong Kong in August 1989. Still more recently the department confirmed that it had hired a

prominent liberal opposition journalist, Mr Bruce Cameron, political correspondent of the *Daily News*, 'to inform people of the situation in South Africa, dealing mainly with the financial media in Europe.' The Reserve Bank continues to offer costly forward cover, paid for by taxpayers, to encourage borrowers to utilise foreign trade credits.

Remaining Options

Those who believed that the banks might be stopped from rescheduling until apartheid was no more, underestimated the power of the banks and overestimated their sensitivity. Banks had driven South Africa to the brink of insolvency for commercial reasons, not political ones (though the crisis was politicised), and they were unlikely to put their South African assets in danger for what they saw as a political whim.

It is equally wrong to see the new agreement as an unqualified victory for Pretoria. South Africa is still under a tremendous amount of pressure in foreign capital markets, and simply remaining so vulnerable adds force to sanctions strategies. The power of the financial sanctions initiative was testified to by the fact and timing of the partial easing of security measures by the South African government, and by the release of eight senior political prisoners.

If South Africa faces the worst case scenario sketched by Minister du Plessis, economic life in South Africa will be uncomfortable and economic pressures effective. But South Africa can avoid the worst case scenario by retaining access to foreign trade credits, through gold swops with Swiss banks, and through the odd medium- and long-term loan entering the economy. Anti-apartheid activists can curtail the supply of new credit to South Africa, but the campaign seems more likely to succeed if they focus on obtaining governmental measures at national and local levels to stop loans and trade credits, rather than try to influence commercially motivated banks. **IPWA**

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Apartheid & Profit Rates

Challenging the Radical Orthodoxy

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New research findings suggest that apartheid simultaneously allowed for high profits relative to other capitalist economies, while exacerbating (if not causing) a decline in actual profitability via the labour market and cost pressures in the post-war period. The author's own empirical research shows that the major roots of South Africa's economic crisis of the 1980s were manifested from the 1960s (if not before) in the form of plummeting profitability. In short, it is argued that there was never a honeymoon period for the marriage of apartheid and capitalism in terms of a stable and reproducible growth path.

The challenge to political economists is to unravel the complex and contradictory processes which allowed for initially high, but rapidly falling rates of profit in South Africa. Interesting questions include why the pressures which built up in the South African economy in the post-war period were more severe than in the Advanced Capitalist Countries (ACCs) and whether apartheid policies alleviated or exacerbated the downward dive of the profit rate.

New Indicators

As all good managers and trade unionists know, the profit rate (i.e. the rate of return on capital employed) is a crucial indicator of how well an enterprise is performing. Low levels of profit constrain growth potential and declining rates of return eventually result in bankruptcy.

The measurement of macro-economic rates of return on capital has however, only recently gained academic respectability amongst conventional economists. Up until the late 1970s, the rate of profit (which

neo-classical economists saw as simply reflecting the relative scarcity of capital) was regarded with limited interest. Radical political economists, by contrast, regarded profitability as a key economic concept shedding light on the nature of capitalist accumulation and reflecting the outcome of class struggle over the distribution of output between wages and profits.

Since the sharp and widespread decline of profit rates in the Advanced Capitalist Countries (ACCs) from the early 1970s, profitability has become increasingly recognised as a summary statistic of trends in productivity and wages. The OECD now publishes a rate of return on manufacturing capital in its macro-economic statistical reports. At the same time, radical economics has become more explicitly and empirically focused on profitability. The new 'regulation school' for instance, centres its explanation of the rise and fall of the 1960s 'golden age' growth on the performance of profits, productivity and wages.

Whereas a great deal of attention has been focused on trends in the rate of profit in the

Radical economists believe that profitability reflects the outcome of class struggle over the distribution of output between wages and profits

TABLE 1
International Net Profit Rates and Shares

	1955	1960	1964	1970	1975	1981
Profit Rate %						
ACCs*	26,3	22,1	23,8	19,3	11,6	8,9
Europe	21,3	19,9	14,8	14,0	7,9	5,2
Germany	35,7	28,8	20,0	18,6	11,0	8,3
UK	18,8	17,5	14,6	9,6	3,9	1,7
Japan	20,7	43,8	41,4	46,5	10,4	13,3
USA	31,2	22,3	35,7	17,7	16,7	10,3
South Africa	39,3	35,3	31,1	23,6	15,1	15,2
Profit Share %						
ACCs*	24,4	22,8	23,5	20,6	15,4	12,5
Europe	27,3	25,9	21,6	19,6	12,5	8,3
Germany	31,6	29,3	25,2	22,5	15,3	11,2
UK	28,5	27,6	25,1	18,2	9,3	5,5
Japan	26,0	41,5	39,4	40,7	15,3	19,1
USA	22,2	17,4	21,0	15,0	16,6	11,6
South Africa	38,7	37,4	33,4	29,3	25,2	31,0

Note:
* ACCs is the weighted average of the top seven Advanced Capitalist Countries (ACCs) (ie UK, USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada).

Sources: Armstrong et al, 1984:464-66 for the international figures and own calculations for South Africa.

Of direct interest to political economists is the fall in the profit share in every post-war period apart from 1948-1955 and 1975-1981

ACCs (see Hill 1979, Armstrong et al 1984), little is known (although a lot is assumed) about the rate of profit in South Africa. Contrary to the popular perception that profit rates were buoyant in the 1960s, a preliminary analysis of manufacturing profitability shows that it was on a sharp trend decline in South Africa during the post-war period. As can be seen from figure one, the rate of return on manufacturing capital declined from 44% in 1948 to 9% in 1986!

Despite experiencing a spectacular fall in profitability, the South African manufacturing sector continued to earn comparatively high rates of return on capital employed. Table one provides an indication of relative manufacturing profit rates and shares in South Africa and selected ACCs.

International comparisons of profitability are always tentative owing to the lack of uniformity in international measurements of the capital stock (Hill 1979). Nevertheless, the fact that South Africa's profit rate was consistently over twice the average European rate, is worthy of comment. More faith however, can be placed in international comparisons of the profit share (which measures the percentage of value added accruing to

workers). As can be seen from table one, the share of profit in South African manufacturing has been consistently higher than that in Europe. It was exceeded only by Japan between 1960 and 1970.

South African capitalists have been able to reap very much higher profits - expressed both as a proportion of capital employed and in terms of value added in production than their counterparts in the Advanced Capitalist Countries. Nevertheless, the fact that South Africa's profit rates have simultaneously declined raises a set of interesting questions about the nature of capitalist development in the post-war period.

Profit Cycles

In order to glean some insight into what lay behind the fall in profitability, it is useful to deconstruct the growth in the rate of profit into trends in the growth of the profit share and the output capital ratio (see tables). The rate of profit fell across every post-war economic cycle except for 1975-1981. The first drastic decline in the South African economy coincided with the decline in profitability in the ACCs following the OPEC oil shocks in the early 1970s. South Africa's profitability fall was less severe than in the ACCs as the rise in the gold price helped cushion the structural adjustment process.

The sharpest fall occurred in the 1980s. Over-enthusiastic monetary policy on the part of the authorities and the negative effects of the socio-political crisis on investor confidence combined to push South Africa into a falling profitability spiral. Unlike the early 1970s, this collapse in profitability occurred at a time when the rate of profit was recovering in the ACCs.

In each post-war peak to peak period, the fall in the output:capital ratio (which reflected inter alia a decline in the productivity of capital) was an important contributing factor to the decline in the profit rate. Of direct interest to political economists is the fall in the profit share in every period apart from 1948-1955 and 1975-1981. Except for these two periods, this data trend implies that workers as a group were able to erode the proportion of value added accrued by capitalists.

This was particularly the case during the 1960s boom, where the increase in worker power relative to that of capitalists, was the major impetus behind the falling rate of

profit. Thus while South African capitalists were relatively exploitative, worker power was increasing at the cost of those same capitalists.

Wage Factor

The process of worker empowerment was uneven, however. The experience of workers from different race groups (as defined by the state) varied markedly at different times. In order to see how these developments linked in with profitability trends, it is useful to deconstruct trends in the profit share in more detail.

Put simply, the profit share will fall if wages increase faster than the surplus available for distribution between wages and profits. In other words, if wage increases are greater than the growth of the total 'economic pie', then it follows that the pie slice accruing to capitalists will be eroded.

Table two provides a breakdown of the growth of product wages for the various racial groups as well as an estimate of the growth of the surplus available for distribution. (See box overleaf for brief explanations of the concepts of product wages and surplus). The data shows that the profit share was squeezed across every period except 1948-1955 and 1975-1981. The dynamics lying behind the fall in worker power are completely different for the two periods and illustrate dramatically the reversal in the power of black and white workers.

As can be seen from table two, the profit share between 1948 and 1955 was able to rise because the surplus available for distribution between wages and profits rose marginally, whereas total average product wages declined. However, as is also clear, the fortunes of the different race groups varied markedly. White product wages grew by almost 2% per annum whereas black product wages fell by slightly over 2% per annum! The white:black wage gap grew by 3% per annum, and despite the higher growth of black employment, the white share of the wage bill rose from 61,7% to 63,4% over the period.

Of great importance is the fact that the decline in black product wages more than compensated for the rise in white product wages (which were well in excess of the growth of the surplus available for distribution between wages and profits). In this way, white workers and capitalists both

increased their power relative to black workers, who suffered dramatic wage declines. This development lends support to the early radical analyses of the close relationship between capitalism and racism.

Between 1955 and 1975, both white and black product wages grew faster than the surplus available for distribution between wages and profits, thus driving down the share of profit. The labour market situation was such that both white and black workers gained at the expense of capitalists. By the period 1970-1975, black product wages were increasing faster than white product wages. This reflects the movement of black workers up the occupational ladder and the growth in trade union militancy.

Between 1975 and 1981, the tables turned completely. This time it was the fall in white product wages which compensated for the increase in black product wages such that the profit share was able to rise. In a reversal of the 1948-1955 situation, black workers and capitalists were able to gain at the expense of white workers.

The fall in white product wages between 1975-1981 compensated for the increase in black product wages, so that the profit share rose

TABLE 2
The Profit Squeeze in South Africa, 1948-1986

Average Annual Compound Growth	White	Coloured/Indian	African	Total
1948-1955				
Product Wages	1,9	-1,3	-2,1	-0,5
Surplus				0,1
Profit Share				0,7
1955-1960				
Product Wages	5,3	3,5	3,9	4,2
Surplus				3,8
Profit Share				-0,6
1960-1970				
Product Wages	4,3	2,5	3,9	4,7
Surplus				2,2
Profit Share				-2,4
1970-1975				
Product Wages	0,6	3,0	4,4	1,2
Surplus				0,2
Profit Share				-3,0
1975-1981				
Product Wages	-0,1	0,8	2,3	0,3
Surplus				1,8
Profit Share				3,5
1981-1986				
Product Wages	-0,5	1,5	1,5	1,1
Surplus				-2,7
Profit Share				-4,3

Sources: Unpublished material from the South African Reserve Bank and various editions of South African Statistics.

It is incorrect to assume that profit rates soared in the manufacturing sector after 1948 because apartheid drove down black wages

However, it is important to stress that the erosion of profit share does not imply that wage increases for black workers were unjustified

Incorrect Assumptions

The above sketch of trends in profitability and the key economic factors behind them, has interesting implications for political-economic theories of South African development:

- *apartheid engine*

Firstly, it is incorrect to assume, as do Saul and Gelb (1986:70-74), that profit rates 'soared' because apartheid drove down black wages. Profit rates were high but falling, in large part because wages were rising faster than the surplus available for distribution. The idea that apartheid via its labour repressive effects was an 'engine' for growth needs to be qualified in important respects. As far as trends in profitability are concerned, post-war South African development is better associated with a high performance but rapidly decelerating engine. Workers gained steadily at the cost of capitalists, and black workers (circa 1970) gained at the expense of whites.

- *productivity linkage*

Secondly, it is important to stress that the erosion of the profit share does not imply that wage increases were unjustified. All too often the more rapid growth of wages (especially black wages) than productivity is presented as ill-gotten gains and economically unjustifiable. The Kleu study group for example argued that from the early 1970s, 'social and political circumstances have given rise to a sharp increase in the wages and salaries of people of colour without a corresponding increase in productivity'. They concluded, 'indicators are that the production factor labour in the manufacturing sector has been over-remunerated' (1983:160-61). Such conclusions are highly suspect and often ideologically motivated.

While it is true that the rise in black product wages squeezed profits (especially from the early 1970s), one can tell nothing about the relationship between the level of black wages and the marginal productivity of black workers. In the absence of any meaningful way of investigating the relative productivities of black and white workers, it is as valid to assume that workers were being paid their marginal product after the wage increases as it is to believe that they were beforehand.

- *crisis adaption*

Thirdly, it is unwise to theorise the 1960s boom as a stable 'racial Fordist' regulation as does Gelb (1988). Regulation analysis is

The Concepts Behind Profit Rates

The rate of profit can be expressed as the product of the profit share (P/Y) and the output:capital ratio (Y/K).

$$\frac{P}{K} = \frac{P}{Y} \times \frac{Y}{K}$$

P = Profits (i.e. Net Operating Surplus - see below)
K = Net Capital Stock at Replacement Value
Y = Net Value Added

When deconstructing trends in the rate of profit, it is useful for mathematical reasons, to examine changes in the rate of growth of the various components. Thus, the rate of growth of profitability can be approximated as the sum of the growth rates of the profit share and the output:capital ratio. The deconstruction of the rate of profit in South African manufacturing over post-war peak to peak economic cycles, is given below.

	$\frac{P}{K}$	=	$\frac{P}{Y}$	+	$\frac{Y}{K}$
1948-1955	-1,8	=	0,7	+	(-2,5)
1955-1960	-2,0	=	-0,6	+	(-1,4)
1960-1970	-3,9	=	-2,4	+	(-1,5)
1970-1975	-8,3	=	-3,0	+	(-5,8)
1975-1981	0,2	=	3,5	+	(-3,3)
1981-1986	-9,7	=	-4,3	+	(-6,0)

Operating Surplus

The concept of 'operating surplus' in the National Accounts corresponds to that of operating surplus in business accounts. In other words, it measures the surplus accruing in respect of real processes of production. Operating surplus is equal to value added in production minus the sum of compensation of employees (which includes cash and in-kind wages, employers contribution to social security schemes, private pension schemes, etc), indirect taxes paid by the producer less subsidies received, and consumption of fixed capital.

Product Wages

- Product wages are nominal wages deflated by the production price index so as to provide a measure of the real cost to capitalists of employing labour.
- Wages deflated by the consumer price index (the usual measure of real wages) provide a measure of the purchasing power of wages in the hands of workers.
- Thus while real wages are important to trade unions when bargaining, product wages are the relevant measure when examining the erosion of the profit share.
- The growth of the surplus available for distribution between wages and profits was estimated as the growth of productivity adjusted for relative input prices.
- Thus, if input prices rose faster than output prices (thus reducing the room for wage and profit increases), then the growth of productivity was adjusted downwards accordingly (and vice versa).

a modern brand of marxism which lays great stress on empirical trends in profits, wages and productivity and on the inter-relationships between institutional structures and the economy (see Natrass 1989). Capitalism is conceptualised as a highly adaptable system where crises are resolved through the restructuring of the socio-institutional environment of the economy. Regulation analysis has gained a large following in France, Britain and the United States, and is becoming increasingly fashionable in South Africa.

The post-war boom in the advanced capitalist countries has been characterised by writers in the regulation school as a 'Fordist' regulation. In essence, this applies to the macro-economic balance between the growth in wages, productivity and consumption which resulted in a constant or gently rising rate of profit. The beneficial interlocking of technological factors (such as the techniques of mass production), Keynesian economic policies and socio-political arrangements (such as the welfare state and incomes policies) is stressed by those writing in the regulation school.

• *constant rate*

Gelb (1988) argues that a Fordist schema can be applied to South Africa as a type of 'racial Fordism' where profitability is not eroded but where whites form the backbone of consumption and capture the lion's share of production gains. However, the limited evidence he presents for a constant profit share and rate is drawn from dubious and inconsistent data sources (see Natrass 1989). By contrast, the author's empirical evidence (see tables and box here) indicates a distinct imbalance between the growth of wages, productivity and profits.

The relationship between the institutional arrangements of apartheid and economic variables were such that there was a trend decline in the rate of profit. Although apartheid probably played a role in creating a climate for high profits, the situation was unstable and unsustainable. Unlike their counterparts in the ACCs, workers in South Africa were increasingly able to erode the share of profits accruing to capitalists. Consequently, characterising South Africa as a 'racial Fordist regulation' is misleading.

Complex Dynamics

As argued recently by Wolpe (1988) from a radical perspective, the process of accumulation in South Africa is a great deal

more complex than previously theorised by the right or the left. Instead, the relationship between apartheid and capitalism is best regarded as 'historically contingent' and 'Janus faced, simultaneously functional and contradictory' (1988:8). Given the high-level but declining trend in the rate of profit, this seems to be an apt description of the dynamics behind South African profitability.

Although apartheid may have cheapened black labour through repressive policies, it simultaneously allowed for the growth of black worker bargaining power by exacerbating labour shortages and via influx control legislation, helping to protect urban workers from competition. Likewise, negative interest rate policies and tariff protection which encouraged capital accumulation, took its toll on profitability in the form of a declining output:capital ratio. Excessive product differentiation (a characteristic of over-protected industries) also helped reduce profitability because the internal market was too small to allow for production-runs of a size sufficient to be economical.

Despite the advantages to capitalists of a repressed and disorganised working class and the growth stimulating effects of import substitution, the long-run dynamics of capitalist development were undermined by these same policies. It is likely that the adverse effects were unintended outcomes. Nevertheless, the political dimensions to both labour policies and the monetary and fiscal instruments which cheapened the cost of capital should never be overlooked. South African macro-economic and labour policies tended to be highly contradictory attempts to marry the requirements of capitalist growth with the demands of capitalists, white workers and a racially segregationalist ideology. **IPWA**

The process of capital accumulation in South Africa is a great deal more complex than theorised by the right or the left

Although apartheid probably played a role in creating a climate for high profits, the situation was unstable and unsustainable

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Economic Outlook

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Pietermaritzburg and Durban

RETROSPECT

The most recent estimates of real economic growth to be released by Central Statistical Services (CSS) contain good and bad elements. The bad news is the confirmation of the falling rate of expansion of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced in the first six months of 1989, with real economic growth at annualised rates now estimated at 2%, 1,2% and 1,2% for the first, second and third quarters respectively. (Economic growth in the current upswing had peaked at an annualised rate in the third quarter of 1988 at 3,9%). The good news is that CSS has revised upwards its estimates of real economic growth for 1988 and the first two quarters of 1989. These revisions to the growth rates are shown in table one.

about economic trends from being drawn from very flimsy data?

Employment in the public sector of the economy has been dramatically affected by the nationalisation of public corporations as a prelude to privatisation. Approximately 40 000 jobs have been shed, mostly since March 1989. Private sector employment had been reduced by 0,3% in the first quarter of 1989, but had grown marginally in the second quarter of 1989 in manufacturing, while decreasing in the construction industry. The elimination of inefficiency in the public corporations is to be commended. We must, however, question the political wisdom of policy which increases levels of unemployment in the

Table 1 Annualised Rates of Real Growth of GDP

Time Period	Original Estimate	Revised Estimate	Percentage Change
1988	3,2%	3,7%	16%
1st Quarter 1989	1,6%	2,0%	25%
2nd Quarter 1989	0,7%	1,2%	71%

Source: Central Statistical Services

Dramatic revisions in the officially estimated rates of economic growth for the South African economy are not something new. For instance, between the 1986 and 1988 editions of South African Statistics the growth rate of the GDP for the financial year 1983-84 was changed upwards by 34%, while the growth rate for the year 1984-85 was revised downwards by 23%.

Errors in a series like the GDP cannot be eliminated because of the inherent inaccuracy in the underlying economic data. However, the size of the errors as judged by the magnitude of the revisions in the series over time should be provided, thereby establishing confidence limits for the data. Is it not time that CSS adopted such a practice to prevent unduly robust conclusions

public sector (affecting mainly black workers) at a time of stagnating levels of employment in the private sector.

On the positive side for the year, there has been the turnabout in the fortunes of the agricultural sector. This boosted farming output by 42%, 31% and 68% in the first three quarters of 1989 respectively, and also contributed substantially to increased export earnings. Food price increases have also fallen, dropping to an annualised 10% in September 1989. In contrast to the 17,7% annualised increase in September 1988, this will contribute to easing inflationary pressures. The good summer rains which have been experienced also augur well for another good year for South African agriculture in 1990.

PROSPECTS

As 1989 draws to a close, the prospects for 1990 assume greater importance in the plans of decision-makers. The key economic variables of interest are the rate of inflation, GDP growth, interest rates, the value of the Rand and the overarching price of gold. The financial press has great difficulty deciding on what sort of landing the economy will have or is having for that matter, given the difficulty in deciding what a 'hard' or 'soft' landing implies.

There is a consensus that the economy is probably slowing down or at least is 'moving sideways' at present. Most forecasters are expecting growth in the GDP to range between 0 and 1% for 1990. Gross domestic expenditure is expected to fall in the region of 2 to 3% while net exports may rise between 3 to 4%. For some economists this is considered to be a 'hard landing' and, given population growth, real per capita incomes are expected to fall once again.

South Africa is committed to substantial debt repayments for most of the 1990s with a peak of R2,7bn expected in 1990. Next year will, therefore, still be one of imposed constraints on domestic absorption in order to generate the required current account surplus to effect the real transfer of this debt repayment.

What are the prospects for the current account in 1990? This will depend critically on the growth of non-gold exports, the price of gold and the propensity to import.

