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CRIME AND Conflict

EDITORIAL

When ihe *Conflict Supplement* was launched in January 1984, we intended to publish four editions and then assess the publication's future. Happily, the *Indicator* has decided to extend the series' life, with new directions. The *Conflict Supplement* has now evolved into *Crime and Conflict,* opening the door to many challenging issues which concern us all.

Since the elections, the media have drawn attention to the problem of crime and KwaZulu-Natal has been labeled the country's crime capital. We are not jumping on this gloom and doom bandwagon. Instead, *Crime and Conflict* hopes to monitor and analyse crime, particularly police statistics, to readers informed about a subject prone to manipulation from various quarters. Crime is a serious problem which deserves more debate than just the exchange of "spook stories" around the braai.

I'm; *Conflict Supplement* pointed out that all violence is a crime, and that the reported upsurge in crime in April last year w.'ir; largely due to a shift in focus away from political conflict. This publication will continue to monitor political violence, **imi** licularly in KwaZulu-Natal, and in the rest of Africa. We do, nevertheless support a change from the South African obsession with matters political. Issues such as domestic violence, rape, white collar crime, and the psychological aspects of violence have been neglected.

In the past, police resources were unevenly spread amongst all crimes. Mark Shaw attributes the boom in the private security industry to the police's preoccupation with political instability. Many other crimes were neglected by the police, with implications for the victims, but also for crime records.

As with most statistics, the media do not devote much space to explaining the data's limitations, which almost always exist. This first edition of *Crime and Conflict* examines police crime statistics. Lorraine Glanz considers recent trends and recording methods, and Mark Shaw's second paper probes the causes of crime.

South Africa's quest for stability is now more challenging then ever. The security forces have to become accountable, and Jakkie Cilliers discusses the implications of this for the notorious riot police unit. The changing role of the military also needs to be monitored. Simon Baynham points out that in an increasingly interdependent world, regional and national security are equally important.

Antoinette Louw
Editor: Crime and Conflict

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Securing the Region

Simon Baynham, Africa Institute

Despite changes in Southern Africa, regional stability is still a concern. This article considers South Africa's role in this process, suggesting that challenges should be addressed now rather than allowing events to set the region's agenda.

During the past five years, momentous changes have taken place that have transformed the political landscape of Southern Africa. South African and Cuban troops have withdrawn from Angola, Namibians celebrated the fifth anniversary of their independence in March, and the civil war that crippled Mozambique for decades has ended. A steady trend towards regional demilitarization has followed.

Equally astonishing has been the pace of change in South Africa, where the end of white minority rule has brought down the barriers separating the country from the wider global community. Encouraged by Western pledges of support, the region (perhaps over-optimistically) is looking towards this country to resume its role as the engineroom for growth and development in Southern Africa.

Despite this progress, the likelihood of an end to the ferocious war in Angola seems slim, while the potential for renewed violence in South Africa has yet to disappear. Elsewhere in the region (for instance in Zambia), the metamorphosis from authoritarian systems towards accountable models of democratic pluralism, raises additional problems for the sub-continent's peace and security.

In the transformed post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, a number of menaces to the stability of the region have diminished or disappeared, only to be replaced by others. In short, despite the important changes that have undoubtedly taken place in Southern Africa during the past few years, the prospects for peace in the sub-continent are overshadowed by uncertainties.

Regional stability is therefore of as much concern today as it was ten years ago. The multifarious challenges and opportunities confronting the sub-continent are so urgent that it would be unwise to allow events themselves to set the region's agenda. In the interests of all Southern Africans, these questions must be addressed in a new spirit of cooperative reconciliation.

The continuing conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Angola and Liberia, not to mention fresh waves of genocidal bloodletting in Burundi and Rwanda, mean that in the post-Cold War era Africa will have to find new institutions and mechanisms to prevent, monitor and manage domestic and interstate violence.

The region sees this country as the engineroom for growth and development in Southern Africa

Continental solutions

The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) held in Kampala in May 1991, stressed the critical relationship between peace and development on the continent. It was emphasized that the security and stability of each African country is inescapably linked to the security of all African states.

The resultant Kampala Document called for the establishment of a continental peacekeeping machinery and for major reductions in African military expenditure. These proposals were endorsed at the 29th Organisation of African Unity (OATJ) summit in Cairo last June.

The CSSDCA process is vital if the *continent's* problems are to be addressed, but the OAU's track record since 1963 has not been impressive. At the Cairo summit Eritrea's new president, Issayas Afewerki, called the body "a nominal organisation that has failed to deliver on its pronounced objectives and commitments". If one examines the OAU's record in conflict resolution, a good deal of scepticism seems appropriate.

The record of the Monitoring and Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia has not been particularly auspicious either. Suggestions are that most African armies "do not have the necessary administrative structures, intelligence mechanisms, or resources to .successfully resolve conflicts in other countries". Unless enhanced by outside financial and logistical support, any peacekeeping body under OAU auspices will be underfunded, underequipped and underutilized.

Regional solutions

Establishing an all-African security regime would therefore seem to be an unrealistic objective. For the foreseeable future, security and development issues can best be dealt with via sub-continental institutions. Indeed, peacekeeping arrangements by regional groupings are an option currently favoured by a United Nations short of both cash and political courage.

In Southern Africa (as elsewhere in the Third World), this could be roughly modelled on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE) where multilateral talks are divided into "baskets", each focusing on groups of related issues including:

n security and confidence building measures

i economics and the environment

."! humanitarian issues, and

fl the cross-border flow of peoples and information.

Embracing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) states and a new South Africa, a similar format should be followed. A Regional Security Council (RSC), on which all governments should be represented, would act as a forum for joint consultation on a wide range of conflict prevention and peace keeping issues.

South Africa will play a central role in peacekeeping operations

The long term objective of a regional security regime are to engage in active security dialogue and prevent conflicts from breaking out. Should this fail, conflicts should be contained and ended. Some lessons might be gleaned from the approval, by leaders of the NATO alliance in January 1994, of a United States proposal for a Partnership for Peace programme with Russia and her ex-satellites.

One observer suggested that "from this fairly informal and loose organisation could develop stronger regional institutions binding the countries more closely together". A post-apartheid South Africa will however, remain the economic and military giant in the sub-continent. Residual regional fears of South African hegemonic domination will have to be addressed with some M.-nsiii\ it\.

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increasingly interdependent world, security can really only exist as common security. No state can safeguard itself merely as a result of national security efforts.

Military policy has become only one element of security policy

In addition, military policy has become only one element of security policy. Today, international and regional relations are also shaped by energy, transport, migration patterns, food and economic requirements, rather than on purely politico-military priorities.

Interdependence

In the past, the international political climate surrounding South Africa did not favour governmental cooperation in the region. But today the scope for meaningful interaction in the establishment or expansion of cross border infrastructural schemes in respect of power, transport and environmental conservation (to name but a few) is very great indeed.

The moment is ripe to abandon the reactive nature of the past, turning potential sources of conflict into arenas of cooperation. There is for instance, a realisation of the interdependence of countries on limited and shared water resources, and the recurrent threat of drought, which has propelled neighbouring states into one another's arms. The , time is opportune for Southern African states to collaborate in a long term water management strategy.

There are many areas in which cooperation between Southern African states would have a salutary effect on the region's stability and security. These include joint endeavours to combat gun smuggling, drug trafficking, una unrolled migration and other thread m the sub-continent's welfare.

Militarih. ;i Regional Security Council could in time introduce a i.insic of confidence- and sccurity-building measures. These mifln include joint military training

exchanges of senior personnel, shared procurement programmes, arms control and disarmament negotiations. With discussions on the reconfiguration of forces, these might enable the mutual implementation of non-offensive strategic defence, rather than offensive defence.

This doctrine aims to increase military stability by ensuring adequate defence against attacks while minimising offensive capabilities.

Accordingly, the African National Congress (ANC) wants to scale down South Africa's military capability to avoid threatening neighbouring states. Powerful lobbies within the ANC however, believe the rationalisation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has gone far enough.

Regional defence

South Africa will have to strike the right balance between the goal of defence and deterrence on the one hand, and the task of regional cooperation on the other. This is particularly difficult to accomplish for this country, whose apartheid history and past propensity to jettison regional diplomatic initiatives in favour of military action, is likely to find its motives questioned.

Although regional suspicions still run high, a post-apartheid South Africa will necessarily play a central role in peacekeeping operations. (The distinction between peacemaking and peacekeeping operations is no longer made, as peacekeepers are increasingly using force to defend themselves.)

The regional nature of likely future conflicts requires flexible and mobile military forces. In this regard, airborne units provide a strategic strike force that can be deployed rapidly over long distances, in conventional as well as in natural disaster and counterinsurgency roles.

It is interesting to note that the Frontline States, whose opposition to apartheid was the movement's *raison d'etre* for almost 15 years, are seeking to shift from disengagement

to intensive engagement at a variety of levels. This includes cooperation with South Africa in regional defence and security.

As Zimbabwe's foreign minister said a few days before President Mandela's inauguration, "There is no longer a front line", so the group of mainly Southern African states, together with South Africa, should set out to promote "peace and stability in the region".

It is encouraging that General Meiring, Chief of the SANDF, has called for joint training, exchanges of personnel and combined military exercises for the region's armed forces. Although he does not envisage a collective security system along NATO lines for the foreseeable future, his comments, and those of the ANC, support a multilateral regional approach to peace, security and development in Southern Africa. C&C

Policing for Profit

Mark Shaw, Centre for Policy Studies

Private security firms have boomed in South Africa, with uniformed employees outnumbering the South African Police Services by about three to one. This article considers their origins, role and relationship with the police.

Private security permeates the lives of most South Africans far more than the public policc. Security personnel also have a higher visible presence in the suburbs, townships and public places of business and learning. Changes in the industry since 1987 indicate an expanding and more regularised sector which is set to have a major impact on future policing.

The South African security sector is not a homogeneous entity. The most important distinction is between contract security and in-house security services. Contract security encompasses private security companies engaging in all related activities for hire on the commercial market.

In-house security includes the security operations in large corporations like Anglo American, as well as individuals employed in security related tasks in smaller business concerns. These individuals are likely to be engaged in a wider range of functions, like cleaning or packing.

Types of security

Beyond this broad classification, the industry is divided into a number of sub-sectors with specific traits and growth patterns. These are not watertight categories however, and some security companies provide a range of services across the sectors. Three broad distinctions can be made.

The guarding industry

This is the largest and most visible component of the industry and includes armed response and 'cash in transit' operations. The industry's regulating mechanism, the Security Officers Board, estimates that the 100 000 active security officers in this sector are spread across approximately 2 700 companies. The nine largest security companies employ about 31 000 security officers.

The exact size of the guarding industry is hard to judge since there is a high turnover of staff (estimated at around 200% a year), which varies according to commercial demand. There are an estimated 180 000 trained security guards in the country with only about 100 000 employed at one time.

Table 1 shows significant differences between the new provinces. All the figures are not included since the Security Officers Board has only begun registering companies in the former bantustans.

Not surprisingly, regions with the highest levels of crime and private enteiprise have the largest number of security companies.

Table 1: Numbers of Companies and Security Officers Registered with the Security Officer's Board as at January 1995

REGION	NUMBER OF COMPANIES	SECURITY OFFICERS
Gauteng	1 326	37 989
KwaZulu Natal	495	13845
Western Cape	369	9 317
Northern Transvaal	219	5 840
Eastern Province	199	5 777
Orange Free State	99	3 210
TOTAL	**2 707**	**78 390**

Electronic security

This includes installers of burglar alarms and quick reaction devices. There is some overlap with the guarding industry, since electronic devices such as panic buttons in homes, are used to alert armed security guard personnel from the same company. This sector is not as large as the guarding industry but has a fairly substantial membership.

Investigations

The least visible of all sectors are the private investigators who cover matrimonial disputes, labour matters, industrial espionage, criminal investigations and some VIP protection services. Risk management consultants also fall into this category. This sector consists of 200 individuals, although about 2 000 people may be involved at any one time.

The growth in the South African industry reflects developments elsewhere in the world

In total, the security industry employs around 200 000 people across 20 security organisations. These fall under the South African Security Federation (SASFED), formed in 1986 after a request from the then Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, for organisation of the industry to facilitate dealings with llie Government.

This process has not hccn easy, as the industry is riven by clashes of a material ami personal nature. The. South African National Hmployers Association (SANS1.A). the most

representative structure of the guarding industry, recently pulled out of SASFED, arguing that employers could do a better job representing themselves.

Tensions arise from the need to create the image of a unified security sector, whose members are also competitors in a cut throat business. Many smaller "fly by night" operators do not belong to any organisation and undercut prices and blacken the industry's name. This has led to demands, particularly from more established companies, for industrial regulation.

