


# POLITICAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Data Trends 1984-1988



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
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# POLITICAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Data Trends 1984 - 1988

Research Co-ordinators

Mark Bennett and Deborah Quin



December 1988

An Indicator SA Issue Focus

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# CONFLICT PRECURSORS & PROCESSES

## National Trends 1984 – 1988

Mark Bennett & Deborah Quin

The overt political conflict that has wracked South Africa since late 1984 has in many ways been little different from the violent cycles that have affected our deeply divided society in previous decades. The current struggle by (mainly) black anti-apartheid organisations and mobilised township communities has witnessed a familiar replay of the tactics of non-collaboration and defiant street protests against the white state's all-powerful civil and security apparatus.

What distinguishes the current conflict from previous cycles of political violence at one level is the scale of the conflict – measured in terms of its ferocity, duration and national spread – which has been greater than ever before in South African history. If put together, in terms of the number of people killed, those injured and detained, school and mandays lost through stayaway actions, and the value of public and private property damages during riots in the past four years, the human and socio-economic losses would far exceed those sustained during the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the 1960 Sharpeville crisis, the Soweto student rebellion of 1976-77 and the education boycotts of the early 1980s. At another level, organisational support and mobilisation by extra-parliamentary groups reached an all-time peak during the insurrectionary phase of 1985-86 in traditionally volatile regions.

### Conflict Precursors

It has been commonly held that South Africa's current cycle of political violence began in September 1984 when Vaal Triangle residents took to the streets to protest rent increases imposed by the Lekoa Town Council. The government, opposition politicians, the media and many research groups have shared this view. The causal emphasis placed on the rent protests of 3 September 1984, although convenient and logical obscures the fact that repressive violence has been a persistent feature of South African society for decades; even though there appear to have been some periods of relative quiescence.

If one were to search for the early rumblings on the surface of the recent 'popular uprising' though, one would have to look at the sporadic confrontations that occurred between an emerging organisational alliance

of civic associations, protesting scholars and anti-apartheid activists, and the authorities from mid-1983 onwards (see Swilling article). The ominous clouds of rising discontent were evident in four broad areas:

- Education

By August 1983 it was estimated that over 10 000 African pupils from more than 25 schools nationwide had been involved in some form of class boycott or disturbances during that year. Student grievances centred mainly on specific educational issues, e.g. transfers of popular teachers, the lack of educational facilities, age limit readmission restrictions, corporal punishment, calls for autonomous Student Representative Councils (SRCs), etc. Later, in the aftermath of police interventions to quell demonstrations, student protests assumed a more direct political content (see Schlemmer article).

- Civic Issues

Sporadic disturbances occurred in a number of urban African areas during 1983. The main triggers of discontent were related to urban African housing issues. In some Natal townships, violence broke out when the Port Natal Administration Board announced that house rents would increase by between 40 and 80 percent. In some Transvaal townships, tensions evolved when local authorities increased rentals and began to destroy squatter homes. In the Cape Peninsula, persistent demolition raids by authorities wishing to prevent the growth of large squatter settlements resulted in a series of skirmishes between the authorities and black residents. A bus boycott initiated by Mdantsane (Ciskei) residents also caused considerable tensions (see Transport Boycotts: Appendix).

- National Reforms

In 1983 critical elements of the government's reform programme came to a head. Firstly, in the August constitutional referendum, white voters, despite considerable warnings from black leaders that the new tricameral dispensation did not meet black aspirations, gave Mr PW Botha a mandate to proceed. Africans, the government announced, were able to enjoy political

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rights within homeland structures and through local councils in urban areas. Elections for the black local authorities, which were characterised by numerous incidents of violence, were held in November/December 1983 but returned dismally low polls (see BLA data base: Appendix). The government's intention to further develop the homeland system also created triggers for conflict in urban areas. For example, in Natal there were confrontations between Inkatha supporters and the residents of Durban's Lamontville township who refused to be incorporated into KwaZulu.

- **Organisational Growth**

During 1983 there was a significant growth of anti-apartheid organisations and black trade unions. The black consciousness aligned National Forum (NF, formed 11-12/6/83) and the Freedom Charter orientated United Democratic Front (UDF, formed 20/8/83) aimed to become umbrella type organisations which would link up local and national level grievances to mobilise opposition against Pretoria (see Phillips; Zulu). During 1983 factions of the black union movement consolidated and extended their organisational structures. The development and strengthening of internal organisation by a range of groups was a critical pre-condition for the successful conduct of the range of opposition activities and campaigns in the volatile period that was to follow.

## **Non-collaboration Politics**

When African schools re-opened in January 1984 it was abundantly clear that many of the demands put forward by scholars in previous years were still on their agenda. The first boycotts to affect African schools occurred in Atteridgeville/Saulsville (Pretoria) where pupils protested a range of general educational issues – particularly the age limit readmission restrictions. A massive boycott also erupted in Cradock where pupils objected to the transfer of activist teacher, Matthew Goniwe, to Graaff-Reinet. It was in the course of these boycotts that the first two recorded fatalities in political violence in the recent cycle of revolt occurred. The first, Emma Sathekga (15), was killed by police on school premises in Atteridgeville (13/2/84); while the second, Zebenzile Jacobs (17), was stabbed to death in Cradock's Ilingelihle township (15/4/84).

Later in the year more African pupils, mainly from the Eastern Cape and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) areas, began boycotting classes over a combination of specific educational and indirect political issues, e.g. rent hikes and two General Sales Tax (GST) increases. By the end of the second term (June 1984) it was estimated that more than 30 000 pupils were staying away from classes on a semi-permanent basis. Although government ministries did attempt to negotiate a solution to the school impasse with student leaders, no substantive solutions were arrived at.

In August 1984 classroom boycotts intensified when Indian and coloured pupils protested the separate elections for the two new ethnic houses of parliament established in terms of the new constitution. During this brief period it was estimated that more than 630 000

coloured pupils and thousands of Indian pupils stayed away from classes. Lectures at many tertiary institutions were also interrupted.

The black opposition campaign for a boycott of the tricameral parliamentary elections climaxed on the two polling days. In preceding months the UDF's 'One Million Signatures Campaign', which aimed to demonstrate popular opposition to the constitution, failed to achieve its target although a sizeable number of signatures were collected for the petition. Voter turnout in both polls was poor (see Tricameral Data Base: Appendix). Despite many activists being detained and arrested prior to the elections, the boycott lobby claimed a victory in effectively utilising the new political space that had opened up during the tricameral campaigns.

Five of the six UDF and Natal Indian Congress (NIC) election boycott leaders who escaped the threat of detention by taking refuge in the British consulate in Durban (13/9/84), were detained on their departure and arraigned on treason charges with a number of other activists. Their presence in the consulate dramatically increased tensions between Pretoria and London, while lending the internal anti-apartheid alliance a renewed international profile. Subsequently, the repressive strategies used by South Africa to control township dissidents severely harmed both diplomatic and economic links with the international community.

During July and August 1984 persistent confrontations, triggered by impending rent increases, occurred between the police and African residents of several Orange Free State townships – notably Tumahole (Parys) and Thabong (Welkom). By September these clashes had erupted into sustained street riots in several African residential areas in the province (see Chaskalson & Seekings: article No1). The targets of black anger were mainly school buildings and property belonging to the black local authorities and African town councillors. The newly elected councillors were placed in the invidious position of having to impose rent increases to keep their self-financing municipalities functioning, even though they were elected into office on extremely low polls and were thus not regarded as legitimate representatives by their own communities (see BLA data base: Appendix).

In support of the demand that house rents and service charges be reduced, thousands of residents in the Vaal Triangle townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Bophelong, Zamdela and Boipatong (all five under the jurisdiction of the Lekoa Town Council), refused to pay rent (from 1/9/84), buy goods from African councillor-owned businesses and stayed away from work (1-2/9/84). Discontent was such that there were calls for councillors to resign, and then, on 3 September, a number of councillors, their homes and their businesses were physically attacked by angry crowds.

The rent protests soon spread to townships in the Pretoria-Johannesburg complex (see Chaskalson & Seekings: article No2). However, the work stayaways called in Soweto (17-18/9/84) and KwaThema (22/10/84), mainly to protest rent and GST hikes, but also to press for the resignation of councillors, the release of detainees and police non-interference in the

funerals of 'unrest' victims, met with a mediocre worker response at this stage of the conflict.

The organisational efforts of Transvaal communities culminated when 37 community, student and labour organisations – under the umbrella of the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee – organised a two-day work boycott in the PWV region. The regionalised stay-at-home (5-6/11/84) involved more than 500 000 workers on each day and was a startling success. Although none of the community demands were met, township civic and student groups' insistence on a further work boycott was rebuffed by the country's two largest African labour bodies – the (then) Federation of South African Trade Unions and the Council of Unions of South Africa. They were reluctant to move out of the factories and commit themselves to a political arena, where they knew they would be extremely vulnerable to state repression. The UDF and its affiliates then instituted a 'Black Christmas' campaign, linked to a consumer boycott, to focus protest on fatalities and detentions.

## State Response

In order to deal with the growing rebellion in African residential areas the state initiated a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, it attempted to ameliorate the 'frustrations' of Africans by 'accelerating' political reforms – the 'win hearts and minds' (WHAM) strategy (see Swilling article). On this terrain the government indicated that it was prepared, among other issues, to:

- establish a central negotiating forum for Africans;
- remove influx controls and end forced removals; and,
- release Nelson Mandela and other long-term political prisoners if they renounced violence as a strategy for political change.

Secondly, the government continued to suppress opposition mobilisation through a combination of security force action and legislative sanction. In terms of ISA regulations, large numbers of people were arbitrarily detained, meetings banned and organisations restricted; while in an effort to eradicate all street demonstrations and attacks on state personnel and property, large numbers of police (and later soldiers) were deployed, almost on a permanent basis, within all riot-torn townships. In one of the first operations of its kind more than 7 000 police and army personnel were used in a combined operation ('Palmiet') in Sebokeng (23/10/84), leading to 350 arrests.

Various security actions by personnel inexperienced in riot control techniques had many tragic consequences. In March 1985 a clash between the police and mourners on their way to a funeral resulted in the killing of 20 Langa (Uitenhage) residents, ironically on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the police shooting of 69 pass protesters in Sharpeville (21/3/60). The Kannemeyer Commission, which reported in June 1985, found that no single person could be held responsible for the Langa deaths. In mid-February 1985, 18 Crossroads (Cape Town) residents were killed in squatter/police confrontations during protests over an

impending forced removal to the Khayelitsha township. Between January and 20 July 1985 it was estimated that more than 300 township residents died in political conflict – over half of them in security actions (see Fatality Data Base: Zulu article). In this pre-emergency period large numbers of activists were detained.

In an effort to prevent further African National Congress (ANC) guerilla infiltration into South Africa the government concluded a non-aggression pact – the 'Nkomati Accord' – with the Mozambican government (16/3/84). In terms of the agreement Mozambique undertook to expel all ANC personnel from within its borders, while South Africa agreed to cease assisting the rebel MNR movement. Notwithstanding the accord, the low intensity sabotage campaign conducted by the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) continued to spread (see ANC Data Bases: Phillips article).

## Issues Coalesce

The underlying causes of the boycotts at African schools were still left unresolved when they re-opened in 1985. In the first academic term there were numerous attempts by pupils, parents, community and scholar organisations (some under the auspices of the National Co-ordinating Committee of Parents' Committees) and the educational authorities to negotiate a general return to classes. The cancellation of the transfer of popular 'activist' teachers and the release from detention of some student leaders failed to stop the boycott.

Indeed, during the second term of 1985 the list of scholar grievances and demands grew so dramatically, that any form of negotiated return became virtually impossible. Nationally, educational issues began to take second place to politically motivated demands, e.g. for the release of detained scholars and political prisoners, an end to police and army activity within townships, the scrapping of rent increases, etc. By May 1985 it was estimated that at least 114 000 pupils from about 130 schools were out on boycott. In response to some sustained boycotts the Department of Education and Training (DET) suspended activist pupils whom they argued were orchestrating classroom stayaways, and closed some schools altogether.

During the first seven months of 1985 it became evident that the African labour movement would be unable to avoid becoming directly involved in the escalating political conflict. Consequently, in order to express dissatisfaction with government actions and policy some unions and union federations initiated and lent support to 'non-shopfloor' based campaigns run by community organisations. Many union shop stewards immersed themselves in the civic affairs of the townships in which they lived.

The death of Chemical Workers Industrial Union official, Andries Raditsela, shortly after his release from police custody in early May 1985, resulted in nationwide workstoppages involving more than 107 000 workers. His death underscored the labour movement's inability to avoid becoming embroiled in the turmoil. Three other union organised work stayaways and stoppages affected

production in commerce and industry: in the PE/Uitenhage region to commemorate the police shootings of Langa residents (28/3/85); for nationwide May Day celebrations (1/5/85); and in Pietermaritzburg to win the reinstatement of 970 dismissed BTR-Sarmcol workers (18/7/85). The latter stayaway was partly responsible for fuelling tensions between Cosatu and Inkatha supporters in the Natal region at a later stage.

It was between late 1984 and mid-1985 that overt differences in the strategies and tactics of extra-parliamentary opposition groups crystallised – thus setting the foundations for internecine conflicts. The visit to South Africa by US Senator, Edward Kennedy (5-13/1/85), on the invitation of UDF patrons Alan Boesak and

Desmond Tutu was responsible for publicly exposing the deep divisions between the charterist (UDF) and black consciousness (NF) supporters. Kennedy's tour was dogged by Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) demonstrations, much to the chagrin of the UDF but to the applause of the government. After May the intense rivalry between the two opposition camps erupted into open feuding in many regions – although both parties alleged that 'state agents' were fuelling the conflict (see Fatality Data Base: Zulu article).

Local community organisations, some operating under the banner of the UDF, were active in many of the country's townships in this pre-emergency phase. All means available were used to mobilise people against the security forces and the government, e.g. the mass funerals for 'unrest' victims, in KwaThema attended by 50 000 residents, Cradock by 40 000, Port Elizabeth by 7 000 and Brakpan by 30 000. At some of these funerals the banned South African Communist Party was openly eulogised, while the flag of the Soviet Union was prominently displayed. Many African residential areas in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal became 'ungovernable' between 1985 and 1986. Anti-apartheid activists were in the process of substituting state structures with organs of 'people's power' – including street, block and area committees, as well as 'people's courts' (see Morris article).

The state could not guarantee the safety of African town councillors and policemen. In response to sustained attacks many fled their homes, and took refuge in barrack-like settlements in other non-volatile

areas. The assaults on local government officials occurred in all parts of the country and by mid-1985 at least 112 town and village councillors (including 14 mayors) had resigned. From January 1985 until the imposition of the select state of emergency (21/7/85), 12 policemen and councillors were killed and more than 101 injured in attacks. The age-old system of indirect rule and elite co-optation appeared to be collapsing.

## Regional Emergency

In an effort to deal with this unstable climate, the

government declared a select state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts (all in the Cape and PWV regions) on 21 July 1985. The security forces (which were to include personnel from the SAP, SADF, SA railways police, prisons service, National Intelligence Service, homeland police and defence forces, and municipal protection services) were quick to implement the vast arsenal of emergency powers conferred upon them by the Public Safety Act. Hundreds of anti-apartheid activists in the affected areas were

detained, meetings banned, organisations restricted and curfews imposed. By the end of October 1985 it was estimated that more than 5 300 people had been detained in terms of emergency laws – in non-emergency areas activists continued to be detained under the ISA (see detentions Data Base: Swilling). As the funerals of 'unrest' victims remained a focus for political mobilisation, blanket restrictions were imposed upon them. In late August 1985 the UDF's largest active affiliate, the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) was banned.

The management of the media became crucial to the state from September 1985 onwards. After ignoring a request from the Commissioner of Police to scale down 'unrest' reportage, formal restrictions were imposed upon journalists entering Soweto. Later, the media was denied access to designated 'unrest areas' in the Cape Peninsula. Reportage of township conflicts from then onwards became even more sketchy as journalists were compelled to make use of 'official' police accounts of all

### Reviving the Stayaway Strike

1984 to 16 June 1988

Work Stayaway Organisers	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	TOT
Trade unions		4	4	2	1	11
National movements	1					1
Regional civics		13	25	2	1	41
Alliances	3	4	4	3	3	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>70</b>

**Note**  
It is virtually impossible to precisely identify who was responsible for organising each stayaway. 'Guesstimate' distinctions have to be made between those groupings who initiated the idea of a boycott, the actual organisers, and those groups which lent organisational support to the protest call.

political violence (see Tomaselli article).

The spiral of violence escalated despite the imposition of the emergency, with many previously unaffected 'rural' (homeland) areas being wracked by conflict as well (see Makanjee article). The Indicator Project SA recorded 179 deaths in political violence in August 1985, 96 in September, 112 in October, 98 in November and 95 in December (see accompanying graphs). The massive, and often fatal, confrontations between UDF and Azapo supporters continued in Paarl, Soweto and the Eastern Cape despite several attempts at negotiating a truce. It is in this period that the spectre of vigilantism emerged on a grand scale. Almost simultaneously, anti-apartheid campaigners and unionists became the victims of mysterious hit-squads in Thabong (known as the Phakathis and/or A-Team), Tumahole (the A-Team), Natal (the Amabutho, A-Team), KwaNdebele (the Mbokodo), the Cape Peninsula's squatter camps (the Fathers, Witdoeke), Leandra (the Russians, Concerned Citizens), New Brighton (the Witdoeke), Soweto (Russians, Makabase, 'Inkatha' – not related to Buthelezi's movement), and in Tembisa (the Smart Centers).

Natal, which until July 1985 had been left relatively unscathed by political violence, experienced a regional explosion after the assassination of UDF activist lawyer Victoria Mxenge at the beginning of August. During the 'Durban riots' (roughly between 1-15/8/85) at least 70 people were killed – 37 in police actions and the rest in intra-oppositional feuds between Inkatha and UDF supporters (see Booth; Hartley articles).

In the latter half of 1985 three security actions occurred which further impaired the image of the security forces and the Pretoria government, locally and internationally (see accompanying list of major incidents):

- In mid-August 19 people were killed and 138 injured in East London's Duncan Village after rumours that the township would be incorporated into the Ciskei homeland.
- In the Cape Peninsula security force personnel concealed in crates on the back of a truck ambushed anti-apartheid protesters (the 'Trojan Horse' incident) in Athlone killing three youths and wounding 19 others (15/10/85). In March 1988 an inquest found a police lieutenant and his special task-force negligent.
- In Mamelodi (Pretoria) 17 residents were killed by the police during a work stayaway to protest the continued army presence in the township, high rents and restrictions on 'unrest' funerals (21/11/85).

In the courts human rights lawyers were moderately successful in rolling back the extensive powers granted to the security forces (see Security Legislation: Appendix), notably important sections relating to detentions. Interdicts were also granted in favour of township applicants, preventing the security forces from unlawfully interfering with them. In December 1985 the first major state attempt to prove a conspiracy behind the current political violence collapsed in the Natal Supreme Court when all treason charges were dropped against 12 of the 16 trialists (some of those released were the activists who had holed-up in the British

Consulate in Durban). The remaining four, all South African Allied Worker Union (Saawu) officials, had to wait until June 1986 before all charges against them were withdrawn. In the interim they were prevented, as were the original 12, from participating in any opposition activities.

## All the Boycotts

The regional emergency served to intensify the boycotts of schools and tertiary institutions, particularly in the Eastern and Western Cape, the Transvaal and the OFS, where pupils rallied under the banner of 'liberation before education'. Coloured schools in the Cape Peninsula were severely affected by the boycotts, which almost rivalled those of 1984. After six weeks of pupil absenteeism, the coloured Minister of Education, Carter Ebrahim, closed 464 schools which had about 360 000 pupils enrolled; in Mamelodi (Pretoria) sustained boycotts resulted in the DET closing ten schools. Anti-apartheid opposition was divided on the boycott issue and periodic battles occurred between pro- and anti-boycott students in many centres.


As 1985 drew to a close many black parents feared their children would again miss all tuition in the forthcoming year, while the government's security officials worried about the consequences of thousands of students on the streets. Poor attendance at matriculation examinations in Cape Peninsula, Eastern Cape and Soweto schools did not augur well for both parties. In an initiative aimed at resolving the impasse, the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC), which comprised a number of community organisations, convened a congress in late December. The SPCC resolved that pupils would return to classes in 1986 on condition that: the emergency was ended, the army removed from townships, 1985 examinations rescheduled for March 1986, certain teachers be reinstated, and students be allowed to form elected SRCs. The decisions of the SPCC were then ratified at a meeting in Port Elizabeth attended by 40 000 residents in January 1986.

In 1986 the DET reopened all schools, deciding it would allow the disrupted 1985 examinations to be written in February and let the 1986 academic year begin in March. Although by late January most pupils had returned to classes in the Cape Peninsula and the OFS, attendance remained low in the Eastern Cape, Soweto and Shoshanguve (near Pretoria). While the sustained national boycott appeared to have ended, sporadic short-duration boycotts triggered by pupils wishing to attend the funerals of 'unrest' victims, demanding free educational stationery, protesting against high examination failure rates, etc., continued at black schools.

The consumer boycott tactic used intermittently by African township residents against white and African 'collaborator' owned businesses in Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Cradock areas spread to the Cape Peninsula, Eastern Cape, Pretoria-Witwatersrand region, OFS and Natal (see Consumer Boycotts: National Strategies). Many of the boycotts, which were

# Data Base

## FATALITIES IN POLITICAL CONFLICT




Monthly Fatalities & Major Incidents, January 1984 - June 1988

Year	TOTAL MONTHLY DEATH TOLL	MAJOR INCIDENTS DATE	PLACE	FATALITIES	DETAILS
1984					
Sept - Dec	149	3-4 Sept	Vaal Triangle	26	Rioting during rent protests
1985					
January		5			
February	32	18/19 Feb	Crossroads (CT)	18	Police actions
March	74	21 Mar	Langa (Uitenhage)	20	Police open fire on marchers
April	53				
May	67				
June	36	26 Jun	Duduza/Tsakane/ KwaThema	10	Activists use booby-trap grenades
July	75				
August	179	5-14 Aug	Durban townships	70	Police, amabutho & activist clash
		12-14 Aug	Duncan Village	19	Police actions
		22 Aug	Aliwal North	7	Police actions
		28-31 Aug	Cape Town	31	Rioting after Mandela march
September	96				
October	112	15 Oct	Athlone	3	'Trojan Horse' ambush
November	98	18 Nov	Queenstown	14	Police shootings at meeting
		21 Nov	Mamelodi	17	Police shootings at meeting
December	95	30 Dec	Guguletu	11	'Fathers/comrades' clashes
TOTAL DEATH TOLL FOR YEAR: 922					
1986					
January	115	1-2 Jan	Moutse (KwaNdebele)	20	Anti-independence clashes
February	103	18 Feb	Alexandra	13	Police & resident clashes
March	153	3 Mar	Guguletu	7	Alleged ANC guerillas in police ambush
		20 Mar	New Crossroads	7	'Fathers/comrades' clashes
		26 Mar	Winterveld	11	Bop police shootings at resident's meetin
		26 Mar	KwaZakele	9	Police shoot attackers of bottle store
April	169	14 Apr	Sekukhuneland (Lebowa)	36	Women necklaced by youths
		23 Apr	Alexandra	9	Police & resident clashes
May	221	17-26 May	CT squatter camps	44	Police/'witdoeke' & 'comrade' clashes
		20-25 May	KwaMashu	11	Youth & amabutho clashes
June	188	9-11 Jun	CT squatter camps	21	Police/'witdoeke' & 'comrade' clashes
		14 Jun	Durban	3	Car bomb near Durban hotel
		16 June	Nationwide	16	Stayaway on tenth Soweto anniversary
July	136	12-13 Jul	Soweto	9	Residents & hostel dwellers clash
		29 Jul	KwaNdebele	1	Car bomb kills Mbokodo head Ntuli
August	94	26-27 Aug	White City (Soweto)	21	Police and residents clash on rent boycott
September	50	13-14 Sep	Mzimphlope (Soweto)	4	Residents & hostel dwellers clash
October	41				
November	24	5 Nov	Pimville (Soweto)	1	11yr-old on Putco bus killed by 4 whites
		5 Nov	Orlando West (Soweto)	5	Police & residents clash over evictions

# MONTHLY DEATH TOLL AND MAJOR INCIDENTS

## MID-1984 - JUNE 1988



MONTH	TOTAL MONTHLY DEATH TOLL	MAJOR INCIDENTS DATE	PLACE	FATALITIES	DETAILS
December	58	1 Dec	Mamelodi (Pretoria)	2	Dr Ribiero & wife assassinated
		5 Dec	Mpophomeni (Howick)	4	Mawu unionists shot by Inkatha member
		16-20 Dec	Phiri/Mapetla (Soweto)	7	Clashes over lights-out protest campaign
TOTAL DEATH TOLL FOR YEAR: 1 352					
1987					
January	64	17-18 Jan	PE townships	7	'Witdoeke' & UDF supporters clash
		21 Jan	KwaMakhuta (Durban)	13	Family of UDF activist gunned down
February	23	2 Feb	Tantjie (Grahamstown)	4	Kitskonstabel shooting
March	44	16-17 Mar	KwaMashu (Durban)	9	Inkatha e & UDF youth affiliates clash
April	50	11-12 Apr	Zincor Mine	5	Num & Uwusa members clash
		22 Apr	Doornfontein	3	Sarhwu members on strike shot by police
		22 Apr	Germiston	3	Police open fire at Sarhwu meeting
		22 Apr	Soweto	2	Stayaway to protest evictions
May	36	8 May	Kaserne (PWV)	4	SATS workers abducted & necklaced
		5-6 May	Nationwide	-	Stayaway to protest white elections,
		20 May	Johannesburg	4	SAP killed by booby-trap bomb
		31 May	Imbali (Pmb)	+5	Children killed in Inkatha/UDF clash
June	32				
July	48				
August	33	31 Aug	Natal Midlands	80	Death toll since Jan 1987
September	73				
October	95	31 Oct	Natal Midlands	83	Death toll increases (60 in Sept)
November	75	24 Nov	KwaShange (PMB)	13	Attack on Inkatha members
December	133	9 Dec	Natal Midlands	298	Death toll by second peace talks
(113 in Dec: 411 in 1987)					
TOTAL DEATH TOLL FOR YEAR: 706					
1988					
January	172	31 Jan	Natal Midlands	152	Highest monthly toll since outbreak,
February	96	29 Feb	Natal Midlands	70	Interneecine violence continues
March	44				
April	43	30 Apr	Natal Midlands	23	Death toll drops (17 in Mar)
May	50	31 May	Natal Midlands	33	Violence increases (317 in 6 months)
June	40				
TOTAL 1988 DEATH TOLL UP TO 10 JUNE: 445					
DEATH TOLL in SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL CONFLICT					
Sept - Dec 1984	149				
1985	922				
1986	1 352				
1987	706				
Jan - 10 Jun 1988	445				
RECORDED DEATH TOLL	3 574				

stunningly successful in smaller towns and in the PE/Uitenhage complex, were organised by UDF affiliates. The tactic aimed to get the white business lobby to pressurise the authorities into resolving a number of local and national problem areas. The tactic had some violent consequences. In many townships youthful anti-apartheid activists manned informal road blocks and summarily tried, sentenced and punished anyone they believed guilty of buying goods from white stores (see Zulu article). Ultimately, the boycotts frustrated many white businessmen, who although sympathetic to some of the concerns of the boycotters, argued they were unable to make any impression on national policy.

Business was also severely disrupted in the period between November 1985 and February 1986 by at least 12 regionalised protest stayaways which were triggered by issues such as continued security force actions and 'unrest' deaths. In the period September 1984 to June 1988, at least 70 worker stayaways were recorded — 14 of which were national, and the rest largely confined to specific townships and regions (see Stayaways: National Strategies).

On 3 December 1985, largely as a result of a perceived reduction in the level of violence and opposition, the government lifted the emergency in eight magisterial districts (mainly in the E Cape), and in early February 1986, in a further six districts. On 7 March 1986, after seven months, the regional state of emergency was withdrawn altogether. It has been estimated that during the emergency at least 853 people were killed in nationwide political violence, while 7 992 were detained under emergency regulations and 4 152 under other laws.

## A Brief Interlude

'Black-on-black' violence, the official term for internecine opposition conflict, accelerated dramatically between March and June 1986. Four distinctive categories were identifiable. Firstly, and perhaps most seriously, was the violence that continued to occur between vigilante groups and anti-apartheid activists. During May and June severe conflicts wracked the Cape Peninsula's squatter camps of Crossroads, Nyanga Bush and KTC. Clashes involving the security forces, 'comrades' and 'witdoeke' resulted in at least 44 deaths between 17-26 May (see Cameron article). During the battles much of the squatter camps were extensively damaged and thousands of residents were forced to flee. In Soweto battles between the 'comrades' and the 'Makabase' spurred on the formation of civic defence committees which tried to guard against further vigilante activity.

Secondly, there was a significant increase of violence in the 'independent' and 'self-governing' homelands (see Makanjee article). In Sekukhuneland (Lebowa) 32 women were 'necklaced' (a car-tyre execution) for 'witchcraft' activities; in KwaNdebele large-scale conflicts erupted when anti-homeland independence residents and royalty opposed a pro-independence faction; in late March 1986 Bophuthatswana homeland

police opened fire on a mass community meeting of Winterveld residents, killing 11 and wounding 70. Other conflicts wracked KaNgwane, mainly over educational issues; and, in Venda, over homeland consolidation proposals.

Thirdly, there was a regional upsurge in mysterious attacks on anti-apartheid activists and officials. Finally, frequent conflicts continued to occur between various extra-parliamentary groups, e.g. between Cosatu/UDF and Inkatha supporters, and between charterist and black consciousness proponents.

The SPCC return-to-school initiative was transformed into a national movement with the creation of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). At the first NECC congress held in Durban in late March 1986, it was decided that all boycotting school pupils should return to classes. For African parents, students and political activists, the rallying cry changed from one of 'liberation before education' to 'education for liberation' through the syllabus medium of 'people's education'.

The government's reliance on existing legislative measures to control escalating conflict and political mobilisation was problematic. Many ISA bans and detentions of leading activists, (including PE consumer boycott leader Mkhuseleli Jack, Eastern Cape UDF vice-president Henry Fazi and Diakonia's Paddy Kearney) continued to be declared invalid after court challenges. The frequent, urgent court interdicts to restrain the police from assaulting detainees and from unlawfully interfering with township residents also placed the spotlight firmly on the security forces. The focus of attention further intensified with the deaths in detention of the UDF's Northern Transvaal chairperson Peter Nchabeleng in April 1986; of a Cawusa member in Mabopane; and a school pupil in KaNgwane.

## National Emergency

In response to escalating conflict (see accompanying fatality graphs) and the lack of success of non-emergency legislation to control dissent, the government sought to increase its security powers through the Public Safety Amendment Bill and the Internal Security Amendment Bill. Due to delaying tactics on the part of the Indian and coloured houses of the tricameral parliament, the bills were not passed. Consequently, President PW Botha declared a national state of emergency on 12 June 1986 — four days prior to the tenth anniversary of the 1976 Soweto student uprising.

The security authorities were again quick to implement the wide-ranging powers conferred on them by the Public Safety Act. Common measures used included further restrictions on 'unrest' funerals, indoor and outdoor meetings, the movement of people (particularly students who were compelled to remain in classrooms during school hours) and the activities of certain organisations. In the latter half of 1986 and in early 1987 emergency and ISA legislation was used to restrict 32 people from participating in UDF campaigns (November), to bar advertisements calling for the

unbanning of the ANC on the organisation's 75th anniversary and the propagation of 'people's education' syllabuses (January); and to halt campaigns calling for the release of detainees (April).

Increased controls on media reportage of all conflict situations were enforced; the main targets of the regulations being the alternative press (newspapers like *City Press*, *New Nation* and *Weekly Mail*), 'independent' news agencies and foreign media corps (some of whom were deported). The government also the resuscitated the infamous Bureau for Information, making it the official source (until May 1987) of all 'unrest' reportage (see Tomaselli article).

The physical arm of the security forces responded swiftly to the many spontaneous public protests to the imposition of the emergency and other subsequent demonstrations. However, even with increased security force powers, the fatality toll did not decline. To shore up security action in 'unrest' areas the SAP trained hundreds of special police constables (known as 'kitskonstabels'), the first 320 of whom graduated in mid-October 1986. Within 24 hours of the imposition of the emergency more than 450 people had been detained nationwide. For the whole of 1986 it has been estimated that approximately 20 000 people were detained — many of them juveniles (see Detention data base: Swilling article).

While the more than 248 applications lodged against emergency powers (by late September 1986) were unsuccessful in declaring emergency rule invalid, some did succeed in making inroads into the vast repressive powers (mainly because of legislative vagueness). Some of the successfully challenged sections were later reintroduced in a 'tightened', less challengeable form by the State President.

In court cases, security force personnel appeared in court to face numerous charges relating to their actions during 'unrest' situations (despite the indemnity from prosecution the emergency offered them); many were also interdicted from unlawfully interfering with township residents and detainees. The Minister of Law and Order also made a substantial number of out-of-court cash settlements (without acknowledging guilt) to victims of alleged unlawful security force actions. Payments by the Minister included R300 000 for actions arising out of destruction of the KTC squatter camp in 1986, and R1,5 million to the victims of the Langa shooting.

It was not only security force members who appeared in court, though. From late 1986 onwards the courts began to fill with anti-apartheid activists charged with a host of 'unrest' related offences — public violence charges being the most common. A number of activists were found guilty of murder (mainly those who had killed or were part of the crowds that had killed policemen, municipal government representatives, alleged police informers and 'system' collaborators) and sentenced to death. In addition some detainees faced charges of sedition arising out of their involvement in 'peoples' courts' (usually adjuncts of 'street' and 'block' committees) during 1985-86.

## Little Cohesion

The extra-parliamentary opposition, and to a limited extent the labour movement, wilted under the effects of the national emergency. The inability of many organisations to withstand the onslaught revealed not only the extent of state power but the failure of the opposition to evolve internal structures that might have enabled them to withstand the crackdown.

In July 1986, unionised workers participated in a series of wildcat strike actions (particularly in the retail and mining industries) to protest the detentions of colleagues and union officials. Under pressure from their labour forces, representatives of commerce and industry demanded the government should release detained employees, alleging that the detentions undermined the collective bargaining process (see Employer Lobby: Morris article). However, although workers did take action to express dissatisfaction over the detentions of colleagues, few supported the Cosatu initiated anti-emergency 'National Day of Protest' (14/7/86).

While the emergency had the effect of reducing the number of observable consumer boycotts (emergency media regulations made it difficult to report on any form of boycott action) it did not hamper the rent and service charge boycotts (see Rent Boycotts: Conflict Regions) that had been operative in some townships from as early as 1984. Indeed, it could be argued that during the national emergency these boycotts even grew in scale. However, it must be stressed that many people probably boycotted rents not out of revolutionary commitment, but rather out of financial need. The boycotts created substantial political and financial instability within the townships. By November 1986 it was estimated that over 650 000 households in 54 African townships nationwide were affected by boycotts, which by then had cost the authorities about R480 million.

Many black local authorities, under pressure from provincial administrations who insisted they would no longer be able to financially bail them out, severed electricity and water supplies, sold defaulters' homes or simply evicted them. A state attempt to pass legislation that would have made it compulsory for employers to deduct rent arrears from the wages of employees, was strongly opposed by employers and trade unions, and the Bill was shelved. Attempts by many local authorities to evict defaulters (with the assistance of the security forces) were often thwarted by successful legal interventions; while in some centres, youths illegally reconnected power supplies which had been cut off, or moved evictees back into their homes. The evictions and the threat thereof often had bloody consequences. During an anti-eviction demonstration in Soweto's White City suburb, confrontations between the security forces and residents left over 20 dead (27/8/86); in another battle in Soweto's Orlando West suburb (1/12/86) five people were killed.

The mass detention of students under emergency regulations and the presence of security force units on many school premises briefly exacerbated some of the existing boycotts, and sparked off new ones at other schools. Schools in the Port Elizabeth, Western Cape



and Witwatersrand regions were the most severely affected. In the third academic term (July/October 1986) only about 20 percent (300 000) of all pupils at DET schools had failed to return to class. Because of these boycotts the DET closed 73 Eastern Cape and Soweto schools early.

At the beginning of the 1987 academic year attendance was near normal, but pupils from 18 Eastern Cape DET schools continued to boycott and their schools were closed. The particularly high attendance in most regions was partly attributable to the 'Back to School Campaign' which was endorsed by the NECC, SPCC, UDF, Azapo, Azasm and SSC. The return of pupils was not without difficulty as rival youth organisations in Soweto again clashed over whether to continue the boycott or not.

Sporadic disturbances and boycotts at schools continued throughout 1987, the most serious of which were the short-duration class and lecture boycotts held during the week of the whites-only general election (6/5/87). Other triggers of small-scale boycotts in 1987 generally centred on the detentions of pupils involved in student elected SRCs, the 'unrest' deaths of anti-apartheid protesters and specific educational demands. The shooting by police of alleged ANC saboteur Ashley Kriel in August 1987 sparked off widespread boycotts in a number of Cape Peninsula schools. Thousands of students demonstrated at most English-speaking South African universities following the threat in mid-October 1987 by the Minister of National Education, FW de Klerk, to cut subsidies unless each campus controlled the political activity of students.

In response to security force actions, the uninterrupted activities of vigilante groups and mysterious attacks by hit squads, various anti-apartheid bodies, the labour movement and various liberal human rights pressure groups launched a series of defensive national and local level campaigns. The UDF, NECC and Cosatu inspired 'Christmas against the Emergency' campaign (beginning 16/12/86) involved the non-use of electricity in several townships. The 'Free the Children' campaign which was launched in November and organised by the Black Sash protested the detentions of an estimated 8 000 juveniles. The DPSC initiated 'National Detainees Day' (11/3/87) to mark nine months of emergency rule, resulting in a number of one hour workstoppages in various companies throughout the country. Lastly, Nusas launched a 'One Person One Vote' campaign as a protest to the white election.

After the massive bomb blast which destroyed Cosatu's national headquarters in Johannesburg (6/5/87), and the other mysterious attacks launched on offices of its affiliates, a 'Hands Off Cosatu' campaign was launched (26/5/87). The UDF call for two weeks of 'National Protest' (16-26/6/87) to commemorate the Soweto student rebellion, the drafting of the Freedom Charter, and to protest the second re-imposition of the national state of emergency was not well supported. Lastly, an initiative to reprieve those sentenced to death for politically motivated offences was launched by the Soweto Youth Congress in July 1987.

## Guerilla Struggle

The low intensity sabotage campaign concluded by the ANC continued throughout 1985-88, with the most popular targets for foreign and locally trained cadres being the homes of 'collaborators' and government buildings in urban areas (see Phillips article). In rural regions a new 'front' was opened when Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres laid a number of land mines on roads and farm tracks.

In other guerilla attacks a limpet mine that detonated in an Amanzimtoti shopping complex killed five Christmas shoppers; while days after the declaration of a national state of emergency a car bomb blast outside a Durban hotel killed three people. Both the cadres responsible for these attacks were caught and sentenced to death (one has already been executed). In increasingly sophisticated ANC attacks, a number of policemen were killed when a remote controlled booby-trapped bomb was detonated outside the Johannesburg courts (20/5/87); two months later, 70 people were injured when another car bomb exploded outside the SADF's Witwatersrand command (30/7/87).

In response to these and other attacks, Pretoria repeatedly warned the governments of 'Frontline' states against allowing their territories to be used as conduits for attacks on South Africa. Despite denials, the South African security forces frequently raided homes of alleged ANC members and logistical headquarters in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique (see ANC data base: Phillips).

## Violence Levels

While the state of emergency certainly had an impact on the functioning of anti-apartheid organisations, it was less successful in bringing down overall conflict levels — particularly the number of fatalities.

Throughout the country in 1987 vigilantes still targeted anti-apartheid campaigners. The most serious conflicts occurred in the PE/Uitenhage townships where the 'Africanists' fought 'comrades'; and supporters of the 'AmaAfrica' group fought anti-apartheid activists. The feud, which intensified during June 1987, left more than 40 dead, scores injured and about 300 PE families homeless. In Soweto the vigilante feuds continued, the most important being between the Makabase and members of the 'Mandela Football Club' (also a para-military vigilante force, whose duties included the protection of Winnie Mandela). Another Soweto vigilante force, the 'Russians' targeted rent boycotters.

During 1986-87 there was considerable debate within the black community over the use of 'necklace' executions by comrades. (Binfo statistics claimed that more than 228 people had been 'necklaced' between January and June 1986.) As a result of adverse publicity the ANC questioned the use of the necklace, while the black consciousness movement openly expressed opposition to it. The murder of former 1976 Soweto student leader (and former political prisoner), Masabata Leote, by anti-apartheid activists (October 1986) after he voiced his rejection to the 'necklace',

fuelled the debate. Thereafter 'necklace' killings virtually disappeared.

## Permanent Emergency

In June 1987 the national state of emergency was renewed for the second time, and then in June 1988, for the third time. Under newer (stricter) emergency regulations, more curbs were placed on the promotion of rent and consumer boycotts, illegal strikes and on the funerals of 'unrest' victims. A new set of media restrictions published in August 1987 allowed the Minister of Home Affairs to arbitrarily suspend the publication of any newspaper if in his 'opinion' it published subversive propaganda. In November 1987 the church-owned *New Nation* became the first paper to receive a warning from the Minister; in the following months warnings against *South*, *The Weekly Mail*, *Die Stem*, *Work in Progress*, *Grassroots*, *Out of Step*, *Saamstaan*, etc., were issued.

The courts continued, although with decreasing regularity, to hear challenges to the detentions of people and the conditions under which they were held. Possibly in response to the furor over the continued detention of juveniles many were released — even though the 'Free the Children Alliance' claimed that by June 1987 over 1 000 under 18-year olds still remained in custody. In important cases, an application for the release of KwaNdebele anti-independence prince, James Mahlangu, was dismissed; while an appeal for the release of *New Nation* editor, Zwelakhe Sisulu, was also turned down.

While it was clear that some activists were going to spend long periods of time in emergency detention, the government began to address the problem of what to do with the ageing leaders of the liberation movement which it had incarcerated since the early 1960s — most importantly the Rivonia prisoners. In an obvious attempt to gauge what the likely reaction would be to the release of Nelson Mandela and others, the government unconditionally released ANC stalwart, Govan Mbeki in November 1987 after he had served 24 years of a life sentence. Mbeki was, however, later served with a banning order which restricted him to the Port Elizabeth magisterial district and prohibited him from giving press interviews.

'Unrest' related trials continued to fill the courts. Between June 1986 and October 1987 it was alleged that more than 5 000 people had been charged with about 2 300 'criminal' offences. Between December 1986 and October 1987 thirty-three people had been sentenced to death, five of whom the DPSC claimed had already been executed (including two for the 'necklace' killing of Langa councillor TB Kinikini). In March 1988, after an international storm of protest, lawyers successfully managed to win a stay of execution for the six Sharpeville residents found guilty of being part of the crowd that killed a Lekoa councillor during the Vaal Triangle rent riots of September 1984.

While in most parts of the country violence seemed to have subsided by mid-1987 there was an uncontrollable outbreak in the Natal midlands region,

where feuding UDF/union and Inkatha supporters fought each other (see Hartley article). Today, the conflict in the region continues despite several attempts by the feuding parties and local business groups to negotiate a peace. One round of peace talks was aborted in November 1987 when the security police detained key UDF officials in the Natal midlands executive. Parties to the feud have regularly appealed to the courts to interdict the other from harassing their members.

Serious internecine conflicts also occurred (from November 1987 through until January 1988) in the Cape Peninsula's KTC squatter camp, when a struggle for hegemony developed between supporters of two UDF aligned factions — the Western Cape Civic Association and the Masincedane Committee (see Cameron article). The battles, which led to many deaths, eventually resulted in the police erecting floodlights and a razor-wire fence to separate warring factions. In the Eastern Cape sporadic conflicts continued to occur between black consciousness and charterist organisations.

In early 1988, the most wide-ranging crackdown on anti-apartheid organisation since the imposition of the emergency the government prohibited 17 organisations from participating in any activities whatsoever (24/2/88); at the same time Cosatu was prohibited from involving itself in any non-union activities. In an effort to further control anti-apartheid opposition, the government tabled the Promotion of Internal Orderly Politics Bill in March 1988. If passed, the bill would allow the government to regulate the flow of foreign funds to any internal opposition movement. During 1988 the security forces have continued to detain activists, and raided the offices of a number of diverse community and political organisations, e.g. Azapo, the Mbeki Reception Committee, the UDF, and the RMC.

One of the reasons for the recent crackdown was the desire to stamp out the rent and service charge boycott which has been in operation since 1984. Nonetheless, it is clear that the local authority policy of disconnecting services and evicting selected defaulters from their homes is having the desired effect in breaking the boycott — the last surviving tactic of non-collaboration.

Another reason for the crackdown on extra-parliamentary organisations and the recent renewal of the emergency lay in the national municipal elections of October 1988. The government still appears to believe that a system of political representation for Africans will evolve out of black local authorities, which it is determined to resurrect from the ashes of township insurrection between 1984-87. With the re-election of a new generation of African town councils on increased but still low, unrepresentative polls, the wheel has turned full circle in the recent cycle of political conflict.

# Data Base

IPSA Research

## MONTHLY FATALITIES in POLITICAL CONFLICT:

### Comparative Monitor Counts

	Independent Monitors		Official Sources	
	Indicator Project SA	SA Institute Race Relations	Bureau for Information	Minister of Law & Order
<b>1984</b>				
Sept }	149	} 149	-	-
Oct }	for	} for	-	-
Nov }	whole	} whole	-	-
Dec }	period	} period	-	-
	<b>149</b>	<b>149</b>	-	-
<b>1985</b>				
Jan	5	4	-	-
Feb	32	35	-	-
Mar	74	76	-	-
Apr	53	46	-	-
May	67	66	-	-
Jun	36	45	-	-
Jul	75	96	58	-
Aug	179	163	94	126
Sept	96	69	60	70
Oct	112	86	80	82
Nov	98	101	65	58
Dec	95	92	50	62
	<b>922</b>	<b>879</b>		
<b>1986</b>				
Jan	115	105	70	64
Feb	103	112	96	81
Mar	153	179	144	107
Apr	169	145	69	87
May	221	221	-	137
Jun	188	212	-	110
Jul	136	122	-	-
Aug	94	75	-	-
Sept	50	39	-	-
Oct	41	16	-	-
Nov	24	37	-	-
Dec	58	33	-	-
	<b>1 352</b>	<b>1 296</b>		
<b>1987</b>				
Jan	64	40	-	-
Feb	23	21	-	-

#### Notes

For the whole of 1985 the Minister of Law and Order revealed that 824 people had been killed in politically motivated incidents of violence (Hansard 25/4/86).

In September 1986 the Minister of Law and Order revealed that between September 1984 and mid-August 1986, 1 697 people had been killed in the civil unrest (Weekly Mail 5/9/86).

The comparative analysis period of September 1984 - February 1987 was chosen as it is the only period for which some substantial comparative fatality data has been made available.

# RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

## Difficulties in Data & Definition

Ruth Tomaselli

Political violence is violent: it is also political. What is often overlooked is that the way in which violence is interpreted may be the most profoundly political aspect of all. 'Reality' is impossible to perceive in an uncontaminated, 'pure' form. All events come to us as mediated reconstructions of what happened, and different systems of representation offer different ways of knowing or experiencing our world. Just as the way in which we perceive data can affect the way in which we interpret it.

Statistics are the raw materials for the interpretation of events. In his discussion of violence in the Pietermaritzburg area, John Aitchison (Centre for Adult Education, UNP), remarks that 'the public, both informed and uninformed, has so far mainly heard only "stories" about Pietermaritzburg' (1988:1). Some of these stories are anecdotal, some are 'more sustained narratives': stories emanating from the UDF, Inkatha and the police/state. 'These stories, enhanced with various degrees of theory and analysis to the extent that intellectuals can be drafted into the story making, try to make sense of the anecdotes and the press reports and fit them into a more general understanding of how people think the world works'. For Aitchison, collecting and carefully enumerating incidents of violence (deaths, injuries, attacks, arson and intimidation) with 'a statistical, census like approach', provides the 'useful raw material for a critique of the Inkatha, state and UDF stories' (ibid).

The state has its own 'story' concerning political violence in South Africa. The data its agencies provide to back up its world view is very partial. In February 1987, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, said in parliament:

'In view of the fact that detentions, unrest-related incidents and the actions by the security forces occur countrywide, the compiling and processing of this additional information will not only be immensely time consuming, but will also have a disruptive effect on the South African Police. In addition, the information is of such a nature that the African National Congress and other enemies will abuse it to the detriment of the country.' (Hansard Q&A, 23/2/87: Col227-30).

On 29 June 1988, Vlok reiterated that:

He was 'in favour of releasing as much information as possible ... (but) extra-parliamentary activists and

radical groups have in the most dreadful way misused this type of information for their own revolutionary and propaganda purposes, to the detriment of South Africa and the majority of its people I am therefore convinced that it is not in the best interests of our country and its people to furnish the requested information. (Hansard Q&A, 29/6/88: Col2007-8).

Vlok's answer is instructive, since it encapsulates the state's policy towards divulging (and withholding) information related to political violence.

## State Definitions

This is not to say that the state does not have a wealth of information at its disposal. Evidence suggests that it has accumulated an enormous amount of data through its agencies, for instance, the SA Police, National Intelligence Service, Directorate of Research at the Bureau for Information (Binfo); as well as research institutes, notably, the Institute for Strategic Studies at University of Pretoria. What is being argued here, is that the data which is disseminated from official sources, both to the public and to research institutes, is carefully screened to maintain the narrative of 'unrest' constructed by the state.

The state has elaborated an interpretive framework – a narrative – within which they are able to make sense of the information concerning political violence in South Africa. Reading through the various publications of the Bureau for Information, several strands of the state's version of the 'unrest' story become evident. Two of the main themes of this narrative are:

- 'unrest' is a result of 'radical instigation'; and,
- the state of emergency has resulted in a decrease in 'unrest' (Binfo, 1988b:35-36).

A recent article disseminated by Binfo notes that: 'In South Africa incidents of unrest and terror have increased alarmingly. These have been and are instigated particularly by the African National Congress (ANC) and other revolutionary and radical groups' (Binfo, 1988c:35). This quotation begs the question of

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what is considered to be 'unrest', and 'terror' (sic), and the difference between the two distinctly separate forms of political violence referred to in the use of these two normative terms.

In a study that has been highly influential among National Party policy makers, Richard Clutterbuck suggests that 'political violence', a term he never defines, encompasses three elements, namely violence in industrial disputes, violence in political demonstrations and violence in 'terrorism'.

The state's use of that strangely passive phrase 'unrest' does not neatly fit any of these categories. It has been defined as:

- 'any gathering in contravention of an order under ... the Security Emergency Regulations, 1988, or of a provision of another law or of any prohibition;
- 'any physical attack by a group of persons on a security force ... or a house or family of a member of a security force or local authority;
- 'any conduct which constitutes sedition, public violence or a contravention ... of the Intimidation Act, 1982' (*Govt Gazette*, 17/6/86: Col10293).

These definitions would seem to exclude industrial violence. Ambiguity arises however, when the line between industrial action and protest against the state or its functionaries becomes blurred: the BTR-Sarmcol strike near Howick being the classic example. Indeed, the latter has been cited as part of the 'roots of the conflict' in the Natal midlands area. Some fatalities, which can only be attributed to incidents of 'political violence', are integrally connected with the strike, notably the death of three strikers after their abduction from Mpophomeni (near Howick) in early December 1987, by vigilantes sympathetic to Inkatha (Mare 1987:521). Indeed, the wearing of Cosatu or Mawu (now Numsa) union T-shirts has been sufficiently provocative to invite assault in these areas (ibid).

'Unrest' is not the only term for political violence used by the state. In questions put to him by opposition MPs, the same Minister (of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok), provides two apparently different answers to what is apparently the same question. On 18 February 1987, Minister Vlok said that the number of persons arrested 'in connection with unrest-related offences' was 11 006 (*Hansard Q&A*, 18/2/87: Col142). Two days later, in reply to Mr. Errol Moorcroft, he stated that 4 982 persons were arrested in connection with 'riots' (*Hansard Q&A*, 20/2/87: Col184-5). From the phraseology of the questions, it is apparent that the concept of 'riots' is confined to the action or intent of injuring persons or damaging property, while the concept of 'unrest' is so wide as to encompass any demonstration of opposition against the state.

In state parlance terrorism or 'terror', as it is more usually and starkly expressed, is frequently associated with international terrorism, and 'does not differ at all from the PLO, IRA and the Red Brigade' (Binfo, 1986:21). In the process of monitoring political violence, however, 'terror' appears to be regarded as a totally separate category of violence from 'unrest'. Evidence for this distinction is that different sets of data are kept for 'terrorist' and unrest activities. The latter figures are usually supplied by the Institute for Strategic Studies

based at the University of Pretoria (1986). Other independent monitoring agencies also keep their figures separate: e.g. Indicator Project SA in monitoring 'armed actions by insurgents' as opposed to 'low-level attacks during civil unrest' (*Indicator SA* Vol5/No2:21); or the SA Institute of Race Relations, which refers to 'identifiable incidents of insurgency' (SAIRR 1986:527).

The state appears to have an ambivalent attitude to the publication of data on 'terrorist' activities. On the one hand, Ministers have been reluctant to divulge information, with Minister Vlok repeating his 'not in the interests of the safety of the Republic' formula to questions in parliament (*Hansard Q&A*, 18/2/87: Col93). Earlier in the same session, the then Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, did mention 170 'incidents of terrorism' for the year 1986 (*Weekly Mail* 3/10/87). He has also been prepared to put a number to persons charged with 'offences relating to sabotage', and the length of detention of such persons before trial. The extensive wait in detention before being charged indicates that the number of persons arrested on similar grounds is probably far greater.

Despite official coyness, the data of the Institute of Strategic Studies has been released by the Bureau for Information in their notorious booklet, *Talking to the ANC*, albeit in an unacknowledged fashion (Binfo 1986:25). Figures of the 'number of acts of terror', 'the number of foreign-trained terrorists killed or arrested' and the 'number of persons killed in terrorism' were released to the media in August 1988 (*Star* 24/8/88). Speculating on the reasons for the change in attitude, two theories come to mind. Firstly, the Bureau's booklet was aimed primarily at foreign consumption, and so could not be seen to endanger the morale of South Africans. Secondly, the public dissemination of figures in 1988 coincides with a marked increase in the number of insurgent incidents, and an apparent shift from state and parastatal to civilian targets. The danger of morale loss is now less important than an increase in public vigilance and the release of these figures should be seen as part of an 'educative' programme. The example illustrates that information is a weapon in the hands of the state, to be given and withheld as political circumstances dictate.

## Indicator SA Survey

This *Indicator SA* special report surveys the course of political violence in South Africa over the past five years. Its purpose is to offer a picture of the extent and repercussions of violence, in terms of conflict levels, community deprivation, economic loss, and political strategies. The need for such a survey arises because of the paucity of data produced by state agencies, and the low credibility of official data. This survey fulfills a need for a comprehensive overview of the extent and pattern of political violence in the 1980s on a national scale. Data on opposition group activity in particular conflict regions, the affiliations and demands of civic associations, and the response of the state, its allies and other interest groups, are vital for informed decision-making. It is clear that such information is not available from the state, or television, and it is extremely

difficult to reconstruct a holistic view from isolated newspaper reports.

A numerical account of political violence, providing the data for a clearer interpretation of the dynamics of the South African conflict, requires quantitatively reliable and objective information. Independent monitoring attempts fall short of this intention. No history, especially contemporary history, can ever be complete. More importantly, however, is the sheer impossibility of reflecting the complete truth (even in a statistical, let alone interpretative manner) under circumstances in which it is in the state's interest to disguise much of what is happening around us.

## MEDIA TERRORISM

Under state of emergency legislation, the state has complete control on the definition, recording and dissemination of all information relating to political 'unrest'. A chief target of the plethora of emergency regulations (see Appendix) has been the media, reflecting the state's perception that 'negative information' will help the cause of those opposed to the state. From the onset of political violence in late 1984, government officials voiced opinions that the almost daily coverage of 'unrest' by domestic, and more particularly, foreign journalists acted as a catalyst for further violence on the part of activists who 'played up for the cameras'. 'There is no doubt that reports emanating from South Africa are unfair and creating the wrong impression of the situation here', stated Louis Nel, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information (*EP Herald* 24/9/85). The theme of press complicity in 'fanning unrest' is a recurrent one, recently enshrined by the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha, in his telling phrase, 'media terrorist', i.e. a person who allegedly uses his skills to support the revolutionary or terrorist cause.

When the first (regional) emergency was declared in July 1985, it appeared that the state anticipated the 'situation' would be seen to be under control, and no further media restrictions would be needed. In the face of unabated violence, the media became an important scapegoat. Several information mechanisms of control were used to discourage journalists from pursuing coverage of the 'unrest':

- Reduced coverage

Initially, there was an appeal to the press to 'play the game' (*Natal Mercury* 24/7/85). Newspapers should 'scale down' their unrest reporting, by not assigning more than two persons per paper to covering these events, suggested the Commissioner of Police, General Johann Coetzee, to a meeting of press representatives (*Natal Mercury* 23/7/85). Two months later, the then Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, again 'appealed for the co-operation of the media in reporting the unrest, and cited several recent cases of manipulation of news coverage' (*Natal Mercury* 12/9/85).

- Harassment of journalists

This became commonplace in connection with 'unrest' coverage during the regional state of emergency (July 1985 to March 1986). Several journalists were

arrested or detained, were threatened with arrest, assaulted, or had their notes confiscated (Stewart 1986). A series of expulsion orders served on foreign newsmen and continued harassment of local practitioners marked the period between the two states of emergency. The uprising in Alexandra (near Sandton, Transvaal) was the site of much of the media struggle in April 1986.

- Registration

This was proposed by the Steyn Commission (1982) as a means of control but was never enacted. During the first state of emergency, journalists were required to be accredited not only to the National Press Union (a 'normal' requirement), but also to the police, the Department of Foreign Affairs, or the Bureau for Information (*Business Day* 5/9/85). The *Cape Times* refused to comply with this requirement, and was resultantly excluded from all police information for several weeks (*Cape Times* 4/1/85). Registration again became an important issue with the attack on the 'alternative press', when in June 1988, the government established a register of all news agencies, excepting those specifically excluded. The given definition of news agency is so wide as to include all freelance journalists, irrespective of whether they contribute to local or overseas publications or radio or television stations.

- Centralising information

This was another tactic to cut down on press/television coverage of political violence. Here, the role of the Directorate of South African Media Liaison has been pivotal. The directorate has been described as promoting 'a news culture through which news is transmitted from the political system to the media, and the government is informed of the activities and problems of the media' (Binfo 1987a:8). The Directorate has a dual function: to provide media with information; and to monitor the media on behalf of the state. In its former capacity, the Bureau set up 'a 24-hour enquiry service for the press' (*ibid*:9) to coincide with the declaration of the first national state of emergency on 12 June 1986.

In effect, the Bureau was the sole source of information relating to 'unrest' during this period. Any information obtained from alternative sources had to be 'cleared' by the Bureau. News from these briefings became increasingly difficult to obtain, with many questions answered simply with a 'no comment' (*Star* 30/6/86). Later, questions were restricted to the daily unrest report only, and were required to be put in writing or telexes. Two weeks after their institution, the briefings were suspended, to be reinstated in a truncated form before finally being shut down in September 1986, 'in the interests of accuracy' (Binfo press release, quoted in the *Daily News* 29/9/86).

Although the police division of public relations is now responsible for the dissemination of the unrest report through the South African Press Association (Sapa), the problems of access remain.

## Restrictions

In a move clearly aimed at the ultimate control of news, particularly to prevent its visual depiction from

reaching foreign viewers and opinion-makers, as well as the South African public, a ban was placed on all use of audio-visual equipment (including video and still cameras) for the use of recording any 'unrest situation' in emergency areas (*Govt Gazette*, 2/11/85: No1004). With the lifting of the first state of emergency in March 1986, the banning of media coverage of the 'unrest areas' was also lifted, but continued to be applied on an ad hoc basis.

The most serious assault on press freedom was dealt in emergency restrictions gazetted with the national state of emergency imposed on 12 June 1986 (*Govt Gazette*, No10280). Six definitions of a 'subversive statement' were included in these regulations. The only reports exempted from this blackout were those disclosed or cleared by a Minister, his Deputy, or an appointed government spokesman. A pernicious refinement to this legislation was enacted in December 1986 forcing the media to conceal the fact and extent of their censorship when the blank spaces and obliterations that were fashionable after the June 1986 curbs were prohibited (*Govt Gazette*, 11/12/86: No10541).

A third set of 'emergency restrictions' were passed in December 1987, when the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) refused to be party to a self-censorship plan, aimed at the isolation of the so-called 'alternative press': particularly the *Weekly Mail*, *New Nation*, and the right-wing *Die Afrikaner* (*Govt Gazette*, 11/12/87).

### Further Constraints

An overview of the restrictions placed on the press was provided in *Indicator SA* Vol4/No3 (Bennett 1987:18; Tomaselli 1987:19-22). Since then, further restrictive measures have been applied. The emergency media regulations gazetted on 10 June 1988 consolidate all previous legislation (*Govt Gazette*, No11342).

Cumulatively, these measures serve to limit both the rights of access to certain events, and the editorial rights to publish information, opinion or photographs on specified categories of news. In the most comprehensive study of the media restrictions to date, John Grogan (1988:25-26) argues that the media prohibitions appear to be aimed at two main targets:

- the 'repressive steps taken by the state itself to control extra-parliamentary opposition and maintain order' as such information will destroy the reformist image the state is at pains to construct of itself; and,
- 'information relating to spontaneous challenges to state authority and on the strategies adopted by opposition movements'.

Rights of access are restricted by the banning of all journalists (including photographers and news camera-persons) 'at the scene' of any 'unrest', 'restricted gathering' or 'security action'. Rights of publication exclude all reports on any 'actions' by the 'security forces' related to 'unrest' or 'follow-up action after unrest has been terminated', the 'deployment' of a 'security force'; 'any restricted gathering'; any information relating to forthcoming 'strikes and boycotts', or the extent to which they were 'successful'; restrictions on the workings of 'alternative' structures of local government (e.g. street committees and 'people's

courts'); 'any speech, statement remark' of a banned or restricted person, or 'spokesman' for an 'unlawful organisation', 'the circumstances or treatment in detention of a person ... detained under the security emergency Regulations', nor 'the release of' such a person.

Further restrictions prohibit the publication of advertisements promoting 'restricted and unlawful organisations'; the publication of 'blank spaces', indicating an act of censorship in terms of the regulations; and finally, the most wide ranging, the publication of a 'subversive statement' in which 'members of the public are incited or encouraged' to perform certain acts or omissions, described ad nauseum in the regulations. (All above quotations are from (*Govt Gazette*, 10/6/88: No11342).

The penalties for the contravention of the media regulations are severe, ranging from fines to the closure of the newspaper. In the early period of the state of emergency, foreign newsmen were hardest hit, and many had their permits withdrawn. More recently, the target for vilification has been the 'alternative press', which is extremely vulnerable, particularly to the threat of summary closure for periods of three months — a threat carried out in the case of the *New Nation*, *South* and more recently, the *Weekly Mail* which was suspended for one month (2/11/88).

After months of verbal attack on the so-called 'alternative press' (i.e. those newspapers who do not belong to one of the four main media conglomerates: Argus, Times Media (ex-SAAN), Nasionalepers, Perskor, and who do not come under the auspices of the NPU), the state acted decisively in August 1987 (*Govt Gazette*, 28/8/87: No10880). Rather than 'opting for blanket pre-censorship', the regulations shifted the onus onto individual newspapers to censor themselves.

Should the state not approve of articles being published, the publisher would be informed in writing that a series of his publications had been examined and that action against the publication was being contemplated, clearly stating the grounds for such action. The publisher then had 14 days to make representations with regard to the contemplated action. If in the opinion of the Minister these were not acceptable the publisher would receive a formal warning to that effect. Failing a suitable compromise, and if the periodical continued 'with its subversive propaganda role after fair warning', the ultimate sanction would be to prohibit it outright for up to three months at a time (see also Collinge et al 1988:32).

The emergency restrictions are worded so loosely that media practitioners have the greatest difficulty in deciding what is and what is not permitted: 'The problem with much of this (i.e. the emergency) legislation is that editors often have to weigh up not what a court might interpret the law to be, but what some police officer might understand it to be' (Steyn 1988). Two consequences flow from this uncertainty. Firstly, newspapers, particularly the mainstream commercial press, tend to act over-cautiously, and when in doubt, they do not tell. This may lead to a situation of self-censorship over and above that required by the law.

Secondly, the vagueness of the regulations makes 'nonsense of legal certainty' (Grogan 1988:26). Those newspapers who choose to test the limits need steel nerves and understanding shareholders. Anton Harber, co-editor of the besieged *Weekly Mail*, noted that negative court judgements and government harassment 'have transformed the press in recent months, with critical newspapers no longer needing to know what is legal or illegal but how far they can push the local bully before he hits back' (Harber 1988). From the state's point of view, fear of not being able to secure a conviction has led it to bypass the courts, and legislate for itself massive and fairly arbitrary powers to decide which publications are not acting within the spirit of the restrictions, and how best to put them out of business.

## OFFICIAL SOURCES

### ● Daily Unrest Reports

In view of the above, it is not surprising that very little original investigation into the civil 'unrest' is carried out by newspapers. For the most part, newspapers rely on the daily 'situation' report, provided from the time of the first emergency (June 1985) by Binfo, and since May 1987 by the Police Division of Public Relations, syndicated through SAPA. Other permissible 'official' sources of information are the substance of press conferences arranged by the police; ad hoc reports, statements and Annual Reports from the Ministries of Law and Order, Justice and the Office of the State President; and of course, parliamentary debate and questions and answers.

Newspapers either reprint the 'situation/unrest' reports as they stand, or attempt to integrate them into a more comprehensive 'story'. The difficulties in using police 'situation reports' to monitor political violence are threefold:

- the paucity of information they provide,
- their obscurity; and
- their occasional divergence from eye-witness reports.

Typically, they only give the general area of the incident, and in the case of a fatality, the cause of death, the sex and sometimes the age of the victim. Names are almost never included, even after the next-of-kin have been informed. This makes cross-tabulation extremely difficult. In their SAPA versions, the 'unrest reports' are further condensed, and even garbled, when the reporter has attempted to summarise two or more reports, and integrate them with other material. The greatest problem with the police 'unrest reports' is that they are quite often simply wrong.

The head of one independent monitoring agency, John Aitchison (1988:5), quotes the example of the shooting of Simon and Smalridge Mthembu on 24 January 1988, by Inkatha vigilante Sichizo Zuma (or those with him). The police 'unrest report' of 25 January 1988 makes no mention of their being shot and wounded but incorrectly claims that one of the vigilantes (presumably Zuma) sustained serious injuries when struck on the head with a bush knife. The *Natal Witness* report on which the Centre for Adult Education data base item was derived, printed the police version of the

story. The inaccuracy only came to light in subsequent affidavits in an application to the Supreme Court for an interdict against Zuma. Since the great majority of 'incidents' do not have independent eye-witness corroboration, let alone a legal outcome, it is not possible to estimate how many other 'unrest reports' are factually incorrect.

### ● Bureau for Information

The Bureau for Information was established in September 1985, under the leadership of Louis Nel. Apart from the direct media liaison referred to above, the Bureau also maintains Directorates of Research and Publications. The former section monitors the national state of emergency and undertakes statistical analyses to determine trends and to disseminate information. Opinion polls are conducted to determine attitudes and views among all population groups and perception studies are done to pinpoint their information requirements (Binfo 1987a:5).

Despite the wealth of information collected by the Bureau, very little is disseminated to either the public or other researchers, except in totally digested forms. According to a Bureau spokesman, this information is given selectively to 'opinion makers', since this is a more objective way of disseminating information than through the press, which tends to reflect certain political opinions (Interview with author, 7/10/87).

The Directorate of Publications produces pamphlets, booklets and periodicals carefully aimed at specific markets, and covering a wide range of subjects. Prominent among these articles is a contextualisation of 'reform' and 'unrest', some of which do contain statistics. Despite their assumed access to accurate sources of information, the Bureau's publications are poor information sources, and rely for their impact on their glossy presentation and cleverly constructed graphs.

## Evaluative Criteria

In order for any information to be worthwhile, it must be reliable, representative, valid and unbiased (Sutcliffe 1988:9).

The data provided by official sources is regarded by researchers as unreliable, since there is no strict pattern to their accuracy. While they are sometimes shown to be accurate, sometimes they are not. A telltale sign of inaccuracy comes from those occasions when two state agencies provide conflicting figures for the same category. Since only one set of figures can be correct, researchers need to cross-check references in order to ascertain which ones are.

Verification is one of the most thorny issues in collecting and collating data. The non-uniform way in which official statistics are presented and categorised makes it extremely difficult to verify data. Data is not released in a systematic way, but must be gleaned from any number of different sources (see above). Different sources use overlapping categories, making it impossible to check for repetition and omission of incidents. Temporal categories, for instance, are conventionally divided into yearly or monthly periods, but figures may be given, for instance, firstly for October and November,



while the next figures released may be for November-December, thus making it impossible to recuperate the figures for November. The most notorious instance of changing categories at will, has been concerned with the number and ages of children in detention.

## Independent Monitoring

Since official sources are treated with such circumspection, efforts are being made by independent agencies to gather data on various aspects of political conflict, state violence and repression. The four monitoring programmes the author has investigated in Natal are the Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal Pietermaritzburg (CAE); the Unrest Monitoring Project (UMP) located at the University of Natal in Durban; the PFP monitoring of political violence based in their Durban offices; and the Indicator Project SA, based at the University of Natal, Durban. The first three projects are regional in their focus, while *Indicator SA* provides national coverage.

All four monitoring groups attempt to build up a comprehensive data base covering the widest possible spectrum of events and incidents connected with the political violence, which will provide the raw materials for a contextual analysis of the situation in their areas. The rationale of each group determines the way in which the data is collected, stored and used. CAE is area specific, dealing only with incidents in the Natal midlands region. The UMP is trend specific, eschewing a day-to-day account in favour of uncovering the dynamics of what is occurring in the south Natal townships — and settlement-areas; while the PFP play a 'watch-dog' role in relation to events in the Natal coastal region.

*Indicator SA* identifies its main monitoring task as providing databanks covering as much of the political violence of the past five years as possible. Its database built up since mid-1984 covers extra-parliamentary strategies (rent, consumer, transport and election boycotts), and work stayaways. The fatality statistics record civil conflicts and guerrilla activities separately; only fatalities, and not incidents are enumerated. Monitoring political violence entails information/data collection, collation, recording and publication. The chief sources of *Indicator SA* are a very large news-clipping collection, together with 'mainstream agencies': Bureau for Information, *Hansard*, ministerial statements and SAPA/SAP 'unrest reports'. Published academic work, court cases, interdicts and affidavits are also used, though no provision is made to collect these independently. No independent fieldwork is carried out, nor does *Indicator SA* receive information from independent crisis agencies (see below). The information is however, cross-correlated nationally with other monitoring agencies who do have access to such 'raw material'.

What distinguishes the monitoring groups' data bases, however, is the wealth of information collected from organisations and individuals affected by, or working directly with the people affected by violence.

These would include lawyers, trade unionists, clergy and political activists. Advice and crises offices of organisations such as Detainees Support Committee (Descom, affiliated to DPSC and now restricted); the Black Sash; Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness; Durban Network, as well as civic advice offices in the townships, have particularly close contact with the victims of political violence and their families. The purpose of crisis agencies is to deal with the immediate plight of the distressed, but in doing so they are in a unique position to obtain first-hand accounts of violence from victims and witnesses. Statements and affidavits are taken, forwarded to a monitoring agency, and the consolidated reports of the different areas are then returned to the crisis organisations.

Independent accounts of violence also find their way to monitoring agencies as either sworn or unsworn statements. In Pietermaritzburg, individuals affected by the violence, as well as their employers, have reported incidents which were not recorded elsewhere. The PFP investigate all reports of violence brought to their attention, either independently, or with the help of the media. Only the (Durban) Unrest Monitoring Programme have their own team of fieldworkers who undertake interviews in the area under the supervision of trained researchers, in keeping with the objective of developing social research skills in the affected communities. Five to twenty part-timers, usually students, are involved in the programme at any one time.

An important factor in the operation of monitoring agencies is the protection of their sources. Clearly, affidavits and sworn statements become public property. In situations where persons are vulnerable to the unwanted attention of both the security forces and vigilantes, anonymity of information becomes essential. This is particularly important in relation to items picked up by the press. For agencies monitoring ongoing trends, the protection of sources is a less vexed issue.

While none of the monitoring agencies surveyed claim that their figures are definitive, there are good reasons for believing that they come far closer to the mark than the figures published by the official sources. As was previously indicated, if anything, the figures given by the independent monitoring agencies are a gross undercount, which cannot reflect the full extent of political violence in South Africa.

The Indicator Project researchers are quick to point out the limitations of the work of independent, non-government monitoring agencies in South Africa in terms of the restricted information flow, limited access and bias problems with primary official and other source materials. By relying on published and verified statistics, the Project has produced in this volume of data collated and updated from the *Indicator SA* quarterly report (published between 1983-88) as well as newly researched, what probably amounts to a 'substantial under-reportage' of incidents of political violence in all spheres. However, in keeping with the Project's objectives of achieving accuracy and objectivity in monitoring conflict, their researchers maintain that it is 'better to be approximately right than precisely wrong'.

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
**PART II**

**CONFLICT REGIONS**


# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict: The Orange Free State/Vaal Triangle


1985




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# THE AWAKENING

## Desperation and Defiance

*Matthew Chaskalson and Jeremy Seekings*

**T**he Vaal Triangle and Orange Free State constitute an unusually heterogeneous area. It includes a major industrial complex (the Vaal Triangle – Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg), a major gold-mining complex (Welkom, Virginia, Odendaalsrus), an administrative/manufacturing centre (Bloemfontein), several minor manufacturing centres (Parys, Kroonstad, Harrismith, Bethlehem), and a host of small towns based around local agriculture.

Township politics in the area has reflected this heterogeneity: the industrial townships in the Vaal Triangle (Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Boipatong, Bophelong, Zamdela and Evaton), the Welkom area (Thabong, Meloding, Phomolong, Khutloanong and Allanridge), Bloemfontein (Mangaung), and other major townships in the northern Free State (especially Tumahole (Parys) and Seisoville (Kroonstad)) saw sustained protest and conflict from around 1984. In some townships in more 'rural' parts of the northern Free State the transition to protest occurred in 1985 or 1986. In most townships in the rural central and southern Free State there has never been any political protest.

Prior to 1984 there had been little organised resistance to apartheid in the Vaal/OFS region. The 1937 Vereeniging beer riots and the 1960 Sharpeville protests were anomalous episodes in the history of the Vaal Triangle, which was practically unaffected both by the political mobilisation of the 1950s (with the occasional exception of Evaton) and by the education protests of 1976-77. The Orange Free State has been even less politically volatile than the Vaal Triangle. The pass protests by women in Bloemfontein in the 1920s were the last well-known instance of organised black political protest in the region.

Notwithstanding this acquiescent history, protests repeatedly occurred in the Vaal/OFS region during the mid-1980s before they became a nationwide phenomenon. Schools protests broke out in Thabong (Welkom) at the end of 1983 and continued intermittently throughout 1984. Residents protesting over rent increases clashed with police in Tumahole in July 1984. Events in Tumahole were repeated on a larger scale in the 'Vaal Uprising' of 3 September 1984. Residents began a rent boycott that continues, four years later. In October 1984, Operation Palmiet brought the SADF into Sebokeng, in the first use of the army to

suppress township protest since 1977.

### Organisational Levels

Prior to the outbreak of resistance, organisation had been weak in the region. Unions (especially Mawu, Ccawusa, NUTW) and unionists provided organisational input in several townships (Tumahole, Mangaung, Thabong, Sebokeng, Sharpeville). Cosas organised students in Thabong and the Vaal Triangle. Otherwise, however, political activity focused around particular individuals. With the exception of the Evaton Ratepayers Association (ERPA), there was little popular organisation comparable to the Sofasonke Party in Soweto, for example, or to many of the civic associations formed in the early 1980s. (The ERPA was a specific response to circumstances peculiar to Evaton – namely, the removal of a freehold township). Furthermore, while the protests of the mid-1980s were accompanied by the emergence of some organisations, the latter rarely developed strong roots in the region.

State analyses of protest in this erstwhile 'acquiescent' region range widely. The first response was a particularly crude agitator thesis of resistance. The Lekoa (Vaal) Town Clerk, Nic Louw, testified in court that the Vaal uprising was initiated by people in UDF T-shirts who were bussed in from outside the Vaal Triangle. He suggested that they had chosen the Vaal Triangle as the site for their attempted insurrection because the Lekoa Town Council was recognised as the most successful black local authority in the country.

A slightly more sophisticated agitator thesis underlies the 'Delmas' treason trial, in which 17 Vaal residents and five others (including three national UDF leaders) have been charged with responsibility for the Vaal Uprising. A third analysis was presented by the Van der Walt Commission (January 1985), which was appointed to report on the educational crisis in the Vaal. Van der Walt attributed the uprising to agitators but conceded that residents had legitimate grievances. An unpublished fourth analysis, the Jordane Report, reportedly places an even greater stress on material

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factors, i.e. rents and township conditions.

The crude agitator theses cannot be substantiated. National organisation had barely touched the region at the time that widespread violence broke out. There was little contact between the UDF and its affiliates in the Vaal, and the Free State was probably the most politically isolated region in the country. It seems then, that if we are to explain why violent political conflict broke out in the Orange-Vaal region in 1983-85, we have to look beyond agitators to some structural forces acting on the region.

## Socio-Economic Linkages

Recession and drought devastated much of the region in the early 1980s. The Vaal Triangle is dominated by heavy engineering industries, which were particularly badly affected by the recession. Real incomes per capita in the Vaal townships fell by an estimated 5 percent from 1980 to 1985. The rest of the region outside the Goldfields was hit by the collapse of agriculture caused by the drought.

Real incomes in the Vaal/OFS townships were lower than in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand townships. Average per capita incomes in 1985 in the Vaal Triangle townships were less than 90 percent of incomes in Pretoria townships, and only about 75 percent of incomes in Soweto. Average per capita incomes were marginally higher in the Goldfields townships, lower in Bloemfontein, and much lower in Botshabelo than in the Vaal Triangle. The percentage of households in Vaal Triangle townships with incomes below the Minimum Living Level (MLL) rose from 28 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1985, and the percentage below the Supplemented Living Level (SLL) rose from 39 percent to 43 percent. In Bloemfontein townships, the percentage of households below the MLL and SLL were 33 percent and 48 percent respectively. This compared with 26 percent and 36 percent respectively for both Pretoria and Soweto (Bureau of Market Research reports).

Orange Vaal Administration Board (OVAB) policy aggravated the effects of the recession. The OVAB administered the Vaal Triangle and the northern Free State after 1979 (in 1984 it became the Orange Vaal Development Board, OVDB). It had a much stricter economic (i.e. unsubsidised) rentals policy than any other administration board. At the same time, the OVAB presided over significant development in some townships, especially Sebokeng and Zamdela. Rents in the OVAB area, therefore, rose more sharply than anywhere else in the country. In Tumahole, rents rose by

155 percent during 1981-83. In the Vaal, rents rose by over 400 percent during 1978-83, making them over 20 percent higher than in any other metropolitan area. This was at a time when real incomes were low and falling. By April 1984 one in two households were in arrears on rent and service charges, with the Lekoa Town Council's deficit for the first quarter of the year at over R1,5m.

In some areas where rents were rising, there was at least some corresponding township development. But development was highly concentrated. As late as 1988 only 11 out of approximately 80 townships in the Free State had more than 10 percent of their houses electrified, (most were under 20 percent electrified). In many northern Free State townships increased rents were not matched by visible township development. Residents thus had the impression that they were paying for development in other areas (Sebokeng, QwaQwa) or just for council expenses.

Popular outrage at the spiralling rent increases was accentuated by the corrupt and unaccountable practices

of the councils which imposed the increases.


Corruption and nepotism were features of many councils across the country, but were particularly pronounced in the Orange-Vaal region. In the aftermath of the Vaal Uprising, three Lekoa town councillors, including the former mayor (Knox Matjila), were charged with taking bribes in

return for the allocation of trading sites. A disgruntled councillor (Jonas Tsoai) proposed a motion of no-confidence in Matjila's successor as Mayor, Esau Mahlatsi, after he consistently allocated business sites to his relatives (Tsoai was suspended for his trouble). The Delmas treason trial revealed that even councillors had admitted residents perceived them to be corrupt (State vs Baleka and 21 others).

The most startling example of malpractice on the Lekoa Town Council concerned the 'sale' of the 25 beerhalls under the OVDB's jurisdiction. Beerhalls were 'bought' with soft loans from the OVDB, provided with no collateral. The Lekoa Town Council applied to the government for a monopoly on beer and liquor sales to be granted to the purchasers until the loans were repaid. Twelve of the 15 beerhalls (valued at R9m out of R14m) in the Vaal, and at least seven of the ten in the northern Free State, were bought by incumbent councillors. Mahlatsi and his brothers bought 12 beerhalls in total, valued at R7,5m.

Elsewhere in the region, councillor malpractice was widespread. Councillors were particularly unpopular in

FATALITIES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS



Evaton, where the Council presided over 'replanning', which involved the removal of eighty year-old freehold rights. The poll in the 1983 elections was a meagre 5 percent, the lowest in the country. Opposition to the Council included the ERPA and the Evaton branch of Inkatha. In most of the OFS townships, however, condemnation of councillors did not go as far as rejection of the actual council system.

## Conflict Triggers

Rent increases and corrupt councillors were the issues central to the outbreak of resistance in Tumahole and the Vaal. Elsewhere in the region early mobilisation took place around education. Educational grievances specific to the region included: the employment of more white teachers than elsewhere, related allegations of racism, and complaints that Afrikaans was being forced on them as a medium of instruction. Grievances that were common to DET students across the country included:

excessive corporal punishment, the exclusion of students on grounds of age, the unavailability of mathematics and science teachers, and the corrupt operation of the prefect system. As resistance in the schools spread and national co-ordination through Cosas

improved, students demanded the recognition of democratically elected SRCs which would be able to take up their grievances.

Isolated school protests broke out in Thabong (Welkom) in November 1983 over the issues of forthcoming examinations and the proposed introduction of an age limit. When some students were excluded in terms of the age limit in January 1984, sporadic protests resumed. In March 1984 the Thabong Youth Congress was launched to organise excluded students (and it affiliated to the UDF). In July 1984 there were violent confrontations between students and authorities at all the high schools in Thabong. When students returned from the July vacation, the authorities threatened not to readmit certain 'agitators'. All three township high schools came out on boycott in response. The school boycott fed into other protests in Thabong. In late August, boycotting students were prominent in a march against rent increases. The march was broken up by police and violent confrontations followed. The

Deputy Mayor of Thabong, Abel Mokoena, blamed the unrest on the insensitivity of the school authorities to student demands.

In May 1984, Tumahole residents were informed of a 43 percent rent increase which was to take effect from 1 July. The community council was forced to call a public meeting, but only three councillors turned up. Older residents angrily asked why the councillors had not fulfilled their election promises to build clinics and parks, why residents had been paying for a sewerage system and for high mast lights that had not been installed, and why rents were increased without prior consultation? The councillors were unco-operative, and told residents that, like it or not, they would have to pay the increased rents.

The rentpayers, mostly older residents, were primarily motivated by conservative concerns. Their opposition to the rent increase and to the councillors, however, was shared by younger and more radical activists based in the Tumahole Students Organisation (TSO). The TSO had, through cultural and welfare activities, earned considerable respect in the township before 1984.

When the TSO took up the rent issue, it was strongly supported by older residents. The TSO met with the councillors and the OVDB, but to no avail. At a report-back meeting, residents resolved to ostracise councillors and to boycott their businesses.

Residents discussed forming a civic association as an alternative to the council.

On Sunday, 15 July 1984, Tumahole residents staged a peaceful protest march. Police shadowed the marchers, ordered them to disperse, and then fired teargas before the allotted time was up. In the subsequent anger and confusion some residents burnt down a councillor's supermarket/cafe, looted his butchery, and also the OVDB bottlestore. Barricades were constructed. One resident who was arrested by the police died in their custody.

## The Vaai Uprising

In July the Lekoa Town Council announced further rent increases, to become effective on 3 September. Protest meetings were held by the Vaal Civic Association (VCA) in Sebokeng, Boipatong and Bophelong, the ERPA in Evaton and the Sharpeville


### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
VT townships	1-2/9/84	mass in 5 townships
OFS/VT	1/5/85	limited regional
OFS/VT	9/10/85	weak
Seeisoville	21/3/86	80% of residents
OFS/VT	1/5/86	moderate
Tumahole	29/5/86	moderate
OFS/VT	14/7/86	support in Vaal Triangle
Sharpeville	15/9/86	partial success
OFS/VT	1/10/86	mostly miners stop work
OFS/VT	12/3/87	little
OFS/VT	5-6/5/87	little
OFS/VT	16/6/87	limited in Vaal Triangle
OFS/VT	21/3/88	little support
OFS/VT	6-8/6/88	(non-mining) unions
OFS/VT	16/6/88	unknown

#### Note

Most of the work stayaways that affected the Orange Free State and Vaal Triangle regions were part of broader national stayaway calls.

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



IPWA

Drawn by Cartographic of Geographical and Environmental Science, University of Natal, Durban 1988



Anti-Rent Co-ordinating Committee (SARCC). The VCA (a UDF affiliate) had been launched in October 1983 to oppose council elections, but then became dormant. The SARCC was an ad-hoc body established to take up the issue of the rent increases. It is important to note that none of these bodies had much contact with regional or national political structures.

At the protest meetings residents condemned the increases and spoke out against the corruption of the councillors. At one meeting it was resolved to stayaway from work on 3 September and to march to the Sebokeng administration offices in protest against the increases. On the night of Sunday, 2 September, there were sporadic clashes between police and residents in Bophelong; by the following morning it was clear that the stayaway had overwhelming support; as police intervened to crush the stayaway violent confrontations spread to Sharpeville and Boipatong. The protest march was brutally broken up by police before reaching the administration offices.

Pandemonium broke out in the township. On 3 September, approximately 30 people, including four councillors, were killed in clashes between protesters and the authorities. Violent confrontations continued through the rest of the week, with many more fatalities. Residents had considered a boycott of the rent increase before the stayaway. In its aftermath, rent payments were boycotted completely.

In protest at security force action, Vaal students did not return to school after the stayaway of 3 September. They linked their boycott to the Vaal uprising and to educational grievances. Their demands included the removal of army and police from the townships, the release of detainees, the withdrawal of the rent increase, the resignation of the councillors, and standard educational demands. The Transvaal stayaway of 5-6 November 1984, which linked student grievances with the demand that troops vacate the townships, was very strongly supported in the region.

By this stage school boycotts had broken out elsewhere. Thabong's high schools were still being boycotted. Tumahole high school students took up their own grievances in the aftermath of the rent protests, boycotting classes too. When students returned after the September break, they found they were expected to re-register. In response, students burnt the registration papers and resumed their boycott. Mangaung students had also come out on boycott and clashed with police in late August. In October boycotts and riots started in Botshabelo.

Early in 1985, school boycotts and clashes spread across the northern Free State. In January students in Khotsong (Bothaville), Meloding (Virginia), Khutloanong (Odendaalsrus) and Moyakeng (Wesselbron) came out on boycott. In February they were joined by students in Seeisoville, and in March by

students in Bohlokong (Bethlehem) and Zamdela (Sasolburg). By this stage schools had been closed in Thabong and classes had been suspended in Moyakeng and Mangaung.

Although protests in the schools had followed a similar pattern throughout the Orange-Vaal region, there does not appear to have been much co-ordination between students in different areas. Outside the Vaal Triangle, school protests preceded the emergence of Cosas organisation in the townships involved. Individual student leaders might have had links with Cosas members in other areas and certainly were aware of school boycotts elsewhere in the country, but there appears to have been little regional or national organisation that fed into the Free State boycotts. The similarity in student demands across the region is more likely to have been a result of similar local conditions and student leaders' awareness of developments in the schools at a regional and national level. This was certainly the case in Tumahole, where the first episode in the school protests was initiated by a student leader who had been inspired by reading about the

Atteridgeville (Pretoria) boycotts in a magazine.

Student protests were generally accompanied by an escalation of violent conflict. Police were unwilling to tolerate protests in the streets, especially when students at one school marched to other schools to encourage other students to join boycotts. The use of

force to disperse students, and the detention of leaders, prompted a violent reaction on the part of some students. The death of students in clashes or in police custody provided a further focus for discontent. Deaths also initiated cycles of violence around funerals.

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Seeisoville	1985-86
Tumahole	July 1984 - 1986
Sharpeville	July 1984 - 1986

### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

Route	Date	Trigger
Botshabelo/ Onverwacht/ Manguang - Bloemfontein	begins Oct 1984	fare hike

## Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of 3 September 1984, organisation in the Vaal region was decimated. Over 900 Vaal residents were reported to be in police custody in late September, and activists who managed to escape arrest fled the region. Operation Palmiet – the deployment of the SADF in the Vaal townships in October 1984 – stopped some of the violent clashes between unorganised residents and police, but the townships remained in a state of insurrection until the end of the year. Students did not return to school, residents did not pay rent and there were frequent attacks on state property and on individuals identified with the state.

Several organisations were formed in specific response to the rent issue. The Vaal Trade Union Co-ordinating Congress (VTUCC) and the Sharpeville,

Boipatong and Bophelong Civic Associations were established to negotiate with the authorities. The negotiations ultimately failed. The Lekoia Town Council took its budget as the starting point; the VTUCC and civics took residents' incomes as theirs. As residents could not afford to pay rents to cover the cost of the council's budget, these two positions were incompatible.

The impasse reached in negotiations reflected a general impasse in the Vaal townships. Repression precluded the emergence of any developed participatory organisation in the townships. Nevertheless, residents still refused to pay rent. Once initiated, the rent boycott did not depend on any organisation, and by 1986 it had developed a powerful momentum of its own.

With the failure of negotiation the organisations lost their raison d'être and decayed. Thereafter, there was general disorganisation.

In Tumahole, too, a civic association was formed to negotiate over rents. The OVDB agreed to reduce rent by approximately 50 percent pending negotiations. A rent boycott began in April 1985 after the OVDB broke off negotiations and all public meetings were banned. As the

boycott gained its own momentum, the civic atrophied. It was unable to adapt itself to conditions in which meetings with residents were no longer possible. Moreover, as in the Vaal, the rent boycott resolved the rents issue as far as residents were concerned.

Soon after the Tumahole rent boycott began, Rents Action Co-ordinating Committee (RACC) was established in the northern Free State. The RACC resolved to promote rent boycotts in Mokwallo (Vredefort), Ramolotsi (Viljoenskroon), Khotsong (Bothaville) and Seeisoville as a way of strengthening (or in some cases initiating) organisation in these townships. In so far as the initiation of boycotts in these townships was concerned, the RACC was successful, but the boycotts did not achieve their aim of strengthening organisation. For example, a UDF Ad-Hoc Committee formed in Seeisoville was almost stillborn in August 1985. As elsewhere, boycotts in the northern Free State developed a dynamic that was almost completely independent of organisation.

As student boycotts spread, older activists were detained and levels of violent conflict escalated, new groups of residents became prominent in the townships. As in the Pretoria and Witwatersrand region, younger male residents emerged at the forefront. In Tumahole, the '14s' (higher primary school students) clashed repeatedly with municipal police. The changing pattern of township 'organisation' in Tumahole was reflected in

the contrasting experiences of two consumer boycotts (of white traders). The first, in August 1985, was in support of demands for the reinstatement of dismissed workers. The boycott was discussed beforehand, and there was solidarity in the township behind it. The second, in December 1985, was in support of calls for a 'Black Christmas'. Consumers first found out about the boycott when they were harassed by young residents 'monitoring' it. The boycott led to conflict between consumers and monitors, and soon faltered.

By the end of 1985, the Vaal/OFS region was the site of widespread school and rent boycotts. Nevertheless, township organisation in the region was weak. Activists elsewhere in the country (especially in the Eastern

Cape) were developing the mass-based participatory structures of street and area committees. In the Vaal/OFS, not only did this fail to take place, but many of the township organisations had weakened, rather than strengthened, as political mobilisation advanced. By the declaration of the partial state of emergency in mid-1985, the

Tumahole and Vaal Civic Associations had ceased to operate in any meaningful sense and organisation in the schools was weak, notwithstanding the spread of Cosas across the region.

In most townships there was growing dissent among students over the boycott strategy. Many students grew disillusioned with activist students' calls for boycotts that increasingly seemed to be unconnected to school grievances. With hindsight one can see that the organised resistance of 1984-85 was an anomalous episode. In most townships, organisation had only developed shallow roots, and did not survive repression (especially the detention/death or exile of central activists), isolation from political support structures and the spread of boycott politics.

## Repressive Forces

The Vaal Triangle was the only area in the region covered by the partial state of emergency (July 1985). This was curious because earlier restrictions on organisations and meetings imposed in June 1985 had affected seven magisterial districts and 11 named organisations (some defunct since the 1970s) in the northern Free State. Restrictions on schools imposed in June/July 1985 also covered the region.

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
Tumahole	July 1984
Thabong	August 1984
Evaton	September 1984
Sharpeville	September 1984
Boipatong	September 1984
Sebokeng	September 1984
Bophelong	September 1984
Zamdela	September 1984
Vredefort	October 1984

#### Note

In July 1986 It was estimated that the Lekoia Town Council (incorporating the townships of Sharpeville, Boipatong, Sebokeng, Bophelong and Zamdela) was owed more than R45m in rent/service charge arrears. By April 1987 It was estimated that OFS township residents owed R10,7m in rent/service charge arrears.

Nevertheless, there was a marked escalation of repression in the entire region from mid-1985. Key activists were detained under the Internal Security Act, and vigilante attacks spread. The first attacks took place in Thabong, where the Phakathi vigilantes killed a student in February 1985 and two more in May. The Phakathis were led by councillors, drove a development board micro-bus, tortured their victims in the administration offices and were alleged to have police support. In Tumahole, the 'A-Team' killed a local Cosas office-holder, and forced other activists into hiding. In several northern Free State townships (including Thabong and Meloding), vigilantes forced students back to school in January 1986.

Repression escalated in 1986. Townships in the region were hard hit by detentions under the national state of emergency. For example, almost forty Tumahole activists were detained, and a similar number fled, most to Johannesburg. There was a very heavy security force presence in many townships. In Tumahole there was reportedly a casspir at almost every major intersection for the first two weeks of the national state of emergency. Night-time curfews were enforced, officially or unofficially, in many townships. More municipal police ('greenbeans' or 'amstels') and kitskonstabels were deployed.

In 1986, the state also adopted a more aggressive response to township protests. It sought to end rent boycotts by evicting boycotters. Municipal police were stationed in schools, and beat students who were alleged to have broken any rule. Students (both primary and secondary) who were identified as 'comrades' were systematically excluded from schools throughout the region. The numbers affected are significant, probably numbering well over one thousand in the Free State. Municipal police and kitskonstabels were also widely alleged to be engaging in apparently random and intimidatory violence directed at residents. In a symbolic act, police destroyed a 'people's park' built in Tumahole in June 1986.

The state also sought to establish conservative township groups, as a longer-term strategy. The development boards sponsored the establishment of youth groups, variously known as The Eagles and SAAYU (thought to stand for South African African Youth Unity). Resources were provided for choirs, sporting and other social activities, and for visits to places as far away as Durban. In almost every township there was a nucleus of councillors to act around. Tumahole was possibly the only township where an administrator was appointed (September 1986).

Support for these state strategies varied from township to township. In some of the northern Free State townships, unlike Tumahole, there had been little respect for student activism before protests began. There was often virtually no civic organisation and no widespread campaign over rents. After chronic student-based violent conflict, residents sometimes endorsed measures which they saw as forcing students back to school and restoring some degree of 'order' in the township. In Meloding, most visibly, many older residents participated in the vigilante groups that literally herded students back into school in 1986. More

generally, support for state actions was limited to obvious constituencies: some state employees, councillors, and embryonic township capitalists and their clients. Security force actions in practice often undermined the possibility of popular support. This was most clearly the case with evictions of rent boycotters, and random municipal police violence.

## Activist Responses

There was a limited range of options open to activists. Many were in detention and most of the others in hiding. Some left the country. Residents who took the place of the former activists risked rapid detention. As in townships in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand regions, 'organisations' tended to engage in legal initiatives, over both rent boycotter evictions and school issues. There were some conspicuous successes. Evictions in the Vaal and Tumahole were prevented by legal action, and the Tumahole Civic Association succeeded in invalidating all rent increases of the last few years.

There were also, again as in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand regions, direct action responses to rent boycotter evictions. Residents who paid their rents risked having their houses burnt, as did people who occupied the houses of evictees. Residents who defied eviction orders were often readmitted to their homes by other residents. Municipal police were often attacked while trying to evict residents, and there were further protest marches and stayaways (for example, in the Vaal Triangle on 15 September 1986). In Tumahole, there was a stayaway in response to the destruction of 'people's parks' by police.

In 1987, Fryco (the Free State Youth Congress) was launched. But Fryco remains an activist-based organisation and conducts much of its activity from outside the OFS. Whilst Fryco provides some co-ordination for youth activists, its primary role has had to be to re-establish structures.

Even with the release of many activists from detention, however, many organisations in the OFS remained moribund, and unions in some cases withdrew from township activity. In the words of one Johannesburg-based activist: 'Meetings were held, workshops were organised, papers were discussed, resolutions were adopted — but nothing was done ... It's just like the 1960s.' Tensions often emerged between activists in the townships and those in 'exile'. The latter controlled most financial resources, and were accused of living in isolated and inactive grandeur. The former were accused of being 'lazy' or 'irresponsible'. Inactivity, which was often common to both groups, generally reflected a feeling of disorientation, of not knowing what to do.

Some activists identified a need for the kind of political activity which had preceded the period of violent conflict and repression. Advice offices were opened, and progressive drama groups were widely formed to 'politicise' township residents (for example, in Phomolong (Harrismith) and Tumahole).

Most of the agricultural townships in the Orange Free State remained unaffected by the conflicts

elsewhere. In Mamafubedu (Petrus Steyn), however, excessive state repression after June 1986 served as a catalyst for resistance. When police detained an alleged stone-thrower and his entire extended family, residents organised themselves around the issue of detention. The repressive response to this organisation only served to aggravate hostility between the police and residents. In 1987 police killed a resident at a meeting, and residents attacked the homes of councillors. In 1988 there have been continued disturbances in schools. Schools in neighbouring townships in Lindley and Reitz have also been affected by protests.

While some of these agricultural townships have seen unprecedented protests and conflict, these remain limited and involve a small range of residents. Many of the 'comrades' in Petrus Steyn were regarded as thugs prior to their politicisation, and drinking sessions in shebeens remain a more frequent feature of organisation than do meetings.

Bizarre events have been reported from some towns. White Ficksburg councillors, for example, were reported to have initiated meetings with a range of black township residents, including UDF sympathisers.

## Current Situation

Despite continued repression under the state of emergency, resistance has continued. School protests occurred in several OFS townships during 1988, although in many cases they were subdued compared to the protests of previous years. In Tumahole, for example, a school boycott in protest against the exclusion from school of over 500 students alleged to be political activists was broken before the end of the day.

There has been sustained protest in Botshabelo. Protests and riots took place sporadically during 1987. The incorporation of Botshabelo into QwaQwa in December 1987 led to an escalation of protest. In January there was a bus boycott, for example. As elsewhere, people successfully turned to the courts. In August 1988 the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein declared the incorporation invalid.

The scope for major protests in the Vaal/OFS region is, however, limited. There will continue to be mass resistance over issues such as evictions. But the focus of successful organisational activity can only be grassroots work, directed at the longer-term.

More recently the state launched major campaigns around the October 1988 municipal elections. In Phomolong, pensioners were forced to register when they collected their pensions, and municipal police went from door to door forcing people to register. In Tumahole, huge posters exhorted residents to vote and municipal officials sent election booklets to all houses in the township. In Sebokeng, pensioners were also pressurised to cast special votes on pain of losing their pensions. It is likely that such practices were common across the whole region.

The elections for the Lekoa Town Council, target and catalyst for the initial Vaal Triangle uprising produced interesting results. The poll was less than 20 percent, but those residents that did vote rejected the

sitting council overwhelmingly. Esau Mahlatsi's Lekoa People's Party won only four of the 42 seats (or six of the 44 seats). The elections were a runaway victory for the veteran councillor from Sharpeville, Samuel Kodisang, whose party won all the other seats.

What makes these results particularly noticable is that Kodisang campaigned on a ticket which included all the demands of the rent boycotters. He promised to reduce rents to R30 a month, to write off rent arrears and to campaign for the release of the Delmas treason trialists and the Sharpeville Six. It is doubtful that Kodisang will be able to implement any of these campaign promises. Nevertheless, his election success has provided strong evidence of community support for the rent boycott and for the individuals on trial who the state holds responsible for the events of September 1984.

## Sources

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Seekings J. 'Township Politics in Tumahole', in *Africa Perspective* (forthcoming).

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
# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict:

### Pretoria/Witwatersrand

#### FATALITIES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS

1985 - up to June 1988



Legend

- 1 Soweto
- 2 Alexandra
- 3 Mamelodi
- 4 Thembisa
- 5 KwaThema
- 6 Duduza
- 7 Tsakane
- 8 Kattlehong
- 9 Atteridgeville
- 10 Daveyton
- 11 Mahlakeng
- 12 Vosloorus

Note:

For monthly death tolls in this region and the rest of the Transvaal consult graphs in case study number five (Makanjee).

# THE CHALLENGE

## From Protest to People's Power

*Matthew Chaskalson and Jeremy Seekings*

The processes of township political mobilisation and resistance in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region from the late 1970s to mid-1984 were characterised by protests over material grievances such as the housing shortage, the inadequacy of municipal services, squatter eviction or shack demolition, and rent or busfare increases. These initial responses were generally focused on councillors and took the form of limited direct action, including placard demonstrations, angry heckling at meetings, and threats of violence against particularly unpopular councillors. Women were often prominent in these protests.

Councillors were the focus of discontent for two related reasons. Firstly, they administered state policies which intensified material grievances. In particular, they administered township finances within the framework imposed by the central state whereby townships had to be financially self-supporting. Development therefore required raising rents and the control (i.e. eviction) of residents who consumed services without paying rent to the council (i.e. squatters and shack-residents). Secondly, there was a subtle but important transformation in the relations between councillors and their constituents.

Formerly, councillors had played the role of local patrons, mediating in disputes among residents and between residents and the township administration. But the nature of patronage relations changed as councillors' powers were extended. Councillors increasingly played an allocative role, and many were seen as unaccountable and corrupt, enriching themselves and a few supporters while neglecting their electoral constituents. The imposition of recurrent rent increases, the failure to fulfil election promises of providing housing or public services, and the repeated eviction of squatters and demolitions of shacks underlined the perceived violation of 'community' obligations and responsibilities.

During this period the tone of township politics was essentially conservative. Protesting residents rarely rejected the council system completely, but rather identified with populist 'opposition' councillors against the less responsive councillors 'in power'. In Daveyton, women who protested regularly about housing conditions between 1979 and 1985 were supporters of councillor Shadrack Sinaba. In Mamelodi (Pretoria),

populist Vukani Vulahmelo People's Party (VVPP) councillors opposed high rents and slum clearance, denounced financial irregularities, demanded low-cost housing and even took the Central Transvaal Administration Board to court. In some cases whole councils adopted a populist stance for some time. For example, the community council at Katlehong on the East Rand was reluctant to act against the spiralling squatter population between 1979 and 1982. But even populist councils were caught up in the problem of rents and shacks. The Katlehong Council began bulldozing shacks in November 1982, and VVPP councillors presided over rent increases after they were elected into power in 1983.

### Organisational Levels

Indications of change came with the resurgence of black nationalist ideology and the increasing coherence of both trade union and political organisation. The principal nationalist organisations in the region were the UDF, Cosas, the Release Mandela Committee (RMC), the General and Allied Workers Union (Gawu), and the youth congresses formed during 1983 (such as the Soweto Youth Congress, Soyco). Nationalist organisation was strengthened greatly by the return of several Robben Islanders (e.g. Lekota, Morobe), and the lapsing of banning orders (reflecting some state tolerance). During 1982, Fosatu (a forerunner of Cosatu) formally acknowledged the need for trade unions to take up extra-workplace issues. However, this recognition was only slowly reflected in actual activity, and it was only during 1984 that former opponents of political activity (such as Mawu's Moses Mayekiso) were converted. The impact of national politics-oriented activism was often sporadic, however.

In Soweto, the Committee of Ten, which reconstituted itself as the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) in 1979, lacked grassroots organisation and was inactive for long periods. In general, activists tended to provide a more extensive ideological and organisational input into township politics where they were able to take

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Matthew Chaskalson & Jeremy Seekings are graduate student researchers.

up otherwise conservative concerns at a grassroots level.

The independent trade unions, with their existing workplace-based democratic structures, were in a good position to provide a grassroots input. In Katlehong, trade unionists played a major role in opposition to shack demolition in 1982-83. Unionists played an important role in emerging civic organisations, including: Erapo (the East Rand Peoples Organisation), the Duduza Civic Association (DCA), the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation (KRO), the Mohlakeng Civic Association (Moca), and the Alexandra Residents Association (ARA). However, even these organisations tended to have a sporadic effect, increasing at times of crisis (shack demolition, rent increases, or the Black Local Authority (BLA) elections), diminishing inbetween.

## Conflict Triggers

During 1984 protests and organisation ceased to be sporadic and localised. State repression of limited protests led growing numbers of residents to view localised grievances in terms of access to formal political power, both locally and nationally.

An especially important development was the emergence of mass protests in schools. The first protests, in Atteridgeville in January 1984, were restrained and concerned purely educational grievances (including age limit restrictions, irregularities in exam marking, corporal punishment and poor teaching), but student protests were transformed by the response of the authorities. A student was killed by police, student leaders were suspended, and the Department of Education and Training (DET) later closed schools down. The town council made no significant attempt to resolve the issue, in contrast to the Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Organisation (ASRO) which gained support through its efforts. This pattern of events was repeated elsewhere. By August schools were also closed or classes suspended in Alexandra, Daveyton, and Tembisa. Cosas provided a framework for communication of grievances and ideas about organisation and protest. But the protests of mid-1984 primarily reflected the widespread identification of common grievances.

In mid-year, councils throughout the region announced further rent increases. Opposition to these increases coalesced with discontent over the schools issue. The failure of the councils and other authorities to address either issue provoked residents to organise parent-student committees and support or form civic bodies in explicit opposition to councils. A volatile situation developed where there was not only a pervasive atmosphere of unprecedented rejection of the councils but also a sense of urgency, and the presence outside classrooms of large numbers of students who were often ready to engage in direct action.

Local protests also linked in with national and political issues to a new degree. The UDF was, however, not strong in 'black' Pretoria/Witwatersrand townships. The 'Million Signature Campaign' (against the tricameral constitution) of early 1984 was poorly

organised in the region, the UDF provided little concerted input into the educational and rent issues, and officials were taken by surprise by the escalation of conflict in August/September. Nonetheless, some people were caught up in nationwide protests over the tricameral parliamentary elections, especially students. Cosas played an increasingly important role in the second half of 1984 through linking student activists in different townships.

From August 1984 student protests and riots proliferated, especially on the East Rand. The state responded with rising repression, including the military occupation of Tembisa. The politicisation of protest in late 1984 was reflected in the resignation of councillors (and collapse of some councils) and the Transvaal stayaway of 5-6 November. The importance of the regional stayaway was evident from its scale alone: between 300 000 and 800 000 workers and 400 000 students observed the call in the PWV region. More importantly, the stayaway was the first mass regional protest around the demands of workers, students and township residents. These included both material and local (but not national) political demands.

Several townships remained conspicuously quiescent. In Soweto there were no protests over rent increases, no councillors resigned, and there were protests at only a handful of schools. Reasons for this included:

- the social structure of Soweto, with an unusual lack of social cohesion at the township-wide level;
- higher incomes and state-subsidised rents, which reduced the intensity of material grievances for many residents;
- the unimportance of the Soweto Council in township politics, which removed a potential focus for popular discontent; and,
- the character of opposition politics since 1977, with the SCA lacking grassroots organisation and with many residents and activists demoralised by unsuccessful campaigns and inactivity.

## Sustained Protest

During 1985 and early 1986 protest became generalised across the region, including areas which had previously been 'quiescent'. At the same time the character of township politics changed in two almost contradictory directions: violent confrontations became more prominent at the same time as disciplined and formal organisation developed.

By the end of 1985, confrontation in Soweto, Kagiso, Munsieville and Mamelodi had reached the same levels as the Vaal and East Rand in 1984. In part, this escalation resulted from local dynamics similar to those which had produced the earlier confrontations. In Mamelodi, rent increases led to a protest march during which 13 people were killed on 21 November 1985. Residents thereafter engaged in sustained protest: a rent boycott, consumer boycotts and stayaways. The sequence of march, shooting and subsequent radicalisation mirrored events in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984.

A new factor in late 1985 was the development of regional organisation, accompanied by a more pronounced interaction of regional with local dynamics. In Kagiso and Munsieville, local organisation and protest received an important stimulus from regional developments. Consumer boycotts were introduced to the PWV region in August 1985 as an essentially regional tactic, and extended to Kagiso and Munsieville in December through the KRO. As elsewhere, a violent state response (especially in early 1986) sustained rather than suppressed opposition. In Soweto protest was not generalised to the same extent, but there was a marked escalation of protest and conflict in 1985. This involved school protests, the regionally organised consumer boycott, and violent incidents arising out of these activities.

The continued interweaving of moral, political, and material themes underlay popular support for more sustained, more 'political', and sometimes more regional protest. It also provided a possible context for the development of popular radical political organisation, and the proliferation of extra-organisational violence. During 1985 the second of these developments was generally the most visible. Township politics was often reorganised around immediate goals, confrontation and violence; formal organisational procedure was bypassed; planning and the possibilities of negotiation disappeared; debate was stifled; and a political culture of confrontation and action became hegemonic (although not necessarily popular).

## Repressive Forces

State repression created an atmosphere that encouraged political violence and specific incidents often produced reactive violence from residents, most visibly at 'unrest' funerals. In a sample of 39 political funerals in the PWV region between September 1984 and January 1986, it was found that violent clashes followed the funeral in 22 cases; in 20 of these, police intervention preceded the violence. There were also, however, funerals where restrained policing defused

potentially violent situations, and many violent incidents were not reactive. Furthermore, while it was never organisational policy, violence occurred in the course of some protests, especially consumer boycotts.

The adjacent East Rand townships of Duduza, Tsakane and KwaThema experienced the most violent conflict in the region. By mid-1985 tension was acute: in Duduza, the council had collapsed in November 1984, further rent increases had been announced in March 1985, and the DET had closed every school. In late June, vigilantes killed several Cosas members, and soon afterwards eight Cosas members were killed by booby-trapped hand-grenades which they presumably intended to use against police or councillors. At least 13 people were shot dead in clashes with the police in just one week in July. Police houses were repeatedly attacked, and by mid-July 178 had been destroyed on

the East Rand, including 36 in Duduza alone. At a funeral in Duduza on 20 July 1985 an alleged informer, Maki Skhosana, was beaten to death and burnt. International TV coverage of the incident provided a grisly 'justification' for the (partial) state of emergency imposed that night.

Conflict elsewhere rarely reached such anarchic and violent extremes. While there were attacks on the homes of police and councillors, more typical

incidents concerned consumer and school boycotts. The tactic of a consumer boycott proved to be particularly susceptible to violence. Several boycotts were 'organised' regionally with little local preparation. In practice, alleged 'comrades' often took it upon themselves to 'organise' such boycotts through roadblock-based coercion. Protests provided political cover for criminal and anti-social activity. This generally horrified regional and township leaders (as well as residents), and Soweto boycotts leaders, for example, repeatedly called on the 'youth' to teach and persuade rather than coerce shoppers.

The changing character of township politics was matched by the changing importance of different groups of residents. Participation in violent protest, let alone protest generally, had certainly not been confined to the so-called 'youth' (which generally referred to young,

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Alexandra	November 1985 - September 1987
Johannesburg	August 1985 - 1986
Krugersdorp	1985-86
Nigel	May 1985 - 1986
Springs	May 1985 - 1986
Tembisa	mid-1985 - 1986
Witbank	1985-86
Pretoria	August 1985 - May 1986

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
Ratanda (Heidelberg)	Aug 1985
Katlehong (Alberton)	January 1985
Atteridgeville (Pta)	March 1985
Mamelodi (Pta)	December 1985
Alexandra (Sandton)	April 1986
Tembisa (N Jhb)	May 1986
Soweto	June 1986
Vosloorus (E Rand)	before July 1986
Mohlakeng (W Rand)	before March 1987


#### Note

By August 1987 it was estimated that rent boycotts in the Pta/Jhb area had cost more than R188m; by November 1987 Soweto residents owed R59m.



# Pretoria/Witwatersrand

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



unemployed, male, ex-students). However, during 1985 younger and younger children were involved in violent clashes, while women and workers became less visible participants in what sometimes became almost daily clashes with police.

Developments in 1984-85 finally buried popular conservative politics in almost every township. On the East Rand, most populist councillors resigned, while councillors who stayed in office were generally identified with state repression and intransigence. In Mamelodi, the bankruptcy of council politics was tragically revealed in the massacre of rent protesters. Thereafter, radical political strategies premised on non-collaboration were hegemonic. Post-November 1985 consumer boycotts and stayaways received a range of support that would have been inconceivable previously. In Kagiso also, state repression removed the 'middle ground'. In many townships, popular support for radical civic organisation grew, winning over a large conservative component.

## Activist Responses

Increasing violence accompanying supposedly non-violent campaigns, and the education crisis emphasised the need for effective organisation. In Kagiso and Munsieville, the coercive enforcement of the consumer boycott led KRO leaders to organise a 'crime-prevention' campaign and to establish a disciplinary committee to monitor members of organisations. An enthusiastic popular response led to the committee's transformation into a body concerned with civil disputes throughout the townships.

The need to resolve the deepening education crisis also precipitated organisational development, in part because school boycotts seemed to lead (indirectly) to escalating violence. A Soweto Parents Committee (SPC) had been formed as early as October 1984; in late 1985, it was reformed as the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC); in early 1986, the SPCC expanded into the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC).

In East Rand townships there was no significant organisational development. This was due to the mass detention of civic leaders under the partial 1985-86 state

of emergency and the violent strategies that came to dominate resistance politics. It is notable that many important civic activists in Mamelodi, Kagiso, Munsieville and Alexandra were not detained in late 1985 and early 1986. These were the areas where organisation was best developed on the declaration of a national state of emergency in mid-1986.

Political development culminated in early 1986 with the tentative organisation of structures of 'people's power' in some townships or parts of townships. This was most advanced in Alexandra, where yard, block and street committees began to be organised in February 1986 under the general framework of Moses Mayekiso's Alexandra Action Committee. Streets and schools were renamed in a symbolic display of popular control. 'People's courts' operated in Alexandra, and also in Kagiso/Munsieville and Mamelodi. In Alexandra and Mamelodi activists organised the provision of some services which the town councils were unable or unwilling to provide.

'People's courts', clean-up campaigns, and even local committees resembled initiatives previously undertaken by conservative groups. But the new structures constituted a fundamental challenge to the

### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
Soweto	17-18/9/84	limited
KwaThema	22/10/84	mass
Pta-Jhb	5-6/11/84	60% of workers
Pta-Jhb	1/5/85	limited
Pta-Jhb	14/5/85	limited, mass in Tsakane
Duduza	6/7/85	mass
KwaThema	9/7/85	mass
KwaThema	23/7/85	mass
Ratanda	23/7/85	mass
Pretoria	10-12/8/85	mass
Pta-Jhb	1-3/9/85	moderate
Pta-Jhb	9/10/85	moderate to weak
Mamelodi	21/11/85	mass
Mamelodi	3/12/85	80% of workers
Soshanguve	4/2/86	unknown
Mohlakeng	11/2/86	unknown
Atteridgeville	13/2/86	unknown
GaRankuwa	17/2/86	unknown
Atteridgeville	19/2/86	unknown
Alexandra	21/2/86	45 000 attend funeral
Soshanguve	5/3/86	unknown
Alexandra	5/3/86	100 000 attend funeral
Mamelodi	17/3/86	unknown
Ratanda	24/3/86	unknown
Alexandra	23/4/86	100%
Pta-Jhb	1/5/86	about 80%
Tembisa	14/5/86	moderate
Tembisa	29/5/86	moderate
Pta-Jhb	16/6/86	about 90%
Pta-Jhb	14/7/86	12% of workers
Soweto	4/9/86	85% of residents
Pta-Jhb	1/10/86	40% in workstoppages
Mamelodi	21/11/86	80% of residents
Pta-Jhb	12/3/87	unknown
Pta-Jhb	15/4/87	4 000-40 000 union members
Soweto	22-24/4/87	30% of residents
Pta-Jhb	5-6/5/87	mass
Pta-Jhb	16/6/87	60% of workers
Tembisa	15/10/87	mass
Soweto	17/2/88	limited to one suburb
Pta-Jhb	21/3/88	80% of workers
Pta-Jhb	6-8/6/88	mass
Pta-Jhb	16/6/88	moderate

authority of the local state because they enhanced the authority of the radical extra-state opposition. These structures seem to have been popular. The restoration of order was particularly welcomed. Alexandra was widely considered to be a less dangerous place to live in. But 'people's power' did not always operate in the harmonious manner implied by some commentaries. Even in Alexandra there was local criticism of the arrogance of the often young decision-makers in committees and courts.

'People's power' in practice addressed a limited range of issues and structures existed in only a few townships. Elsewhere civic organisation was less developed and even more uneven. In Soweto, organisation remained issue-specific: the SPCC/NECC concerned with the education crisis and, in some areas (such as Chiawelo), emerging grassroots committees dealing with rent. The SCA provided a general framework for the latter, but remained essentially detached from grassroots politics. On the East Rand organisation was almost non-existent outside of the workplace.

Throughout the region, however, there were high levels of protest in mid-1986. Despite SPCC/NECC calls for a return to class, many schools continued to be completely boycotted or regularly disrupted. In some schools (especially in parts of Soweto), students did begin to organise for 'people's education' within schools, although it is unclear how widely this was a constructive as opposed to anarchic development. Support for the bus and consumer boycotts intensified in Kagiso and Munsieville. Conflict escalated in Tembisa. In Duduza, buses were boycotted. Rent boycotts began in Alexandra in April and in Tembisa in May. In Soweto, local rent boycotts in Chiawelo and Jabulani extended into a Soweto-wide boycott in June. Councils continued to collapse, including in Alexandra (in April).

## The Aftermath

The national state of emergency declared in mid-1986 marked a turning-point in township politics. Severe repression and the tentative introduction of counter-revolutionary measures caused widespread organisational paralysis and broke the back of school boycotts and embryonic structures of 'people's power'. But it also provided for the proliferation of rent boycotts, recurrent mass stayaways, and later, the resurgence in many areas of the localised protests over specific grievances that had typified the period up to mid-1984. Thus processes of mobilisation were transformed rather than suppressed.

Political organisation was disrupted through a combination of mass detentions, the prohibition of meetings and other constraints on organisation, the disruption of channels of communication including the media, and other forms of legal and illegal harassment. Some leading activists downplayed the effect of the emergency, claiming that structures were operating underground. But the fact that some activists had avoided detention obscured the reality of widespread organisational paralysis. Some organisations were

decimated — for example, the Alexandra Action Committee. And even those which were relatively unscathed were severely affected.

