

CONFLICT

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CONFLICT SUPPLEMENT EDITORIAL

Indicator South Africa's first Conflict Supplement comes at a time when the country's future is threatened by violence as never before. The Supplement was discussed last year when violence was claiming lives at an unprecedented rate.

The need for reliable information and interpretations has since become essential with election day fast approaching. Political campaigning has reached fierce proportions, and information, particularly about violence, may be distorted as parties compete for the favour of voters. Less than a month before this crucial event, it is perhaps futile to hope for free and fair elections. Political intolerance, a culture of violence, intense political competition, and the rejection of the process by some groups, count against achieving this ideal.

The situation is desperate, but those in positions of authority must take responsibility for events during this turbulent period. Political leaders cannot use public platforms to threaten their opponents, while on the ground their antagonistic statements have destructive repercussions. Leaders must no longer simply pay lip service to freedom of association and activity, while their supporters publicly violate these rights. If we are to believe political organisations can govern in future, supporters of these parties must be controlled.

The security forces also, have to prevent intimidation and violence. The activities of some members are under scrutiny, but until the elections, the existing police and defence forces, along with the National Peace Keeping Force, are all we have. No effort can be spared in ensuring they perform optimally.

It is unlikely that violence will cease after the elections. The search will begin for successful ways of reducing conflict and securing peace. These developments will be monitored and assessed in the Supplement. The devastating effects of violence and the challenges which these present for reconstruction, will also be covered. The Supplement will inform readers about the changing nature of conflict and the solutions which must be found in the interests of democracy and peace.

Antoinette Louw
Conflict Supplement Editor

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THE

In the murky world of Self Defence Units (SDUs) and criminal gangs in the townships, it has become very difficult to define political violence or criminal violence, and whether they are two distinct types of violence or have become interchangeable. The dividing lines have become blurred.

It is of course a moot point that killing remains the violent crime of murder whether it has political motives or criminal intent. That certain actions are conceived as having political connotations and therefore can be justified as 'legitimate' responses to a violent situation cannot be condoned in any society striving towards justice and democracy.

SDUs were established in a number of black townships on the Reef, from February 1990 onwards. This was in response to the perceived threats posed by various forces, including vigilantes and Inkatha-supporting hostel residents during the so-called 'Reef Township War', harassment from township councils and actions by security forces.

They were also a logical extension of the structures set up during the mid-1980s in the Vaal Triangle townships - block committees, neighbourhood watches and civic associations - which mobilised opposition to the apartheid structures of the government in line with the African National Congress (ANC) strategy of ungovernability.

During 1990 the lead in the formation of local SDUs on the Reef was more often than not taken by the ANC. Most often the initial core members and leadership structures were provided by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres: in September that year ANC president, Nelson Mandela, publicly pledged at a mass funeral in Soweto that MK members would help form and train SDUs.

Aims

Their initial aims were to protect communities from attacks or harassment by members of the security forces - in a purely defensive capacity - and to repulse any attacks by alleged vigilante forces.

ARMS OF BABES

By Anthony Minnaar

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National Peace Accord principles can be interpreted as condoning Self Defence Units. The NPA recognises the right of all individuals to defend themselves and their property, and to set up voluntary associations or units to combat crime or prevent invasion of the rights of communities.

This right ostensibly includes the right to bear licensed arms and use them in self-defence. Complications arise when armed self-defence becomes attack, intimidation and extortion. In such situations the existence of Self Defence Units becomes highly suspect and problematic.

They largely comprise organised groups of politicised youth, sometimes armed with guns but more often with home-made weapons or any other objects (sticks, stones, lengths of pipes, bushknives etc.).

At a later stage they added a sort of community policing function to their activities, and political mobilisation within communities became an implied activity.

However, in many townships political mobilisation was not always without intimidation. In a number of East Rand townships SDUs openly targeted Zulu-speaking residents, even if they were not supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) for special attention.

Some Zulu-speaking residents out of fear joined the ANC or attended their meetings in a bid to deflect the attentions of the SDUs.

Initially in the townships on the East Rand residents had all agreed to pay R20 per household to local youths for the protection of their neighbourhoods. The money was allegedly used to buy arms and ammunition to allow the youths to form a SDU. These communities' decision to form SDUs apparently stemmed from the perception that the police were unwilling or unable to protect residents from attacks emanating from the local hostels.

As the situation progressed the SDUs underwent subtle changes. By the nature of their activities they would often be involved in such illegal activities as the smuggling of illegal firearms or the extortion of a 'protection' levy from local households.

To this situation a number of variations in structure and activities occurred. Some of the SDUs were used for offensive purposes in pre-emptive, retaliatory or revenge attacks or for the gaining of additional space/land for a specific community. Many have also been used in a vigilante capacity for policing certain communities, patrol duties, enforcing stayaways, boycotts or merely community adherence to decisions taken by local civics.

Another of their functions is to prevent criminal actions, to bring those accused of participating in crime before 'Peoples' Courts' for further punishment, and very often to mete out such punishment as decided on by these courts.

Comtsotsis

However, some recruits to SDUs were already criminals, and used their positions in these organisations to gain control of a community in order to carry on their criminal activities - extortion, smuggling of illegal firearms, control of racketeering, prostitution, gambling, dagga trade, illegal shebeens etc. - under the protection of a SDU and with relative impunity from punishment.

These are the so-called 'comtsotsis' - those who call themselves 'comrades', but are in fact 'tsotsis' (thugs/criminals) - who hide behind political slogans, use political activities and the names of specific political organisations to gain power, but remain just that - 'comrade criminals'.

A third variation in SDU activities were the genuine political comrades who, in time and

The SDUs were a logical extension of structures set up as part of the ANC strategy of ungovernability

Some SDU recruits were criminals and used the organisation to further their criminal activities



Paul Valesco - Southlight

Some linked up with local security forces to destabilise the community

Some have created neighbourhoods so lawless that the police cannot or will not enter them

through the force of circumstances, have turned to criminal activities to sustain themselves and to fund their political activities or merely to survive in a situation where the national organisation no longer supports them with material or money.

A fourth variety are those criminal gangs who, because of their position as powerful criminals and use of extortion and intimidation in the normal course of their activities, control a community through fear.

In return for either a hands-off policy, non-prosecution or protection from the wrath of a community, they had linked up to local security force (SAP/KZP or SADF) structures and were used to destabilise a community for political ends. That their actions often involved overtly criminal acts of violence does not detract from the fact that they were as much political as the SDUs of the comrades.

A final category are those criminals who have fanned the flames of what has been termed 'political or unrest-related violence'. By random acts of violence and intimidation perpetrated purely in order to create more violence and conflict with the aim of establishing 'no-go areas' they have created neighbourhoods so lawless and anarchic that the police cannot or will not enter.

Although the ANC basically mandated their creation, there are high levels of secrecy surrounding the local operations of the various SDUs. In many areas secret codewords, handshakes or gestures are used to identify members or ascertain what political loyalties residents might have.

In addition, in the townships that they patrol the SDUs are accountable to no-one. Communities coming under the control of SDUs have learnt that the word of the

youthful comrade leaders is law. Lack of discipline is a major problem.

Furthermore, not everyone in the townships is supportive of SDUs. Not all the youth join up. Some young residents, often after repeated requests to accompany local SDUs on their patrols, have rather opted to leave a township and go elsewhere where they will not be subjected to onerous demands.

IFP units

In recent months there has been an important variation. As conflict in East Rand townships escalated in mid-1993 between Inkatha-supporting hostel residents and township inhabitants and ANC-aligned SDUs, the Transvaal leadership of Inkatha called for the establishment of Self-Protection Units (SPUs).

They argued that this move was necessitated by a singling out of Zulu-speakers on the Reef for 'genocide and ethnic cleansing'. Mangosuthu Buthelezi had called for a levy of R5 on every member in order to pay for the training and arming of the euphemistically called 'community guards' of the SPUs to protect Zulus from attacks by SDUs in Natal.

By the end of 1993 the first batch of 600 young recruits was being trained at the Mlaba Training Camp in Zululand. The role of these SPUs was, according to the organisers, to protect the chiefs (Amkhosi) from attacks and to make sure that KwaZulu never fell into the hands of the ANC/Communists. This has added a new dimension to the existing conflicts between the ANC and Inkatha.

Political links

In many cases violence has been committed in the name of the ANC or IFP by uncontrolled young thugs. In some cases members of various political parties were deliberately accused of certain crimes merely because they belonged to a political party, and were then dragged before a 'Peoples' Court' and punished.

In other cases the local street committees through the 'Peoples' Courts' had waged a genuine campaign to rid their areas of criminals. However, this on occasion led to the assassination of the local street committee chairman or 'judge' of the local 'Peoples' Court'.

In a twist to this many of the criminal gangs sought the protection, albeit only by

association, of the structures of local branches of political parties. Political parties in the Vaal region have tacitly acknowledged that there are gangs either terrorising people in the name of a political party or calling themselves a self defence unit.

It is hard to know who the real comrades are and who the comsotsis. However, pointers can be found in the subtle differences in certain actions - comsotsis loot possessions and steal cars - comrades only 'borrow' them, returning them once finished using them and tended to firebomb houses of suspected opponents (policemen, informers etc.) without looting of the contents.

The ANC had also made attempts in some townships to control their members. In Sebokeng the local ANC office in the community centre makes any young resident wanting to join the local SDU file an application form.

In some cases where the local ANC structures were disciplined by the community for various crimes such as theft and assault, they would turn renegade and attack the organisation itself.