The security boom

The industry has grown remarkably since 1980. The growth rate initially was about 30% a year, but slowed down to between 10% and 15% in the last three years. Turnover in 1993/94 was estimated at about R1.5 billion with an average growth rate of 18% since the late 1970s.

The industry's growth does not reflect that of the country's economy. Rather, the industry grows remarkably in poor economic, conditions. Before the 1994 election when most business stagnated, the security sector reflected record growth rates. This has since stabilised, although perceived crime increases are again boosting security companies.

The grow ill in the South African industry reflects developments elsewhere in the world, although grow tli occurred slightly later here. I .arge scale expansion occurred in the l')W)s in tiie United States and Canada and in the 1970s in the

United Kingdom and Europe. Despite the size of the South African security industry it is not necessarily fully developed yet.

According to the security industry's in-house journal *Security Focus* (October, 1994), the development of the local industry is falling behind other countries. In the US and UK the security sectors employ roughly 1,5% of the population, while in South Africa this is only 0,5%. In areas of high property ownership however, the ratio is bound to be higher in South Africa.

The most important distinction between local and foreign industries is growth in the reactive side of the local industry. Security companies are usually proactive, with guards patrolling defined areas to prevent crime. In South Africa the combination of electronic and guarding functions has led to a marked growth in 'armed response' activities. This indicates the degree to which the industry has usurped the state's role in maintaining law and order.

In SA, the state encouraged the private security sector to fill the gap left by the police

Origins

There are two broad and opposing arguments regarding the origins of private security.

Withdrawal of the state

This argument maintains that the growth of the private security industry is a function of the inability of the state to police certain activities adequately. According to Robert (1988), a private security sector might develop to fill the gap between rapidly expanding public demand and an unresponsive criminal justice system.

Mass private property

Shearing and Stenning (1983) argue that the growth of private security in North America is due to the expansion of property ownership

which encourages the use of private security. Where there is a blurring of private and public property, such as in shopping malls, the scope for policing by private means is much greater.

These arguments are not exclusive and both apply to South Africa. The police withdrew throughout the 1980s to police opposition to apartheid and the ensuing violence, leaving an expanding market for private security. The growth of private property, especially affluent suburbs, also increased the profile of the local security industry.

In South Africa, an additional factor has been at work. The state not only allowed the private security sector to develop, but actively encouraged it to fill the gap left by the police who were concentrating on other concerns. Cohen (1985) argues that privatising security threatens the state, but private security in South Africa has augmented the functioning of the state.

The result was a greater attempt to control the industry through the Security Officers' Act of 1987. This laid the foundation for the regulation of the industry and the registration of security officers and companies. This initiative has had important implications for the future of the South African security industry and its continued relationship with the state.

Private security assisted the state in its fight against terrorism and subversion where interests coalesced around the protection of white property. Private security guards were for example, trained to search shoppers and commuters for explosive devices. The state also made direct use of private security companies through the National Keypoints Act 102 of 1980.

The Act provided for the declaration of certain strategically important installations which warranted special protection. The Minister of Defence could compel an owner to provide such protection, or could take over the duties himself. This meant the Minister could take over contracts with private security companies for the protection of certain installations.

Security personnel employed in such roles were given greater powers including arrest, search and seizure. For private security companies, protecting national key points was a lucrative task which ensured the growth of the industry and enhanced its paramilitary nature.

Type of personnel

The nature of the security industry in South Africa is closely related to developments on the continent. Military and police personnel, and those already engaged in private security who emigrated to South Africa after independence in Kenya, Zimbabwe and elsewhere, stimulated the local industry. Many of these expatriates occupy senior positions in the local security industry.

In South Africa, the type of people involved in private security has important consequences for the industry. The legacy of bush war, colonialism and apartheid has been the growth of a large group of mostly men whose only expertise lies in security, particularly counter-insurgency training and low intensity conflict. This has markedly effected the structure, training and approach of local private security companies.

The extent to which the industry's growth resulted from the initiative of ex-military or police officials is unclear. Anecdotal evidence from interviews suggests the industry always grew after periods of national service had ended.

Private entrepreneurs are involved in the business, but the vast majority in management have had military, intelligence or police training, and entered the industry because of that training.

These links to ex-military or police officers may have other important implications. Many police officers are leaving the SAPS and the military is being rationalised. These individuals may seek work in the private security industry. One military commander has suggested that he is approaching the private security industry to find jobs for ex-soldiers from his unit.

A new phenomenon is that of ex-MK guerillas establishing private security companies in townships to protect lives and property. Private security companies such as this now operate on the East Rand and in Alexandra near Johannesburg, undermining the claim that private security is necessarily a prerequisite of the rich.

Assisting the SAPS

Crime increases since 1990 extended private security functions to policing public places, including protecting commuters at stations and on trains. Even panic buttons are not necessarily attached to police stations, but are handled largely by private reaction units. In some suburbs, such as Lundudno in the Cape, a private security company installed panic alarms in all the houses and patrols the area 24 hours a day.

Other local authorities have also taken the initiative. In Kempton Park and Pretoria the activities of the municipal authorities, police and private security companies are closely coordinated.

In the Johannesburg city centre, some blocks are protected by patrolling security guards in cooperation with the SAPS to improve safety for tourists.

These links are acknowledged at senior levels of the industry. Roy Macfarlene, the "doyen" of private security says the "private sector security is a sizable and powerful ally of government and law enforcement agencies". Within the industry, calls for the security sector to assist the police in their fight against crime have been made.

Some senior police officers concede that the SAPS must provide a more comprehensive service in the townships, leaving the suburbs to private security companies. A National Crime Combating Council was formed before the election to coordinate the activities of public and private crime control agencies. The Minister of Safety and Security has however, not displayed much interest in the structure, possibly because it was initiated by disgraced police general, Basie Smit.

Nevertheless, the private security function will still be encouraged by the State. Crime is gaining significance as a political issue, and the police will be perceived to be unable to handle the situation. Since private security firms have established a substantial role for themselves they will need to be accommodated in the new order.

Most security practitioners expect the role of private companies to grow as the police are engaged in a process of internal transition. This will mean an expansion of the market share and some members argue that the security sector must gear itself for these changes, to provide better levels of service to all communities .

Accountability

The Security Officers' Board (SOB) appointed regional inspectors in some provinces to police the industry. It has established itself in a regulatory position despite difficulties related to high turnover of personnel and companies.

Ironically, the SOB has been assisted by the competitive nature of the industry, as companies are keen to report other's transgressions to undercut opposition.

The growing activities of private investigators are bound to allow abuses of power

Employers have welcomed this regulation, but other aspects of the legislation have been opposed. The Board's registration fee is resented since it increases costs. Training programmes offered by the SOB are unpopular as they lead to poaching of trained guards by other companies.

Training also increases the costs of security, meaning larger companies can be undercut by smaller operators.

The SOB is however, set on its training role which is seen as a mechanism to upgrade the industry. Training is also viewed as the key to greater regulation since it allows a grading of security officers and acts as a form of gatekeeping for the industry.

Given even the current level of powers, the growth and expansion of the private security sector's activities may need to be monitored.   ,

Existing legislation is inadequate in this respect. Since the industry

operates under the maxim, "the customer is always right and the crook is always wrong", some form of independent complaints mechanism may be appropriate.

This is particularly necessary if private security companies usurp the functions of the police in some suburbs. The growing activities of private investigators are bound to allow abuses of power. Claims by the industry that they are accountable because they are paid by clients does not hold, since this excludes any responsibility to the wider public.

Debates around the future of the security industry are underway. The structure and composition of the SOB is currently being discussed with the Ministry of Safety and Security, and attempts to farther regulate the industry continue.

Discussions have however, not been accessible to the public and given the expanding role and visibility of the industry, this should be considered.

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Patterns of Crime

Deciphering the Statistics

Lorraine Glanz, Human Sciences Research Council

Crime levels have soared since 1990, but our knowledge of its extent is limited to police crime statistics which throughout the world are considered unreliable. This article scans recent trends, indicating the discrepancies in these statistics.

Crime is presently an emotive issue in South Africa. Few would argue that crime has not reached critical proportions and even senior members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) have declared openly that if left unchecked, crime threatens to reduce the country to a state of anarchy.

The crime situation is very often cited by (mainly white) emigrants as the main reason for leaving South Africa. Yet, besides car hijackings and housebreakings, whites are the least victimized group.

So-called township residents have been the victims of violent crime for so long that the threat and the fear of crime have become part of their everyday lives.

Police crime figures are the primary source of information about the problem, but are notoxiously unreliable. Crime statistics have been used and abused by politicians, police chiefs, the media and anyone with a stake in the crime situation. It is well documented that police crime figures are an underrepresentation of the true extent of the problem.

This is due mainly to the nonreporting of much crime by the public, and partly because not all crimes reported to, or uncovered by the police are recorded. Victimization surveys developed in the United States in the 1970s attempted to reveal the so-called dark figure of crime. Very few such surveys have been undertaken in South Africa, due to the considerable cost involved.

This article considers whether reported increases in crime are real, along with the discrepancy between the number of cases reportedly solved by the police and the number being prosecuted in the courts. The fact that the number of convictions obtained in the courts has dropped considerably, will also be discussed.

Police crime statistics

An important symbiotic relationship exists between the public and the police. An incident can only be followed up if the case is known to the police. Most incidents only come to the police's attention after being reported by the public. Worldwide, officially recorded crime is influenced by a host of factors and one can therefore never be sure what the true crime picture is. Some factors affecting crime statistics reported by the police are:

- Differences (among groups and between geographical areas) in the public's willingness to report crime to the police. This in turn, is affected by perceptions of the police (such as efficiency, fairness, impartiality etc.).

- Crimes of varying levels of seriousness have different reporting patterns. Less serious crimes (such as petty theft) and crimes of a personal nature (such as wife abuse) tend not to be reported.

- Whether or not a particular crime is covered by insurance affects reporting behaviour. Having insurance, in turn, varies according to population group and socio-economic status.

- Reporting behaviour is also influenced by the level of ease associated with reporting a crime. Distance to the nearest police station, access to transport and access to a telephone are all factors that affect the decision to report, particularly in the case of less serious crime.

- The incidence of some crimes, such as drug related offences, gambling, prostitution and driving under the influence of alcohol, is strongly related to police practices (such as the vigour with which this type of activity is tracked down). The level of police staffing affects the reported incidence of these offences in particular.

An increase in the number of police in a specific area leads to an increase in reported crime

- Differences in levels of police staffing across geographical areas affect crime statistics. Research has shown that an increase in the number of police in a specific area leads to an increase in reported crime.

- Whether or not a crime is recorded by the police, and the classification of crimes, is subject to bias. The extent of bias may be related to police management and control. It has been shown in Great Britain, for example, that certain hard-to-solve crimes are recorded less often than other crimes in order to inflate the rate at which crimes are solved by the police.

Types of crime

Crime statistics published in the South African Police Service's (SAPS) annual reports for 1992 and 1993 are compared in Table 1. This table also presents a five year comparison of statistics for the period 1988 to 1993. The effect of population growth has been taken into account in all calculations.

Property crime

The decrease in property crime between 1991 and 1992 was short-lived since it increased by two percent between 1992 and 1993 (Table 1). During this period, the rate of housebreaking remained the same and stocktheft and fraud actually decreased. Increases were however, reported in property crimes such as motor vehicle theft, theft out of a motor vehicle, arson (5%), and malicious damage to property.

It is important to examine crime trends over a period longer than a year

The Commissioner of the SAPS reported that 7 208 vehicles were hijacked during 1993, nearly 2 000 more than in 1992. More than 80% of these were hijacked in Soweto or elsewhere in the Witwatersrand. From 1988 to 1993 property crime increased by 23% (Table 1). Of the more serious types of property crime, burglary of business premises increased by 36%, residential burglary increased by 27% and motor vehicle theft increased by 23%.

Violent crime

Violent crime increased by six percent between 1992 and 1993 (Table 1). This matches the increase in violent crime between 1991 and 1992 and this trend, evident for a number of years, thus continues. Increases in particular types of serious violent crime between 1992 and 1993 are worth noting: public violence (157%); murder (6%); attempted murder (16%); rape (9%); and aggravated robbery (H%).

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(Table 1). The most serious types of violent crime increased at very high rates during this period. Murder increased by 50%, rape by 27%, aggravated robbery by 109% and aggravated assault by five percent. Public violence increased by an alarming 260%.

The proportion of violent crime compared to other types of crime has also been steadily increasing over the years. This suggests that crime is becoming more violent. The HSRC reported an increase of one percent in the proportion of violent crime between 1991 and 1992. Similarly, this proportion increased by a further one percent, to 24%, between 1992 and 1993.

