

RURAL URBAN STUDIES UNIT



UNIVERSITY OF NATAL DURBAN

**THE ANATOMY OF RURAL BLACK
POVERTY :**

**THE CHALLENGE TO A NEW
ECONOMIC ORDER**

by

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DEVELOPMENT STUDIES UNIT

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RURAL URBAN STUDIES UNIT

The Rural Urban Studies Unit was founded in 1983 by the Human Sciences Research Council for the purpose of studying the dynamics of the links between the rural and urban areas of South Africa. It is situated at the University of Natal, Durban and works in close co-operation with the Development Studies Unit.

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**THE ANATOMY OF RURAL BLACK POVERTY:
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1.0 Introduction

A century of capitalist development within a racist framework has resulted in the black controlled bantustan regions of South Africa being characterised by underdevelopment, persistent poverty and growing inequality, both within these regions themselves and between them and the rest of the South African economy (McGrath, 1984; Nattrass, 1981). This paper looks at the extent of the poverty and underdevelopment in one bantustan area, KwaZulu, and draws on the data collected by field studies in five different rural areas scattered throughout KwaZulu, namely, in the Mapumulo, Inkanyezi, Hlanganani, Nqutu and Emzumba districts; see Map. In all, 1120 households were surveyed covering more than 8000 individuals.

2.0 The Role of The Bantustan Rural Areas

Economic development theory, regardless of whether it is radical or orthodox in its direction, for simplicity, divides a developing economy into two major segments. These segments come with a variety of labels such as 'dependent and independent', 'modern and primitive', 'developed and underdeveloped' or 'industrial and agricultural', and the relationship between the segments during the

1. This paper draws heavily on a data bank which has been established at the University of Natal using field studies undertaken over the past three years in KwaZulu by Alan Peters, Julian May and David Perkins.

development process is seen as the key to their evolution, although the nature of the relationship differs with the development paradigm being used. It has, however, been argued that for the South African case, such a simple dichotomy is an inappropriate structure for analysis since the social and economic relations that exist between the modern mining and industrial sector, the commercial farming sector and the bantustans, or labour reserve areas, differ significantly and that, consequently, a three sector model structure is more suitable (Natrass, 1981; 1984). In terms of such a three sector model, the role played by black rural areas in the development process is not that of a typical traditional or agricultural sector but instead, that of a labour reserve (Wolpe, 1972). As development proceeds, the labour reserve sector is seen as becoming increasingly dependent on the other two sectors (Natrass, 1977).

The modern manifestations of the growing degree of dependency of the bantustans are most clearly evident in the exchanges that take place via the market transactions occurring between the labour reserves and the other sectors. Through the market, labour power is exchanged with commercial agriculture for food and with the mining and manufacturing sectors, for manufactured goods and services.

Quite apart from the market there is another arena of action namely that of the State and in this area, too, the dependency of the bantustans has been increased over the past twenty years, as the result of a number of Government actions, notably the massive resettlement of people into the reserve areas via the 'Black Spot' removals, the introduction of legislation that actively discouraged

the urbanisation of the African communities (influx control laws), the neglect of urban infrastructure in Black areas and the various taxation concessions which fostered mechanisation in the commercial farming sector and led to a significant outflow of African labour, which having no alternative, also mostly resettled in the bantustans (Morris, 1977; Natrass, 1977).

Following this type of analysis It is very clear that if the role played by the bantustan rural areas is one of growing economic dependency and underdevelopment, then the fruits of economic self sufficiency and agricultural production are not going to be major sources of economic activity in these regions. Indeed, if local production does take place to any degree, in these areas one should expect that it will fill one of three roles, namely that of:

- 1) a means of reducing the cost of labour supplies to the other sectors,
- 2) a safety net i.e. as an alternative means of support to those who cannot find a job outside the reserves,
- 3) as a supplementary source of income i.e. providing income in addition to that earned from the export of labour.