Such indiscipline led to efforts by the ANC PWV Region in December 1992 to draw up a code of conduct for SDUs to make them 'more disciplined bodies, with greater accountability to the communities they are supposed to be defending'. Various ANC leaders publicly conceded that some SDUs in the Vaal townships were 'harbouring unruly elements who were harming the image of the organisation by their deplorable behaviour'.

Conclusion

It has become obvious that while there are subtle differences between criminal and political violence, in methods and application there are great similarities. What might have started out as political violence often becomes criminal and vice versa. While the one is used to further political aims the other hides behind political labels to justify the criminal aspect of its actions.

Furthermore, in some cases there is a fairly straightforward, albeit cynical, exploitation of political violence by criminals for their own benefit. Finally there was the use by certain members of the state security forces of criminals for the political purpose of destabilising specific communities. As a result there has been a blurring of the lines,

which are in any case artificial, between these two types of violence in South Africa - political and criminal.

Both should be jointly dealt with, recognising that they are part of the same problem - the high level of crime in South Africa - and not as two distinct and different sets of violence. The solutions lie not only in the political arena but also in effective policing and the implementation of socio-economic development in the worst affected areas.

In many communities SDUs have become a menace. They no longer defend, protect or serve the communities as originally intended. Once revered by communities they have now become universally feared, and are racked by in-fighting and cynical exploitation of the structures for individual members' own personal gain.

An important factor in bringing the SDUs under control will be the disowning of them by the political parties and a re-assertion of accountability to the community they are supposed to serve. Thorough screening will be needed if they are to be incorporated into any community policing structures. It will not be a solution to disband them summarily without providing some alternative for ex-SDU members.

The other problem in dealing with SDUs is the fact that until the police enjoy the support of the residents, communities will be vulnerable to extortion and violence. Most residents would like to see SDUs bound into more formal structures than at present. One mooted solution has been the suggestion of a people's militia, trained, funded and equipped by the government, which would work closely with existing police structures to ensure more effective 'community policing'.

Such formalisation of SDU structures, it is hoped, would bring the SDUs above ground - legitimise them - and undercut rogue SDUs who refuse to submit to community discipline. Certainly a minimum prerequisite for any sort of free and fair elections to be held in some of the high conflict areas in parts of the East Rand townships, would be for the SDUs to be disbanded and their illegal weapons handed over.

Given the present state of instability and breakdown of law and order in a number of areas, it has become imperative that the problem of disciplining uncontrolled SDUs be dealt with hastily and, if at all possible, be resolved before elections take place. *IPWA*

The problem is the high level of crime - not different sets of violence

SDUs have become a menace

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Committed to Peace

By Mark Shaw

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There is growing debate about the future of peace structures. Here, the history of one of the most active peace committees in the Wits/Vaal region is examined in order to explore possible future roles, and what combination of factors have been important in ensuring that one peace committee is active, while others are on the brink of collapse.

It has been argued that Local Peace Committees, while theoretically meant to preempt violence, were often only set up as a reactive measure after substantial violence had already occurred. This made their task extremely difficult, as conflict was often at its height and warring parties were more committed to violence than peace.

More importantly, this dynamic disallowed Local Peace Committees (LPCs) from undertaking preemptive and future orientated strategies as they essentially were playing a 'fire fighting' role.

At the same time, there was little enthusiasm to establish committees in areas where there was little or no violence as this was considered a waste of scarce resources - and some committees established in areas largely free of violence have not survived long.

But in certain circumstances committees have strengthened over time. This has mostly been in areas where substantial violence has occurred, a committee has been established, violence has declined and the LPC has begun changing its orientation from a response to a preemptive outlook.

This has important implications for the future operations and orientation of some LPCs. While a number of specific conditions were also present, the change to a preemptive orientation was arguably what occurred in the case of the Benoni/Boksburg LPC.

Benoni-Boksburg

The Benoni-Boksburg Peace Committee was formed in April 1992 after exploratory meetings in March of that year. A number of important procedural decisions were taken at the first meetings.

These included a decision to allow the full LPC to operate for two months before an executive would be formed for which single representatives would be designated; that the number of representatives per organisation to the full committee would not be limited as long as all concerned were committed to peace; and that the chairperson - at the time from the East Rand Attorney's Association - would be mandated to handle any crises that developed until such time as an executive had been formally constituted.

There was much initial discussion around the proposed jurisdiction for the committee, with two competing models being settled on. One envisaged two independent structures for Benoni and Boksburg, each with its own executive and committee structure.

The second involved two separate committees for the Boksburg and Benoni areas, each headed by a vice-chair and forming a combined executive. While the latter model was accepted, the LPC has effectively only operated as a single committee for both Boksburg and Benoni. So the area of the single LPC is quite large, covering Benoni, Boksburg, Daveyton, Wattville and Reiger Park.

Later, a sub-committee was established to deal exclusively with the Daveyton area, but it has only been marginally successful in getting participants to meetings. More recently an Etwatwa Local Peace Committee, based in that area of Daveyton, has been formed. These sub-committees effectively operate under the auspices of the Benoni-Boksburg Peace Committee while retaining a degree of independent action.

Measuring the achievements of peace committees is extremely difficult given the nature of their tasks. But a combination of meetings held, average attendance, the

LPCs were essentially playing a fire-fighting role

Measuring the achievements of peace committees is extremely difficult

A central reason for the success of the LPC appears to be the support of the churches

number of events monitored and projects underway gives a fair indication at least of how active any individual LPC is.

Like all peace committees in the Wits/Vaal area, Benoni/Boksburg has had a fairly high turnover of participants since its establishment. Until the end of August last year, for example, there were 27 participating organisations with 191 people having attended various meetings. But 175 of these participants attended five or fewer meetings, 11 attended six to 10 meetings, while only five attended between 11 and 15 meetings. Average attendance at a meeting was around 27 people.

The LPC has been extremely active in a wide set of areas. It has established fairly sophisticated monitoring structures, to date, just under 50 events since its inception. A monitoring team of about 25 has been deployed at both local and regional events. Because of its advanced nature, the monitors of Benoni/Boksburg were the first to be selected for regional training.

A crucial factor is the availability of permanent office space and staff

In addition, during the period of mass action early in 1993, procedures were laid down by the committee for organisations undertaking marches and other mass gatherings.

Both through its monitoring and mediation functions, the LPC has made a number of important interventions. In January 1993, for example, it negotiated the Daveyton Peace Agreement between organisations within the ANC alliance after fighting broke out in Chris Hani Park between youths and the local Self-Defence Unit.

Other negotiations have revolved around disputes over service charges between Boksburg City Council and Reiger Park residents; the mediation of a dispute between Wattville Council and the local civic; and intervention in a number of IFP/ANC and youth gang conflicts. The LPC has also intervened in local labour disputes and made an input into the ongoing educational crisis.

There is enough violence for the LPC to meet, but not enough to subvert its operation

Localising peace

There are arguably a number of reasons why the Benoni/Boksburg LPC has experienced relative success. One central reason appears to be the support of the churches. This applies to Daveyton, where both the sub-LPCs are chaired by local ministers with good standing in the community.

But it applies especially to Benoni, where the Methodist church has been particularly active in supporting Peace Committee initiatives.

Methodist Ministers attend regularly and the church provides central figures, a degree of logistical and material, and often spiritual support to the operation.

This process - although certainly not restricted to church groups - has resulted in a fairly continuous and strong leadership core in the peace committee. The five members who have attended the most meetings have been crucial in holding the process together.

This fact is of some importance when the histories of other peace committees are examined: continually changing leadership, erratic interventions from a regional level and lack of continuity and follow-up between meetings have disrupted the process elsewhere.

Tentative analysis suggests that since Benoni is slightly more isolated than other East Rand towns - which tend to merge into one another, for example, Edenvale, Germiston, Kempton Park and Tembisa - it has developed a tradition of independent action and resourcefulness.

The Democratic Party has also been fairly active and supportive of the peace process, as has the Benoni Municipality, and the LPC has received relatively generous donations to cover its running costs. One of the greatest strengths of the Benoni Peace Committee, though, is the availability of permanent office space and staff.

A broader study of peace committees in the Wits/Vaal region found this to be a crucial contributing factor in the development of local peace structures. Offices and staff provide continuity and empowerment and, symbolically, a permanent location solidifies the identity of local peace structures.

Analysis suggests that two other factors have served to strengthen the operation of the committee over time. One is the nature of the violence within Daveyton itself. On one hand, rather clinically, there is enough violence to ensure a reason for the committee to meet. On the other hand, violence is not so extensive as to subvert the operation of the LPC as has occurred elsewhere on the East Rand and in Natal.

In addition, the death and burial of Chris Hani in the jurisdiction of the Benoni/Boksburg LPC acted as a catalyst for establishing more formalised monitoring networks, not only for the local area but also for the region. The process around the Hani funeral served as crucial 'trial by fire' period which provided lessons and experience for events that were to occur in the future.

Undermining peace

The committee has, however, had its weaknesses. Because the LPC is one of the strongest and most efficient in the region, considerable pressure has been placed on its monitors, who have been active not only in the East Rand but also more widely. LPC staff have been called in to assist the stretched regional office, and some eventually moved there permanently.

The sporadic lack of representation by some parties is also of concern. While the 27 organisations which have attended meetings in the past are widely representative, there are some crucial gaps: neither the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) nor the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) attend meetings.

At the same time, individual party attendance has often been sporadic. The security forces (this includes the SAP, SADF and local traffic departments) have had a total of 35 representatives at LPC meetings, but the vast majority though have attended five or less meetings and only one has attended between 11 and 15 meetings.

