VOLUME ELEVEN NUMBER TWO AUTUMN 1994

INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA



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

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EDITORIAL

No doubt South Africa's transition to democracy would have been more orderly were it not conducted at breakneck speed. No doubt there are many obstacles on the road ahead, the most widely anticipated being violence, economic ills and unmet black expectations.

But there was always a chance, had transition lingered longer, that achieving a democratically elected government would not have happened at all. Certainly violence would have continued.

What has been truly remarkable about the last four years, often missed in the blur of change and fear of unknown destinations, is how far South Africa has travelled. Millions of people may not yet have decent homes, but the foundations for greater equity have been laid.

There will be no easy walk to peace. Violence will persist and will probably get worse. But a Government of National Unity will be more determined to begin solving the causes of conflict than any of its predecessors. And one source of conflict at least, the struggle for political power, will have been won by the majority of South Africans.

Many of the preconditions for lasting democracy are still to be met, and there are no guarantees that they will be. But a great deal of work has been done towards building a democratic society. Representative structures and mechanisms are in place, and the political paradigm has moved from one of confrontation to an extraordinary (if not total) degree of consensus.

Now democratic elections are upon us, and the roller-coaster ride of hope and despair - of on-off negotiations, in-or-out of elections - is almost at an end. Soon South Africans will be able to get on with the job of constructing a country that is, at the very least, better for most.

This issue of *Indicator SA* contains the first of the Conflict Supplements which will accompany each of our quarterly reports this year. The Supplements will contain data on conflict trends, both in Natal and the Transvaal, analysis of violence and peace initiatives, interviews and case studies.

This should not be seen as a gloomy view on our part of the possible permanence of conflict, but as an attempt to help begin relieving it through rational, non-partisan thought, analysis and understanding.

The same principle will be applied by *Indicator SA*, as it always has been, to other social, political, economic and developmental issues that arise in the course of South Africa's transformation.

Karen Mac Gregor
Editor

INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA
Quarterly Report

AUTUMN 1994

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

Party Choice according to Race



Source: Johnson RW, L Schlemmer, J Seymour and C Marais. *Launching Democracy: A National Survey on Issues relevant to a Free and Fair Election. Third Report: October-November 1993*. Launching Democracy project is sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council (MarkData and Information Update)



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

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Party Tricks

By Robert Schrire
Department of Politics, University of Cape Town

Unlike general elections elsewhere in the world, the South African election has not been dominated by parties competing for votes but by the debate between participants and non-participants. The greater drama is between those who accept the rules of the new electoral game and those who do not - and the degree to which violence and the threat of violence influences the outcomes.

In a democracy, a general election is a routine political event which represents a part, albeit a significant one, of the ongoing political activity of measuring the strength of the various interests in society. Continuities, rather than dramatic breaks with the past, characterise the process.

The South African general elections of 1994 are anything but part of a normal routine. Indeed, they represent a fundamental break from the past.

It is therefore not surprising that the campaign has been marked by a clash between the future and the present, by conflicts between parties who have accepted the imperatives of the future and those wedded to the past.

As a result, the campaign has been dominated not by the context between the parties competing for votes and support, but between participants and the non-participants: the African National Congress (ANC) and National Party (NP) on the one hand and the now defunct Freedom Alliance (FA), based upon the white right and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), on the other.

The shape of the future political order, rather than the distribution of power within it, has commanded the dialogue. The political campaign itself has thus been relatively muted.

It is generally perceived that South Africa's first elections will be characterised by 'uhuru' issues of national liberation. As a result the elections represent a 'census' where whites will vote for status quo parties and Africans for the liberation movements, with coloured people and Indians caught in the middle.

This initial impetus is strengthened and reinforced by the national/regional Proportional Representation system, because no-one has any real incentive to build multi-racial coalitions. For example, the NP endangers its white support base if it modifies its policy programme to meet African aspirations, while if the ANC becomes too sensitive to white fears, its loss of black support will outweigh any possible white gains.