If the rural areas fulfil either or both of the first two of these roles, then access to the means of production in the rural areas accruing to families living there, should act as a levelling influence

in the rural communities. However, to the extent that the reserves fulfil the third role, such access may well increase the decrease the degree of socio-economic differentiation present within the rural communities. People who have earned funds from the export of labour may be better placed to utilise their rural resources productively than those who are solely dependent on agricultural production. Further, since those who have rural resources are more likely to be able to afford education for their families which, itself, improves an individuals chance of obtaining an urban job, access to rural resources, too, will improve the prospect of obtaining earnings from the export of labour, thus further intensifying the potential for rural differentiation.

This paper will examine the data gathered in the surveys with a view to answering the following questions in relation to the rural areas of KwaZulu.

1. What are the living levels like?
2. How dependent are the areas on the export of labour?
3. What is the degree of economic differentiation?
4. How do the poor families differ from the more wealthy ones?
5. What policy alternatives are there to redress the situation?

3.0 The Demographic Profile

In all, data relating to 1120 households and 8485 individuals were gathered in the surveys. The mean household size was 7,6 people and 50 percent of the households had seven or more members (including

members absent from home at the time of the survey). Taking the community as a whole, i.e. including the absentees, 35 percent were aged under 15 years. However, of the resident population, 47 percent fell into the age category 0 - 14 years. Absentee members, most of whom were migrant workers, made up 22 percent of the total population but 46 percent of the adults between 25 and 50 years were away.

Education levels were low on average. More than half the people over 15 years (52 percent) had had either no formal schooling or insufficient to ensure their retention of literacy (less than five years of formal schooling). However, there were significant differences between the regions and the percentage of the adult population who could be assumed to be likely to be illiterate, varied from a high of 67 percent in the Inkanyezi district, through 56 percent in Emzumba, 46 percent in Mapumulo to 35 percent in Hlanganani and 31 percent in the Nqutu area.

On average there were no differences in the educational profiles by sex but there were by age and by whether the individual was a migrant worker or not. The age/education profiles are given in Table 1 below, in terms of the percentages in each category who have had sufficient formal education (5 years or more) to be presumed to be literate.

There are two interesting features in the data in Table 1, namely;

1. Average educational levels have clearly improved over time.
2. The process of out-migration for work is education selective

since the percentage of the migrant workforce that is literate is higher than the average for the communities as a whole in every age category.

Table 1: The Literacy Profiles of the Demographic Groups

Age Category	Percentage of Category Literate			
	Men	Women	At Home	Migrant
20 - 24	77,9	68,6	70,0	79,0
25 - 29	67,6	65,0	60,0	72,7
30 - 34	55,5	55,9	48,6	64,4
35 - 39	52,0	51,0	43,5	61,5
40 - 44	45,3	50,6	46,3	50,6
45 - 49	41,1	44,3	41,3	45,2
50 - 54	42,1	35,8	31,3	54,4
55 - 59	33,3	32,6	30,0	41,8
60 - 64	21,0	23,9	23,8	18,4

4.0 Access to Land

All the areas surveyed were rural areas with the exception of the Nqutu district which, although it is classified as rural, is an area in which there has been substantial population resettlement, as part of the so called 'black spot removal' campaign. The outcome of the resettlement in this area has been the densification of settlement around the village of Nqutu itself and the creation of the rural town

of Mondlo. The other four areas are typical of rural areas in the bantustans but differ from each other in respect of land types encountered in the regions as well as in terms of the extent of their physical access to the modern sectors of the economy. Hlanganani is situated in the foothills of the Drakensberg mountains as, indeed, is most of the Nqutu district. Mapumulo, Inkanyezi and Emzambe are partly on the coastal plain and partly inland.

The rural character of the surveyed areas is illustrated most clearly by the fact that 77 percent of the household surveyed said that they had access to land for growing crops in addition to the gardens they had around their homesteads. Land availability did, however, vary between districts with 91 percent of the families surveyed in the Mapumulo district, having access to land for crops, 85 percent of those in Inkanyezi, 81 percent in Hlanganani, 88 percent in Emzambe and only 33 percent in Nqutu, again reflecting the influence of resettlement in this district.

The average size of the land holdings was small, with 68 percent of those families who had land, having less than one hectare and 87 percent less than 2 hectares. Within the communities land was unequally distributed. The largest 1 percent of the land owners controlled 16 percent of the land, whilst the small landholders, those with less than 1 hectare of land, who comprised 68 percent of the landholders, had access to only 25 percent of the total land available.