The IFP, when it was in the LPC, had a poor attendance record with only one member having attended between six to 10 meetings. The ANC has a slightly better attendance record, with at least 2 permanent representatives. This has led, as elsewhere on the East Rand, to accusations that the ANC has dominated the local peace structure. This has enormous repercussions for the future operation of LPCs.

Some of these factors have fed into a perception that the peace committee is dominated organisationally by whites and is therefore removed from the realities of violence on the ground. This has been partly reinforced by the substantial role played by Benoni Methodist and, to a lesser extent, local business interests.

Despite these criticisms, the real strength of the committee remains its local nature; it cannot be labelled a regional peace initiative, it has its own dynamic and projects and is driven by local interest groups.

Daveyton Peace Corps

In recent months the Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat has initiated the formation of a Peace Corps in Daveyton. The Corps trains young people in the art of negotiation and monitoring, and its pilot group is now deployed permanently on monitoring exercises in the Daveyton area.

The primary functions of the Peace Corps include intervening in and managing conflict situations, daily patrolling of the neighbourhood and providing emergency services. Training included courses in mediation, first aid, crowd control, radio handling, violence documentation and a basic understanding of the provisions of the National Peace Accord.

Phase I of the project - which entailed the training of the first group of Peace Corps members - lasted about four weeks and took place within the township. One problem was that not all those on the course possessed reading and writing skills, and there was a fairly large degree of theoretical instruction built into the course.

Another problem was that it had not been made clear at the beginning that some participants could 'fail', and there was substantial dissatisfaction when some could not take up Peace Corps duties. This has since been resolved.

Selecting Peace Corps members has been a central question. It has often been suggested that if political parties were themselves allowed to select candidates for development projects they would choose persons of clear political affiliation, possibly leading to patronage networks being built into the process. In this case, however, selection was passed on to the political parties and other organisations, since it was felt this would emphasise that the project was a community initiative.

Thus, of the first batch of 92 trainees, there were Democratic Party participants, six IFP members, about 50 who gave their affiliation as ANC, and the rest gave their church or the local peace committee itself as their organisational affiliation. About 40% of the participants are women. This ensured that the first batch of participants was politically aware.

There is unease that some members of the Peace Corps are also members of the local Self Defence Unit (SDU). While this may facilitate the patrolling of some areas, it increases the dangers that the force is politically partisan, particularly if the Peace Corps members are seen to patrol during the day in the name of the Peace Corps and at night in the name of the SDU.

Relations with the police on a regional level have been very good, with support being given to the project by a number of offices. The same does not always apply to the local level, where some believe that the SAP feel threatened by the presence of the Peace

There are some crucial gaps in those involved, notably the IFP and the PAC, while accusations of ANC domination can have enormous repercussions

There was substantial dissatisfaction when some Peace Corps trainees 'failed'

Some believe the SAP feel threatened by the Peace Corps

Some have indicated that their participation will end with the election

Corps. There does need to be greater clarity over the relationship between the Corps and the security forces, as well as the relationship between Peace Accord election officials and the LPC itself.

The LPC is feverishly preparing for the election. It hopes to deploy 360 monitors in the area, and to establish a number of Joint Operations Centres. Intensive monitoring will take place for 10 days around the election.

This must be one of the largest local peace committee monitoring exercises in the area since the Hani funeral. The danger, of course, is election preparations may take up so much effort that insufficient thought will be given to post-election peace development. Some people have indicated that their participation in peace structures will end with the election.

Future alternatives

What does the Boksburg/Benoni experience teach us about the future of LPCs? As the election approaches, debate within peace structures on this issue is crystallising. In late 1992 and early 1993, when the Peace Accord and its structures were much in the news and seemed to be the thin line between order and chaos, the answers appeared to be much clearer than they are now.

There are three competing legs to the debate. The first is the argument that peace structures will be a valuable contribution to the establishment and consolidation of democracy on a local level, and thus should not only continue but should be expanded and strengthened.

Given the near state of collapse of some peace structures and the thin presence on the ground of others, this argument may seem more idealistic than real.

The inability to find appropriate staff replacements for skilled personnel lost to structures like the Independent Electoral Commission and political parties is cause for concern. Unless LPCs have a long term future they are unlikely to attract substantial numbers of new participants.

A second, and diametrically opposing point, suggests that peace structures are essentially creatures of the transition. Once the transition has passed, local peace structures will no longer be needed, particularly given that other structures and representative local

governments will be established to carry out many of their functions.

But this point ignores the very real gains that peace structures have achieved in some areas. While these should not be exaggerated they have often been significant in bringing and keeping the peace.

The crucial point, though, and this is the third leg of the argument, is that the success of peace structures differ markedly at both the regional and local levels. The Boksburg/Benoni experience demonstrates this aptly.

Reinforcing this approach is the expectation that local tensions will not simply be resolved. This will particularly be so with non-participation in the elections by the IFP. Besides, many conflicts are driven by local dynamics which appear to have little to do with the election. Even a period of calm may not eliminate the factors which have prompted violence over the past few years.

LPCs dominated by the ANC, though - as has occurred elsewhere on the East Rand - are in danger of being seen as illegitimate by some parties. In turn, the ANC may become less inclined to participate in peace committees after the election in areas where it has gained strong control over local government, issues, authorities and the security apparatus.

Indeed, the axis of participation may swing to the IFP, the DP and the National Party who might view the committees as useful channels through which to express grievances.

Of course, a central question in relation to the future of peace committees lies in their funding. Funding will be a political decision made by the new government, but, since some committees are funded by local business or overseas sources, as is the Boksburg/Benoni LPC, some will probably continue to exist.

Since some local peace structures preceded the establishment of the Accord, it seems reasonable to assume that some will outlast it. IDA

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Unless LPCs have a long-term future, they are unlikely to attract new participants

Many conflicts are driven by local dynamics that have little to do with the election

Zuma on Violence

By Antoinette Louw
Editor, Indicator SA Conflict Supplement



An interview with **Jacob Zuma**, Deputy Secretary General of the African National Congress, and candidate Premier of KwaZulu/Natal

As KwaZulu/Natal's most likely Premier post-elections, Jacob Zuma will be responsible for tackling the critical problem of violence in the region. *Indicator SA* interviewed Mr Zuma to ascertain how he views the conflict and what he and the ANC intend doing about it.

There has been intimidation around the election process. What is the ANC doing about this and what will be done on election day?

The multi-party negotiating teams agreed that the international monitors would have to be increased. There was a decision to establish a National Peace Keeping Force. That force is under training and will be deployed very soon.

We in Natal are making the necessary pleas for the increase of monitors and also for the larger part of the NPKF to be deployed here. Added to that we are having discussions with the IFP. It was agreed that people should be free to vote and there should be no intimidation. Both Dr Mdlalose and myself have met with the chairpersons of the peace structures and have also had the opportunity to address their workshop. We are confident that a lot of work has been done to ensure that at least violence is limited.

Voting has to take place with or without violence because these elections are aimed at finally dealing with all the problems of our country. Once you have a new government with all the legitimacy, you will be in a position to begin to use the law enforcement agencies to deal with violence.

Some time ago it was reported that Inkatha was unhappy about the deployment of the NPKF in KwaZulu. Is that still the case?

Well I don't know. There have been a lot of things that many parties are not happy about. I think what counts in any democratic situation is the broad consensus. If the IFP is not happy with the NPKF here that will be noted, but that does not mean it is not going to be deployed.

If the IFP do not participate in the elections, the process and the results may not have their recognition. If they decide to join at a late stage, the process may not be judged free and fair, as they will have had little time for campaigning. What is your opinion and what effects might these scenarios have on violence levels?

It would be unfortunate if the IFP does not participate, because it is not in keeping with what I have understood the IFP to be, all along. One of the cardinal objectives of the IFP was to give liberation to the oppressed people. It does not make sense that when the opportunity comes, because of constitutional technicalities, to say don't use your chance. If they don't participate in this election it automatically means they will not participate in the drawing up of a final constitution. If they have got views to put across, I think it's important to be part of the system. That's what democracy is about all over the world.

A cardinal objective of the IFP was the liberation of the oppressed. It does not make sense now to discourage voting

The IFP must respect the decision of the majority. We are not going to allow a minority view to become a veto

We will certainly find ways of disarming society

The IFP has preached over the years the peaceful way of resolving issues and the adherence to democratic principles. I want to believe that that is going to prevail. It must let the people make their free choice, and it is important that once the outcome comes, whether the IFP participated or not, it must respect the decision of the majority. I think this will prevail. I don't think we are going to allow a situation where the minority view becomes a veto. That's not democracy, that is dictatorship.

The National Party government could not reduce violence levels in this region. Why do you think this was, and how is the ANC going to address this problem?

The entire policing system in South Africa has been based on the notion that the police force is there to protect the government. The policing was partisan. There was the belief that in order to break the resistance which was growing every year, it was important to introduce violence.

We are all guilty of saying 'This is a no-go area'

Violence is managed, manipulated. We have argued that there is a third hand. That's precisely the reason why we have not been able to uproot violence in Natal. Even if the ANC and IFP reach good agreements, that hand destabilises it. You can't reach peace, because apartheid structures were put there to generate violence in order to suppress people. Added to that, you have rightwing elements, AWB, who are in the police force, who are now like an unguided missile.

But once you have a new government you get rid of all those elements, and introduce a new type of policing. I am certain all the agreements that have been undertaken between the two organisations, for the first time, will be implemented vigorously. We will be able to handle it as soon as we have a new authority.

What will a regional ANC government do to ensure effective, impartial policing?