Serious crime

The proportion of serious crime is steadily increasing. The rate of the "big six", the most serious crimes in South Africa, increased by three percent between 1992 and 1993. All other ciimes increased by only one percent (Table 1). The HSRC reported a year ago that whereas all other types of crime decreased by one percent between 1991 and 1992, the big six increased by one percent during this period.

Very serious crime increased at a considerably higher rate than general crime over the past five years. The big six increased by 27% between 1988 and 1993 whereas other crime increased by 15% (Table 1). Furthermore, the rate of increase in the big six is escalating rapidly. According to the HSRC, the big six increased by 18% from 1987 to 1992, compared to the current five year increase of 27%.

It is important to examine crime trends over a period longer than a year. Table 1 shows that the illegal possession of firearms decreased by 12% between 1992 and 1993. However, over a five year period this serious offence actually increased by 88%.

Crime increases of this extent are a cause for concern. However, the increase is partly due to a greater willingness In the public to report crimes. Police-community relations have cerUiinK inipro\ ed over the past

few years and the police have instituted various schemes (such as the Crime Stop campaign) to encourage crime reporting and the cooperation of the public in solving ciimes.

The new community policing approach is undoubtedly the most appropriate policing method at the moment. It will lead to more openness and a greater flow of information between the police and the public. This will inevitably result in increases in reported crime. It is conceivable that high levels of crime may have existed for many years, but remained undisclosed.

Police vs court statistics

Once a crime is recorded by the police, its inclusion in official crime records is influenced by many factors. Some relate to the relationship between the public and the police, which determines how cooperative the public are during investigations. Others relate to the efficiency of the police in solving crimes and to police practices in general.

The police's clear-up rate (based on whether or not an arrest is made) varies substantially according to the type of crime. Generally, the clear-up rate is highest for crimes where the offender is known to the victim. A clear-up rate of 51% was reported by the SAPS for 1993. This represents a decrease from 56,8% in 1988, probably due partly to the increase in crimes reported to the police.

High levels of crime may have existed for many years, but remained undisclosed

Once a crime has been solved, a decision is taken on whether to prosecute the offender. Factors such as the strength of the evidence and thus the likelihood of a conviction influence this decision. The age of the offender and the seriousness of the offence are also considered, particularly in countries such as the United Kingdom, where a formal system of warning is in operation.

Table I: Crime Statistics for the RSA in 1988,1992 and 1993: A Comparison of the Most Serious Types of Crime

Type of offence	1988 N	1988 Rate	1992 N	1992 Rate	1993 N	1993 Rate	% change in the rate 1988-1993	% change In the rate 1992-1993
property offences	779 131	2 658	1 010 329	3197	1 051 516	3 262	+22,7	+2,0
Violent offences	202 785	692			281 997	875	+26,5	
			416 831	1 319	449 498	1 395		+5,8
All other	441 847	1 507			518 710	1 609	+6,8	
			354 701	1 123	351 209	1 090		-2,9
TOTAL	1 423 763	4 857	1 781 861	5 639	1 852 223	5 747	+18,3	+1,9
The big six	422 116	1 440	557 426	1 764	587 030	1 821	+26,5	+3,2
A selection of offences								
Public violence	1 368	5	2 250	7	5 696	18	+260	+157,1
Illegal possession of firearms	4 698	16	10 580	34	9 556	30	+87,5	-11,8
Murder	10 631	36	16 067	51	17 467	54	+50,0	+5,9
Rape	19 368	66	24 360	77	27 056	84	+27,3	+9,1
Assault: aggravated	125 571	428	136 332	431	144 662	449	+4,9	+4,2
Robbery: aggravated	25 941	89	54194	172	60 089	186	+109	+8,1
other	19 906	68	24 483	78	27 027	84	+23,5	+7,7
Burglary: business premises	49 687	170	73 282	232	74 378	231	+35,9	-0,4
residential	133 067	454	181 659	575	185 502	576	+26,9	+0,2
Theft of livestock	21 671	74	26 921	85	26 633	83	+12,2	-2,4
Theft of motor vehicle	57 851	197	71 532	226	77 875	242	+22,8	+7,1
Theft out of motor vehicle	116813	399	154 247	488	166 310	516	+29,3	+5,7
Other theft	217 240	741	259 690	822	266 909	828	+11,7	+0,7
Fraud	37 032	126	58 576	185	55 890	173	+37,3	-6,5
Arson	4 882	17	6 389	20	6 855	21	+23,5	+5,0
Malicious damage to property	74 399	254	96 138	304	103 415	321	+26,4	+5,6

Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner of the SAP, 1988,1992 & 1993 and HSRC (Cape Town)

Notes

'   The rates are calculated per 100 000 of the population of the RSA (i.e. excluding the former TBVC states but including the former self-governing territories). Rates for 1988 are based on 1985 census data, taking population growth between 1985 and 1988 into account. Rates for 1992 and 1993 are based on 1991 census data, taking population growth for 1992 and 1993 into account.

*   The category *property offences* includes: burglary (business and residential), stocktheft, shoplifting, theft of a motor vehicle, theft out of a motor vehicle, theft of a bicycle, other theft, fraud, arson and malicious damage to property.

*   The category *violent offences* includes: public violence, murder, attempted murder, rape, aggravated assault, common assault, aggravated robbery and other robbery.

*   The category *other* covers all the remaining crimes not included in the categories *violent* and *property* offences, as reflected in the SAPS's list of serious offences (excluding minor infringements of the law).

*   The *big six* include the following: rape, murder, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, burgiary (business and residential) and theft of motor vehicle.

*   Different data for *violent offences and all other* crimes in 1993 is used in comparisons with 1988 and 1992. This is because the SAPS's annual report for 1988 did not contain some of the statistics published in the 1993 report and the two categories could not be matched using the same criteria.

When a case proceeds to prosecution it is recorded in the court's statistics. A total of 485 099 persons were prosecuted in South African courts in 1991/92. This is 28% of the number of similar crimes reported to the police in 1991. Prosecutions in 1991/1992 were not necessarily for crimes reported during 1991, but a tentative comparison illustrates that court statistics are the tip of the iceberg in terms of the total crime picture.

The SAPS reported a crime clear-up rate of 52% for 1991. Although solving a crime does not necessarily mean that a prosecution will follow, one would expect a greater number of prosecutions than those recorded, given a reported crime figure of I 744 738 for 1991.

Convictions followed 77% of prosecutions in 1991/92. The conviction rate varies considerably for different offences. The rate was relatively low for offences such as rape, murder, attempted murder, robbery and arson (just over 50%). More convictions were noted for shoplifting, fraud and driving under the influence of alcohol (over 80%). Overall, convictions were obtained in a greater proportion of cases relating to property crime (80%) than violent crime (67%).

It is evident that South Africa is losing the battle against crime. The overall increase of 25% in crime from 1988 to 1992 was accompanied by a four percent decrease in the number of convictions during the same period. This means that increasingly, offenders are carrying on their business undisturbed, knowing that the likelihood of conviction is slim.

No purpose is served by laying the blame solely at the door of the SAPS. Numerous factors influence the police's ability to combat crime. In addition, the police rely to a great extent on the cooperation of the public in their fight against crime. The discrepancy between police and court statistics could in part be accounted for by the following:

• Fewer cases being successfully solved by the police, which could be due to manpower shortages, a drop in

Table 2: Crimes Reported to the Police from January to October 1994 in the Police Regions

SAPS Regions		Property offences	Violent offences	The big six	Drug related offences	Murder	Burglary: business premises	Burglary: residential premises	Aggravated robbery	Theft of firearms	Theft of motor vehicle
		A selection of offences:									
Eastern Cape	N	84 912	43 454	50168	3 664	1 145	6115	13 971	2 652	296	3179
	Rate	4 230	2165	2 499	182,5	57	305	696	132	15	158
Northern Cape	N	24 617	15 830	16 484	928	367	1 994	3 700	535	65	353
	Rate	3 393	2 182	2 272	128	51	275	510	74	9	49
Western Cape	N	149 479	73 914	90 015	10 430	2 097	12 333	28 789	5 455	460	7 589
	Rate	3 942	1 950	2 374	275	55	325	759	144	12	200
Natal	N	151 683	58 751	92 307	7 389	4 569	13 146	26 856	11 109	945	13 826
	Rate	5 837	2 261	3 552	284	176	506	1 033	427,5	36	532
Orange Free State	N	67 480	32 718	37 053	3 701	901	5 536	11 166	2119	361	2 897
	Rate	2 878	1 395	1 582	158	38	237	476	90	15	124
Eastern Transvaal	N	48 802	17 029	25 356	1 611	513	3 660	8 270	1 867	280	2 591
	Rate	3 512	1 225	1 825	116	37	263	595	134	20	186,5
Far Northern Transvaal	N	21 457	8 194	10 009	769	134	1 887	3 050	571	96	819
	Rate	4 493	1 716	2 096	161	28	395	639	120	20	171,5
Northern Transvaal	N	68 440	22 917	36 637	2 299	430	3 509	13192	2 914	409	7 210
	Rate	5 735	1 920	2 902	193	36	294	1 305	244	34	604
Western Transvaal	N	33 727	15 482	20 020	1 694	445	2 975	5 344	1 101	176	1 932
	Rate	3 081	1 414	1 829	155	41	272	488	101	16	176,5
Witwatersrand	N	252198	101 930	169 109	4 383	4 325	14 842	47 932	28 186	1 657	38 736
	Rate	4 209	1 701	2 822	73	72	248	800	470	28	646,5
Total	N	902 795	390 219	545 158	36 868	14 926	66 024	162 270	56 509	4 754	79132
	Rate	4177	1 805	2 522	171	69	305,5	751	261	22	366

Source: MIOVS CIAIC SAPS (Pretoria) and HSRC (Cape Town)
Note: Rates are calculated per 100 000 of the relevant population, based on 1994 mid-year estimates

investigative efficiency and poorly trained police.

- Cases being less well prepared for court with the result that fewer convictions are obtained. This could be due to police manpower shortages and heavy case loads with a consequent drop in police efficiency. It could also be the result of public prosecutors being poorly paid, poorly trained and inexperienced.

Crime in 1994

Crimes reported to the police during ilie lirsi l() months ol' |<J94 are presented per SAI'S region in Table *2*. These regions do not always coiiieiile with the new provincial boundaries in South Africa. Since statistics are not available for the whole year, comparisons cannot be made with previous years.

The rate of property offences was   , highest in Natal although the rate in the Northern Transvaal (which includes Pretoria) was only fractionally lower than Natal. High rates of violent offences were recorded in the Eastern and Northern Cape, but Natal again had the highest rate (Figure 1). Higher rates were recorded in six regions ahead of the Witwatersrand, contrary to the crime-ridden image this area has.

The rate of the "big six" was highest in Natal followed by Northern Transvaal and Witwatersrand (Table 2). The proportion of the "big six" relative to oilier offences reflects the seriousness of crime. This category constituted 40% of all offences listed in Table 2, for the whole country, and 46% in the Witwatersrand. Although the rate of violent crime was not high in this region, serious crime constituted a greater proportion of crime here than anywhere else in the country.

Comparing crime types across the regions reveals certain trends:

- Low rates of drug related offences occurred in the Witwatersrand. The reported incidence of these offences particularly, along with gambling, prostitution and drunken driving vary according to police practices. Given the high crime rate in the Witwatersrand, the police

Figure 1: Crimes Reported to Police per Police Region
January 1994 to October 1994
Ftgufes are rates per 10Q 000 population

possibly did not have enough manpower to police these activities well. This argument does not, however hold for Natal which has a high rate of drag related offences, even though the overall crime rate is very high.

Comments about crime in Natal based on these statistics must be made with circumspection

• The murder rate was low in the OFS and all the Transvaal regions. In Natal by contrast, this rate and that of attempted murder was much higher than the other regions. An individual was six times more likely to be murdered in Natal than in the regions already mentioned.

• The rate of aggravated robbery was low in all regions except for Natal and the Witwatersrand. In the latter region the robbery rate was six times greater than in the Northern Cape.

G Residential burglaries were recorded at a fairly high rate in Natal and the Northern Transvaal, while the rate of business premises burglaries was quite high in the Far Northern Transvaal and the highest in Natal.

• Theft of firearms occurred extensively in Natal and is undoubtedly a factor contributing to the high murder rate in this region. The rate in the Northern Transvaal was only slightly lower than in Natal, however.

G Theft of motor vehicles was lowest in the Northern Cape and high in Natal and the Northern Transvaal. Witwatersrand experienced the highest rate, where this crime was 13 times more likely than in the Northern Cape.