There are some signs that the world economy may slow down next year, diminishing the prospects for buoyant growth in non-gold exports. In order to maintain their growth the Rand will have to remain low. At the time of writing, the price of gold appeared to have peaked and declined to R405 per ounce. Even at this level it would continue to provide support for the current account in the event of lower growth in non-gold exports.

Despite the import surcharge, imports have remained high, attesting to pent-up demand for capital goods in the economy. We would not see the demand for imports abating in the new year. The role of the future price of gold remains, as always in the South African economy, a key player in any scenario.

Lower international interest rates have significantly reduced the opportunity cost of holding gold, while strong demand from the East coupled with some weakness in the value of the Dollar have contributed to the recent rise in the price of gold, (although Russian sales have led to some subsequent weakening). It is not likely,

however, that the price of gold will be stimulated any further in the new year. Given the fundamentals which have recently contributed to the rising price of gold, the price is as likely to go up as down.

It is predicted that inflation will continue at a double digit figure for next year, with forecasts ranging between 13,5% and 14%. It is notable that all these forecasts are for a fall in the rate. The forces in the economy which have been largely responsible for driving the rate of inflation have been the excessive increases in the money supply which have validated the price increases arising from the depreciated rand. As long as the Rand continues to fall to such low levels, in real terms inflation will remain a problem.

The apparent shift in policy towards placing more emphasis on the problem of inflation may, if the price of gold were to rise substantially, appreciate the exchange rate while holding the line on monetary and fiscal policy. This policy would give a 'one-shot' reduction to the rate of inflation. Of course, given the low level of net reserves, any upward pressure on the Rand may well be resisted. It has been shown that irrespective of the exchange rate policy followed, policy-makers have target levels of reserves and South African authorities may not be an exception.

With most forecasters looking for a slower, softer economy next year, real wages will be squeezed. Nominal interest rates are also predicted to come off their peak of 1989 towards the middle of the year. This is not to say that real interest rates will necessarily fall just because the rate of inflation is also predicted to fall for 1990.

The prospects of any tax cuts for 1990 are being heavily discounted. There is the strong possibility that the import surcharge, having failed to dampen imports, will be scrapped next year and with lower growth tax revenues will accordingly be reduced. Although defence expenditure should be lower, the necessity to pay educators and other providers of social services adequate salaries indicates that there is little prospect of a cut in government expenditure.

To sum up the prospects for 1990, there is no doubt that the political freedoms introduced by Mr FW de Klerk have reduced the level of anxiety in the country and that they will enable businessmen to take a more favourable, longer run view of the economy. Nevertheless, 1990 will be a year of belt-tightening and consolidation. Political reforms will also be closely watched by the outside world and their outcome will determine the future stance of the sanctions lobby.

PRIVATISATION

The 1990s promise to be the era in which the South African government will divest itself of many of its public enterprises. Questions of privatisation have been politically charged in all the economies in which they have been posed. This is also the case for South Africa.

Privatisation is seen by some as a way of limiting the commitment of government to provide equal services to all South African groups. It is also mistrusted by white employees of the public corporations as it will erode their privileged employment. Fears have also been expressed that government is running down its public sector assets to weaken the economic power of any future, democratically elected government.

At face value these are not, however, the reasons for privatisation. The South African privatisation programme according to the White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation of August 1987, aims to improve the performance of the economy in terms of the effective use of productive factors, the optimal functioning of market forces, and an increased percentage of net fixed investment in the private sector. The White Paper specifically warns against the replacement of public sector monopoly with a private sector monopoly. One of the envisaged benefits of privatisation is the deregulation of markets in order to create competition.

International experience has shown that the mere threat of privatisation seems enough to substantially increase both management and labour productivity. However, the privatisation of ISCOR raises a number of question marks about government's intentions.

If competition is an important goal why was ISCOR not privatised as three competing steel plants, and its other assets (eg housing estates) also privatised separately? The answer may be that the market value of a monopoly is greater than a series of competing firms, and that government is simply not interested in promoting competition, but rather, in raising revenue.

In the case of public utilities the benefits of competition (or of potential competition) can often be obtained without the state selling its asset. It is possible for government to auction the franchise to operate the public utility (such as water supply),

with the franchise being awarded to the bidder who offers to supply the service at the lowest price to the consumer.

Franchise schemes of this type can capture for consumers the benefits of private sector efficiency in production and ensure low prices, while allowing the state to still retain ownership of the asset. Privatisation of water supplies, electricity, airports and railways can all be achieved with maximum gains in economic efficiency by following this route, rather than by simply selling off the public corporation's stock.



If the public corporation is to be sold there are alternative possibilities. One is the offer for sale of shares at a fixed price (e.g. ISCOR shares at R2,00 per share). Another possibility is the use of a tender system whereby buyers are asked to make an offer on the price. The discounts on sale prices of shares in privatisations in the United Kingdom have averaged 26%, and this represents a huge loss of revenue to society. Why does the South African government not use a tender system to at least feel out the market to establish the right price for any future privatisation share issues?


However, the most worrying aspect of the privatisations is whether they will be simply a selling off of 'the state's silver'. Many of the public corporations which will be privatised were established by the South African government because the private sector was not prepared to contribute risk capital. The potential returns to the state from the sale of its public corporations are vast, and could easily exceed 30% of the national debt. Government proposes to use the proceeds of the ISCOR sale to redeem public debt, thereby reducing the state's need to pay interest. It will, therefore, be able to reduce top marginal income tax rates.

There is a great need for development of housing and other infrastructure in urban and rural areas for black communities, and a shortage of risk capital forthcoming for investment in manufacturing, especially for export-orientated ventures. Surely the returns to using the proceeds of privatisation in such areas will be higher than by applying the proceeds to reducing taxes, which may simply lead to increases in consumption expenditure of the high income groups. ~~IPQA~~

RURAL & REGIONAL

M O N I T O R





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
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WOOLTRU

Can't Get No Satisfaction

Quality of Life in the 1980s

*Professor Valerie Moller, Centre for Social and Development Studies,
University of Natal, Durban*

There are many differing ideological perspectives on the nature of poverty in South Africa and the manner in which it affects the lives of South Africans. One view is that poverty has deepened and detracted from the quality of life in the 1980s (Wilson and Ramphela, 1989). Racial inequality has become more firmly entrenched. Another view is that there have been marked areas of improvement in education, wage income, and basic spending on development infrastructure. Modest but meaningful socio-economic and socio-political gains have been achieved by black people as a consequence of the reform 'euphoria' of the early 1980s (Schlemmer et al, 1989).

The question as to whether social and economic inequality has deepened or receded in South Africa during the 1980s may be largely academic. In a divided society with ideological polarisation, conventional objective measures of economic and social welfare are subject to partisan interpretation. A more appropriate yardstick may therefore be people's personal assessments of their life circumstances.

Social Indicators

A set of social indicators devised specially to test feelings of personal well-being and social inequality in South Africa was developed by the Centre for Social and Development Studies (CSDS) in the early 1980s (Moller and Schlemmer, 1983). The indicators were applied nationwide among a representative cross-section of the population in collaboration with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 1983 (Moller, Schlemmer and DuToit, 1987). The same set of indicators were measured again by the HSRC in a comparative survey after a five-year interval.

Over 4 000 persons participated in both surveys. They stated their personal satisfaction with 31 aspects of their lives and with their lives in general. The

accompanying data base shows the emergent trends. The indicators cover many aspects of the government's reform programme during the last decade, including health services, urban infrastructure, economic development projects, and social security.

Quality of life studies are a specialised field devoted to the development and application of social indicators. Research is concerned with the degree of well-being experienced by individuals or aggregates of people under prevailing personal, social and economic conditions. Experts in the field consider satisfaction measures to be highly reliable indicators of subjective quality of life. They elicit rational and durable judgments which are not subject to day-to-day fluctuations in mood.

The aim of the quality of life project was to develop a practical measure which would capture the essence of quality of life applicable to South Africans living in a wide range of circumstances, i.e., a reliable and valid cross-cultural measure of well-being. Baseline data generated by means of such a quality of life measure were to serve as a yardstick against which improvement or deterioration in well-being in a rapidly changing society could be assessed at regular intervals.

Interpreting Trends

The perceived quality of life of a nation can be captured in the overall aggregate and specific life satisfaction ratings obtained from its citizens. Assuming that the quality of life of South Africans had improved during the last five years, one would expect a significant increase in the percentages of respondents indicating general satisfaction and specific satisfaction with various aspects of their lives in 1988 over 1983.

In South Africa in the 1980s, it is highly likely that equality or social justice considerations are the most significant reference standards for black South

Does the average black man feel that modest but meaningful socio-economic and political gains have been achieved in the 1980s?

For black people, it is highly likely that considerations of equality or social justice are the most significant yardstick of improvement

Data Base

**TABLE 1
QUALITY OF LIFE TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA**

	Whites		Indians		Coloureds		Africans	
	1983 n	1988 n	1983 n	1988 n	1983 n	1988 n	1983 n	1988 n
	834	752	1 316	991	970	829	1 516	1 199
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Percentages of survey respondents perceiving themselves to be 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with:								
1.1. DOMAINS OF LIVING								
• Health								
Own health	91	88	90	82	92	83	67	51
Family health		89		65		71		64
• Housing								
Own present dwelling	93	92	82	71	73	68	60	45
Size of dwelling	89	89	74	68	64	61	35	30
Availability of housing	65	80	57	50	43	40	33	29
Choice of where to live	89	89	69	59	57	61	50	43
• Community facilities								
Public services	80	73	68	54	55	51	39	33
Transport costs	63	66	37	43	44	48	21	21
Security against crime	77	68	50	49	41	52	31	35
• Family life								
Family happiness	93	91	94	89	92	84	83	76
• Education								
Own education	71	74	65	60	52	64	39	26
• Occupation								
Job opportunities	66	73	37	35	47	46	19	17
Independence at work	92	87	88	78	87	79	60	51
Treatment at work	92	88	89	77	86	81	61	52
• Income								
Own wages/salary	70	59	55	44	57	47	26	15
Ability to provide for family	87	89	83	65	77	71	51	32
Insurance against illness/death	83	83	51	51	53	51	16	13
Income in old age	73	69	47	42	47	45	14	11
• Food								
The food you eat	94	95	96	89	94	89	67	59
• Socio-political issues								
Voting rights	90	93	31	48	20	44	27	19
Life compared with other race groups	84	85	68	68	50	60	30	27
Respect from other race groups	85	84	73	68	59	64	38	38
Race relations	90	90	80	79	70	80	40	36
Freedom of movement	96	90	76	68	68	71	48	36
• Intimate, private and social life								
Yourself as a person	89	85	95	91	95	90	89	77
Respect in the community	93	91	91	90	85	85	64	60
Loyalty of friends	91	90	92	86	87	83	69	65
Peer group adjustment	92	92	94	92	94	91	72	76
Intimate relationships	94	92	90	83	89	81	75	71
Spare time activities	86	83	80	68	79	81	69	42
Fun in life	89	84	84	75	85	81	61	42
1.2 OVERALL WELL-BEING								
Overall life satisfaction	89	82	89	77	81	77	48	32
Global happiness	93	92	88	83	80	83	53	38
Rewarding (vs frustrating) life	63	62	53	50	53	55	46	34
Life getting better (vs getting worse)	61	55	53	51	59	57	49	34

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to thank the HSRC (ISODEM) for permission to reproduce unpublished data (1988) and to Ms Penelope Geerds and Professor SHC du Toit of the HSRC for their assistance with data retrieval. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the HSRC.

Africans. Objective improvements in life circumstances may not measure to this exacting standard despite the reform measures of the last decade.

A meaningful interpretation of quality of life trends must take technical factors (survey variations), external factors (objective improvements), and internal factors (subjective appraisal) into account (see box). Internal factors tend to confuse clear-cut trends in that they dilute or enhance the impact of policy interventions on people's personal lives.

For example, a well-timed policy intervention, attuned to the popular mood, may capture the public imagination, and activate a wave of citizen reaction which registers as increased satisfaction with life. Conversely, reforms may register no satisfaction increase or even a decrease if expectations have outpaced reforms. Furthermore, the effects of the interaction of internal and external factors are not necessarily uniform in all spheres of life. Relative deprivation may be felt more intensely in some areas than others.

Socio-Economic Issues

A comparison of the survey data shows that during the five-year period from 1983 to 1988, the overall perceived quality of life has decreased for all South Africans.

However, the gradient in the South African racial hierarchy is less sharp and the cleavages between the white, Indian and coloured groups appear to have decreased. At the same time, the polarisation between Africans and the other race groups has increased. The main trends were:

- The general decrease in overall quality of life is reflected in virtually all aspects covered in the survey. Discontent is pervasive and not concentrated in any one domain of life. Dissatisfaction rates increased between 1983-1988 for all indicators with few notable exceptions.
- Discontent has risen, particularly in the economic sphere of life. Among all race groups, larger proportions are discontent with their earnings in 1988 compared to 1983. In 1988 small majorities among Indians and coloureds, and 85% among Africans express discontent.
- In 1983 being black (i.e. African) in South Africa contributed significantly to depressed well-being (Moller and Schlemmer, 1989). This appears still to be

the case in 1988. In 1983 between 4 to 5 out of 10 Africans stated general satisfaction with their lives; in 1988 only 3 to 4 out of every 10.

- The quality of life of Indian and coloured South Africans is more on par in 1988 than 1983, mainly as a result of perceived improvements to coloured people's life circumstances. Coloureds appear to suffer less from relative deprivation and educational disadvantages than formerly, while Indians perceive their life circumstances to have deteriorated in most spheres of life.

- In relative terms, white quality of life has decreased least during the past five years. Apart from loss of real income, deterioration is felt mainly in areas such as increased exposure to crime, and a drop in the standard of public services. In 1988 white South Africans tend to feel less free, less confident in themselves, and less able to enjoy life than in 1983.

The survey shows that the perceived quality of life has decreased for all South Africans between 1983 and 1988

INTERPRETING SOCIAL INDICATORS

Over 200 social indicators were thoroughly tested before making a final selection of 35 indicators covering general and specific quality of life satisfactions, which were then re-applied in the 1988 survey. The multi-item instrument is considered ideally suited for the systematic monitoring of subjective quality of life across all communities in South Africa and for the description of changing patterns of social cleavages and racial inequality.

From a policy-maker's point of view, social indicators are most useful if they give a clear indication of popular reactions to policy interventions. Satisfaction ratings result from a mix of several interacting factors which need to be taken into account when interpreting subjective trend data on quality of life:

• Technical Factors

Theoretically, social indicators are measured under identical circumstances in each repeat survey to reduce sampling error. This is rarely the case in practice. For example, in the present case the research instrument was refined and shortened after the first wave of research.

Trend data compiled from cross-sectional surveys are also subject to changes in the target populations under study. Shifting satisfaction trends may partially reflect changes in the composition of the urban African population as a result of population movements during the review period. Newcomers may subscribe to different values.

• External factors

Shifting quality of life trends may reflect real changes in the objective life circumstances of South Africans during the review period. All other things being equal, positive interventions aimed at improving living standards are expected to register in higher satisfaction rates in the affected area.

• Internal factors

Satisfaction results from people's subjective appraisal of their objective life circumstances. Individuals measure the appropriateness of their life circumstances against various standards. Therefore, personal quality of life may be seen to improve or deteriorate because of shifting reference standards as well as actual changes in people's life circumstances.

Table 2
Comparative Satisfaction Levels for Africans and Whites

	Average %	Average		Average increase
	African	African/White	African/White	African/White
	satisfaction	satisfaction	satisfaction	satisfaction
	levels	differentials	differentials	differentials
	1988	1983	1988	1983/1988
Overall life quality	35	1:1,57	1:2,09	0,52
• Specific domains:				
Family	76	1:1,12	1:1,20	0,08
Private life	62	1:1,28	1:1,42	0,14
Food	59	1:1,40	1:1,61	0,21
Health	58	1:1,35	1:1,53	0,18
Work	40	1:1,77	1:2,08	0,31
Housing	37	1:1,87	1:2,38	0,51
Socio-political issues	31	1:2,41	1:2,84	0,43
Community infra-structure	30	1:2,43	1:2,30	-0,13
Education	26	1:1,82	1:2,85	1,03
Income	18	1:2,89	1:4,17	1,28
Average over domains				0,40

Reform Responses

On the positive side, there are signs that race relations and respect between members of the different race groups have not deteriorated. They may even have improved.

At the same time, political reforms appear to have deepened cleavages and persisting inequalities. Firstly, rates of satisfaction with the right to vote have increased significantly among Indian and coloured respondents since the introduction of the tricameral parliament. Nevertheless, in 1988 only every second Indian and coloured South African express satisfaction with political rights. Secondly, discontent with political rights is more pronounced among the disenfranchised Africans in 1988 than in 1983. The proportion of Africans satisfied with their voting rights decreased from 27% to 19% in this period.

Despite the removal of influx control regulations during the review period significantly fewer Africans feel satisfied with their freedom of movement in 1988. Further, perceived inequality in terms of African versus white satisfaction differentials has increased in every sphere of life (see table 2). However, in the more private spheres of life which are less amenable to public intervention, inequalities are least pronounced.

Satisfaction with community services and infrastructure is the only area in which perceived inequality has narrowed during the review period. (This is due to white perceptions of the deterioration of public services in their areas and greater exposure to crime). Despite increased expenditure on African education and wage increases in

excess of levels of inflation, education and income are the two areas which are dissatisfying for the largest proportions of Africans. Perceived inequality has increased from 1:2 in 1983 to 1:3 in 1988 in the educational sphere, and from 1:3 in 1983 to 1:4 in 1988 in the income sphere (see table 2).

Overall well-being has deteriorated significantly for Africans between 1983 and 1988. In 1983, on average, 8 in 10 whites compared with 5 in 10 Africans were generally positive about their life circumstances. By 1988 the racial divide had widened: 7 in 10 whites but only 3 in 10 Africans see their life quality as positive.

Comparing Inequality

Inequality in South Africa must also be reviewed in terms of international standards. People all over the world typically profess to being very satisfied or satisfied with their lives, i.e. they give themselves high to very high ratings on subjective well-being. Levels of well-being below this norm have never been measured in developed countries although they have occurred in surveys conducted in developing countries (Headey and Wearing, 1988:513). South Africa has the dubious distinction that the African sector of its population scores well below the universal norm.

The second quality of life survey undertaken by the HSRC in 1988 suggests that the reforms that occurred in South African society under Mr PW Botha's leadership have not been able to remove this stigma. It is anticipated that the HSRC will repeat the subjective quality of life test after a five-year interval in 1993. Time will tell if the ruling party's five-year plan and Mr FW de Klerk's initiatives will succeed in reducing racial inequality and improving the quality of life for all South Africans in the next decade. **IPWA**

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Discontent with political rights has increased among Africans from 1983 to 1988, but decreased for Indians and coloureds

Stand and Deliver

Waiting in the Service Line

By Professor Simon Bekker and Craig Clark,
Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban

What role does the delivery of services play in determining rural-urban linkages? What are the likely effects of service delivery upon the urbanisation process? These dynamics were discussed at a workshop held on 26 October 1989 by CSDS. In their report, the authors argue that the impact of the delivery of services on migration to urban regions will depend on a number of factors, especially the mix of welfare and productive services found in different development zones.

The delivery of services is profoundly influenced by the specific zone a community falls into. In urban areas, the provision of many essential services is typically the responsibility of a local authority. In white-designated rural areas, service delivery is largely dependent upon the private initiatives of white farmers who own farms in the area. And in rural areas in the independent and self-governing homelands, neither the tribal authorities nor the state have the finances or the expertise to deliver adequate services to communities.

Consequently, rural communities have frequently to pay for the establishment and maintenance of services that they might require. For instance, often a community wanting a new school must apply for permission to build one, construct it at their own expense, and then await a state subsidy while meeting maintenance and running costs.

Defining Zones

There is no universally-accepted definition of the terms 'rural', 'urban', and 'urbanisation' (Graaff 1989). Indeed, it might be argued that the best way to view rural and urban areas is to see them as points on a continuum which may then be defined in three ways:

- A continuum based on *modes of production*. One extreme would refer to forms of agricultural production - the cultivation of crops, forestry, and/or the husbandry of livestock - and the other to forms of industrial production. Those areas predominantly concerned with forms of agricultural production would be rural, while those concerned with forms of industrial production would be urban. This

continuum is of particular applicability to white rural:urban linkages.

- A continuum based on *development*, i.e. the provision of employment, infrastructure and institutions. Less developed regions would be rural, particularly within homeland regions, and more developed regions would be urban.

- A continuum based on *institutional definitions*. Since the official definition of urban is one incorporating those regions which fall within the areas of jurisdiction of local governments, rural becomes equivalent to all regions which do not receive services delivered by local governments (irrespective of whether these regions include dense settlements or not).

A picture of the path from rural to urban should not be drawn too simplistically. 'Rural', in fact, may be imagined as a mirror-image of 'urban' and may best be defined in contrast to 'urban' (ibid). Rural areas, particularly within homelands, have recently tended to provide a more stable political environment for the education and nurturing of children, than the politically unstable environments of the townships; they can sometimes provide agricultural opportunities which, in turn, provide a supplement to income, a form of welfare and a 'nest-egg' for retirement; and they also may provide a residence for women engaged in nurturing children and agricultural production, and for pensioners.

In white rural areas, by contrast, black farm workers and their families earn a regular and predictable wage, and are provided with some services - including housing (though often of a low standard) and access to some form of schooling. Urban areas, on the other hand provide, through both the

Rural areas, particularly in the homelands, have recently tended to provide a more stable educational environment than the urban townships

There is a greater investment by the state in the delivery of welfare and productive services for 'white' urban areas

formal and the informal sectors of the economy, a significant income, and 'a source of consumer goods and entertainment' (ibid).