The law enforcement agencies that are operational lack legitimacy. They are also involved in violence and they cannot in any way begin to address the issue. In a new situation, you need a kind of policing system that will be community based. Given how the communities are armed as a result of the legacies of apartheid, that's one issue we'll have to deal with. We will certainly find ways of disarming society and that must go together with a new system of policing.

What does the ANC intend to do about the KwaZulu Police and SAP Internal Stability Unit, given their unpopularity?

As soon as you have a new administration every police and law enforcement agency will have to be looked at. You cannot leave the old policing agencies unattended to. The leaders and officials of the SAP, fortunately, have agreed they need retraining. So all those will be looked at and a thorough and rigorous retraining will be undertaken.

At the local level, it seems there are chiefs in some cases, warlords in others and groups of youths who have control over certain resources. How can you ensure that this will not happen under a new government?

Unfortunately, the way the homelands were designed was to use the chiefs to control. Chiefs are an important layer to protect the system. So we'll explain all the decisions that have been taken and try to put them in place. We know it's going to be difficult to do so, but once you have a new authority, then you've got to have a new blanket principle to handle those areas.

What about the situation where the ANC or IFP monopolises certain public amenities like schools or stadiums. How will you stop this from happening?

We have agreed in our meetings that facilities should be allowed to everybody. In practice, all organisations tended to say, this is our area, or a no-go area, and I think we are all guilty of that. As soon as we have a new set up, that is going to be ruthlessly dealt with. You cannot make communities suffer as a result of political differences. A government here is not going to be one of ANC members and supporters, but a government for the whole province. Everybody must feel, 'I'm a citizen of this province, I'm protected, I'm enjoying all my basic rights'. It will be our golden principle to ensure that every citizen here is free and has no restrictions whatsoever.

What is the future of the Self Protection and the Self Defence Units in this region?

The National Peace Accord had made a provision that you could establish the Neighborhood Watch or protection units. That time has ended. Once you've got a new South Africa, with a new administration, new law enforcement agencies, there is absolutely no need for any SDUs. To defend ourselves from what? I think that chapter has ended.

Many communities are divided into ANC and IFP zones. How would you remove these divisions which cause a lot of violence, and how will you boost political tolerance?

It's not wholly true that IFP and ANC people

Once there are new law enforcement agencies, there is absolutely no need for SDUs

are only seen in sections. There are areas where they are mixed. What has become bad is this intolerance which reached a point where if people disagree with you they kill you. I think it's an animal, barbaric attitude which must be stemmed and uprooted. We will have to deal with that very ruthlessly. I don't think we will talk of a new South Africa where killing a person has become a simple matter like drinking a cup of tea. We will do everything to ensure that people must learn to live in harmony - that holding a different political view is not a crime. Our organisations believe in free political activity. It's just a question of implementing that. Any person in the ANC who doesn't follow that is breaking ANC policy, and must be dealt with.

Once we've got a new situation where there is no third hand, we'll be able to deal with that once and for all. It needs just a short shock treatment of this question by all organisations. The problem at the moment is that because of the complexity of violence, organisations, much as they believe in these policies, tend not to act. That's wrong. Once you've got a new authority, there will be measures taken if organisations do not act.

Will peace meetings still be important after the elections?

Definitely. We have to continue even after the election.

How will you ensure that these meetings will have the desired effect, which many previous meetings have failed to achieve?

I wouldn't say they didn't have the desired effect. When I was involved in the peace here, violence went down. I think it's going to be critical for us to continue. We can't stop the meetings, and stop discovering problems and making people learn to work together. The process must go on. Employ the international monitors which have helped a great deal. I think their being present has helped in some cases to lessen the violence. This indicates that if we had more measures, we could contain it and control it until we've got a better government to uproot it totally.

How will the ANC ensure that development and reconstruction are carried out impartially and that violence does not develop around the resources provided?

We think South Africa has been destroyed. It needs to be reconstructed, and we have prioritised areas. The lack of housing - there is absolutely no need for people to be living in shacks. It becomes a fertile area to generate violence, even non-political violence. Education has been designed in this country

to keep particular sections of this community permanently subservient. It has to be addressed. We have got to deal with addition of schools and renovation of schools, we have got to deal with the content of education.

Another part of the reconstruction that we've got to deal with particularly in Natal, is the property which has been devastated by violence. I believe that as long as we have not dealt with those houses which were destroyed, one will not have dealt with the violence. Not a single person is going to sit with no home when he knows his home was destroyed by those kinds of people. The spirit of revenge is tempting. I think people who support us have got to help us to address that question. This will have to be addressed very specifically as a measure to deal with violence.

How would an ANC government deal with rightwing elements declaring areas like Newcastle, for example, a volkstaat?

It is an extremely provocative action which is not going to be tolerated. We won't tolerate people who are worse than racist. They can express it, talk about it, discharge their emotions, but once they wield weapons and they kill people... You cannot allow anarchy. They've got the right to voice their views about how they feel about the volkstaat. They could place it on the agenda of negotiation. They can only be left by the National Party government to occupy cities. Not in the new government. I think that must be very clear.

As the possible future premier of this region, what is the biggest challenge which you face in dealing with violence?

The culture of violence in this region. The biggest thing to deal with is bringing peace and stability among people here. To me that is critical. Then work towards creation of job opportunities. Deal with the question of housing. Violence which used to be here before political violence, faction fighting, was a product of land hunger. If peace and stability is not there, it's going to be difficult to implement all our good ideas.

I think as soon as we take over, you have to look at the policing and law enforcement agencies very seriously and the criminal justice system. We need to have a situation where all citizens of this province feel secure. All sectors, business, churches, political institutions, and others, have got to work together to find a solution. It is critical. I want this before the end of the first five years of the government of provincial unity. We must be able to deal with this, because if we don't, there's a problem. **IP/A**

Intolerance has reached barbaric levels and must be dealt with ruthlessly

The declaration of a volkstaat would be an extremely provocative action, which is not going to be tolerated

Before political violence, there was faction-fighting which was a product of land hunger

A Recipe for PEACE

By Peter Smith
Inkatha Freedom Party Information Centre

Defusing the violence so deeply embedded in our society demands a determined and multi-pronged approach. An inclusive political settlement is essential, and so are more effective policing, joint peace initiatives, political tolerance, surrendering of arms, and in the longer term, democratic education, overhauling the justice and prisons systems and redressing socio-economic ills.

If the new constitution lacks legitimacy, it is virtually axiomatic that efforts to nurture peace will be severely compromised

That achieving peace is a necessary precondition to a genuinely tolerant democracy need hardly be emphasised, given the tragically vast death toll in internecine violence to date.

To move forward, however, into a transition premised on retaining Section 29 of the Internal Security Act is a testament to both failed negotiations and to the belief in having to use repressive measures to contain an anticipated increase in pre and post-electoral violence.

Moreover, the manner by which the Transitional Executive Council was very reluctantly compelled to reevaluate its position on this repressive legislation inspires anything but confidence in the longevity of what could still turn out to be a very short-lived Prague Spring.

A political settlement based upon the highest possible level of national inclusivity is thus clearly the starting point from which to tackle the problem of politically-motivated violence. After all, the constitution has a major bearing on the exercise of political power, which is itself the central dynamic behind the violence.

If this is not achieved, and if the new constitution lacks legitimacy with a vital

proportion of the population, then it is virtually axiomatic that efforts to nurture peace will be severely compromised.

This is not to suggest that possible rightwing violence in itself necessitates capitulating to demands for a volkstaat. Though mere speculation, it is more than likely that the *modus operandus* of the negotiation process itself hardened attitudes, and that had the style of negotiations been more inclusive and less overtly bellicose, the rightwing might have felt sufficiently at ease to accept a federal constitution instead of a volkstaat.

Frankly, this might still be the only means of bringing the rightwing into a settlement. Only if this fails should state sanctions be considered.

Even if negotiations do in fact succeed in creating national consensus on the form of state, this can in no way result in the immediate eradication of violence, which is so deeply embedded in our society that it will probably take many years for the wounds to heal and for reconciliation to succeed.

Pre-election

Pre-election violence is the most immediate concern, especially in KwaZulu/Natal, which

is characterised by a long list of negative attributes that will tax peace brokers to the full: a long-standing culture of violence; severe political antagonism; deeply divided communities; no-go areas; ready availability of arms and ammunition; private armies; hit squads, etc.

On top of these, we are faced with competition for scarce resources, poverty, crime, unemployment and a host of social ills which together create a volatile mixture easily ignited with political sparks.

What can be done to defuse this? In the immediate short term, the socio-economic factors will have to be ignored. Indeed, attention will have to be given almost exclusively to two elements: adequate security and a political willingness to build peace.

The former is not without difficulty, however. Policing is already viewed as highly partisan, as is the South African Defence Force's peace-keeping efforts. Furthermore, there is only a very remote possibility that the National Peace-Keeping Force can be deployed here successfully.

This body does not reflect the make-up of the region's population, does not reflect its political players, is altogether too small a force, and is probably functionally inept. Incompetence and political partiality will be the inevitable outcome of its deployment, along with a raising of political temperatures.

The security forces on their own cannot solve the problem because violence is a political rather than a security problem. The major thrust of working towards peace must, therefore, come from the political parties. Only if this is successful can the security forces be usefully deployed, as a back-up and reinforcement to the political process.

Joint initiatives

Without rehashing the myriad causes of political violence, and assuming a constitutional settlement is found, I believe the following areas need to be tackled immediately. First and foremost is that the leaders of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC) participate in joint initiatives.

This should start at the top, with Presidents Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela addressing joint peace rallies throughout the region. It should be followed by regional and local leaders doing likewise. Vitally, these initiatives must not be allowed to flounder.