Nonetheless, protest persisted. The forms which continued were those that required relatively little township-based organisation. Rent boycotts were the most conspicuous of these. By April 1987, about R300m was owed in Transvaal townships. Once begun, rent boycotts achieved a momentum of their own, with the prospect of immediate material benefits drawing in initially wary residents, while escalating arrears raised the cost of withdrawing from the boycott. Evictions and other counter-boycott measures provoked moral outrage and often served to strengthen support for the boycotts, especially when resisters were killed (as in White City, Soweto, in August 1986).

Much of the organisational activity involved in the rent boycotts was legal or concerned publicity, which could be undertaken by activists based outside of the townships. Legal initiatives had some major successes, with the Supreme Court rescinding the 1984 Mamelodi rent increase. But the activists involved sometimes became exclusively lawyer-oriented. In 1979-81 the Soweto Civic Association's legal responses to rent and busfare increases had been criticised for depoliticising these issues. While legal initiatives in 1986-88 delivered real benefits, they ran similar risks.

An important difference between the 1979-81 and 1986-88 experiences in Soweto was the emergence in the latter period of grassroots organisation to complement the legal initiatives. Prior to 1986 there had been little decentralised radical political organisation in Soweto. But the combination of the state of emergency and the rent boycott led to the emergence of street committees or local level bodies in some areas, in response to threatened evictions and the possibility of negotiation.

Mass school boycotts had continued through most of 1986, sustained primarily by the momentum of previous years' protests. In Soweto, only 20 percent of secondary students wrote the end-year exams. In early 1987, student leaders called for a return to class, urging students to organise and protest in 'a form evolved to fit the circumstances of life under a state of emergency'. Most students returned to school, but schools did not return to normal: teachers did not teach and students did not study. Student protest continued during 1987 and 1988, but in a qualitatively different form. Unlike the boycotts of 1985-86, protests were limited to particular schools and were directed against specific educational grievances. In this way they resembled the school protests before mid-1984.

The other major form of protest under the emergency has been the stayaway. A stayaway in Soweto in September 1986 over local grievances, including the eviction of rent boycotters and the 'White City War', attracted unprecedented support. There were also a series of major industrial disputes, particularly in the parastatal transport and post office sectors.

## Current Situation

Resistance has continued through 1988, despite the nationwide emergency and the restriction in February of active individuals and organisations, including the UDF, Azapo, Sansco, RMC, NECC, SCA and Soyco. A tough approach against rent boycotts caused only a small decline in support. Stayaways have continued to draw support that surprised even the organisers, on May Day, 6-8 June, and Soweto Day. Protests have continued in schools, particularly in Soweto but also in Mohlakeng, Daveyton, Tembisa and Katlehong. In Soweto, Sosco successfully called for a boycott of the first nine school days in July 1988.

The state hopes that it can provide for improved material conditions in the townships and thereby attract into state institutions conservative leaders previously aligned with the radical opposition. This approach revolves around promoting urban development and home-ownership as politically 'stabilising' factors to attract popular support. During the mid-1980s, home-ownership (under 99-year leasehold) grew rapidly, primarily through the sale of the existing state housing stock. By early 1988, 31 500 out of the 46 000 houses available for sale from the Soweto Town Council had been sold. It is not obvious, however, why these two policies should promote conservative politics. If capital expenditure on urban renewal is going to be reclaimed from residents in the form of bond and service charges, then township upgrading is likely to provide a new source of protest.

Central government and Regional Services Council transfers will reduce and subsidise the capital cost of development. Nevertheless, residents will still end up with primary responsibility for an expanding bill, and rent will continue to rise — in real terms and in proportion to incomes for most households. Nor does home-ownership give township residents a stake in the system they have protested against. Grievances over 'rents' have primarily been over the site rent/service charge components, both of which are paid by home-owners.





Are there other factors which might increase the prospects of a conservative revival? Unlike the earlier period, radical political organisation is unlikely to be allowed much space to manoeuvre in. Furthermore, popular organisation is extremely disorganised and fragmented at present, while conservative organisations can expect considerable state support. The state's virtual banning of the SCA can be contrasted with its accommodating approach to Soweto's Sofasonke Party, for example.

The experience of the mid-1980s has radicalised many township residents. Not least, participation in rent boycotts has radicalised perceptions of what constitutes a 'fair rent', and of the state and councillors (further prejudiced by evictions and repression), while facilitating the incorporation of national constitutional themes into local political consciousness. Some conservative organisations may, however, be able to appropriate this radical experience. The Sofasonke Party in Soweto is a prime candidate in this respect. Sofasonke campaigned successfully on a populist ticket

in 1983 and its leader, 'ET' Tshabalala, has tailored that populism to residents' current priorities: he has called for house rent to be abolished, for site rent/service charges to be substantially reduced, and for an end to the eviction of rent boycotters and shack demolitions.

# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict Eastern Cape , Karoo & North Eastern Cape



# MILITANT TRADITIONS

## The Ungovernable Townships

Robin Palmer

Among Xhosa-speakers in the Eastern Cape it has long been the custom to instill a spirit of resistance in their children. Most parents perform a rite immediately after the birth of the child; some leave it until later in childhood — a fire is made of a special wood and the child, whether male or female, is lifted and passed through the smoke several times to the chant *Huntshu! Huntshu! Khanyela into oyaziyo!* (Hush! Hush! Deny what you know!) This is more than an exhortation to be wary of strangers, the kind of advice most parents give to their children the world over; it is a brief, complete ritual to make the individual proof against interrogation and the community safe from betrayal.

The widespread observance of the rite is one indication of the deeply-rooted value of independence and autonomy in this region, in spite of nine Frontier Wars in previous centuries and the modern experience of political repression. The violent equilibrium that has characterised South African society for so long was first found in the Eastern province. White settlers moving into the interior discovered that while the San (Bushmen) could be evicted and the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) could be subjugated, the Xhosa could not be conquered, even though they were defeated in numerous campaigns.

In the twentieth century, black opposition in the Eastern Cape has mainly taken the form of support for the policies and strategies of what began as the South African National Native Congress in 1912, with its deferential and lobbyist opposition to issues such as the Land Act of 1913. Under the subsequent and more assertive title of the African National Congress, the organisation slowly became more militant, particularly after the coming to power of the National Party in 1948. The transition to militancy in the ANC was in large measure a function of the influence in the organisation of Eastern Cape elements. As Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo — all members of the Youth League, all Xhosas from the Transkei — came of age in the movement, so the first real confrontation with the government was realised in the Defiance Campaign of 1952.

As a measure of the grassroots support Congress enjoyed in the Eastern Cape at that time, of the total arrests which resulted from the Defiance Campaign nationwide, 71 percent took place in the Eastern Cape

— 24 percent in Port Elizabeth alone (Riordan 1988:60). Subsequent clashes between black activists and the forces of government at the national level were not always so enthusiastically supported in this region. Sharpeville (1960) and Soweto (1976) provoked some rioting and arson in the region, but nothing like the response in the Transvaal. Perhaps it was because these incidents were more directly influenced by the Pan African Congress and the Black Consciousness Movement, respectively — thus, less unambiguously ANC products than the Defiance Campaign — that they did not resonate as strongly in the Eastern Cape. However, when a new movement in the Congress tradition, the United Democratic Front (launched in 1983), began organising against the tricameral parliament and the 'Koornhof Bills' in 1983-84, the response in the region was enthusiastic.

## Socio-Economic Linkages

The political violence which has occurred in the Eastern Cape since 1984 has been kindled in the interface between Congress loyalists and activists, on the one hand, and government forces and their collaborators (and those perceived as their collaborators), on the other. Underlying this latent — and at times, as between 1984-86, manifest — conflict situation are socio-economic conditions of the most extreme rural and urban under-development to be found anywhere in South Africa.

Development region 'D', encompassing the Eastern Cape, the Border sub-region, Ciskei and most of Transkei, is beset by contradictions. In the two homelands, a policy known as 'betterment' has actually led to a marked deterioration in the subsistence agriculture sector (De Wet & McAllister 1985:555-7). In the west of the region, in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area and elsewhere, industries are being weakened by, inter alia, the availability of generous subsidies and non-unionised labour in and around the homelands (Riordan 1988a; Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987:593-9). In the rural areas, the worst drought of the

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century has impacted heavily on the economies of black and white farmers alike, leading to a shedding of surplus labour. Simultaneously, economic recession and disinvestment have indirectly led to the migration of the footwear industry and an important section of the motor industry from Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, resulting in the loss of about 15 000 jobs (Davies 1986; Riordan 1988a:61-2; De Villiers & Roux 1988:3-6).

Influx control and the Group Areas Act have made it difficult for Africans to move into town and find accommodation; controls on squatters have made it impossible for them to stay where they were on the periphery. Not that the attractions of urbanisation should be exaggerated: for those with regular employment in industry or in government service, preferably with the means to rent or buy housing in the Ibhayi Town Council's four townships or in the new township of Kwamagxaki, life in Port Elizabeth could be secure and satisfying. But for the city's huge underclass – the Ukuhleleleka – there has been neither regular employment nor adequate housing. According to Riordan, 39 percent of the black population of Port Elizabeth subsists below the least generously defined poverty datum line; 56 percent of men and women in their economically active years are unemployed; and 45 percent of black households are found in shack areas (1988b). Comparing Riordan's assessment with White's of 1984, the situation appears to be deteriorating.

In the small towns, such as Grahamstown, low wages can be added to the problems of unemployment and poor housing. In 1986, when R180 a month was considered a subsistence wage, the average earning of a black domestic worker was R50 a month. In the same town, in the late 1970s, Wilsworth found that the very

survival of the population was almost inexplicable in terms of official figures; only through the inclusion of an extensive informal sector, casual employment, and various forms of charity and welfare was she able to explain how a living was made at all (1979:ch4).

Such unrelenting poverty, which could not necessarily be evaded through rural-urban migration within the region, created a situation in which there was little to lose in any material sense for active participation in the revolt of 1984-86. By the same token, however, co-optation has been especially alluring to people in such extreme economic circumstances. Wilsworth calculated that informing to the police brought in twice the revenues of prostitution to the black townships of Grahamstown in the late 1970s (1979:108). Offering a starting wage of R225 a month, the municipal and special constable police forces in the Eastern Cape were later able to recruit 429 members in their first three months of existence (De Villiers & Roux 1988:21). Small wonder that one of the watchwords of the political conflict as it intensified after 1984 was 'sell-out'.


## Conflict Triggers

However desperate and deteriorating the socio-economic situation in the Eastern Cape might have been by the mid-1980s it alone could not have provoked the extraordinary degree of organised extra-parliamentary opposition to the state which ensued. Several commentators have remarked on the high level of ideological cohesion in the region's African communities which built up rapidly in the period before the national state of emergency in 1986 (Roux & Helliker 1986; Swilling 1987; Walker 1987). While the formation of the UDF on a national basis in 1983 was the necessary condition for the mobilisation of the townships in the Congress-aligned region, it was not a sufficient condition. Certain other developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s both assisted organisation and created precedents for political violence.

The Soweto uprising of 1976 may not have provoked much immediate response in the townships of the Eastern Cape. Nevertheless the demographic pressures which had underlain Soweto made it probable that over time youth/education issues would be the flashpoint in this region too.

In Grahamstown, where the African school-going population increased from 2 000 to 10 000 between 1942 and 1979, and demand for places in the single high school outstripped supply

## FATALITIES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS



After the mid-1970s, activism tended to crystallise around education issues (Davenport 1980:ch4). In October 1977, 300 high school pupils marched to deliver a protest to the circuit inspector. Over 100 were arrested and nearly all found guilty of contravening a ban on outdoor gatherings and sentenced to cuts or fines. It was the month after Steve Biko's death in detention. Not long afterwards the Black People's Convention (BPC), which had a strong following in the town, was banned.

Youthful activists began to organise in earnest. Almost a year later, in 1978, a partly successful attempt was made to burn down three schools, and by the winter of 1980 there were regular confrontations between youths and the police.

A vigilante and a black shopkeeper were stoned to death that year, and the police shot several by-standers while trying to keep order. Nearly every Saturday had its funeral, which became a legal venue for conscientising work by the community's more skilful orators. They later formed the Grahamstown Burial Action Committee (GBAC) which organised funerals and rallied opposition to the new system of black local authorities (Gilmour & Roux 1984).

Meanwhile, in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area, militant community-based trade unions were beginning to emerge. The Ford strikes of 1979 were an early expression of their organisational capacity, as were a number of other stoppages in the motor

industry in 1980-81. In a trenchant analysis of the build-up to the states of emergency, Swilling has claimed a connection between the workplace struggles in the cities, on the one hand, and the community campaigns in the hinterland, centering first on education and later on opposition to Black Local Authorities (1987:6).

## Organisational Levels

The extent to which pre-UDF moves at co-ordinating extra-parliamentary opposition also involved the homelands is hard to assess. But Congress members and sympathisers undoubtedly had a hand in the Mdantsane (Ciskei) bus boycott of 1983-84 which was so ruthlessly put down by the Ciskei Defence Force, assisted by lorry-loads of vigilantes brought in from the rural areas. Again, in 1985, when unrest across the unpatrolled borders of Ciskei threatened to spill over into the homeland's urban areas, vigilantes were recruited to patrol Zwelitsha at night. As before,

excessive and arbitrary violence was employed, resulting in the death of Zalisile Mathyolo, former leader of the banned South African Students Organisation (Haysom 1986:60). A pattern of boycotts, unrest, expulsions, arrests and violent repression came to characterise the campuses of the Universities of Fort Hare and Transkei (Indicator SA 1985:14).

Aside from the developing mobilisation in the industries and townships of East London, most opposition activity since the mid-1980s has been to the west of the region's two homelands. In the crowded urban townships and widely separated small town locations of the Eastern Cape, the UDF

affiliates, the unions and Azapo, extended their organisation after 1983 initially with unity of purpose. The task of mobilisation was facilitated by the physical isolation and small size of many black communities, as well as the relative absence of ethnic and class cleavages. Such characteristics, when combined with a long tradition of resistance and loyalty to the ideals of the Congress mainstream, facilitated the activists' tasks and brought noteworthy successes for the nascent UDF.

The cell structure foreshadowed by the Mandela 'M-Plan' of the early 1950s, had never been successfully

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Adelaide	May 1985 - 1986
Albany	1985-86
Aliwal North	February 1986 - 1986
Bedford	1985-86
Colesberg	June 1985 - 1986
Cradock	July 1984 - 1986/87
Cuthbert	1985-86
De Aar	1985-86
East London	July 1985 - August 1986
Fort Beaufort	July 1985 - 1986
Graaff-Reinet	September 1985 - 1986
Grahamstown	June 1985 - October 1986
King Williamstown	August 1985 - May 1986
Kirkwood	1985-86
Middleburg	1985-86
Molteno	1985-86
Port Alfred	June 1985 - 1986
Port Elizabeth	July 1985 - December 1986
Queenstown	August 1985 - April 1986
Somerset East	1985-86
Steynsburg	1985-86
Stutterheim	1985-86
Tarakstad	1985-86
Uitenhage	July 1985 - January 1987

**Note**  
It is extremely difficult to establish precise dates for the beginning or end of consumer boycotts. Boycotts did not run continuously (as the above dates might imply) - in many instances they were suspended for brief periods and then resumed again.


### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

Route	Date	Trigger
Mdantsane - East London	Jul 1983 - Mar 1985	various
KwaZakele - Port Elizabeth	begins Apr 1985	intro of mini buses



# ECape, Karoo & NE Cape

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



Drawn by Cartographic Studio, Dept. of Geographical and Environmental Science, University of Natal, Durban 1988

implemented, but it took off in the Eastern Cape at this time (Riordan 1988a:64). 'Street' and 'area' committees proliferated from mid-1985 onwards. Another organisational initiative which was more successful in the Eastern Cape than anywhere else was the consumer boycott, which was rife in the region in 1985-86. (Helliker, Roux & White 1987). But the hierarchy of committees controlled ultimately by the UDF executive was logically prior: without such a structure the negative consequences of 'ungovernability', as perpetrated by the militant youth and the amabutho (warriors), could not have been mitigated, the vacuum left by the collapsing community councils filled, or the consumer boycott organised. Nor could a co-ordinated response from the repertoire of school boycotts, stayaways and strikes be achieved.

As it developed in 1985-86 the campaign was successful against all odds, but it had a basic contradiction: the UDF leadership insisted from the outset that it was as non-violent as it was non-racial. The organisational initiatives it favoured most were intended to offset or replace the semi-suicidal street-fighting tactics of the youth. But the UDF's preoccupation with 'territory', with controlling all the hearts and minds within a given street or area, implied the need for force to eject the opposition, to coerce the reluctant and to police the consumer boycott. There were many violent youth only too willing to fill the 'enforcer' role. The problem in the face of mounting detentions of UDF leaders was how to control these enthusiasts in order to maintain some semblance of Congress' non-violent idealism and to prevent the townships from slipping into an anarchy of 'kangaroo' courts and arbitrary stonings, burnings and necklacings (Riordan 1988a:65).

With the declaration of the partial state of emergency in July 1985 (which mainly affected the Eastern Cape) and the national emergency in June 1986, both activist and amabutho were swept into detention. The swing of the pendulum from revolt to repression saw a shift in the nature of the extra-parliamentary opposition. The role of the external ANC and PAC and their insurgents came more to the fore by default. The trade unions, particularly the UDF-aligned Cosatu affiliates, regained the prominence in opposition they had enjoyed before 1984 and now enjoyed a legal standing unique among extra-parliamentary groupings (Webster 1987:155-8). On the 'centre-left' of the political spectrum, support groups emerged to address human rights issues, aligning the Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC), the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), the Black Sash, and the churches.

For a time, in 1986, it seemed as if the extra-parliamentary opposition was gaining significant support from an unexpected quarter. In response to the early and unusually tenacious consumer boycotts which were mounted in the cities and small towns of the region, local chambers of commerce were instilled with a dynamism and political concern they had never manifested before. Small businessmen, who were the most affected by the withholding of black custom, tried desperately to conserve their livelihoods.

Some of the chambers, as in Port Elizabeth and Port Alfred, adopted a liberal stance, calling on government to accede to the boycotters' demands, criticising official handling of the boycotts, and complaining when local negotiations were disrupted by detentions. But there was no uniformity within or between centres: some business responses were predictably reactionary

(Helliker, Roux & White 1987). Ultimately, any independent political role for business that might have developed was still-born by the emergency and by the associated fact that, since business support was coerced, it therefore tended to evaporate once the means of coercion (the boycotts) was removed.

#### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
PE/Uitenhage	18-21/3/85	90% PE, 36% Uitenhage
Uitenhage	28/3/85	8 000 workers
Eastern Cape	1/5/85	limited
Eastern Cape	14/5/85	limited workplace stoppages
East London	21/8/85	100% African workers
Queenstown	23-24/9/85	100% African workers
East London	26/9/85	100% African workers
Dimbaza	1/10/85	unknown
Eastern Cape	9/10/85	mass support in PE/Uitenhage
PE/Uitenhage	21/3/86	100% African & coloureds
Cradock	28/4/86	most African workers
Eastern Cape	1/5/86	90% in PE/Uitenhage
Port Alfred	5-11/5/86	most African women
Eastern Cape	16/6/86	100% in PE/Uitenhage
Eastern Cape	14-15/7/86	39% of PE Africans
Uitenhage	31/7/86	partial
Duncan Village	14/8/86	partial
Eastern Cape	1/10/86	limited workplace stoppages
Eastern Cape	12/3/87	limited workplace stoppages
Eastern Cape	5-6/5/87	97% in PE/Uitenhage
Eastern Cape	16/6/87	93% of Africans
Eastern Cape	21/3/88	65% of African & coloureds
Eastern Cape	6-8/6/88	low workplace attendance
Eastern Cape	16/6/88	unknown

#### Note

Many of the work stayaways that affected the Eastern Cape were part of broader national stay-at-home calls. It was in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage conurbation that these national stayaways tended to have their greatest impact.

## Repressive Forces

Whether the extra-parliamentary opposition of the region was of the Congress or liberal traditions, mainly black or mainly white, ideologically committed, opportunistic or coerced, it had to accept an unpalatable reality after the third if not the second emergency: the state had stolen the initiative for the time being. Government efforts to replace an older, impracticable form of apartheid with a newer, more subtle form — a process somewhat misleadingly termed 'reform' — may have rendered it in some ways more vulnerable to opponents than in the past. However, the state security apparatus, in terms of legislation, technology and personnel, was still a highly effective counter to mobilisation on the political left. After 1986 it was not the 'struggle' which continued but the process of wholesale co-optation whose opening salvo, the promulgation of black local authorities and of the tricameral parliament, had provoked the revolt of 1984-86 in the first place.

By July 1986, 31 out of 50 black councils had been neutralised, numerous black police houses incinerated and 'ungovernability' had become a reality in many townships in the Eastern Cape. The reinstatement of the state's authority through repression demanded more than

simple restoration of the status quo ante: this time the state had to maintain the initiative, but in such a way that large numbers of white SAP and SADF were not tied up in township patrols indefinitely. Besides, while black youths armed with stones and petrolbombs may seem to be no match for well-armed policeman and soldiers in casspirs, the physical conditions of most black townships tend to favour the forces of resistance. When jittery security forces over-reacted, as at Langa on Sharpeville Day (21 March 1985), the political costs to the state were heavy.

There was a strong incentive from the outset to employ proxy forces — vigilantes, municipal police and 'kitskonstabels' — in the front-line after the initial pacification was completed; when the second and third states of emergency, with their accompanying press restrictions provided the proxies with the necessary room to manoeuvre. Historically, in every one of the region's frontier wars, whites were able to recruit as many blacks as were needed to assist them in the task of pacification. In the mid-1980s, there was nothing new about the recruitment of black 'irregulars' as well as 'regulars' to counter the unrest in the townships. Indeed, the conditions which facilitate such recruitment —

ignorance and insularity, poverty and unemployment — had either remained little altered or become a good deal worse in the last couple of hundred years.

Vigilantes were utilised in the Ciskei as early as 1983 to suppress a bus boycott, and two years later to patrol Zwelitsha. In 1985 vigilante violence became a nation-wide phenomenon, with many other exemplars in the Eastern Cape. The Border towns of Fort Beaufort and Queenstown were particularly badly affected. In the former case four Congress-linked community organisations opposed the community council with its seventeen unelected councillors, most of them absentees. In the ensuing conflict the police intervened with a remarkable degree of partisan enthusiasm. After lawyers and clerics took steps to report the actions of the police to higher authorities, police actions abated, but assaults continued as armed councillors supported

by vigilantes continued to harass the town's UDF activists and sympathisers (Haysom 1986:46-54).

In Queenstown the link between the SAP and the vigilantes was much more explicit: 400 residents of the (coloured) township of Alocville, all supporters of the local management committee, formed themselves into a vigilante force in the face of

increasing violence in the nearby (African) township of Mlungisi in late 1985. They mounted roadblocks and clashed violently with African and coloured sympathisers who opposed them. By December of that year they were given a week's training and absorbed into the Queenstown Commando, thereby becoming the first vigilante group to be incorporated into the state's formal 'law and order' apparatus anywhere in the country (ibid:128-131).

Nevertheless the most pressing local need was for 'regulars' — uniformed, salaried municipal policemen — to fill a spectrum of security roles including (but by no means confined to) the guarding of the property and personnel of the revived black local authorities. Indeed, the municipal police in the Eastern Cape, though employed by the black municipalities, continue to work closely with the SAP which is responsible for their training (Black Sash 1988). From an analysis of 260 reported incidents involving municipal police, the study discerns a continuing close relationship between the municipal police force and the SAP, particularly the security police. A number of testimonies describe municipal police arresting and interrogating suspected activists, then handing them over to the security police

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
Lingellhle (Cradock)	1983
Nonzwakazi (De Aar)	July 1985
Stutterheim	August 1985
Soweto (PE)	begins 1986
Langa (Uitenhage)	before July 1986
Port Alfred	before July 1986
Alexandria	before July 1986
Duncan Village (EL)	before July 1986
Mdantsane (Ciskei)	August 1986
Burgersdorp	August 1986
Mhluzi (Middleburg)	before July 1987

#### Note

By May 1985 it was estimated that the Eastern Cape Development Board was owed more than R5m in rent and service charge arrears. By February 1987 Port Elizabeth's township residents (falling under the control of the Ibhayi council) were estimated to owe the council R4m in arrears.

for detention.

In the Eastern Cape the recruitment of municipal police, supported or supplemented by vigilantes from the local African population, has added an important dimension to the security strategies of the state. Each black local authority becomes, from the security point of view, a homeland writ small, subject to a form of indirect rule. Under the Internal Security Act of 1982 and the refinements which have followed the successive states of emergency, all activities of state agencies have been better co-ordinated than ever before by a network of regional, sub- and mini-Joint Management Centres reporting to the State Security Council.

## Aftermath

The comprehensive destabilisation of black communities in the region has been effected through mass detentions and the banning of almost every form of assembly. According to the Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC), about 1 200 people were detained in the Eastern Cape between June 1986 and the end of January 1988 (SAIRR 1988:824). Recruited and based in the community, the role of the municipal police in detentions has been two-fold: to lend more precision to the process by identifying activists in hiding; and to 'monitor' (a euphemism which does not exclude harassment) the activities of activists and sympathisers as they are released from detention.

Ex-detainees are not necessarily about to take up the struggle where they left off. The rigorous conditions of detention has caused a decline in health in many cases. Demoralised and physically weakened on release, ex-detainees who have lost their jobs face the almost impossible task of finding new employment as branded 'politicals' in a region of very high unemployment (De Villiers & Roux 1988:15-20). Even the few pensioners who were detained have had to wait many months for the reinstatement of their pensions (*Eastern Province Herald*: 12/7/88). On top of these kinds of disabilities, the key activists among the ex-detainees have immediately had banning orders placed upon them.

Under these conditions there was little point in keeping thousands in detention at state expense. From the second half of 1987 onwards most Eastern Cape detainees who were not charged were gradually released until, by April 1988, there were only 56 still inside. That the state can feel secure enough to release large numbers of detainees in this most politicised and formerly mobilised region after the SAP and SADF presence in the townships has been substantially reduced, is a reflection of confidence in its security legislation, its security forces and its capacity to co-opt sufficient recruits for the municipal police and vigilante forces. Through these proxies, whenever real or imagined opposition reasserts itself, repression can now take the form of 'black-on-black-violence', and the state can evade responsibility. Much has been learned since the Langa shootings.

Repression in the Eastern Cape, as elsewhere, may have become all-encompassing under the states of emergency of recent years, but it has not been

all-consuming. In spite of the very real impact of disinvestment and de-industrialisation on an already seriously underdeveloped regional economy, upgrade initiatives have followed the restoration of *Pax Pretoriana*. In April 1986 the Eastern Cape Development Board approved a R148m capital budget for the upgrading of township infrastructure and the supply of housing and services, with R1bn earmarked for continuing improvements in Region 'D' over the next five years (SAIRR 1988:116). Between 1983-84 and 1984-85, subsidies to black local authorities doubled, and have continued to increase by about 50 percent a year ever since (ibid).

## Activist Responses

Precisely the kinds of improvements that were called for by the consumer boycotters, among other more political demands, are now being delivered. Yet the top-down manner of their implementation contradicts the core political values of the Eastern Cape's black communities, so comprehensively recharged with Congress ideals in the mid-1980s. Whether it was intended or not, the manner of the delivery of post-unrest reconstruction and development in the region has become yet another issue on which the already seriously alienated black communities are becoming divided.

It may be presumed that among the 50-odd still in detention, and in every black township of any size in the Eastern Cape, there are very small groups of dedicated activists who are reviewing what amounted to a tenth frontier war in 1984-86 and planning future strategies. It may also be presumed that after the failure of the popular revolt orchestrated by the Congress-traditionalist, non-racialist and non-communist UDF, more radical alternatives are being contemplated. Under the current fourth state of emergency, with its accompanying media restrictions, it is very hard for any outsider to know with any precision what is going on in the townships.

The 'struggle' seems to have been replaced by a struggle for existence as economic conditions continue to worsen. By July 1988, region 'D' had the highest unemployment, with a third of the economically active black women out of work (*Eastern Province Herald*: 12/7/88). Among the formerly politically active, the subtraction, for months, of more than a thousand members was highly disruptive of extra-parliamentary organisation; after release, hundreds of ex-detainees, having lost their jobs, not only contribute to the unemployment problem in certain categories, but also experience such difficulties of readjustment that there is little time, energy or motivation to reorganise. Under these difficult circumstances the siren-song of co-optation is, for many hard-pressed individuals, irresistible.

The post-unrest crisis in the townships has given more scope than hitherto to resource and support groups organised by sympathetic whites, activities which are not affected by emergency regulations. In Grahamstown and the surrounding area three such

initiatives have been recently set in train:

- South African Council for Higher Education (Sached) and the Dependents' Conference jointly run an education programme for detainees and ex-detainees.
- Another group has established production co-operatives in an attempt to offset the unemployment problem.
- Branches of Grahamstown's well established advice bureau and legal aid machinery are being established in the surrounding small towns. The Albany Black Sash has been particularly active in terms of monitoring and relief activities.

These initiatives are more than token efforts. This is evidenced in the harassment of some of those involved, the petrol-bombing of a minister's house and the burning down of the Sached Building in Grahamstown (De Villiers & Roux 1988:29). At another level, the increased involvement of recent organisations such as Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA) and the Human Rights Trust, as well as the persistent questioning of ministers by Eastern Cape PFP MPs such as Andrew Savage also reflect the heightened concern of some of the region's white politicians since 1984-86.

## Current Situation

Ultimately, the measure of whether Eastern Cape Africans have been conquered or merely temporarily defeated following their revolt and the clamp-down is found in the voting figures for the October municipal elections. An uncoerced low percentage poll means that the spirit of resistance so comprehensively manifested in 1984-86 continues to characterise the 'masses' in the region, in spite of the repression and the co-optation. An uncoerced high or increased poll suggest a turning away from the politics of confrontation, towards a relationship with the government analogous to that of Hendrickse or Buthelezi.

The second scenario would be heresy to many in this Congress-aligned region. But the 'carrot' has never dangled so close, the 'stick' has never been wielded so enthusiastically, and the region has never been in such desperate economic straits as now. Black parents may well continue to pass their infants through the fragrant smoke to safeguard them and their communities when the struggle is resumed, but for the present, at least, the struggle appears to have been postponed.

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## COMPARATIVE TARGETS & COSTS Three Cycles of Political Violence: 1976/77, 1984 and 1985 (Pre-Regional State of Emergency)

RIOT TARGETS: Number & Costs of Damage <sup>1</sup>	FIRST CYCLE, August/November 1984	SECOND CYCLE, January/21 July 1985	(PROVISIONAL) TOTAL for Both Cycles, 1984/85	(FINAL) TOTAL for June 1976/ February 1977
<b>PUBLIC PROPERTY</b>				
Government Buildings <sup>2</sup>	17	55	72	161
Educational Institutions	61	84 (±R4m)	145	429
Official Vehicles	47 (Also 1 train)	269 (Also 3 trains)	316	400 (Includes 244 police vehicles)
Churches & Clinics	No separate estimates available	No separate estimates available	22 (10 churches) 12 (12 clinics)	(R60 000 damage to churches, number unknown)
Beerhalls/Liquor Outlets <sup>3</sup>	34	38	72	188
<b>Sub-Total Costs</b>	<b>R30-55m</b> (Vaal Triangle)	—		<b>R15.5m</b>
<b>COMMERCIAL SECTOR<sup>4</sup></b>				
Shops/Business Premises	100	125	225	264 (R10m)
Delivery Vehicles	55	151	206	(See vehicle count in third section)
Bus Company Vehicles	468 (+R1m)*	328 <sup>5</sup> (±R3.5m)	1 088 (± R4.5m as of 13/5/85)	599
<b>PRIVATE PROPERTY</b>				
Town Councillors' Homes	56*	120*	Not available	250
Policemen's Homes		168* (+R279 000)		
Unspecified Houses <sup>6</sup>		318		
Vehicles	140*	326*	516 (as of 12/4/85)	764 (includes de-livery vehicles)
<b>TOTAL COSTS</b>				
All Buildings	No separate estimates available	No separate estimates available	R31m (as of 23/5/85)	(No breakdown)
All Vehicles			R12m (as of 30/4/85)	TOTAL = R25.5m+

\*Incomplete count)

### FOOTNOTES





- The figures record the number of riot targets destroyed or badly damaged, not the actual number of attacks, which would considerably boost the estimate if included. All estimates exclude grenade and bomb attacks by guerrillas or internal insurgents on a range of explicit targets (see following chronology).
- The 'Government Building' category includes all official premises, such as those occupied by township development (formerly administration) boards and other state bodies, post offices, police stations, etc.
- Government-owned beerhalls have traditionally been used to raise revenue for township development, formerly under the aegis of (white) administration boards, since transferred to the (African) town councils (see main text).
- Estimates in all tables also exclude loss of life, injuries or damage to property ensuing from strikes and labour unrest on the mines.
- The provisional totals presented in the third column do not always reflect the combined figures from the first and second columns (see asterisks). There are obvious discrepancies because both general, official totals and incomplete, daily media reports have been used in compiling this table (see monitoring problems).
- Rioters specifically targeted the homes of suspected police informers and 'collaborators', and in concert with unknown agents, attacked the homes of leaders/members of other opposition groups. All of these incidents fall into the general category of attacks on 'unspecified homes'.

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# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict: Western Cape & North Western Cape



# THE CROSSROADS

## Sectarianism and the State

Robert Cameron

The political dynamics of the Western Cape contain specific regional characteristics. Firstly, the population of the Cape Metropolitan Region is 57 percent 'coloured', 31 percent white, 11 percent African and 1 percent Indian, compared with the national average of 65 percent African, 20 percent white, 11,5 percent 'coloured' and 3,5 percent Indian (Census 1980). The main political problem of the state in this region has always been how to accommodate coloured people as the dominant group. The small number of Africans in the Western Cape is to a certain extent explained by the former coloured labour preference policy and the strict enforcement of influx control. However, there is still a massive backlog of land and housing due to a freeze on the expansion of African housing when this policy was in effect between 1954-84.

Secondly, the tradition of non-collaboration has been an important regional political characteristic down the years. Non-collaboration, which has its roots in the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), is a refusal to participate in government-created political structures on the basis of principle. Its political successors, the New Unity Movement (NUM) and the Cape Action League (CAL), still adhere to this strategy. For the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its affiliates, non-collaboration is regarded as a boycott tactic only, among other possible tactics. In reality, however, the non-collaboration strategy has guided their practice too. A fear of being outflanked by the Left, (as they were in the 1950s) is one of the reasons why charterists have consistently boycotted state structures in the region. As Alexander remarked in 1986, 'In the Western Cape, up to this very moment the ethos of the NEUM is all-pervasive' (1986:13).

### Shack Conflict

Central to any discussion of political violence in the Western Cape is the tragic destruction of 60 000 homes in the satellite shack settlements and the KTC camp in the general Crossroads area by 'witdoeke' (vigilantes) in May/June 1986. What were the reasons for this? The Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), a UDF affiliate, had entered into a strategic alliance with the foremost shack leader in Old Crossroads, Johnson

Ngxobongwana, in order to resist forced removals to Khayelitsha, a planned township. However, the WCCA and other progressive organisations then began to challenge Ngxobongwana's economic and political control of Old Crossroads, accusing him of patronage and corruption.

The announcement of a R2m upgrading scheme by the government gave Ngxobongwana an additional, material incentive to eliminate threats to his leadership. He joined forces with other traditional leaders, and aided and abetted by the security forces, attacked the traditional bases of support of progressive groups in the squatter camps, viz. the satellite camps and KTC. All of the former settlements and two-thirds of KTC were destroyed. This was in spite of the fact that KTC residents had won a court interdict against the state and the 'witdoeke', restraining them from unlawfully entering KTC and destroying the camps (Cole 1987).

The cataclysmic events at Crossroads suggest a congruence between the interests of government militarists (police, military, JMCs) and reformists (Constitutional Development). The local Joint Management Centre (JMC) is thought to have played an active role in deciding state strategy in the shack settlements: Ngxobongwana could control Crossroads in a way that dovetailed with security interests. Further, local officials wanted squatters to move to Khayelitsha in terms of 'orderly urbanisation' policies, so they tacitly supported the removals. Minister Heunis of Constitutional Development, who had overall responsibility for urban Africans, refused to allow shack refugees to return to the original site of their homes (Cole 1987).

The Urban Foundation withdrew its upgrading scheme for Crossroads, claiming that government policy in the area 'legitimises violence as a method of achieving community objectives' (*Argus* 29/5/86). UDF affiliates were not entirely blameless in the affair, however. The ruthless enforcement of the consumer boycott and 'Black Christmas' (1985) by some over-zealous comrades had certainly alienated a large sector of the Old Crossroads community and gave Ngxobongwana the opportunity to mobilise residents against the

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progressive organisations (Cole 1987). Since then, a number of KTC shackdwellers whose dwellings were demolished have instituted a civic action for damages against the Minister of Law and Order. The court case is currently in process.

In 1987, the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) announced a R1,25m upliftment programme for the cleared satellite camps (*Cape Times* 12/3/87). Now began a dispute over who would occupy the land. Ngxobongwana seemed to regard it as conquered territory, while exiled former residents demanded the right to return. Minister Heunis said Ngxobongwana would have the final say in the settlement of people; in the case of irregularities or malpractice in land allocation, the Administrator may intervene (*Cape Times* 25/9/87).

## Community Responses

KTC survived the crisis of 1986 and a number of people returned to the area. However, it is regarded as a 'hive for terrorist activity' and the security forces have maintained a high profile in the area. In 1987 and early 1988 violence erupted between the Masincedane Committee in the new KTC area (representing newly urbanised Africans) and the old KTC group (consisting of local residents). Both groups supported UDF affiliates such as the WCCA and United Womens Organisation (UWO) and both were committed to the democratic movement. (The Masincedane group still operated on a form of community charges, however.)

The conflict began when militant activists in the name of the Cape Youth Congress (Cayco), a UDF affiliate, attempted to set up a steering committee in new KTC in opposition to the Masincedane group. The violence escalated, especially after the murder of a senior Masincedane member which led to the burning down of a number of old KTC shacks. The security forces appeared to exploit these differences, trying to woo the Masincedane group in the same way as the 'witdoeke' were promoted in 1986 (Levy 1988; *Argus* 18/12/87).

A mediating committee headed by Dr Boesak and Bishop Tutu and consisting of representatives of community organisations was set up to try and defuse the new crisis. The police response was to arrest the UDF members of the committee and to restrict Cayco and WCCA from engaging in activities in the area. The 'total strategy' influence of the JMC came to the fore when the Divisional Commissioner of Police said that, 'According to the information at his disposal, one group wanted a stable area which should be uplifted to improve living conditions. The other group with a socialist and Marxist influence wanted to maintain chaos to make KTC ungovernable and uncontrollable' (*Cape Times* 29/2/88). Despite official obstruction the mediating committee has managed to negotiate an uneasy calm at KTC which is still holding at present.

## Conflict Triggers

The first six months of 1985 were relatively tranquil in the Western Cape compared to upheavals in other parts of the country. Two factors were the catalyst for the political violence in the Cape Peninsula in late 1985. Firstly, the declaration of a state of emergency in certain magisterial districts, and secondly, the (coloured) House of Representatives in its first year of 'own affairs' administration which began to interfere in educational matters. It was the transfer of a single teacher that led to the student protests. The above two events caused University of the Western Cape students and school pupils to go out on boycott (Hall 1986).

The security response to these educational upheavals was the same as it had been during the 1976 and 1980 school boycotts: violent repression. The police used physical force in attempts to prevent student gatherings and to disperse meetings, rallies and marches. This led to escalated protest in the form of a call for a consumer boycott by community organisations and the call by Dr Boesak for the Pollsmoor march (28 August 1985), to demand the release of Nelson Mandela and to express opposition to the political system. Inflammatory actions to prevent the march sparked off a virtual insurrection in both coloured and African areas (Hall 1986).

In early September, the government closed down coloured schools and colleges in the Western Cape serving about 500 000 pupils and students. This provoked a wider community response. Meetings were held and attempts made to occupy the schools, amidst further violence. The (coloured) Department of Education and Culture (DEC) opened up the schools but under strict conditions. The next three weeks, to quote Hall, were 'the apogee of the revolution in the Western Cape' (1986:19). Pitched street battles and even shoot-outs took place between police and residents. The notorious 'Trojan Horse' incident occurred on 15 October, when police hidden in crates on SATS vehicles entrapped and opened fire on street activists.

## Organisational Levels

The state's response was to detain 69 members of civic organisations (including almost the entire Western Cape UDF executive) and to extend the state of emergency to the region, which prohibited one hundred organisations from holding meetings in black areas. Further restrictions regulated pupils to narrowly confined curricula activities.

The counter-response of students was to refuse to write exams at the end of 1985. They were supported by a number of Western Cape Teachers Union (Wectu) members, a progressive group formed at the height of the crisis to formalise opposition to state education. Armed police were sent to the schools to ensure that the exams were written. Wectu called on teachers not to administer exams under such farcical circumstances; the DEC responded by bringing charges of misconduct against 72 teachers who observed the call. This, in turn, elicited strong protests from the wider community.

Since 1985, school militancy has continued along with a security force presence at schools in the Cape Peninsula. There have been continual accusations of police harassment of teachers and pupils at DEC schools. There also have been many complaints of Labour Party interference in appointments and promotions in order to promote patronage. These developments have radicalised the previously middle-of-the-road Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA), culminating in its adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1988.

The schools threatened to erupt again in early 1988. The (African) Department of Education and Training (DET) attempted to transfer African students to other schools and closed Langa High School after a violent confrontation involving students and teachers over a DET sport tour. (The school was re-opened by students and joint parent-teacher-student associations). During 1988 registration, DET did not accept applications from 1 500 students and an identity card system was

introduced to prevent unregistered students from entering the schools. Most of those excluded were Cayco members and student activists. These measures were perceived as a deliberate attempt by DET to exclude student activists (Venter 1988).

The Western Cape Students Congress (Weccoc), representing 70 000 African, coloured and Indian scholars at 65 affiliated schools responded by calling a three-day protest action at schools. This mobilised 100 000 students and is acknowledged as the biggest education protest action in the region since 1985. Further, both progressive and conservative African teacher associations stayed away for two days in protest against the new registration procedures. These actions met with a heavy-handed response by the security forces, which attempted to ensure that teaching took place during the stayaway.

The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) has been decimated in the Western Cape. The regional chairman has been detained and the entire executive is in hiding. The conflicts smoulder on, however, threatening to ignite again at any time in the region (Venter 1988). One direct consequence of the curtailment of normal political activity under successive states of emergency is that schools have been and will continue to be focal 'sites of struggle' in the struggle for a democratic South Africa.

On the labour front, Cape Town's workforce has traditionally observed protest stayaways to a much lesser

extent than workers in other metropolitan areas, including the most recent nationwide strike on 16 June 1988. The organisation of coloured workers, who constitute the bulk of the workforce in the region, reflects the legacy of the conservative, former Tucs unions (Joffe 1986). Although there are signs that some of these unions are moving in a leftward direction, industrial unrest does not appear to be an important factor in the political conflict experienced to date.

## Local Negotiations

The insurrection of 1985 caused an alarming decrease in tourism, the lifeblood of the Western Cape, exacerbating an already stagnating regional economy. The region was in a political and economic crisis. For a number of Cape Town City (CCC) councillors it became paramount to ensure that the

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Beaufort West	August 1985 - 1986
Cape Peninsula	August 1985 - January 1986
Oudtshoorn	1985-86
Paarl	July 1985 - 1986
Stellenbosch	1985-86
Upington	1985-86
Worcester	August 1985 - 1986

### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

Route	Date	Trigger
Cape Peninsula services	28/29 Nov 1984	fare hike

pending Regional Services Councils (RSCs) — underpinned by unrepresentative ethnic local authorities — were not introduced. They feared the RSCs would lead to further political turmoil.


Councillor Keegan proposed that the CCC should convene a Cape Metropolitan Conference to draw up a manifesto for non-racial democratic local government, in an attempt to halt 'escalating violence and the alarming deterioration of race relations in the region'. His motion was passed almost unanimously. Former PFP leader Van Zyl Slabbert was appointed as facilitator to promote the aims of the proposed conference, viz., to persuade disparate groups to come together with the ultimate objective of drawing up such a manifesto. This local option was strongly supported by business organisations active in behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Having made contact with a number of community organisations, including UDF affiliates, Slabbert asked the CCC in January 1987 to put the initiative into cold storage. The main reasons were:

- the state of emergency meant UDF regional leaders were either in detention or hiding;
- a climate for negotiation did not exist;
- the centralised nature of local government in South Africa meant there were limited resources over which to bargain at local level; and
- that regional/local options were rejected until the question of national political power had been settled.

# Western Cape

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



The council's response was to abandon the conference-style approach to solving the crisis. The project has been superseded by an investigation by a single researcher who is investigating the feasibility of a participative planning project, which would involve extra-parliamentary organisations in the actual planning process.

## Socio-Economic Linkages

The CCC has probably prevented further conflict by refusing to devolve the allocation of housing to (coloured) local authorities, i.e. the management committees.

These powers could be used to promote patronage and could provoke a violent response in a community where there is a shortage of some 40 000 housing units. The House of

Representatives has promoted home-ownership with vigour to improve the quality of life and give people a stake in the system. Minister Curry thinks it no coincidence that the riots in coloured areas in 1985 occurred in housing estates and not home-ownership areas. An amount of R7m has been made available for the upgrading of infrastructure on the Cape Flats.

Unlike RSCs in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the Western Cape RSC has been characterised by internal wrangling and little distributive activity has been performed thus far. However, the RSC for the metropolitan area made R92m available for upgrading in the 1988-89 budget. Presumably, most of these funds will go to needy African areas.

The Cape Town Community Council (CTCC), encompassing the established African townships which are the stronghold of the WCCA, collapsed in 1985-86 due to popular resistance. Nevertheless, alternative local government structures which developed in other parts of the country during the civil unrest of 1984-86 were not manifested in the Western Cape. There has been a rent boycott in New Crossroads since 1985 as a protest against rent increases. However, the state of emergency has curtailed the activities of progressive organisations and allowed the state to resurrect the black local authority system. The government has also established new local authorities in Old Crossroads and Khayelitsha. As part of the policy of co-optation, Ngxobongwana was made mayor of the former area but a court ruling has rendered his appointment invalid.

## Aftermath

Over the past three years there has been a radicalisation of black communities (viz. African, coloured and Indian) in the Western Cape. However, this process has worked in two different directions. In coloured areas and the more established African townships, there has been a move to the left of the political spectrum. This is largely due to police overreaction to protests in the 1985-86 period, and to the House of Representatives' interference in teaching matters and its acquiescence to police harassment of DEC schools.

On the other hand, in the region's shack settlements there has been a swing to the right. The legacy of influx control as well as the Group Areas Act has ensured there is limited land and housing for the ever-increasing emigration of African people from Ciskei and Transkei. Today, Cape Town is the fastest growing

### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
Western Cape	1/5/85	limited
Western Cape	14/5/85	little
Western Cape	9/10/85	little
Western Cape	1/5/85	15% of workers
Western Cape	16/6/86	35% in Cape Town
Western Cape	1/10/86	little
Western Cape	12/3/87	little
Western Cape	5-6/5/87	average 27% of workers
Western Cape	16/6/87	75% of African workers
Western Cape	21/3/88	limited
Western Cape	6-8/6/88	limited
Western Cape	16/6/88	little

#### Note

All the work stayaways observed in the Western Cape between 1984 and June 1988 always formed part of a broader national strike initiative.

metropolitan area in the country (Gentle & Romanovsky 1986:4). Such an uncertain environment is a fertile ground for the state to exploit, and they have done so successfully in the Crossroads area in 1986, though perhaps less successfully in KTC in 1988. Further, newly urbanised Africans are more embedded to traditional values such as patron/client relationships; they are less likely to be attracted by progressive organisations, with their principles of democracy and accountability.

Ironically enough, the threat of an influx of Africans into the Western Cape, so long the bugbear of the state, has proved to be its greatest ally in the region. The 'Crossroads option', whereby the state supports a conservative faction in a shack settlement (both militarily and through material upliftment) in order to achieve indirect control and community-based legitimacy, has proved most successful. The strategy is likely to be utilised again in the future. UDF affiliates are not entirely blameless in this affair either. Even before the removal through detention of the Western Cape executive, the fragmented nature of the Front had made it very difficult for its leadership to control undisciplined comrades who were acting in the name of UDF affiliates.

The security forces in the Western Cape have had major successes against guerrillas belonging to the ANC's military wing. Two major Umkhonto we Sizwe cells which were responsible for a number of bombings have been smashed, and both the regional military

commander of the ANC and his successor arrested and convicted. There also has been the arrest of Quibla members (Muslim fundamentalists) from Cape Town who have been charged with furthering the aims of the rival PAC. Despite these successes, Cape Town was wracked by another spate of bombings on 16 June 1988, including one at a Conservative Party meeting. These armed actions are perhaps a reminder by the ANC that its military capacity in the region has not been exhausted.

## Current Situation

What are the prospects for peace in the region? This depends on the willingness of both sides to be genuinely committed to peaceful solutions. There is little evidence of this commitment in state circles and the militarists appear to be firmly in the driving seat. Their JMC-influenced strategy is to decimate extra-parliamentary opposition to the state, whether it be in the shack settlements, schools or broader community. The only opposition tolerated is that which falls within structures the state creates or supports. The centralised tricameral system, ethnic local authorities, RSCs and separate education will continue to be imposed on an unwilling populace, and local options or negotiation initiatives will be undermined.

The state is attempting to buy off the '80 percent moderates' through a process of material upliftment. The strategy entails giving black leaders who work in the system credit for such achievements in order to promote their legitimacy. It also involves no negotiations with the '20 percent radicals': their organisations must be repressed and isolated as part of this co-optation strategy.

However, there are limits to the state's ability to enforce its will unreservedly. For example, it seems unable to halt guerrilla activity in the region. There are grave doubts about its fiscal ability to buy stability, scholars are able to mobilise thousands of students on a non-racial basis to protest against the state's education policies, and the extra-parliamentary movement soldiers on. The UDF, in particular, has been severely affected by the state of emergency – its leadership has been decimated, it cannot hold meetings or be quoted in the press. The Front now has a semi-underground existence, yet these restrictions have forced its affiliates to concentrate on building up organisational levels. The base of some affiliates is probably stronger than in the pre-emergency days, when the UDF generally concentrated on high profile campaigns while ignoring its organisational base.

On the left of the UDF, the Cape Action League appears to be active again after being paralysed by internal divisions for a period. The New Unity

Movement is still functioning, although in line with a traditional strategic emphasis its affiliates have not undertaken any mass action. The one interesting development appears to be the emerging greater tactical flexibility of extra-parliamentary opposition in the region. There has been a subtle move away from rigid non-collaboration and one of the affiliates to the NUM has split, apparently on this issue.

All of these opposition organisations agree on the issue of political power at the national level as being of paramount importance. Regional political violence can never be stemmed until the national question has been resolved. One must therefore identify the typical national pre-conditions set by the extra-parliamentary opposition for negotiations with government.

The UDF has set certain pre-conditions viz. lift the state of emergency, unban the ANC, release political prisoners and detainees, withdraw troops and police from townships, guarantee the safe return of exiles and scrap all discriminatory laws (*Sunday Star* 14/6/87). The state appears to be light years away from reaching these demands. Until it realises that the demands expressed by this 'radical 20 percent' are supported by most black communities and until it consequentially enters into genuine negotiations, the prospects for peace not only in the Western Cape, but in the country as a whole, remain bleak.

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
Crossroads (CT)	January 1985
Nkqubela (Robertson)	October 1985
Langa (CT)	November 1985
Nyanga (CT)	November 1985
Guguletu (CT)	November 1985
Atlantis (CT)	before April 1986
Lawaaikamp (George)	before April 1986
Bonteheuwel (CT)	May 1986
Zolani (Ashton)	before June 1986
Huhudi (Vryburg)	before July 1986

#### Note

By the end of January 1987 it was estimated that black local authorities in the Cape Town area were owed more than R5m by residents.

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Table 1  
DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS

Source	(1) Indicator SA Aug 1984 - 21 Jul 1985	(2) Minister of Law & Order 1985	(3) Minister of Law & Order Sept 1984 - Jan 1986	(4) State President Sept 1984 - 22 Apr 1986	(5) Bureau for Information Sept 1984 - 29 May 1987
No by Category					
Private houses	+ 636	-	2 528	3 621	4 638
SAP private houses	500	-	-	814	1 021
Shop/Factory/Office	225	-	925	1 417	1 159
Schools	145	-	920	-	1 549
Post Offices	<22	-	33	-	64
Churches	<22	-	1	28	47
Clinics	-	-	-	-	27
Community Centres	-	-	-	54	-
State Buildings	-	1 153	-	-	-
All private buildings	-	2 787	-	-	-
Total	1 550	3 940	4 423	5 934	8 505

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- 1) Quin D. 'Comparative targets & Costs of Three Cycles of Unrest', in Indicator SA Vol3/No2 (Urban Monitor): Spring 1985.
- 2) Hansard Vol5/86: Col493.
- 3) Cape Times 23/1/86.
- 4) Bureau for Information. South African Digest. Week ending 2 May 1986.
- 5) Bureau for Information (Directorate Research). 'The Unrest Situation in South Africa: September 1984 - May 1987', in ISSUP Strategic Review. University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies: August 1987.

Table 2  
DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION OF VEHICLES





Source	(1) PUTCO Bus Company Slayaway 5-6/11/84	(1) PUTCO Bus Company Sept 1984 - Oct 1984	(2) Minister of Law & Order Sept 1984 - Jan 1986	(3) Bureau for Information Sept 1984 - 29 May 1987
No by Category				
Private	-	-	5 338	9 704
Buses	55	468	5 054	8 368
Post Office	-	-	-	198
SAP	-	-	-	3 634

## Sources

- 1) PUTCO public affairs spokesperson, Pat Rogers.
- 2) Cape Times, 23/1/86.
- 3) Bureau for Information (Directorate Research). 'The Unrest Situation in South Africa: September 1984 - May 1987', in ISSUP Strategic Review. University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies: August 1987.

# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict: Transvaal



These graphs include fatalities in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand regions, but exclude fatalities in the Vaal Triangle areas.

# APARTHEID'S SATELLITES

## From Urban to Rural Revolt

Vijay Makanjee

'Although born out of a political philosophy which has now been abandoned, it must remain as one of the successes of that policy. Whatever the constitutional future that will result from the process of reform on which we have embarked, Gazankulu, like the others, cannot be undone.'

Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Education and Development Aid (Race Relations Survey 1986, 2:598)

South Africa's ten homelands were created as separate political entities as a direct result of the National Party's policy of apartheid, ostensibly to provide a homeland for different language/ethnic/nation groups. Today, they have conveniently become reservoirs for South Africa's forgotten people, for the millions of Africans stripped of their South African citizenship and thus excised from official statistics. Contrary to Gerrit Viljoen's statement, the political philosophy of separate development in the form of territorial apartheid has not been abandoned. Rather, the current constitutional 'reforms' of the central political system have proved to be a refinement of that policy at the national, regional and local levels.

### Repressive Forces

Homeland administrations have ably succeeded in reproducing Pretoria's elaborate system of social and political controls, through adopting the same security legislation and extending the national state of emergency. Curfews, emergencies, bannings, union bans, detentions, the suppression of opposition, and activist fatalities have become common features of politics in the homelands.

Levels of political conflict in Transvaal's cluster of homelands, especially Bophuthatswana, KwaNdebele, Lebowa and Venda, were particularly high between 1985-86 as township dissidence and resistance campaigns spilled over homeland borders. Ethnic fervour has surged also, with the Transkei and the Ciskei authorities (both Xhosa homelands) at loggerheads with each other over land and legitimacy as rival administrations. It needed Pretoria's intervention

to calm down the Matanzima/Sebe feud in the mid-1980s. In KwaNdebele, non-Ndebele speakers find themselves at the short end of the stick when it comes to housing, jobs and vigilante attacks. Many people of the controversial Moutse area (initially excised from Lebowa), were told to leave the homeland if they were not Ndebele speakers.

The South African government has 'granted independence' to four homelands since 1976, namely Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). It remains to be seen whether the six 'self-governing' homelands will request or be granted the same status. Recent changes to the 1971 National States Constitution Act have somewhat blurred the long-standing marked distinction between independent and self-governing homelands. In 1987 Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis released details of a major restructuring of the system of government in the non-independent homelands. The new powers are contained in the Self-Governing Territories Bill, which replaces the 1971 National States Constitution Act. The Bill could restrict the political and economic rights of Africans in 'white' South Africa while entrenching these regimes as regional authorities. Another fear is that the Bill could include a clause allowing the government to incorporate African communities into homelands without forcibly removing them (*Indicator SA* Vol5 No1:19).

The unstable homeland administrations remain subordinate to Pretoria — as the South African Defence Force's (SADF) swift quelling of the attempted Bophuthatswana coup on 10 February 1988 clearly indicated — and dependent on it for budgetary support and seconded personnel. At most, independence has meant a degree of limited and highly constrained administrative autonomy delegated by the central state to local collaborators. The state has thereby created a group of middle-class civil servants whose primary interest is the maintenance of homeland structures. Together with aspirant businessmen, civil servants and local politicians seek to maintain control at any cost despite popular resistance to homeland balkanisation, both inside the homelands and in 'white' South Africa.

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Even chiefs have been drawn into attempts to justify the existence of the homelands. Traditionally respected elders, chiefs have now become salaried officials of homeland administrations, with new policing functions. Their customary power to allocate land has been abused in many cases and used as a means of political control. However, some chiefs have refused to be co-opted and paid the price. An example was the harassment suffered by traditional Tembu leader Sabata Dalindyebo — even after death — at the hands of his cousin and junior in the tribal hierarchy, Kaiser Matanzima. Pretoria elevated Matanzima, who supported separate development, firstly to Paramount Chieftaincy and then to Chief Minister of the Transkei. Sabata was deposed and died in exile in Lusaka in 1986. Matanzima hijacked his coffin and prevented mourners from throughout South Africa from attending Dalindyebo's funeral in Umtata.

## Conflict Triggers

South African 'homelands' have not been immune from or uninvolved in the spate of unrest that ravaged South Africa between 1984-87. However, the nature and extent of the conflict has been markedly different in each of the ten 'homelands'.

Resistance in the Ciskei, the 'other' Xhosa homeland and the last to be granted independence, has been part and parcel of spiralling 'unrest' in the volatile Eastern Cape, which has a long history of opposition to white rule. Residents of Duncan Village, which is physically part of East London, have waged long and bitter street battles against forced removals and later incorporation into the Ciskei. Both Duncan Village and Mdantsane, which lies within the borders of the Ciskei, have experienced long-lasting, and often violent, bus and consumer boycotts. Although considered independent by Pretoria, the homeland's forces have often acted as the central government's surrogate security arm, detaining activists, breaking up meetings, and forcing people to use buses and trains during transport boycotts.

In KwaNdebele, where at least 80 people died in simmering political violence between 1985-86, Ndebele King David Mapoch joined forces in 1987 with young comrades, workers, other activists and even civil

servants in opposing independence, which had been opted for by the homeland's legislative authority. His royal kraal was fire-bombed and attacked by the KwaNdebele vigilante group, Mbokodo. After this, many youths took to the bush where they operated in groups to defend their homes. Close alliances were forged with the royal family, local villagers and parents. Youths from the nearby township of Mamelodi moved in to strengthen the anti-independence alliance.

By mid-May 1987, about 41 of the homeland's 72 MPs had had their homes and businesses burned to ashes. Early in June, a massive stayaway to protest against independence was called. Significantly, the entire civil service stayed away from work — and were forced to reapply for their jobs. The unparalleled show of resistance resulted in the legislative assembly rejecting the proposed independence option in August 1987. However, in 1988 President PW Botha announced independence would be granted to KwaNdebele if authorities had a mandate from inhabitants. Subsequently, vigilante activity has resurged alongside the legislative assembly's renewed call for support for independence.

Pretoria has admitted that in its decision to grant independence to the homeland, the inhabitants were not consulted. According to Heunis, 'It is not the responsibility of the South African government to consult the citizens of KwaNdebele. It is the prerogative of the government of KwaNdebele to decide on such a matter' (SAIRR 1986:684). The Pretoria Supreme Court, however, has found the KwaNdebele administration's actions to be illegitimate. One case concerned the right to vote of women, who prior to the judgment were denied that right in the homeland. The court's finding throws into doubt the validity of any decisions made by the legislative authority.

In Bophuthatswana, the second homeland to achieve 'independence', major conflicts have occurred between the new administration and its opponents. The homeland's proximity to the PWV industrial complex has meant township issues are taken back by daily commuters and unionised migrants. On 26 March 1986, homeland police opened fire in Bophuthatswana's Winterveld area on 5 000 people attending a meeting, killing 11, injuring 70 and arresting 2 500.

Citing widespread corruption and electoral

malpractices, members of the homeland's army staged a coup attempt in February 1988. Although short-lived, the attempt highlighted the institutional support which Mangoshe draws on for continued homeland rule. Within about 15 hours the coup was put down by the SADF acting under the behest of South Africa's State Security Council. Frequent clashes between security forces and ANC

### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

Route	Date	Trigger
Moletji/Seshogo - Pietersburg	begins Apr 1984	fare hike
Batlokoa/Solomondale - Pietersburg	begins Jul 1984	fare hike
Mabopane/Soshanguve - Pretoria	begins Apr	intro of train
KwaNdebele - Pretoria	1 Feb 1985	fare hike
Lebowa	begins Jul 1985	fare hike
Sakile - Standerton	Aug - Dec 1985	fare hike
Elangala - Pretoria	11 Nov 1985	fare hike
W Transvaal townships	begins Feb 1986	political
Sekhukhuleni	Aug-Sept 1986	various
Lebowa	begin Jul 1987	workers dismissed

Note  
Excludes boycotts in the Vaal Triangle and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region.

guerrillas attempting to reach the Reef offer a partial explanation for the rapid quelling of the coup attempt in this strategically placed homeland on the border of Botswana.

In KaNgwane, the decision by Chief Minister Enos Mabuza to resist independence (and later to meet with the ANC in Lusaka) has meant that the simmering unrest in the rest of South Africa had less of an impact in the homeland. However, in 1986 there were sporadic incidents of civil unrest with millions of rands worth of damage inflicted in political violence. School boycotts were widespread, and in 1986, more than 4 000 youths set fire to a high school and destroyed about 20 government-owned vehicles.

In widespread violence in the area, the SAP and SADF moved into the homeland. In an incident outside the Kabokweni magistrates court, police opened fire on 2 000 pupils, killing one and injuring 80. Mabuza admitted that most of those shot had birdshot wounds in their backs. The police claimed the pupils had become uncontrollable, leaving them with little option but to open fire on the protestors. Mabuza subsequently announced the formation of the homeland's own police force and set up a commission to investigate the shootings.

changes in the state structure. With the granting of certain levels of self-governance, Pretoria transformed previously hereditary figures into paid officials. These people have had little occasion to rock the boat.

This has not been the case in all the homelands, however. In the northern Transvaal, traditional authority figures have supported popular calls for political rights. In KwaNdebele in 1986, youth (the 'comrades') forged an alliance with civil servants and traditional leaders. This homeland, set to become the fifth 'independent' homeland in December 1986, was rocked by continual violence as people mobilised to resist being excised from South Africa and losing their citizenship rights in the process.

Independence for KwaNdebele became controversial following the incorporation of Moutse from Lebowa on 31 December 1985. (However, in 1987 Moutse residents won a Supreme court case declaring this incorporation null and void). Following the formal incorporation of Moutse, violence erupted in the area leaving at least 24 people dead. The issue of incorporation turned a previously placid rural area into a hotbed of political activity. Another irony is that another homeland (Lebowa) has laid claim to Moutse, although residents in the area are adamant that they do not want to be part of any homeland.

Details of political violence in the homelands, (which are generally unreported), sometimes only emerge in court cases. In the Transkei at least six cases of ANC activities were linked in some way. Most of the cases coming to trial at present deal with the 1985-86 period, which saw major shoot-outs with insurgents and sabotage incidents in several homelands. In the Transkei there were attacks on petrol depots, waterlines, power stations and police stations. Among the accused in court, very few are charged with direct involvement but are alleged to have assisted guerrillas in these attacks.

According to one source, 'the homelands' (security) forces have a 'dual task': to protect the repressive bantustan authorities, and to carry out local and

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Nelspruit	1985-86
Phalaborwa	November 1985 - 1986
Pietersburg	November 1985 - 1986
Potgietersrus	November 1985 - 1986
Tzaneen	November 1985 - 1986
Warmbaths	February 1986 - 1986

Note  
Excludes boycotts in the Vaal Triangle and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region.

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
EMgwenya (Waternal Boven)	July 1985
Belfast	January 1986
Carolina	January 1986
Piet Retief	January 1986
Ermelo	January 1986
Jouberton (Klerksdorp)	February 1986
Nelspruit	before July 1986
Amsterdam	before July 1986
Lydenburg	before July 1986
White River	before July 1986

Notes  
Excludes boycotts in the Vaal Triangle and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region.  
By the end of April 1987 it was estimated that 86,7% (R235,5m) of all rent and service charge arrears accrued nationwide was owed in the Transvaal - including Vaal-Triangle and Pretoria-Witwatersrand townships.

## Organisational Levels

With the creation of the homelands, Pretoria cultivated certain individuals or families with a view to making them the future, malleable rulers. In the Transkei, Kaiser Matanzima was nurtured and proclaimed a tribal leader with the ousting of Dalindyebo Sabata, traditional leader of the Tembus. At the same time Pretoria promoted the tribal authority system. These traditionalist bodies have tended to be conservative and disinclined to press for fundamental



regional operations as dictated by the strategic priorities of the central government in Pretoria' (Crawthra:125). In the Transkei large-scale detentions occurred in December 1983 and January 1984 in the Engcobo area, where over 200 people were detained. These large-scale detentions are not unusual in the homelands. In KwaNdebele in 1986, police stormed the royal kraal of David Mapoch and detained over 2 500 people.


In 1984, the University of the Transkei experienced deportations of members of staff by the homeland's security police. In the same year, the homeland authorities banned the newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and the Azanian Students Organisation (Azaso). They joined the list of 19 anti-apartheid organisations banned by the Transkei in 1979. Unions in homeland areas have also faced major constraints on their operations. Bophuthatswana outlawed 'foreign' trade unions, raising questions about the homeland's commitment to its much vaunted Bill of Rights.

Interestingly, some homeland armies have been trained by former members of Rhodesia's notorious Selous Scouts. In the Transkei, this external intervention culminated in an internal tussle for power between factions of the homeland's army, and resulted in a change of rulers in late 1987. However, these changes have not drastically affected the structure of the ruling power bloc in the Transkei. The new ruler, Major-General Bantu Holomisa, who appears to have popular support, has suspended all 'political' activity.

This tussle for power is also reflected in the attempted coup in the second 'independent' homeland, Bophuthatswana, by a faction of the army. Citing widespread corruption and electoral malpractice, a faction within the territory's security forces staged a short-lived coup attempt in Mmabatho on 10 February 1988. Although there were similarities in the two coup attempts, the successful overthrow of the Matanzimas in the Transkei was notable for the lack of South African intervention. Pretoria's explanation for its intervention in the Bophuthatswana coup was that the rebels had threatened the physical well-being of President Lucas Mangope. However, it is more likely that the central government feared the latter homeland could be used as an entry point for ANC guerrillas. Also, the homeland has large stocks of platinum, which are used to bolster the South African balance of payments.

The two coups in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana over the last twelve months have emphasised the fundamental instability of the homelands in general. Without Pretoria's fiscal and military support, these fragile, fledgling regimes are unable to withstand internal political division or the challenge posed by national-based popular resistance groups. The next round of political violence in South Africa's townships may well result in an even greater overspill of urban struggle from the core. The experience of KwaNdebele between 1985-86 suggests that some homeland administrations might not survive the next political challenge, especially if it involves the co-ordinated rural and urban mobilisation of a wide range of anti-apartheid groups.

## FATALITIES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS



### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
Transvaal	5-6/11/84	limited
Transvaal	1/5/85	limited regionalised
Transvaal	14/5/85	small
Witbank	15/8/85	mass
Witbank	8/10/85	unknown
Witbank	17-23/2/86	unknown
Warmbaths	3-10/3/86	unknown
White River	1-7/4/86	between 75-100%
Nelspruit	1-7/4/86	between 75-100%
Transvaal	16/6/86	unknown
Transvaal	14/7/86	limited
KwaNdebele	15-28/7/86	most workers
KwaNdebele	17-22/11/86	unknown
Transvaal	12/3/87	unknown
Transvaal	5-6/5/87	limited
Transvaal	16/6/87	limited
Transvaal	21/3/88	limited
Transvaal	6-8/6/88	limited
Transvaal	16/6/88	limited





**Note**

- Excludes stayaways in the Vaal Triangle and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region.

# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict:

### Natal



# A STRATEGIC DIVIDE

## Townships on Contested Terrain

*Douglas Booth*

Between 1987-88 Pietermaritzburg has been the focal point of the political violence that has variously affected large portions of KwaZulu/Natal since the late 1970s. As in the rest of South Africa, political violence in KwaZulu/Natal is neither isolated nor incoherent but a product of the convergence of conflicts unresolved by negotiation. These conflicts find expression in simultaneous political processes: namely, hegemony, resistance, reform, co-optation and coercion. In this sense a process is an attempt by a specific actor either to retain power or transform the power relations. The specific convergence of conflict in KwaZulu/Natal can be reviewed by focusing on relationships between the principal actors: the state, the extra-parliamentary opposition and Inkatha.

In KwaZulu/Natal the term, extra-parliamentary opposition, essentially refers to civic and student affiliates of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). (Neither the National Forum nor the National Council of Trade Unions, both orientated towards the black consciousness tradition, have a strong presence in the region). Under the banner of Inkatha there are those groups operating from within state-created institutions, namely the KwaZulu administration and township local authorities. While in essence both the UDF/Cosatu and Inkatha are committed to a non-racial democracy, it is the conflict within the politics of opposition that has turned the liberation struggle into a battle for hegemony.

### Socio-Economic Linkages

The birth of the UDF can be traced to the national repression of black resistance in the wake of the mass violence of 1976-77 and the subsequent co-optation of some elements of the urban bourgeoisie. In the first instance the state banned 17 black consciousness affiliates in October 1977 which had the effect of temporarily forcing black opposition underground. Over the next 18 months this opposition resurfaced in the form of community-based civic organisations, spurred on, ironically, by a process of state co-optation.

The essence of co-optation in the early 1980s was the selective redress of material inequalities (e.g. township

upgrading programmes) and the provision of limited political representation (e.g. black local authorities). Both strategies accentuated community frustrations, particularly in African townships located outside the homelands. Redress which was primarily directed at the underdeveloped homelands did not bring significant relief as even here resources were not redistributed but used to concentrate power bases.

The relaxation of 'controls' over urban African rights has had a paradoxical effect as township residents have felt the brunt of the rising costs of urban residence at a time of increasing unemployment and inflation. In brief, the object of state tactics has been to encourage the excess urban African population in South Africa to relocate to the homelands. By 1982 civic organisations in southern Natal townships (administered by the then Port Natal Administration Board — PNAB) had begun to mobilise against the increases imposed by state and other agencies in transport, rent and service charges.

The new political dispensation did not introduce any meaningful changes either. African political participation is limited to either the homelands or third-tier government (e.g. community councils and later black local authorities) in townships outside the homelands. However, representation through the community council system has proved fruitless. For example, councillors on the Ningizimu Community Council (NCC), which represents Lamontville and Chesterville townships and adjacent migrant hostels, were not informed of the increases, even though they form part of the advisory structure to the PNAB.

### Organisational Levels

State co-optation was not only directed at African communities. In 1984 the tricameral parliament was established to embrace coloured and Indian people. In response, resistance organisations countrywide coalesced to form the UDF. Among nearly 600 founding members were the Natal-based Joint Rent Action Committee (an umbrella body opposed to rent increases in PNAB townships), youth leagues from Chesterville, Lamontville, KwaMashu, Sobantu, Umlazi, and worker organisations. While the host of civic and student organisations that gave birth to the new Front typically

mobilised around specific local issues, the UDF as an umbrella body attempted to co-ordinate mass resistance to national issues such as political representation by Black Local Authorities (BLAs), the tricameral parliament and the presence of security forces in the townships.

Strategically, the extra-parliamentary opposition has relied upon a non-collaboration strategy (e.g. non-participation in government created structures such as homelands and the BLAs), boycott tactics (e.g. commuter, consumer, education and rent boycotts; work stayaways and strikes) and protests (e.g. economic sanctions and disinvestment; cultural, academic and sporting boycotts). The logic of these tactics is, firstly, to conscientise and mobilise people to make them aware that they have control over their lives, and secondly, to use mobilisation as a bargaining instrument. Of course, the absence of a resource base from which material rewards can be offered to supporters has limited alternative strategies.

The militancy which peaked during 1985 and 1986 throughout South Africa's townships reflected the extent to which the extra-parliamentary opposition rejected 'reform'. At the time a euphoric feeling prevailed that the apartheid state was a 'dying horse'. However, this was based on the misperception of a changed balance of power between the state and the opposition; a perception fuelled by the partial development of alternative institutions (e.g. street committees, 'people's education', 'people's courts' and community newspapers) and temporary 'no-go' areas in townships for the security forces. While the extra-parliamentary opposition was successful in collapsing local government it neither replaced these structures with financially viable alternatives nor seriously challenged the state's key apparatuses.

The crisis in African education in Natal schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET) and the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture (KDEC) during 1985 and 1986 (e.g. the non-recognition of student representative councils and the refusal of pupils to write final exams in both years) exposed the state's adherence to certain apartheid strictures and the underdevelopment of the boycott strategy. 'Reform' in education is limited to long-term parity in resource allocation within racially defined institutions. While pupils have demanded more resources (e.g. free textbooks and stationery), the essence of resistance is the rejection of the philosophy of apartheid education (e.g. through the advocacy of 'people's education for people's power') and the absence of non-racial structures. As the state crushed the boycott tactic during 1987 by the detention or expulsion of 'troublesome' pupils/teachers and the occupation of schools by security forces, pupils lost an organisational base from which real gains could be made.

At the present juncture, 'reform' has been abandoned to restore 'normality'. The state of emergency has enabled the state to regain the upper hand and the extra-parliamentary opposition faces a period of re-evaluation — particularly at the strategic level. This includes the trade union movement, as their hard won economic gains and the political assertiveness

of the black working-class, is threatened by, inter alia, the recent Labour Relations Amendment Act.

## Inkatha Role

In contrast to the former opposition groups, Inkatha has opted to 'liberate blacks from white domination' by 'working within' a state-created institution — the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). The KLA, which administers the KwaZulu homeland is controlled by Inkatha. The party mouthpiece, *Clarion Call*, has stated that: 'the KwaZulu government is Inkatha' (1984:27). Inkatha has become increasingly synonymous with KwaZulu chief minister and Inkatha president, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who has progressively supplanted Zulu lineage structures, headed by a monarch, with a strictly hierarchical organisation in an attempt to consolidate personal power (see Mare & Hamilton 1987).

Inkatha's strategy since its formation in 1975 has moved through a resistance-compliance continuum (Gwala 1988:21-24). Between 1975 and 1980 Inkatha successfully promoted itself as the internal wing of the African National Congress (ANC), a strategy facilitated by the ANC leadership's blessing of the new movement. Buthelezi was admired by many people, despite working within the homeland system, because he portrayed an image of challenging the state while creating the illusion that the KLA provided a viable institution to consolidate the forces of liberation (ibid:21).

Through the KLA, Inkatha wielded a material base and was thus able to foster extensive client-patron relationships with subjects. Inkatha's use of the state's strategy of homeland empowerment is well reflected in education. Control over education in the homeland passed to the KDEC in 1977. For Inkatha this meant freedom from the shackles of bantu education and pupil resistance henceforth was regarded as the antithesis of Inkatha's participative philosophy of liberation. However, ubuntu-botho or 'Inkatha education', introduced to KDEC schools in 1979, merely supplanted one set of inimical ideals, values and norms with another (Mdluli 1987). Moreover, it provided a perfect vehicle by which Inkatha could manipulate Zulu 'culture' to build political support. Thus Inkatha, far from consolidating the forces of opposition, was developing a structural dependence on the state via the homeland system.

This dependency has been accentuated with the breaking of ties between Inkatha and the ANC and the progressive mobilisation of the extra-parliamentary opposition in the early 1980s. Inkatha perceived the national non-racial movement as a threat to its constituency — the Zulu 'nation'. As the conflict between Inkatha and other black opposition groups has intensified (see below), Inkatha has sought more power from the state. Examples include requests for the incorporation of 'troublesome' townships (e.g. Hambanathi, Lamontville and Edendale — the first being incorporated during 1987) and for the increased police powers given to the KwaZulu Police (KZP) (*Natal Mercury* 12/4/88). Nearly every instance of



empowerment, or attempted empowerment, has been accompanied by community resistance and protracted violence.

Just as the strategies adopted by disenfranchised civic associations are consistent with their position in the social formation, so too does Inkatha's strategy derive from its structural location. The leadership is middle-class, comprising tribal chiefs, traders, and professional civil servants employed in the upper echelons of the KwaZulu public service all of whom are dependent upon the ruling bloc for their positions. Of the 119 members of the KLA, 65 are nominated through the tribal authority system (traditional tribal chiefs were made chairmen of rural Inkatha branches, while township councillors became chairpersons in their ward) and 54 are 'elected' (effectively nominated by Inkatha). The entire KwaZulu 'cabinet' forms the executive of Inkatha.

The close relationship between Inkatha and the KLA is a source of strength and weakness. On the one hand, it gives Inkatha control over resources denied to the extra-parliamentary opposition. Inkatha allocates land and housing, and provides jobs in the civil administration including education, health and crime prevention. Moreover, Inkatha leaders and members escape state repression in the form of harassment, detentions and bannings. On the other hand, the relationship limits strategic and tactical flexibility. For example, Inkatha cannot pursue boycott tactics (one of the most widely used tactics of the extra-parliamentary opposition) because it controls township administrations, education through the KDEC, and many transport routes through the KwaZulu Department of Transport. Similarly, many leaders have various retail interests which effectively discounts consumer boycotts. In the same vein, support for economic sanctions is contrary to homeland development via foreign investment.

## Conflict Triggers

The conflict between Inkatha and the extra-parliamentary opposition has produced the most intense violence in KwaZulu/Natal in the past decade. In theory, both Inkatha and the UDF are committed to a non-racial democracy. However, because of their structural locations, intense differences have emerged concerning the method by which this can be achieved.

Among the extra-parliamentary opposition, 'non-co-operation' and 'non-participation' policies are underpinned by the assumption that the conflict between government and oppressed are beyond negotiation; rather, the government must be replaced. Inkatha, on the other hand, favours conservative reform and has restricted itself to moderate political proposals such as those of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba.

The actual terrain of conflict in the region has largely been shaped by Inkatha's control over township administration and its jurisdiction over education, labour and policing in the homeland. Thus at one level it is a fundamental conflict over the boycott versus participation strategy that precipitates violence. At another level, the conflict is for hegemony within black politics: the re-emergence of popular opposition to the state in the early 1980s challenged Inkatha's self-perception as the sole representative of 'genuine liberation' in the region.

### RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS

Townships	Begin
Chesterville (Dbn)	1983
Lamontville (Dbn)	1983
Hambanathi (Tonga)	1983
Note	
In November 1987 the Natalia Development Board claimed that it was owed R2,5m in rents from 13 townships since rent boycotts erupted in the province in 1983.	
It was revealed in July 1987 that although there was no formal rent boycott in Lamontville at least 50% of households owed at least R800 each in rent arrears.	

### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

Route	Date	Trigger
Sobantu - PMB	operative Aug 1984	fare hike
Nqethu - Hillcrest/Pinetown	begins Sept 1984	fare hike
African areas -		
Empangeni/Richards Bay	Jan - May 1985	fare hike/service
Mpophomeni - Howick/PMB	begins Jan 1988	fare hike


- Education  
African pupils at schools in Durban's townships do not perceive ideological differences between KwaZulu's DEC and Pretoria's DET. Thus, between April and June 1980, pupils in KwaMashu and Umlazi joined Cosas's call for a nationwide black school boycott. The 1980 school boycotts raise

critical questions about Inkatha's strategy of 'non-violence'. By May, Inkatha's initial complacency towards the boycott proponents had turned to open hostility against pupils and their parents. In the KLA members used the 'conspiracy theory' (e.g. the cause of the boycott was attributed to 'pundits from Reservoir Hills', 'intellectuals from the black medical school', etc.) to justify the formation of vigilante groups used to force pupils back to school.

African schools under the KDEC next experienced pupil boycotts in August 1985 in the wake of the assassination of UDF defence lawyer, Victoria Mxenge. Cosas and Azaso called on pupils to stay away from school for a week as a mark of respect. Since that period, vigilantes have been widely deployed against pupils protesting over material inequalities (e.g. the provision of free textbooks and stationery). In KwaMashu, for example, violent clashes have resulted in the deaths of pupils, their parents and vigilantes in May 1986 (14 people killed), March 1987 (7 killed) and April/May 1988. Of course, KwaZulu's dependence on ad hoc budgetary assistance from Pretoria and the

# KwaZulu/Natal

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



Drawn by Cartographic Studio, Dept. of Geographical and Environmental Science, University of Natal, Durban 1988

KLEC's narrow resource base means that demands for adequate educational resources cannot be met.

● Local Government

In PNAB townships Inkatha and the UDF were first drawn into conflict in 1983, via the dispute between community councillors and civic organisations. Inkatha has long supported the community council (now BLA) system and in Natal most councillors campaign on an Inkatha ticket. When attacks were directed against the community councillors and their property, they retreated to their natural support base — Inkatha.

Since 1983 community councillors in Lamontville have twice (1984 and 1986) 'invited' the security forces to rid the township of 'criminal elements'. In the words of one community councillor: 'If the ANC was not controlled by the police things would be worse. At the moment the police are doing a tremendous job blocking the criminal elements from entering our places' (Booth 1987). The attempt to criminalise political activity should also be noted. Of course, the distinction between crime and political violence is easily blurred, particularly under conditions of spontaneity and inadequate communication of intentions (e.g. in instances where activists stone commuters who may be unaware of any boycott).

On the other hand, township councillors in KwaZulu are more often met with apathy. This is because the precipitating factors which have ignited violence against councillors have been generally absent, e.g. housing rents are lower in the homelands (Zulu 1986:9).

● Labour

Since the two-day stayaway in the Transvaal in November 1984, the black trade union movement has actively sided with community organisations against the state. Given that Inkatha's structural position mitigates against boycott strategies which it describes as 'harming

the cause of liberation', stayaways and strikes have been a source of division. Resolutions passed at the launch of Cosatu in 1985 exposed the full extent of ideological divisions between the two forces, for example:

- the right of workers to assert themselves politically;
- the rejection of bantustans and federalism as solutions to South Africa's problems;
- support for disinvestment;
- proposed 'socialist' alternatives, which obviously challenge Inkatha's road to a free-enterprise economy, e.g. investment in homeland parastatals.

Ideological and rhetorical struggles shifted to physical attacks on both unionists and union property following the formation in 1986 of the Inkatha-backed United Workers Union of South Africa (Uwusa) with its free enterprise ideology. The emergence of Uwusa aggravated community conflicts because labour tensions were expressed as being between Cosatu/UDF and Inkatha, rather than between Cosatu and Uwusa affiliates. For example, at Mpophomeni (Howick) in December 1986 members of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu) and their families were assaulted and murdered, allegedly by uniformed Inkatha members. At the time Mawu was fighting an Industrial Court case for the re-instatement of 950 workers dismissed by BTR-Sarmcol. Uwusa subsequently gained recognition at the factory.

Moreover, the antagonistic relationship between Inkatha and the black trade union movement is compounded by Inkatha's structural position as an employer of labour through the KwaZulu administration. Inkatha is thus placed in the contradictory position of being an employer and defender of worker interests. Of course, how workers will resolve the contradiction of being members of both

Inkatha and Cosatu remains to be ascertained. While Inkatha supporters have been victims of violence in the sphere of local government and education this is less true on the labour front, with the overwhelming majority of assaults being directed against Cosatu members.

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

Place	Duration
Howick	May - October 1985
Pietermaritzburg	August - October 1985
Durban	September - October 1985
Pinetown	September - October 1985

### WORK STAYAWAYS

Place	Date	Support
Natal	1/5/85	some unionised workers
Natal	14/5/85	limited to few workplaces
PMB	18/7/85	92% of African workers
Natal	9/10/85	weak
Natal	1/5/86	70%, mainly union members
Natal	16/6/86	unknown
Natal	14/7/86	negligible in S Natal
Natal	1/10/86	little
Natal	12/3/87	very little
Natal	5-6/5/87	average 65%
Natal	16/6/87	55% Durban African workers
Ashdown (Pmb)	1/2/88	100% of residents
Natal	21/3/88	limited
Natal	6-8/6/88	high in manufacturing
Natal	16/6/88	mass

## Activist Responses

To comprehend political and interfactional violence in South Africa it is necessary to examine the state and its insidious division of black communities which has resulted in a contested terrain in black politics. Township politics in KwaZulu/Natal epitomise that terrain. Moreover, the state's use of coercion as an instrument

for the extension of its apparatuses, has become a role model for black resistance. In South Africa the politics of coercion override the politics of reason and negotiation in both white and black politics. Even where the state does consent to negotiation, it invariably unilaterally defines what is negotiable.

The relatively weak power bases of the extra-parliamentary opposition and Inkatha restrict their definition of anti-state resistance to a bargaining process. The frequent use of coercion between, and within, resistance organisations is casting an ominous shadow. It is not the intention here to 'prove' which resistance organisation is the aggressor. However, as Maré and Hamilton put it: 'The violence of Inkatha supporters is the more conspicuous because it belies the much vaunted platform of "non-violence" which gains Inkatha such national and international favour' (1987:197). To add to this, interfunctional violence is invariably defined by partisan supporters and perpetrators from both camps as 'self-defence'.

Political violence also suggests that organisational capacity does not match the discourse of extra-parliamentary opposition groups. This is particularly true where criminals and 'political thugs' are allowed to exploit leadership vacuums. What is alarming here are the disclaimers emanating from black leaders.

Archie Gumede, national president of the UDF, has hedged around his organisations's responsibilities in the Pietermaritzburg violence: 'The affiliates are totally autonomous, they operate their own communities. The UDF itself does not have the machinery to supervise the activities of its affiliates ... I am not able to control 10 year-olds. The only people we believe can make a meaningful agreement are the ones in jail — Mandela, Sisulu' (*Leadership* 1984:51-52).

Responding to allegations of violence perpetrated by Inkatha chiefs in Pietermaritzburg, Buthelezi recently said there was 'No nexus whatsoever between those chiefs and myself as president of Inkatha or between them and Inkatha as an organisation. If they are members of Inkatha then that is incidental ... I am unable to control the manner in which they act in their capacity as chiefs' (*Sunday Tribune* 21/2/88).

These statements raise doubts over the level of 'real' consciousness among resistance organisations and their capacity to impose discipline. Moreover, the violent expression of interfunctional differences in Pietermaritzburg's townships points to a severe crisis in black opposition politics.

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# Data Base

## SELECT FINANCIAL COSTS

Source	(1) PUTCO Bus Company Sept 1984 - 31 Oct 1984	(2) Port Elizabeth Tramways Jul 1984 - Mar 1985	(3) PUTCO Bus Company Sept 1984 - Sept 1985	(4) Cape Town City Tramways 14 Jul 1985 17 Oct 1985	(5) Minister of Law & Order - Sept 1985 Jan 1986	(6) Special Risk Insurance Association 1 Sept 1985 - Mar 1986	(7) ISSUP Sept 1984 - Apr 1986	(8) Minister of Security Law & Order Police 1 Sept 1985 - Sept 24 Jan 1986 Dec	(9)
Damage to vehicles/property	R1m	-	-	-	-	R56m	-	-	-
Damage to vehicles/lost fares	-	R4m	R21m	R1,5m	R100m	R138m	R211m	R138m	R285
Total cost	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

### Notes

- For the years 1984-85 the Minister of Justice revealed that the per unit cost of keeping a person in prison was R8,65 a day (Weekly Mail 20/9/85). For 1988 he disclosed that the per unit day cost had risen to R11,29 (Hansard Vol7/88: Col566). If one were to take the total number of people detained under security and emergency legislation in the period January 1984 to June 1988, the financial cost to the state of detaining people for long periods could be approximated.
- In mid-1987 the Minister of Defence claimed in parliament that it was not in the public interest to reveal the costs involved in deploying SADF personnel in African townships (Weekly Mail 10/7/87). However in 1988 the SADF revealed that it had incurred a cost of R5,7m in erecting 14 temporary military bases near 'unrest' areas in black townships (Weekly Mail 17/6/88).
- Brigadier Hermanus Stadler of the Security Police revealed in an affidavit (in a court application by the New Nation to overturn the media regulations), that in 1986-87 more than 1 000 attacks on homes belonging to security force members had caused damage of R3m. He said seven police stations had been damaged at a cost of over R10 000 and about 90 power pylons and transformers damaged at a cost of more than R1,4m. Damage to a police helicopter costed the police R20 000 (Weekly Mail 17/6/88).

### Sources

- 1) PUTCO Public Affairs spokesperson, Pat Rogers.
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- 8) ISSUP. 'The Unrest Situation: Its Effects on Politics and the Economy', in ISSUP Bulletin. 1/86, University of Pretoria: 1986.
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## SELECT EDUCATION COSTS

The Minister of Education reveals that:





- disturbances at black schools between 1982-84 cost R1,5million (Hansard Vol2/85, Col15).
- during 1984 nine schools were damaged in Vaal Triangle disturbances at an estimated at R540 000 (Hansard Vol3/85, Col100).
- 32 Department of Education and Training (DET) schools were damaged in riots in the OFS between 4/11/83 and 29/3/85 at an estimated to be R710 000 (Hansard Vol11/85, Col1096).
- in 1984 out of the 7 269 black schools which fell under his department's jurisdiction 55 were damaged in riots. Damage was estimated to be R1,5m. (Hansard Vol6/86, Col493)
- in 1985 out of 7 362 schools, 17 schools were irreparably damaged, 30 seriously damaged and 247 just damaged. Damage was estimated to be R7,8m (ibid).
- 30 DET schools were damaged in riots between 1/1/87 and 30/4/87. Damage was estimated to be R267 390 (Hansard Vol4/87, Col97).

IPVA

# Data Base

## Fatalities in Political Conflict: Natal Midlands

● Acknowledgement: The Indicator Project would like to thank the Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) for assistance in monitoring 'unrest' fatalities in the Natal midlands.



● By mid-October, the death toll in the Natal Midlands had reached 602 for 1988, the worst year of violence in the region. No monthly breakdown is available for the 285 fatalities since 16 June 1988

# THE AFTERMATH

## A Separate Civil War

*Wyndham Hartley*

**I**t has often been asserted that truth is the first casualty of war. This may certainly be said of the violence that has lacerated the townships of the Natal midlands between 1986-87. People are mortally afraid to talk, the authorities refuse to, the emergency regulations hamper negotiations, and press restrictions surround the regional crisis in an eerie half-silence. Hundreds of people have died, scores have fled the violence to become refugees in other parts of Natal, many homes have been destroyed, millions of rands in property lost, and thousands of people injured in the eighteen months of conflict.

At Pietermaritzburg's Edendale Hospital, located in the heart of the conflict, the number of unrest victims passing through its theatres with severe injuries (bullet and stab wounds, skull fractures, etc.) has increased dramatically since mid-1987. A new male surgical ward has had to be opened. Most of the patients hurt in the violence are between 15 and 25 years old; the youngest victim was seven years old and the oldest 85. The number of burn victims, largely women and children, has rocketed from arson attacks on township homes. These facts offer a glimpse into the scale of the fighting in the townships that is as alarming as the body counts released by the police. Edendale Hospital has become a war hospital in a civil war zone.

At the national level, there are several theories about the causes and nature of South Africa's civil unrest. The first is the conspiracy theory, which asserts that everything is orchestrated by a preordained plan. The violence is supposedly the work of 'agitators' from outside the affected areas. This explains, according to the theory, why the national unrest moved from area to area between late 1984 and 1988, flaring up and then dying down sequentially in the PWV area, the Eastern Cape, Durban, Western Cape, NE Transvaal, Crossroads, Soweto and Pietermaritzburg.

The conspiracy theory does not fully explain why Inkatha and the United Democratic Front should be at loggerheads in Pietermaritzburg's Edendale Valley, unless it is coupled with another. This can be broadly called the Marxist-Leninist theory, according to which moderates cannot be tolerated in the ranks of the revolutionaries if the struggle is to succeed. Inkatha members are the moderates in this deadly scenario of interfactional conflict, and the movement of the violence

in the Natal midlands coincides with strategical advances and physically shifting battle lines.

A third theory assumes that communities are dynamic and can act of their own volition. Without detracting from the salience of the other theories — indeed, such interpretations may loom large in the minds of many of the protagonists — this account seems to be the most persuasive explanation of the war in the Edendale Valley. The fighting is a manifestation of a profound and fundamental division which has sundered black society and the Zulu 'nation' in KwaZulu/Natal.

### Conflict Triggers

The formation of the UDF in 1983 gave voice, and an identity, to one side of the community, as Inkatha had for many years given expression to the other. The political split was, without any doubt, between rural-based traditionalism on the one hand and the new progressive ideas from the cities, which challenged traditional norms and belief, on the other. The divide also should be seen in terms of a generation gap of startling proportions. The traditionalists were adult Zulus, loyal to Ulundi and proud of the KwaZulu state; the young people in the cities were coming to reject Zulu nationalism as a political option. They began to regard the KwaZulu administration and Inkatha as part of a system designed by Pretoria and based on ethnicity, which they could no longer tolerate.

Ironically, in 1983 both Inkatha and the UDF were implacably opposed to the new tricameral constitution for the same reason — the exclusion of Africans from parliament. But beneath the surface a deadly struggle had begun to win over the grassroots support. It essentially became an ideological struggle between political activists who believed in the power of their own nationalism, and activists who perceived Zulu nationalism and its traditions to have been used by the state to ensnare people in the bantustan trap.

Key manifestations of the emerging conflict in KwaZulu/Natal were the assassinations of civil rights lawyer Griffiths Mxenge (1981), community leader

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Harrison Dube (1983) and Victoria Mxenge (1985); the killing of five students at the University of Zululand (1982); and the attack on the Gandhi settlement near Phoenix (1985). From August 1985 recurrent violence swept through the Durban townships of Umlazi, Lamontville and others, surfacing in the Pietermaritzburg area also. Conflict developed between the Imbali township council, controlled by Inkatha, and the Imbali Civic Association, which later affiliated to the UDF.

Tensions between the two movements in the region were exacerbated by the organisation of a consumer boycott and stayaway in mid-1985 to support the dismissed BTR - Sarmcol workers from nearby Howick. During the bitter labour dispute between the Metal and Allied Workers Union (then under the Fosatu umbrella) and the management of Sarmcol, Uwusa, shortly after its formation on May Day 1986, began to organise among the replacement workers at the factory. The struggle between unions associated with Cosatu (launched end-1985)/UDF and Inkatha respectively, shaped deep divisions in the communities around Pietermaritzburg.

Throughout the civil upheavals which shook the country and Durban's townships in 1985 and 1986, however, Pietermaritzburg's townships had been generally subdued. The national violence, in spite of later internecine conflict, was fundamentally a conflict between rulers (the state) and the ruled. Can the same be said of the violence in Pietermaritzburg?

It would be foolish to assume that the potential for this type of confrontation does not exist in KwaZulu/Natal. Indeed, there have been direct clashes between activists and the security forces. At the moment, though, most people in Pietermaritzburg's townships appear to welcome the presence of the police or military. And it would be simplistic, in spite of allegations of collaboration, to see Inkatha as merely another vigilante force, carrying the state's battle to its predominantly youthful enemies. Or, as a local interviewee remarked: 'Did the vigilantes in Crossroads or Soweto have a King?'

## Socio-Economic Linkages

The struggle in the townships seems much more fundamental. It is a manifestation of the classic conflict of post-colonial Africa — traditionalism against the newer idea of a kind of social democracy in a 'unitary state'. The conflict is profoundly exacerbated by the apartheid structures under which black people have laboured for generations. The question is often asked, 'Why Pietermaritzburg, when the rest of the country is relatively calm?' The answer is, at least in part, geographical. Nowhere else is the mix of urban and rural socio-political identities so complex and entangled as in the Edendale Valley.

'I saw a youth of no more than 14 years, a firearm in each hand.' The comment by a township dweller sums up the horror, the desperation and the deadly seriousness of the conflict. But it provides no clear picture of the real nature of the two sides. Inkatha and

the UDF — the latter a loose association of 'progressive' organisations followed, inter alia, by the township youth cadre; the former a closely-knit cultural organisation fashioned on para-military lines. On the one side, the conservative, proud and disciplined Zulu; on the other, a wild, angry and radical youth.

Many township residents say that the single most important cause of the violence is apartheid. The state's attitude to urbanisation, and especially to the educational needs of black people, has sown the seeds of the anger which is being so horrifyingly vented today. Limited concessions seem irrelevant to the black youth. 'They beat our fathers; they have not beaten us' is their slogan. Deprived of a stable family life, of the discipline inherent in a stable community, the youth have emerged as a formidable force which cannot be ignored. And their power is growing; more than 50 percent of Africans in KwaZulu/Natal are under 16 years of age.

The concepts of exclusion and inferiority have remained in the minds of millions of African people. Even though the need for skills, development and massive injections of capital is at last realised, the spirit and economic disparities of 'bantustan education' still survive. The legacy is a semi-literate population and a youth which feels cheated out of not only a decent education but reasonable employment prospects as well. That boy with a firearm in each hand almost certainly sees himself as someone with nothing to lose. Although many of the 'comrades' (called the amaqabane in the Edendale Valley) have no official affiliation with the UDF, it would be a mistake to perceive them simply as unstructured bands of criminals and desperadoes. They are capable of desperate deeds, certainly, yet in some spheres their actions have remarkable cohesion.

'In some rural communities high up in the valley', an African intellectual from Imbali said recently, 'the youth are emerging as a stabilising force. They are tackling the problem of crime ... in one case, they have repaired a road so that the buses can get through; in another, they have asked for permission to repair a school. They are also challenging the powers, so often abused, of the chiefs and indunas, and are winning the hearts and minds of the people' (anonymous interview).

Seen in this light, the conflict is tragic. Neither side is blameless; and neither side is wholly right or entirely wrong. Indeed, it is impossible not to respect the fundamental position of both the traditionalists and the young. However, if the conflict is also marked by downright thuggery and more importantly by the 'revenge phenomenon', is there a way of resolving it? Is the fourteen year-old with a firearm in each hand simply running amok, or is he controllable? Could it even be that he is acting on someone's orders?

Some observers believe that the leadership of both parties, who have thrice sat down at peace talks, could stop the conflict if they wanted to. On the other hand, the pessimists (and many realists) believe that, 'Only the complete crushing of one side by the other will stop it now. The introduction of more police will only prolong the process' (ibid). When asked if their respective leaders had lost control over their followers, my interviewee replied, 'They have lost control, but not all of it'.



## Security Response

The police in the city have maintained throughout that the situation in the townships of the Edendale Valley is under control. Shortly after the floods in September 1987, a ten year-old boy, Sikhumbuzo Shezi, was decapitated when the family home was visited by a group of men searching for the youngster's parents. The furore in the local press caused the National Party MP, Brian Edwards, to become involved. This led in turn to an announcement by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf Meyer, that the Pietermaritzburg conflict should receive top priority from the police.

Shortly afterwards, the riot control unit in the city was reinforced with members from Pretoria. But in spite of continued assurances from the politicians that the situation was under control, national servicemen were sent into Edendale next. The dramatically increased police and military presence in the townships could not stop the death toll and the number of incidents from increasing still further. December was the most violent month of 1987.

At a police function on Christmas Eve 1987 in Pietermaritzburg, the officer in command of all riot units in the country, General Bert Wandrag, promised a plan for the new year. This plan, he said, would ensure that peace was restored in the townships. Early in January large numbers of police reinforcements were sent to the city, followed by a flying visit by General Wandrag, and the assignment of even more manpower to the area.

At a press briefing, Brigadier Jan Kotze, and the new security police head in Pietermaritzburg, Brigadier Jac Buchner, announced that the violence would be stopped and that police action would be absolutely impartial. This assurance was prompted by a statement from UDF President, Archie Gumede, that any reinforcements would be to support Inkatha.

Senior police officers also explained, during a tour of the townships, how difficult it was to stamp out violence in an area without formal infrastructure. The Edendale Valley is hilly, criss-crossed with ridges and gullies, without street lighting and, indeed, without streets in many areas. At night the valley is very dark and early evening mists descend the valley. The mist hampers helicopter operations, virtually the only rapid way of reaching rural settlements not served by any roads. It was described how, on one occasion, a foot patrol heard a woman screaming but it took the police four hours to reach her body. The murderers were long gone.

## Negotiations

While the violence did not begin with the horrific floods which struck Natal in September 1987, the plight of flood victims focused media attention on township areas. The extent of the internecine violence, which continued unabated throughout the natural tragedy, began to be known. The effects started to be felt in Pietermaritzburg as more and more workers were tired and unproductive on duty, and domestic servants arrived exhausted at their places of work. Many workers

— domestic, commercial and industrial — simply disappeared, becoming faceless statistics in the civil war body counts.

At this time both Inkatha and UDF made approaches to the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce to establish some neutral meeting ground where the possible cessation of the conflict could be discussed. After a number of meetings with both parties, the chamber, led by second vice-president, Rob Pater, and manager, Paul van Uytrecht, managed to get delegations of both parties to the conference table in November 1987. After more than four hours of discussion between the parties, the chamber released a five point statement.

Certain points relating to the perpetrators of the violence could not be agreed on, so the parties agreed to 'reflect' and raise them again at a further meeting, tentatively set for 9 December 1987. The points of agreement were:

- A call for the release of members of organisations party to the talks.
- The freedom to meet with their constituencies without interference from the security forces.
- Endorsement of the principle of freedom of expression, with agreement to discipline those who violate it.
- Condemnation and dissociation from the 'current' violence.

On the day these talks began a further three unrest fatalities were reported by the police. Yet, so positive were the first impressions of the peace talks that spokesmen for the parties believed that peace could be established within a few days. This, however, was not to be. The UDF/Cosatu applied for permission to hold an open air rally to address membership at the grassroots level. The rally went off with little incident and with agreement on only employing violence as a means of self-defence. Thus the stage was set for a second round of talks.

At the second meeting, the Inkatha delegation raised the issue of an article published in the banned journal, *Inqaba Yabasebenzi*, issued by the Marxist Workers Tendency (an expelled faction of the ANC). The document criticised Inkatha/Uwusa and called for their destruction — Inkatha demanded a public repudiation by the UDF/Cosatu grouping. In response on 16 December, the same day as an Inkatha rally at Taylor's Halt, the UDF/Cosatu published a full-page advertisement in *The Natal Witness*, repudiating the document and calling for an end to the violence in the area. This statement was welcomed by the Inkatha leadership who said they were now prepared to resume talks. The peace negotiations were, after a serious hiccup, back on course.

However, in the weeks before Christmas 1987 Inkatha and Uwusa members came under serious attack, prompting local Inkatha leaders to declare the peace process futile. After these events, the chamber held low-key discussions with both groups in an attempt to get them back to the negotiation table, including meeting with Chief Buthelezi in Ulundi on 25 January 1988.

During most of January the townships abounded

# PIETERMARITZBURG METROPOLITAN AREA

## Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence



### Administrative Units

<b>BOROUGHES</b> Pietermaritzburg City Council Howick Town Council	<b>DEPT OF CO-OPERATION &amp; DEVELOPMENT</b> Edendale Complex
<b>TOWN BOARDS</b> Hilton	<b>NATALIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD</b> Sobantu
<b>HEALTH COMMITTEES</b> Ashburton Mt Michael	<b>IBAZULU</b> Vulindlele Empfomeni
<b>DEVELOPMENT &amp; SERVICES BOARD</b> Registered Areas: Midmar Development Area    Foxhill    Plesislaer	<b>LAND OWNERS</b> Mainly Farming Areas

Source:  
Pietermaritzburg 2000 Information Dossier

IPMA

with rumours of an Inkatha strikeback, dubbed 'Operation Doom'. This became a reality on 31 January when, after a 15 000-strong rally in Sweetwaters, Inkatha attacked the township of Ashdown, known to be sympathetic to the UDF. There were widespread allegations, made public and denied in parliament, of police collusion in the attack.

As a result, Cosatu and 19 other individuals applied to the Supreme Court for an interdict restraining Inkatha from violence and killing. The redetention of many local UDF leaders, the effective banning of others including President Archie Gumede, and the severe restrictions placed on the organisation itself, made the prospect of further peace talks extremely remote for the next six months.

## Aftermath

Throughout 1988 the basic conflict has continued in the townships of the Natal midlands, with varying degrees of intensity. Many observers believe, despite assurances that the violence is waning, that it has never stopped. The huge security force presence in Pietermaritzburg's townships has merely driven the violence underground and to a certain extent kept the lid on the pressure cooker. Now, it is on the boil once again.

Brigadier Buchner believes that the nature of the conflict has changed fundamentally from the earlier manifestation of large groups of people killing opponents and destroying property in a spontaneous way when they encountered opposing groups. 'Now there are smaller groups focusing on specific individuals, homes and families as targets, making the violence more difficult to prevent', he said, adding that the theory of a community in revolt is unfounded. Communities are caught up in the violence rather than actively involved in it. However, the fundamental political reasons for the violence remain. Buchner believes that while the police can play a preventative role they can never resolve the conflict.

A study report released in May 1988 (Cross et al) by Unisa's Department of Development Administration and Politics, concluded that unless large amounts of money were spent by the government to promote infrastructural development in Pietermaritzburg's townships many years of violence lay ahead. The report noted that the national security strategy of pouring money into 'oilspots' has not been followed in this region, in spite of the fact that the midlands violence remains the most serious in the country in the aftermath of the national civil unrest of 1984-8:

'One of the most bitter aspects of the recent conflict for many rural people was that it appears to have no rules, unlike the armed conflict of earlier years. Today, women and children were not exempt, and were often beaten and killed along with the other members of their families. With no-one in the family safe, the areas undergoing acute conflict could have their entire economic life disrupted, being unable for a period of time to have access to either their subsistence crops or their formal jobs' (ibid).

## Current Situation

During the first six months of 1988 there were two developments of great importance in Pietermaritzburg's townships. The first was the revelation that amongst the special constables (kitskonstabels) there were Inkatha members and supporters. One of them had been interdicted by the Supreme Court against perpetrating acts of violence. Brigadier Buchner said that because of the trouble surrounding the kitskonstabels, they were being used as interpreters and guards rather than in an active policing role. However, in late October the kitskonstabel controversy re-emerged in the township of Mpumalanga, near Hammarsdale.

The second development was the national banning of the UDF and the further emergency restrictions, and in some cases, the detention of the organisation's leaders. These state actions, and Chief Buthelezi's displeasure with remarks by negotiators from Pietermaritzburg's Chamber of Commerce published in the *New York Times*, led to the complete breakdown of the business group's initiative. Further, the gagging of the UDF leadership has led to a one-sided flow of information to the media.


In early August 1988 an Inkatha chief from the Table Mountain area, Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, whose district has borne much of the refugee problem, attempted to get the peace talks back on course. Rivalry within Inkatha plagued the early meetings between the various factions to the conflict, however. Chief Maphumulo, who is also involved in the Mpumalanga area, has received death threats for his efforts.

Perhaps the most significant initiative to date, and the one which holds out the most hope for the beleaguered communities in and around Pietermaritzburg, is the Cosatu/Inkatha accord which emerged from the many Supreme Court actions resulting from the violence of 1987-88. The joint declaration of 2 September calls for an end to the violence and to forced recruitment. Most importantly, it advocates freedom of political association.

The accord also allowed for the creation of an adjudication board, funded by both organisations, to hear complaints and make recommendations for disciplinary action against members of either side who do not act in accordance with the declaration. Access to the board, which began hearing its first case in early November, is not restricted to members of Cosatu/Inkatha. Any victim of the violence can seek recourse through the board. The recommendations of the board, convened by a Supreme Court judge, will carry weight with the police and the Attorney-General.

Paradoxically, in the last three months since the signing of the accord, there has been a noticeable increase in violence, especially during October. Clearly, the accord on its own is not sufficient to halt the township interfactionalism. While it presents hope for peace, the main problems are that its area of jurisdiction is Pietermaritzburg and the Vulindlela magisterial districts, and that the UDF is not part of the accord. Recently, much of the shifting conflict has occurred in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg corridor, with Mpumalanga undoubtedly the worst affected township.

**FATALITY BY REGION**  
**Six Comparative Periods**



<b>KEY</b>	
TOTAL DEATHTOLL	3 574
1/9/84 - 10/6/88	
<b>Six Unrest Periods</b>	
<b>National State of Emergency No2</b>	<b>930</b>
12/6/87 - 10/6/88	
<b>National State of Emergency No1</b>	<b>731</b>
12/6/86 - 11/6/87	
<b>Post-State of Emergency Phase</b>	<b>594</b>
8/3/86 - 11/6/86	
<b>Build-up Unrest</b>	<b>317</b>
1/1/85 - 20/7/85	
<b>Early Rumbblings</b>	<b>(149)</b>
1/9/84 - 31/12/84	

**Monitoring Notes**

- It has not been possible to provide a breakdown of where, when and how deaths occurred in the period 1 September to 31 December 1984.
- The figures on political violence fatalities are compiled from a combination of daily press, police, Bureau for Information, parliamentary estimates and independent monitors. In mid-1986 the state created the Bureau for Information as the only legal source for 'unrest' data/incidents (or confirmation thereof), a function which has since reverted to the police.
- Official records supplied in parliament and at press conferences tend to differ from independent monitors; and further, cover interim periods that differ from the breakdown used in this table.
- The paucity of detail in official reports and a wide range of media restrictions has made it increasingly difficult to attribute specific responsibility for political violence fatalities. It must be stressed that the fatality count arrived at in this Indicator SA monitoring exercise constitutes a set of provisional figures that are significantly lower than the probable actual fatality count.

**PART III**

**National Security Management System**

**STATE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**NATIONAL STRATEGIES**


**THE SECRETARIAT**

**INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES (IDCs)**

**NATIONAL JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRE**

**JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (JMCs)**

## National Security Management System



SOURCE: Swilling M and Phillips M. 'Reform, security and white power: re-thinking state strategies in the 1980s', delivered at the 19th annual conference of the Association of Sociologists of South Africa, University of Durban-Westville: July 1988.

# THE BIG CHILL

## From Reform to Counter-Revolution

Mark Swilling

After the 1976-77 township rebellion it became clear to both big business and the government that reforms were necessary if a black revolution was to be prevented. The crucial problem facing the government, however, was as follows: how could apartheid be dismantled without the wholesale capitulation of white power and the capitalist system?

It was only after Muldergate and the installation of PW Botha as prime minister that the solution was found. In 1977, a Defence White Paper emphasised the need for a 'total strategy' that would 'utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies.' In implementing this new strategy, Mr Botha came to spearhead an ambitious reform programme that resulted in:

- the legalisation of black trade unions via the Wiehahn Commission;
- the recognition of the permanence of urban Africans in line with the recommendations of the Riekert Commission;
- the formulation and implementation of a new constitution that brought Indians and 'coloureds' into parliament as junior partners; and,
- the introduction of a new regional development policy premised on the division of South Africa into eight (eventually nine) development regions and managed by a highly complex 'multi-lateral' decision-making system.

Prime minister Botha and his military advisors were well aware of the fact that reform without repression could have revolutionary results. The theory was that revolutions have occurred before in history when far-sighted reformers have promised reforms before developing a system capable of turning promises into real changes. The result has been a rapid rise in popular expectations which revolutionaries then exploit to create an entirely new system by overthrowing the reformers. Reform, the generals advise, can only work if a sufficient degree of repression is used to keep expectations down and prevent the revolutionaries from organising an alternative.

In South Africa in the early 1980s the state's security strategy was essentially preventive and heavily reliant on the success of reform. As long as the reform process retained its momentum and appeared to be succeeding,

the reformers remained dominant and the security officials played a subordinate role.

### Reform

The internal logic of total strategy was coherent and premised on a specific perception of South Africa's social reality. The Riekert Commission's assumption was that the homelands could be retained but 'urban Africans' should be recognised as permanent members of the cities and towns. Responding directly to the urban unrest of 1976-77, this concession contradicted a cornerstone of an official urban policy implemented since 1921: namely, that Africans are 'temporary sojourners' in white South Africa and must be allowed into the cities only if their labour is required by white employers.

Once 'urban rights' had been conceded to Africans by the Riekert Commission, then a range of other complementary rights necessarily followed. These included the right to form trade unions, to purchase property, to sell labour on a 'free urban labour market' without a restrictive influx contract, and to trade. The municipal franchise was seen as the ultimate embodiment of the new 'urban identity'. African communities were given, for the first time ever, fully autonomous municipal institutions, the Black Local Authorities (BLAs). The BLAs were granted extensive urban powers, e.g. in the allocation of housing and trading sites. The state expected these authorities to defuse black grievances because a semblance of African 'self-government' had been conceded.

The new urban policy rested on two critical contradictions that underlay township protest later on. First, because it aimed to create a privileged elite of 'urban insiders' divorced from the poverty of the rural masses, the new policy required an intensification of influx control – hence the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982. Secondly, the BLAs were inadequate because the attainment of self-government meant the new local authorities had to be financially self-sufficient. Furthermore, the

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homelands were the only link between the BLAs and higher forms of political representation.

The constitutional reforms were premised on the consociational theory that 'group identities' in multi-cultural societies must be protected but that structures for 'co-determination' and 'joint decision-making' should also be created. In other words, moving away from the belief in total separation and white domination, the state conceded that at least some segments of the black majority should be incorporated into the constitutional framework. The result was the creation of what may be called a new consociational contract for whites, coloureds and Indians, manifested in the 1983 constitution and the tricameral parliament.

Finally, the new regional development policy and the complex 'confederal framework' it underpinned (i.e. the mini-version of the original constellation of states idea) was premised on the assumption that the self-governing homelands would proceed to independence. They would then enter into a supra-state agreement to form a confederation of Southern African states, a vision equated to the European Economic Community. Like the consociational contract, this policy represented a softening of separate development because it rested on the principle of 'economic interdependence and political independence', or what the Buthezi Commission called the 'soft-borders approach'.

## Resistance

The explosion of black resistance in the mid-1980s was fuelled by the contradictions of total strategy and triggered by the rapid politicisation of popular consciousness in the townships. As resistance expanded from its origins in the schools and affected ever-widening layers of black society, so the total strategy reforms were unravelled piece by piece in a costly and violent process.

As far as urban policy was concerned, the attempt to drive a wedge between urban insiders and rural outsiders by intensifying influx control was challenged and made unviable by two social movements. The first and most important centred on squatter struggles. Displaying a desperate and relentless determination to escape grinding rural poverty and live in urban areas, squatter communities broke through the barrage of influx controls and illegally invaded land to secure their right to urban existence. Despite ongoing attempts to forcibly remove these communities, the state had conceded by 1985 that influx control was simply unworkable.

The unions also helped undo the rural-urban divide. By organising migrant workers and the urban-based working class into single industrial trade unions committed to joint wage demands, the attempt to create two labour markets — one urban and privileged, the other rural and cheap — was severely undercut and eventually abandoned.

The local government system that was supposed to bind the new urban system together was soon in ruins. Because the state insisted that African councils should raise their own finance for township development,

councillors were forced to increase rent and service charges. Low levels of legitimacy meant that suspending development was simply not an option. African councillors needed to demonstrate the benefits of participation. The increases, however, triggered a nationwide popular rebellion that began in the Vaal townships in September 1984 and spread across the country. By mid-1985 many BLAs had collapsed because of mass resignations or because councillors had been killed by residents (see BLA data base: Appendix).

The absence of fiscal viability was not the only problem. The root cause of the depth of popular protest was the fact that the local franchise was not tied to a programme for granting full political rights to Africans. This facilitated the emergence of the United Democratic Front and National Forum, which are committed to the total dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial democracy. The local community organisations that articulated urban grievances produced by urban policy soon coalesced into national movements co-ordinated by the national political organisations. The mass rebellion of 1984-86 was largely shaped by the politicisation of local urban grievances; a process facilitated by an urban policy that started from the assumption that urban rights were a substitute for political rights.

The new labour dispensation failed to achieve its twin objectives of extending control while encompassing 'urban insiders' only. After strong union opposition, the state backed down and extended the definition of 'employee' to include migrant workers. This reversal was the first clear example of how popular organisation could pressurise the state into policy shifts that contradicted the assumptions of urban policy. More importantly, however, the new labour regulations failed to bring the burgeoning union movement under control. Instead, because the state had conceded industrial citizenship without committing itself to full political rights for Africans, workers naturally took their newly won industrial power into the fight for political change. The result was the rapid politicisation of the unions, culminating in the formation of politically committed national union federations like Cosatu and Nactu.

Finally, the consociational contract foundered on the rocks of popular resistance expressed through the election boycotts of 1984 (see tricameral data base: Appendix). The confederal schema also began to come apart at the seams as black protest strengthened the resolve of key homeland leaders to resist 'independence'. Even some leaders of independent homelands came out in support of a federal (as opposed to a confederal) plan for the future. The steady political and fiscal decline of model homelands like Ciskei, Transkei and Bophuthatswana was turning the grand vision of a confederation of states into a nightmare.

## Policy Shifts

Proceeding from the assumption that more concessions would satisfy black demands and legitimise state strategies, reformers in the state responded to black rejection of reform by extending the reform



programme. There were four critical moments in the extension of this programme:

- In December 1984, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis announced that BLAs were to be included in the proposed Regional Services Councils (RSCs);
- in May 1985, Stoffel van der Merwe published a National Party pamphlet entitled '... and what about the Blacks?' which argued that the homelands were a failure;
- in late 1985, President Botha conceded that the tricameral parliament was not the final solution, but merely a step in a process; and
- in September 1985, the President's Council published its report on urbanisation which culminated in the Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986.

These seemingly unrelated policy shifts had two things in common: firstly, they were all ad hoc responses to popular pressure from political movements, trade unions, squatters and township organisations; secondly, they unintentionally undid existing policy positions without being coupled to a coherent set of alternatives. This needs further elaboration.

After the inauguration of the tricameral parliament, the state committed itself to extending the consociational contract to the local level, i.e. to a new local government structure for whites, coloureds and Indians — the proposed RSCs. African local authorities were excluded from this contract because it was assumed they would exercise national political rights at the homeland level. These arrangements were all consistent with the over-arching confederal plan to link homelands to the tricameral state. When, however, BLAs were included into RSCs in direct response to township protest, the consociational contract was in effect being extended to Africans at local level without simultaneous provision for their inclusion at higher levels.

The anomaly in macro-policy was recognised by some top officials. In May 1985, Stoffel van der Merwe's pamphlet formally admitted that homelands were not viable bases for a future stable constitutional dispensation that would incorporate Africans. In doing so, he had effectively removed a crucial foundation of traditional apartheid policy. During the National Party congresses of August and September 1985, the principle that Africans were to be incorporated into 'all levels of decision-making up to the highest level' culminated in PW Botha's statement that he is committed to 'the principle of a united South Africa, one citizenship, and a universal franchise'. Flowing from a Special Cabinet Committee formed in 1983, the National Council emerged in 1986 to investigate a new constitutional framework. The state had effectively admitted the failure of the 1983 formula. By 1988, however, the National Council (Great Indaba) had not moved beyond first base because no legitimate African leaders had agreed to participate in it.