The campaign is been marked by a clash between parties who have accepted the imperatives of the future and those wedded to the past

Thus at least four different 'electorates' are participating in the elections: African, white, coloured and Indian. For potential African voters, the most salient issues include: liberation defined in terms of African control over the state in which they are a majority; the containment of violence; and economic progress in terms of improvements in housing, income, employment and health.

For whites, and to a large extent coloured people and Indians, the major concerns are typically conservative: the maintenance of standards, law and order, the protection of economic interests and the continuation of South Africa's Western orientation.

An important segment, especially Afrikaners, maintains that these interests cannot be secured in a majoritarian democracy but must be sought in a volkstaat. The pace and magnitude of change has been such that many whites do not yet understand the implications of the changes.

The shape of the future political order, rather than the distribution of power within it, has commanded the dialogue

South Africa's two smaller minorities, coloured people and Indians, are reacting to the new pressures with considerable ambiguity. On the one hand they have been victims of many of the NP's apartheid policies, on the other hand they have a deep-seated fear of African domination.

The ANC has deliberately followed a policy of 'creative ambiguity' - to be all things to all men and women

This is bolstered by feelings of apathy and irrelevance as a result of their demographic minority status. In the case of the coloured people living in the Western Cape, this is somewhat contradictory given their regional numerical dominance in a political arrangement which will give regional governments considerable powers.

The issues

As an 'uhuru' election, detailed policy issues are of limited importance. Policy proposals are only a very rough guide to how parties in power might govern.

PAC strategy has been to emphasise the ends and to largely ignore the possible means to attaining those ends

The ANC has the enormous advantage of being the symbol of African nationalism and can reasonably claim to have made the major contribution to the liberation struggle. Its definition of the issues and its consequent policy proposals are designed to reinforce these advantages.

Its strategy has been twofold: to focus on the issues which are of major concern to its historical constituency, including land reform, job creation and redistribution; and to convince the world that it has the expertise and competence to govern by producing detailed policy documents on issues such as health, education, mining and foreign policy.

At the same time it has deliberately followed a policy of 'creative ambiguity' in order not to lock itself into specific policies, and thus to be all things to all men and women. The campaign slogan 'working together for jobs, peace and freedom' captures the thrust of this strategy.

The NP has emerged as the voice of the centre

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), in contrast, has filled the radicap gap left partly open by ANC strategy. It has moved to out-bid its rival with pledges to redistribute 'every grain of soil of Azania' to Africans.

PAC strategy has been to emphasise the ends of policy - redistribution, Africanist political control, a strong centralised state - and to largely ignore the possible means of attaining those ends. Its campaign slogan summarises this strategy: 'It's the PAC for true liberation'.

The Democratic Party has been over-shadowed

The NP has emerged as the voice of the centre: strong on law and order; an advocate of the private sector and the market system; and a policy of gradual reform in areas such as affirmative action and land ownership.

'Justice, peace and prosperity for all' is its campaign slogan. The NP has based its campaign on the claim that it is the party that reformed apartheid, and combines the instincts of the reformer with the expertise and experience derived from participation in the government.

The Democratic Party (DP) has been over-shadowed by the big two. It has centred its strategy on being the 'Mr Clean' of South African politics. It has claimed to have both expertise and integrity. At the same time the DP has had to try to convince the electorate that a vote for a small party will not be wasted.

With the exception of the PAC, then, all the party proposals focus on the same issues and shape a broad consensus around the role of the market, the need for economic reconstruction, and for law and order. In practice, of course, it will be the different emphases which will shape the nature of our future political conflicts.

The campaigns

❑ *The ANC*

To the surprise of many, the ANC has run a highly effective and well-organised campaign. Well-financed and with the assistance of a team of professional American campaign experts, the party has been able to communicate its message to a large part of its constituency.