Joint agreements at the community level covering areas of dispute must be encouraged and must be reinforced by regional and national leadership. Retrogressive steps must be tackled immediately and communities must not be allowed to revert to their divided past.

Secondly, parties must commit themselves to free political activity. This is obviously easier said than done, and might therefore be premised upon further joint initiatives. For instance, parties might agree to their opponents holding rallies in a list of specified contested areas, perhaps on a one-for-one basis.

They might agree to their opponents canvassing in specific areas, under the aegis of joint and neutral monitoring. They might agree to branch formation on the same basis. In all instances, it must be made very clear that the 'host' party is encouraging the process - regional or local leaders of the 'host' parties might well be invited guests at such rallies, canvassing etc.

Thirdly, a method will have to be found to tackle the vexing issue of armed formations and the availability of arms. The problem is partly a function of violence (and the concomitant belief in the need for adequate self defence), but it is also a cause of the violence.

Defusing the political temperature via the above steps should assist at one level, but it is vital that disarming also takes place. Arms caches must therefore be surrendered, and the severest penalties applied for infringements of the law.

These approaches towards building peace cannot be initiated individually, or if there is not a demonstrable political will on both sides to see them through to their logical conclusion: recognition of each other's legitimacy as role players and thus tolerance of opposing political beliefs.

While this has occasionally succeeded at the local level - most notably in Mpumalanga - these isolated success stories are no substitute for a thorough regional initiative. Mpumalanga may be a role model, but it cannot bring peace to the region. We need Mpumalanga to be repeated countless times, in the large urban townships down to remote rural kraals.

With the best political will in the world one cannot expect totally peaceful elections, if by this term one includes the period of electioneering before polling day. But with a consensus-based settlement in place, violence

Incompetence and political impartiality will be the inevitable outcome of the deployment of the National Peace-Keeping Force, along with a raising of political temperatures

Violence is a political rather than a security problem

Agreements at community level must be reinforced by regional and national leadership

An election is but part of the democratic process

There is nothing inevitable about our society making a successful transition to democracy

The most pressing difficulty in building peace lies in creating agreement on the rules of the game

can perhaps be contained to levels sufficient to render the elections 'adequately' fair and acceptable to all political parties.

Post-election

As for the post-election period, the constitutional caveat is even more valid. An election foisted on the region which rejects the constitution would be a sure recipe for far worse calamity than KwaZulu/Natal has suffered to date. Without doubt, one cannot conceive of reducing violence in such circumstances, and I will therefore assume as a starting point that the election and constitution have the required legitimacy.

No post-election government can afford not to place peace and reconciliation very high on the agenda. This commitment could be made concrete in various ways. One political dimension could be that the government expressly devotes resources towards building democracy over possibly a considerable period of time.

An election is but a part of the democratic process, and there is a huge need to educate people for democracy by inculcating democratic values and norms of behaviour throughout all levels of society. Civic education, perhaps modelled in part on the United States model, could be a very constructive supplement to this within the education system.

From a policing perspective, it is clearly vital that the police are viewed as legitimate, and that community-police relations are strengthened so that the police are perceived as protectors of the people, and communities are perceived by the police as cooperative and willing helpers in the fight against crime. It is therefore crucial that policing be depoliticised and that it be responsive to local communities and their needs.

The judicial and prisons systems, too, need an overhaul for at present they are unable to cope with the pressures exerted upon them. The result is that criminals appear to believe that they have *carte blanche* to do as they wish, knowing full well that their chances of

escaping justice are high enough to risk a life of crime.

Redressing the people's socio-economic plight would make another major contribution towards peace. Unemployment, lost hope, homelessness and other myriad ills inherited from both our apartheid past and the inter-organisational violence must be addressed if expectations (reasonable or otherwise) are not to act as a catalyst for discontent. Discontent, translated into populist anger, could serve to deligitimise the transition, and threaten the ascendancy of centrist politics which alone can unite the people.

National unity

Though a teleological view of the transition - democracy necessarily following apartheid - is tempting to many observers, we should realise that there is nothing inevitable about our society making a successful transition to democracy, and more important, to a lasting democracy. For every positive indicator of change there is a negative counterpart.

For all that we address our socio-economic plight through redressing the legacy of the past, for all that we improve policing, or whatever, we should note that in the final analysis, the majority of people in poor or oppressed societies are not necessarily violent people, no matter that they seek to redress their poverty and oppression.

Apartheid may well have comprised institutionalised violence on a vast scale but, unfortunately, the antidote has also been one of violence, and of such a nature that dealing with its political dimension is central to securing long term peace.

We face the same 80:20 political:security principle that applies to so many other hot spots around the globe - thus a necessary return to my opening caveat. Our prime objective, and possibly the most pressing difficulty ahead of us in building peace, lies in creating national unity on the rules of the game in which politics is to be played out in future. Without this peace will remain elusive. **IP/A**

Conflicts of Interest

OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN KWAZULU/NATAL FROM 1989 - 1993

By Antoinette Louw

Researcher, Centre for Social and Development Studies

In communities crippled by violence, the expectation that elections and a new government will bring peace is high. Fulfilling this expectation, along with many others which will inspire people to the cast their votes, will be vital for stability in South Africa.

Of all the promises which a future government makes, finding long-term solutions to ending the violence will be the most challenging. Meeting this challenge will be especially daunting in KwaZulu/Natal where the conflict is endemic, sustained and, disturbingly, has permeated throughout the region.

This spread has gained momentum since 1992, which raises important questions about the effectiveness of the peace process, the commitment of political leaders to this process, and the control which leaders have over their supporters. These in turn have grave implications for the prospects of free and fair elections.

In the face of these sobering trends, according to two measures developed by the Conflict Trends in Natal project, an encouraging tendency is that the violence decreased in intensity last year. While this trend has not been analysed, it may point to improved policing and to the increased presence of international monitors since late 1992.

This article will use information from the Conflict Trends in Natal database - a joint project of the University of Natal's Centre for Social and Development Studies, the Human Sciences Research Council and Indicator SA - to explore the increase of violence in 1993 and changes in the levels of intensity, particularly in areas outside the Durban-Pietermaritzburg metropolitan region.

1993: Most violent year

Since the KwaZulu/Natal conflict began in the mid-1980s, the greatest number of deaths was recorded in 1990. Last year, however, 361 more people died than in 1990, with fatalities soaring to 2 145.

Since 1992 there have been consistently more than 100 violent events per month, with numbers increasing steadily throughout 1993 (Figure 1). The sustained nature of the conflict is distinct and can be compared with the more erratic trends in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area (Figure 2).

The conflict is endemic, sustained and, disturbingly, has permeated throughout the region





Figure 1:
Monthly frequency of violent
and peaceful events in
KwaZulu/Natal: 1989 - 1993

Figure 2:
Number of deaths in KwaZulu/Natal and PWV in 1993




Changes in conflict levels in KwaZulu/Natal do not correlate as closely with events of national importance as in the PWV. The assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993 and the announcement of the election date in July that year were followed by surges of violence in the PWV, while in KwaZulu/Natal violence levels were not affected as obviously.

This illustrates the endemic nature of the conflict in KwaZulu/Natal, which in most areas has become a power struggle between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress. Reports of leadership rivalries within groups continue, as do outbreaks of faction fights with strong political overtones, and the assassinations of political party organisers. Solutions to this conflict will depend largely on local initiatives, especially as conflict spreads across the region.

Solutions to the conflict will depend largely on local initiatives

Figure 3: Proportion of events in sub-regions in which lethal weapons were used: 1990 - 1993



Changes in intensity

The intensity of conflict has been assessed in various ways - mostly by measuring the number of deaths per violent event and types of weapons used - using the Conflict Trends database. The following measures suggest an intensification in the conflict:

In 90% of all events, conflict continues to be dealt with through violent rather than peaceful means. The proportion of protest events has not increased since restrictions on political activity were lifted (Figure 1).

A trend which persists is the increasing use of lethal weapons, such as firearms, bombs and a combination of types. This points to the prevalence and accessibility of dangerous weapons, which has increased most dramatically in recent years in the Zululand and South sub-regions (Figure 3).

There was an increase in the intensity of violence in 1993, with deaths occurring in over 60% of events (Figure 4). It is worth noting that this intensification is the result of a rise in the number of events in which only one person was killed, while the occurrence of two or more deaths per event remained constant. While the conflict is increasingly characterised by fatalities, fewer people are dying in each event.

Changes in intensity in 1993 also occurred with respect to events in which large numbers of people were killed or injured (Figure 5). While in 1992 there was an increase in the proportion of events in which five or more people were killed, this trend ended in 1993.

Figures also indicate a distinct decrease in the proportion of massacres (events in which ten or more people are killed or injured) since 1990. The popular perception, in the light of recent attacks such as the Creighton massacre in February, is that these events are increasing.

Massacres are among the few types of violence-related incidents which still reach the front pages of our newspapers. The Conflict Trends data thus suggests that large numbers of people are not being killed in single events of violence, on the scale of previous years.

Shifts in violence

Formal and informal urban settlements around Durban and Pietermaritzburg have historically been the scene of most violence in the region. But deaths in the North-West

region have doubled from 1992 to 1993, and equally disturbing trends apply in the Zululand and South regions (Figure 6).

Although by far the most people died in the Durban region in 1993, the proportion of deaths here as a total of the whole of KwaZulu/Natal has dropped markedly since 1989 (Figure 7). In the Midlands fatalities have decreased steadily since 1991. Last year deaths in this sub-region accounted for only 14% of the total as opposed to 35% in 1990.