Finally, the President's Council Report on Urbanisation effectively admitted that influx control should be scrapped because the regulations could no longer be properly implemented. The Abolition of Influx Control Act ended a previous phase of urban

policy without establishing a new one. Top officials in the Directorate of Urbanisation cannot provide a coherent explanation for the current chaotic mix of race zoning, land-use planning, squatter regulation and privatised housing. In the final analysis, by admitting Africans were permanent members of the cities, state planners were jettisoning the 1921 Stallardist principle: to ensure Africans did not demand the vote, they should be defined as 'temporary sojourners' in urban South Africa. Those who had struggled for the city had won a battle. The war, however, was far from over.

To argue that these policy shifts were ad hoc responses to popular pressure emanating from black communities and liberal white sectors (e.g. big business) is to question the assumption that they flowed from a coherent policy package worked out by a cabal of top-level reformers in the state and business. The pressures, contradictions and incoherencies produced a series of policy reversals that were reactive rather than pro-active in character. In the end it was not the reactive reversals of the reformers that the state turned to, but the counter-insurgency strategies of the security establishment.

## State Factions

Up until April-May 1986, the political initiative within the state was in the hands of an influential group of advanced reformers located largely in Heunis' Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, but also found to some extent in the Departments of Manpower, Finance, Foreign Affairs and the National Party itself. This was so despite the ascending importance of the military, which was reflected in the way total strategy now was reformulated.

The early formulation of total strategy rested on the essential argument that for security policy to succeed, the reform programme must succeed. This formulation made it possible for the reformers to retain control of the pace and content of the reform programme. However, as the so-called 'revolutionary climate' intensified, the top echelons of the state came to rely increasingly on the security establishment for advice, policy proposals and straight repressive power. Popular protest, therefore, produced two responses within the state: political reformers who believed it was possible to extend the reform programme, and 'securocrats' who were itching to implement a counter-revolutionary programme framed by the principles of 'low-intensity warfare'.

The heyday of the Heunis empire followed the cabinet reshuffle in early 1985 that had destroyed Koornhof's old Department of Co-operation and Development, putting Constitutional Development and Planning in control of virtually every aspect of African life. This is why a 'state-within-a-state' could shift the reform programme as adeptly as it did. Coupled to the shift were the explorations by Foreign Affairs into the possibility of negotiations during the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) mission of December 1985 — June 1986.

Between April and May 1986, the political reformists

lost the initiative to the 'securocrats' as a result of two key developments. Firstly, in April an open rift appeared between what PW Botha and Minister of Defence Malan were saying and doing, and what Heunis and his group were calling for. Whereas the former were referring to 'city-states', promoting independence for the homelands, and defending the detention and imprisonment of political leaders, the latter were proceeding with the inclusion of African local authorities into RSCs, back-peddalling on homeland independence, undoing influx control and supporting negotiations between senior government officials and UDF leaders (e.g. in places like Port Elizabeth, Oudtshoorn, Worcester, Cradock, Uitenhage, Port Alfred and St Wendolins). Certain sources explain this rift in terms of a clash in the cabinet after President Botha refused to accept criticisms emanating from Heunis' department.

Secondly, the collapse of the EPG initiative after the State Security Council decided to bomb the capitals of the Frontline states represented the final break between the political reformers and 'securocrats'. Significantly, whereas now PW Botha argues that the 'renunciation' of violence by the ANC is a pre-condition for talks, before the EPG collapsed the government conceded that the 'suspension' of violence would be sufficient (see letter to EPG in appendix of mission's report). When the EPG indicated the ANC would accept this, President Botha and the generals were struck with the sudden realisation that the chips were down and they had to make a choice.

What followed was the activation of a counter-revolutionary option, the objectives of which

were clearly expressed in a speech made by Minister of Law and Order Vlok in May 1986:

- 'bomb the enemy in its bases';
- re-establish law and order — i.e. mass detentions;
- 'bring government down to the people' — i.e. RSCs;
- redistribute resources from white areas to upgrade black areas.

Then followed the declaration of a national state of emergency and the full-scale activation of the National Security Management System (NSMS) at local and regional level. The security police and sections of the military promised the State Security Council that township protest, 'alternative structures' and ANC support could be eliminated by applying a sufficient degree of force in a relatively short space of time. Only after that, they argued, could negotiations be considered. Not surprisingly, this armed procrastination alternative was attractive to President Botha who was still reeling from the consequences of the 'Rubicon I' and 'Rubicon II' fiascoes.

## Security System

It must be recognised, that the state's counter-revolutionary option was not intended to be purely coercive. Writing in March 1986, Professor Hough of the Institute of Strategic Studies expressed the rationale of state strategy: 'Reform and unrest are not totally contradictory situations. Reform creates rising expectations and counter-action by those who do not want reform, but revolution. Hopefully the longer-term

Table 1:

### DETENTIONS UNDER SECURITY LEGISLATION 1984 - JUNE 1988

REGION	1984	1985	1986	1987	(up to) June 1988	TOTAL
Transvaal	420	262	323	203	44	1 252
Natal	67	100	104	115	5	391
W Cape	7	197	66	60	9	339
E Cape	96	75	256	17	8	452
N Cape	-	43	6	4	-	53
OFS	5	49	14	9	-	77
Transkei	407	1 848	368	197	16	2 836
Ciskei	123	99	116	69	5	412
Bophuthatswana	1	6	8	2	7	24
Venda	1	-	28	18	-	47
Unknown	22	958	1 551	-	-	2 531
NATIONAL						
TOTAL	1 149	3 637	2 840	694	94	8 414

Table 2:

### TARGETS OF SECURITY DETENTIONS 1984 - JUNE 1988

CATEGORY	1984	1985	1986	1987	(up to) June 1988
Scholars, students, teachers	50,7	27,0	29,5	12,6	6,3
Community & political activists	19,7	28,1	20,8	8,3	10,6
Trade unionists	4,4	3,4	3,5	23,9	4,3
Clergy & church workers	1,0	1,2	2,7	1,1	1,1
Journalists	0,6	2,2	0,3	1,0	-
Other or unidentified activity	23,6	38,1	42,9	52,8	77,6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

effects of credible and meaningful reform will lessen revolutionary and unrest potential, as will economic recovery. In the interim, the maintenance of law and order, within limits, is crucial. Reform alone will not cause the ANC to disappear.'

In a recent speech, Major-General CJ Lloyd — recently appointed as the secretary of the State Security Council — said the counter-revolutionary strategy involved the countering of planned subversion on all fronts, 'elimination' of the revolutionaries, and reform of the environment. This is the logic Professor Willie Breitenbach refers to when he points out with deep scepticism, 'Where once there could be no security without reform, now there can be no reform without security'.

The accompanying diagram explains the structure of this system. It is important to note the following key features of the NSMS:

- the JMCs at regional, sub-regional and local level are chaired either by a policeman or military man;

- the officials who work in the NSMS are seconded from other departments;
- there is an extra-ordinarily high proportion of intelligence personnel;
- although government now acknowledges that this system exists, the precise functions, strategies and personnel who serve on the hundreds of committees remain unknown.

The security committees of most JMCs meet once a month and involve officials from the army, navy, air force, police, security police, riot police, CID, traffic departments, local fire departments and the prison service. The political, economic and social committees usually involve officials from the Departments of Manpower, Transport, National Education, Population Development, Water Affairs, and the provincial administrations. The communications committee involves officials from the Bureau for Information, civil defence, SABC and certain government media. It is claimed by some officials that access to the State

Table 3:

TOTAL DETENTIONS 1984 - JUNE 1988					
	1984	1985	1986	1987	March 1988
Security Legislation	1 149	3 637	2 840	694	94
Emergency Regulations	0	7 361	+20 631	+8 500	-
TOTAL	1 491	10 998	+23 471	+9 194	-

Table 4

#### ARRESTS

The then Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, announced that 11 006 people had been arrested during 1986 for public violence and other township unrest offences. He gave a detailed category of arrest breakdown as follows:

Public violence	6 046
Malicious damage to property	1 188
Arson	1 324
Assault	1 609
Murder	839
TOTAL	11 006

He revealed that of those arrested 7 710 were eventually charged. Of those charged, 5 819 were aged 20 or under - of whom 1 144 were 15 or under, 2 076 were between 16 and 18 years old, and 2 599 aged between 18 and 20 (Hansard 3/87: Col141).

#### Notes on Data

- Data collected by the Detainees Support Committee (DPSC) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies on state of emergency detentions are estimates. Furthermore, on 24 February the Minister of Law and Order promulgated regulations in terms of the state of emergency which prevented the DPSC (and 16 other organisations) from carrying on or performing any activities whatsoever.
- The official figures on the number of state of emergency detainees given by government spokespersons are much lower than those given by the DPSC. One of the reasons for this gap is that in terms of the emergency regulations, the authorities only have to publicly reveal a person has been detained if that person was held for
- The Minister of Law and Order revealed that between 12 June 1986 and 11 June 1987, 15 250 people had been detained. A discrepancy occurred in the official number of emergency detainees, however, when the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, revealed in an affidavit that between 12 June 1986 and 15 April 1987, over 19 209 people had been detained already.
- Similarly, official statistics are much lower on security legislation detentions. The South African government acknowledged that 577 people had been detained in 1984, 2 436 in 1985 and 4 132 in 1986. The DPSC figures are much higher, however, in part because they also include the numbers of people detained in the 'independent' homelands.
- For arrests of public violence offenders in 1986 the Minister of Law and Order announced, in the same month, that only 4 982 civilians were arrested on charges of murder, arson, public violence, attempted murder, intimidation, malicious injury to property etc., in unrest situations (Hansard 3/87: Col184). This second estimate represents a discrepancy of 6 024 from the figures he issued two days earlier!

#### SOURCES

Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC). Annual DPSC Review of Detentions, Johannesburg: 1985/87.  
Centre for Applied Legal Studies. Human Rights Update, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg: 1988.  
Hansard 3/87.

President's office can be obtained from any level in the JMC within hours.

The sub-JMCs meet monthly and consist largely of the same departments as the JMC. Connected to the sub-JMC is a monitoring committee that meets daily to discuss immediate issues and problems. The members of this committee are ready for action at any time and are on standby twenty-four hours a day. The mini-JMCs are usually staffed by military, police and Bureau for Information personnel. At the most grassroots level, the Community Liaison Forum brings together local officials from the traffic police, local authorities, city and public transport companies, township administrators, various private organisations and co-optable black elements.

There is another structure concerned with labour that has links to the JMC system. Set up originally to co-ordinate conscription so as not to damage management structures, the Defence Manpower Liaison Committees (Demalcoms), are now reported to be co-ordinating strike information. They are chaired by military personnel and include employer representatives from the Chamber of Mines, Seifsa, FCI, Assocom and others.

## Counter-Revolution

What concrete strategies have been pursued by the state as part of its counter-revolutionary strategy? These can be divided into repressive and reformist strategies. The repressive measures include:

- press restrictions

These effectively eliminate the most important link between the township movements and the South African public – a link that was becoming increasingly important in forcing whites to re-think their support for the government and in helping publicise the alternative structures of self-government that community organisations established in the townships.

- mass detentions

Over 50 000 people have been processed through the detention cells since 1984 for their political activities.

- vigilantes

Opposition leaders have been eliminated through the use of extra-legal means. Vigilantes have been active in East London, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Cape Town, Tembisa, Bloemfontein, Soweto, Alexandra, and many Vaal and Natal townships.

- forced removals

Some of the most militant, symbolic strongholds of resistance have been destroyed and entire communities relocated, e.g. Crossroads (Cape Town), Langa (Uitenhage), Duncan Village (East London), Oukasie (Brits), and many other politicised squatter camps in the PWV region.

- rent boycott evictions

In response to the spread of the rent boycott among black communities, hundreds of people have been evicted from their homes throughout the country.

- army occupations

The army has occupied many of the public spaces previously used by communities to hold meetings, such

as stadiums, halls and schools. Furthermore, barbed wire has been used to symbolically carve up townships into discreet units, thus disrupting the unity forged by street and area committees.

The reformist measures of this counter-revolutionary strategy include:

- infrastructural upgrading

Key target areas have been identified by the JMC, and marked for special attention, e.g. Mamelodi (Pretoria), Alexandra (Johannesburg) and New Brighton (Port Elizabeth). These areas are referred to by security officials as 'oilspots' into which massive resources will be poured to upgrade services, thereby 'winning the hearts and minds of the masses' (the WHAM approach).

- housing development

By way of special grants through the South African Housing Trust and National Housing Commission, the state, in conjunction with the private sector, is embarking on the most extensive housing construction programme since the 1950s.

- local government reform

Officials now admit that 'it was a mistake not to give the BLAs resources of magnitude'. Minister Heunis introduced RSCs by arguing that townships cannot be expected to pay for themselves: the R800m raised by the new RSC levies is being spent on upgrading infrastructure in the black townships.

- scrapping of influx control

The hundreds of thousands of Africans who were previously excluded from the right to reside in urban areas, may now do so on condition they have access to employment and 'approved accommodation'.

- legitimisation of state structures

This involves massive expenditure on propaganda for radio, TV and pamphlets to convince people to pay rent, service charges and bus fares, and to boost the image of the security forces and JMC personnel. So-called 'moderates' get extensive TV and radio coverage and have been given material resources to form new political parties.

- populist co-optation in squatter camps

Emulating their counter-parts in Latin America, JMC officials have realised that squatter camps provide invaluable opportunities for co-optation. By granting local populist 'warlords' (like Crossroads' Johnson Nxobongwana) control over the allocation of all resources (including employment), it is possible to buy co-operation through providing basic urban services.

- the National Council Bill

Finally, to carry through to higher levels of government the inclusion of Africans into multi-racial administration that has already taken place at RSC level, the National Council is being formed to hammer out a post-tricameral constitution.

- 'Bothanomics'

This may mean a repressive version of inward industrialisation, premised on wage freezes, de-regulation, lowered but quantitatively extended reproduction costs, uncontrolled regional/metropolitan labour markets and reckless privatisation.

The state's objectives cannot be achieved without making concessions to meet at least some of the

demands that the (now crushed) civic associations articulated during the heyday of popular organisation. The above concessions comprise this reformist dimension of state strategy. Some of these were articulated by the civilian reformists before 1986, but they have been appropriated and recast by the 'counter-revolutionary' strategists. Referred to as 'soft war' responses, a combination of measures is now being used in an attempt to 'win hearts and minds'.

It must be noted that for security officials the reformist concessions are just as important as the repressive measures although less effective in the short term. The time lag between the promise of concessions and their effect on the communities leads to rising expectations which, for those who subscribe to the conservative explanation of revolution, can fuel revolutions.

Reformist concessions, therefore, must be coupled to harsh repression in order to forcibly lower expectations and eliminate the revolutionaries. The delicate balance between using just the right amount of repression without triggering a counter-reaction, while identifying and addressing the most explosive grievances is a task fulfilled by the JMCs. The co-ordinated control of intelligence, coercion and developmental resources within the new National Security Management System equips them to effectively carry out these tasks.

## Contradictions

The strategy of repressive reform is an option developed by the militarised South African state that will not resolve our fundamental problems. To this extent, the solutions it is offering are a recipe for further violence, rather than long-term peace.

Three key contradictions face the current strategy of repressive reform. Firstly, economists argue that a sustained economic growth rate of 5-7 percent is required to support large-scale state subsidisation of urban infrastructure, which, in turn, will require massive foreign investment or heavy international borrowing. International isolation and sanctions will make this option unlikely and will probably keep growth down to less than 2 percent. Fiscal restraint, deregulation and privatisation will not in and of themselves stimulate internal economic growth on the required scale.

Secondly, expensive upgrading projects are all very well, but who will pay for them in the end? It is part of the government's orderly urbanisation policy to force the poorer sections of the urban population out into controlled squatter settlements and site-and-service schemes located on the metropolitan peripheries. The inner townships near the white areas will be reserved for the better-off skilled workers and aspirant African bourgeoisie. Upgrading is an effective way of achieving this dual task of inclusion and exclusion: the better-off will be able to afford high bonds for private housing and expensive service charges for proper urban services.


Thirdly, the mass-based black political organisations are too deeply-rooted in communities to be eradicated so simply. These organisations have consistently articulated popular demands for better services and full

political rights. No matter how the state goes about creating the conditions for 'good government', as long as the majority cannot vote for direct representatives in central government, political conflict will remain endemic.

The poor may be pushed out of the cities. However, this process of exclusion will be resisted. The growing squatter movements in the PWV region and the rent boycotts are both important forces that will inhibit the divide-and-rule objectives of the state's post-influx control urban policy. In the final analysis, JMC-led upgrading will probably fail to win the hearts and minds of the masses. What the South African government still refuses to accept is that the black majority are not demanding solutions, but quite simply the right to participate democratically in the formulation of solutions. For this to happen, a new constitutional order is required that derives its legitimacy from the fact that it has been negotiated by all parties, including the ANC. To this extent, urban upgrading and fundamental political change must be regarded as inseparable.

# RESURGENCE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 1976-1988

Table 1 Breakdown of Guerilla Activity & Targets



**Notes on categories**

- 1 Guerilla attacks and shoot-outs in security force raids, both in urban and rural areas. (Excludes sniper attacks in townships unless weapons used are identified as being of foreign origin.)
- 2 Armed attacks directed at police patrols and stations, security force vehicles and property, administration boards, town council property, courts, etc.
- 3 Sabotage of power substations, railway lines and stations, oil depots, pipelines, etc.
- 4 Includes hotels, supermarkets, factories, shopping centres, etc.
- 5 Includes armed attacks on (mostly) township homes of state witnesses, police, councillors, informers, MPs.
- 6 Covers both detonated and defused landmines.
- 7 Accidental explosions involving amateur saboteurs (5), propaganda pamphlet bombs (6), unspecified defused explosives (11), assassinations and some targets unidentified in reports.

**Notes on Data**

- A few known incidents of defused explosives, perhaps the most underreported aspect of guerilla action, have been included in appropriate categories.
  - The number of incidents monitored here reflect armed actions (bullets, bombs and grenades) by both insurgents and locally trained 'comrades', which often became indistinguishable during the widespread unrest of 1984 - 1987.
  - Low-level attacks on a similar range of targets during the civil unrest are explicitly excluded from the above data. See table 3 in *Indicator SA Urban Monitor* Vol3/No2: p5.
  - Also excluded are discoveries of arms caches, confiscated firearms, and the number of arrests of ANC members/sympathisers.
- \* The provisional total for 1988 includes 126 incidents for the period 1 July - 20 October, which have not been added into categories 1-7. The update was taken from official figures which do not specify the specific type of guerilla action.

# AFTER KABWE & THE EMERGENCY

## Lessons of the 1980s

*Ian Phillips*

South Africa has not enjoyed extended periods of peace since the national 1976-77 uprisings. Most of the battles have been fought in the black townships. In recent years, the widespread occurrence of consumer boycotts, strike action and guerrilla activity has forced the conflict increasingly out of these areas into white areas.

Many analyses of political conflict in South Africa have tended to focus almost exclusively on urban and peri-urban areas, where the activities of popular organisations have had the greatest impact. It is thus quite tempting to describe the civil unrest as an essentially urban phenomenon isolated from the rural areas. That this is not the case should be clear from the preceding section on the homelands (cf Makanjee). It should also be noted that state repression and an information black-out have been most effective in outlying areas, given their relative isolation from organisational infrastructure and the urban bases of monitoring organisations and the media.

Extra-parliamentary organisations in South Africa assume a number of different forms. Firstly there are those that operate internally as clandestine organisations because they have been outlawed by the state but have managed to establish external bases and infrastructures. The best examples are the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and a few other smaller bodies. For the most part, they all have organised armed wings under the ultimate control of their parent bodies. The domestic presence of the major actors in this area has increased dramatically since 1976-77, and attempts to demarcate clear-cut political divisions between their internal and external 'wings' is artificial and misleading.

Secondly, there are those that operate wholly within South Africa, including the large number of local, regional and national organisations affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF) which are largely drawn from the supporters of the Freedom Charter, or the Congress tradition. On the black consciousness side of the opposition spectrum is the National Forum (NF), an ad hoc committee that draws to itself a smaller number of affiliates. The best known, largest and most influential of these is the Azanian Peoples Organisation

(Azapo), itself an umbrella body with a large number of affiliates. They define their philosophy along the lines of the Azanian Manifesto, and are often classified as the more 'left-wing' or 'radical' of the major groupings, in deference to the socialist vocabulary of the Manifesto (as opposed to the Charter). The strong, well-organised labour movement, whose immediate origins pre-date the 1976 uprising, provides a special case of opposition politics that falls outside the limits of this discussion.

Both the UDF and NF/Azapo contain various tendencies within the larger ideological consensus of each major umbrella body. Both coalitions include organisations of various geographic location and social constituencies such as youth, women, workers, writers, students, etc. What are the major strategies that have been adopted by the various extra-parliamentary organisations operating within the country as a whole, i.e. including the homelands?

### Four-Prong Policy

Over the years the ANC has developed a broad policy that rests on essentially four elements:

- to build up and consolidate its internal structures;
- to step up the armed struggle through the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK);
- to mobilise the masses around issues in order to increase political awareness and build support; and,
- to propagate the international isolation of Pretoria in the military, economic and political spheres, whilst at the same time attempting to increase the ANC's own standing in the international community.

Two major threads can be identified, namely, a politico-military emphasis that relates to specific ANC/MK activity and a political/diplomatic initiative aimed mainly at the international community but also concerned with nuts-and-bolts politics within South Africa. It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of these threads as contradictory or in fact mutually exclusive.

The Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, attended by

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about 250 cadres drawn from all its operations both outside and inside South Africa, resolved a number of issues. On the domestic, institutional front, resolutions were carried that concerned new disciplinary procedures, constitutional changes (such as increasing the size of the new, non-racial National Executive Committee and establishing the rule that a Consultative Conference be held every five years), and policies concerning the recruitment, education and training of cadres. On the wider policy front, most attention has been given to the resolutions concerning the conduct of the armed struggle within South Africa. The frequent allegation that the conference resolved to disavow the distinction between so-called 'soft' and 'hard' targets and thus permit MK units to attack civilian targets bears little relation to the actual decisions of the conference.

The 1984 uprising had started months prior to the conference which opened three days after a SADF raid on Gaborone had left a number of civilians and ANC members dead. At Kabwe it was argued that given the context of the escalating conflict in South Africa and the development of 'people's war', it was improbable that civilians would remain unscathed. Kabwe outlined the movement's strategy of people's war, a policy which calls for the involvement of the masses in action *against the state* at all levels. Armed activity has increased dramatically since the conference.

However, land-mines in border regions were deployed against the farming community drawn into the commando system through state policy, thereby annulling their status as civilians; and spectacular sabotage acts have occurred alongside an increase in the number of attacks against members of the security forces, some people classified as stooges or sell-outs like community councillors, alleged police informers, state administrators and the like.

Furthermore, especially since Nkomati, the ANC has embarked successfully on a campaign to train cadres within South Africa. That such training may not be of the same calibre as provided outside may be true, but state successes against internal cells have not been able to stop the increase in or frequency of sophisticated attacks. Given the clandestine nature of the war, the highly fluid situation on the ground, and popular anger

and frustration, it is impossible to speculate accurately on the nature of command structures between headquarters and the home front, to attribute responsibility for sporadic attacks in public places, or in fact to trace accurately — in the absence of statements to the contrary — claims that the ANC has changed its Kabwe policies concerning the armed struggle.

In mid-August 1988, the National Executive Committee of the ANC issued a communique reiterating the organisation's policy of avoiding civilian targets, but accepted that cadres had been responsible for some assaults that had led to civilian casualties. Although it has become commonplace to accuse the ANC of every bombing in the country, it is clear that

other groups are involved, some of which are motivated by right-wing views. Foreign intelligence services have accused Pretoria of involvement in overseas attacks on ANC personnel and offices. Similar suspicions have been voiced within South Africa, in connection with some incidents that have been blamed on the ANC, that may form part of a 'dirty tricks' campaign.

It is also difficult to assess the significance or success of the armed struggle from any one perspective. The guerilla campaign has moved through

a number of phases, most notably from a period of armed propaganda that concentrated for the most part on sabotage and bomb blasts in built-up areas, through to people's war. The literature also refers to the development of an insurrectionary situation. The state's apparent success in effecting a roll-back through successive states of emergency, encourages the view that the wheel has perhaps turned back towards armed propaganda and the consolidation of units rather than their extensive deployment for the time being.

The armed struggle is not meant to challenge directly the armed might of the state. It is meant more to undermine white confidence and security, to galvanise state opponents with the conviction and evidence of state vulnerability, and to steadily build up a force of better trained cadres who will be able to take advantage of instances of state retreat. This could occur, for

Table 1

**GUERRILLA ACTIONS: 1976 to JUNE 1988**

Comparative Independent Monitors

NO OF ACTIONS

MONITOR	Indicator Project South Africa	Institute for Strategic Studies	Lodge (Wits Univ)
1976	4	4	-
1977	19	20	23
1978	27	13	30
1979	12	12	13
1980	19	19	19
1981	29	55	55
1982	33	39	39
1983	46	56	56
1984	44	44	44
1985	96	136	136
1986	203	230	118 (up to 30/6/86)
1987	183	230	-
1988 (up to June)	-	54	-
TOTAL	769	858	533

Notes

- The majority of actions reflected in this table can be ascribed to the ANC.
- The Bureau for Information derives its published statistics on guerilla activity from Pretoria University's Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSUP).
- Dr Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand estimated that between January 1985 and June 1985 there were 88 guerilla actions; and between January 1986 and June 1986, 118 incidents (Weekly Mail 31/10/86).



example, in the so-called 'free zones' of townships that appeared in many places around the country between 1984-86, where the security presence could only be a migratory, transient one. At the political level, there may be some significance in the fact that calls for the government to create a suitable climate for negotiating a settlement have increased with the escalation of the conflict. At the current stage, the ANC is of the conviction that the state does not negotiate because it still thinks it can retain white domination, rather than because (as it argues) the ANC refuses to eschew 'violence'.

## Political Initiatives

On the political/diplomatic axis, Kabwe reiterated the policy to isolate Pretoria internationally and to secure support for the resistance movement. The ANC enjoyed some diplomatic success with the International Conference against Apartheid held in Arusha, Tanzania, in December 1987. What distinguished this conference from other such events like the Amsterdam cultural festival (December 1986) was the fact that it brought together representatives of foreign governments, agencies, support organisations, the ANC, the democratic movements from within the country, and members of the English and Afrikaans language press corps. Sober assessments of the recent 'rugby rhetoric' stress the difficulties that face even the most determined sports administrators to break their isolation, given the fact that integration at all levels involves the government's policy of segregation rather than purely

administrative matters related to the proposed linkage of sporting bodies.

ANC President Oliver Tambo, sometimes accompanied by other leading figures in the ANC's National Executive, has been received by world leaders and heads of states on an unprecedented scale, especially from western governments. Through these contacts the ANC has been able to put its case, for example, to the international business community, the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the Commonwealth, the United States Administration and the EEC. These contacts have all served to buttress the work done by the ANC's permanent representative at the United Nations and its growing entourage of representatives worldwide.

In mid-1988, the ANC produced guidelines for a constitution of a liberated South Africa. Co-ordinated by a constitutional committee of the ANC's NEC established in 1986, a number of in-house seminars within the various branches of the movement (international affairs, education, religion, women, information, etc), produced a wide-ranging debate and working papers. These range from studies of electoral systems and of bills of rights, through to the nature of education and the resolution of the national question in a post-apartheid society. Interpretations of the guidelines are varied. Briefly, they are an elaboration of the central tenets and principles of the Freedom Charter that espouse a non-racial democracy in which racism is outlawed and the economy is subject to general centralised direction and control. The entrenchment of group or ethnic rights is rejected because, in the South African context, they would

Table 2

### GUERRILLA ACTIONS: 1974 to Oct 1988

Period Covered	Official Monitors			SOURCES
	No of Incidents	Guerilla Casualties Killed/Captured	Guerilla Victims Dead/Injured	
1974 - Sept 1988	1 006			H Stadler
1976 - 1984	265			J vd Merwe
1976 - Nov 1986		428	97	Binfo
1976 - 1986				A Vlok
1/1/77 - 31/12/85	398	79 / 201	85	L ie Grange
1986	230	160	54	A Vlok/J vd Merwe
1987	234	106	30 / 327	J vd Merwe
1/1/88 - 30/6/88	88	78	22 / 156	J vd Merwe
1/1/88 - 20/10/88	262			A Vlok

#### Notes

- ISSUP claimed that 428 guerrillas had either been captured or killed by the South African security forces between June 1976 and 31 August 1986; and 181 'eliminated' between 1 September 1984 and 31 August 1986 (ISSUP: 'Terrorism and Sabotage in the RSA: 1976-1986', University of Pretoria: 4/86).
- In October 1986 the Deputy Commissioner of the SA Police, Lieutenant-General LP Neethling, said that South Africa had experienced a large increase in 'terrorism' in the past 14 years. He said that in 1971 there were 300 incidents, and in 1985, 3 000. It is clear that his definition of terrorism is much broader than those of other government sources (Weekly Mail 24/10/86).
- Most of the official sources do not reflect guerrilla incidents in the 'independent' homelands.

#### Sources

- Indicator SA press clippings.
- L ie Grange, Minister of Law & Order.
- H Stadler (Brigadier), Chief of Security Police Intelligence.
- J vd Merwe (Lieutenant-General), Head of the Security Police.
- A Vlok, Minister of Law & Order.
- Binfo (Bureau for Information), government media management agency.

## Data Trends

# ANC CASUALTIES ON THE FRONTLINE IN THE 1980s

## Secret War in the Shadows

	Date & Location	Incident & Responsibility
<b>1981</b>	30 January Matola (16km from Maputo, Mozambique)	Three homes are attacked in commando raid on residential area and 13 people killed. SADF admits responsibility for the deaths of (30) alleged ANC members and a Portuguese technician in homes which it claims are the local planning and logistic headquarters of the ANC. Two SADF soldiers die in attack.
	1 August Harare (Zimbabwe)	ANC representative and National Executive Committee member, Joe Gqabi, is shot dead by unidentified assassins. Zimbabwean government blames South Africa, but Pretoria denies involvement.
	Gaberone (Botswana)	ANC executive member and Sactu official is killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
<b>1982</b>	March London (UK)	ANC headquarters are damaged in explosion. Bombers unknown. Pretoria denies involvement.
	June Mbabane (Swaziland)	ANC representatives, Jabu and Petrus Nzima, are killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
	27 June Lesotho	ANC representative, ZP Mbali, disappears. His decapitated body is found later. Assassins unknown.
	August Lesotho	ANC representative, Chris Hani, survives a car bomb that is detonated near him. Another person is killed. Bombers unknown.
	17 August Maputo	Ruth First, ANC member, renowned academic and wife of SA Communist Party executive member Joe Slovo, is killed by letter bomb at Eduardo Mondlane University. Assassins unknown.
	9 December Maseru (Lesotho)	Commando raid across border leaves 42 people dead. SADF claims responsibility, alleging 32 of victims were ANC members. ANC denies that homes attacked were local ANC headquarters. Lesotho accuses Pretoria of acting in collusion with renegade Lesotho Liberation Army.
<b>1983</b>	23 May Maputo	Jet strike on six alleged ANC bases. SADF claims responsibility for deaths of 64 people (incl 41, ANC guerrillas). Mozambique reports six fatalities (incl four women and children) and 40 wounded (mostly Mozambicans). Foreign journalists claim targets were a jam factory, a day-care centre and ordinary suburban homes.
	17 October Maputo	Commando raid on apartment building injures five people. SADF claims responsibility for attack on alleged ANC military planning centre. ANC acknowledges flats housed its members but maintains other targets were a clinic used by SA refugees and a library.
	22 November Manzini (Swaziland)	ANC members, Keith MacFadden and Zwelakhe Nyanda, are shot dead by unknown assassins.
<b>1984</b>	2 May Swaziland	Four ANC members are abducted. The (South African) Minister of Law and Order announces that an arms cache had been found after the capture of four guerrillas.
	28 June Lubango (Angola)	Sactu member, Jeonette Schoon (nee Curtis), wife of Sactu's Marius Schoon, is killed by letter bomb. Assassins unknown.
<b>1985</b>	13 February Botswana	Home of exiled South African poet, Nat Serache, is blown up. Bombers unknown.
	14 May Gaberone	Vernon Nkadimeng is killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
	14 June Botswana	Commando raid on ten homes and offices leaves twelve dead and six wounded. SADF and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, claim responsibility for attack which they allege kills four ANC operatives and results in seizure of weaponry, ANC documents and financial records. ANC denies those killed were members; Botswana authorities claim only five victims had ANC connections.
	1 July Lusaka (Zambia)	Explosion at headquarters of the ANC. Bombers unknown.
	16 November Gaberone	Four South African exiles are killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.

	Date & Location	Incident & Responsibility
	(7-13) December Lusaka	Parcel bomb injures ANC member. Source unknown.
	20 December Lesotho	Nine die when homes are attacked. Lesotho Liberation Army claims responsibility for killing of six South Africans and three Lesotho nationals. Lesotho blames South Africa.
<b>1986</b>	19 May Frontline States	<b>Zambia:</b> At Makeni (10km south of Lusaka) two die and thirteen people are injured in attack on bar and shop. <b>Zimbabwe:</b> In Harare Diplomatic office of ANC destroyed, while empty home is attacked. <b>Botswana:</b> At Mogaditsane (near Gaborone) house is attacked, a Botswana citizen killed and three others injured. Pretoria claims responsibility for simultaneous SA Air Force and commando raid on selected ANC targets, including alleged 'guerilla transit' facilities.
	3 June Mbabane	Two ANC members are killed by unknown assassins.
	15 June Gaborone	One person is killed, while a man and child are injured in raid on home. Assassins unknown. SADF denies responsibility.
	August Swaziland	ANC member, Lucas Seme, is kidnapped from Swazi police cells. In July 1987 SA police confirm he is held in their custody.
	8 September Stockholm (Sweden)	ANC offices are extensively damaged in explosion. Bombers unknown.
	October Mbabane	Three people, including 2 suspected ANC members, are shot dead in home. Assassins unknown.
	12 December Swaziland	ANC member, Shadrack Mzeni, two Swiss citizens and two others are abducted in cross-border raid. South Africa accepts responsibility and eventually hands over abductees.
	15 December Swaziland	Senior ANC member, Ebrahim Ebrahim, is abducted by South African agents. Ebrahim later stands trial in South Africa for contraventions of the Internal Security Act.
<b>1987</b>	January Mbabane	Four people believed to be ANC members are killed by unknown assassins.
	8 April Gaborone	Three people are killed and 2 injured by car bomb. Bombers unknown.
	May Swaziland	Alleged ANC member and two others are shot dead by unknown assassins.
	14 May Harare	Booby-trapped television set explodes, intended for ANC's chief Zimbabwean representative, Reddy Mazumba, kills a woman. Bombers unknown.
	17 May Harare	ANC diplomatic offices are bombed. Bombers unknown.
	25 May Mbabane	ANC member, Sheila Nyanda, is abducted by kidnappers.
	29 July Mbabane	ANC National Executive Committee member, Cassius Make, and Umkhonto we Sizwe member, Paul Dikeledi, are shot dead by unknown assassins.
	6 August Swaziland	Two men are shot dead, one a South African and one Mozambican national. Assassins unknown.
<b>1988</b>	January Harare	Rocket propelled grenade damages local ANC headquarters; South African exile, Paul Brickfield, is injured by car bomb near shopping centre. Attackers unknown.
	January Francistown (Botswana)	ANC member, Jacob Molokoawane, is shot dead in car by unknown assassins.
	January Bulawayo (Zimbabwe)	Two ANC members are killed by car bomb. Bombers unknown.
	13 January Swaziland	ANC member, Siphon Ngema, is killed by unknown assassins.
	March Gaborone	ANC Treasurer-General, Thomas Nkobi, and ANC General-Secretary, Alfred Nzo, escape attempt on their lives. Attackers unknown.
	19 March Paris (France)	ANC representative, Dulcie September, is shot dead by unknown assassins. Western intelligence services allege South African involvement.
	22 March Maseru	ANC member, Mozizi Maqokeza, is shot dead in Queen Elizabeth II Hospital. He was admitted after earlier assassination attempt when Radebe was killed. Assassins unknown.
	27 March Brussels (Belgium)	Large 17kg unexploded bomb found outside ANC offices. Earlier there had been an armed attack on ANC representative Godfrey Motsepe. Attackers unknown.
	28 March Gaborone	Four South African refugees are killed in commando raid on house. SADF claims responsibility.
	17 April Maputo	ANC member, Albie Sachs, is severely injured by car bomb. Bombers unknown.

**Notes**  
 In the last two decades, the first recorded assassination of an anti-apartheid activist outside of South Africa occurred in 1974, when student leader Ongepost 'Abraham' Tiro was killed by a letter bomb in Botswana.

**Sources**  
 Moss G. 'Politics with a price on its head', in WIP No53: April/May 1988.  
 SA Barometer, Vol1/No4, 24 April 1987:52-53. Vol2/No7, 22 April 1988:101-103. Johannesburg, Hoopoe Publications.  
 Indicator SA press clippings.

entrench privilege and inequality.

Part of the ANC's political initiative involves encouraging contact with people from within the country. Besides keeping a finger on domestic developments, contact serves to undercut state propaganda on the ANC. Furthermore, such discussions are also ways of identifying and perhaps bringing together the broadest possible range of opponents of Pretoria in a pragmatic way. It is largely for these reasons that the movement has held talks at various stages with big business, students, religious leaders, the PFP, the Dakarites, universities and educationists, trade unionists, sports administrators, lawyers and other individuals from within the country.

Many people incorrectly assume that the ANC directs the activities of the internal extra-parliamentary opposition. In these terms, it supported the home-grown initiative of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) concerning the return-to-school campaign. After some apparent confusion over conflicting statements about 'necklacing', Tambo called for an end to the practice, but his comments could not be published in South Africa because of press restrictions and ministerial fiat. The ANC's position on participation in apartheid structures is also influenced by internal developments, rather than being dominant over those developments.

The ANC's opinion of Inkatha (and Chief Buthelezi in particular) is unsympathetic. Inkatha is seen as a chauvinistic, nationalist movement that invokes more hostility towards the democratic movement than towards Pretoria and practically acts as the state's policing agent in the Natal region. On the other hand, the ANC has shown a willingness to accord greater recognition to bantustan leaders like Enoch Mabuza, where they have stated clearly their case against 'independence'.

## SACP Role

The oldest non-racial political party in the country, the South African Communist Party (SACP), is part of the alliance led by the ANC. It adopts the view that the ANC is the sole representative of the resistance movement in the international arena. The SACP's membership is considerably smaller than its partner's.

At the sixth Party conference in 1984 the SACP resolved, inter alia, to increase its activity within the country. The conference adopted a new constitution that outlined the Party's aims and objectives. In working towards the creation of a socialist society the SACP believes that political and economic power must come to rest in the hands of the working class in alliance with the rural peasantry. The way to achieve this involves the Party in a number of strategies that are not wholly different from those of the ANC.

The SACP identifies one of its major tasks as participating in and strengthening the moves to build a broad internal alliance within South Africa behind the ANC. Its role essentially, is to act as a watchdog and ensure that the interests of the working class are not

jeopardised. The SACP fully supports the armed struggle. At the same time it also consistently refuses to deny the efficacy or desirability of a thorough negotiated settlement. Unless and until Pretoria is prepared to relinquish its desire to retain power, a negotiated settlement would be an empty shell.

Since 1985 the Party's presence has been felt inside South Africa more keenly than for many years. It claims to have set up factory floor units as important structures to make underground work more effective. During the last three years it has also produced a new underground newspaper that is meant to facilitate discussion on a wide variety of topics, not least the basic elements of marxist theory. Most of the Party's time is taken up with clandestine organisational activity, rather than with public statements and campaigns which are largely left up to the ANC.

## PAC Setbacks

The PAC has had a distinctly harder time of it than the ANC on all counts. It does not enjoy the international attention that the latter gets, nor does it boast as impressive an institutional or administrative structure. More importantly, it does not seem to enjoy the same degree of national support either. During the 1960s the PAC lost ground in the international stakes, largely because it was not accorded the same rights of recognition by many countries, although it does enjoy recognition by the OAU and the UNO.

Recently, the PAC's relationship with even these organisations has been tenuous. Many problems seem to be related to questions of the leadership's ability, morality and cohesion. But perhaps the main problem for the PAC is the absence of a well-defined forward base in southern Africa, notwithstanding the diplomatic support it has received from Zimbabwe.

PAC sources argue that the bad press they receive has more to do with hostile propaganda than affinity to the truth, and point to an apparent tendency to ignore PAC achievements. Whatever the case, since the Bethal trial the PAC's armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), has increasingly claimed responsibility for a number of armed attacks within South Africa. These appear to have taken on similar aspects of the people's war strategy of the ANC, a development that signifies some change from the fairly haphazard attacks of APLA's predecessor, Poqo, in the 1960s. As political opposition expands and the conflict escalates, it would be natural for the armed activities of all groups that espouse this form of struggle to increase.

Evidence from political trials involving PAC members indicates an increased presence within South Africa, a phenomenon acknowledged by SAP/SADF sources as well. At this stage, it appears that the activities of APLA are restricted to the Vaal Triangle and Western Cape regions, with pockets of support for the PAC extending into areas of the Eastern Cape and the Transkei. Furthermore, PAC-aligned sentiments have emerged at public meetings on a more frequent basis than previously. One recent example of this, perhaps, was the Africanist pressure from the shopfloor

that caused a change in the political perspective of the executive of the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu).

## Internal Opposition

The severe February 1988 restrictions placed on many organisations, including the UDF, its largest constituents and Azapo, has led to a decline in public activity and in some cases to the reassessment of particular strategies and tactics. Further restrictions followed, bringing to 23 the number of organisations restricted this year alone, with the threat of yet more restrictions against other bodies being made by state officials at the time of going to press.

The period under review has been dominated in power terms by the various states of emergency and related repressive acts. Opposition activity now takes

place in even more abnormal circumstances than before 1984. Azapo, formed in the aftermath of the repression that witnessed the end of the 1976-77 uprising, attempted to regroup black consciousness proponents. Its primary focus at the early stage was organisation rather than mass mobilisation per se, while attempting to create a coherent, ideological position based on a socialist perspective for South Africa. The National Forum came into being prior to the UDF in 1983, though both emerged largely in response to state initiatives around the new constitution and the Koornhof bills.

The NF and Azapo have attempted to focus more on internal organisational developments than on particular issue campaigns. They tend to treat with great suspicion concepts like the united front, fearing ideological dilution or loss of control through interaction with the essentially 'bourgeois' and/or 'imperialist' groups which these fronts may bring with them. Antagonism between adherents of the Azanian Manifesto and the Freedom

Charter has erupted from time to time, ostensibly over the geographical control of areas. The recent interaction between Nactu and Cosatu over amendments to labour legislation, rather than indicating moves towards a possible pragmatic rapprochement at a political level, shows co-operation at the level of worker interests only.

UDF affiliates have focused attention on community organisation and mobilisation around particular issues, attempting to challenge the state on these terms rather than concentrating solely on consolidation of extant support. Notable in the forefront of UDF campaigns have been the youth and student affiliates such as Sayco (emerging in the middle of the first emergency to fill the gap left by the banning of Cosas in 1985) and Sansco. At least four major national campaigns can be identified prior to the

Table 3

### GUERILLA ACTIONS for COMPARATIVE PERIODS

Nature of Incident	Sept 1982 - Aug 1984 24 Months Prior to Unrest	Sept 1984 - Aug 1986 24 Months of Unrest
Attack on SAP stations	4	9
Attack on SADF buildings	1	2
Murder/attempted murder of SAP	11	88
Murder/attempted murder of civilians	3	118
Murder/attempted murder of SADF	1	9
Armed robbery	0	1
Sabotage/attempted sabotage on:		
Rail installations	17	5
Fuel and bus depots	2	6
Telecommunication installations	0	1
Business properties	4	24
Private properties	4	5
Water pipelines	0	6
Government and public buildings	23	21
Power installations	22	21
Total	92	316

Table 4

### GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION of GUERILLA ACTIONS 1976 - 31 August 1986

Area	Actions
PWV	212
Natal	148
Rest of Transvaal	77
Eastern Cape	54
Western & Northern Cape	48
Orange Free State	26
Walvis Bay	1
Total	566

Sources (Table 3 & 4)

Hough M. 'Revolutionary Warfare in the RSA', in ISSUP Strategic Review. University of Pretoria: ISSUP, August 1987.

Hoggi M. 'Targeting in Revolutionary and Terrorist Campaigns with Specific Reference to RSA', in ISSUP Strategic Review. University of Pretoria: ISSUP, August 1987.

ISSUP. 'Terrorism and Sabotage in the RSA: 1976-1986', University of Pretoria: 4/86.

restriction of the organisations. These are the campaigns around education, the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of political organisations and, more recently, lobbying support against the death sentence for political activity. Many of these campaigns are supported by the black consciousness groups who, nonetheless, balk at the non-racial policies of the Congress tradition and, at times, the way in which some of the campaigns are organised.

## Major Campaigns

The boycott of schools, a feature of many regions for various periods since at least 1980, has moved through a number of phases. Generally, the slogans have developed from the rallying cry of 'Liberation before Education' to 'Education for Liberation', through to attempts to introduce 'People's Education' programmes. The SPCC and the NECC liaised between parents, scholars and community leaders on the one hand, and school representatives (and in some cases, even the authorities) on the other hand, to devise a working programme for a return to school.

Pupil demands were significant in that they were directly related not only to matters pertaining strictly to education, but also to pertinent national questions such as the release of detainees and political prisoners, reorganisation of school administrations and syllabi, unbanning organisations, lifting the state of emergency, and so on. State interventions in the activities of the NECC, the banning of meetings, the detention of personnel and the effective outlawing of 'People's Education' through emergency regulations, raised serious questions about the ruling party's desire to alleviate the crisis in education.

A major national campaign around the release of Nelson Mandela in particular (co-ordinated by the Release Mandela Campaign) and of all political prisoners in general took off in the early 1980s. The call was soon taken up by a large number of international agencies and governments as one of several necessary conditions for Pretoria to fulfil on the way towards creating the climate for a negotiated settlement. The potential significance for the state of the release of Rivonia trialist Govan Mbeki, the motivation for which has been hotly debated in a number of circles, was deflated when he was placed under a wide range of restrictions in Port Elizabeth. The various campaigns and meetings held on this issue have served to highlight the precarious moral position of the government, helped to extend organisational structures and to extend political awareness. Speculation about the timing (and conditions) of the release of Mandela and others has arisen again at the present time. Generally, commentators are agreed that the dire economic crisis the state finds itself in has prompted it to look towards at least one spectacular action to regain investor confidence and much-needed foreign loans.

Calls to unban political organisations were a logical extension of the campaign to release political prisoners. Initially aimed at old-guard bodies such as the ANC, SACP and PAC, the campaign has been extended to

include Cosas, the large number of banned organisations from the 1970s, and recently, those groups restricted in terms of emergency regulations. The campaigns have taken a variety of forms, from fairly low-key public meetings, large mass rallies and a million signature campaign (that ultimately did not reach its target for a number of reasons, not least state intervention), to calls for international support. By focusing on state action in this way, the various opposition groups question the bona fides of what they term an intransigent government, elicit interest in the policies of these organisations, and stress continually the need to resist the steady erosion by legislative and more often executive fiat of the definition of legitimate participation in South Africa's politics.

A more specialised campaign has recently emerged around the plight of people sentenced to death for 'political offences'. This has taken at least two forms, though the distinction between campaigns has not always been clearly drawn. Firstly, broad campaigns to 'save' those on death-row are organised around appeals for clemency. The most notable of these so far has concerned the 'Sharpeville Six', the circumstances of their case being sufficiently controversial to draw a large number of people from the establishment into the calls for a judicial reconsideration if not reprieve. Most recently, the Society for the Abolition of the Death Sentence in South Africa was revamped with the support of many eminent personalities from judicial and professional circles.

Secondly, attempts have been made to popularise the issue of the status of ANC (and other) guerillas in terms of international law. The first salvo in this campaign was fired in 1980 when the ANC officially endorsed the relevant Geneva Protocols of 1977 which refer to the prisoner-of-war status of people involved in guerilla campaigns against colonialism and racism. The South African government has refused to ratify the same conventions, and still treats guerillas caught and sentenced as such as common criminals. Recently, the issue has been taken up in various cases around the country, although defence arguments along these lines have been rejected.

## No Participation

One interesting feature of the period between 1984-88 has been the emergence of institutional structures of 'organs of people's power' within the townships. Regional differences abound here, both in terms of the efficiency of these alternative structures as avenues of democratic local government and as forums for popular participation in decision-making on national campaigns. The division of many townships into various street, area and defence committees, the creation of civic associations and the like to replace the defunct local authorities inspired by Pretoria, created a situation where the state lost control of areas of traditional authority.


The widespread geographic occurrence of the system of alternative structures is in marked contrast to the uprisings of previous eras. Though now largely

# Data Trends

## Select Indicator of Industrial Conflict

Compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

### The Official Strike Count 1976 - 1987



suppressed, the system has left an indelible mark on the resistance movement as a whole. For the first time, the idea of viable alternative structures within the country began to take tangible form. This development added a major boost to the confidence and vitality of people involved in these institutions and the townships in general.

The extent and nature of the state's clampdown on all areas of meaningful political activity within the country has meant that popular organisations have had to reassess their current strengths and weaknesses. From the days when boycotts, strikes, general mass mobilisation and meetings were the order of the day, in some quarters a rethink of the basic strategies open to the opposition has been urged. One line of argument suggests that previous strategies did a good deal to unite the opposition and to build a mass movement, but did little actually to destabilise or disorganise the state itself. Out of this, some commentators have laid a good deal of stress on discussions about participation within the system as a likely or desirable strategy for the opposition to employ.


At a general level, the basic rule that the boycott is a strategy rather than a principle remains valid. In some regions, community organisations have participated in round-table discussions aimed at improving conditions or negotiating around consumer boycotts and the like,

but these have occurred as a result of an examination of local and immediate conditions rather than as part of a grand national strategy. At this stage the various discussions and proposals regarding participation still originate from a basic assumption that the structures are illegitimate, that to participate gives them a certain credibility, and that ultimately, they are emasculated through their operation by the institutional rules of the game that ensure white hegemony. Proponents of participation urge consideration of the possibility of organisational and political space that could — in certain circumstances — emerge if participation took place at certain levels. Given the organisational difficulties of operation under present conditions that hinder discussion, the prospects for national participation are negligible at present.

At the current stage there are extreme pressures on the democratic movement both within the country and, at an increasing rate, on personnel abroad. Notwithstanding this onslaught, the ANC and its allies, representing the most public opposition to Pretoria, have been able to maintain their fundamental advantage on the political/diplomatic side, and to a lesser extent on the politico-military front, at home and abroad. It is too early to classify the present time as the end of an era that began in 1984, or indeed merely as a slumbering point between open revolt then and heightened insurrection or forced surrender in the future.

# Data Base

## BUSINESS CONFIDENCE



### ASSOCOM Business Confidence Index 1985 - June 1988

	1985	1986	1987	1988
January	78,6	81,9	89,5	98,0
February	83,3	85,5	89,8	98,1
March	79,1	83,0	93,5	98,3
April	76,1	79,0	95,9	99,3
May	77,9	78,6	96,4	99,3
June	81,0	80,1	93,0	98,1
July	77,9	80,9	95,5	
August	76,9	85,7	97,8	
September	78,2	89,9	99,8	
October	78,0	89,9	100,0	
November	80,6	90,2	97,1	
December	81,1	87,0	97,3	
Year average	79,1	84,3	95,5	

#### Note

1) The Assocom Business Confidence Index (BCI) endeavours to measure business confidence via the movements of 15 economic indicators which have the greatest bearing on the business mood. The 15 inputs are:

- dollar price of gold in London
- Rand-Dollar exchange rate (commercial and financial Rand)
- merchandise imports (in real terms)
- Consumer Price Index
- Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Market Index
- three months' Bankers Acceptance Rate
- prime lending rate of commercial banks
- estimated retail sales (in real terms)
- number of insolvencies of individuals and partnerships
- unemployment among all races
- motor car sales
- new companies registered
- number of persons migrating to and from South Africa
- volume of manufacturing production
- value of building plans passed

2) Although the BCI base year is 1983, figures were only published from 1985 onwards.

#### Source

Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 'Business Confidence Index' No 9: August 1988.



## REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORM

### WHAM\* ban, thank you Malan

Mike Morris

The reform process initiated by the government from 1980 onwards has been the key element in government racial policy during the 1980s. It has shifted state policy away from the classic Verwoerdian apartheid established during the 1960s. Reform was essentially composed of four discernible elements which were often jumbled up and presented as being necessarily interconnected:

- Initiating a limited 'democratisation' or 'liberalisation' (opening up) of ideological and political life;
- Implementing the 'de-racialisation/re-racialisation' of social and political life;
- Instituting a partial, and selective, 'redistribution' of social resources towards the black majority.
- Backing up reform with major repressive interventions in order to manage the process.

The 'democratisation' that the reform process engendered was limited, but nonetheless significant. This process did not, and was never intended to, entail anything like a complete liberalisation of state control. Nevertheless, it was real and seen as an integral and necessary shift away from Verwoerdian apartheid. Furthermore, the lessons of trade union struggles and the stabilisation of industrial relations were not lost on many businessmen, and often presented as a comparable lesson to be used outside of this arena. Finally, the reform process was significantly influenced by the struggles of the black majority during the mid-1970s, which resulted in the process of liberalisation being extended beyond the parameters that many in power had intended.

Up until 1986, space was opened up for political organisations to emerge openly (most importantly, the UDF), and for other organisations to take on additional or new political profiles (e.g. Cosatu and NECC). Cosatu was able to operate a series of high profile mobilisation campaigns around issues beyond those relating to labour. Affiliates of the UDF were able to organise and campaign around a series of socio-economic issues such as the rent and school boycotts. The ideological bonds of state control were

also significantly relaxed. New publications, journals, magazines and newspapers covering alternative news, discussion and debate emerged that would have been inconceivable a decade before.

### Twin Process

The state simultaneously initiated a contradictory process of restructuring the racially hierarchical boundaries that had so clearly constrained and characterised apartheid. Some aspects of social life, mostly revolving around racially discriminatory social amenities (termed petty apartheid) were 'de-racialised'. Black people were allowed access to a variety of social amenities hitherto denied them, such as parks, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, pubs and beaches. Such previously sacrosanct pillars of apartheid as the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Acts were abolished. The abandonment of racially discriminatory legislation governing trade union activity also significantly 'de-racialised' the industrial relations arena and coincided with the rapid growth of the independent trade union movement. Furthermore, the scrapping of influx control and the shift towards formal acceptance of Africans as permanent city dwellers via the controlled urbanisation policy was also a significant aspect of this process of de-racialisation.

De-racialisation of social interaction represented an abandonment of the more overt discriminatory manifestations of apartheid. Nevertheless, de-racialisation operated within certain definite limits, even if these limits were never clearly spelt out by the state. The movement away from Verwoerdian apartheid did not occur by simply abandoning legislatively enforced racial categorisation. It was, instead, intertwined with a *racial restructuring* of other aspects of South African society, albeit on different terms. This was a process of 're-racialisation' of a number of other spheres — the most obvious and significant being the introduction of the tricameral parliamentary system and the concepts of 'own and general affairs'. Reform, therefore, contained a process of racial elimination as

\* Security jargon for a counter-revolutionary strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds (WHAM) of the masses, promoted by Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan.

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well as racial addition; of destructuring and of restructuring Verwoerdian apartheid; in short, a twin process of 'de-racialisation/re-racialisation' of social and political life.

The third major element of 'reform', which initially was not accorded the status it currently holds, was a stress on the 'redistribution' of social resources away from the straightforward monopoly that whites previously exercised. The state became concerned with upgrading the social and economic life of selected Africans in selected townships. The electrification of Soweto became a priority, for instance. The urbanisation initiatives stressed the importance of providing differential housing for Africans, and the state diverted large amounts of revenue towards African education. In the private sector, 'black advancement' within corporate managerial structures became a major concern and was closely associated with 'reform'.

In the crucial initial stages of reform, almost all sections of business, intent on supporting reform, found it difficult to distinguish between reform of apartheid and Mr PW Botha's reform process. Everything contained within this process was regarded as a movement away from racial discrimination and deserving of unqualified support, lest the right wing of the National Party regain its power base. If one was anti-apartheid, then this meant wholeheartedly supporting reform, warts and all, which in turn meant getting into bed with Botha. Hence, to give an example, Chris Saunders' (Tongaath-Hulleths) unqualified support for a 'yes' vote in the 1983 referendum and the clear desertion of large sections of business from the PFP over the party's rejection stance in the referendum.

Liberal businessmen, in their rejection of classic apartheid, seemed unable to separate out the process of re-racialisation from that of de-racialisation/democratisation. They assumed that the former was necessarily and acceptably part of the latter since it was 'after all a step in the right direction'. In effect, President Botha's reform process was for a short time given ideological carte blanche.

## Misplaced Euphoria

Likewise, the black extra-parliamentary organisations seemed also to be caught in a vice of analytic opacity, but for the opposite reasons and with opposite consequences. For them, everything in the state's reform process seemed to signify no movement at all away from Verwoerdian apartheid. Hence one witnessed the somewhat odd sight of legal opposition organisations, emerging as a result of reform, unqualifiedly denouncing the very same reform as mere window dressing. The contradictory irony of such a position seemed wholly to escape these organisations. Instead of attempting to separate out, at least for their own purposes, those elements of reform, such as democratisation and de-racialisation, that were integral to their own struggles and required defending, they lumped all these elements together and declared that the whole process of reform was merely apartheid in drag.

Consequently, responding to the militant spontaneous mood in the townships, black opposition groups counterposed to the state's reform process a strategy of 'ungovernability' and allowed themselves to be swept up in the prevailing mood of insurrectionism. This slogan was particularly popular in 1985-86, when to many it seemed that apartheid was about to crumble and the transition to majority rule was perhaps more likely than ever before. Indeed, for a short time even liberal businessmen seemed to be considering hedging their bets. Gavin Relly (Anglo-American), following the PFP's initiative, led a high-powered delegation of businessmen to meet the ANC in Zambia and exchange 'views'.

Underlying this misplaced euphoria was an assumption that South African society was experiencing a period of 'dual power'. Hence an insurrectionist strategy seemed most appropriate. The slogan dominating political strategy in addition to 'ungovernability', included 'liberation before education', 'peoples' power' and 'peoples' courts'. For example, in Alexandra township, which ranked as one of the most militant but also organised centres of resistance, there was a discussion paper circulating which 'portrayed organs of people's power as tools to move from ungovernability to dual power'. People's power was defined as, 'Control over every aspect of our lives — at work; at school; where we live; over the structures of local and national government; over the army, police, courts and prisons; the media; the church; financial institutions and the economy as whole.'

The fundamental problem with this position was that it mistook a period when the mass of the population was embarking on a process of spontaneously gaining an angry consciousness of their potential power, with a period when a disorganised state, unable to rule, was confronted with nationally consolidating, real organs of alternative and countervailing popular power. The former condition may have existed; but the latter most certainly did not.

It was true that in many African townships local government did appear to have collapsed and, therefore, to have left a power vacuum. Moreover, in many, but not all areas, extra-parliamentary organisation was strong enough to challenge the local, delegated organs of state power. However, these were fundamentally unable to even begin to challenge and overthrow the central organs of state power. The state, with a centralised power structure, still had its military forces firmly behind it and was able to repress township resistance with brute force. The government may have been unable to successfully proceed with its policy of localised 'co-optative domination' but it was by no means shaking on its very foundations.

## Redistributive Approaches

The government response to the civil unrest was to, at least temporarily, abandon the 'democratisation' elements in its reform program and initiate a series of repressive interventions to restore stability, if not normality. Even though they have not been eradicated,

the black extra-parliamentary organisations have been severely disorganised by the successful imposition of the various states of emergency. Furthermore, this has aided a fundamental restructuring of the future direction of the reform process.

The declaration of a (national) state of emergency in mid-1986 clarified the previous confusion prevalent within the reform process. It has resulted in a fundamental shift within the state towards the executive — in particular, the state president's office, the military and the department of law and order. The shift towards the executive had already been formally inscribed within the new constitution heralding the tricameral parliamentary system and an executive president. However, the successful implementation of the state of emergency has allowed the restructuring to take place outside of public view and entrenched a secretive style of exercising state power.

The mechanism whereby this occurred was through the creation of a parallel system of state power — the National Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS is clearly a political initiative sidestepping whatever representative structures exist at all levels in the society in order to ensure a co-ordinated security and redistributive intervention. The role of the JMCs is to identify problems in a community and deploy expertise to upgrade township conditions in an effort to defuse the political consequences. It is deemed able to do this because of links to the NSMS, which is able to bypass normal representative structures in order to ensure speed and efficiency of operation.

The NSMS has been in existence since 1979. However, it is only in the past two years that it has come to play such a significant role within the state's social engineering framework. This is a striking indication of the structural shifts that have taken place within the state's process of reform. Firstly, it demonstrates a decisive shift in the emphasis away from democratisation/de-racialisation towards that of 'redistribution to avoid political change' or 'redistribution for political stability and legitimacy'. Secondly, it indicates the alteration in the balance of power within the state, and how, within this newly defined process of reform, the department headed by Minister Malan has come to dominate that headed by Minister Heunis.

Two sets of strategies have been put forward, associated respectively with Heunis and Malan. Both are attempts to have a measure of selective redistribution of social wealth. The differences between the strategies are not unimportant, for the mechanism that each is based on has fundamental ramifications for the constitution of state structures. Heunis is attempting to do this through structures such as the Regional Services Councils, and Malan, through the NSMS, including the State Security Council and the various layers of the JMCs. The one is trying to build African houses for the middle class through the direct use of the Defence Force, while the other is attempting to do this via black town councils.

The Heunis strategy is a complicated combination of bureaucratic and representative intervention in order to effect redistribution. In so doing he hopes to create

legitimacy for the black local authorities or RSCs that are seen to be able to provide some of the material goods, if not to all the inhabitants of the townships, at least to the selected black middle class. For Heunis, the key issue is to create a situation where the state is seen to be negotiating with the community via his contorted representative structures, not over political power, but over development.

The role of redistributive interventions is to provide legitimacy for Heunis' particular form of representative structures. In this sense he is still operating within the semblance of the 'democratisation' elements of reform. However, because he has been fundamentally confined within the framework of de-racialisation/re-racialisation, he has been unable to effect a straightforward democratic process of representativity. He had therefore to set up such a complicated and potentially corrupt bureaucratic structure of representativity that he has been unable to operate effectively within it.

The NSMS strategy, associated with Malan, on the other hand, places much more emphasis on the primary role of redistributive interventions by the state. In Malan's strategy the provision of the social services is the primary objective, not the process of negotiation. The provision of the social services will, it is deemed, result in the legitimacy required, as long as all other forces can be controlled. In the struggle between Malan and Heunis, Malan with the State President's support, appears to hold the upper hand at present.

The security network is also a major force on the Committee for National Priorities (CNP), which is chaired by the State President and includes all the so-called planning ministers (Malan is the only non-planning minister). According to a senior state official this is now the most important planning committee in the country and can be equated with the State Security Council (SSC), which can override the priority decisions of the CNP only in the short term, to meet changed security conditions. The recent economic reform announcements of the State President have emphasised the importance of the CNP.

## Business Shift

The restructuring of the relations of power within the state and its ability to demonstrate most effectively that it is by no means unstable has led to a re-appraisal of capital's relationship to the state. The more conservative sections of monopoly capital, responding to the success of the state's stabilisation strategy and the corresponding inability of the organisations of the popular classes to demonstrate that they are a viable alternative, have gained political control over the corporate organisations of capital.

Thus in a major secret manoeuvre in 1987, a powerful lobby within the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), the 'Corporate Forum' of 30 — 40 big companies, threatened to withdraw their special subscription funding (said to be of the order of R20 000 each) of the FCI. They did not accept the FCI's recent high profile political stance, especially that of its chief executive, Johan van Zyl, which brought it into direct

## THE EMPLOYER LOBBY

### Workers

### Conflict Issues

### Employers

#### The Politics of Public Holidays

- Trade unions and opposition groups demand that 16 June (Soweto Day) and 1 May (Labour Day) be proclaimed paid public holidays. In 1985 and 1986 workers stay away from work on these days — Labour Monitoring Group (LMG) estimates (in 1986) 1,5 million workers participate in national stayaway from work on both days.
- Unions reject recent presidential decree (21/3/87) that makes first Friday in May a worker holiday, as 1 May has international recognition and significance for workers.

- Prior to 1986 some employers sign agreements with unions recognising these in commemorations as paid public holidays. LMG survey in W Cape shows 46 percent of employers support concept of May Day and 16 June. Few employers fire workers involved in stayaways on these days in 1985/86, adopting policy of 'no work, no pay, no penalty'.
- In late 1986 Assocom, Seifsa and other employer bodies call on government to review existing statutory holidays. They argue that some existing holidays are of little relevance for black South Africans.

#### Arrests in Industrial Unrest

- Under emergency regulations, police detain 140 OK Bazaars workers on strike (Dec 1986 — Feb 1987) who are members of the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA (Ccawusa). Union demands company should negotiate their release, claiming failure could inhibit settlement of national industrial dispute.

- OK management arranges meeting (6/2/87) between Minister of Law and Order, two strike mediators and company director. Minister agrees to examine cases of 140 workers but refuses to give undertaking regarding their release. Further detention of workers occur (8/2/87). Dispute settled prior to release of unionists.

#### Detention and Deportation of Unionists

- New labour movement protests death in police custody of Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) official Andries Raditso. National work stoppages and stayaways on day of funeral (14/5/85).
- Unions demand that chemical industry employers intercede on behalf of CWIU official Chris Bonner, after government starts deportation procedures (Dec 1986). More than 6 000 workers in chemical industry participate in wildcat strike action and work stoppages to support demand.

- Workers allowed time off to attend funeral and participate in work stoppages. LMG claims that employers' failure to publicly condemn circumstances of unionist's death is criticised by workers and unions.
- Employers meet with Minister of Home Affairs to oppose Bonner's deportation order which is withdrawn in January 1987.

#### The National State of Emergency

- Following the State President's declaration (12/6/86) Cosatu demands (25/6/86):
  - release of unionists detained in security clampdown
  - no dismissals and full wages for detained workers
  - no compulsory nightshift work due to unrest dangers in townships
  - paid time off for shop stewards to attend to union business off company premises
  - workers be allowed to meet on premises for two hours every week, without loss of pay.
- Unions participate in national work stayaway (14/7/86), strikes (particularly in retail, chemical and mining industries), work stoppages and endorse consumer boycotts.

- Cusa/Cosatu meet FCI and Assocom — employer bodies and Cusa issue joint statement demanding end to civil violence. Cosatu disassociates itself from statement because of employers' 'low key' approach on broader political demands.
- Premier, AECL, and FCI place media adverts condemning emergency.
- Delegation of retail employers (affected by more than 100 strikes) meet Minister of Law and Order and Commissioner of SAP (21/6/86) to discuss detentions.
- Assocom and FCI suggest members accept most of Cosatu's workplace-related demands. LMG survey (August 1986) in E Cape shows 50 percent of companies interviewed are paying no or minimal salaries to detained workers. In later survey of 20 companies (Jan/Feb 1987), five pay full wages, seven pay amounts between 50 and 60 percent, eight offer limited or no support.

#### Civil Disobedience

- Clashes occur between bathers and police as blacks transgress separate amenities legislation on PE beaches (Christmas 1985).

- PE City Council warns it will prosecute blacks who 'trespass' on white beaches.
- In February 1986 General Motors, supported by Amcham, claim they will give legal and financial support to black employees prosecuted under separate amenities laws.

#### The First Emergency and Consumer Boycotts

- Unions in alliance with extra-parliamentary groups protest repressive effects of first emergency (21 July 1985), especially detentions and disappearance of community leaders in E Cape.
- Various consumer boycott committees in E Cape, then other centres, co-ordinate boycott of white businesses from mid-1985 spreading across country over next 12 months.

- Delegation of E Cape businessmen put forward grievances of local African communities in meeting with State President. In second delegation to Minister of Constitutional Development, they demand white local authorities should administer adjacent black townships.
- East London Chamber of Commerce claims it might defy apartheid laws. PE Chamber's manifesto (August 1985) recommends removal of influx controls and black political participation. PE businessmen form 'Committee of 20' (April 1986) and adopt reform charter. Black leaders welcome initiative and agree to participate on committee.

#### Vaal Triangle Violence and Stayaways

- Fosatu, Cusa, independent unions and opposition groups form co-ordinating committee to protest police actions in African townships, demand release of political prisoners, resignation of community councillors, scrapping of rent increases and educational reforms.
- Between 300 000 and 800 000 workers stage work stayaway on 5/6 November 1984 in Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging areas. Over next two years, series of local and regional work stayaways occur over similar protest issues.

- Few employers fire workers involved in stayaway, but adopt policy of 'no work, no pay'. Assocom warns that although it acknowledges grievances of black communities, its members will dismiss employees in further stayaways.
- While employer bodies negotiate with unions over crisis, six union stayaway organisers are detained, including Cusa and Fosatu leaders Camay and Dlamini. In meeting with Minister of Law and Order (14/11/84), FCI and Assocom claim detentions are counter-productive to sound labour relations and demand that they be charged or released.

#### The Tricameral Constitution

- Fosatu, Cusa and loose alliance of non-aligned unions support 'no vote' in white constitutional referendum (2/11/83). Fosatu demands employers express attitudes to new constitution and disclose any financial contributions to referendum campaign. The General Workers Union argues that if business lobbies for 'yes vote', workers will interpret it as employer support for government.
- The new labour movement urges union members to boycott elections for coloured (22/8/84) and Indian (28/8/84) chambers of parliament.

- Many employers lobby for 'yes vote' in referendum, arguing 'no vote' will undercut further political reform and reduce foreign investment and trade.
- In response to violence in black townships over national and local government reform (1984/85) employer bodies — AHI, Assocom, Chamber of Mines, FCI and Seifsa — issue joint statement (13/3/85) pledging support for further economic and political reforms.
- Pick 'n Pay head forms 'Independent Committee of Ten' (August 1985) to pressure for accelerated reform. In another public statement 91 businessmen call on government (September 1985) to scrap race discrimination, grant full citizenship to all and return to rule of law.

and open confrontation with the government. The studies that the Forum was paying were incrementally stepped up, until the members of the Corporate Forum resolved to adopt the principle that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'.

The state of emergency became the trigger mechanism. Although there were contradictions within the Forum, the majority feeling was that van Zyl's approach and language, as in the FCI's Business Charter, was too strong and proving counterproductive. Fundamentally, the position adopted by the FCI was not in line with general business support for the state of emergency. Many businessmen, for instance, particularly those in the commercial sector in the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), wanted the shops opened to black consumers and the consumer boycotts smashed.

These developments resulted in the resignation of van Zyl as Executive Director and the replacement of John Wilson, the liberal Chairman of Shell (SA) and President of the FCI, by Hugo Snyckers, head of the most conservative regional affiliate of the FCI, the Northern Transvaal Chamber of Industries. In short, capital has shifted its ground to a less strident approach on political questions and instead is attempting to influence the state through what is termed 'the quiet approach'. In business circles this is summed up by contrasting the publicly confrontational approach that Chris Ball of First National Bank took with the cautious, conservative, behind-the-scenes style of Warren Clewlow, Barlow Rand's Deputy Chairman. The latter is cited as a more appropriate example of the approach for capital to follow.

## NP Power Base

Essentially, while the government and the NP is divided, this does not mean that reform has been accorded a low priority. Rather the *meaning* of reform has shifted. Those who equate reform to speeding up the process of democratisation (e.g. the NP's Nothnagel) are clearly in the minority. The dominant viewpoint stresses economic growth with selective redistribution.

The relative weight of different departments, and in particular the role of the Department of Defence, is a consequence of the new direction of reform. Certainly, the involvement of the defence force in this process of control/restructuring of black townships has had the effect of shifting the military's priorities away from one dimension (external defence/border control) and given it a dual role to play. If the Angola/Namibia issue is really settled — and the SADF now has an added incentive deriving from its internal role — then the state will be able to divert significant amounts of revenue towards township restructuring. This process would increase the role and power of the military in society.

The ruling party is both strong and weak depending on whether one is posing the question in terms of its relationship to blacks or to whites. In relation to the black extra-parliamentary organisations, the government is clearly in a powerful position. It has effectively

disorganised them and reduced their organisational role to one of international diplomacy as they attempt to strengthen the international sanctions and isolation lobbies and, in particular, to influence US governmental policy. Although these organisations have been effectively emasculated, this does not mean that the government has won popular support from the mass of the black population. It has, however, effectively gained a breathing space, enabling it to pursue its 'reform' policy. In this sense the government is relatively stable — its administrative, political and military machine has a comprehensive hold on black opposition.

However, in regard to whites, the social basis of support upon which the NP and the government has rested is no longer as secure as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. They do not command the unfailing support of white farmers and blue collar workers — many of whom have swung over to the CP — nor have they unequivocally forged a new basis of support amongst urban professionals, businessmen and skilled white collar workers. This is particularly the case when placed in the context of the ever persistent Afrikaner/English divide in white society. The NP has managed in the past to forge a unity of support which was broader than Afrikaner nationalism but it has still to prove that what has been lost to the CP has been compensated for by gains in urban English-speaking votes.

There is an ultimate irony in this process, in that having committed itself irrevocably to reform (in this new phase, meaning redistribution/security), the government is not guaranteed of being able to win over sufficient electoral support to comfortably move along this path. As long as the government sees reform as not necessarily meaning an extension of democratic rights to disenfranchised blacks, and as long as the government is not prepared to attempt to gain electoral support from middle-class blacks to compensate for lost support, amongst whites democracy in its present form is a potential obstacle to the further implementation of a NP-directed reform process. Further reform may well mean a process of restricting democratic rights and a further narrowing of parliamentary privileges as the NP protects itself from its white right.

## Disinvestment & Sanctions

The influence that foreign policy such as disinvestment and sanctions have had on South Africa's politics are complex. Both actions have been predicated on an assumption that their adoption and implementation will result in such massive external pressure being exerted that the government will be forced, within a relatively short time, to either negotiate majority rule, or implement a process of rapid political democratisation within its reform program.

Disinvestment as a strategy has led to the opposite political result, however. Instead of increasing forces for positive change within South Africa it has led to a decrease in such power. Foreign companies which might have exerted such pressure and power have withdrawn, and disinvestment has resulted in a transfer of ownership from foreign multinationals to locally owned

companies. The economic effect is complex since these local companies still maintain a relationship via licensing agreements and so on. Politically, however, the effect has been to strengthen the political presence of local corporations relative to foreign corporations, with a concomitant decrease in the local political influence of the latter.

The effects of sanctions are much more complex. Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under the conditions of insurrectionism that prevailed in 1986 might well have forced the government to change course rapidly. However, under the current conditions of an ebb in mass resistance, external pressure by itself is unlikely to bring about a major and rapid shift in government policy. There are signs that the change in the overall socio-political conditions under which sanctions are supposed to impact is being noticed by external advocates of sanctions.

The debate within US policy circles reflects some feeling amongst supporters of sanctions that comprehensive mandatory sanctions are no longer appropriate to the current South African political scene. A major political factor is the perception that some trade sanctions could seriously undermine black organisations, particularly the trade unions, in a context where the latter are already on the defensive, and there is no short-term possibility of dramatic political change. As a consequence, there is an increasing tendency to regard selective sanctions that focus on the weaknesses of the apartheid system to be the best method to force political change in the medium term. The major thrust of such selective sanctions is likely to be directed towards strengthening financial sanctions against South Africa.

If this transpires the government will be faced with a desperate shortage of funds to implement its redistributive reform strategy, i.e. to pay for the houses, infrastructure, streets, electrification, and job creation programmes aimed at urban African townships. The government will have to increase revenue through taxation and import duties, and to cut expenditure through privatisation and the reduction of military-linked costs.

## Privatisation

Although there has been much confusion generated by government pronouncements on privatisation, involving much talk without real substance on what action the government intends taking to implement its policy — the real meaning of state policy has only recently been clarified. In essence, the state policy is not going to introduce a 'Thatcherite' selling-off of public corporations. Instead, the government's intention in introducing privatisation appears to be threefold:

- to use privatisation to transform the internal accounting and management practices in the state productive sector, so that these are in line with standard business practice in the private sector;
- to use privatisation to raise additional state disposable revenue; and,
- to use privatisation to escape the potentially crippling

social security responsibilities that will be incurred by accepting African communities as part of the South African nation.

The government intends to use privatisation in order to expand its revenue base so that it can buy itself out of the fiscal crisis caused by an elaborate constitutional structure and state overspending. In addition, the emphasis on redistribution as the main plank of its reform project requires a major injection of finance. Privatisation is seen as one of the important mechanisms in funding the township upgrading program currently undertaken by the NSMS. Privatisation is also a means of expanding a shrinking corporate tax base — as Wim de Villiers (ex-General Mining) pointed out, the fact that since 1973 67,3 percent of all net fixed investment was made in the public sector has meant a serious reduction in the tax base (*Business Day* 5/9/88).

The emphasis is, therefore, on transforming the parastatals into efficiently functioning enterprises run by means of capitalist accounting principles. If this were not the case, there would be no incentive for private capital to buy into any state corporation. Herein also lies the key to the manner in which privatisation is likely to occur. It seems highly unlikely, from all the evidence available thus far, that the government will engage in a wholesale selling off of parastatals. The only parts that are likely to be fully privatised (i.e. sold lock, stock and barrel) are the peripheral servicing activities of various parastatals, with for example, the design functions sold off.

As for the rest — i.e. the core productive activities — a significant but minority shareholding will be made available to private capital for investment without the government losing their controlling interest. This will allow a reorganisation of these parastatals to make them more profitable, to retain state control over them, to give private capital the incentive to hold portfolio investment in them, and yet still ensure that revenue is raised from their partial sale.

The other aspect of the privatisation program refers to the transformation of state-provided social services. The classic apartheid era was based on the racially differentiated provision of social services. Whites particularly, but also coloureds and Indians, on the one hand, had access to a form of state social welfarism. Africans, particularly migrants, on the other hand depended on the 'homeland' tribal structures for social security. The acceptance of Africans as part of the South African 'nation people' has given the government two possible options — either include those racially excluded or discriminated against on the same terms as previously available to whites, with the extension of these services causing a massive drain on the state fiscus; or downgrade the social welfare functions of the state at the same time as this process of inclusion occurs.

To take medical health as an example, the state is using privatisation as a means of excluding, through redirection to private medical aids and hospitals, those citizens previously cheaply catered for by state hospital services, whilst simultaneously including Africans into a downgraded primary health care hospital system. This allows the state to restructure on a new basis state

medical social services – i.e. privatised medical health to the middle and upper strata of society (including the skilled working class), irrespective of colour; and primary health care, in combination with downgraded hospital facilities, for the unemployed and bulk of the working class.

## Growth Factor

The scene has thus been set for the major emphasis in the state's reform process to fall on the redistribution element. As it now stands there are powerful forces within both the business sector and the state arguing against necessarily equating reform with rapid democratisation. Attempting to significantly widen the base of political representativity, it is said, will only lead to increasing and uncontrolled demands for the available resources that the state has to distribute. In simple terms, the argument goes that there is no point in allowing politics to cut up the cake unless it can be significantly enlarged. Democratisation and increased representativity are therefore being seen as potentially in contradiction to the newly dominant element of the reform process – redistribution.

Furthermore, it is argued in some reform circles that the parliamentary form is an obstacle to the current path that reform is taking. Insofar as it obstructs the construction of a strong state which can decisively intervene to ensure restructuring of the economy, sustained growth and selective redistribution, democratic representation even for whites, coloureds and Indians is being regarded as expendable. The shift of power towards the executive is thus further reinforced.

There is an increasing tendency to draw the political lessons of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of South-East Asia. As a senior executive in Barlow Rand has succinctly stated:

'We have to follow the path of the East Asian NICs. I think we have come a long way in understanding that the really important issues are economic. We desperately need to do something about the economy, otherwise you will never solve your political problems. You can only grow and give slices as the economy grows, otherwise you get too many distortions ... you destroy the capital base. Study the economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong ... what is the government form in these countries? It is a dictatorship or colonial form' (author interview).

There is substantial sympathy, within the confines of a strong state, for placing the emphasis in the reform process on redistribution. A consistent position emerging is that executive attempts to facilitate redistribution are futile unless the government also decisively intervenes to ensure restructuring of the economy and sustained growth. With the question of economic growth setting the pace for redistribution, and this, in turn, laying forth the possible agendas of political reform, the emphasis within reform debate is falling on possible long-term economic strategies.


This emphasis is important in understanding the limits of the redistribution strategy underlying reform.

The argument is often advanced that the state does not have enough resources to upgrade every township, and furthermore, that economic upgrading does not necessarily mean the state will gain political consent for its policies. While it is true that the government is hemmed in by its own fiscal crisis, this argument misses the point about the underlying intentions of the redistribution strategy. The point is not to immediately upgrade all areas on a massive scale and ensure the consent of all blacks. The government strategy is intentionally selective and long-term. The question is not whether the government can upgrade all townships in the immediate future but rather whether they can achieve enough of a spread over the next five to ten years.

Unlike Verwoerdian apartheid, the state is not concerned with implementing a uniform policy for all blacks. It is rather, by being intentionally selective and favouring certain areas and classes at the expense of others, aiming at facilitating class and regional differentiation within black society. The aim is to foster maximum division and through a strategy of containment, control and neutralisation, make the creation of a broad alliance of black communities against the state so much more difficult.


PART IV

SCENARIOS





**FATALITIES BY CATEGORY**  
**Six Comparative Periods**



<b>KEY</b>	
<b>TOTAL DEATHTOLL</b> 1/9/84 - 10/6/88	<b>3 574</b>
<b>Six Unrest Periods</b>	
<b>Notional State of Emergency No 2</b> 12/6/87 - 10/6/88	<b>930</b>
<b>Notional State of Emergency No 1</b> 12/6/86 - 11/6/87	<b>731</b>
<b>Post-State of Emergency Phase</b> 8/3/86 - 11/6/86	<b>594</b>
<b>Build-up Unrest</b> 1/1/85 - 29/7/85	<b>317</b>
<b>Early Rumbblings</b> 1/9/84 - 31/12/84	<b>149</b>

**Monitoring Notes**

- It has not been possible to provide a breakdown of where, when and how deaths occurred in the period 1 September to 31 December 1984.
- The figures on political violence fatalities are compiled from a combination of daily press, police, Bureau for Information, parliamentary estimates and independent monitors. In mid-1986 the state created the Bureau for Information as the only legal source for 'unrest' data/incidents (or confirmation thereof), a function which has since reverted to the police.
- Official records supplied in parliament and at press conferences tend to differ from independent monitors; and further, cover interim periods that differ from the breakdown used in this table.
- The paucity of detail in official reports and a wide range of media restrictions has made it increasingly difficult to attribute specific responsibility for political violence fatalities. It must be stressed that the fatality count arrived at in this Indicator SA monitoring exercise constitutes a set of provisional figures that are significantly lower than the probable actual fatality count.

**Category Notes**

1 Security forces includes SADF, SAP, SA Railways police, municipal police, kitskonstabels, security guards and homeland-based soldiers or police. Insurgents killed by security forces in township shootouts are not included here (see fifth category).

2 The second category includes fatalities in several distinct types of political conflict that are statistically inseparable in most media and police reports, however. All specified reports of burnt bodies, often the victims of 'necklace' killings (whose political affiliation is unknown), have been included here. The sub-categories include:

- feuding between extra-parliamentary opposition groups, e.g. UDF and Inkatha in KwaZulu/Natal, UDF and Azapo, and between labour groups e.g. Cosatu and Uwuso.
- left-wing activist attacks on 'collaborators' (black town councillors, Binfo singers, informers, etc.), vigilantes and third force groups.
- right-wing township, shack settlement and homeland vigilante attacks on opposition groups.

3 The third category includes many Natal midlands fatalities, white unrest victims (except for security force fatalities), assassinations of leaders by 'death squads', deaths of detainees and prisoners awaiting trial for unrest offences. The deaths of 65 Crossroads (CT) victims from May/June 1986 are included here because specific responsibility cannot be attributed to 'witdoeke' (vigilantes), the 'comrades' or security forces.

4 The fourth category mostly reflects security force casualties in unrest clashes but includes a few members killed in township or rural shootouts with insurgents.

IPSA

# THE ALTERNATIVE

## Post-apartheid Visions

*Paulus Zulu*

When, on 18 February 1988, the state restricted 18 organisations to 'office work' only and thus barred them from any access to public platforms, it was making a significant statement. The first part of the statement was that the 'turmoil' in the townships had reached a stage where repressive tolerance could not contain it and, therefore, those organisations which, in the eyes of the state, were responsible for 'agitation' had to be effectively silenced. The second part of the statement was that the state's 'total strategy' was at stake and together with this, the constitutional reform initiatives. The October municipal elections were on the way, on which would depend the legitimacy of the regional services councils and probably the state president's national council.

The state's belief was that the extra-parliamentary opposition, particularly the popular forces (civic and community organisations) and to a certain extent the unions, were bent on wrecking the coming elections. It was, therefore, necessary to get such opposition out of the way. These particular emergency restrictions have to be seen partly within this context, and partly as an intensification of the state's repressive apparatus. The main issues are that the state faces two challenges, both crucial to its existence in its current form: the external and the internal, and to contain the external challenge, the state has to sort out the 'internal mess'.

In ordinary parlance, resistance refers to a conservative anti-change stance. In South Africa the opposite pertains. It refers to those forces that refuse to comply with the state's conservative programme. The internal challenge to the state has not only brought about confrontation between the state and the black population, it has also torn the black community asunder. The state's reform strategy is designed to create 'space' and thus win over a section of the black population. However, in most instances, reform through co-optation has backfired as individuals and groups, in expressing their anger and frustrations, have turned upon the co-opted functionaries (town councillors, and at times, officials in the homelands) as representatives of the state.

The other side of the resistance coin is constituted by protests against deteriorating material conditions in the townships (hikes in rents and transport fares, lack of equipment and books in schools, and the soaring prices

which bite heavily on black consumers). Both sides of the coin often lead to protests which, in turn, draw in the heavy hand of the police. The confrontation leads to retaliation where protesters turn on councillors, policemen and other government functionaries. As attacks and counter-attacks continue, anarchy sets in. This is the anatomy of the so-called 'black on black violence'. There are numerous allegations, and in some instances, serious indications that the state is in collusion with the conservative elements in the conflict.

### Social Composition

Because specific issues such as rent, transport or education trigger off resistance and, consequently, unrest, groupings tend to follow along the same lines. Hence the following broad categories comprise the main groups engaged in resistance politics:

- youth organisations located mainly in educational institutions but also including a significant section of the unemployed youth and some of the youth affiliated to the unions;
- civic and community organisations, both permanent and ad hoc. Here the membership may even be cross-cutting where an individual holds membership in more than one organisation; permanent organisations include residents' associations, whilst ad hoc groupings focus on an immediate issue such as a hike in transport fares.
- youth groups, residents' associations and transport committees may, together, organise a consumer boycott campaign, thus necessitating the formation of a consumer boycott committee;
- institutional groupings such as the church, labour and professionals may work in close alliance with community groups. Such tactical alliances strengthen the latter by creating more space for both organisation and administration, especially in the light of the expertise, discipline and experience gained in both union and church work.

In one way or another, community and youth organisations are affiliated to or work in a close

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relationship with regional and national umbrella bodies. The United Democratic Front (UDF) is a conglomerate of civic, community, professional, youth and labour organisations. Likewise, the National Forum (NF) displays the same composition as the UDF but tends to have a more regional than national concentration.

The main groups in the resistance movement include:

- youth organisations

Numerous youth organisations exist in the townships and in some instances co-ordinate their efforts in order to effect changes in specific spheres, e.g. in education when youth congresses collectively call for free books and stationery or organise commemorative services. The socio-economic origins of the student movement explain the politicisation of educational issues and their central role in extra-parliamentary opposition politics: 'The late sixties to the early seventies were the years of economic boom in South Africa. Economic growth had demonstrated the need for more skills at an increasing scale. This necessitated an investment in education, particularly in African education. Ironically the increase in numbers in African schools further revealed the contradictions in a racist society. When the recession of the late seventies set in, the Lumpenproletariat was young, better schooled and more politicised. Conservative provisions of the sixties could not contain the consolidated fury of the mid to late seventies' (Nzimande & Zulu, 1987:2).

- the United Democratic Front

Initially, the UDF came into being in opposition to the government's tricameral plan and the Koornhoof Bills. By the beginning of 1987 it had well over 600 civic, student, youth, community, labour and other organisations affiliated to it, with the Freedom Charter as a common rallying point.

- the National Forum

While ideologically the UDF is a charterist organisation, the main thrust of the NF is black consciousness. Secondly, the National Forum and particularly the Azanian Peoples Organisation (its main component), has a card-carrying membership whilst the UDF is a broad representation of affiliated organisations and, therefore, almost confederal in nature. Both, however, espouse a policy of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa and will not co-operate with the state or other apartheid-sponsored bodies.

- worker organisations

In addition to popular organisations like the UDF and the NF, worker organisations like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council for Trade Unions (Nactu) work closely with community mass-based organisations at the community level.

- professional and church organisations

The thrust of the professional, educational, business and church organisations is to promote the 'alternative concept' as an ideological and practical programme of empowering the disadvantaged communities.

## Resistance Logic

One of the ways of evaluating a group of actors engaged in a cause to bring about justice is to subject both their utterances and activities to a predetermined set of internal and external criteria. Internal criteria entail looking for consistency within the actors' philosophical visions of the world and examining the means they adopt to realise their visions. External criteria refer to the compatibility between the actors' means and goals and the universal values encompassing justice. Since resistance groupings are organised around a common philosophical base, policy, strategy and techniques, a critical assessment within this framework is both inevitable and desirable in order to constitute the strategic logic of the actors.

However, in carrying out this evaluation, it is necessary to bear two points in mind. Firstly, resistance constitutes a set of normative objections to the established legal order. Resistance groupings have to operate against the legal system and flourish mainly through delegitimising the existing socio-legal order. This immediately brings them into the state's firing line where retribution ranges from intimidation, detention and banning, to death in detention in some instances. Secondly, because of the constitution of the various groups engaged in resistance, i.e. a coalition of actors caught in a multi-strategy situation, their programme of action is often anticipatory and vague (the main intention is to mobilise support). However, in spite of this constraint the various groups of actors within the organisations do have specific 'programmes of action'. In some instances, these are rigidly adhered to even to the extent of limiting tactical flexibility.

Resistance groups believe in and strive to realise 'a single non-racial South Africa' based on the principles of democracy and fair play. They see the present system in South Africa as discriminatory and exploitative. At one level this is a response to the material and status inequalities that exist in apartheid South Africa, and at another, a re-affirmation of the basic democratic principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as espoused by the various religious and political movements in the country. While basically they believe that this democratic non-racial future can be negotiated, they feel that the state's intransigence, and especially its repressive response to challenges, diminishes the chances for negotiation. This has prompted them to lay down specific preconditions for negotiation such as:

- the freeing of political prisoners and detainees;
- the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, other political organisations and individuals;
- allowing the political exiles to return;
- removing the troops from the townships; and
- depoliticising the function of the police in the townships.

To the resistance groupings a political solution must precede any changes to economic arrangements since access to economic position is predicated on race in South Africa. (Nolutshungu 1983). Black people understand this too well. They have a subjective experience of a skewed redistributive system which equates black with inferiority. The affluence and peace

in Durban North contrasts with the poverty and insecurity in KwaMashu, where the residents are too poor even to paint their houses and save them from the anonymity to which they have been destined (Meer 1987).

## Transformation

Confronted with social and economic inequalities, resistance groups have found a possible solace in the socialist alternative. Their alternative is more an existential than an ideological socialism. In other words there is no clear doctrinaire line but rather a broadly conceptualised economic order, wherein the country's resources are equitably distributed. This is roughly articulated in a call for:

- the nationalisation of major industries or a significant portion thereof;
- equality of opportunity, with access to work training and the reward system;
- an equitable distribution of the country's resources, i.e. land, industries and profits;
- free access by all to the country's social security system.

There is a significant group among the professional and managerial classes as well as among older people, which emphasises a mixed economy of the Scandinavian model, i.e. some form of social democracy. Members of the resistance movements, whether within the popular or labour fields, remain unimpressed by the arguments that socialism does not generate as much wealth as capitalism or that socialism has had a bad track record in Africa. To them, these arguments have no substance in South Africa, given the glaring existential inequalities in the workplace as well as structural inequalities in the living space.

Political as well as economic visions are sustained by a corresponding educational system. To the actors engaged in resistance politics, the future educational system hinges on the abolition of the current one, which they view as a perfect recipe for subservience. Frere's model, 'the pedagogy of the oppressed', thus becomes a philosophical point of departure as well as a political programme. It encompasses conscientisation of the society to the current ills in both society and education, thus facilitating a healthy reconstruction. Education forms part of the terrain for the struggle for social, political, economic and intellectual transformation. In practical terms this can be realised firstly in the building of democratic organs where the people shall participate not only in the administration, but also in the planning of their education; and, secondly, in the development of an alternative curriculum moulded to suit the socio-economic and political environment in which education takes place.

Black education, according to the resistance groupings has become the terrain for both resistance and containment. Educational reforms are seen as designs to create a buffer class through a meritocratic, elitist system – an illusion whereby an increase in the black educational budget allows for an increase in numbers whilst leaving problems of a qualitatively

inferior education unattended.

## Policy and Strategy

Resistance groups share a common policy which basically attempts to isolate the state from all constituencies. Accordingly, all of them reject participation in and co-operation with the state-created institutions at all levels. In this way they hope to create alternative structures such as civic organisations, street committees, and alternative professional and occupational organisations such as the National Medical and Dental Association or the National Educational Crisis Committee.

The objective behind the formation of alternative structures is to give expression to the will of the people and wrest the initiative away from the state structures, which pose as avenues of redress while they are responsible for the very suffering which they purport to redress. For instance, landlessness and shacks are a direct product of governmental policy, yet the state creates black town councils which in turn allocate housing in the townships. Shack-dwellers therefore seek refuge from the agents of their persecution. This not only depoliticises the town council system, but gives it the mantle of benefactor as well. Alternative structures therefore conscientise the masses to their lot as well as empower them to devise their own solutions to their problems.


Strategies adopted by the resistance movements have varied with the state's response to the challenge, from petition to peaceful defiance and finally, confrontation. Most strategies have been 'moment actions', although this does not imply lack of planning and executing a clearly defined design in long-term situations. Boycotts of rent and transport, work stayaways and strikes, school, consumer and voter boycotts, are widely known and the most frequently practiced strategies. The basic aim is to conscientise and mobilise for support as well as force the state or the private sector to the negotiating table.

As the state meets each challenge with growing repression, from sheer brutal forms such as baton charging, teargas and shooting, to more sophisticated forms such as banning and detention, so has the potential for violence from the resistance groups grown. In essence, violence is not on the formal agenda of resistance groupings, but is often a momentary response or retaliation to more organised violence by the state. Admittedly, there have been acts of violence against town councillors, members of the police and 'police informers', but in many instances this has followed pitched street battles with the police. In retaliation people have turned on the nearest objects that they identify with the state. There have also been cases where dissenters from planned strategies, such as boycott breakers, have been severely dealt with. However, these are isolated and unco-ordinated cases which do not fall into the general anatomy of violence as policy but rather occur as part of the structural problems inherent in the politics of resistance within a highly repressive climate.

The success of the strategies is difficult to measure,

# RESURGENCE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 1976-1988

Table 1 Breakdown of Guerilla Activity & Targets



**Notes on categories**

- 1 Guerilla attacks and shoot-outs in security force raids, both in urban and rural areas. (Excludes sniper attacks in townships unless weapons used are identified as being of foreign origin.)
- 2 Armed attacks directed at police patrols and stations, security force vehicles and property, administration boards, town council property, courts, etc.
- 3 Sabotage of power substations, railway lines and stations, oil depots, pipelines, etc.
- 4 Includes hotels, supermarkets, factories, shopping centres, etc.
- 5 Includes armed attacks on (mostly) township homes of state witnesses, police, councillors, informers, MPs.
- 6 Covers both detonated and defused landmines.
- 7 Accidental explosions involving amateur saboteurs (5), propaganda pamphlet bombs (6), unspecified defused explosives (11), assassinations and some targets unidentified in reports.

**Notes on Data**

- A few known incidents of defused explosives, perhaps the most underreported aspect of guerilla action, have been included in appropriate categories.
  - The number of incidents monitored here reflect armed actions (bullets, bombs and grenades) by both insurgents and locally trained 'comrades', which often became indistinguishable during the widespread unrest of 1984 - 1987.
  - Low-level attacks on a similar range of targets during the civil unrest - e.g. attacks involving arson and stone-throwing, even where fatalities result - are explicitly excluded from the above data. See table 3 in *Indicator SA Urban Monitor* Vol3/No2: p5.
  - Also excluded are discoveries of arms caches, confiscated firearms, and the number of arrests of ANC members/sympathisers.
- \* The provisional total for 1988 includes 126 incidents for the period 1 July - 20 October, which have not been added into categories 1-7. The update was taken from official figures which do not specify the specific type of guerilla action.

# AFTER KABWE & THE EMERGENCY

## Lessons of the 1980s

*Ian Phillips*

South Africa has not enjoyed extended periods of peace since the national 1976-77 uprisings. Most of the battles have been fought in the black townships. In recent years, the widespread occurrence of consumer boycotts, strike action and guerrilla activity has forced the conflict increasingly out of these areas into white areas.

Many analyses of political conflict in South Africa have tended to focus almost exclusively on urban and peri-urban areas, where the activities of popular organisations have had the greatest impact. It is thus quite tempting to describe the civil unrest as an essentially urban phenomenon isolated from the rural areas. That this is not the case should be clear from the preceding section on the homelands (cf Mankanjee). It should also be noted that state repression and an information black-out have been most effective in outlying areas, given their relative isolation from organisational infrastructure and the urban bases of monitoring organisations and the media.

Extra-parliamentary organisations in South Africa assume a number of different forms. Firstly there are those that operate internally as clandestine organisations because they have been outlawed by the state but have managed to establish external bases and infrastructures. The best examples are the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and a few other smaller bodies. For the most part, they all have organised armed wings under the ultimate control of their parent bodies. The domestic presence of the major actors in this area has increased dramatically since 1976-77, and attempts to demarcate clear-cut political divisions between their internal and external 'wings' is artificial and misleading.

Secondly, there are those that operate wholly within South Africa, including the large number of local, regional and national organisations affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF) which are largely drawn from the supporters of the Freedom Charter, or the Congress tradition. On the black consciousness side of the opposition spectrum is the National Forum (NF), an ad hoc committee that draws to itself a smaller number of affiliates. The best known, largest and most influential of these is the Azanian Peoples Organisation

(Azapo), itself an umbrella body with a large number of affiliates. They define their philosophy along the lines of the Azanian Manifesto, and are often classified as the more 'left-wing' or 'radical' of the major groupings, in deference to the socialist vocabulary of the Manifesto (as opposed to the Charter). The strong, well-organised labour movement, whose immediate origins pre-date the 1976 uprising, provides a special case of opposition politics that falls outside the limits of this discussion.

Both the UDF and NF/Azapo contain various tendencies within the larger ideological consensus of each major umbrella body. Both coalitions include organisations of various geographic location and social constituencies such as youth, women, workers, writers, students, etc. What are the major strategies that have been adopted by the various extra-parliamentary organisations operating within the country as a whole, i.e. including the homelands?

### Four-Prong Policy

Over the years the ANC has developed a broad policy that rests on essentially four elements:

- to build up and consolidate its internal structures;
- to step up the armed struggle through the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK);
- to mobilise the masses around issues in order to increase political awareness and build support; and,
- to propagate the international isolation of Pretoria in the military, economic and political spheres, whilst at the same time attempting to increase the ANC's own standing in the international community.

Two major threads can be identified, namely, a politico-military emphasis that relates to specific ANC/MK activity and a political/diplomatic initiative aimed mainly at the international community but also concerned with nuts-and-bolts politics within South Africa. It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of these threads as contradictory or in fact mutually exclusive.

The Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, attended by

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about 250 cadres drawn from all its operations both outside and inside South Africa, resolved a number of issues. On the domestic, institutional front, resolutions were carried that concerned new disciplinary procedures, constitutional changes (such as increasing the size of the new, non-racial National Executive Committee and establishing the rule that a Consultative Conference be held every five years), and policies concerning the recruitment, education and training of cadres. On the wider policy front, most attention has been given to the resolutions concerning the conduct of the armed struggle within South Africa. The frequent allegation that the conference resolved to disavow the distinction between so-called 'soft' and 'hard' targets and thus permit MK units to attack civilian targets bears little relation to the actual decisions of the conference.

The 1984 uprising had started months prior to the conference which opened three days after a SADF raid on Gaborone had left a number of civilians and ANC members dead. At Kabwe it was argued that given the context of the escalating conflict in South Africa and the development of 'people's war', it was improbable that civilians would remain unscathed. Kabwe outlined the movement's strategy of people's war, a policy which calls for the involvement of the masses in action *against the state* at all levels. Armed activity has increased dramatically since the conference.

However, land-mines in border regions were deployed against the farming community drawn into the commando system through state policy, thereby annulling their status as civilians; and spectacular sabotage acts have occurred alongside an increase in the number of attacks against members of the security forces, some people classified as stooges or sell-outs like community councillors, alleged police informers, state administrators and the like.

Furthermore, especially since Nkomati, the ANC has embarked successfully on a campaign to train cadres within South Africa. That such training may not be of the same calibre as provided outside may be true, but state successes against internal cells have not been able to stop the increase in or frequency of sophisticated attacks. Given the clandestine nature of the war, the highly fluid situation on the ground, and popular anger

and frustration, it is impossible to speculate accurately on the nature of command structures between headquarters and the home front, to attribute responsibility for sporadic attacks in public places, or in fact to trace accurately — in the absence of statements to the contrary — claims that the ANC has changed its Kabwe policies concerning the armed struggle.

In mid-August 1988, the National Executive Committee of the ANC issued a communique reiterating the organisation's policy of avoiding civilian targets, but accepted that cadres had been responsible for some assaults that had led to civilian casualties. Although it has become commonplace to accuse the ANC of every bombing in the country, it is clear that

other groups are involved, some of which are motivated by right-wing views. Foreign intelligence services have accused Pretoria of involvement in overseas attacks on ANC personnel and offices. Similar suspicions have been voiced within South Africa, in connection with some incidents that have been blamed on the ANC, that may form part of a 'dirty tricks' campaign.

It is also difficult to assess the significance or success of the armed struggle from any one perspective. The guerilla campaign has moved through

a number of phases, most notably from a period of armed propaganda that concentrated for the most part on sabotage and bomb blasts in built-up areas, through to people's war. The literature also refers to the development of an insurrectionary situation. The state's apparent success in effecting a roll-back through successive states of emergency, encourages the view that the wheel has perhaps turned back towards armed propaganda and the consolidation of units rather than their extensive deployment for the time being.

The armed struggle is not meant to challenge directly the armed might of the state. It is meant more to undermine white confidence and security, to galvanise state opponents with the conviction and evidence of state vulnerability, and to steadily build up a force of better trained cadres who will be able to take advantage of instances of state retreat. This could occur, for

Table 1

**GUERRILLA ACTIONS: 1976 to JUNE 1988**

Comparative Independent Monitors

NO OF ACTIONS

MONITOR	Indicator Project South Africa	Institute for Strategic Studies	Lodge (Wits Univ)
1976	4	4	-
1977	19	20	23
1978	27	13	30
1979	12	12	13
1980	19	19	19
1981	29	55	55
1982	33	39	39
1983	46	56	56
1984	44	44	44
1985	96	136	136
1986	203	230	118 (up to 30/6/86)
1987	183	230	-
1988 (up to June)	-	54	-
TOTAL	769	858	533

Notes

- The majority of actions reflected in this table can be ascribed to the ANC.
- The Bureau for Information derives its published statistics on guerilla activity from Pretoria University's Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSUP).
- Dr Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand estimated that between January 1985 and June 1985 there were 88 guerilla actions; and between January 1986 and June 1986, 118 incidents (Weekly Mail 31/10/86).

example, in the so-called 'free zones' of townships that appeared in many places around the country between 1984-86, where the security presence could only be a migratory, transient one. At the political level, there may be some significance in the fact that calls for the government to create a suitable climate for negotiating a settlement have increased with the escalation of the conflict. At the current stage, the ANC is of the conviction that the state does not negotiate because it still thinks it can retain white domination, rather than because (as it argues) the ANC refuses to eschew 'violence'.

## Political Initiatives

On the political/diplomatic axis, Kabwe reiterated the policy to isolate Pretoria internationally and to secure support for the resistance movement. The ANC enjoyed some diplomatic success with the International Conference against Apartheid held in Arusha, Tanzania, in December 1987. What distinguished this conference from other such events like the Amsterdam cultural festival (December 1986) was the fact that it brought together representatives of foreign governments, agencies, support organisations, the ANC, the democratic movements from within the country, and members of the English and Afrikaans language press corps. Sober assessments of the recent 'rugby rhetoric' stress the difficulties that face even the most determined sports administrators to break their isolation, given the fact that integration at all levels involves the government's policy of segregation rather than purely

administrative matters related to the proposed linkage of sporting bodies.

ANC President Oliver Tambo, sometimes accompanied by other leading figures in the ANC's National Executive, has been received by world leaders and heads of states on an unprecedented scale, especially from western governments. Through these contacts the ANC has been able to put its case, for example, to the international business community, the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the Commonwealth, the United States Administration and the EEC. These contacts have all served to buttress the work done by the ANC's permanent representative at the United Nations and its growing entourage of representatives worldwide.

In mid-1988, the ANC produced guidelines for a constitution of a liberated South Africa. Co-ordinated by a constitutional committee of the ANC's NEC established in 1986, a number of in-house seminars within the various branches of the movement (international affairs, education, religion, women, information, etc), produced a wide-ranging debate and working papers. These range from studies of electoral systems and of bills of rights, through to the nature of education and the resolution of the national question in a post-apartheid society. Interpretations of the guidelines are varied. Briefly, they are an elaboration of the central tenets and principles of the Freedom Charter that espouse a non-racial democracy in which racism is outlawed and the economy is subject to general centralised direction and control. The entrenchment of group or ethnic rights is rejected because, in the South African context, they would

Table 2

### GUERRILLA ACTIONS: 1974 to Oct 1988

Period Covered	Official Monitors			SOURCES
	No of Incidents	Guerilla Casualties Killed/Captured	Guerilla Victims Dead/Injured	
1974 - Sept 1988	1 006			H Stadler
1976 - 1984	265			J vd Merwe
1976 - Nov 1986			97	Binfo
1976 - 1986		428		A Vlok
1/1/77 - 31/12/85	398	79 / 201	85	L le Grange
1986	230	160	54	A Vlok/J vd Merwe
1987	234	106	30 / 327	J vd Merwe
1/1/88 - 30/6/88	88	78	22 / 156	J vd Merwe
1/1/88 - 20/10/88	262			A Vlok

#### Notes

- ISSUP claimed that 428 guerillas had either been captured or killed by the South African security forces between June 1976 and 31 August 1986; and 181 'eliminated' between 1 September 1984 and 31 August 1986 (ISSUP, 'Terrorism and Sabotage in the RSA: 1976-1986', University of Pretoria: 4/86).
- In October 1986 the Deputy Commissioner of the SA Police, Lieutenant-General LP Neethling, said that South Africa had experienced a large increase in 'terrorism' in the past 14 years. He said that in 1971 there were 300 incidents, and in 1985, 3 000. It is clear that his definition of terrorism is much broader than those of other government sources (Weekly Mail 24/10/86).
- Most of the official sources do not reflect guerilla incidents in the 'Independent' homelands.

#### Sources

- Indicator SA press clippings.
- L le Grange, Minister of Law & Order.
- H Stadler (Brigadier), Chief of Security Police Intelligence.
- J vd Merwe (Lieutenant-General), Head of the Security Police.
- A Vlok, Minister of Law & Order.
- Binfo (Bureau for Information), government media management agency.



## Data Trends

# ANC CASUALTIES ON THE FRONTLINE IN THE 1980s

## Secret War in the Shadows

	Date & Location	Incident & Responsibility
<b>1981</b>	30 January Matola (16km from Maputo, Mozambique)	Three homes are attacked in commando raid on residential area and 13 people killed. SADF admits responsibility for the deaths of (30) alleged ANC members and a Portuguese technician in homes which it claims are the local planning and logistic headquarters of the ANC. Two SADF soldiers die in attack.
	1 August Harare (Zimbabwe)	ANC representative and National Executive Committee member, Joe Gqabi, is shot dead by unidentified assassins. Zimbabwean government blames South Africa, but Pretoria denies involvement.
	Gaberone (Botswana)	ANC executive member and Sactu official is killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
<b>1982</b>	March London (UK)	ANC headquarters are damaged in explosion. Bombers unknown. Pretoria denies involvement.
	June Mbabane (Swaziland)	ANC representatives, Jabu and Petrus Nzima, are killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
	27 June Lesotho	ANC representative, ZP Mbali, disappears. His decapitated body is found later. Assassins unknown.
	August Lesotho	ANC representative, Chris Hani, survives a car bomb that is detonated near him. Another person is killed. Bombers unknown.
	17 August Maputo	Ruth First, ANC member, renowned academic and wife of SA Communist Party executive member Joe Slovo, is killed by letter bomb at Eduardo Mondlane University. Assassins unknown.
	9 December Maseru (Lesotho)	Commando raid across border leaves 42 people dead. SADF claims responsibility, alleging 32 of victims were ANC members. ANC denies that homes attacked were local ANC headquarters. Lesotho accuses Pretoria of acting in collusion with renegade Lesotho Liberation Army.
<b>1983</b>	23 May Maputo	Jet strike on six alleged ANC bases. SADF claims responsibility for deaths of 64 people (incl 41 ANC guerillas). Mozambique reports six fatalities (incl four women and children) and 40 wounded (mostly Mozambicans). Foreign journalists claim targets were a jam factory, a day-care centre and ordinary suburban homes.
	17 October Maputo	Commando raid on apartment building injures five people. SADF claims responsibility for attack on alleged ANC military planning centre. ANC acknowledges flats housed its members but maintains other targets were a clinic used by SA refugees and a library.
	22 November Manzini (Swaziland)	ANC members, Keith MacFadden and Zwelakhe Nyanda, are shot dead by unknown assassins.
<b>1984</b>	2 May Swaziland	Four ANC members are abducted. The (South African) Minister of Law and Order announces that an arms cache had been found after the capture of four guerillas.
	28 June Lubango (Angola)	Sactu member, Jeonette Schoon (nee Curtis), wife of Sactu's Marius Schoon, is killed by letter bomb. Assassins unknown.
<b>1985</b>	13 February Botswana	Home of exiled South African poet, Nat Serache, is blown up. Bombers unknown.
	14 May Gaberone	Vernon Nkadimeng is killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.
	14 June Botswana	Commando raid on ten homes and offices leaves twelve dead and six wounded. SADF and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, claim responsibility for attack which they allege kills four ANC operatives and results in seizure of weaponry, ANC documents and financial records. ANC denies those killed were members; Botswana authorities claim only five victims had ANC connections.
	1 July Lusaka (Zambia)	Explosion at headquarters of the ANC. Bombers unknown.
	16 November Gaberone	Four South African exiles are killed by car bomb. Assassins unknown.

	Date & Location	Incident & Responsibility
	(7-13) December Lusaka	Parcel bomb injures ANC member. Source unknown.
<b>1986</b>	20 December Lesotho	Nine die when homes are attacked. Lesotho Liberation Army claims responsibility for killing of six South Africans and three Lesotho nationals. Lesotho blames South Africa.
	19 May Frontline States	<b>Zambia:</b> At Makeni (10km south of Lusaka) two die and thirteen people are injured in attack on bar and shop. <b>Zimbabwe:</b> In Harare Diplomatic office of ANC destroyed, while empty home is attacked. <b>Botswana:</b> At Mogaditsane (near Gaborone) house is attacked, a Botswana citizen killed and three others injured. Pretoria claims responsibility for simultaneous SA Air Force and commando raid on selected ANC targets, including alleged 'guerilla transit' facilities.
	3 June Mbabane	Two ANC members are killed by unknown assassins.
	15 June Gaborone	One person is killed, while a man and child are injured in raid on home. Assassins unknown. SADF denies responsibility.
	August Swaziland	ANC member, Lucas Seme, is kidnapped from Swazi police cells. In July 1987 SA police confirm he is held in their custody.
	8 September Stockholm (Sweden)	ANC offices are extensively damaged in explosion. Bombers unknown.
	October Mbabane	Three people, including 2 suspected ANC members, are shot dead in home. Assassins unknown.
	12 December Swaziland	ANC member, Shadrack Mzeni, two Swiss citizens and two others are abducted in cross-border raid. South Africa accepts responsibility and eventually hands over abductees.
	15 December Swaziland	Senior ANC member, Ebrahim Ebrahim, is abducted by South African agents. Ebrahim later stands trial in South Africa for contraventions of the Internal Security Act.
<b>1987</b>	January Mbabane	Four people believed to be ANC members are killed by unknown assassins.
	8 April Gaborone	Three people are killed and 2 injured by car bomb. Bombers unknown.
	May Swaziland	Alleged ANC member and two others are shot dead by unknown assassins.
	14 May Harare	Booby-trapped television set explodes, intended for ANC's chief Zimbabwean representative, Reddy Mazumba, kills a woman. Bombers unknown.
	17 May Harare	ANC diplomatic offices are bombed. Bombers unknown.
	25 May Mbabane	ANC member, Sheila Nyanda, is abducted by kidnapers.
	29 July Mbabane	ANC National Executive Committee member, Cassius Make, and Umkhonto we Sizwe member, Paul Dikeledi, are shot dead by unknown assassins.
	6 August Swaziland	Two men are shot dead, one a South African and one Mozambican national. Assassins unknown.
<b>1988</b>	January Harare	Rocket propelled grenade damages local ANC headquarters; South African exile, Paul Brickfield, is injured by car bomb near shopping centre. Attackers unknown.
	January Francistown (Botswana)	ANC member, Jacob Molokoawane, is shot dead in car by unknown assassins.
	January Bulawayo (Zimbabwe)	Two ANC members are killed by car bomb. Bombers unknown.
	13 January Swaziland	ANC member, Siphon Ngema, is killed by unknown assassins.
	March Gaborone	ANC Treasurer-General, Thomas Nkobi, and ANC General-Secretary, Alfred Nzo, escape attempt on their lives. Attackers unknown.
	19 March Paris (France)	ANC representative, Dulcie September, is shot dead by unknown assassins. Western intelligence services allege South African involvement.
	22 March Maseru	ANC member, Mozizi Maqokeza, is shot dead in Queen Elizabeth II Hospital. He was admitted after earlier assassination attempt when Radebe was killed. Assassins unknown.
	27 March Brussels (Belgium)	Large 17kg unexploded bomb found outside ANC offices. Earlier there had been an armed attack on ANC representative Godfrey Motsepe. Attackers unknown.
	28 March Gaborone	Four South African refugees are killed in commando raid on house. SADF claims responsibility.
	17 April Maputo	ANC member, Albie Sachs, is severely injured by car bomb. Bombers unknown.

**Notes**  
 In the last two decades, the first recorded assassination of an anti-apartheid activist outside of South Africa occurred in 1974, when student leader Ongepost 'Abraham' Tiro was killed by a letter bomb in Botswana.

**Sources**  
 Moss G. 'Politics with a price on its head', in WIP No53: April/May 1988.  
 SA Barometer, Vol1/No4, 24 April 1987:52-53. Vol2/No7, 22 April 1988:101-103. Johannesburg, Hoopoe Publications.  
 Indicator SA press clippings.

entrench privilege and inequality.

Part of the ANC's political initiative involves encouraging contact with people from within the country. Besides keeping a finger on domestic developments, contact serves to undercut state propaganda on the ANC. Furthermore, such discussions are also ways of identifying and perhaps bringing together the broadest possible range of opponents of Pretoria in a pragmatic way. It is largely for these reasons that the movement has held talks at various stages with big business, students, religious leaders, the PFP, the Dakarites, universities and educationists, trade unionists, sports administrators, lawyers and other individuals from within the country.

Many people incorrectly assume that the ANC directs the activities of the internal extra-parliamentary opposition. In these terms, it supported the home-grown initiative of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) concerning the return-to-school campaign. After some apparent confusion over conflicting statements about 'necklacing', Tambo called for an end to the practice, but his comments could not be published in South Africa because of press restrictions and ministerial fiat. The ANC's position on participation in apartheid structures is also influenced by internal developments, rather than being dominant over those developments.

The ANC's opinion of Inkatha (and Chief Buthelezi in particular) is unsympathetic. Inkatha is seen as a chauvinistic, nationalist movement that invokes more hostility towards the democratic movement than towards Pretoria and practically acts as the state's policing agent in the Natal region. On the other hand, the ANC has shown a willingness to accord greater recognition to bantustan leaders like Enoch Mabuza, where they have stated clearly their case against 'independence'.

## SACP Role

The oldest non-racial political party in the country, the South African Communist Party (SACP), is part of the alliance led by the ANC. It adopts the view that the ANC is the sole representative of the resistance movement in the international arena. The SACP's membership is considerably smaller than its partner's.

At the sixth Party conference in 1984 the SACP resolved, inter alia, to increase its activity within the country. The conference adopted a new constitution that outlined the Party's aims and objectives. In working towards the creation of a socialist society the SACP believes that political and economic power must come to rest in the hands of the working class in alliance with the rural peasantry. The way to achieve this involves the Party in a number of strategies that are not wholly different from those of the ANC.

The SACP identifies one of its major tasks as participating in and strengthening the moves to build a broad internal alliance within South Africa behind the ANC. Its role essentially, is to act as a watchdog and ensure that the interests of the working class are not

jeopardised. The SACP fully supports the armed struggle. At the same time it also consistently refuses to deny the efficacy or desirability of a thorough negotiated settlement. Unless and until Pretoria is prepared to relinquish its desire to retain power, a negotiated settlement would be an empty shell.

Since 1985 the Party's presence has been felt inside South Africa more keenly than for many years. It claims to have set up factory floor units as important structures to make underground work more effective. During the last three years it has also produced a new underground newspaper that is meant to facilitate discussion on a wide variety of topics, not least the basic elements of marxist theory. Most of the Party's time is taken up with clandestine organisational activity, rather than with public statements and campaigns which are largely left up to the ANC.

## PAC Setbacks

The PAC has had a distinctly harder time of it than the ANC on all counts. It does not enjoy the international attention that the latter gets, nor does it boast as impressive an institutional or administrative structure. More importantly, it does not seem to enjoy the same degree of national support either. During the 1960s the PAC lost ground in the international stakes, largely because it was not accorded the same rights of recognition by many countries, although it does enjoy recognition by the OAU and the UNO.

Recently, the PAC's relationship with even these organisations has been tenuous. Many problems seem to be related to questions of the leadership's ability, morality and cohesion. But perhaps the main problem for the PAC is the absence of a well-defined forward base in southern Africa, notwithstanding the diplomatic support it has received from Zimbabwe.

PAC sources argue that the bad press they receive has more to do with hostile propaganda than affinity to the truth, and point to an apparent tendency to ignore PAC achievements. Whatever the case, since the Bethal trial the PAC's armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), has increasingly claimed responsibility for a number of armed attacks within South Africa. These appear to have taken on similar aspects of the people's war strategy of the ANC, a development that signifies some change from the fairly haphazard attacks of APLA's predecessor, Poqo, in the 1960s. As political opposition expands and the conflict escalates, it would be natural for the armed activities of all groups that espouse this form of struggle to increase.