Rural homeland areas are largely dependent upon urban areas and the fulfilment of the roles perceived above depends upon financial support for the rural areas. Consequently, it is true that the provision of services in urban areas will have an indirect effect upon rural areas. As Graaff (1989) puts it, 'A great deal of rural development happens in urban areas.'

Defining Services

What should be understood by 'services'? For our purposes, these are defined as the institutionalised and collective delivery of goods and amenities, both of a welfare and a productive nature. An example of a welfare service would be the delivery of potable water, and an example of a productive service would be a state-funded skills training programme. Productive services must be noted here: too often, the delivery of services is viewed exclusively from the welfarist perspective, which sees them exclusively as a state responsibility and often as a state 'handout'.

Verwoerdian apartheid led to the creation of urban settlements in homeland areas with poor facilities and services

It is increasingly claimed that delivery of services is characterised by a distinct urban bias which is cumulative in effect. This bias is discernible in two dimensions: firstly, in the allocation of state funds to the provision of services, and secondly, in the comparative efficiency with which services are delivered. Simply stated, there is a greater investment by the state in service delivery to urban areas, and service delivery in these areas is more efficient than in rural areas.

The historical origins of the three zones identified above, each with its own pattern of service delivery, can be traced to two factors: the universal phenomenon of urbanisation driven by an expanding urban-industrial economy, and the Land Acts. The first led to the emergence of urban settlements, while the second created the discriminatory distinction between white rural and homeland rural areas. In Simkins' words, the Land Acts divide 'Rural South Africa into two parts - scheduled and released land, which, anomalies apart, constitute the territory of the homelands and other rural land'.

In white rural areas, service delivery has remained largely the responsibility of the

white farmers who own the farms on which black communities live and work. In the rural areas of the homelands, on the other hand, a wholly different approach has been taken to development and the delivery of services. This approach is in essence a heritage of apartheid.

The Verwoerdian dream of independent black homelands led in the 1960s and 1970s to the state making available the funding to promote a policy of urbanisation within the homelands themselves. Rather than concentrate on promoting urbanisation and managing it in an orderly fashion in the core areas, the state advocated a 'separate development strategy' that promoted the idea of urban settlements within the homelands. This led to the creation of urban settlements with poor or no facilities and other services.

In the late seventies the state has been forced to re-structure its policy in this regard. This change was brought about by the rising costs of development aid to homelands, the need for skilled manpower in the cities, and the rise in resistance to separate development. The urban bias - in state financial allocations towards service delivery, and in efficiency of delivery - is a direct consequence of these changes and the state's attempts to address the needs of the increasing numbers of urban residents who are poorly or inadequately serviced.

Defining Migration

In essence, the process of urban migration follows the classic pattern described by Todaro: rural residents expect to earn more in urban areas than they earn in their home rural areas, and so migrate. Since, therefore, the city is regarded as the location of productive opportunities and services, service delivery challenges also tend increasingly to be found in urban areas.

The move from rural to urban areas in search of adequate employment is a virtually ubiquitous and irreversible process. What characterises the process in South Africa, however, would appear to be a more complex pattern of rural-urban migration than a mere direct one-stage migration from rural to urban areas.

Firstly, as Bromberger (1989) notes, legislative and administrative controls constrain the migrant from seeking permanent residence (at first) in urban areas. Many migrants see their sojourn in the urban areas as temporary, and return at

intervals to the rural household to which they remain attached. Those individuals who are able to find employment may later make a more permanent settlement in urban areas - through the acquisition of accommodation and the establishment of a family or household in town. As yet, it is not ascertained why some do not, returning in retirement to rural areas; or why others move to tribal areas closer to urban areas, or perhaps to an urban or peri-urban settlement, either formal or informal.

As Bromberger notes, however, the move from oscillating migration to permanent urban settlement takes place in stages. One possible pattern is to migrate from rural areas to peri-urban areas outside towns (where tenure may take the form of tribal land ownership, African freehold or squatting), and thence into urban areas. Another is to migrate from ex-farm areas to 'tribal' or reserve areas which are urban in orientation, before moving to urban areas.

This process of step-by-step urban migration underlines the need for planning of service delivery, not only within urban areas but also in areas peripheral to existing metropolitan regions. It also points to the need for both finances and adequate local authority arrangements in these areas.

Urban Bias

As a result of improved transportation and communications networks, regions interact much more closely with one another. In a MacLuhanesque sense, it is possible to speak, at a regional level, of the 'world growing smaller': isolated local economies lose their isolation. The interaction and interdependence between rural and urban areas becomes more pronounced.

The spatial context of this process favours the urban over the rural areas, reinforcing the urban bias. One example of this might be discerned in the role played by transportation routes. De Wet and Leibbrandt (1989) cite the example of two rural villages in the Ciskei. In the last forty years, there has been a move from a series of local economies in the Ciskei to a more integrated regional economy. Certain communities have, however, been more favoured than others because of spatial factors: they are more favourably located on transport routes, and access to them is more easily gained.

Location on transport routes facilitates access to employment in other centres -

urban centres - and makes it possible for workers from such settlements to commute, rather than migrate. Commuters are worth more to a village or community than migrants: '... daily commuters tend to bring most of their pay-packet home with them, instead of spending most of it themselves, as many migrants in more distant centres tend to do' (ibid).

It must not be forgotten, though, that the commuters from such settlements are using transportation routes to gain access to the services of urban areas. And even if such commuters do enrich, ultimately, their communities, they are merely perpetuating the dependency of rural communities upon the services provided in urban areas, and so reinforcing the urban bias. The same is true of migrants from communities which are not so spatially well-situated: they favour urban regions with their labour and their expenditure, and so perpetuate an urban bias in service delivery.

In homeland areas the onus rests upon tribal authorities to provide services to their residents. The viability of such authorities is uncertain, however, as Manona (1989) notes in a study on the Amatola Basin in the Ciskei: 'The delivery of services in this community is affected by the fact that the Tribal Authority has limited executive powers and on many issues it may not act independently (to any degree) of the central government'.

Tribal authorities have limited financial resources with which to implement service delivery programmes, and they lack political credibility among younger, more politicised residents. The same is true of urban residents, who often perceive black local authorities as lacking viability, legitimacy and credibility. Even though these local authorities are seen to be inadequate, however, they do deliver some services to their communities, and these are supplemented by some degree of service delivery by local government in white urban areas. This again confirms the urban bias already noted. By contrast, in white rural areas, there exist no institutions to deliver services, and residents are largely dependent upon the discretion and largesse of white farmers.

Improving Access

What may we conclude regarding changes in access to services in rural areas? What will be their effects on the relationship between rural and urban communities?

Improved transport and communications networks make interdependence between rural and urban areas more pronounced

Step-by-step urban migration creates a need for planning and service delivery in areas peripheral to existing metropolitan regions

As state policy shifts to grapple with the development of unstable urban areas, fiscal allocations to rural areas may decrease

It is clear that the state is now able, through innovative planning and technological advances, to improve access to services in rural areas. Examples include the introduction of telecommunication services, which would allow a more rapid and cheaper flow of information; better roads, which would reduce the time spent commuting; and electrification, which allows for a greater flexibility and choice in the consumption of energy. The introduction of such services would release rural residents from some of the time they currently devote to household and community chores, while simultaneously bringing the urban areas closer to these communities.

In themselves, however, such changes will probably function as an additional incentive to rural residents to seek jobs in urban areas, rather than as an inducement to stay at home. Without visible employment opportunities in rural areas, improved welfare services will not only draw the urban areas closer to rural residents, but will also increase the household costs of rural living. Income to cover these additional costs will have to be earned elsewhere.

There already exists a bias in state policy and provision toward urban areas. Without the development, in rural areas, of production-oriented services which are delivered parallel to welfare services, the net outcome will probably be a further increase in the scope of rural-urban migration. This, in effect, will further strip the rural areas of their most productive human assets. This state of affairs is often found in white rural areas as well as in the homelands.

Parallel to improved welfare services is the need for improved production services which emphasise employment creation

Changed Approach

We may draw three conclusions from these analyses. In the first place, there is a need to seek out and introduce in rural areas appropriate productive services. These would produce local employment opportunities which would contribute toward finding some balance between aspirations for new welfare services, and local affordability levels. Examples may include small farmer enterprises, local maize mills, and different types of cottage industries.

In the second place, it is inevitable that fiscal allocations by the state for the introduction of, or upgrading of, welfare services in all rural areas, particularly

within homelands, will remain inadequate. The situation might reasonably be expected to worsen as the state's policy shifts towards grappling with the problems in and around urban areas. Homeland authorities from government level to tribal authority will be even more sorely pressed to cope with the tasks of providing basic services.

One possible solution in white rural areas, Ardington argues, would be to identify small towns as rural development growth-points. The black populations living in and close to such towns contribute toward their economic well-being. They receive, however, little service support - of either a welfare or productive nature - from the local administrations of these towns. Typically, they have no influence, through representation or otherwise, in these administrations.

Limited state investments in service infrastructure will need to be made strategically in homeland areas:

- to identify and invest in a limited number of regions where services may optimally be linked with the launch of productive activities;
- to facilitate in those regions the empowerment of rank-and-file rural residents rather than simply to support rural elites and their patterns of patronage; and,
- thereby to correct, at least in a number of rural areas, the fundamental urban bias in state policy and practice.


In the third place, it is clear that issues regarding access to services in rural and urban areas are interdependent. There is an urgent need for the development of appropriate forms of production in urban settlements in the homelands and in white South Africa. (The majority of services delivered in urban areas are welfare-oriented rather than production-oriented). The alternative is to maintain the present inadequate delivery of services, and so to continue to lengthen the long queues of impoverished rural residents who stand and wait for unsatisfactory handouts. **PPA**

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URBAN

M O N I T O R



carlton paper

CARES

- FOR ME • FOR YOU • FOR HEALTH
- FOR MOTHERS • FOR HOUSEWIVES
- FOR BABIES • FOR CHILDREN • FOR SCHOOLS
- FOR GOLFERS • FOR RUNNERS • FOR HYGIENE
- FOR COMMUNICATION • FOR EVERYBODY
- FOR PARENTS • FOR DRIVERS • FOR TAXIS
- FOR WORKERS • FOR STUDENTS
- FOR BUSINESSMEN • FOR BUSINESSWOMEN
- FOR HOSPITALS • FOR NURSES
- FOR PATIENTS • FOR CYCLISTS
- FOR MINERS • FOR PLUMBERS • FOR PEOPLE
- FOR GRANDPARENTS • FOR FARMERS
- FOR THE COUNTRY AND THE FUTURE
- FOR TEACHERS • FOR DOERS
- FOR FRIENDS • FOR JIVERS • FOR SHOPPERS
- FOR HOUSEHOLDERS • FOR RELIGION
- FOR T.V.ADDICTS • FOR COOKS • FOR HOMES
- FOR DOG OWNERS • FOR THE YOUNG
- FOR THE OLD

FOR EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING

Changing the shape of Men's Fashion



Svenline

MAN ABOUT TOWN

the most
natural shape
in shoulders

Violence on the Periphery

Part Two: The Greater Edendale Complex

By Stavros Stavrou and Lwazi Shongwe,
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In a previous study of violence in the Molweni region (1989), Stavrou and Crouch (Indicator SA Vol6/No3:46-50) argued that there are important causes of conflict in the peripheral settlements of the Greater Durban Metropolitan Region that go beyond the ideological. They include high rates of in-migration, rife unemployment and scarce infrastructural resources. These forces, all primarily the result of rapid urbanisation, have created a classic setting of conflict between groups of people who are competing for access to limited resources in order to survive.

The current study reported here (Data Research Africa, 1989) was undertaken in the second half of 1989 in the Greater Edendale Complex (GEC), to the west of Pietermaritzburg. In a forthcoming and third part of this Indicator SA series on the Natal conflict, a data profile will be published on related aspects of the GEC's infrastructure, demography, administrative institutions, housing and land arrangements, etc.

The violence in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area first reached crisis proportions in September 1987. It has continued unabated since then, spreading into the Hammarsdale/Durban corridor. This regional conflict had resulted in over 1 600 fatalities in the Natal Midlands by October 1989, with about 3 000 houses destroyed and an estimated 30 000 people left homeless in the past three years (see data base, this monitor:72).

The violence has been portrayed primarily as an ideological-political conflict between a broad combination of forces on the 'left', including supporters of the ANC, UDF, Cosatu and the youth, and a coalition of the South African state, the KwaZulu

government and Inkatha, on the 'right' - a conflict between comrades and vigilantes.

In this context, we posed the following two questions in our study of the GEC:

- Firstly, do the participants in this conflict engage in violent resolutions of problems solely for ideological reasons, or does ideology mostly play a rationalising role, obscuring other more fundamental causes of the violence?
- What role, if any, does the struggle for access to scarce and inadequate infrastructural resources play in creating the conditions for conflict which result in violence, as competing groups attempt to gain control over these resources?

The research was undertaken between August and October 1989. Information was gathered by means of in-depth interview schedules of 24 respondents, specifically chosen to represent the socio-economic and political profiles of the survey area. These in-depth interviews were conducted by means of open-ended taped or written discussions. The respondents included local 'comrade' and 'vigilante' leaders and combatants, township authorities, journalists, ministers of religion, local business people, nurses, teachers and schoolchildren. A further 500 randomly selected respondents from the GEC were also interviewed.

Geo-politics

At the beginning of the survey a geo-political layout of the area was mapped out. This was done by asking the respondents which individuals or groups wielded the greatest influence within their immediate community (residential area). The results are listed in tables one and two.

The research reaffirmed that the GEC cannot be treated as an homogeneous political entity. Furthermore, a geo-political analysis revealed that those sub-sections which are not under the hegemony of one

Research confirmed that Greater Edendale cannot be treated as an homogeneous political entity

The worst violence occurs in areas which are not under the hegemony of either UDF or Inkatha factions

Survey respondents alleged that conflict occurs because of frustration with poor quality of life under apartheid

of the conflict groups, such as Georgetown, Sinathingi and Slangspruit, exhibit the highest degree of violence.

Table one shows that councillors or indunas, who in most instances are Inkatha members, are most influential in Imbali and Willowfountain. Residence associations and various advice committees, the youth and the UDF are most influential in Edendale and Ashdown (including Plessislaer). The quantitative data gathered in Slangspruit was erratic and flawed, as the researchers were under threat of violence, therefore, this area is omitted. However, it was ascertained from residents in Slangspruit that political affiliations are evenly divided between Inkatha and the UDF, and that the demarcation line is the road through the middle of the shack settlement.

Respondents were also asked whether they identified with and supported the most influential groups within their area of residence. Eighty-three percent said that they did, whereas 11% either did not answer or gave an unclear response. Further qualitative information was combined with the above data to construct a breakdown of 'comrade/vigilante' support in the GEC (see table two and map).

They believe that conflict spills into violence because of political dogmatism and the need to exact revenge for previous acts of violence

Ashdown, including Plessislaer, and Willowfountain are the most homogeneous areas in terms of political support and influence. The level of support enjoyed by the comrades/UDF and vigilantes/Inkatha indicates their respective dominance in these areas. However, large sections within these areas and a significant number of residents do not clearly (or refused to) identify with either group. It is within these areas that some of the most persistent violent activity has occurred, as each group seeks to gain control of the area.

The map illustrating the geo-politics of the survey area is based on an analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative survey data, plus fieldworker observation and analysis. Large unmarked areas reflect an unclear position as to the dominant political persuasion.

The Inkatha strongholds would appear to be Imbali (Stages One and Two), the Edendale sub-district of Harewood and the part of Slangspruit north of the tar road that divides the shack settlement. Imbali (Stage One) was found to have the most militant of all Inkatha members in the GEC, who along with Inkatha members from Mpumuza which falls within Vulindlela,

have been involved in most violent skirmishes within the northern part of Edendale. Indeed, most attacks by Inkatha protagonists on Ashdown have emanated from these two areas, as well as from Harewood.

Apart from Ashdown and Plessislaer, the UDF strongholds would appear to be the Edendale sub-districts of Caluza, Dambuza and Machibisa, as well as the southern part of Slangspruit. It was suggested by a large number of respondents that both Edendale sub-districts of Georgetown and Sinathingi are 'comrade' zones of influence. However, our researchers found no clear evidence of this fact. Indeed, on the contrary, they found a significant number of 'streets' to be under the control of the 'vigilantes'. Violence in these two areas and in Slangspruit was an almost daily occurrence during the course of the survey.

Scarce Resources

The survey respondents alleged that although there was conflict over the use and sharing of infrastructural utilities, services and natural resources, such discord rarely turned into violence. They argued that conflict occurred because of frustration with the existing poor quality of life, brought about by the maintenance of apartheid, unemployment, a bad educational system, an undisciplined youth, and an in-flow of migrants and outsiders. They believe violence takes place, however, because of political dogmatism (the 'stubbornness' of the 'other side') and the need to exact revenge for previous acts of violence.

A study conducted by Bromberger et al (1987) in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area concluded that unemployment among Africans was as high as 33%. There is no reason to suggest that the GEC exhibits any peculiarities that would make it differ from this general estimate.

Our research (1989) showed that the incidence of unemployment, measured in terms of those persons actively seeking employment, was lowest in Imbali and greatest in Willowfountain, ranging from 11% to 14%. With the inclusion of unemployed persons not seeking jobs (not out of choice but because they had lost hope), over-aged scholars who remain at school due to the dearth of available jobs, and the under-employed, the scale of unemployment in the GEC compares with Bromberger's finding.

Rapid urbanisation has placed even greater pressure on all existing infrastructural resources, increasing competition over equally scarce employment opportunities while decreasing the overall quality of life. In-migrants, like almost all Africans resident in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area, have become politicised and mobilised. Their recruitment into various political groups, as previously argued (see *Indicator SA* Vol6/No3:46-50), can be understood in terms of material interests.

In-migrants are confronted with a more complex set of circumstances and political choices than existing local residents. Feelings of insecurity (as a result of displacement) and vulnerability (surrounded by an unfamiliar conflict) will, in the event of no existing allegiances, drive them to join the political group which offers the best future prospects in their host area. For instance, the research showed that for those migrants moving into Vulindlela and Imbali (Stages One and Two), membership of Inkatha is a prerequisite to their continued presence in that area. Many in-migrants, whose agenda might be different to the local residents', thus become part of the conflict.

A large number of single male migrants moving into Imbali (Stage One), reside in the hostel houses. The majority of these migrants strongly identify with the dominant faction within their host area - i.e. Inkatha. It was suggested by both 'comrades', 'neutrals' and by 'vigilantes' that these migrants represent the backbone of all Inkatha combatants in the region. Being single and with neither family nor intangible property, they have the least to lose in the violence.

Very little evidence emerged as to how the assimilation of in-migrants into the 'comrade' zones of influence might occur. All indications, however, point to the general evidence that they either actively or passively support and/or participate in the activities of the host group.

The Youth

The youth are a central component of the GEC conflict. Often, the schools are the battlefields.

Understandably, with only a poor education to lose, the politicisation of scholars exceeds other sectors of the population. Leeb (1989) argues that the stage has been reached where many schools have become

the preserve of one or another ideological faction, that 'thousands of children are being denied an education' as many schools are 'refusing to admit children, on political grounds'. Research has shown that schools under the 'comrade' zone of influence are to be found mainly in the Edendale area, while Inkatha-run schools are to be found in Imbali. Control of other schools is still being contested. This is where most of the violence occurs at present.

Data Base

GEO-POLITICS OF THE GREATER EDENDALE COMPLEX (GEC)

Table 1
Zones of Influence in the GEC

	Edendale %	Imbali %	Ashdown %	W/fountain %	Total %
Councillors/Induna	13	57	0	89	31
Nobody	33	24	5	0	23
Residence assoc	14	0	55	0	15
Youth	20	7	12	0	13
UDF	6	0	19	0	6
Neighbours	3	3	5	0	4
Landowners	9	3	0	0	4
Church	1	3	4	11	2
Did not answer	1	4	0	0	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2
'Comrade' & 'Vigilante' Support in the GEC

	Edendale %	Imbali %	Ashdown %	W/fountain %	Slangspruit %
Comrades/UDF	52	12	100	8	50
Vigilante/Inkatha	15	63	0	85	50
Nobody	37	25	0	7	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Quite clearly, politicised scholars continuously call for the upgrading of the provision and quality of education. But they turn to violence wherever necessary in order to maintain the 'liberation' character and status quo in their schools. Amidst the turmoil, no material upgrading can take place. Thus, conflict over a scarce resource is manifested in violence and rationalised in ideological-political terms. With the exception of a solitary event concerning Soweto Day, not a single respondent could remember a conflict situation that arose directly out of an educational grievance but instead, identified a struggle over 'turf' or a 'revenge' mission as the catalyst.

Ideological conflict in Natal has tended to obscure a material conflict over infrastructural resources and facilities

However, this is not to suggest that all school-related violence can be attributed to such a theory. Certainly, conflict situations were found which had turned into violence purely over ideological matters.

One explanation as to why the youth have remained at the forefront of this violence, may lie in the fact that as a conflict group they were highly mobilised prior to the infiltration of Inkatha into GEC. The youth/Inkatha conflict was preceded by inter-youth conflict, with the ideological discourse between 'charterist' students (pro-UDF/Azaso, now Sansco) and 'black consciousness' youth (pro-Pan African Congress/Azasm) manifested in violent conflict. The youth have since put their differences aside and channelled their energies into the current conflict.

The lack of accountability of the youth to the umbrella political organisations, partially explains why the youth are often perceived as acting as a party to the conflict in their own right. The research showed conclusively that the major reason for their lack of accountability is that state and vigilante actions have forced youth leaders into hiding or through detentions and assassinations, removed youth leaders. Further, the UDF itself has been unable to impose any structures of accountability upon the youth because of emergency restriction orders which limit its scope of operation.