In contrast to the situation found in other studies done in KwaZulu (Lenta, 1981), in these studies it was found that those families who had access to land, generally made use of it. Of the landholders, 58 percent said that they had cultivated all their land in the previous growing season and a further 12 percent that they had farmed more than half. Only 19 percent said that they had not farmed their land at all. Most families grew crops for their own use and only 17 percent (187 households) generated any cash income through sales of the produce from their agricultural activities. Although farm incomes including subsistence production, were low, with a mean weekly income of R2,90 per household and a median of R1,20, only 13 percent of households generated no farm income at all, notwithstanding the fact that 23 percent did not have access to fields - in other words, gardens, too, were a source of income generation.

5.0 Incomes; Levels, Distribution and Determinants.

5.1 Income Levels and Distribution

Income levels on average were low and poverty was widespread. The depth and extent of the poverty of the families living in these rural areas can be seen from the fact that, taking the sample as a whole, the mean household income per week from all sources was R60 and 50 percent of households had weekly incomes of less than R43,15.

Incomes were extremely unequally distributed. At the bottom end of the income scale the poorest 20 percent of the households, in terms of total household income, received only 2,5 percent of the total income,

had a mean household income of R15,79 per week (median of R16,00), and a mean per capita income per week of only R3,52 (median R2,86). At the other end of the distribution, however, the top 5 percent of the households received 20 percent of the total income, had a mean household income per week of R232,16 (median R213,16) and an average household per capita income of R41,59 (median R38,81). In between the two extremes the distribution was as follows: the bottom 50 percent received 17 percent of the total income; the top 20 percent, 48 percent of the total and the top 10 percent, 33 percent of the total. The full extent of the income inequality in the rural areas surveyed is, however, shown most clearly by the fact that the average income of the households in the wealthiest one fifth of the distribution was more than 19 times greater than that of the average of those in the poorest one fifth!

5.2 The Determinants of Income

In an attempt to isolate the determinants of incomes in the study areas, stepwise, linear regression analysis was undertaken using both total household incomes and per capita household incomes (not standardised for adult equivalents) as dependent variables. A number of possible independent variables were offered in the carrier stock, namely, wage incomes, cash incomes from farming, subsistence production, informal sector cash earnings, incomes from pensions, the number of male and female migrants, the number of resident males in the households, the number of large livestock units held (standardised), the place of work of the migrant and his or her

occupation. The analysis was performed for the sample as a whole, for the 5 sub regions, and for the different segments in the income distribution i.e. poorest 20 percent, richest 20 percent etc. The results are summarised in Tables 2, 3 and 4 below.

In respect of the determinants of household income for the samples as a whole, in the final regression the independent variables in the equation explained 77 percent of the variations in total household income per week. The determinants were monthly wage income (including remittances from migrants, pensions, monthly cash farm income, monthly income from handcraft and the number of male migrants away from the household.

In terms of the standardised Beta weights, a one unit change in the variable monthly wage income, explained three times as much of the resulting change in weekly incomes as did the next most influential independent variable, monthly cash farm income and roughly seven times more than the other three variables, pension income, handcraft income and the number of male migrants. The dominant importance of wage income is also shown by the fact that it was also the most influential variable in the regressions relating to households in the top 20, 10 and 5 percent of the income distribution (Table 3).

Table 2: The Determinants of Household Incomes by Region

SAMPLE	CONSTANT	WAGE INCOME	PENSION INCOME	MALE MIGRANTS	HANDCRAFT INCOME	FARM INCOME	SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD	LIVESTOCK UNITS	R ²	F
Household Income										
Full Sample	6,75 (2,243)	,231 (26,271) (,757)	,097 (2,234) (,063)	5,27 (3,406) (,096)	,065 (4,061) (,115)	1,30 (8,633) (,248)	-	-	,77	195,34
Region:										
1. Mapumulo	1,715 (,406)	,2204 (14,892) (,693)	-	10,996 (4,849) (,224)	,064 (7,506) (,104)	1,219 (2,28) (,343)	-	-	,79	98,56
2. Inkanyezi	1,816 (,235)	,2342 (15,493) (,817)	-	-	,1219 (3,945) (,210)	-	1,860 (2,333) (,124)	-	,74	90,031
3. Nqutu	18,789 (2,352)	,2114 (9,041) (,640)	,1487 (2,126) (,129)	-	-	2,989 (6,669) (,521)	-	-1,894 (-2,556) (-,189)	,83	58,05
4. Hlanganani	8,691 (1,33)	,2956 (14,317) (,883)	-	-	-	2,2811 (2,47) (,152)	-	-	,94	169,899
5. Enzumbé	37,917 (4,947)	,1552 (4,481) (,667)	-	-	-	-	-	-	,42	20,08