A survey of fatalities in magisterial districts also illustrates how the conflict has spread. In 1989 deaths had occurred in only 22 of the 65 magisterial districts in the whole of Natal and KwaZulu; by the end of 1993, at least one person had died in 54 of these districts.

Districts in focus

Trends in the sub-regions will be reviewed briefly by focusing on those magisterial districts which accounted for the largest proportion of deaths (Map).

□ Durban

Fatalities in the Durban sub-region have declined as a proportion of the total region (Figure 7). The most significant decline occurred in the Umbumbulu magisterial district in which 36% of all deaths in the Durban region occurred in 1992. In 1993 this figure dropped to 24%. In the Umlazi district proportions also dropped slightly over this period.

Violence in both these areas occurred between Inkatha and ANC strongholds which divide the communities. In Inanda fatality levels soared from only 2% in 1992 to 24% last year.


Intense violence in Bhambayi is responsible for this district having the second highest number of deaths, or 189, of all magisterial districts in KwaZulu/Natal in 1993. The breakdown of joint monitoring efforts, which brought peace to this tiny settlement for one month, caused fatalities to increase towards the end of 1993. Extreme tensions between the community and the SAP Internal Stability Unit added to the list of casualties.

□ Midlands

The proportion of deaths which this sub-region contributed to the KwaZulu/Natal has, like the Durban region, dropped since 1989 (Figure 7).

The magisterial districts of Pietermaritzburg and Vulindlela, which in the past were racked by violence, accounted for the same

Selected Magisterial Boundaries in KwaZulu/Natal



proportion of deaths in the Midlands last year as the outlying district of Ixopo (15%). Since 1989, Ixopo had accounted for no more than 3% of Midlands deaths.

In 1991 when violence raged in the Richmond area, there were fears that the battle between the ANC and Inkatha would spread to Ixopo, and by 1993 these fears had assumed a grim reality. A feature of the violence in Ixopo is the well-organised attacks on IFP leaders which caused violence to flare up in September 1993 (Natal Focus, Human Rights Commission, Sep 1993).


□ South

The proportion of deaths which this sub-region contributed to KwaZulu/Natal dropped from a high of 17% in 1990 to 10% in 1992. But last year levels again increased to 15% (Figure 7). The South Coast area has been the scene of devastating violence since conflict erupted in 1990.

Sources monitoring the South Coast attribute the violence to various factors: a complete breakdown of law and order; gang warfare;

The proportion of deaths in the Midlands and Durban regions have dropped markedly

Figure 4: Proportion of events in which people were killed in KwaZulu/Natal: 1989 - 1993



The North-West is the only sub-region where the intensity of violence increased in 1993, according to the numbers killed or injured per event

political power struggles between the ANC and IFP; and rivalry between two ANC groups (Natal Focus, HRC, Nov 1993). With more people dying in the Ezingolweni magisterial district in 1993 than in any other district in KwaZulu/Natal, the situation remains critical.

North-West

Until 1992 this region experienced little violence compared with the other sub-regions in KwaZulu/Natal. This trend ended suddenly with the doubling of fatalities between 1992 and 1993, with the death-toll in 1993 reaching the same level as that in the traditionally violent South and Midlands regions (Figure 6).

Zululand

The number of people dying in Zululand as a proportion of the whole of KwaZulu/Natal increased dramatically from only 6% in 1990 to 21% in last year - the second most deaths after the Durban sub-region (Figure 7).

Reports of violence in this sub-region focus on the intolerance of political groups towards free political activity. Reports condemning the actions of the KwaZulu Police also abound: since the arrest of four policemen in Esikhawini, violence has decreased (Natal Focus, HRC, Nov 1993).

The Ongoye magisterial district, which includes the township of Esikhawini, was the

site of the most deaths in 1993 (26% of the total in Zululand). Violence also escalated recently in the township of Sundumbili, near Mandini, in the magisterial district of Inkanyezi. This district, along with that of Lower Umfolozi, accounted for 18% of fatalities in the Zululand sub-region last year.

Although the proportion of deaths in the Okhahlamba magisterial district, where Wembezi is situated, dropped from 55% of the North-West's total in 1992 to 30% last year, this proportion remains high.

The violence here has its roots in a taxi conflict which has become a war over political and commercial power. The territorial division of Estcourt's Central Business District (a unique situation in the KwaZulu/Natal conflict) and Wembezi township into ANC and IFP zones has exacerbated the conflict.


In the magisterial district of Emnambithi, which incorporates Ezakheni, deaths increased from 20% in 1992 to 35% of all deaths in North-West last year. Violence between the ANC and IFP escalated as a result of the territorial division of the township. This meant Inkatha supporters had to pass through an ANC stronghold to reach public transport, and many came under attack.

Violence in KwaZulu/Natal has been explained in various ways, (Capturing the Event, Indicator Issue Focus, 1992). But the most salient trend referred to here, namely the escalation of violence in areas outside the Durban-Pietermaritzburg metropolis, has not been analysed in as much depth.

Lawlessness

Possible reasons for this must be considered.

Figure 5: Proportion of deaths and injuries per event in KwaZulu/Natal: 1989 - 1993






Figure 6: Fatalities in the sub-regions of Natal/KwaZulu: 1989 - 1993


The Peace Accord signed in 1991 has not contained violence as was hoped, and in areas where policing is still not adequate, such as parts of the South Coast and North Coast, law and order has broken down completely.

Two additional considerations relate to the movement of people within the region, and to political activity:

- The numbers of refugees and displacees from violence over the years runs into thousands. Conflict has arisen when these people either move into new communities or try to return to their homes. This, along with migration of people for economic reasons, puts extra pressure on scarce resources, creating the potential for violent conflict. Examples of this situation are events in Shakaville near Stanger, and the Port Shepstone area.

- Party political activity increased in KwaZulu/Natal in 1990 when political organisations were unbanned and the state of emergency lifted. The subsequent conflict was one of the reasons cited for the increase in violence in that year (*Capturing the Event*, Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992). With the elections set for April 1994, efforts to win over and secure political support have intensified. Levels of political tolerance throughout the country are extremely low. Added to this fundamental problem are those characteristic of the KwaZulu/Natal conflict: the strict territorial divisions of communities into IFP and ANC zones; the restrictions on free political activity, which often means a political group controls access to public venues; and allegations of forced recruitment drives.

Figure 7: Proportion of deaths occurring in the sub-regions in each year: 1989 - 1993



Under these conditions tensions and power struggles between the IFP and ANC will rise, particularly in areas where potential for support still exists.

Even if the elections are free and fair, it is unlikely that the installation of a new government alone will ease these tensions, particularly if some political groups do not endorse the process. Fostering political tolerance will be the major task of the new government, along with effective peace initiatives.

The recipe for peace also means a review of the criminal justice system and policing, which have failed to convict the vast majority of perpetrators of 'political' violence. Socio-economic development and job-creation will alleviate the often violent struggles over limited resources. Reducing the quantity and accessibility of dangerous weapons is also a priority. **IPDA**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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What Sexwale Says

By Karen Mac Gregor
Editor, Indicator SA

Tokyo Sexwale, Premier-to-be of the PWV, intends taking firm action against those planning violence and disruption. **Indicator SA** interviewed Mr Sexwale on violence, placing on the record his views about conflict and what he and the ANC intend doing about it.

We do not believe the SADF to be a major factor in the violence or creating tension

The ANC is the organisation suffering the most intimidation

Which aspects of violence in the PWV do you think are the most serious?

I don't think the PWV is intrinsically different from the rest of the country. But this is South Africa's heartland, so a large chunk of conflict has taken place here. It's an urban area, a seat of government and political organisations across the spectrum are well represented. The conflict reflects this mosaic.

The critical thing is creating a free and fair climate for elections. Firstly, this means controlling hostels - focal points from which violence emanates. Some have become paramilitary barracks. There are many where the police cannot go for fear of being shot at.

Secondly, there are hidden pockets of rightwingers. They are vocally predominant here, but in numbers are better represented in other parts of the Transvaal, in farming communities. They want Pretoria as the capital of a volkstaat, so we have a problem in that regard.

Thirdly, we have the police, and particularly the Internal Stability Unit (ISU). We succeeded in pulling the ISU out of the East Rand after a lot of quarrelling with the government and senior police officers. Afterwards, there was an immediate drop in the number of deaths. That is an achievement.

Fourthly, we have problems with certain informal settlements, especially those which are Inkatha inclined, which play the same role as the hostels.

Fifthly, we have crime masquerading as politics. Ordinary criminals who claim to be ANC members when in trouble. Sixth, we have ordinary crime, which is very high because of socio-economic factors.

Then there are the faceless killers - the Balaclava Brigade. People who fire at homes, beerhalls or political meetings, throw

grenades at funerals and mow people down in the street.

I must also comment on the small but existing criminal and *agent provocateur* elements within Self Defence Units (SDUs), because they belong to us. SDUs are not criminal or violent bodies, they are the last line of defence of the people. They are there for self-protection.

The state machinery has infiltrated them. I don't think this is engineered in the top structures of the police force, but among the leadership of certain police stations. They infiltrate SDUs, cause shooting and turn comrades against one another.

The South African Defence Force is not, at least for the next few months, perceived as a major threat. That is why we welcomed the SADF into the East Rand when the ISU withdrew. We do not believe the army to be a factor in terms of creating violence or increasing tension.

Which are the other critical areas? Those agents of violence aligned to organisations trying to stymie the electoral process. People with a civil war mentality.

What has the ANC done to deal with voter intimidation, and what are its plans post-election?

When a battle starts, the first victim is always the truth. We are the organisation suffering the most intimidation. The biggest intimidatory factor is the government and certain parts of the security forces.