Competition for scarce resources has been compounded by high levels of in-migration and unemployment

The youth are sometimes accused of acting with excessive zeal during times of conflict (see Sunday Tribune, 15 October 1989). Such accusations have normally emanated from Inkatha, but more recently, concern has also been voiced from persons within the progressive movement. Naturally, none of the respondents who identified with the 'comrade' ideology felt that the youth were a liability to the 'struggle'. Instead, they acknowledged the youth lacked direction and leadership, but felt that if this were provided, most of the current problems experienced would be overcome.

Perceptions of Police

The role of the police, particularly the KwaZulu Police (KZP), was either condemned outright or questioned by most of the survey respondents. The KZP and Inkatha are synonymous in the minds of the interviewees. Even the more conservative respondents claimed that only Inkatha sympathisers would be admitted into the KZP. In general, the police are perceived

by township communities in the role of 'oppressors'. It was argued that, whereas they are quick to act against 'comrade' activists who identify with the progressive movement, the police do not detain Inkatha members for political reasons.

It was argued that Inkatha members are only arrested for committing criminal offences, and more often than not, they are acquitted or receive very light sentences. Certainly, where the youth were concerned, the respondents felt that the police spared no effort in tracing and 'punishing' alleged protagonists, and often acted in open collusion with 'vigilantes'. Those respondents inclined towards the 'comrade' ideology do not draw a distinction between Inkatha supporters, the 'vigilantes' and the police.

Interpretations


Conflict over ideology inherently presumes that participatory groups subscribe to a different set of ideological-political goals. Yet respondents from each of the conflict groups in the GEC - Inkatha and the broad UDF/ANC/Cosatu alliance - all stated that their ultimate goal is the dismantling of apartheid power structures and the creation of a free, democratic government. This does not create a sense of common purpose and shared ideals, however.

Within narrow ideological parameters, the Natal conflict makes little sense. This does not suggest, however, that the majority of the people of the GEC are involved in a struggle which they do not understand. But what is suggested is that the circumstances of specific conflict situations are not always clear, and that the root causes of the conflict have become obscured.

A significant proportion of the 'progressive' respondents strongly deny that the violence is the product of 'black-on-black' conflict, another common paradigm. Instead, they identify the South African state as an important protagonist or external agent of the conflict, through the medium of its proxy, Inkatha. Similarly, Inkatha sympathisers often laid the blame for the violence on the exiled political movements, such as the ANC and PAC.

Ideological conflict over a future political dispensation has tended to obscure a material conflict over infrastructural resources. The survey of GEC residents found widespread frustration with inadequate infrastructural utilities, such as

Battleground Beirut: The Struggle for Edendale



LEGEND
 ||| Predominantly Inkatha-controlled
 === Predominantly UDF-controlled
 ✕ Persistent Violence
 ✖ Sporadic Violence

NOTE
 • The battle-lines in the Greater Edendale Complex change as sub-sections are seized or lost by the combatants of opposing groups.
 • The zones of influence and struggle indicated above reflect the state-of-play established by the research survey as of September 1989.

water supply, electricity, telecommunications and sewage, and infrastructural services such as schools, health recreation and shopping facilities. Competition for scarce resources has been compounded by a relatively high degree of in-migration and increasing levels of unemployment. For a large number of residents, the tenuous land and household tenure arrangements exacerbate a sense of insecurity. Their feelings of insecurity and frustration become sources of conflict which, in turn, are manifested in the form of violent struggle.

The existence of easily identifiable ideological-political groups provides a collective avenue whereby individual frustration can be violently manifested. Moreover, these groups provide ideological justification for engagement in violent activities. Such rationalisation tends to obscure the original sources of conflict. For instance, a great deal of violence occurs because of 'revenge' missions and personal vendettas. In this climate, 'ideological'

differences are often used to justify the deed and exonerate individuals or groups from any sense of criminal activity.

The cycle of violence, by its very nature, delays the development of any additional utility or infrastructural services. Ironically, the lack of development, one of the original causes of the conflict, then becomes one of the effects of the violence.

What this study has attempted to show is that conflict and violence in the Greater Edendale Complex is not just 'political' in nature. It has evident social roots in a context of rapid urbanisation and social differentiation. In conclusion, therefore, the struggle over these scarce resources is as important as the ideological and political struggle for democratic alternatives. **IPQA**

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NATAL'S WASTELANDS

THE UNOFFICIAL WAR GOES ON

By John Aitchison, Centre for Adult Education,
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This year the business of political killing in Natal has clearly carried on as usual.

In 1987, there were 403 political killings in the Natal Midlands. In 1988 there were 691 fatalities. And in the first ten months of 1989 alone, there were 531 fatalities. During this 34 month period 1 600 people were killed in political conflict in the region (see data base, this monitor:72).

These figures, monitored by the CAE Unrest Monitoring Group, do not include fatalities in and around Durban, Inanda and Shongweni. According to the Black Sash Monitoring Group, many people were killed in these areas, particularly in late 1988 and in 1989.

Estimates for the Durban Functional Region (excluding Mpumalanga and Shongweni) show that at least 251 people died in the violence of the first eight months of 1989. The monthly death toll reads, January (61), February (19), March (28), April (55), May (18), June (15), July (18), August (37). The figures for September (48) and October (46) may include deaths in Hammarsdale.

If these 251 fatalities are added to the Midlands 1989 figures, then at least 782 people from Natal have been slaughtered this year for what seem to be political reasons (albeit mixed with other motives of revenge and criminality). In most people's understanding, death on this scale is war.

Natal Anomaly

Nationally, available data shows that the state of emergency appears to have been effective in reducing the number of deaths in conflict, including reducing the number of deaths caused by policemen and soldiers (Bennett & Quin, 1989). The anomaly is Natal (and more specifically the Natal Midlands), which since September 1987 has experienced an enormous new wave of political violence. Most of the deaths

CHRONOLOGY OF MIDLANDS CONFLICT JANUARY - DECEMBER 1989

JANUARY

1989 began with what can only be described as nightmare conditions in Mpumalanga. SAP 'kitskonstabels' had been removed on 30 December but the mayhem continued. In the first 9 days of January 35 houses were destroyed. The mayor of Mpumalanga, Rodger Sishi, claimed that the removal of the kitskonstabels did reduce the number of deaths. Nearby Fredville (Inchanga) appeared to be under the control of youthful comrades who broke into factions and intimidated the area.

In the Pietermaritzburg region, Imbali and Ashdown were the main conflict areas in January. In Imbali, an alleged Inkatha group associated with a gunman called Skweqe Mveli, an 18 year old, wreaked havoc, particularly on 2 January when a number of households were attacked and on 16 January when four people were gunned down. Subsequently, Mveli was arrested and temporarily detained.

In Ashdown there were regular skirmishes between UDF supporters in the township and Inkatha supporters from neighbouring Mpumuza. In Edendale there were clashes between people in Caluza and neighbouring Mpumuza, with the stoning of buses and reports of extortion by comrades in Nhalazatshe. The opening of Edendale schools, marred by boycotts by students and staff over registration problems, saw an influx of young people from Vulindlela.

In Vulindlela the attempts by chiefs and Inkatha to regain effective control of the whole area continued. The areas with the most action were Mnyandu, with several invasions by impis (which the police allowed unhindered), Haza and Mgwagwa. Other areas with deaths were Dindi, Nxamalala, Vulisaka, Mpande, Taylor's Halt and Inadi.

Residents of central Pietermaritzburg were made aware that the conflict was coming closer. There were regular deaths, and gang skirmishes in the Relief Street area had traders up in arms. Attempts to control the violence met a setback with the report by the Joint Cosatu/Inkatha Complaints Adjudication Board that two Inkatha members, Chief Shayabantu Zondi and Lawrence Zuma had refused to submit to the Board's authority.

FEBRUARY

In February the KZP took over control of Mpumalanga but within five days 10 people had died, with several more deaths during the month. Busloads of Inkatha supporters returning from the inauguration of the police station at Mpumalanga were involved in a major confrontation in Edendale that led to deaths. Bus stoning continued in Edendale, leading to clashes between comrades in Dambuza and bus drivers and workers travelling to and from the Vulindlela area of NoShezi. Several people were killed.

In Vulindlela, Inkatha action in Mgwagwa continued. People were killed there and in neighbouring Haza and KwaShifu, leading to a refugee exodus (of up to a thousand people) to Mpophomeni, itself troubled by conflict between comrades and a pro-AZAPO group. A number of deaths also occurred in other Vulindlela areas. Imbali continued to be a major site for conflict fatalities.

Attempts by the PFP representatives in parliament to expose Sichizo Zuma, an alleged Edendale gunman and mass murderer, met with a cold response from Minister of Law and Order Vlok.

MARCH

In March Mpumalanga appeared to be more peaceful under KZP control, though there were deaths there, in Georgedale and in Shongweni. Themba Sishi, son of the mayor of Mpumalanga, was assassinated.

Inkatha pressure on Mgwaqwa, Haza and KwaShifu in Vulindlela increased, particularly with a series of incidents starting on 27 February that led to fighting which reached Mpophomeni. (These events were documented in a series of affidavits that formed part of a successful interdict application against the Minister of Law and Order and the Police launched on 28 April).

Deaths were also recorded in other parts of Vulindlela, Ashdown, Edendale, Imbali and the Retief Street area in Pietermaritzburg. On 22 March Cosatu released a dossier which documented incidents where Inkatha vigilantes allegedly had helped police detain, interrogate and shoot residents of Imbali township. In Edendale attacks on buses by refugees from Vulindlela continued. Community leaders complained about the lack of action by police or by tribal authorities in Vulindlela to create a climate in which the refugees could return without being killed.

APRIL

In April the fighting in the Mpophomeni area continued, with the police riot unit apparently behaving extraordinarily badly (an interdict applied for against the police was made final on 23 May). In Mpumalanga what appeared to start as a relatively peaceful month disintegrated with the arrival of a special group of KZP on 22 April (they were removed by 12 May).

There were some incidents in Edendale and more deaths, including the massacre of a family, in the Taylor's Halt area. There was also trouble in Swayimani near Wartburg. In Imbali the killings culminated with the murder of a witness to the Complaints Adjudication Board, which led to Cosatu's withdrawal from this legal mechanism.

The renewal of peace moves received much publicity in the first half of 1989. On 7 April Chief Maphumulo, host to an estimated 10 thousand refugees, petitioned the State President to set up a judicial inquiry into the violence. His plea was turned down. On 24 April Minister Vlok in his budget speech promised 'to grab them with an iron fist', i.e. the alleged alliance of ANC/SACP/UDF/Cosatu and misguided clergymen.

Other peace initiatives began to gather momentum in spite of numerous setbacks. On 13 April an intervention by Archbishop Hurley and a group of conveners was revealed but rejected by Chief Buthelezi and the Inkatha Central Committee who proposed their own peace plan and a Marshall plan for development. On 26 April Cosatu and the UDF responded reasonably warmly, if not desperately, and agreed to work towards some kind of compromise peace conference. Their plan was rejected by Inkatha on 29 April.

MAY

In May high fatality rates continued in Mpumalanga and Georgedale. Women protested to the police about the special constables. Imbali murders continued as well. On 22 May a Cosatu leader, Jabu Ndlovu, lost most of her family, she herself dying of wounds and burns on 2 June. An Inkatha Youth organiser, Thulani Ngcobo was later arrested for the crime.

In Edendale there were deaths and clashes between comrades and 'comtsotsis' in Dambuza. The Sinathing cemetery was declared to be full. Vulindlela had a number of deaths, particularly in Elandskop, Nxamalala and Taylor's Halt. The lower end of Pietermaritzburg saw more fatalities too. At Emosomeni, near Richmond, there was unrest which later led to a number of deaths.

Cosatu suspended its use of the Complaints Adjudication Board on 8 May but appealed for a peace conference. Church leaders joined an appeal for a judicial inquiry into the violence. Vlok rejected such requests on the 16 May. Peace moves finally seemed to be making progress and Chief Buthelezi agreed to a meeting on 20 May. However, he was insistent on an Ulundi venue and the talks never took place in spite of numerous appeals from many parties.

recorded nationally during this period have occurred in this region.

There are two possible interpretations for this second surge of violence in the 1980s:

- the violence in Natal is simply a later occurrence of the revolt against government structures that started elsewhere in 1984/85;
- or, it is in nature a different conflict - one about Inkatha and its opponents' ability to command the allegiance of black people in Natal, rather than a conflict between white government and black rebels.

The two interpretations do not have to be totally exclusive of each other, for undoubtedly the revolt against government-installed township structures was spreading to Natal. But the second option is more compelling, i.e. the conflict has been essentially about Inkatha's desire to maintain its support (or at least to maintain its ability to claim such support) among black people in Natal while its support has been falling elsewhere.

This hypothesis is partially supported by the fact that Inkatha's support in the PWV industrial heartland had seemed to progressively wither from about 30% in 1977 (more or less equal to ANC support at that stage) to less than 5% in 1988. By 1988, ANC support had risen to nearly 50% and together with the UDF, other radical groups and individuals such as Archbishop Tutu, this broad coalition could command the allegiance of more than 70% of the black population of the PWV (Orkin 1989).

Another reason for differentiating the Natal conflict from the national one is that it helps to explain the curious inability or unwillingness of the state's forces to crush the violence raging in the region.

1989 Overview

Whatever the original causes, this unofficial war has continued in 1989 without significant abatement. There are growing signs that it is now spreading into the more conservative rural areas.

The escalation of the conflict between 1987-88 warns of the high probability that the conflict is becoming embedded in the social fabric of the region. This is perhaps one of the most disturbing features of the continuing conflict. Anecdotal evidence from a variety of witnesses and observers in Natal confirms this phenomenon.

In looking back at the events of 1989 (see monthly breakdown alongside text) in the Natal Midlands the following features emerge:

Throughout the year, Mpumalanga and associated areas such as Shongweni to the south were the worst areas of conflict in Natal. In the Pietermaritzburg area there were continuing attacks in the township of Imbali, in the outlying areas of Vulindlela, and in the township of Mpophomeni (near Howick).

There were growing signs of strife within the comrade refugee groups - the debilitation of two years of war was beginning to show. War weariness appeared to have an impact on the Inkatha 'warlords' as well. In addition, in the second half of the year there were signs that the conflict was spreading into rural tribal areas, with the politicisation of what may originally have been tribal factionalism.

In settled, 'mature' (and particularly freehold) urban communities like Edendale, though there is some violence it is at relatively low levels compared with other areas. The violence is often associated with young refugee comrades from the more outlying areas. The extent to which such comrade refugees merge into 'comstotis' and criminal gangs is unclear.

The township areas that were once totally dominated by Inkatha but which are now contested terrain seem to have experienced the worst violence, particularly in Imbali, Mpumalanga and in some of the Durban townships. However, it is not simply a matter of Inkatha being under pressure or attack in these areas, for the evidence, particularly from Imbali is that the worst excesses and the majority of the killings appear to be conducted by vigilantes associated to varying degrees with Inkatha.

In numerous cases the police have been accused of highly partisan behaviour in these townships. Curiously enough, given the dynamics of the political struggle, the KwaZulu Police (KZP) seem on the whole to have had a good press. It is the other more mysterious forces and the South African Riot Police and kitskonstabels whose activities have been regularly condemned by witnesses and residents of these areas.

An illustrative example is provided by Mpumalanga, where a KZP take-over in February 1989 proved to be successful. They acted in a very non-partisan way. This

JUNE

Following the death of Jabu Ndlovu there was a Cosatu-led three day stayaway in Pietermaritzburg from 5 to 7 June.

After much negotiating, and appeals from an Anglican Church delegation that visited him in Ulundi, it appeared that Chief Buthelezi would be willing to engage in talks with the Presidents of the UDF, Cosatu and the ANC. Two initial meetings between Cosatu/UDF and Inkatha delegations took place in Durban on 19 and 25 June that led to joint press statements. This seemed to be the breakthrough that had happened against all odds, including the more severe restriction of UDF leader Archie Gumede on 12 June by Vlok (subsequently relaxed).

Deaths continued, particularly in Vulindlela and in Hammarsdale (where a magistrate and senior prosecutor fled from his post on 11 June). But on the whole, June showed a considerable downswing in the death toll. Reports emanating from an Inkatha rally led by Chief Buthelezi in Edendale on 25 June indicated that high level negotiations between the parties, including the ANC were now likely.

JULY

July showed that the optimism was premature. All hell broke loose in Mpumalanga with 21 deaths alone in the period 14 to 16 July. According to informants heavy guns were used and vast quantities of ammunition expended. Efforts to patch up a ceasefire by local Cosatu and Inkatha leaders were not long lived.

Meanwhile, violence re-emerged in Mpophomeni/Howick. Perhaps even more significant was the violence beginning to take place in rural areas, in Swayimani (near Wartburg), Ehlanzeni (near Camperdown) and Emosomeni (near Richmond). The Ehlanzeni conflict which escalated in later months was between two chiefdoms which now appeared to have, at least nominally, become Inkatha and UDF areas respectively. The Richmond conflict, though apparently more tribal in origin, led to at least 20 deaths and a similar politicisation.

AUGUST

In August many killings took place in Imbali, including the gunning down of two youths after a Imbali Youth Organisation peace rally. Allegations were also made that a special SAP unit was engaged in the harassment and torture of youths, and an interim interdict was granted against the police on 3 November.

There were more deaths in Hammarsdale, Geogedale and Fredville and some intra-comrade killings in Ashdown, which was also attacked by Inkatha supporters from Mpumalanga leaving 17 injured and 1 dead. In Vulindlela, Mvundlweni became a site of conflict with several attacks and deaths. Violence also spread to the tribal area of Ualane near Greytown. The peace talks including the ANC never took place.

behaviour was allegedly objected to by local members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and a new batch of police arrived from Ulundi. They acted independently of the local KZP official in charge and created havoc. Then a (white) SAP unit resumed control, allegedly sided openly with Inkatha, shootings took place, and the violence escalated again. According to informants, prior to this regression Mpumalanga had become relatively peaceful. It is only in the two remaining Inkatha areas, where Inkatha is making a last bid for control, that there is much violence.

The conflict is beginning to infect rural areas, as seen in Swayimani (Wartberg), Richmond, Ehlanzeni (near Camperdown) and, most dramatically, in the Shongweni area. If the conflict continues in the broad

SEPTEMBER

September saw more bloodletting in Mpumalanga, more deaths in Inqol and at least 10 deaths in Ehlanzeni. In Vulindlela people in KwaShange marched in Pietermaritzburg to complain about attacks. Indeed, September was the month of marches, with the arrest of 356 university marchers in Pietermaritzburg (the day after police shooings on the Durban campus), a march by Mpopoheni residents to complain about the police, and a large 7 000 strong but legal march in Pietermaritzburg on 21 September (marred by some looting afterwards). It was also a month with an election day stayaway.

In Vulindlela a prominent Inkatha 'warlord', Lawrence Zuma, was wounded and 3 of his family killed. He was allegedly attacked by his chief, fellow warlord, and companion in interdict allegations, Chief Shayabantu Zondi, who, together with a KZP policeman eventually appeared in court on murder charges. On 23 September Chief Buthelezi announced a moratorium on peace talks and made various demands about any future peace negotiations.

OCTOBER

October continued Mpumalanga's agony with numerous people killed, various high level meetings between parliamentarians and police, and a visit by an Eminent Persons Group. There were reports of a 600/800-strong warband in Summerfield near Mpumalanga. From Swayimani there was a report of a 300-strong warband on the rampage that left 9 people dead, and a 1 000-strong gathering near Pietermaritzburg also saw casualties. The precise political nature of these groups remains unclear.

In Ehlanzeni at least 8 people died. Accusations were made by Cosatu that Inkatha had ordered local chiefs to stop peace negotiations, amidst claims that a pact was facilitated by the police on 15 October. In Vulindlela, Gezibuso became the area with the most conflict. Early in the month Cosatu claimed it would go it alone with peace efforts, despite Inkatha's withdrawal from negotiations.

NOVEMBER

Natal's unofficial war continued with no end in sight. The month ended with reports of a massive attack on UDF areas in Mpumalanga by Inkatha supporters and special constables in which 22 people (incl young children) were killed and many homes looted and destroyed. Thousands of township residents stay away from work on 27 Nov to mourn deaths and protest presence of SAP.

DECEMBER

The 'Christmas offensive' begins in early Dec, with pre-dawn raids by 300-strong war parties in Ntuzuma (18 deaths, 100 homes gutted) and Umsumduzi (6 deaths). More deaths occur in serious conflict in Inanda (27 since 15/11) and KwaMakhutha (15 since 19/11).

band of territory around Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and, in particular, in the corridor between the two cities, there probably will be a sorting out of allegiances in tribal areas. At least nominally, the dividing line will be between Inkatha and the UDF/Cosatu.

The creation of Contralesa (the Congress of Traditional leaders of SA), led by Chief Maphumulo from Natal's Table Mountain area, and the rapprochement between the ANC and the Transkei regime, provide rural chiefs with the possibility of a political home with the radicals. They may perceive this option to be less costly in terms of the prospects of further violence than remaining within the Inkatha fold. The peace initiatives that have been energetically pushed by Cosatu (the most

honest broker in the whole affair), lawyers and concerned clergymen seem to constantly break down at the level of local gunmen, who ignore the peace moves, at the highest level within Inkatha (which always appears to move the goalposts at the last minute), and by state disdain. The one peace initiative that seems to have held is in Shongweni between local Inkatha and comrade leaders (one which was allowed to happen by the SAP).

The state appears paralysed and unable to halt the violence. Commentators have ascribed this to varying reasons, including

- Machiavellian planning (keep the radicals and Inkatha busy destroying each other and use dirty tricks to halt promising peace initiatives);
- faulty mind sets (conservative tribalists, however heavily-armed and murderous, are by definition good; radicals, however reasonable and peace-loving, are bad and working for the ANC);
- sheer official incompetence; and,
- a hopelessly undermanned police force.