Figures in parentheses are (i) t values (ii) Beta co-efficients

When the analysis was undertaken on a regional basis the overall results were similar in the sense that again wage income was very clearly the dominant independent variable. There were, however, some differences. The variable, men migrants, was only important in the Mapumulo district, pension incomes only figured in the Nqutu area and handcraft incomes in Mapumulo and Inkanyezi. New variables entering the equation were, size of household (Inkanyezi) and large stock units (negatively related in Nqutu).¹

Table 3 contains the results of analysis undertaken by running the data in terms of the household's position in the income distribution. The results are good in respect of the households falling into the top 20 percent, 10 percent and 5 percent of the distribution but very poor in relation to those in the bottom quintile. Interesting differences between the results for the sample as a whole and those in the top three income categories are the absence of pension incomes, male migrants, and handcraft incomes as determinants of weekly household incomes in the latter categories and the addition of female migrants (top 5 percent), household size (top 20 percent and top 10 percent) and large stock units (bottom 20 percent).

The very different economic characteristics of the poorest one fifth of the households are re-affirmed by the fact that when the bottom 40 percent of the households were run as a group no meaningful results

1. This probably reflects the fact that there is a higher rate of wage labour in the urban areas of the Nqutu district and consequently urban incomes (with no large stock holdings) are higher than true rural incomes with stock holdings.

Table 3: The Determinants of Household Income by Income Distribution

SAMPLE	CONSTANT	WAGE INCOME	PENSION INCOME	MALE MIGRANTS	FEMALE MIGRANTS	HANDCRAFT INCOME	FARM INCOME	SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD	LIVESTOCK UNITS	R ²	F
Household Income											
Full Sample	6,750 (2,243)	,231 (26,271) (,757)	,097 (2,234) (,063)	5,270 (3,406) (,096)	-	,065 (4,061) (,115)	1,30 (8,633) (,248)	-	-	,77	195,34
Bottom 20 per cent	12,388 (10,929)	,031 (2,414) (,303)	-	-	-	-	-	-	,523 (3,318) (,416)	,20	7,42
Top 20 percent	22,113 (1,493)	,1971 (9,865) (,700)	-	-	-	-	,96 (4,656) (,309)	4,164 (3,024) (,200)	,939 (2,089) (,149)	,72	42,581
Top 10 percent	7,230 (,361)	,2283 (10,745) (,833)	-	-	-	-	,988 (5,147) (,397)	6,484 (4,078) (,315)	-	,82	46,719
Top 5 percent	81,349 (2,171)	,1945 (4,350) (,747)	-	-	26,189 (2,808) (,425)	-	,675 (2,435) (,421)	-	-	,2	10,418

Figures in parenthesis are (i) t values (ii) Beta co-efficients

were obtained, re-affirming the data break suggested by the low R^2 shown in respect of the bottom 20 percent in Table 3.

The determinants of the incomes of poor and rich households measured in terms of total income, may not be a good indicator of the determinants of family living standards, since no account is taken of the relative household sizes involved. To counteract this regression analysis was also done using average per capita household incomes per week (not standardised for adult equivalents)¹. The results are presented in Table 4.

Although the extent to which the independent variables explain family incomes per head is smaller, ranging from 47 percent in the poorest 40 percent, to 73 percent in the case of the top 10 percent, the results are on the whole similar. Wage income was again the dominant variable and it was followed by the size of the household. The numbers of male and female migrants were also important determinants in all four regressions. Interesting differences, apart from the obvious one of household size, were the absence of pension income from the equations, the failure of wage income to enter the equation for the bottom 40 percent, and the significance of the regional variable.