The ANC enjoys the incalculable advantage of being perceived as the legitimate vehicle of African political aspirations. The party thus begun its campaign with a large segment of the potential electorate favourably disposed towards it.

The campaign itself has been highly visible. The basic thrust of the approach has been to mount travelling 'road shows' during which ANC leaders, including Nelson Mandela, have encouraged people to tell leaders about the issues that concern them. The ANC leadership has thus appeared non-authoritarian and open to persuasion.

An extensive media campaign has been mounted to capture public attention. The spate of policy douments, although not always well-received by the business community, was more important than the details of the proposals.

The campaign has also benefited significantly from the new position of the SABC. While it would be an exaggeration to claim that the public media has favoured the ANC, the very existence of the new SABC board contributed to increased and fairer coverage. The dynamism of the ANC

campaign has forced television and radio to devote considerable attention to it.

Of all the parties at the early stage of the campaign, only the ANC captured large segments of public opinion. Instead of squandering its initial advantages, as many observers anticipated, it built upon them.

The personality of its greatest human asset, Nelson Mandela, has been skilfully exploited. Despite his age he has fulfilled an almost superhuman programme. He has come to personify to many, moderation and pragmatism married to loyalty to ANC traditions. The campaign has been greatly strengthened by the emergence of powerful 'second order' personalities such as Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and Thomazile Botha.

The ANC has also been effective in building a unified team with a coherent message. Fears that activists like Winnie Mandela and Peter Mokaba would undermine the campaign through acts of self-indulgence or rhetorical overkill have not thus far not materialised.

In general, then, the ANC has run a well-organised campaign. Its workers have been effective and motivated. It is the only party contesting the elections which has a strong presence both nationally and in all of the nine provinces.

One of the party's greatest challenges is the result of its very success: over-confidence. With the polls showing a landslide, there will be the danger of complacency and a slackening of effort.

❑ *The National Party*

The NP campaign thus far has not lived up to its past 'mean machine' reputation. However, it is possible that the party will do significantly better than the present 15% poll predictions. The NP retains the core of its former highly professional organisation and has been well-funded.

The party continues to enjoy several advantages. In FW de Klerk it has a highly effective leader who is far more popular than the party he leads. His challenge, unmet thus far, is to convert that support into votes for his party.

One challenge facing the NP is to retain its white, coloured and Indian support while winning votes within the African community. Thus far, this seems to have paralysed the party. It has not run its usual 'kragdadigheid' campaign, in part to avoid antagonising potential black voters, but this restraint has

Paul Valesco - SouthLight

contributed to loss of support within its traditional white constituency.

The party's difficulty in penetrating the African community is partly due to intimidation, but the major factor is its historical responsibility for apartheid. Thus NP claims of being reformist, by for example getting rid of influx control, sound hollow and simply remind voters that the party was originally responsible for the policy.

The ANC, to the surprise of many, has run a highly effective and well-organised campaign

Put simply, the NP is and is seen to be the historical party of white interests, now with the added support of the 'have' sections of the coloured and Indian communities. This recipe is simply not very appealing to Africans.

Attacks on South African Communist Party (SACP) influence within the ANC are probably not very productive: they frighten white and middle-class coloureds who are already opposed to the ANC but have very little credibility with African voters.

Another reason for the present weakness of the NP is its difficulty in adjusting to its changed status and position. In the past, one of the reasons for the party's electoral success was its ability to control the instruments of the state, especially the public media, dispense patronage and in general project itself as a credible and self-confident force.

The present weakness of the NP is related to its difficulty in adjusting to its changed status and position

Bereft of its effective control over the state, the party is floundering. Its former supporters and activists are confused and demoralised. Thus the NP has become overly dependent upon FW de Klerk to win support. Unlike the ANC, it does not have a strong team of second order leaders.