These rates calculated from police statistics suggest that Natal is the most troubled region, but this

interpretation is problematic. Crime statistics recorded by the SAPS ostensibly only relate to crimes committed in the former four provinces and reported to former SAP stations. In calculating crime rates, population figures for these former provinces only are used.

Since some police stations are managed by the SAPS on an agency basis for certain former self-governing territories like KwaZulu, the population served by those stations should also be included when calculating rates.

Since this is not done, Natal's rates could be unrealistically high. Comments about crime in Natal based on these statistics must be made with circumspection.

Conclusion

Experts contend that socio-political change is usually accompanied by an increase in crime. The escalation in the crime rate after independence in Namibia exemplifies this trend.

Unfortunately, the positive political changes in South Africa have been accompanied by economic recession, and the predicted increase in crime has been fuelled by the escalating rate of unemployment.

Given that future economic and social stability are uncertain, it is impossible to predict short term crime rates. It would be unrealistic to assume that crime will decrease. At best, the present rate will stabilise.

Unless we mobilise communities to take action against crime and empower people to respond collectively to its threat, crime will disrupt the essence of social life.lMSl

Exploring a Decade of Crime

Mark Shaw, Centre for Policy Studies

This article draws on international comparisons to review whether recent crime increases are a result of instability wrought by political transition, or of development and an increase in poverty The role and effect of policing is also considered.

Crime seems set to become an explosive political issue, as newspaper headlines such as "A country of criminals", (*Sunday Times,* 16/11/94) portray South Africa on the brink of anarchy. Recent surveys suggest that in the minds of ordinary people, crime is one of the most pressing problems for the new Government, along with housing and employment creation.

Measuring crime, particularly over sustained periods of time, is fraught with difficulties. Police figures often say as much about police procedures as they do about the crime rate, as Glanz points out in this edition. Even in Britain, with its sophisticated system of recording crime, official statistics do not depict the actual extent of the problem.

In South Africa, the collection and collation of statistics has been further complicated by the divide between people and the police. South African Police Services (SAPS) figures historically excluded the bantustans, which implies that the "dark figure" of unrecorded crime in South Africa is fairly substantial.

Although crime has increased over the past decade, this does not apply to all types of crime or to all areas uniformly. A more consistent measure is attained by calculating crime rates per 100 000 people, but this does not mean that each such group of South Africans experience a similar degree of threat. The propensity to be victimized changes according to crime types, location and sneio-eeonomie sialus.

Regional \amnions in crime illuslmle H'is (see (ilan/ in this issue. pai:e 10) C ai- liijiicliini; lor example. is feared

nationally, but takes place mostly in Gauteng. In the Cape Peninsula for instance, figures for local police stations show that changes in categories of crime vary considerably according to individual station areas.

Crime is without doubt a serious problem, but it does not influence all South African citizens uniformly. In South Africa, black people have always been more likely to experience violent crime, while whites are victims of crimes against property. This balance may change as income patterns alter over time.

Crime since 1980

The number of murders increased gradually from 1980 to 1990 after which levels surged (Figure 1). Some of these statistics reflect political violence, but the line between political and criminal violence is fine. This implies that the murder rate should decline from 1994 when political violence decreased.

Levels of assault fluctuated slightly until 1986 when numbers dropped

(Figure 2). From 1987, assaults increased gradually with a significant rise in 1992. The dip in 1986 may be due to the state of emergency. The security forces' presence could have prevented assaults, or people possibly reported fewer assaults. The latter is more likely since murder figures increased consistently over this period.

Property crime in the form of housebreaking did not increase consistently over the last decade. Levels increased drastically in 1986 and 1987, only to drop quite substantially in 1988 and 1989, and increase again in 1990 to reach the highest levels of the decade (Figure 3).

The robbery statistics in Figure 4 illustrate why caution is needed when analysing data which has not been recorded consistently. Until 1985, robbery, recorded as a single category, declined fractionally. In 1986, robbery was divided into "aggravated" and "other" categories, making comparisons with the previous five years difficult.

Robbery generally, increased in 1986 and 1987 after these changes were introduced, then dropped slightly in 1988, after which levels rose steadily to 1993. The slight decrease in 1988 from 1986 levels in both "aggravated" and "other" robberies could be due to the state of emergency. This explanation will be

Figure 1: Number of Murders in SA
1980- 1993

m

Figure 2: Number of Serious Assaults in SA
1980-1993

Pease's (1983) research shows a decrease in crime in Britain during the Falklands War, suggesting that crime decreases during war time. Similar trends occur during widely followed sports events.

This dimension is borne out in South Africa, where crime dropped dramatically during the 1994 elections. Under these circumstances criminal activity may diminish because those usually engaged in crime are otherwise occupied. Alternatively, a national consciousness may prevent people from committing crimes in a period of heightened national awareness. Or, the police might be less likely to record crimes during periods when they are engaged in other activities.

Police officers may deliberately ignore some offenccs which seem paltry in comparison to the national event or crisis. An explanation would probably include elements of all these arguments. It is clear however, that lower crime rates are usually only a temporary respite, with increases over time reaching similar or higher levels.

explored below with the assistance of comparative material.

Political transition

Comparative information suggests that crime increases markedly during political transition coupled with instability and violence. This occurred in Eastern Europe during the transition to democracy and in the final days of the former Soviet Union. A substantial increase in crime was also experienced in Namibia just before and after independence.

During these periods of instability, routine policing activities are diverted towards controlling violence, and crime consequently increases. The social bonds holding society together are loosened, making crime more likely. Also, much of the political instability is recorded in the crime figures, hence the increase in murder in South Africa from 1990.

The decline of some ciimes during the late 1980s in South Africa is harder to explain. The International Crime Survey showed that the Northern Irish are less likely to be victims of crime than Americans or other West Europeans. This is reflected in a victimisation survey as opposed to official statistics, making the argument more convincing.

Policing in Northern Ireland, with its paramilitary dimension, means a higher presence of armed police officers on the streets. The political culture of Northern Ireland may also serve as a damper on crime. Tighter

and more vigilant community structures make criminal activity more difficult, as crime is seen as contrary to the political struggle.

A similar situation may have applied in South Africa during the late 1980s. Greater concentration on the political struggle, tighter community structures and heavier policing may have led to a decrease in some crimes. Of course, fear or mistrust of the police may also have ensured that fewer crimes were reported.

Interestingly though, the promise of political compromise and transition in Northern Ireland has brought fears of a crime wave. The loosening of tight community bonds, the greater numbers of armed ex-fighters on the streets, and less vigilant policing is feared to herald an increase in crime *(The Economist,* 15/10/94).

A less explored dimension proposes that crime decreases during events of great social or political significance.

Development

Crime is alleged to be one of the social consequences of the development process. The relationship between crime and development is however, not a simple one. First and Second World crime surveys demonstrate that as development increases (measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita), so do crimes against property.

Figure 3: Number of Housebreakings in SA
1980- 1993

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280000

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<3*XX>

180000

160000

140000

120000

Figure 4: Number of Robberies in SA
1980- 1993

Development generates greater opportunities for crime while also causing inequalities which encourage crime. The survey material does however, indicate that development over time tends to reduce crimes of violence. The fact that less developed countries experience higher rates of violent crime than their more developed counterparts, illustrates this.

The relationship is complicated by high and growing levels of property crime in developed countries. This type of crime has less impact on these countries because their societies are affluent and provide more economic support. Rather than surmising that the price of develop-ment is an increase in crime, we should conclude that the impact of crime is less in developed countries even though some crime rates increase.

Urban underclass

The growth of crime worldwide, particularly from the 1970s to the 1980s, placed crime firmly on the political agenda. In Britain, the Labour Party has pointed out that the focus on 'law and order' policies under the Thatcher Government corresponded ironically, with an increase in crime. The Conservative Government in turn, has attempted to emphasize "community" involve-ment us opposed io policing in the combining of crime.

in Britain, the growth of mi underclass cul oi l' from opportunities in the formal economy is linked to

increasing property crimes. British criminologist Reiner (1994), argues that current crime "is best explained by the socio-economic factors most stressed by radical accounts. The crime explosion corresponds closely to the adoption of free market strategies... These policies have increased poverty, inequality and long term unemployment amongst young people".

The connections between unemployment, recession and rising crime are not as neat as they first appear. The orthodoxy that the unemployed are more likely to commit crimes is not necessarily verified by research. Some findings show a con-elation and others not. Even if a connection is established, it need not follow that unemployed people are committing crimes during periods of high joblessness and crime.

More conclusive links have been made between unemployment, crime

and punishment. One of these is that the length of prison sentences increase during periods of recession. For Box and Hale (1982) this implies that imprisonment is not a direct response to a rise in crime. Rather it is an ideologically motivated reaction to the perceived threat of crime posed by the growing numbers of econo-mically marginalised people.

Rising crime rates in the West and a corresponding increase in rates of imprisonment in some countries, can be linked to the growth of an urban underclass in the inner city. Recent economic growth in the high technology sector demands more skilled and fewer employees, thus bypassing the underclass. In the long term, this may have crucial implications for the growth of crime in South Africa.

Policing crime

Given these debates, the police in South Africa and in Britain have suggested that they can control crime, but not its root causes. In contrast to Britain, increased crime in South Africa is not seen purely as a result of economic factors but as a social consequence of apartheid.

The SAPS argue that they can control rather than eradicate crime given its socio-economic causes. This argument may be influenced by the police's need to demonstrate that they influence the crime rate but also that the problem is still serious. This enables them to maintain their image as an effective service, while appealing for more resources.

Figure 5: Population per Police Official in SAPS Regions in 1993

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the politics around policing are likely to gain attention in future. The dispute between Deputy President Thabo jVlbeki and the police general staff over the extent of crime figures is a case in point. Attempts by the police to end crime, and the rate of crimes solved (the clear-up rate) will be scrutinised in the media.

There is little evidence that increasing patrols actually reduces crime

Such assessments of the police should however, be approached with caution. British research into the relationship between police work and crimc trends confirms that clear-up rates bear little relationship to the realities of detective work, and are inappropriate measures of police effectiveness.

The problem of policing and its relationship to crime may be an intractable one. Morris and Heal (1981) reviewed evidence of the effectiveness of general and specialised police patrols, criminal investigations and community policing and concluded that "At the risk of over simplification ... it is beyond the ability of the police to have a direct effect on a good deal of crime".

There is little evidence that increasing the number or frequency of l oot or car patrols actually reduces crime. In fact, experiments in Germany show that a greater number of police officers on the street raise the recorded crime figures, leading to fears that crime is on the increase {*The Economist,* 15/10/94).

This finding may support the South African evidence. The Natal and Northern Transvaal SAPS regions have the highest recorded levels of crime (see Glanz in this issue), but

also the most policemen per head of population. On the other hand, the Eastern Transvaal and the Orange Free State have comparatively fewer police officers and lower levels of recorded crime (Figure 5).

This suggests that a proactive approach through community police forums and attempts to make the police more approachable may result in people being more willing to report crime. This may lead to an increase in the recorded crime rate. Other factors such as the growing use of insurance and telephones and an increase in property ownership, may accentuate this.

Fear of crime

Increases in the recorded crime rate in South Africa may lead to a fear of crime, a consequence which receives little attention in this country. In Britain, the United States and Europe, the fear of crime is becoming as great as crime itself. This fear distorts the lifestyles of average citizens, by for instance, curtailing the extent to which they go out at night, with serious social results.

The fear of a "crime wave" can have destructive and self-reinforcing consequences

A recent survey in South Africa found that the fear of crime effects the lives of "one third of South Africans to a great extent" (Glanz, 1994). This is reinforced by the fact that those least likely to be victimised such as woman and the aged, fear crime the most. Young urban men are the most likely casualties because of their lifestyles.

The fear of crime may also have political consequences. Components of the electorate (usually the middle class) may use these "moral panics" for political action. This can result in

harder policing against those stereotypically involved in crime, which reinforces these stereotypes. In the UK for example, more black males are convicted because the police concentrate more on their activities than on other social groups perceived to be less threatening.

Policing crime in South Africa must be sensitive to these issues. Crime statistics and their links with broader social processes are useful but also contain dangers. Releasing monthly crime figures to measure police performance could have a destructive impact on policing, as the SAPS may seem to be performing poorly when in fact the police could be *recording* more crime.

Comparative evidence suggests that in societies with lower crime rates than South Africa's, the fear of a "crime wave" can have destructive and self-reinforcing consequences. The issue is a sensitive one which demands restraint on the part of politicians and the media, and care in measuring and releasing crime statistics. QS-36

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Unfinished Business

Problems in our Prisons Continue

Amanda Dissel
Centre For the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Prisons are a vital part of the criminal justice system often overlooked in the struggle for peace and stability. This article considers the many issues which remain unresolved despite the protests and severe destruction caused by prison riots last year.