The business sector appears similarly paralysed, partly through the habit of not offending the security establishment and partly through an inability to believe that their temporary ally, Chief Buthelezi, might have feet of clay at the local level.

The system of justice appears to be paralysed as well. In spite of a conservative estimate of two thousand deaths in Natal over the last three years, the murder trials can probably be counted on one's fingers and toes. It is not hard to understand why in the townships, direct action to gain revenge seems overwhelmingly more effective.

In these heady days of international and de Klerkian 'glasnost' it is easy to overlook the damage being done to the social fabric of Natal. But this intense regional violence will probably exert an impact on national politics far into the future. One of the most damaging effects is the perception that it is because black life is not valued that the violence has been allowed to continue. For if two thousand whites had been shot, stabbed, burned and mutilated, then surely something would have been done about it.

IPQA

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TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

A CAUSAL MODEL

(with particular reference to Natal)

THE ENVIRONMENT

Negative Circumstances

ECONOMIC
 corruption
 ‡ crime
 ‡ scarce resources
 lack of infrastructure
 lack of facilities eg entertainment
 poor schooling
 ‡ poverty
 * shortage of development funding
 *‡ unemployment (vs birth rate)

POLITICAL
 ineffective policing
 ‡ localised power struggles
 *‡ political activities eg UDF, INKATHA
 unclear agendas of political organisations
 high politicisation (real and rhetorical)
 no or ineffective political channels
 *‡ discriminatory state practices
 *‡ non-existence of a democratic system

SOCIAL
 apartheid restrictions
 ‡ gang culture
 loss of values (traditional/human)
 family life breakdown
 community life breakdown
 ‡ refugee problem
 ‡ overcrowding

NOTE
 * key areas for conflict resolution
 ‡ corroborated with other research
 (local and international)

THE YOUTH

Three Socio-psychological Profiles
 Almost 90% of investigated incidents of township violence are perpetrated by youths aged 14 -25.

'NORMAL'

- higher tolerance levels
- ability to cope
- ability to rationalise
- principled
- purposeful
- positive expectations
- moralistic/religious

schooling with purpose
 working with purpose

high 'middle-class' component
 high 'female-youth' component

'APATHETIC'

- demotivated/bored
- insecure/anxious
- low self-image/esteem
- sense of hopelessness
- immature character traits
- personality disorders
- socially alienated

'VOLATILE'

- anti-authority
- frustrated/angry
- aggressive (often displaced)
- insecure (no future vision)
- irrational
- personality disorders
- resentful/embittered
- desperate
- destructive compulsions
- unrealised expectations
- extreme intolerance

strong tendency towards group formation

CATALYSTS

(ISSUES)
 territory
 schooling
 resources
 housing
 power
 labour action
 revenge

(PEOPLE)
 youth gang leaders
 community leaders
 political leaders
 political activists
 mafia (crime) leaders
 businessmen
 police

BEHAVIOURAL MANIFESTATIONS

EVASION/ADAPTATION

- careful public profile
- avoidance/evasion strategising
- security/survival planning
- political scepticism
- clandestine socialising

ESCAPISM

- low public profile
- drugs/alcohol indulgence
- petty crime
- street begging
- socially outcast
- drop-out
- non-participative

VIOLENCE

- thuggery
- 'war games'
- vandalism
- criminal violence
- irrational violence
- vigilante violence
- rape
- political violence - (local and regional)
- isolated power struggles
- reactionary violence
- tribal conflicts
- 'haves/have-nots' conflicts

Source
 Gavin Woods, The Inkatha Institute

Rebels with a Cause

The Discontent of Black Youth

By Gavin Woods, Director, the Inkatha Institute, Durban

In attempting to explain certain key causes of violence in Natal's black urban and peri-urban areas, a universal premise emerges to remind us that, 'happy, contented and stable people are not easily given to behaving violently'. Of course, the converse is equally true. Looking at Natal today, are there particular sections of people within black communities who are predisposed to, and predominate in the violence? If so, are they unhappy, discontented and unstable?

Causal Model

Recent research findings into the ongoing violence, drawn from 2 000 interviews with township residents, are represented by the accompanying model. The role of the youth who live in or around these areas is highlighted in particular. An investigation into aspects of the surrounding socio-economic environment shows that they have good reason to be unhappy, discontented and unstable.

• Discontented Youth

Almost 90% of the incidents of township violence investigated in this survey were perpetrated (but not necessarily instigated) by youth. The key role of 'youth' has been singled out by numerous other parties who observe and monitor the Natal conflict. Besides the logic of simple population demography (i.e. 50% of all black South Africans are 17 years and younger), general profiles of the youth show the impact on their lives of many negative characteristics of the environment (see diagram).

Other contemporary studies of social conflict in Natal and other regions have linked discontented youth (in the group context) to a high incidence of violence. The titles from a few of the many articles on this subject are self-explanatory: 'Children know only violence' (Fatima Meer in the *Cape Argus*, 3/6/89), 'Children are at war' (Colin Bundy in the *Natal*

Witness, 15/9/89), and 'Children of violence will grow up violent' (Professor Chuenyane in the *Star*, 21/9/89).

Submissions to the Parson Commission of Enquiry into the violence in KwaNdebele in 1986 stressed similar themes (see *Daily News*, 7/11/89).

• Negative Environment

The research findings have highlighted 25 factors (all well-substantiated and very visible) which bear negatively on township communities, and particularly, on the dominant role of youth in violence within these communities. These negative environmental characteristics have been categorised in the accompanying diagram under the headings of economic (e.g. scarce resources), political (e.g. non-democratic influences) and social (e.g. gang culture) factors. They are found in various permutations in the different townships.

When contemplating the diagram, it should be noted that singularly or collectively all of the factors, for the most part, can be attributed to apartheid and its effects.

The findings on the role of external circumstances can be corroborated with comparable research experience - both locally and from other parts of the world. International studies on societal phenomena linked to localised violence by youth, emphasise:

- scarce resources and violent children (Toufexis 1989);
- poverty and 'black-on-black' murders (Bell 1989);
- mass unemployment and violent sub-cultures (Wolfgang 1980);
- crime rates in 'black' communities (Savitz 1973);
- power struggles and youth affiliation (Fraser 1973);
- excessive state suppression (Soskin 1967);
- gang formation in 'ghetto-societies' (Short 1974);
- accelerated population overcrowding (Castells 1977)

Research has linked negative environmental circumstances and youth to township conflict

Almost 90% of violent incidents surveyed were perpetrated (but not necessarily instigated) by the youth

A category of 'volatile' youth identified by research are most likely to behave aggressively in a conflict situation

Interviews reveal that the youth who predominate in a political conflict do not comprehend the ideologies or politics of the groups they fight for

- *Psychological Profiles*

Which socio-psychological categories typify the youth who are exposed to this awful combination of negative living conditions?

While all township youth must to some extent be subjected to a cross-section of these negative circumstances, different people will react differently in the face of similar circumstances. In broad terms, three categories of youth were identified in the survey. The profiles have been broadly labelled as 'Normal', 'Apathetic' and 'Volatile' (see diagram). Each category used in this model correlates with a particular behavioural pattern or lifestyle identified from the survey responses:

(1) Normal Youth

In general terms, the 'normal' youth tend to retain a degree of purpose and aspiration. This, in turn, helps them to adapt and to modify their lives to the extent that latent frustration and anger does not surface and dominate their values or judgement. They do not allow themselves to become pawns of instigated violence. Amidst the violence swirling around them, they become instinctively evasive in the interests of self-preservation. They persist with attempts to lead as normal a life as possible.

(2) Apathetic Youth

This second category of youth are perhaps the real casualties of the township environment. They litter the streets of the townships as individuals or as small groups. Their lack of purpose is apparent as is their general non-involvement or alienation from mainstream society. They have often passively 'dropped out' as they are not equipped to respond to the challenges of their environment. They have simply 'given up'.

(3) Volatile Youth

Thirdly and most importantly, there are those youth who, through manifestations of the negative circumstances in their lives, have an exaggerated emotional make-up. Those who fall into the category of volatile youth are likely to react spontaneously and in an aggressive manner, usually as a response to a particular issue or the instigation of an influential party.

Unless they are pathological, however, these youth are not likely to commit premeditated killing of their fellow citizens simply because they are in an aggravated emotional state. There almost always has to be some kind of instigation.

- *Catalysts*

A number of typical catalysts were identified during research as the triggers that would provoke those in youth in the volatile category into actions of aggression (see diagram).

It is the role of the catalysts behind the violence that is most difficult to evaluate with confidence. While the underlying causes (youth discontent, objective circumstances, etc) are generally common to all the conflict areas, this is not necessarily the case with the catalysts. They differ widely from settlement to settlement, and in sequence, differ even in the same community.

- *Causes in Sequence*

When contemplating the whole model that has been developed to explain the multiple causes of violence, one could make the deduction that the youth are the immediate cause of the violence, but with equal wisdom it could be said that the negative environmental circumstances are the fundamental cause. Of course, another approach would be to attribute cause to the catalysts.

In short, to identify the causes of the violence it is crucial that all the factors detailed in the diagram should be considered as sequential parts of the total phenomenon.

Political Gangland

Political animosities are an important reality amongst other aspects of the violence. From time to time, it is apparent that political agendas are foisted on the youth with the intention of achieving certain ends. There is no doubt that on occasion, local UDF and/or Inkatha people of influence do mobilise the youth in their areas in an effort to purge that area of those to whom they are opposed.

Interviews in the townships have long revealed that the youth who predominate in a so-called political struggle do not nearly comprehend the ideologies or even the general politics of the organisations they purportedly fight for.

But then again, it appears obvious that these same youth are 'politicised' as such. They have a painful consciousness, which goes far beyond their parents, of the disparities between themselves and the

white people whom they constantly observe from their ghettos on the outskirts of the city.

The youth are aware that fundamental change is imminent which will hopefully address their plight. But whilst these expectations remain unrealised in the face of rising frustrations, causes that are vaguely political find a popular appeal. In a number of areas of endemic violence, for instance, the research found that a one-off issue served as the initial catalyst for violence. Soon, however, youth gangs emerge from the prevailing fervour and become engrossed in an ongoing 'war game' despite the disappearance of the original issue. It seems to displace aggression and to fulfil the lack of purpose these youth experience in their lives.

Often in Natal, urban and peri-urban black settlements have been zoned off and given political labels. Surveys of a few of these so-named areas have revealed that it takes a youth gang comprising less than 5% of the community to impose a political identity on the entire community. Against this fiat residents dare not object for fear of suffering dire consequences at the hands of the gang.

Research findings show that areas where comparatively small youth groups dominate entire communities in this way now include:

- KwaMashu: L Section
- Mpumulanga: A and C Sections
- Imbali: Various Sections
- Ashtown: Most Sections
- Inanda/Newtown: Sections A and B
- KwaMakutha: KO 1, 4, 6, 10 and 11.

As in the Cape townships, this gangsterism is often criminally motivated and operates under a variety of names. Currently, there are at least ten well-established organisational names (besides those of the UDF and Inkatha) under which groups are violently active in Durban. To the degree that the Inkatha/UDF conflict existed in 1987 and most of 1988, this aspect of the violence has gradually given way to other dynamics. In areas such as KwaMakutha and Inanda/Newtown there are gangs who claim to operate in 'retaliation against collaborators' but they are not able to enlarge on the meaning of their 'cause'.

No Easy Solution

Violence levels in the townships and suburbs of the Western Cape and PWV townships have been increasing at an

appalling rate in the 1980s. We should not isolate ourselves from the rest of the country in the search for explanations, labelling it as an Inkatha/UDF conflict unique to the Natal/KwaZulu region.

It is clear that real solutions to the Natal violence are moving further out of reach. It is unlikely whether even an event such as the political reconciliation of Inkatha and the UDF would in itself imbue the many warring youth factions with a sense of brotherhood and goodwill.

A few years ago, though as seemingly impossible then as now, one apparent solution would have been to remove the root causes of unhappiness and aggression (i.e. the negative circumstances) from the townships. This would have involved, amongst other initiatives, mass job creation, mass community development schemes and new political freedoms.

Today, even this would not be enough. Now, in addition, there is the challenge of mass rehabilitation. There is an established sub-culture which encompasses a substantial strata of youth who experience a basic loss of human and other societal values. They display an intensity and irrationality of behaviour that dares comprehension.

This phenomenon continues to grow. And our research leaves two vital questions in the national equation unanswered. Firstly, for how much longer can the violence be contained in the black settlement areas? (It has already begun to overflow into the white cities, for example, in the form of recent city centre stonings and youth clashes at beaches in Durban.) And secondly, considering demographic trends, at what point will the proportions of the violence threaten to disrupt whatever future political arrangement comes about in South Africa? **UPA**

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Amidst the fervour of the conflict, youth gangs emerge and become engrossed in ongoing war games

Real solutions to the Natal violence are moving further out of reach as the youth, exposed to daily violence, lose touch with basic human values

The Fourth State of Emergency

	Resistance Strategies Detainee Hunger Strikes, Rent & School Boycotts	Civil Unrest Regionalised Violence in Natal/KwaZulu
1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In end-year exams 57,4 % of 85 656 black matric pupils pass, however some results held back over claims of irregularities: only 35% of Soweto pupils pass. 222 national servicemen classified as religious objectors in 1988 in anti-conscription campaign. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to CAE, at least 691 people died in political violence in Pmb and Mpumalanga during 1988, 3 000 homes destroyed and 30 000 people displaced. In Dec alone, 87 fatalities in Midlands, incl 26 fatalities in Mpumalanga (75 since 1 Oct 1988).
1989	<p>6 Jan In Yeoville the house of co-editor of <i>Weekly Mail</i> house is damaged in an arson attack.</p> <p>9/11 Jan NUM launches a campaign to save 2 of its members from the gallows. 3 000 Weilers Farm squatters boycott R35pm rentals charged by Transvaal Provincial Administration.</p> <p>13 Jan In Soweto DET withdraws 200 teachers from 5 high schools after they are attacked after former pupils refused readmission; teachers to stay away until the community can guarantee their safety.</p> <p>15 Jan Violence is reported in Soweto schools where 4 teachers are injured. Violence also reported in W Cape townships.</p>	<p>1/4 Jan Violence continues in Natal townships with 5 deaths; 6 people are killed in Tugela Ferry faction fights.</p> <p>5 Jan In KwaZakele (PE) a policeman is shot dead.</p> <p>7/8 Jan More fatalities in Pmb townships, a man is stoned to death in Lebowa, 4 miners are killed in clashes at a Gencor mine in Evander and a white man is necklaced at Balfour (Ciskei).</p> <p>9/10 Jan In Shongweni 5 men are hacked to death, 100's leave the valley and in Hammarsdale a woman is stabbed to death. In Ixopo 2 people are killed in an arson attack on a house.</p> <p>11/12 Jan In Molweni police kill 2 people, in Imbali and Willow Fountain 2 more fatalities. In Theunissen a farmworker is shot dead, allegedly by 'Russian' vigilantes.</p> <p>13/15 Jan In Imbali 3 people are shot dead, 1 person is killed in Shongweni and in KwaMakutha a UDF youth league member is stabbed to death.</p>
Jan Weeks 1 & 2	<p>16 Jan In Nhlazatshe (Edendale) buses are boycotted after fare hike. In Soweto and Phahameng (Bultfontein) schools crises continue.</p> <p>17 Jan In Kwamashu Siyanda squatters and KwaMashu residents meet with police, KwaZulu MP's to discuss ongoing violence since Nov.</p> <p>18 Jan Soweto mayor intervenes in school clashes and gets repeat matric pupils readmission, 5 schools in Diepkloof still not open.</p> <p>19 Jan 2 Mankweng detainees released after hunger strike demanding their release, 1 still held.</p> <p>21/22 Jan In Diepkloof a meeting between parents, teachers and pupils to find ways of ending violence at 4 schools ends in chaos, pupils refuse to return to schools until all 2 500 pupils who failed matric last year are readmitted.</p> <p>In Daveyton 6 000 residents petition mayor over 25% rent hike.</p> <p>24 Jan 20 detainees at Diepkloof prison are refusing meals.</p> <p>27 Jan In East London, Trade Union House is gutted by fire, the 4th fire in area's union offices in 4 months. School arson in Soweto.</p> <p>28/29 Jan 300 attend peace rally in Shongweni, resumption of schooling most important issue as only 5 pupils registered.</p> <p>31 Jan 53 More Diepkloof detainees begin hunger strike demanding to be charged or released.</p>	<p>16 Jan In Imbali 4 people are shot dead allegedly by Inkatha members, violence reported in other Pmb and Dbn townships.</p> <p>20/22 Jan In Mpumalanga, Fredville and Inanda 3 fatalities.</p> <p>24 Jan In Pmb the Complaints Adjudication board finds 2 Inkatha men have violated the agreement and should be disciplined.</p> <p>26 Jan In Katilehong a man dies after being set alight.</p> <p>27 Jan Rockville (Soweto) Dr Abubaker Asvat, health secretary for Azapo, is shot dead in his surgery. In Pinetown 3 people are killed.</p> <p>28/29 Jan 7 more people die in Pmb clashes, 2 in Ntuzuma (Dbn). In Mitchells Plain (CT) police shoot dead a youth as they are attacked. In Davidsonville (Roodepoort) 3 die in clash with police. Violence also reported in Bongoletu (Oudtshoorn) and Elandsdraal (Marble Hall).</p> <p>30/31 Jan In Umlazi 2 men are shot dead at station by 6 gunmen, in KwaMashu 2 children are killed in a petrol bomb attack and in Pmb 2 men are stabbed to death at bus depot.</p>
Jan Weeks 3 & 4	<p>1/2 Feb Schools in Table Mountain, Ntshongweni, Mpumalanga and Georgetown and Bongudunga (Edendale) still not opened due to violence and shortage of facilities. In Mpumalanga and Georgetown teachers abandon classes after headmasters refused to admit pupils from other schools.</p> <p>At Elandsdraal (N Tvl) 10 students are detained following 3 day school boycott of classes to protest the dismissal of 3 detained teachers and 3 pupils.</p> <p>3 Feb In Witbank 2 more detainees begin fast.</p> <p>6 Feb In Jabavu (Soweto) police disperse memorial service for Siculo Dhlomo, 18 people injured. Detainees hunger strike enters 15th day, a further 118 begin fasting, bringing the total to 192.</p> <p>8/10 Feb 105 Detainees at St Albans prison (PE) join hunger strike, 10 detainees already hospitalised. 43 lawyers representing detainees begin sympathy fast.</p> <p>11/14 Feb 123 Westville detainees begin hunger strike and in Jhb 'Lawyers In Protest' meeting banned. More E Cape detainees begin fasting, 22 detainees hospitalised. In CT members of the medical and law faculties with other organisations protest and in London 5 former detainees fast outside the SA embassy.</p>	<p>1/2 Feb In Edendale 26 buses are stoned, police shoot dead 1 woman and another person is shot dead from a vehicle. In KwaMashu (Dbn) a child is killed in an arson attack. In Richmond 5 people are killed in faction fighting.</p> <p>4/5 Feb In Natal, 5 men are stabbed to death in Klaarwater, 2 people are shot dead in Imbali and a man is stabbed to death in Clermont. In Heideveld (CT) a driver shoots dead a stonethrower and 7 people are arrested. At Vredendal, 2 children are killed in an accident with SADF explosive.</p> <p>11/12 Feb In Pmb 3 more people die in clashes and 15 people injured in shooting rampage at funeral of Imbali resident.</p> <p>13/14 Feb In Mpophomeni (Howick), an Azapo member is stabbed to death. In Orlando (Soweto) the body of Madondo, a Mandela Football Club member is found and the body of activist Stompie Moeketsi is identified after more than a month. International furor breaks out over killings and the role of Winnie Mandela's bodyguards.</p>
Feb Weeks 1 & 2		<p><i>During Jan 133 people are killed in Natal political conflict, 72 in the Midlands and 61 in Greater Dbn (excl Mpumalanga/Shongweni), with at least 155 fatalities nationwide.</i></p>