Without a strong policy platform or ideological thrust, the NP has also found it difficult to build lasting alliances with other

Paradoxically, of all the parties the NP has the best prospects of electoral growth

parties. It thus has no allies to strengthen it in areas where it is weak. Paradoxically, however, of all the parties the NP has the best prospects of electoral growth, and could yet mobilise considerable potential support.

Firstly, if it changes tactics and adopts a strong law and order approach, it may increase its support in the coloured and Indian communities. Secondly, a boycott of the elections by some of parties could create a large new source of voters. Finally, the NP will benefit greatly from strategic voting: voters whose first preference is for a party like the DP will, often reluctantly, support the NP to ensure that the anti-ANC forces are not divided and thus 'wasted'.

❑ *The Boycotters*

Non-participation by the IFP and certain rightwing groups raises two major issues: how will their supporters react to the call for a boycott; and will the level of violence increase so dramatically that the elections results are meaningless or, worse, that an election will not be held?

In the short-term the the white right is more dangerous as a potential cause of political violence, in the longer term the Zulu nationalists

There are two major potential sources of political violence: the white right and the IFP-supporting Zulu nationalists. In the short-term the former are more dangerous, in the longer term the latter.

The dangers from the white right are twofold. First, they have the capacity to wage a low-intensity campaign of violence and sabotage which could make a relatively free election campaign in the Orange Free State and parts of the Transvaal impossible.

Secondly, they lack the capacity to overthrow the state or launch a sustained civil war, but could place profound stress on the loyalty of the existing state, especially its security and military services. Should these dangers of the white right be contained up to the elections, the threat of violence will decline as whites adjust to new political realities.

The prospects for this election ending the crises of the past are not very promising

The dangers from dissident IFP supporters are more serious. Violence should be containable during the election period. It seems probable that the KwaZulu administration will cooperate with the South African authorities, given the influence of seconded officials and concerns about future prospects and pensions.

This should be adequate to ensure that the region does not collapse into chaos. In the longer term, however, dissident Zulus, unlike the white right, may continue to oppose vigorously the policies and institutions of the new Government.

❑ *The Smaller Parties*

The DP is not a major factor in the elections. Despite its credible claims to competence and integrity, it is a classic victim of a racially polarised society. Lacking the resources to project its policies, and without a natural constituency, it will suffer from the 'don't waste your vote' syndrome.

The PAC has more potential for long-term growth than any other party. Its present problems - poor organisation, limited resources and non-charismatic leadership - could change over time. The PAC's present policy is to position itself to remain a significant presence and wait for future disillusionments to emerge which could lead to splits within the ANC and an overall realignment in South African politics.

Final Thoughts

Two dramatic struggles are taking place in South Africa at present: the election campaign between organised parties for control over the government; and the dialogue/conflict between those groups that accept the new rules of the electoral game and those who do not.

It is ironic that the first genuinely democratic election in South Africa's history threatens to be dominated by the actions, and inactions, of those who are not part of the process.

Indeed, the real drama lies outside the mechanics of the campaign and the elections. The one continuity with the past is our almost certain knowledge of the important results. Only the name of the winner is different. And few doubt that the anticipated ANC victory will be as decisive as the NP's past victories.

The critical factor will remain the degree to which violence and the threat of violence influences the outcomes. This includes not only the possibilities for a relatively free and fair election, but also the inheritance obtained by the victor.

If the worst possible outcome is an election which fails to end the debate about power and legitimacy, the alternative - a government which is not permitted to act democratically - is only marginally less disastrous. And at present, the prospects for this election ending the crises of the past are not very promising. IPA

TEC-nical Transition

By Colin Eglin
Co-Chairman of the Transitional Executive Council
and Chief Constitutional Negotiator for the Democratic Party

Controversy has surrounded the Transitional Executive Council since its inception five months ago. It has been accused of secrecy, bumbling and ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, argues Colin Eglin, the TEC has played a crucial role in maintaining political stability and facilitating the delicate and dangerous process of transition to democracy.