The sources of dissatisfaction in prisons which led to violence last year are multifaceted. Certain inherent conditions in prisons have caused discontent for some time. Other factors such as politicisation, the change in government and the amnesty regulations have exacerbated tensions. The Kriegler Commission of Inquiry into this violence has not released its findings and the problems which caused this situation still threaten stability in prisons.

Conditions in prisons

Change in release policy

The Correctional Services Act was amended in March 1994, introducing a new release policy. Numerous complaints from the public and courts were made about standard remissions of sentence awarded to prisoners. Release is now discretionary and depends on the prisoner's conduct, adaptation, possibility of relapse into crime and any remarks made by the sentencing court.

The release policy, which is applied in two phases, has not been explained adequately to prisoners. Institutional committees based at each prison award credits to prisoners which advance the date on which the prisoner can be considered lor parole. The parole hoard considers the case and makes a recommendation lor the prisoner's release, which must be ratified by the Commissioner of Correctional Services.

This process is highly discretionary and the criteria for consideration are often not communicated to prisoners. Because the date of parole cannot be confirmed until just before the actual day, prisoners are uncertain about when they may be released. Some complain that release dates given to prisoners on admission under the old system are disregarded and inmates are detained beyond those dates.

Assaults on prisoners

Despite numerous representations to the Department of Correctional Services, assaults of prisoners by the authorities continue. Not all assaults are reported due to fear of reprisals and lack of faith in the internal disciplinary procedures. Furthermore, when inquiries are made, the results are not forthcoming or are inadequate. Prisoners are repeatedly assaulted by fellow inmates without adequate investigations and allegations are made of personnel complicity in gang violence.

Unauthorised disciplinary measures

Despite recent amendments to disciplinary procedures, many prisoners complain of detention in isolation cells as punishment, sometimes without bedding and I'm "nishings. This occurs frequently without any disciplinary procedures having been followed or reasons given for their isolation. Prisoners are also physically and verbally assaulted by personnel.

Discontent among prison officials

Black staff members in particular are dissatisfied with their treatment and that of prisoners, as well as the lack of clear policy on rehabilitating prisoners. Warders allege that they have been sidelined in the policy making process and bypassed in promotions and training opportunities in favour of their while colleagues.

Overcrowding of cells

Reports of between 30 and 50 inmates in accommodation designed for 29 prisoners are frequent. Cell furniture is sparse and prisoners often have to sleep on floor mats. Bunk beds used to maximise available space are low, making sitting up in bed uncomfortable. In communal cells, usually only one toilet is available, situated in the cell. A lack of privacy, especially in personal hygiene matters, is prevalent.

An almost complete absence of organised activity for prisoners and extensive lockup times (sometimes 23 hours a day), contribute to hi tense frustration and pent up aggression. Prisoners' involvement in gang and other unlawful activities can partly I v explained by this incarceration for long periods in close confinement with other prisoners.

Prisoners' rights

Prison regulations are not usually made available to prisoners, who are unaware of which transgressions lead to disciplinary action. Administrative procedures are poorly explained, if at all, and prisoners are uncertain as to how decisions affecting them are

made. They are thus unable to intervene. No independent structure exists to assist prisoners in lodging and following through complaints.

Access by legal practitioners to prisoners is at the discretion of the Commissioner of Correctional Services. While in practice there is usually no difficulty, legal advisors have occasionally been denied access because the request for consultation was not made by a prisoner directly to the authorities.

Political factors

Since the prison population is largely transitional and prisoners have access to the media, the euphoria and expectations surrounding the political transition inevitably reached them. Prisoners who believed they were sentenced by an illegitimate apartheid government anticipated their release, or review of their convictions.

Prisoners remain frustrated that they have not been considered for amnesty

Although these expectations were well publicised in the media, they were not dealt with satisfactorily by the outgoing Government or the Government of National Unity. It was only after organised protest action by prisoners themselves, which caused widespread damage to property, injuries and loss of life, that they won the right for most prisoners to vote in the elections.

After the elections, the issue of amnesty for prisoners was raised. President Mandela stated that the new Government would urgently address the amnesty issue for various categories of prisoners. This raised expectations that not only political prisoners, but also common law offenders would be considered for amnesty.

Efforts by the South African Prisoners Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR) to meet with the Ministers of Justice and Correctional Services were unsuccessful. The

Government meanwhile met with members of right wing organisations to discuss amnesty, and prisoners became frustrated that these groups received precedence.

On 2 June 1994, SAPOHR issued an ultimatum to the Minister of Justice demanding amnesty for various categories of prisoners. Seven days later rioting broke out in prisons across the country. The Minister of Correctional Services, Dr Mzimela, then announced a sentence reduction of six months for all categories of prisoners. SAPOHR criticised this as unfair since some prisoners were more deserving of amnesty than others.

Prisoners remain frustrated that they have not been considered for amnesty. Some feel they were tricked into voting for a government which no longer considers their interests. Some prisoners from the new Local Prison in Pretoria wrote a petition to the State President saying "you have to date, sir, sown seeds of discontent, frustration and anger amongst all the prisoners, who now believe that they were deceived..."

The development of a human rights culture also contributed to the conflict. SAPOHR professes to organise on a human rights basis and is established nationwide within and outside prisons. But organising prisoners around highly emotional issues has proved dangerous and unless carefully controlled, can result in huge destruction.

Recommendations

These recommendations relate to the task of the Kriegler Commission, but also apply to the situation generally in prisons, since little has been done to remedy the problems.

Human rights and disciplinary measures

The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of Prisoners must be recognised and implemented. With regard to sanitation and hygiene, regular inspections should be made by the Department of Health and Welfare. Sufficient functioning toilet facilities

should be made available to all prisoners as well as proper bedding and clean clothing.

A human rights culture must be built in prisons at the level of prisoners and prison personnel. The training curriculum of staff should create an awareness of prisoners' rights, and training in conflict resolution should be provided. Staff must be taught to identify and deal with tension in the prison before it erupts into large scale violence.

Organising prisoners around highly emotional issues has proved dangerous

Prisoners have already begun to organise themselves around human rights issues and violations from both prisoners and personnel. These groups should be encouraged as this is a positive alternative to gang activity, and could foster a commitment to non-violent conduct.

Representative prisoner organisations are an important mechanism for expressing prisoners' interests to the prison administration. These organisations must be regulated by a code of conduct or a recognition agreement between themselves and the authorities.

Clear guidelines must also be available on the use of the prison Stability Unit (SU). In many instances during the prison violence, administration called on the Stability Unit before a real threat was apparent. The SU presence and its use of force against prisoners was sometimes preemptive.

Disciplinary procedures in prisons should be reviewed, as well as the use of segregation in prisons. The circumstances necessitating segregation must be clearly defined and the Head of the prison must be required to justify the use of this method.

Prisoners must be informed of the reasons for their segregation and should have the opportunity to make representations to a disciplinary committee.

Family ties and Community Prisons

Rules regarding visitation rights must be reviewed. According to the Correctional Services' new privilege system, primary privileges relating to the maintenance of family ties may be limited for a disciplinary infringement where the retraction of secondary privileges has not had the desired effect. This leaves contact with the outside world securely in the prison authority's hands.

Maintaining family ties should be an important feature of imprisonment. Greater provision must be made for adequate visiting time for prisoners in an atmosphere conducive to maintaining optimal relationships. Allowance must be made for physical contact between prisoner and family members and deprivation of this contact should not be used as a means of punishment.

The importance of a prisoner maintaining links with his community cannot be underestimated. Continuity of service facilities and family relationships available to the prisoner in the community should be maintained in prison, since the prisoner is released back into the community on completing his/her sentence. The prisoner is often dependent on the community's resources for some time after being released.

Deprivation of family contact should not be used as a means of punishment

The Commission of Inquiry into disturbances in British prisons in 1990 acknowledged that imprisonment without remedial action would result in a deterioration of the prisoner's ability to function lawfully and effectively in society. The State was obliged to remedy the harmful effects of imprisonment which could partly be done by situating the prison within the community.

Prisoners are olien hekl in prisons ouisule llieir home area and their network I'aciliiies often break down. The British Inquiry recommended lluil prisoners he held as physically

close to their families as possible and that Community Prisons should be established for this purpose, accommodating no more than 400 prisoners at a time.

Prisons have been alarmingly free of public scrutiny

The system of community prisons is a necessity in South Africa where large geographical distances and lack of public transport make travel to centralised prisons difficult and expensive for visitors. Contact with existing service providers is often lost when the prisoner is required to move out of his home area.

More effective control

The British Inquiry suggested breaking prisons into units of 50 to 70 prisoners and accommodating them according to the severity of their offence, arguing that it would be easier to control small numbers.

Prisons in South Africa can accommodate large numbers of prisoners. Incarcerating many prisoners in one cell makes control difficult, especially where warden-prisoner ratios are low. Dividing prisons into manageable segments should be considered.

The unproductive time spent by prisoners in their cells should be minimised. Being out of the cell can alleviate the effects of poor conditions. Although participation in programmes should never be obligatory, recreation programmes, educational and vocational training should be made available to all prisoners.

Accountability

An independent prisons inspectorate should be established which would visit prisons regularly, monitor prisoners' complaints and conditions in prisons, observe investigations by the police, and make policy recommendations. The inspectorate should be independent of the Department of Correctional Services and I he Minister, yet accountable to Parliament.

Prisons have been alarmingly free of public scrutiny and consequently there has been little pressure for prison accountability. A lay visitors scheme could open up prisons to the public and ensure public participation in prison matters. This scheme could also play a watchdog role over prison abuses.

The current mood

There is still considerable tension in prisons and the Ministry of Correctional Services has done little to solve the crisis. Neither the Ministry nor Department of Correctional Services initiated any dialogue with civic or non-governmental organisations (NG( )s). The Department only began some form of discussion after substantial pressure from NGO's and other slate departments.

Calls for amnesty by political prisoners have increased and common law prisoners persist in their demands for amnesty or remission of sentence. At a meeting in November 1994 to deal with this issue, Justice Minister Dullah Omar said many common law prisoners were victi ms of the system. He added that a mechanism had to be found to deal with those prisoners who commilicd offences in terrible socio-economic circumstances.

Representations made to the National Advisory Board for the establishment of an Amnesty Resolution Committee were rejected. SAPOl IK issued an ultimatum for the creation of this committee by April 10 1995. failing which prisoners will embark on nationwide mass action, go-slows and demonstrations. This is unwise given that previous calls for peaceful action resulted in widespread riols.

President Mandela indicated in his inaugural speech that prisoners would be considered for amnesty, hut this has been delayed causing frustration among common law prisoners. The President has not clarified his statement and the Minister of Correctional Services has made no attempt to discuss the matter with prisoners or their representatives. Given better channels of communication, the

Alternative White Paper
on Correctional Services

In October 1994, a White Paper on policy was released by the Department of Correctional Services. The Paper was disappointing for a number of reasons. It recognised two main problems in prisons, namely a shortage of resources and gross overcrowding, both of which the Department has little control over.

The Paper failed to consider the many other problems such as violence in prisons, the lack of rehabilitation programmes, accountability of prisons to prisoners and the public, and prison conditions. Moreover, the White Paper did not take into account the implications of the Reconstruction and Development Programme and the Interim Constitution for penal reform.

The Penal Reform Lobby Group made up of Lawyers for Human Rights, The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, NICRO and SAPOHR, drafted "An Alternative White Paper on Correctional Services". This paper seeks to address the problems facing prisons and the criminal justice system in the management of offenders, arguing that there is a need for fundamental reform of correctional services.

The first requirement is for more openness to outside involvement at all levels. Civil society must be given the opportunity to participate in policy making and to comment on departmental activities. There should also be greater emphasis on diverting offenders from prison and on cooperation with the other arms of the criminal justice system to achieve this.

More attention must be given to the rehabilitation of offenders in prison so that prisoners can lead a crime free life when they are released. Rehabilitation should focus on life skills programmes, training and education, and equipping prisoners with skills which make them productive members of society.

Mechanisms for protecting prisoners' rights must be introduced, possibly through an independent prisons inspectorate and a lay visitors scheme which would monitor and investigate prisoners' complaints. In addition, the due process rights of prisoners must be protected in disciplinary hearings, grievance procedures and decisions relating to a prisoner's release from custody.