Evidence from political trials involving PAC members indicates an increased presence within South Africa, a phenomenon acknowledged by SAP/SADF sources as well. At this stage, it appears that the activities of APLA are restricted to the Vaal Triangle and Western Cape regions, with pockets of support for the PAC extending into areas of the Eastern Cape and the Transkei. Furthermore, PAC-aligned sentiments have emerged at public meetings on a more frequent basis than previously. One recent example of this, perhaps, was the Africanist pressure from the shopfloor

that caused a change in the political perspective of the executive of the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu).

## Internal Opposition

The severe February 1988 restrictions placed on many organisations, including the UDF, its largest constituents and Azapo, has led to a decline in public activity and in some cases to the reassessment of particular strategies and tactics. Further restrictions followed, bringing to 23 the number of organisations restricted this year alone, with the threat of yet more restrictions against other bodies being made by state officials at the time of going to press.

The period under review has been dominated in power terms by the various states of emergency and related repressive acts. Opposition activity now takes

place in even more abnormal circumstances than before 1984. Azapo, formed in the aftermath of the repression that witnessed the end of the 1976-77 uprising, attempted to regroup black consciousness proponents. Its primary focus at the early stage was organisation rather than mass mobilisation per se, while attempting to create a coherent, ideological position based on a socialist perspective for South Africa. The National Forum came into being prior to the UDF in 1983, though both emerged largely in response to state initiatives around the new constitution and the Koornhof bills.

The NF and Azapo have attempted to focus more on internal organisational developments than on particular issue campaigns. They tend to treat with great suspicion concepts like the united front, fearing ideological dilution or loss of control through interaction with the essentially 'bourgeois' and/or 'imperialist' groups which these fronts may bring with them. Antagonism between adherents of the Azanian Manifesto and the Freedom

Charter has erupted from time to time, ostensibly over the geographical control of areas. The recent interaction between Nactu and Cosatu over amendments to labour legislation, rather than indicating moves towards a possible pragmatic rapprochement at a political level, shows co-operation at the level of worker interests only.

UDF affiliates have focused attention on community organisation and mobilisation around particular issues, attempting to challenge the state on these terms rather than concentrating solely on consolidation of extant support. Notable in the forefront of UDF campaigns have been the youth and student affiliates such as Sayco (emerging in the middle of the first emergency to fill the gap left by the banning of Cosas in 1985) and Sansco. At least four major national campaigns can be identified prior to the

Table 3

### GUERRILLA ACTIONS for COMPARATIVE PERIODS

Nature of Incident	Sept 1982 - Aug 1984	Sept 1984 - Aug 1986
	24 Months Prior to Unrest	24 Months of Unrest
Attack on SAP stations	4	9
Attack on SADF buildings	1	2
Murder/attempted murder of SAP	11	88
Murder/attempted murder of civilians	3	118
Murder/attempted murder of SADF	1	9
Armed robbery	0	1
Sabotage/attempted sabotage on:		
Rail installations	17	5
Fuel and bus depots	2	6
Telecommunication installations	0	1
Business properties	4	24
Private properties	4	5
Water pipelines	0	6
Government and public buildings	23	21
Power installations	22	21
Total	92	316

Table 4

### GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION of GUERRILLA ACTIONS 1976 - 31 August 1986

Area	Actions
PWV	212
Natal	148
Rest of Transvaal	77
Eastern Cape	54
Western & Northern Cape	48
Orange Free State	26
Walvis Bay	1
Total	566

Sources (Table 3 & 4)

Hough M. 'Revolutionary Warfare in the RSA', in ISSUP Strategic Review, University of Pretoria: ISSUP, August 1987.

Hough M. 'Targeting in Revolutionary and Terrorist Campaigns with Specific Reference to RSA', in ISSUP Strategic Review, University of Pretoria: ISSUP, August 1987.

ISSUP. 'Terrorism and Sabotage in the RSA: 1976-1986', University of Pretoria: 4/86.

restriction of the organisations. These are the campaigns around education, the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of political organisations and, more recently, lobbying support against the death sentence for political activity. Many of these campaigns are supported by the black consciousness groups who, nonetheless, balk at the non-racial policies of the Congress tradition and, at times, the way in which some of the campaigns are organised.

## Major Campaigns

The boycott of schools, a feature of many regions for various periods since at least 1980, has moved through a number of phases. Generally, the slogans have developed from the rallying cry of 'Liberation before Education' to 'Education for Liberation', through to attempts to introduce 'People's Education' programmes. The SPCC and the NECC liaised between parents, scholars and community leaders on the one hand, and school representatives (and in some cases, even the authorities) on the other hand, to devise a working programme for a return to school.

Pupil demands were significant in that they were directly related not only to matters pertaining strictly to education, but also to pertinent national questions such as the release of detainees and political prisoners, reorganisation of school administrations and syllabi, unbanning organisations, lifting the state of emergency, and so on. State interventions in the activities of the NECC, the banning of meetings, the detention of personnel and the effective outlawing of 'People's Education' through emergency regulations, raised serious questions about the ruling party's desire to alleviate the crisis in education.

A major national campaign around the release of Nelson Mandela in particular (co-ordinated by the Release Mandela Campaign) and of all political prisoners in general took off in the early 1980s. The call was soon taken up by a large number of international agencies and governments as one of several necessary conditions for Pretoria to fulfil on the way towards creating the climate for a negotiated settlement. The potential significance for the state of the release of Rivonia trialist Govan Mbeki, the motivation for which has been hotly debated in a number of circles, was deflated when he was placed under a wide range of restrictions in Port Elizabeth. The various campaigns and meetings held on this issue have served to highlight the precarious moral position of the government, helped to extend organisational structures and to extend political awareness. Speculation about the timing (and conditions) of the release of Mandela and others has arisen again at the present time. Generally, commentators are agreed that the dire economic crisis the state finds itself in has prompted it to look towards at least one spectacular action to regain investor confidence and much-needed foreign loans.

Calls to unban political organisations were a logical extension of the campaign to release political prisoners. Initially aimed at old-guard bodies such as the ANC, SACP and PAC, the campaign has been extended to

include Cosas, the large number of banned organisations from the 1970s, and recently, those groups restricted in terms of emergency regulations. The campaigns have taken a variety of forms, from fairly low-key public meetings, large mass rallies and a million signature campaign (that ultimately did not reach its target for a number of reasons, not least state intervention), to calls for international support. By focusing on state action in this way, the various opposition groups question the bona fides of what they term an intransigent government, elicit interest in the policies of these organisations, and stress continually the need to resist the steady erosion by legislative and more often executive fiat of the definition of legitimate participation in South Africa's politics.

A more specialised campaign has recently emerged around the plight of people sentenced to death for 'political offences'. This has taken at least two forms, though the distinction between campaigns has not always been clearly drawn. Firstly, broad campaigns to 'save' those on death-row are organised around appeals for clemency. The most notable of these so far has concerned the 'Sharpeville Six', the circumstances of their case being sufficiently controversial to draw a large number of people from the establishment into the calls for a judicial reconsideration if not reprieve. Most recently, the Society for the Abolition of the Death Sentence in South Africa was revamped with the support of many eminent personalities from judicial and professional circles.

Secondly, attempts have been made to popularise the issue of the status of ANC (and other) guerillas in terms of international law. The first salvo in this campaign was fired in 1980 when the ANC officially endorsed the relevant Geneva Protocols of 1977 which refer to the prisoner-of-war status of people involved in guerilla campaigns against colonialism and racism. The South African government has refused to ratify the same conventions, and still treats guerillas caught and sentenced as such as common criminals. Recently, the issue has been taken up in various cases around the country, although defence arguments along these lines have been rejected.

## No Participation

One interesting feature of the period between 1984-88 has been the emergence of institutional structures of 'organs of people's power' within the townships. Regional differences abound here, both in terms of the efficiency of these alternative structures as avenues of democratic local government and as forums for popular participation in decision-making on national campaigns. The division of many townships into various street, area and defence committees, the creation of civic associations and the like to replace the defunct local authorities inspired by Pretoria, created a situation where the state lost control of areas of traditional authority.


The widespread geographic occurrence of the system of alternative structures is in marked contrast to the uprisings of previous eras. Though now largely

# Data Trends

## Select Indicator of Industrial Conflict

Compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

### The Official Strike Count 1976 - 1987



suppressed, the system has left an indelible mark on the resistance movement as a whole. For the first time, the idea of viable alternative structures within the country began to take tangible form. This development added a major boost to the confidence and vitality of people involved in these institutions and the townships in general.

The extent and nature of the state's clampdown on all areas of meaningful political activity within the country has meant that popular organisations have had to reassess their current strengths and weaknesses. From the days when boycotts, strikes, general mass mobilisation and meetings were the order of the day, in some quarters a rethink of the basic strategies open to the opposition has been urged. One line of argument suggests that previous strategies did a good deal to unite the opposition and to build a mass movement, but did little actually to destabilise or disorganise the state itself. Out of this, some commentators have laid a good deal of stress on discussions about participation within the system as a likely or desirable strategy for the opposition to employ.


At a general level, the basic rule that the boycott is a strategy rather than a principle remains valid. In some regions, community organisations have participated in round-table discussions aimed at improving conditions or negotiating around consumer boycotts and the like,

but these have occurred as a result of an examination of local and immediate conditions rather than as part of a grand national strategy. At this stage the various discussions and proposals regarding participation still originate from a basic assumption that the structures are illegitimate, that to participate gives them a certain credibility, and that ultimately, they are emasculated through their operation by the institutional rules of the game that ensure white hegemony. Proponents of participation urge consideration of the possibility of organisational and political space that could — in certain circumstances — emerge if participation took place at certain levels. Given the organisational difficulties of operation under present conditions that hinder discussion, the prospects for national participation are negligible at present.

At the current stage there are extreme pressures on the democratic movement both within the country and, at an increasing rate, on personnel abroad. Notwithstanding this onslaught, the ANC and its allies, representing the most public opposition to Pretoria, have been able to maintain their fundamental advantage on the political/diplomatic side, and to a lesser extent on the politico-military front, at home and abroad. It is too early to classify the present time as the end of an era that began in 1984, or indeed merely as a slumbering point between open revolt then and heightened insurrection or forced surrender in the future.

# Data Base

## BUSINESS CONFIDENCE



### ASSOCOM Business Confidence Index 1985 - June 1988

	1985	1986	1981	1988
January	78,6	81,9	89,5	98,0
February	83,3	85,5	89,8	98,1
March	79,1	83,0	93,5	98,3
April	76,1	79,0	95,9	99,3
May	77,9	78,6	96,4	99,3
June	81,0	80,1	93,0	98,1
July	77,9	80,9	95,5	
August	76,9	85,7	97,8	
September	78,2	89,9	99,8	
October	78,0	89,9	100,0	
November	80,6	90,2	97,1	
December	81,1	87,0	97,3	
Year average	79,1	84,3	95,5	

#### Note

1) The Assocom Business Confidence Index (BCI) endeavours to measure business confidence via the movements of 15 economic indicators which have the greatest bearing on the business mood. The 15 inputs are:

- dollar price of gold in London
- Rand-Dollar exchange rate (commercial and financial Rand)
- merchandise imports (in real terms)
- Consumer Price Index
- Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Market Index
- three months' Bankers Acceptance Rate
- prime lending rate of commercial banks
- estimated retail sales (in real terms)
- number of insolvencies of individuals and partnerships
- unemployment among all races
- motor car sales
- new companies registered
- number of persons migrating to and from South Africa
- volume of manufacturing production
- value of building plans passed

2) Although the BCI base year is 1983, figures were only published from 1985 onwards.

#### Source

Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 'Business Confidence Index' No 9: August 1988.

# REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORM

## WHAM\* ban, thank you Malan

Mike Morris

The reform process initiated by the government from 1980 onwards has been the key element in government racial policy during the 1980s. It has shifted state policy away from the classic Verwoerdian apartheid established during the 1960s. Reform was essentially composed of four discernible elements which were often jumbled up and presented as being necessarily interconnected:

- Initiating a limited 'democratisation' or 'liberalisation' (opening up) of ideological and political life;
- Implementing the 'de-racialisation/re-racialisation' of social and political life;
- Instituting a partial, and selective, 'redistribution' of social resources towards the black majority.
- Backing up reform with major repressive interventions in order to manage the process.

The 'democratisation' that the reform process engendered was limited, but nonetheless significant. This process did not, and was never intended to, entail anything like a complete liberalisation of state control. Nevertheless, it was real and seen as an integral and necessary shift away from Verwoerdian apartheid. Furthermore, the lessons of trade union struggles and the stabilisation of industrial relations were not lost on many businessmen, and often presented as a comparable lesson to be used outside of this arena. Finally, the reform process was significantly influenced by the struggles of the black majority during the mid-1970s, which resulted in the process of liberalisation being extended beyond the parameters that many in power had intended.

Up until 1986, space was opened up for political organisations to emerge openly (most importantly, the UDF), and for other organisations to take on additional or new political profiles (e.g. Cosatu and NECC). Cosatu was able to operate a series of high profile mobilisation campaigns around issues beyond those relating to labour. Affiliates of the UDF were able to organise and campaign around a series of socio-economic issues such as the rent and school boycotts. The ideological bonds of state control were

\* Security jargon for a counter-revolutionary strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds (WHAM) of the masses, promoted by Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan.

also significantly relaxed. New publications, journals, magazines and newspapers covering alternative news, discussion and debate emerged that would have been inconceivable a decade before.

### Twin Process

The state simultaneously initiated a contradictory process of restructuring the racially hierarchical boundaries that had so clearly constrained and characterised apartheid. Some aspects of social life, mostly revolving around racially discriminatory social amenities (termed petty apartheid) were 'de-racialised'. Black people were allowed access to a variety of social amenities hitherto denied them, such as parks, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, pubs and beaches. Such previously sacrosanct pillars of apartheid as the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Acts were abolished. The abandonment of racially discriminatory legislation governing trade union activity also significantly 'de-racialised' the industrial relations arena and coincided with the rapid growth of the independent trade union movement. Furthermore, the scrapping of influx control and the shift towards formal acceptance of Africans as permanent city dwellers via the controlled urbanisation policy was also a significant aspect of this process of de-racialisation.

De-racialisation of social interaction represented an abandonment of the more overt discriminatory manifestations of apartheid. Nevertheless, de-racialisation operated within certain definite limits, even if these limits were never clearly spelt out by the state. The movement away from Verwoerdian apartheid did not occur by simply abandoning legislatively enforced racial categorisation. It was, instead, intertwined with a *racial restructuring* of other aspects of South African society, albeit on different terms. This was a process of 're-racialisation' of a number of other spheres — the most obvious and significant being the introduction of the tricameral parliamentary system and the concepts of 'own and general affairs'. Reform, therefore, contained a process of racial elimination as

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well as racial addition; of deconstructing and of restructuring Verwoerdian apartheid; in short, a twin process of 'de-racialisation/re-racialisation' of social and political life.

The third major element of 'reform', which initially was not accorded the status it currently holds, was a stress on the 'redistribution' of social resources away from the straightforward monopoly that whites previously exercised. The state became concerned with upgrading the social and economic life of selected Africans in selected townships. The electrification of Soweto became a priority, for instance. The urbanisation initiatives stressed the importance of providing differential housing for Africans, and the state diverted large amounts of revenue towards African education. In the private sector, 'black advancement' within corporate managerial structures became a major concern and was closely associated with 'reform'.

In the crucial initial stages of reform, almost all sections of business, intent on supporting reform, found it difficult to distinguish between reform of apartheid and Mr PW Botha's reform process. Everything contained within this process was regarded as a movement away from racial discrimination and deserving of unqualified support, lest the right wing of the National Party regain its power base. If one was anti-apartheid, then this meant wholeheartedly supporting reform, warts and all, which in turn meant getting into bed with Botha. Hence, to give an example, Chris Saunders' (Tonga-Hullets) unqualified support for a 'yes' vote in the 1983 referendum and the clear desertion of large sections of business from the PFP over the party's rejection stance in the referendum.

Liberal businessmen, in their rejection of classic apartheid, seemed unable to separate out the process of re-racialisation from that of de-racialisation/democratisation. They assumed that the former was necessarily and acceptably part of the latter since it was 'after all a step in the right direction'. In effect, President Botha's reform process was for a short time given ideological carte blanche.

## Misplaced Euphoria

Likewise, the black extra-parliamentary organisations seemed also to be caught in a vice of analytic opacity, but for the opposite reasons and with opposite consequences. For them, everything in the state's reform process seemed to signify no movement at all away from Verwoerdian apartheid. Hence one witnessed the somewhat odd sight of legal opposition organisations, emerging as a result of reform, unqualifiedly denouncing the very same reform as mere window dressing. The contradictory irony of such a position seemed wholly to escape these organisations. Instead of attempting to separate out, at least for their own purposes, those elements of reform, such as democratisation and de-racialisation, that were integral to their own struggles and required defending, they lumped all these elements together and declared that the whole process of reform was merely apartheid in drag.

Consequently, responding to the militant spontaneous mood in the townships, black opposition groups counterposed to the state's reform process a strategy of 'ungovernability' and allowed themselves to be swept up in the prevailing mood of insurrectionism. This slogan was particularly popular in 1985-86, when to many it seemed that apartheid was about to crumble and the transition to majority rule was perhaps more likely than ever before. Indeed, for a short time even liberal businessmen seemed to be considering hedging their bets. Gavin Relly (Anglo-American), following the PFP's initiative, led a high-powered delegation of businessmen to meet the ANC in Zambia and exchange 'views'.

Underlying this misplaced euphoria was an assumption that South African society was experiencing a period of 'dual power'. Hence an insurrectionist strategy seemed most appropriate. The slogans dominating political strategy in addition to 'ungovernability', included 'liberation before education', 'peoples' power' and 'peoples' courts'. For example, in Alexandra township, which ranked as one of the most militant but also organised centres of resistance, there was a discussion paper circulating which 'portrayed organs of people's power as tools to move from ungovernability to dual power'. People's power was defined as, 'Control over every aspect of our lives — at work; at school; where we live; over the structures of local and national government; over the army, police, courts and prisons; the media; the church; financial institutions and the economy as whole.'

The fundamental problem with this position was that it mistook a period when the mass of the population was embarking on a process of spontaneously gaining an angry consciousness of their potential power, with a period when a disorganised state, unable to rule, was confronted with nationally consolidating, real organs of alternative and countervailing popular power. The former condition may have existed; but the latter most certainly did not.

It was true that in many African townships local government did appear to have collapsed and, therefore, to have left a power vacuum. Moreover, in many, but not all areas, extra-parliamentary organisation was strong enough to challenge the local, delegated organs of state power. However, these were fundamentally unable to even begin to challenge and overthrow the central organs of state power. The state, with a centralised power structure, still had its military forces firmly behind it and was able to repress township resistance with brute force. The government may have been unable to successfully proceed with its policy of localised 'co-optative domination' but it was by no means shaking on its very foundations.

## Redistributive Approaches

The government response to the civil unrest was to, at least temporarily, abandon the 'democratisation' elements in its reform program and initiate a series of repressive interventions to restore stability, if not normality. Even though they have not been eradicated,

the black extra-parliamentary organisations have been severely disorganised by the successful imposition of the various states of emergency. Furthermore, this has heralded a fundamental restructuring of the future direction of the reform process.

The declaration of a (national) state of emergency in mid-1986 clarified the previous confusion prevalent within the reform process. It has resulted in a fundamental shift within the state towards the executive — in particular, the state president's office, the military and the department of law and order. The shift towards the executive had already been formally inscribed within the new constitution heralding the tricameral parliamentary system and an executive president. However, the successful implementation of the state of emergency has allowed the restructuring to take place outside of public view and entrenched a secretive style of exercising state power.

The mechanism whereby this occurred was through the creation of a parallel system of state power — the National Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS is clearly a political initiative sidestepping whatever representative structures exist at all levels in the society in order to ensure a co-ordinated security and redistributive intervention. The role of the JMCs is to identify problems in a community and deploy expertise to upgrade township conditions in an effort to defuse the political consequences. It is deemed able to do this because of links to the NSMS, which is able to bypass normal representative structures in order to ensure speed and efficiency of operation.

The NSMS has been in existence since 1979. However, it is only in the past two years that it has come to play such a significant role within the state's social engineering framework. This is a striking indication of the structural shifts that have taken place within the state's process of reform. Firstly, it demonstrates a decisive shift in the emphasis away from democratisation/de-racialisation towards that of 'redistribution to avoid political change' or 'redistribution for political stability and legitimacy'. Secondly, it indicates the alteration in the balance of power within the state, and how, within this newly defined process of reform, the department headed by Minister Malan has come to dominate that headed by Minister Heunis.

Two sets of strategies have been put forward, associated respectively with Heunis and Malan. Both are attempts to have a measure of selective redistribution of social wealth. The differences between the strategies are not unimportant, for the mechanism that each is based on has fundamental ramifications for the constitution of state structures. Heunis is attempting to do this through structures such as the Regional Services Councils, and Malan, through the NSMS, including the State Security Council and the various layers of the JMCs. The one is trying to build African houses for the middle class through the direct use of the Defence Force, while the other is attempting to do this via black town councils.

The Heunis strategy is a complicated combination of bureaucratic and representative intervention in order to effect redistribution. In so doing he hopes to create

legitimacy for the black local authorities or RSCs that are seen to be able to provide some of the material goods, if not to all the inhabitants of the townships, at least to the selected black middle class. For Heunis, the key issue is to create a situation where the state is seen to be negotiating with the community via his contorted representative structures, not over political power, but over development.

The role of redistributive interventions is to provide legitimacy for Heunis' particular form of representative structures. In this sense he is still operating within the semblance of the 'democratisation' elements of reform. However, because he has been fundamentally confined within the framework of de-racialisation/re-racialisation, he has been unable to effect a straightforward democratic process of representativity. He had therefore to set up such a complicated and potentially corrupt bureaucratic structure of representativity that he has been unable to operate effectively within it.

The NSMS strategy, associated with Malan, on the other hand, places much more emphasis on the primary role of redistributive interventions by the state. In Malan's strategy the provision of the social services is the primary objective, not the process of negotiation. The provision of the social services will, it is deemed, result in the legitimacy required, as long as all other forces can be controlled. In the struggle between Malan and Heunis, Malan with the State President's support, appears to hold the upper hand at present.

The security network is also a major force on the Committee for National Priorities (CNP), which is chaired by the State President and includes all the so-called planning ministers (Malan is the only non-planning minister). According to a senior state official this is now the most important planning committee in the country and can be equated with the State Security Council (SSC), which can override the priority decisions of the CNP only in the short term, to meet changed security conditions. The recent economic reform announcements of the State President have emphasised the importance of the CNP.

## Business Shift

The restructuring of the relations of power within the state and its ability to demonstrate most effectively that it is by no means unstable has led to a re-appraisal of capital's relationship to the state. The more conservative sections of monopoly capital, responding to the success of the state's stabilisation strategy and the corresponding inability of the organisations of the popular classes to demonstrate that they are a viable alternative, have gained political control over the corporate organisations of capital.

Thus in a major secret manoeuvre in 1987, a powerful lobby within the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), the 'Corporate Forum' of 30 — 40 big companies, threatened to withdraw their special subscription funding (said to be of the order of R20 000 each) of the FCI. They did not accept the FCI's recent high profile political stance, especially that of its chief executive, Johan van Zyl, which brought it into direct

## THE EMPLOYER LOBBY

### Workers

### Conflict Issues

### Employers

#### The Politics of Public Holidays

- Trade unions and opposition groups demand that 16 June (Soweto Day) and 1 May (Labour Day) be proclaimed paid public holidays. In 1985 and 1986 workers stay away from work on these days — Labour Monitoring Group (LMG) estimates (in 1986) 1,5 million workers participate in national stayaway from work on both days.
- Unions reject recent presidential decree (21/3/87) that makes first Friday in May a worker holiday, as 1 May has international recognition and significance for workers.

- Prior to 1986 some employers sign agreements with unions recognising these as commemorations as paid public holidays. LMG survey in W Cape shows 46 percent of employers support concept of May Day and 16 June. Few employers fire workers involved in stayaways on these days in 1985/86, adopting policy of 'no work, no pay, no penalty'.
- In late 1986 Assocom, Seifsa and other employer bodies call on government to review existing statutory holidays. They argue that some existing holidays are of little relevance for black South Africans.

#### Arrests in Industrial Unrest

- Under emergency regulations, police detain 140 OK Bozaars workers on strike (Dec 1986 — Feb 1987) who are members of the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA (Ccawusa). Union demands company should negotiate their release, claiming failure could inhibit settlement of national industrial dispute.

- OK management arranges meeting (6/2/87) between Minister of Law and Order, two strike mediators and company director. Minister agrees to examine cases of 140 workers but refuses to give undertaking regarding their release. Further detention of workers occur (8/2/87). Dispute settled prior to release of unionists.

#### Detention and Deportation of Unionists

- New labour movement protests death in police custody of Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) official Andries Raditsela. National work stoppages and stayaways on day of funeral (14/5/85).
- Unions demand that chemical industry employers intercede on behalf of CWIU official Chris Bonner, after government starts deportation procedures (Dec 1986). More than 6 000 workers in chemical industry participate in wildcat strike action and work stoppages to support demand.

- Workers allowed time off to attend funeral and participate in work stoppages. LMG claims that employers' failure to publicly condemn circumstances of unionist's death is criticised by workers and unions.
- Employers meet with Minister of Home Affairs to oppose Bonner's deportation order which is withdrawn in January 1987.

#### The National State of Emergency

- Following the State President's declaration (12/6/86) Cosatu demands (25/6/86):
  - release of unionists detained in security clampdown
  - no dismissals and full wages for detained workers
  - no compulsory nightshift work due to unrest dangers in townships
  - paid time off for shop stewards to attend to union business off company premises
  - workers be allowed to meet on premises for two hours every week, without loss of pay.
- Unions participate in national work stayaway (14/7/86), strikes (particularly in retail, chemical and mining industries), work stoppages and endorse consumer boycotts.

- Cusa/Cosatu meet FCI and Assocom — employer bodies and Cusa issue joint statement demanding end to civil violence. Cosatu disassociates itself from statement because of employers' 'low key' approach on broader political demands.
- Premier, AECL, and FCI place media adverts condemning emergency.
- Delegation of retail employers (affected by more than 100 strikes) meet Minister of Law and Order and Commissioner of SAP (21/6/86) to discuss detentions.
- Assocom and FCI suggest members accept most of Cosatu's workplace-related demands. LMG survey (August 1986) in E Cape shows 50 percent of companies interviewed are paying no or minimal salaries to detained workers. In later survey of 20 companies (Jan/Feb 1987), five pay full wages, seven pay amounts between 50 and 60 percent, eight offer limited or no support.

#### Civil Disobedience

- Clashes occur between bathers and police as blacks transgress separate amenities legislation on PE beaches (Christmas 1985).

- PE City Council warns it will prosecute blacks who 'trespass' on white beaches.
- In February 1986 General Motors, supported by Amcham, claim they will give legal and financial support to black employees prosecuted under separate amenities laws.

#### The First Emergency and Consumer Boycotts

- Unions in alliance with extra-parliamentary groups protest repressive effects of first emergency (21 July 1985), especially detentions and disappearance of community leaders in E Cape.
- Various consumer boycott committees in E Cape, then other centres, co-ordinate boycott of white businesses from mid-1985 spreading across country over next 12 months.

- Delegation of E Cape businessmen put forward grievances of local African communities in meeting with State President. In second delegation to Minister of Constitutional Development, they demand white local authorities should administer adjacent black townships.
- East London Chamber of Commerce claims it might defy apartheid laws. PE Chamber's manifesto (August 1985) recommends removal of influx controls and black political participation. PE businessmen form 'Committee of 20' (April 1986) and adopt reform charter. Black leaders welcome initiative and agree to participate on committee.

#### Vaal Triangle Violence and Stayaways

- Fosatu, Cusa, independent unions and opposition groups form co-ordinating committee to protest police actions in African townships, demand release of political prisoners, resignation of community councillors, scrapping of rent increases and educational reforms.
- Between 300 000 and 800 000 workers stage work stayaway on 5/6 November 1984 in Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging areas. Over next two years, series of local and regional work stayaways occur over similar protest issues.

- Few employers fire workers involved in stayaway, but adopt policy of 'no work, no pay'. Assocom warns that although it acknowledges grievances of black communities, its members will dismiss employees in further stayaways.
- While employer bodies negotiate with unions over crisis, six union stayaway organisers are detained, including Cusa and Fosatu leaders Camay and Dlamini. In meeting with Minister of Law and Order (14/11/84), FCI and Assocom claim detentions are counter-productive to sound labour relations and demand that they be charged or released.

#### The Tricameral Constitution

- Fosatu, Cusa and loose alliance of non-aligned unions support 'no vote' in white constitutional referendum (2/11/83). Fosatu demands employers express attitudes to new constitution and disclose any financial contributions to referendum campaign. The General Workers Union argues that if business lobbies for 'yes vote', workers will interpret it as employer support for government.
- The new labour movement urges union members to boycott elections for coloured (22/8/84) and Indian (28/8/84) chambers of parliament.

- Many employers lobby for 'yes vote' in referendum, arguing 'no vote' will undercut further political reform and reduce foreign investment and trade.
- In response to violence in black townships over national and local government reform (1984/85) employer bodies — AHL, Assocom, Chamber of Mines, FCI and Seifsa — issue joint statement (13/3/85) pledging support for further economic and political reforms.
- Pick 'n Pay head forms 'Independent Committee of Ten' (August 1985) to pressure for accelerated reform. In another public statement 91 businessmen call on government (September 1985) to scrap race discrimination, grant full citizenship to all and return to rule of law.

and open confrontation with the government. The strategies that the Forum was paying were incrementally stepped up, until the members of the Corporate Forum resolved to adopt the principle that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'.

The state of emergency became the trigger mechanism. Although there were contradictions within the Forum, the majority feeling was that van Zyl's approach and language, as in the FCI's Business Charter, was too strong and proving counterproductive. Fundamentally, the position adopted by the FCI was not in line with general business support for the state of emergency. Many businessmen, for instance, particularly those in the commercial sector in the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), wanted the shops opened to black consumers and the consumer boycotts smashed.

These developments resulted in the resignation of van Zyl as Executive Director and the replacement of John Wilson, the liberal Chairman of Shell (SA) and President of the FCI, by Hugo Snyckers, head of the most conservative regional affiliate of the FCI, the Northern Transvaal Chamber of Industries. In short, capital has shifted its ground to a less strident approach on political questions and instead is attempting to influence the state through what is termed 'the quiet approach'. In business circles this is summed up by contrasting the publicly confrontational approach that Chris Ball of First National Bank took with the cautious, conservative, behind-the-scenes style of Warren Clewlow, Barlow Rand's Deputy Chairman. The latter is cited as a more appropriate example of the approach for capital to follow.

## NP Power Base

Essentially, while the government and the NP is divided, this does not mean that reform has been accorded a low priority. Rather the *meaning* of reform has shifted. Those who equate reform to speeding up the process of democratisation (e.g. the NP's Nothnagel) are clearly in the minority. The dominant viewpoint stresses economic growth with selective redistribution.

The relative weight of different departments, and in particular the role of the Department of Defence, is a consequence of the new direction of reform. Certainly, the involvement of the defence force in this process of control/restructuring of black townships has had the effect of shifting the military's priorities away from one dimension (external defence/border control) and given it a dual role to play. If the Angola/Namibia issue is really settled — and the SADF now has an added incentive deriving from its internal role — then the state will be able to divert significant amounts of revenue towards township restructuring. This process would increase the role and power of the military in society.

The ruling party is both strong and weak depending on whether one is posing the question in terms of its relationship to blacks or to whites. In relation to the black extra-parliamentary organisations, the government is clearly in a powerful position. It has effectively

disorganised them and reduced their organisational role to one of international diplomacy as they attempt to strengthen the international sanctions and isolation lobbies and, in particular, to influence US governmental policy. Although these organisations have been effectively emasculated, this does not mean that the government has won popular support from the mass of the black population. It has, however, effectively gained a breathing space, enabling it to pursue its 'reform' policy. In this sense the government is relatively stable — its administrative, political and military machine has a comprehensive hold on black opposition.

However, in regard to whites, the social basis of support upon which the NP and the government has rested is no longer as secure as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. They do not command the unfailing support of white farmers and blue collar workers — many of whom have swung over to the CP — nor have they unequivocally forged a new basis of support amongst urban professionals, businessmen and skilled white collar workers. This is particularly the case when placed in the context of the ever persistent Afrikaner/English divide in white society. The NP has managed in the past to forge a unity of support which was broader than Afrikaner nationalism but it has still to prove that what has been lost to the CP has been compensated for by gains in urban English-speaking votes.

There is an ultimate irony in this process, in that having committed itself irrevocably to reform (in this new phase, meaning redistribution/security), the government is not guaranteed of being able to win over sufficient electoral support to comfortably move along this path. As long as the government sees reform as not necessarily meaning an extension of democratic rights to disenfranchised blacks, and as long as the government is not prepared to attempt to gain electoral support from middle-class blacks to compensate for lost support, amongst whites democracy in its present form is a potential obstacle to the further implementation of a NP-directed reform process. Further reform may well mean a process of restricting democratic rights and a further narrowing of parliamentary privileges as the NP protects itself from its white right.

## Disinvestment & Sanctions

The influence that foreign policy such as disinvestment and sanctions have had on South Africa's politics are complex. Both actions have been predicated on an assumption that their adoption and implementation will result in such massive external pressure being exerted that the government will be forced, within a relatively short time, to either negotiate majority rule, or implement a process of rapid political democratisation within its reform program.

Disinvestment as a strategy has led to the opposite political result, however. Instead of increasing forces for positive change within South Africa it has led to a decrease in such power. Foreign companies which might have exerted such pressure and power have withdrawn, and disinvestment has resulted in a transfer of ownership from foreign multinationals to locally owned

companies. The economic effect is complex since these local companies still maintain a relationship via licensing agreements and so on. Politically, however, the effect has been to strengthen the political presence of local corporations relative to foreign corporations, with a concomitant decrease in the local political influence of the latter.

The effects of sanctions are much more complex. Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under the conditions of insurrectionism that prevailed in 1986 might well have forced the government to change course rapidly. However, under the current conditions of an ebb in mass resistance, external pressure by itself is unlikely to bring about a major and rapid shift in government policy. There are signs that the change in the overall socio-political conditions under which sanctions are supposed to impact is being noticed by external advocates of sanctions.

The debate within US policy circles reflects some feeling amongst supporters of sanctions that comprehensive mandatory sanctions are no longer appropriate to the current South African political scene. A major political factor is the perception that some trade sanctions could seriously undermine black organisations, particularly the trade unions, in a context where the latter are already on the defensive, and there is no short-term possibility of dramatic political change. As a consequence, there is an increasing tendency to regard selective sanctions that focus on the weaknesses of the apartheid system to be the best method to force political change in the medium term. The major thrust of such selective sanctions is likely to be directed towards strengthening financial sanctions against South Africa.

If this transpires the government will be faced with a desperate shortage of funds to implement its redistributive reform strategy, i.e. to pay for the houses, infrastructure, streets, electrification, and job creation programmes aimed at urban African townships. The government will have to increase revenue through taxation and import duties, and to cut expenditure through privatisation and the reduction of military-linked costs.

## Privatisation

Although there has been much confusion generated by government pronouncements on privatisation, involving much talk without real substance on what action the government intends taking to implement its policy — the real meaning of state policy has only recently been clarified. In essence, the state policy is not going to introduce a 'Thatcherite' selling-off of public corporations. Instead, the government's intention in introducing privatisation appears to be threefold:

- to use privatisation to transform the internal accounting and management practices in the state productive sector, so that these are in line with standard business practice in the private sector;
- to use privatisation to raise additional state disposable revenue; and,
- to use privatisation to escape the potentially crippling

social security responsibilities that will be incurred by accepting African communities as part of the South African nation.

The government intends to use privatisation in order to expand its revenue base so that it can buy itself out of the fiscal crisis caused by an elaborate constitutional structure and state overspending. In addition, the emphasis on redistribution as the main plank of its reform project requires a major injection of finance. Privatisation is seen as one of the important mechanisms in funding the township upgrading program currently undertaken by the NSMS. Privatisation is also a means of expanding a shrinking corporate tax base — as Wim de Villiers (ex-General Mining) pointed out, the fact that since 1973 67,3 percent of all net fixed investment was made in the public sector has meant a serious reduction in the tax base (*Business Day* 5/9/88).

The emphasis is, therefore, on transforming the parastatals into efficiently functioning enterprises run by means of capitalist accounting principles. If this were not the case, there would be no incentive for private capital to buy into any state corporation. Herein also lies the key to the manner in which privatisation is likely to occur. It seems highly unlikely, from all the evidence available thus far, that the government will engage in a wholesale selling off of parastatals. The only parts that are likely to be fully privatised (i.e. sold lock, stock and barrel) are the peripheral servicing activities of various parastatals, with for example, the design functions sold off.

As for the rest — i.e. the core productive activities — a significant but minority shareholding will be made available to private capital for investment without the government losing their controlling interest. This will allow a reorganisation of these parastatals to make them more profitable, to retain state control over them, to give private capital the incentive to hold portfolio investment in them, and yet still ensure that revenue is raised from their partial sale.

The other aspect of the privatisation program refers to the transformation of state-provided social services. The classic apartheid era was based on the racially differentiated provision of social services. Whites particularly, but also coloureds and Indians, on the one hand, had access to a form of state social welfarism. Africans, particularly migrants, on the other hand depended on the 'homeland' tribal structures for social security. The acceptance of Africans as part of the South African 'nation people' has given the government two possible options — either include those racially excluded or discriminated against on the same terms as previously available to whites, with the extension of these services causing a massive drain on the state fiscus; or downgrade the social welfare functions of the state at the same time as this process of inclusion occurs.

To take medical health as an example, the state is using privatisation as a means of excluding, through redirection to private medical aids and hospitals, those citizens previously cheaply catered for by state hospital services, whilst simultaneously including Africans into a downgraded primary health care hospital system. This allows the state to restructure on a new basis state

medical social services — i.e. privatised medical health to the middle and upper strata of society (including the skilled working class), irrespective of colour; and primary health care, in combination with downgraded hospital facilities, for the unemployed and bulk of the working class.

## Growth Factor

The scene has thus been set for the major emphasis in the state's reform process to fall on the redistribution element. As it now stands there are powerful forces within both the business sector and the state arguing against necessarily equating reform with rapid democratisation. Attempting to significantly widen the base of political representativity, it is said, will only lead to increasing and uncontrolled demands for the available resources that the state has to distribute. In simple terms, the argument goes that there is no point in allowing politics to cut up the cake unless it can be significantly enlarged. Democratisation and increased representativity are therefore being seen as potentially in contradiction to the newly dominant element of the reform process — redistribution.

Furthermore, it is argued in some reform circles that the parliamentary form is an obstacle to the current path that reform is taking. Insofar as it obstructs the construction of a strong state which can decisively intervene to ensure restructuring of the economy, sustained growth and selective redistribution, democratic representation even for whites, coloureds and Indians is being regarded as expendable. The shift of power towards the executive is thus further reinforced.

There is an increasing tendency to draw the political lessons of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of South-East Asia. As a senior executive in Barlow Rand has succinctly stated:

'We have to follow the path of the East Asian NICs. I think we have come a long way in understanding that the really important issues are economic. We desperately need to do something about the economy, otherwise you will never solve your political problems. You can only grow and give slices as the economy grows, otherwise you get too many distortions ... you destroy the capital base. Study the economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong ... what is the government form in these countries? It is a dictatorship or colonial form' (author interview).

There is substantial sympathy, within the confines of a strong state, for placing the emphasis in the reform process on redistribution. A consistent position emerging is that executive attempts to facilitate redistribution are futile unless the government also decisively intervenes to ensure restructuring of the economy and sustained growth. With the question of economic growth setting the pace for redistribution, and this, in turn, laying forth the possible agendas of political reform, the emphasis within reform debate is falling on possible long-term economic strategies.

This emphasis is important in understanding the limits of the redistribution strategy underlying reform.


The argument is often advanced that the state does not have enough resources to upgrade every township, and furthermore, that economic upgrading does not necessarily mean the state will gain political consent for its policies. While it is true that the government is hemmed in by its own fiscal crisis, this argument misses the point about the underlying intentions of the redistribution strategy. The point is not to immediately upgrade all areas on a massive scale and ensure the consent of all blacks. The government strategy is intentionally selective and long-term. The question is not whether the government can upgrade all townships in the immediate future but rather whether they can achieve enough of a spread over the next five to ten years.

Unlike Verwoerdian apartheid, the state is not concerned with implementing a uniform policy for all blacks. It is rather, by being intentionally selective and favouring certain areas and classes at the expense of others, aiming at facilitating class and regional differentiation within black society. The aim is to foster maximum division and through a strategy of containment, control and neutralisation, make the creation of a broad alliance of black communities against the state so much more difficult.


PART IV

FATALITIES BY CATEGORY  
Six Comparative Periods

SCENARIOS



### FATALITIES BY CATEGORY Six Comparative Periods



KEY	
TOTAL DEATHTOLL	3 574
1/9/84 - 10/6/88	
Six Unrest Periods	
Period	Deathtoll
National State of Emergency No2 12/6/87 - 10/6/88	930
National State of Emergency No1 12/6/86 - 11/6/87	731
Post-State of Emergency Phase 8/3/86 - 11/6/86	594
Build-up Unrest 1/1/85 - 20/7/85	217
Early Rumblings 1/9/84 - 31/12/84	149

**Monitoring Notes**

- It has not been possible to provide a breakdown of where, when and how deaths occurred in the period 1 September to 31 December 1984.
- The figures on political violence fatalities are compiled from a combination of daily press, police, Bureau for Information, parliamentary estimates and independent monitors. In mid-1986 the state created the Bureau for Information as the only legal source for 'unrest' data/incidents (or confirmation thereof), a function which has since reverted to the police.
- Official records supplied in parliament and at press conferences tend to differ from independent monitors; and further, cover interim periods that differ from the breakdown used in this table.
- The paucity of detail in official reports and a wide range of media restrictions has made it increasingly difficult to attribute specific responsibility for political violence fatalities. It must be stressed that the fatality count arrived at in this Indicator SA monitoring exercise constitutes a set of provisional figures that are significantly lower than the probable actual fatality count.

**Category Notes**

- 1 Security forces includes SADF, SAP, SA Railways police, municipal police, kitskonstabels, security guards and homeland-based soldiers or police. Insurgents killed by security forces in township shootouts are not included here (see fifth category).
- 2 The second category includes fatalities in several distinct types of political conflict that are statistically inseparable in most media and police reports, however. All specified reports of burnt bodies, often the victims of 'necklace' killings (whose political affiliation is unknown), have been included here. The sub-categories include:
  - feuding between extra-parliamentary opposition groups, e.g. UDF and Inkatha in KwaZulu/Natal, UDF and Azapo, and between labour groups e.g. Cosatu and Uwusa.
  - left-wing activist attacks on 'collaborators' (black town councillors, Binlo singers, informers, etc.), vigilantes and third force groups.
  - right-wing township, shack settlement and homeland vigilante attacks on opposition groups.
- 3 The third category includes many Natal midlands fatalities, white unrest victims (except for security force fatalities), assassinations of leaders by 'death squads', deaths of detainees and prisoners awaiting trial for unrest offences. The deaths of 65 Crossroads (CT) victims from May/June 1986 are included here because specific responsibility cannot be attributed to 'wildoekers' (vigilantes), the 'comrades' or security forces.
- 4 The fourth category mostly reflects security force casualties in unrest clashes but includes a few members killed in township or rural shootouts with insurgents.

IPSA



# THE ALTERNATIVE

## Post-apartheid Visions

Paulus Zulu

When, on 18 February 1988, the state restricted 18 organisations to 'office work' only and thus barred them from any access to public platforms, it was making a significant statement. The first part of the statement was that the 'turmoil' in the townships had reached a stage where repressive tolerance could not contain it and, therefore, those organisations which, in the eyes of the state, were responsible for 'agitation' had to be effectively silenced. The second part of the statement was that the state's 'total strategy' was at stake and together with this, the constitutional reform initiatives. The October municipal elections were on the way, on which would depend the legitimacy of the regional services councils and probably the state president's national council.

The state's belief was that the extra-parliamentary opposition, particularly the popular forces (civic and community organisations) and to a certain extent the unions, were bent on wrecking the coming elections. It was, therefore, necessary to get such opposition out of the way. These particular emergency restrictions have to be seen partly within this context, and partly as an intensification of the state's repressive apparatus. The main issues are that the state faces two challenges, both crucial to its existence in its current form: the external and the internal, and to contain the external challenge, the state has to sort out the 'internal mess'.

In ordinary parlance, resistance refers to a conservative anti-change stance. In South Africa the opposite pertains. It refers to those forces that refuse to comply with the state's conservative programme. The internal challenge to the state has not only brought about confrontation between the state and the black population, it has also torn the black community asunder. The state's reform strategy is designed to create 'space' and thus win over a section of the black population. However, in most instances, reform through co-optation has backfired as individuals and groups, in expressing their anger and frustrations, have turned upon the co-opted functionaries (town councillors, and at times, officials in the homelands) as representatives of the state.

The other side of the resistance coin is constituted by protests against deteriorating material conditions in the townships (hikes in rents and transport fares, lack of equipment and books in schools, and the soaring prices

which bite heavily on black consumers). Both sides of the coin often lead to protests which, in turn, draw in the heavy hand of the police. The confrontation leads to retaliation where protesters turn on councillors, policemen and other government functionaries. As attacks and counter-attacks continue, anarchy sets in. This is the anatomy of the so-called 'black on black violence'. There are numerous allegations, and in some instances, serious indications that the state is in collusion with the conservative elements in the conflict.

### Social Composition

Because specific issues such as rent, transport or education trigger off resistance and, consequently, unrest, groupings tend to follow along the same lines. Hence the following broad categories comprise the main groups engaged in resistance politics:

- youth organisations located mainly in educational institutions but also including a significant section of the unemployed youth and some of the youth affiliated to the unions;
- civic and community organisations, both permanent and ad hoc. Here the membership may even be cross-cutting where an individual holds membership in more than one organisation; permanent organisations include residents' associations, whilst ad hoc groupings focus on an immediate issue such as a hike in transport fares.
- youth groups, residents' associations and transport committees may, together, organise a consumer boycott campaign, thus necessitating the formation of a consumer boycott committee;
- institutional groupings such as the church, labour and professionals may work in close alliance with community groups. Such tactical alliances strengthen the latter by creating more space for both organisation and administration, especially in the light of the expertise, discipline and experience gained in both union and church work.

In one way or another, community and youth organisations are affiliated to or work in a close

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relationship with regional and national umbrella bodies. The United Democratic Front (UDF) is a conglomerate of civic, community, professional, youth and labour organisations. Likewise, the National Forum (NF) displays the same composition as the UDF but tends to have a more regional than national concentration.

The main groups in the resistance movement include:

- youth organisations

Numerous youth organisations exist in the townships and in some instances co-ordinate their efforts in order to effect changes in specific spheres, e.g. in education when youth congresses collectively call for free books and stationery or organise commemorative services. The socio-economic origins of the student movement explain the politicisation of educational issues and their central role in extra-parliamentary opposition politics: 'The late sixties to the early seventies were the years of economic boom in South Africa. Economic growth had demonstrated the need for more skills at an increasing scale. This necessitated an investment in education, particularly in African education. Ironically the increase in numbers in African schools further revealed the contradictions in a racist society. When the recession of the late seventies set in, the Lumpenproletariat was young, better schooled and more politicised. Conservative provisions of the sixties could not contain the consolidated fury of the mid to late seventies' (Nzimande & Zulu, 1987:2).

- the United Democratic Front

Initially, the UDF came into being in opposition to the government's tricameral plan and the Koornhoof Bills. By the beginning of 1987 it had well over 600 civic, student, youth, community, labour and other organisations affiliated to it, with the Freedom Charter as a common rallying point.

- the National Forum

While ideologically the UDF is a charterist organisation, the main thrust of the NF is black consciousness. Secondly, the National Forum and particularly the Azanian Peoples Organisation (its main component), has a card-carrying membership whilst the UDF is a broad representation of affiliated organisations and, therefore, almost confederal in nature. Both, however, espouse a policy of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa and will not co-operate with the state or other apartheid-sponsored bodies.

- worker organisations

In addition to popular organisations like the UDF and the NF, worker organisations like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council for Trade Unions (Nactu) work closely with community mass-based organisations at the community level.

- professional and church organisations

The thrust of the professional, educational, business and church organisations is to promote the 'alternative concept' as an ideological and practical programme of empowering the disadvantaged communities.

## Resistance Logic

One of the ways of evaluating a group of actors engaged in a cause to bring about justice is to subject both their utterances and activities to a predetermined set of internal and external criteria. Internal criteria entail looking for consistency within the actors' philosophical visions of the world and examining the means they adopt to realise their visions. External criteria refer to the compatibility between the actors' means and goals and the universal values encompassing justice. Since resistance groupings are organised around a common philosophical base, policy, strategy and techniques, a critical assessment within this framework is both inevitable and desirable in order to constitute the strategic logic of the actors.

However, in carrying out this evaluation, it is necessary to bear two points in mind. Firstly, resistance constitutes a set of normative objections to the established legal order. Resistance groupings have to operate against the legal system and flourish mainly through delegitimising the existing socio-legal order. This immediately brings them into the state's firing line where retribution ranges from intimidation, detention and banning, to death in detention in some instances. Secondly, because of the constitution of the various groups engaged in resistance, i.e. a coalition of actors caught in a multi-strategy situation, their programme of action is often anticipatory and vague (the main intention is to mobilise support). However, in spite of this constraint the various groups of actors within the organisations do have specific 'programmes of action'. In some instances, these are rigidly adhered to even to the extent of limiting tactical flexibility.

Resistance groups believe in and strive to realise 'a single non-racial South Africa' based on the principles of democracy and fair play. They see the present system in South Africa as discriminatory and exploitative. At one level this is a response to the material and status inequalities that exist in apartheid South Africa, and at another, a re-affirmation of the basic democratic principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as espoused by the various religious and political movements in the country. While basically they believe that this democratic non-racial future can be negotiated, they feel that the state's intransigence, and especially its repressive response to challenges, diminishes the chances for negotiation. This has prompted them to lay down specific preconditions for negotiation such as:

- the freeing of political prisoners and detainees;
- the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, other political organisations and individuals;
- allowing the political exiles to return;
- removing the troops from the townships; and
- depoliticising the function of the police in the townships.

To the resistance groupings a political solution must precede any changes to economic arrangements since access to economic position is predicated on race in South Africa. (Nolutshungu 1983). Black people understand this too well. They have a subjective experience of a skewed redistributive system which equates black with inferiority. The affluence and peace

in Durban North contrasts with the poverty and insecurity in KwaMashu, where the residents are too poor even to paint their houses and save them from the anonymity to which they have been destined (Meer 1987).

## Transformation

Confronted with social and economic inequalities, resistance groups have found a possible solace in the socialist alternative. Their alternative is more an existential than an ideological socialism. In other words there is no clear doctrinaire line but rather a broadly conceptualised economic order, wherein the country's resources are equitably distributed. This is roughly articulated in a call for:

- the nationalisation of major industries or a significant portion thereof;
- equality of opportunity, with access to work training and the reward system;
- an equitable distribution of the country's resources, i.e. land, industries and profits;
- free access by all to the country's social security system.

There is a significant group among the professional and managerial classes as well as among older people, which emphasises a mixed economy of the Scandinavian model, i.e. some form of social democracy. Members of the resistance movements, whether within the popular or labour fields, remain unimpressed by the arguments that socialism does not generate as much wealth as capitalism or that socialism has had a bad track record in Africa. To them, these arguments have no substance in South Africa, given the glaring existential inequalities in the workplace as well as structural inequalities in the living space.

Political as well as economic visions are sustained by a corresponding educational system. To the actors engaged in resistance politics, the future educational system hinges on the abolition of the current one, which they view as a perfect recipe for subservience. Frere's model, 'the pedagogy of the oppressed', thus becomes a philosophical point of departure as well as a political programme. It encompasses conscientisation of the society to the current ills in both society and education, thus facilitating a healthy reconstruction. Education forms part of the terrain for the struggle for social, political, economic and intellectual transformation. In practical terms this can be realised firstly in the building of democratic organs where the people shall participate not only in the administration, but also in the planning of their education; and, secondly, in the development of an alternative curriculum moulded to suit the socio-economic and political environment in which education takes place.

Black education, according to the resistance groupings has become the terrain for both resistance and containment. Educational reforms are seen as designs to create a buffer class through a meritocratic, elitist system — an illusion whereby an increase in the black educational budget allows for an increase in numbers whilst leaving problems of a qualitatively

inferior education unattended.

## Policy and Strategy

Resistance groups share a common policy which basically attempts to isolate the state from all constituencies. Accordingly, all of them reject participation in and co-operation with the state-created institutions at all levels. In this way they hope to create alternative structures such as civic organisations, street committees, and alternative professional and occupational organisations such as the National Medical and Dental Association or the National Educational Crisis Committee.

The objective behind the formation of alternative structures is to give expression to the will of the people and wrest the initiative away from the state structures, which pose as avenues of redress while they are responsible for the very suffering which they purport to redress. For instance, landlessness and shacks are a direct product of governmental policy, yet the state creates black town councils which in turn allocate housing in the townships. Shack-dwellers therefore seek refuge from the agents of their persecution. This not only depoliticises the town council system, but gives it the mantle of benefactor as well. Alternative structures therefore conscientise the masses to their lot as well as empower them to devise their own solutions to their problems.

Strategies adopted by the resistance movements have varied with the state's response to the challenge, from petition to peaceful defiance and finally, confrontation. Most strategies have been 'moment actions', although this does not imply lack of planning and executing a clearly defined design in long-term situations. Boycotts of rent and transport, work stayaways and strikes, school, consumer and voter boycotts, are widely known and the most frequently practiced strategies. The basic aim is to conscientise and mobilise for support as well as force the state or the private sector to the negotiating table.

As the state meets each challenge with growing repression, from sheer brutal forms such as baton charging, teargas and shooting, to more sophisticated forms such as banning and detention, so has the potential for violence from the resistance groups grown. In essence, violence is not on the formal agenda of resistance groupings, but is often a momentary response or retaliation to more organised violence by the state. Admittedly, there have been acts of violence against town councillors, members of the police and 'police informers', but in many instances this has followed pitched street battles with the police. In retaliation people have turned on the nearest objects that they identify with the state. There have also been cases where dissenters from planned strategies, such as boycott breakers, have been severely dealt with. However, these are isolated and unco-ordinated cases which do not fall into the general anatomy of violence as policy but rather occur as part of the structural problems inherent in the politics of resistance within a highly repressive climate.

The success of the strategies is difficult to measure,

given the overall political climate within which they operate. The first problem comes from the conception of justice by each of the contesting parties, i.e. the state versus the actors engaged in resistance. On its part the state conceives justice in legal terms. The resistance movements argue that such a definition of justice is fraught with problems of power and powerlessness which reflect the social relations as they exist in South Africa. Their conception of justice is based on a moral perception which the state finds threatening to its hegemony. The second problem is a function of the first. Operating within a hostile environment where the state perceives their activities as a threat to 'law and order', resistance groups have to contend with harassment and intimidation. This creates various disjunctures in their operations, especially in their communication. It perhaps accounts for their shortcomings, especially their sometimes unco-ordinated actions.

While both policy and strategy dictate the tactics employed by the resistance groups, in many instances, tactics are 'moment actions' operating at the street level. Their main objective is to mobilise support, put strategies into effect and to express protest against and rejection of the system. Street demonstrations, the forced resignation of community councillors, 'people's courts' and 'street committees' fall into this category. It is not uncommon that violence breaks out at this level of operation since it constitutes the arena for conflict where the state and its apparatus seek to re-assert themselves by crushing any opposition move as an illegal activity.

## Exploiting Spaces

Internal as well as external developments have demonstrated the socio-political and socio-economic effectiveness of the resistance in the townships. Faced with a crisis of legitimacy, the state has constantly been forced back to the drawing board to restructure the political and administrative machinery in the country. This reform, through restructuring, creates space for the resistance movement. For instance, the Department of Education and Training gave in on the establishment of the students' representative councils, despite the safeguards and the intensification of security measures. This was not only a tacit admission by the Department, that the system, as it existed, did not allow for a democratic representation of the educational interests of the African people, but a psychological victory for the 'comrades'.

Similarly, the legal recognition of trade union rights for African employees was an outcome of resistance on the factory floor. The economic effects of resistance have also had far-reaching consequences. Since the 1973 Durban strikes and Soweto 1976, both the state and the private sector have conceded and, in significant instances, practically implemented the principle of parity in remuneration at the professional and managerial levels. Admittedly, this constitutes part of the efforts to create an African middle class with a stake in the system. However, the political symbolism and the economic outcome could be interpreted differently.

Both represent the positive fruits of resistance. It is such spaces that the resistance movement has exploited to advance both the material and psychological dimensions of the popular struggle.

At the popular level, resistance has acted as the main agent in conscientising the masses and mobilising them against social, economic and political disadvantages. This has resulted in the formation of grassroots organisations that do not only challenge the existing social order, but also endeavour to reconstruct a future society. The 'alternative' concept has moved from a theoretical stance to a practical programme — the programmes on alternative education, community health and street committees to name a few.

The concept of 'people's justice' as against the conventional 'legal' system needs a closer examination. The oft quoted reference to 'Kangaroo courts' is perhaps more of an ideological reference than an appraisal based on objective facts. 'Comrades' argue that the South African legal system is based on the existing power relations and is, therefore, a political tool. They cite the numerous convictions for political offences as examples, and contend that the sophisticated trappings do not make that system more acceptable than the people's courts which, in their opinion, reflect the sentiments of the communities. Whatever the arguments are in both cases, in the final analysis, questions of method and detail do not enhance a judicial system if its basic premises are non-democratic.

The international consequences of township resistance have been far-reaching. There is no doubt that resistance has drawn more attention to and elicited more international sympathy for the underprivileged than has been the case with the activities of so-called forces of moderation, e.g. high profile homeland leaders or private corporations.

However, township resistance has its problem areas. In the first place actors engaged in resistance have made no distinction between protest as policy and protest as strategy. Part of this 'inability' is due to a misplaced belief that the state is about to disintegrate, although the South African state does not demonstrate any tendency in that direction whatsoever. This misplaced notion has meant that the resistance movement has failed to take advantage of spaces created by the state's policy. For instance, the township or popular resistance movement has not considered principled participation for purposes of making gains in organisational strategy. Cosatu has made tremendous gains in the politics of production mainly through participation in a game where the rules were drawn not to favour workers.

Secondly, in the deployment of tactics the resistance movement has alienated some segments of the black population. The poor organisation (understandable in the face of the state's onslaught on the extra-parliamentary opposition) has resulted in the adoption of coercive measures such as the stoning of buses to enforce a boycott or the confiscation of goods bought from boycotted shops. This gave the state the appropriate space to manoeuvre where it unleashed both police and vigilante power against the 'criminals'. The state, through the media, had long been involved in a propaganda campaign to criminalise protest. The

leadership of the vigilantes could thus whip up human emotions against the protesting youth. Poor communication and other related 'blunders' on the part of the resistance movement did little to alleviate the situation.

Further problems of miscalculation by the extra-parliamentary opposition have resulted in more hardships for the disadvantaged populations, thus further blurring the positions of victor and victim. For instance, workers forced to observe a stayaway strike for no economic gains lose income. This promoted Cosatu to mediate in June 1986 when it was rumoured that the township-based actors were considering a work stayaway between 16 – 26 June. The outcome was that a one-day stayaway was called for on 16 June.

Similarly, shoppers forced to boycott often have to alter their shopping habits and patterns at their own expense and inconvenience, whilst commuters denied access to public transport incur costs such as increased transport fares and longer periods away from home. Admittedly, in a struggle there have to be sacrifices, but such sacrifices have to be informed by a sound educational and communication programme to the masses. It is the absence of such a programme that has to be regretted, especially when such absence results in hardships which may include, and have in some instances included, acts of violence.

## Uneasy Calm

The imposition of the state of emergency, together with the restrictions of organisations and persons, have adversely affected the internal resistance movements. Taking the country as a whole there is an uneasy calm in the townships today, except for some areas in Natal and at times the Eastern Cape and some 'sparks' in Soweto. In Natal the street battles are pitched on a different terrain yet the underlying causes are as fundamental as those of 1984-85. In both the Eastern Cape and Soweto, it is a continuation of the old battles, with the change being in magnitude and scale only. It is an uneasy calm because the underlying causes, objective material inequalities, high rents, poor conditions in the schools, high transport tariffs and wages that cannot meet the high prices, still pertain. The fundamental conflict between state and the people remains as unresolved as ever. The poor turn-out in the October municipal elections, despite the heavy state propaganda, is ample evidence that we have not shifted from 1983.

However, the constraints have facilitated a rethink and an internal evaluation by the resistance groupings themselves. Firstly, there have been some important lessons to learn. The confrontation in 1984 and the subsequent momentum in the conflict were premised on the notion of a disintegrating state. Developments such as street committees, people's education for people's power and rendering the country ungovernable were attempts to create space for people's democracy. In some instances there was creation of space, in many the 'spaces' were short-lived because the state's power turned out to be overwhelming. Also, in terms of co-optive repression the vigilantes and kitskonstabels

did a thorough job, thus in a way distancing the state from the immediate conflict.

With the realisation that the shrinkage of 'space' can immobilise actors, resistance groups have begun to engage in debates about 'principled participation' or started to adopt a measure of tolerance towards opposite views. They appear to be entering into tactical alliances with some elements within the 'opposition', at least in community projects that do not call for overt political alignments.

### ● Acknowledgement

Adapted from an article entitled: 'Resistance in the Townships: An Overview', forthcoming in IBR and Mariba Publications, 1988


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# Data Trends

## THE CO-INCIDENCE OF RECESSION & SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROTEST

The trendline reflects the combined effect of 30 indicators of economic activity as recorded by The Reserve Bank of South Africa. (Recessions are shaded areas)



● Sharpeville

● Onset of Natal labour protest

● Soweto riots

● Natal school unrest/onset of Lamontville unrest, etc.

● Onset of Vaal Triangle and 1984-86 national unrest

## POLITICAL OPTIONS

### Countering Cycles of Violence

*Lawrence Schlemmer*

There are interpretations to be placed on South Africa's political protests of 1984-88 which are utterly unambiguous. Among these are the messages for the system of government contained in the violence. One message, the broadest perhaps, is that the most active, aspiring section of the country's black youth are fundamentally estranged not only from the present mode of government but also from its possible future trajectory. Although not necessarily causes of the violence, sentiments lauding a complete alternative to anything like the current structure of government, proliferated in the protests. One recalls the Soviet flags flown at the funerals of unrest victims as the most obvious symbol of the alternative.

In parenthesis, it strikes one that these flags have to be interpreted carefully nonetheless. The white ultra-right at present and during the years of the second world war has used flags depicting or reminiscent of Nazi symbols (the Ossewa Brandwag, the Greyshirts, the AWB). Like these, the Soviet flags at comrade funerals did not necessarily denote literal and specific support for a doctrine such as communism. For both camps, the flags were simply the strongest possible symbol of an alternative to British/white imperialism, respectively. They are measures of estrangement.

Another message is the message of neglect. A neglect of quality of life and neglect of the need that all communities have for reassurance and hope. Both the 1976-78 and the 1984-88 protests were a fitting, if delayed, rejoinder to the sixties and early seventies. During this period it was the stated intention of government to depress the quality of life for African people outside of the homelands, and there were frequent reminders that the townships were positively not to become 'honey pots', as it was once stated.

One more message which stands out is functional, but dramatic nonetheless. The basis of social authority is defective in South Africa. This conclusion is seen in the fact that throughout the major protests, there was relatively more civil unrest outside of African administered regions (the homelands) than inside them. This author walked through African areas in the Ciskei when it was courting life and limb to walk through an Eastern Cape township a few kilometres away. Without in any way defending certain homeland administrations, the lesser relative degree of unrest could not

conceivably be due only to greater repression (comrades in the Eastern Cape would concede that the South African security system is relatively gentle). In KwaZulu/Natal, more recently, the violence took place on the fringes between KwaZulu and Natal in places where the KwaZulu administration was never fully ensconced.

Virtually every African country has a dissident youth elite. Botswana, often taken as a shining light of legitimate democratic government, has just expelled 1 800 students in tertiary institutions. Zimbabwe, at the time of writing, is having to cope with substantial student demonstrations against alleged government corruption. Many African countries build their universities far away from centres of population. Yet youth elite disaffection, which is just as great (quantitatively) in Kenya, the Ciskei, Botswana and Bophuthatswana as it is in the common area of South Africa, is not perceived as a phenomenon which can generalise and spread. Outside of South Africa, the authorities speedily match dissidence with repression, and the world shrugs. Once a year Amnesty International publishes a horrifying report on repression throughout the third world.

Youth dissidence and violence in South Africa is seen in a different context, however, by foreign observers and by South Africans themselves. In Berlin, strident youth protest is taken as a comment on the student fringe. In South Africa, more than in any third world country, it is seen as a comment on the state. This, in a word, is the problem of 'legitimacy'. In other words, while student and youth dissidence will probably reappear in some future post-apartheid regime, it will not contain the same message or elicit the same interpretation.

More specifically, for every year that South Africa's economy grows at less than 4,5 to 5,5 percent per annum, youth unemployment and alienation will increase. This is a critical 'political' problem for a white-controlled government because it cannot be seen to be acting on behalf of black communities. For a black or majority government, this problem, unless it actually threatens the power of the state, will be a security

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management problem. The obvious question flowing from this is how long South Africa can afford to control the system without shared authority?

These messages of neglect, black youth estrangement and defective political authority are well known, but without restating them, South Africa's political violence cannot be appreciated in its full context.

## Some Specific Causes

The implications of violence are not necessarily its causes. Social events always acquire a value-added significance in a political arena. Nevertheless, it is important to reflect on some of the major causes of the violence.

## The Economy

The role of the economy in political conflict is fundamental, but quite frequently overlooked. The accompanying graph shows the remarkable coincidence between the average of 30 economic indicators and socio-economic unrest in South Africa since the 1960s.

The precise relationship between economic downturn (or the components of a downturn) and civil unrest are not adequately understood. That there is a relationship is certain. It probably includes the following dynamics during recessionary phases:

- the lowered prospects of finding employment demoralise senior school pupils, perhaps via their family or friends who are new job-seekers;
- pupils who might otherwise leave school either stay in school or return after failing standards eight to ten - this creates a climate of restlessness among all pupils;
- the pocket money of pupils or unemployed school-leavers is one of the first items in family budgets to be cut back;
- parents complain more about the cost of living, inflation and the struggle to make ends meet. Family life becomes tense, extra lodgers may be taken in, and the young generation become angry about the impact of external conditions on themselves and their families.

In other words, recessions, particularly sudden recessions, affect expenditure and decision-making at the margins quite severely. The shift in quality of life and aspirations can create intense frustration for a period lasting long enough to be mobilised into protest.

## Township Administration

The Van Der Walt Commission (1984-85) appointed to investigate the causes of disturbances in the Vaal Triangle identified corruption among councillors and ignorance of the way a system of representation should work or can work as keynote features in the initial civil unrest. Minister Heunis at one point, for example, had to intervene to stop the allocation of 16 bottle store licenses on the East Rand where councillors were illegitimately using their influence. The government tried to take steps to introduce a code of conduct for the new black local authorities as a consequence of

allegations of massive corruption (SAIRR 1985:26-91).

At a conference on 'Ethics for Town Councillors' organised by government in 1985, a delegate prominent in local African affairs said that it was part of traditional custom to accept gifts for favours. This highlights a fundamental problem in the government of townships, but it is structural rather than cultural.

In small communities, whether western or tribal, leadership is prominent in community affairs, including the power to secure personal advantage, but it is also very visible and usually embedded in powerful social networks of kinship and patronage. This visibility and the constraints imposed by expectations and vigilance in the networks, limit favouritism and personal advantage to that which is socially condoned.

The townships of South Africa are not communities as such. They are huge, mass aggregates of people. In mass society the social vigilance of networks does not exist and requires to be replaced by other structures. One such structure is voluntary organisation (associations, clubs, etc.). Another is the press. Without these institutions, democratically elected councillors in white areas or in the West generally would be just as corrupt as black town councillors. Our townships are composed of an amorphous mass of people who cannot through interaction sanction the behaviour of councillors. They are also, however, structurally under-developed communities since they are poorly organised into voluntary associations and there are few effective community newspapers.

Corruption in third world cities, for these reasons, is inevitable. There are, perhaps, a few fundamental solutions. One is strong party organisation, which will only exist once the UDF, Inkatha and other groupings organise to fight municipal elections.

A second option is perhaps to incorporate network leaders into black local government. This would involve a changed kind of local council on which not only elected representatives but also local church leaders, social workers, businessmen, school principals and police captains would serve.

A third option is to make councils much smaller, having a mini-municipal authority for each neighbourhood, which would at least break up city size townships into manageable, community-based communes, where some community surveillance of the activities of representatives is possible. Only this latter adjustment is within the capacity of the authorities to address.

## Ill-timed security decisions

The most recent wave of disturbances, the civil unrest phase between 1984-88, was in part mobilised (or co-opted) by various national mobilisation organisations which were already operating in 1983. The following is a quote from the 1983 Survey of Race Relations (SAIRR 1983:545-6):

'In May (1983) it was suggested that the government may be 'easing up' on banning orders in response to criticism and pressure from western countries. It was observed that no person had been banned since October 1982 ... Some observers linked the lifting of banning



orders to the US policy of constructive engagement,' Whether speculation on the cause of the 'easing up' was correct or not, the respite enabled national organisations to form and grow within the extra-parliamentary camp. This was also the time, however, when constitutional reforms which totally excluded African people were introduced and debated. The organisations attained even greater strength and coherence on the wave of perception of a co-optation of coloured and Indian people at the expense of Africans, and in the campaigns around the 1983 constitutional referendum and the 1984 elections for the tricameral parliament.

When a regional state of emergency was imposed in 1985, it started to weaken the leadership and the fabric of organisation of the UDF, Azapo, etc. By then, however, these organisations had acquired a following of youthful activists and other rank-and-file youth. As pointed out elsewhere in this volume, the state of emergency not only weakened progressive leadership but also destroyed its capacity to impose discipline.

If one were writing a textbook on how a government should court social dislocation, it would identify the following steps as more than sufficient; steps which are duplicated in the account above and other actions of the South African government from 1983 to 1986:

- lift security restrictions, possibly for extraneous reasons, which will be seen as a capitulation to pressure, and then fail to negotiate with the persons formerly restricted;
- at the same time, introduce changes in government which suggest a possibility of accommodation (raising expectations) but then deliberately exclude the formerly restricted organisations from all benefits;
- simultaneously allow popular township organisations to mobilise among youth, who are least inclined to self-discipline;
- when disturbances break out, re-impose restrictions on and avoid negotiating with the leaders and organisations which have the capacity to exercise discipline on the youth.

Nothing further need be said. It would have been surprising indeed if South Africa had not gone through a period of political violence.

### Overstressed School Systems

In any third world society in which youth are a substantial proportion of the population, and who also have the highest aspirations, the system of education is usually very destabilising (Hanf 1975). A major factor is

that as education provision grows, it becomes less and less efficient in serving the interests of the pupils, both in school and out of school.

In all of South Africa, including the homelands, the increase in African secondary school enrolment between 1979 and 1984 was 59 percent. Between 1980 and 1983 there was a 64 percent increase in standard eight examination candidates in the African schools in the common area, but the pass rate dropped sharply from 63 percent in 1981 to 52 percent in 1983. These are simply some indications of the mounting stress in the country's African school system (Verwey et al 1984).

Education is the major (for most, the only) avenue to opportunity for black youth. Obviously the extent to

which the school system becomes stressed and under-performs in terms of facilitating opportunity, is the most destabilising aspect in modern township society.

TABLE 1

#### White Attitudes on Security Actions

	POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS		
	All	NP	PFP
Percentage of white respondents 'satisfied' with:			
● police action in the townships	67%	75%	25%
● army action in the townships	75%	80%	39%

Source

A survey conducted by this author in August 1988 through IMS SA Ltd among a stratified random sample of 1 000 white voters in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand regions.

### Township Densities

The black ghetto riots of the 1960s in the USA reflected, inter alia, the effect of increasing stress of population density in the Northern and North-Western ghettos as black people moved in from the South in large numbers. The new arrivals are politically passive but in myriad ways, the host communities are so affected as to produce social tensions (Schlemmer 1968).

South African townships have been exposed to very rapid in-migration. Occupancy rates of houses and sites have risen and the space for individual activity and privacy is now critically constrained. The increased occupancy makes people feel that life is deteriorating, despite advances in wages and incomes. All services and amenities are under pressure and the general impression is one of congestion and underprovision.

It is under these circumstances that the more aspiring, younger and better-educated members of these communities live and experience on a daily basis a form of proof that the system has to be smashed. Radical mobilisation, which undoubtedly occurred, entered into the mix of conditions simply to provide focus and objectives. The motivation obviously preceded the mobilisation.

The socio-political issues related to economic recession, corrupt township administration, ill-timed security decisions, overstressed school systems and increased township densities, are some of the major

underlying causes of the violence. Obviously there were expatriate organisations with revolutionary goals which influenced the situation. As in 1976-77, however, the rise of political violence seemed to precede the utilisation of that violence as a focused strategy. The objective of making the townships ungovernable and of liberating certain areas through their capture by street committees crystallised after the townships had already become widely disrupted. The presence of radical organisations probably accounted more for the persistence of confrontation than for its origins.

## Future Implications

'Human conflicts cannot usually be settled by removing the original source' (Berelson & Steiner 1964). One may argue endlessly about the root cause of our political violence but in the course of unfolding, it acquired new dynamics which took it beyond the scope of the original material frustrations and social pressures which caused the violence in the first place.

The South African security agencies are mobilised, with other state departments, to address the material grievances of black people through the Joint Management Centres and their sub-organisations down to street level. The state of emergency appears to be seen as necessary despite the fall-off in violence outside of Natal and despite the attention being paid to township conditions. This is a measure of the added dimensions which the violence acquired.

One of the objectives of the state of emergency is to block radical goals so that the local leadership will re-orientate its strategy towards local level negotiation, or will be replaced by more 'moderate' individuals who are willing to co-operate. The latter process may well begin to occur, and when it does it could conceivably become a self-reinforcing trend if the authorities respond in ways to justify participation.

By all accounts and observations, however, a more resistant echelon of leadership, with longer-term and

more ambitious goals, will survive. If there is another sharp recession, and if it coincides with unpopular or controversial constitutional changes, this semi-latent leadership will be well-poised to remobilise. If the same mistakes are made as in the past, South Africa could well go through yet another cycle of violence.

One may almost comfortably predict this if the Conservative Party were to come to power. That in itself may result in a sharp fall of economic confidence, coinciding with far-reaching and unpopular constitutional changes.

Finally, however, it is necessary to assess the result achieved by political violence as a change strategy. The lowering of the level of confrontation as a result of the state of emergency (excluding Natal, where the violence is between opposing black power groups which does not affect the state directly) is more or less undeniable proof that confrontation cannot succeed while the state maintains its determination not to yield to unrest pressure.

## White Attitudes

Only if the support-base of the government were to develop sympathies accommodative of the aims of township activists is the government likely to yield. Unless this occurs, any response which could be interpreted as capitulation will simply provide political ammunition for the right-wing white opposition.

The accompanying tables demonstrate that the attitudes of most whites are immovable on township violence.

These survey results show that the larger majority of whites support coercive measures against political violence. Even among PFP supporters, four out of ten appear to approve of the presence of the army in the townships. The item which asks for a choice between reform, security action or both equally is also instructive. If one adds security action, and both security action and reform together (see table), as implying support for security control, then some 58 percent of

TABLE 2

### Values on National Security

SURVEY STATEMENT	SURVEY RESPONDENTS				
	All Whites	NP	PFP	Coloureds & Indians	Africans
1) National security best imposed by:					
reform	42%	34%	83%	41%	61%
tougher security	27%	22%	2%	17%	12%
both equally	31%	44%	15%	42%	26%
2) The State of Emergency should be:					
intensified	22%	21%	1%	6%	5%
retained	40%	60%	17%	7%	5%
eased	24%	18%	51%	30%	21%
lifted	12%	2%	31%	57%	69%

#### SOURCE

A survey undertaken by Market and Media Research for The Star, among a stratified random cluster sample of 500 whites, 120 coloureds and Indians, and 382 Africans in August/September of 1988, also in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand regions.

whites, 59 percent of coloureds and Indians, and even 38 percent of Africans would appear to endorse a 'political' role for internal security control.

In other words, township violence, no matter how compelling its causes and how justified the sentiments associated with it, is pushing up against immovable resistance at this stage. As it increases in intensity, so the sentiments of whites and even many blacks turn against it. Almost inevitably, political violence will exhaust itself and in the end undermine its own organisation, leaving the security agencies better informed and more sophisticated, with the economy and job-creation severely weakened.

The words of Martin Luther King spring to mind once again: '... rioting is not revolutionary, but reactionary, because it inspires defeat. It involves an emotional catharsis, but it must be followed by a sense of futility.'

However wise, Martin Luther King's warning is not an invitation to quiescence or apathy. It suggests, instead, that somehow or other the energy that goes into political violence must be channelled into realisable goals, offering end-rewards for participants.

South Africa's black communities are smothered by problems awaiting solution. If township activists mobilise around these concrete problems, and form alliances to facilitate negotiation around their solution, township organisations and their support will grow and be maintained. If the goals are manifestly signalled as being constructive and problem orientated, the authorities and their supporters will find it less easy to justify repression. Above all, perhaps, large, visible and cohesive township organisations with alliances and objectives which cannot be discredited as being revolutionary, will in the final instance exert far greater pressure for significant change than yet another cycle of violence and defeat.

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## STAYAWAY STRIKES IN THE 1980s

DATE & REGION	SUPPORT GROUPS
<b>The Union Stayaway</b>	
11 February 1982 Natal, W and E Cape: Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging (PWV)	Affiliates of emergent black union movement
<b>The Outbreak of Unrest, 1984</b>	
September/October 1984 Regional stayaways in Vaal Triangle (1-2/9/84), Soweto (17-18/9/84) and KwaThema (22/10/84)	Vaal Civic Organisation with support of Congress of SA Students, and other extra-parliamentary groups (Vaal Triangle), Release Mandela Committee (Soweto); and KwaThema Parent-Student Action Committee with trade union support
5/6 November 1984 Transvaal, centred mainly in PWV area	Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee: an umbrella body representing 37 trade unions, student and community groups
<b>The Civil Unrest of 1985/86</b>	
18/22 March 1985 Port Elizabeth (PE)/Uitenhage	PE Black Civic Organisation and Uitenhage Youth Congress, without support of Federation of SA Trade Unions (FOSATU) affiliates and other unions
28 March 1985 Uitenhage	Black labour movement, including FOSATU and GWU
1 May 1985 National	Many black trade unions
14 May 1985 Transvaal, Natal, E and W Cape	FOSATU
July 1985 Localised stayaways in Duduza (6/7/85), KwaThema (9/7/85 and 23/7/85) and Ratanda (23/7/85)	Various civic groups with support from extra-parliamentary opposition organisations
18 July 1985 Pietermaritzburg (PMB), Howick, and partly in Durban	Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU)
August 1985 Pretoria's townships (10-12/8/85), Witbank (15/8/85) and East London (21/8/85)	Same loose alliance
September 1985 PWV (1-3/9/85), Cape Peninsula (10-13/9/85), Queenstown (23-24/9/85) and East London (26/9/85)	Same loose alliance, with trade union participation
October 1985 Dimbaza (1/10/85), Witbank (8/10/85) and national 'prayaway' (9/10/85)	Various community groups and 47 religious groups form the National Initiative for Reconciliation (NIR) — not endorsed by trade unions
November/December 1985: Mamelodi, 21/11/85 and 3/12/85	Civic organisations, with support from other opposition groups
February 1986 Soshanguve (4/2/86), Mohlakeng (Randfontein 11/2/86), Saulsville/Atteridgeville (13/2/86), GaRankuwa (17/2/86), Witbank (17-23/2/86), Atteridgeville (19/2/86) and Alexandra (21/2/86)	Community and student groups
March 1986 Bela-Bela (Warmbaths, 3-10/3/86), Alexandra and Soshanguve (5/3/86), Mamelodi (17/3/86), Seisoville (Kroonstad) and PE/Uitenhage (21/3/86), and Ratanda (24/3/86)	Civic and student organisations, with support from other opposition groups
April 1986 Kabokweni (White River) and Nelspruit (1-7/4/86), Alexandra (23/4/86) and Cradock (28/4/86)	Civic organisations, with support from other opposition groups
May 1986 National stayaway (1/5/86) Port Alfred (5-11/5/86), Tembisa (14/5/86 and 29/5/86), Tumahole (Parys, 29/5/86)	Labour and extra-parliamentary movements (May Day), Regional civic, student and women's groups
16 June 1986 National	Supported by broad range of black trade unions, extra-parliamentary opposition and student and civic groups
<p><b>SOURCES:</b>                  Howe G. 'The Stayaway Strikes of 1984', <i>Indicator SA Urban Monitor</i>, Vol2/No4, 1984                  Kane-Berman J. 'Soweto: Black Revolt-White Reaction', Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978                  Moss G. 'Stay-Aways: Mass Strike or Demonstration?' <i>Work in Progress</i> No25, p29/34, 1985                  Webster E. 'Stay-Aways and the Black Working Class: The Evaluation of a Strategy', in <i>Journal of the South African Society</i> Vol14/No1, 1981</p>	

## 'Akuyiwa emsebenzini' ("We will not work")

PROTEST ISSUES	WORKER PARTICIPATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Death in detention of Neil Aggett, Transvaal Secretary of the Food and Canning Workers Union</li> </ul>	More than 106 130 workers participate in some form of protest action, from work stayaways to half-hour work stoppages.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rent and service charge increases</li> <li>Resignation of town councillors</li> <li>Release of detainees and police non-interference in unrest funerals</li> </ul>	Mass support for two stayaways, but not Soweto.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Withdrawal of police/army from African townships</li> <li>Release of detainees and political prisoners</li> <li>Reform of African educational system</li> <li>Abolition of 'unfair' taxes</li> <li>No rent/service-charge and bus fare increases</li> </ul>	Labour monitoring group (LMG) estimate between 300 000 workers (60% of blacks employed in private commerce and service sectors) and 800 000 (60% of total number of blacks employed in PWV — excluding miners) support call. Both media and employers in PWV area estimate 60% support.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mass retrenchments in region</li> <li>Future loss of jobs due to mergers in automobile industry</li> <li>Increases in petrol price</li> </ul>	LMG estimate that at least 120 000 workers stay away from work for at least one day — 90% of Africans in PE and 36% in Uitenhage. Excludes about 50% of PE/Uitenhage workers on short time.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police shooting of 20 Africans in Langa township (Uitenhage) on 21 March 1985</li> </ul>	8 000 Unionised workers halt work for 15 minutes to one hour.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May 1 to be a paid holiday</li> <li>A living wage and adequate support for unemployed</li> <li>40-hour working week, maternity rights</li> </ul>	Unknown, but generally of limited regional effect.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Death of Chemical Workers Industrial Union official, Andries Raditsela, soon after release from police custody</li> </ul>	14 000 Workers stay away from work to attend funeral in Tsakane. LMG estimates that 107 500 workers participate in stayaways and temporary work stoppages.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Security force action in the townships</li> <li>Funerals of unrest victims</li> </ul>	Mass regional community support.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To pressurise employers in Natal Midlands to lobby BTR Sarmcol to re-employ 950 workers, dismissed in recognition dispute</li> </ul>	LMG and MAWU estimate from survey of 49 firms that 92% of all PMB African workers participate — PMB Chamber of Industries estimate is 60%. Few support call in Durban.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Similar demands</li> </ul>	Mass regional support: 100% in East London.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commemoration of first anniversary of Vaal Triangle uprising</li> <li>An end to State of Emergency and unbanning of organisations</li> <li>The payment of a living wage</li> <li>To allow residents to attend funeral of ANC guerilla (Dimbaza)</li> <li>State of emergency and security force actions (NIR)</li> </ul>	Variable support of 20% to 60% for four-day stayaway in Peninsula, but migrants do not participate; in East London and Queenstown 100% success.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Security force presence in township, high rents and stringent restrictions on funerals</li> <li>Second stayaway for funerals of twelve unrest victims killed in earlier stayaway</li> </ul>	Massive stayaway in PE/Uitenhage in support of NIR — in rest of country success is moderate to weak, some JHB firms experience 80% absenteeism.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Release of detained community activists (Soshanguve and Witbank)</li> <li>Funerals of unrest victims (Mohlakeng, GaRankuwa and Atteridgeville)</li> <li>To commemorate death of student leader Emma Sathekge in 1984 (Sautsville/Atteridgeville)</li> <li>To allow residents to attend church-led meeting (Alexandra)</li> </ul>	Unknown extent of support. In Alexandra more than 45 000 people attend report-back after clergy meets with government.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rent hikes and corporal punishment at schools (Bela-Bela)</li> <li>Funerals of unrest victims (Alexandra and Seisoville)</li> <li>Release of detainees and disruption of meetings (Ratanda, Soshanguve and Mamelodi)</li> <li>To commemorate first anniversary of Langa shootings (PE/Uitenhage)</li> </ul>	Variable support. More than 100 000 participate in Alexandra, 80% in Seisoville and 100% in PE/Uitenhage.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unknown causes in Kabokweni and Nelspruit</li> <li>Funerals of unrest victims (Cradock) and mass meeting (Alexandra)</li> </ul>	Between 75% and 100% effective in Kabokweni and Nelspruit; 100% successful in Cradock and Alexandra.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May Day to be recognised as paid public holiday</li> <li>Arrival of Port Alfred women at May Day rally, and protest release of alleged rapist</li> <li>In attendance at funeral of unrest victims (Tembisa)</li> <li>Municipal police dismantle parks built by students</li> </ul>	LMG estimate more than 1 500 000 workers stay away on May 1. Regional worker support is 90% in E Cape, 15% in W Cape, 80% in PWV, 70% in Natal; and 80% of all miners participate. All women workers in Port Alfred; moderate support in Tembisa and Tumahole.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commemoration of 10th anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion</li> </ul>	LMG estimate more than 1 500 000 workers support stayaway (Natal excluded). Regional worker support is 90% in PWV, 35% in Cape Town, 100% in PE/Uitenhage, but only 10% of miners participate.

Source: Labour Bulletins 1983/86  
Press Clippings

# Data Trends

DATE & REGION	SUPPORT GROUPS
14 July 1986 Nationwide	Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
15/28 July 1986 KwaNdebele (Central Transvaal)	Anonymous pamphlets are distributed
31 July 1986 Uitenhage (E Cape)	Cosatu
14 August 1986 Duncan Village/Mdantsane (East London)	Community groups
<b>Evictions and Deaths in Rent Boycotts</b>	
4 September 1986 Soweto	Soweto Civic Association, with support from community and student groups
15 September 1986 Sharpeville (Vaal Triangle)	Community groups
1 October 1986 Nationwide	National Union of Mineworkers (Num) and Cosatu
17/22 November 1986 KwaNdebele	Anonymous pamphlet is distributed
21 November 1986 Mamelodi (Pretoria)	Community groups
<b>Detentions Under the Emergency</b>	
12 March 1987 Nationwide	Detainees Parents Support Committee and 15 other organisations, including Cosatu
15 April 1987 Transvaal	Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu)
21 April 1987 onwards Nationwide	Mawu
22/24 April 1987 Soweto	Anonymous pamphlets are distributed
<b>Parliamentary Election Protests</b>	
5/6 May 1987 Nationwide	Labour, extra-parliamentary, community and student groups
16 June 1987 Nationwide	Some loose alliance
15 October 1987 Tembiso (Springs)	Anti-Eviction Committee
1 February 1988 Ashdown (Pietermaritzburg)	No organisational initiative
17 February 1988 White City Jabavu (Soweto)	Unknown
21 March 1988 Nationwide	Unknown
6/8 June 1988 National	Cosatu and Nactu, with support from community and student groups
16 June 1988 National	No organisational initiative

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McCaul C. *Satellite in Revolt: KwaNdebele on Economic and Political Profile*. Johannesburg:

South African Institute of Race Relations, 1987.  
Quin D. 'Unrest Chronologies', in *Indicator SA 1986/7*.  
Reports of Port Elizabeth Labour Monitoring Group (PE LMG)

PROTEST ISSUES	WORKER PARTICIPATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The declaration of a national State of Emergency on 12 June 1986</li> <li>● Widespread detentions of workers and union officials, police raids on Cosatu offices</li> </ul>	<p>Labour Monitoring Group (LMG) estimates that in PWV region 12% of all African workers observe stayaway. Negligible support in S Natal while protest is cancelled in W Cape. In Port Elizabeth (PE) stayaway is extended for second day, with average 39% African worker support on both days.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Opposition to planned independence, with calls for resignation of homeland cabinet</li> <li>● Security force presence in villages and actions of Mbokatho vigilantes</li> <li>● Forced removal of Africans from Kabah suburb (Langa) to KwaNobuhle township</li> <li>● Concern over Department of Education and Training ruling that all African pupils must re-register in order to attend school after boycotts</li> </ul>	<p>By fourth day the entire African workforce of region, including civil servants, participate in stayaway.</p> <p>LMG survey of 23 companies shows that 79% of African and 43% of coloured hourly-paid staff participate in stayaway, which is strongest among African workers in Cosatu organised factories.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To commemorate civil unrest deaths of 1985</li> </ul>	<p>Stayaway achieves partial success.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To attend funerals of 15 unrest victims killed during rent protests</li> </ul>	<p>LMG estimates that 85% of Sowetans stayaway, resulting in 38% drop in worker attendance in manufacturing sector and 27% in retail sector in Johannesburg region. Only 5 000 to 8 000 attend funeral because of restrictions and security force presence. Putco claims only 50% drop in bus passenger loads.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Residents protest evictions during rent boycott campaign</li> </ul>	<p>Stayaway achieves partial success. Residents claim no buses enter township in morning.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Day of mourning for 177 Kinross miners killed in underground fire on 16 September 1986</li> </ul>	<p>In mining industry Num claims 325 000 workers observe stayaway, management claim 250 000 and LMG estimates close to 300 000. In non-mining sectors in PWV region LMG survey of 49 firms finds 40% of workers engage in 1 to 2 hour sympathy stoppages. In PE, 19 out of 40 Cosatu plants surveyed experience some stoppages lasting from 5 minutes to 3 hours. Little support in Natal or in rest of country.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Unconditional release of two tribal princes and 9 other anti-independence activists</li> </ul>	<p>All African workers, except for medical personnel and those employed in 'white' South Africa, observe stayaway. Protest continues for at least 5 days.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To commemorate first anniversary of police shooting of 13 rent protestors in 1985</li> </ul>	<p>At least 80% of residents support stayaway.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The nine month-old State of Emergency, detentions and security force actions</li> </ul>	<p>LMG shows 20% of workers surveyed in PE participate in 1 hour (non-lunch time) stoppages.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Detention of union members and shop stewards</li> </ul>	<p>Fawu claims 40 000 members participate, but companies estimate that only 4 000 workers respond to call.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Continued detention of union's general secretary, Moses Mayekiso, first held during July 1986</li> </ul>	<p>Union holds weekly one-hour work-stoppages and claims 62 000 members had already stopped work on 3 separate occasions.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Rent evictions, with demands that State-owned homes should be given to residents</li> <li>● End to State of Emergency and resignation of town councillors</li> </ul>	<p>Putco claims 50% decline in bus passenger services. Government estimates that less than 10% of Jhb workforce participated, while only 30% stayaway in Soweto</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● All-white elections for the House of Assembly on 6 May</li> </ul>	<p>Largest stayaway in South Africa ever. LMG estimates 1 million workers participate on each day. In retail and manufacturing sectors 500 000 stayaway on 5/5/87 and 600 000 on 6/5/87. In PE/Uitenhage 99% of workers observe stayaway on 5/5/87 and 96% on 6/5/87; in Cape Town, 12% and then 42%; in Transvaal, 57% and then 70%; and in Natal, 60% and then 70%.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To commemorate eleventh anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion</li> </ul>	<p>LMG estimate from sample survey that 60% of black workers (82% of Africans) participate in stayaway. In PWV 75% of African workers in manufacturing sector and 54% of workers in commercial sector stayaway; in PE/Uitenhage total of 93% African workers stayaway; in Durban, 55%; and in Cape Town, 75%.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Eviction of rent and service charge defaulters during boycott campaign</li> </ul>	<p>No public transport enters the township of 200 000 residents.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Township residents, predominantly aligned to the UDF, form defence committees to protect homes and families from vigilante attacks during Inkatha/UDF clashes</li> </ul>	<p>100% observation of stayaway is reported.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Eviction of rent defaulters by security forces during boycott campaign</li> </ul>	<p>Hundreds of residents observe stayaway.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To commemorate third anniversary of Langa (Uitenhage) and 28th anniversary of Sharpeville shootings</li> </ul>	<p>LMG sample survey estimates that average 80% of African workers observe stayaway in PE/Uitenhage and 51% of coloured workers. Police estimate 80% stayaway on the Witwatersrand and in the E Cape, while work attendance is higher elsewhere.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The Labour Relations Amendment Bill</li> </ul>	<p>Largest stayaway in South Africa ever. Cosatu estimates 3 million workers participate on each day. LMG estimate average 77% of manufacturing workers in Natal and the PWV participate. Support for stayaway in mining, commercial and public sectors is very low. While attendance at all E Cape undertakings is low, it is relatively high in the Western Cape.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To commemorate twelfth anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion</li> </ul>	<p>Many unions negotiate paid day-off for workers. South African Transport Services estimate that overall train occupancy for day is 70% below normal. Chamber of Mines estimates that only 5% (24 500) of miners participates; the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce claims stayaway is more successful than 6/8 June 1988 protest.</p>

South African Labour Bulletin 1986/7.



## Data Trends

### CONSUMER BOYCOTTS IN THE 1980s The Internal Sanction: "Buy African" "Asithengi!" (We are not buying)

One of the first recorded consumer boycotts in South Africa was directed by Bloemfontein's African residents at the city's white-owned stores in 1925. The boycott, which was part of a range of protest strategies, was successful in winning the first ever minimum wage legislation for African workers. During the Great Depression (1929/32) the boycott tactic was used by the white-dominated Cape Federation of Labour Unions against all Jewish-owned shops in the Western Cape because of their alleged discriminatory employment practices. However, the boycott petered out because of its overtly racist overtones. In 1946 widespread agitation against Indians resident in South Africa culminated in the National Party organising a boycott of Indian-owned businesses. The boycott also formed part of a strategy aimed at promoting Afrikaner-owned businesses.

In the 1950s the South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) showed that the consumer boycott could be used, with devastating effect, in support of striking or dismissed workers. The ANC-aligned labour federation first used the tactic in 1954 during a labour dispute with the Durban-based United Tobacco Company. In 1959 the ANC and Sactu initiated a boycott of the Langeberg Ko-operasie Besperk, which eventually forced South Africa's largest canning factory into direct negotiations with the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU), a Sactu affiliate. In the same year Sactu and the ANC organised a potato boycott which resulted in limited improvements in the official requirements for the treatment of farmworkers (Lodge 1983: p198). Between the late 1950s and the late 1970s the consumer boycott tactic remained dormant. It was eventually resuscitated by the emergent African labour movement in April 1979 after the Fattis and Monis pasta manufacturers dismissed workers for refusing to resign from the FCWU. The union initiated a consumer boycott of the company's products which succeeded in halving the company's profits for the first six months of 1979. In the same year a boycott of red meat products was called when the Table Bay Storage Company tried to force workers into resigning from the General Workers Union. The company eventually agreed to re-employ the workers after they had gone on strike and been dismissed. Throughout the 1980s the newer African labour movement has made frequent (yet selective) use of the consumer boycott tactic. However, the Labour Relations Amendment Bill (introduced into parliament in December 1986) now seeks to outlaw all union-initiated product and service boycotts by declaring them Unfair Labour Practices.

LOCATION & ORGANISERS	DURATION
<b>National</b> A range of extra-parliamentary organisations	December 1984
<b>National</b> Extra-parliamentary organisations	8-31 December 1985
<b>National</b> A coalition of community and labour organisations (including the UDF, Cosatu, NECC, SACC, etc)	16-26 December 1986
<b>Eastern Cape &amp; Cape Interior</b>	
<b>ADELAIDE</b> Adelaide Youth Congress, local women's and residents' association	Begins 6 May 1985 Suspended September Resumed 1 December 1985
<b>ALIWAL NORTH</b> Aliwal North Consumer Boycott Committee	Begins late February 1986

Many of the boycotts triggered by unions succeeded mainly because they were able to mobilise broader community support behind workers. Perhaps as a result of some of the startling gains made by union boycotts, community organisations with specific grievances against local businessmen, white municipalities and the government began to use boycotts as a pro-active weapon in the mid-1980s. The widespread boycotts became particularly favoured as they:

- exposed protesting African communities to relatively few risks;
- took the 'struggle' out of the townships and into white areas;
- provided rightless African communities with a method to negotiate with white authorities over a range of local and national issues;
- acted as catalysts for general political mobilisation.

Many of the boycotts have had devastating consequences, particularly for smaller white-owned businesses. In October 1985 Professor Loubser of Unisa's Bureau of Market Research claimed that the stores most affected by boycotts were those dependent upon the sale of groceries, footwear, clothing, alcohol and furniture; and those stores in rural areas upon which African consumers were entirely dependent. He said that if consumer boycotts in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had been as successful as those in the Eastern Cape, many more white traders would have been bankrupted. By 1987 however, emergency regulations made it virtually impossible for activists or communities to initiate any boycotts. If, however, localised boycotts have occurred, emergency media restrictions make it illegal to report upon them.

**ANNUAL CONSUMER BOYCOTTS**

Between 1984 and 1986 three 'nationally' organised consumer boycotts were called. The boycotts, which all coincided with the festive shopping season, were never really co-ordinated or effective on a truly national basis. They did, however, maintain the momentum of existing boycotts - the Eastern Cape and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging areas were the most severely affected.

LOCAL & NATIONAL DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES & RESULTS
The boycott formed part of the first 'Black Christmas Campaign' which was called to mourn for the victims of civil unrest and those in detention	The boycott was an almost complete failure.
The consumer boycott remained an integral part of the 'Black Christmas Campaign', which on the Witwatersrand aimed to demand the: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of Emergency and removal of SADF from the townships</li> <li>● release of all detainees and political prisoners</li> <li>● resignation of all African local government councillors</li> </ul>	The boycott was more successful in 1984 as it coincided with a number of other trade boycotts already effective in regional centres. During the boycott, after it became known that Zimbabwean citizens were going on shopping sprees in South Africa, a Zimbabwean cabinet minister appealed to his compatriots to show solidarity with South African blacks by not shopping at white-owned shops south of the border.
Demands included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of Emergency</li> <li>● removal of SADF from townships</li> <li>● resignation of white, African, Indian and coloured local government councillors within the greater Johannesburg metropolitan region</li> <li>● the holding of elections to form a single multi-racial municipality for the region</li> <li>● immediate end to all rent evictions</li> </ul>	In November 1986 it was noted that there was a nationwide boost in the value of retail sales of between R60 and R80 million a month which, it was argued, was as a result of many Africans having a larger disposable income because of the non-payment of rents. It was also believed that this increase in pre-Christmas sales was also a result of African consumers stockpiling goods in anticipation of the impending December consumer boycott.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● township residents' cattle to have grazing rights on town common land</li> <li>● local businessmen to cease serving in the army reserve which assists in quelling township disturbances</li> </ul>	Negotiations between the Adelaide town council and UDF affiliates broke down. The subsequent detention of local anti-apartheid activists precluded further contacts. The boycott was resumed in December 1985 because few community demands and protests had been addressed. Indian traders were exempted from the boycott.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of Emergency and unconditional release of detained activists</li> <li>● removal of the SADF from African townships</li> <li>● provision of adequate recreational facilities and housing (with reasonable rents) for all</li> <li>● payment of reasonable wages to all workers</li> </ul>	

LOCATION & ORGANISERS	DURATION
<b>COLESBERG</b> Local civic groups	Begins late June 1985
<b>CRADOCK</b> Cradock Residents Association (Cradora)	Begins July 1984 (for two weeks) Relaunched June 1985
<b>EAST LONDON</b> Border Consumer Boycott Committee (BCBC) A coalition of UDF affiliates and non-aligned unions	Begins 29 July 1985 Suspended November 1985 Resumed 3 March 1986 Called off August 1986
<b>FORT BEAUFORT</b> Fort Beaufort Consumer Boycott Committee	Begins 14 July 1985 Suspended mid-November 1985 Resumed 2 December 1985
<b>GRAAFF-REINET</b>	Begins 4 September 1985
<b>GRAHAMSTOWN</b> Grahamstown Burial Action Committee (GBAC)	Begins June 1985 (selectively applied to 8 white shops) Enlarged 2 September (extended to all white shops) Suspended 11 November Reimposed 23 December Suspended 4 January 1986 Reimposed 16 June Suspended 1 October 1986
<b>KING WILLIAMSTOWN</b> Mulungisi Residents Committee (MRC)	Begins early August 1985 Suspended 21 November Reimposed 21 April 1986 Called off May 1986
<b>PORT ALFRED</b> Local civic organisation	Begins early June 1985 Suspended August Reimposed 15 September 1985
<b>PORT ELIZABETH</b> Port Elizabeth Consumer Boycott Committee (PECBC) A coalition of UDF affiliates and non-aligned unions	Begins 15 July 1985 Suspended (two weeks) 15 November Suspended 8 December 1985 Restarted April 1986 Suspended 15 September Restarted 3 November Suspended indefinitely late in December 1986

LOCAL & NATIONAL DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES & RESULTS
	By late August 1985, 36 000 residents of the local African townships had no place from which to buy food. The only four (informal) township outlets had run out of supplies but were unable to restock as a white wholesaler in the town refused to resupply them. The crisis resulted in the boycott activists lifting the boycott on two politically 'sympathetic' white shopkeepers.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● lifting of ban on public meetings during school boycotts</li> <li>● termination of Emergency</li> </ul>	In both boycotts African community support was almost total. Negotiations occurred between the Cradock Employers Federation and Cradock officials but their outcome remains unknown. In September 1985 representatives of commerce and industry from 15 Eastern Cape centres affected by boycotts attended a meeting, hosted by Cradock employers, in an effort to formulate a regional strategy on the boycotts.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● hawkers to be allowed non-restrictive trading rights in city CBD</li> <li>● halls in white areas to be made available to black community for meetings</li> <li>● an end to forced removals of urban blacks</li> <li>● non-incorporation of Duncan Village into the Ciskei homeland</li> <li>● termination of Emergency and removal of the SADF/SAP from townships</li> <li>● students to be allowed to form elected SRCs</li> </ul>	By December 1985 the boycott of white stores (and those belonging to coloured, Indian and African traders who supported the tricameral system) was estimated to be 100 percent. Sixteen shops in the North End trading area were forced to close. It was alleged that African shopkeepers whose stores were unaffected were harassed by the police. After meeting with the BCBC, the local Chamber of Commerce claimed it would defy government policy and laws in an effort to assist the black community. In 1985 the East London City Council lifted trading restrictions on African hawkers, while in 1986 it 'opened' residential areas to all race groups. Upon resumption of the boycott in 1986, the BCBC claimed 100 percent support. Many African shoppers slowly returned to white shops because of cheaper prices, and the detention of many activists.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of Emergency and the release of detainees</li> <li>● unbanning of organisations</li> <li>● lifting of ban on meetings</li> <li>● resignation of African councillors</li> <li>● upgrading of local townships (construction of a sports stadium, tarred roads, adequate water supplies, etc.)</li> </ul>	By September 1985 the boycott was estimated to be 90 percent effective, despite negotiations between the white business lobby and African civic leaders. Walmer MPC, Molly Blackburn, claimed the security forces harassed township shopkeepers in efforts to force Africans to buy from white stores. The proprietor of the largest African-owned business in nearby Tinus, his employees and relatives had been detained, leaving no-one to run the shop.
	Local Chamber of Commerce placed an advertisement in the local newspaper inviting black people to meet with them to discuss grievances.
<p>GBAC lists 34 demands (June 1985):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● the construction of new school buildings, a night school, community halls, creches, parks, public telephones, a library, playgrounds, homes for the aged, and the development of a proper sewerage system</li> <li>● an end to the eviction of people from their homes</li> <li>● provision of trading sites for hawkers and payment of living wages</li> </ul> <p>Further Issues (September 1985):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● teacher training facilities for black matriculants</li> <li>● an end to racial discrimination at local hospitals and to employer victimisation of employees who are activists</li> <li>● an end to petty apartheid</li> <li>● termination of Emergency</li> </ul>	The boycott resulted in some shop takings dropping to R50 a day, while two others were forced to close altogether. In mid-September 1985 the (white) Grahamstown Action Group began a boycott of white stores to show African residents that some white citizens were sympathetic to their grievances. Negotiations between the GBAC and the local Chamber of Commerce were unsuccessful, mainly because of the detentions of activists and banning of meetings and organisations. Under Emergency regulations the security forces closed African-owned shops in the early morning, on Wednesday and Saturday afternoons, and on Sundays, making shopping at African stores very difficult for workers.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● general upgrading of the nearby African township</li> <li>● future consultation over rent increases and abolition of lodger fees</li> <li>● an end to harassment of students by the authorities</li> <li>● the recognition of trade unions</li> <li>● Pretoria to pressurise Ciskeian authorities to stop killing activists.</li> </ul>	The boycott was initially estimated to be 60 percent effective, but by October 1985 white traders claimed that African customers were drifting back to their shops - even though commercial activity was nowhere near its normal level. The local Chamber of Commerce failed to establish contact with boycott organisers and thus initiate negotiations.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of Emergency</li> <li>● release of local community leader</li> <li>● local townships to be transferred from jurisdiction of Eastern Cape Development Board (ECDB) and placed under management of white local municipality</li> </ul>	The white business community formed the Employer's Federation to negotiate with the local civic boycott organisers. The boycott was lifted because the Federation presented local African community demands to the ECDB and the Department of Constitutional Development. However, the redetention of local community leader, Gigile Nkwinti, led to the boycott being reimposed - although it was less effective than before.
<p>Initially:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of regional Emergency, withdrawal of security forces from townships, and release of all detainees, Mandela and political prisoners</li> <li>● official explanation for disappearance of three Pebco community leaders</li> <li>● lifting of ban on Cosos and a consideration of student demands by the Department of Education and Training</li> <li>● scrapping of Black Local Authorities</li> <li>● equalisation of racially-classified state pensions</li> <li>● removal of a racist superintendent at a local hospital, proper medical treatment for township residents, and non-interference by police in hospitals</li> <li>● opening of city CBD to all races and removal of all trading discrimination</li> </ul> <p>Restarted (April 1986):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● to protest police shooting of 11 people attacking a KwaZakele liquor outlet</li> <li>● as parties demands had not been met</li> </ul> <p>PECBC indicates (December 1986) boycott would restart unless:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Emergency was terminated, troops withdrawn from townships, and political prisoners and detainees released</li> <li>● the security barbed-wire fence separating New Brighton and KwaZakele townships was removed</li> <li>● schools damaged in unrest were rebuilt</li> </ul>	The boycott was launched under the banner of "Don't buy White" and by August 1985 it was estimated that trade had slumped by between 80 and 100 percent. Shops belonging to the Watson brothers were exempted because of their political sympathies with the black community. In late 1985 some white businessmen warned they would retrench staff if the boycotts continued, but Cawusa countered that its members would strike if such actions took place. (Notwithstanding the threat of strike action, the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce estimated that the city's North End retailers retrenched 15 percent of their staff during the boycotts.) Negotiations between the local Chamber of Commerce and the PECBC became difficult (and sometimes impossible) because of the ongoing detentions of leading activists, notably Mkhusele Jack. In 1986 the boycott was resumed and became 100 percent effective according to store owners. Although both Indian and coloured businessmen were affected, some were given immunity by the PECBC. To support the broader community, the Eastern Cape Traders Association (comprised mainly of African traders) instituted a boycott of all white stores in mid-April. However, by August 1986, white traders reported that black customers were again using their shops.

LOCATION & ORGANISERS	DURATION
<b>QUEENSTOWN</b> Residents Ad-hoc Committee (RAC)	Begins 12 August 1985 Suspended April 1986
<b>UITENHAGE</b> Uitenhage Consumer Boycott Committee	Begins July 1985 Suspended 23 September Resumed 14 October Suspended 14 December (for two weeks) 1985 Reimposed 1 January 1986 Suspended 5/6 January 1987
Boycotts were also recorded in: <b>ALBANY, BEDFORD, CUTIIBERT, DE AAR, KIRKWOOD, MIDDLEBURG, MOLTENO, SOMERSET EAST, STEYNSBURG, STUTTEHEIM, TARAKSTAD.</b> Various local civic groups	Most begin in mid-1985
<b>Natal</b>	
<b>NATAL</b> Fosatu, Ccau u a, GAU With support of range of extra-parliamentary opposition organisations (excluding Inkatha)	Begins Howick 6 May 1985 Extended Pietermaritzburg 15 August 1985 Extended in other Natal centres 2 September 1985 Called-off 4 October 1985
<b>Northern &amp; Eastern Transvaal</b>	
<b>NELSPRUIT</b> Local civic groups	Begins 1985 Renewed mid April 1986
<b>PHALABORWA, PIETERSBURG, POTGIETERSKRUS, TzANEEN</b> Local civic groups, with assistance from trade unions	Begins 21 November 1985 Restarted May 1986 in some N Transvaal towns
<b>WARMBATHS</b>	Begins February 1986
<b>Central Transvaal</b>	
<b>ALEXANDRA</b> Alexandra Boycott Committee (ABC)	Begins November 1985 Relunched April 1986 Suspended early June 1986 Suspended late September 1987 with certain conditions
<b>JOHANNESBURG</b> (probably including all African residents from nearby satellite townships and white residential areas) Consumer Boycott Co-ordinating Committee (CBCC) A coalition of UDF and NF affiliates, Cusa, Fosatu and Num	Begins 12 August 1985 Suspended 30 November 1985 for 1 week
<b>KRUGERSDORP</b> Krugersdorp Residents Association; Kagiso Youth Congress; Azasim Local	Begins 1985 Suspended 28 February 1986
<b>NIGEL/SPRINGS</b> Duduza Civic Association (DCA)	Begins end May 1986 In progress late August 1986
<b>PRETORIA</b> Pretoria Consumer Boycott Committee (PCBC) A coalition of UDF affiliates, Cusa and Fosatu	Boycott begins 9 August 1985 Suspended 26 August Restarted 11 December Scheduled to finish 15 January 1986 Restarted 24 March Lifted May 1986

LOCAL & NATIONAL DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES & RESULTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● no further rent increases without consultation with the community</li> <li>● rent evictees to be allowed to return to their homes</li> <li>● all township homes to have adequate sewerage and running water supplies</li> <li>● renovations to the local Umlungise sports stadium</li> <li>● improved school conditions</li> </ul>	<p>Except for three white stores, all white-owned businesses were effected. Eventually, 35 businesses, both small and large, were forced to close or suspend trading. The Queens-town Chamber of Commerce claimed that while all local demands could be met, broader political demands were unachievable. (In 1985 the government committed R15 million for the upgrading of the nearby Mlungisi township.) Negotiations with the RAC broke down altogether after the detention of African community leaders. White Queenstown residents demanded that the government withhold emergency food aid to black residents in order to break the boycott, and instead grant financial aid to businesses facing liquidation.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● removal of security forces from townships</li> <li>● release of detained activists and lifting of a ban on UDF meetings</li> <li>● killers of three Cradora officials to be brought to justice</li> <li>● students be allowed to form Student Representative Councils</li> <li>● reinstatement of leader of Uitenhage Youth Congress at Volkswagen plant</li> </ul>	<p>Although the Uitenhage Town Council agreed to open the CBD to all races, the boycott continued as other issues had not been addressed. The town's massive coloured population supported the boycott from October 1985 onwards.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● reinstatement of 970 Mawu members dismissed from BTR Sarmcol factory in Howick</li> <li>● termination of Emergency and release of detainees</li> <li>● to protest assassination of Natal UDF official Victoria Mxenge</li> </ul>	<p>In Howick the boycott had a severe impact, forcing many white residents to leave the town altogether (the number of homes put on sale increased by 50 percent during the boycott). Two weeks after being extended to Pietermaritzburg, the local Chamber of Commerce estimated black custom in the city's white stores had dropped by an average of between 60 and 70 percent. The Chamber unsuccessfully tried to initiate further contacts between the Sarmcol management and Mawu. When the boycott was extended, white-owned stores in Durban were hardly affected but in nearby Pinetown severely affected. The boycott was cancelled, without winning any concessions, after a reduction in community support, increased violence within townships, security force harassment and the intervention of the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce (an Inkatha affiliate).</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● withdrawal of SADF from townships and release of detainees</li> <li>● resignation of African town councillors and members of homeland legislatures</li> <li>● end to mysterious attacks on activist homes</li> <li>● a reduction in bus fares</li> </ul>	<p>Although effective in a number of towns with common demands and protests, the boycotts were not co-ordinated by a single anti-apartheid body. Intimidation was a persistent feature of the boycotts, with youths setting up informal road blocks near townships to search for 'illegal' goods; and the police harassing organisers. In May 1986 the Pietersburg Chamber of Commerce claimed the boycott was responsible for a 20 percent drop in sales; while its head warned that the boycott could cause many of Pietersburg's 25 000 African employees to lose their jobs. No information exists regarding the impact of the boycott on the businesses of homeland politicians.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● to protest rent hikes</li> <li>● end to corporal punishment in schools</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● local white and black businessmen to end collaboration with police</li> </ul>	<p>In the 1986 campaign the ABC targeted 25 businesses in and near Alexandra, some of which were owned by African councillors. A white restaurateur estimated the boycott resulted in a 25 percent drop in custom.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of regional Emergency</li> <li>● the withdrawal of the security forces from townships</li> <li>● release of all political prisoners and detainees</li> </ul>	<p>Debate occurred between anti-apartheid opposition groups and trade unions over the precise demands of the boycott. Possibly because of this lack of unity the boycott was a relative failure. In December 1985 conflicts erupted between hostel dwellers and youths over the need to boycott. The widespread detentions of CBCC members made it difficult for the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce to negotiate an end to the boycott.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● police disruption of unrest funeral</li> </ul>	<p>Despite the detention of 14 anti-apartheid activists the boycott of white stores was suspended so that African residents could buy goods not readily available in township shops. The boycott was enforced on all African council liquor outlets.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● release from detention of local leaders</li> <li>● upgrading of Duduza, with provision of homes for the homeless, an improvement of the outdated lavatory system, etc.</li> <li>● a reduction of bus fares</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of regional Emergency</li> <li>● release from detention of boycott organisers, an end to police harassment of activists and removal of security forces from townships</li> <li>● explanation for the deaths of three Cradora officials</li> <li>● resignation of all community councillors</li> <li>● reluctance of the authorities to decrease rents</li> <li>● refusal to unban Cosas</li> <li>● Pretoria city council not to move taxi rank</li> <li>● reinstatement of fired Metal Box employees</li> </ul>	<p>At the start of the first boycott smaller businessmen claimed it was so effective they would only be able to survive for two months. The boycott restarted in December 1985 after the police killed 13 protesters in Mamelodi. The boycott planned for April 1986 collapsed soon after it began, partly because many black traders charged African customers exorbitant prices for goods. The PCBC officially called off the boycott in May 1986 because it claimed people needed to buy winter clothing which was only available in white stores. The PCBC appealed to the youth to stop threatening and assaulting those who had bought food from white shops.</p>

LOCATION & ORGANISERS	DURATION	LOCAL & NATIONAL DEMANDS/PROTESTS	FEATURES & RESULTS
<b>TEMBISA</b> Local civic groups	Begins mid-1985		The boycott was highly effective in nearby white areas. On 30 August 1985 the President of the Tembisa African Chamber of Commerce and other businessmen were detained and seven shops closed after they promised support to boycotters, although they were released after pressure from Nafcoc.
<b>WITBANK</b> Local civic groups	Begins 1985		Shops severely affected.
<b>Orange Free State &amp; Vaal Triangle</b>			
<b>OSBERHOLTZER (Khutsong)</b>	Begins 1985 Still effective January 1986		
<b>PARYS</b>	Begins July 1984 Begins 12 August 1985 Called off early September 1985 Begins November 1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>in 1984, the mayor and other township councillors should resign and oppose impending rent increase</li> <li>in August 1985, secure re-employment of workers dismissed after participating in a work stayaway</li> <li>in November 1985, end to arrests of rent defaulters, release of detainees, dropping of public violence charges against students and scrapping of rent increases</li> </ul>	A series of boycotts affected various Tumahole traders and businessmen during 1984. The first, which was directed at the township mayor's businesses, was supervised by township youths; in another boycott the taxis of a councillor were boycotted. Both the mayor and the councillor resigned. The boycott started in August 1985 was successful in securing the reinstatement of dismissed workers. The November boycott (which was to some extent obviously designed to coincide with the Black Christmas Campaign) was an almost complete failure mainly because it was poorly organised, and because some white shops developed 'sophisticated' techniques to allow/entice black customers.
<b>SHARPEVILLE</b> Vaal Civic Association, Sharpeville Anti-Rent Committee, Cosos, UDF and Azapo	Begins 3 September 1984	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>rent and electricity hikes</li> </ul>	All shops, garages and taxis owned by African councillors were boycotted. In a massive outbreak of violence many shops were destroyed and looted by mobs.
<b>Western &amp; Northern Cape</b>			
<b>CAPE PENINSULA</b> UDF and NFC affiliates, New Unity Movement, sporting organisations, religious groups and trade unions	Launched mid-August 1985 Lost until after Christmas 1985 Suspended 21 January 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>termination of Emergency and release of political prisoners</li> <li>withdrawal of SADF/SAP from townships</li> </ul>	By mid-October 1985 the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce claimed the boycott was having little impact upon white retailers. In December 1985 it was estimated that losses only ranged from between 0 and 30 percent. Some organisations argued that even though the boycott was not so effective, it did provide a mechanism for unifying ideologically opposed movements and was therefore a success.
<b>BEAUFORT WEST</b> Zanokhanyo Youth Organisation	Begins 17 August 1985		By late November 1985 trade at many white shops had dropped by between 25 and 50 percent. In an effort to stop the boycott the Afrikaanse Sakekamer urged white employers to pay equal wages for equal work.
<b>PAARL</b> Consumer Boycott Action Committee (Conbac)	Begins late July 1985		By its fourth week the boycott was estimated to be at least 70 percent effective. A meeting organised by Conbac decided it would be acceptable for residents returning to Paarl East township to have their shopping bags searched to check where they had been shopping.
<b>STELLENBOSCH</b>	Begins 1985		
<b>WORCESTER</b>	Begins August 1985		Major supermarket chains operating in the town claimed a substantial drop in turnover because of the boycott. Support for the boycott in the coloured community was limited, however.
Boycotts were also recorded in <b>Uppington and Oudtshoorn</b>	Most began in mid-1985		

**Sources**

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# APPENDIX

## TRANSPORT AND RENT

### BOYCOTTS

### IN THE 1980s



## Data Trends.

### TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS IN THE 1980s

"Azikhwela!" ("We will not ride")

While most of the transport boycotts in the current phase of political conflict have not had direct origins in political grievances, they all reflect a significant socio-political content. Historically, the movement and settlement patterns of African people in South Africa have been rigidly channelled by group areas, influx control, resettlement and homeland policies. Instead of living closer to the city with easy and cheap transport access, black workers have been forced to oscillate across the great apartheid divide artificially created between town and township.