During the constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park in 1993, the Multi-Party Negotiation Council took two decisions that were to change the course of South Africa's history. The one was to adopt a new democratic constitution for our country. The other was that there was to be a nationwide election on April 27, 1994, to usher in that new constitution.

These decisions were traumatic, for they set both the mechanism and the date for bringing to an end the era of minority rule in South Africa.

They spelled out the reality that 84 years after the founding of the Union of South Africa and 34 years after the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress were banned, South Africa's political decision-making was to be put in the hands of a central government and nine provincial governments elected on a one-person-one-vote basis.

Two questions arose immediately in the minds of the negotiators at the World Trade Centre. The first was: 'If the elections are going to be free and fair, what government or agency or body should be put in charge of managing and supervising the electoral process?'

The answer was unanimous: 'Not the present government'. Because it was unrepresentative, and in the opinion of many South Africans illegitimate, and because it was one of the competitors in the election. It could not be both a player and a referee.

The decision was that the election had to be managed and supervised by an independent body that would have the confidence of all the participants. This body was to be known as the Independent Electoral Commission.

The government could not supervise the electoral process because it was unrepresentative and, in the opinion of many, illegitimate

The second question had to do with the levelling of the political playing fields: 'How can one ensure that the National Party government will not use the powers and resources of the state to influence voters in favour of the National Party in the election?' And the related problem: 'How can one ensure that various parties participating in the election will not be prejudiced by the fact that they are not part of government?'

The answer to these two questions led to the establishment of a unique constitutional structure, the Transitional Executive Council.

TEC functions

According to the TEC Act, the Council's objective was to facilitate and promote, in conjunction with all legislative and executive structures at all levels of government, the transition to democracy in South Africa. It was to do this by:

Creating and promoting a climate for free political participation by trying to:

- eliminate obstacles to legitimate political activities; eliminating any form of intimidation affecting the transition; ensuring that all parties are free to canvass, hold meetings and have access to all voters; ensuring the full participation of women in transition; ensuring that no government or administration exercises its powers in any way that advantages or prejudices any party;

The TEC's objective is to facilitate the transition to democracy



Courtesy of Natal Newspapers

- Creating and promoting conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections;
- Exercising the powers and performing such duties conferred or imposed on it by any other law.

The TEC can direct the government to act in any field which has a bearing on the election or the transition to a new democratic order

The TEC consists of representatives of 20 of the parties and administrations which participated in the negotiations at the World Trade Centre. The Conservative Party, the Bophuthatswana Government, the KwaZulu Government, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the PAC stayed out of the Council.

The parties and administrations involved in the TEC had to commit themselves in writing to the objectives of the Council, in respect of themselves as well as all organisations under their control. They also had to undertake to be bound by and to implement Council directives, and to renounce violence as a means of achieving political objectives.

Powers

While the TEC has no direct executive power, it has wide-ranging powers to monitor the activities of the government, to call ministers and the government to account, and to direct the government to act in any field which has a bearing on the election or the transition to a new democratic order.

The TEC can order the government not to proceed with any legislation that it believes will have an adverse effect

In the legislative field it is required to scrutinise all legislation proposed by the government which has a bearing on its objectives. The TEC can order the government not to proceed with any legislation that it believes will have an adverse effect on transition to democracy. Added to this, parties that are not in government are obliged to inform the TEC of any activities that may have a bearing on 'levelling the playing fields'. The Council can also order parties or the government not to act on decisions which it believes are likely to affect its objectives adversely.

Sub-councils

There are seven sub-councils which help the TEC perform its functions, each consisting of six to eight members drawn from participating governments, administrations and parties. Three of the sub-councils deal security matters: Law and Order, Security and Stability; Intelligence; and Defence. The remaining four cover Local Government, Regional Affairs and Traditional Authorities; Finance; the Status of Women; and Foreign Affairs.