That's why we've reached agreement with the Independent Electoral Commission that the police are not to be anywhere near the polling booths. We insisted that polling stations be called voting stations, because if we say polling stations it sounds like police stations, and people may not go there.

The second line of intimidation is farmers. Farmers have been keeping our people captive on their land. We can't go in, we can't do voter education, we can't consult people there. And you've got domestic workers: she's being told stories by her madam, and she's worried about going out to vote. That's intimidation.

Then there is intimidation by people declaring *boerestaate* all over the country. That's the type of intimidation that can prevent an election.

You've got intimidation by members of the IFP, who have decided that an election won't be held. There'll be slaughter if we don't handle this. Nobody will go out to vote. They are planning (mass disruption and violence).

We have another form of intimidation. That of de Klerk moving around, and people feeling, 'we don't want de Klerk to come'. We understand that someone threw a small stone at de Klerk. They were intimidating him. I don't think it was an ANC person. An ANC person would have thrown a brick. I believe it was an NP *agent provocateur*, doing it so that de Klerk can appear aggrieved.

But we have said to our people, demonstrate at a distance. We don't want our people to prevent de Klerk, because we are going to defeat him, and we want the defeat to be decisive. He must come into the Government of National Unity as a defeated person.

You can't take Hitler to go and canvass in Tel Aviv or in a Polish ghetto. Forty-six years of the harshest rule. And then all of a sudden you go out and you want to canvass for voters among the people. They hate you.

We couldn't go to Bophuthatswana. That's intimidation. De Klerk can go to Ulundi. We can't go to Ulundi. So if you talk about intimidation, we know what it means.

What about post-election?

I think post-election the threat of violence will come from those people and organisations that have, firstly, been fighting the holding of elections or, secondly, have been thoroughly defeated and want to find reasons to camouflage their democratic defeat.

How do we deal with that? We are integrating the security forces right now. We are reaching out to the police, reaching out to the army. It's an army of this country, after all. Once we have achieved unity of the security forces, and we have a Government of National Unity, and investments pour in, these factors will play down the violence.

What about jobs and the deployment of youth? And ANC strategies for ending conflict.

The essence of the struggle has been about resources. The majority was never allowed into the centre stage of the economy. So you have to address political tensions and socio-economic problems.

Job creation becomes critical. With the majority of the population young, it is important to have schemes that will draw them in. Public works is critical, because it will immediately create more than two million jobs. Then we can address housing, medical care and other social services.

What are you and the ANC going to do about hostels, SDUs and the ISU.

Hostels first. Our policy is one of upgrading these centres. Bringing back people their dignity and making hostels home. Make their lives more worthwhile, get them to bring their families with them. Give them strength, but also make them vulnerable, so that when they start violence against other people in the townships they are also vulnerable.

So hostels will be kept?

Not as they are. The call of our people is to bring them down, but we must realise that breaking them down will increase the conflict. Where do those people go? Hostels need to be upgraded, to be made into places where people can live a worthwhile life. Right now they are dungeons.

The SDUs. Nobody wants to be in a Self Defence Unit. These are students and men who stay up at night instead of working. They carry rifles, pangas, waiting for attackers. Ordinary citizens take up weapons, axes, boiling water, all sorts of things. They wait, they dig trenches, do anything to slow down those who come in fast cars and shoot at people's homes. And of course they buy weapons instead of buying furniture.

They don't want to be in SDUs. It's an obligation. In many areas, there is no longer talk about SDUs because the level of violence has dropped. Where you have a reduction in violence these structures dissolve on their own. That's the future of SDUs.

However, there are people who loved being in the SDUs. They would now like to join the police force or the army. In white areas, instead of staying up yourself, you pay someone else to do it. Self Defence Units in white areas are Rapid Response, patrols, Chubb Security.



We understand that someone threw a small stone at de Klerk. An ANC person would have thrown a brick

You can't take Hitler to go and canvass in Tel Aviv

Where you have a reduction in violence, the SDU structures dissolve of their own

If it is in the national interest to force peace on certain people, we'll do that

I don't believe the intelligence forces are unable to find Apla or rightwing perpetrators

The ISU. I don't see a future for it. I see the creation of a new police force as a community based policy. The ISU is going to be swallowed, it's going to be restructured.

What about non-acceptance of the police or army by certain parts of the community in the future, for example the IFP?

We understand why some have problems with the Defence Force. You see the SADF has been misused and abused in Angola and Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and so on. But people are resigning themselves to these things in the main.

What can we do about people who do not accept this? We cannot force it down their throats, though we may have to in the end. Peace can only be held by force. Peace is fought for. If it's in the national interest and the interests of peace and national security for us to force peace on certain people, we'll do that. But we'll do it right.

The constitution must be right, the democratic process must be respectable. We are talking about a country which is part of the world which believes in the solution of problems first by peaceful means.

That's why we are bending over backwards. We went to prostrate ourselves in front of Buthelezi. Mandela said: 'I'll kneel and beg in front of anybody to say let's have peace in this country.' I follow Mandela in that crusade, but I'll add: 'I'll go down on my knees and beg. I'll do everything. But I'll get up if they don't listen.'

Do you see a future role for peace structures?

Well, the East Rand is peaceful now because of a major initiative. The ANC and de Klerk declared it a disaster area, instead of an unrest area, because that means utilising laws to suppress human rights, and now we have peace.

But peace structures are happening within a situation of conflict. We are fighting against time. We are fighting against the balaclava forces. We had peace in the Vaal, and then the East Rand exploded. We addressed the East Rand, and the West Rand started. People are transporting violence.

Getting rid of the Balaclava Brigade will be difficult. But it is not impossible, because the intelligence forces of this country are advanced. Right now they are sitting with budgets but I don't know what they're doing. I don't believe they are unable to know what's happening at Ulundi. (Or that they

cannot find Apla or rightwing perpetrators.)

How are you going to handle the rightwing? The declaration of these boerestaate?

We engage the rightwing in negotiations. That's the first approach. It's also the last approach before we roll up our shirtsleeves. Engage them in negotiations and debate, accept the correctness of some of their positions and expose the fallacy of some of their arguments. That's our strength.

Don't let them break away from negotiations, even at the cost of being maligned by some of our people, who say we are being too soft. I am beginning to believe it is enough. More concessions now will be at the cost of disuniting our own people.

Having said that, the rightwing are dangerous people. So we must be prepared. We have said to them that we will consider their boerestaat, but they must also consider going to the elections. We will give them time in Parliament to discuss their boerestaat. They can start creating a volksraad right now.

But if push comes to shove, you have to unite the people behind a president, behind a flag, behind an army, to defend democracy, the new parliament, the new constitution.

That's where we'll arm people. I don't think we want to hesitate about that. We will use the security forces. We will open the armouries of this country to ordinary people, as has been done in many other countries.

But the essence of the whole thing is to hold an election. To have legitimacy, to have democracy, legitimate institutions and defence forces. When you are accepted in the eyes of the people, the rightwing will think twice before it moves.

It is the police who are arresting the rightwing, because they do not like what the rightwing is doing. They will continue to do so. We are not prepared to give the rightwing any excuse to rally anybody within the security forces or from the army.

They thought we would come with strategies that would antagonise the army and the police, and would give them both forces on a silver platter. These people know now in the depths of their hearts that they can only create a farce in their camouflage uniforms, storming negotiations, trying to occupy the monument. They are doing all sorts of desperate picnic things. If they end it there I think it is good for this country. If they start throwing grenades it will be bad for them. ~~UPA~~

Figuring out the Problem

OVERVIEW OF PWV CONFLICT FROM 1990 - 1993

*By Anthea Ki & Anthony Minnaar
Centre for Conflict Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council*

Government reforms which opened up political activity in February of 1990, heightened expectations about the end to white minority rule and an easing of violence. Hopes have been dashed by a sharp rise in levels of conflict in the Transvaal - and it seems likely that violence will continue for a long time after the elections.

The levels of conflict, in terms of protest action and incidents of collective violence, in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Triangle (PWV) warrants closer analysis as this region has consistently shown high trends of violence and death since mid-1990.

Protests are defined as incidents where action is directed against organisations, institutions or state structures in defiance of their policies through the use of public activities such as demonstrations and marches.

Acts of violence, on the other hand, constitute the use of any activity involving violence directed at another group that is present, either real or symbolic. For example, the destruction of property seen to belong to a rival political organisation or a state structure.

The PWV region is often considered as a single entity in relation to other regions nationwide. However, since the focus of this article is solely the PWV region, five different sub-regions have been identified based on arbitrary judgements and geographical allowances: East Rand, Central Rand, West Rand, South-Vaal and Pretoria/Midrand (see Map).

Data problems pre-1990

The information presented here is derived from a database at the Centre for Conflict Analysis at the Human Sciences Research Council which records, among other things, unrest-related incidents or events linked to politically-motivated actions.

The database has been developed by the researchers in the Centre, and contains data on collective action events from 1970 to 1993. The State of Emergency prevented the dissemination of unrest-related incidents by the public media from 1985 to 1989 inclusive, and left the database incomplete for this period.

Furthermore, during the Emergency there existed no independent unrest monitoring agencies in the PWV: most present-day agencies only came into existence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The monitoring situation on the Reef was in direct contrast to KwaZulu/Natal, where independent agencies with their own networks not dependent upon media reporting, operated through the 1980s.

Another problem on the Reef is the fact that the monitoring agencies and other such non-governmental organizations do not share the same co-operative attitude as their coastal counterparts. No monitoring network has been established in the PWV.