Today, both urban African residents and homeland commuters are forced to spend a substantial part of their income and a great deal of their time travelling long distances to work in 'white' cities, on transport services that are often over-crowded, poorly maintained, unpunctual and crime-ridden. In

Date & Duration	Region & Route
Begins 18 July 1983 Ends 18 March 1985	Mdantsane - East London
Begins 16 January 1984 Ends June 1984	Alexandra - Johannesburg
Begins 16 April 1984	Moleletji/Seshego - Pietersburg
Begins 30 April 1984	Mabopane/Soshanguve - Pretoria
Early July 1984	Batlokoo/Solomondale - Pietersburg
Operative in August 1984	Sobantu - Pietermaritzburg
Begins late September 1984 Lasts at least four weeks	Nqethu - Hillcrest (white residential suburb), Pinetown/New Germany
Begins 1 October 1984	Botshabelo, Onverwacht, Mangaung - Bloemfontein
Begins 28 November 1984 Ends 29 November 1984	Cape Peninsula

*In this context, it is not surprising that many black communities perceive a close alliance between government policy and the services of state-supported transport monopolies.*

*In many cases, there has been a rapid politicisation of disputes over fare increases and the quality of commuter services. Since the 1950s, transport issues have been a significant site of political conflict, reflected in the many localised and regional bus boycotts and in the rallying cry "Azikhwela" ("We will not ride!").*

Source: 'A Ticket to Ride: The politics of (re)public transport', Indicator SA Vol4/No1: Winter 1986.

Triggers & Demands	Features & Results
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 11 percent bus fare increase (July 1983) by Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC)</li> <li>● concession fares for pensioners and scholars; free travel for children under age of six when accompanied by guardians</li> <li>● provision of bus shelters and soft seating on buses</li> <li>● general improvement to quality of bus service</li> <li>● CTC to be removed from homeland administration control</li> <li>● workseekers with CTC not to be required to be members of CNIP (ruling homeland party)</li> <li>● CTC to compensate families of commuters shot dead by Ciskei police (4/8/83)</li> </ul>	<p>By April 1984 CTC claimed buses were carrying 25 percent of former capacity, and by May 1984, 33 percent. (In 1983 it was estimated route had 25 000 daily commuters.) By July 1984 CTC estimated revenue losses of R6,2m claimed it was forced to retrench 600 workers and withdraw 200 buses. Commuters walked, used trains (at station 6-12km away) and kombi-taxis, even though taxi operators were victimised at Ciskei police roadblocks. An elected Commuters Committee held regular but unsuccessful negotiations with CTC. In July 1984 CTC conceded most commuter demands, but refused to rescind the 11 percent fare increase. Ongoing detentions of committee members by Ciskei police resulted in talks breaking down until 1985. The boycott was called off because commuters claimed it had lasted for too long, caused community dissension, and CTC had acceded to many demands. In terms of a final 'settlement' CTC suspended fare increase, promised to improve services and hold regular meetings with commuter representatives.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 12,5 percent bus fare increase by Putco</li> </ul>	<p>Meeting of 2 000 commuters forms Alexandra Commuters Committee (14/1/84). Out of estimated 36 000 daily commuters, on first day boycott was estimated to be 90 percent effective; by second week, 50 percent; and by third week 95 percent. To get to work workers walked or took kombi-taxis. Putco attributed empty buses to intimidation, hostel-dwellers broke boycott. In March 1984 Putco was given over 10 000 name petition and grievances. In late February (26/2/84) 19 boycott organisers were detained, nine charged with intimidation and released on bail. Taxi owners were harassed by police and fined for technical offences with only 12 of township's 56 taxis on road, 30 owners arrested.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● bus fare increase by Lebowa Transport in February</li> </ul>	<p>Organised by a range of student, political and union groups aligned to black consciousness movement. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● termination of private bus service commuter choice</li> <li>● reject introduction of state train service</li> </ul>	<p>Commuters were represented by Sashanguve Residents Association and Inter-denominational African Ministers Association of SA. On first day most of average 16 000 daily commuters boycott trains, using taxis and private vehicles instead. Over time, however, boycott is less effective. Taxi owners are harassed by police. A 6 000 name petition asks Putco to restore bus services, while fund is started to take legal action against SATS and National Transport Commission. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● doubling of bus fares on some routes by Bohwaduba Bus Service</li> </ul>	<p>● Villagers were unable to sustain boycott as police deprived them of alternative transport by acting against pirate kombi-taxis. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare hike</li> <li>● introduction of mini-buses by bus company, which compete with kombi-taxis</li> </ul>	<p>Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare hike imposed by Interstate Bus Services</li> <li>● bus company to be replaced</li> </ul>	<p>From inception boycott was almost total. Bus company withdrew vehicles after frequent attacks and ticket office was torched. To get to work people walked (20km), got lifts from employers (particularly domestics) or caught kombi-taxis. Transport inspectors stepped up patrols in area, shut down newer pirate taxi operators, and fined other legal operators for overloading. Negotiations failed between boycott leaders, local chiefs, headmen, bus company and transport officials. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 13 percent fare increase by Jacaranda Bus Service</li> <li>● 12,5 percent fare hike imposed by City Tramways</li> </ul>	<p>Initiated by Western Cape executive of UDF after it surveyed commuter opinions in ten Cape Flats areas. Pamphlets were issued despite police seizure in raid on UDF offices. The two day boycott enjoyed limited support; strongest in African townships but weak in coloured suburbs.</p>

<b>Date &amp; Duration</b>	<b>Region &amp; Route</b>
Begins 14 January 1985 Ends May 1985	African townships - Empangeni/Richards Bay
1 February 1985 (one day)	KwaNdebele - Pretoria
Begins March 1985 Ends late June 1985	Alexandra - Johannesburg
Begins early April 1985	KwaZakele - Port Elizabeth
Begins 1 June 1985 Ends 26 June 1985	Lenasia - Johannesburg
Begins mid-July 1985	Lebowa
Begins August 1985 Still operative mid-December 1985	Sakile - Standerton
11 November 1985	Ekangala - Pretoria
Begins 17 November 1985	GaRankuwa - Pretoria
Begins 6 January 1986 Still in progress July 1986	W Rand townships (including Bekkersdal, Kagiso, Munsieville, Mohlakeng)
Begins 7 February 1986	Several W Transvaal townships (including Klerksdorp, Orkney, Stilfontein)
Begins May 1986 Ends September 1986	Duduza - Nigel/Brakpan
Begins August 1986 Ends September 1986	Sekhukhuneland
Begins 3 November 1986 Ends 19 February 1987	Soweto - Johannesburg
Begins late July 1987	Lebowa
Begins 11 January 1988	Mphophomeni - Howick/Pietermaritzburg
Begins late February 1988	Wattville - Benoni

**Sources**  
Indicator SA Press Clippings  
South African Labour Bulletin  
South African Institute of Race Relations

Triggers & Demands	Features & Results
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare increase by Empangeni Transport</li> <li>● to improve quality and quantity of service</li> <li>● punctual time schedules, more buses for outlying areas</li> <li>● provision of commuter shelters and related amenities</li> <li>● free and regular competition by bus, taxi and rail transport</li> <li>● issue of permits for kombi-taxis</li> </ul>	<p>A meeting attended by 50 000 residents (involving 26 000 daily commuters) elected the Empangeni Commuters Committee, consisting of black unions, KwaZulu officials and tribal leaders. Committee held series of talks with local commerce, industry, municipal and government representatives. Although bus company suspended increases until July 1985, the boycott continued over the company's regional transport monopoly. In April, after a breakdown in negotiations, the boycott was strengthened (9/4/85). It ended, however, after transport inspectors fined illegal taxi operators, police harassed commuters, and continual community hardship.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● bus fare increase of 41 percent on weekly tickets</li> </ul>	<p>Boycott involved 300 buses which normally carried 17 000 passengers daily. Road barricades were set up by boycotters, and damage of R45 500 caused to bus and police vehicles; 18 people arrested on public violence charges. After negotiations between Putco, commuters and KwaNdebele, the increase and boycott were suspended.</p>
<p>Reasons unknown</p>	<p>Boycott ended after negotiations between local community organisations and Putco.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● mini-bus service introduced by PE Tramways competes with kombi-taxis</li> </ul>	<p>Boycott was organised by PE Black Civic Association (Pebca). Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● planned 20 percent bus fare increase</li> <li>● protest at Lenasia Bus Services monopoly</li> </ul>	<p>Boycott activated after community meeting called by Federation of Residents Associations. In first week boycott is successful as 4 000 commuters shared lifts in private vehicles to get to work. After talks, company suspended increase for three months on condition they could negotiate a future fare increase with commuter representatives.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 20 to 30 percent fare hike</li> </ul>	<p>Youths who organised boycott arrested by police. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare increase</li> </ul>	<p>Police blitz kombi-taxis in December, limiting passenger loads and ticketing drivers. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare hike</li> </ul>	<p>One-day boycott affects only those buses taking commuters to work in morning.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 17,5 percent fare increase imposed by Putco on 1/11/85</li> <li>● demand Putco withdraws bus service from KaRankuwa</li> </ul>	<p>Putco and Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings (BTH) buses were stoned - although BTH buses were used later as transport alternative. After Putco took over BTH, the BTH was barred from carrying commuters into Pretoria. Homeland police dispersed protesting commuters and youths who enforced boycott. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● detention of chairman of Kagiso Residents Association (KRA)</li> <li>● Winnie Mandela to be allowed to reside in Soweto home, and Cosos to be unbanned</li> <li>● Greyhound Bus Lines (GBL) to provide free services to carry mourners to unrest funerals</li> <li>● allow pupils to travel for free</li> <li>● GBL to plough profits back into community</li> <li>● GBL to cease objecting to private taxi operators' permit applications</li> </ul>	<p>To get to work boycotters used taxis or walked distances up to 10km. A GBL manager argued the boycott was not directed at company per se but was part of a consumer boycott. Negotiations between GBL and commuter leaders, were impeded by detention of boycott organisers and ban on report-back meeting. After visit by Deputy Minister of Defence and Law and Order (22/1/86), in 'crime prevention' exercise traffic and security officials blitz taxis and cars seconded by 'comrades'. A march by 2 000 residents (late January) to the Krugersdorp police station to protest police harassment was stopped by security forces who kill one protester, wound five and arrest many. After meeting with the KRA in June the GBL announced residents had ended boycott and a normal service would resume from 1 July. However, the national State of Emergency (12/6/86) prevented the KRA from holding a report-back meeting, so the boycott continued. By the end of October, as buses were only carrying an average of six passengers, GBL withdrew its services almost completely from all W Rand townships and operated a token one bus, per day, per township service. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● probably over political issues</li> </ul>	<p>By end of year boycott of Western Bus Lines (GBL's sister company) was reported to be 100 percent effective in Orkney, 60 percent in Klerksaorp, and 20 percent in Stilfontein. The company reduced services to all three areas. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● withdrawal of security forces</li> <li>● release of six detained Duduza Civic Association members</li> <li>● withdrawal of charges against Duduza youths over 1985 hand grenade incidents</li> <li>● provision of sewerage, electricity and recreation facilities</li> <li>● decrease in bus fares</li> </ul>	<p>Boycott affected Nigel municipal bus service only as residents continued to use Brakpan municipal service to get to railway station. Towards end of August Duduza commuters gradually began to use the municipal bus service again, after the Nigel municipality reduced single ticket fares by 17 percent.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● demand fare reduction of 20 percent, free travel for pensioners</li> <li>● conditions on buses</li> <li>● Lebowa Transport Company (LTC) to cease transporting SADF members, and to provide bursaries to needy students</li> </ul>	<p>Sekhukhuleni Youth Organisation cancelled boycott as it claimed police had harassed motorists who provided commuters with alternative transport. A LTC spokesperson claimed there was no bus boycott per se, attributing reduced passenger levels to a consumer boycott.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fare increase of 17,5 percent by Putco</li> </ul>	<p>Organised by Soweto Putco Boycott Committee with UDF support. On first day boycott was estimated to be 60 percent effective, by second week 45 percent, and by third week 75 percent. To get to work people used trains, private vehicles and kombi-taxis. During boycott security forces stopped vehicles to check the road-worthiness of vehicles. Many buses were extensively damaged in petrol bomb and stone attacks, while two Putco depots in Soweto were bombed. Putco claimed that damage to buses and lost revenue was over R500 000. Four uniformed white men shot dead an 11-year old boy and injured five others in attack on bus in Pimville (Soweto - 5/11/86).</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● solidarity with Transport and Allied Workers Union members on strike at LTC</li> <li>● win the reinstatement of LTC employees dismissed during 16 June work stayaway</li> </ul>	<p>Community involvement began when the transport company brought in replacement drivers to keep the service running. During the boycott pamphlets, purportedly issued by Azapo, urged people not to use taxis. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● five cent bus fare increase</li> </ul>	<p>Negotiations take place between bus company and local civic leaders. Outcome unknown.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● bus fare increase by Benoni Town Council</li> </ul>	<p>To convey boycotters to work, local taxi association expanded its route schedule, encompassing many bus routes. Outcome unknown.</p>

# RENTING THE NATION

## Rent & Service Charge Boycotts in the 1980s

"Asinamali" (We have no Money!)

	<b>The Authorities</b> Rent Collections, Evictions & Enforcement	<b>The Civics</b> Rent Boycotts, Protests & Demands
	In 1978 the Vaal Triangle Community Council introduced its 'economic rentals' policy. Costs of housing provision, municipal services and administration were to be covered by rents, which rose dramatically. In 1982 the Black Local Authorities Act No 102 is passed, making self-governing townships responsible for their own finances and recommending the withdrawal of certain State subsidies. Councils increase rent and service charges to raise own revenue.	In 1983 residents of Cradock's Lingelihle township form a civic association in an attempt to fight rent increases; eventually organise one of the first rent boycotts. In the same year violence erupts in Natal's townships of Chesterville, Lamontville and Hambanathi in protests over rent increases. In first three months of 1984, Lekoa council owed over R1.5m in house and shop rentals; highest rentals in the country.
<b>Jul/Sept 1984</b>	July Lekoa town council announces increased rent and service charges in Vaal Triangle townships. Vaal Civic Association (VCA) organises campaign against increases R5,90 for board houses and R5,50 for private houses. Since March 1984, 14 black councils on the Witwatersrand have announced rent and service charge increases. 28 Aug In Daveyton (E Rand) town council cuts rents by R5 after protests, in Atteridgeville (Pta), rent increases are dropped. Three Rotanda (Heidelberg) councillors resign as residents refuse to pay increased rents. 1 Sept Rent increases implemented in black townships of Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Evaton, Vosloorus, Boipatong, Bophelong, Refengkatso, Zamdela (Vaal Triangle); Tembisa (Jhb); Mamelodi, Laudium, Soshanguve (Pta); Wattville, Daveyton (E Rand) and Thabong (Welkom). Rents in Lekoa had already risen 427% in previous seven years - now highest rentals in country's townships. 6/7 Sept Rent increases scrapped in Sharpeville and Sebokeng, but residents demand reduction to R30pm. In Lekoa and Evaton three councillors resign in response to community calls, schools are closed one week early as all pupils boycott classes. 9 Sept Meetings banned in magisterial districts of Vaal Triangle, prohibition on protest gatherings where any State policy or implementation is discussed. 13/14 Sept Daveyton council suspends massive rent and service increases, by now at least ten councils have suspended increases. Soweto council shelves R5 electricity levy increase.	14 July In OFS over 30 000 Tumahole (Porys) township residents march to community hall to protest R11pm rent increase. Several arrested, one of whom dies in police custody. 2/3 Aug Rent riots break out in Thabong (Welkom) after police disperse 500 demonstrators. 21 Aug In Sharpeville (Vereeniging) two residents arrested during protests over service increases proposed by Lekoa and Evaton councils. In Thokozza (Alberton) a youth is shot dead by police during rent protests. 3 Sept On Monday a one-day work and school stayaway in Vaal Triangle townships is held to protest rent increases. Street demonstrations are broken up by police; violence erupts, and by following morning 26 people are dead and over 200 injured. Schools close one week early after 120 000 pupils boycott classes; councillors go into hiding after four killed by angry residents. Indian businesses in Evaton lose over R25m in attacks on premises; more than 100 left homeless. 5 Sept Sharpeville residents mass in township and demand R30 reduction in rents. 9 Sept In Daveyton 3 000 contravene ban to attend funeral of rent unrest victim. Tumahole residents stay away from work and march on OVDB offices; council agrees to freeze rents but not reduce them to R18,50 demanded; also promises relief for unemployed. 17 Sept Release Mandela Committee (RMC) calls stayaway in Soweto in solidarity with Vaal residents and to protest police action in townships. 24 Sept Home of chairman of Tembisa Civic Association (TCA) petrol-bombed after he successfully negotiates indefinite suspension of rent increases. 30 Sept VCA calls for day of lasting and mourning for victims of unrest.
<b>Oct/Dec 1984</b>	23 Oct In Operation Palmiet in Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong, more than 7 000 police and SADF members seal townships in pre dawn raid to 'restore law and order' (the first time troops used in townships in 1980s unrest). Minister of Education and Development Aid Viljoen announces black town councils empowered to establish their own police forces. 4 Nov Sharpeville authorities begin cutting off electricity supply in attempt to make residents pay rent and service charges. 11 Nov Rotanda elections for a new community council postponed as no nominations. 14 Nov In Sebokeng, OVDB members, police and SADF raid a hostel of 10 000 people and arrest nearly 2 000 for failure to pay rents. 15/30 Nov Atteridgeville mayor resigns, along with two more Lekoa councillors. Three more Evaton councillors resign. Although mayor announces increases shelved indefinitely, the council requests employers to deduct rent from wages.	Oct Rent Action Co-ordinating Committee established to co-ordinate rent boycott of Orange Vaal Development Board (OVDB) in the Vaal and Northern OFS. Rent boycott in Vreddefort (OFS) partially successful. 5/6 Nov E Rand and Vaal residents stage massive stayaway, 24 people die in conflict and councillors' houses are attacked. Between 300 000 and 500 000 workers participate. Community demands include resignation of all town councillors, scrapping rent and busfare increases. 10 Nov Opposition alliance calls for 'Black Christmas' (consumer boycott to mourn unrest victims). 19 Nov In Bophelong a house is burnt by activists because tenant broke boycott and paid rent.
<b>Jan/Mar 1985</b>	2 Jan Van Der Walt Commission report into Sept 1984 unrest in Vaal is released to the press. Proposes urgent attention be given to improving communication between residents, development boards and town councils. Dismisses theory that agitators are responsible for unrest and identifies legitimate grievances. Calls for official investigation into rent increases, corruption and maladministration in local government. During 1985/86 financial year only 8 021 houses were built for blacks by the State in the nine main urban areas - none in Natal. Feb At least 45 councillors have now resigned, including entire Rotanda and Mankweng (Pietersburg) councils, and mayors of Duduza, Atteridgeville, Tumahole, Tsakane and Thokozza.	1 Jan 40 000 Vaal Triangle households withholding rent payments in seven townships. In Kallehong increases suspended indefinitely after protests, residents owe R2,1m in rent arrears. 19 Jan Kallehong residents resolve to boycott charges until they are reduced, and businesses owned by board and councillors until they resign. Peacelul rent campaign begins in Crossroads (CT), organised by Cape Youth Congress (Cayco) and United Womens Organisation (UWO); rents increased by R40 since 1982. 22 Jan At Crossroads 169 women at rent meeting are arrested and violence erupts; houses of two councillors burnt - marks beginning of long and violent struggle in the area. Feb Unrest spreads to E Cape, not in form of rent protests but directed at local authorities. 30/31 Mar In Sibongile (Dundee) 300 go on rampage in township over rent increases and attack development board offices.
<b>Apr/Jun 1985</b>	By end of April arrears reach R13,1m in Lekoa townships. Residents given 12 months to settle, to be arranged with town clerk before July or face legal action. By end of May 257 community and local authority councillors have resigned nationwide, including 22 mayors. Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Heunis says R200m owed by debtors to 13 development boards, of which R60m accumulated since June 1984. E Cape Development Board is owed more than R5m in rent arrears.	11 June In Pta 22 activists appear in court charged with high treason arising out of 1984 unrest in Vaal townships - mainly UDF and civic leaders. Atteridgeville/Saulsville rent boycott called off after three months. In N Cape Bongweni (Colesburg) residents hold public meeting with board officials to protest rent increase and lack of facilities in township.

	The Authorities	The Civics
Jul/Sept 1985	<p>21 July A select state of emergency is declared in 36 magisterial districts. Aug Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development warns Vaal residents that steps will be taken against them if they continue to boycott rents.</p> <p>Sept Sebokeng homeowners have stand permits withdrawn for failure to pay leases, eviction notices issued to residents in rent arrears. All prayer meetings in Vaal triangle and seven other areas to commemorate anniversary of Sept 1984 unrest are banned. Mamelodi council increases service charges after shelving them in July - R1m deficit.</p>	<p>July Nonzwakazi (De Aar) residents begin boycott to protest high rentals and poor township conditions, only 40 of 937 houses paying rents. In E Tvl rent boycott begins in eMgwenya (Walterville Boven).</p> <p>Aug Vaal Triangle residents still demand that rents be reduced to R30pm; charges increased by 100% between 1980/1985, highest rate in country.</p> <p>Rent offices in Mannenberg (CT), Cambridge (East London), Shalo and Sada (Whittlesea) are damaged and one man is killed in clashes. Also in E Cape, Stutterheim township residents begin rent boycott of service charges. Queenstown township residents begin consumer boycott of white-owned shops to protest rent increases and township conditions.</p>
Oct/Dec 1985	<p>Oct In Vereeniging, eight Sharpeville residents are charged with subversion and murder of deputy mayor in Sept 1984.</p> <p>25 Nov In Tumohole (Parys) first prosecutions of rent defaulters begin, several imprisoned for failing to appear in court. Joint Management Committee (JMC) strategy for collection of arrears submitted to Lekoo council, town clerk announces selective issue of summonses starting with employed residents. Calls for stop-order facilities from employers for employee rentals, court orders, evictions and extensive media campaign. Lekoo council elections for 12 vacancies fail as only one candidate is nominated. In Tembisa rent increases shelved. Calls for meeting with Cape Divisional Council in Atlantis as 2 000 residents in arrears face eviction and some have water supply cut.</p> <p>Dec Mamelodi Council responds to rent boycott by refusing to remove garbage or provide services.</p> <p>In Nonzwakazi seven residents six months in arrears are evicted and leader detained. Three days later 90% of residents make arrangements to pay rents. In Katsheleho evictions are carried out with help of SADF. In Vaal Triangle over 2 000 summonses issued to rent boycotters.</p> <p>Government announces freehold property rights for blacks - affects one-sixth of black population.</p>	<p>Oct Unrest erupts in Witbank's townships over increases in electricity tariffs. In Bonteheuwel (CT) rent offices are burnt; in Nkqubela (Robertson) residents begin rent strike.</p> <p>21 Nov Mamelodi residents stage stayaway to protest high rents, army presence in township, etc. March on board office to demand meeting with mayor is dispersed by security forces, killing at least 13 people. Rent boycott begins at end of month, residents demand electricity accounts be sent directly to them as council accounts are inaccurate.</p> <p>25 Nov In CT Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu residents begin rent boycott to protest township conditions and state of emergency.</p> <p>The YCA says SADF occupation of townships and state of emergency are new obstacles in resolving Vaal rent crisis. In Alexandra consumer boycott of white traders begins to protest high rents and detentions.</p> <p>Dec Mamelodi residents form street committees, duties include garbage collection, house-to-house campaigns, rent boycotts, etc.; people's courts also established.</p> <p>Crossroads rent boycott breaks out into violent confrontation.</p> <p>Six Sharpeville residents sentenced to death for murder of deputy mayor in Sept 1984.</p>
Jan/Mar 1986	<p>Jan More than 24 000 Mamelodi residents summoned to town council office in attempt to avoid legal action over non-payment of rents.</p> <p>Attentive residents owe more than R1m - council cuts off electricity supply.</p> <p>Feb Government notice prevents homeland township residents from being evicted or jailed for not paying rent. Township manager may disconnect lights and water for non-payment of rents and service charges (move decriminalises non-payment).</p> <p>March In Bela Bela (Warmbaths) police/SADF conduct house-to-house searches and arrest 40 people including negotiation delegation.</p> <p>In previous 12 months 216 councillors had resigned nationwide; only 48 seats refilled (36 of them unopposed).</p>	<p>Jan Rent boycotts spread in E Tvl townships of Belfast, Carolina, Piet Retief and Ermelo. In Belfast a youth is shot dead by police when dispersing a rent protest meeting. Lekoo council is losing more than R500 000pm in boycott of electricity charges.</p> <p>Attentive residents owe more than R1m in rent arrears.</p> <p>Feb Jouberton (Klerksdorp) rent and bus boycott begins after four residents die in clashes with police.</p> <p>Mar Bela Bela residents stage one-week stayaway to protest rent hikes and corporal punishment in schools. Ekangala Action Committee member involved in fighting high rents and incorporation into KwaNdebele has house damaged by grenade attack. National Forum calls for a national rent boycott.</p>
Apr/Jun 1986	<p>April George municipality gives 5 000 Looanikamp residents a week to pay arrears or face legal action; fires 215 employees after stayaway.</p> <p>Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning introduces bill to provide for stop-order rents to be deducted from wages; bill withdrawn after massive opposition by organised commerce and unions. Mamelodi hostel dwellers evicted, charged with trespass, two win inderdict instructing council to return confiscated goods and readmit them to hostel.</p> <p>May Nkqubela (Robertson) residents have electricity cut off after failing to pay arrears. Tembisa residents warned electricity to be cut off, summonses issued over rent arrears. In Alex a white administrator is appointed to replace collapsed town council.</p> <p>Development boards owed nearly R200m in debts, including an estimated R100m in rent and service arrears. R43m owed in 11 PWV townships. In Sebokeng 19 910 households and businesses owe R21.3m; in Sharpeville 6 073 owe R8.3m; Boipatong 2 082 owe R3m.</p> <p>12 June National state of emergency is declared - sweeping new restrictions outlaw unlawful strikes and any boycott action. The key element of emergency is definition of subversion, anything calculated to have the effect of promoting any object of any organisation which has, under any law, been declared to be an unlawful organisation or inciting anyone to take part in or support any boycott action ... etc.</p> <p>Wotville town council collapses.</p>	<p>April Alex boycott committee calls on residents to withhold rentals until all councillors resign; by 22 April all resign. Vrededorp (OFS) residents arrested after march on council offices to protest rent increases. Mhlungisi (Queenstown) residents call off seven-month consumer boycott after negotiations with authorities; demands include abolition of lodger permits, reinstatement of evictees, consultation on rent increases and improved services.</p> <p>May Areas most affected by rent boycotts include Katsheleho, Vaal area, Mamelodi, E Cape and new development areas like Atlantis. UDF meeting in Bonteheuwel (CT) calls for rent boycott until police leave schools and townships. Guguletu residents continue rent boycott. Jouberton residents demand rents reduced from R35pm to R5; council sets June deadline for arrears. Tembisa residents begin rent boycott to demand upgrading of township, removing bucket system, tarring roads and electrification of houses.</p> <p>June Soweto rent boycott begins (see separate chronology). Alex consumer boycott is called off but rent boycott continues.</p> <p>Tumohole evictions begin. Rents in Looanikamp (George) almost doubled (seen as attempt to get residents to move to Sandkroal); service charges increased although there is no electricity and only four taps to serve community of about 5 000. Zolani residents warned to end rent boycott or have township occupied by soldiers; 586 residents detained under emergency regulations.</p>
Jul/Sept 1986	<p>July Rent boycotts reported to have cost State more than R250m nationwide at R30m per month. So far Lekoo council has lost R45m in rent arrears.</p> <p>Urban Councils Association of SA (UCASA) reports that 32 black community councils and three black town councils have collapsed because of rent boycotts, cutting off councils' main source of revenue. Electricity in Vaal townships cut off after residents reconnect supply, the council begins digging up cables. Residents given five years to pay arrears; most households now owe over R2 000 each.</p> <p>Development boards phased out completely, community councils transformed into local authorities, with powers to levy rents/rates and set up own municipal police forces.</p> <p>Aug In Tembisa six councillors are appointed to administer township after council collapses; 70% of residents are in arrears but will not be evicted. Mayor resigns on 6 Aug saying the black local authority system is economically and politically ineffective.</p> <p>Twenty-three families from Sharpeville, Bophelong and Zandela are evicted after 1 800 eviction orders granted by magistrates in Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark. Electricity to 150 householders cut off. Government confirms national JMC plan to counter rent boycotts through stop-order legislation for collecting arrears, a 'hearts and minds' campaign and multi-media campaign.</p> <p>Sept Mamelodi town council issues 600 notices threatening eviction; court case pending legality of increases. Alex town council issues rent arrears statements to all permit holders and cuts off water supply.</p> <p>Lekoo takes legal steps against 2 000 of its 30 000 residents; so far 51 families evicted. Vosloorus authorities threaten tough action against rent defaulters; 14 families served with eviction notices as arrears reach R400 000.</p> <p>Thousand new special constables (<i>kitskonstabels</i>) to be used in black townships after only three-week training course to counter intimidation and supplement normal police force. A further 5 000 to receive training. In previous 18 months 6 000 council policemen deployed in townships after three-month training course; R18m set aside to train a further 10 000.</p>	<p>July Tumohole lawyers file case challenging validity of rents being levied on residents, development board already taken action against 70 defaulters.</p> <p>In Langa (Uitenhage) a survey reveals nearly half the residents are not paying rentals and cannot even afford to buy food.</p> <p>Community Research Group (CRG) monitors rent boycotts in 38 townships: Mamelodi, Alexandra, Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Boipatong, Bophelong, Tumohole, Mhudi, Ermelo, Piet Retief, Soweto, Ratando, Tembisa, Katsheleho, Vosloorus, Warmbaths, Carolina, Walterville Boven, Mhudi, Nelspruit, Amsterdam, Lydenburg, White River, PE, Uitenhage, Port Alfred, Alexandria, Cradock and Duncan Village.</p> <p>Aug In Jhb/Pta area rent boycotts have cost R188m. Estimates of households involved vary between 300 000 and 400 000 nationwide. Residents in Sharpeville, Boipatong and Bophelong evicted; authorities meet with resistance and no residents found to fill empty houses. Rent boycott spreads to Mdantsane in the Ciskei and Burgersdorp in the E Cape.</p> <p>20 Aug Third anniversary of the UDF; statement released claims achievements over past two years include successful campaigns against black local authorities and trimeral elections; intensified rent boycott.</p> <p>Sept CRG estimates rent boycotts have now spread to about 54 townships, costing R40m pm and involving about 650 000 households. Breakdown: 25 in Tvl, 21 in Cape, seven in OFS, one in Natal. Rent boycotts spreading in small OFS townships and on increased number of PE township residents withholding rent payments.</p> <p>Lekoo town clerk's house is damaged in petrol-bomb attack. Seven people shot in Sharpeville after march on township offices to protest rent evictions.</p> <p>Three Tumohole residents take the OVD to Supreme Court to test legality of rent increases, as they were not legally promulgated.</p>

	<b>The Authorities</b>	<b>The Civics</b>
<b>Oct/Dec 1986</b>	<p>Oct In Tumahole several residents serve sentences over weekends for failing to appear in court for rent summonses. Mayor of KwaThema (Springs) is among seven councillors not paying rent who owe over R47 000.</p> <p>Nov In Kotlehong 115 black municipal policemen arrested for demonstrating against low wages. Rent boycott boosting retail sales; huge cash injection into the economy; estimated it could be as high as R400m over preceding six months.</p> <p>27 Nov Three Delmas treason trialists released after judge finds State had not established case; six more released on bail; 13 still in custody.</p> <p>11 Dec Harsh new restrictions on reports and comment of unrest, including consumer and rent boycotts, alternative structures, activities of municipal police, etc.</p>	<p>Oct Azonyu national congress resolves to expand rent boycotts throughout country.</p> <p>Nov According to Heunis R177 647 owed in back rent and service charges in townships at 30 Nov. Natalia Development Board owed R2,5m in rents from 13 townships since rent controversy erupted more than two years ago. So far rent boycotts in 54 townships have cost the authorities R480m. Many residents from townships such as Lamontville and Chesterville paying old (not new, increased) rents. Soweto residents owe R39m, increasing at R6m pm; 15 000 Alex residents owe R1,9m in arrears by end of year - only about 500 paying rents. Mamelodi residents stay away on first anniversary of 'massacre' in which at least 13 people died at rent protest meeting.</p>
<b>Jan/Mar 1987</b>	<p>Jan no money spent by State on black housing during 1986/87 financial year in CT, Pmb, Dbn, Pta, Kimberley, Bloemfontein. Housing funds granted for PE and East London. So far 1 750 special constables deployed in townships.</p> <p>12 Feb In PE townships, Ibhayi town council distributes pamphlets urging residents to settle R4m arrears.</p> <p>24 Feb Rent defaulters in Zwide are evicted; houses of residents who have not paid for over three months are to be reallocated. CT's Community Services Town Committee issues notices threatening legal action, warns residents to pay arrears within seven days.</p> <p>March In Sharpeville five residents evicted, and in Mhlabeng rent defaulters given seven days' notice to pay arrears.</p> <p>13 March Lekoa town council refuses to reduce rents to R30pm although it slashes rents of all liquor outlets previously owned by development boards and now mainly owned by councillors and ex-councillors; due to drop in sales from boycott.</p>	<p>By end Jan black local authorities in CT area owed R5m in rent and service arrears, more than R160m in Tvl.</p> <p>KwaNobuhle and KwaLanga (Uitenhage) raids by Ama Africa Paqo vigilantes opposing youth enforcing rent and consumer boycotts.</p> <p>Feb Mamelodi resident successfully applies for court order nullifying R6pm increase in rents from Sept 1984.</p> <p>Ratanda (Heidelberg) residents complain of municipal police brutality in forcibly collecting arrears from hostel dwellers instead of taking court action.</p> <p>18 March Rand Supreme Court test case for evictions brought by the VCA is postponed indefinitely.</p> <p>Lingelihle (Cradock) residents begin paying rent after slight reduction; municipal police and <i>kitshabets</i> are introduced, and plans to upgrade township announced.</p> <p>Rent boycott begins in Mhluzi (Middelburg).</p>
<b>Apr/Jun 1987</b>	<p>April Deadline for sale of houses built with National Housing Commission funds extended to June 1988, also extended to all black townships. Lekoa house prices to be reduced by up to 70%; provision made for tenants who paid rent regularly over previous three years to buy house without deposit, or arrears can be included in house loan. Government attempt to boost mass housing sale started in 1983, now aims at ending rent boycott.</p> <p>Rand Supreme Court rules that township councils have right to evict rent defaulters under Housing Act.</p> <p>10 April Hundreds of Kotlehong families given seven days' notice to pay rent arrears or face eviction.</p> <p>11 May Tembiso council owed about R6m in arrears and unable to borrow any money as it cannot sign assurance for loans without any income.</p> <p>Jouberton mayor confirms that some councillors are in rent arrears and gives all residents three-month deadline to pay arrears or face legal action. Town clerk and engineer suspended pending investigation of corruption charges.</p> <p>By end May 52 767 of the 363 097 houses for sale have been sold for about R62m - all on long leases, not freehold.</p> <p>1 June Hundreds of Ibhayi rent defaulters served with final demands for rent arrears face ten-day limit or eviction; several families already evicted.</p> <p>9 June Auction of 50 Kotlehong houses belonging to defaulters called off at last minute, postponed until end month.</p> <p>Pta Supreme Court refuses Mamelodi Town Council leave to appeal against recent court judgment that R6pm increase is null and void.</p>	<p>April Five township residents in Vaal Triangle lay charges after furniture is confiscated by white man masquerading as Court Messenger.</p> <p>R288 545 097 owed in unpaid rent and service charges by end April - 86,7% rent and service arrears owed in the Tvl (R231,5m); R2,8m owed in Natal; R10,7m owed in OFS and R21,7m owed in the Cape.</p> <p>Rent boycotts are reported in at least 60 townships nationwide.</p> <p>May UDF calls a two-day stayaway to protest white elections; among other demands calls for end to emergency, scrapping of white parliament and end to rent evictions.</p> <p>Thakozu youths start township clean-up campaign as council has suspended services due to bankruptcy from rent boycott.</p>
<b>Jul/Sept 1987</b>	<p>8 July Kotlehong town council auctions off eight houses belonging to rent defaulters (first council to take such harsh measures); two sold by private companies who were owed arrears; 50 more houses advertised. In Tembiso, 30 families are evicted for arrears.</p> <p>9 July Heunis tables Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Bill in Parliament, providing for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● effective by-passing of courts which could be deemed to have made judgments against debtors in favour of local authorities;</li> <li>● compels employers to deduct arrears from workers' wages for local authorities with penalty of R2 000 or a year in jail. Similar bill in June 1986 withdrawn after massive outcry from business and opposition groups.</li> </ul> <p>11 July New emergency regulations impose wide-ranging restrictions on boycott campaigns, particularly rent and consumer boycotts. It is now an offence to take part in an act of civil disobedience by refusing to pay rent to a local authority.</p> <p>12 July Government announces relief measure of subsidised interest for tenants with low income who occupy state-financed housing.</p> <p>State housing sale not underway yet as valuers still to be trained and areas surveyed.</p> <p>Atteridgeville mayor announces there will be no increases in 1987; no rent boycott in the township; those not paying rents were unemployed. There was a three-month boycott in 1985.</p> <p>6 Aug Tembiso announces new rent increases, as one-year boycott continues. Residents currently paying between R37 and R50pm. Council collects R890 000 in rent arrears this month compared with R152 000 in May.</p> <p>Bureau for Information spent R4,3 on 'Rent and Service' campaign during 1986/87, and allocated R3m for 1987/88 campaign. Estimated that councils now owed about R400m in rent and service charge arrears.</p> <p>11 Aug Mamelodi council announces increased tariffs for service charges.</p> <p>Duncan Village residents in arrears refused burial sites for family members.</p> <p>Sept Tumahole residents win court case declaring several rent increases since 1979 illegal; local authorities immediately gazette new rent and service tariffs which apply retroactively. Tembiso council establishes 'whites only' records office to prevent black employees finding out which residents are paying rent.</p> <p>SADF confirms its personnel are involved in great housing sale to help break rent boycott.</p> <p>Mamelodi council continues to act against rent boycotters; cuts off electricity supply.</p> <p>Dr Frankel of Wits Political Studies Department gives a conservative estimate of between R600m and R700m owed in rents.</p>	<p>June Kotlehong residents about R5m in arrears.</p> <p>The American Chamber of Commerce, Anti-Apartheid Movement in London, Association of Chambers of Commerce warn government if new Rent Bill goes ahead, industrial strife and new sanctions will result.</p> <p>24 June NMC tables annual report in Parliament; recommends government drops legislation empowering local authorities to deduct rent arrears from wages of employees because it would further politicise relations between employers and employees.</p> <p>Dobsonville mayor in court on charges of corruption over allocation of houses. Thabong councillors' names on list of rent defaulters who have not paid for over 16 months.</p>
		<p>More than 100 families evicted by Ibhayi council since Jan after 12-month rent boycott. Houses of evicted residents being reallocated. Unemployment in PE townships between 54% and 70%.</p> <p>In Chesterville (Dbn) 600 families are sent final warnings with one month to pay; R300 000 owed; 50% of households owe more than R800 each. No formal rent boycott although residents have not paid increased rentals since 1983. In Lamontville authorities put increased pressure on defaulters, and several residents locked out of houses.</p> <p>Town clerk of Tembiso announces electricity to be cut off if residents do not pay rent by 13 July.</p>
		<p>23 July In Mhluzi (Middelburg) mayor allegedly owes over R3 000 in rent arrears while about 30 rent defaulters in area are evicted.</p> <p>7 Aug American multinationals increase pressure on SA over proposed legislation to deduct rent arrears from worker wages, and child detentions. Soweto (PE) rent boycott 100% successful since 1986.</p>
		<p>Sept After winning court case, Tumahole residents consider taking action against authorities for R500 000 in overpayment on rents.</p> <p>Allegations made in parliament that R268 000 of money set aside for job creation spent on building nine houses for Ibhayi town councillors at rentals of R4,24pm.</p> <p>After three-year rent boycott, Lekoa town clerk says 100s of residents are buying no new under new discount ownership scheme introduced at beginning of month. 30 000 houses available in Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Bophelong, Boipatong and Zamdela for as little as R390.</p>

	<b>The Authorities</b>	<b>The Civics</b>
<b>Oct/Dec 1987</b>	<p>Oct Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) announces probe to investigate Lekoa council corruption, and appoints white official to run township until new councillors are elected. In Mamelodi evictions of defaulters continues despite court application which renders increases null &amp; void; council denies SADF is involved in evictions, claims that white messengers of court are accompanied by security forces. Estimated two-five homes in every Mamelodi street have had electricity disconnected. Eviction notices issued in Vaal Triangle in terms of Housing Act (S65) empower council to evict tenants for non-payment of rent, without court procedure.</p> <p>Nov Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses second appeal by Mamelodi council against order rescinding the R6 increase (1984). On the same day the council announces new rent and service charge increases. Evictions continue in Tembisa.</p> <p>21/29 Dec The TPA warns it will dissolve black local authorities who have failed to keep proper financial records or are guilty of misconduct. Lekoa town clerk dismissed after mutiny of municipal police. White official now administers Ibhayi council (PE) as well as KwaNobuhle.</p> <p>30 Dec Mafikeng council is charging increased rentals even though promulgated incorrectly.</p>	<p>15 Oct In Tembisa thousands of residents observe stayaway from work to protest evictions. Nov UDF claims that combined SAP, SADF and council police raid is testimony to the efficacy of the rent and service charge boycott. The Front also notes that its affiliate membership in the Eastern Transvaal have been the victims of large-scale evictions. By December 1987 it is estimated that 4m people from 650 000 households in 55 townships nationwide have cost the authorities R720m in rent and service charge arrears during the boycotts.</p>
<b>Jan/Mar 1988</b>	<p>13 Jan In Manguang all 17 councillors appear before OFS Provincial Executive Committee to face range of charges, including unauthorised expenditure, a deficit budget and failing to get residents to pay service charges.</p> <p>26 Jan In PE townships an estimated 5 000 municipal tenants owe R1,25m in arrears.</p> <p>1/4 Feb Alexandra hostel-dwellers' rentals to increase by more than 45%, from R25 to R34,80. Mamelodi council scheme to refund all rents to those who overpaid for 38 months during period of previous illegal rent increase. Residents will still have to pay the new legal increases.</p> <p>Mar The state has sold more than 80 561 houses to African people and a further 93 000 to the South African Housing Trust, out of more than 373 751 houses put on market in the 'great housing sale'.</p>	<p>Jan Squatters from Uitenhage's Lapland settlement continue boycott of service charges.</p> <p>24 Feb The organisations involved in opposing rent increases and evictions, the Soweto Civic Association, The Vaal Civic Association, the Cradock Residents Association, the Western Cape Civic Association and the PE Black Civic Organisation, are effectively banned in terms of emergency regulations.</p> <p>Mar Nationwide, official monitors estimate R387,5m is owed in unpaid rent and service charges - R321,2m in Tvl; R16,9m in OFS; R2,5m in Natal and R46,9m in Cape; other independent monitors estimate figure is closer to R1bn.</p>
<b>Apr/Jun 1988</b>	<p>6 Apr Three opposition members in the Lekoa council are suspended after protesting over rent issues. Reports of a schism in council between mayor Mhlotso and councillors who support residents.</p> <p>2/4 May Atteridgeville council reveals plans to increase service charges by R20 per month. In Sharpeville 20 families are evicted from their homes by a messenger of the court, accompanied by security force personnel, following warnings from Lekoa council.</p> <p>18 May Further 25 Sharpeville families are evicted by Lekoa council for rent non-payment, some in arrears from September 1984. Council reveals that 200 other defaulters have been listed for eviction, which will occur every Wednesday.</p> <p>20 May Daveyton council announces rents will increase by more than 28% from 1 December 1988 in order to pay for electricity and water supplies.</p>	<p>14 Apr In Tembisa a man is arrested after 'intimidating' others to damage water and electricity meters.</p> <p>19 Apr African businessmen in Vaal Triangle invite Ministers FW de Klerk and G Viljoen to meeting in an effort to resolve rent crisis.</p> <p>21/24 Apr Kagiso council police who evict rent defaulters remove part of roof of one home and empty it of all furniture. Meeting of 5 000 Vaal Triangle residents reiterates demands for council to reduce house rents to R30 a month to halt evictions, and that councillors should resign.</p> <p>2 May Rent hikes of over 100% in Witbank's KwaGuqo township are halted after community leaders (including a former mayor) go to Provincial Administrator's office. KwaGuqo Civic Association demands city council and town clerk should resign.</p> <p>8 Jun In Sharpeville 400 residents decide to pay R30 for service charges in an attempt to cut down arrears, but still refuse to pay rent.</p>



# THE SOWETO RENT BOYCOTT

## April/June 1986

In Soweto 800 residents of Tshiwello decide to continue two-month-old rent boycott until rents and purchase prices are reduced. Some rents are cut for Jabulani and Tshiwello flats and Naledi care houses. May 27 000 Soweto residents owe R2,5m; in Diepmeadow 20 840 owe R1,1m; 40% of Dobsonville residents owe R0,3m. Soweto City council threatens that if residents do not settle rent arrears already accumulated, their houses will be reallocated to 22 000 people on waiting list. June The Soweto rent boycott begins, only one-third of 75 000 registered tenants pay charges, (35 000 of the houses are privately owned). Reduces council's monthly rental income from R500 000 to less than R200 000. Community demands include lower rents, resignation of town councillors, improved services, withdrawal of troops from township, lifting the emergency, etc.

## Jul/Sept 1986

Soweto council police deliver warning notices to residents, giving them 14 days to pay last two months' arrears. Violence erupts after council police raid and remove furniture from houses and flats of rent defaulters. Soweto council opens rent office in central Jhb to enable residents to pay anonymously. Rand Supreme Court grants final order restraining Soweto council from taking possession of house, as eviction order does not comply with the Housing Act. Reprived residents served with similar eviction notices, but council issues new notices to 155 defaulters in terms of the Housing Act, Section 65b. Fighting erupts between youth and council police after house-to-house raids on rent defaulters in Naledi. 26/28 Aug In White City a confrontation between residents and security forces over imminent evictions leaves 21 people dead (including a councillor), with nearly 100 injured. The next day 500 residents march on council chambers and are dispersed by police; evictions are suspended. White City is the most densely populated suburb of Soweto, with the lowest income group. 10 Sept Biggest stayaway since 1976 to mourn those killed in White City unrest, funerals banned and several victims buried without knowledge of families. Three evicted families allowed to return home after interim agreement with Soweto council, pending outcome of court challenge. Soweto council's housing director resigns after her Randburg house is damaged by a limpetmine explosion.

## Oct/Dec 1986

In Orlando West three more people die in conflict over evictions. Arrears in Soweto boycott since June reach R29m for water and electricity charges and R30m for rents. Township's running costs are R7m pm but only about R1m pm is being paid. All reserves now used up; council reports it may have to retrench 300 employees because of rent boycotts. Some councillors also not paying rents. Nov 94 percent of Soweto residents do not pay rent as boycott intensifies. Streets organised into committees to warn residents of evictions; several clashes with police reported. 5 Nov Four people are shot dead and 20 injured in Orlando West as residents clash with police after eviction rumours. 22/27 Nov Limpetmines extensively damage Fordsburg flats of municipal officials and councillors who fled township in Sept. Pimville residents turn out all lights to obstruct evictions. Mayor ET Shabalala resigns 12 days before expiry of his term; blames council for unrest and calls on civic organisations to run township. Dec In Soweto R2,5m is collected in rents - about twice as much as in Nov. Between 16 and 18 Dec five people are killed by 'Russians' (vigilantes) opposed to 'lights-out' protest campaign.

## Jan/Mar 1987

Soweto council institutes legal action against 160 rent defaulters and issues 95 summonses. Seventy families who fail to defend action face automatic eviction by order of the court. Council also threatens to cut off water and electricity supply of non-paying tenants. First cuts reported in Tshiwello Ext3 and later to houses and flats in Mafolo North, Orlando East, Pimville; most residents reconnect supply. Residents in arrears refused permission to buy houses. ET Tshabalala, chairperson of Solasanke Party, calls on residents to pay R15 rent for houses as compromise solution to council's demand that residents pay arrears; Soweto Civic Association (SCA) demand that rents be scrapped. Feb Soweto's new mayor, Botile, town clerk and President PW Botha meet to discuss possible reduction in rents. Council collects R3m in monthly charges instead of full R7m. 9 March In Meadowlands a councillor's house is damaged in grenade attack. 16/19 March Jabulani residents march on council offices after more than ten families evicted from flats; obtain interim agreement to halt evictions. Three Soweto residents bring urgent action to Rand Supreme Court to halt evictions.

## April/June 1987

Rand Supreme Court rules council has right to evict rent defaulters after seven days' notice without applying for court order. Town clerk Nico Malan announces evictions to recommence in Jabulani and Moleletsane. All councillors submit 25 names of defaulters in their ward for eviction. 8/10 April Ten Jabulani families evicted by Court Messenger; furniture confiscated to cover arrears. Council now owed more than R80m in unpaid rents; of the 80 000 households only five families have been permanently evicted since beginning of boycott. Soweto's town clerk announces relief measures for pensioners, the sick and the unemployed. 21 April Council policeman is killed and 64 injured in grenade attack on Soweto municipal police training grounds. 22 April Three-day stayaway in Soweto to protest evictions; residents demand title deeds to homes. One thousand march on council to speak to town clerk; council refuses to allow him to negotiate with the SCA. Crowd dispersed, one man shot dead and another dies after being set alight. Daily evictions continue in Emdeni, Nnledi and elsewhere. Government confirms it will not meet with black groups or civic associations to discuss rent issue, but will only negotiate with councillors. Residents argue they will pay for services but not rentals, as houses have long been paid off. Council argues that of R54pm paid, only R4 is for rent and rest for service. May Soweto council serves Bishop Tutu, Winnie Mandela, Albertino Sisulu, Ellen Kuzwayo and Ntsho Mollana with eviction notices. In Pimville evictions a Court Messenger is murdered; further clashes with vigilantes. Soweto council is notified by lawyers that furniture is being unlawfully seized. Town clerk sends memo to President PW Botha recommending that houses be given to tenants, rents reduced to R15, sites sold for R760 and electricity upgrading levy of R24 scrapped. Council police cut off electricity to houses in

Orlando East and distribute pamphlets warning residents not to reconnect it. June Soweto council withdraws notice served on Albertino Sisulu, but evicts 22 families in Zola North. Soweto mayor announces service charges to be increased by R4,30pm from 1 Oct. Twelve Pimville families evicted, but move back after police leave. Jhb Chamber of Industries says at least half of all rent defaulters in Soweto are still engaged in rent boycott. Summonses served on at least 270 rent defaulters.

## Jul/Sept 1987

1 July Soweto town clerk says evicted families who move back into homes without settling debt will be charged with contempt of court and trespassing on council property. Twenty-one families arrested in Zola North and Chiawello for moving back into houses without council permission, but case collapses. At least eight families evicted in White City. 16 July Soweto town clerk finally meets residents (a delegation of street committee members from White City). Discuss grievances regarding electricity charges, water supply and maintenance, and affordable housing. No agreement reached and position continue, mainly aimed at tenants in arrears before boycott started. In Orlando East two families evicted at 4am and 30-40 families locked in council offices for 16 hours. Town clerk confirms normal practice to call residents to council headquarters to make arrangements for payment, but agrees to halt practice of picking up residents in early hours. Power supply cut off in Soweto's elite suburb of Seletson Park and in two areas of Pimville. 29/30 July Eighteen more Zola families evicted and red crosses pointed on roofs of houses to prevent families' reoccupying. Evictions carried out by men in baladavas to prevent victimisation. Council requests government to repay R250m electricity loan owed to overseas financiers. 3/4 Aug Soweto council acknowledges residents have legitimate grievances over electricity accounts, investigates metering. Council decides to privatise electricity meter reading; more than 1 200 municipal workers come out on strike over decision. Zola residents protest evictions at council chambers, demand that councillors negotiate with the SCA. At least 13 of the 18 families evicted pay some arrears, as homes are patrolled by municipal police who prevent reoccupation. Houses of evictees still not being reallocated. 14 Aug Soweto mayor Botile announces moratorium on rent evictions; appeals to residents to make arrangements for arrears payments with township managers. Council now owed R111m in rent and service arrears. Electricity cut off in Orlando East, Orlando West Nnledi and Dube. Sept At least 150 families evicted during the past 14 months. Soweto Council announces further cuts in house prices, some of which will be sold for as little as R153; the selling price to be calculated on original cost, to be available under freehold system in about one month. Residents who bought under 33- or 99-year leasehold system can convert to freehold right. Mayor says poor response due to 'lack of publicity and radicals'. 6 Sept Three thousand Soweto residents decide at meeting called by ET Tshabalala to apply for Supreme Court order to stop Soweto Council from selling houses of defaulters. Order granted; delays council selling 30 houses by public auction. Ten Jabulani families evicted by council officials escorted by SADF; furniture confiscated. Thirty percent of tenants occupying 78 464 houses now paying rent. Planned meeting between SCA and the town clerk falls through after Association's office is raided by security police and files seized. Newly formed Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council votes R28m to Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow for upgrading services.

## Oct/Dec 1987

Soweto Council continues to evict residents, incl ten more Mofolo families - mainly Solasanke members who pay R15 per month portion of rent only. 18/24 Nov In Orlando West SADF, SAP and municipal police raid defaulters' homes at 4am and order residents to pay half of arrears or be evicted. Raids also occur in New Emdeni. Soweto council claims to have collected more than R143 000 from rent defaulters in past four months. During Soweto boycott 348 families evicted - but 164 reinstated after part or whole payment of rent arrears, the other 184 residents lose their houses. Extra security force personnel reported in Soweto to break the boycott. Zola municipal offices are damaged by bomb, while a councillor's house is damaged in grenade attack. 17 Dec Diepmeadow council is dissolved by Tvl Administrator Cruywagen after it fails to recover outstanding arrears and put financial affairs in order; former Soweto mayor Thebehali is appointed administrator. Diepkloof and Meadowlands residents owe about R145m in arrears. 23 Dec AGM of SCA demands that residents who have rented homes for 15 years should be given them as they have been paid for; other residents should be allowed to purchase or rent homes at reasonable cost. 29 Dec Soweto council claims R3m damage to electricity meter boxes caused by residents' illegal attempts to reconnect power. Council now begins to remove boxes, leaving scores without electricity, incl Albertino Sisulu and Winnie Mandela. Without income, Soweto council relies on bridging finance from central government.

## Jan/Mar 1988

5 Jan Diepmeadow issues notices warning residents to settle arrears within seven days. 15/21 Jan In Tshiwello six families are arrested for rent arrears. In Soweto four families are evicted for arrears even though some had allegedly paid rent; evictions in Klipspruit and Naledi also. 26 Jan Soweto council claims it will continue to employ SADF and SAP in rent raids as a successful method in getting people to pay rent. 1/4 Feb The council considers reducing rents in Tshiwello (extension 3) - planned council survey of residents income to determine rents is rejected by SCA. Eighteen month boycott in Soweto totals R132m in arrears. Town clerk Malan claims only 30% of residents are paying rent and the bankrupt council is forced to treat jobs. 16/17 Feb In White City (Jabavu) 15 families in arrears are evicted and their furniture confiscated. Hundreds of residents observe stayaway from work and school to resist evictions. Police disperse 11 000 people at municipal offices, injuring 3 people. 24 Feb SCA is restricted in emergency clampdown on extra-parliamentary organisations; before the evictions the SCA claimed residents should start paying negotiated service charges, but not rents. 26 Feb The total debt accumulated by Soweto residents is R140m, including R80m in water and electricity charges. Council plans to cut electricity supplies and remove meter boxes and substations, unless illegal users start paying accounts. Within six months of boycott there were about 40 000 illegal power users. Mar Dobsonville council evicts 20 families.

## April/June 1988

6 Apr Soweto council removes doors from homes of defaulters to discourage evictees from moving back in. 22 Apr In Emdeni four municipal policemen arresting rent and service defaulters are shot in an ambush on their vehicle. May Revealed that frequent attempts to evict Soweto tenants flounder because court messengers do not follow correct procedures. 9 June Soweto council deadline expires for people to object to proposed electricity tariff increase. Jun Thousands of Soweto council workers, including 60% of municipal police, strike to protest against wage freeze imposed by council because they are participating in rent boycott.

# Data Base

Compiled by IPSA Researchers Bennett and Quin

## Voter Boycotts in the 1980s Part I: Parliamentary Election Polls

On the 2 November 1983, 2 713 300 white voters (76 percent of all white registered voters) participated in a referendum on the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (No 110 of 1983). In all, 66 percent of whites approved the government's new constitution. Central to the Act was the creation of a further two houses of parliament - a House of Representatives for coloured people and a House of Delegates for Indians. Africans were still expected to pursue their political destinies through homeland structures.

The first elections for both these new Houses was held in August 1984. A wide spectrum of political, labour, cultural and religious organisations called on Indian and coloured people not to exercise their votes in the elections. The tricameral constitution was opposed mainly because:

- the constitution's procedural mechanisms - the power-sharing ratio of 4 white: 2 coloured: 1 Indian - ensured that in the last instance white political representatives would retain absolute political control
- the absence of representative structures for the majority African population
- the principled decision not to participate in structures and institutions created by a minority (illegitimate) white government.

The elections for the two new houses of parliament in August 1984 merely reinforced the boycott tradition that had been firmly entrenched in black South African liberation politics. In 1969, 50 percent of all potential coloured voters participated in the first Coloured Persons Representative Council (CPRC) elections, though the fact that the Labour Party went in on a 'boycott' ticket probably accounted for the relatively high poll (Howe 1984:7). In 1981, the first South African Indian Council (SAIC) elections were held with only 10 percent of registered voters going to polling stations. Both the CPRC and its counterpart SAIC foundered, in part because of a lack of popular legitimacy.

General Election 22 August 1984  
**HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES - COLOUREDS**  
**CAPE PROVINCE**

	Total Registered Voters	Votes Polled	Vote %	No of Candidates	No of Votes to Winning Candidate
Addo	12 720	5 951	46,78	3	4 388
Belhar	16 085	1 583	9,84	3	825
Berg River	13 962	3 518	25,19	3	2 589
Bethelsdorp	20 624	6 228	30,19	2	5 958
Bishop Lavis	13 813	2 449	17,72	2	1 589
Bokkeveld	12 475	5 104	40,91	2	2 545
* 23/3/88	20 228	7 127	35,05	2	5 706
Bonteheuwel	10 690	1 017	9,51	2	960
Border	16 404	7 724	47,08	3	6 717
Britstown	13 067	5 298	40,54	2	4 362
Daljosaphat	4 777	877	18,35	3	490
Diamant	18 719	8 672	46,32	3	5 904
Diaz	15 474	4 903	31,68	2	3 778
Dysselsdorp	17 681	7 282	41,18	2	6 592
Elsie's River	12 981	1 321	10,17	2	1 133
Essellen Park	14 328	3 265	22,78	3	1 956
Fish River	13 081	4 535	34,66	3	3 394
Gelvandale	22 563	7 546	33,44	3	6 276
* 8/9/87	31 129	8 085	25,97	2	5 715
Genadendal	8 122	Unopposed			
Grassy Park	14 123	1 432	10,13	3	781
Griqualand West	10 020	5 190	51,79	3	3 948
Haarlem	13 223	5 760	43,56	3	4 411
Hanover Park	16 463	909	5,52	2	732
Hantam	11 323	4 842	42,76	2	3 631
Hawston	11 866	2 738	23,07	3	1 746
Heideveld	9 899	453	6,83	2	453
Kalahari	13 050	6 855	52,52	3	6 226
Karee	12 214	3 961	32,42	2	2 627
Kasselsvlei	14 223	2 057	14,46	4	1 191
Liesbeek	6 145	322	5,24	2	271
Macassar	15 300	2 577	16,84	3	1 762
Mamre	15 338	5 226	34,07	2	4 847
Mannenberg	9 526	448	4,70	3	294
Matroosfontein	12 821	1 515	11,81	3	1 168
Mid-Karoo	11 735	5 620	47,89	3	5 121
Mitchells Plain	13 219	1 147	8,67	3	946
N Cape	9 928	4 941	49,76	4	3 204
NE Cape	10 221	5 211	50,98	3	3 707
Nuweveld	13 827	5 819	42,08	2	4 809
Ottery	13 401	1 122	8,37	2	629
Outeniqua	21 998	9 153	41,60	2	5 706
Pniel	14 958	Unopposed			
Ravensmead	11 251	2 038	22,84	4	2 038
Rawsonville	15 714	2 670	16,99	2	2 132
Retreat	12 682	1 106	8,72	2	922

**HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES - COLOUREDS**

**CAPE PROVINCE**

	Total Registered Voters	Votes Polled	Vote %	No of Candidates	No of Votes to Winning Candidate
Rietvlei	9 579	1 548	16,16	4	1 002
Riversdal	13 510	5 837	43,20	2	2 950
Robertson	11 730	3 535	30,13	2	3 206
Schauderville	16 195	5 320	32,84	3	3 935
Sivertown	10 533	832	7,89	2	723
Springbok	8 767	3 261	37,19	3	2 109
Steinkopf	12 048	4 666	38,72	4	2 399
Strandfontein	5 369	562	10,46	3	444
S Cape	7 710	2 303	29,87	2	2 057
Suurbraak	12 500	4 197	33,57	3	2 454
Swartkops	22 167	10 361	46,74	2	8 020
Swartland	15 104	5 117	33,87	2	3 687
Tafelberg	5 626	234	4,15	2	115
Upington	14 743	6 254	42,42	2	5 657
Vredendal	10 021	4 101	40,92	2	2 579
Wuppertal	10 550	3 600	34,12	3	2 652
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>778 186</b>	<b>222 113</b>	<b>28,54</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>166 747</b>

**ORANGE FREE STATE**

Heidedal	3 537	1 753	49,56	3	1 558
E OFS	3 886	Unopposed			
Opkoms	3 692	2 119	57,39	3	1 774
S OFS	4 788	Unopposed			
W OFS	3 910	2 321	59,36	3	2 089
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>19 813</b>	<b>6 193</b>	<b>31,25</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4 521</b>

**TRANSVAAL**

Alra Park	6 250	3 434	54,94	3	2 800
Bosmont	5 180	1 680	32,43	2	834
* 4/3/87	10 130	2 679	26,63	2	1 257
Eersterus	11 339	6 728	59,33	3	4 200
* 8/6/88	21 290	7 855	36,89	2	5 301
Eldorado Park	14 357	3 966	27,62	4	2 753
Klipspruit West	8 696	3 300	37,94	4	1 969
Newclare	9 408	2 426	25,78	3	1 616
N Transvaal	1 266	753	59,47	3	585
* 8/9/87	3 503	1 438	41,05	2	857
Reigerpark	9 131	4 634	50,75	3	3 835
Rust Ter Vaal	6 942	4 731	68,15	2	3 542
Toekomsrus	8 954	3 545	39,59	3	1 810
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>81 523</b>	<b>35 197</b>	<b>43,17</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>23 944</b>

**HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES - COLOURED**

**NATAL**

	Total Registered Voters	Votes Polled	Vote %	No of Candidates	No of Votes to Winning Candidate
<b>NATAL</b>					
Durban Suburbs	5 421	911	16,80	2	621
Greenwood Park	7 176	1 670	23,27	3	1 371
Natal Mid-East	6 590	1 448	21,97	4	903
* 8/6/88	12 076	4 036	33,42	2	2 217
Natal Interior	5 150	2 087	40,52	2	1 573
Wentworth	9 312	2 479	26,62	2	1 336
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>33 649</b>	<b>8 595</b>	<b>25,54</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5 804</b>
<b>GRAND#</b>					
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>913 171</b>	<b>272 096</b>	<b>29,79</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>201 016</b>

# Excludes all by-election results.

**Notes**

● The actual percentage poll would have been much lower if the potential number of people who were eligible to cast votes (i.e. coloured people over the age of 18 with no criminal record) had registered as voters. Dispute exists over precisely how many people were eligible for the franchise, however. The Electoral Delimitation Commission claimed there was a total of 1 020 721 potential voters (which would have produced an actual percentage poll of 26,65); Howe estimated 1 398 040 potential voters (percentage poll of 19,46); Minister Chris Heunis, 1 500 558 potential voters (percentage poll of 18,13); and the University of Stellenbosch's Unit for Futures Research, 1 578 771 potential voters (percentage poll of 17,23) (SAIRR 1984:123 and Indicator SA 1984:8/9).

● Symbol \* represents an area where a by-election has been held.

General Election 28 August 1984

**HOUSE of DELEGATES - INDIANS**

**NATAL**

	Total Registered Voters	Votes Polled	Vote %	No of Candid	No of Votes to Winning Candidate
Allandale	11 733	1 184	10,09	2	608
Arena Park	10 572	1 495	14,14	2	1 088
Bayview	10 097	2 122	21,01	3	1 187
Brickfield	12 134	2 223	18,32	3	130
* 12/11/86	16 416	2 130	12,98	2	1 643
Camperdown	9 907	1 538	15,52	3	793
Cavendish	13 028	3 006	23,07	6	1 226
Chatsworth Central	11 096	1 535	13,83	3	727
Clare Estate	12 045	2 397	19,90	5	783
Durban Bay	7 787	981	12,59	6	508
Glenview	11 933	2 661	22,29	2	2 052
Havenside	9 888	1 474	14,90	3	970
Isipingo	10 527	2 409	22,88	3	950
Marianhill	7 931	2 198	27,71	3	1 107
Merebank	13 200	1 403	10,62	5	661
Montford	11 239	1 909	16,98	4	924
Moorcross	11 162	2 202	19,72	3	1 027
Natal Midlands	12 637	3 579	28,32	4	1 662
Newholme	15 202	1 434	9,42	4	596
North Coast	11 370	2 127	18,70	2	1 724
N Natal	12 371	4 709	38,06	5	1 890
Phoenix	23 300	2 850	12,23	9	1 012
Red Hill	11 942	2 581	21,61	3	1 770
Reservoir Hills	10 735	1 418	13,20	3	756
Springfield	12 614	2 258	17,90	9	1 149
Stanger	11 355	3 267	28,77	3	2 360
S Natal	10 325	1 791	17,34	7	864
Tongaat	10 481	1 369	13,06	7	418
* 26/11/87	16 259	6 348	39,04	3	3 533
Umzinto	11 224	4 516	40,23	5	1 574
Verulam	13 542	4 410	32,56	4	928
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>381 377</b>	<b>67 046</b>	<b>17,57</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>33 444</b>

**TRANSVAAL**

Actonville	7 707	2 553	33,12	4	899
Laudium	9 843	3 206	32,57	5	1 838
Lenasia East	5 555	383	6,89	4	163
Lenasia Central	5 598	533	9,52	4	214
* 4/8/87	8 410	1 354	16,09	4	609
Lenasia West	5 841	920	15,75	4	427
NW Transvaal	9 867	1 727	17,50	5	675
E Transvaal	6 785	2 932	43,21	3	1 336
* 2/2/88	9 628	3 501	35,89	2	2 689
Central Rand	8 308	1 664	20,02	6	847
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>59 504</b>	<b>13 918</b>	<b>23,39</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>6 399</b>

**HOUSE of DELEGATES - INDIANS**

**CAPE PROVINCE**

	Total Registered Voters	Votes Polled	Vote %	No of Candid	No of Votes to Winning Candidate
<b>CAPE PROVINCE</b>					
Malabar	4 282	1 583	36,96	3	1 250
NW Cape	2 582	510	19,75	5	177
Rylands	4 150	319	13,39	4	319
<b>Sub-totals</b>	<b>11 014</b>	<b>2 412</b>	<b>21,89</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1 746</b>
<b>GRAND#</b>					
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>451 895</b>	<b>83 876</b>	<b>18,45</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>41 589</b>

# Excludes all by-election results.

**Notes**

● As with the coloured elections the actual percentage poll for the House of Delegates would have varied if the potential number of people who were eligible to cast votes (i.e. Indian people over the age of 18 with no criminal record) had registered as voters. Dispute exists over precisely how many people were eligible for the franchise, however. The Electoral Delimitation Commission claimed there was a total of 329 970 potential voters, 100 000 fewer than eventually registered. Howe estimated 464 000 potential voters; a government source, 514 946 potential voters (SAIRR 1984:123 and Indicator SA 1984: 8/9).

● Symbol \* represents an area where a by-election has been held.

**Sources**

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# APPENDIX

## VOTER BOYCOTTS IN THE 1980s:

## BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITY POLLS

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Part II: Black Local Authority Polls  
Voter Boycotts in the 1980s

1992



## Voter Boycotts in the 1980s Part II: Black Local Authority Polls "Asivoti!" ("We will not vote")

Prior to the 26 October 1988 elections, no general elections had been held for African local councils since their constitution in 1977. Township elections were held in 1983 for 29 community councils that were given city, town or village council status (see below) under the Black Local Authorities (BLA) Act, No 102 of 1982. Elections for 158 councils were to have been held in September 1982 but were postponed, along with all other community council elections in African residential areas, until November/December 1983 pending implementation of the new BLA legislation. A government notice published in July 1986, replaced all community councils that were not already town or village councils with town committees.

Besides the fully-fledged Black Local Authorities (city, town or village councils), there are also 195 town or village committees throughout the country, also established through the Black Local Authorities Act. These committees have not as yet achieved full local authority status, and in many cases, they are run under the chairmanship of a white administrator appointed by the provincial administrator.

### BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITY ELECTIONS

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<u>Transvaal</u>									
Agisang (Sannieshof)	-	-	-	760	425	5	-	296	69,6
Alexandra (Johannesburg)	79,0	-	-	62 857	-	9	-	no elections	
Atteridgeville (Pretoria)	22,8	15,0	1	68 179	47 599	11	-	8 939	18,8
Bekkersdal (Westonaria)	-	-	-	10 740	2 195	7	-	467	21,1
Belabela (Warmbad)	-	-	-	3 621	539	6	-	348	64,5
Boikhutso (Lichtenburg)	-	-	-	2 799	628	5	-	489	77,9
Boitumelong (Bloemhof)	-	-	-	2 644	1 207	5	-	785	65,1
Borolelo (Swartruggens)	-	-	-	921	347	5	-	248	71,5
Botleng (Delmas)	-	-	-	5 941	3 309	8	-	1 444	43,6
Daveyton (Benoni)	19,6	18,6	-	53 729	38 526	10	-	10 740	27,9
Diepmeadow (Johannesburg)	16,0	14,6	-	171 055	45 633	15	-	5 401	11,8
Dobsonville (Johannesburg)	42,0	23,5	-	40 265	3 682	7	-	1 376	37,4

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<u>Transvaal</u>									
Duduza (Nigel)	-	-	9	17 348	2 662	9	-	578	21,7
Embalenhle (Langverwacht)	-	-	1	-	14 500	9	-	3 286	22,7
eMgwenya (Waterval-Boven)	-	-	-	1 783	-	6	-	no elections	
eMjindini (Barberton)	-	-	-	4 019	-	6	-	no elections	
eMthonjeni (Machadodorp)	-	-	-	914	-	5	-	no elections	
Emzinoni (Bethal)	-	-	-	8 296	8 700	8	-	3 128	36,0
eSizameleni (Wakkerstroom)	-	-	-	439	3 720	6	-	1 639	44,1
eThandakukhanya (Piet Retief)	-	-	-	4 866	2 020	7	-	913	45,2
Evaton (Vereeniging)	10,0	5,9	3	48 274	-	12	-	no elections	
EZamokhule (Amersfort)	-	-	1	1 138	910	6	-	334	36,7
Ikageleng (Zeerust)	-	-	-	3 012	561	5	-	368	65,6
Ikageng (Potchefstroom)	40,3	24,5	-	23 671	17 346	8	-	7 021	40,5
Impumelelo (Devon)	-	-	1	1 110	102	7	-	65	63,7
Ipelegeng (Schweizer-Reneke)	-	-	-	3 101	894	5	-	586	65,5
Jouberton (Klerksdorp)	23,9	31,7	-	25 800	15 494	8	-	5 943	38,4
Kagiso (Krugersdorp)	48,0	36,6	-	38 700	5 790	11	-	2 344	40,5
Kanana (Orkney)	-	-	-	6 023	4 120	8	-	2 705	65,7
Katlehong (Germiston)	23,0	22,7	2	280 000	92 300	15	-	19 425	21,1
Kgakala (Leeudoringstad)	-	-	-	2 232	1 021	5	-	809	79,2
Khuma (Stilfontein)	-	-	1	7 432	2 915	8	-	1 418	48,6
Khutsong (Carltonville)	-	-	-	14 242	5 418	8	-	2 832	52,3
Kokosi (Fochville)	-	-	-	2 234	1 905	5	-	1 065	55,9
Kwadela (Davel)	-	-	-	419	690	6	-	600	87,0
KwaGuka (Witbank)	25,1	29,6	2	23 438	18 500	13	-	6 360	34,9
KwaThandeka (Amsterdam)	-	-	-	606	-	5	-	no elections	
KwaThema (Springs)	19,0	20,7	1	63 805	36 722	10	-	7 441	20,3
KwaZamokuhle (Hendrina)	-	-	-	1 314	992	5	-	484	48,8
KwaZanele (Breyton)	-	-	-	4 653	-	6	-	no elections	
Lebaleng (Makwassie)	-	-	-	2 170	407	5	-	334	82,1
Lebohang (Leandra)	-	-	-	-	4 040	6	-	1 115	27,6
Lekoa (Vanderbijlpark)	-	14,7	7	154 587	122 797	39	-	28 665	23,3
Letsopa (Ottoedal)	-	-	-	1 271	1 318	5	-	889	67,5
Mamelodi (Pretoria)	24,7	27,8	-	106 662	80 825	12	-	22 255	27,5
Masing (Lydenburg)	-	-	1	12 697	4 000	7	-	1 627	40,7
Messina Nancefield (Messina)	-	-	-	2 901	1 750	5	-	1 243	71,0
Mhluzi (Middelburg)	46,0	-	-	11 851	20 000	11	-	7 012	36,1
Mohlakeng (Randfontein)	-	-	-	32 678	1 484	7	-	331	22,3
Mookgophong (Naboomspruit)	-	-	-	2 382	1 464	5	-	1 005	68,6
Nthorwane (Greylingstad)	-	-	-	970	690	6	-	333	48,3
Phagameng (Nylstroom)	-	-	-	1 766	1 086	5	-	738	68,0
Phola (Ogies)	-	-	-	3 953	4 500	6	-	1 778	39,5
Ratanda (Heidelberg)	-	-	7	5 697	1 194	7	-	313	26,2
Reagile (Koster)	-	-	-	2 333	1 241	5	-	934	75,3
Refilwe (Cullinan)	-	-	-	835	1 554	6	-	978	62,9
Sakhelwe (Dullstroom)	-	-	-	410	1 550	5	-	640	41,3
Sakhile (Standerton)	-	-	-	7 919	866	9	-	266	30,7
Silobela (Carolina)	-	-	-	2 572	-	6	-	no elections	

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Transvaal</b>									
Simile (Sabie)	-	-	3	2 066	6 240	6	-	1 974	31,6
Sivukile (Morgenzon)	-	-	-	698	1 110	6	-	733	66,0
Siyathemba (Balfour)	-	-	-	4 358	-	6	-	no elections	
Siyathuthuka (Belfast)	-	-	-	2 700	768	6	-	196	25,5
Soweto (Johannesburg)	5,9	10,7	-	375 880	258 617	30	-	29 373	11,4
Tembisa (Kempton Park)	13,2	16,9	6	119 532	3 648	17	-	132	3,6
Thabazimbi (Thabazimbi)	-	-	-	219	292	6	-	238	81,5
Thokoza (Alberton)	29,2	16,7	-	32 950	17 790	9	-	1 110	6,2
Tigane (Hartebeesfontein)	-	-	-	1 488	424	5	-	363	85,6
Tlhabologang (Coligny)	-	-	-	1 465	723	5	-	504	69,7
Tsakane (Brakpan)	-	-	-	32 432	14 011	10	-	1 154	8,2
Tshing (Ventersdorp)	-	-	-	1 762	845	5	-	541	64,0
Tsweleng (Wolmaransstad)	-	-	1	3 637	1 224	5	-	418	34,2
Utlwanang (Christiana)	-	-	-	3 878	1 246	5	-	929	74,5
Vosloorus (Boksburg)	16,0	11,9	-	35 427	30 144	9	-	3 779	12,5
Vukuzakhe (Volksrust)	-	-	-	5 663	38 010	7	-	6 638	17,5
Wattville (Benoni)	16,6	16,0	-	8 197	13 048	5	-	3 885	29,8
Wesselton (Ermelo)	-	-	-	13 820	175	10	-	83	47,4
WsaChibinhula (Chrissiesmeer)	-	-	-	133	-	5	-	no elections	
Zithobeni (Bronkhorstspuit)	-	-	-	1 121	-	6	-	no elections	
Ziyazenzela (Paardekop)	-	-	-	800	-	6	-	no elections	
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>27,4%</b> (ave)	<b>19,9%</b> (ave)	<b>47</b>	<b>2 015 020</b>	<b>1 020 453</b>			<b>222 383</b>	<b>46,1%</b> (ave)

## Notes

- The total number of votes cast in the Transvaal, expressed as a percentage of the total number of registered voters in wards where elections were held, is 21,8 percent.
- There are 13 instances where the number of registered voters exceeds the adult population figures for 1987.
- The average percentage poll for townships in which councillor resignations occurred (to mid-1985) was 29,9%.
- The average percentage polls according to township populations is as follows:

Town with a population over:	Percentage Poll
100 000	16,4
50 000	18,4
20 000	22,5
10 000	26,1
2 000	39,6

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Natal</b>									
Bhekezulu (Vryheid)	-	-	-	5 357	3 046	6	987	1 269	41,7
Bhongweni (Kokstad)	-	-	-	4 934	180	6	99	119	66,1
Bruntville (Mooi River)	-	-	-	2 899	360	5	-	3 candidates	
Dumbe (Paulpietersburg)	-	-	-	1 419	539	5	150	319	59,2
Enhlalakahle (Greytown)	-	-	-	2 718	1 331	5	-	no elections	
Hambanati (Tongaat)	-	-	-	5 930	2 390	6	877	1 142	47,8
Itsokolele (Matatiele)	-	-	-	605	102	6	44	51	50,0
Klaarwater (Pinetown)	-	-	5	2 566	1 688	(5 seats)	-	no candidates	
KwaMevane (Howick)	-	-	-	545	497	(5 seats)	156	246	49,5
Mzingise (Cedarville)	-	-	-	139	123	(5 seats)	48	72	58,5
Ningizimu (Durban)	-	-	2	45 754	16 433	14	1 369	3 876	23,6
Nkanyezi (Colenso)	-	-	-	503	370	4	130	154	41,6
Shakaville (Stanger)	-	-	-	2 368	1 133	(5 seats)	-	4 candidates	
Shayamoya (Scottburgh)	-	-	-	378	216	(5 seats)	-	no elections	
Sibongile (Dundee)	-	-	-	5 256	4 299	7	-	6 candidates	
Sithembile (Glencoe)	-	-	-	1 905	1 985	5	-	no elections	
Sobantu (Pietermaritzburg)	-	-	7	6 244	4 072	7	-	no candidates	
Steadville (Ladysmith)	-	-	-	5 096	1 748	6	212	344	19,7
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>94 616</b>	<b>40 512</b>		<b>4 072</b>	<b>7 592</b>	<b>45,7%</b> (ave)

## Notes

- The total number of votes cast in Natal, expressed as a percentage of the total number of registered voters in wards where elections were held, is 18,7 percent.
- Of the 107 available seats, 49 had candidates unopposed and a further 19 attracted no candidates.

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Cape Province</b>									
Bhongweni (Cookhouse)	-	-	-	1 732	1 445	5	-	no elections	
Boichoko (Postmasburg)	-	-	2	2 544	1 415	6	805	1 003	70,9
Boipelo (Reivilo)	-	-	-	798	216	6	-	5 candidates	
Bongani (Douglas)	-	-	-	1 199	117	6	30	78	66,7
Bongolethu (Oudtshoorn)	-	-	3	-	1 650	8	-	no elections	
Crossroads (Cape Town)	-	-	-	43 000*	15 045	7	-	6 candidates	
Cumakala (Stutterheim)	-	-	-	3 114	2 559	6	641	1 075	42,0
Ditloug (Olifantshoek)	-	-	3	770	409	6	231	273	66,7
Dukathole (Aliwal North)	-	-	-	8 412	2 591	6	-	postponed	
Dyoki (Ugie)	-	-	-	1 434	590	6	319	461	78,1

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Cape Province</b>									
E'Thembeni (Prieska)	-	-	-	1 152	273	6	206	221	81,0
Galeshewe (Kimberly)	26,9	36,4	-	42 688	8 508	12	2 789	3 213	37,8
Ginsberg (King Williams Town)	-	-	-	5 012	2 059	6	195	643	31,2
Gompo Town (East London)	-	-	-	22 139	2 907	8	709	1 040	35,8
Huhundi (Vryburg)	-	-	-	8 455	6 240	8		no elections	
Ibhayi (Port Elizabeth)	13,7	11,0	5	154 546	144 342	21	9 330	13 258	9,2
Ikapa (Cape Town)	-	-	2	207 590*	46 722	21		8 candidates	
Ikutseng (Warrenton)	-	-	-	8 560	2 181	6	1 420	1 501	68,8
Jeffreys Bay	-	-	-	110	78	5		no elections	
Kareedouw (Kareedouw)	-	-	-	354	234	5	94	183	78,2
Katikati (Cathcart)	-	-	-	2 840	221	6	77	126	57,0
Kaya Mandi (Stellenbosch)	-	-	-	3 000*	2 635	7	1 400	1 545	58,6
Kayamnandi (Steynsburg)	-	-	1	4 800	735	6	310	334	45,4
Keiweg	-	-	-	300	161	5		no elections	
Khanyiso (Pearston)	-	-	5	1 625	527	6		no elections	
Khwesinaledi (Lady Grey)	-	-	-	2 735	963	6	483	578	60,0
Kuisebmond (Walvis Bay)	-	-	-	10 000*	1 405	8	304	392	27,9
Kutlwano (Windsorton)	-	-	-	157	107	6		no elections	
Kuyasa (Colesburg)	-	-	8	5 524	1 119	8	567	639	57,1
KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage)	-	-	17	79 212	46 500	16		8 candidates	
KwaNojoli (Somerset East)	-	-	1	8 050	2 563	9	1 439	1 620	63,2
KwaNomzamo (Humansdorp)	-	-	8	1 784	967	8		no elections	
Kwanonqaba (Mossel Bay)	-	-	-	2 273	231	7	67	75	32,5
Kwanonqubela (Alexandria)	-	-	5	1 960	1 199	5		no elections	
Kwanonzame (Middelburg)	-	-	-	5 126	1 672	8	578	831	49,7
Kwanonzwakwazi (Alicedale)	-	-	3	2 058	1 388	8		no elections	
Kwatinidubu (Fort Beaufort)	-	-	-	7 039	6 362	7		no elections	
KwaZamukucinga (Jansenville)	-	-	7	2 023	649	6	327	373	57,5
KwaZamuxolo (Noupoort)	-	-	8	3 686	1 162	7	771	814	70,1
Kwazenzele (Paterson)	-	-	-	1 579	1 101	5		4 candidates	
Lingelethu (Adelaide)	-	-	8	4 518	3 722	9		no elections	
Lingelethu-Wes (Khayelitsha)	-	-	-	150 000*	67 850	20	23 990	29 363	43,3
Lingelihle (Cradock)	-	15,6	6	7 266	1 167	7		no candidates	
Lukhanyisweni (Philipstown)	-	-	-	504	204	5	156	160	78,4
Luxolweni (Hofmeyer)	-	-	3	1 749	903	5		no elections	
Lwandle (Strand)	-	-	-	2 100*	1 926	5		no candidates	
Masake (Sterkstroom)	-	-	-	2 750	1 032	6		no elections	
Masakhane (Jamestown)	-	-	-	758	404	4	309	314	77,7
Masibambane (Elliot)	-	-	1	3 360	1 483	6	382	571	38,5
Masinyusane (Victoria West)	-	-	6	1 889	353	5		3 candidates	
Mataleng (Barkly West)	-	-	-	1 464	1 386	6		no elections	
Matlomola (Griekwastad)	-	-	-	672	431	6		no elections	
Mavuya (Indwe)	-	-	-	3 380	1 178	6		no elections	
Mbekweni (Paarl)	-	-	3	7 575*	6 262	7		no elections	
Mfuleni (Kuilsvier)	-	-	-	3 200*	1 043	7	263	320	30,7
Mlungisi (Queenstown)	-	-	-	16 437	18 534	8		no elections	
Motherwell (Port Elizabeth)	-	-	-	8 704	11 124	8		no candidates	

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Cape Province</b>									
Motswedimosa (Ritchie)	-	-	-	1 455	674	6	209	332	49,3
Mzomomhle (Burgersdorp)	-	-	-	4 789	3 121	8	1 504	1 789	57,3
Mziwabantu (Britstown)	-	-	-	483	154	5	80	110	71,4
Nduli (Ceres)	-	-	-	1 650*	1 392	5	548	658	47,3
Nkululeko (Barkly East)	-	-	-	1 885	869	6	623	687	79,0
Nkwekwezi (Port Alfred)	-	-	5	7 813	1 454	7		no elections	
Nomonde (Molteno)	-	-	-	4 190	3 111	6		no elections	
Nomothamsanqa (Kirkwood)	-	-	7	5 709	1 627	7		no elections	
Nompumelelo (Hanover)	-	-	7	1 115	77	6	52	57	74,0
Nonzwakazi (De Aar)	-	-	-	5 126	1 705	6		no elections	
Nozizwe (Venterstad)	-	-	-	1 762	659	6	502	530	80,4
Nqubela (Robertson)	-	-	3	1 100*	972	7		6 candidates	
Nyarha (Bedford)	-	-	-	3 541	1 820	5		no elections	
Paballelo (Upington)	-	-	-	5 134	1 826	6		2 candidates	
Qumrha (Komga)	-	-	-	1 299	1 283	5	907	937	73,0
Rini (Grahamstown)	6,1	26,0	1	23 992	11 054	9		7 candidates	
Sabelo (Richmond)	-	-	6	840	298	(5 seats)	135	176	59,1
Sidesaviwa (Beaufort West)	-	-	8	3 108	1 803	7		5 candidates	
Sinako (Dordrecht)	-	-	-	1 650	1 050	5		no elections	
Sonwabale (Maclear)	-	-	-	2 423	867	6	425	504	58,1
Thembalesizwe (Aberdeen)	-	-	6	969	618	6		no elections	
Thembalethu (George)	-	-	-	4 400	3 034	9		5 candidates	
Thembinkosi (Petrusville)	-	-	-	616	160	6	87	94	58,8
Thlakalatlou (Danielskuil)	-	-	3	1 063	259	6	171	191	73,7
Tidimalo (Delportshoop)	-	-	-	1 241	245	6	10	110	44,9
uMasizakhe (Graaff-Rienet)	-	-	9	4 913	2 710	8		no elections	
Umzomomhle (Hankey)	-	-	-	1 309	923	6		no elections	
Valspan (Jan Kempdorp)	-	-	-	1 160	484	6	320	341	70,4
Vuyolwethu (Steytlerville)	-	-	5	511	387	4		no elections	
Wongalethu (Klipplaat)	-	-	7	944	463	6	293	317	68,5
Zakhele (Rhodes)	-	-	-	205	78	5		no elections	
Zola (Tarkastad)	-	-	3	2 220	908	7		no elections	
Zolani (Ashton)	-	-	-	2 100*	1 033	7	693	732	70,9
Zweletemba (Worcester)	-	-	4	7 000*	5 746	7		no candidates	
Zwelihle (Hermanus)	-	-	-	800*	710	5		no elections	
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>15,6%</b> (ave)	<b>22,2%</b> (ave)	<b>179</b>	<b>984 157</b>	<b>483 824</b>		<b>54 751</b>	<b>68 569</b>	<b>57,9%</b> (ave)

## Notes

- The total number of votes cast in the Cape Province, expressed as a percentage of the total number of registered voters in wards where elections were held, is 14,2 percent.
- Prior votes made up 79,8 percent of all votes cast in the Cape Province.
- Of the 44 towns that held elections in the Cape, 20 had populations lower than 2 000 adults.
- The average percentage polls according to township populations is as follows:

Town with a population over:	Percentage Poll
50 000	26,3
10 000	30,8
2 000	48,8

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Orange Free State</b>									
42nd Hill (Harrismith)	-	-	-	6 807	4 430	8	281	1 589	35,9
Bohlokong (Bethlehem)	-	24,0	-	15 636	16 318	11	4 237	6 179	37,8
Bolokanang (Petrusburg)	-	-	1	1 175	744	5	570	574	76,6
Borwa (Tweespruit)	-	-	-	1 441	1 228	6	744	784	63,8
Dipelaneng (Hobhouse)	-	-	1	781	239	6	68	111	46,4
Ditlhake (Koffiefontein)	-	-	-	2 720	-	6	-	-	no elections
Ezenzeleni (Warden)	-	-	2	2 010	-	4	-	-	no elections
Fateng-Tshe-Ntsho (Paul Roux)	-	-	-	1 205	456	6	171	254	37,5
Ha-Rasebei (Edenburg)	-	-	-	1 175	678	6	414	437	64,4
Hlohlolwane (Clocolan)	-	-	-	2 802	2 351	6	1 027	1 206	51,3
Ikgomotseng (Soutpan)	-	-	-	665	94	5	64	67	71,2
Ipopeng (Fauresmith)	-	-	1	918	668	6	368	449	67,2
Itumeleng (Jagersfontein)	-	-	-	2 143	-	7	-	-	no elections
Kgotsoeng (Bothaville)	-	-	1	10 489	6 007	7	2 586	3 102	51,6
Kgubetswana (Clarens)	-	-	-	988	-	4	-	-	no elections
Kutlwanoeng (Edendaalsrus)	-	-	-	10 517	13 934	7	4 770	5 682	40,8
Kwakwatsi (Koppies)	-	-	-	2 226	1 256	5	673	707	56,3
Lephoi (Bethuli)	-	-	1	2 609	2 100	5	835	940	44,7
Leratswana (Arlington)	-	-	-	2 563	439	4	252	297	67,7
Madikgetla (Trompsburg)	-	-	-	681	710	6	564	596	83,9
Mafahlaneng (Tweeling)	-	-	2	760	485	4	384	393	81,0
Mafutlatshepe (Smithfield)	-	-	-	1 356	1 372	6	762	850	61,9
Mahlatswetsa (Excelsior)	-	-	-	1 069	780	6	289	411	37,0
Majwemaseu (Brantfort)	-	-	-	2 740	659	6	287	434	65,9
Makeleketa (Winburg)	-	-	-	2 601	-	6	-	-	no elections
Malebogo (Hertzogville)	-	-	-	894	576	6	449	449	77,9
Mamafubedu (Petrus Steyn)	-	-	-	1 240	2 092	4	923	1 049	50,1
Mangaung (Bloemfontein)	-	24,8	-	55 055	55 535	17	13 730	16 987	30,6
Maphodi (Springfontein)	-	-	1	1 333	1 012	6	624	655	64,7
Masilo (Theunissen)	-	-	-	4 194	1 809	6	411	766	42,3
Masjaing (Fouriesburg)	-	-	1	1 605	986	6	164	217	22,0
Matlakeng (Zastron)	-	-	-	1 469	1 830	6	1 092	1 280	69,9
Matlwangtlwang (Steynsrus)	-	-	-	1 243	293	5	113	166	56,6
Matwabeng (Senekal)	-	-	-	3 316	2 850	6	1 223	1 585	55,6
Mautse (Rosendal)	-	-	-	660	112	6	49	55	49,1
Meloding (Virginia)	-	-	-	10 420	4 385	7	841	1 313	29,9
Meqheleng (Ficksburg)	-	-	-	10 490	-	6	-	-	no elections
Metsimaholo (Oranjeville)	-	-	-	332	294	4	118	182	61,9
Moemaneng (Marquard)	-	-	-	3 418	973	6	504	597	61,3
Mokwallo (Vredefort)	-	-	3	1 179	1 858	5	883	969	52,2
Monyakeng (Wesselbron)	-	-	1	3 502	-	6	-	-	no elections
Monyatseng (Ladybrand)	-	-	-	6 370	4 118	7	1 708	1 985	48,2
Morojaneng (Dewetsdorp)	-	-	-	2 082	1 605	6	829	899	56,0
Namahadi (Frankfort)	-	-	-	5 003	4 522	5	534	1 402	31,0
Ngwathe (Edenville)	-	-	1	1 497	666	4	342	406	61,0
Ntha (Lindley)	-	-	-	2 380	1 656	5	653	779	47,0
Ntswanatsatsi (Cornelia)	-	-	-	316	95	4	51	56	58,9

INDICATOR SA Issue Focus

Township	CC % Poll+ 1978	BLA % Poll+ 1983	Councillor Resignations (to mid-1985)	Adult Population (1987)	1988 Registered Voters£	1988 No of Wards	1988 Prior Votes	1988 Total Votes	1988 BLA % Poll+
<b>Orange Free State</b>									
Petsana (Reitz)	-	-	-	2 050	1 208	5	608	645	53,4
Phahameng (Bultfontein)	-	-	-	3 680	2 407	6	1 475	1 609	66,8
Phiritona (Heilbron)	-	-	-	6 948	2 272	7	714	788	34,7
Phomolong (Hennenman)	-	-	-	3 776	1 231	6	360	583	47,4
Poding-Tse-Rolo (Philippolis)	-	-	-	895	-	6	-	-	no elections
Qalabotjha (Villiers)	-	-	1	1 690	669	4	153	232	35,0
Qhoweng (Reddersburg)	-	-	1	727	240	5	147	174	72,5
Qibing (Wepener)	-	-	-	3 056	1 606	6	411	604	37,6
Rammulotsi (Viljoenskroon)	-	-	-	4 813	577	5	348	389	67,4
Ratanang (Jacobsdal)	-	-	-	562	-	6	-	-	no elections
Rwelelevathunya (Rouxville)	-	-	1	1 077	392	6	309	318	81,1
Seeisoville (Kroonstad)	35,4	-	5	31 779	22 462	15	5 620	7 277	32,4
Seretse (Boshof)	-	-	-	1 037	292	6	172	193	66,1
Thabong (Welkom)	28,4	34,4	1	-	25 844	9	6 528	8 604	33,3
Thapelang (Van Stadensrus)	-	-	-	314	106	5	81	86	81,1
Thembalihle (Vrede)	-	-	-	3 000	2 143	7	799	961	44,8
Tikwana (Hoopstad)	-	-	1	1 496	1 100	6	843	882	80,1
Tlholong (Kestell)	-	-	-	1 178	448	4	59	143	31,9
Tshepong (Verkeerdevelei)	-	-	-	461	-	5	-	-	no elections
Tswaraganang (Dealesville)	-	-	-	749	526	6	259	325	61,8
Tswelangpele (Ventersburg)	-	-	-	2 162	-	6	-	-	no elections
Tumahole (Parys)	-	-	8	9 836	-	8	-	-	no elections
Zamani (Memel)	-	-	-	453	99	4	62	71	71,7
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>31,9%</b> (ave)	<b>27,7%</b> (ave)	<b>34</b>	<b>276 814</b>	<b>205 837</b>		<b>63 435</b>	<b>80 743</b>	<b>54,5%</b> (ave)

Notes  
 • The total number of votes cast in the Orange Free State, expressed as a percentage of the total number of registered voters in wards where elections were held, is 39,2 percent.  
 • Prior votes made up 78,6 percent of all votes cast in the Orange Free State.  
 • There are 8 instances where the number of registered voters exceeds the adult population figures for 1987  
 • The average percentage polls according to township populations is as follows:

Town with a population over:	Percentage Poll
10 000	36,6
2 000	47,1

DATA FOR ALL BLA TABLES

+ Where data is available  
 £ Registered voters in contested wards only  
 \* Estimated population figures  
 - Where data is not available

INDICATOR SA Issue Focus

## ANALYSIS

- In almost all the elections polls there have been objections that official figures are too high, as there are many more eligible voters than actually appear on the voters rolls. Township population figures are under-enumerated, and voters rolls are often compiled from township registers.
- There have been more resignations by an unknown number of council members since mid-1985. In refusing to reveal the number of black councillors injured or killed during unrest between 1986-87, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning said recently, 'it cannot beyond doubt be attributed to their holding these offices' (Hansard, 21-24 March 1988, Questions: Col698).
- In all areas, BLA election polls decreased from 1978 to 1983, the lowest polls being recorded in the Eastern Cape. Widespread unrest in the region between 1984-87 led to the collapse of many local authority structures.
- There were resignations of 52,9 percent of councillors in the Eastern Cape between September 1984 and May 1985, in comparison to 8,7 percent of councillors in the Transvaal.
- Evaton in the Transvaal recorded the lowest percentage poll in the 1983 elections. The council went on to announce rent increases in August 1984, sparking off widespread unrest in the Vaal Triangle during which several councillors were killed.
- Townships under the Lekoa and Tembisa councils were centres of unrest and have had the highest number of councillor resignations. The chairman of the Lekoa council and another councillor were killed in September 1984; the 'Sharpeville Six' now await an appeal against their death sentence in the former case.
- In the Free State, Thabong experienced unrest in August 1984 after the first rent riots against the new BLAs in Tumahole in the province.
- The number of Eastern Cape committee members who resigned represent 65 percent of the total number of committee members (184) who resigned in the whole of South Africa over the same period.
- The number of Eastern Cape mayors who resigned represent 45 percent of the total number of mayors (22) who resigned in the whole of South Africa over the same period.

## **Sources**

The respective Provincial Administrations  
Hansard, 10 to 14 June 1985, Questions:Col1795  
Hansard, 22 to 26 June 1987, Questions:Col325  
Hansard, 21 to 24 June 1988, Questions:Col697  
Annual Survey of Race Relations 1983. Johannesburg: SA Institute of Race Relations.

# APPENDIX TWO

## TEN CHRONOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

### JANUARY 1984 TO JUNE 1988

# BUILD-UP OF TOWNSHIP UNREST

January-December 1984

1984	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS Student, Worker and Community Alliances	CIVIL UNREST Town Councils, Rents & Riots	GOVERNMENT RESPONSE Detentions, Restrictions & Army Role	BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY Guerrilla Attacks & Sabotage
<p><b>JANUARY-APRIL</b></p>	<p>Jan School term begins but African pupil grievances from 1983 remain unresolved. Important student issues include age limit readmission criteria, demand for elected SRCs, abolition of prefects, end to corporal punishment and sexual harassment, free textbooks and stationery, and poor teacher qualifications.</p> <p>16 Jan Saulsville Secondary School pupils in Atteridgeville (Pretoria) boycott classes, citing non-readmission of 90 colleagues. Later, 5 other schools in area join protests.</p> <p>Early Feb In Cradock scholars boycott classes after teacher and Cradora head, Matthew Goniwe, is transferred to Graaff-Reinet.</p> <p>End April Total of 13 107 pupils at 24 schools in Atteridgeville, Soweto, Alexandra and E Cape are now out on boycott.</p>	<p>13 Feb First unrest victim, 15 year-old Emma Satheka from Atteridgeville, is killed by police vehicle.</p> <p>April Violence sweeps llingelihle (Cradock) with confrontations between residents and police. (15/4/84) Second victim, 17 year-old Zebenzile Jacobs, is stabbed to llingelihle.</p>	<p>Jan Minister of Education and Training, Barend du Plessis, reveals 319 African pupils are refused school readmission because they are over 20 years-old.</p> <p>April Goniwe and other Cradock community leaders are detained. In an attempt to resolve Atteridgeville education impasse, numerous meetings are held between education officials, pupils, parents and community leaders.</p> <p>Early May Eighteen Atteridgeville pupils meet with Minister who gives assurance schools will not close before mid-May. Although Cosas leaders recommend students return to prevent closure, student majority decide to observe boycott until SRCs are accepted and student detainees released.</p> <p>Education Ministry agrees to formation of 'Pupil Representative Councils' (PRCs) and Liaison Committees consisting of school principal, teachers, parents, pupils and local school inspector. Pupils reject initiative, claiming PRCs are puppet bodies that undermine SRCs.</p>	<p>Jan In Bloemfontein explosion damages railway line.</p> <p>Feb Explosive devices damage Ciskei 'embassy' (Durban) and electricity sub-stations in Pietermaritzburg and Mandini. SASS begin fire-bombing homes of Soweto councillors.</p> <p>Mar Ermelo petrol depot damaged in limpet mine attack, 3 insurgents killed in shoot-out with police in Johannesburg.</p> <p>3/5 April Car-bomb explodes in Durban, killing 3 and injuring 20. Explosion rocks Transkei 'embassy' in Botshabelo (Bloemfontein).</p>
<p><b>MAY-JULY</b></p>	<p>June Pupils side with community organisations because of second GST increase in year - from 6 to 7 percent (1/2/84), and 7 to 10 percent (1/7/84) - and more join class boycotts.</p> <p>Early July 30 000 pupils boycott classes nationwide. Affects schools in Bloemfontein, Parys and Welkom (OFS), Pietersburg and Warmbaths (Transvaal), and in E Rand townships of Katlehong, Daveyton, Thokoza, Wattville, Vosloorus, Duduza, Ratanda, and KwaThema.</p>	<p>May UDF President Archie Gumede is attacked by alleged Inkatha supporters at May Day rally in Empangeni.</p> <p>14 July Demonstration by Tumahole (Parys) residents and pupils to protest rent and GST increases is broken up by police using teargas and sjamboks. In week of violence 52 are arrested and charged with offences from public violence to housebreaking.</p> <p>22 July In Lamontville 3 die in clash between Inkatha supporters and residents after armed men arrive at unveiling of tombstone of assassinated community leader, Harrison Dube.</p>	<p>May/June Education authorities blame 'outsiders' for manipulating education 'for their own political ends'.</p> <p>15 May All 6 Atteridgeville schools closed after 6 000 pupils fail to return to class.</p>	<p>May In Pietermaritzburg community activist, Ben Langa, is assassinated by ANC cadres. In Durban, Department of Internal Affairs and Railway Police HQ damaged by explosions; (13/5/84) Mobil Oil Refinery comes under RPG7 rocket attack; in ensuing clash with police, 4 insurgents and 3 bystanders are killed and 7 injured. In Jabulani (Soweto) police vehicle damaged by grenade, while Jhb/Vereeniging railway line is damaged by saboteurs. SASS claims responsibility for grenade attack on 2 Soweto homes.</p> <p>June Limpet mine attacks in Durban, Johannesburg and Bethal, while guerrillas die in shoot-outs with police in Ndwedwe (N Natal) and Bethal. Parcel-bomb kills SA exile Jeanette Schoon and daughter in Angola.</p> <p>12 July Car-bomb in Durban kills 5 civilians and injures 27.</p>
<p><b>AUGUST</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>UDF, NFC and Cusa/Fosatu affiliates intensify voter boycott campaigns of parliamentary elections through mass meetings, pamphlets and house-to-house visits. UDF 'One Million Signatures Campaign' against tricameral constitution reaches 500 000 mark.</p> <p>African pupils at 32 schools boycott classes; 21 in Transvaal and OFS, 11 in E and W Cape. Scholars at 7 tertiary institutions boycott over range of political and educational issues.</p>	<p>2/3 Aug Rent riots erupt in Thabong (Welkom), after earlier protests against increases in Tumahole in mid-July. Thabong police use teargas and rubber bullets to disperse 500 demonstrators and arrest 18. In Atteridgeville mayor's home is petrol-bombed.</p>	<p>By August rents/service charges are increased in African townships in Pretoria, E and W Rand and E Cape. Evaton and Lekoa councils announce rent increases for Vaal Triangle townships.</p> <p>17/20 Aug Police arrest 90 people on wide range of electoral picketing and pamphleteering charges.</p>	<p>3/8 Aug In Ellisras (NW Tvl), ANC suspect killed in clash with police. In Durban electricity sub-station destroyed by blast, while ANC suspect dies in grenade attack on Durban police complex.</p>
<p><b>AUGUST</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>17/19 Aug Nationwide anti-election meetings held. 60 000 attend first anniversary rally of UDF in Cape Town.</p> <p>22 Aug House of Representative (coloured) election: ballot cast by 19 percent of all potential voters, dropping to equivalent 5 percent in 20 Cape Peninsula constituencies.</p> <p>28 Aug House of Delegates (Indian) poll: ballot cast by 18 percent of all potential voters but controversy rages over role of special votes which number almost 25 000 (30 percent of all votes cast).</p> <p>Because of elections 630 000 coloured pupils, 'thousands' of Indians and whites, and 30 000 Africans observe school boycott. In addition pupils at 73 schools boycott over range of issues, while boycott at 30 tertiary institutions results in temporary closure of 12.</p>	<p>18/25 Aug Violent clashes occur between Inkatha and UDF supporters in Hambanathi (Tonga) over issue of township incorporation into KwaZulu.</p> <p>Further conflict erupts in Tembisa (Kempston Park), Tumahole, Sharpeville and Vosloorus (Alberton) over educational issues. Schools, cars and town council offices and shops are burnt in arson attacks. In Pietermaritzburg government/homeland on 21 Aug 1 500 youths who picket Minister Koornhof's visit to inaugurate town council test Minister Koornhof's visit to inaugurate town council.</p> <p>28/30 Aug Sporadic violence erupts in E Cape and Vaal Triangle. Police vehicles, commuter buses, schools and council offices are damaged in numerous incidents of arson, petrol-bombing and stoning.</p> <p>Conflict at schools in E Rand, Welkom, Vaal Triangle, Soweto, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein and Pretoria which results in 5 deaths, 21 injuries and 20 arrests.</p>	<p>14/21 Aug Police detain further 35 election boycott campaigners, including leaders 'Terror' Lekota (publicity secretary), Archie Gumede (president), Aubrey Mokoena (Transvaal vice-president), Essop Jassat (TIC president), George Sewpersadh (NIC president) and Curtis Nkondo (RMC chair).</p> <p>22/8 Aug Heavy police presence at polling stations, where violent clashes result in arrests of dozens of protesters and election poll monitoring nationwide. At Lenasia West polling station over 100 are injured by rubber bullets/batons in police action.</p> <p>In many townships police use teargas to disperse crowds of rioting youths.</p> <p>On 21 Aug (Benoni) town council drops rent increases by R5; Atteridgeville council scraps increases, while 3 community councillors resign in Ratanda (Heidelberg).</p>	<p>16/17 Aug Soweto police headquarters damaged by limpet mine, while ANC suspect dies in Soweto police shootout.</p> <p>20/24 Aug In Langlaagte (Johannesburg) 3 explosive devices defused in railyard. Johannesburg DET offices damaged by explosion, while another bomb damages police offices in city.</p>

1984	<b>NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS</b> Student, Worker and Community Alliances	<b>CIVIL UNREST</b> Town Councils, Rents & Riots
<b>SEPTEMBER</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	1/3 Sept Residents of 5 Vaal townships begin rent boycott. VCA, Sharpeville Anti-Rent Committee, Cosas, UDF and Azapo organise two-day work stayaway to protest rent and electricity increases. Organisers also call for boycott of shops, garages and taxis owned by town councillors. Sept Mainly in PWV area, boycott over rent/political issues at 123 schools and 6 tertiary institutions.	1/3 Sept Attempted petrol-bombing of Inkatha mayor's home in Lamontville. Widespread rioting erupts in Vaal Triangle region. In Sharpeville Deputy Mayor and councillor are killed, while homes of council officials are gutted; Lekoa council is killed by angry crowd; in Sebokeng a councillor is stoned to death and shopping centre, petrol station, bus depot, beerhalls and schools are destroyed; in Bolpatong/Bopheng councillor homes and shops are looted, administration and post offices burnt. In Thabong police and private vehicles, and officials' homes are stoned. In Tembisa youths stone vehicles and beerhalls. 4/6 Sept Violent rent protests spread to Mamelodi (Pretoria), Vosloorus and other PWV townships. Evaton deputy mayor is killed, many councillors go into hiding and 3 regions. 12/13 Sept First white victim of unrest is stoned to death in Sebokeng. Police disperse large crowds in Soweto. Riot death toll reaches 50.
<b>SEPTEMBER</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	16/18 Sept NUM calls first legal strike by black miners. Amidst police intervention and riots, 10 miners die and 450 are injured, many during illegal strikes in following week. One-day Soweto work stayaway organised by RMC continues into second day. Four Fosatu affiliate, Stawu, launches consumer boycott of Simba-Quix products to force reinstatement of 464 workers fired in August.	17/19 Sept During Soweto stayaway 60 buses and cars damaged, delivery trucks and shops looted, train gutted, and beerhalls/hostels/official buildings are attacked by mobs. Renewed violence in E Cape and in Tembisa, Vosloorus and Katlehong; in Thokoza crowd burn down wholesale outlet and supermarket owned by policeman.
<b>OCTOBER</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	Trade unions and community groups pledge support for Simba boycott. 10 Oct Azasm and Cosas initiate series of meetings with parents and workers to broaden support for school boycotts; 190 schools are boycotted (143 in E Rand and Vaal Triangle, and 43 in E Cape) mostly over issues of rents, education and unrest affecting 170 000 African pupils. Students at 3 tertiary institutions on boycott. 14 Oct Meeting of 4 000 establishes KwaThema Parent-Student Committee which organises one-day stayaway with union support.	Oct Township riots continue unabated, with fresh outbreaks in KwaThema (E Rand), Bothshabelo (OFS), Joza (Grahamstown), New Brighton (Port Elizabeth) and Kagiso (Krugersdorp). Community councillors' and policemen's properties, official buildings, buses, beerhalls and schools are the main targets. In educational boycotts one student dies while 6 are injured and 68 arrested. Unrest death toll estimated to be between 70-80.
<b>OCTOBER</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	22 Oct One-day stayaway in KwaThema is highly successful, but second localised stayaway planned 7 days later is shelved as co-ordination of larger regional action begins. 27/31 Oct Umbrella TRSC is formed by VCA, RMC, Cusa, Fosatu, independent trade unions, Cosas and other community and youth organisations. TRSC launches a joint campaign by 37 organisations for two-day stayaway strike to be held on 5-6/12/84. Rent boycotts continue in the Vaal Triangle. More than 200 000 pupils from 210 schools and 4 tertiary institutions are now out on boycott.	Oct In 6 weeks at least 16 children under 15 years-old die in unrest. In Graaff-Reinet home of community council chair is petrol-bombed, while in Ikageng (Potchefstroom) violence erupts. In KwaThema rubble barricades block main roads, bottle-store is destroyed and buses/vehicles are stoned. SAHR estimates 131 fatalities in 2 months of unrest. 23/31 Oct New wave of township unrest affects PWV and E Cape townships.
<b>NOVEMBER</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	5/7 Nov TRSC distributes 400 000 pamphlets and 5 000 posters calling on township residents to observe stayaway. Cosas activists visit hostels to mobilise migrant workers. About 500 000 workers participate in stayaway with average 60% response in PWV complex, 90% in Vaal Triangle and 85% on E Rand. SASOL dismisses 6 000 workers for participation in stayaway. 9 Nov In Fingo, Joza and Tantie (all Grahamstown) 70% of workers observe one-day stayaway. Informal talks open between business organisations and Cusa/Fosatu but further detentions of 13 unionists interrupt initiative. Three employer associations issue statements criticising detentions of labour leaders and call on government to charge or release them. Pupils at over 375 schools on boycott, involving more than 400 000 African pupils; 315 schools in PWV region and 60 in E Cape.	5/6 Nov In stayaway rioters damage 55 buses in 6 Vaal Triangle townships, while in E Rand 7 councillor homes are attacked. Unrest deaths reported in Tembisa (7), Katlehong (5), Ratanda (6), other Transvaal townships (5). In Grahamstown and KwaZakhele (Port Elizabeth) renewed violence flares, police vehicles are stoned and weather bureau burnt. 10 000 mourners attend funerals of 7 unrest victims. Nov In PWV townships 24 die as police and rioters clash. Troops enter Tembisa and Tsakane (Brakpan) townships.



## GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

### Detentions, Restrictions & Unrest Fatalities

3/6 Sept Large police contingents enter Vaal townships to quell rebellion, which leaves 26 dead and at least 300 injured. 141 people later appear in court on public violence charges.

10 Sept 10 councils agree to suspend rent and service increases, in-AT le Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Evaton and Soweto. Ministers of Law and Order, Defence, Internal Affairs and Education inspect Vaal townships.

12 Sept Indoor political meetings banned in 21 magisterial districts of Transvaal, E Cape, Natal and OFS. In Soweto police use teargas and bullets, guard council buildings, businesses and homes amidst riot on seventh anniversary of Biko's death in detention.

13 Sept After Supreme Court judge sets aside detention orders on 6 UDF and NIC activists (21 Aug), they take refuge in British Consulate (Narhan) as Minister of Law and Order orders their re-detention. DET closes all schools in Vaal Triangle, E Rand and Pretoria one week early for holidays.

22 Sept At least 666 people are arrested - mostly mourners at funerals of unrest victims - in Vaal townships of Sebokeng, Bophelong and Sharpeville.

26 Sept Police release 6 election boycott campaigners, including Azapo's deputy president Saths Cooper and Cape vice-president Peter Jones; Transvaal UDF general secretary Moss Chikane, and Moruti Mapella of Cosas. Ten prominent activists remain in detention.

Mourners arrested en masse for attending unrest funerals are fined R50 or 50 days.

6/8 Oct Police detain NIC's Sewpersadh, MJ Naidoo and Ramgobin as they leave British Consulate refuge; 3 remain inside. Supreme Court upholds validity of new Section 28 'preventative' detention orders served on original 6 Consular refugees.

Minister of Law and Order announces greater SADF/police collaboration to suppress unrest. Release of 4 community and student leaders from Cradock, including Goniwe, after 6 months in detention.

Oct On E Rand African town councils given control of bottle-stores to provide them with extra revenue.

14/17 Oct British Labour MP, Anderson, visits Consulate 3 and other detainees.

23 Oct In 'Operation Palmiet', 7 000 SADF/SAP personnel cordon Sebokeng and search all 19 500 houses, arresting 354 people. In similar SADF/police house-to-house raids in Sharpeville and Boipatong many are arrested. In Vanderbijlpark and Sebokeng 5 special courts are established to deal with arrests.

24/26 Oct Transkei bans UDF and Cosas and Azaso affiliates.

27 Oct Police arrest 52 Sebokeng residents en route to funeral of unrest victim. Further SADF/police seal-and-search raids in Sharpeville and Boipatong.

31 Oct DPSC estimates 1 600 arrests made in PWV area during Sep/Oct. Minister of Co-operation and Development, Gerrit Viljoen announces state compensation for those who suffer damage in rent riots. State empowers 32 new African town and community councils to establish their own police forces.

Nov Authorities cut electricity to Sharpeville to coerce residents to settle rent and service arrears. Atteridgeville mayor resigns; in Ratanda elections for new councils are postponed as no candidates come forward. Soweto council announces 20% electricity tariff increase.

19 Nov Police raid UDF and Fosatu offices. Detentions of 4 TRSC members including chairman Thami Mali, Soyco president Oupa Monareng, and 2 unionists. Fosatu president Chris Dlamini, VCA chair Lord Mafeni and other activists are also arrested.

14 Nov Cusa general secretary Pirowshaw Camay, Nusas president Kate Phillip and at least 15 others are detained; 220 people now in detention including 12 unionists. SADF/police raid (Sebokeng) hostels, arresting 2 000 rent defaulters.

15 Nov Minister of Law and Order reveals 130 dead during township unrest, 96 due to police action.

## BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

### Guerilla Attacks & Sabotage

3/5 Sept In Johannesburg offices of Department of Home Affairs are damaged by explosion, while limpet mines are found in Rand Supreme Court. Rustenburg electricity sub-station destroyed by limpet mine.

13/14 Sept In Durban limpet mine destroys electricity sub-station. In Krugersdorp Department of Community Development building is damaged in blast.

27 Sept In Khuma (Stilfontein) 5 people are injured in grenade attack on police.

6 Oct Explosive detonator injures Durban street-cleaner.

1984	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS Student, Worker and Community Alliances	CIVIL UNREST Town Councils, Rents & Riots
<b>NOVEMBER</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p><b>19 Nov</b> Fosatu, Cusa and Azapo oppose calls for further stayaways in immediate future - particularly 5 day stayaway scheduled from 26/11/84 onwards.</p> <p><b>30 Nov</b> Boycotts continue unabated at schools and tertiary institutions. Andrew Levy and Associates estimate 500 000 mandays are lost in 1984 because of strikes alone (excluding political stayaways).</p>	<p><b>By 20 Nov</b> At least 22 councillors and 5 mayors have resigned, on Reef, with 5 killed in riots; but 5 members of Duduza council (Nigel) rescind earlier resignations.</p> <p><b>29 Nov</b> Police arrest 30 demonstrators in Johannesburg during national protest against repression.</p> <p><b>Nov</b> In Tembisa 115 people are arrested during raids - 50 on looting charges.</p>
<b>DECEMBER</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p><b>9 Dec</b> In Sharpeville meeting of 5 000 residents decides to continue rent boycott until rents are reduced to R30 and some service charges are scrapped.</p> <p><b>12 Dec</b> UDF calls for 'Black Christmas', a consumer boycott and period of mourning for unrest victims - those killed, maimed or in detention.</p>	<p><b>5 Dec</b> Soweto councillor Edward Manyosi assassinated on eve of impending election as mayor; later, home of replacement Edward Kunene is fire-bombed.</p> <p>Two youths die in Fingo and Joza where barricades are erected, vehicles stoned and a beerhall and church burned. In Zamdela (Sasolberg) crowds go on rampage, stoning police vehicles and destroying a number of shops - including some owned by community councillors.</p>
<b>DECEMBER</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p><b>Christmas week</b> Most shops close in PWV townships in response to UDF call. 'Black Christmas' campaign is observed in some of more volatile PWV and E Cape townships, but fails to have national impact. Thousands of youths march in Evaton, while others in Boipatong and Sharpeville clean township cemeteries to honour unrest victims. In Ilngelihle (Cradock) community organisations hold massive protest rally.</p> <p><b>27 Dec</b> Atteridgeville Residents Organisation calls on newly elected councillors to resign.</p> <p>Imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela rejects offer of conditional release under Transkeian auspices.</p>	<p><b>Christmas week</b> During renewed rioting in PWV area, homes of 3 town councillors (Pretoria/E Rand) and a policeman (Boipatong) are attacked, a supermarket (Mamelodi) and beerhall (Sebokeng) are burnt; crowds stone policemen in Katshehong - in many instances police use birdshot to disperse crowds.</p> <p><b>31 Dec</b> SAIRR estimates 175 people were killed during 1984 in unrest-related incidents - 149 between 3/9/84 and year-end.</p>

## GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

### Detentions, Restrictions & Unrest Fatalities

11 Soweto council reverses 1981 decision to exempt pensioners from rent payments. Oranje-Vaal Development Board and Lekoa/Evaton Councils obtain court orders to force employers to deduct rent payments from defaulters' wages.  
 12 Combined SADF/police operations continue in volatile PWV. Police now refuse to comment on 'day-to-day activities' of army in townships.  
 14 Ministers of Law and Order and Manpower meet AHI, Assoccom and FCI to discuss detentions. DPSC estimates police actions in 1984 result in detention without trial of over 1 093 - including 515 youths, 202 community workers, 15 Cosas office-bearers and 14 UDF leaders. Minister of Law and Order claims only 164 remain in detention, however.

5 Dec Police release 16 activists and unionists from detention, including Fosatu's Dlamini and Cusa's Camay; 11 Section 28 preventative detention notices are withdrawn.

7/12 Dec SADF/police patrol Grahamstown and disperse crowds. In Durban 3 former Consular fugitives (Ramgobin, Sewpersadh, Naidoo), together with TIC president Jassat and RMC leaders Nkondo and Mokoena, appear in court on treason charges. Remaining 3 refugees leave consulate and join 6 other treason trialists; 12 stayaway organisers are charged with treason and released on bail.

13 Dec ERDB hands over R22m to 7 councils to promote financial self-administration and funding. Tembisa council reintroduces R4 service levy, withdrawn after earlier unrest.

Dec All Lekoa councillors live in heavily guarded compound of 40 houses in Sebokeng as their homes were destroyed during unrest.