1. It was decided not to standardise for adult equivalents since there was not sufficient data for the researchers to form an opinion of the share of family income accruing to the various family members and to allow them to decide on such things as whether residents should have preferential access; what the relationship is between the sexes and the ages and the dietary constraints on pregnant women.

Table 4: The Determinants of Per Capita Income by Income Distribution

SAMPLE	CONSTANT	WAGE INCOME	MALE MIGRANTS	FEMALE MIGRANTS	FARM INCOME	SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD	LIVESTOCK UNITS	REGION	R ²	F
Full Sample	10,233 (5,637)	.0445 (14,904) (.651)	2,832 (4,832) (.208)	3,344 (5,920) (.227)	.245 (4,842) (.179)	-1,705 (-9,158) (.233)	1,076 (2,267)	1,076 (2,267)	.59	72,34
Bottom 40 per cent	10,090 (11,885)	-	1,554 (4,198) (.313)	2,598 (6,897) (.492)	-	-1,032 (-8,632) (-.660)	-	-	.47	33,72
Top 20 percent	45,376 (9,523)	.0272 (4,309) (.326)	5,587 (4,026) (.359)	9,253 (6,453) (.509)	.136 (2,097) (.148)	-5,177 (-9,138) (-.837)	.314 (2,215) (.168)	-	.69	24,266
Top 10 percent	48,615 (7,528)	.0207 (2,806) (.285)	5,168 (3,667) (.408)	8,366 (3,591) (.384)	-	-4,481 (-6,742) (-.822)	.452 (3,322) (.334)	-	.73	18,82

Figures in parentheses are (i) t values (ii) Beta co-efficients

The overall conclusion coming from the analysis is the re-affirmation of the extent of the dependency and underdevelopment of the rural areas. The dominance of the variables wage income and/or migrants in most of the equations underlines the inability of these areas to support themselves through rural production. Nevertheless cash income from farming activities was an active contributor to family incomes in respect of the wealthier half of the households.

One of the interesting differences between the results relating to the top 20 percent and the bottom 40 percent in the per capita income distribution is the growing influence of labour migration in relation to wage earnings as a whole. It seems that whilst the wealthier households have some access to local work opportunities the households in the poorest two fifths can only find employment through migration. This being so, any economic recessionary trends in the modern sector that lead to labour retrenchment and growing unemployment amongst migrant workers will hit the poorest rural households harder than they will the wealthier ones.

6.0 Incomes and Access to Amenities

Table 5 contains data relating income levels to the access that the households in the different income groups have to the communities' amenities, most of which are State provided. The results show very clearly how income levels are positively related such access and how the physical distribution of people and amenities in practice, acts to widen the overall differences in quality of life and to perpetuate these differences through time.

Table 5: Access to Amenities by Income Group

Income Category	Percentages of Category in Indicator														
	Land				Water			School		Store		Hospital		Bus stop	
	Have Access	Over 1 Hectare	All used	None used	Less than 5 minutes walk	More than 15 minutes walk	Reliable supply	Over 30 minutes walk	Over 15 minutes walk	Over 30 minutes walk	Over 15 minutes walk	More than 1 hour	More than 30 minutes walk	More than 15 minutes walk	
Top 5 percent	66	47	58	27	33	38	41	11	56	18	52	42	2	27	
Top 10 percent	68	47	61	23	30	43	41	23	56	24	63	49	11	37	
Bottom 40 percent	84	20	55	20	15	46	46	33	73	26	61	67	12	42	
Bottom 20 percent	80	18	45	15	12	55	53	34	77	27	65	71	10	40	

Wealthier households have markedly better access to education, to larger land plots, to water, to public transport, to the local store and to the local hospital, all of which improve their relative earning capacities through time.

The impact of the spatial location of amenities on income generation is probably most clearly illustrated through an examination of its impact on education. Not only did access to the local schools improve as the average income of the households increased (with only 11 percent of the wealthiest group being more than 30 minutes walk from the nearest school and 23 percent of the second group, as opposed to 33 percent of the bottom 40 percent of the households), but the richest categories also spent, on average, more than twice as much per week on education and had a higher percentage of households with children participating in the education system. The better educational access of these families is reflected in their higher earning capacities, lower rates of economic inactivity, and higher mean adult educational levels.