While these sub-councils operate under the general supervision of the TEC they have their own statutory powers, duties and functions. They have the authority to:

- Request and obtain any information and documents necessary to perform their functions and achieve the Council's objectives;
- Initiate or participate in negotiations relating to their functions and objectives;
- Appoint a person or body to investigate any matter relating to their functions.

The sub-councils at times deal with the matters referred to them by the TEC. At other times they act on their own authority and initiative.

While all of them have to attend to the 'levelling of the political playing field', the role of the sub-councils in ensuring that the transition to a new democratic order is smooth and orderly has become increasingly important. Let us look for a moment at the responsibilities and functions of the seven sub-councils.

❑ ***Law and Order, Stability and Security***

In general its function is to supervise the consolidation of the various policing agencies into an effective peace-keeping and crime prevention force. It has to establish a national inspectorate to monitor and investigate all policing agencies and propose of ways of improving police efficiency, improving community cooperation and enabling the police to prevent political violence, and introduce a Code of Conduct binding on all policing agencies. The sub-council has to be consulted before any Minister or the State President can declare any unrest area.

❑ ***Defence***

Its task is to monitor and supervise all defence related matters, and to oversee the planning, preparation and training of a future national defence force. This includes providing areas for the assembly of the various armed forces that will form that new integrated defence force. The sub-council is also required to establish a Joint Military Command Council consisting of the Commanders of the various armed forces, and a National Peace-Keeping Force to maintain peace and public order in South Africa.

❑ ***Intelligence***

Its job is also essentially one of monitoring, supervising and coordinating, in this case of the various intelligence structures operating in South Africa. The main instrument for achieving this is the new Joint Coordinating Intelligence Committee comprised of representatives from all of the security services. This sub-council cooperates closely with those on Law and Order, and on Defence.

❑ ***The Status of Women***

This group is required not only to ensure that women exercise their rights fully at the election, but also that women have full and equal participation at national, regional and local levels in the free and democratic order that is to follow. The sub-council's work comprises research, monitoring and liaising with employer and employee organisations, the IEC, state departments and policy-making forums. It also scrutinises the work of the TEC and all its other sub-councils on matters affecting women.

❑ ***Regional and Local Government and Traditional Authorities***

This sub-council has the considerable task of monitoring and supervising local and regional government during this difficult phase of transition. It must ensure there is no collapse of services or shortfall of finances, and that transition takes place in an orderly, democratic and even-handed way.

The Regional and Local Government and Traditional Authorities sub-council has the considerable task of monitoring and supervising local and regional government during the transition

❑ ***Finance***

This sub-council has far reaching and unique responsibilities. Its task is to not only ensure that the political playing field is levelled, but to draw up the national budget for the 1994-95 financial year and to monitor all financial aspects of the present administration. It also has to approve all senior public service appointments and approve all new financial agreements struck by the Government.

❑ ***Foreign Affairs***

This has mostly to do with ensuring that the new democratic South Africa is well prepared in the field of international affairs. It is charged with achieving consensus on South Africa's international relationships, securing international agreements that will assist with the transition to democracy, and with promoting trade, finance, culture and sporting relations that will benefit the country as a whole.

The financial sub-council has to draw up the national budget for 1994-95



Courtesy of Business Day

It can be argued with some justification that the TEC's achievements have been patchy

Bad press

So much for the mandate of the TEC and its sub-councils. What, if anything, have these transitional structures achieved? It can be argued with some justification that the TEC's achievements have been patchy.

Frankly, this is not surprising when one takes into account the disparate political views represented on the TEC, the logistical problems of staff and accommodation and the novel inter-relationships between the Council, its Management Committee, the seven sub-councils and their numerous sub-structures.

There is no doubt that the TEC has suffered as the result of less than satisfactory public relations, and from the fact that the various parties assuming joint responsibilities on the TEC are simultaneously engaged in a fiercely competitive election campaign.