The Alternative Paper also focuses on conditions in prisons, the status of women, HIV and AIDS prisoners, the mentally ill and juveniles. Recommendations are made for restructuring the Department, including the demilitarisation of correctional services. The appointment of a Change Management Team is recommended to guide the Department's transformation to reflect the culture and structure of our society.

The Alternative White Paper is a discussion document and part of a process to reform the legislation and policy governing correctional services. Copies are available from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

impending crisis in prisons could be averted with careful management.

Prison warders

Since the prison violence last year, the growing dissatisfaction among prison wardens has heightened tensions and contributed towards the current instability in prisons. The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) are frustrated by the Ministry and Department of Correctional Services's approach towards transforming the institution.

POPCRU was officially recognised in October 1994, but claim the Department's attitude towards the union has not changed. The union alleges that decisions are made without the consultation of labour, and that affirmative action policies devised by the Department without consultation are inadequate, or poorly implemented.

The integration of prisons and personnel of the former self governing territories and 'independent' bantustans has also created tensions. Promotions awarded prior to incorporation were challenged, or allegedly unfairly denied. In December 1994, POPCRU staged a go-slow and strike in Ncome prison in Vryheid and in Durban Westville around this issue.

The dispute was resolved after the then acting Minister of Correctional Services, Ben Ngubane intervened, and a task team was appointed to investigate promotions. The team's work was interrupted in February 1995 when POPCRU members again embarked on a go-slow in KwaZulu-Natal in protest against the implementation of performance bonuses. POPCRU were concerned about the inherent lack of transparency in the bonuses system.

POPCRU has been criticised by the Democratic Party for undermining the criminal justice system in South Africa, and strong action has been called for against the union. It may be more appropriate to engage the labour unions in transformation at all levels and discourage the Department from entering the process unilaterally.

Dangerous Travels

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Taxi violence simmered across the country in 1994 fueled by hitmen, corruption and deadly competition between rival groups. Deeply entrenched, unresolved antagonisms ironically drain the industry's lifeblood as commuters are caught in the crossfire.

To observers it appeared that taxi operators were bent on self destruction as conflicts became increasingly bloody throughout 1994. As different organisations contested a market with minimal growth prospects, the industry degenerated into a lawless free-for-all with operators using random violence to assert control over routes and ranks.

During 1994, 250 people were killed and 372 injured in 381 recorded incidents of taxi conflict. Most incidents and deaths occurred in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Northern Transvaal (Figures 1 and 2).

Taxi conflicts often follow patterns particular to a certain area, but the underlying dynamics are applicable in all the regions to a varying degree.

Gauteng, N & E Transvaal

The use of hired hitmen appears to be more widespread here than in the other regions although this trend has appeared in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal where disputes have become particularly violent. Gauteng police claim that hitmen are paid R2 000 for a taxi driver, R4 000 for an owner and up to R10 000 if the victim is employed by an opposing taxi organisation (*City Press,* 2/1/94).

The Gautcng region was also the first In li:i\ e an electronic bomb used in laxi conflict. In Ma\ | W4 ;1 tax j on the Huneulew route picked up a passenger who le!i •liiugaj-e' fa sophisticated bomb containing plastic explosives and an electronic frequency device) on the taxi. When the driver turned on his radio the bomb exploded.

Failed peace

The taxi disputes in 1994, especially in Gauteng and the Northern Transvaal, were characterised by constant attempts at peace.

The feud between two Lebowa taxi associations, the Letlhabile Taxi Association (LTA) and the Federated Local and Long Distance Taxi Association (FELLDTA) started in the late 1980s over control of routes between Johannesburg and Lebowa. More than 100 people, mainly taxi drivers and owners, were killed largely by hired hitmen.

Executive members of both organisations believed the rivalry had been resolved when a peace agreement was signed in April 1994, but conflict between certain taxi operators of the two groups continued. The LTA was also involved in a feud in Johannesburg with the South African Long Distance Taxi Association (SALDTA).

In June 1994 a peace agreement between the LTA, FELLDTA and SALDTA was signed, but less than 24 hours later two SALDTA taxis were hijacked by members of LTA.

That month the Minister of Safety and Security announced that a special police unit would he set up to investigate taxi violence. In August LTA, FELLDTA and SALDTA again tried to institute a peace agreement, but with no success. In an effort to stem the violence on its routes, SALDTA announced a R14 million project with 20 patrol cars and security guards patrolling major routes from Johannesburg to Pietersberg.

The ambitious plan envisaged up to 1 000 security guards and 200 patrol cars with one helicopter operating by the beginning of 1995 (*New Nation,* 23/9/94). But rival organisations feared the project would create a private army of taxi operators linked to one organisation, and fighting continued.

In November, when delegations from the North West, Eastern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal and Gauteng met in Pietersberg, violence erupted outside the hall when a taxi was set alight, shots were fired and stones thrown by men allegedly linked to FELLDTA and SALDTA. The organisations pledged to work towards peace and cooperate with police, but 11 people died and several taxis were burnt in November.

Peace agreements failed due to deep mistrust among taxi associations. Most operators had no confidence that the agreements would last, and peace pacts were usually temporary compromises which failed to deal with the real issues.

Other dynamics

Competition for passengers has led to groups torching rivals' vehicles in an effort to ruin them economically. In mid-November, 16 taxis were burnt out at Jane Furse in the Northern Transvaal. In two incidents at taxi ranks in former KwaNdebele, 30 minibuses were torched. This can ruin an owner since many do not insure their vehicles in an attempt to cut costs.

Figure 1: Incidents *of Taxi* Conflict in 1994

Ciskei 1%
Border 2%
E Cape 5% —
Bop 1%
ETvl 1% -
N Tvl 5%
W Cape 25%
Natal 26%
OFS 1%
WTvl 1%
Gauteng 31%

Some Gauteng taxi conflicts were connected to political struggles between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporting hostels and African National Congress (ANC) aligned civics and Self Defence Units (SDUs). On the East Rand, taxis serving IFP hostels could only collect passengers and use streets in IFP areas. Taxis serving ANC areas faced similar restrictions.

Separate taxi ranks in towns like Alberton served drivers aligned to different groups. When access to certain hostels was denied to IFP aligned taxis by SDUs, the local authorities had to bulldoze a ground road through the open veld to make the hostels accessible. IFP taxis trying to get to the Thokoza hostels also came under fire from the ANC aligned Phola Park settlement.

Land invasions and squatter spillovers also led to taxi conflict. At Zevenfontein north of Randburg, 5 000 squatters moved to an open piece of ground within a month, and as they became more permanent they required transport. Three taxi associations in the area tried to control this new route from Zevenfontein and conflict soon erupted with a series of attacks on rival taxis.

KwaZulu-Natal

During 1994 much of the taxi conflict appeared to be an extension of the struggle for political hegemony between the ANC and

IFP. In many incidents people were transported by taxi to attack political rivals at taxi ranks, or taxis were used as 'chase-cars' or for roadblocks to ambush political leaders.

Competition for routes and passengers was also a factor in certain areas although political rivalries exacerbated these tensions. This characterised attacks on taxis by rival organisations during April 1994 in the Nongoma/Ulundi area. The conflict became politicised when some owners aligned themselves with ANC or IFP structures.

By December, the Nongoma taxi war took an ugly turn when hitmen-style attacks occurred. The Nongoma KwaZulu Police confirmed that one side in the dispute had resorted to hiring killers from outside. Competition for routes also resulted in a spate of killings on the Empangeni/ Utrecht route which serves the lucrative Johannesburg run.

Attempts by one taxi organisation to restrict other operators' access to taxi ranks also caused violence. Some organisations argued that they operated the route first, had been involved in building the taxi rank and should therefore be paid a rank fee (usually R30-R40 per month). This paid for a marshal at the rank who prevented pirate owners from 'muscling' in on 'their' route.

Newcomers argue for a free market and access to all routes and taxi ranks, but are usually attacked and driven away. One such dispute

developed in May 1994 when the Mpumalanga Taxi Association obtained a court order allowing them a rank in Pinetown. However, the Pinetown Taxi Association rejected this, arguing that the Mpumalanga group could transport commuters to Pinetown but not from it.

The Pinetown Association staged a blockade to protest against Mpumalanga taxis collecting commuters in Pinetown. Tensions between the two organisations eventually led to the assassination of the Mpumalanga Taxi Association chairman in the centre of Pinetown.

As in Gauteng and the Northern Transvaal, peace agreements in KwaZulu-Natal were short lived. At the end of August, violence broke out between the Greytown and Tugela Ferry taxi associations. The Tugela Ferry Association was accused of breaking an informal agreement not to carry passengers through to Pietermaritzburg, but to drop them off in Greytown.

Taxis and buses

In KwaZulu-Natal there were also tensions between taxi associations and bus operators competing for passengers. In August 1994, three buses of the Maphumulo Bus Services were set alight allegedly by local taxi operators trying to discourage locals from using the buses. A Maphumulo Bus Services driver was later shot and injured at the taxi rank.

Taxi operators claimed the buses poached passengers and should only pick up commuters at designated bus stops. In a similar dispute in Newcastle, taxis were stoned by angry commuters after the drivers intimidated passengers, pulling them off buses belonging to Chippa's Bus Services. Chippa's had already stopped operating long distance routes in October 1993 following intimidation by taxi operators.

In August 1994, Chippa's suspended then local services after two bus drivers were threatened. Numerous meetings with the South African Police Services (SAPS), Newcastle Peace Committee and the local taxi

association resulted in Chippa's resuming their services. That same day however, taxi drivers prevented the buses from operating. Chippa's eventually stopped running in Newcastle.

Western Cape

Taxi conflicts in 1994 were partly an extension of old political rivalries emanating from squatter areas such as Crossroads, and also a resurgence of the taxi war from the early 1990s between the Langa/Guguletu/Nyanga Association (LAGUNYA) and the Western Cape Black Taxi Association (WEBTA).

Conflict in Crossroads was linked to the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WECUSA). Both organisations were aligned to the ANC, but when WECUSA chairman, Jeffrey Nongwe and his 'cabinet' forced people out of Crossroads in 1993 resulting in 55 deaths, they were suspended from the ANC.

In 1994, attempts to unify the more than 90 taxi associations in the Western Cape failed

The conflict between the LAGUNYA and WEBTA taxi associations had eventually ended in 1992 when they helped form the Convention of Democratic Taxi Associations (CODETA), which became an umbrella body for 13 taxi associations.

Mr Nongwe and WECUSA were, however involved in a territorial struggle with SANCO in Old Crossroads. Nongwe used members of the Big Eight Gang, who had been associated with WEBTA, as bodyguards. In October 1994, Nongwe and the Big Eight formed the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA), comprising mainly disaffected former WEBTA members who broke away from C'OIJI-.TA.

Some C'A'I A members were Pan Alricanisl Coiuircv, (PA(') aliened.

Figure 2: Persons Injured and Killed in Taxi Violence, i.:

citing CODETA's support for the ANC as a reason for the breakaway. While certain CATA taxis used PAC colours, the PAC denied any formal link with the group. Subsequent hostilities became inextricably linked to Mr Nongwe's personal struggle for control of certain areas in Crossroads.

Revived hostilities

With the formation of CATA the taxi hostilities were revived. After a CATA member was killed, the group retaliated, shooting at a crowd in Khayelitsha who had attended a SANCO rally, killing 10 people. More than a month of conflict involving the taxi and civic organisations and Big Eight members followed.

When CODETA refused CATA access to the new Station Deck Taxi Rank in central Cape Town, CATA threatened to renew the taxi war and to resume loading passengers at the now illegal Strand Street rank. CODETA refused to accept the legality of CATA and the standoff erupted into open violence in October when shooting broke out between the rival members at the new taxi rank.

In response, the provincial Government set up a Western Cape 'Iask Team to resolve the taxi war, and the police began random weapons checks at the Station Deck 'lasi Uank. The Task Team also tried lo unil\ ihe more than 90 taxi

associations in the Western Cape, hut this proved to be impossible.

As the conflict escalated there wore fears that CODETA and CATA had lost control of their members and open warfare broke out. Roving hitsquads ambushed and chased taxis, drivers were abducted and executed, commuters intimidated and shacks torched. Anyone even vaguely connected to the two wai ring taxi organisations became a potential target.

Peace fails

When a peace pact was eventually initiated on November 13, attacks broke out before it was signed causing CATA leaders to withdraw. As clashes continued, police feared that elements were fueling the violence for their own ends. In one incident, two people were killed when two rival taxis simultaneously came under fire from men in a passing car.

This incident sparked off reprisals, causing seven deaths in 18 incidents during the ensuing 24 hours. These events seemed to bring the two associations to their senses and a peace agreement was eventually brokered. Police patrols along the affected routes were also stepped up.