21 Dec Eight UDF, Indian Congress and RMC leaders denied bail while awaiting trial set for 29/3/85 on treason charges for acts committed between 1981/84.

Final government figures put 1984 unrest death toll at 211 due to police action, with another 368 people wounded. According to Ministry of Law and Order, 135 people are still in detention at end of January 1985.

## BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

### Guerilla Attacks & Sabotage

25 Nov In Huhudi (N Cape) policeman and ANC insurgent die in clash.

24 Dec In Ingwavuma (N Natal) ANC insurgent is killed in shootout with SADF/police and large arms cache uncovered.

According to police 58 insurgency incidents occur in 1984; ISS estimates over 100 ANC members were killed or captured by police. SASS responsible for 25 petrol-bomb attacks on councillor property during 1984 - 24 in Soweto.

### Acronyms

- AHI Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut
- Assoccom Associated Chambers of Commerce
- Azapo Azanian Peoples Organisation
- Azasm Azanian Student Movement
- Azaso Azanian Students Organisation
- Cosas Congress of South African Students
- Cradoora Cradock Residents Association
- Cusa Council of South African Unions
- DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee
- ERDB East Rand Development Board
- Federated Chambers of Industries
- Fosatu Federation of South African Trade Unions
- Institute for Strategic Studies
- Joint Rent Action Committee
- NFC National Forum Committee
- NIC Natal Indian Congress
- NP National Party
- NPP National Peoples Party
- NUM National Union of Mineworkers
- NUSAS National Union of South African Students
- PPP Progressive Federal Party
- PWWV Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging
- RMC Release Mandela Committee/Campaign
- SADF South African Defence Force
- SAP South African Police
- SFAWU Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union
- SP Solidarity Party
- TIC Transvaal Indian Congress
- TRSC Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee
- UDF United Democratic Front
- VCA Vaal Civic Association

# COUNTDOWN TO TOWNSHIP REVOLT

January-20 July 1985

1985	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS <i>School, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/ Stayaways</i>	GENERAL CIVIL UNREST <i>Township Revolts and Factionalism</i>	GOVERNMENT RESPONSE <i>Reform and Repression</i>	BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY <i>Strategies, Guerilla/Internal Insurgent Attacks</i>
<b>JANUARY</b>	<p>1 Jan 350 000 township residents in Vaal Triangle (VT) continue rate and rent boycott begun in September 1984. Two councillors resign after the VCA demands that Lekoa Town Council reduce all charges to R30 a month.</p> <p>9 Jan Except for VT area, African pupils return to school in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) complex, despite COSAS calls to continue boycott. The massive school boycott of 1984 continues in Eastern Cape — in Port Elizabeth (PE), pupils protest against detention of 11 COSAS leaders; in Ilingeihle (Cradock), they demand that 2 teachers, Fort Calata and Matthew Goniwe, be reinstated. AZAPO urges all pupils to end boycott.</p> <p>19 Jan Katlehong (East Rand) residents begin boycott of rent charges and of all businesses owned by councillors and ERAB. Police rescue officials from public meeting called by Katlehong Town Council.</p> <p>21 Jan PE school boycott ends after 9 COSAS leaders are released on bail.</p>	<p>1/3 Jan African youths riot in Grahamstown and Port Alfred. Sporadic stone throwing incidents in VT and East Rand townships.</p> <p>5/13 Jan Senator Edward Kennedy's visit to South Africa exposes deep AZAPO/UDF divisions.</p> <p>17 Jan Uitenhage youths riot and destroy homes of 3 African policemen.</p> <p>20/21 Jan In Tembisa (North Johannesburg), UDF supporters disrupt meeting organised by AZAPO to form new branch AZASM for pupils/students. In Beaufort West, police use teargas to disperse 300 demonstrators after UDF leader Willie Kratshi is shot dead.</p> <p>23 Jan Riots in KwaThema (East Rand) — PUTCO suspends services into township after 6 buses and ERAB buildings are stoned.</p> <p>29/30 Jan Unrest spreads to OFS townships — in Khotso (Bothaville), 48 arrests are made when a large crowd attacks teachers, policemen, their houses and vehicles; in Virginia police disperse 600 pupils who stone police vehicles and school buildings.</p>	<p>The van der Walt Commission identifies the major catalyst of 1984 VT unrest as township residents' 'widespread misunderstanding of the new local authority system'.</p> <p>Jan Cabinet Minister Dr Gerrit Viljoen says the government will create a national negotiating forum for Africans.</p> <p>Jan On opening parliament, State President PW Botha makes a 'clarification of intent', offering Africans limited freehold rights and a review of influx control laws and forced removals.</p> <p>Jan Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange says that police will investigate SACBC claims of police misconduct in VT townships. He states that police action in 1984 resulted in 96 deaths, while SACBC puts figure at 100 deaths.</p> <p>Jan PW Botha offers conditional release to Nelson Mandela and other long-term security prisoners if they reject violence as a political weapon. Le Grange announces that 135 people are now in detention under Section 27 of the Internal Security Act.</p>	<p>Mid-Jan ANC external mission in Lusaka announces it is revising its guerilla strategy to include the 'soft target' (civilian) option.</p> <p>13 Jan Three heavily armed ANC insurgents and 1 policeman are killed in rural contact in Nongoma (Zululand).</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  ANC African National Congress                  AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organisation                  AZASM Azanian Students Movement                  COSAS Congress of South African Students                  ERAB East Rand Administration Board                  OFS Orange Free State                  SACBC South African Catholic Bishops Conference                  UDF United Democratic Front                  VCA Vaal Civic Association</p>
<b>FEBRUARY</b>	<p>6 Feb In Galeshewe (Kimberley), Department of Education and Training (DET) suspends classes at 2 schools after unrest and demands parents sign undertaking that children will not boycott. Pupils return to classes 6 days later.</p> <p>11 Feb Pupils at 6 Mamelodi (Pretoria) schools end boycott.</p> <p>18 Feb In Uitenhage, pupils at 2 coloured schools boycott classes for 3 weeks until transfer of SACOS activist teachers is suspended. In Duncan Village (East London) pupils begin 8 day boycott to demand expulsion of principal. 70 000 Pupils are now on boycott in areas affected by unrest.</p> <p>27/29 Feb DET closes 5 Tembisa schools after 4 000 scholars demonstrate near police station for release of 9 colleagues.</p>	<p>3/9 Feb Unrest simmers in Ilingeihle after a policeman dies in a crowd of 5 000 riots. In Soweto, SA Suicide Squad petrol bombs home of publicity secretary of Sofasonke Party.</p> <p>11 Feb Arrests are made as youths riot in Seelsoville (Kroonstad) and destroy 27 businesses, worth R500 000.</p> <p>18/21 Feb Violence erupts at Crossroads settlement near Crossroads Town, leaving 18 dead and 230 injured in clashes with police. Police disperse 400 shackdwellers protesting against removal of forced removal to Khayelitsha and arrest of community leader.</p> <p>27 Feb Homes of UDF activists in VT are petrol bombed. AZAPO pamphlets found nearby. Both UDF and AZAPO blame 'agents of the state'.</p>	<p>PW Botha rejects idea of creating fourth parliamentary chamber for Africans.</p> <p>Nelson Mandela and other ANC long-term political prisoners reject conditional release offer, but by mid-month 18 former PAC activists accept terms of release.</p> <p>Eight UDF executive members are detained, including Albertina Sisulu (FEDSAW); Sam Kikine, Isaac Ngcobo, Sisa Njikalana, Thozamile Mvela (SAAWU); Cassim Saloojee, Ismail Mohamed (TIC) and Rev Frank Mkhize (RMC). All join 8 other treason trialists in Pietermaritzburg.</p> <p>Feb Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC) claims that 164 people have been detained without trial in 1985 so far.</p>	<p>8/9 Feb Limpet mine damages old army offices in Johannesburg (JHB). ANC guerilla killed by police in Alexandria (JHB).</p> <p>23 Feb Hand grenade attacks on homes of 2 Huhudi community councillors (Vryburg) and policeman.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  FEDSAW Federation of South African Women                  PAC Pan Africanist Congress                  RMC Release Mandela Committee                  SAAWU South African Allied Workers Union                  SACOS South African Council of Sport                  TIC Transvaal Indian Congress</p>
<b>MARCH</b>	<p>6/8 Mar DET suspends classes at 20 schools on East Rand and at Wesselsbron (OFS) schools, where police disperse pupils. Reopened schools are boycotted by 5 000 pupils in Tembisa, 7 000 in Mamelodi, and others in Bloemfontein.</p> <p>10/14 Mar In Thabong (Welkom), 300 residents disrupt town council meeting to demand its resignation. All KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) councillors, except Kinikini, resign. DET closes 7 schools in Ilingeihle.</p> <p>16/18 PEBCO organises total stayaway strike by scholars, workers and consumers, to protest price increases of petrol and consumer goods.</p> <p>19 Mar School boycotts by 10 000 pupils begin in Klerksdorp and Bethlehem, while massive boycott of VT schools continues.</p> <p>21/22 Mar Second stayaway strike in PE and Uitenhage. 35 African miners injured in clashes with police at Vaal Reefs (Klerksdorp) where 42 000 workers strike for higher wages.</p> <p>29 Mar 8 000 FOSATU members in Uitenhage stop work for 15 minutes to mourn Langa (Uitenhage) dead.</p>	<p>2/4 Mar Riots in Uitenhage townships leave 1 dead, 5 injured and 3 vehicles destroyed, and another councillor resigns. Home of Atteridgeville town council candidate is petrol bombed.</p> <p>9 Mar In Eastern Cape, clashes between crowds and police leave 10 dead, and 83 people are arrested.</p> <p>15/18 Mar Regional upsurge of unrest with 9 fatalities, injuries and 30 arrests. A security policeman and 14 Ilingeihle during attacks on homes of 11 policemen and 14 councillors/supporters.</p> <p>19 Mar Two policemen's homes attacked in Atteridgeville (Pretoria) and home of Soweto Youth Congress leader is bombed.</p> <p>21/24 Mar On twenty-fifth anniversary of Sharpeville, police open fire on crowd near Langa, killing 19. Intense Uitenhage's townships leaves 10 dead as mobs kill Kinikini and destroy 17 policemen's homes.</p> <p>28 Mar Four members of Bontrug Town council (Kirkwood) resign. Soweto home of former deputy mayor petrol bombed. PE, arsonists cause R530 000 damage to 6 schools.</p>	<p>Magistrate bans funeral of Thabong riot victim.</p> <p>Government orders inquest into death of UDF leader Kratshi.</p> <p>In central PE, police disperse 800 pupils at law courts, where 9 COSAS members appear on public violence charges.</p> <p>Government orders inquiry into Langa shooting and bans all meetings to do with student boycotts.</p> <p>27 Mar 239 Demonstrators including Reverends Allan Boesak and Pieter Naude arrested during march on parliament. Kannemeyer Commission into Langa shooting sits for first time.</p> <p>Government imposes 3-month ban on meetings convened by 29 organisations in 18 magisterial districts.</p> <p>Records for first 3 months of 1985 put riot death toll at 104, with 60 percent of fatalities in Eastern Cape, and 71 deaths due to police action.</p>	<p>4 Mar Explosions destroy home of Alexandria Mayor Sam Buti and National Party offices in Kroonstad.</p> <p>13 Mar In Swartruggens (Western Transvaal) 3 suspected ANC guerillas flee to Botswana after they kill 2 shopkeepers.</p> <p>17/19 Mar Limpet mine destroys police vehicle in Mamelodi. Two alleged ANC insurgents shot dead and 1 arrested by police in Eastern Transvaal.</p> <p>23 Mar Hand grenade attacks on government building in Soweto and on security policeman's home in Tembisa.</p> <p>28 Mar ANC external mission announces possible guerilla attacks on SA subsidiaries of multi-national companies.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  FOSATU Federation of South African Trade Unions                  PEBCO Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation                  SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations</p>

1985	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS <i>School, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/ Stayaways</i>	GENERAL CIVIL UNREST <i>Township Revolts and Factionalism</i>	GOVERNMENT RESPONSE <i>Form and Repression</i>	BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY <i>Strategies, Guerilla/Internal Insurgent Attacks</i>
APRIL	<p>1 Apr Black traders close stores in Grahamstown to protest arrests.</p> <p>8/16 Apr Ilingelihle school boycott ends, though Goniwe and Calata are not re-instated. 32 Percent of pupils continue boycott to protest police presence in township.</p> <p>21 Apr Joint Somerset East-Cookhouse Community Council resigns en masse.</p> <p>26/28 Apr 14 400 miners from Vaal Reefs and Hartebeesfontein gold mines are fired after mass strike, which leaves 2 dead and hundreds injured. In Fort Beaufort, white businessmen try to negotiate end of month-long black consumer boycott.</p> <p>29 Apr In Grahamstown, African pupils boycott school to protest against death of scholar in police action. University of North closes after student attacks on staff members.</p>	<p>2/3 Apr 21 Ward committee members and 5 councillors resign. Kayamandi Town Council (PE) resign. Arsonists destroy homes of 5 policemen in Bontrug.</p> <p>4/7 Apr Unabated unrest in Eastern Cape leaves 54 on strike. Police disperse 7 000 mourners at funeral of 711 arrested. Police disperse 7 000 mourners at funeral of 711 arrested victims.</p> <p>10 Apr Police vehicle and home petrol bombed in Kallehongo.</p> <p>11/17 Apr Another 8 die and 3 policemen's homes are bombed in Eastern Cape riots. In KwaThema, the homes of policeman and the Mayor are burned down and youths' businesses of former Soweto mayor 'ET' Tshabalala.</p> <p>28/30 Apr Five die and police arrest 200 as regional violence continues in Eastern Cape, Transvaal and Northern OFS. A policeman is killed in Motherwell (PE), while in Oudtshoorn, 13 school children are charged with public violence.</p>	<p>7/4 Apr Deputy Minister Adriaan Vlok says SADF, SAP and SARP will continue to mount joint operations in townships. State withdraws Internal Security Act charges against MAWU official Moses Mayekiso for role in stayaway of November 1984.</p> <p>11 Apr SADF units patrol New Brighton (PE) and police raid Bontrug township, arresting 39 on charges of murder and public violence.</p> <p>15/16 Apr Joint SADF/SAP patrol disperses crowd in KwaThema. SADF units in townships are now issued with live ammunition and shoot dead 11 in Langa (Uitenhage).</p> <p>23 Apr Three UDF leaders, 'Terror' Lekota, Popo Molefe and Moss Chikane are detained by security police and later charged with treason.</p> <p>28 Apr Joint SAP/SADF force of 50 police and army vehicles tours PE township. Le Grange announces that 217 people have died between 1976 to 22 March 1985, with more than 10 000 unrest arrests.</p>	<p>18 Apr Bomb explodes at Spar supermarket in central Durban during consumer boycott to support striking workers.</p> <p>25 Apr Durban park attendant is killed by bomb planted at electricity sub-station.</p> <p>29 Apr SACP pamphlet bomb explodes in Durban.</p> <p>30 Apr In central JHB 2 limpet mines damage offices of mining companies involved in mass dismissals.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b> MAWU Metal and Allied Workers Union SACP South African Communist Party SADF South African Defence Force SAP South African Police SARP South African Railway Police</p>
MAY	<p>1 May Lebowa homeland closes University of North and nearby schools after students clash with police. May Day celebrations in Natal and Transvaal result in isolated worker stayaways.</p> <p>7/9 May School boycotts in Port Alfred and Grahamstown lead to DET-parent talks. In Alice (Ciskei), boycott hits University of Fort Hare after arrest of 8 students.</p> <p>11 May AZAPO and UDF reach accord in Eastern Cape and blame government and state media for fuelling black political factionalism. One week later, abduction of AZAPO leader breaks truce.</p> <p>14 May 107 500 Workers in Transvaal, Natal and Eastern and Western Cape strike, hold work stoppages and meetings to protest death of CWIU official Andries Raditsela on 6 May after release from detention. 30 000 People attend funeral in Brakpan.</p> <p>25 May Near Pretoria, UNISA's medical school is closed after students boycott lectures to demand dismissal of professor.</p> <p>28 May In Imbali township (Pietermaritzburg) scholars end 5 day sit-in after arrest of 6 students.</p>	<p>1/5 May Soweto homes of 2 AZAPO and AZASM members attacked. In Pretoria, 3 die and 2 are injured in riots.</p> <p>6 May Alleged UDF supporters attack 5 AZAPO members in Eastern Cape and scuttle Bishop Tutu's early efforts to reconcile AZAPO/UDF activists. In Soweto, police arrest crowd of 500 who attack delivery vehicles. During UDF/ANC clashes in Natal, the homes of 6 UDF supporters in Hamburg are destroyed.</p> <p>7/9 May Soweto homes of 2 UDF leaders, Rev. Frank Chikane and Aubrey Mokoena, and homes of UDF members in Eastern Cape are petrol bombed. Alleged UDF activists kill 177 in Pietermaritzburg.</p> <p>11/13 May Unrest is unabated in Eastern Cape. OFS and PE townships. In Thabong, homes of 2 AZASM members are bombed.</p> <p>15/22 May Bus services are suspended in Soweto after riot cause extensive damage to 80 PUTCO buses. Petrol bomb attacks on SADF vehicle in Soweto (PE), and homes of town councillor (Fort Beaufort), AZAPO and AZASM members Zamdela (Sasolburg) and 2 COSAS members in Grahamstown.</p> <p>31 May Police in KwaZakele (PE) disperse clashing AZAPO/UDF supporters.</p>	<p>11/14 Pietermaritzburg judge overturns decision of Attorney-General and grants bail to 16 UDF treason trialists.</p> <p>15/16 Apr Police and SADF personnel conduct house-to-house searches in KwaNobuhle. COSAS organiser Siphon Mutusi dies in police custody in Mankweng (Odendaalsrus).</p> <p>10 May Three PEBCO members disappear, including president and general secretary. Security police later deny they are in detention. Simultaneous SADF/SAP operations in Fort Beaufort and Adelaide townships result in 44 arrests.</p> <p>17/18 May Combined SADF/SAP operation in Langa results in arrest of 3 members. In Fort Beaufort, police disperse 200 youths who march on magistrate's courts.</p> <p>20/22 May Treason trial of 16 UDF members begins in Pietermaritzburg. Joint SADF/SAP operation mounted in Duduza township (East Rand) after youths stone motorists, killing a white woman.</p> <p>28 May Police arrest 115 people in Khotso township.</p>	<p>10 May Largest arms cache ever found in South Africa discovered on OFS farm, containing 31 limpet mines, AK47 rifles, pistols, hand grenades and ammunition.</p> <p>14 May ANC insurgents bomb police station and courts in Brakpan, Raditsela's home town.</p> <p>27 May Two suspected ANC insurgents kill policeman in Garankua township (Pretoria).</p> <p>28 May Explosion at SADF offices in central JHB injures 14 people.</p> <p>29 May Defence Minister Magnus Malan warns that SADF will hit ANC guerilla bases in neighbouring countries.</p> <p>30 May Limpet mine damages Southern Cross defence fund offices in JHB. Rev. Allan Boesak has discussions with Oliver Tambo in Lusaka.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b> CWIU Chemical Workers Industrial Union</p>
JUNE	<p>4 June In Lenyeny (Tzaneen), pupils on week-long school boycott to support demands for students representative council.</p> <p>11/13 June 4 000 Students at University of North end 2 month boycott. In Tanti (Grahamstown), alleged UDF activists kill AZAPO member. In Soweto, AZAPO and UDF agree to hold joint 16 June memorial service to commemorate black martyrs of 1976 student protests.</p> <p>16 June One student shot dead and 3 wounded at University of North in clashes with Lebowa police. Pupils demonstrate outside DET buildings in Mankweng (Pietersburg).</p> <p>18/23 June Township factionalism continues as 4 youths armed with grenades arrested in PE after UDF and AZAPO homes attacked.</p> <p>28 June Three Cradock Resident Association (CRADORA) leaders, Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata and Michael Mkhonto mysteriously disappear.</p>	<p>1/6 June Riots break out in Guguletu (Cape Town) at Galashewe. Unrest continues in Eastern Cape townships and East and West Rand. Policeman dies in Graaff-Reinet and home petrol bombed.</p> <p>9/13 June Homes of 2 Barberton councillors, 3 Tembisa officials and 3 PE AZAPO members attacked with petrol bombs and grenades. Three Zwide (PE) policemen injured in attack on SADF vehicle. Three die in Eastern Cape and Northern OFS unrest.</p> <p>16/18 June On East Rand, 2 youths shot dead in attack on home of Daveyton Mayor Tom Boya. Unrest in VT, De Aar and KwaMashu (Durban) townships.</p> <p>19/26 June Upsurge of unrest engulfs PWV and Eastern Cape regions. Riots also reported in Eastern Transvaal, Oudtshoorn and KwaMashu. Police disperse crowd of 6 000 after 8 COSAS activists die and 7 are injured by own suspect grenades on East Rand. Four SADF vehicles stoned by 240 coloured youths in Newclare (JHB). Grenade attack on Tembisa councillor's home.</p>	<p>6 June 400 Arrests made in simultaneous SADF/SAP operations in Soweto (PE) and Tumahole (Parys).</p> <p>10 June Eastern Cape UDF President, Edgar Ngoyi, and Vice-President Henry Fazi detained.</p> <p>11 June Second major treason trial of 22 UDF activists begins in Pretoria. SADF/SAP operations in Tumahole and Mokwallo (Vrededorf) result in 195 arrests.</p> <p>13 June Gerrit Viljoen announces that community militants have forced resignation of 240 African councillors since September 1984. Later, the homes of another 3 town councillors are petrol bombed in Soweto.</p> <p>24 June Application for bail by 22 UDF Pretoria treason trialists refused. SADF announces that it will double citizen force call-ups from 30 to 60 day camps to cope with continuing unrest.</p> <p>28 June Pretoria magistrate bans commemorative meetings of thirtieth anniversary of Freedom Charter.</p>	<p>12/13 June Western Cape Suicide Squad in hand grenade attacks on homes of 2 coloured parliamentarians. Crossroads resident and Langa (Cape Town) police station. ANC denies responsibility.</p> <p>14 June SADF kills 14 in raids on alleged ANC bases in Botswana.</p> <p>16 June In Mmabatho (Bophuthatswana), policeman who fires on crowd is killed. Three blasts at Natalia Development Board offices in Lamontville and Umlazi police station (Durban).</p> <p>19/21 June In Durban, bombs damage restaurant and sub-station, and SACP pamphlet bomb explodes. Police kill suspected guerilla in NE Transvaal contact.</p> <p>24 June Bomb damages AECL offices in JHB in support of labour conflicts at AECL factories.</p> <p>26 June Blast destroys Transkei Development Corporation bulk fuel depot and water and power supplies to Umtata.</p> <p>Last Week June Major ANC conference in Kabwe (Zambia) rejects negotiations with SA government and decides to hit 'soft' civilian targets.</p>
JULY	<p>2 July Bodies of missing CRADORA leaders Goniwe, Calata and Mkhonto found. UDF exonerates AZAPO and blames right-wing hit squad.</p> <p>3 July East Cape African Chamber of Commerce initiates AZAPO/UDF peace talks as homes of Eastern Cape UDF president and AZAPO member are petrol bombed. Three die and 85 arrested in violence during wage strike at Western Platinum Mine (Rustenburg).</p> <p>15 July In PE and Uitenhage, 2 month consumer boycott of non-African businesses begins, to demand withdrawal of SADF/SAP from townships and resignation of Kayamandi Community Council. After many shopkeepers experience a 90 percent drop in turnover, PE mayor asks PW Botha to negotiate end to boycott.</p> <p>17 July School boycotts in 26 centres including 46 East Rand schools, all Eastern Cape (except Uitenhage and PE), 3 Alexandria, all Ratanda, 5 Mamelodi and some Northern Transvaal schools.</p> <p>18 July 90 Percent work stayaway in Pietermaritzburg to support MAWU demands for Howick company to re-employ 950 dismissed workers.</p> <p>20 July 40 000 Attend funeral of assassinated CRADORA officials.</p>	<p>1/3 July Seven die in Eastern Cape, 3 in East Rand, and SADF vehicle is petrol bombed.</p> <p>4/7 July 200 Coloured demonstrators dispersed by police in Westbury township (JHB). Lamontville home of KLA member petrol bombed. After 3 days of rioting and 5 deaths, Duduza residents threaten work stayaway unless SADF/SAP is withdrawn.</p> <p>8/9 July Seven die in waves of intense township unrest in KwaThema residents attend funeral of 4 killed in hand grenade incidents. Crowds attack SADF patrols in KwaNobuhle and townships.</p> <p>10/12 July Two die in rioting in VT townships. SAIRR claims 50 people have died in political violence since 1 January.</p> <p>14/17 July Eleven die in widespread unrest in 7 Eastern Cape: East Rand, Huhudi, Lamontville and OFS townships.</p> <p>17 July Five die in nationwide unrest. Riots break out in so where PUTCO suspends services after a bus load of foreign tourists is stoned and home of Soweto mayor Edward Mkhonto and shops of former mayor are attacked.</p> <p>18/20 July Riots continue throughout Soweto and 122 people arrested on East Rand as crowds of up to 2 000 battle police. Imbali town councillor's home petrol bombed. Huhudi and Guguletu.</p>	<p>3 July SADF/SAP conduct house-to-house search in Tembisa. Daveyton police arrest 8 men with 9 petrol bombs.</p> <p>7/9 July Government rejects UDF accusations that it is responsible for assassinations of 11 political activists and disappearance of 27 in Eastern Cape, Transvaal and OFS. Police arrest 79 in Colesburg township and round up youths in Duduza.</p> <p>10 July Duduza COSAS leader gets Supreme Court order to prevent police from assaulting or harassing him.</p> <p>16 July SAP raid Ratanda township (Heidelberg).</p> <p>18/19 July Organiser of PE consumer boycott questioned by police. In Grahamstown SADF, Security Police, ECDB, DET, and business representatives meet to discuss boycott. SAP announces that 500 people have died in 17 months of political violence, with attacks on homes of 360 people, 178 on East Rand alone. Widespread security crackdown on COSAS leaders on Rand.</p> <p>21 July Government declares a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts, predominantly in the PWV and Eastern Cape areas.</p>	<p>1 July Petrol bomb and grenade attacks on homes of Indian parliamentarian in Durban and former Guguletu town councillor. ANC headquarters in Lusaka bombed.</p> <p>2 July Two hand grenade attacks in Tembisa. Rifle attack on home of Indian MP in Durban.</p> <p>12/15 July Two limpet mines destroy electrical sub-stations in Durban. Johnson Mhlambo takes over presidency of the exiled PAC after death of John Pokela in Harare.</p> <p>20 July SA Suicide Squad attacks 2 Soweto policemen's homes.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b> CRADORA Cradock Residents Association ECDB Eastern Cape Development Board KLA KwaZulu Legislative Assembly</p>

# RESURGENT REBELLION: A Regional Emergency

PART I: 21 July-October 1985

1985	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Regional Revolt and Opposition Factionalism</i>	Government Response <i>Security Crackdown and Counter-Insurgency</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Political Contacts, Guerilla Attacks</i>
<b>July</b> <i>Emergency week</i>	<p>22/25 July School boycotts continue in 8 East Rand (ER) townships, some Soweto and Pretoria schools and in Eastern Cape. Pupils also boycott in Zwelenthemba (Worcester); Guguletu (Cape Town), and in Lebowakgomo (Lebowa) to demand SRC.</p> <p>26 July In the Cape Peninsula, 6 000 students/pupils begin boycott of educational institutions. Black students at University of Natal (UND) boycott lectures for two weeks to protest Emergency.</p> <p>29/31 July Consumer boycott of white-owned stores in East London (EL) begins. Township residents demand use of halls in white areas, that hawkers be allowed to trade in city, SRCs for schools and an assurance that Duncan Village (EL) will not be incorporated into the Ciskei. University of Durban Westville (UDW) students begin fortnight lecture boycott.</p>	<p>21/23 July Unrest reported in all provinces. Three killed in attack on policeman's home in Tumahole (Parys). In KwaThema (ER), 30 000-strong crowd attends funeral of 15 unrest victims. Two die in widespread Eastern Cape unrest. Western Cape home of community councillor petrol-bombed.</p> <p>24/28 July In Daveyton (ER), 4 die and 17 are wounded after 4 000 funeral mourners clash with police. Unrest reported in 3 Western Cape townships. Three shot dead and 1 policeman killed in New Brighton (Port Elizabeth (PE)). Soweto town councillor's home burnt.</p> <p>29/30 July Nationwide unrest continues. In Guguletu, protesters die during clashes between boycotting students and police. In downtown Durban, police disperse UDW/UND student demonstration to protest Emergency.</p>	<p>11/22 July Government declares State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts and detains 113 persons under regulations. Seven-hour curfew imposed in Transkei. Commissioner of Police asks media to 'scale down' unrest reportage.</p> <p>12/24 July Fifteen people killed in riots, 12 in police action; and 441 detained so far in terms of Emergency regulations. Molly Blackburn, PFP MP, arrested for attending illegal gathering. Police raid UDF offices in Johannesburg (JHB).</p> <p>15/28 July Magistrate bans JHB meeting to celebrate birthday of jailed ANC leader, Nelson Mandela. In Oudtshoorn, 214 pupils arrested on intimidation charges after allegedly forcing others to join boycott.</p> <p>10 July 259 detained so far in terms of Emergency regulations. Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, places restrictions on funerals of unrest victims.</p>	<p>21 July Limpet mine damages Umlazi (Durban) bakery, in support of striking workers.</p> <p>24 July In Guguletu, hand grenade attack on home of former Community Councillor, the eighth grenade attack in the Cape Peninsula in the past few months.</p> <p>31 July Two ANC guerillas and 1 policeman killed in shootout at police roadblock near East London.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b>                      ANC African National Congress                      PFP Progressive Federal Party                      SRC Student Representative Council                      UDF United Democratic Front                      VT Vaal Triangle</p>
<b>August</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd week</i>	<p>1/4 Aug Lectures at UDW suspended for 3 days. School boycotts continue in 3 Witbank townships of Ackerville, KwaGhugha and Lynville.</p> <p>5/7 Aug Rev Allan Boesak endorses national consumer boycott of white-owned businesses. COSAS and AZASO initiate one week school boycott in Lamontville. Umlazi (Durban), in 4 Pietermaritzburg (PMB) townships and in Mpophomeni (Howick). University of North reopens.</p> <p>10/13 Aug Most Umlazi workers observe work stayaway. Three-day work stayaway and boycott of white-owned stores in Pretoria begins, to demand release of all political detainees, removal of security forces from townships, resignation of all community councillors and an end to the Emergency. Similar consumer boycotts of white-owned businesses begin in JHB; Parys, to secure reinstatement of workers sacked after work stayaway; and in Queenstown, to protest rent increases and township conditions. University of Western Cape (UWC) students return to lectures as University of Witwatersrand (Wits) students begin three-day lecture boycott. School boycotts begin in Duncan Village.</p> <p>14/15 Aug Consumer boycott of white and 'collaborator' businesses begins in Western Cape, with same aims as Pretoria. FOSATU launches consumer boycott of white-owned stores in PMB, to get fired BTR Sarmcol workers in nearby Howick reinstated. Residents in Vaal Triangle (VT) townships warned to pay rent arrears after 12-month boycott.</p>	<p>1/2 Aug Unrest reported in 3 Eastern and 2 Western Cape, and 2 Transvaal townships. Victoria Mxenge, civil-rights activist assassinated in Umlazi and 31 UDW/UND students arrested after 2 500 protest. Home of policeman attacked in Zwelenthemba (Ciskei).</p> <p>3/4 Aug Mourners ignore restrictions on funeral of 12 unrest victims in Zwide (PE). Policeman's home petrol-bombed in KwaGhugha.</p> <p>5/9 Aug Youths battle with police throughout Durban's African townships and loot shops, and delivery vehicles. In Chester-ville (Durban), home of community councillor petrol-bombed. In Umlazi, at Mxenge memorial service, 13/17 die in clashes between vigilantes and mourners. 1 000 Indian residents flee Inanda (Durban) after attack by African shackdwellers. 20 University of Cape Town (UCT) students arrested after clashes with police.</p> <p>10/11 Aug Riots continue in Durban's townships, where Ghana Settlement is destroyed. Mobilised Inkatha supporters patrol Durban's townships. Ciskeian soldier killed at Mxenge funeral in King Williamstown.</p> <p>12/15 Aug 31 killed in intense nationwide unrest. Riots break out in Duncan Village where 19 die, 138 are injured and homes of all 6 community councillors are destroyed. Ten students arrested and 30 injured as police break up demonstration at Wits. Official death-toll in Durban unrest is 70 dead (37 in police action).</p>	<p>1 Aug Supreme Court rejects bail application for 22 Pretoria treason activists. Emergency regulations in Adendorp (Graaff Reinet) compel pupils to attend school between 8am and 2pm, bar outsiders from townships, and give police power to close shops if they promote or attend consumer boycotts.</p> <p>2/7 Aug 85 arrested in joint SADF/SAP operation in Zwelenthemba, and consumer boycott leader, Mkhuzeli Jack arrested under Emergency regulations. Minister of Law and Order extends Emergency detention orders on detainees held for longer than 14 days. Police raid Brandfort (PMB) home of Winnie Mandela. Dependents and victims of Langa shootings on 21 March claim R2m damages from police.</p> <p>1/13 Aug 1 482 detained so far and 616 released in terms of Emergency regulations. Boesak and 18 others detained for illegally entering Guguletu township. Police conduct house-to-house search for boycotting pupils in KwaThema. SADF conscript fined R600 for refusing to go on duty in Durban's townships.</p> <p>17 Aug State President, PW Botha's 'Rubicon Speech' at National Party congress in Durban dashes hopes of reform. In Soweto and Eastern Cape townships, 6-hour curfew is imposed and all school activity not related to school work is banned. Rector of UWC, RE van der Ross, reinstates school work in Durban's townships.</p> <p>20 Aug Two die and 19 injured after Witbank residents and police clash.</p>	<p><b>Acronyms</b>                      AZASO Azanian Student's Organisation                      COSAS Congress of South African Students                      FOSATU Federation of South African Trade Unions                      OFS Orange Free State                      SADF South African Defence Force                      SAP South African Police</p>
<b>August</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th week</i>	<p>19/21 Aug Scholars boycott and teachers strike at 63 Cape Peninsula schools, technikons, colleges, and universities. DET estimates 60 percent school attendance in KwaMashu (Durban). FOSATU announces extension of national consumer boycott to all Natal centres, to demand security force withdrawal from townships, an end to Emergency and release of political detainees. Commerce in PMB announces 50 percent drop in turnover.</p> <p>23/24 Aug School boycott in Western Cape enters fourth week. Food shortages develop in Colesberg for 36 000 African residents who boycott white businesses.</p> <p>28/30 Aug In Lenasia, 850 pupils boycott classes after police detain 40 colleagues. Youths in Mpophomeni destroy goods bought by residents at white stores. Pupils in Lamontville stage sit-in to protest detention of community leader Rev Mcebisi Xundu. The President of Tembisa Chamber of Commerce and other businessmen are detained under Section 29 ISA and their shops closed, but they are later released after pressure from NAFCCO.</p>	<p>16/18 Aug Upsurge of rioting in Cape and Transvaal. Police separate feuding AZAPO and UDF supporters in Uitenhage. Community councillor's home in Nkobela (Robertson) petrol-bombed.</p> <p>19/22 Aug Police disperse 1 000 students in Mitchells Plain. Body of UDF activist, Toto Dweba, found on Natal north coast.</p> <p>In Aliwal North township, 6 killed and 26 wounded after clashes between crowds and police.</p> <p>24/27 Aug In Umlazi, home of UDF-aligned community leader is burnt and 300 Inkatha supporters harass mourners at funeral of 8 unrest victims. Police clash with UWC students.</p> <p>28 Aug Widespread rioting breaks out in the Cape Peninsula. Five die and 60 injured as 8 000 march on Pollsmoor prison. Police clash with 1 000 UDF supporters.</p> <p>29/31 Aug Violence escalates in Cape Peninsula, where 17 are killed and 89 arrested. In Zwide (PE) mayor's home is petrol-bombed. Rioting in 5 Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging townships. Near Duncan Village, 2 whites killed and 2 injured in attack by crowd after 50 000 attend funeral of 19 unrest victims.</p>	<p>18 Aug 1 968 detained so far and 1 022 released under Emergency regulations. Police raid black residence at UND and arrest 3 students. President meets executive of DRC and SACC delegation (except Yulu), who complain of alleged SADF/SAP misconduct in townships.</p> <p>22 Aug Joint SADF/SAP operation in Thokoza (ER) and Diepkloof townships. Supreme Court injunction orders police to end harassment of Church in Eastern Cape, and Durban court allows 2 detainees to be released. 500 Soweto scholars arrested for 'loitering'.</p> <p>23 Aug Police detain 40 UDF activists, including Billy Nair, Farouk Yumus Mohamed of the NIC; Yusuf Adams and Christmas Tinto of Western Cape UDF executive; and 3 executive members of the UDF. SAP investigates allegations of security force misconduct in Mamelodi (Pretoria) and certain Eastern Cape townships.</p> <p>29 Aug Boesak is detained after calling for march on Pollsmoor prison. Police ban access to Athlone stadium where march is to start and attempt to reach prison. Press barred from unrest areas in Cape Peninsula. Government bans COSAS.</p>	<p>17/18 Aug Petrol-bomb attacks on homes of 2 coloured MPs in Cape Town.</p> <p>22 Aug In prison interview, Nelson Mandela claims there is no alternative other than to continue armed struggle to defeat white nationalist government.</p> <p>29 Aug Hand grenade damages home of coloured MP in Cape Town.</p> <p>30 Aug ANC external mission in Lusaka announces it will meet with South African businessmen to discuss dismantling of apartheid.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b>                      DET Department of Education and Training                      DRC Dutch Reformed Church                      ISA Internal Security Act                      NAFCCO National African Chamber of Commerce                      NIC Natal Indian Congress                      SACC South African Council of Churches</p>

1985	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Regional Revolt and Opposition Factionalism</i>	Government Response <i>Security Crackdown and Counter-Insurgency</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Political Contacts, Guerilla Attacks</i>
<b>September</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd week</i>	<p>1/3 Sept In Tinus (Fort Beaufort), police close black-owned shops after detaining owners under Emergency regulations. Classes suspended at all 10 Mamelodi (Pretoria) schools. School boycotts and work stayaways in VT townships.</p> <p>4/5 Sept Two-day national protest organised by AZASO to mark banning of COSAS has little success. 4 000 boycott lectures at University of North to protest police raids and detention of 4 students.</p> <p>6 Sept After 6-week boycott, coloured Minister of Education Carter Ebrahim closes 464 out of 904 educational institutions in Western Cape affecting 360 000 students/pupils. All institutions scheduled to reopen on 1 October.</p> <p>10/11 Sept In Cape Town, 60 white pupils boycott classes in solidarity action with black students/pupils. In Durban, schools in Chesterville close and 1 000 KwaMashu pupils boycott classes to demand release of detained colleagues and to protest attacks of UDF homes. Boycotting Soweto students march on Moroko police station to demand release of detainees.</p> <p>12/15 Sept National work stayaway/'prayaway' scheduled for 9 October by 47 religious groups in the National Initiative for Reconciliation (NIR). Pupils in 3 Witbank townships boycott classes to commemorate death of Steve Biko.</p>	<p>1/2 Sept Renewed unrest in Durban/Pinetown townships amid Inkatha/UDF in-fighting. Two administrative buildings and policeman's home burnt in Umlazi. Youths clash with police on Cape Flats, and policeman is killed in riots in Transvaal.</p> <p>3/4 Sept Unrest in 7 Cape Peninsula areas including white suburbs, where rioters clash with police and white residents. Over past week, unrest in Western Cape has resulted in 27 deaths, 60 injuries and 238 arrests. Second Durban organiser of the UDF-affiliated NFW is murdered.</p> <p>5/6 Sept In Western Cape, 2 die and 19 are arrested in riots. In Durban, homes of sociologist Fatima Meer and mayor of Umlazi are petrol-bombed. Two white-owned homes near Amalinda (East London) are petrol-bombed. In Mdantsane (Ciskei) 2 die and 56 arrested in riots.</p> <p>7/11 Sept In Guguletu, 2 die in clashes between 20 000-strength crowd and police at funeral of 9 unrest victims. In Diepsmead (Soweto), town councillor's home petrol-bombed. AZAPO member is killed in Mpumulanga. Policeman killed by mourners at funeral of Cape Peninsula unrest victim.</p> <p>12/15 Sept In Cape Town, 3 shot dead in Crossroads and another killed as 300 youths attack police barracks in Langa. One killed and 4 wounded in continuing unrest in Mphahlele.</p>	<p>2 Sept Seven pupils hospitalised after police baton-charge 1 000 township pupils.</p> <p>3/4 Sept All prayer meetings in VT and 7 other areas to commemorate anniversary of September 1984 'uprising' are banned. Ten Cape Peninsula community leaders are detained under Section 29 ISA.</p> <p>6/9 Sept Ministers of Law and Order and Defence visit Cape Town to assess security situation. Four members of ECC are detained. Minister of Law and Order states in past 15 months 660 people, including 11 members of the security forces, have died in civil unrest, 2 400 injured and R93m damage to property.</p> <p>7/7 Sept SADF opens offices to hear complaints of security force misconduct in townships. Durban judge declares the detention of township director Paddy Kearney unlawful and he is released. In Eastern Cape, police detain SAAWU unionist and UDF activist. Police arrest 746 township pupils under Emergency regulations in White City (Soweto), and detain a white teacher.</p> <p>11/5 Sept Magistrate places restrictions on funerals in Mamelodi and Meridale. Four policemen are suspended in Zwide after alleged misconduct. 3 227 detained so far and 1 988 released in terms of Emergency regulations.</p>	<p>3 Sept ANC external mission claims that the 'struggle' will be taken to white areas, but that the deliberate killing of civilians is to be avoided. Home of coloured MP on Cape Flats is petrol-bombed.</p> <p>6 Sept Limpet mine found 'abandoned' in Durban factory.</p> <p>8 Sept Petrol-bomb attack on home of coloured MP in Cape Peninsula.</p> <p>13 Sept Three top level businessmen and 3 journalists meet with the exiled leadership of the ANC in Lusaka.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b> ECC End Conscription Campaign NFW National Federation of Workers SAAWU South African Allied Workers Union</p>
<b>September</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th week</i>	<p>16 Sept Clashes between pro- and anti-boycott groups of Soweto students. University of Fort Hare students boycott lectures to protest amended SRC constitution and detention of 5 students. University of North students begin 5-day lecture boycott to demand withdrawal of security forces from campus.</p> <p>17/19 Sept In Western Cape, 173 scholars, parents and teachers are arrested after they try to enter school premises to demand immediate reopening of 465 educational institutions. In Ritavi (Tzaneen) pupils boycott classes at 4 schools. In Pretoria's townships, DET urges pupils to end boycotts.</p> <p>23/27 Sept Consumer boycotts in Uitenhage and PMB called off. Two-day work stayaway in Queenstown is 100 percent successful. Almost total work stayaway in East London. Pupils in Clermont (Pinetown) boycott classes to demand withdrawal of SADF from townships and release of detained students.</p>	<p>17/19 Sept Riots continue unabated in Cape, West Rand and Northern Transvaal regions. Ex-Secretary General of Inkatha Sibusio Bhengu's home in Empangeni petrol-bombed.</p> <p>20/22 Sept Another 7 die and 42 are arrested in nationwide riots. Crowds battle with security forces in Langa (Cape Town). Ciskei policeman is killed. In Atteridgeville and Shoshanguve, 11 houses, 7 belonging to policemen, and a magistrates court are petrol-bombed.</p> <p>23/25 Sept All Cape Peninsula townships sealed off and Langa police barracks come under attack again.</p> <p>28 Sept Six die in Lamontville as youths clash with Inkatha supporters. In KwaZakele, 2 members of SADF injured after petrol-bomb explodes in armoured vehicle.</p> <p>30 Sept Nineteen killed, including policeman in nationwide unrest over the past week. According to Indicator SA figures, so far 740 people have been killed, 4 126 injured and 19 033 arrested in political violence since September 1984.</p>	<p>19/21 Sept Six Queenstown residents detained, including member of regional consumer boycott committee. Boesak released from detention on R20 000 bail, charged under Section 54 ISA for promoting consumer boycotts and disinvestment. Carter Ebrahim opens educational institutions in Western Cape. In Durban, judge declares detention orders of 3 Section 29 ISA detainees invalid and orders their release. Oranje-Vaal Development Board issues eviction notices to Sebokeng residents who have not paid rent since September 1984.</p> <p>24/25 Sept Transkei police kill Batandwa Ndondo, ex-SRC member of University of Transkei (UNITRA). PE court restrains police from assaulting detainees in Eastern Cape after intervention by district surgeon Dr Wendy Orr. Minister of Education Gerrit Viljoen announces that black schools may form advisory SRCs.</p> <p>27/28 Sept Minister of Law and Order bans all meetings, for 6 months, that promote work stayaways. Police to investigate charges of alleged misconduct against 11 members of security forces.</p>	<p>25 Sept Huge arms cache, supposedly intended for a car-bomb, found near Cullinan (Pretoria).</p> <p>27 Sept Three limpet mines explode in Durban department stores, causing limited damage with no injuries.</p> <p>29 Sept Bomb explodes in Umlazi hotel, injuring 30 children.</p>
<b>October</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd week</i>	<p>1 Oct At UWC, police kill 2 students and arrest 8 journalists after 3 500 scholars meet to discuss reopening of schools. UNITRA students begin one-week lecture boycott to protest ban on commemoration service for Ndondo. Consumer boycott of white stores called off in Natal because of opposition divisions. In Western Cape, 370 private security guards are employed to protect schools.</p> <p>6/8 Oct Trade unions, representing 500 000 workers, reject call for work stayaway on 9 October. School boycotts continue in 3 Pretoria townships, in the Eastern and Western Cape and at most OFS high schools.</p> <p>9/11 Oct The NIR day-of-prayer is held. Few people boycott work in major centres, except for massive stayaway in Uitenhage. African businessmen in Eastern Cape close shops for 5 hours in support of day-of-prayer. CTPA calls on pupils to end class boycott in Cape.</p> <p>14 Oct After demands are not met, consumer boycott resumes in Uitenhage, with support of coloured community.</p>	<p>1/4 Oct Police allege that dissidents are conducting 'people's courts' in townships. Three KwaMashu schools petrol-bombed. Police attacked by coloured residents in Schauderville (PE).</p> <p>5/9 Oct Severe unrest continues in Soweto, Eastern and Western Cape with 14 fatalities, including policeman. In Kagiso (West Rand) town councillor's home is petrol-bombed. Several Inkatha members jailed after attacks on UDF supporters' homes in Hambanati in August 1984. Upsurge of unrest in Durban townships and Cape Peninsula, where 50 people are injured.</p> <p>10/14 Oct In Durban townships, 4 die in attacks on homes of UDF supporters; with attempted murder of Clermont community leader, Aubry Nyembezi. Cape Town offices of the UDF and trade unions are burnt, and 60 coloured youths damage white shops and cars in Wynburg (Cape Town) after arrest of UDF activist Graeme Bloch.</p>	<p>1/5 Oct SADF announce they may close complaint offices in African townships in Cape and Transvaal after little response. 4 827 arrested and 3 760 released so far in terms of Emergency regulations. Acting NIC president Farouk Meer released from detention. Clashes between Emergency detainees and warders at Modderbee Prison (Transvaal).</p> <p>7/9 Oct Gerrit Viljoen says government will not repair riot-damaged schools. SADF/SAP establish base in Lamontville and SADF assists Mankayi town council to demolish 'illegal' shacks in KwaZakele. NIC official Billy Nair released after court intervention.</p> <p>10/11 Oct 29 Former members of COSAS, including ex-National President Udu Johnson, arrested at secret conference in Grahamstown. Le Range announces that action may be taken against media in unrest areas.</p> <p>12/14 Oct White police officer in Atteridgeville suspended after alleged assault results in death of boy aged 13. First SADF soldier is killed while on township duty, in KwaZakele. 47 people are detained at funeral of Ndondo in Transkei.</p> <p>14 Oct In Thornton Road (Athlone, Cape Town), police concealed in boxes on truck entrap stone-throwers, killing 3 and wounding 19.</p>	<p>9 Oct In Cape Peninsula, shots are fired at police patrol in coloured township.</p> <p>12 Oct Three PFP MPs, including leader van Zyl Slabbert, hold talks with ANC Council in Lusaka.</p> <p>13 Oct Hand-grenade attack on policeman's home in Mamelodi.</p> <p><b>Acronym</b> CTPA Cape Teachers Professional Association</p>
<b>October</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th week</i>	<p>17 Oct Protest march by 2 000 pupils to local African education offices in central PE is dispersed.</p> <p>21/24 Oct In Natal, despite DET threat of cancellation of examinations, school boycotts continue in Lamontville and Imbali, while attendance is normal in Clermont, Umlazi and KwaMashu. Violence erupts at UWC as pro- and anti-boycott students clash over whether to continue lecture boycott. Students at 14 coloured teacher training colleges throughout country boycott lectures for educational and political demands. Deputy Minister of Education claims African students who miss year-end exams may write in May/June 1986.</p> <p>25/30 Oct Only 6 percent of Western Cape pupils, 5 percent of Eastern Cape pupils and 10 percent of Soweto pupils sit matric examinations. All exams at UWC postponed until early 1986.</p>	<p>16/17 Oct In Cape Peninsula, 4 shot dead and policeman injured in unrest. Muslim youths riot, claiming 'Jinai' (war), and shoot-out occurs outside Athlone Mosque. UDF policeman's home petrol-bombed.</p> <p>18/19 Oct In central JHB, youths clash with police and riot shops after memorial service for ANC's Moloise. Communist SADF/SAP swoops in Athlone as 35 000 attend funeral of Moloise. In PE, home of Watson brothers, whose stores are emptied from consumer boycott, is petrol-bombed.</p> <p>21/25 Oct In Soweto, 3 die in clash after hostel residents refuse to contribute to funeral of township unrest victim. Official death toll in Cape Peninsula since 28 August reaches 71. Further violence in central JHB and in Cape Town, where police use water-cannon to disperse crowds.</p> <p>26/27 Oct Eighteen die in upsurge of national unrest. In Guguletu, 40 000 attend funeral of unrest victim, KwaMashu MP, Francis Dlamini is gunned down outside his KwaMashu home.</p>	<p>16/17 Oct Eight Sharpeville students charged with murder of deputy mayor of Lekoa town council on 3 September 1984. In Eastern Cape, AFCCO president is detained.</p> <p>18/22 Oct ANC guerilla, Benjamin Moloise is executed in Pretoria. Detainees now allowed more freedom of choice in selection of doctors. Western Cape UDF leader Trevor Manuel is detained.</p> <p>25/26 Oct State of Emergency is lifted in 4 Eastern Cape and 2 Transvaal districts, but extended to 8 magisterial areas in Western Cape. In massive pre-dawn swoop in Cape Peninsula 66 people are arrested. 5349 detained and 4 476 released so far, and journalists barred from entering Soweto, under Emergency regulations.</p> <p>27 Oct In Peninsula meetings of 102 groups banned and restrictions placed on pupils to control boycotts. State President extends indemnity for security force actions, countrywide. Court clears policeman of death of UDF official William Kratschi in Beaufort West.</p>	<p>16 Oct Government withdraws passports of 8 Stellenbosch University students who plan to meet ANC Youth League in Lusaka.</p> <p>17 Oct Hand grenade attack on home of Umlazi school headmaster.</p> <p>22 Oct After NGK (Africa) church officials claim they will meet with ANC in Lusaka, government warns that it may withdraw their passports. ANC external mission announces that it would suspend armed struggle if the Pretoria government was prepared to negotiate.</p> <p>23 Oct Police twice attacked with hand grenades in Cape Peninsula.</p> <p>24 Oct In Guguletu, hand grenade attack on home of former community councillor. Two limpet mines kill 2 suspected saboteurs at Durban school/polling station.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b> AFCCO African Chamber of Commerce NGK Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</p> <p><b>SOURCE</b> Indicator SA press clippings</p>

# Conflict Chronology 4

## SPREADING CIVIL DISORDER: A Regional Emergency

1985	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaway Strikes</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Sustained Revolt, Homeland Flashpoints and Vigilante Clashes</i>
<p><b>November</b> 1st &amp; 2nd week</p>	<p><b>1 Nov</b> Matric exams at black schools start under armed guard in many areas. In W Cape no African pupils write, E Cape 5 percent, and in Soweto 25 percent. Average attendance at coloured matric exams in W Cape is 56 percent; 5 teachers at Mitchells Plain schools detained after protesting presence of troops. Students at 5 training colleges nationwide tear up exam papers. University of Bophuthatswana reopens after 4 week closure following unrest.</p> <p><b>6 Nov</b> In Cape Town (CT), residents of 6 coloured suburbs begin candlelight vigils in solidarity with unrest victims and detainees. In Victor Verster and Pollsmoor prisons (W Cape) detainees begin hunger strike, joined by prisoners in Oudtshoorn, and workers at 2 factories in Athlone (CT). 23 Organisations picket in CT to protest clamp on press under emergency regulations - 1 arrest.</p> <p>Third Lekoa (Vaal Triangle) town council elections - only 1 candidate for 12 vacancies. Council to selectively prosecute rent boycotters.</p> <p>In E Cape, consumer boycott in Adelaide peters out after negotiations; in Port Alfred, organiser Nkwinti refuses to negotiate while 10 other residents still in jail.</p> <p><b>15 Nov</b> Boycotts called off in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth (PE) after organiser Mkhuseleli Jack and 16 others are released and troops withdraw from townships.</p>	<p>In unrest since Jan 1985 death toll is 761, and property damages to at least R100m. Damage to 126 DET schools between 1 Sep 1984 and 31 Oct 1985 estimated at R8m.</p> <p>Widespread civil disorder continues in Cape Peninsula and Boland, particularly Paarl and Worcester, as students boycott schools and end-of-year exams. In CT suburbs fatalities due to police action since August rise to 50 and a soldier is shot dead in Mitchells Plain. 34 Teachers and an entire school (510 pupils) in Lotus River (CT) are detained.</p> <p>Severe disturbances in 10 Karoo towns as well as Upington (N.Cape). Continued unrest in PE/Uitenhage townships leaves at least 4 dead. In PE townships between 22 March and Nov, 145 reported arson attacks on schools in Queenstown township, 700 are detained in pre-dawn raid.</p> <p>In Natal, sporadic unrest in Chesterville and Umlazi (Dbn), Hammarsdale, Edendale (PMB) and Mpopomeni (Howick).</p> <p><b>13 Nov</b> In Soweto, student nurses protesting working conditions are bated charged and 840 staff arrested at Baragwanath hospital; 1800 are dismissed after strike and troops called in to help staff hospital. In central JHB, law-security patrols after downtown riots.</p>
<p><b>November</b> 3rd &amp; 4th week</p>	<p>Students, parents and teachers in W Cape agree to discuss return to school if exams are postponed to March 1986 and all detainees released. 8 principals in W Cape and 50 in Soweto face dismissal, and staff at some schools are unpaid for refusing to administer internal exams. Large police presence at CT schools to enforce exams. WECTU treasurer sacked from school after 2 weeks suspension. 155 Organisations sign document blaming government and the harsh action of SAP/SADF for the region's education crisis.</p> <p><b>21 Nov</b> Consumer boycotts launched in Alexandra (JHB) and Pietersburg; Lebowakagomo, Feshego and Mankweng (Lebowa); and called off in King Williams Town and East London though few demands met. Queenstown ratepayers call on government to withhold emergency food aid to break boycott there.</p> <p><b>25 Nov</b> Residents of CT's African townships begin rent boycott to protest township conditions and emergency. In the Temba area of Bophuthatswana, police and youths clash over bus boycott. Some residents in Tumahole (Parys), the first township to withhold rentals, are prosecuted.</p> <p>Detainees in Diepkloof prison (Tv) launch a hunger strike, and more school pupils and teachers join sympathy fasts. DPSC calls a day of fasting and prayer for detainees on hunger strike.</p>	<p><b>17/19 Nov</b> In Queenstown, police disperse township meeting, killing 14 people. In other police shootings, 3 people die in Leslie (Bethal) and 3 in Leandra (E Tv), where 1 person is killed by shopowner during stayaway to protest forced removals (reprieved on 25 Nov).</p> <p><b>20 Nov</b> At Malukazi (Natal S coast), 8 die in faction fighting between Pondo and Zulus, and 5 die in Umbumbulu over 23/24 Nov.</p> <p><b>21 Nov</b> In Mamelodi (Pretoria), stayaway called to protest army presence, high rents and restrictions on unrest funerals. When crowds gather to speak to township mayor, police open fire killing 13 and injuring 79 people. In 2 Pretoria townships, large scale withdrawal of SADF. Minister of Law and Order Le Grange also announces removal of police from the border, to be replaced by SADF - to free more police for riot control.</p> <p>In Zwelitsha, 54 vigilantes, allegedly led by Ciskei MPs, in court after death of ex-SASO member. In Queenstown, coloured residents form vigilante group with police approval after several houses near African township attacked.</p> <p><b>29 Nov</b> In Bongoletu (Oudtshoorn), 226 are arrested in massive military operation. In CT, police prevent over 2000 youths from staging lunchtime protest.</p>
<p><b>December</b> 1st &amp; 2nd week</p>	<p><b>1 Dec</b> In Dbn, 10 000 attend launch of COSATU, uniting 33 trade unions. Consumer boycotts resumed in Adelaide as no demands met; continue in JHB, Reef and Pretoria areas; abate in De Aar, though 5 month rent boycott continues; in East London boycott meeting ends in mass walkout over refusal to allow Nkosi Sikelela anthem; in Oudtshoorn 2 organisers appear in court over 2 month boycott. Call for 'Black' Xmas - a boycott of white-owned shops and all festivities.</p> <p><b>3 Dec</b> In Mamelodi, mass stayaway for funeral of 12 unrest victims attended by diplomats and Winnie Mandela. In Queenstown, 7 community leaders detained at funeral of 11 unrest victims, COSATU president warns of black tax boycott if government does not meet popular demands.</p> <p>Police in CT continue to take action against candlelight vigils for detainees, spreading to white suburbs. FAFOD announces campaign of fasting to protest detentions. Teachers are finally paid after threatening court action because salaries withheld over exam issue.</p> <p>Kathlehong town council uses SADF to evict people refusing to pay rents.</p>	<p>Unrest breaks out for first time in Knysna where police shootings leave 1 dead; 8 arrested. In KwaZakele (PE) 2 policemen are killed, and another in Mamelodi.</p> <p>In W Cape, 140 people detained in Crossroads in joint SADF/SAP 'crime prevention' operation, 136 in Guguletu, 26 in Mfuleni (Kuisiwer) and 24 in Khayelitsha, where a soldier is killed by mob.</p> <p><b>12/15 Dec</b> In PE, UDF and AZAPO have second peace meeting after 3 die in intra-opposition clashes. In Soweto, vehicles are damaged after unrest funeral, and SADF shoots dead 1 man during clashes between residents over consumer boycott. In Krugersdorp, 3 bodies found in township after tension builds up over boycott. Nearby in Westonaria, 1 is shot dead by police during unrest on mine premises, and another in Munzierville.</p> <p>In Chesterville (Dbn) 2 people die in clashes between the 'A Team' vigilantes and the 'comrades' (township youth); another is killed in police action.</p>
<p><b>December</b> 3rd &amp; 4th week</p>	<p>Violence in PE/Uitenhage area drops off with withdrawal of troops from townships and lifting of consumer boycott - no recorded unrest deaths for two week period.</p> <p>In Vaal Triangle townships, 2000 residents are issued with summonses as rent boycott begun in Sep 1984 continues.</p> <p><b>17 Dec</b> 21 Leaders of consumer boycotts detained nationwide, including Soweto and Mamelodi organisers, and several businessmen. Boycott in Grahamstown is re-imposed from 23 Dec until 4 Jan, and in Uitenhage, suspended for 2 weeks.</p> <p><b>28/29 Dec</b> Wits meeting of 312 organisations under SPCC decides pupils should return to school on 28 Jan instead of 8th. Other demands to be met by end-March are: reschedule exams to end of March; reinstate all teachers, repair damaged school buildings; remove SADF from townships; allow SRCs; lift state of emergency and urban COSAS. Parents to refuse to pay school fees or provide materials.</p>	<p>Disturbances spread in Karoo towns and in E Cape, unrest deaths in Queenstown, Hanover, Fort Beaufort; and 222 arrested in Maitland. In the Cape, riots break out in Phillipstown.</p> <p>In CT townships, 4 people burned to death including a community councillor, and police shootings leave 13 year-old dead. In Colyton, police baton charge people having candlelight vigils. In Durban, 3 members of Wellington, Robertson, Stellenbosch and Paarl, where 3 Durban members die in clashes with AZANYU supporters, 1 UDF activist killed by police.</p> <p><b>16/21 Dec</b> Violence erupts in Moutse (Lebowa) over incorporation of KwaNdebele; in vigilante attacks, 4 people die and scores arrested in Dennenilton.</p> <p><b>23 Dec</b> In Soweto 4 people die after police fire on funeral procession. Clashes with youth over consumer boycott, 4 most in deaths in Dobsonville, and at Westonaria mine, two white men stabbed to death, black workers killed by police. Unrest spreads to surrounding mining towns.</p> <p><b>24/27 Dec</b> In Natal, faction fighting between 3000 Pondo and 2000 Zulu the KwaMakuta and Umbumbulu areas leave 58 dead and 2000 homeless.</p>



PART II: November 1985-7 March 1986

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Emergency Extended, Continued Crackdown and Court Challenges</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Guerilla Attacks on City, Township and Rural Fronts</i>	<b>1985</b>
<p>Number of detentions this year, including under ISA, now exceeds 3500. So far 2500 people detained under emergency regulations and 3561 arrested, and between 12 668 (Le Grange) to 25 000 (DPSC) arrested. 250 children in detention, and 68 killed since state of emergency declared. In the Western Cape 1840 detained since 5 May.</p> <p>Government bans photographs of unrest in emergency areas, except with police permission. Only accredited journalists to be granted access to emergency areas. A CT city hall meeting of 23 organisations and a UCT conference on UDF are banned. Stringent funeral restrictions imposed in Paarl East.</p> <p>Wynberg court (Boland) relaxes Boesak's bail conditions after Pollsmoor court judge allows that he retain his passport but it is then removed. On 13 Nov charges against him and 5 others for illegally entering township are withdrawn. In Pietermaritzburg (PMB), residents of Imbali township obtain court interdict preventing 10 Inkatha members from assaulting them.</p> <p>In Durban, Justice Milne reprimands Deputy Minister of Law and Order, for blaming unrest on SACP and its alliance with ANC, UDF and National Front, as it prejudices treason trial in PMB.</p> <p>In Pretoria's townships all white police are withdrawn after negotiations, and in Soweto SPCC meets police commissioner and deputy ministers of Law and Order and Education, to demand removal of the SADF. In CT, PW Botha and Transvaal education ministers meet heads of UCT, UWC and the Peninsula Technikon to discuss regions' education crisis.</p>	<p>1 Nov In central JHB, building housing Institute of Bankers damaged by bomb blast.</p> <p>5 Nov Planned visit by clergymen to ANC in Lusaka cancelled after Department of Home Affairs refuses to provide travel documents.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>ISA</b> Internal Security Act  <b>DPSC</b> Detainees Parents Support Committee  <b>SAOF/SAP</b> South African Defence Force/PoliceSASO South African Students Organisation  <b>UCT/UWC</b> Universities of Cape Town and Western Cape  <b>UDF</b> United Democratic Front</p>	<p><b>November</b> 1st &amp; 2nd week</p>
<p>13 Nov Almost 6000 people detained under emergency regulations so far. Numerous new banning orders issued, including UDF publicity secretary Trevor Manuel. In CT and JHB, many protest meetings are banned. Strict restrictions imposed on unrest funerals in Mamelodi - no weekend funerals.</p> <p>JHB 3 PFP MPs visit jails to investigate 35 complaints of assaults on detainees. Three medical bodies reject medical panel for detainees because of government control, and only MASA members may sit on it.</p> <p>Y. Zwicksha, 3 policeman suspended after shooting of a 13 year-old. In Pretoria, inquest into unrest fatality of 4 year-old child in Atteridgeville finds police to blame, and a PE inquest acquits police after shooting of 14 year-old in Zwelentemba.</p> <p>11 Nov In Grahamstown, Supreme Court reserves judgement on validity of prospective amendment of emergency regulations. In Dbn, Judge rules detention under section 29 of ISA is unlawful if detainee is incapable of being interrogated. In Wynberg (CT), charges are withdrawn against 48 who were taken to Pollsmoor on 28 Aug. Rand Supreme Court rules dismissal of 30 student nurses at Baragwanath hospital invalid and orders reinstatement. In Pretoria, Supreme Court rules that 2 senior police must furnish affidavits on arrest of missing man.</p>	<p>16/18 Nov In Guguletu and Bellville South (CT), hand-grenade attacks on two policemen's homes leave one injured. Other grenade attacks damage vehicles at Mannenburg police station and Woodstock bank. Later, in Crossroads 3 soldiers are injured in grenade attack. 21 Grenade attacks in Cape Peninsula since 20 July.</p> <p>In Mochudi (Botswana), 4 exiles die in car bomb blast - 17 people killed so far this year in violence directed against SA refugees.</p> <p>19/22 Nov In JHB parcel bomb explodes in hands of MD of Omega Coal.</p> <p>26/28 Nov In Soutspanberg (N Tvl) landmine explodes and 5 other mines found - 1 man killed and 8 injured including 4 soldiers. In Tlhabane (Rustenburg) Bophuthatswana security forces kill 4 and injure 2 insurgents in contact. After rocket attack on Sasol oil plants at Secunda, 3 insurgents killed. In Kiplontein (CT) handgrenade explodes near mission, 7th attack in 2 weeks.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>COSATU</b> Congress of South African Trade Unions  <b>MASA</b> Medical Association of South Africa  <b>WECTU</b> Western Cape Teachers Association  <b>PFP</b> Progressive Federal Party</p>	<p><b>November</b> 3rd &amp; 4th week</p>
<p>12 Dec In Zwelentemba (Worcester) police forbid attorneys and MPs/MPCs from entering township to help residents claim damages against security forces. In Calhcart (E Cape) out-of-court settlement reached with government who pay costs and undertake that none of its agencies will abuse its powers.</p> <p>14 Dec Government lifts state of emergency in 8 out of 38 declared magisterial districts, on Dec 10th, freeze on repayment of foreign debt extended for 3 months.</p> <p>Supreme Court dismisses application for release of detainees, judge says that evidence need not be heard from both sides. Government ordered UDF to suspend its temporary interdict restraining police from assaulting union members. In Durban, Justice Milne appointed to head investigation into unrest charges. 15 given earlier to prosecutors and magistrates by security police. In Durban, 15 policemen fined R150 for common assault after charges laid by M. Black and Di Bishop.</p> <p>Charges of treason against 12 UDF leaders on trial in PMB dropped.</p> <p>In Pretoria, Supreme Court sentences 6 Sharpeville residents to death for killing deputy mayor in Sep 1984.</p>	<p>1/5 Dec US government representatives reputed to have met ANC in Lusaka twice. In Harare South African church leaders, UCT and Stellenbosch students meet with ANC and PAC representatives. In Soweto, grenade attack on SADF vehicle. In Escourt, 7 men convicted of terrorism under ISA - 6 of accused acquitted, and judge refers torture claims while in detention to Minister of Law and Order.</p> <p>7/13 Dec In Dbn 8 people injured by limpet mine at Mobeni post office and in nearby Chesterville a grenade attack on policeman's house. In Chatsworth magistrate's court is bombed. In Parden Eiland (CT) a handgrenade explodes on business premises. In Lusaka a parcel-bomb injures an ANC member. In Benoni 5 PAC members found guilty of terrorism.</p> <p>14/16 Dec In KwaThema (Springs), one person dies, policeman and 2 others injured in AK47 and grenade attacks. In Soweto 3 people are injured in grenade incident. In Messina 6 people die in 7th landmine explosion in area since 27 Nov, ANC claim responsibility.</p>	<p><b>December</b> 1st &amp; 2nd week</p>
<p>SADF powers extended, given right to search, seize articles, detain people and disperse crowds in unrest situations. Three foreign TV men barred from entering CT's African townships for 2 months. In PE, 93 more charges filed in supreme court alleging assault of detainees. CT Supreme Court dismisses with costs application for release of 6 detainees, and Rand Supreme Court for 13 detainees.</p> <p>20 Dec Winnie Mandela arrested for defying her banning order by returning to Soweto a day after her banning order is relaxed - no longer confined to Brandfort (OFS).</p> <p>21 Dec In CT, 45 detainees released, mainly UDF executives, all with restrictions, participating in political activities or attending educational institutions.</p> <p>21 Dec In Dbn 2 jobs extends previous ban on political meetings - places 6 ban on indoor gatherings by 74 organisations in 30 districts.</p>	<p>16/18 Dec In Soweto, 2 grenade attacks on houses, in Umlazi (Dbn) a mine damages Putco bus depot. In London Tory MPs meet with ANC.</p> <p>20/23 Dec In Maseru, 6 South Africans and 3 Lesotho nationals killed in alleged SADF assassinations. In Amanzimtoti (Dbn) bomb blast in shopping centre kills 5 people, injures 61, in retaliation for Maseru raid. Grenade attack on holidaymakers' kombi in central Dbn.</p> <p>24/31 Dec DRC minister meets ANC in New York and SPCC meets with them in Harare to discuss education crisis. In Soweto a policeman is injured in grenade attack and in Crossroads (CT) 5 people injured when grenade explodes in vigilante/youth clashes.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS:</b>  <b>ANC</b> African National Congress  <b>AZANYU</b> Azanian National Youth Union  <b>AZAPO</b> Azanian People's Organisation  <b>DRC</b> Dutch Reformed Church  <b>FAFOD</b> Friends and Families of Detainees  <b>PAC</b> Pan-Africanist Congress  <b>SPCC</b> Soweto Parents Crisis Committee</p>	<p><b>December</b> 3rd &amp; 4th week</p>

1986	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Scholar, Worker and Consumer Boycotts/Stayaway Strikes</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Sustained Revolt, Homeland Flashpoints and Vigilante Clashes</i>	Government Response <i>Emergency Extended, Continued Crackdown and Court Challenges</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Guerilla Attacks on City, Townships and Rural Fronts</i>	1986
<b>January</b> 1st & 2nd week	<p>During 1985, 230 out of 328 African secondary schools were disrupted by boycotts. PE township residents heed call to stay indoors and boycott beaches over festive period. Consumer boycott called off in most Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) areas.</p> <p>2 Jan In central PE, 20 000 attend funeral of PFP MPC Molly Blackburn, killed in car accident with civil rights activist Brian Bishop on 28 Dec.</p> <p>6 Jan 40 000 Attend education meeting in Zwide (PE), decide to return to school, and ratify SPCC demands. An education meeting in Lenasia is banned. DET reopens schools on 8 Jan, although pupils can register until 28 Jan. Coloured department of education drops most teacher suspensions. Gencor dismisses 23 000 workers after strike and police open fire on gathering, injuring 27 miners. In other police shootings, 3 people die in Khutsong (Oberholzer) in clashes over school and consumer boycotts.</p> <p>13 Jan Pretoria Council of Churches appoints commission of inquiry into deaths of at least 13 people in Mamelodi massacre of 21 Nov - town council summons more than 24 000 residents who have refused to pay rents since.</p>	<p>1/3 Jan In Dbn on new years day, 2 people die in clashes on beachfront, blamed on overcrowding. Umbumbulu (S Coast) death toll in faction fighting rises to 63 since Xmas Eve. In Moutse, 2 policemen, 16 tribesmen and youths die in 2 days of clashes after incorporation into KwaNdebele. 8 comrades' leave 4 dead.</p> <p>Widespread unrest in Karoo townships, with fatalities in Kwanqane (Middelburg), Jansenville, Sandbult (Burgersdorp): in E Cape 9 die in Stutterheim, 4 in Queenstown. Daily reports of violence in Soweto, 2 members shot dead by police and one 'informer' killed at unrest funeral in Alexandra, two die in Zulu/Pondo clashes. Unrest on W Rand spreads to Orkney, Meyerton, Bekkersdal and Munsievillie townships.</p> <p>11 Jan Chief Mayisa of Leandra Action Committee (UDF) killed by vigilantes hours before he was to meet Chester Crocker. Unrest spreads through Tvl to Kabokweni (White River), Watervalboven, Bethal, Witbank, Trust (Kangwane) and Belfast, with attacks on government property. Fresh outbreaks of unrest in OFS after long period of calm.</p>	<p>Death-toll from police action during 1985 unrest is 763 people, including 201 juveniles; 16 policemen were killed and 330 injured. 6 733 were detained under emergency regulations, of whom 118 juveniles were temporarily hospitalised. 3 637 people were detained under ISA and arrested for 'political' offences and torture of detainees were court actions relating to assault and torture of detainees were a police paid out R845 000 for their unlawful actions.</p> <p>Court dismisses with costs an application by CTPA and 12 students to allow students to write supplementary exams; 95 schools and 11 training colleges affected. In CT and Tvl education crisis meetings banned, the latter in 8 areas for 4 days.</p> <p>London application to search police station for torture equipment dismissed by Supreme Court. In Dbn, Justice Milne and 5 others decide magistrates who attended security police briefing on unrest should not be allowed to preside at political trials.</p>	<p>1 Jan South Africa imposes blockade on Lesotho's borders; no goods allowed through and massive border queues.</p> <p>4/7 Jan In Ellisras (nr Botswana) a landmine kills 2 people and injures 2; in East London and Soweto, police kill 2 suspected insurgents. In Pretoria a transformer is damaged by a limpet mine.</p> <p>9/13 Jan On 74th anniversary of ANC, President Oliver Tambo announces plans to escalate guerilla actions into full-scale 'people's war'. In Wentworth (Dbn), an electricity substation is blown up and a delayed booby-trap kills 1 policeman and injures 5 people. In CT, a parcel-bomb explodes at railway station, injuring postal sorter.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>  <b>COSCO</b> Community Support Committee  <b>CTPA</b> Cape Teachers' Professional Association  <b>DET</b> Department of Education and Training</p>	<b>January</b> 1st & 2nd week
<b>January</b> 3rd & 4th week	<p>In CT, 4 coloured schools decide to return on 2 Jan. At Rylands high school soldiers force pupils back to class after walk-out to protest presence of 14 'scab' teachers.</p> <p>Soweto cultural festival organised as COSCO receives widespread support for boycott of JHB centenary celebrations.</p> <p>21 Jan CT consumer boycott called off but demands remain. In E Cape only 17 of 45 community councils operating - white municipalities now administer Oudsthoorn, Kwanobuhle and Lingelihle townships after mass resignations. In Vaal Triangle, Lekoa Town Council loses more than R500 000 per month in unpaid electricity charges alone; Atteridgeville town council cuts off electricity as residents owe more than R1 million in rent and service charges as boycotts continue. In Watervalboven, Belfast, Carolina, Piet Retief and Ermelo (E Tvl) townships, residents begin rent boycotts.</p> <p>27/28 Jan DET announces changes in 1985 exam schedule: pupils to write in February and 1986 academic year to begin in March. Schools reopen with high turnout in W Cape, OFS and KwaZulu, but in E Cape. Soweto and Soshanguve (Pretoria) attendance at high schools is low.</p>	<p>Unrest abates in W Cape and in PE/Uitenhage townships. In the Karoo 3 die during continued disturbances in townships of Sandbult, Pearston and elsewhere. In Soweto, 2 people are killed amid daily crowd confrontations with police. Unrest on W Rand flares up where at least 20 people die, mainly in police action.</p> <p>17/21 Jan In Westonia, 7 die (4 in police shootings) and 73 injured during faction fighting on mine between Ponds and Zulus. In nearby Bekkersdal 2 white policemen killed by miners after tension over beerhall boycott and ban on unauthorised meetings. Another 8 killed by police and 86 charged with murder as township is cordoned off. Also on W Rand, in Khutsong, 2 people killed by police after unrest funeral where severe restrictions imposed. Another 2 die in Munzievillie where unrest spills over into white suburb of Dan Pienarsville.</p> <p>Upsurge of unrest in E Tvl, where police and community councillors attacked; 41 arrested in Breyton after policeman is shot. At Mayisa's funeral in Leandra, a man accused of killing chief is hacked to death and 8 other injured in clashes between youths and vigilantes. Unrest spreads in OFS to Kangwane and in KwaNdebele, where police kill two.</p> <p>22/23 Jan In Natal faction fighting continues with heavy death toll of 106 since Xmas; 36-50 people in Umbumbulu, 6 in Port Shepstone and 10 in Shongweni/Hammarsdale area. Sporadic unrest in other Dbn townships and Mphohmeni (Howick).</p>	<p>Fort Hare University (Alice) several student activists refused readmission prior to Ciskeian take-over; and the University of Transkei expels all foreign students.</p> <p>Pretoria Supreme Court grants temporary interdict to protect residents in Leandra, including the Action Committee, against vigilantes. Evidence is that police did not respond to chief Mayisa's call for help before he was murdered.</p> <p>New Brighton (PE) 3 policemen in court on charge of murder arising out of unrest are released without bail. In Zwelitsha charges of murder against 5 members of death of Giskian soldier at Victoria Mxenge's funeral are withdrawn. PE court finds police acted in self-defence in inquest of 3 unrest deaths.</p> <p>25/27 Jan Education crisis meetings banned in Zwide and Soweto. In the Cape Peninsula a blanket ban on visual display of any political viewpoints including placards, banners, stickers and clothing - is lifted before it is implemented. In Kagiso (Krugersdorp) 3 people die and many injured in police action during house-to-house raid over bus boycott.</p> <p>31 Jan Parliament opens - PW Botha in second Rubicon speech announces limited package of reforms for black people.</p>	<p>18 Jan In Westville (Dbn), substation damaged by limpet mine, and in Stockport (nr Botswana) 2 undetonated landmines are found.</p> <p>20 Jan Coup in Lesotho, General Lekhanye topples ruling Chief Leabua Jonathan. In Dbn, electricity pylons are bombed, again with second delayed limpet mine.</p> <p>22/26 Jan UDF leaders meet ANC in Sweden. In Mamelodi, a policeman dies in hand-grenade attack on his house, and in Kattelohong a community councillor's home is also damaged by grenade. In Swaziland 28 ANC refugees are deported, and the blockade on Lesotho is lifted after ANC and PAC office-bearers leave. Lekhanye orders all flights leaving the country to pass through SA airports.</p>	<b>January</b> 3rd & 4th week
<b>February</b> 1st & 2nd week	<p>4 Feb Work stayaway in Soshanguve to protest arrest of 120 at church meeting on 3 Feb.</p> <p>10 Feb Work stayaway in Mohlakeng (W Rand) to enable residents to attend unrest funeral - all media people removed by police.</p> <p>11/13 Feb In Mamelodi, pupils observe school stayaway to protest fatal police shooting of fellow scholar, 50 detainees, 13 under the age of 18, stage protest fast at Diepkloof prison. In Jouberton (Krugersdorp) students abandon classes in wake of severe unrest which leaves up to 8 dead.</p> <p>In GaRankuwa (Lebowa) class boycott begins for duration of trial of pupils charged with public violence. In Atteridgeville 2 day stayaway called to mark anniversary of first unrest fatality pupil killed on school grounds in police action.</p>	<p>1/2 Feb Widespread township unrest continues in E Tvl, East and West Rand, with at least 6 fatalities; in Randfontein white businesses are attacked. A youth dies in Soweto (PE), with other disturbances in Clermont and Lamontville (Dbn).</p> <p>6 Feb At Randfontein mine, 5 workers die and 14 injured in clashes with police. At Winterveld shack area, scores of people are detained at unrest funeral.</p> <p>8/9 Feb In Umbumbulu, 3 policemen are hacked to death and 6 others die as faction fighting continues. UDF/Inkatha clashes in Kwandengezi (Pinetown) leave 3 dead, and a murder docket is opened after policeman kills youth. In Alexandra youths launch anti-crime campaign after local AZAPO leader is murdered. Violence continues in Pretoria, W Rand and E Tvl townships, where 3 people die in police shootings at unrest funerals.</p> <p>10/13 Feb In Soweto (PE), 8 die in UDF/AZANYU clashes. Wilgespruit Ecu Centre is raided by SADF/SAP who open fire on youths seeking sanctuary after violence in Leslie; 3 injured and over 50 arrested.</p>	<p>E Cape development boards disclose they are R20m in arrears after anti-boycotts and other non-payments.</p> <p>In Fort Beaufort, magistrate extends interdicts to restrain 3 community councillors from assaulting children and to order policeman not to hamper high-powered investigations into assaults. Nationwide last year there were 40 complaints made against SADF, and nearly 500 against SAP - another 141 assault charges laid by detainees.</p> <p>7 Feb Le Grange estimates riot damage bill at R138m to date. State of emergency is lifted in 7 Cape districts. PFP's Dr Van Zyl Slabbert resigns as Opposition Leader and as MP. In Cradock (E Cape), consumer boycott meetings by 3 organisations banned for 2 days.</p> <p>13/14 Feb Child Welfare in Jhb reports that since the emergency was declared they have treated 100 child detainees. In PE regional court, 4 policemen charged with assault during unrest are given 6 month - 2 year prison sentences.</p>	<p>1/3 Feb In Lamontville (Dbn) a police vehicle is damaged by a handgrenade, and in Guguletu (CT), 4 soldiers are injured by a grenade attack on a butel patrol.</p> <p>4/7 Feb After PW Botha's speech at opening of parliament, rumours fly about imminent release of Mandela in East/West spy swap. In Engcobo (Transkei), a car-bomb kills 1 person and injures 4.</p> <p>10/11 Feb Limpet mines explode at police station in Umlazi and a substation in Durban. A soldier and an insurgent die in clashes near Botswana border.</p> <p>13 Feb Another 42 ANC/South African refugees expelled from Maseru and flown out to ANC HQ in Lusaka, Zambia.</p>	<b>February</b> 1st & 2nd week
<b>February</b> 3rd & 4th week	<p>17/19 Feb Residents of Lynneville, Ackerville and KwaGuqua (Witbank townships) begin 7 day stayaway to protest arrests of 820 people. In Atteridgeville, pupils and workers observe second stayaway for funeral of unrest victim.</p> <p>In Mabopane (nr GaRankuwa), pupils boycott schools for unrest funeral. Family halt funeral because of police presence, even after interdict restrains them from interfering. In KwaZulu school boycott continues - in KwaMashu 5 000 parents and pupils demand immediate delivery of free stationary and textbooks; in Umlazi pupils at 3 schools demand refund of fees. Government later hands out R5.7m to KwaZulu for stationary.</p> <p>21 Feb In Lawaakamp (George), 400 municipal workers dismissed for stayaway after unrest in which police killed 5 people.</p> <p>24 Feb Krugersdorp's African townships decide to call off consumer boycott from end of month; boycott of community council liquor stores and buses continues, with new campaign to socially isolate 'collaborators'.</p> <p>In Kangwane, boycotts at 5 high schools, to protest high failure rate of std 8 pupils in 1 school; cabinet meeting decides to promote all. In PE a 3-day class boycott starts; pupils attend school but not lessons, to protest detentions and support demands for free text books.</p>	<p>15/18 Feb In Alexandra, police and mourners battle at unrest funeral, township sealed off and press barred. Death toll mounts to 27, including 2 policemen, at least 57 injured and 123 detained. Church leaders meet with deputy ministers of police and defence, and address meeting of 45 000 residents. In Edendale (PMB) violence erupts at unrest funeral.</p> <p>20/23 Feb After Witbank stayaway, 11 patients with gunshot wounds arrested by police. In Lawaakamp, 5 people killed by police during week-long disturbances. Severe unrest in Soshanguve continues.</p> <p>24 Feb In Brits (nr Pretoria), several buildings and vehicles attacked by residents after police open fire on meeting. In Soweto pupils go on rampage, commandeering 51 cars and burn several. Security forces in Odi and Moretele districts (BOP) are accused of atrocities - at least 9 people have died since mid-Nov and many abducted. In Lebowa unrest claims at least 4 lives.</p> <p>26/28 Feb In Atteridgeville an activist's house is petrol-bombed, the 10th in 2 weeks. In CT, schools disrupted in Bonteheuwel, Heideveld and Arcadia over presence of security guards. In KwaNdegezi (Pinetown), 3 die and 3 seriously injured in faction fighting.</p> <p>Several incidents of random shooting attacks on blacks by whites; in St Albans (E Cape), Krugersdorp, near Schweizer-Reneke. In Krugersdorp, 3 white men are arrested after a burnt body is found; and in nearby Kagiso 2 AZANYU leaders are injured by masked white vigilantes.</p>	<p>15/16 Feb In Atteridgeville, weekend funerals for 2 unrest victims are banned.</p> <p>17/18 Feb Residents of Kagiso and Munsievillie appeal to Supreme Court for relief from SADF/SAP abuse - court rules that no allegations in over 100 affidavits may be published. SAP undertakes in court to release 41 of 48 minors arrested at Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre after urgent application for their release. None of the 10 policemen prosecuted after unrest deaths have been found guilty; 17 suspended after torture allegations and activities during unrest.</p> <p>19 Feb The Pretoria Supreme Court acquits 5 people on charges of murdering a Sebokeng (Vaal Triangle) councillor in Sep '84.</p> <p>22/23 Feb In PE, large contingent of security forces enforce 'whites' only beaches after General Motors offer to legally support any of 8000 black employees prosecuted for swimming there. Confrontations witnessed by members of Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group.</p> <p>24 Feb In Steytterville inquest, verdict of justifiable homicide after 20 year-old killed by police in unrest. Supreme Court grants interdict to Black Sash, restraining vigilantes from preventing them from setting up unrest advice centres in Ashton, Worcester and Robertson.</p>	<p>15/17 Feb In Mamelodi, a casspir is damaged by a landmine. In Lamontville, a policeman's house and Inkatha Womens Brigade's house are damaged in handgrenade attacks. Police kill 2 suspected ANC members in New Brighton (PE) and Soweto, arrest another in Zwide (PE) - 2 policemen injured in grenade attacks.</p> <p>18/23 Feb In Edenpark (Alberton), a mobile police station is damaged by a grenade - a bomb explodes in Cambridge (East London) police station toilet. On W Rand, an electricity substation is damaged by a limpet mine and in Meyerspark (Pretoria) a bomb explodes in a shopping centre.</p> <p>25 Feb SA and Botswana governments reach informal accord - Botswana undertakes to prevent transit of ANC combatants. In the Rand Supreme Court, a white ANC guerilla, Eric Pelsler (21) is convicted of treason and given a 7 year prison sentence.</p> <p>26 Feb In Dbn, Andrew Zondo is indicted on 5 charges of murder for Amanzimtoti bomb blast on 23 Dec. Police kill a suspected ANC member in Soweto, and in Dinokana Village (Zeerust) a community councillor's house is damaged in grenade attack.</p>	<b>February</b> 3rd & 4th week
<b>March</b> Last week of emergency	<p>1/3 Mar In Bella Bella (Warmbaths), township residents stage successful consumer boycott to protest rent hikes and corporal punishment in primary schools, police arrest 70. Consumer boycott in East London resumed.</p> <p>5 Mar Another work stayaway in Alexandra for mass funeral of 17 unrest victims, 40 000 attend. Police search all people entering township - no cameras allowed, 3 foreign newsmen issued with expulsion orders for illegally filming funeral.</p>	<p>1/2 Mar Mamelodi residents defy weekend ban on unrest funerals for 4 victims, police seal township and refuse press entrance. In Nkqabela (Hortons) vigilantes kill advice centre organiser and another person burnt to death. Three people die in Chesterville (Dbn) in intra-opposition violence.</p> <p>3/7 Mar Violent clashes continue in W Rand townships, Atteridgeville and Soweto with 6 fatalities in police shootings. In Border region new wave of unrest - 4 people die in Duncan Village (East London); 2 people shot dead by police in Clermont (Dbn).</p>	<p>7 Mar LAST DAY OF STATE OF EMERGENCY as government lifts restrictions in all affected magisterial districts. Death toll of about 600 people during 7 month emergency period since 21 July 1985, totalling 1 237 fatalities in over 18 months of unrest - police responsible for +441 deaths, +273 township residents killed by other residents (1985). Over emergency period, 62 people detained under regulations and 4 152 under other security legislation; 292 remaining emergency detainees released, leaving 241 still in detention.</p>	<p>3/4 Mar In Guguletu, police ambush mimbus and kill 7 suspected ANC insurgents - 2 policemen injured. In Assagay (nr Dbn), a substation is bombed. Bomb explodes in toilet of John Vorster Square, police headquarters in JHB. In Atteridgeville, 1 person dies and 2 injured in grenade attack on house.</p> <p>7 Mar Bomb explodes in toilet of Hillbrow police station, Jhb.</p>	<b>March</b> Last week of emergency

# Conflict Chronology 5

## FROM REGIONAL TO NATIONAL EMERGENCY: A Brief 'Interlude'

1986	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS <i>Community Boycotts &amp; Stayaways</i>	GENERAL CIVIL UNREST <i>Vigilante/Activist Clashes, Faction Fighting</i>
<b>MARCH</b> <i>2nd week</i>	<p>7 March DET suspends classes at 5 schools in Tvl Highveld region due to renewed unrest since start of first term. In Pmb (Natal), 7 schools closed; and in E Cape, pupils at 25 schools in PE boycott to protest suspension of classes at 5 schools.</p> <p>11 March At Kabokweni (White River/KaNowane), schoolchildren gather outside magistrate's court in support of 8 pupils on charges of public violence: police shoot on crowd, with 5 fatalities and 80 injuries.</p>	<p>Since Sept 1984, about 1 000 schools damaged or destroyed, more than 10 000 buses and private vehicles damaged. Transport company PUTCO losses since Sept 1984 estimated at R28m, incl R24m in lost fares; 3 bus drivers killed and 230 injured during unrest. Bus services in Tembisa suspended for nearly a year.</p> <p>7/9 March In Bela Bela (Warmbaths), security forces search houses and arrest 40, incl civic leaders. Near Umbumbulu (Natal S Coast), 12 die in renewed faction fighting. In Motetema (Lebowa) security forces open fire at unrest funeral, killing 6 people and injuring 11.</p>
<b>MARCH</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p>17/20 March In Mamelodi residents stage 2-day stayaway to protest police action. In Guguletu (CT) pupils protest inferior quality of free books; media ordered out of township.</p> <p>21 March Commemoration of Sharpeville/Langa shootings. Protesters clash with police in Langa township, WITS and UWC campuses. Dbn city centre and elsewhere.</p> <p>24/25 March Stayaway in Ratanda to protest detention of 2 community leaders; 4 fatalities. Consumer boycotts launched in Pretoria's 4 main townships, GaRankuwa (Lebowa), and Odi and Moretele districts (Bop). Medunsa students boycott to protest reinstatement of 2 white students.</p> <p>29/30 March NECC conference in Dbn — 1 000 delegates decide that pupils will return to school but set new demands. Two Inkatha supporters die in attempt to disrupt meeting. Annual National Forum conference calls for a 10-day stayaway from June 16, and for a national rent boycott. Fort Hare university closes 1 week early after 3-week boycott. In Zwide (PE), 20 000 attend memorial service for SACP's Mabhiba.</p>	<p>15 March In Guguletu 30 000 mourners attend funeral of alleged ANC guerillas killed in police shootings on 3 March. In Mamelodi and Jouberton, mourners and police clash, with 4 fatalities. At gold mine near Orkney, 15 die and 66 injured in Sotho/Xhosa faction fighting.</p> <p>18/21 March In Soweto, 8 die in clashes between schoolchildren, gangsters and police. In Atteridgeville, 4 activists' houses are petrol bombed; 250 Women from Crossroads march on police station over intimidation by 'witdoeke' (vigilantes) — 9 die in 2-day battle with 'comrades' (youth activists). In Dbn incendiary attacks at UND cause R1m damage to 23 offices. In KwaMashu, 5 KwaZulu government cars are burnt at Polyclinic.</p> <p>24/26 March In PE townships, police shoot dead 13 people after they attack liquor outlets. In Crossroads feud, 2 policemen and 2 youths are killed. At Winterveld (Bop), police open fire on meeting of 5/10 000 residents, killing 11 people, injuring 70, and arrest 2 500.</p> <p>31 March 300 Crossroads women demonstrate against leader Johnson Nxobongwana and detention of 2 women. In nearby Nyanga Bush squatter leader Yamile is detained.</p>
<b>APRIL</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/2 April Stayaway in White River and Nelspruit, as Pretoria businessmen discuss 2-week-old consumer boycott with government. In Zwide, thousands attend NECC follow-up meeting and call for pupils to return to school, 'people's education' and for 3-day stayaway on 16/18 June.</p> <p>4/6 April In Atteridgeville 5 activists' houses burnt; totals 45 in past few days; also 4 fatalities. Consumer boycotts launched in Pretoria's 4 main townships, GaRankuwa (Lebowa), and Odi and Moretele districts (Bop). Medunsa students boycott to protest reinstatement of 2 white students.</p> <p>5/9 April In Winterveld (incl Nafcoc president's). Severe restrictions and security presence for unrest funerals in Alexandra and Guguletu. In New Brighton 2 men are killed in clash with police at unrest funeral. In Brandfort, Winnie Mandela addresses mourners who defy funeral restrictions; after disrupted Kagiso funeral, residents decide to continue bus and start consumer boycotts.</p> <p>7 April PE consumer boycott resumed after 5-month break; in Nelspruit 6-day stayaway ends. In Cape Town, 100 Nyanga camp women protest detentions outside court.</p> <p>12/14 April In Soweto, Regina Mundi meeting resolves to stamp out thuggery among youth. All 1 076 Medunsa students sent home after riots erupt over reinstatement of 2 white students.</p>	<p>2/4 April In Bop's Odi district, 51 people arrested after 50 buses damaged in riot. In Zolani (Ashton) 250 detained during protest march on development board. In Vosloorus stayaway 5 people die and several injured; also in march on offices after bar on funeral of ANC guerillas. In Kanyamazane (nr Nelspruit) at least 3 die in internecine violence, and 2 in PE township.</p> <p>5/9 April In Motherwell (PE) 3 charred bodies found after opposition feuding. In Kanana (Orkney) 3 people die in clashes with police nationwide at least 13 die over weekend. In Hammarsdale, 3 KwaZulu employees are killed by unknown assassins. Six die in continued faction fighting in Natal.</p> <p>12/14 April In Mooiplaas (nr East London) 9 people die in conflict over incorporation into Ciskei; in Sekhukhuneland (Lebowa) 32 000 es 'necklace' victims found — 67 later detained. In New Brighton, undertaken by activists for secretly burying 5 unrest victims. Five die in clashes in Daveyton (Benoni), Tantje (Grahamstown) and Lungen (Cradock).</p>
<b>APRIL</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p>38 African community councils and 3 local authorities nationwide inoperable due to resignations under community pressure; in Ratanda, development board appoints 5 members to local council after all resign.</p> <p>19/20 April In Potgietersrus, workers stay away and begin bus boycott. In Lawaaiikamp mass meeting dispersed by police; in Soweto 800 Tshiawello residents decide to continue 2-month boycott until rents reduced.</p> <p>21 April In Dundee and Elsie's River pupils are dispersed outside magistrates' courts where detainees appear on charges of public violence. In Alexandra indefinite consumer boycott begins. 13th township to recently announce renewal — others incl Kagiso, Munsieville, Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Soshanguve, Mabopane, King Williamstown, and 6 townships in PE and Nelspruit.</p> <p>22/23 April Alexandra town council collapses as mayor Sam Buti and 4</p>	<p>President PW Botha announces that between Sept 1984 to 22 April 1986, 508 dead in 'black on black' violence (205 in 1986), many of them by 'necklace' victims killed by security forces (149 in 1986), and 439 injured in faction fighting (not related to unrest).</p> <p>15/20 April In Bongweni (nr Adelaide) consumer boycott organiser killed. In Lamontville and Chesterville, 5-day security force operation, 77 arrested. In New Brighton, police shoot dead 1 and arrest 200 in bus hijacking. In Umbumbulu 8 more die in faction fighting, and on Germiston mine another dies. In Soweto a policeman and 1 civilian die in riots. In Middelburg 5 people die in clashes incl a councillor. In Nyanga Bush 2 'witdoeke' die in clash with 'comrades'.</p> <p>22/23 April In Lawaaiikamp 200 are arrested in 'crime clean-up operation'. In Alexandra 10 activists' houses are damaged and violence continues.</p>

8 March - 11 June 1986

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE	BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY	1986
<p><i>Sustained Crackdown &amp; Court Challenge</i></p> <p>At least 787 deaths recorded during first state of emergency from 20/7/85 to 1/3/86, incl 371 in police shootings and remainder in radical/moderate violence and other incidents of political violence. 31 Policemen killed since 1984. Minister of Law and Order Le Grange announces 18 569 detained during Emergency incl 3 681 juveniles, with 323 detainees still in custody on 7 March. In 1985, 35 372 soldiers were deployed in 96 townships. 11 March In Alexandra, 3 foreign newsmen expelled for illegally filming townships. Five-year ban placed on PE consumer boycott leader, Mkhusele Mkhize and E Cape UDF vice-president, Henry Fazzie.</p>	<p><i>The External &amp; Domestic Fronts</i></p> <p>7/9 March Limpet mine explodes in toilet of Hillbrow police station (Jhb). Moses Mabhida, general secretary of SACP, exec member of ANC and vice-president of SACTU, dies in Maputo, Mozambique. 10 March Former SA journalist Marion Sparg arrested after series of ANC-linked bomb blasts in police stations.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  ANC African National Congress                  DET Department of Education and Training                  SACP South African Communist Party                  SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions                  UDF United Democratic Front</p>	<p><b>MARCH</b> 2nd week</p>
<p>17 March High-ranking police official appointed to investigate shooting of schoolchildren at Kabokweni on 11 March. 27/28 March Appeal Court finds banning and detention orders served on 16 people invalid, incl 6 Dbn consulate sit-in protesters (late 1984); in future, Minister of Law and Order must provide full reasons for actions. Supreme Court rules 2-week-old banning order of Jack and Fazzie invalid after recent court decisions. Banning orders on Arenstein, Issel, Manuel and others also lifted. 28 March Administration appoints one-man commission to investigate police shootings at Winterveld shack settlement near Pretoria. 28 March Government renews ban on outdoor public gatherings for another year. Monthly unrest death toll for March is 179, highest count since outbreak in Sept 1984, with next worst months being Aug 1985 (163 deaths) and Feb 1986 (112).</p>	<p>15/19 March In central Springs, a limpet mine explodes damaging shops and injuring 1 person. In nearby Elsburg a limpet mine is defused. In Geduld (Springs) a church is damaged by explosives. 22/23 March In Alberton a bomb explodes, causing minor damage. On Durban Bluff, 4 limpet mines go off at sub-station. 25 March In Kattlehong township an ANC insurgent is killed by police. 29/30 March NUSAS/ANC meeting takes place in Harare. Mabhida buried in Maputo after funeral arrangements outside Pmb threatened with disruption.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  WITS/UWC Universities of the Witwatersrand and Western Cape                  MEDUNSA Medical University of SA                  NECC National Education Crisis Committee                  NUSAS National Union of SA Students</p>	<p><b>MARCH</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1 April Chief Minister Mabuza of KaNgwane appoints 1-man commission of inquiry into Kabokweni shootings. In Mabopane a CCAWUSA member dies in custody, hours after arrest. Banning orders on Winnie Mandela no longer 23 years but she remains a 'listed' person. In Lawaaiikamp (George) municipality bulldozes 150 shacks after unrest. CT Supreme Court dismisses application to have restrictions on Knysna unrest funeral lifted. In Mahwelereng (Potgietersrus) a journalist dies in custody while being arrested with 3 Azapo members, who are later hospitalised. 13 April George municipality fires 215 workers who heed stayaway and refuse to pay rent arrears or face court action. In Malmesbury mass funeral for 11 people called off as police refuse to allow it. In clashes 3 more fatalities occur. 17/18 April Crossroads Sacta clinic claims it treated more than 500 people with gunshot wounds in past 10 months, with at least 13 fatalities. In Lebowa, lawyers file suits for R2.8m against police on behalf of 494 people. In Bisho (Ciskei) application on behalf of detained Rev Stofile. Fort St John, granted by Supreme Court — state undertakes not to act against him. In Lebowa, N Tvl president of UDF Peter Nchabeleng dies in custody. In Mahushu Trust (KaNgwane) pupil dies in detention.</p>	<p>Le Grange says ANC responsible for 197 sabotage and other incidents in past 12 months. 1 April ANC exec member Joe Slovo becomes new SACP chairperson. 2 April 19-year-old Andrew Zondo sentenced to death for Amanzimtoti bomb blast of Dec 1985. 8 April In Wentworth (Dbn) handgrenade attack on ex-Labour Party secretary's house. Death in Lusaka of exiled paramount chief Sabata Dalinyebo, hereditary leader of Transkei's Thembu tribe. 9 April In Vrededorp (Jhb) 1 killed and 4 injured in bomb explosion in public toilet.</p> <p><b>ACRONYMS</b>                  AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organisation                  CCAWUSA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA                  NAFCOC National African Federated Chamber of Commerce</p>	<p><b>APRIL</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16 April In Maboloka (Bop) a 25-year-old man dies in detention. Bop Minister of Law and Order ordered to show why 26 arrested at Winterveld were not brought to court. In Durban a final court order granted to prevent police from assaulting a 16-year-old detainee. Pretoria Supreme Court grants interdict restraining Atteridgeville police from attacking activists' houses. 17 April Van der Walt commission of inquiry into Vaal unrest of 1984 is set up in Parliament. In Grahamstown a conference on alternative forms of government is banned. In Cradock all meetings except bona fide church meetings are banned. In the Transkei ex-president Matanzima is removed and buried body of Chief Sabata to prevent funeral. 17 April In Middelburg 4 church leaders and 3 teachers detained. The</p>	<p>15 April Transkei police kill suspected ANC insurgent. The SACBC meets with ANC in Lusaka. 11 ANC members detained in Swaziland in security preparations for coronation of new Swazi king. 17/18 April In Umtata, prime minister's office and defence headquarters are bombed as Sabata's body arrives from Lusaka for burial. At Wild Coast Casino, bomb blast kills 2 people and injures 6. 21/22 April Near Breyten (E Tvl), 2 landmines explode injuring 3 people. Large arms cache found in white area of Roodepoort. 26/27 April In Edendale (Pmb) police kill one insurgent and injure one. Le Grange says 51 arms caches uncovered over past year.</p> <p><b>ACRONYM</b>                  SACBC SA Catholic Bishops Council</p>	<p><b>APRIL</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>

1986	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS <i>Community Boycotts &amp; Stayaways</i>	GENERAL CIVIL UNREST <i>Vigilante/Activist Clashes, Faction Fighting</i>
	<p>remaining councillors resign. Middelburg students boycott until 3 of their teachers are released. In Hambanathi (Tongaat), pupils continue class boycott after transfer of 2 teachers — several pupils injured in clashes with amabutho (Zulu vigilantes).</p> <p>28 April In Cradock, workers stage stayaway to attend unrest funeral banned on weekend.</p>	<p>stayaway — between 3-9 fatalities reported, with at least 50 injured. 45 000 attend rally and resolve to form street committees. Another arson attack on UND campus.</p> <p>26/29 April Unrest funeral in Cradock is banned — severe unrest with 1 person dead. In KwaMashu another fatality and riots after funeral of student leader. In Soweto 3 more activists' homes petrol bombed; 5 people reported dead and many injured after night vigil. In Umbumbulu, 3 more deaths. In Tembisa, 5 beerhalls burnt and 5 people die. In Alexandra 2 people killed after police use handgrenade; 18 dead in the next week according to Alexandra committee. In Sharpeville 20 activists' houses attacked.</p>
<p><b>MAY</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p><b>MAY DAY</b> About 1.5m workers stay away on International Labour Day, the largest national strike in SA history; in Durban 60 000 attend launch of Ujwusa, a pro-Inkatha union.</p> <p>1/4 May In Bongoletu (Oudtshoorn) residents begin bus boycott to protest high fares and suspended township service; in Zwelentemba (Worcester) a year-long bus boycott is called off after demands are met. In Bela Bela (white River) all councillors resign except the mayor and his deputy.</p> <p>5/9 May In Port Alfred African women stage stayaway to protest detention of 5 women at Mayday rally. In Pretoria, a 7-week consumer boycott is called off to enable residents to buy winter clothing. In CT a church delegation is prevented from meeting the commissioner of police to discuss welfare of detainees. In Venda 3 detainees go on hunger strike, demanding to be charged or released. In Vosloorus 2 councillors resign.</p> <p>10/12 May At rally in Zwide, Mkhoseli Jack calls for consumer boycott to be extended throughout E Cape; indefinite boycott also launched in N Tvl, incl 9 white towns, to protest detentions, attacks on activists' homes, high bus fares and troops in townships; calls for resignations of councillors and homeland MPs.</p> <p>14/15 May In Tembisa residents stay away for restricted funeral of 3 unrest victims, police halt procession. In Atteridgeville 2 people appointed to town council to fill vacancies.</p>	<p>1/5 May In Bonteheuwel police whip protesting pupils — next day pupils in many high schools on Cape Flats stage walkouts. In KwaZakhele two 13-year olds held responsible for murder of 12-year-old girl are killed by youth activists. Several people are burnt to death in Khutsong (Oberholzer) and KwaNobuhle in internecine township violence. Handgrenade attacks on houses kill 2 people in Mabopane (Bop) and injure 2 in Crossroads, where vigilantes force clinic to close.</p> <p>6/8 May 34 Mbokotho vigilantes are arrested in KwaNdebele. In Daveyton 3 people are injured by unidentified gunmen, and in Roodepoort the bodies of 3 youths are found. Severe clashes in Soweto between youths and vigilantes, also attacks on activists' houses in Tembisa, Alexandra, and Witbank townships. In Gelvendale 1 man is shot dead in attack on 'coloured' MP's house.</p> <p>9/14 May In Mankweng (Kroonstad) a youth is shot dead after unrest funeral. Police conduct search in Walmer (PE) where UDF/Azapo clash and in Bongoletu, detaining 48 people. In Soweto 4 youths are shot dead by development board members. Alexandra closed off by 1 600 security forces in 'clean-up operation'. In Zolani (Ashton), 4 activists' houses burnt.</p> <p>In Khutsong several shacks destroyed in 'comrades' /vigilante clashes; in Tembisa 4 youths allegedly killed at night vigil for unrest victim; and in Vlaklaagte (KwaNdebele) youths go on rampage after funeral for vigilante victim. Attacks on activists' homes in Tumanole and Mamelodi, where child is injured. In Ndundza royal kraal (KwaNdebele) 2 000 at banned anti-independence meeting are dispersed — 7 die and many injured, 41 businesses and 9 houses are burnt.</p>
<p><b>MAY</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>17/19 May In the Transkei more than 500 Unitra students detained after boycott to protest deportation of 2 students. Mbekweni (Paarl) residents stage stayaway as violence erupts in township. Two councillors from KwaGuga (Witbank) and Vosloorus quit their posts.</p> <p>20/23 May Police act against student protests at Wits and UCT protesting SADF raids into frontline states. Vaal Crisis Committee investigates school crisis and looting, in attempt to curb township violence. In Alexandra, an administrator is appointed to replace defunct town council, while residents appoint their own committees — community leaders claim death toll of 80 in 1986 so far.</p> <p>26/29 May Duduza residents start bus and consumer boycott to support demands for township upgrading; in King Williamstown boycott is lifted. In Soweto, SCA calls on residents to form street and defence committees to oppose vigilantes. In Tumahole (Parys), partial stayaway to protest police action against 'people's parks' — 6 people injured on march to police station. In Lekoa, 7th councillor resigns.</p> <p>31 May In Soweto rent boycott begins; and 2 more councillors resign in Thokoza and Vosloorus. Third day of police/student clashes on wits campus; students at UWC decide to postpone mid-year exams, and students on Vista's Soweto and Zwide campuses boycott exams. In Jhb, NECC calls on pupils at private schools to observe June 16 stayaway. Boycotts and schools closures now affecting 80 000 pupils at more than 100 schools nationwide.</p>	<p>16/18 May In Soweto 4 youths shot dead after being kidnapped by township 'Kabasa' gang. In Sekhukhuneland (Lebowa) 150 villagers charged for murder of 36 women. In KwaNdebele 2 die in clashes between Mbokotho vigilantes and youths. In Zamdela (Sasolburg) 1 Azapo member dies and 5 injured as police disperse fundraising event; other fatalities in police action in Chesterville (Dbn) and Vosloorus. Three burnt bodies found in Tanga (Nelspruit) and one in Soweto — violence erupts in Humansdorp with its first necklace murder.</p> <p>19/22 May Crossroads official death toll now 27, with over 2 000 homes destroyed, leaving 20 000 homeless — several calls made for official inquiry into alleged police support for 'witdoeke'. In Mbekweni, clashes between UDF, Azanyu and police leave 2 dead. In Kagiso (W Rand), key unrest witness injured and 5 of his family die in attack on house. Twelve people die near Ulundi (KwaZulu) in faction fighting. In KwaMashu (Dbn) pitched battles between youths and amabutho who attempt to break school boycott, 6 vigilantes die.</p> <p>23/25 May In CT man accused of being informer is murdered by mob after UDF meeting in Mitchell's Plain, and a man in Mannenburg is stoned to death. In KwaMashu, death toll rises to 14 in 5 days, when 5 youths shot dead by 2 000 attacking amabutho. In Chesterville, 2 'comrades' die in clashes with 'A-team' vigilantes; in Zolani (Ashton) 14 people injured and 120 arrested after similar clashes. In Soweto, 5 people die in opposition feud at funeral of unionist. In E Cape, 7 die in security force action.</p> <p>26/30 May Crossroads death toll rises to 45 in 10 days, thousands moved to Khayelitsha. In Soweto, Azapo member is killed on way to truce meeting to end Azapo/Soyco feud. In Kwanobuhle, 2 die and 3 injured in police shooting; in Kallenong and Thokoza 8 activists' houses attacked, in past 4 weeks 7 fatalities. In Brits, a Mawu organiser's wife killed in a handgrenade attack on house. In Tumahole (Parys) a policeman is killed during stayaway. In Soweto 2 people killed at roadblock, and in PE townships 3 youths burnt to death — 67 necklace killings in E Cape since May 1985.</p>
<p><b>JUNE</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/4 June DET suspends classes at 24 schools in Highveld region incl Tembisa, Vosloorus, Thokoza and Kallenberg; lifts suspension on 6 schools in Atteridgeville. Schools in Soweto close 2 days early before mid-year break, due to growing violence. In Bop, classes in 20 schools disrupted by pupils protesting security force actions; in Pietersburg pupils and students boycott protesting detention of colleagues.</p> <p>Rent boycott begins in Soweto, and consumer boycotts begin in Potchefstroom, Boksburg, Springs, Nigel and Vosloorus. More councillors resign in Thokoza, Vosloorus and Tembisa. Three-day stayaway begins in KwaNdebele in protest at forthcoming 'independence', and in Thokoza residents stay away to attend unrest funeral.</p> <p>9/12 June 2 Protests outside parliament by Crossroads women demanding help for devastated camp. In Welkom 22 arrested at protest against new security bills. Bonteheuwel and Mannenburg pupils protest detentions in central CT. Stayaway in Brits to attend funeral of Mawu organiser's wife killed in house attack; in Alexandra, 2-month consumer boycott is called off but rent boycott continues.</p> <p>Several major firms grant June 16, 10th anniversary of 1976 Soweto rebellion, as paid public holiday — though employer associations adopt 'no work, no pay' policy.</p>	<p>1/3 June Police action at funerals of unrest victims in Guguletu, Soweto and KwaMashu; in Chesterville, 'comrades' and vigilantes clash at funeral. In upsurge of violence in Soweto, 9 bottlestores, 20 Putco buses and several houses damaged — 22 vehicles hijacked by youths in Alexandra in past few days, totals 250 since March. In KwaNdebele, 2 people die in clashes.</p> <p>4/6 June In Soweto, 35 fatalities in violence over preceding week — WRN8 loses R600 000 in attacks on its bottlestores.</p> <p>7/8 June In Kempton Park centre, youths go on rampage causing R1m damage to shops. At Hlobane mine (Vryheid) clashes between NUM/NUM/NUM unions leave 11 dead and 115 injured. In PE townships 2 people burnt in internecine feuding. In Mamelodi, leader of KwaNdebele opposition is assassinated. Two policemen die in Pretoria and Luvuvhu.</p> <p>9/11 June After days of sporadic violence near Crossroads, 'witdoeke' invade KTC and Zolani clinic relief centres. Bishop Tutu holds peace talks with 'witdoeke' as latest death toll rises to 21, with thousands of refugees in Alexandra, leader of youth organisation killed in clash with youths. In KwaNdebele, 5 people die incl 3 security guards killed by youths. Official unrest death toll from 1 Jan to 12 June 1986 is 570 — 191 fatalities in police action, a further 379 people killed 'by other persons' incl 15 policemen. IPSA/SAIRR monitoring shows 815 total deaths over 6-month period to 12/6/86, compared with 879 for whole of 1986, with at least 22 necklace killings over 12-month period to 20/6/86. Total death toll since Sept 1984 reaches 1 843.</p>

<b>GOVERNMENT RESPONSE</b> <i>Continued Crackdown &amp; Court challenge</i>	<b>BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY</b> <i>The External &amp; Domestic Fronts</i>	<b>1986</b>
<p>... is temporarily barred from police press liaison because of ... of ambush of ANC cadres in Guguletu. Bop government passes ... legislation to prevent 11 Winterveld victims from being buried in ... general. Public Safety Amendment bill read for first time, to increase ... powers. In Dbn 2 security police found guilty of assaulting Billy ... in Venda 4 detainees hospitalised.</p> <p>... death toll in April's political violence is 145, bringing total count since Sept 1984 to 1 561.</p>		
<p>... death toll in 1986 stands at 10, with 122 police houses damaged in ... Minister of Defence says that 5 temporary military bases have ... been set up in black townships since start of unrest. 76 civil cases and 33 ... complaints made last year against SADF in townships, with at least 20 ... members found guilty.</p> <p>... in Lebowa, security forces undertake not to 'unlawfully interrupt' ... for UDF leader Nchabaleng, after magistrate allows funeral to go ... with restrictions.</p> <p>... 6-week ban on the Cape Times receiving police information is ... The CT Supreme Court grants temporary interdict restraining police ... assaulting detainee, Cassiem.</p> <p>... Rand Supreme Court dismisses application by 3 residents of ... to set aside restrictions on unrest funerals. In Alexandra mass ... is banned.</p>	<p>Police figures show 75 guerilla attacks so far in 1986 compared with 20 for same period in 1985.</p> <p>1/2 May In Wentworth, ex-Labour Party secretary and his wife are injured in handgrenade attack on house. In Jhb a man is given 18-year prison sentence for bomb attack on Nedbank last year.</p> <p>3/5 May Bystander dies as ANC guerilla is freed from police guard in Edendale hospital (Pmb). 8 People arrested in connection with arms find in CT.</p> <p>14/15 May Policeman's house damaged in grenade attack. Landmine explosion near Hectorspruit kills 3.</p> <p>ACRONYMS  SADF SA Defence Force  UWUSA United Workers Union of South Africa</p>	<b>MAY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<p>Le Grange states 18 966 people arrested for unrest-related offences in 1985, of whom 16 094 were charged — incl 13 556 under-20 year olds and 1 125 trade unionists. 522 Lawsuits were brought against him for police action in unrest. In Soshanguve, SACBC head, Father Smangalis, is ...</p> <p>19/22 May In rural E Cape, compulsory military call-up for all men between 18 and 54. PE regional court finds 2 policemen guilty of setting black man ... last year. Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses Le Grange's appeal ... judgment ordering Diakonia's Paddy Kearney release from ... in Sept 1985.</p> <p>26 May Development boards owed nearly R200m in debts, incl an ... R100m in rent/service arrears. CT Supreme Court grants urgent ... interdict restraining security forces and 'wildoeke' from ... actions at Crossroads. A Dbn judge grants interim interdict ... Shabalala, Inkatha exec member, from assaulting activist ...</p> <p>27/30 May Ciskei Supreme Court grants temporary interdict restraining ... from further assaults on students at College of Education. PE ... Court sentences 2 security policemen to 11 and 4 years ... respectively, for murder of 2 schoolchildren in July 1985. New Brighton ... court drops charges against 60 youths for public violence.</p> <p>... magistrate's court drops charges of public violence against ... Bishop, hours before Bishop Tutu was to lead march in protest. In ... Lebowa's Chief Minister applies to have cessation of Moutse to ... declared null and void.</p> <p>... death toll of 213 for May is highest in 21 months of civil unrest in ... Africa.</p>	<p>16/18 May In Rustenburg an ANC member is sentenced to 20 years jail; and in Rand Supreme Court. Dutch citizen Helene Pastoors is sentenced to 10 years for high treason. In Krugersdorp, the largest arms cache so far is uncovered.</p> <p>19 May SADF raids ANC targets in Gaborone, Lusaka and Harare. 2 people die and 13 injured. Swaziland deports 17 ANC members.</p> <p>21/23 May Rand Supreme Court sentences 4 ANC members for treason; and in Bethal 11 Witbank youths are acquitted on terrorism charges. A landmine blast in Davel (E Tv) kills 3 people and injures 8. A bomb explodes in Umlazi supermarket and in central Dbn a bomb is defused in a parkade.</p> <p>26/30 May Another landmine explodes in Davel, and in Dbn 10 people appear in court in connection with 13 bomb blasts. In Lusaka, Natcoc and ANC officials meet for 3 days.</p> <p>ACRONYMS  AZANYU Azanian National Youth Unity  MAWU Metal and Allied Workers Union  SCA Soweto Civic Association  SOYCO Soweto Youth Congress  UNITRA University of Transkei  UCT University of Cape Town</p>	<b>MAY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks
<p>2 June In KwaMashu, woman granted interdict restraining councillor from ... after her husband was killed in raid by amabutho.</p> <p>... houses of Delegates and Representatives refer new security bill ... back to standing committee. Minister of Law and Order bans ... gatherings until 30 June, to commemorate 1976 Soweto rebellion ... for Freedom Charter launch (26/6/55).</p> <p>5/7 June Government reaffirms that KTC squatter refugees must move to ... via. Rand Supreme Court grants order to allow UDF to go ahead ... to launch 'unban the ANC' campaign. In London, Common ... report opts for sanctions after 6-month investigation into SA ...</p> <p>18 June Transkei police instructed by Prime Minister Matanzima to ... people found necklacing others. In Winterveld, promotion of 2 ... officers after March shootings — community's lawyers ... from official inquiry.</p> <p>... President Botha declares national STATE OF EMERGENCY, with ... powers given to security forces to detain, enter, search and ... with indemnity from prosecution. Tight controls placed on ... and freedoms of expression and organisation.</p> <p>... all unrest reports coming from state-run Bureau for Information.</p>	<p>3 June In Mbabane (Swaziland), 2 ANC members assassinated in alleged cross border raid. In Ficksburg (OFS) 1 ANC guerilla shot dead by security forces.</p> <p>5 June Lesotho expels 63 more SA refugees and ANC members.</p> <p>10 June In Volksrust, 3 people injured in 2 landmine blasts.</p> <p>ACRONYMS  EPG Eminent Persons Group  NUM National Union of Mineworkers  WRDB West Rand Development Board</p>	<b>JUNE</b> 1st & 2nd weeks