Part 2: 1 January - 10 June 1989

Security Strategies Detainees, Restrictions & Negotiations, Trials	Armed Struggle ANC Sabotage, Interest Group Meetings	
<p>Minister of Law and Order restricts 36 organisations in terms of emergency regulations this year. During 1988 there were 645 children under the age of 18 in jail awaiting trial, 135 emergency detainees were restricted on release.</p> <p>Auditor General reports the SAP paid out a total of R3 449 733 in 1988 in compensation for damages in 456 claims, R1,5m for police action during riots. 25 members of the SAP dismissed in 1988 and 35 suspended as a result of security activities.</p>	<p>• According to security forces during 1988, they arrested 156 suspected ANC members, 111 collaborators and 21 trainees, with 38 PAC members, collaborators and trainees also arrested; 47 suspected ANC members and a collaborator killed, and 4 suspected PAC members killed. During the same period, 293 limpet-mines, 844 grenades and 24 RPG-7 rocket were confiscated. Police record 281 terror incidents during the year.</p>	<p>1988</p>
<p>1 Jan Special constables withdrawn from Mpumalanga after numerous complaints.</p> <p>5 Jan SADF troops deployed in Inanda/Newtown area after application by 100 residents.</p> <p>11 Jan 4 more newspapers served with warning notices in terms of the emergency act for subversive reports. <i>Al Qalam</i>; <i>Work in Progress</i>; <i>New Era</i> and <i>Grassroots</i> newspapers.</p> <p>13 Jan Transkei unbans 15 organisations which were banned in 1980 including SACC, World Council of Churches, SASJ and Union of Black Journalists.</p>	<p>1/5 Jan In Soweto police detonate a limpet-mine found on pavement, in Rynsoord (E Rand) HoD chairman's house is damaged by a limpet explosion. In Katlehong 2 municipal police are killed and 31 injured in a grenade attack on police station.</p> <p>7/8 Jan ANC announces it will dismantle camps in Angola to support the peace accord in Namibia. ANC's 77th anniversary celebrated in Lusaka, attended by South Africans and diplomats. A substation in Randhurst is damaged by a limpet-mine blast.</p> <p>9 Jan Near Soweto a pump station is damaged by explosion.</p> <p>11 Jan In King Williamstown a limpet-mine is discovered in a phone booth, in Wisonia (E Cape) a municipal switching station is damaged by an explosion and in East London an explosion is reported at a Dunlop factory.</p> <p>In Pretoria 12 alleged ANC members are charged with high treason.</p>	<p>1989</p> <p>Jan</p> <p>Weeks 1 & 2</p>
<p>16/17 Jan Minister of Law and Order bans the White Nationalist Movement, formed to take over from the BBB banned in December. Minister of Defence loses appeal against Supreme Court judgement ordering him to pay R62 500 to Soweto resident shot by SADF 3 years ago.</p> <p>31 Jan In Tembisa DET provides protection for 9 secondary schools hit by boycotts last year.</p>	<p>16 Jan Pretoria Supreme Court sentences Ebrahim Ebrahim to 20 years for treason and co-accused Maseko to 23 years, another co-accused, a Swazi national is sentenced to 12 years.</p> <p>20 Jan In Meadownlands, 2 municipal policemen and 1 other are shot dead in AK-47 attack.</p> <p>23 Jan In Khayelitsha police shoot dead a man allegedly pointing out arms cache, claims he tried to kill them.</p> <p>24 Jan In Livingstone (Zambia) a security guard is killed in hotel bomb blast. In Ciskei, 2 houses of Ciskeian policemen charged with murder of Eric Mlonga are damaged by grenades and AK-47 gunfire. In Umtata house of exiled Ciskeian, Charles Sebe is bombed.</p> <p>25/27 Jan Glenwood (Durban) substation damaged by limpet-mine explosion. Bulembu (Ciskei) 3 bombs explode at aircraft factory and in Frankfort (Ciskei) a bomb explodes at the Post Office. Pmb Supreme court convicts 3 men on charges of terrorism, 1 acquitted.</p> <p>28/29 Jan In Sydney (Australia) shots are fired at home of ANC representative. In Livingstone (Zambia) a woman cleaner is killed by a bomb blast in a bar. In Durban, a limpet-mine is detonated by police. 3 ANC members escape from Venda jail, 1 is rearrested and 2 ANC members escape from Wynberg police cells.</p> <p>31 Jan SADF kill 2 and injure 4 in illegal crossing from Zimbabwe.</p>	<p>Jan</p> <p>Weeks 3 & 4</p>
<p>2 Feb Rand Supreme Court acquits 3 SATS employees charged with murder of co-worker during 1987 strike. 3rd Mankweng detainee released and restricted after 27 months in detention.</p> <p>6/8 Feb Durban Supreme Court sentences 2 Lindelani community guards to death for kidnapping and murdering 7 schoolchildren, 5 men are acquitted. ADJ hands petition of 3 000 signatures to the Minister of Home Affairs to protest warnings against 4 publications.</p> <p>9/10 Feb In Cape Town, 2 community leaders and a policeman are detained in connection with the escape of 2 ANC prisoners.</p> <p>Lebowa inquest magistrate finds police responsible for the death of student leader Ramalepe in detention in October 1985. Supreme Court sentences 4 SATS workers to death for murdering 4 non-strikers in 1987 SATS strike, altogether 16 found guilty of the murders.</p> <p>14 Feb Minister of Law and Order meets with lawyers and detainees relatives to discuss hunger strike. 19 detainees released including 2 Uppington hunger strikers detained in Kimberley, who are restricted from even returning home.</p>	<p>1 Feb 4 ANC members facing charges of high treason at Delmas Court refuse to plead or be represented as they do not recognise the court.</p> <p>3 Feb Rand Supreme Court sentences ANC member Seheri to death for 2 murders committed in 1987. Pretoria Supreme Court reduces sentences for 2 E Rand activists jailed on Robben Island for ANC membership.</p> <p>5 Feb Harare conference of SA and ANC lawyers ends, discussion on new constitution and a bill of rights.</p> <p>9/10 Feb In Durban a bomb explodes under a police vehicle. 12 people injured by limpet-mine explosion outside Braamfontein army headquarters.</p> <p>11/12 Feb In Swaziland 3 ANC members are killed in ambush near border of SA. In CT police detonate bomb found near Supreme Court.</p>	<p>Feb</p> <p>Weeks 1 & 2</p>

1989	Resistance Strategies Detainee Hunger Strikes, Rent & School Boycotts	Civil Unrest Regionalised Violence in Natal/KwaZulu
Feb Weeks 3 & 4	<p>15 Feb In Soshanguve (Pta) 1 200 pupils boycott classes to protest shortage of teachers. KwaGuquqa (Witbank) residents warned of electricity cuts as council is R300 000 in arrears. SACC makes urgent appeal for calm in Soweto amid fears of violence over death of Stompie Moeketsi and actions of the Mandela Football Club.</p> <p>16 Feb Murphy Morobe of the UDF denounces actions of Winnie Mandela and the Club, calls on affiliates to distance themselves from her.</p> <p>7 detainees in hospital suspend hunger strike while 13 more are hospitalised. Detainees at Diepkloof prison suspend fast for 2 weeks while detainees in Westville and East London prisons continue as do sympathy fasts by organisations across the country. 27 detainees released.</p> <p>17/21 Feb 200 Detainees in Pmb, Mayville, Molweni, Brighton Beach and CR Swart cells begin fast as do 17 ISA detainees held at John Vorster Square. 16 fasting detainees from Fort Glamorgan (EL) are hospitalised. Khutsong residents decide to launch NUM backed consumer boycott of CP-ruled Carletonville, to protest against council's re-implementation of petty apartheid.</p> <p>23 Feb Detainees in Dbn and East London suspend hunger strike while 100 Pmb detainees continue with more than 7 hospitalised.</p> <p>24 Feb 21 Westville detainees released, 91 remain.</p> <p>25/26 Feb In Tumahole, 7 000 attend funeral of Stompie Moeketsi.</p> <p>27/28 Feb Mamelodi mayor says 2 month electricity cuts to continue, to enforce payment of R15m arrears. Pmb detainees separated in jails around province in attempt to break fast and in Jhb 2 ISA detainees from John Vorster Square are hospitalised.</p>	<p>16 Feb In Ntuzuma (Dbn) the principal of a school is stabbed to death by parents demanding registration of their children.</p> <p>18/19 Feb In Natal, 9 people are killed in upsurge of violence. In Alex (Jhb) taxi wars claim 5 lives over past week and in Lebowa police investigate death of man in Seshego police cells.</p> <p>20/22 Feb In Molweni 5 deaths are reported in past week after the removal of security force base. In Inanda 22 men are arrested and police uncover arms cache. Ashdown community leader Moloko is stabbed to death and in nearby Sinathing 2 men are killed in an attack on a bus.</p> <p>In Soweto a house connected to the Mandela Football Club is attacked and a child is killed by AK-47 gunfire.</p> <p>23 Feb Wits meeting on detentions dispersed by police. Imbali resident dies in hospital after earlier attack.</p> <p>25/27 Feb In KwaDabeka (Dbn), 3 comrades stabbed to death and 2 people are killed in Fredville (Inchanga). 4 people are killed in Mpumalanga and in nearby Shongweni police confirm 6 deaths. In Sinathing (Pmb) 5 people are stabbed to death.</p> <p>28 Feb In Shongweni 7 people are killed in revenge attack for weekend killings and 1 person is killed in Edendale.</p> <p><i>According to monitoring groups, 19 deaths reported in Dbn area during Feb and 57 in Midlands (at least 26 in Mpumalanga). Another 35 fatalities reported in unrest in other areas, nationwide.</i></p>
Mar Weeks 1 & 2	<p>1/2 Mar In Soweto municipal traffic officers and policemen down tools in protest at racial discrimination and unequal pay.</p> <p>3 Mar In CT 11 buses of schoolchildren are stopped by riot police from attending non-racial athletics meeting.</p> <p>6/8 Mar Detainees at Modderbee prison resume fast after suspension, to protest continued detention; 6 detainees also fasting at Nylstroom prison. Westville detainees also resume fast while 35 Pmb detainees end fast after assurances of being charged or released. In Durban 3 of 4 hunger strikers at CR Swart are hospitalised.</p> <p>Carletonville Chamber of Commerce expecting 27 businesses to fold as consumer boycott bites, so far 25 cases of assault reported against black people by whites in past 2 months.</p> <p>9 Mar In CT police arrest 35 at placard demonstration for release of detainees. In KwaZulu schools plan meeting to discuss violence in which 7 lives lost since re-opening in Jan, resulting in teacher stayaway at 8 schools.</p> <p>11/12 Mar National Detainees Day, services held across SA, 214 detainees released but more than 50 new detainees. Carletonville defiance action against whites-only amenities led by Cosatu's Barayi called off due to police pressure.</p> <p>13/14 Mar In Pretoria Central 4 detainees begin hunger strike.</p>	<p>1/3 Mar In Ashdown 2 bodies are found and in Mpophomeni 1 person is shot dead by police. In Pmb a Nactu shop steward is stabbed to death and 3 days of violence in KwaHaza leaves 4 residents dead.</p> <p>4/5 Mar In Imbali, 4 people are shot dead in attack on house; 2 people are killed in Sweetwaters, 1 person is killed in Sinathing and 3 die in Mpumalanga while a shopkeeper is killed in Shongweni.</p> <p>6/8 Mar In Shongweni 2 people are killed returning from a funeral and 2 more are shot dead and burnt. In KwaNdengezi 2 people abducted from Emangangeni are killed and in Taylors Halt a man is stabbed to death.</p> <p>11/12 Mar In Inanda 3 people are killed, 1 person killed in St Wendolins and 1 in Lamontville.</p> <p>14 Mar In Imbali 2 more people die following attack on house.</p>
Mar Weeks 3 & 4	<p>15/16 Mar In Soweto more than 3 000 pupils refused re-entry to schools this year, teachers call for unconditional readmission of pupils; the erection of more schools; hiring of more teachers and all children supervised after schools plagued by violence.</p> <p><i>Of 623 detainees known to have been on hunger strike between Jan 23 and 14 Mar, 85 are still fasting and according to police 350 still detained, the lowest number since June 1986.</i></p> <p>20 Mar Four UDF youth leaders escape from detention in Hillbrow hospital and take refuge in German Embassy in Pretoria.</p> <p>21 Mar Anniversary of Sharpeville shootings, widespread support for stayaway in PE areas, schools in Durban area boycotted and at Wits campus students and police clash on march.</p> <p>22 Mar In Soweto nearly all schools deserted as pupils stayaway to protest DET policies. 4 detainees leave sanctuary of German embassy after Minister Vlok signs release orders.</p> <p>25/27 Mar UDF leader Chikane meets with Minister Vlok to discuss detainee Dbn detainee Sandile Thusi, who then ends fast after 37 days while 8 detainees fast at Shifa hospital.</p> <p>29 Mar In Dbn, Shifa hospital detainee escapes custody and flies to Jhb where he takes sanctuary in US consulate. In Pretoria 6 former detainees take refuge in British Embassy for 1 day to protest restrictions placed on them.</p> <p>30/31 Mar According to chamber of commerce, Carletonville consumer boycott has already cost 252 jobs. Detainee leaves US consulate after assurances he will not be detained.</p>	<p>15/17 Mar 2 people die in New Germany and Marianhill near Pietermaritzburg. 1000's fleeing Shongweni valley after more than 22 gunned down in past month, over 1 300 houses empty. In Blikkiesdorp (Uppington) murder charges against a policeman are investigated after death of boy when police open fire on crowd. Several incidents of rightwing violence reported in Carletonville, Pretoria and CT advocate of Yengeni trialists' car is vandalised, allegedly by Wit Wolwe.</p> <p>18/20 Mar Continued violence in Natal townships, with deaths reported in Riverview (Pinetown), Taylors Halt, Edendale (Pmb). In KwaHaza and Mpophomeni (Howick) police arrest 239 people following violence in which 3 people are killed by mobs and 1 by police. In Diepkloof (Soweto) a man is burnt to death.</p> <p>21/23 Mar 4 people die in Pmb townships of Sweetwaters and Imbali, a man is shot dead by police in Inanda and 2 people are killed in Shongweni; 1 person is killed in police action in Tembisa and Kaitshong (Tvi).</p> <p>24/26 Mar Over long weekend 13 people are killed in Dbn township violence, 6 in Pmb areas including the son of mayor of Mpumalanga. 15 people are killed in faction fighting in Etimatola reserve. In Randville (Estcourt) municipal police quarters are gutted, in Soweto busses and trains are damaged and in Bridgeton (Oudtshoorn) police disperse crowds.</p> <p>28 Mar Pmb violence claims 3 more lives in Taylors Halt and Imbali.</p> <p><i>At least 92 die in political violence in Natal in Mar, incl 56 in Midlands and 28 in Greater Dbn</i></p>

Security Strategies Security Restrictions & Negotiations, Trials	Armed Struggle ANC Sabotage, Interest Group Meetings	1989
<p>17 Feb According to Minister of Law and Order, 316 people detained under ISA Section 29 over the past year. In Scottburgh, 4 policemen are fined and given suspended sentences following the death of a suspect during interrogation. Pmb court sentences Infatha member to 3 years for a political murder in 1987.</p> <p>24 names of detainees held for more than 30 days tabled in Parliament. Minister Vlok meets with Archbishop Tutu and Rev Frank Chikane. Vlok agrees to review the position of every detainee but emphasises that no detainee on hunger strike will be released. He announces the release of 50 more detainees. Vlok also meets with delegation from NGK to discuss hunger strike.</p> <p>21/22 Feb PE inquest magistrate finds persons unknown killed E Cape community leaders Goniwe, Mkonto, Calata and Mhlauli in mid-1986. Pretoria Supreme Court overturns conviction of man sentenced to 2 years in jail for refusing to testify in PAC/Qibla trial. He is immediately detained under ISA. Pmb court acquits 2 Imbali councillors on murder charges.</p> <p>23 Feb Minister of Law and Order pays R190 000 in out-of-court settlement to mother of child paralysed by police shooting in Belhar in 1987. Jhb court fails to overturn ban on outdoor Rainbow music festival and in CT an outdoor street party is banned. 3 Guguletu residents detained under ISA including church worker.</p> <p>28 Feb Pmb inquest magistrate finds KwaZulu MP and 5 others linked to killing of 2 women from Maswazini district in October 1987, case referred to AG. 5 detainees are released from Jhb hospital and restricted.</p>	<p>15/16 Feb In Kallehong (W Rand) a special constable is killed and 9 injured in a grenade attack. In Mdantsane the traffic dept building is damaged by an explosion. In KwaMashu (Dbn) a bomb is found on the railway line.</p> <p>18/19 Feb In Lusaka the ANC calls on SA organisations not to shun Winnie Mandela, accuses government agent provocateurs of causing trouble. In Kallehong a police station commander's house is damaged by a limpet explosion.</p> <p>20/22 Feb In Khayelitsha (CT) 3 suspected ANC members and 3 collaborators are arrested. In Swaziland, an injured ANC member is snatched from hospital. Pmb court convicts Cosatu official Ndlovu on terrorism and attempted murder charges.</p> <p>25/26 Feb In Pinville (Soweto), a blast made with commercial explosives kills a child, in Inhlanzani Station a limpet-mine explodes and police detonate a homemade explosive at Kempton Park.</p> <p>In Lusaka UDF/Cosatu reps arrive for talks with the ANC over controversy surrounding Winnie Mandela and her Football club.</p> <p>27 Feb In Bishop Lavis (CT) 3 children are injured by SADF grenade detonator found in rubble.</p>	<p>Feb</p> <p>Weeks 3 & 4</p>
<p>1/2 Mar Delegation of church leaders meet with Minister Vlok to discuss detainees on hunger strike. Anglican church call on state president to implement judicial inquiry into Natal unrest is refused. In Pmb 261 unrest cases brought before courts since April 1988, involving 252 Inkatha and 156 UDF supporters. In Pmb, Supreme Court sets aside Industrial court decision refusing application to reinstate 1000 Sarmcof workers fired at Howick in May 1985. Minister of Home Affairs gazettes notice warning Af-Qalam publication while WIP receives telex saying no action is under consideration any longer.</p> <p>3/6 Mar Acting State President grants reprieve to 16 condemned men. Grahamstown Supreme Court sentences 2 people to death for the murder of Azapo member in KwaNobuhle in November 1986. So far only 127 detainees released from detention since Vlok gave undertaking to review every case.</p> <p>6/8 Mar Vlok meets with Pmb detainees lawyers.</p> <p>10 Mar In Bisho (Ciskei) 6 policemen are sentenced for the murder of Eric Mntonga in 1987.</p> <p>13/14 Mar All 35 detainees released in Pmb, including UDF leader Skumbuzo Ngwenya, 6 are charged. 8 Westville detainees also released and in CT 8 demonstrators are arrested protesting detention. Vlok announces 600 detainees have been released since 16 Feb.</p>	<p>2 Mar Delmas Circuit Court finds 3 of 4 self-confessed ANC members guilty on charges of murder, drops treason charges. In Carletonville bomb blasts outside civic centre and power pylon.</p> <p>4/5 Mar Near Magaliesburg 4 PAC insurgents and 1 collaborator are arrested at a roadblock.</p> <p>10 Mar In Durban a limpet-mine explodes outside Natal Command headquarters and in Manzini 2 ANC members charged with possession of arms.</p> <p>13 Mar In Diepkloof (Soweto) a municipal policeman is injured in an ambush with AK-47's.</p>	<p>Mar</p> <p>Weeks 1 & 2</p>
<p>17 Mar Evander court sentences 9 policemen to short jail terms following the death in detention of Madonsella at Mzinoni police station.</p> <p>24/29 Mar Braklaagte chief fighting incorporation into Bophuthatswana is detained with 50 others after Supreme court finds incorporation valid. Appeal Court sets aside sentences and convictions of 10 Slutterheim residents found guilty of 3 murders in 1987, 3 of them are released after 18 months on death row, 1 of the accused hanged himself in prison. Police announce all detainees on hunger strike will be sent to Bloemfontein hospital.</p> <p>31 Mar According to official figures 111 people held under security legislation, 104 of them under ISA 29.</p>	<p>17/19 Mar Sowetan poet, Mzwakhe Mbuli and his wife are arrested and charged with possession of explosives. Dube Training centre for municipal police is attacked by grenades injuring 4 policemen.</p> <p>22/23 Mar Umtata court convicts 2 ANC members on charges of terrorism and murder following the deaths of 2 people killed in casino bomb blast. In Kazangula (Zambia) on the Botswana border 2 ANC members are injured in a landmine explosion.</p> <p>25/26 Mar In Lusaka, Stellenbosch students and ANC meet. In Mafikeng (Bop) a bicycle detonates a Russian grenade.</p> <p>28 Mar Bermuda meeting on the 'South African Problem' is attended by several SA delegates incl from the SACP and the ANC.</p>	<p>Mar</p> <p>Weeks 3 & 4</p>
<p>MONITORING NOTES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full details of the many conflict incidents and numerous peace initiatives in Natal/KwaZulu were published in an interim regional chronology for the period Sept 1987 - June 1989 (See <i>Indicator SA Urban Monitor</i>, Vol6/No3: 68 - 72). • In the preceding national chronology, No 11, the column headings were transposed. Reading from left to right across the middle double-page, the correct headings should read (1) Non-collaboration Politics (2) Civil Unrest (3) Government Response (4) Black Nationalist Activity (See <i>Indicator SA Political Monitor</i>, Vol6/Nos1-2: 22 - 27) • A chronology and data base on the defiance campaign for the period mid-1989 to early 1990 will be published in the next edition of <i>Indicator SA</i>, Vol7/No2. 		