The 1994 taxi conflicts were also fueled by other underlying problems. CODETA was accused of trying to monopolise certain routes. Also, police officers were found guilty ol

illicitly running a taxi business, which led to renewed calls for proper registration of taxi operators and identification of owners.

There were also tensions when the Golden Arrow Bus Company's drivers were harassed and attacked by taximen trying to prevent them from operating in Khayelitsha. The police increased patrols along bus routes and eventually in March 1994, after extensive negotiations, it was agreed that buses could operate in Khayelitsha but they had to use the designated bus routes and stopping points.

High ranking Ciskei police officers allegedly own and protect King Taxi Forum taxis

Ciskei & Border

In February 1994, conflict broke out between the Border Alliance Taxi Association (BATA) based in East London and the King Williams Town based King Taxi Forum (KTF). King Williams Town is a central point in the region which taxi associations from surrounding areas claimed as their own.

In addition, two kinds of route permits exist for the taxi industry, namely direct route and radius permits. A direct route permit was used by long distance operators who were only allowed to use the route once or twice a day. A radius permit allowed taxis to operate one route up to a certain distance from the starting point. Hence the starting point was crucial.

The Department of Transport refused to grant permits to taxis based outside King Williams Town. Taxi operators in the Ciskei however, merely obtained a Ciskei operating permit and the Department of Transport were obliged to issue a covering permit. The King Williams Town routes quickly became saturated and conflicts developed between the various taxi organisations.

In November 1993, a meeting of taxi organisations from the region had agreed that there should be no boundaries in the industry, but this did not prevent some associations from trying to control certain routes. In January 1994, King Taxi Forum (KTF) was formed in the Ciskei and demanded the use of King Williams Town roads.

Fighting for routes

KTF forced open the Mdantsane route causing conflict with the Border Alliance Taxi Association (BATA). BATA alleged that KTF was supported by high ranking Ciskei police officers who protected KTF taxis, some of which were allegedly owned by Ciskei police members. BATA complained that this made it difficult for the SAPS in King Williams Town to disarm KTF drivers who had firearms licensed by the Ciskei police.

The territorial dispute continued and in three incidents in February 1994, handgrenades were thrown into taxis. The feud was then sidelined for some months by the election and the change of government. In November clashes resumed, only two weeks after the two sides had signed a ceasefire agreement.

Rival taxi operators were killed on the assumption that this would permanently eliminate economic opposition

Thousands of commuters were stranded when both associations set up roadblocks on the routes to King Williams Town. KTF did not interfere with the public, but drivers of BATA taxis trying to breach the roadblocks were assaulted and some taxis were burnt. When KTF tried to stop commuters boarding buses, passengers armed themselves with sticks and pangas, warning taxi operators not to interfere with the buses.

Police eventually removed the blockades and disarmed the taxi drivers. During the ensuing deadlock, taxi operators agreed that no taxis should run. Instead private bakkie owners were allowed to transport passengers. Some of these owners, when realising that they could make money, bought new vehicles. When the taxis resumed operations, bakkie owners refused to withdraw as they now had expensive repayments to make.

The Border/Ciskei taxi disputes show that economics underlies many of the conflicts. Economic competition has led to the killing of rival taxi operators on the assumption that this will permanently eliminate economic opposition. However, such actions lead to a cycle of revenge attacks and as the stakes increase, desperate measures are used, like hiring hitmen.

Eastern Cape

In Port Elizabeth tensions were caused by the illegal loading of passengers at the Pier 14 Taxi Rank by taxis not affiliated to any local associations. These pirate taxis, registered outside the Uitenhage/Port Elizabeth area, were known as 'sweepers'.

In November 1994, violence erupted between the sweepers and members of the Algoa Taxi Association when a number of taxis were shot at and drivers assaulted. Some commuters were also whipped for boarding the sweepers' taxis.

Underlying problems

In 1992 the Goldstone Commission's investigation into taxi violence in Ivory Park and Alexandra, declared unequivocally that commercial rivalry over routes was one of the main causes of the violence. The Commission's inquiry into the Western Cape Taxi War of 1991-1992 recommended that the issuing of permits should be restricted by the number of ranks available.

Permits

The indiscriminate issuing of licences by the Local Road Transportation Board led to their devaluation. It made no difference to many operators whether they had one or not, and the traffic police were

unable to adequately police the industry.

Taxi operators were also dissatisfied with the arbitrary acquisition of permits by operators outside the industry such as schoolteachers, policemen and traffic officers. In some areas, traffic and police officers had stakes in the industry and they either favoured or victimised associations in their own interests.

Recession

Another cause of conflict was the effect of the economic recession. In September 1993, many taxi organisations protested against the rise in the petrol price and the escalating costs of spares. In 1994, various taxi organisations tried to negotiate a reduction of the fuel price and permission to own petrol pumps, but to no avail.

Operators refuse to accept that economically uncompetitive taxis should go bankrupt

Bank rates also showed an upward trend, making it hard for taxi owners to repay bank loans. These pressures were expressed in increased competition for routes and passengers. The situation was exacerbated by general overtrading on most routes. By the end of 1994 there were an estimated 70 000 legal taxis in South Africa and 40 000 illegal (pirate) operators.

The collapse of the South African Black Taxi Association's Foundation (with a loss of more than R10 million) further weakened the economic position of taxi owners. The foundation was set up in the 1980s to help aspirant taxi owners

get bank finance. Owners were guaranteed finance on condition they made a payment to SABTA which they could claim back when the vehicles were paid off. When the foundation collapsed, taxi owners were not refunded their contributions by SABTA.

State subsidies

The question of state subsidies was also a problem. Taxi owners wanted government subsidies to help them survive in an increasingly competitive environment. The Government was opposed to outright subsidies which, as in the case of many bus companies, caused dependence. The Government instead favoured a taxi operator insurance scheme at lower rates.

Taxi operators argued that since they provide transport to the majority of blacks in the country they deserved subsidies similar to bus companies. Bus companies however, are audited and the administration of state subsidies can be controlled. In contrast, taxi operators function as individuals with little financial controls or accountability.

There was wide recognition in the taxi industry of the dire need for stability in order to prosper. Large-scale fragmentation however, meant there was no unified national structure which could negotiate with the government. By August 1994, the Department of Transport had more than 480 taxi associations listed, but very little was known about these groups.   t

Regulation

While the government deregulated all transport, there were urgent calls for forced regulation of the taxi

industry. Measures to stem the conflict paid scant attention to its root cause, namely poor regulation. Market forces have not led to a process of natural pruning, as operators refuse to accept that economically uncompetitive taxis should go bankrupt.

Instead, most attempted to swing the odds in their favour by using illegal methods, corruption and the elimination of rivals through violence. To these operators, open and fair competition was an anathema. Regulation is opposed by most taxi owners because they know that some operators would be forced out.

In particular, one-man operations fear being ousted by the multiple owning businesses, those with influence in government or who can afford to pay bribes. Legislation has been urgently called for to empower provincial legislatures to withdraw permits and force troublemaking associations to disband. A code of conduct for the taxi industry is needed which should be policed by the industry itself through a democratically elected professional body. ☙

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Reigning in the Riot Police

Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Defence Policy

The Internal Stability Division (ISD) is notoriously unpopular.   This article considers public order policing options, and suggests that a revamped unit will have virtually the same tasks as the ISD, including the universally unpopular riot control function.

South Africa is facing an increasing crime rate ciin i pounded by inefficient policing. Pri -ons are overflowing with hardened criminals and in certain splu-res, the emerging human rights culture is fast becoming a culture of entitlement. The flood of illegal immigrants is becoming a massive socio-economic problem, with a glowing criminal element.

Cn >wd and mass based violence will pro! lably continue and hence the need for public order policing. This is inii limited to riot control, but includes crowd control and security cordons for sports, cultural events am I big shows. The police may In >w ever, be unable to implement community-based policing and combat crime if a clear distinction cannot be made between normal and public order policing.

The legitimacy crisis of the ISD is clearly affecting public perceptions of the police in general. This has been confirmed in a recent Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) public opinion survey. If the ISD is beyond redemption, a replacement must be created.

An important prerequisite for reconstructing the ISD is a clear commitment from the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) at the most senior level. Various options are available but any replacement would perform virtually the same functions, perhaps resorting to many of the same tactics, and containing former ISD members.

The nature of public order policing does not endear it to the citizenry, particularly those finding themselves at the wrong end of the baton. Even in France, with its legitimate, democratic political system, neither the *Gendarmerie Mobile* nor the *Compagnies Republicaines de Securite* (CRS) can really be considered popular. Nevertheless, they are undeniably effective.

But how acceptable should a public order force have to be? Once the novelty of an improved force with the advantages of modern training has worn off, the result may be a unit which differs only slightly from the ISD. It is therefore necessary to sound a word of warning to temper unrealistic expectations about a new public order squad.

The task of any public order force is to protect innocent people, bystanders, and public and private property. However, the right to protest and to freedom of expression also has to be guarded. A vast grey area exists between these two roles. Well trained and professional persons must make this distinction, not a unit for which representativeness is the single criteria for legitimacy, to the exclusion of effectiveness.

The primary role of the ISD is defined as "the combating of riots...and combating of violence and unrest in the Republic of South Africa. The division places emphasis on preventative actions, such as patrols in areas where unrest, intimidation and other unrest-related crimes prevail. If there is no unrest in an area, the ISD is fully employed in the prevention of crime".

Their defined role aside, the ISD is commonly seen as an arrogant paramilitary force, poorly trained, often operating independently of local station commanders, to the extent that they undermine the credibility of the police as a whole.

Options

Internationally, there are five approaches that could be of value for South Africa.

The Gendarmerie Mobile

France's paramilitary *Gendarmerie Mobile* is part of the Gendarmerie Nationale which in turn, is part of the military. In times of war they act as territorial troops, also assisting with mobilisation, the management of the military reserves, etc. Otherwise they function as police units, particularly in the rural areas. The Gendarmerie accompanies French armed forces stationed overseas and is often used for peacekeeping operations.

The Compagnies Republicaines de Securite (CRS)

France's CRS is a division of the national police and as such, falls under the Department of the Interior. The structure of the ISD in South Africa follows the tradition of the CRS. It provides for career movement from the public order police to the 'normal' police force and vice versa.

Reasons for involving the French military and police in community and public order policing are historical and peculiar to that country. The *Gendarmerie Nationale* is largely a parallel police force to the *Police Nationale.* While their functions are virtually similar, the *Police Nationale* generally operates in French towns with more than 10 000 inhabitants each, while the *Gendarmerie Nationale* operates in rural areas and along the larger roads.

In fact, only some 17 000 of the total 88 000 *Gendarmes* are members of the *Gendarmerie Mobile* with a public order police function. Of the 125 000 strong *Police Nationale,* the

CRS is only some 14 000 strong. In France therefore, the public order component is about 15% of the total police complement.

Although the two French public order police forces have the same basic training, knowledge and powers, they are distinct in their dress, equipment, function, organisation and actions. While the normal police act as individual policemen, the public order police act only within a set organisation.

The German option

Since the Second World War, the Germany military (*Bundeswehr)* deliberately have minimal internal function during peace times. During war situations, its internal functions are also severely constrained. The Federal Border Police (*Bundesgrentz-schutz)* fulfill the normal riot control and public order duties. Even during a national emergency, the internal duties of the *Bundeswehr* are virtually restricted to traffic control.

Total separation

Creating a separate organisation is an expensive alternative, but cannot be discounted. Given the demands on state expenditure, this option is inherently unattractive for South Africa. Setting up a separate state department with the necessary infrastructure would be particularly ineffective. Attempts at cost-saving would also be complicated if this organisation did not share the existing infrastructure of the South African Police Services (SAPS) or the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

The British model

The final option is to establish a small public order core force and use normal policemen and women in a public order role when required. This draws on the British model in which public order duties are not distinct from other policing functions. The existing links between the community and the local police are therefore retained, which ideally results in a softer approach.

An effective and coordinated intelligence network is a crucial

component and prerequisite for the success of this model. This is necessary since the whole system depends on prior warning to allow for the assembly and positioning of forces.

Within these five options any number of permutations could be followed for structuring at national and provincial level. South Africa could opt for a small, highly trained national force, centrally located and deployable countiy wide. At the other extreme, each province could have its own units. A balance between these two would probably be required.

At present, an integrated vision is lacking at virtually all levels of informed debate about the future management of security in South Africa. Decision-makers simply do not know what the end product should be, and as a result have trouble identifying the best route toward reform.

SANDF support for SAPS

For most of the last few years, between 6 000 and up to 17 000 soldiers have supported the SAPS, executing law and order duties at any given stage. In fact, these forces generally serve as a back-up to the Police. Strictly speaking, they do not operate as a public order type squad, but augment police numbers.