February 1990 ushered in the opening of political activity as previously banned organizations were permitted to publicly display their sentiments and loyalties. A negative aspect of open political activity is the politicisation of issues that were previously non-political.

Reform also brought about heightened expectations about the end to white minority rule and violence. But where a downward swing in the level of political conflict and unrest-related violence was expected, an upswing in fact materialised.

The PWV region has consistently shown high trends of violence and death since mid-1990

A negative aspect of open political activity is the politicisation of issues that were previously non-political

Graph 1: Total number of conflict incidents in the PWV region, 1990 - August 1993



A plausible explanation could be the beginning of the 'Reef Township War' between the residents of hostels and townships, and among others such as criminal gangs, increased levels of political intolerance and the establishment of 'no-go' areas through territorial hegemony.

The Jeppe and Selby hostels present a microcosm of the conflict problem

Violence soars

Conflict activity shows an exceptional rise in 1992 for all the sub-regions with the exception of the West Rand (Graph 1). The Central Rand especially, with the highest total of 473 incidents, showed an increase of 133% from 1991. It includes Alexandra, where there has been ongoing high levels of conflict between residents of the KwaMadala Hostel complex and township inhabitants.

This situation was complicated by Zulu-speaking hostel residents expelling large numbers of non-Zulu speaking hostel residents from the hostel. In retaliation local ANC comrades specifically targeted Zulu-speaking residents in Alexandra for intimidation and attack.

Many Zulu residents were forced to flee and sought refuge in the local hostel. In time they drove out residents living in houses close to the hostel complex, and took them over. In essence Alexandra (and to a degree areas in Thokoza and Katlehong on the East Rand) experienced two sets of refugees who for the past three years have been in conflict with each other.

The Central Rand also includes Johannesburg with its hostels. The Jeppe and Selby hostels present a microcosm of the conflict problem. One largely has Zulu-speaking residents and is dominated by the Inkatha Freedom Party, while the other largely has Xhosa-speaking migrant workers and there is a strong union and African National Congress presence.


Unlike most townships, where the conflict is mostly along township-hostel lines, this conflict is between two hostels, albeit along political lines. A good deal of the violent political conflict in central Johannesburg occurred during attacks between the residents of these two hostels. The situation became so serious that in August 1992, the residents resolved to initiate peace.

Other districts where violence worsened were the East Rand with an 84% increase in 1992, from 145 incidents to 266; the South-Vaal with 200% , from 53 to 160 incidents; and Pretoria-Midrand with a mere 4% more.

The low percentage increase for the Pretoria-Midrand region can be ascribed to a number of factors. Firstly, the Pretoria townships of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville are dominated by two parties, the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), who have not come into open political conflict with each other.

The situation has been further defused by the fact that Mamelodi is considered an ANC township while Atteridgeville is more strongly PAC. Both townships have only a small number of hostels. These hostels house very few Zulu-speaking residents and, unlike those the East Rand, are not a natural recruiting and mobilising base for the IFP.

Most of the incidents of protest or violence occurring in these two townships revolve around school boycotts and to a lesser extent taxi transport problems. However, Ivory Park



in Midrand experienced a number of conflict incidents during an ongoing taxi 'war' between two rival taxi organisations competing for passengers and routes.

Tembisa provided the largest number of incidents of protest and violence for the Pretoria-Midrand region largely because of the conflict between Vusimuzi Hostel supporters of the IFP and the ANC-aligned township inhabitants. The situation was complicated by the activities of a criminal gang called the Toasters, who had sought refuge in the Vusimuzi Hostel and often launched raids on residents from there.

The level of activity on the West Rand decreased by 15% in 1992, but the number of incidents remained higher than Pretoria-Midrand.

East Rand explosion


The frequency of conflict for 1990 appears high for Central Rand in relation to 1991, but this is difficult to determine as 1989 statistics are not available. Frequencies for the remaining areas suggest that the level of activity for 1990 was not in fact abnormally high: East Rand, Pretoria-Midrand and West Rand show a slight decrease, while in South-Vaal an equally slight increase occurred.

The frequencies for 1993, taking into consideration that the data is valid up to the end of August, suggest there will be a decline in the total for the year. However, a preliminary analysis of the death tolls - intensity of the violence - for the last four months of last year indicate that in the PWV the trends of violence and conflict will remain as high as in 1992.

This would be consistent with the fact that October 1993 witnessed a renewed explosion of the fighting in the undeclared 'East Rand Civil War' between ANC comrades/local Self Defence Units (SDUs) and hostel residents. This conflict is also tied in to transport problems: many hostel residents had their transport to work disrupted by continual sabotage of railway lines. It is suspected that attacks on taxis in the area have been in retaliation for the disruption of rail transport.

The violence on the East Rand spilled over into other areas. In Mamelodi, for instance, there was a sharp increase in taxi-related conflicts linked to East Rand taxi organisations. Though the South African Defence Force was sent into Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus to stabilise the situation, this occurred too late in the year to

Graph 2: Number of conflict events in the PWV Central region, 1990 - August 1993



significantly influence the 1993 trends.

The levels of conflict activity for the Central and East Rands for 1993 are relatively close at 165 and 141 events respectively. The figure for Central Rand (Graph 2) is significantly lower than the previous year, although the same can be said for the East Rand (Graph 3). But as mentioned, this district experienced a significant upsurge in activity in mid-1993.


Massacres and SDUs

Massacres also formed an integral part of this increase. Three East Rand areas - Katlehong, Thokoza, and Phola Park - appeared on the top ten list of areas with the highest occurrences of massacres in the Transvaal.

The establishment of 'no-go areas' by SDUs through night-time patrols, blockades, intimidation, extortion, death threats and murder has left the communities isolated and helpless. The activities of the SDUs fed into the high levels of violence in certain townships.

The activities of the Self Defence Units fed into the high levels of violence in certain townships

Graph 3: Number of conflict events in the PWV East Rand region, 1990 - August 1993



There appears to have been a deliberate attempt by the warring parties to inject ethnicity into the East Rand conflict.

Another consequence of activities by SDUs/criminal gangs is the lack of credibility the South African Police, already unpopular, has experienced. The actions of such SDUs have led to the SAP being unwilling or incapable of entering or patrolling 'no-go' areas, especially at night. Control is totally in the hands of local SDUs, some of which are there to protect their communities but others have been subverted by criminals for economic gain.

Attacks on East Rand train commuters by groups intent on political mobilisation and disrupting their opponents has contributed towards destabilisation and the renewal of violence. Taxi violence has also been rampant in Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, where numerous splinter taxi associations vied for control of the lucrative taxi routes, and many became politicised.

The politicisation of ethnicity in issues such as the local peace accords agreed upon by the Jeppe and Selby hostels, which involved Zulu-speaking and Xhosa-speaking residents respectively, was an attempt to set aside the political factor in the conflict and overcome ethnic differences.

But the deliberate execution of seven Zulu-speaking men on 18 July 1993 near the Scaw Metals Hostel in Germiston, and the vengeful killing of 13 Xhosa-speaking residents there a month later, appears to have been a deliberate ploy by the warring parties to inject ethnicity into the conflict on the East Rand. Both massacres emphasise the wanton killing through the politicisation of ethnicity and fears of 'ethnic cleansing' of one antagonistic group by another.

Causes

West Rand regions reported a vacillating trend, with different areas experiencing high levels of activity in various years. Krugersdorp, for example, shows a high in 1991 while the Oberholzer district suffered the same level - 33 incidents - the previous year and Roodepoort, 30 incidents in 1992.

The general impression of the West Rand is that of an 'unstable calm'. Activities can increase and decrease by the same margin from year to year, but compared to other sub-regions the West Rand's activity level is low. The average maximum number of events a year is 24.

The considerable distance between the West and East Rands may be a factor in influencing the spread and effect of political activity from one district to another. The

location of Thokoza (including Phola Park), Katlehong and Vosloorus suggests that close proximity contributes towards high levels of violence (see map).

The South-Vaal sub-region clearly indicates the high levels of conflict activity occurring in 1992. This is partly due to the effects of the Boipatong Massacre of 17 June 1992, which resulted in the communities withdrawing and isolating themselves in a defensive attitude from the outside.

Predictably, following the massacre there was renewed and heightened SDU activity, particularly in Sebokeng and in Orange Farm, both of which came to be dominated by Units. However, subsequently some of the violence revolved around rival SDUs attacking each other. The problem appeared to be the refusal of certain SDUs to accept discipline from the national level, or accountability to their local communities.

Another factor involved in the high levels of conflict activity in the PWV region has been the growth of the informal squatter settlements. This has resulted in conflict between landowners and squatters, and in some instances between hostel residents, as happened in the Swanieville massacre of 12 May 1991, when Kagiso Hostel residents attacked the squatters in the Swanieville shack settlement.

A further dimension has been protests by residents of neighbouring areas, who take exception to 'legal squatters' building shacks on a rented piece of land, as happened in Zevenfontein and Noordhoek. Conflict over scarce land for settlement purposes will increasingly be an important factor in the levels of conflict activity in the PWV region.

Conclusion

Given the dynamics described and the trends exhibited in the graphs, it is highly likely that the high levels of conflict activity in the PWV region will at the very least continue and be sustained at present levels. There is a strong likelihood that in some sub-regions, in particular the East Rand townships of Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, there could be a rise in already high levels.

Conflict figures are unlikely to go down after elections since the underlying dynamics of political violence in the PWV will not be eliminated or even substantially addressed merely because the elections have occurred. It would be fairly safe to predict that violence and conflict in the PWV will continue for a considerable period after the elections. **IPQA**

The general impression of the West Rand is that of an 'unstable calm'

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