1989	Resistance Strategies Detainee Hunger Strikes, Rent & School Boycotts	Civil Unrest Regionalised Violence in Natal/KwaZulu
Apr Weeks 1 & 2	<p>1/3 Apr Idasa, FFF and Actstop call for defiance campaign against racial discrimination.</p> <p>Soweto mayor announces estimated R701m rent arrears to be written off and new rates and service charges levied. Later denies this while negotiations continue between council, provincial authorities and Soweto People's Delegation.</p> <p>Ladysmith and Newcastle township residents boycott KZT buses after fare hike.</p> <p>5 Apr A hunger striker from Diepkloof flees hospital to British consulate but leaves after assurances he will not be redetained.</p> <p>7 Apr Chief Maphumulo flies to CT to urgently petition President Botha to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry into the causes of conflict in Natal townships.</p> <p>11 Apr 500 Mpophomeni women gather outside Howick police station to protest police action over weekend.</p>	<p>1/2 Apr In Taylors Halt (Pmb) 3 people are killed and 1 person is killed in KwaMashu (Dbn). Violence is reported in New Brighton and Lingelihle (E Cape) and Mhlakeng (PWV).</p> <p>4/6 Apr In Imbali, 2 people are shot dead by assassins impersonating police. In Dobsonville, Steve Kgama, president of Ucasa is shot and injured, 2nd assassination attempt.</p> <p>7/9 Apr In Inanda and Mpophomeni 2 fatalities.</p> <p>10/14 Apr Continuing violence reported in Natal townships with several murders. Restricted youth leader Chris Ntuli is stabbed to death after reporting to police station, allegedly killed by Sinyora gang. In Soweto 3 people are killed in taxi-war.</p> <p><i>Over 3 000 Pmb township homes burnt in conflict over past 3 years, and more than 3 000 refugees fled violence.</i></p>
Apr Weeks 3 & 4	<p>18/19 Apr In Jhb Lawyers for Human Rights and students are dispersed by police while protesting capital punishment.</p> <p>22/23 Apr In Jhb ISA detainee hospitalised for 2 months resumes hunger strike as he has still not been charged.</p> <p>Inkatha calls prayers meetings around Natal, in Ulundi Chief Buthelezi commits Inkatha to peace following calls by the Church, ANC and Nelson Mandela.</p> <p>26/27 Apr Inkatha and UDF/Cosatu hold a joint press conference, plan preparatory meeting leading to peace conference.</p> <p>Jhb ISA detainee calls off fast after being charged with terrorism.</p> <p>Jhb prison detainees resume hunger strike as they have not been released.</p> <p>30 Apr <i>So far this year 644 detainees on hunger strike, 620 of them released, 134 had been hospitalised. According to Minister Vlok no-one on hunger strike at the moment. In April 48 fatalities in Midlands (CAE) and 55 in Dbn area (Umag).</i></p>	<p>15/16 Apr In Nxamalala 2 people are stabbed to death and nearby in Taylors Halt 5 people are killed. In Van Der Bijl Park Lekoa police shoot dead a man after shots fired at them and in Khayelitsha (CT) a policeman's house is stoned.</p> <p>17/18 Apr In Sweetwaters 2 more die and in Shongweni 6 people are shot dead in another mass killing.</p> <p>20/23 Apr In Dbn townships, 3 people are killed in KwaMashu, 9 in Inanda and 1 in Ntuzuma in clashes between comrades and Sinyora vigilantes. Schools attacked in Guguletu (CT) and Soweto.</p> <p>24/25 Apr In Pmb Fbwu alleges 2 of its members killed and 3 missing after attacks by Fawu members. In Mpophomeni, 5 people are killed, several houses burnt and 194 arrested.</p> <p>28/30 Apr A woman is killed in KwaNdengezi and a bus driver is killed near Nigel Dam after call for buses to stay away.</p> <p>In Pmb a youth is killed in Taylors Halt and in Imbali 2 people are killed, incl a witness at Inkatha/Cosatu adjudication board.</p>
May Weeks 1 & 2	<p>1 May In Troyeville (Jhb), Wits academic and human rights activist David Webster is assassinated.</p> <p>9/10 May Nine Diepkloof detainees resume hunger strike and deputy president of Azapo detained at John Vorster Square is moved to hospital in Bloemfontein.</p> <p>Cosatu suspends its participation in complaints adjudication board following the death of a witness but appeals to Inkatha to meet for new peace initiative in Natal.</p>	<p>1/3 May In Natal townships 4 deaths are reported in Haza, Shongweni and KwaMashu and one person is killed by a kitskonstabel in Mpumalanga.</p> <p>4/7 May Violence escalates in Mpumalanga following the death of Inkatha leader Zakhele Nkehli in hospital after attack in December, 2 people are allegedly killed in retaliation attack by vigilantes. In Pmb 3 deaths are reported in Imbali and Elandskop and a man is killed in Mpophomeni (Howick).</p> <p>8/9 May In Soweto a youth dies after alleged abduction by Sofasonke party official, councillor and man shot dead in Edendale.</p> <p>10/11 May Ongoing battles in Mpumalanga claim another life and police shoot dead 2 people in KwaMashu and Chesterville.</p> <p>13/14 May 2 more people killed in Pmb townships and 6 die in Mpumalanga/ Marianhill area and several houses destroyed.</p>
May Weeks 3 & 4	<p>16 May In PE, Mkhuseleli Jack and Henry Fazzie are released from 3 years of detention, 17 more released and according to Minister of Law and Order only 40 people remain in detention. 9 hunger striking detainees from Diepkloof prison are transferred to Bloemfontein hospital.</p> <p>20 May Scheduled peace talks between Inkatha and UDF/Cosatu fail to materialise as no neutral venue agreed on.</p> <p>24 May In Soweto 21 schools sitting for mid-year exams but stayaways at more than 41 schools in protest at inferior standard of teaching.</p> <p>Over 50 people in detention in Natal while 21 held in the rest of the country. In Pretoria 8 people are arrested for demonstrating outside prison while 2 people are hanged.</p> <p>30/31 May In Jhb, ISA detainee Mtambu goes missing after allegedly escaping from custody. UDW shut after violence during exams, following expulsion of 2 students.</p> <p><i>According to police 90 people detained under Internal Security legislation.</i></p>	<p>15/16 May In Taylors Halt (Pmb) a man is stabbed to death, 2 people die in Dbn townships of Marianhill and KwaMakhuta. In Katlehong (E Rand) a man is killed by students at school.</p> <p>18/21 May No police reports of deaths in Natal although violence continues.</p> <p>22 May In Imbali (Pmb) Jabulani Ndlovu and his daughter are killed in attack on house of Cosatu organiser who is critically injured.</p> <p>Violence reported at schools in Soweto and Burgersdorp (E Cape).</p> <p>24/25 May In Mpumalanga a man is shot and burnt to death and 2 killed in nearby Malangeni a woman is shot dead in Springvale while violence is reported in Lamontville (Dbn), Guguletu (CT) Alberton (Jhb) and Mhluzi (E TV).</p> <p>26 May In Ndwedwe 9 people are killed in upsurge of violence in rural area.</p> <p>27/28 May In Hammarsdale area 7 people are killed in escalating violence while 2 die in KwaMashu and 2 in Lindelani and Ntuzuma townships of Durban.</p> <p>31 May In Inanda another man is killed by mob.</p> <p><i>In Pmb/Hammersdale areas, 53 fatalities this month; in Inanda 50 fatalities since 1 Jan.</i></p>
Jun Weeks 1 & 2	<p>2 Jun Stellenbosch University expels Nusas president for political activism and suspends all Nusas and BSS activities until end Sept.</p> <p>5/7 Jun In Pmb residents begin 3-days of peaceful protest to mark death of Cosatu official Jabu Ndlovu. In Ulundi, Anglican church delegation meets with Buthelezi to discuss peace initiatives.</p> <p>Cape Peninsula schools under DET deserted as pupils enter third week of stayaway protesting presence of security forces at schools and the suspension of some teachers.</p>	<p>1 Jun In Pmb, Cosatu shop steward Jabu Ndlovu dies in hospital</p> <p>3/4 Jun Violence reported in Langa (CT), Tembisa (Jhb), Lawaakamp (George) and Mpumalanga. At Dindi (Pmb) a man is shot dead at a funeral and 2 others die nearby in Sinathing.</p> <p>5/8 Jun Continued reports of violence in Dbn, Pmb and CT townships.</p> <p><i>The mid-year death toll for 1 Jan-30 Jun reaches 313 in Midlands and 196 in Greater Durban.</i></p>


Security Strategies Detainee Restrictions and Negotiations, Trials	Armed Struggle ANC Sabotage, Interest Group Meetings	1989
<p>4 Apr In Vosloorus the SAP are called in to quell rebellion of 30 municipal police over salary inequalities. Pmb Supreme Court convicts 4 youths for murdering student who defied school boycott in New Hanover in 1987. 6/6 Apr Minister Vlok tables 12 names of detainees held for more than 30 days, says 730 detainees released since mid-Feb, less than 170 still in detention. Meetings to honour Solomon Mahlangu banned in N Tvl and in Mamelodi police occupy hall of commemoration service. 14 Apr State President reprieves 11 death row prisoners.</p>	<p>1/2 Apr In Orlando (Soweto) 2 men are killed in grenade blast in a shebeen and 13 injured, also in Soweto a car is damaged by a grenade and a substation is attacked. 4 Apr In Soweto a Transkei Chief is killed in police raid on house, suspected ANC member also killed by police grenade. 6/7 Apr In Dbn, CR Swart police residences are damaged by an explosion. Yeoville police station damaged by explosion. 14 Apr Nigel post office damaged by mini-limpet blast.</p>	<p>Apr Weeks 1 & 2</p>
<p>18/21 Apr In the E Cape 7 more detainees are released from St Albans prison while 29 still detained, incl entire executive of the UDF. 810 detainees released since mid-Feb, less than 100 remain, 486 released under restrictions. 24 Apr Supreme Court acquits Moses Mayekiso and 4 other treason trialists on all charges after trial lasting more than 2 years. 25/26 Apr 82 people still being held under ISA, PE regional organiser for Lawyers for Human Rights detained under emergency regulations. 7 people are hanged in Pretoria for non-political offences, brings number of executions in 1989 to 19.</p>	<p>15/16 Apr Soweto municipal offices damaged by an explosion. In Lusaka 2 ANC member shot dead at farm. 19 Apr Harare conference 'Women in the Struggle', delegates from Zimbabwe, SA and ANC meet. In Lusaka delegates from Africa Enterprises meet with ANC. Piet Relief inquest replaces investigating officer into deaths of 4 ANC members as he had been involved in the shootings, after families make applications. 22/23 Apr Berlin (E Cape) post office is damaged by explosion. 27 Apr Delmas court sentences 3 ANC members to death for 4 killings and a bomb-blast. They had refused to participate in trial as they claimed they were prisoners of war. 29/30 Apr In Jhb central 2 shops are damaged by mini-limpet blasts. According to Institute for Strategic Studies there were 58 terror attacks in the past 4 months.</p>	<p>Apr Weeks 3 & 4</p>
<p>10 May KwaZulu resident awarded R15 000 damages against Deputy minister of KwaZulu following attack in which 1 person was killed. 11/12 May CT Supreme Court sentences ANC member to 18 years for death following an explosion. Umtata Supreme Court sentences 2 ANC members to death for killing 2 people in explosion in casino in 1986. In Dbn, 2 people are jailed for 25 years for killing 5 people in KwaNdengezi. Mpumalanga special constables are withdrawn after residents claim violence spiralled since their arrival in April. ANC Helene Pastoors released from jail after renunciation of violence, Belgium and SA officials agree to prevent her travelling to SA.</p>	<p>2 May W Tvl Radar station is attacked by mortars, SADF allegedly arrest 1 ANC member and 20 recross the border. 6/8 May In Katlehong a stadium is damaged by an explosion. In Randfontein a Nat MPs house is damaged by a bomb. 13/14 May In Dobsonville a municipal policeman and 2 others are injured in grenade attack on mayor's house. In nearby Dube the municipal police barracks are attacked.</p>	<p>May Weeks 1 & 2</p>
<p>16 May Pia Supreme Court sentences right-wing mass murderer Barend Strydom to death on 8 counts. 18 May W Cape police ban Grassroots annual conference. Durban Supreme Court dismisses application for relaxation of restrictions on Yunus Mohammed. 19 May George Supreme Court sentences a policeman to 12 years for murder of Sandkraal resident in the police station, 2 others found guilty of attempted murder. 23 May Pmb Supreme Court confirms restraining order on Minister of Law and Order and the SAP from unlawfully assaulting or threatening Mpophomeni residents. Minister of Justice orders stay of execution for man convicted of killing Soshanguve policeman. 24 May Bloem Appeal Court sets aside conviction of 6 men sentenced to death in June 1987 for the murder of Queenstown women in Dec 1985 violence. 25/26 May In Pretoria 3 people are executed, 2 for politically motivated murders while 8 condemned men are reprieved, incl a white man sentenced for necklace murder of black policeman. 3 Natal policemen jailed following torture and death in custody of a suspect. Upington Supreme Court sentences 14 of 'Upington 25' to death for the murder of a black policeman in 1985.</p>	<p>22 May In Soweto 2 grenades are thrown at a councillor's house and in Duduza (Nigel) municipal police find a mini-limpet mine. 23 May In Schoemansdal (E Tvl) a ANC member allegedly kills himself and injures a policeman.</p>	<p>May Weeks 3 & 4</p>
<p>1 Jun Cosatu official Donsie Khumalo is charged with breaking restriction orders. 6 Jun Bisho (Ciskei) Supreme Court sentences 12 Mdantsane residents to death for necklace murders of 5 youths in 1987. 8 Jun Dbn Supreme Court grants interdict restraining Lindelani councillor Shabalala from assaulting or threatening 3 youths. 9 Jun State of Emergency is reimposed, restrictions on 32 organisations and about 500 individuals extended.</p>	<p>1/2 Jun In Laudium (Pta) a limpet-mine explosion damages home of HoD MP and another is reported at the home of a doctor. 4 Jun Randfontein Nat MP's home damaged by explosion. 5 Jun In Harare 3 white Zimbabweans are convicted on charges of bombing ANC buildings. 7 Jun In Welkom a shopping centre is damaged by an explosion.</p>	<p>Jun Weeks 1 & 2</p>

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Data Base

GRAPH 1


FATALITIES IN THE NATAL CONFLICT Pietermaritzburg & the Midlands January 1987 - November 1989



Note: • The Natal Midlands covers the area with Pietermaritzburg as its centre, extending to Greytown in the east, Mooi River to the north and Hammersdale to the south.
• November figures are provisional.
Source: Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

GRAPH 2


COMPARATIVE CONFLICT FATALITY RATES South Africa & Pmb/Midlands 1985 - 1988



Sources
Midland figures: Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
National figures: Indicator Project South Africa, University of Natal, Durban.

INDUSTRIAL


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Basement Bargains versus Central Deals

Will Industrial Councils survive the 1990s?

By Kate Jowell, Graduate School of Business,
University of Cape Town

The first and oldest industrial council in South Africa opened its doors in 1919, well ahead of the 1924 legislation which allowed it to formalise its activities. Sixty years later in 1979, law reform allowed it to accept black union membership if it so wished. Whether it wished or not, it did not do so. By the end of 1989 the National Industrial Council for the Printing and Newspaper Industry was to close its doors permanently.

This bald case study glosses over sixty years of growth and expansion of the industrial council system. It was followed by ten years of intense debate and strategic manoeuvring by the many parties interested in the future of South Africa's statutory collective bargaining structure. Kate Jowell, a former member of the National Manpower Commission, documents the changing debate and analyses the strategic stances of the parties at the start of the second post-Wiehahn decade.

In retrospect, the events in South Africa's industrial relations life in 1979 seem full of irony. When Minister Fanie Botha presented the Wiehahn Commission's labour law reforms to, among others, conservative white workers, the major issue was 'will the white worker be swamped if black workers have access to industrial councils?'

In numerous forums, the Minister argued the need to bring black workers into unions that could be registered and subject to the control of Pretoria. A new industrial court would also ensure that white worker interests would be safeguarded against unfair black competition. And in the amending legislation that finally passed through parliament in 1979, a small insertion allowed the existing parties to an industrial council to veto any new member they disliked, another soothing sop to white anxiety.

In the event, the idea that unions could be 'controlled' by registration has been shown to be illusory. For instance, the irony about the industrial court was not to be revealed for several years - that the majority of its

litigants would be **black** workers cementing **their** rights, vis-a-vis employers. The immediate and most exquisite irony was that new black unions generally disdained to join industrial councils. On the contrary, as they correctly saw, the obvious strategy for a fledgling union was to secure a powerful base at the factories where it could build the visibility, credibility and the shop steward cadre necessary for growth and development. To seek access to centralised bargaining would be to invite domination by the established craft and semi-skilled unions.

In retrospect too, the approach of the establishment unions in the immediate post-1979 phase was, if not ironic, then arguably misguided. Since the turn of this century, legislation affecting the workplace has operated to create a divided working class in South Africa. Inevitably, wage bargaining at industrial councils, by white and coloured workers for their African colleagues, has resulted in job structures and wage gaps based more on colour differences than on the value of work. This was despite the prohibition in the old Industrial Conciliation Act on

TABLE 1
The Major Industrial Councils
Current Agreements in 1988/89

INDUSTRY	AREA	Employers Covered		Employees Covered ¹	
		1985	1988/89	1985	1988/89
Automobile	Eastern Cape	4	3	15 525	7 763
Building	Transvaal	2 987	1 339	54 337	41 991
Building	Western Cape	2 700	1 560	45 000	25 943
Building	Natal ²	1 907	1 213	28 663	21 056
Clothing	Cape	414	445	59 000	56 559
Clothing	Natal	n/a	413	n/a	43 886
Clothing	Transvaal	380	360	17 800	14 934
Iron, Steel, Engineering	National	8 926	9 847	365 649	355 829 ³
Motor	National	13 000	14 951	190 000	145 878
Sugar	Natal	16	16	10 600	9 305
Textile	National	45	30	10 000	8 214
TOTALS		30 379	30 177	786 574	731 358

Footnotes:

1 1988 figures: Agreement expired 31/12/88 - not renewed subsequently.

2 Two councils covering Port Natal, PMB and Northern Areas.

3 Of which approximately 50 000 are covered by house agreements negotiated under the auspices of the industrial council.

Sources:

Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tucsa). *Official Trade Union Directory and Industrial Relations Handbook, 1985-1986*.

Department of Manpower.

Industrial bargaining was a logical extension of the power base that the new unions established at plant level

racially-based wage differences. Establishment unions thus showed more interest in prohibiting the access of black workers to councils or in controlling the method or terms of that access, than in uniting the working class, now that it was legally feasible.

In those early post-Wiehahn days the main supporters of industrial councils - other than the state - were the employers. Centralised bargaining is a useful method of minimising wage competition between companies. It can also neutralise unions, by weakening their plant base and causing them to focus more on maintaining benefit funds and on bidding up the price of their members' skills, than on grassroots organising. So, indeed, did the new black unions argue. Employers were also aware that they were vulnerable to plant-level bargaining and strikes, given their lack of industrial relations expertise.

Strategic Shift

Within three years, however - by 1982 - a new strategy was emerging behind the newer union rhetoric about the 'evils of the system.' In carefully worded statements, in union newspapers and at union

conferences, industry unions such as Fosatu's National Union of Textile Workers (now Sactwu), the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union and the Metal and Allied Workers Union (now both merged into Numsa), floated the idea that centralised bargaining was not per se bad. It was only contaminated by the narrow vested interests that had shaped it. Indeed, it was argued, industry bargaining was a logical extension of the activities and power base that the new unions had by then established at plants around the country. It was also a logical step in the strategy outlined in Naawu Secretary Joe Foster's important speech at the Fosatu conference in 1982, to build a one-union power base in all the important industries in the country.


Plant bargaining was not rejected, however. This was to be retained and fought for as a necessary supplement to industry bargaining. Tactics were to be found to overcome the strategic weakness that strikes at the plant level are 'illegal' if there is a current industrial agreement.

The early working out of this strategy has resulted in the newer unions gaining access to several existing industrial councils. Employers have in some cases facilitated this by persuading established unions to accept the newcomers. The metal industry council, the largest in the country by far (see table 1), provides an important example. The employer body in that council, Seifsa, has pressed its members to resist plant bargaining since the 1970s. It has not been entirely successful but soon after Wiehahn, in 1980, first a Cusa union and then (in 1983) a Fosatu union applied for membership anyway. They were accepted although no permanent coalition has yet been forged between the newcomers and the old guard. Nor has their own coalition been stable. It has also taken five years for Numsa to sign the industry's annual agreement, despite its participation in council bargaining.

Elsewhere applicant unions have used the industrial court to lever them into councils, despite existing union resistance - with or without employer support - such as in the Transvaal knitting industry, and the (national) leather industry (ILJ Vol8:296). In at least one case a new union (then Nutw) won its battle to join a council by persuading the resisting union (Twiu) to merge with it (as in the Cape's cotton textile industry).

So far so good, for at least some of the parties. However, the shifts in employer

Levels of bargaining



Source: Seifsa News, September 1987.

approaches to industrial councils and in particular those of the state since 1983 may yet be more important for the future than shifts in union strategies.

Extending Agreements

Industrial council bargaining rests on the pluralist notion that industry self-government is the most effective way to establish wage levels and minimise industrial unrest. Every industrial council agreement may thus be made binding on the parties which were involved in its negotiation but also on those companies and unions/workers in the industry which were not. The legislation (LRA:section 48) provides only that the relevant minister may do so if he believes that it is expedient and if the parties to the negotiation are 'sufficiently representative' of the industry concerned.

No legal content has ever been given to the word 'expedient', however. An examination of the representativeness of the parties' to certain agreements extended and current in 1982 (see table 2) reveals no completely consistent approach in the past to measuring 'representativeness'. There are three possible measures:

- the percentage of employers belonging to the employer association(s) compared with the number in the industry;
- the percentage of employees belonging to unions on the council compared with total employment in the industry; and,
- the percentage of employees in the companies party to the employer

association compared with industry totals.

Given that council membership is open only to registered unions and that African workers could not join such unions until 1979, it has been impossible for party unions to claim the democratically accepted '50% plus one' representativeness of the industry. This has not stopped the state from extending agreements in industries where the union representation has been extremely low. It simply took as its main cue the fact that the party companies employed a majority of the industry's workforce, regardless it would seem, of whether those employers were themselves in a minority.

The early moral stance by black unions in the post-1970s was that they were not democratically bound to accept industrial council bargaining. Why shouldn't they push for plant bargaining, given that they had no involvement in the central bargains made on their behalf by minority white and coloured unions? By the time the practical dangers of such an argument became obvious to those unions, employers and the state had begun to challenge the right of industrial councils to seek extension of their agreements, on precisely the same grounds.

Setting Minima

Why, it was argued, should all employers be bound to pay a minimum wage for the industry when the parties negotiating such wages were not representative in the

Industrial councils rest on the pluralist notion that industry self-government is the most effective way to establish wage levels

Should plant-level bargaining force actual wages above industry minima?

generally accepted sense? Equally, why should an industry association composed of and dominated by a few large employers be allowed to impose such minima on the many smaller and - by crude, conventional wisdom definition - weaker employers? Why should minimum wages be provided at all, given that this interfered with the 'iron hand' of the market and was a form of regulation that crippled emerging businesses? And was it fair that plant-level bargaining could force actual wages above industry minima?

withdrawn from the metal council and had agreed to negotiate actual wages at its plant. Such action could of course be unfair, as the President of the court suggested in his addendum to his colleague's judgement (ILJ Vol9:995).