White conscripts and regular troops of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) along with Citizen Force soldiers on call-up, have been deployed in the townships. In the rural areas the commando's have been involved in policing activities for many years. This has generally been to protect home and hearth and man roadblocks.

Calls to end the military's internal support of the SAPS are based on the assumption that public order policing should not involve the military. There is however, an argument for allocating this function to an additional but separate elite arm of service in the military. (Existing arms of service include the SA Army, Navy, Airforce and Medical Services.) This would enable the

commando's for one, to be posiiively restructured rather than disbanded fur political and financial reasons.

Training

The challenge of establishing a public order force can be underestimated. The now defunct National Peacekeeping Force is a case in point. As regards training, members of the CRS have stressed the importance of the leader group. Junior leaders, essentially comprising platoon leaders, could be crash-trained in two months. This however, requires that candidates have five to eight years of appropriate experience.

Company commanders and more senior officers could be trained in a month, given at least 10 years appropriate experience. In total, the selection process for all leader groups would take about two weeks, followed by one or two months of training (for senior and junior leaders respectively) and a further two weeks of evaluation.

Squad members should have attai ned at least an academic level of education equal to standard eight. Based on CRS minimum standards, a proposed training schedule is outlined in Table 1. The schedule assumes that no specialisation training for drivers, signallers, medics, clerks, storekeepers, etc. is required.

Training and deployment in the CRS occur at company level. Each company consists of four platoons of about 250 members each. Based on CRS standards, a training team of 10 instructors per company is required. Training a public order force of about 1 000 men and women simultaneously would therefore require a team of 40 full-time trainers.

The squadron of some 120 men is the basic unit of the *Gendarmerie Mobile.* It is divided into four platoons, including a headquarters platoon. There are four types of squadrons:

- with wheeled vehicles (buses)
- with wheeled armoured vehicles
- with wheeled, armoured

Table 1: Estimated Crash Training Course for Public Order Police Members

Company Commander and senior officers	2 weeks selection	1 month training	2 weeks evaluation	1 week integrate	9 weeks total
platoon Commander and Junior officers	2 weeks selection	*2 months* training	2 weeks evaluation	1 week integrate	13 weeks total
Squad members	2 weeks selection	3 months training	2 weeks evaluation		16 weeks total

vehicles equipped with machine guns
1 with armoured cars fitted with *cannon* and machine guns.

In contrast, as a civilian body the CRS is armed with only revolvers, automatic pistols, rifles, tear gas, dele nee sticks, shield, etc.

Costs

Based on comparisons with the CRS, it is possible to calculate an appi oximate equipment cost estimate per | iublic order company (Table 2).

The equipment cost for one company is about R2,5 million (Table 2). This excludes items such as normal tin i I orms, estimated at roughly R2 lOO per person. Total costs will be about R3 million per company, excluding operating costs. Based on the ISD, annual operating expenses of one company would be around R16 million. The budget for a force ol It) 000 (40 companies) would be approximately R640 million.

The SANDF by comparison, have on awrage 50 companies deployed internally at any given time and during the election in 1994, up to 140 companies were deployed. Funds for this deployment amounted to about R i billion, drawn from the Defence budget.

C)mmand and control

Judicially, a civilian authority should lv in charge of public order, and a public order force may therefore only intervene on request. Resorting to compulsion implies that all means to effect obedience to the law have been used without success. Ideally, a formal request for assistance is made and the entrance of the public order force is documented.

Whether a new public order unit forms part of the police, the military or any another government department, it is expensive. The annual budget of the ISD is about R500 million. We should also accept that police public order agencies inevitably become involved in normal policing duties and that the distinction between the two is often artificial.

There is considerable evidence in South Africa that a lack of resources and manpower results in excessive use of force to compensate for these deficiencies. The mere presence of the ISD has in the past sparked off protest and violence. The ISD presently consists of about 7 000 officers. An equal number would be required for any new unit, ideally considerably more if the problem of inadequate personnel is to be dealt with.

Many of these problems arise due to the lack of professionalism, poor training and ineffectual actions of the public order agencies, rather than as

a result of inherent deficiencies in the model of a separate public order protection force.

In conclusion, the following points are important:

- Without a clear decision from, and the support of, the highest level of national government, there is no chance of establishing a legitimate and effective public order policing unit to replace the ISD.

- Any such force must be placed under civilian authority. The premier of a province or his/her MEC for Safety and Security must request and/or authorise the deployment of any public order force. He or she must carry the political responsibility.

O The public order force must be divorced from the 'normal' police. This could be achieved through distinctive uniforms, vehicles, etc., and/or through making public order part of a non-police structure, such as the military.

- The division of functions and resources between the departments of Safety and Security, Defence and the private sector must be thoroughly considered in making the necessary decisions about public order policing. P0£\

Table 2: Rough Cost Estimate (in Rands) to Equip a Company

Description	Number	Unit cost	Total cost
Command cars (soft skinned)	5	30,000	150,000
Troop carriers *(buses)*	12	100,000	1,200,000
Ammunition carrier	1	100,000	100,000
Equipment vehicle	1	100,000	100,000
Kitchen and catering vehicle	1	100,000	100,000
Radio command vehicle	1	300,000	300,000
Radio's	7	7,000	49,000
Pistols	35	2,000	70,000
Rifles	42	3,000	126,000
Submachine guns	31	3,000	93,000
Grenade launching rifles	6	500	3,000
Rubber truncheons	88	50	4,400
Shields	28	300	8,400
Gas masks	88	500	44,000
Fire resistant clothing	110	400	44,000
Helmets and visors	88	200	17,600
TV cameras	5	3,000	15,000
Total			**2,424,400**

KwaZulu-Natal Conflict Update

Antoinette Louw, Indicator SA researcher

One year since the elections, KwaZulu-Natal faces all the problems of the new South Africa, and more. Political competition still translates into intimidation and violence, and democratic procedures are inconceivable in many areas.

The year began badly with about 130 people reportedly killed in January, in the highest monthly count since the pre-election months of March and April 1994, when over 600 people died. Many observers, comparing this fatal period with the post-election months, conclude that levels have since been low in KwaZulu-Natal.

Monthly counts have in fact been higher than those in the PWV region throughout 1994 (Figure 1), and similar to levels in 1991 and 1992 in KwaZulu-Natal, when violence was regarded as a major problem in this province.

Issues such as King Zwelethini's status, Minister Buthelezi's relationship to the monarchy and international mediation for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), impact on the mood in the province.

Conflict over the role of traditional leaders in local government elections however, has the greatest potential to disrupt the voting process. These issues will have to be carefully dealt with to avoid reducing local elections to the violent, quasi democratic process which culminated in national elections in this province.

In addition to divisions at the regional level, the phenomenon of territoriality divides people on the ground. Areas previously afflicted by violence such as Mpumalanga and Pietermaritzburg, are relatively quiet because these communities have been "won" and "lost" by political parties. Free political expression and association are rare even here. Areas where political control is disputed, or where communities are targeted for recruiting purposes, experience ongoing violence.

The distribution of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has not changed much from 1993 to 1994. The highest proportion of events occurred in the Durban region, followed by Zululand. The percentage of events in the other regions were similar, and all dropped fractionally from 1993 to 1994 (Figures 2 and 3).

Durban region

Violence over the past eight months occurred largely in Umlazi. The areas of Inanda, Ndwedwe and Umbumbulu were also affected. Conflict in hostels in Montclair, bordering on Umlazi and in Umbilo in Durban, contributed to the high death toll in January this year.

This violence illustrates the power struggle between the African National Congress (ANC) and the IFP, the intolerance of non-supporters, and the strategy of creating political "no-go" zones which characterise the "lives for votes" campaign being fought in this province.

Dalton Road hostel

Violence in this hostel began when the IFP launched a branch here in December 1994. Since then, 31 men have been killed and many refugees have fled. According to the IFP, the KwaZulu-Natal Hostel Residents Association (Khora), which they believe is an ANC organisation, facilitated the banning of political activity in the hostel. This represented an attempt to establish a "no-go" zone for IFP supporters.

The IFP challenges the "democratic" way in which this was achieved, saying not only did Khora's decision deny them freedom of association, but coincided with their launch of a branch in the hostel. After IFP members were attacked on the day of the launch, they counter attacked.

Figure 1: Deaths in KwaZulu-Natal and PWV, 1993 - Feb 1995

The ANC and Khora however, blame the violence on a group of IFP supporters who control the hostel's liquor, gambling and drug trade and allegedly force people to support the IFP (HRC, Jan 1995). They maintain that a democratic decision was taken to avoid establishing political party branches in hostels in the interests of peace.

The violence has since become quite indiscriminate, claiming innocent lives in the vicinity. On January 23, police arrested eight IFP hostel dwellers, including a branch committee member, in connection with seven murders and two attempted murders. Seven of these men were granted bail in February and returned to the hostel.

Glebelands hostel

Glebelands is a predominantly ANC supporting hostel, with one block inhabited by IFP supporters. Violence claimed 20 lives here this year. The IFP believe the ANC is trying to force them out through intimidation and attacks. Inkatha maintain that other sections of the hostel are quiet because its members there are afraid, and can only organise covertly.

The Human Rights Committee (HRC) reports that ANC supporters were the victims of the first attacks in January by alleged IFP supporters. Three days later IFP supporters shot

Figure 2: Proportion of Violent Events in Regions of KwaZulu-Natal, 1993

North-West 15.3
Zululand 21.5
Midlands 14.7
South 13.3
Durban 35.1

at the hostel, with fatal consequences. In February, a gun battle occurred between hostel residents and 16 bus loads of IFP supporters coming from a rally in Eshowe. The Internal Stability Division (ISD) had tried to stop the buses using this route, but the IFP refused to comply (HRC, Feb 1995).

North Coast

The Natal Monitor reports that almost half the deaths recorded in

Figure 3: Proportion of Events in Regions of KwaZulu-Natal, 1994

North-West 11.3
Zululand 26
Midlands 13.6
South 10.7
Durban 38.3

February this year occurred here. The lower North Coast, particularly the rural areas around Mandini were most affected in recent months. The dynamics of this violence are similar to those in rural South Coast regions.

Clashes between IFP and ANC supporters occur in an environment in which largely IFP supporting traditional authorities form a significant power bloc. Attempts by ANC supporters to establish their own support bases in these areas are met with fierce resistance. Battles for the allegiance and control of communities have caused much violence.

Reports of poor policing by the KwaZulu Police and the South African Police Services are also common in both the North and South Coast areas. Several incidents however, illustrate the blatant disregard that some people have for the police. This may in turn, be caused by ineffective policing and a lack of faith in the criminal justice system.

During February in Isithebe, an IFP member shot dead an ANC member, allegedly in self defence. The man informed police, but by the time they arrived a mob of 500 people had gathered. The mob prevented police from reaching the guilty man and cut the van's radio wires to stop police

requesting backup. The police then watched helplessly as the mob stoned and stabbed the man, then doused him with petrol and set him alight (HRC, Feb 1995).

The mind set which favours physical force over dialogue still prevails

South Coast

The intensity of violence in the South Coast region is disturbing. In October 1994, 14 people were killed, including four women and seven elderly people in a massacre in Gcilima attributed to ANC-IFP hostilities. As with most incidents of violence, there was little agreement between the IFP, ANC and police about what actually happened.

There is consensus that the attackers were from a neigbouring IFP stronghold, and the victims were residents of an ANC area. The police said it was a revenge attack for arson attacks on the IFP area the previous weekend.

The IFP however, claimed it was a spontaneous, unplanned response by their supporters to a "massive pre-dawn military offensive on sleeping residents", and that all the deceased were attackers. This was also the culmination of months of attacks and intimidation by the ANC.

Since the elections violence has indeed claimed 48 lives in the area. The HRC reports however, that the attack was well orchestrated and launched by 100 heavily armed men during a change over of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) personnel. There were consequently no security forces present at the time. The ISD was also absent, even though they had been warned that an attack was imminent (HRC, Oct 1994).

In January 1995, 14 people died in Izingolweni, near Port Shepstone. Eight of these people were killed (including a baby) in an attack on a home. The allegiance of victims or their family members and attempts to eliminate or drive away supporters of opposing parties, were contributing factors.

The *modus operandi* of political parties to conquer territories and drive out or silence residents who do not support their party, is a major obstacle to peace and democracy in KwaZulu-Natal. The mind set which favours physical force over dialogue still prevails, sustaining the image of a province at war with itself. tfP0£\

Sources
The *Conflict Trends in Natal* project, Human Rights Committee reports on KwaZulu-Natal, Natal Monitor and IFP Information Centre.

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
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