A similar picture emerges when one looks at health care. Amongst the poorest 40 percent of households, mean weekly spending on health care was 89c and only 39 percent of the families in this income group, had spent money on health care over the previous 12 months. Amongst the wealthiest 10 percent, on the other hand, the mean weekly spending on health care was R2,00 and 57 percent had spent money on health care during the previous year.

7.0 What Distinguishes the Wealthy Households from the Poor

If one compares the socio-economic profiles of households in the top 10 percent of the income distribution with those in the bottom 40 percent, one finds that the wealthier households are larger (mean household size 8,3 as against 7,1 people), own more land (47 percent having more than 1 hectare as against 20 percent), have higher rates of out-migration (72 percent having one man away and 32 percent more than one, as against 44 percent and 14 percent respectively), have higher rates of employment and lower rates of dependency and most importantly higher earning rates, irrespective of whether the source of the income is wages, subsistence farming, cash farming or informal activities (see Table 6 and 7), have higher participation rates in respect of cash farming and informal sector activities and, as was discussed earlier, better overall access rates to the amenities in their area.

The poor households were, in general, very poor, the mean average weekly income from all sources for the families comprising the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution being R22,62 and the median R22,57. The major determinants of changes in per capita incomes in this group were the size of the household, which was negatively related and the household's ability to supply another migrant worker. Indeed, the fact that women migrants were of greater importance in determining changes in the per capita incomes of this group (See Table 4), further stresses the importance that the export of labour plays in determining changes in the present living standards of these families in the bottom income categories.

Table 6: Income Profiles of Households in Different Income Categories

Income Category	Clean Income (Rands)		Median (Rands)	Percentage Household Receiving Income
	All Households	Receiving Households		
Weekly Wage Income				
Wealthiest 5 percent	142,71	162,69	172,38	88
Wealthiest 10 percent	114,41	123,12	125,00	96
Poorest 40 percent	24,29	24,96	20,00	92
Poorest 20 percent	20,09	20,49	15,00	89
Total Sample	38,55	48,56	30,00	88
Weekly Subsistence Income				
Wealthiest 5 percent	5,62	6,41	2,40	88
Wealthiest 10 percent	5,08	5,80	2,40	88
Poorest 40 percent	1,79	2,08	,87	86
Poorest 20 percent	1,27	1,52	,64	84
Total Sample	2,90	3,31	1,28	88
Monthly Farm Income				
Wealthiest 5 percent	12,95	35,14	-	37
Wealthiest 10 percent	8,78	25,44	-	35
Poorest 40 percent	,36	3,24	-	11
Poorest 20 percent	,76	5,65	-	9
Total Sample	1,66	9,92	-	17
Monthly Handcraft Income				
Wealthiest 5 percent	55,67	149,63	-	28
Wealthiest 10 percent	74,25	180,67	-	27
Poorest 40 percent	8,79	43,02	-	13
Poorest 20 percent	4,58	27,12	-	17
Total Sample	28,80	104,39	-	16
Total Weekly Income				
Wealthiest 5 percent	232,16		213,16	
Wealthiest 10 percent	185,61		162,24	
Poorest 40 percent	22,46		22,41	
Poorest 20 percent	15,79		16,02	
Total Sample	60,00		43,15	

Table 7: The Working Profiles of Households in the Different Income Categories

Income Category	Percentage of Category	
	One	more than one
Number of Men Away Working		
Wealthiest 5 percent	33	39
Wealthiest 10 percent	40	32
Poorest 40 percent	44	14
Poorest 20 percent	55	13
Number of Females Away Working		
Wealthiest 5 percent	26	3
Wealthiest 10 percent	22	4
Poorest 40 percent	12	3
Poorest 20 percent	7	5
Number of Males Working at home		
Wealthiest 5 percent	14	2
Wealthiest 10 percent	16	2
Poorest 40 percent	13	1
Poorest 20 percent	14	2
Number of Females Working at Home		
Wealthiest 5 percent	12	7
Wealthiest 10 percent	13	5
Poorest 40 percent	10	1
Poorest 20 percent	12	1
Number of People Unemployed		
Wealthiest 5 percent	25	12
Wealthiest 10 percent	21	10
Poorest 40 percent	24	12
Poorest 20 percent	26	12