# Conflict Chronology 6

## A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

1986	Non-collaboration Politics <i>Community Boycotts &amp; Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Vigilante/Activist/Security Force Clashes</i>
<p><b>JUNE</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p><b>12/13 June</b> National state of emergency, with hundreds detained as many activists go into hiding. Brits stayaway for funeral of Mawu organiser's wife killed in grenade attack. In CT, President Botha and Bishop Tutu meet for talks on the Crossroads/KTC vigilante and comrade clashes, leaving 24 dead and 5 000 refugees.</p> <p><b>16/18 June</b> Estimated 1,5m workers in national stayaway on tenth anniversary of Soweto uprising. Phones cut off in Cape, Dbn, Kimberley and PWV townships, security forces distribute pamphlets urging residents to stay indoors. Anti-apartheid rallies in several major cities in the west, 90 000 attend New York rally.</p> <p>Consumer boycott launched in Grahamstown to protest emergency; bus boycotts in Duduza, Kagiso, Munsieville and KwaThema. In PWV area, strikes at 100 chainstores to demand release of detained Cawusa unionists, businessmen appeal to government to end deadlock. In PE townships, residents remove house and street signs to foil security force raids.</p> <p><b>27 June</b> Retail strikes end with 920 union members still in detention.</p>	<p>According to Bureau for Information (Binfo) 228 people necklaced this year. Minister of Law and Order, Mr Le Grange, reports 570 unrest deaths so far in 1986, 191 killed by security forces with 15 police fatalities. (SAIRR estimates 754 deaths, RMG 969.)</p> <p><b>12 June</b> In Dbn police open fire on UND medical students protesting emergency injuring 5. In Duncan Village security forces detain 85 people.</p> <p><b>13/15 June</b> In Soweto 73 scholars detained for breaching emergency regulations, 51 detained at nearby Meadowlands church. In CT a mosque is teargassed, 180 people are detained in Elsie's River church, and in Graaff Reinet, 600 members of church congregation detained.</p> <p><b>16 June</b> Commemoration meetings restricted to churches except for outdoor Inkatha rally in Dbn. At least 13 people die in political violence, incl 4yr-old Sowetan child.</p> <p><b>17/20 June</b> Soweto community centre fire-bombed. In KTC bulldozers begin demolishing shacks, refugees given 4 days to leave churches and schools in white areas. CT Supreme Court grants interim order preventing further demolition.</p> <p><b>25/29 June</b> In Soweto, 3 people die in clashes between 'comrades' and 'Inkatha'; 3 days later 6 people die after an Inkatha rally, when bus is stoned and ploughs into crowd.</p> <p><b>30 June</b> At least 89 unrest deaths since declaration of emergency, excl 4 ANC insurgent fatalities and 3 others who died in bomb blasts - 25 died in KwaNdebele, 18 in Soweto, 10 in KTC/Crossroads, 8 in PE townships, 5 in Durban and 5 in Tembisa. Binfo death toll for June is 161.</p>
<p><b>JULY</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p><b>1/7 July</b> Bus company meets residents demands over 6-month boycott in W Rand townships. At Vista University (PE), 650 students who boycotted June tests are not allowed to re-register. Strikes and go-slows for past week by 18 000 miners to protest emergency and unionist detentions. At Modderbee prison on E Rand, 35 detainees start hunger strike. In Soweto several residents threatened with eviction unless they pay 2 months outstanding rent.</p> <p><b>14 July</b> 'Day of Action' called by Cosatu to protest detentions - extensive stayaway in E Cape, called off in W Cape and N Natal, limited response in PWV area and rest of Natal. 28 townships now affected by rent boycotts, 20 000 Sowetans have payment extended for week. Lekoa town council has lost R45m in rent arrears; Mamelodi residents had not paid since November 1985 when 17 people were shot dead on rent protest march. Tembisa council threatens to cut off services to residents on rent boycott. African schools officially re-open, total stayaway by Duduza pupils, 30-50% attendance in PE and W Cape, high 80% in Jhb.</p>	<p>Binfo reports that since September 1984, 937 SAP houses seriously damaged or destroyed, 3 254 SAP vehicles, 8 773 commercial vehicles, 6 850 buses, 1 272 schools, 985 businesses, and 3 920 private homes.</p> <p><b>1/5 July</b> 222 trade unionists still in detention. Binfo announces 780 detainees will be prosecuted. In Tembisa 1 000 former council employees detained after dismissal in May wage strike. In Kensington (CT), 15yr old is shot dead in police station.</p> <p><b>8 July</b> Emergency detentions reach 3 482, 1 359 in Cape, 1 665 in Tvl, 164 in OFS and 170 in Natal. Since 1984 more than 21 000 arrested for violence, damage to buildings and vehicles estimated at R61m. In PE townships bus service withdrawn after several stoned.</p> <p><b>11 July</b> Cosatu president, Elijah Barayi, released from detention with severe restrictions on his movements. In Soweto, residents flee from Mzimphlope transit camp after week-long clashes with hostel dwellers, with at least 9 deaths.</p>
<p><b>JULY</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p><b>15/18 July</b> PE stayaway runs into second day. Tumahole lawyers file case challenging rent increases, after development board takes legal action against 70 rent boycotters. More than 80 Diepkloof prison detainees send protest petition to Le Grange. In Lamontville pupils burn ID cards and boycott classes for 2 weeks, in Uitenhage 2 SRC members expelled for refusing to register, and in Alexandra primary schools on boycott. In Bellville (CT), 34 high school pupils appear in court for not being at school during hours.</p> <p><b>21/24 July</b> In Soweto 1 000 women from squatter camp march on council and demand sites for houses - council opens rent office in Jhb to enable residents to pay anonymously. Mass boycott of PE schools to commemorate deaths of 2 pupils in 1985.</p> <p><b>25 July</b> Last day for registration of African schoolchildren, 80% attendance means 300 000 not back at school could be permanently excluded. DET requests presence of SADF at schools. In Ciskei, Fort Hare students stage protest.</p> <p><b>28/31 July</b> In Dbn, Westville prison detainees start hunger strike. Tembisa mayor resigns over evictions of rent boycotters. Cosatu calls 2-day stayaway in Uitenhage, to protest Longa removals, school security measures and ongoing detentions.</p>	<p>Binfo reports 800 people on trial for necklace murders, with another 979 unrest arrests by 30 June.</p> <p><b>15/18 July</b> In Vlaklaagte (KwaNdebele) bodies of 9 men found shot with AK47s, residents accuse vigilantes. In Soweto fighting erupts between residents and council police following raids on rent defaulters, escalation of violence in townships around Jhb.</p> <p><b>19/23 July</b> In PE townships buses are withdrawn, security forces shoot dead 3 people in clash, New Brighton cordoned off with barbed wire.</p> <p><b>24/31 July</b> Binfo announces 168 unrest deaths in first 6 weeks of emergency, 121 of them in internicine violence. PFP report 4 300 people detained under emergency regulations and 700 under other security legislation. In Soweto 3 burnt bodies found; 4 people die in renewed violence in PE townships. In Tantiie (Grahamstown) an informer believed to have betrayed Steve Biko is shot dead.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p><b>1/2 Aug</b> CRG claims rent boycotts have cost state more than R250m over past 2 years, JMCs assigned to collect rent arrears. About 1 000 Tembisa council employees reinstated, after being fired more than 2 months before on strike. In Soweto, 1 300 pupils stage walkout of classes over presence of security forces.</p> <p><b>9/11 Aug</b> 13 families in Sharpeville, Bophelong and Zamdela evicted after 1 800 eviction orders granted by magistrate, electricity to 150 households cut off. Lekoa Town Council owed R30m-40m in rent and service arrears. PE pupils continue boycott despite DET threat of school closures if pupils are not registered by 8 Aug.</p> <p><b>13/14 Aug</b> In Soweto, sporadic class stayaways to protest SADF presence on school premises. Unions continue to fight for full pay for detainees, CT city council agrees while several other companies offer part payment or to hold jobs. At Modderbee prison 601 detainees begin indefinite hunger strike to demand lifting of emergency. Partial stayaway in Mdantsane and Duncan Village to commemorate unrest deaths of 1985.</p>	<p><b>1/7 Aug</b> PFP reports at least 3 959 emergency detainees nationally and 619 in Natal. LMG produces list of 350 union leaders and 2 730 members detained. In CT 5 Cawu members released after court application. In Orlando (Soweto), 4 youths are shot dead, Azapo member and 5 other suspects arrested. In Njoli township (PE), Azapo E Cape leader shot dead, another Azapo member killed in Zwide. In Sebokeng, man is burnt to death, and in Bekkersdal, 7 people die in arson attack. In East London union offices are fire-bombed.</p> <p><b>9/14 Aug</b> In Centreton (Hankey), 3 people are burnt to death in unrest. In Soweto, security forces break up funeral for 3 youths and man is killed by council police. In KwaNdebele, 200 detainees are released - Trac puts KwaNdebele death toll since May at 160. PFP national list of missing people increases to 5 900. Binfo's death toll since emergency reaches 217, with 40 necklace killings.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p><b>15 Aug</b> Rent boycotts involving 400 000 households in 39 townships cost government approx R30m a month; in PWV area, rent boycotts have already cost R188m. Rent boycott in Tumahole now 17 months old, started when resident was killed on rent protest march. Over R1m donated by foreign governments for relief in KTC/ Guguletu</p>	<p><b>15/19 Aug</b> 2 People die in Tembisa, 1 in KwaMashu and 1 in Khutsong (Oberholzer), all burnt in unrest. In Tinus (Fort Beaufort) policeman allegedly shoots dead so player during game, crowd retaliates and kills him.</p> <p><b>23/24 Aug</b> In Umlazi, wife of KwaZulu MP Sabelo is killed in grenade attack, and in</p>

PART I: 12 June -14 November 1986

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Sustained Crackdown &amp; Court Challenge</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>External &amp; Domestic Fronts</i>	<b>1986</b>
<p>12 June State of emergency declared, giving state wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention, indemnity for security forces, and stipulating no court challenges to regulations. Nationwide raids on extra-parliamentary groups with at least 450 detentions. Blanket ban imposed on reporting of any unrest or security force movements without clearance from police, news on unrest only from Binfo.</p> <p>13 June Unrest funeral restrictions imposed in E Cape and Tvl. Government expels foreign newspaper and 2 priests, seizes all copies of 2 newspapers. In Tzaneen, 2 people sentenced to death for murder of 2 suspected police informers previous year.</p> <p>17/21 June News curbs extended to 'self-governing' homelands. In E Cape curfews imposed in 13 magisterial districts, non-residents barred, clothing bearing names of 47 organisations banned, pupil movement restricted. In W Cape press is barred from quoting 118 groups, which are also banned from holding meetings. Rand Supreme Court grants interdict restraining Lekoa municipal police after 2 pupils file affidavits of torture.</p> <p>23/24 June Pmb treason trial ends after 13 months, 4 Saawu officials acquitted on all charges. Newsweek chief given deportation order. Controversial Public Safety and Internal Security Amendments enacted.</p> <p>25 June Police issue orders barring Alexandra pupils from school premises during school holidays. Re-opening of African schools postponed for 2 weeks until new ID security system for pupils is ready. 11 N OFS townships have funeral restrictions imposed.</p>	<p>12 June At Swaziland border security forces arrest woman carrying explosives. 30 more South African refugees flown from Lesotho to neighbouring states.</p> <p>14 June On Dbn beachfront car-bomb kills 3 people and injures 69. In Gaborone, a woman dies and 2 others injured in attack on SA refugee house, allegedly by SA forces.</p> <p>22/24 June In Vryheid, 2 landmines defused. In Dbn 3 bombs explode, no injuries; 2 bombs explode in Jhb city centre, injuring 19 people. No one injured by blast at Soweto stadium. In London SA businessmen and Afrikaans academics debate with ANC on BBC, Whitehall invites ANC president for talks at ministerial level.</p> <p>25 June SACC says more than 25 000 South Africans live in exile. Le Grange says in past 8 years there have been 498 sabotage and terrorist attacks, with 98 ANC and PAC insurgents killed and 271 arrested. In Paarl, ANC member is sentenced to 6 yrs for terrorism and in Dbn, 10 people appear in court for Dbn bomb-blasts.</p> <p>26/30 June At Nietverdiend (nr Botswana), 4 ANC insurgents die in clash with security forces. In Queenstown 2 people are injured by bomb-blast in shopping centre, and in Dbn 2 water pipelines are damaged by limpet mine. In CT a 15yr old is given suspended sentence for furthering aims of ANC.</p>	<p><b>JUNE</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1 July Nearly 100 organisations prohibited from holding indoor meetings in 65 magisterial districts. In E Cape all persons banned from school property until mid-July, increased funeral restrictions in CT and W Tvl townships.</p> <p>7/8 July Sowetan Commissioner of police bans 35 organisations incl trade unions and SACs from holding any indoor meetings. Rand Supreme Court orders release of newsmen from detention. Dbn Supreme Court grants 3 interdicts restraining police from assaulting detainees. Transkei curfew extended for another year.</p> <p>11 July Government lifts 2-day-old ban on indoor gatherings of trade unions in Jhb and Roodepoort after 4 unions file court challenges. In Bloemfontein, judgment is reserved on release of 2 UDF detainees. Regulations permit DET to refuse registration of pupils and place pupils in class they choose. Two more people given deportation orders.</p> <p>14 July When African schools re-open, all pupils compelled to wear ID cards with school grounds locked and guarded. DET's Cape director says SRC/PTAs to be abolished and communication with NECC ended.</p>	<p>1/4 July In Jhb a limpet mine explosion injures 8 people, in CT a bomb outside Mowbray police station injures 2 SAP members, and in Silverton (Pretoria) an explosion at busstop injures 20 people. 3 ANC suspects shot dead by police near Empongeni and 4 arrested in Soshanguve (Pretoria). Bop businessman shot dead after reporting presence of armed men.</p> <p>5 July In Vosloorus 2 development board members are shot dead by alleged ANC insurgents. In later clash in nearby Kallehong, 3 more development board members are shot dead along with both insurgents.</p> <p>9 July In Jhb 5 suspected ANC insurgents arrested; 20 operatives shot or captured since emergency declared. In 1986 there have now been 16 bomb blasts, killing 4 people and injuring 152.</p> <p>10 July In Alldays district near Botswana border, 6 suspected insurgents killed in shootout with security forces. In Jhb explosive device is detonated outside Stock Exchange.</p>	<p><b>JULY</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16/18 July Pmb Supreme Court rejects Mawu application and upholds state of emergency, rules state president acted beyond his powers in denying detainees access to lawyers, declares 6 'vague' clauses invalid. Lawyers throughout country start applying to visit detainees, Pretoria Supreme Court rules detention of Mamelodi doctor unlawful.</p> <p>22/24 July Grahamstown Supreme Court reserves judgment on UDF application to have regulations banning meetings set aside. In Rand Supreme Court, government agrees to release detainee after urgent application.</p> <p>25/31 July PE Supreme Court grants restraining order against council police. Rand Supreme Court rules all bans on meetings made by anyone below rank of police commissioners are invalid, incl prohibitions on Soweto meetings of 26 organisations; 198 Divisional Commissioner withdraws funeral restrictions in Alexandra. In CT, application by Cosatu is settled out of court, enabling unions to hold meetings. Dbn Supreme Court reserves judgment on validity of emergency regulations. In PE and Baland, divisional police commissioners withdraw their emergency regulations following Grahamstown court decision restricting delegation of president's powers.</p>	<p>19/22 July In Maseru an ANC member is abducted then shot dead in attempt to escape, 2 days later another abduction occurs. In Kallehong, policeman is killed in attack involving grenades and AK47s. In Soshanguve (Pretoria) a bulldozer detonates a landmine. In CT a man is imprisoned for year for refusing to testify in terrorism trial.</p> <p>25/27 July In Parow (CT), home-made car bomb defused outside business complex. In Mdantsane and Katlenong 4 alleged ANC members killed by security forces in shootouts.</p> <p>29/30 July In Umtata, bomb blast at police station kills 3 policemen and 4 civilians.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b>                      Binfo Bureau for Information                      Cayco Cape Youth Congress                      Cawusa Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union SA                      Clowu Clothing Workers Union                      CRG Community Research Group                      DET Department of Education and Training                      DPC Detainees Parents Support Committee</p>	<p><b>JULY</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1/7 Aug PW Botha reimposes emergency restrictions invalidated by Supreme Court and delegates powers to divisional commissioners of police, more than 100 orders reserved. Rand Supreme Court rules that all detainees held for more than 14 days entitled to make representations to Minister of Law and Order.</p> <p>1 Aug Rand Supreme Court orders release of 2 Tembisa residents, Kallehong council orders restrained from assaulting 6 residents. Bloemfontein Supreme Court embargoes unions by 38 Heilbron residents after police undertake not to permit assaults.</p> <p>11/12 Aug Natal Supreme Court rules 2 key emergency clauses on detentions invalid, specifically detention of UDF official Tsenoli, state appeals. Applications for release of 138 in Natal and over 500 in Tvl and Cape. Dbn court orders release of 6 detainees, immediately re-arrested under Criminal Procedure Act; in Pmb court action, 2 Natal union detainees released. OFS Judge confirms release of 42 Frankfurt detainees, others released nationwide before court hearings.</p> <p>13/14 Aug Pmb Supreme Court finds Dbn judgment incorrect, 19 detainees' applications for release withdrawn and others refused or halted, pending appeal.</p>	<p>2 Aug In Lakeside, near CT, bomb explodes in a litter bin. In Walvis Bay, SA enclave in Namibia, 5 people die in bomb blast in butchery.</p> <p>8 Aug In Shallcross (Dbn) security policeman is killed in grenade attack on home.</p> <p>13 Aug In Sobantu (Pmb), police station is damaged in grenade attack, 1 policeman injured.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b>                      RMG Repression Monitoring Group                      SAAWU South African Allied Workers Union                      SACC South African Council of Churches                      SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations                      Trac Transvaal Rural Action Committee                      UND University of Natal, Durban</p>	<p><b>AUG</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>15 Aug In E Cape, funeral restrictions reimposed in 13 magisterial districts; restrictions on visits to detainees repealed.</p> <p>16 Aug Le Grange releases names of 8 551 detainees; at least 2 000 names removed from list where duration of detention does not exceed 30 days, 3 000 allegedly</p>	<p>16/17 Aug Landmines kill 3 women and 2 children in rural area near Nelspruit and a woman dies in another landmine incident. In Mbabane (Swaziland), a man is injured in alleged SA raid.</p>	<p><b>AUG</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>



1986	Non-collaboration Politics <i>Community Boycotts &amp; Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Vigilante/Activist/Security Force Clashes</i>
	<p>area, 10 000 refugees in care of relief agencies.</p> <p>20 Aug Lamontville pupils stay away to protest suspension of colleague, 3 schools in Bonteheuwel and 2 in Kagiso on boycott. Duduza bus and consumer boycott now in third month. Minister of Finance announces that R3,1m of R750m housing fund set aside for families of detainees, R3m to rebuild police houses damaged in attacks.</p> <p>27/28 Aug Zwelentemba youth leader detained in Allied Building Society, collusion with security police sparks off protest campaign. In Lamontville pupils dispersed by police, and at Wits violence flares over meeting to mourn Soweto deaths. In Tembisa 6 councillors appointed as administrators after collapse of town council, 70% of residents still owe rents.</p>	<p>Imbali 5yr-old child is killed in grenade attack on councillor's house in Mamelodi. In Westville son of community leader is shot dead after being detained. In Wekom 7 'A Team' vigilantes acquitted on charges of murder, but investigation of alleged collusion with police begins. PE Supreme Court sentences 4 minors for necklace murder at Cookhouse with teacher, 9 acquitted.</p> <p>26/27 Aug In White City (Soweto), municipal police and youths clash at barricades set up to prevent evictions, leaving 12 dead. By morning 21 people are dead incl councillor - Soweto city council suspends evictions and Deputy Minister of Info agrees to inquest.</p> <p>28 Aug 464 Detainees admitted to hospital since declaration of emergency. In Altondra, man is shot dead allegedly by comrades, and in Tinus, a municipal policeman is killed.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p>4/5 Sept Partial stayaway in Soweto for funeral - 15 unrest victims buried despite ban, 8 000 mourners dispersed, 4 undertakers arrested, with more deaths in clashes. Soweto council owed R22m in unpaid rents. In PE 44 schools still boycotting.</p> <p>6/10 Sept In Soweto, 3 evicted families return home after interim agreement with council, awaiting court application. Fort Hare SRC suspended after stayaway. Most consumer boycotts over except in E Cape where committee members are all detained and meetings banned. DET closes more than 20 schools in E Cape until end of 1986. In Soweto, poor attendance at beginning of fourth term, students demand withdrawal of troops and release of detainees. DPSC names 15 detainees released with restriction orders for duration of emergency.</p> <p>13 Sept DET announces closure of 10 schools in Soweto, 2 in Kattlehong and 1 in Lamontville. Permanent teachers transferred, others retrenched. DET admits existence of 5 or 6 camps for detained children, claims 167 there for re-education.</p> <p>15 Sept In Sharpeville, partial stayaway as residents march on township offices to protest rent evictions, 2 municipal policemen's houses burnt. In PE consumer boycott is conditionally suspended until 3 Nov. Fort Hare students boycott ends when 300 troops occupy campus.</p>	<p>Le Grange's figures for past 2 years of unrest are 1 832 deaths, including 56 members of security forces; 6 325 injuries.</p> <p>3/5 Sept In Soweto police disperse night vigils for 27 victims. Clashes at Umkomaas funeral of UDF organiser, killed by vigilantes.</p> <p>6/7 Sept In Dbn 4 youths killed in police action, 1 allegedly a trained ANC member and KwaMashu house in grenade attack. In E Cape, 2 burnt bodies found in Alexandria and Mlingelihle.</p> <p>11/12 Sept In Tantie white supervisor shot dead and 1 person killed in unrest. In Sebokeng security forces shoot dead 1 man. In Mzimhlope (Soweto), at least 4 people die as residents and hostel dwellers clash, 2 municipal police injured in grenade attack on training camp, private security guard is stabbed to death. In Zwide 2 SADF members injured and 1 person killed in shootout.</p> <p>14/15 Sept In Mdantsane, woman is killed and several people injured in shootout. PFP estimates 277 people have died since emergency declared.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p>17/20 Sept After 10-month boycott, Mamelodi town council issues 600 notices threatening eviction to rent defaulters. After 5-month boycott, Alexandra town council issues rent arrears statements and cuts off water supplies. Minister of Education Gerrit Viljoen says 200-250 black schools still affected by unrest.</p> <p>22/23 Sept CT City Tramways lifts year-long suspension of services to townships. In Lekoo legal steps taken against 2 000 of 30 000 tenants for not paying rents, 51 families evicted so far.</p> <p>24/25 Sept 75 Diepkloof detainees start hunger strike. Alexandra consumer boycott called off indefinitely, with several conditions. Rent boycotts now affecting 54 townships, about 650 000 households, total R40m a month arrears.</p>	<p>16/18 Sept In Soweto man is burnt to death, and in KwaZakele fatality in security force action. Atteridgeville youth dies, allegedly making explosives. In Alexandra, more than 447 vehicles hijacked in post months, 95 arrests.</p> <p>19/20 Sept 100 days since emergency declared, at least 288 people dead with estimated 14 000 detained. In Soweto, Nkhato Motlana alleges 4 people killed in security force action at night vigil (Binfo denial). In further unrest woman dies in security force action and 2 men burnt to death, one in Fingo Village (Grahamstown).</p> <p>27/28 Sept 2 people burnt to death in Kwanobuhle (Uitenhage) and Kagiso (Krugersdorp) unrest. Lekoo Town clerk's house petrol-bombed.</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p>1 Oct Day of mourning for 177 mineworkers killed in Kinross mine disaster, stayaway on reef supported by pupils in E Cape. Grahamstown consumer boycott launched on 16 June conditionally suspended. Rent boycotts now affecting 54 townships, black councils estimated to be losing between R40m-R80m a month.</p> <p>6/7 Oct All New Brighton residents issued with special ID documents. Unibo students return to class after weeklong boycott. Azanyu's first national congress condemns necklace killings, resolves to expand rent boycotts throughout country. Wits indoor meeting banned, UCT students storm lecture of Connor O'Brien over breaking academic boycott. In Jabavu (Soweto), youths remove house numbers and street names to thwart council evictions.</p>	<p>1/5 Oct In Meadowlands, 9 injured in clashes between residents and squatters; also in Soweto, 1 man dies and 7 injured in municipal police shooting. Queenstown DPSC worker dies in detention in East London.</p> <p>6/9 Oct In Joza (Grahamstown) security force member is shot dead. Continued clashes in Meadowlands, 3 injured in shootout, 1 dead.</p> <p>10/12 Oct Anglican Church claims 200 people have died in Crossroads/KTC violence. Burnt bodies found in Umlazi, Kattlehong, KwaZakele, New Brighton and Soweto unrest. In KwaZakele 2 municipal policemen killed, in Brickfield (Jansenville) man shot dead by police.</p> <p>15 Oct Kwanobuhle municipal policeman shot dead; in Zwide security forces kill 1 man after 4 petrol-bomb attacks, and in Fingo village, municipal police arrest 3 and kill 1 allegedly escaping.</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p>17 Oct Tumahole Town Council takes legal action against rent defaulters, sentenced to 800 hours 'weekend' imprisonment. In Soweto, Masobata Laate, 1976 student leader jailed for treason, hacked to death after voicing opposition to necklacing.</p> <p>23/24 Oct Wits meeting to mourn Machel's death dispersed. Breakdown of rent boycotts in 54 townships - 25 in Tvl, 21 in Cape, 7 in OFS and 1 in Natal; Soweto arrears in service charges reach R29m, rent deficit R30m. Several Sowetan councillors also not paying rent although they made decision to evict defaulters.</p> <p>27/29 Oct Witwatersrand Command HQ picketed by 15 ECC women, all arrested. In Hanover Park police disperse banned memorial service for Machel, service also banned in Khotso House (Jhb). In Tumahole (Parys), 35 families evicted in June reinstated pending court decision on validity of increased rentals, 700 more summonses temporarily halted.</p> <p>30/31 Oct In Pretoria and KwaNdebele 100s of buses are attacked after Putco hikes fares, KwaNdebele increases later suspended after talks between homeland and SA. In Kattlehong, 115 municipal policemen detained after striking for higher wages and protest march. In Jhb, detainees begin hunger strike (prison service denial). In CT 9 people arrested and 2 policemen injured in Muslim protest against NGK Synod resolution on Islam as a 'false religion'.</p>	<p>16/19 Oct Burnt body found in Darrington. In Veeplaas security forces shoot alleged escapee dead. In Alexandra and Tembisa 2 people are necklaced, in Queenstown a policeman's son shot dead after failing to stop at roadblock.</p> <p>20/22 Oct In Upington a 20yr-old emergency detainee found hanged in his cell. In Soweto, father of Azapo activist is abducted and murdered, a burnt body is found and 2 buses conveying pupils to exam centre are burnt. Several schools attacked in New Brighton, Kattlehong and Sebokeng.</p> <p>24 Oct Youths disrupt matric exams at several Soweto centres under security force guard. In Parkwood Estate (CT), a 15yr old is shot dead and 1 person injured in shootout with police.</p> <p>25/26 Oct In Lamontville alleged police informer shot dead. In Soweto a man mistaken for municipal policeman is burnt, mob kills 1 man in revenge. In Bekkersdal, a 16yr old is shot dead in police action and another person is killed by security forces in KwaZakele. In Witlokasie (PE), former Robben Island PAC prisoner is killed, and in PE, awaiting trial prisoner charged with murder of policeman dies after assault.</p> <p>27/31 Oct In Soweto, 16yr old is burnt to death, in KTC a Cayco organiser is shot dead by security forces. Near Joza (Grahamstown), child found dead and 6 others critically injured in unrest.</p>
<p><b>NOV</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p>1/3 Nov Natalia Development Board owed R2,5m in rents from 13 townships since rent increase controversy started over 3 years before. In Soweto bus boycott begins to protest 17,5% increase, several buses stoned and 6 hijacked. PE consumer boycott resumed.</p> <p>5/6 Nov Putco loses over R60 000 in first 5 days of boycott. In Soweto security forces stop and search all taxis and private minibuses, Binfo rejects allegations that commuters are forced to use buses. In Orlando, eviction rumours spark off clashes between residents and municipal police, leaving 5 dead.</p> <p>13 Nov UDF calls for period between 16 and 26 December to be observed as 'Christmas Against Emergency'.</p>	<p>1/2 Nov Mourners defy restrictions on funeral of Rose Mpetha, wife of jailed union veteran; 1000s dispersed by security forces.</p> <p>5 Nov In Pimville (Soweto), alleged 'trojan horse' incident when 11yr old is shot dead and 5 injured by 4 whites hidden in Putco bus; police investigation.</p> <p>6/9 Nov In Phusanang (Witbank) a woman is set alight, youth is necklaced in Chesterville. In New Brighton and Soweto security force members are treated by unknown gunmen, man shot dead.</p> <p>10/11 Nov DPSC advisor detained, about 30 members now detained. Homes of Azapo general secretary and Cusa official attacked after peace talks.</p> <p>12/14 Nov Soweto man is necklaced, allegedly hacked a woman to death. In Meadowlands 2 woman are injured in clashes with security forces over evictions. KwaNobuhle youth leader shot dead in home by masked gunmen, in Alexandra man shot dead by police in his home, allegedly armed.</p>

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Continued Crackdown &amp; Court Challenge</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>External &amp; Domestic Fronts</i>	<b>1986</b>
<p>children in the age of 16. Inquest finds no one to blame for deaths of 3 Soweto youths killed by Wredebo officials. Former Azapo president released from detention hours before hearing.</p> <p>20/724 Pmb Supreme Court reserves judgment in application by Argus/Saan members challenging 6 emergency regulations; 2 'telex' regulations found invalid re police conduct and presence of journalists in townships and unrest areas. PE court imprisons 16yr-old youth for 12 years for necklace murder.</p> <p>24/729 Aua In Pretoria Supreme Court, Le Grange undertakes that no unlawful action will be taken against Fr Smangaliso Mkhatsa after affidavits of torture.</p> <p>31 Aug Binfo reports 234 injuries in political violence during August, 169 attacks on security forces.</p>	<p>Acronyms</p> <p>ECC End Conscription Campaign  IRC International Red Cross  JMC Joint Management Committee  Jodac Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee  LMG Labour Monitoring Group  Mawu Metal and Allied Workers Union  NECC National Education Crisis Committee</p>	
<p>There have now been 248 court applications lodged against emergency regulations.</p> <p>1/23 Sept Le Grange releases 786 names of detainees, bringing official total to 9 337.</p> <p>16 Sept Kinross court acquits 47 youths on public violence charges, sentences 32 for 7-10 years. Vanderbijlpark court fines policeman R600 for death of 16yr old shot in the back of a police van. New emergency regulations on press coverage of funerals.</p> <p>4 Sept In Pmb Supreme Court, newspaper challenge of 6 emergency regulations is partially successful, seizure of publications halted. Grahamstown Supreme Court rules provisions of regulations are valid. In PE man is sentenced for necklace murder.</p> <p>8/9 Sept In PE, 2 hospitalised detainees apply for interdict, alleging police assault - judgement reserved. Jhb inquest into death of Soweto man on 26/2 acquits police. In CT 4 people found guilty of murdering Oudtshoorn councillor, 4 acquitted.</p> <p>10/11 Sept OFS Appeal Court reserves judgment over 2 conflicting Natal judgments on detention regulations. In PE man is found guilty of murder of police informer.</p> <p>12 Sept Dbn Supreme Court grants interdict restraining police from assaulting 24 detainees, incl 19 minors; over 100 claims by detainees of alleged assault proceed.</p>	<p>According to Minister of Law and Order, there have been 170 incidents of 'terrorism' this year, (136 in 1985; 44 in 1984) - 17 landmine, 55 grenade and 47 limpet mine explosions.</p> <p>1/3 Sept In Dbn limpet-mine explosion in supermarket injures 18 people, 1 person dies later. Police arrest 1 ANC suspect and seize armaments.</p> <p>8/9 Sept In Stockholm (Sweden) bomb explodes in ANC offices. In Pretoria 3 ANC guerillas hanged incl Andrew Zondo, bomber of Amanzimtoti shopping centre. 8 ANC members hanged since April 1979.</p> <p>11/14 Sept Jhb magistrate convicts ANC man on 2 charges of terrorism. In Verwoedburg limpet mine is found in shopping complex.</p> <p>15 Sept Senior members of UCT and UWC visit ANC in Lusaka.</p>	<p><b>SEPT</b>  1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16/17 Sept E Cape funeral restrictions extended for 3 months and restrictions imposed in Attaridgeville. In CT 6 people convicted and 26 acquitted for assault in Nyanga people's court.</p> <p>18/19 Sept Colesberg doctor found guilty of disgraceful conduct for not treating unrest victim. In Dbn, Inkatha branch chairman found guilty of killing one of his own volunteers.</p> <p>23/24 Sept 3 Oudtshoorn men sentenced to death for necklacing councillor. Dept of Constitutional Planning announces detainees' families to get food and not money from R3m set aside. So far 112 church workers detained, incl 60 priests, 3 bishops and 4 nuns.</p> <p>26/29 Sept Grahamstown Supreme Court reserves judgment on release of hospitalised detainee, orders release of 2 detainees from Middelburg.</p>	<p>16 Sept Bomb explodes near Dbn beachfront, no injuries.</p> <p>20/22 Sept In Glencoe, bomb explodes outside railway station, no injuries. Rand Supreme Court finds 3 guilty of terrorism and high treason, 2 are ANC members.</p> <p>24/25 Sept In Craighall Park limpet mine wrecks house of Soweto's housing director, who resigns 2 days later. Landmine blast in Ubombo (KwaZulu) damages vehicle.</p> <p>26/30 Sept In Braamfontein, hotel bomb blast injures 3 people. In PE 2 men are convicted of terrorism and possession of firearms. Tom Lodge, Wits ANC expert, has office petrolbombed; in Khayelitsha man killed in grenade attack. Mobeini (Dbn) substation damaged by bomb.</p>	<p><b>SEPT</b>  3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1 Oct Binfo admits to distributing newspaper in E Cape townships after initial denials.</p> <p>6/9 Oct DPSC estimates more than 22 000 detained (PPF lists 16 000 names) under emergency rule, 2 400 under ISA or homeland legislation. UDF declared an affected organisation, effectively cutting off foreign funding, estimated R100 000 frozen though 700 affiliates still able to raise funds.</p> <p>13/14 Oct 2 Jhb inquests find police not to blame for deaths of 13yr-old and 23yr-old Sowetans shot by police in late 1985. First 320 <i>kitskonstabels</i> (black unrest policemen) graduate from 6-week crash course near Koeberg, 700 still in training.</p>	<p>4/5 Oct In Nbuze (KaNgwane) 6 SADF members injured in landmine blast. In Sobantu (Pmb), grenade attack on house injures 2 people.</p> <p>8 Oct In Empidweni district (New Hanover) grenade attack on chief's house injures 1 person. 2 undetonated mines are found in Pont Drift area near Zimbabwe. In Mobeini, limpet mine explodes in stormwater drain, and Osizweni police station (Newcastle) is attacked by guerillas using AK47s, 1 policeman injured.</p> <p>15 Oct Jhb magistrate convicts Bekkersdal man for possession of ornaments.</p>	<p><b>OCT</b>  1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16 Oct In PE 4 of the accused in multiple Kinikini murder trial acquitted, in Jhb necklace murder case withdrawn.</p> <p>18/19 Oct SADF members used by prison service to provide recreation and educational courses for political detainees in 'attempt to change their attitudes'. In Mlungisi (Queenstown) funeral of DPSC detainee is restricted, although magistrate overturns restrictions on conveyance of mourners.</p> <p>23/24 Oct Grahamstown Supreme Court sentences man to hang for burning of white men in Kwanobuhle. 30 Emergency detainees at Victor Verster prison charged with misconduct for refusing to obey orders.</p> <p>25/29 Oct IRC expels members from SA, government threatens to cut IRC visits to political prisoners. PE Supreme Court convicts 2 people on charges of culpable homicide for burning of man in Langa in 1985, charges against 2 other accused withdrawn.</p> <p>Binfo announces that since the emergency was declared, number of people killed by security forces has dropped by 66%, deaths from internicine violence 90% lower.</p>	<p>16 Oct In Soweto 2 grenades thrown at councillor's house. In Manzini (Swaziland) 2 white men raid refugee offices, where files on SA refugees removed in August raid.</p> <p>20/24 Oct In Lamontville limpet mine explodes outside police station, and in Volksrust 2 commercial premises are damaged by limpet mines. In Dbn 2 alleged ANC insurgents arrested; so far this year 70 alleged ANC saboteurs arrested. In Ubombo (KwaZulu) truck is damaged by landmine, 2 alleged ANC insurgents killed in later shoot-out.</p> <p>27/31 Oct Jhb magistrate convicts Steve Marais on charges of terrorism. Several alleged ANC members arrested after assassination of Bop's Brigadier Molope. Swazi police arrest ANC member and seize weapons near SA border. In Umlazi security force member is killed in grenade attack on house. In Bisho (Ciskei) man sentenced for undergoing military training overseas and importing arms.</p>	<p><b>OCT</b>  3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>3/6 Nov Malmesbury magistrate withdraws charges of subversion against Reverend M. C. ... allgedly advocating disinvestment, school and consumer boycotts. In Jhb 6 ... Jac members restricted from campaigns of 8 organisations. PE Supreme Court finds 3 youths guilty of burning person to death in Langa in 1985.</p> <p>12/13 Nov 3 300 Crossroads squatters sue police for R5m damages over May/June demolitions. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining police from assembling Natal detainees. Minister Le Grange pays out R27 000 to Daveyton family of Mphahlela Ngwenya (31), who died in custody in 1985 - R5,5m in official settlements for 77 ... cases 1969-1983 (DPSC). Since 1963, 62 people have died in detention under emergency laws. DPSC estimates 8 000 children detained since emergency declared.</p> <p>14 Nov Inquest into deaths of 7 alleged ANC insurgents killed in police action in March. Wynberg magistrate finds nobody guilty.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov National serviceman killed by landmine near Barberton, brings death toll to 11 in 14 landmine incidents in E Tvl since April. Rand Supreme Court convicts Marion Sparg on treason charges, 25yr prison sentence.</p> <p>6/7 Nov In Swaziland ANC member is severely injured trying to evade arrest by Swazi police. In Pretoria Regional Court 2 former security policemen charged with espionage and furthering ANC aims.</p> <p>8/11 Nov In Soweto 2 Putco ticket offices damaged by limpet mine explosions. In Newcastle 2 explosions at Game centre and magistrates court, 24 injured.</p> <p>12/13 Nov Dbn magistrates court, 2 appear charged with 'Magoos' bomb blast and murder of 4 people. Brigadier Stadler of security branch estimates 598 ANC 'terrorist attacks' over past 10 years - 200 in 1986, 136 in 1985.</p> <p>14 Nov In Lusaka delegation from SA Evangelical Lutherans holds talks with ANC. Pontdrif landmine explosion injures 2 people.</p>	<p><b>NOV</b>  1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>

## PRELUDE TO THE EMERGENCY ELECTIONS

PART II: 15 November 1986 - 6 May 1987

1986	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Consumer Boycotts, People's Courts on Trial</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Factionalism, Kitskonstabels, Snipers</i>	Government Response <i>Court Battles, Unrest Trials</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent &amp; Township Attacks, Security Trials</i>	1986
<b>NOV</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	DET schools close early in Nov after confusion over calls for exam boycott, disruption of matric exams in Soweto and Eastern Cape; about 26 000 African pupils complete matric exams, 8 000 do not write and 2 000 unable to complete them. Detained pupils allowed to write in jail. 15/16 Nov Warring youth opposition factions hold peace talks in Soweto and KwaThema. Since 1984 rent boycotts in 54 townships had cost authorities R480m; in Soweto R59m of R6m a month from end of May '86. 17/19 Nov Chief Minister Skosana of KwaNdebele dies of natural causes, civil servants stay away after detention of Princes J & C Mhlangu, and 9 other homeland residents. Puka to retrench 270 employees as bus boycott over fare increases enters third week in Tvl and Dbn townships. 21 Nov Mamelodi stayaway to commemorate first anniversary of police shooting of 13 people on rent protest march. Tembisa community leaders detained over plans for consumer boycott from 16-26 Dec. 24/26 Nov Soweto Mayor Tshabalala resigns to protest Council demolition of 100 shacks without warning. Fresh wave of violence in township, calls for councillors' resignation and formation of interim civic committee to run Soweto. In Pimville (Soweto) lights turned off in entire township to thwart rent boycott evictions. 16 detainees at Victor Verster prison (Paarl) begin hunger strike.	15/16 Nov At least 335 unrest fatalities since emergency declared on 12 June; DPSC members detained in E Cape. Two youths shot dead in Sebokeng and Saulsville, charges laid against police. Mawu rally in Durban police disperse crowds, 1 fatality. At Veeploos (PE) white men found dead in funeral. In Pefterville (EL) SADF member is attacked in shebeen, 2 others injured. At KwaNdebele Gen Sec Ngukwana are detained. 18/23 Nov In Senaone (Soweto) several shots fired at home of consumer boycott organizer of KwaNdebele Territorial Authority detention revives independence controversy. In bus boycott driver shot dead in Umlazi, and several buses damaged in Soweto. At Lingelihle a woman is killed. Three security force members attacked and killed in Umlazi, Crossroads and Somerset East and others injured at Bekkersdal (Westonaria) and Tantiie (Grahamstown). In Soweto police arrest 6 men and demolish a house. 24/30 Nov In Soweto a Saco and an Azapo member are shot dead in rival clashes; SCA offices raided, a councillor's house demolished by hijacked bus and shots fired at security forces. In KwaNdebele (Dbn) 3 Inkatha officials' houses attacked, 3 injured.	17 Nov In Kutlwanong (Odendaalsrus) explosive device detonated at school. 19/21 Nov SADF says insurgents from Botswana responsible for 6 landmine and 14 other incidents in 1986; since Jan security forces had killed or captured 160 ANC guerrillas. Reward offered for information leading to capture of ANC insurgent is R2 500, for reporting landmine R3 000. In Leslie (E Rand) grenade attack on house. 22/26 Nov Fordsburg block of flats, the home of refugee municipal workers and councillors who fled Soweto in Sept '86, extensively damaged by 2 limpet mines. In KTC squatter camp (CT) 2 policemen injured in grenade attack. 27 Nov In Jhb ANC member sentenced to 6 yrs in prison for attempting to recruit whites.	<b>NOV</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	
<b>DEC</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1 Dec Soweto launch of month-long consumer boycott of white and councillor-owned shops. Besides other demands residents call for single municipality for Jhb and Soweto. PE township bus services withdrawn after buses attacked, since Jan '85 18 support vehicles and 75 buses worth R12m completely destroyed in area, service withdrawal costs R25 000 daily in lost turnover. 4/7 Dec In Soweto bogus pamphlets are distributed, urging UDF to eradicate Azapo. 12 Dec Solidarity calls for detainees over Xmas, candle vigils on 16 & 24 Dec, singing outside prisons.	1/4 Dec Mamelodi community doctor, Fabian Ribiero, and his wife are gunned down outside home - witnesses chase killers and trace vehicles to private security firm. In Uitenhage bus boycott found, and in KwaMakhuta 2 houses are petrol-bombed, infat mayors. In Soweto a policeman is shot dead by unknown gunman. Azapo president says about 30 members have been killed and more than 100 injured in opposition clashes and unrest. 5 Dec At Mpophomeni (Howick), 4 Mawu members are abducted and murdered during BTR labour dispute, 12 injured in clashes with Inkatha vigilantes. Soweto home of singer Steve Kaba petrol-bombed over his participation in Bina 'peace' song, a person dies. 6/10 Dec In Moroka (Soweto) police station 2 people shot dead, incl policeman. In Chesterville 2 Mawu members die in unrest. At Kleinskool (PE) a policeman is shot dead, and in Walmer (PE) a is burnt to death. 11/14 Dec After Ribiero funeral, 2 men are shot at their home, one a witness to assassination. Reports security forces opened fire in self-defence and denies media permission to publish newspaper version. In Walmer 2 children burnt to death in attack on house, and in Soweto 2 men are shot to death.	1 Dec KwaNdebele cabinet orders detention of 1 000 anti-independence activists. UDF national members detained totalling 60 since emergency; Black Sash records 1 300 to 1 800 children under current regulations. Raditsela family paid R33 800 in out-of-court police settlement, and a unionist's death in detention continues. 1 Dec Minister of Law and Order states 256 children aged 15yrs and under are in detention, incl on trial between Sept '84/Aug '86, 60 police fatalities and more than 1 500 black police left homeless in 1986 attacks. 1 Dec Restrictions lifted on Mamelodi memorial service for Ribieros. Deportation orders issued for M and Chris Banner, CT arts festival 'Towards a People's Culture' is banned. In Mpophomeni, 1000 Mawu/BTR vigilante victims is prohibited. Dbn Regional Court convicts 2 Inkatha officials in houses in KwaMakhuta in April. Harsh new press restrictions imposed - blackout on all news and comment on unrest, illegal strikes, boycotts and alternative institutions, e.g. people's media forbidden to report allegations of ill-treatment of detainees until court has given final verdict in such cases. 1 Dec Prof Banner released from detention to present case against deportation; Michael Parks of LA permitted to remain in country until 31 Jan.	2 Dec At Orkney (PWV) a pedestrian bridge is sabotaged in chemical bomb attack. UCT academic Renfrew Christie released from Pretoria Central after Presidential amnesty for renouncing violence, having served 6 of 10yr sentence for furthering aims of ANC. 8/9 Dec In CT arms cache found at Nyanga school, several arrested in N Natal with 'terrorist weapons'. UCT study reports more than 55 arms caches discovered in past 14 months, 428 alleged guerrillas killed or captured since 1976 (42% since 1984). In 1985 there were 217 incidents of sabotage incl 60 armed attacks on police and 26 on private homes. Police report 200 acts of 'terrorism' in first 10 months of this year, 60 directed at police. 12/14 Dec SADF Major detained under ISA, to face charges linked to ANC. In raid on Swaziland, 2 Swiss citizens and 3 others abducted, 3 people killed and 1 missing. Minister Pik Botha announces they are detained for ANC links. Swiss couple and Swazi national returned after international outcry. Near Warrenton (N Cape) a suspected ANC insurgent dies in shootout with police, 4 arrested and arms seized. An arms cache is discovered in a dam in Benoni. At Josefsdal (E Tvl) landmine explosion injures 2 security force members.	<b>DEC</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>DEC</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	Since emergency declared, 614 unionists detained, exd mass detention of at least 2 000 workers. During 1986, 11 006 people arrested for unrest offences, incl 3 220 children under 18yrs. 16 Dec First day of 'Christmas Against the Emergency' campaign called by UDF, Cosatu and the NECC - several townships blocked out in protest, floodlights also turned off in Soweto. In Paarl murder charges dropped against 4 women accused of people's court execution. 19/21 Dec British ambassador presents demarche to Pretoria on behalf of 12 EEC governments to protest press restrictions and abuses of human rights. Azasam calls for pupils to return to school unconditionally. 'Free the Children' campaign is stepped up with adverts in the press; DPSC reports sharp increase in detentions before Xmas, half of whom are children. They report 8 800 people of 18 yrs and younger detained since declaration of emergency, 40% of total detentions. 23 Dec Soweto Civic Assoc organises truce between 'Russian' vigilantes and youths, after 10 people were believed to have died. 29 Dec PE consumer boycott suspended after 2 months, bus service to townships resumed. 'Back-to-School' call for 1987 gains momentum, endorsed by UDF, NECC, Azapo, Azasam, SPPC and SSC.	15/16 Dec In Alexandra a security force member is injured by unknown gunman; in Kalleburg a is injured and 3 arrested after attack on security forces. At Jouberton (Klerksdorp) a man arrested in public violence is shot dead by security forces, allegedly escaping custody. In Inanda (Dbn) 8 people arrested after 1 man is burnt to death and another severely injured. In the Transkei 17 people are incl an attorney, a public prosecutor and civil servants. 17/19 Dec Burnt bodies found in Lingelihle and KwaZakele (E Cape); injuries in arson attacks in Grahamstown and Thusanong (Witbank) townships. A 16yr-old Bredasdorp girl sentenced to 1200 days for public violence is raped and killed by male prisoners, 2 policemen suspended pending inquiry. In Phiri and Mapello (Soweto) 5 men beaten to death in clashes between 'radicals' and Inkatha vigilantes over 'lights out' campaign to protest emergency. 20/23 Dec In Mapello 2 more people die in opposition clashes, 20 arrested. In KwaNobuhle a man burnt to death, and in East London a policeman is shot dead. In Tembisa reports of 'lights out' township protests. KwaThema youth activist, Simon Marule, dies after 6 months in 25/29 Dec At Mzintini (Bethal) 3 people shot dead by security forces, at Maraisburg a security force member shot dead, at Dobsanville a security force member is injured in shooting. In KwaZakele necklaced, and at Sakhile (Standerfont) 2 die in internecine violence. SAIRR records at least 2 500 in political violence since Sept '84, about 1 300 of them during 1986, compared with Bina's 1 500	1 Dec KwaNdebele cabinet orders detention of 1 000 anti-independence activists. UDF national members detained totalling 60 since emergency; Black Sash records 1 300 to 1 800 children under current regulations. Raditsela family paid R33 800 in out-of-court police settlement, and a unionist's death in detention continues. 1 Dec Minister of Law and Order states 256 children aged 15yrs and under are in detention, incl on trial between Sept '84/Aug '86, 60 police fatalities and more than 1 500 black police left homeless in 1986 attacks. 1 Dec Restrictions lifted on Mamelodi memorial service for Ribieros. Deportation orders issued for M and Chris Banner, CT arts festival 'Towards a People's Culture' is banned. In Mpophomeni, 1000 Mawu/BTR vigilante victims is prohibited. Dbn Regional Court convicts 2 Inkatha officials in houses in KwaMakhuta in April. Harsh new press restrictions imposed - blackout on all news and comment on unrest, illegal strikes, boycotts and alternative institutions, e.g. people's media forbidden to report allegations of ill-treatment of detainees until court has given final verdict in such cases. 1 Dec Prof Banner released from detention to present case against deportation; Michael Parks of LA permitted to remain in country until 31 Jan.	15/16 Dec In Umto 9 alleged PAC members appear in court on charges of furthering its aims. In Mbabane (Swaziland) a UDF member is abducted by armed men, alleged links with previous abductions. At Berdergate (nr Swaziland) 3 arrested for possession of arms. 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<b>1987</b> <b>JAN</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1 Jan In Soweto Dec consumer boycott ends, part of 'Christmas Against Emergency'. 5/6 Jan Uitenhage consumer boycott suspended indefinitely, PE boycott suspended week before. In Mafola (Soweto) clashes with council police after 200 shacks are bulldozed. Soweto Town Council claims increased number of tenants paying rents but 7-month boycott not broken; bus boycott enters third month in township. 7 Jan 1000s of pupils enrol as DET schools officially reopen, in E Cape only form and primary schools reopen, rest to register on 19 Jan. No places guaranteed as many schools damaged, parents to sign forms permitting disciplinary action against offending pupils and payment for any damages to school property. Clashes in Soweto between rival youth organisations over end-of-school boycott. 13/14 Jan KwaZulu teachers asked to sign loyalty pledges to Chief Buthezi and homeland government before school term begins. Soweto council considers suspending municipal services to boycotters.	1/2 Jan In Soweto 3 people necklaced and in Alexandra an SADF member is injured by sniper. 3/4 Jan In Leandra a man is shot dead by vigilantes, and in Tembisa 2 people killed by vigilantes. In KwaNobuhle 3 youths die in vigilante action as 1 500 'Africanist' vigilantes ransack township to rid it of 'comrades'. At Looplek (W Cape) violent clashes leave 1 youth dead and 1 dies later. In Sebokeng a child dies after policeman's house is petrol-bombed; and a councillor dies after arson attacks on 5 Inkatha officials' houses. 7/8 Jan Soweto house of Bina singer, Abigail Khubeka, is petrol-bombed. In Umlazi 2 people burnt to death, and in Chesterville 3 people die when 7 injured in petrol-bomb attacks. 9/14 Jan At Dobsanville Ucaso president Steve Kgora is injured by masked gunmen, and at Doveyton mayor Tom Mboya. In Soweto a man is necklaced; in Guguletu (CT) a policeman attacks, 3 others injured, and in Zwide a security force member is injured in shooting.	1 Dec KwaNdebele cabinet orders detention of 1 000 anti-independence activists. UDF national members detained totalling 60 since emergency; Black Sash records 1 300 to 1 800 children under current regulations. Raditsela family paid R33 800 in out-of-court police settlement, and a unionist's death in detention continues. 1 Dec Minister of Law and Order states 256 children aged 15yrs and under are in detention, incl on trial between Sept '84/Aug '86, 60 police fatalities and more than 1 500 black police left homeless in 1986 attacks. 1 Dec Restrictions lifted on Mamelodi memorial service for Ribieros. Deportation orders issued for M and Chris Banner, CT arts festival 'Towards a People's Culture' is banned. In Mpophomeni, 1000 Mawu/BTR vigilante victims is prohibited. Dbn Regional Court convicts 2 Inkatha officials in houses in KwaMakhuta in April. Harsh new press restrictions imposed - blackout on all news and comment on unrest, illegal strikes, boycotts and alternative institutions, e.g. people's media forbidden to report allegations of ill-treatment of detainees until court has given final verdict in such cases. 1 Dec Prof Banner released from detention to present case against deportation; Michael Parks of LA permitted to remain in country until 31 Jan.	15/16 Dec In Umto 9 alleged PAC members appear in court on charges of furthering its aims. In Mbabane (Swaziland) a UDF member is abducted by armed men, alleged links with previous abductions. At Berdergate (nr Swaziland) 3 arrested for possession of arms. Institute for Strategic Studies estimates ANC/Umkhonto We Sizwe could have 10 000 guerrillas with about 500 fully trained ANC members operational in SA, mainly in training roles. 18/19 Dec Landmine blast nr Komatipoort injures a SADF member, 2 more mines found nearby. In Durban 2 youths sentenced for grenade attack on home of headmaster. In Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, PAC official receives parcel bomb, but no one injured. 25/29 Dec Wieps area (N Tvl), 4 alleged ANC guerrillas shot dead and another arrested, who later escapes and kills 2 security policemen. At Vosloorus a councillor's house is attacked with grenades, injuring his daughter.	<b>1987</b> <b>JAN</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>JAN</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	19/20 Jan Cosatu hosts PE peace talks between UDF and Azapo in wake of renewed inter-opposition violence. DET says most of 73 schools closed last year have been reopened. In E Cape 18 still closed after ongoing pupil boycotts. 21 Jan In Soweto youths reconnect electricity after council cuts off selected households where rent and service charges not paid for a year. 23/26 Jan Five black participants in Bina 'peace' song pledge their earnings to charity in exchange for UDF and Azapo pardon. 4 Alex community leaders appear in court, incl Mawu Gen Sec Moses Moseyiso on charges of sedition and alleged people's courts. 27/31 Jan UDF vice-president Christmas Tinto detained. CT black local authorities owed nearly R5m in rent and service arrears. In Mitchells Plain court 52 people appear on charges of sedition and assault over alleged people's courts held in mid-1986.	15 Jan In Soweto policeman's father is killed. In KTC (CT) 100s of squatters flee camp after renewed vigilante attacks. 17/18 Jan In New Brighton 2 people die in clashes with 'witdoeke' vigilantes, and in Umlazi 1 person is burnt to death in unrest. In Meadowlands 1 person is killed and a member of the South African Football Team is shot dead by Makabasa gang. Guguletu youth is shot dead by a vigilante. Soweto 4 council police are arrested after a man is shot in hostel. 21/23 Jan In KwaMakhuta 13 people incl 8 children shot dead in attack on UDF youth organisation. In KwaNobuhle a 16yr-old girl is shot to death in a school. 24/27 Jan In Umlazi a youth is burnt to death (Bina claims he is 400th victim since 5 of E Cape since 12 June). In Guguletu a man is shot dead by security forces in school ground. In Uitenhage a policeman is arrested after policeman injured in gunfire; in Uitenhage a policeman is arrested after policeman injured in gunfire. 30/31 Jan In Khayelitsha and Guguletu two men are shot dead by kitskonstabels. In Mamelodi 2 workers' homes petrol-bombed. In Mdantsane 6 people are burnt to death in a school. Bina reports 1000 deaths in Jan, SAIRR estimates 40 and IPSA 63 fatalities.	1 Dec KwaNdebele cabinet orders detention of 1 000 anti-independence activists. UDF national members detained totalling 60 since emergency; Black Sash records 1 300 to 1 800 children under current regulations. Raditsela family paid R33 800 in out-of-court police settlement, and a unionist's death in detention continues. 1 Dec Minister of Law and Order states 256 children aged 15yrs and under are in detention, incl on trial between Sept '84/Aug '86, 60 police fatalities and more than 1 500 black police left homeless in 1986 attacks. 1 Dec Restrictions lifted on Mamelodi memorial service for Ribieros. Deportation orders issued for M and Chris Banner, CT arts festival 'Towards a People's Culture' is banned. In Mpophomeni, 1000 Mawu/BTR vigilante victims is prohibited. Dbn Regional Court convicts 2 Inkatha officials in houses in KwaMakhuta in April. Harsh new press restrictions imposed - blackout on all news and comment on unrest, illegal strikes, boycotts and alternative institutions, e.g. people's media forbidden to report allegations of ill-treatment of detainees until court has given final verdict in such cases. 1 Dec Prof Banner released from detention to present case against deportation; Michael Parks of LA permitted to remain in country until 31 Jan.	15/16 Dec In Umto 9 alleged PAC members appear in court on charges of furthering its aims. In Mbabane (Swaziland) a UDF member is abducted by armed men, alleged links with previous abductions. At Berdergate (nr Swaziland) 3 arrested for possession of arms. Institute for Strategic Studies estimates ANC/Umkhonto We Sizwe could have 10 000 guerrillas with about 500 fully trained ANC members operational in SA, mainly in training roles. 18/19 Dec Landmine blast nr Komatipoort injures a SADF member, 2 more mines found nearby. In Durban 2 youths sentenced for grenade attack on home of headmaster. In Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, PAC official receives parcel bomb, but no one injured. 25/29 Dec Wieps area (N Tvl), 4 alleged ANC guerrillas shot dead and another arrested, who later escapes and kills 2 security policemen. At Vosloorus a councillor's house is attacked with grenades, injuring his daughter.	<b>1987</b> <b>JAN</b> 3rd & 4th weeks

### Acronyms

- ANC African National Congress
- Aawu African Allied Workers Union
- Ayco Alexandra Youth Congress
- Azanyu Azanian National Youth Unity
- Azapo Azanian Peoples Organisation
- Azom Azanian Students Movement
- Binfa Bureau for Information
- Conatu Congress of SA Trade Unions
- DEC Department of Education & Culture
- DET Department of Education & Training
- Doscom Detainees Support Committee
- DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee
- ECC End Conscription Campaign
- Fawu Food & Allied Workers Union
- Hayco Hammoudale Youth Congress
- ISA Internal Security Act
- Jadax Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee
- Mawu Matol & Allied Workers Union
- NECC National Education Crisis Committee
- Num National Union of Mineworkers
- Nusas National Union of SA Students
- PAC Pan Africanist Congress
- PPP Progressive Federal Party
- RMC Release Mandela Campaign
- SACBC SA Catholic Bishops Conference
- SACC SA Council of Churches
- SACP SA Communist Party
- SADF SA Defence Force
- SAIRR SA Institute of Race Relations
- SAP SA Police
- Sarhwu SA Railways & Harbour Workers Union
- SCA Soweto Civic Association
- SPCC Soweto Parents Crisis Committee
- SSC Soweto Students Congress
- UCT University of Cape Town
- UDF United Democratic Front
- Uitwa University of SA
- UWC University of the Western Cape
- Uwusa United Workers Union of SA
- VCA Vool Civic Association

1987	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Consumer Boycotts, People's Courts on Trial</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Factionalism, Kitskonstabels, Snipers</i>	Government Response <i>Court Battles, Unrest Trials</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent &amp; Township Attacks, Security Trials</i>	1987
<b>FEB</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	2 Feb In Tembisa a detainee's family is evicted over house repayments. TV hire companies no longer operate in Soweto after attacks on vehicles, and in PE hire purchase dealers unable to ensure payments or reclaim goods. 4/6 Feb Soweto council bankrupted by 8-month rent boycott, residents urged to pay for services if not rent. Pretoria court finds 6 Soshanguve residents not guilty of attempted murder in 'people's courts'. 11 Feb Tembisa municipal workers and police mutiny over wage negotiations, demand resignation of appointed administrator.	2 Feb In Tontjies 4 people are shot dead and 5 injured by kitskonstabels, 3 of whom are arrested. Guguletu a kitskonstabel is burnt to death. 3/10 Feb In Soweto several attacks made on Azapo members, Sisulu home damaged in an attack. In Alex snipers fire on 5 SADF members. In Clermont (Dbn) a youth is hacked to death. In Soweto, off-duty policeman is killed, gunman fire on security forces in Guguletu and Alex. 11/14 Feb In Alex an Azapo youth and an Ayo youth are killed in internecine conflict. P. M. service withdrawn after 41 attacks on drivers since Nov. In Chesterville a man is shot dead by gunman, shots fired at security forces. Minister of Law and Order tables a list of 3 857 detainees held longer than 30 days; 21 under 13yrs old, 260 under 15yrs. PFP estimates 20 000-25 000 detainees during emergency, 5 000 still in detention. Minister of Justice reports detainees have been hospitalized 18 times since July '86, 1 456 involved in hunger strikes. Minister of Law and Order reports 263 detainees hospitalized since emergency declared.	16/18 Feb In Hammarsdale Hnyco member shot dead after meeting. In Soweto a policeman is shot dead and an arrested stone thrower dies after he allegedly jumps from moving car. 19/22 Feb In Soweto a community doctor is attacked. In Mamelodi a child dies after a house is bombed. In Botshabelo (DPS) 156 pupils are arrested for intimidation. In Hammarsdale 4 more youths are shot dead in separate incidents. 25/26 Feb A KwaMakhulu man is shot dead, wife and 3 children injured in attack. Another member of Mandela Football Club is shot dead in Orlando, allegedly by Makabaso gang. 28 Feb Inkatha members attacked in Chesterville and KwaDobeko; shots fired at security forces in Lingelihle. Binlo reports 16 unrest deaths in last month, SAIRR estimates 21 fatalities.	1/5 Feb In CT bomb attacks a Goodwood pylon is damaged, and in Newlands a bus shelter outside President's residence destroyed. In Mahwelereng (Lebowa) a policeman is injured in grenade attack on hostel. Pretoria Supreme Court, 7 people charged with terrorism and murder, incl 4 alleged PAC members. In Pmb, Greta Apelgren and Robert McBride charged on 4 counts of murder and terrorism charges related to Maqoo's (14/6/86) and other bomb blasts. In Hermanus Regional Court, 15 alleged ANC members charged with treason. 12 Feb Mbabane court sentences ANC member to four yrs for possession of arms and explosives, 5 acquitted; 6 departed and 20 still in jail. 13 Feb Near Jeppes Reef landmine kills a cow. Rand Supreme Court sentences man to 6 yrs for furthering aims of ANC. 14 Feb Grace Cele, kidnapped by SA security forces from Swaziland in November, is returned to her home, one abductee still in detention.	<b>FEB</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>
<b>FEB</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	19/23 Feb In Soweto Putco bus boycott lifted after 4 months and some compromises over fares and special rates. In London UDF President Archie Gumede meets with British cabinet ministers. 24/25 Feb Zwide rent defaulters evicted and houses reallocated, council has lost R4m in rent. In W Cape 72 teachers to still face DEC hearings for refusing to administer end-of-year exams during 1985 boycott of coloured schools, some teachers already reinstated. 26 Feb Rotando municipal police allegedly beating rent defaulters and imposing curfew on township, one person believed dead and others hospitalised.	2/3 March More sniper attacks on security forces, 3 in Lingelihle, 2 in Soweto with policeman injured and on private guards in Matherwell. Disturbances reported in 2 Pmb townships. Three Nam die at Zinor hostel in clashes with Uwusa members. In KwaNdebele Prince James Mhlangu is released from detention, one brother still in detention. 4/6 March In KwaThema a policeman is stabbed to death. President of All African Committee and Azapo leader are detained in Soweto. 7/9 March In Azadville 2 people die in clashes. In Nyanga a kitskonstabel shoots dead a man after releasing him from custody, and in Crossroads a kitskonstabel is stabbed to death and another injured. In Guguletu 3 security force members are injured in another attack by unknown gunmen. 11/15 March At Woody Glen (Hammarsdale) Inkatha branch chairman is shot dead. In Chesterville a man is burnt to death, and in Clermont, Hnyco president Vusi Maduna is stabbed and burnt to death after holding peace talks with local chairman of Inkatha. Two Nasco members killed by vigilantes of Imbali (Pmb). Police come under armed attack in Nyngga, Sharpeville and Kagiso.	16/18 Feb A Soweto councillor's house is damaged in grenade attack, injuring 3 municipal policemen. PAC claims responsibility for sniper attacks on security forces in Alex. 19/20 Feb Police arrest 5 alleged Libyan-trained guerrillas who attempt to enter the country, 1 escapes. Dobsonville house attacked by grenades. In KwaMashu 2 people are injured in a grenade attack on a bakery. Government lists ANC spokesman Tom Sebina. 23 Feb A Lusaka post-office is bombed, Zambia blames SA agents. In Pta Regional Court, a teacher and 4 pupils are charged with terrorism and ANC membership. 26/27 Feb In CT 6 people are acquitted on charges of terrorism and furthering aims of ANC, 1 man convicted.	<b>FEB</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	
<b>MAR</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	5 March In Guguletu schoolchildren abandon classes after dash with kitskonstabels. Alex police offer rewards for info on graffiti artists renaming streets after detainees. At Pollsmoor 24 awaiting-trial prisoners begin hunger strike to protest poor conditions. 11/12 March National Detainees Day called by DPSC and 15 other organisations, marks 9 months of state of emergency. In Jhb police disperse youths leaving church service, one-hour work stoppages by workers; 109 detainees on hunger strike at Victor Verster Prison, 26 under 18yrs old. In Alex high school classes abandoned after Asco/Azosp clashes, feud has already claimed 5 lives. Lekoo Town Council halves rents on liquor outlets (mainly owned by councillors) during boycott, house rents not reduced. In Tvl block local authorities now owed about R160m in rental arrears.	15/16 March In KwaMashu two Inkatha youths abducted after UDF funeral for three Hnyco members stoned to death. Venda police shoot dead a matric pupil near Sibasa. 17 March Seven youths found dead in trench in KwaMashu, all members of Youth League abducted by vigilantes after meeting. In Inanda community leader Madela is shot dead. 19/20 March Huhudi (Vryburg) offices of UDF, Dpscom and other community organisations are burnt down; in Jhb Khatso House and Ravan Press offices vandalised. In Clermont police disperse measure service for 7 KwaMashu youths and arrest 50; 7 arrested in Lindelani over killings. 21/23 March Continuing violence in Dbn's townships - Clermont Youth League member shot while guarding house against vigilantes and a man is beaten to death; in KwaDobeko an Inkatha member is attacked. In KwaMashu 2 people die, and in Chesterville an Inkatha member injured in shooting. 24/31 March Detainee Benedict Mashoke (20) found hanged in his cell at Burgerfontein (E.T.). emergency detainee to die in custody. Chesterville youth activist hacked to death, and in another policeman is shot dead. A KwaZulu MP is assassinated in the Nquthu district. Binlo reports 11 deaths in March, lowest since 1984; IPSA records 35 in political violence.	3/5 March In London PAC Secretary for Foreign Affairs holds talks with British and Commonwealth officials. In Wynberg 2 people are charged with furthering aims of ANC, and in Vryheid 2 men are charged with terrorism and attempted murder over Ingwavuma landmine. 11/12 March In Mbabane 2 ANC members sentenced to 4 years for possession of arms. In Umlozi an Inkatha member is killed in grenade attack. In Guguletu police shoot dead a suspected ANC insurgent, and in Mdantsane security forces clash with suspected insurgents. Pretoria court case against 2 security policemen accused of spying is postponed. 13/15 March In Nyanga a suspected insurgent is arrested, shot dead by police next day after he allegedly attacks them.	<b>MAR</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	
<b>MAR</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	16/17 March Directorate of Fundraising to investigate all foreign anti-apartheid funding. In Jabulani (Soweto) council police force entry to flats and confiscate possessions to meet tenants' rent arrears. University of QwaQwa closed after week-long class boycott. Rand Supreme Court postpones indefinitely YCA test case for rent evictions. 19 March KwaMashu pupils stay away for third day, fears of more UDF/vigilante clashes after 9 deaths in week. In Sharpeville at least 5 pensioners evicted for rent arrears, 1000s of Mhlabeng residents summoned to rent office by Wredebo police. In Zondo (Soweto) electricity cut off to tenants in arrears, Soweto residents bring urgent action in Supreme Court to halt evictions. 21 March Anniversary of Sharpeville shootings, countrywide services to commemorate death of 69 people of anti-pass rally in 1960 and 21 protesters of Langa in 1985. 23/24 March Railway workers begin strike over dismissal of colleague. All evictions at Jabulani flats halted after residents march on council, Soweto Town Clerk snys council collecting R3m a month instead of R7m.	1/3 April In Trug (Bop) police arrest 37 people for stone throwing. In KTC 3 policemen are injured in armed attack, and in Mokabeni (Umkomaos) 3 people are injured in another attack on UDF house. 4/5 April In Soweto Azosp and Azapo houses are attacked, 1 person shot and injured. In Dreyer a youth is murdered by alleged 'radicals'. In Doornfontein 4 policemen are injured in train in Transkei detains 75 Num members on way to funeral for furthering aims of banned Cosatu. 7/9 April 305 railway workers detained near Ogies (E Rand) for illegal gathering. In KwaMashu kitskonstabel shoots man dead after being attacked and in Kaitleng a man is shot dead by security forces. 10/12 April In Dube, Naledi and Doornfontein, coaches are set alight as railway strike enters 2nd month. In Daveyton a man is stoned to death after unrest funeral. At Mdantsane festival 5 people die in stampede after police fire teargas. At Zinor hostel, 5 Num members shot dead by mistake in ongoing clashes with Uwusa. 13/14 April In Tsokane at least 2 gangsters are burnt to death, accused of murdering resident. Klipspruit security forces return fire and kill 2 people. In Soweto 34 railway carriages burnt, member shot and injured.	16/17 March In Buccleugh (Jhb) a bakkie is damaged by explosion, Newcastle/Jhb railway line is damaged by 3 explosive devices. In Inanda police using grenades kill suspected ANC insurgent and woman, two people are injured. 18 March Lesotho government expels 5 ANC members arrested for possession of arms. 19/20 March SADF's Brig Stadler says since 1976 attacks by insurgents increased by 200%, and police have shot dead and arrested more than 500 trained 'terrorists'. Bishop Tutu meets ANC officials in Lusaka for official talks. 23/25 March In Dube limpet mine fails to damage railway line at start of rail strike. In Jhb a man is sentenced to 5 years in prison for ANC membership. Three more ANC members deported from Swaziland. 26/29 March Near Josefsdal (E Tvl) a car detonates landmine, killing 4 people. Fort Hare student jailed for 4 years for refusing to testify in Bisho terrorism trial. In Pta 7 alleged PAC members charged with 24 counts of terrorism.	<b>MAR</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	
<b>APRIL</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	1/6 April Nusas launches One Person One Vote Campaign, part of national UDF/Cosatu anti-election campaign. Black students at Rhodes University occupy administration buildings, demand representation over bursary allocations. Rent boycott enters ninth month in Soweto, 57 town councils now affected by rent boycotts, several Jabulani families evicted in wake of court decision. 7 April In Soweto at least 4 000 postal workers stop work in support of railway strikers, later formulate own demands. 13/14 April Wynberg Regional Court withdraws charges of sedition against 20 detainees for alleged involvement in 'people's courts'.	Officially 4 244 people in detention - 1 424 children. 15/16 April Soweto/Jhb area, 19 more coaches are burnt, total 59, trains and stations generally paralysed. Inletang sniper kills policeman from moving vehicle, and a KwaDangezi youth is killed in political violence. 17/19 April An Imbali youth is killed by vigilantes. At Masila (nr Theunissen) and Welkom police kill 2 men after stoning. 20/21 April Damage to trains already about R25m after 6 weeks of strike. In Kaitleng 63 people are arrested after stones thrown at police, and in Chesterville 2 people are arrested after a man is burnt to death. 22/23 April In Naledi police open fire on stone throwers, killing an 18yr-old. Sats deaths in return to jobs, few return and many gather to discuss dismissals; police surround Germiston and shoot dead 3 strikers in ensuing fracas. At Doornfontein 4 policemen are injured in attacks by marching strikers; they open fire killing 3. Police surround Cosatu office for shelter, detain over 400 Cosatu members in search-and-seize operation. 24/27 April Continued disturbances in Soweto and more attacks on trains. 28/29 April At Kaserne (Jhb) burnt bodies of 4 Sats workers are found, police re-enter Cosatu office and arrest 11 people, allegedly connected to murders. In Tembisa another body of a worker is found. Huge security force presence in townships nationwide in run-up to white elections on 16 May.	1/1 March Durban court finds 2 'A-Team' vigilantes guilty of murdering 17yr-old Clermont youth in mid-1984. Worcester inquest finds death of 17yr-old Zwelentemba schoolboy in Nov '86 an offence on part of two constables. Rand Supreme Court convicts 2 Soweto youths for burning a youth to death, 4 others in New Brighton a man is convicted of attempted murder for throwing petrol bomb into American churchworker suing Lebowa police for sjambok assault, deported by Venda then back to SA. 11 March In New Brighton court, 5 policemen charged with rape and indecent assault, released on bail by township council. PE Supreme Court finds 7 youths guilty of necklote murder, acquits 3. Area magistrate orders district surgeon to visit detainee who has filed application for interdict against the assault. Rand Supreme Court acquits policeman on charges of culpable homicide for deaths of 2 black schoolchildren - insufficient evidence. 17 March Div Commissioner of Police decrees Sharpeville meetings can only be held in church halls. 17yrs of Hammarsdale victims restricted. 19 March Casulu court appeal to revoke ban on meetings to launch 'Living Wage' campaign.	<b>APRIL</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	
<b>APRIL</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	15/17 April 40 000 members of Fowu in Tvl stay away from work to protest union detentions. In Durban more than 600 people march through town carrying crosses for detainees. 1 200 Sats workers from Bloemfontein join Tvl strikers. 20/21 April Mawu resolves to stage weekly one-hour work stoppages to protest continued detention of Gen Sec Moyaekiso. University of North reopens after 2-week boycott. University of QwaQwa also reopened. ECC hit by more than 70 detentions in previous 10 months. 22/24 April Three-day stayaway in Soweto to protest rent evictions, residents march on council chambers; SCA asks to meet Town Clerk but will not negotiate with councillors, residents demand title deeds to homes. UWC students join 3-week boycott by Denistry students demanding resignation of Prof accused of racism. In East London 280 detainees begin hunger strike over prison conditions. 27/28 April UCT students clash with police for 3 days. Pretoria overturns Natal Director of Education's decision to suspend all cadet activities. Soweto Town Clerk says residents now owe R80m, increasing at R3m a month, most evicted families move back home without settling arrears. Wynberg Regional Court acquits 21 people on sedition charges, related to 'people's courts'. Early May All outdoor meetings to celebrate May day banned. Nationwide stayaway called by Cosatu/UDF on 5/6 May to protest all-white elections.	Officially 4 244 people in detention - 1 424 children. 15/16 April Soweto/Jhb area, 19 more coaches are burnt, total 59, trains and stations generally paralysed. Inletang sniper kills policeman from moving vehicle, and a KwaDangezi youth is killed in political violence. 17/19 April An Imbali youth is killed by vigilantes. At Masila (nr Theunissen) and Welkom police kill 2 men after stoning. 20/21 April Damage to trains already about R25m after 6 weeks of strike. In Kaitleng 63 people are arrested after stones thrown at police, and in Chesterville 2 people are arrested after a man is burnt to death. 22/23 April In Naledi police open fire on stone throwers, killing an 18yr-old. Sats deaths in return to jobs, few return and many gather to discuss dismissals; police surround Germiston and shoot dead 3 strikers in ensuing fracas. At Doornfontein 4 policemen are injured in attacks by marching strikers; they open fire killing 3. Police surround Cosatu office for shelter, detain over 400 Cosatu members in search-and-seize operation. 24/27 April Continued disturbances in Soweto and more attacks on trains. 28/29 April At Kaserne (Jhb) burnt bodies of 4 Sats workers are found, police re-enter Cosatu office and arrest 11 people, allegedly connected to murders. In Tembisa another body of a worker is found. Huge security force presence in townships nationwide in run-up to white elections on 16 May.	11 April Two-year ban on outdoor gatherings extended for year, ban on funeral restrictions relaxed. Rand Supreme Court rules tenants must pay local authorities rents or face eviction without court order. Wemondorp Youth Congress member sentenced to 8 years for arson attack on white school. CT Court hands out suspended sentences to 4 Zoloni residents for public violence, compensatory damages and 2 years of part-time community work. 14 April Rand Supreme Court orders release of detainee for wrongful arrest but refuses application for release of NECC chairman Vusi Khanyile and Joda's Tom Wospe. In Pretoria urgent application for release of detainee Ebrahim Ebrahim, abducted from Swaziland last year; 4 SADF members plead not guilty to charges of assaulting blacks in white suburbs. 15 April Commissioner of Police bans Release Detainees campaigns. 19 April Roodepoort court finds 3 white men guilty of attempted murder for shooting 3 black men (Jhb).	<b>APRIL</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	

# Conflict Chronology 8

## THE RENEWED EMERGENCY

Compiled by IPSA Researcher Deborah Quin

PART I: 7 May - October 1987

1987	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Rent Boycotts, Student Protests, Activist Detentions</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Township Clashes, Factionalism, Kitskonstabels</i>	Government Response <i>Powers, Court Interdicts, Unrest/Security Trials</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent Shootouts &amp; Sabotage</i>	1987
<b>MAY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	7/8 May Police disperse UND student march in solidarity with anti-election protests and clashes on other campuses. Rhodes students pass motion of no confidence in university admin after its refusal to take stance on student detentions. Cosatu House destroyed in bomb blast. Duncan Village (EL) residents lay more complaints against municipal police. Mgwenya (Walterval Boven) pupils boycott classes after white headmaster hands pupil over to police; 4 pupils injured when dispersed. 11/12 May Dower College (PE) students stay away to protest expulsion of 4 SRC members. Police search UCT SRC offices; at UDW students boycott lectures to protest police presence on campus. In Pietersburg 8 trade unionists released after 2 weeks in detention; 12 more Azapo members still detained. 13 May UWC Dentistry students return to classes on lecturer's dismissal after inquiry into racism. 14 May Soweto evictions for R74m arrears continue. According to DPSC 429 people detained under ISA.	7/8 May Several railway carriages burnt in Soweto and New Canada as rail workers continue strike. Disturbances and arson attacks continue at Cape Flats schools. 9/10 May Violence reported at Edendale, Caloza and Sobantu (Pmb); in Dbn townships a UDF activist is shot in his Clermont supermarket; in KwaMashu and Lamontville houses and a bus are attacked. Rosedale (Despatch) a municipal policeman blows off his own face. In KwaNdebele, sporadic violence against opponents of independence occur; arson reported at 4 schools in Klippfontein and Mangula. 11/12 May East London offices of Sached and Soawu are burnt. In Bathshabalo (Bloem) incidents of arson and stonings are reported. Several reports of disturbances on Cape Flats. In New Brighton (P) 4 people are arrested for beating a man to death; at Dududu (Natal Coast) a man dies when a bus is hit by a pedestrian and-run accident. In Malokazi (Dbn) a youth is sjombokked to death. A railway carriage is damaged by arson in Jeppe; 2 schools are damaged by arson in Kwagofontein and Tweelontien (KwaNdebele) (Soweto) court messenger is murdered during evictions and several residents are abducted by Robson supporting councillors.	7/8 May Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in riot. Dbn Supreme Court invalidates government proclamation which declares the UDF an affected area. 11 May Labour Bulletin refused work permit renewal - given 30 days to leave the country. 11 May Jhb magistrate finds 4 Azam members not guilty of sedition and 3 guilty of public violence after 22 months in court. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining Uwasa members from publishing film to journalist after bringing urgent interdict; 2 Westville detainees granted interdict on wardens from assaulting them. Transkei government deports 3 Umlata attorneys; Court sets aside banishment orders on Cola residents. Two British journalists have work permits. 12 May Supreme Court convicts man for murder of a policeman - co-accused acquitted; Pietersburg court convicts 4 men and a youth for the necklaced murder of a woman accused of being a witch. Pietersburg court finds security police justified in killing 4 armed men in Quarry Rd on 7 Sept 1986.	9/10 May Roodepoort ticket office bombed - 2 white workers injured. In Mamelodi a suspected ANC insurgent is shot dead by the SADF - another person also dies. 11 May In Harare the wife of an ANC member is killed by a bomb blast - several people injured. 13 May Jhb Technical High School damaged by explosion.	<b>MAY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>MAY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	15/19 May KwaNdebele police confirm 70 political activists detained in past 10 days. Serious allegations of torture - charges laid against police. Orlando residents have electricity supply cut off; warned not to reconnect it themselves. In Motolo N 5 families evicted for rent arrears. 19/20 May At Modderbee prison detainees begin hunger strike, fearing transference to social re-education centres. Massive police raids of Hillbrow and Wits residences - 14 people detained. Mayor of Dobsonville charged with 62 counts of corruption over allocation of houses. 21/22 May Sado (Ciskei) College of Education SRC suspended and then entire student body expelled. In Soweto arrears deadline for Sisulu, Mollona, Khuzwayo and Mandela pass without evictions; Bishop Tutu also served with notice and Mandela electricity supply cut off. 25/27 May Thakozza (Alberton) town council dissolved by TvI administrator because of unsound financial position - 3 former councillors appointed to run township. In Jhb Cosatu launches Hands-off-Cosatu campaign. Hunger strike at Modderbee prison called off. DPSC reports that child detainees being rapidly released. 28 May In Jhb 4 people incl 2 members of the KwaNdebele royal family are detained after meeting with British Consulate.	15/18 May KwaMashu man shot dead by police at memorial service for unrest victim - another shot dead at his funeral in Clermont - 8 injured. Violence reported in nearby Chesterville and the 10th and 11th youths are shot dead. 19/20 May Violence reported in Dube and Orlando (Soweto), Weltevrede (KwaNdebele), Teyateyan (Pmb) and KwaMashu (Durban). 21/23 May Mzimphope residents lay charges against SADF for refusing to give information on armoured vehicle kills man. In Brandfort Winnie Mandela's house and mobile clinic are damaged in attack. KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) police shoot dead one man and injure 3 allegedly in possession of bombs. Two Imbali youths killed in separate incidents. Jhb police still looking for at least 9 more workers feared dead. 25/28 May In Soweto railway carriages are burnt and reports of public violence in KwaMashu (Dbn) Soshanguve (Pta), Imbali (Pmb), Bishop Lavis, Langa, Guguletu (CT), Doveyton and Eldorado Park (P) KwaThema (W Rand) on armed hostel resident shot dead by police. In KwaMakuluha (Dbn) on Inkatha Youth Brigade leader is stabbed to death. KTC (CT) kitskonstabel shot and injured. 30/31 May Imbali residents claim 10 children dead in clashes after a funeral for victim of township violence - police confirm only 5. In Weltevrede (KwaNdebele) a man is killed and 5 injured in clashes with police.	15/18 May Magistrate finds 4 Azam members not guilty of sedition and 3 guilty of public violence after 22 months in court. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining Uwasa members from publishing film to journalist after bringing urgent interdict; 2 Westville detainees granted interdict on wardens from assaulting them. Transkei government deports 3 Umlata attorneys; Court sets aside banishment orders on Cola residents. Two British journalists have work permits. 12 May Supreme Court convicts man for murder of a policeman - co-accused acquitted; Pietersburg court convicts 4 men and a youth for the necklaced murder of a woman accused of being a witch. 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In Bekkersdal a house is damaged by an explosion. 19 May Carlton Centre bomb blast. 20 May Remote controlled booby bomb outside Jhb magistrate's court kills 4 policemen and injures 15. 22 May In Mbabane 3 ANC members are shot dead in a car. In Bisho (Ciskei) Rev Stofile and 3 others convicted of terrorism; in CT 6 men including Lizo Nqungwana, self-confessed leader of W Cape division of ANC, are convicted of terrorism and harbouring terrorists. 23/25 May In Gaborone Ronnie Watson overpowers man attempting to assassinate him; claims to be British MI6. In Selby (Jhb) an explosive device damages vehicles. A woman is allegedly abducted from Swaziland and taken to South Africa to be state witness in ANC trial. 29 May SA raid on Maputo kills 3 Mozambicans in rocket attacks on ANC targets.	<b>MAY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks
<b>JUNE</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1/2 June DPSC and Free the Children Alliance say more than 1000 children could still be in detention. Officially still 11 children under 16 in detention, compared with 280 in February; 14 725 names of detainees in custody for more than a month since June 1986 tabled in parliament. Ibhoyi town council serves hundreds of notices to rent defaulters - some families already evicted. 6/7 June Benoni council warned that should it withdraw lands from the First National Bank over the ANC advert, it will be subject to a consumer boycott by residents of Wattville and Doveyton. 8/12 June UDF calls for 2 weeks of national protest and action from 12 to 26 June to commemorate SA Youth Day, declaration of the emergency and Freedom Charter Day. Cosatu says 60 of its leaders in detention. 15 more families in Zola (Soweto) are evicted for rent arrears. More than 800 detainees released following announcement of the reimposition of the emergency - 2 000 still held; 100 from Krugersdorp, 98 of whom are charged and of the 60 released from Westville 14 appear in court. Azapo claims 430 of its members detained in Bekkersdal alone.	1/4 June In Orlando East a man is burnt to death in arson attack on a house. At Westgate and Crime Mins' stations several people are injured in petrol bomb attacks. In Soweto 2 railway carriages are burnt. In Kooking 4 youths are injured when police open fire on stone throwers. In New Brighton municipal police attacked. In Mamelodi a policeman is shot dead. In Edendale (Pmb) an Inkatha youth is stabbed to death in nearby Plessislaer a woman is injured in petrol bomb attack. The Sobantu Committee of 12 residents taking legal action after they receive several death threats; hundreds of youths from Imbali, Ashmore and Edendale take refuge there. 5/8 June In Soweto an SRC and Sosco member is shot dead in Senoane school grounds by 3 gun Reports of violence in Guguletu (CT), Bulwer, Bangolethu (Oudshoorn) and Hammarsdale. The Mosopole Technikon in Umlozi is seriously damaged in arson attack. Eight miners die in clashes with security of Anglo OFS mine. 10/11 June In Sobantu 2 UDF youths are injured by police gunfire; the following day a youth dies in clashes allegedly between UDF and Azapo. 12/14 June In Imbali (Pmb) a man is stabbed to death by crowd; following day on Inkatha youth is stabbed to death. In nearby Plessislaer another Inkatha member is shot dead. Near Hammarsdale 2 men are shot dead when armed men open fire on party. In Chiawello (Soweto) police arrest 2 people after one is attacked. In New Brighton (PE) a municipal policeman goes berserk and shoots dead a suspect who kills himself. In Kallehong charges against 2 kitskonstabels are investigated after they gun down 5 people 2 of whom die. In Mapello (Soweto) a policeman raiding a home is shot dead; in nearby Emdeni a woman is shot and injured by police in raid. In Innda a driver injures 4 pedestrians - angry crowd burns him to death in his car.	11 May KwaNdebele police take over control of 4 police stations including KwaMashu and Umlozi. CT court orders school teacher to be released from detention, detained since June 1986. In Pmb 20 former school workers and relatives of unionists killed; lodge claim against KwaZulu Minister of Police and Azapo for R395 500. In PE third court case brought in attempt to get police to produce missing Pabco worker in KwaZulu, thought to be still alive in custody. 12 May KwaNdebele police forward several dockets concerning allegations of police assault on detainees to attorney general. CT inquest into death of messenger in Sept 1985 finds police acted beyond bounds of National security budget increased by 39% to over R10bn; budgeted cost for detained people increased by 73% to R9.2m. Detainee in Durban released after court application but before final judgment. 13 May Pabco inquest into death of Lucky Kutshelo on 5/4/86 finds 6 Lebowa policemen liable. reintroduces bill to have rents deducted from employees' wages in attempt to recover R3m rent arrears. 14 June New regulations on annual renewal of emergency impose wide-ranging restrictions, particularly on consumer boycotts and illegal strikes. Jhb inquest into death of Andries Radtsele finds no one responsible after he allegedly fell off police Cossipir in June 1986 - police already paid out settlement to his wife. Father Mkhathsho of SACBC released from detention after a year and 2 days in court applications for his release. 14 June In Melspruit terror trial a Lebowa MP and his brother are acquitted with 3 others - charges of deaths of 36 'wizards'.	4 June In Aberdeen a large arms cache is uncovered. 9/11 June Newcastle police arrest on ANC suspect and some collaborators - uncover an arms cache. In Emdeni (Soweto) an ANC suspect is killed in shootout with police - 2 policemen injured and 4 people arrested. 12/14 June Two policemen are killed with AK47s while escorting 2 suspects from Komatiport - they are later re-arrested.	<b>JUNE</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>JUNE</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	15 June 300 Worcester detainees released. 16 June Anniversary of Soweto Uprising; Reef townships relatively peaceful with some meetings dispersed by police. Most black workers stay away from work in PWV area, E Cape and CT - only 46% in Durban but more in Pmb. Modderbee detainees begin hunger strike to protest continued detention after some detainees released on 11th. 19 June Modderbee detainees end hunger strike.  24/25 June Soweto city council says at least 21 people arrested on contempt of court charges for moving back into houses after being evicted; drop charges after court appearance. At least 18 more families evicted in Pinville. 29/30 June Jhb Chamber of Commerce estimates Soweto residents owe R80m in rent arrears - nationwide arrears of R294m. E Cape Dev Board owed R9 764 973 this year.	15/16 June In Guguletu a community councillor's house is damaged by grenade - 5 people injured. Imbali and Edendale (Pmb) violence is reported. In Tembisa police shoot and kill one man after their patrol is stoned. In Umlozi several residents are severely beaten by KZ police; PFP collects affidavits of more than 20 people assaulted. The Mosopole a councillor's house is attacked with grenade on 2nd consecutive day. Violence reported in 3 townships. 17/21 June In Boksburg, security forces kill 2 men and injure 3 after they are stoned. Near Crossroads man burnt to death; Senoane municipal policeman shot dead; Magene (Dbn) man stabbed to death by youths. Violence reported in Pmb townships, Soweto, Sidesawwa (Beaufort West) and KwaThema. 22 June In KTC (CT) 7 security force members are injured in a grenade attack. In KwaMakuluha (Dbn) families are evicted from township after mayor tells 'UDF nests' to move out. 54 taking refuge in Sobantu in the Baha's Hill Koinonia Centre are arrested - 11 of them charged with murder. 25 June Crime swoop in KTC; 110 residents held after house-to-house searches. 27/28 June In KwaNobuhle 2 people are stabbed to death in clashes between UDF and members, several others injured and houses attacked. Reports of arson in Zwide (PE), KTC and (CT), Dobsonville (Soweto) and Doveyton (Benoni). 29 June In continued internecine fighting in Imbali (Pmb) and KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) one person died.	11 May KwaNdebele police take over control of 4 police stations including KwaMashu and Umlozi. CT court orders school teacher to be released from detention, detained since June 1986. In Pmb 20 former school workers and relatives of unionists killed; lodge claim against KwaZulu Minister of Police and Azapo for R395 500. In PE third court case brought in attempt to get police to produce missing Pabco worker in KwaZulu, thought to be still alive in custody. 12 May KwaNdebele police forward several dockets concerning allegations of police assault on detainees to attorney general. CT inquest into death of messenger in Sept 1985 finds police acted beyond bounds of National security budget increased by 39% to over R10bn; budgeted cost for detained people increased by 73% to R9.2m. Detainee in Durban released after court application but before final judgment. 13 May Pabco inquest into death of Lucky Kutshelo on 5/4/86 finds 6 Lebowa policemen liable. reintroduces bill to have rents deducted from employees' wages in attempt to recover R3m rent arrears. 14 June New regulations on annual renewal of emergency impose wide-ranging restrictions, particularly on consumer boycotts and illegal strikes. Jhb inquest into death of Andries Radtsele finds no one responsible after he allegedly fell off police Cossipir in June 1986 - police already paid out settlement to his wife. Father Mkhathsho of SACBC released from detention after a year and 2 days in court applications for his release. 14 June In Melspruit terror trial a Lebowa MP and his brother are acquitted with 3 others - charges of deaths of 36 'wizards'.	15 June In Richards Bay a police vehicle is damaged by a limpet mine. Jhb court sentences Alex man for possession of ANC literature.	<b>JUNE</b> 3rd & 4th weeks
<b>JULY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1/3 July 1 000 White City residents march on council chambers after at least 8 more families evicted. Of the 307 government employees detained under emergency regulations, 219 are employed by DET. Langa (CT) high school closed by Deputy Minister of Education and Training. 8/9 July Kallehong council sells 8 houses of families in arrears, 2 privately owned houses also sold. In Tembisa 30 families are evicted for non-payment of rent - council owed R700 000 for water and electricity. Soyco launches nationwide campaign to save the lives of 32 people awaiting execution as a result of unrest-related killings.	1/3 July In Enkalahle (Greytown), 2 men shot dead by police; in Dududu 2 residents die in arson on house and in Soweto (PE) a white man is necklaced. Wilgespruit fellowship centre damaged by bomb blast, R135 000 damage to printing equipment. 4/5 July Guguletu house is petrol-bombed and owner hacked to death. In Diepkloof a policeman is shot dead on guard duty. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) an Uma Afrika man is killed in continuing township conflict. In Bathshabalo (Bloem) a police house is attacked. In Aberdeen (E Cape) a preacher is shot dead by kitskonstabel. 8/10 July In Sakhile (Standerfont) 3 workers killed at coal yard during strike. 11/12 July In Tembisa the burnt body of a man is found. In Doveyton a man is stabbed to death in a crowd. In Alex an alleged ANC guerilla is shot and stoned to death after he allegedly shot 7 people. In KwaNobuhle 7 people are injured when kitskonstabels open fire on gamblers. In Crossroads residents opposed to leader Ngxabongwane are burnt down. 14 July In Mpumalanga (Hammarsdale) a man is stabbed to death by youths, and in Sobantu a man is shot and injured. Soweto squatters lay charges against municipal police after demolition of Chicken Farm camp.	11 May KwaNdebele police take over control of 4 police stations including KwaMashu and Umlozi. CT court orders school teacher to be released from detention, detained since June 1986. In Pmb 20 former school workers and relatives of unionists killed; lodge claim against KwaZulu Minister of Police and Azapo for R395 500. In PE third court case brought in attempt to get police to produce missing Pabco worker in KwaZulu, thought to be still alive in custody. 12 May KwaNdebele police forward several dockets concerning allegations of police assault on detainees to attorney general. CT inquest into death of messenger in Sept 1985 finds police acted beyond bounds of National security budget increased by 39% to over R10bn; budgeted cost for detained people increased by 73% to R9.2m. Detainee in Durban released after court application but before final judgment. 13 May Pabco inquest into death of Lucky Kutshelo on 5/4/86 finds 6 Lebowa policemen liable. reintroduces bill to have rents deducted from employees' wages in attempt to recover R3m rent arrears. 14 June New regulations on annual renewal of emergency impose wide-ranging restrictions, particularly on consumer boycotts and illegal strikes. Jhb inquest into death of Andries Radtsele finds no one responsible after he allegedly fell off police Cossipir in June 1986 - police already paid out settlement to his wife. Father Mkhathsho of SACBC released from detention after a year and 2 days in court applications for his release. 14 June In Melspruit terror trial a Lebowa MP and his brother are acquitted with 3 others - charges of deaths of 36 'wizards'.	17/18 May Two bomb blasts at Newcastle station injure policeman. In Harare an ANC house is attacked with mortar rockets. In Bekkersdal a house is damaged by an explosion. 19 May Carlton Centre bomb blast. 20 May Remote controlled booby bomb outside Jhb magistrate's court kills 4 policemen and injures 15. 22 May In Mbabane 3 ANC members are shot dead in a car. In Bisho (Ciskei) Rev Stofile and 3 others convicted of terrorism; in CT 6 men including Lizo Nqungwana, self-confessed leader of W Cape division of ANC, are convicted of terrorism and harbouring terrorists. 23/25 May In Gaborone Ronnie Watson overpowers man attempting to assassinate him; claims to be British MI6. In Selby (Jhb) an explosive device damages vehicles. A woman is allegedly abducted from Swaziland and taken to South Africa to be state witness in ANC trial. 29 May SA raid on Maputo kills 3 Mozambicans in rocket attacks on ANC targets.	<b>JULY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>JULY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	16 July White City (Soweto) residents meet the town clerk for the first time to discuss grievances, 128 residents evicted so far but nearly all move back in. 22/24 July Two national UDF leaders detained in PE and national treasurer detained with 8 other members. Police order family to bury the body of ANC member killed in Swaziland immediately - order finally extended for 3 days.	15/19 July In Bonteheuwel and Heideveld (Cape Flats) thousands of pupils hold rallies to protest killing of Ashley Kriel. Continuing violence in Pmb townships; in Sobantu a committee of 12 members is attacked, buildings damaged by petrol bombs; in nearby Mpumalanga a child is abducted and a man is stabbed to death. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) an APCC youth is killed. In Mamelodi (Pta) a woman and her wife are injured in grenade attack on their house. In Zwelitsha (Ciskei) an armed man is shot.	11 May KwaNdebele police take over control of 4 police stations including KwaMashu and Umlozi. CT court orders school teacher to be released from detention, detained since June 1986. In Pmb 20 former school workers and relatives of unionists killed; lodge claim against KwaZulu Minister of Police and Azapo for R395 500. In PE third court case brought in attempt to get police to produce missing Pabco worker in KwaZulu, thought to be still alive in custody. 12 May KwaNdebele police forward several dockets concerning allegations of police assault on detainees to attorney general. CT inquest into death of messenger in Sept 1985 finds police acted beyond bounds of National security budget increased by 39% to over R10bn; budgeted cost for detained people increased by 73% to R9.2m. Detainee in Durban released after court application but before final judgment. 13 May Pabco inquest into death of Lucky Kutshelo on 5/4/86 finds 6 Lebowa policemen liable. reintroduces bill to have rents deducted from employees' wages in attempt to recover R3m rent arrears. 14 June New regulations on annual renewal of emergency impose wide-ranging restrictions, particularly on consumer boycotts and illegal strikes. Jhb inquest into death of Andries Radtsele finds no one responsible after he allegedly fell off police Cossipir in June 1986 - police already paid out settlement to his wife. Father Mkhathsho of SACBC released from detention after a year and 2 days in court applications for his release. 14 June In Melspruit terror trial a Lebowa MP and his brother are acquitted with 3 others - charges of deaths of 36 'wizards'.	17/18 May Two bomb blasts at Newcastle station injure policeman. In Harare an ANC house is attacked with mortar rockets. In Bekkersdal a house is damaged by an explosion. 19 May Carlton Centre bomb blast. 20 May Remote controlled booby bomb outside Jhb magistrate's court kills 4 policemen and injures 15. 22 May In Mbabane 3 ANC members are shot dead in a car. In Bisho (Ciskei) Rev Stofile and 3 others convicted of terrorism; in CT 6 men including Lizo Nqungwana, self-confessed leader of W Cape division of ANC, are convicted of terrorism and harbouring terrorists. 23/25 May In Gaborone Ronnie Watson overpowers man attempting to assassinate him; claims to be British MI6. In Selby (Jhb) an explosive device damages vehicles. A woman is allegedly abducted from Swaziland and taken to South Africa to be state witness in ANC trial. 29 May SA raid on Maputo kills 3 Mozambicans in rocket attacks on ANC targets.	<b>JULY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks

# Conflict Chronology 8

## THE RENEWED EMERGENCY

Compiled by IPSA Researcher Deborah Quin

PART I: 7 May - October 1987

1987	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Rent Boycotts, Student Protests, Activist Detentions</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Township Clashes, Factionalism, Kitskonstabels</i>	Government Response <i>Police, Court Interdicts, Unrest/Security Trials</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent Shootouts &amp; Sabotage</i>	1987
<b>MAY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	7/8 May Police disperse UND student march in solidarity with anti-election protests and clashes on other campuses. Rhodes students pass motion of no confidence in university admin after its refusal to take stance on student detentions. Cosatu House destroyed in bomb blast. Duncan Village (EL) residents lay more complaints against municipal police. Mgwenya (Woltervol Boven) pupils boycott classes after white headmaster hands pupil over to police; 4 pupils injured when dispersed. 11/12 May Dower College (PE) students stay away to protest expulsion of 4 SRC members. Police search UCT SRC offices; at UDW students boycott lectures to protest police presence on campus. In Pietersburg 8 trade unionists released after 2 weeks in detention; 12 more Azapo members still detained. 13 May UWC Deniliury students return to classes on lecturer's dismissal after inquiry into racism. 14 May Soweto evictions for R74m arrears continue. According to DPSC 429 people detained under ISA.	7/8 May Several railway carriages burnt in Soweto and New Canada as rail workers continue strike. Disturbances and arson attacks continue at Cape Flats schools. 9/10 May Violence reported at Edendale, Caluza and Sobantu (Pmb) in Dbn townships a UDF member is shot in his Clermont supermarket; in KwaMashu and Lamontville houses and a bus are attacked. Rosedale (Despatch) a municipal policeman blows off his own face. In KwaNdebele, sporadic violence against opponents of independence occur; arson reported at 4 schools in KwaNdebele. 11/12 May East London offices of Sached and Soawa are burnt. In Bothasabalo (Bloem) workshops are destroyed. 13/14 May In Nelspruit 3 SADF members are charged with murder after a pedestrian is killed in a road-run accident. In Malakazi (Dbn) a youth is stabbed to death. A railway carriage is burnt and an arson in Jeppe; 2 schools are damaged by arson in Kwagolentain and Tweefontein (KwaNdebele) a supporting councillor is murdered during evictions and several residents are abducted by police.	7/8 May The Supreme Court invalidates government proclamation which declares the UDF an affected party. 9/10 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 11/12 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 13/14 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 15/16 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	9/10 May Rodepoort ticket office bombed - 2 white workers injured. In Mamelodi a suspected ANC insurgent is shot dead by the SADF - another person also dies. 11 May In Harare the wife of an ANC member is killed by a bomb blast - several people injured. 13 May Jhb Technical High School damaged by explosion.	<b>MAY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>MAY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	15/19 May KwaNdebele police confirm 70 political activists detained in past 10 days. Serious allegations of torture - charges laid against police. Orlando residents have electricity supply cut off; warned not to reconnect it themselves. In Mofoto N 5 families evicted for rent arrears. 19/20 May At Modderbee prison detainees begin hunger strike, fearing transfer to social re-education centres. Massive police raids of Hillbrow and Wits residences - 14 people detained. Mayor of Dobsonville charged with 62 counts of corruption over allocation of houses. 21/22 May Sada (Ciskei) College of Education SRC suspended and then entire student body expelled. In Soweto arrears deadline for Sisulu, Moflana, Khuzwayo and Mandala pass without evictions; Bishop Tutu also served with notice and Mandala electricity supply cut off. 25/27 May Thokoza (Albion) town council dissolved by Tvl administrator because of unsound financial position - 3 former councillors appointed to run township. In Jhb Cosatu launches Hands-off-Cosatu campaign. Hunger strike at Modderbee prison called off. DPSC reports that child detainees being rapidly released. 28 May In Jhb 4 people incl 2 members of the KwaNdebele royal family are detained after meeting with British Consulate.	15/18 May KwaMashu man shot dead by police at memorial service for unrest victim - another man shot dead at his funeral in Clermont - 8 injured. Violence reported in nearby Cheterville and Mafeking townships. 19/20 May Violence reported in Dube and Orlando (Soweto), Weltevrede (KwaNdebele), Yeyeni and Mafeking townships. 21/23 May Mzimphole residents lay charges against SADF for refusing to give information on armoured vehicle kills man. In Brandfontein Mandala's house and mobile clinic are damaged in an attack. KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) police shoot dead one man and injure 3 allegedly in possession of arms. Two Imbali youths killed in separate incidents. Jhb police still looking for at least 9 missing persons. 25/28 May In Soweto railway carriages are burnt and reports of public violence in KwaMashu (Pi), KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage), Bishop Lavis, Langa, Guguletu (CT), Daveyton and Eldorado Park (W Rand) an armed hostel resident shot dead by police. In KwaMashu (Dbn) an Imbali youth is killed. Brigade leader is stabbed to death. KTC (CT) kitskonstabel shot and injured. 30/31 May Imbali residents claim 10 children dead in clashes after a funeral for victim of township violence - police confirm only 5. In Weltevrede (KwaNdebele) a man is killed and 5 injured in clashes with police.	15/18 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 19/20 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 21/23 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 25/28 May The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	17/18 May Two bomb blasts at Newcastle station injure policeman. In Harare an ANC house is attacked with mortar rockets. In Bekkersdal a house is damaged by an explosion. 19 May Carlton Centre bomb blast. 20 May Ramona controlled booby bomb outside Jhb magistrate's court kills 4 policemen and injures 15. 22 May In Mbabane 3 ANC members are shot dead in a car. In Bisho (Ciskei) Rev Stofle and 3 others convicted of terrorism; in CT 6 men including Lizo Nqungwana, self-confessed leader of W Cape division of ANC, are convicted of terrorism and harbouring terrorists. 23/25 May In Gabarone Ronnie Watson overpowers man attempting to assassinate him; claims to be British MI6. In Sabyi (Jhb) an explosive device damages vehicles. A woman is allegedly abducted from Swaziland and taken to South Africa to be state witness in ANC trial. 29 May SA raid on Maputo kills 3 Mozambicans in rocket attacks on ANC targets.	<b>MAY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks
<b>JUNE</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1/2 June DPSC and Free the Children Alliance say more than 1000 children could still be in detention. Officially still 11 children under 16 in detention, compared with 280 in February; 14 725 names of detainees in custody for more than a month since June 1986 tabled in parliament. Ibhayi town council serves hundreds of notices to rent defaulters - some families already evicted. 6/7 June Benoni council warned that should it withdraw funds from the First National Bank over the ANC advert, it will be subject to a consumer boycott by residents of Watville and Daveyton. 8/12 June UDF calls for 2 weeks of national protest and action from 12 to 26 June to commemorate SA Youth Day, declaration of the emergency and Freedom Charter Day. Cosatu says 60 of its leaders in detention. 15 more families in Zola (Soweto) are evicted for rent arrears. More than 800 detainees released following announcement of the reimposition of the emergency - 2 000 still held; 100 from Krugersdorp, 98 of whom are charged and of the 60 released from Westville 14 appear in court. Azapo claims 430 of its members detained in Bekkersdal alone.	1/4 June In Orlando East a man is burnt to death in arson attack on a house. At Westgate and Crossroads several people are injured in petrol bomb attacks. In Soweto 2 railway carriages are burnt and 4 youths are injured when police open fire on stone throwers. In New Brighton municipal police are attacked. In Mamelodi a policeman is shot dead. In Edendale (Pmb) an Inkatha youth is stabbed to death in nearby Plessislaar a woman is injured in petrol bomb attack. The Sobantu Committee of 12 members taking legal action after they receive several death threats; hundreds of youths from Imbali, Mafeking and Edendale take refuge there. 5/8 June In Soweto an SRC and Socpa member is shot dead in Senaone school grounds by 3 gunmen. Reports of violence in Guguletu (CT), Bulwer, Bongolothu (Duitshoorn) and Hammarstad. The Mafeking Technikon in Umhlozi is seriously damaged in arson attack. Eight miners die in clashes with security forces at Anglo OFS mine. 10/11 June In Sobantu 2 UDF youths are injured by police gunfire; the following day a youth dies in clashes allegedly between UDF and Azapo. 12/14 June In Imbali (Pmb) a man is stabbed to death by crowd; following day an Inkatha youth is stabbed to death. In nearby Plessislaar another Inkatha member is shot dead. Near Hammarstad 9 men are shot dead when armed men open fire on party. In Chiswell (Soweto) police arrest 2 people after they are attacked. In New Brighton (PE) a municipal policeman goes berserk and shoots dead a suspect who kills himself. In Kothahong charges against 2 kitskonstabels are investigated after they gun down 5 people, 2 of whom die. In Mapello (Soweto) a policeman raiding a home is shot dead; in nearby Emdeni a woman is shot and injured by police in raid. In Inanda a driver injures 4 pedestrians - angry crowd burns him to death in his car.	1/4 June The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 5/8 June The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 10/11 June The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	4 June In Aberdeen a large arms cache is uncovered. 9/11 June Newcastle police arrest an ANC suspect and some collaborators - uncover an arms cache. In Emdeni (Soweto) an ANC suspect is killed in shootout with police - 2 policemen injured and 4 people arrested. 12/14 June Two policemen are killed with AK47s while escorting 2 suspects from Komatipoort - they are later re-arrested.	<b>JUNE</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>JUNE</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	15 June 300 Worcester detainees released. 16 June Anniversary of Soweto Uprising: Reef townships relatively peaceful with some meetings dispersed by police. Most black workers stay away from work in PWV area, E Cape and CT - only 46% in Durban but more in Pmb. Modderbee detainees begin hunger strike to protest continued detention after some detainees released on 11th. 19 June Modderbee detainees end hunger strike.  24/25 June Soweto city council says at least 21 people arrested on contempt of court charges for moving back into houses after being evicted; drop charges after court appearance. At least 18 more families evicted in Pimville. 29/30 June Jhb Chamber of Commerce estimates Soweto residents owe R80m in rent arrears - nationwide arrears of R294m. E Cape Dev Board owed R9 764 973 this year.	15/16 June In Guguletu a community councillor's house is damaged by grenade - 5 people injured. In Tembisa police shoot and kill one man after their patrol is stoned. In Umhlozi several residents say they are severely beaten by KZ police; PFP collects affidavits of more than 20 people assaulted. In Guguletu a councillor's house is attacked with grenade on 2nd consecutive day. Violence reported in 3 Pmb townships. 17/21 June In Boksburg, security forces kill 2 men and injure 3 after they are stoned. New Crossroads man burnt to death; Senaone municipal policeman shot dead; Mogene (Dbn) man stabbed to death by youths. Violence reported in Pmb townships, Soweto, Sidesawiva (Beaufort West) and KwaThema. 22 June In KTC (CT) 7 security force members are injured in a grenade attack. In KwaMashu (Dbn) 4 families are evicted from township after mayor tells 'UDF nests' to move out. 54 taking refuge in Sobantu in the Botha's Hill Koinonia Centre are arrested - 11 of them charged with murder. 25 June Crime snoop in KTC; 110 residents held after house-to-house searches. 27/28 June In KwaNobuhle 2 people are stabbed to death in clashes between UDF and AmaMkhosi members, several others injured and houses attacked. Reports of arson in Zwida (PE), KTC and Guguletu (CT), Dobsonville (Soweto) and Daveyton (Benoni). 29 June In continued internecine fighting in Imbali (Pmb) and KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) one person shot dead.	15/16 June The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 17/21 June The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	15 June In Richards Bay a police vehicle is damaged by a limpet mine. Jhb court sentences Alex man for possession of ANC literature.  19/21 June Swazi authorities arrest 3 ANC members and seize arms. Venda police arrest suspected insurgent and in Lusaka an ANC house is damaged by a bomb. 22/23 June Maputo security services detain SA commando in connection with blast in Harare which killed 2 people. Five limpet mines explode in Mafeking (E TV) CBD. Police confirm the arrest of 2 suspected insurgents, several collaborators and seize arms in Mafeking (Soweto). 24 June CT student jailed for furthering the aims of the ANC.	<b>JUNE</b> 3rd & 4th weeks
<b>JULY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks	1/3 July 1 000 White City residents march on council chambers after at least 8 more families evicted. Of the 307 government employees detained under emergency regulations, 219 are employed by DET. Langa 8/9 July Kothahong council sells 8 houses of families in arrears, 2 privately owned houses also sold. In Tembisa 30 families are evicted for non-payment of rent - annual owed R700 000 for water and electricity. Sayco launches nationwide campaign to save the lives of 32 people awaiting execution as a result of unrest-related killings.	1/3 July In Enklakhe (Greytown), 2 men shot dead by police; in Duduzu 2 residents die in arson attack on house and in Soweto (PE) a white man is necklaced. Wilgespruit fellowship centre damaged by bomb blast, R135 000 damage to printing equipment. 4/5 July Guguletu house is petrol-bombed and owner hacked to death. In Diepkloof a policeman is shot dead on guard duty. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) an Uma Afrika man is killed in continuing internecine conflict. In Bothasabalo (Bloem) a police house is attacked. In Aberdeen (E Cape) a preacher is shot dead by kitskonstabel. 8/10 July In Sakhile (Standerfontein) 3 workers killed at coal yard during strike. 11/12 July In Tembisa the burnt body of a man is found. In Daveyton a man is stabbed to death by crowd. In Alex an alleged ANC guerilla is shot and stoned to death after he allegedly kills resident. In Mafeking 7 people are injured when kitskonstabels open fire on gamblers. In Crossroads 24 shops of residents opposed to leader Ngobongwana are burnt down. 14 July In Mpumalanga (Hammarstad) a man is stabbed to death by youths, and in Sobantu (Pmb) a man is shot and injured. Soweto squatters lay charges against municipal police after violence during demolition of Chicken Farm camp.	1/3 July The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 4/5 July The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	1/4 July In Mmakubane village (Bop) 2 people die in explosion, possibly by own explosives. 6/7 July Van Zyl Slabbert and a group of 50 predominantly Afrikaners go on an ANC tour in West Africa. In Mafeking (PE), a suspected ANC insurgent and another person killed by police; in Lamontville police kill a locally trained ANC suspect. 8/9 July A Jhb hotel is damaged by a limpet-mine blast. Bonteheuwel (CT) shopping centre is damaged by blast. In Athlone (CT) Ashley Kriel, a trained ANC insurgent, is killed in home by police. In Swaziland Cassius Make, an ANC exec member, Paul Dikeledi and a Mozambican woman are shot dead in their car on airport road by 3 gunmen. In Dbn a Soweto man is sentenced to 8 years for terrorism. 14 July Swazi police arrest 3 people and seize arms.	<b>JULY</b> 1st & 2nd weeks
<b>JULY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks	16 July White City (Soweto) residents meet the town clerk for the first time to discuss grievances, 128 residents evicted so far but nearly all move back in. 22/24 July Two national UDF leaders detained in PE and national treasurer detained with 8 other members. Police order family to bury the body of ANC member killed in Swaziland immediately - order finally extended for 3 days.	15/19 July In Bonteheuwel and Heidveld (Cape Flats) thousands of pupils hold rallies to protest the killing of Ashley Kriel. Continuing violence in Pmb townships; in Sobantu a committee-of-12 meeting is attacked, buildings damaged by petrol bombs; in nearby Mpumalanga a child is abducted and a youth stabbed to death. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) an APCC youth is killed. In Mamelodi (Pi), a policeman and his wife are injured in grenade attack on their house. In Zwelitsba (Ciskei) an armed man is shot dead by police.	15/19 July The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot. 22/24 July The Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay R15 000 to Soshanguve youth who lost her eye in a riot.	14 July In Mdantsane (Ciskei) 2 policemen and an alleged insurgent die in shootout. 17 July Explosive device detonated under bus in Strandfontein (PE). In London 3 men are accused of conspiring to kidnap members of the ANC living in London. In Swaziland a Soweto motorist is shot dead near the border; Swaziland authorities depart 4 ANC members after found with arms. In Jericho Village (Bop) 3 people die in explosion.	<b>JULY</b> 3rd & 4th weeks

Acronyms	Pecca
APCC African Peoples Christian Coalition	RMC Release Mandela Committee
Asayo Azanian Youth Organisation	Saawa SA Allied Workers Union
Cayco Cape Youth Congress	SACBC SA Catholics Bishops Conference
DET Department of Education and Training	Sached SA Council for Higher Education
DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee	SAMDC SA Medical and Dental Council
ECC End Conscription Campaign	Serwuu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union
Fedawo Federation of South African Women	Sets SA Transport Services
Idaxa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA	Soyco SA Youth Congress
KRA KwaNdebele Residents Association	Sotco Soweto Students Congress
NECC National Education Crisis Committee	UDW University of Durban-Westville
NPP National Peoples Party	UND University of Natal/Durban
Nam National Union of Mineworkers	UWC University of Western Cape
NUTW National Union of Textile Workers	Uwusa United Workers Union of SA
Pecca Plebeian/Black Agency for Christian Social Awareness	Wectu Western Cape Teachers Union