One of the hotel cases (1989) more firmly supported the right of unions to bargain for actual wages at the company level, by reinstating workers who had struck over such bargaining (Bawu v Asoka Hotel). It was not, said the court, illegal to strike over

Should industry minima be imposed on smaller employers at plant level?

TABLE 2
Selected Industrial Councils
Increase in representativeness, 1982-1985

Industry		Employers covered		Employees covered		TU members % of employees covered
		Parties %	Non-Parties %	In Party Co	In Non-Party Co	
Metal	1982	40	60	78	22	25
	1985	38	62	73	27	46
Motor	1982	56	44	49	51	34
	1985	56	44	73	37	51
Building	1982	22	78	75	25	19
	1985	27	73	73	27	17
Clothing	1982	47	53	74	26	89
	1985	44	56	71	29	92
Printing	1982	66	34	86	14	48
	1985	65	35	87	13	85
Tearoom Restaurant	1982	93	7	94	6	8
	1985	83	17	98	2	19

Sources:
National Manpower Commission. 'Report on an Investigation into levels of Collective Bargaining and Works Councils, the Registration of Trade Unions, Employers Organisations and Related Matters and the Industrial Court'. Pretoria: RP45/1984:76.
National Manpower Commission. 'Report on Dispute Settlement, levels of Collective Bargaining and Related Matters. Pretoria: RP115/1986:39.

Should industry minima regulate the 'iron hand' of the market?

The last question has been the subject of several industrial court decisions. In the celebrated case brought by Mawu (1985), Hart Aluminium argued that it was not unfair for it to decline to bargain at the plant level on actual wages, because it was subject to the metal industry's minimum agreement. The court did not declare such behaviour unfair but its conclusion that all bargaining should be voluntary did little to halt the spread of plant-level bargaining (ILJ Vol6:478).


More recently, there have been the Barlows Manufacturing decision and a series of cases in the hotel industry. In the first (1988), the court ruled that it would not be illegal for Numsa (then Mawu), to strike at Barlows Manufacturing in support of industry bargaining demands. This was despite the fact that the company had

actual wages only. Union strategy to secure the 'right' to strike at plant level within an organised industry has clearly been furthered (ILJ Vol10:167).

Employer Rethink

These events have led to a strategic rethink by many employers. One approach has been to encourage significant new unions to join industrial councils and in that event, either to resist plant bargaining or at least try to define with the unions the relationship of plant to industry issues.

Two interesting agreements have been concluded recently by Sactwu (then Actwusa) with the employers in the cotton textile industry in the Cape, and between the Cape Clothing Manufacturers



Association and the Cape Knitting Association on the one hand and the Garment and Allied Workers Union (now Sactwu) on the other. In both cases a further procedural agreement has been attached to the substantive industry agreement. In this the unions have agreed not to raise matters relating to remuneration with any company, at least not without the permission of the council. This meant in the Actwusa case that it must relinquish the plant bargaining arrangements it already had with certain employers. In return it has been granted closed shop rights across the industry.

A longer term strategy however, pushed with some vigour by at least one large conglomerate, namely Barlow Rand, is to continuously press government to justify its policy of extending agreements to non-parties as part of a general lobby for more deregulation. Several major companies have also withdrawn from industry associations because, they argue, they do not want to be subject to bargaining and possible strikes at both levels. Others argue that they do not support centralised bargaining in principle, that it is not in keeping with a decentralised management style. In so doing they have hastened the demise of several councils, one being the Printing and Newspaper Council.

The government has in a sense met such employers halfway in these longer term strategies, but from two different directions. The first started in November 1983, when Minister Fanie Botha briefed the 104 industrial councils then in operation on the

pressure being placed on him by employers who objected to being bound by industry minima. The warning was clear: it might not be possible to sustain the old measures of representativeness. For industrial councils, one might say, it would be a case of 'adapt or die'!

Deregulation Policy

The gathering economic policy shift in the 1980s towards more market freedom has also brought pressure for privatisation, deregulation and support of developing business. These pressures have come, not primarily from the Department of Manpower, but from the Economic Advisory Council and elsewhere in the government: from finance, commerce and industry, and even from the state departments driving the Joint Management Committees. They represent an approach that leans heavily towards market liberalism, away from the social democratic philosophy that underlies a system supporting collective bargaining, particularly at a national or industrial level.

This second type of pressure on industrial councils is explicit in the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act of 1986. The State President now has powers to suspend industry wage agreements and various protective clauses embodied in long-standing acts of parliament such as the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.

Industrial relations in the 1980s has been plagued by the tension between state policy and labour reforms, e.g. deregulation versus minimum wages

TABLE 3
The Metal Industry Council
Increase in representativeness, 1985-1989

Year	Employers Covered		Employees Covered	
	Number	% Represented by Seifsa	Number *	% Represented by Unions
1985	8 925	39	365 650	54
1989	9 850	38	355 825	67

Note:
* Includes approximately 45-50 000 employees covered by house agreements under the auspices of the council, hence percentages differ from table 2.

Source: Seifsa.

Privatisation leans heavily towards market liberalism, and away from the social democratic philosophy that underlies collective bargaining

Mr PW Botha first used these powers to 'deregulate' the business-supported Enterprise Centre which was opened at Kew, Johannesburg, in 1987. Since then a further 24 'industrial parks' operated by the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) have similarly applied for exemption, despite opposition from major employer and union groupings such as Seifsa and Cosatu.

Protagonists of this type of deregulation such as Mr Johann Naude of the SBDC argue that the businesses that operate in their parks are vastly different from those in the formal sector. They need an 'incubation environment' to become established before they can graduate to the formal sector, where they would have to abide by the formal rules.

As Seifsa has pointed out, however, more than 70% of its members employ less than 20 people, the cut-off point for the State President's definition of an 'informal' business. Many of them manufacture products similar to those produced by their de-regulated competitors. Those new businesses must pay only what the SBDC or Enterprise Centre managers advise are 'reasonable' wages and agree not to conduct activities 'detrimental to the health and safety of employees'. Legal sanctions have been waived.

Improvements

The impact of these various pressures on industrial councils since 1983 has been considerable. In the end, however, they coalesce into one main focus, on those two phrases contained in the Minister's lawful

discretion to extend council agreements: what **does** 'sufficiently representative' mean and how is expediency to be assessed?

Thus far the Department of Manpower has relied on the guidelines provided for it by the National Manpower Commission (NMC) in 1986. In the NMC's view there should be a presumption in favour of extension if:

- party trade unions represent at least 50% of the workers potentially affected;
- party employers employ at least 60% of the workers potentially affected;
- party employers represent a satisfactory proportion of employers, in terms of size and regional distribution as well.

The NMC also argued that, in interpreting and applying these guidelines, the Department could take into account:

- whether the representation of parties was improving or not; and
- how responsibly and acceptably the particular council dealt, currently and in the past, with applications for exemption from agreements.

No extension has yet been refused, though several councils have been given a deadline to improve their representativeness by early 1990. Others have made strenuous efforts to improve their numbers on one or both sides.

Probably the most spectacular improvement in employer representativeness has been that of the building industry council in Bloemfontein. Having fought and won a battle with the established unions on the council to withdraw from the council and reconstitute itself, the Master Builders Association has returned to the council as the Bloemfontein Building Industries Association (NH 11/2/444). It now claims to represent 85% of the industry's employers. It has achieved this by abandoning the old standards for membership of the association, such as a minimum labour force ('we can't behave like an elite club'); by becoming multi-racial (157 black and 149 white contractors); and by offering an intensive development programme for small contractors built around an SA Housing Trust project. Its latest agreement consists of eight pages - down from 48 - and stipulates only two wage categories - down from 52.

Seifsa's success in drawing the Cosatu and Nactu unions into the metal industry council and the growth of Numsa in particular has also greatly improved the

union representativeness on that council, as table three illustrates. The Director, Brian Angus, also estimates that it could improve employer representativeness to more than 50% if it could get the industry unions to agree to exempt from the agreement, those companies employing less than ten workers (1989).

Closures and Withdrawals

Some councils have closed down since 1979 under a variety of pressures, although the number of employees who have had the minimum wage floor cut from under their feet is relatively small (see table 4). Some 950 000 employees are estimated to be covered by council agreements, though this total includes various local government agreements.

The pending demise of the Printing and Newspaper Council is significant however, given its size, and the possible reasons are complex. This council may be unique in having operated with one party union since its inception in 1919, the South African Typographical Union (Satu). By dint of a closed shop agreement Satu has ensured that it has substantial representation in the industry and a strong hold on the contents of jobs in the industry as well as the rates.

In 1989 at least one large employer threatened to withdraw from the major employer party, the SA Printing and Allied Industries Federation (Sapaif), considerably weakening the council's representivity. In the same year Cosatu's Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppwawu), representing some 6 800 industry employees, applied for membership but was rejected by the council. Shortly afterwards, in June 1989, the Sapaif announced that it would withdraw from the council, leaving only the Newspaper Union, representing some 13% of the industry.

In its application to stay the withdrawal, Ppwawu argued before the industrial court that the purpose of the Federation's withdrawal was to avoid collective bargaining with Ppwawu. However, the executive director of the Sapaif, Chris Sykes, argued that a major factor was the increasingly diverse nature of businesses in the industry, which made unified bargaining difficult. The arguments have some validity, given that this industry has experienced the full impact of the explosion in computer technology, including in particular the appearance of word

processing and desk-top printing that have almost wiped out traditional printing methods. They may not be sufficient arguments, however. The metal industry is a powerful example of how the makers of battleships and safety pins, to use Halton Cheadle's neat turn of phrase, can hold together and support central bargaining, despite their diversity.

Another reported reason for the closure of the Printing and Newspaper Council was the overload on members of the various regional joint boards whose job it was to handle industry disputes. These disputes ran at times, and in some areas, at one a day, necessitating five to six hours a week of meetings. At the regional level the load tended to fall on managers from the medium to smaller firms in the industry who had less resources (and taste?) for the job.

The court had not ruled on the Ppwawu application when this edition of *Indicator SA* went to press. Nor is it possible to tell at this stage where the balance of power lies among the various parties.

Scenarios

How far will the government exponents of a more free labour market be able to push their policies before hitting the

Several major companies have withdrawn from industry associations because they do not want to be subject to bargaining at both levels

TABLE 4
The Demise of Industrial Councils, 1985-1989

Defunct Industry Council	Area	as at 1985	
		Employers covered	Employees covered
Baking	Cape	170	3 400
	PE/Uitenhage	21	812
	Durban	?	?
Brewing	Pretoria	?	?
	Cape	1	420
	Witwatersrand	1	?
Chemicals	Cape	20	1 500
	Tvl (1987)	180	10 500
Dairy (National)	Verwoerdburg	50	7 000
Liquor and Catering	Pretoria	23*	2 000*
	Wits & Vereeniging	200*	12 000*
Pulp and Paper	National	19	10 000*
	Total of known figures	684	47 212

Note
* These are approximate figures.

Sources:
Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tuusa) *Official Trade Union Directory and Industrial Relations Handbook, 1985-1986*.
Various Government Gazettes since 1985.
Selected employers associations.

The Cosatu unions are relentlessly pursuing centralised bargaining, with or without a statutory structure such as an industrial council

countervailing power of collective self-interest? Will established unions seek a coalition with the newer black unions to protect their wider joint interests in central bargaining? How far will the influence of the decentralised bargaining supporters among management really spread? Barlow Rand, the group which accounts for some 10% of South Africa's gross domestic product in any one year is a formidable protagonist of this principle, though its chief formulator of industrial relations policy, Mr Andre Lamprecht, admits that not all of its companies have yet chosen to follow this route.

The Cosatu unions are relentlessly pursuing centralised bargaining on a number of fronts, with or without a statutory structure such as an industrial council. They have thus far failed in the oil industry (Cwiu), but achieved partial success in the automobile industry following the recent round of joint negotiations by Numsa with every major manufacturer except Delta Corporation. They are gradually securing company-wide bargaining in the food industry, for example at SA Breweries (Fawu), and more recently Premier Milling, as a prelude to seeking an industry-wide national bargaining forum of some kind. The Num remains committed to

central bargaining in the mining industry, though the much discussed industrial council for that industry is not much nearer achievement than when it was first recommended by the Wiehahn Commission in 1979 (para 3.16.1).

The old Nutw has gone a long way towards its goal of national bargaining for the combined clothing, textile and leather industries, via its metamorphosis into, first Actwusa and now Sactwu, absorbing or merging with various textile and clothing unions along the way and securing membership of the separate councils. Finally, the Tgwu has followed its success at arbitration over central bargaining at Cargo Carriers with similar negotiated agreements with other carriers.

For Mr Jan Hiemstra, a Barlow Rand labour specialist, the position is reasonably clear: 'The industrial council has survived the first post-Wiehahn decade. I don't think it will see out the second decade'. He may well be right, in theory. The capacity of our society to surprise us with its ironies may yet prove him wrong, however, in practice. The parties to industrial relations are nothing if not creative and adaptable. ~~DDA~~


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ACRONYMS

- Actwusa Allied Clothing and Textile Workers Union of SA
 Bawu Black Allied Workers Union
 Cosatu Congress of SA Trade Unions
 Cwiu Chemical Workers Industrial Union
 Cusa Council of Unions of SA
 Fawu Food and Allied Workers Union
 Fosatu Federation of SA Trade Unions
 Gawu Garment and Allied Workers Union
 ILJ Industrial Law Journal
 LRA Labour Relations Act
 Mawu Metal and Allied Workers Union
 Naawu National Automobile and Allied Workers Union
 Nactu National Congress of Trade Unions
 NMC National Manpower Commission
 Num National Union of Mineworkers
 Numsa National Union of Metalworkers of SA
 Nutw National Union of Textile Workers
 Ppwawu Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union
 Sactwu SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union
 Sapaif SA Printing and Allied Industries Federation
 Satu SA Typographical Union
 SBDC Small Business Development Corporation
 Seifsa Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of SA
 Tgwu Transport and General Workers Union
 Twiu Textile Workers Industrial Union

CONSENSUS MANAGEMENT



TOWARDS A NEW CORPORATE CULTURE

By Don Mkhwanazi,
National President, Black Management Forum

In classical terms, corporate culture refers largely to the rituals, norms and practices within corporations. However, if it is defined in this narrow sense, we still need to recognise and understand the extent to which the socio-political and historical norms of a particular community or nation will have an impact on the corporation. Put simply, the corporate norms and practices are a product of those values and belief systems that are dominant in any nation. They are by no means static, and will change over time. Neither are they immune to influences from other parts of the world.

The important factors that have shaped corporate culture in South Africa would be the norms and practices of European or American corporations, both historically as well as presently. According to Professor James Leatt, 'Corporate culture is a shorthand way of saying two things: first, that a corporation is more than a rational form of organisation with its own structure and technology; it has symbols, ideologies, a particular language, beliefs, rituals and myths. Second, that corporate culture can be managed and therefore also changed' (1988 BMF address).

In the Black Management Forum (BMF) it has been argued that the beliefs and values of (mainly) Europeans and the exploitative traditions of European colonialism have determined the general norms and practices of South African corporations, e.g. the Protestant work ethic, the European ethic about the relationship between man, his environment and technology, etc. What emerges is the fundamentally exploitative and racial way in which these ethics have been applied in South Africa. At no stage have corporations sought to incorporate and

use positively the norms and practices of indigenous South Africans.


We have sought to mould where possible the corporate practices of South Africa in accordance with those of the West. More importantly, where we have had to look inward, i.e. at South Africa, we have sought to use largely those values and norms that mainly cater for white interests. To a great extent this has historically benefited and continues to disproportionately favour a particular segment of our nation. The norms and practices that impact on the reward system therefore have no real legitimacy in terms of broad-based support from the total community.

Black Dominance

South Africa suffers from a high manager/subordinate ratio compared to other countries in the West. We experience an acute shortage of skilled manpower in the managerial and technical fields. In short, it has become very clear that the majority of the future managers at all levels will have to come from the black population.

In the consumer field blacks are also dominating a number of major markets, and will continue to do so in the future. If we agree that the main function of business is to satisfy consumer needs and, in the process, to maximise shareholder wealth, then we need to understand the consumer and the market properly. This includes consumer perceptions and attitudes, which are influenced by the values and norms of the surrounding community. In short, the new consumer and new markets, which will

Corporate norms and practices in South Africa are a product of dominant white colonial values and belief systems



Black South Africans have made little headway in the corridors of corporate power, despite talk of black advancement and affirmative action

be predominantly black will impact on the way we do business. Corporate philosophy, in turn, will influence consumer culture.

In the mid- to late- 1970s we started to hear about concepts such as black advancement, upward mobility of blacks, affirmative action, reverse discrimination, equal opportunity, equity, equalising equal opportunity, etc. Since these programmes were introduced, however, there has not been much headway by blacks in the corridors of corporate power (see Andrews, Schlemmer and others). Professor Sam Zondi, the only black person serving on the Margo Tax Commission, believes that, 'The political philosophy of white supremacy is the main obstacle to black advancement, although there are a number of stumbling blocks, *cultural factors*, poor education and so on'.

Most commentators mention cultural factors in their analysis of obstacles to black advancement. Emphasis is placed on the supposed problems and barriers that exist due to different cultures, and the supposed inability of people from different cultures to interact positively and constructively. However, noted researchers such as Schlemmer and Nel have shown that culture per se is not a major obstacle. It is rather the lack of exposure of different cultures to each other that becomes the

problem. Culture or cultural differences cannot be used as a justification for failure in advancing blacks through the corporate structure.

The former chairman of Shell, John Wilson, has argued that, 'A distinction should be made between domestic and business culture. In a multi-racial and multi-cultural South Africa, Jews, Greeks, Afrikaners, Chinese, English and a host of other nationalities work together whilst pursuing very different lifestyles and customs during non-working hours. One never hears of their cultural differences affecting performance. Why should the black person's lifestyle and culture be judged as an impediment to production, advancement and corporate loyalty?' What is also important in the definition of culture is the transient and dynamic nature of culture.

The message is clear - we must create opportunities for the exposure of different cultures to each other.

Missed Opportunities

Preoccupation with cultural differences has resulted in a number of missed profit opportunities for corporate South Africa. Much emphasis is placed on black

affiliation needs rather than on achievement needs, e.g. it is argued blacks are used to doing things by group consensus, acting slowly and non-individualistically. Whether this is true or not is open to debate. But if it were true, how is this affiliation need harnessed positively for productivity?

A non-individualistic and collective spirit is more suited to production than individualism. One only has to think about the Japanese economic success: 'The Japanese learnt the art of consensus management at the business schools of the West and applied it to the chagrin of Western economies' (Wilson). Reuel Khoza, a Director of BMF, concurs when he says that, 'Whites talk a lot about blacks' lack of competitive spirit, forgetting that they can learn a lot from our team spirit. In marketing, we have seen thousands of missed profit opportunities in this regard'.

Most building societies, for instance, refuse to accept the income of all members of the black household for a bond loan application. Moses Leoka, a leading management consultant, says, 'Economic necessities and, in particular, years of disillusionment with financial institutions prompted blacks to evolve financial schemes of their own. This practice has grown into a multi-million rand industry. However, only those institutions that take the trouble to understand the socio-economic background, and devise new products and services to meet the financial needs at the level of blacks' own schemes can hope to have a piece of this large and growing cake'.

The *stokvels*, *mshonisas* and *spaza shops* represent a response by blacks to neglected needs and the application of first world perceptions to a third world environment, based on white values, norms and beliefs. At no stage have corporations in South Africa sought to incorporate or use positively the values and beliefs, the norms and practices, of indigenous South Africans. Yet it is very clear that there are a number of attributes in their culture that can be tapped for the maximisation of shareholder wealth. In short, history has shown that cultural differences between people are not an impediment but a challenge to the successful manager.

Non-Racial Norms

Corporate culture can find expression in human resources utilisation and in development, promotion and evaluation

systems, labour relations and corporate social responsibility. In moving towards a new corporate culture in these areas, we have to ask ourselves some fundamental questions. To what extent are corporations willing to re-evaluate their norms and practices so as to benefit all? Have we moved away from attempts to inculcate values and belief systems that have hitherto had as heroes those who have benefited through exploitative mechanisms, with no legitimacy?

To succeed, the new corporate culture must incorporate the following critical elements:

- a fundamental shift from a racial to a non-racial value system. (The new corporate culture will not fall into a trap of either seeking to 'Westernise the workforce' or 'Africanise the workplace');
- the meaningful empowerment of black people within corporate South Africa;
- an approach to macro-political and socio-economic issues that liberates all, balancing power inequalities and other disparities;
- the identification of 'heroes' that are meaningful to all within corporate South Africa, not only to the small segment.

As long as South African corporate culture is based on white Western norms and practices, black managers will never take their rightful place at all levels of management. Black or indigenous African culture offers a number of values and beliefs that can be used effectively and positively in the creation of a new corporate culture for the benefit not only of corporate South Africa but the whole country. Systematic research should be conducted to identify all those aspects of African culture that can be positively incorporated into a new corporate culture for South Africa. Thus the Black Management Forum has decided to conduct an in-depth study in this new area.

The late Professor Jill Nattrass said, 'South Africa should evolve its own value system which is neither black nor white. Blacks should be circumspect and avoid distorted white value systems; equally, whites should derive lessons from black traditional practices such as learning how blacks make decisions through a process of consensus'. We must create a new South African corporate culture that will build one nation - a corporate culture that will incorporate a new spirit of our new South Africanism. **IPWA**

Corporate preoccupation with cultural differences has resulted in a number of missed profit opportunities

The stokvels, mshonisas and spaza shops are indigenous commercial responses by black people to corporate neglect of their needs

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
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
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
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