The other major difference between the wealthier families and the very poor were demographic. Amongst the bottom 40 percent, 41 percent were aged under 15 and 4,7 percent over 65, whereas in the top 10 percent these percentages were 30,5 and 4 percent respectively. Education levels also differed. The mean level of education amongst those over 7 years was 4 years for the poor group and 5,5 for the wealthier ones and, whereas in the former groups, only 13 percent had completed primary school and 1 percent high school, in the latter the relevant percentages were 26 percent and 5 percent.

8.0 The Overall Situation in KwaZulu's Rural Areas

Returning to the questions posed earlier in this paper, the data flowing from these rural surveys show that the historical development patterns have generated a situation in KwaZulu's rural areas that is characterised by the following:

1. On average, living levels are very poor in the rural areas of KwaZulu with half of the households having a weekly income from all sources of less than R43,15.
2. The living levels in the areas, such as they are, are almost entirely due to the receipts from the sale of labour. Whilst the dependency is evident at all levels and in all regions, it is even greater amongst the poorest 40 percent of the households.

3. There is a significant degree of differentiation evident. The average household income in the top decile was 8 times greater than that of the households in the poorest 40 percent and 12 times that of the poorest 20 percent. The income disparity is intensified from a quality of life viewpoint by unequal access to community amenities.

4. The domestic economic resource base of these areas has been almost totally eroded and whilst those families who could generate income through farming or informal sector production of some type did not do too badly, particularly in respect of the informal sector, the overall participation rates were low, involving only 16 percent of the household.

Whilst apartheid has certainly been a contributing factor to this overall situation, chalking as it has a large proportion of black families to a rural struggle for existence, it would be naive in the extreme to believe that the removal of apartheid could alone provide the solution to black rural poverty. Whilst an apartheid free society may well be a prerequisite for an end to widespread black rural poverty, the end of apartheid is certainly not likely to prove to be a sufficient condition for the economic transformation of these areas. What will be needed, in addition, will be for the new political regime to create and implement of a policy package that has been specifically designed to achieve this end.

9.0 Black Rural Poverty in Post Apartheid South Africa

9.1 The Limits on Policy Making for Development

Policy packages that are designed to alleviate or, even more ambitiously, to eliminate rural poverty are certainly not paradigm neutral, nor do they "drop from heaven onto a clean slate". They essentially comprise moves that those in control in the society believe to be desirable in terms of their particular world view. Whether or not such policy packages are successful, depends firstly on how realistic they are and secondly, whether the people in apparent power have the actual strength and willpower that will be needed to see the policies through. It has been pointed out that;

"Good policy analysis, as opposed to good intentions consists in learning to understand the constraints of power - be it man's or nature's - and in learning to shape feasible programmes within the limits they impose" (Johnston and Clark, 1982, p.13).

What does this imply in respect of the black rural areas? Firstly, that the new order must be genuinely interested in the needs and welfare of the rural communities, particularly when seen in relation to the needs of competing groups (urban blacks, blacks on commercial farms etc). Secondly, that the policymakers, when framing the policies, have correctly identified the problem areas. Thirdly that the new order has the necessary manpower and funding to implement the policies and the means to counter any moves that may be made by groups who will oppose the policies. It is no accident that the rural poor are powerless; powerlessness and poverty feed on each other and in

doing so strengthen the hands of the powerful. It will take great resolve and substantial effort on the part of any government to overcome the results of a century of neglect and a half century of apartheid.

The post apartheid regime will have to face up to a number of constraints on their actions and try to frame a feasible development strategy within such constraints. Major difficulties will be;

1. The present structure and organisation of the economy and the need to protect the productive base whilst seeking to modify the institutional aspects so that they fit more clearly into the new Government's economic objectives.
2. The lack of sufficient, committed and well trained beaurocrats to implement government policy. KwaZulu at present does not have sufficient agricultural extension officers to man each of the agricultural wards and also has a backlog of some 12 000 teachers against a throughput of some 400 trainee teachers per year in the training colleges. Whilst these bottlenecks are certainly a product of apartheid they will not disappear with the system that created them.
3. The need to improve black access to land but at the same time to ensure that South Africa's ability to feed herself is not seriously impaired.