<p><b>1987</b></p>	<p>Minister of Education says replacement costs for school property damaged during unrest is R47m.</p> <p>29/31 July In PE Nobandle Bani dies in detention - 5th emergency detainee to have died in custody. In Imbali (Pmb) a man arrested dies after one day in custody. 221 people detained under ISA29, including 16 children.</p>	<p>police. Thousands of mourners dispersed and journalists arrested at Ashlaw Kriek... in Bonteheuwel...  20/21 July In Wynbera (CT) a policeman is injured by a homemade bomb while filming crowd...  In Grahamsville a municipal policeman is shot and injured. In Soweto a man is injured by grenade attack on house...  In Koop several cars damaged after police action at high school. In Mpumalanga (Hammarsdale) a...  shot dead and 2 bodies found shot in field.  22/23 July In Soweto a security force member guarding a councillor's house is shot. In Ashdown (Pmb)...  youth is stabbed to death and another injured.  24/26 July Near Kingwilliamstown an Idasa official is assassinated - tortured body found in car...  Potsdam (E Cape) another community leader is murdered. In Langa (Uitenhage) a man is burnt to death...  At Orkney mine, a man is burnt to death and at Witbank strike-bound metal processing plant 1 man is...  killed by masked gunmen. In Ashdown and Marhobise (Pmb) 2 people are killed amid widespread violence...  27/31 July Five miners of Gencor mine in Leslie (E Tvl) killed in fighting. In Orlandi (Soweto) a child dies...  after being run over by an SADF buffer; charges of culpable homicide investigated. In Midrand (E Tvl)...  a man is shot dead by police - they deny it.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/4 Aug In Jhb Cosatu and Num offices gutted by fire; 2 Cosatu employees' property damaged. Mhluzi (E Tvl) town council has financial records investigated by government authorities following disappearance of large sums of money. UCT campus disruptions as moderate/radical students clash over addresses by former ambassador, Dennis Worrall and former Ibhayi mayor, Tomosang Linda; 6 students suspended and 19 fined. At Matlo mine (Kriele) a man is stabbed to death for refusing to observe stayaway.  6/9 Aug Tembisa's year-long rent boycott costing the council R6m so far. Mayor and town clerk of Thokaza (Alberton) face charges over council's missing R1,3m. A further 1 100 detainees named, bringing total to over 16 000 since emergency declared. In Lenasia police disperse anti-election march. In Langa (CT) 4 000 women march on offices of Community Services to demand action against 'Witdoeke' (vigilante) leader Gobingo and kitskansabels.  11 Aug On the Cape Flats thousands of pupils stay away from classes. Atteridgeville mayor calls for immediate withdrawal of special police after student is shot dead in township. Rent arrears in black townships now officially R267m.</p>	<p>1/3 Aug In Dobsonville (Soweto) a man is killed in a grenade attack. In Germiston a white man is stabbed and burnt to death in car. W Cape violence is reported in Bonteheuwel, Elsie's River, Point East and Zweetentemba; in the E Cape in Lingelihle, Graaff-Reinet, Matherwell and Schauderville. Arson reports from Soweto and Daveyton on the Reef and several incidents of violence in Pmb townships.  4/6 Aug In KwaDobeka (Pinetown) a youth is necklaced. In Elondskop (Pmb) 16 youths are injured by unknown gunmen. In Kwagqolametin (KwaNdebele), police and Mbokodo detain family of former chief magistrate. Arson and stone throwing reported from Bonteheuwel and Langa (CT).  7-9 Aug In Atteridgeville (Pta) a matric pupil is shot dead by a kitskansabel of a so-called 'hesherville' 2 men are injured by an unknown gunman. Stonings reported in Pmb townships, Roikland (Bloem), Bongoletu (Oudstroom), Boksburg and Bonteheuwel (CT).  10/12 Aug In KwaZakele (PE) a burnt and beheaded body is found. In Venda 9 people are arrested and 12 others charged for political graffiti. Continued unrest on Cape Flats.  13/14 Aug In Chiawella (Soweto) a municipal policeman on guard is shot dead. In Mpumalanga an Inkatha member is shot dead.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Maphumulo (Greytown) the burial of ANC London Commissar is addressed by UDF and Inkatha officials. Soweto rent and service deficit now R111m.  19 Aug In CT charges for refusing to administer exams against 72 Wactu teachers are dropped - all the teachers reinstated. Dobsonville mayor acquitted on 62 charges of theft and corruption over allocation of houses.  20/21 Aug In W Cape 14 new detentions are confirmed; in Dlamini (Soweto) 13 Azapo youths are detained.  25 Aug Seshego College of Education (Lebowa) students boycott to protest detention of SRC president.  27 Aug In Khayelitsha 8 girls are injured after vigilantes storm school to 'teach boycotters a lesson'.  29 Aug Salt River (CT) Community House damaged by explosives.</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Bruntville (Mooi River) a Sals employee is shot dead. In Graaff-Reinet a man is necklaced by police; in Kimberley a youth dies and 6 are injured when municipal police disperse crowd at soccer match. At a Secunda mine a worker is killed in clashes with security over planned strike. Continued violence in Pmb and Bloem townships. In Umlozi (Dbn) a security force member is shot and injured in passing car.  19/20 Aug In Mpumalanga 2 men are shot dead; family of activist assaulted by 15 men dressed as policemen who set fire to house killing 102yr-old woman. Goldfields miner killed in clash with security guards, victim of 12-day gold and coal strike.  22/23 Aug In Plessislaer (Pmb) 2 men are burnt to death and several other incidents of violence reported in surrounding townships; also in Soweto, Kroonstad and Mannenberg (CT).  24/25 Aug In Daveyton student leader Caiphus Nyoka is shot dead in his home by police. In KwaNdebele a youth is shot dead by a municipal policeman. In Boipatong a crowd is dispersed outside municipal office and 41 arrested.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/3 Sept Since emergency declared, 5 042 people charged in connection with 2 300 offences, excluding 33 people sentenced to death in unrest/security trials.  In Jhb security police raid offices of the National Student Co-ordinating Committee. Khatso House cordoned off by police during service for execution of 2 people, with police action at UWC protest meeting. In Guguletu police disperse pupils protesting the detention of W Cape NECC vice-chairman and another pupil. Medunsa students continue 5-week boycott. Azapo president Malolo and general-secretary Wauchope detained with 8 Azapo members in Orlando and Mamelodi.  4 Sept Daveyton funeral of Caiphus Nyoka who was shot by police; thousands turned away by SADF on horseback.  9 Sept In KwaMashu 171 people are arrested at memorial service for ANC's Andrew Zondo, executed a year ago.  10/14 Sept In Walkam 2 workers injured in petrol-bomb attack on Num offices. In the Ciskei 4 senior Azapo members are detained after service on 10th anniversary of Steve Biko's death.</p>	<p>1/2 Sept In Clermont (Durban), a man dies in police car chase; several buses are stoned in violence over busfare hikes; in KwaMashu 35 people are arrested at barricades. In Forty Second Hills (Harrismith) buses are stoned and in Mamatubedu (Petrus Steyn) security forces are stoned. Near Pmb an Edendale high school is closed after death of 2 students; Harewood and Sinating residents claim they are being forced to join Inkatha.  5/8 Sept In KTC (CT) a police cleaner is burnt to death and in Sinating (Pmb), a policeman is stabbed to death. In Lynville (Witbank) a security force member is set alight. Violence continues in Dbn and Pmb townships where 2 men are killed in Caluzu and Edendale. In Zola (Soweto) a man is killed; in Pomeary (Greytown), Ravensmead and Elsie's River vehicles are stoned.  10/14 Sept In Edendale (Pmb) 2 people are killed and several injured in intermine clashes; in Mopumusa 2 people are burnt to death; violence in nearby Ashdown, Eskikeni and Sabantu. In Mpumalanga/Hammarsdale area 4 people die. In Guguletu a security force member is injured when shot at. In Diazville (Saldanha) a boy is shot dead by police in industrial conflict.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/17 Sept In Jhb deputy president of Azapo is detained. The Soweto Civic Association gets court interdict to prevent Soweto council selling houses of rent defaulters.  19/23 Sept Observatory offices of ECC damaged by petrol bomb. In Athlone (CT) Spes Bono pupils and teachers walk out after a pupil is detained. In Patchelstroom 9 actors are released after 3 weeks detention. Rent evictions continue in Emdeni (Soweto). Minister of Law and Order announces that at the end of July there was 1 child under the age of 15 in detention; 12 between 16 and 17 years; and 169 men and 21 women under section 29 of the ISA.</p>	<p>15/17 Sept In Edendale 2 people are burnt to death in house; in Madakani a man is stabbed to death; in Harewood youths shoot dead 2 people.  19/20 Sept In Sinating (Pmb) a man is shot dead and another is stabbed to death; several Edendale people injured. In Bongoletu (Oudstroom) 2 people injured by special constables at party for residents released after serving sentences for public violence. Violence reported in St Wendolans, KwaMashu and KwaDobeka (Dbn), Dobsonville (Soweto), Mamelodi (Pta), Forty Second Hills (Harrismith) and in Bophuthatswana.  23/27 Sept Buses stoned in Clermont and KwaDobeka, vehicles damaged in Soweto and Guguletu (CT). Police report over 42 incidents of violence in Pmb, Durban and Greytown townships in past 3 weeks. In Nyanga (CT) brother of KTC squatter leader Yamile is shot and injured. Soweto police mount biggest anti-crime operation with 2 000 police deployed and arrest 234 people. In Lingelihle (Crocodile), a woman is burnt to death; in Marchibiso (Pmb) 3 people are killed and in nearby KwaShange, 13 Inkatha members are killed, with 6 people arrested, including 3 policemen. Sept death toll in Natal Midlands townships is 64 (Passo).</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/5 Oct Minister of Law and Order announces release of 41 children from detention; 69 under 18 years still detained. Also releases the names of further 91 people detained for more than 30 days under emergency regulations, bringing total to 1 580 since 11 June 1987. In Mamelodi 4 Azapo members, including president, are detained. UDF and Inkatha release joint statement appealing to members to stop the violence in Pmb.  6/12 Oct Stella Sigau takes over rule in Transkei after ousting George Matanzima as prime minister. In Duduza (Nigel) 4 appointed administrators are dismissed and Tvl Provincial Administration to investigate corruption, white town clerk appointed to run township. New Nation newspaper warned in terms of 6-week-old media regulations.  Cape Administrator says only 9 of 87 local authorities not functioning because of unrest, compared with 23 at beginning of year.</p>	<p>3/4 Oct In New Brighton 3 people die in arson attack on house. In Edendale (Pmb) a youth is shot dead after buses are stoned. In Hlahlogahle (Greytown) 2 men are killed in clashes.  7/11 Oct In Pmb townships 9 deaths reported in Sinating, Sweetwaters, Geargedale and Mpanzi. Nearby at Henley Dam 2 Ubusa bus inspectors are shot dead. Violence also reported in Tembisa, Clermont (Dbn), Malopo (Soweto) and Walmer (PE). In Daveyton (Benoni) a murder docket is opened and Mwaso member killed by policeman.  12/14 Oct In Edendale a burnt body is found; unrest incidents reported in Sokhile (Standerfontein), Mpanzi (Greytown), Nomandle (Molteno).</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/18 Oct In Tembisa thousands stage stayaway to protest rent evictions called by anti-eviction committee. In E Cape security police raid offices of organisations including Black Sash. Minister of National Education announces drastic measures, threatening to cut university subsidies to ensure university councils police their own campuses. Wits meeting to protest subsidy measures is banned. Commemoration service organised by KwaNcwane government for Samara Mochel; several road blocks delay hundreds and Albertina Sisulu is served with order banning her from the funeral district.  19 Oct 10th anniversary of 1977 crackdown on black consciousness organisations.  23/26 Oct In CT the president of Fedsaw is detained. In Bonteheuwel 150 teachers present petition to police commander protesting detention without trial; they demand unconditional release of 5 teachers and 18 pupils. According to DPSC 38 political prisoners on death row - 5 executed since December 1986.  29 Oct UDF executive member Qumbele and Mary Ngembu of Unemployed Workers Union detained in CT.</p>	<p>15/18 Oct Two deaths in Mpumalanga and Sinating; in Forty Second Hills (Harrismith) a youth is set alight. In Alexandria (E Cape) a priest's house is burnt; in Empongeni N Natal secretary of Cosatu is shot and injured. In Mubopane (Bop) a Cosatu official's house is destroyed. In Uitenhage more than 500 people have fled their homes in ongoing conflict between UDF and Ama-Afrika - 40 people already dead.  19/20 Oct Edendale examinations disrupted by armed men; police called in to protect pupils. In nearby Esigodeni a child is decapitated in a revenge killing; in Sabantu a policeman is shot dead. In Nyanga (CT) 2 people die and 180 squatters left homeless after fire.  21/23 Oct In Pmb townships 5 more bodies are found at Taylors Halt, Mpumalanga, Harewood and Ashdown; 324 arrests since 15 Oct. A special police team formed to crackdown on unrest.  24/25 Oct In Pmb townships 7 people are killed over the weekend.  26/28 Oct In Kimberley 4 DPSC and Cosatu offices damaged in arson attack. In Sweetwaters (Pmb) a youth is shot dead by police; in Sinating a man is stabbed to death.  Passo reports 143 deaths in Natal Midlands political violence since January - 49 this month; 154 people injured, 111 cases of damage to Pmb homes, vehicles and shops.</p>

<p>18/20 July In Maitland (CT) a limpet-mine explodes at a garage and another is uncovered nearby, a third limpet-mine is discovered by Wynberg petrolpump attendant. In District Six a limpet-mine explodes in the parking area of flats occupied by the SADF.</p> <p>21/22 July In CT a limpet-mine explodes in airport cloakroom. Police confirm and then deny Lucas Seme abducted from Swaziland police cells in Aug 1986 is in detention in SA.</p> <p>24 July In Vloeberg (Stellenbosch) a limpet-mine explodes on railway track.</p> <p>25/27 July Katlehong police seize arms after shoot-out with insurgent, no arrests or deaths. Transkei hold-up with AK47s nets only R8 000.</p> <p>28/30 July Arms cache uncovered in Mamelodi and the following day a municipal policeman is shot dead with an AK47 while guarding a house. In Jhb a bomb blast outside SADF Witwatersrand Command injures 70. Landmine near Pontdriff injures 3 people on the farm of director of SA Tourist Board.</p>	<p>1/3 Aug Near Greytown a police vehicle detonates a landmine. In Swaziland 1 person is killed and 4 injured after car, allegedly chased by SA hit squad, crashes. Piet Relief court dismisses application to have Ibrahim Ismael returned to Swaziland from where he was abducted; now facing terror charges.</p> <p>4/6 Aug Jhb motorway chase - 3 PAC guerrillas, believed to be involved in armed robbery that day, killed. In New Brighton (PE) an ANC guerrilla is killed in shootout with police. In Swaziland a South African and a Mozambican are shot dead.</p>	<p><b>1987</b></p>
<p>1/1 Aug CT Supreme Court orders state psychiatrist and magistrate to visit detainee after mother brings application. CT court cuts public violence prison sentences of 32 Zolani residents. Jhb inquest fails to find responsible for death of Alex youth, allegedly shot by police in Feb 1986. Minister of Law and Order declines to prosecute over police shootings at Kabokweni magistrates court in March.</p> <p>2/1 Aug (EL) police have 63 complaints laid against them between November and June; 1 policeman in trial on murder charge. Minister Heunis says total of 195 serious complaints over actions of police being investigated.</p> <p>3/1 Aug Minister of Law and Order pays out R35 000 to Crossroads woman, husband shot dead by police.</p> <p>4/1 Aug Supreme Court interdicts KwaNdebele police from harassing a member of the Mahlangu clan.</p> <p>5/1 Aug Pta Supreme Court commander of Fort Beaufort found not guilty on 8 counts of assault after senior police officer.</p> <p>6/1 Aug Supreme Court finds men guilty of burning villager to death. CT inquest into death of policeman De'Alh in Crossroads finds he was killed by persons unknown - application to hear oral evidence turned down. In New Brighton a man is sentenced to death for the murder of an alleged informer.</p> <p>7/1 Aug CT Supreme Court sentences 13 convicted of terrorism - Liza Ngungwana is given life sentence.</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Mbekweni (Paarl) 2 security force members are injured in grenade attack and in Emdeni (Soweto), Vosloorus (E Rand) and KwaMashu (Dbn) houses are attacked with grenades. Maseru raid on PAC residence.</p> <p>18/19 Aug In Springs a pipeline supplying water to mine is sabotaged. CT police seize arms and arrest 2 suspected ANC members and several collaborators.</p> <p>28 Aug In Maphumulo a police vehicle damaged by limpet-mine.</p>	<p><b>AUG</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>1/1 Aug Seshego (Lebowa) inquest magistrate finds 9 Lebowa policemen responsible for fatal assault on N TVI president, Peter Nchabaleng, in April 1986. Jhb magistrate convicts 2 ANC members for assault and ISA offences. Pta Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for assault in Mamelodi.</p> <p>2/1 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebishe is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 KwaNdebele detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongolethu (Loboshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with shooting a policeman - 8 co-accused sentenced on charges of public violence. PE Supreme Court sentences 2 men to death for murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Loyd and Lande appeals against sentences for 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>3/1 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering a policeman. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC court over 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>4/1 Aug In Pinelown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen trial against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one R200 admission of guilt fine.</p> <p>5/1 Aug New press curbs introduced.</p>	<p>Min of Law and Order announces in Parliament that more than 500 guerrillas were 'eliminated' by police between July 1985 and June 1986; 47 trained guerrillas and 6 collaborators are shot dead.</p> <p>1/4 Sept In Buccleuch (Jhb) police kill alleged commander of ANC unit at a road block. In Winterton a child is killed by a rifle grenade of unknown origin.</p> <p>7/13 Sept In PE 4 ANC members are sentenced to 6 years for terrorism. In Chesterville an alleged ANC member dies in confrontation with police. Near Marble Hall (E Tvl) the commanding officer of Siyabuswa police station and his son, also a policeman, are shot dead with AK 47 rifles. In Dube (Soweto) a station is damaged by an explosion. In Koster (OFS) 2 suspected ANC guerrillas are arrested at a road block; in the Alldays area (NW Tvl) 3 suspected guerrillas are shot dead in gunbattle with security forces.</p> <p>14 Sept In Emdeni (Soweto) a grenade is thrown at a police vehicle and 1 person is arrested.</p>	<p><b>AUG</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1/1 Sept Tanjies and Mielies are executed in Pretoria for killing KwaNdebele councillor and five others.</p> <p>2/1 Sept Supreme Court withdraws charges against 18 KwaNdebele residents for the death of a policeman. Pta orders Min of Law and Order to pay R300 000 to student paralysed when unlawfully shot by police in Mamelodi. Mitchells Plain resident granted out-of-court settlement after shot in eye from a cospir.</p> <p>3/1 Sept New Brighton court sentences Letsore to death for the necklaced murder of alleged police officer in 1985 - other accused all acquitted. Rand Supreme Court convicts 2 Tembisa residents of shooting a policeman - 8 co-accused sentenced on charges of public violence. PE Supreme Court sentences 2 men to death for murder of policeman in December 1985 - 5 co-accused acquitted.</p> <p>4/1 Sept Pta Supreme Court dismisses application for release of 4 KwaNdebele detainees. <i>New Nation</i> banned for distribution.</p>	<p>15 Sept In Madimba (Venda) 2 alleged ANC guerrillas shot dead by security forces. Tulu goes to Lusaka.</p> <p>17/20 Sept Zimbabwe authorities arrest anti-ANC spy, allegedly responsible for blast in Harare. Security force member is injured in landmine blast near Schoemansdal (E Tvl).</p> <p>24/25 Sept In Emdeni (Soweto) 10 people, including 2 security force members, are injured in a grenade attack. Police confirm arrest of Gordon Webster and 3 others with firearms.</p> <p>28 Sept At an Ellis Park boxing match a limpet-mine explodes under a car and another is discovered.</p>	<p><b>SEPT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>18/17 Sept CT Supreme Court acquits 2 policemen on charges of murder in Bellville unrest, as they were following the orders of a superior officer. In New Brighton 3 white policemen are charged with murdering a municipal policeman.</p> <p>17/22 Sept After court proceedings KwaNdebele drops wide-ranging police orders preventing outsiders entering homeland. New funeral restrictions implemented in Pmb townships, Greytown and Howick.</p> <p>21 Sept Supreme Court dismisses application by RMC and Weekly Mail to have emergency declared invalid, after setting 4 regulations aside. Pietersburg court sentences man to 10 years for burning a woman in December 1985 - 6 acquitted.</p> <p>22/25 Sept Grahamstown Supreme Court convicted of indecently assaulting women while in police custody. PE Supreme Court sentences 2 men to death for necklaced murder in Sandbult (Burgersdorp) in January 1986. PE court convicts 7 men under ISA for displaying ANC and Soviet flags and banners at Ganiewe in 1985. New Brighton court finds 4 people guilty of necklaced murder in January 1985 - sentences 4 years. Supreme Court orders Minister of Defence to pay R100 000 to man, injured after bullet foils stop at stop street.</p> <p>3 Sept Grahamstown Supreme Court finds 4 Uitenhage residents guilty of murder in Kobah, April 1985 - sentenced to death. In PE 5 Iboyi city police appear on charges of murder. Port Alfred Supreme Court finds 10 people guilty of murdering 3 women, 16 acquitted. Pta Supreme Court sets aside jail sentence on Albertina Sisulu for furthering ANC aims imposed in 1984. AG orders report on 10 policemen responsible for death of journalist Lucky Kutumela. Pta Supreme Court sentences ex-policeman to death for murder of man in December 1985.</p>	<p>1/6 Oct An explosion damages Lenasia NPP offices. Minister of Law and Order announces detention of 11 people in the Western Cape, including 4 regional commanders of Umkhonto we Sizwe.</p> <p>9/12 Oct Police announce arrest of 16 ANC members in Plo and Soweto, claim to have killed 37 suspected ANC members since 1 January 1987. In Kwarrielaagte a former KwaNdebele MP's house is destroyed in an explosion; in Soweto a policeman's house is damaged by a limpet-mine.</p> <p>13/14 Oct In Harare 2 anti-apartheid activists and 2 others are injured in car-bomb explosion of shopping centre - Zimbabwe blames SA. In Empangeni an explosive device in CBD Post Office robbish bin injures 5 people.</p>	<p><b>SEPT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>15 Oct Natal Supreme Court refuses application for release of Umlozi detainee. Minister of Law and Order served with claims of nearly R170 000 after Mawo meeting of Carries Foonlain in 1986.</p> <p>16 Oct Supreme Court sentences 3 men to death for murder of 3 women burnt in Kubise.</p> <p>17 Oct Deputy Minister of Constitutional Planning says 95 guns issued to <i>kiiskonstabels</i> (unrest police) used to commit crimes, including 12 murders. Disciplinary action taken against 632 for neglect of duty or overstepping authority, excl OFS and Natal police. Colonel Strydom says 55 people necklaced in 1986.</p> <p>18 Oct Pmb Supreme Court finds 3 Inkatha Youth Brigade members guilty of murdering Cosatu in Mtunzini, December 1986. Minister of Law and Order ordered to pay costs to Worcester civic centre for unlawful detention.</p>	<p>15/19 Oct Police report arrest of 2 insurgents near Messina (N Tvl). At Komotipoort a landmine blast damages a police casspir 4km from commemoration service for Somoro Machel. In Kwothemo (Springs) a policeman and his father are shot dead with AK47s. In Balho (Bloem) a man armed with a Makarov pistol is arrested; nearby in Heidedal police kill a man with a hand grenade after being fired at with AK47s. In Mbabane an ANC member is found guilty of illegal entry into Swaziland after police raid private house.</p> <p>22/25 Oct In Soweto a councillor's house is damaged by grenade; in Eldorado Park, suspected guerrillas hold up guards with AK47s and injure 2 at First National Bank. In London charges against 3 men accused of plotting to kidnap ANC leaders are dropped after 3 months. In N Natal police arrest 2 'foreign trained insurgents and a collaborator'.</p> <p>27 Oct Police claim 27 suspected ANC insurgents arrested in past 3 weeks in CT and Tvl. In Swaziland an SADF member is shot dead attempting to prevent 2 suspected insurgents returning to Swaziland; Swazi police arrest 4 people.</p>	<p><b>OCT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>1/1 Oct Rand Supreme Court sentences Tembisa youth to death for murder of policeman - co-accused sentenced to 14 years and 8 acquitted. New Brighton Magistrate acquits 2 security policemen on charges of detaining; Ciskei Supreme Court orders the release of a detainee, who is immediately redeployed to anti-subversion unit. Sister Bernard Ncube and 6 co-accused from Kagiso are released on bail after emergency detention - none are allowed to return to township. Bloem Supreme Court finds 2 men not guilty of murdering Manquang resident in November 1985.</p> <p>2/1 Oct Pietersburg court finds N Tvl Council of Churches official not guilty on 23 counts of possession and distribution of subversive literature after 380 days of detention. CT Supreme Court dismisses application for release of 17-yr-old Bantelheuwel youth. KwaZulu police ask for Plessisloer (Pmb) police station to be handed over to them as the SAP have failed to maintain Law and Order. Chiel Buthelezi and Minister of Law and Order Vlok hold talks in Ulundi.</p> <p>3/1 Oct Rand Supreme Court finds 5 Alex youths guilty of burning 'o with' to death.</p>	<p>15/19 Oct Police report arrest of 2 insurgents near Messina (N Tvl). At Komotipoort a landmine blast damages a police casspir 4km from commemoration service for Somoro Machel. In Kwothemo (Springs) a policeman and his father are shot dead with AK47s. In Balho (Bloem) a man armed with a Makarov pistol is arrested; nearby in Heidedal police kill a man with a hand grenade after being fired at with AK47s. In Mbabane an ANC member is found guilty of illegal entry into Swaziland after police raid private house.</p> <p>22/25 Oct In Soweto a councillor's house is damaged by grenade; in Eldorado Park, suspected guerrillas hold up guards with AK47s and injure 2 at First National Bank. In London charges against 3 men accused of plotting to kidnap ANC leaders are dropped after 3 months. In N Natal police arrest 2 'foreign trained insurgents and a collaborator'.</p> <p>27 Oct Police claim 27 suspected ANC insurgents arrested in past 3 weeks in CT and Tvl. In Swaziland an SADF member is shot dead attempting to prevent 2 suspected insurgents returning to Swaziland; Swazi police arrest 4 people.</p>	<p><b>OCT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>



# Conflict Chronology 9

## OPPOSITION FEUDS, STATE CRACKDOWN: The

1987	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Negotiations, Rent Boycotts, Activist Detentions</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Pietermaritzberg Clashes, Sporadic Violence</i>
<b>NOV</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p>2/5 Nov In KwaMashu the president-elect of Methodist Church is detained under ISA/529. In Grahamstown 70 black municipal policemen are dismissed after complaining their wages are lower than kitskonstabels (township unrest police). Former ANC leader Govan Mbeki released after 23 years in prison; 5 others released incl PAC's John Nkosi, the first political prisoner given a life sentence, and 2 right-wing AWB supporters. In Pmb UDF and Inkatha leaders meet to discuss ways of ending 7 months of interfactional violence in region's townships.</p> <p>7/9 Nov In Soweto SADF act to prevent unveiling ceremony for 26 victims shot dead in White City rent evictions (Aug 1986), 2 000 attend. In CT 24 women march on Parliament to demand release of family members from detention.</p> <p>13 Nov In Pmb 2 senior UDF officials, Martin Wittenburg and Skumbuzo Ngwenya are detained with 10 others during peace talks with Inkatha; UDF and Cosatu estimate 200 of their Midlands supporters now detained.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov Death toll for Sept/Oct in Pmb and Midland township violence is 143, 223 fatalities in 1987 so far, after 6 more people killed in Ashdown, Caluza, Sinati and Georgetown. Unrest reported elsewhere in Bruntville (Mooi River), Atteridgeville (Pta) and Zamdela (Sasolburg).</p> <p>6/13 Nov Inter-factional violence continues, with 2 fatalities in KwaNdengezi (Pinetown) Hammarsdale (3), Pmb townships (9), and 4 abducted men found murdered in Ashdown. In Khayelitsha (CT) a kitskonstabel and 2 teenage girls are shot dead.</p> <p>14/15 Nov In Pmb at least 5 people (3 shot by police) die in townships of Slangspruit, Sweetwaters, Dindi and Caluza, with many other incidents reported, incl in Enhlalakahle (Greytown); police arrest 289 in Pmb crime prevention operation. In KTC (CT) 2 UDF members are shot dead, one a member of shack settlement committee.</p>
<b>NOV</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p>16/18 Nov In Pmb, a further 18 UDF and Cosatu members are detained 2 days before peace talks begin, incl 2 key negotiators, Mkhize and Dladla; 29 people arrested in Edendale and Plessislaer. In Orlando West (Soweto), SADF/SAP and municipal police raid houses, give residents 3 days to pay rent arrears or face eviction.</p> <p>19/20 Nov Two Pmb UDF leaders, Ngwenya and Wittenburg released from detention; 34 Inkatha members detained in new crackdown. In Emdeni (Soweto) raids continue to help council break rent boycott. In Pta security police detain at least 6 black consciousness leaders.</p> <p>21/25 Nov UDF/Inkatha peace talks hosted by Pmb Chamber of Commerce get underway. In Regina Mundi service (Soweto), UDF leaders attempt to resolve rent crisis. Soweto City Council claims more than R143 000 collected since issue of eviction warnings four months ago. During boycott 384 rent defaulters evicted but 164 reinstated after some payment. Azapa's Jhb head office is raided by security police. In Sekhukhuleni (Lebowa) 4 Azosm members are detained; in the Ciskei wife of UDF's Rev Stofile and 5 others detained.</p>	<p>16/19 Nov In violent struggle for control of KTC, 3 people die in clashes between W Cape Civic Assoc and Masincedone Committee. Pmb violence claims 4 more lives; more than 500 homemade weapons confiscated by police and 500 arrests in past 2 months. In KwaDindi 2 KwaZulu policemen are injured in shootout with SAP. Violence also reported in Ratanda (Heidelberg), Kallehong (E Rand), Azaadville (Krugersdorp), KwaMakutho (Durban).</p> <p>21/25 Nov More Pmb fatalities in Taylors Halt, Ashdown, Mpumzu, Inadi, Sweetwaters and Mpumalanga; violence also reported in Smeru, Imbali, Dambuza, Esibuso, Edendale and Slangspruit. In KwaShange, attack on Inkatha members leaves 13 dead.</p> <p>26/27 Nov Two residents die in Ashdown and Shongweni, Natal Midlands.</p> <p>28/30 Nov In Pmb 10 deaths reported over weekend and police disperse crowd in city. In Soweto, a crime prevention swoop by 539 police nets 241 residents. In Pmb townships 4 more fatalities in Myandu, Sweetwaters and Willowsfontains, brings Midlands death toll to 61 in Nov (compared to 17 in Aug, 60 in Sept, and 83 in Oct).</p>
<b>DEC</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/6 Dec At Diepkloof prison 120 detainees sign a memorandum demanding their release. In Jhb offices of anti-apartheid groups in Khotsiso house are raided by security police, pamphlets calling for 'People's Christmas Against the Emergency' are seized. UDF peace rally in Edendale is attended by 10 000 people after anti-UDF pamphlets are distributed, amid speculation about third force role. In Athlone (CT), Mbeki Reception Committee (MRC) offices are raided by security police and materials seized.</p> <p>7/8 Dec In PE, stickers with 'Welcome our Boys back from Angola' are distributed in name of ECC. In Jhb, exec UDF member Molobi is detained. In Durban, 2 brothers from Chesterville are charged with terrorism, attempting to set up street and area committees. CT magistrate refuses permission for Mbeki rally.</p> <p>9/11 Dec Second round of Pmb peacetalks hosted by Chamber of Commerce deadlock over document issued by breakaway ANC faction, calling for destruction of Uwusa and Inkatha. In PE the regional co-ordinator of Idasa is detained. From Jhb prison 93 detainees petition the Minister of Law and Order for their release, incl 15 youth under 18 years.</p> <p>12 Dec In CT, 3 week ban placed on MRC meetings.</p>	<p>1/6 Dec In Pmb townships 7 fatalities, several injuries and houses burnt, 3 decapitated bodies found in Willowsfontain. In Kagiso an executive member of Krugersdorp Residents Association, charged with sedition, is found stabbed to death.</p> <p>7/8 Dec In Taylors Halt (Pmb), a large group of men bussed into township go on rampage killing 7 and damaging property; police arrest 28 people, totals 1120 charged with unrest-related offences in region. In Tjokville (Uitenhage) a man is beaten to death, 6 youths have been killed in clashes since mid-Nov.</p> <p>9 Dec In New Crossroads (CT) 2 kitskonstabels are injured by gunman. In Sebokeng (Vaal Triangle) an armed mutiny by 60 Lekoa Council police is put down by SAP, with 8 injured and 19 arrested after refusing to obey white commander, who is suspended later.</p> <p>12/13 Dec In Motherwell (PE) the bodies of 2 municipal policemen are found. In Meadowlands (Soweto) 2 policemen are shot dead and 4 injured in AK-47 attack. In Midland townships, 6 people are killed in Mpumalanga, Edendale, Taylors Halt, Willowsfontain, Sobantu and Camperdown. In Clermont (Pinetown) a man is stabbed to death after a house is petrolbombed.</p>
<b>DEC</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p>16 Dec Heroes Day/Day of the Vow/Day of the Africanists. In Pmb Inkatha hold peace rally at Taylors Halt and Cosatu/UDF hold report-back meeting on peacetalks. In PE, the official launch of Ama-Afrika is attended by UDF affiliates in attempt to end township violence. Diepmeadow Town Council is dissolved and former mayor of Soweto appointed as administrator, after council fails to recover outstanding rents or keep financial records in order. Diepkloof and Meadowlands residents owe about R145m in arrears.</p> <p>19/20 Dec In CT 3 SADF national servicemen are arrested under Defence Act.</p> <p>23/24 Dec Soweto Civic Assoc says residents who have rented houses for 15 years have paid for homes, while other houses should be sold at reasonable rates, all with fair service charges. Lekoa Town clerk Nik Louw is fired after suspension of Cpt de Bruins over confrontation between municipal police and SAP. KwaNdebele police release Prince Mahlangu, secretary of Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA.</p> <p>25 Dec Six ISA detainees escape from Protea police station (Soweto).</p> <p>28/31 Dec Ibhoyi Town Council taken over by white administrator. Soweto council says illegal reconnection of electricity has cost them more than R3m, council's removal of meter boxes cuts off supply. During 1987 a total of 147 DET schools were hit by boycotts or disturbances.</p>	<p>15/17 Dec Continued violence in Pmb townships claims 4 more lives. In Nyanga (CT), a police constable is shot dead and 2 injured. In Pta former offices of AWB are burnt after Supreme Court orders them to vacate premises.</p> <p>18 Dec In Nyanga (CT), shooting and grenade attack at police station injures 10 kitskonstabels and 2 civilians. Three more fatalities in Pmb.</p> <p>19/20 Dec Unrest is reported in Soweto (PE), man is burnt to death, in Kutlunong (Odendaalsrus), police injured when stoned, and in Khutsong.</p> <p>22 Dec At Henley Dam (Pmb) 4 people die in attack on Uwusa member's household, in nearby Ezakheni, police report death after man sets himself alight.</p> <p>25/27 Dec In Pmb clashes another 12 people die. Tribal faction fighting in Natal areas of Kranskop, Molweni, Cele and Bulwer leaves 16 people dead. Violence reported in Clermont and KwaMashu (Dbn), where police shoot dead man.</p> <p>28/31 Dec In Chesterville (Dbn) a man is shot and burnt to death. Violence reported in Motherwell (PE), Retreat and Bonteheuwel (CT). Eight more fatalities in Deda, Slangspruit, Taylors Halt, Dindi, and 5 more in Sinating in an ambush of mourners of a funeral. Final 1987 death toll in Pmb and Midland townships is 402, Dec the most violent month with 113 fatalities (at least 30 since Xmas).</p>
<b>1988</b> <b>JAN</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p>4 Jan In Grahamstown, Sached offices are burnt by arsonists. Diepmeadow Town Council issues warning notices to residents to settle rent arrears, no evictions in area so far.</p> <p>6/7 Jan In Jhb police ban all meetings to celebrate the 76th ANC anniversary and the release of Mbeki. One detainee on hunger strike hospitalised since mid-Dec.</p> <p>8/10 Jan In Pmb Inkatha and UDF release a joint statement calling on members to stop committing acts of violence, catholic churches hold vigils to pray for peace.</p> <p>13 Jan All 17 Manguang (Bloem) councillors appear before OFS Provincial Exco to face charges of misconduct, allegedly incl unauthorised expenditure, failure to make residents pay service charges, and budget deficit. Official Pmb death toll rises to 44 since 1 Jan after woman dies in Taylors Halt. Pmb police conference claims 246 fatalities in 1 002 unrest incidents and 605 arrests since Sept 1987.</p>	<p>1 Jan In Pmb townships 26 people die in New Years Day violence. In Dedesiwa (Beaufort West) a 14 yr-old boy is shot dead by police. In Durban trains are stoned at 3 stations after race riots on beaches, in Guguletu (CT) a kitskonstabel is shot and injured, and in Rini (Grahamstown) a municipal policeman is stabbed to death.</p> <p>4/5 Jan More fatalities in Pmb clashes, in Mbubu (3), Elandskop (1), Smeru (1), Taylors Halt (1), Deda (1), Edendale (1) and Willowsfontain (3). In Walmer (PE) a UDF supporter is killed, and in Botshabelo (Bloem) 6 people are arrested stoning buses after fare hike.</p> <p>6/7 Jan Another 5 people die in Pmb clashes and youth is killed in KwaNdengezi (Pinetown). Two black consciousness supporters killed in Walmer (PE) in renewed feuding. In Diepkloof (Soweto) the house of a security force member is petrolbombed.</p> <p>8/10 Jan In New Brighton a man is stabbed to death. In Sobantu (Pmb) a man is</p>

# National Emergency

PART II. Nov 1987 - 14 March 1988

Government Response <i>Bans, Restrictions, Court Interdicts</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent Shootouts &amp; Sabotage</i>	1987
<p>3/9 Nov In Pmb Supreme Court, 3 Slangspruit and 9 Harewood residents seek urgent interdicts to restrain Chief Zuma, an Inkatha leader from attempting to kill or assault them. David Ntombela, local Inkatha chairman of Maswazini, and 7 others ordered to show why restraining order should not be imposed, in application by Mkhize family after murder of 2 members.</p> <p>Pta Supreme Court dismisses applications for release of KwaNdebele royal heir, Prince Carmelius Mahlongu, and KwaNdebele businessman. PE Supreme Court sentences Zwide resident to death for necklaced murder of policeman in Sept 1985.</p> <p>10/11 Nov Jhb magistrate serves subpoenae on doctor to reveal identities of patients he treated for injuries received in detention. Minister of Law and Order offers R40 000 out-of-court settlement to widow of Mopopane (Pta) resident who died hours after surrendering to police in 1986. Grahamstown Supreme Court grants interdict restraining 14 kitskonstabels from assaulting or detaining 8 Hofmeyr residents. Pta Supreme Court acquits 15 yr-old youth of necklacing 71 yr-old man. Wynberg court fines policeman R1 100 for culpable homicide, driving his casspir over a shack in Langa, killing occupant.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov London High Court grants injunction to restrain former SA man from conspiring to kidnap or assault ANC members in England. CT Supreme Court refuses to grant prisoner-of-war status to ANC member Petane. Same application in Pmb Supreme Court for 4 accused in terrorism trial is also turned down. Bluehills substation on old Pta/Jhb road is damaged by bomb blast. In Pta Magistrate's Court, a security policeman admits assaulting 1 of 7 alleged PAC members facing terrorism charges.</p> <p>10/14 Nov Mbabane magistrate fines ANC member for illegally entering Swaziland and possessing firearms. British Foreign Office officials meet ANC London representative for talks. In Walvis Bay an explosive device in post office injures employee. In Camps Bay (CT) an explosion in rubbish bin injures SAOF member on 75th commemorative roadrun. In the W Tvl 3 people are arrested at roadblock and firearms seized.</p>	<p><b>NOV</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16/20 Nov Rand Supreme Court dismisses application for release of Zwelokhe Sisulu, New Nation editor. East London magistrate acquits policeman on charges of assaulting 7 yr-old. In Pmb Supreme Court, 4 Inkatha members restrained from committing acts of violence against 2 Imbali residents.</p> <p>23/27 Nov Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses second appeal by Mamelodi Town Council against earlier court ruling that 1984 rent increases were invalid. Pmb Supreme Court restrains police from killing or assaulting UDF negotiator, Dladla. Bisha Supreme Court grants Mdantsane (Ciskei) resident interdict against police torture. In PE police ban Mbeki rally after earlier approval is granted by local magistrate. In Pta, Minister of Home Affairs invokes new emergency regulations against New Nation newspaper, paving the way for later 3-month banning.</p> <p>28/30 Nov In Namakgale (Lebowa), Nactu president and 54 FBWU workers are detained after meeting is banned. In the Transkei, ex-president Kaiser Matanzima is detained, following the September 1987 coup which ousted prime-minister George Matanzima.</p>	<p>16/22 Nov In South Hills (Jhb) a limpetmine is defused in the post office. In Soweto, Zola municipal offices are damaged by a bomb. Near Zeerust (W Tvl) an anti-tank mine is uncovered.</p> <p>23 Nov In the Otoshoop district a landmine is defused. In Umlazi 2 ANC members and an alleged collaborator are killed by police using grenades, 2 policemen injured. Near CT station a limpetmine is defused. Pretoria sends warning note to Botswana over 'large scale ANC infiltration'. Nigeria offers military training facilities to black nationalists from South Africa.</p> <p>25 Nov Piet Retief terror trialist, Ebrahim, sues Minister of Law and Order for kidnapping, unlawful detention and torture. A senior MK member, Ebrahim was abducted, along with Swiss couple and Swazi national, by security forces from Swaziland in Dec 1986. In Piet Retief area 2 landmines are uncovered.</p> <p>30 Nov In Dube (Soweto) 3 limpetmine blasts damage police training centre and barracks.</p>	<p><b>NOV</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1/3 Dec Ka-Gapane (Lebowa) magistrate indefinitely postpones inquest into N Tvl student leader Ramapole, who died on 19 Oct 1985 after being arrested by Lebowa police. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining police from assaulting or killing Mpumalanga court clerk. Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses appeal by 'the Sharpeville Six' against death sentences for killing of a Lekoa deputy mayor (Sept 1984); in the past 2 years 44 people sentenced to death in political violence trials, with 5 executed. (During 1987, 164 people were executed in Pretoria prison, highest number since 1910.) Pta Supreme Court sentences 2 former security policemen to 14 yrs jail, for spying for ANC. Dbn Supreme Court convicts Umlozi youth of murder of policeman.</p> <p>7/11 Dec Pta Supreme Court orders release of a former KwaNdebele magistrate, who is immediately rearrested. Pta magistrate finds SADF member not guilty of attempted murder of witness to Ribiero's killing (Dec 1985) in Mamelodi.</p> <p>12/14 Dec Rand Supreme Court dismisses application for release of UDF leaders Morobe and Moosa. Mbeki restricted to PE magisterial district and prohibited from giving press interviews. CT Supreme court sentences kitskonstabel to death for murdering man in Crossroads, no indemnity under emergency regulations.</p>	<p>9 Dec In Mbabane 4 ANC members are arrested in Swazi police raid. In Soweto (PE) 4 suspected ANC members are killed in shootout with security forces. In CT, ANC leader Petane is imprisoned for 17 years in terrorism trial.</p> <p>12/14 Dec In QwaQwa a suspected insurgent is arrested, and in Swaziland paramilitary police raid ANC homes in Mbabane.</p>	<p><b>DEC</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16 Dec At Nylstroom prison, 25 detainees write open letter to Minister of Law and Order to demand release before Xmas. In East London ECC chairperson is detained with a UCT researcher.</p> <p>22/29 Dec Pta Supreme Court orders SA government and KwaNdebele to release 3 detained activists; arrests and detention are unlawful as the three were taken from Jhb by homeland police. Also orders KwaNdebele to release 2 schoolteachers from detention.</p> <p>31 Dec General Holomisa, head of Transkei's defence force, stages second coup in homeland in 3 months, ousting Stella Sigcau.</p> <p>A total of 9 194 people were detained in 1987, and an estimated 25 000 detained since emergency was declared in June 1986. During 1987 more than 1 338 youths under the age of 18 were detained under the emergency regulations, but only 343 charged. About 50% of all those detained in 1987 were released without being charged, 15% of known detainees were brought to court and only 3,46% convicted.</p>	<p>15 Dec Near Bloemfontein a suspected ANC insurgent is killed when his own grenade detonates at a roadblock. In Emdeni (Soweto) a house is damaged in another grenade explosion.</p> <p>17 Dec A Soweto cinema is damaged by an explosive device.</p> <p>29/30 Dec In QwaQwa police arrest another alleged ANC insurgent and 2 locally trained members. In Kroonstad, Dutch ANC member Pastoors - linked to Ebrahim trial in Messina - is caught while allegedly attempting to escape from prison. Police figures for the first 9 months of 1987 show '132 trained terrorists arrested and 32 killea', with 195 guerilla attacks between Jan and Oct.</p>	<p><b>DEC</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>8/11 Jan PE magistrate finds KwoZakele resident was unlawfully detained and assaulted by Ibhayt municipal policeman. Sarhwi president and 6 officials released on eve of court challenge, detained under ISA/S29 for over 6 months after railway strike.</p> <p>13 Jan Former mayor of Thokoz township and town clerk are charged with theft from town council.</p>	<p>8/11 Jan In Francistown (Botswana) an ANC member is shot dead by an unknown gunman. In Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) 2 people die in a car bomb explosion outside an ANC residence.</p> <p>12 Jan In Soweto an ANC insurgent is shot dead by police and 6 'collaborators' arrested. In Carletonville, a high school is damaged by an explosion. In the Transkei a detainee, former MK and Sactu official, is shot dead by security forces.</p>	<p><b>1988</b> <b>JAN</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>

<b>1988</b>	<b>Non-Collaboration Politics</b> <i>Negotiations, Rent Boycotts, Activist Detentions</i>	<b>Civil Unrest</b> <i>Pietermaritzberg Clashes, Sporadic Violence</i>
		shot dead, with unrest also in KwaMakhuta (Dbn) and Rockville (Soweto). <b>11/12 Jan</b> In Boipatong (Voal Triangle) security forces shoot dead 1 man; in Sweetwaters (Pmb) a youth is stabbed to death, with unrest in Fortv. Second Hills (Harrismith). In CT townships 3 security patrols are shot at in Khayelitsha and Newlands.
<b>JAN</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i>	<p><b>15 Jan</b> In Tshiawello (Soweto), 6 families evicted for rent arrears. Paarl magistrate postpones funeral of youth killed in police action in Dec. Education officials claim 100% turnout of African pupils as primary and secondary schools reopen.</p> <p><b>20/21 Jan</b> In Jhb, RMC offices are raided by security police and material seized. In Soweto rent evictions continue in Klipspruit, Naledi and Tshiawello.</p> <p><b>25 Jan</b> Pmb Chamber of Commerce meets with Chief Minister of KwaZulu in ongoing peace initiative. In Jhb, Sahrwu shop steward is released from 9 months detention after 33-day hunger strike; 11 shop stewards still in detention after pre-May 1987 election strike. In Dbn, Cosatu regional secretary for S Natal is detained.</p> <p><b>26/27 Jan</b> In PE, 5 000 municipal tenants owe over R1,25m in rents, 12 families evicted during Jan. Soweto City Council continues to employ SADF/SAP in rent raids, claims highest success rate. In Taylors Halt (Pmb) bus drivers stop work after bus driver is shot, 10 killed since May 1987. Uitenhage town clerk to take action against rent defaulters in shack areas.</p> <p><b>28/31 Jan</b> Minister of Law and Order says no children younger than 14 yrs held under emergency regulations, one 14 yr-old held, and 'a few' aged 15 and 16 yrs. In Mannenberg (CT) 3 teachers and a pupil are detained. After 15 000 Inkatha members attend Sweetwaters rally, raid on UDF area, Ashdown, leads to more clashes and stayaway on 1 Feb by workers to guard property.</p>	<p><b>15/17 Jan</b> Pmb unrest fatalities in Hammarsdale (1), Taylors Halt (1), in Mpumalanga (1), Mpumaza (1), Mafunzi (3), and Mafakotini (1). In Fikhalale (Greytown) violence 3 people, incl a baby, are killed. In Bongolethu (Oudtshoorn) 3 people are killed in clashes with police, unrest also in Mallowanawana (Steyns), Sebokeng and Michausdal (Cradock). In Mdantsane (EL), police disperse mourners at funeral of anti-apartheid campaigner and 3 yr-old daughter killed 3 weeks ago.</p> <p><b>18/19 Jan</b> In Mpumalanga 6 men are killed in 2 AK-47 attacks, with another 6 fatalities in Sweetwaters, Henley Dam, Taylors Halt, KwaShange and Elandskop (Pmb). Violence reported in Sakhile (Standerfontein) and KwaNdengezi (Pinetown).</p> <p><b>20/24 Jan</b> In Pmb townships 2 youths killed, with 11 more deaths over weekend. Violence also in Ikakeng (Potchefstroom), Bethal, and Kokstad where man is killed after cars are stoned. In Crossroads (CT) a kitskonstabel is shot, 14th injured in area since Dec.</p> <p><b>25 Jan</b> Four people die in Pmb townships. In Soweto, Siculo Dromo, a DPSC worker is found shot dead, detained previous week over foreign TV interview.</p> <p><b>27/28 Jan</b> Pmb violence claims 6 more lives. Violence erupts again in KTC camp after hit squad assassinates Masincedane clan leader and destroys property of 2 other members. Violence reported in Bongolethu and Niha (Lindley OFS).</p> <p><b>29/31 Jan</b> In KTC clashes at least 5 fatalities and 300 homeless after 50 shacks burnt, residents flee area. Another 14 people die in Pmb feuds, reaching 161 death toll in Jan, the worst month of clashes.</p>
<b>FEB</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p><b>1/3 Feb</b> Ashdown (Pmb) residents stay away from work to protect homes after Inkatha members go on rampage in UDF-aligned township. Four people die, with more police reinforcements brought in as 100's flee Ashdown and Mpumaza. Sobantu (Pmb) high school closed, with clashes feared between UDF and Azapo/Azasm. Police arrest 46 people in Pmb city centre after 100 Inkatha youths bussed into town attack Cosatu offices. In CT, 1 000's of pupils return to school after 3 week delay over late registration issue. In Soweto, DET refuses to release matric results to former detainees.</p> <p><b>4 Feb</b> Rent boycott by Soweto residents since June 1986 has cost council R132m in arrears, town clerk Malan says 30% of residents now paying rents. Mayor of Atteridgeville and 2 councillors suspended over irregularities.</p> <p><b>10/11 Feb</b> In Pmb, UDF Midlands secretary Wittenburg and Ngwenya, members of peace committee, are redetained with 3 other UDF officials.</p> <p><b>12/14 Feb</b> In Sweetwaters (Pmb), a 70 yr-old man is killed after supporting court application against Inkatha on 12 Feb, wife and daughter injured. Official records show 234 people under 18 yrs in detention in SA, 169 from Natal. During 1987, 1 338 people under 18 were detained and only 343 were charged.</p>	<p><b>1/2 Feb</b> Renewed lightning in KTC squatter camp claims another life, over 400 shacks destroyed in past 5 days leave 3 000 homeless. In Guguletu (CT) a man is stoned to death.</p> <p><b>3/4 Feb</b> In Ashdown and Taylors Halt (Pmb), 2 people stabbed to death, and in Mpumalanga a policeman and friend are shot dead. KTC patrolled by armed Masincedane supporters, to enforce curfew after 6 deaths.</p> <p><b>5/7 Feb</b> More fatalities in Pmb (3) and KwaNdengezi (Pinetown); a Cayco member is killed in KTC. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) a man is shot dead by municipal police; unrest also in Sharpeville and Wesseltown (Ermelo).</p> <p><b>8/10 Feb</b> In Protea (Soweto) a youth is shot dead after attack on municipal police, violence also in KwaThema (Springs) and Emoyolweni (Hofmeyr). Coup in Bophuthatswana put down by SADF who reinstate President Mongope.</p> <p><b>11/12 Feb</b> In Clermont (Pinetown), wife of advocate is shot dead outside her shop; in Hammarsdale, a pupil is abducted by armed men from classroom and shot dead.</p> <p><b>13/14 Feb</b> In Kakamas (N Cape), police shoot dead 2 children (4 and 14 yrs), allegedly throwing stones during narcotics raid - police sergeant later suspended. In Slutterheim a man is shot dead by police. More fatalities in Pmb, Caluza (1), Shongweni (2), Taylors Halt (4), KwaNdengezi (3).</p>
<b>FEB</b> <i>2nd &amp; 3rd weeks</i>	<p><b>16 Feb</b> In White City (Soweto), 15 more families evicted for non-payment of rent and furniture confiscated; town clerk claims arrears of R200m, SCA disputes figures. In CT more than 150 teachers ordered to return to work after occupying DET offices for 2 hours.</p> <p><b>17 Feb</b> White City residents stay away from work to resist evictions, police disperse 1 000 people outside municipal offices after 28 families are evicted.</p> <p><b>18 Feb</b> CT teachers at black schools return to classes after refusing to teach for 3 days, protesting DET refusal to extend deadline for late registration of pupils.</p> <p><b>20/23 Feb</b> In Guguletu police confiscate coffin of KTC violence victim, claim funeral restrictions not complied with; in KTC 4 members of church mediating committee arrested and charged with arson. At Soshanguve technikon (Pta) 1 700 students on boycott sent home, after police action in which 68 students are assaulted. In KwaThema the national organiser of Azasm is detained. W Cape chairman of NECC released after 1 month in detention. Minister of Law and Order releases names of 976 more people detained for over 30 days under emergency regulations.</p> <p><b>24/25 Feb</b> In wake of new state crackdown, 100's of activists go into hiding after restriction orders are placed on 18 people and many groups. In CT, 4 detainees released, incl UDF's Zoli Malindi and Christmas Tinto, all served with restriction orders.</p> <p><b>26 Feb</b> Soweto debt for water and electricity is about R80m, to recover arrears council plans further electricity cuts, removal of meters and substations, unless estimated 40 000 illegal users start paying.</p> <p><b>27/29 Feb</b> Nationwide services held on tenth anniversary of death of PAC founder president, Robert Sobukwe. In CT, 150 clergymen arrested after attempted march on parliament to protest state clampdown on 17 organisations.</p>	<p><b>15/16 Feb</b> In Mafunze and Caluza (Pmb) 2 men die, and nearby in Sweetwaters, mutilated body of youth is found. Violence also in Ezakheni (Ladysmith) and KwaMakhutha (Durban). In Khayelitsha (CT) a kitskonstabel is injured in attack.</p> <p><b>17/18 Feb</b> In Kraaitfontein (CT) a school is stoned, and in KwaThema (W Rand), homes of 5 school principals, vehicles are petrolbombed; with police action in Moraniani (Dewetsdorp) and Soshanguve (Pta) technikon. Pmb church leaders estimate 60 000 residents have been displaced by ongoing violence.</p> <p><b>20/22 Feb</b> In Mpumalanga an Inkatha leader is stabbed to death, police arrest 15 youths. An Imbali resident dies in hospital, allegedly shot by Inkatha leader Zuma, a day before interdict granted to restrain latter. Violence in KwaMakhutha (Dbn) and Dindi (Pmb).</p> <p><b>24 Feb</b> In Pmb armed groups clash in city centre, several arrested, and in nearby Imbali township, a man is stabbed to death. In Grassy Park (CT) a school is petrolbombed, and in Ikakeng (Potchefstroom) several schools are stoned.</p> <p><b>25/26 Feb</b> In KwaNdengezi (Pinetown) a man is shot dead, and nearby in Haza, 2 men are shot dead and 2 youths injured. In nearby Clermont wife of deputy speaker of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is injured in armed attack on home. Renewed violence in KTC leaves 2 people dead and 20 shacks destroyed; SADF erects barbed wire fence to keep warring groups apart and installs floodlights. In Kallehong, a Seawuse shop steward is shot dead.</p> <p><b>27/28 Feb</b> Clermont man, headmaster and advisory board member, is shot dead. In Oukasie (Brits) a house is burnt by arsonists after 2 weeks of tension and detention of 15 community leaders.</p>
<b>MAR</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i>	<p><b>1 Mar</b> New black consciousness movement, the ACC, formed to fill vacuum left by government bannings; deputy director detained 2 days later. In Pmb 300 new kitskonstabels begin duty after 8 weeks on training course.</p> <p><b>4 Mar</b> In parliament names of 66 more emergency detainees released, totals 2 622 since 11/6/87; 17 596 held for more than 30 days since emergency declared in June 1986. According to Minister Heunis, black local authorities owed more than R321,2m in Tvl; R16,9m in OFS; R2,5m in Natal and R46,9m in Cape, mostly because of rent boycotts. In Dobsonville (Soweto) 20 more families evicted.</p> <p><b>7/9 Mar</b> After new state bans the Committee for Defence of Democracy (CDD) is launched in CT by churchmen, incl Tutu and Boesak, and anti-apartheid activists. In Jhb, 50 Fedtraw women present petition to Chamber of Mines, calling on them to oppose LRA amendment bill and pressurise government to lift restrictions. UCT student march to protest bannings is dispersed by riot police. In Pmb 5 kitskonstabels are discharged for alleged involvement in crimes, one arrested who is second respondent in interdict in Imbali violence and Inkatha youth member.</p> <p><b>13 Mar</b> On National Detainees Day 2 000 attend prayer meeting at Regina Mundi church in Soweto.</p>	<p><b>1/2 Mar</b> In KwaNdengezi (Pinetown) a youth is decapitated, and in Ximba (Camperdown), a member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is shot dead in AK-47 attack.</p> <p><b>4/6 Mar</b> In Sobantu (Pmb) another decapitated body is found, and in Pmb, a kitskonstabel kills a colleague. In Clermont (Dbn) a second advisory board member is assassinated, and nearby in KwaNdengezi, a man is stabbed to death. In KwaMakhutha (Dbn) a man is shot dead by police and 4 injured. In Soweto 5 undertakers are beaten to death and burnt after rumours of gangs in hearses who abduct children. Violence also in Magabeni (Umkomaas) and Tembisa (Kempton Park).</p> <p><b>7/10 Mar</b> In KwaNdengezi and Shongweni, two men are shot dead. In Belville Reverend Boesak's house is attacked, violence also in Louwville (Vredenburg).</p> <p><b>14 Mar</b> In Mhlabeng a man is stoned to death. Minister of Justice reports that there are 165 unrest cases awaiting trial in Pmb, involving 400 accused.</p> <p>Decreasing sharply from death toll in Feb, 14 Pmb fatalities in March is lowest since June 1987 (12). Worst months of interfacional violence in Pmb townships were Sept 1987 (60) to Feb 1988 (50), peaking between Dec (113) and Jan (161).</p>

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Bans, Restrictions, Court Interdicts</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Insurgent Shootouts &amp; Sabotage</i>	<b>1988</b>																												
<p>14 Jan CT police ban all meetings aimed at encouraging boycotts at black schools until the end of month. Grahamstown Supreme Court orders 2 policemen and 12 kitskonstabels to refrain from assaulting inhabitants of Thembalesizwe (Aberdeen).</p>																														
<p>18/19 Jan Rand Supreme Court sentences Alex youth to 9 years for necklace murder. Grahamstown Supreme Court sentences 4 Kwezi (Hanover) residents to death for killing man in 1985 unrest. In CT senior police investigate alleged police torture of 2 Nyanga pupils after attending Idasa meeting. CT Supreme Court grants interim interdict to restrain police from unlawfully shooting or killing residents of Bongoletu (Oudshoorn). Pta Supreme Court restrains KwaNdebele police from assaulting 2 emergency detainees, and keeping them in unhygienic conditions. 23 Jan Jhb funeral of Percy Qoboza, editor of City Press, who died of natural causes, restricted under emergency regulations. 25 Jan Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict to restrain 3 Inkatha members, incl an Imbali town councillor, from killing or assaulting Imbali resident and 4 sons. PE regional court fines kitskonstabel for murder of colleague, magistrate finds inadequate 6 week training course to be a mitigating circumstance. 28/29 Jan Pmb Supreme Court grants temporary interdict against Inkatha leader Zuma, after 2 members of Mthembu family injured. CT police extend ban on advising or encouraging pupil boycotts of black schools in the W Cape.</p>	<p>19 Jan In Lusaka a bomb explodes outside ANC office, 2 Zambian children are injured. 24 Jan In Kokstad, explosion in country club of unknown origin.</p>	<p><b>JAN</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>																												
<p>1 Feb Pmb Supreme Court extends interdict against Inkatha leaders Zuma, Ntombela and 7 others, to restrain them from attacking Mkize family. Also in Pmb, 3 Descom officials summonsed on charges under Fund Raising Act alter police investigations last year. 4/5 Feb In CT a military tribunal sentences 3 SADF members to 18 months in detention for conspiring to commit an offence, allegedly leaking information on anti-ECC campaign. Pmb magistrate refuses permission for Inkatha rally at Taylors Hall. 11 Feb In 87/88 financial year police paid out R1,2m in 126 cases of injuries resulting from police action; paid out R192 626 as a result of unlawful arrests.  12 Feb CT Supreme Court declares subsidy conditions imposed on UCT and UWC administrations to discipline student protests, to be invalid. Grahamstown Supreme Court extends interim order to restrain 14 kitskonstabels from acting unlawfully against all Hofmeyr township residents. Dbn Supreme Court imprisons policeman for 2 years for his part in death of 17 yr-old KwaNdegezi youth in Feb 1986.</p>	<p>4/5 Feb In Brussels (Belgium) 1 person is injured by shots fired at ANC offices. Transkei police shoot 3 suspected insurgents.    13/14 Feb Near Messina a farmhouse is attacked by rockets and grenades, limpet mines found in follow-up operations; SA warns Zimbabwe government it will launch hot pursuit operations.</p>	<p><b>FEB</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>																												
<p>15/16 Feb CT Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay R6 000 damages to man shot and assaulted by police in Crossroads; in separate case minister agrees to R35 000 out-of-court settlement to CT advocate arrested and charged under emergency regulations. Pmb Supreme Court extends 3 interim interdicts to restrain Inkatha leaders and members from threatening or attempting to kill certain township residents. Charges laid against 254 Pmb residents, now awaiting trial. 17 Feb Rand Supreme Court application by detained UDF publicity secretary, Eric Molobe, fails to win release. Minister of Law and Order undertakes in CT Supreme Court to ensure 15 kitskonstabels in Bongoletu would not unlawfully kill, assault, detain or arrest any resident. 22/23 Feb PE Supreme Court sentences man to death for second conviction of necklace murder, 2 others also sentenced to death for murder of police informer in 1985 KwaNobuhle violence. Also in PE, a youth is convicted of necklace killing of Azapo member outside UDF leader's house. In Dbn on informal inquest into death of Victoria Mxenge (Aug 1985) finds she was murdered by persons unknown, but recommends further AG investigation. In controversial move, magistrate refuses to hear oral evidence. 24 Feb Government cracks down on extra-parliamentary groups, gazettes new regulations in terms of Public Safety Act which prohibit 17 organisations from performing any acts or activities, whatsoever.</p>	<p>15 Feb In Tembisa 3 people are injured in grenade explosion in shebeen.    17 Feb In Lusaka 4 Dutch Reformed churchmen hold talks with ANC. 19 Feb Government lists 2 senior ANC members, Pallo Jordan and Gqibo, not to be quoted. 20/21 Feb In Osizweni (Newcastle) police van is attacked by gunmen with AK-47's, injuring 2 policemen. 22 Feb In London police agree to allow ANC access to most of 3 000 documents covering ANC kidnap plot and trial. 26/28 Feb In Mdantsane a limpetmine is discovered near police station. At Jon Smuts airport in Jhb, 2 replica limpetmines are detonated by police.</p>	<p><b>FEB</b> 2nd &amp; 3rd weeks</p>																												
<p>1/2 Mar KTC (CT) is declared a restricted area under emergency regulations, open only to residents. In Parliament a bill is tabled to prevent overseas funds being sent to organisations incl trade unions, church, student and community groups. Minister of Law and Order pays schoolgirl R15 000 in out-of-court settlement over police action. 3/5 Mar Wynberg magistrate finds policeman negligent in death of 3 children in 'Trojan Horse' incident in Athlone Oct 1985, refer case to AG for decision on prosecution. Conscientious objector Ivan Toms, given maximum sentence for refusing to serve in military camp. Grahamstown Supreme Court extends interim interdict for third time, granting 8 Hofmeyr residents protection from 14 kitskonstabels. CT Supreme Court restrains Minister of Defence from placing 3 convicted SADF conscripts in detention barracks. Pta Supreme Court overturns police prohibition on Moutse residents travelling to Bloemfontein to hear appeal against incorporation into KwaNdebele. 8/9 Mar Rand Supreme dismisses application by New Nation against 3-month banning. 12/14 Mar Government prohibits new CCD from performing any activities. Pmb Supreme Court rules subsidy conditions imposed on University of Natal are invalid. CT Supreme Court reserves judgement in application to re-open inquest into death of George De'Ath, ITN journalist killed in Crossroads, request for oral evidence to be heard.</p>	<p>1 Mar In Benoni a limpet-mine explodes near bus transporting SAAF personnel. 4 Mar In Mlungisi (Queenstown) 2 men are killed and 6 policemen injured in shootout and grenade attack. 8 Mar In Soweto municipal police are attacked with AK-47s and grenades at Phiri hall. 10 Mar PE regional court convicts 3 PAC members on charges of terrorism.</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>ACC Azanian Co-ordinating Committee</td> <td>ISA Internal Security Act</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AWB African Workers' Movement</td> <td>LRA Labour Relations Act</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Asanyu Azanian National Youth Unity</td> <td>MIK Abibonke we Sizwe</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Asapa Azanian Peoples Organisation</td> <td>MIRC Abibonke Reception Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Asosm Azanian Students Movement</td> <td>Mactru National Council of Trade Unions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Coyco Cape Youth Congress</td> <td>NECC National Education Crisis Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CCD Committee for the Defence of Democracy</td> <td>PAC Pan Africanist Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions</td> <td>Sached SA Council for Higher Education</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DET Department of Education and Training</td> <td>Sactu SA Congress of Trade Unions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee</td> <td>Sakruwu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ECC End Conscription Campaign</td> <td>Sayco SA Youth Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FBWU Food and Beverage Workers Union</td> <td>SCA Soweto Civic Assoc</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fedizaw Federation of Townsfolk Women</td> <td>LUDW University of Durban Westville</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Idasa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA</td> <td>UWUSA United Workers Union of SA</td> </tr> </table>	ACC Azanian Co-ordinating Committee	ISA Internal Security Act	AWB African Workers' Movement	LRA Labour Relations Act	Asanyu Azanian National Youth Unity	MIK Abibonke we Sizwe	Asapa Azanian Peoples Organisation	MIRC Abibonke Reception Committee	Asosm Azanian Students Movement	Mactru National Council of Trade Unions	Coyco Cape Youth Congress	NECC National Education Crisis Committee	CCD Committee for the Defence of Democracy	PAC Pan Africanist Congress	Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions	Sached SA Council for Higher Education	DET Department of Education and Training	Sactu SA Congress of Trade Unions	DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee	Sakruwu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union	ECC End Conscription Campaign	Sayco SA Youth Congress	FBWU Food and Beverage Workers Union	SCA Soweto Civic Assoc	Fedizaw Federation of Townsfolk Women	LUDW University of Durban Westville	Idasa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA	UWUSA United Workers Union of SA	<p><b>MAR</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
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# Conflict Chronology 10

## SECOND NATIONAL EMERGENCY ENDS

1988	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>The Big Stayaway, Rent &amp; School Boycotts</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Pietermaritzburg Feuds, Regional Violence</i>
<p><b>MAR</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>17 Mar International outcry over impending execution of 'Sharpeville 6'; 29 Black Sash members are arrested and Wits students dispersed in protests. 21 Mar Nationwide stayaway to commemorate 28th anniversary of Sharpeville shootings and third anniversary of Langa (E Cape) shootings. In Soweto most residents observe call; in Pta, CT and Pmb most workers show up; strong observance of stayaway in Uitenhage, PE and Durban. A Cosatu spokesperson says federation did not encourage workers to observe stayaway. School pupils in Natal, E Cape and Soweto boycott classes. Police disperse students at UDW who allegedly enforce boycott. In Sharpeville, 1 000 attend Nactu service and clean graves of 1961 martyrs.</p>	<p>16/17 Mar Violence reported in Inanda (Dbn), Botshabelo (Bloemfontein) and Bishop Lavis (CT). In Chesterville (Dbn), a youth wanted for petrol bombings is shot dead by SAP. 19/20 Mar In Botshabelo houses are burnt and a policeman is injured; in KwaNdegezi (Pinetown) a house is attacked, and nearby in Clermont, a bus is burnt. In Zola (Soweto), a woman accused of being a witch is burnt to death. In Mpumalanga (Hammarsdale) 2 men are killed, and in Ashdown (Pmb), a man is stabbed to death in interethnic violence. 21/23 Mar In Ntuzuma (Dbn), Clermont and Inanda buses are withdrawn after 20 are stoned. Nearby in Mariannhill a train is stoned, and in Inchanga (Hammarsdale), a man is injured in petrol bomb attack. Two unrest fatalities in Hammarsdale and Imbali (Pmb). Community Resource Information Centre offices in Jhb are gutted by fire, the second arson attack in a month. 24/27 Mar In Ashdown a man is stabbed to death; in Mpumalanga a woman is shot dead, and nearby in Geordedale (Hammarsdale), a man is stabbed to death. In Motherwell (PE) a substation is damaged in an arson attack. Violence also in Imbali, Inanda, Tembisa (Kempton Park) and Kagiso (Krugersdorp). 29 Mar In Soweto a policeman is shot and injured. Houses attacked in Umlazi (Dbn) and a woman is shot and injured in Mpumalanga.</p>
<p><b>APR</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>3 Apr Black Sash members place crosses on Durban beach to commemorate the 4 killed in SADF Botswana raid. 6 Apr Soweto rent defaulters have home front doors removed in effort to force residents to pay rent/service charges. 14 Apr In Tembisa (Kempton Park) a man is arrested after allegedly intimidating others to damage water and electricity meters.</p>	<p>1/3 Apr Political violence reported throughout country. In Lingelihle (Cradock) woman is stoned to death; while in Creighton (Natal midlands) 3 die in ethnic faction fight. 4/5 Apr Four die in Natal townships; in 'Tambo Square' (Guguletu - CT) white Community Services official is shot dead while repairing burst pipe. 9/12 Apr In Shongweni (Hillcrest) 6 unrest fatalities, and in KwaNobuhle, 1 fatality. SAP arrest 3 Mpumalanga residents in connection with murder of boy. 14 Apr In Duduza a vehicle belonging to private security firm is set alight.</p>
<p><b>APR</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15 Apr Organisers of conference at UNP on Natal midlands conflict refuse Natal SAP security branch head, Colonel Buchner, permission to attend. 19/20 Apr School in Khayelitsha closed after pupil boycott and parent protest. Vaal Triangle businessmen invite Ministers de Klerk and Viljoen to meeting to resolve rent boycott. In KoNgwane 700 pupils allowed to return to college if they drop SRC demand. 21/24 Apr In Kagiso municipal police remove roofs and furniture from rent defaulters' homes. In Vaal Triangle 5 000 residents demand reduced rents of R30 a month, all councillors to resign and an end to evictions. Cape Democrats group formed for liberal white supporters of UDF. 25/27 Apr Azapo makes Rand court application to declare Emergency restrictions invalid. Thousands of Cape Flats pupils boycott classes for 3 days in efforts to: get DET to re-admit about 1 500 African pupils who refused to register according to DET criteria; win the release of detained scholars and teachers; abolish corporal punishment; and end police harassment. 28 Apr Thousands of Soweto and Tembisa pupils boycott classes because of detentions of colleagues and teachers. Released ANC member, Govan Mbeki, launches legal challenge to State of Emergency promulgation.</p>	<p>15 Apr In Mpumalanga a man is shot dead by unknown gunman. In Mitchell's Plain (CT) a delivery vehicle is stoned. 18/19 Apr Police and students clash in Cape Town after series of meetings held to express solidarity with 'Sharpeville 6'. In Bonteheuwel (CT) scholars stone vehicle. In Edendale (Pmb) violence a woman is stabbed to death. 20 Apr In Lindelani (KwaMashu) pupil is killed at school. Stoning incidents occur in Mitchell's Plain and Botshabelo. 22/24 Apr Widespread street violence affects Cape Peninsula townships. In Osizaweni (Newcastle) a youth is shot dead by unidentified persons. 28 Apr In Cape Peninsula a school and bus are petrol bombed.</p>

PART III: 15 March - 10 June 1988

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Interdicts, Press Restrictions, Unrest Trials</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Low-Intensity Warfare</i>	<b>1988</b>
<p>17/18 Mar Pta court grants 'Sharpeville 6' a one month reprieve in lost minute court action. Jhb court quashes case of sedition against Sister Bernard Ncube and 14 other Kagiso residents, who plan to sue Minister of Law and Order for R5,5m for unlawful arrest.</p> <p>21/22 Mar Howick inquest magistrate finds 9 Inkatha members responsible for killing of 3 Mpophomeni residents and refers charges to AG. Pmb court grants 2 temporary interdicts to restrain Inkatha leaders from killing township resident and 3 sons, and to restrain policeman.</p> <p>21/28 Mar In Natal midlands conflict mass detentions take place in Ashdown (259) and Sobantu (218), only 12 are charged with unrest crimes. Pta court rejects final appeal to halt execution of Michael Lucas, for murdering bus driver in Oudtshoorn (1985). Minister of Home Affairs warns seventh paper, Oudtshoorn's <i>Saamstaan</i> under Emergency press regulations.</p> <p>29/30 Mar Pmb court extends interim interdict to restrain Imbali councillor from attacking 6 residents. Grahamstown court sentences 4 to death for murdering KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) police informer in Oct 1985. Bloemfontein appeal court upholds appeal to allow detainee to take part in court proceedings. Ciskeian magistrate finds 3 men guilty of terrorism.</p> <p>31 Mar Government extends ban for further year on outdoor meetings promoting educational boycotts or illegal strikes. Kitskonstabel sentenced to 6 months in jail for contempt of earlier court order issued after he assaulted residents of Thembalesizwe (Aberdeen).</p>	<p>17/18 Mar In Krugersdorp car bomb explosion outside magistrate's court kills 3 and injures 20. In Atteridgeville (Pta) 3 policemen are shot dead in AK-47 attack.</p> <p>22/24 Mar In Maseru (Lesotho) ANC member is shot dead while under guard in hospital. On Botswana border 3 suspected guerillas are killed in shootout with SADF.</p> <p>27/28 Mar In Pietersburg a mini limpet mine explodes outside Holiday Inn. In Brussels (Belgium) a 17kg bomb is defused outside ANC offices. In Lusaka an ex-SADF serviceman is sent to jail for 50 years after being convicted on 3 counts of spying on ANC. SADF raids house in Gaborone, killing 4 people (a South African refugee and 3 Botswana nationals). SA alleges ANC commander who masterminded 47 attacks in SA is killed in raid. In Venda 4 alleged guerillas are killed and 1 arrested in contact with SADF.</p> <p>29 Mar In Paris ANC representative, Dulcie September is assassinated outside office. Western security networks allege SA complicity.</p>	<p><b>MAR</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>6/7 Apr UDF official Hofmeyer appears in CT court for breaking restriction order. Deputy Commissioner of KwaZulu Police alleges 2 Inkatha members died after SAP dropped them in UDF stronghold of Ashdown. Minister of Law and Order Vlok ordered to pay R44 000 damages for SAP shooting of KwaThema school pupil (1985).</p> <p>11/14 Apr Tvl Secretary of Sarhwi and 17 union members appear in Rand court on 5 counts of abduction and 4 of murder arising from 1987 rail strike. CT court sentences woman to 6 months jail for ANC membership. Pmb court sentences 2 men to a total of 21 years in jail for 13 murders after attack on Inkatha member's home; another Pmb court grants 3 interdicts against Inkatha officials alleged to have assaulted township residents.</p>	<p>4 Apr Limpet mine blasts canteen of Atteridgeville Development Board.</p> <p>7 Apr Maputo car bomb blast severely injures SA exile Albie Sachs. Minister Pik Botha claims SA was not behind Dulcie September's assassination in Paris nor attempt on Sachs' life, blames ANC feud. Transkei security forces turn mourners away from Mpozolo (Willowvale) funeral of guerilla assassinated in Lesotho.</p> <p>11 Apr On W Rand 2 unidentified explosive devices damage rail line and rubbish bin at station.</p> <p>13 Apr In Mpumalanga ANC guerilla kills himself and 2 white policemen with hand grenade. In follow-up operation second guerilla is shot dead, another escapes and 3 civilians are wounded in crossfire.</p> <p>14 Apr Limpet mine damages facade of Jhb city hall.</p>	<p><b>APR</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16/18 Apr SAP ban Lenasia People's Committee conference on education, and Wactu solidarity meeting with detained teachers and pupils. In 5 Durban townships SAP distribute 10 000 anti-'unrest' posters.</p> <p>19/20 Apr Revealed some kitskonstabels deployed in Pmb have been dismissed after it was discovered they had criminal charges pending. CT court extends order which restrains SADF from harassing or interfering with ECC.</p> <p>22/25 Apr UDF's Hofmeyer is detained; SAP raid Community House and seize documents. 'Sharpeville 6' granted 14-day reprieve from gallows.</p> <p>26/28 Apr Inquest into deaths of 4 assassinated Cradock activists is postponed for further investigation. In Kakamas court a former SAP sergeant faces murder charges for using shotgun fire to disperse people.</p> <p>29 Apr Six Elandskop (Pmb) men, including Inkatha official, charged with 2 counts of murder. Senior Transkei civil servant detained by homeland security branch. KwaNdebele administration passes Bill indemnifying it from legal actions arising out of past 18 months of political conflict (from 1 December 1985 onwards). Former editor of Oudtshoorn <i>Saamstaan</i> paper and CCAWUSA organiser is detained.</p>	<p>15 Apr Two limpet mines detonated in central Pretoria. In one blast near cinema complex the alleged bomber is killed; second mine is defused in vicinity.</p> <p>19/20 Apr In CT limpet mine explosion damages bank situated near Houses of Parliament. Blast is reported to be sixth in country in past 9 days. Pmb court sentences ANC guerilla commander, Gordon Webster, to 25-years imprisonment.</p> <p>21 Apr Two Ciskei security policemen shot dead and another is wounded in shoot-out with guerillas.</p> <p>22/24 Apr Four Soweto municipal policemen, arresting people for non-payment of rent, are wounded by AK-47 fire when their vehicle is attacked. In Kagiso hand grenade damages home. On E Rand the funeral of ANC activist shot by security forces is restricted.</p> <p>25 Apr In Osizaweni black policeman is killed in AK-47 attack. Messina court sentences 2 ANC guerillas to death, found guilty of 9 counts of murder and 24 of attempted murder in N Tvl land mine blasts.</p> <p>28 Apr Revealed at Ebrahim Ebrahim trial that security branch has informer in Lusaka headquarters of ANC.</p>	<p><b>APR</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>

1988	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>The Big Stayaway, Rent &amp; School Boycotts</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Pietermaritzburg Feuds, Regional Violence</i>
<p><b>MAY</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p>1 May Nationwide, workers commemorate Labour Day on 1 May rather than on official public holiday - first Friday in May. 2 May Atteridgeville council reveals plans for R20 service charge increase. In KwaGqqa (Witbank) rent hikes of 100 percent cancelled after community leaders (including former mayor) see provincial administrator. KwaGqqa Civic Association calls on African councillors and town clerk to resign. Soweto students boycott lectures at Molapo education college to protest lack of competent lecturers. No pupils attend classes at Tembisa schools despite release of detained teacher; pupils at 2 Soweto secondary schools stage boycott. Fort Hare university spokesperson alleges intimidation in 3-day lecture boycott, triggered by student detention. 2 May Foreign TV crews covering Lawaakamp (George) removals claim video tapes sent overseas by air courier are erased. 4 May In Sharpeville 20 families are evicted from homes, by Messenger of Court supported by security personnel, for non-payment of rent after Lekoo council warnings.</p>	<p>1 May In KwaNdegezi a youth is killed and 2 others injured; continuing violence is reported in 2 other Natal townships. In CT mini-bus of SAP special guard unit is fired upon. 4 May In Lindelani (Durban) a matric pupil is killed and another is injured during fighting at school; in Bulwer (Natal midlands) home of KwaZulu MP is petrol bombed 5 May In KwaThema delivery vehicle is severely damaged in arson attack; private vehicles also attacked in Mitchell's Plain where 2 youths are arrested. In Zwide (PE) school classroom is damaged by arsonists. 6/7 May In Kallehang (Alberton) private home is damaged by stone throwers. SAP report no unrest over weekend in any area. 11 May In Klipplaat Drift (KwaNdebele) a school is extensively damaged in arson attack.</p>
<p><b>MAY</b> <i>3rd &amp; 4th weeks</i></p>	<p>14/15 May Inkatha Central Committee decides to suspend any member who uses violence for political purposes. Shobalala's Inkatha membership is suspended. 17 May Unira students boycott university canteen. 18 May In Sharpeville 25 families are evicted from homes by messenger of court, supported by security personnel, for non-payment of rent (some since Sept 1984) after Lekoo council warnings. Council reveals 200 others will be evicted soon. 19/20 May In Soweto pupils from 3 schools and students from Vista University branch boycott classes over detention of 9 pupils. Daveyton council announces intention to increase rents by over 28 percent to pay for municipal electricity and water services. 23 May Azapo disassociates itself from pamphlet circulated in N Tvl which criticises ANC's armed struggle tactic. 28/29 May 200 church leaders meet to examine non-violent ways to end apartheid.</p>	<p>14/15 May At St Wendolins (Dbn) bodies of 3 men with bullet wounds are found; in Pmb numerous clashes reported involving SAP and rival black political groups. 20 May In Mpumalanga a man is stabbed to death; another fatality in Dindi (Pmb). 21/22 May Extensive rioting occurs in Durban/Pmb regions, at least 13 fatalities in past week. In Soweto a municipal policeman is injured when unknown gunmen open fire. Violence reported in KwaZakhele (PE) where a security force vehicle is stoned; Soweto (PE) private home is petrol bombed; in Germiston a man is shot dead and 3 are wounded; and in Mpumalanga petrol bomb attacks occur. 23/24 May In Diepkloof (Soweto) a man is wounded when private security guards fire birdshot at people stoning delivery truck; in other stoning incidents in Bishop Lavis (CT) 3 delivery vehicles are damaged, and in Khayelitsha, 6 children arrested. In Mpumalanga 2 men are abducted and killed; 18 deaths recorded in Natal since 16 May. In Soweto (PE) a private delivery vehicle is petrol bombed. 26 May In Hammarsdale 3 die when gunmen attack house; in nearby KwaNdegezi 2 men are arrested for stoning house. 28/29 May In Edendale a policeman is stabbed to death by crowd; in Inanda a man is killed, and police disperse crowd with birdshot; and in Fredville (Inchanga) child is injured by petrol bomb. In Guguletu special policeman is shot dead by unknown gunmen; in Lipoi (OFS) SAP fire on funeral mourners who attack policeman's home. 30/31 May In Enhlakahle (Greytown) a municipal policeman is knifed to death; houses in Fredville, Marionridge and Mpumalanga are petrol bombed.</p>
<p><b>JUNE</b> <i>1st &amp; 2nd weeks</i></p>	<p>1/3 June After 5-week boycott Molapo education college students defy ultimatum to return to lectures, and DET later claims they have dismissed themselves. After closure of Uniba campus since Feb 1988 attempted coup, it is announced lectures will begin on trial basis. 4 June Black Sash holds protests to mark 40 years of National Party rule. 6/8 June Cosatu and Nactu, with support of range of community organisations hold 3-day work stayaway to protest LRA amendments. Estimated between 2 and 3 million workers participate on each day in most successful stayaway strike ever called. SAP visit UND head to discuss campus organisations. In Sharpeville 400 residents decide to pay R30 each month for service charges in attempt to cut arrears, but still refuse to pay house rent. They demand rents should be reduced from R60 average to R30. 9 June Deadline passes for residents to object to Soweto council's proposed electricity tariff increases.</p>	<p>1/2 June In unabated Natal midlands violence, 3 men killed in Hammarsdale and 1 in Sobantu. In Soweto private vehicles are petrol bombed. After participating in anti-LRA amendment protest rally, students at UDW are warned to disperse by SAP; police take action against Wits students who protest detentions of university staff and students. 4/5 June In Mpumalanga man is stabbed to death and 2 are wounded after home is attacked. Violence reported in Natal townships of Imbali, St Wendolins, Clermont, Inanda and KwaMashu, where policeman is injured in attack on security patrol. Incidents reported in Rosedale (Uitenhage) and Nihorawe (E Rand). 6 June Binfo reports 7 die, 23 arrested and 21 injured in nationwide violence which coincides with national stayaway. Most violence is centered in Pmb/Durban area; in KwaNdegezi 3 (all under age of 26) are killed by unknown gunmen; and in Hammarsdale 2 youths are shot dead. Conflict also erupts in Sakhile (Standerton) where youth is killed by municipal policemen, in Williams Farm (Vereeniging), Tsakane (Nigel), Nyanga (CT), and Umgababa (Natal S Coast). 7/9 June Deaths are reported in Ashdown (2-year old), in Hammarsdale where man is hacked to death, and in Pinetown where 3 men are stabbed. Violence in Natal townships of Sweetwaters, Sahantu, KwaMashu and Dassenhoek, and in some E Cape townships. (Unrest death toll since 16/5/88 is 16). In Ashdown SAP arrest 6 after illegal gathering.</p>

<b>Government Response</b> <i>Interdicts, Press Restrictions, Unrest Trials</i>	<b>Black Nationalist Activity</b> <i>Low-Intensity Warfare</i>	<b>1988</b>
<p>2 May In Pmb court 27 men face murder charges. CT lawyer subpoenaed under Criminal Procedure Act to reveal funding of Atlantis civic organisation.</p> <p>3 May Cape AG declines to prosecute policemen involved in 'Trojan Horse' incident (3 fatalities) or 2 senior SAP officers who had allegedly attempted to defeat ends of justice in unrest trial. Later, families of youths killed in Athlone indicate they will prosecute police privately. Pmb detainees denied visiting rights because of 'mis-behaviour' after sentencing of ANC's Webster.</p> <p>5 May None of 150 clerics arrested in parliamentary protest march will be charged; first person known to be charged with furthering aims of one of 18 restricted organisations appears in court. In KwaNdebele the anti-independence prince, James Mahlangu, is released after 3 days.</p> <p>9 May <i>SOUTH</i> is second publication (after New Nation) suspended for 3 months by Minister for Home Affairs. Passport of Azapo secretary-general, Haroon Patel, is withdrawn. In 18-month period to December 1987, 247 passport applications are refused.</p> <p>14 May Lindelani squatter leader and senior member of Inkatha Central Committee, Thomas Shabalala, is released on R500 bail by Ntuzuma court after being charged with murder and attempted murder.</p>	<p>5 May In Mamelodi a hand grenade blast damages private home; while in Kagiso SAP single quarters are extensively damaged in bomb explosion. ANC announces intention to release draft constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa.</p> <p>8 May In Broederstroom (Palindaba), 4 white ANC guerillas are arrested and a large arms cache seized.</p> <p>10 May In Mamelodi a hand grenade thrown into house kills policeman's 1-year old daughter.</p> <p>12/13 May PAC spokesperson claims African countries must increase material assistance to aid armed struggle against SA. In Harare the OAU Liberation Committee suggests rival ANC and PAC should unite.</p>	<p><b>MAY</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p>16/18 May Minister of Law and Order tables names of 54 emergency detainees held for longer than 30 days. Since 11/6/87 over 3 012 people have been held for longer than 30 days. Wits Applied Legal Studies estimates 53 people await execution for politically motivated 'crimes'.</p> <p>25 May Court sentences 2 members of Cradock SAP riot squad to death for murder of activist, denies leave to appeal. Rumoured government will drop bill which cuts funding to anti-apartheid bodies.</p> <p>26/27 May 50 Wits students bring civil claims amounting to R245 000 against Minister of Defence for teargassing student bus in Soweto. 18 Stutterheim residents appear in East London court charged with necklace murder of man from Mlungisi in November 1985. Pmb court acquits Inkatha youth leader of murder.</p> <p>31 May Former DPSC official Max Coleman estimates in past 3 years 40 000 have been detained, including 10 000 children; claims Vlok's current figure of 100 detainees below age of 18 is wrong, that figure is closer to 250; and that children under age of 16 are in detention.</p> <p>Vlok reveals number of deployed kitskonstabels will soon reach 5 000; that special policemen have been responsible for over 11 000 arrests, only 35 in terms of Emergency regulations.</p>	<p>14/17 May In Osizaweni SAP kill man after he fires at them with AK-47. In response to alleged detention of ANC member Paul Annegarn in Quatra camp in Angola, ANC denies it hold dissidents in correction camps.</p> <p>22 May In Soweto 3 die and 38 are wounded when grenades are thrown and AK-47 fired at Sofasonke Party rally. Youth is later detained in connection with attack. Vlok reveals that since Jan 1986 SAP have arrested 525 ANC insurgents and killed another 54; that in 1987 SAP have 'eliminated' 490 guerillas, 44 of whom were shot dead. He claimed 79 guerillas were arrested and 10 shot dead in first 4 months of 1988. However, Wits academic Lodge claims other SAP figures for 1987 showed only 160 guerillas had been eliminated.</p> <p>25 May ANC representatives meets (SA parliamentary) National Democratic Movement delegation in Europe.</p> <p>26/28 May In Pretoria 4 women are hurt when 2 bombs explode in city; in Jhb explosive device detonates in garbage truck causing little damage, and bomb blast at city station injures 3 people.</p>	<p><b>MAY</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>
<p>1/2 June Defence lawyers win more time to argue in mitigation of 'Upington 25' who face death sentence for killing policeman; 4 children are 'orphaned' after mother is detained and father is in jail facing treason charges. In CT 11 treason trialists begin hunger strike to demand they be held together on non-racial basis. Minister Vlok announces Coleman may visit prisons to prove claims of juvenile detainees.</p> <p>3 June Two ANC members are sentenced to 20-years jail for N Natal bomb blasts. <i>NEW ERA</i> community publication receives warning from Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha.</p> <p>6/7 June KaNgwane court sentences man to 9 year jail term for terrorism. SAP deny Coleman allegations that under 15-year olds are in detention and produce birth certificates. Vlok withdraws offer to Coleman to point out further juvenile detainees.</p> <p>8 June BBC documentary on child detention in SA is screened in Britain. In CT 15 treason trialists are held in solitary confinement after alleged escape attempt.</p> <p>10 June State announces all news agencies must register. National state of emergency is renewed for second time (first declared on 12/06/86).</p>	<p>3 June In JHB, explosion rocks headquarters of SA Irish regiment. In Roodepoort 4 people are killed and 19 injured when limpet mine is detonated. Blast is reported to have been fifth on Reef in past 8 days. In Crawford (CT) a homemade explosive device damages drain.</p> <p>5 June Near Mmabatho a hand grenade explodes and shots are fired on Lucas Mangope highway but no-one is reported hurt.</p> <p>6 June In Soweto hand grenade attack on house leaves 8-year old boy dead and woman injured.</p> <p>7 June In Howu (Ciskei) security forces kill suspected guerilla after he throws hand grenade which injures 1 officer seriously.</p> <p>9 June In Riverview (Hillcrest) man kills himself when handling explosive device; while hand grenade damages Soweto home.</p> <p>10 June In Lusaka bomb explodes near home of ANC members.</p>	<p><b>JUNE</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>
<p><b>Sources</b> Indicator SA Press Clippings</p> <p><b>Acronyms</b>  AG Attorney General  Binfo Bureau for Information  Ccawusa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA  DEC Department of Education and Culture  DET Department of Education and Training  DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee  ECC End Conscription Committee/Campaign  LRA Labour Relations Act  SADF South African Defence Force  SAP South African Police  SARHWU South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union  UDW University of Durban-Westville  UND/P University of Natal - Durban/Pietermaritzburg  Unjibo University of Bophuthatswana  Unitra University of the Transkei  WESCO Western Cape Students Congress  Wectu Western Cape Teachers Unions</p>		



## Security Laws & Emergency Regulations 1984 - June 1988

Compiled by IPSA Researchers Bennett and Quin

### SECURITY LEGISLATION in GENERAL

The statutory powers enabling the government to act against anti-apartheid activists, organisations and campaigns rests on two main pieces of legislation.

#### Public Safety Act (PSA) (No3 of 1953)

Enables the State President to declare a State of Emergency; define and set attendant Regulations; and declare certain regions 'unrest areas'. However, while the issuance of Emergency regulations essentially remains the President's prerogative, he may in certain urgent cases, delegate Emergency powers to government Ministers.

#### Internal Security Act (ISA) (No74 of 1982)

Provides for the security of the state and the maintenance of law and order. The Act is the result of a merger of a number of security acts passed since 1950: the Suppression of Communism Act (No44 of 1950), the Riotous Assemblies Act (No17 of 1958), the Terrorism Act (No83 of 1967) and sections of the General Laws Amendment Act (No74 of 1962) being the most important.

The Act allows the security authorities to, inter alia,  
 O declare certain organisations unlawful  
 O outlaw meetings or impose conditions upon the holding of meetings  
 O prohibit the publication of certain newspapers and periodicals  
 O restrict specified people from belonging to certain organisations, attending certain meetings, going to certain places, etc.  
 O detain individuals (Sec28: indefinite preventative detention; Sec29: indefinite detention for interrogation purposes; Sec31: indefinite detention of judicial witnesses; Sec50: 14-day detention)  
 O outlaw the promotion of communism.

#### Other Laws

In addition there are a host of laws that restrict the activities of organisations, individuals and publishers. Restrictive Acts include: the Protection of Information Act (No84 of 1982); the Intimidation Act (No72 of 1982); Demonstrations in or near Court Buildings Prohibition Act (No71 of 1982).

South Africa's independent' and self-governing homelands have also passed a variety of statutes - similar in many ways to the South African versions - which limit political activity and individual freedoms.

### EMERGENCY REGULATIONS & AMENDMENTS

Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
<b>1984</b>			
9 Mar	9110	RProc30	Administration of PSA reassigned to Minister of Law Order from Minister of Justice
30 Mar	9141	GN579	ISA prohibition on certain gatherings 1/4/84 - 31/3/85
29 Jun	9276	GN1316	ISA prohibition on certain Cradock gatherings 30/6/84 - 30/9/84
29 Jun	9276	GN1317	ISA List of persons
29 Jun	9276	GN1337	ISA Consolidated List of persons found guilty of certain offences or on whom prohibitions were placed
27 Jul	9338	GN1580	Correction to ISA GN1317 of 1984
12 Oct	9455	GN2228	Amendments to ISA GN1317 of 1984
12 Oct	9455	GN2229	Amendments to ISA GN1337 of 1984
<b>1985</b>			
Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
15 Mar	9620	GN572	Withdrawal of names of people from the ISA Consolidated List
15 Mar	9620	GN573	Withdrawal of names of people prohibited from attending meetings from the ISA List
22 Mar	9631	GN705	ISA prohibition on certain gatherings 22/3/85 - 31/3/86
29 Mar	9665	GN776	ISA prohibition on certain E Cape gatherings 29/3/85 - 30/6/85
8 May	9736	GN1029	Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act (No53 of 1985)
30 May	9759	GN1156	Withdrawal of names from the ISA List of people prohibited from attending meetings
28 Jun	9806	GN1433	Internal security prohibition on certain E Cape gatherings 30/6/85 - 31/12/85
5 Jul	9830	GN1490	Withdrawal of names from the ISA List of people involved in furthering communism
5 Jul	9830	GN1491	Correction to ISA Consolidated List of persons
5 Jul	9830	GN1500	Correction to Consolidated List of persons
21 Jul	9876	RProc120	Declaration of a State of Emergency in particular areas
21 Jul	9877	RProc121	Emergency regulations and list of areas affected
31 Jul	9884	GN1746	Emergency orders pertaining to certain police divisions in the E Cape, OFS and Transvaal districts. Measures relate to all/some of the following: movement of persons; non-residents of areas; school boycotts; use of petrol; prohibition of gatherings and funeral ceremonies for certain persons
8 Aug	9896	GN1798	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions incorporating Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Albany and Fort Beaufort
8 Aug	9896	GN1799	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Graaff-Reinet
8 Aug	9896	GN1800	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions of certain E Rand districts
8 Aug	9896	GN1801	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions incorporating Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Randfontein and Westonia
15 Aug	9897	GN1850	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Alexandra
15 Aug	9897	GN1851	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions of Soweto, Diepkloof, Meadowlands and Roodepoort
15 Aug	9897	GN1852	Amendments to GN1801 of 1985
15 Aug	9897	GN1853	Amendments to GN1798 of 1985
16 Aug	9891	GN1816	Correction to ISA Consolidated List of persons
22 Aug	9912	GN1899	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions in the Sasolburg and Transvaal districts
23 Aug	9913	GN1924	Amendments to GN1851 of 1985

1985 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
28 Aug	9914	RGN1977	ISA prohibition on the Congress of South African Students (Cosas)
27 Sep	9951	GN2221	ISA prohibition of certain gatherings 27/9/85 - 31/3/86
27 Sep	9951	GN2222	Amendments to ISA GN1433 of 1985
24 Oct	9991	RProc199	Amendments to RProc120 of 1985
25 Oct	9979	GN2379	Correction to ISA Consolidated List of persons
26 Oct	9991	RProc200	Declaration of State of Emergency in particular areas
26 Oct	9993	RProc201	List of areas affected by Emergency regulations
26 Oct	9995	GN2484	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions of Simonstown and Wynberg
26 Oct	9995	GN2485	Emergency orders pertaining to the police divisions of Paarl and Worcester
31 Oct	10003	RProc207	Amendments to RProc121, 199 and 201 of 1985
2 Nov	10004	RProc208	Emergency regulations prohibiting making of films, photographs, drawings etc., and sound recordings of specified public disturbances
15 Nov	10006	GN2571	ISA List of persons prohibited from attending meetings
3 Dec	10034	RProc220	Amendments to RProc120 and 121 of 1985
13 Dec	10035	GN2761	Delegation of powers of Act No53 of 1985 (GN1029) to Snr. Chief Deputy Commissioner of SAP
31 Dec	10055	GN2869	ISA list of organisations prohibited from holding gatherings in certain areas 31/12/85 - 30/6/86

1986 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
3 Jan	10056	GN18	Amendments to ISA Consolidated List of persons
7 Feb	10098	RProc13	Amendments to list of areas under Emergency
7 Mar	10119	RProc39	Withdrawal of Emergency (RProc208 of 1985)
27 Mar	10157	GN582	ISA prohibition on certain gatherings 1/4/86 - 31/3/87
4 Jun	10268	GN1135	ISA prohibition on certain gatherings 4/6/86 - 30/6/86
12 Jun	10279	RProc108	Declaration of a State of Emergency
12 Jun	10280	RProc109	Emergency regulations
12 Jun	10281	GN1196	Emergency measures for the detention of persons in prison
13 Jun	10292	GN1236	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province. Measures relate to all/some of the following: movement of persons; non residents of areas; school boycotts; presence on or in school premises or buildings; use of petrol; prohibition of gatherings, certain funeral ceremonies, organisations; possession of certain articles or objects
13 Jun	10292	GN1237	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
13 Jun	10292	GN1238	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the Witwatersrand
13 Jun	10292	GN1239	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
13 Jun	10292	GN1240	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
17 Jun	10293	RProc110	Amendments to Emergency regulations
19 Jun	10302	GN1276	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
19 Jun	10302	GN1277	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
19 Jun	10302	GN1278	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Transvaal
21 Jun	10309	GN1352	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
21 Jun	10309	GN1353	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Transvaal
21 Jun	10309	GN1354	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the Boland
21 Jun	10309	GN1355	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province

1986 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
25 Jun	10311	GN1368	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
26 Jun	10313	GN1372	Internal Security Amendment Act (No66 of 1986) provides for temporary measures to deal with public unrest
26 Jun	10314	GN1373	Public Safety Amendment Act (No67 of 1986) allows Minister of Law and Order to declare certain regions unrest areas; provides for the assignment of the administration of the PSA of Minister of Law and Order; and amends procedures for the tabling of regulations in parliament
26 Jun	10319	GN1378	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the N OFS
26 Jun	10319	GN1379	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the N Transvaal
27 Jun	10296	RProc111	Amendments to Emergency regulations
27 Jun	10329	RProc121	Amendments to Emergency regulations
30 Jun	10328	GN1413	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the Witwatersrand
1 Jul	10338	GN1430	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the N OFS
1 Jul	10338	GN1431	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the SW Districts
1 Jul	10338	GN1432	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
1 Jul	10338	GN1433	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
2 Jul	10339	GN1434	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Transvaal
2 Jul	10399	GN1435	Withdrawal of existing and issuance of further Emergency orders in the police division of W Province
4 Jul	10320	GN1416	ISA Consolidated List of prohibited persons and persons whose speeches, utterances and writings have been banned
4 Jul	10320	GN1417	ISA Consolidated list of persons listed because of specified convictions in terms of the IS
7 Jul	10347	GN1490	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the N Cape
7 Jul	10347	GN1491	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
8 Jul	10348	RProc125	Amendments to Emergency regulations with relation to the: arrest and detention of persons; extension of detention by means of telegraphic or similar communication from the Minister or authorised officers
10 Jul	10354	GN1505	Withdrawal of existing and issuance of further Emergency orders in the police division of Soweto
10 Jul	10354	GN1506	Withdrawal of existing and issuance of further Emergency orders in the police division of N OFS
11 Jul	10355	GN1517	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of N Natal
11 Jul	10355	GN1518	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Transvaal
11 Jul	10355	GN1527	Withdrawal of Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
13 Jul	10357	RProc131	Emergency regulations with relation to the: control of admission to and placement of Blacks in schools
18 Jul	10367	GN1561	Amendments to Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the N OFS
25 Jul	10375	RGN1610	Correction to RProc125 of 1986
1 Aug	10382	RProc140	Amendments to Emergency regulations with relation to the: arrest and detention of persons; the prohibition of film representations and sound recordings; the promulgation of Emergency orders and the authorisation for the issuance thereof; the prohibition of publications and the seizure thereof
15 Aug	10396	RGN1755	Withdrawal of certain Emergency measures applicable to the detentions of persons in prison (GN1196 of 1986)
22 Aug	10399	GN1772	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
2 Sep	10428	GN1866	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
3 Sep	10429	GN1881	Emergency orders prohibiting the dissemination of information on unrest, restricted gatherings or security actions and prohibiting the presence of media representatives at such scenes

1986 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
28 Nov	10542	RProc225	Amendments to Emergency regulations
11 Dec	10541	RProc224	Emergency regulations with relation to the: dissemination of prohibited information; making of subversive statements; and the presence of representatives of media at certain scenes
29 Dec	10563	RProc235	Emergency regulations in relation to the issuance of certain orders prohibiting specified activities in schools and hostels

1987 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
8 Jan	10584	GN101	Emergency measures relating to support for illegal organisations
8 Jan	10584	GN102	Emergency orders aimed at prohibiting the dissemination of certain information on unlawful organisations in newspapers or periodicals
9 Jan	10585	GN116	Emergency orders aimed at prohibiting the gatherings or courses on African school or hostel premises involving the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC)
20 Jan	10592	GN157	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto (measures relate to all/some of the following: movement of persons; non-residents of areas; school boycotts; presence on or in school premises or buildings; use of petrol; prohibition of gatherings; certain funeral ceremonies, organisations; possession of certain articles or objects)
23 Jan	10598	GN173	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
23 Jan	10598	GN174	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
23 Jan	10598	GN175	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the Witwatersrand
29 Jan	10599	Proc18	Amendments to Emergency regulations
29 Jan	10605	GN236	Withdrawal of GN101 of 1987
29 Jan	10605	GN237	Withdrawal of GN102 of 1987
29 Jan	10605	GN238	Emergency measures aimed at prohibiting the dissemination of certain information on unlawful organisations in newspapers or periodicals
20 Feb	10615	RGN336	ISA Consolidated List of prohibited persons and persons whose speeches, utterances and writings have been banned
27 Feb	10644	GN501	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
18 Mar	10669	RGN617	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
19 Mar	10670	RGN618	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
19 Mar	10670	RGN619	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
20 Mar	10676	GN649	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
20 Mar	10676	GN650	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
26 Mar	10687	GN703	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
31 Mar	10686	RGN664	Administration of certain sections of the ISA transferred from Minister of Law and Order to Minister of Justice
1 Apr	10691	GN750	ISA prohibitions on certain gatherings 1/4/87 - 31/3/88
4 Apr	10702	GN791	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
10 Apr	10713	RGN873	Emergency orders prohibiting the participation in any action aimed at accomplishing the release of detainees
5 May	10737	RGN1055	Amendments to Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
5 May	10737	RGN1056	Amendments to Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
5 May	10737	RGN1957	Amendments to Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the Witwatersrand
15 May	10750	RGN1120	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal

1987 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statute Category Number	Subject and Purpose
11 Jun	10770	RProc95	Declaration of a State of Emergency
11 Jun	10771	RProc96	Emergency regulations
11 Jun	10772	RProc97	Emergency regulations pertaining to the dissemination of prohibited information, the making of subversive statements and the presence of media representatives at certain scenes
11 Jun	10773	RProc98	Emergency regulations pertaining to the issuance of orders prohibiting specified activities in schools and hostels
11 Jun	10775	GN1300	Emergency measures pertaining to detentions of persons in prisons
16 Jun	10787	GN1344	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
16 Jun	10787	GN1345	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
16 Jun	10787	GN1346	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
16 Jun	10787	GN1350	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
18 Jun	10794	GN1360	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
18 Jun	10794	GN1361	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
18 Jun	10794	GN1362	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
23 Jun	10802	GN1417	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
26 Jun	10805	RProc106	Emergency regulations pertaining to detentions of persons in prisons
9 Jul	10831	GN1534	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
9 Jul	10831	GN1535	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Port Natal
16 Jul	10841	GN1590	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
17 Jul	10842	GN1610	Amendments to Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
23 Jul	10846	GN1645	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
31 Jul	10857	GN1710	Administration of certain sections of the ISA relating to the detentions of persons under Emergency regulations assigned to Minister of Law and Order and Cabinet
7 Aug	10852	GN1679	ISA Consolidated List of prohibited persons and persons whose speeches, utterances and writings have been banned
7 Aug	10852	GN1680	ISA Consolidated List of persons listed because of specified convictions in terms of the ISA
21 Aug	10866	GenN583	Amendments to the detentions of ISA detainees
28 Aug	10880	RProc123	Amendments to Emergency regulations pertaining to the compulsory deposit of periodicals and newspapers by publishers or importers and a prohibition on the systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
3 Sep	10904	GN1953	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
4 Sep	10905	GN1965	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
4 Sep	10905	GN1966	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
4 Sep	10905	GN1980	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
11 Sep	10915	GN2039	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Natal
11 Sep	10915	GN2042	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
27 Nov	11049	RGN2676	Emergency warning issued to The NEW NATION for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
27 Nov	11059	GN2705	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Province
11 Dec	11075	RGN2811	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Rand
14 Dec	11076	GN2813	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the W Province
21 Dec	11074	RGN2790	Emergency warning issued to SOUTH for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
21 Dec	11074	RGN2827	Emergency warning issued to DIE STEM for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
21 Dec	11074	RGN2828	Emergency warning issued to WORK IN PROGRESS for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda

1988 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statutory Category Number	Subject and Purpose
7 Jan	11101	GN49	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto. Measures relate to some/all of the following: movement of persons; non-residents of areas; school boycotts; presence on or in school premises or buildings; use of petrol; prohibition of gatherings, certain funeral ceremonies, organisations; possession of certain articles or objects
8 Jan	11102	GN52	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
14 Jan	11112	GN83	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of W Province
15 Jan	11105	RProc7	Amendments to Emergency regulations applicable to newspapers and periodicals for the systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
19 Jan	11114	GN108	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
19 Jan	11114	GN109	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
19 Jan	11114	GN110	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
22 Jan	11121	GN132	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
29 Jan	11130	GN153	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of W Province
29 Jan	11115	GN188	Internal security prohibitions on persons (relating to any/all of the following: attendance of meetings, movement outside specified areas, reproduction of speeches and publications)
3 Feb	11131	GN163	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of Soweto
9 Feb	11137	GN212	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
11 Feb	11138	GN229	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of SW Districts
19 Feb	11139	GN241	ISA prohibitions on certain persons
19 Feb	11139	GN242	ISA prohibitions on certain persons
24 Feb	11156	RProc23	Amendments to Emergency regulations empowering the Minister to issue orders prohibiting the activities of certain organisations and persons
24 Feb	11157	GN334	Emergency measures prohibiting certain organisations from performing certain activities
24 Feb	11157	GN335	Emergency measures prohibiting the Congress of South African Trade Unions from involving itself in political activities
1 Mar	11168	GN411	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of W Province
12 Mar	11194	GN502	Emergency measures prohibiting the Committee for the Defence of Democracy from performing all activities
12 Mar	11195	GN503	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division W Province
22 Mar	11210	GN578	Emergency prohibition on publication of the NEW NATION for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda.
31 Mar	11220	GN621	ISA prohibition on certain gatherings 1/4/88 - 31/3/89
31 Mar	11247	GN700	Emergency order pertaining to a specified funeral in the police division of SW Districts
15 Apr	11251	GenN241	Emergency warning issued to GRASSROOTS for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
15 Apr	11261	GN760	Emergency warning issued to OUT OF STEP for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
15 Apr	11261	GN761	Emergency warning issued to SAAMSTAAM for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
22 Apr	11276	GN831	Emergency orders pertaining to the police division of the E Rand
26 Apr	11284	GN873	Emergency warning issued to the WEEKLY MAIL for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
9 May	11305	GN954	Emergency regulations prohibits the publication of SOUTH
3 Jun	11338	GN1101	Emergency warning issued to NEW ERA for systematic and repeated publication of subversive propaganda
10 Jun	11339	RProc96	Declaration of a State of Emergency
10 Jun	11340	RProc97	Emergency regulations
10 Jun	11341	RProc98	Emergency measures for the detentions of persons in prisons
10 Jun	11342	RProc99	Emergency media regulations

1988 Date	Govt Gazette Number	Statutory Category Number	Subject and Purpose
10 Jun	11343	RProc100	Emergency regulations with regard to educational institutions
10 Jun	11344	GN1112	Emergency measures prohibiting certain specified organisations from performing certain activities
10 Jun	11344	GN1113	Emergency measures prohibiting COSATU from involving itself in political activities
10 Jun	11345	GN1114	Emergency orders to prohibit certain people from entering designated Cape Peninsula areas
10 Jun	11345	GN1115	Emergency orders to prohibit certain people from entering designated Cape Peninsula areas
10 Jun	11346	GN1116	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division of Natal
10 Jun	11346	GN1117	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division of Port Natal
10 Jun	11346	GN1118	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division of the E Rand
10 Jun	11346	GN1119	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division of the E Province
10 Jun	11346	GN1120	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division in Soweto
10 Jun	11346	GN1121	Emergency orders pertaining to specified funerals in the police division of the W Rand

#### Note

The above index of security laws does not include any legislation passed by the homelands.

#### Sources

Government Gazette Index (January 1984 - March 1988).

#### Key

Gen N Gazette General Notice  
GN Gazette Government Notice  
RProc Regulation Gazette Proclamation

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Full Name	Category
AAC	Alexandra Action Committee	Community
AAWU	African Allied Workers Union	Labour
ABC	Alexandra Boycott Committee	Community
ACC	Azanian Co-ordinating Committee	Political
ACC	Alexandra Commuters Committee	Community
AHI	Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut	Business
ANC	African National Congress	Political
ANCBC	Aliwal North Consumer Boycott Committee	Community
APCC	African Peoples Christian Coalition	Religious
APDUSA	African Peoples Democratic Union of SA	Political
APLA	Azanian Peoples Liberation Army	Guerilla
ARA	Alexandra Residents Association	Community
ASRO	Atteridgeville/Saulsville Residents Association	Community
ASSOCOM	Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industries	Business
AYCO	Alexandra Youth Congress	Student
AYO	Adelaide Youth Organisation	Student
AZANYU	Azanian National Youth Unity	Student
AZAPO	Azanian Peoples Organisation	Political
AZASM	Azanian Students Movement	Student
AZASO	Azanian Students Organisation	Student
AZAYO	Azanian Youth Organisation	Student
BCBC	Border Consumer Boycott Committee	Community
BCI	Business Confidence Index	finance
BCMA	Black Consciousness Movement of Azania	Political
BINFO	Bureau for Information	State Agency
BPC	Black Peoples Convention	Political
BTH	Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings	Business
CAE	Centre for Adult Education	Educational
CAL	Cape Action League	Political
CAYCO	Cape Youth Congress	Student
CBCC	Consumer Boycott Co-ordinating Committee	Community
CBD	Central Business District	area
CCAWUSA	Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA	Labour
CCC	Cape Town City Council	State Agency
CDD	Committee for the Defence of Democracy	Political
CLOWU	Clothing Workers Union	Labour
CNIP	Ciskei National Independence Party	State Agency
CNP	Committee for National Priorities	State Agency
COSAS	Congress of South African Students	Student
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions	Labour
COSCO	Community Support Committee	Research
CPA	Cape Provincial Administration	State Agency
CRADORA	Cradock Residents Association	Community
CRG	Community Research Group	Research
CTC	Ciskei Transport Corporation	Business
CTCC	Cape Town Community Council	Community
CTPA	Cape Teachers Professional Association	Educational
CUSA	Council of South African Unions	Labour
CWIU	Chemical Workers Industrial Union	Labour
DCA	Duduza Civic Association	Community
DEC	Department of Education and Culture	State Agency
DESCOM	Detainees Support Committee	Humanitarian

Acronym	Full Name	Category
DET	Department of Education and Training	State Agency
DPSC	Detainees Parents Support Committee	Humanitarian
DRC	Dutch Reformed Church	Religious
ECC	End Conscription Campaign	Humanitarian
ECDB	Eastern Cape Development Board	State Agency
ECTA	Eastern Cape Traders Association	Business
ELCC	East London Chamber of Commerce	Business
EPG	Eminent Persons Group	Diplomatic
ERAB	East Rand Administration Board	State Agency
ERAPO	East Rand Peoples Organisation	Community
ERDB	East Rand Development Board	State Agency
ERPA	Evaton Ratepayers Association	Community
FAFOD	Friends and Families of Detainees	Humanitarian
FAWU	Food and Allied Workers Union	Labour
FBCBC	Fort Beaufort Consumer Boycott Committee	Community
FCI	Federated Chambers of Industries	Business
FCWU	Food and Canning Workers Union	Labour
FEDSAW	Federation of South African Women	Women
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions	Labour
FRYCO	Free State Youth Congress	Student
GAWU	General and Allied Workers Union	Labour
GBAC	Grahamstown Burial Action Committee	Community
GCC	Grahamstown Chamber of Commerce	Business
GST	General Sales Tax	finance
HAYCO	Hammarsdale Youth Congress	Student
IAMASA	Inter-denom. African Ministers Assoc of SA	Religious
IDASA	Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA	Research
IPSA	Indicator Project South Africa	Research
IRC	International Red Cross	Humanitarian
ISA	Internal Security Act	legislation
ISSUP	Institute for Strategic Studies	Research
JCBDA	Johannesburg Central Business District Ass	Business
JCC	Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce	Business
JMC	Joint Management Centre	State Agency
JODAC	Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee	Political
JORAC	Joint Rent Action Committee	Community
KDEC	KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture	State Agency
KLA	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly	State Agency
KRA	Kagiso Residents Association	Community
KRO	Krugersdorp Residents Association	Community
KZP	KwaZulu Police	State Agency
LMG	Labour Monitoring Group	Research
LP	Labour Party	Political
LRTB	Local Road Transportation Board	State Agency
MASA	Medical Association of South Africa	Health
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers Union	Labour
MEDUNSA	Medical University of South Africa	Educational
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe	Guerilla
MOCA	Mhlakeng Civic Association	Community
MPC	Member of Provincial Council	official
MRC	Mbeki Reception Committee	Political
MRC	Mulungisi Residents Committee	Community

Acronym	Full Name	Category
NAFCOC	National African Chambers of Commerce	Business
NCC	Ningizimu Community Council	State Agency
NCCPC	National Co-ordinating Comm of Parent Committees	Community
NECC	National Education Crisis Committee	Educational
NEUM	Non-European Unity Movement	Political
NFC	National Forum Committee	Political
NFW	National Federation of Workers	Labour
NGK	Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk	Religious
NIC	Natal Indian Congress	Political
NMC	National Manpower Commission	State Agency
NP	National Party	Political
NPP	National Peoples Party	Political
NPU	Newspaper Press Union	Media
NSMS	National Security Management System	State Agency
NTC	National Transport Commission	State Agency
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers	Labour
NUM	New Unity Movement	Political
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of SA	Labour
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students	Student
NUTW	National Union of Textile Workers	Labour
OFS	Orange Free State	area
OVAB	Orange-Vaal Administration Board	State Agency
OVDB	Orange-Vaal Development Board	State Agency
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	Political
PACSA	Pietermaritzburg Agency for Social Awareness	Humanitarian
PCBC	Pretoria Consumer Boycott Committee	Community
PCC	Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce	Business
PCI	Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Industries	Business
PEBCO	Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation	Community
PECBC	Port Elizabeth Consumer Boycott Committee	Community
PECC	Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce	Community
PFP	Progressive Federal Party	Political
PNAB	Port Natal Administration Board	State Agency
PRC	Pupil Representative Council	Student
PWV	Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging	area
QCC	Queenstown Chamber of Commerce	Business
QRAC	Queenstown Residents Ad-hoc Committee	Community
RACC	N OFS Rent Action Co-ordinating Committee	Community
RMC	Release Mandela Committee/Campaign	Humanitarian
RMG	Repression Monitoring Group	Research
RSC	Regional Services Council	State Agency
SAAWU	South African Allied Workers Union	Labour
SAAYU	South African African Youth Unity	State body
SACBC	South African Catholics Bishops Conference	Religious
SACC	South African Council of Churches	Religious
SACHED	South African Council for Higher Education	Educational
SACOS	South African Council of Sport	Recreational
SACP	South African Communist Party	Political
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions	Labour
SADF	South African Defence Force	State Agency
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations	Research
SAMDC	South African Medical and Dental Council	Health

Acronym	Full Name	Category
SANSCO	South African National Students Congress	Student
SAP	South African Police	State Agency
SAPA	South African Press Association	Media
SARCC	Sharpeville Anti-Rent Co-ordinating Committee	Community
SARHWU	South African Railways and Harbour Workers Union	Labour
SARP	South African Railways Police	State Agency
SASO	South African Students Organisation	Student
SASS	South African Suicide Squad	Political
SATS	South African Transport Services	State Agency
SAYCO	South African Youth Congress	Student
SCA	Soweto Civic Association	Community
SFAWU	Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union	Labour
SOSCO	Soweto Students Congress	Student
SOYCO	Soweto Youth Congress	Student
SP	Solidarity Party	Political
SPBC	Soweto PUTCO Boycott Committee	Community
SPCC	Soweto Parents Crisis Committee	Educational
SRC	Students Representative Council	Student
SSC	State Security Council	State Agency
SYCO	Seshego Youth Congress	Student
TCA	Tembisa Civic Association	Community
TIC	Transvaal Indian Congress	Political
TRAC	Transvaal Rural Action Committee	Research
TRSC	Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee	Community
TSO	Tumahole Students Organisation	Student
TUCSA	Trade Union Council of South Africa	State Agency
TYCO	Thabong Youth Congress	Student
UCASA	Urban Councils Association of South Africa	Local Govt.
UCT	University of Cape Town	Educational
UDF	United Democratic Front	Political
UDW	University of Durban Westville	Educational
UMP	Unrest Monitoring Project	Research
UMSA	United Municipalities of SA	Local Govt.
UND	University of Natal (Durban)	Educational
UNIBO	University of Bophuthatswana	Educational
UNISA	University of South Africa	Educational
UNITRA	University of the Transkei	Educational
UNP	University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg)	Educational
UWC	University of the Western Cape	Educational
UWO	United Womens Organisation	Women
UWUSA	United Workers Union of South Africa	Labour
UYCO	Uitenhage Youth Congress	Student
VCA	Vaal Civic Association	Community
VT	Vaal Triangle	area
VTUCC	Vaal Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee	Labour
VVPP	Vukani Vulahmelo Peoples Party	Political
WCCA	Western Cape Civic Association	Community
WECSOC	Western Cape Students Congress	Student
WECTU	Western Cape Teachers Union	Educational
WITS	University of the Witwatersrand	Educational
WRDB	West Rand Development Board	State Agency
ZYO	Zanokhanyo Youth Organisation	Student



# INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA

**T**he Indicator Project South Africa (IPSA) is an applied research and publication unit which now falls under the auspices of the Centre for Social and Development Studies (CSDS) at the University of Natal. The newly renamed centre is the result of a merger between the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (which formerly encompassed *Indicator SA*) and the Development Studies Unit. The new association of units should further expand research interests and expertise within the university community, enriching the scope of our publication.

*Indicator SA* was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to develop statistical indicators and monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change. The Project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decision makers through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' – namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban, and industrial – as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

Financially, the Project relies on donor subscriptions from companies and foundations in South Africa and abroad, who consider it part of their social responsibility programme to support the independent investigation and analysis of issues in all areas of South African society. A broad spectrum of individuals and institutes in the public and private sectors also subscribe to the *Indicator SA* journal and information service. Interested subscribers should contact the liaison officer directly at the IPSA offices.

*Indicator SA* draws on university-based research findings and commissions reports from prominent academics and practitioners in the field, besides maintaining a project research team which monitors issues, undertakes special studies and makes regular contributions. The main thrust of the IPSA information service is to provide objective, practical, policy-directed research. We strive to quantify published commentary and findings, through providing hard data, survey results and comparative research. Simultaneously, IPSA initiates debate on controversial issues by inviting a wide range of partisan perspectives, including government, labour, community, corporate executives, and spokespeople representing other key participants in the change process.

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'Indicator South Africa, an authoritative academic journal that attempts to come to terms with the facts behind what are otherwise emotive political issues.' *Business Day, January 1987*

'The Project has again confirmed its ability to tackle major problems of the country, presenting the full scope of opinion.' *The Daily News, October 1987*

The government cannot argue with facts and Indicator SA has a habit of producing disturbing statistics.' *The Natal Mercury, May 1987*

'Indicator SA, that most valuable barometer of social trends.' *Sunday Times, September 1986*

'That absolutely indispensable publication... We need better research, the kind of research published inter alia in Indicator SA.' *Cape Times, August 1984*

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