4. The need to deliver some meaningful improvements in black living standards in a manner that will not undermine South Africa's productive capability but yet will offer some hope to the disadvantaged to show them that the new Government has, in fact, something to offer them.

9.2 Some Possible Policy Directions

The extent of the differentiation present in KwaZulu's rural communities suggests that there are a number of possible areas for action and that whether or not a particular policy will impact on a rural household will be a function of the size and nature of the household's rural economic base. There are a number of different thrusts that can be made;

1. Amongst the very poor households, there is clearly a need for a significant welfare input. Households who have neither land nor access to wage labour can only be helped in the short term by such means.
2. Those households with small land holdings and access to the urban labour market should be encouraged to leave the rural areas and resettle in the towns. Apartheid has led to the under urbanisation of the black population and there is now a real need to revise this trend as it is economically more efficient to provide jobs and services for people living in higher densities. It should be noted, however, that since

many of these families view their rural landholdings as their social security net, in order to get them to urbanise in any significant numbers it may be essential to provide some social security system in the towns.

3. There is a need to improve black access to agricultural land. Land presently owned or controlled by whites must be opened up to blacks either through purchase or through confiscation.

The Buthelezi Commission recommended the establishment of a Land Commission, which could buy up commercial farmland, subdivide it and then make it available to black farmers in 50 hectare plots (Buthelezi Commission, 1982). In order to ensure that the long term agricultural potential of the economy is not damaged, any programme of land transfer must be backed up by a programme of agricultural education and the expansion of the present system of agricultural extension services.

Another way in which land could be made available to black farmers would be through Government acquisition of white farms and their subsequent transfer to black co-operatives. However, although this type of transfer is a lower cost option than that of the Land Commission, since the farms acquired do not have to be subdivided, it may have significant hidden costs since experience in other

developing countries suggests that the failure rate of such co-operative farms is often very high.

4. There is at present a real need for job creation in South Africa and, with the present movement towards sanctions and the possible job losses that will result, and the very high present rate of population growth, the need is likely to be very much greater in post apartheid South Africa.

Since in practice it may not prove easy to re-open markets lost through the sanctions programme, job creation may prove to be an almost impossible task. One positive move that could do a great deal to foster job creation would be a successful urbanisation strategy. Urban areas have their own internal economic dynamics not only does the construction phase of an expanding town create jobs but the concentration of people create a market which itself encourages production. Even in urban squatter areas, income levels, whilst they are lower than those in the formal black townships are very much higher than they are in the rural areas. For example, in the Mgaga squatter settlement outside Durban, May found a mean weekly household income of R57,28 and a median of R50 per week and a mean per capita income of R15,37 per week (median R11,40).

5. Given the uneven spatial access to amenities in the black rural areas and the low level at which they are presently supplied, there is also a need for direct Government action

to upgrade and extend rural services. Such actions would have the added spin-off of providing jobs in the rural areas at least through the construction phase of the delivery of the needed services and, if properly managed, it may be possible to maximise the long term spin-offs from such programmes.

6. The development and implementation of affirmative action campaigns in respect of the labour market, particularly with reference to the Public Sector. The elimination of the 'poor white problem' through the use of the civilised labour policy on the mines and in the Government in the 1930's and 1940's showed what can be done in this field. The new order should try to repeat the exercise with respect to the African groups.

7. There are clearly significant gains to be made from an increased provision of education. Educational levels are low and access to schooling facilities is also poor and compounded by the quality of the educational plant provided in these areas. At present rural education at the primary school level is still provided on the basis of community schools¹, which places a heavy burden on the poor areas -

1. Community schooling is a process in which the communities themselves build the school and are then partly re-imbursed by the Government when the school is handed over and the teachers and running expenses are provided by the State.

the very areas where the need for education is greatest. An essential ingredient of post apartheid South Africa will be the provision of free compulsory schooling - although this too will take time to achieve.

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