Added to these difficulties, the TEC has had to devote much of its time to problems created by organisations such as the Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu governments, the IFP and the Afrikaner Volksfront staying out of both the election and the transition processes.

Cabinet ministers and government officials have come to learn that they cannot use the state to advantage the National Party

Achievements

Nevertheless, the achievements of the TEC and its sub-councils have been of great significance for the country in at least three areas. They have:

- Helped to level the playing fields. Cabinet ministers and government officials have come to learn that they cannot use the state to advantage the National Party.
- Locked the parties participating in the TEC into a commitment to cooperate in ensuring free and fair elections and a peaceful transition to democracy.
- Enabled participants from very different political backgrounds to experience both the problems and the practice of co-responsibility in government. This is an important training ground for people who will have to accept joint responsibility in the Government of National Unity that will come into being early in May, and will be responsible for guiding our country's destiny until April 1999.

The TEC has played an important role in maintaining political stability and in facilitating the delicate and dangerous process of transition

The TEC has given attention to trouble spots such as the East Rand townships and KwaZulu/Natal, and wrestled with the problems of Bophuthatswana's refusal to allow free political activity and the subsequent collapse of its government.

It launched the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the Special Electoral Board and the nine Provincial Committees for local government which will function under the Local Government Transition Act.

It monitored the legislation presented to Parliament at the special session in December 1993 and February 1994. The TEC's Sub-Council on Defence, through a new Joint Military Command Council, is supervising the integration of the various military forces into a new National Defence Force.

The sub-council on Foreign Affairs has had discussions on South Africa's future international relations with representatives of bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organisation of African unity, the Commonwealth, and the Economic Commission for Africa. It has also brought together for the first time the representatives of the South African Government and the 'liberation movements' stationed abroad.

Conclusion

The TEC was a daring political concept and a unique constitutional mechanism. One day historians and political analysts will be able to look back and evaluate the role it played during a crucial five months in the history of our nation.

I have no doubt that evaluations and judgments will vary on matters of detail. I also have no doubt they will agree that, despite some shortcomings, the TEC, by imparting an element of multi-party legitimacy to government at a time when the 46-year-old dynasty of the NP government was coming to an end, played an important role in maintaining political stability and in facilitating the delicate and dangerous process of transition from minority rule to non-racial democracy. IPSA

The Burden of Consensus

By Graeme Götz and Lawrence Schlemmer
Human Sciences Research Council

This article is by two members of the Launching Democracy project, an election surveying and monitoring exercise conducted by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and the HSRC. The project covers the PWV, Western Cape and KwaZulu/Natal regions which account for half of South Africa's population. This article reports on electoral conditions in the PWV.

The literature on transitions to democracy the world over suggests that there are three basic criteria for certifying an election 'free and fair': Firstly, inclusivity: all adult citizens, regardless of gender, social station, racial character, or whatever, must be accorded the right to participate.

Secondly, procedural legitimacy: the rules that prescribe fair conduct during the processing of the poll result must be stringently observed. Thirdly, free contestation: all political groupings must be allowed to openly compete for support.

The last criterion is arguably the most important and undeniably the most delicate of the three. It is the most important, because it frames what lies at the very heart of democracy - free choice and the possibility of an indeterminacy of political outcomes.

It is certainly the most delicate, because those charged with adjudicating an election face the almost impossible task of determining beyond which threshold reported instances of intimidation and inducements must be said to have irrevocably compromised the fundamental democratic rights of thought, expression, assembly and association.

Who can tell, with any certainty, exactly when voters become so constrained by external pressures that their franchise no longer reflects the principle of a free, critical choice between equivalent possibilities?

Who is prepared to say that an election is definitely not free and fair because voters' individual expressions of will in the privacy of the polling booth have been pre-determined by a political environment prejudiced against certain options?

These issues are extremely sensitive, but this does not mean that observers of the process should balk at confronting them. Unfortunately, the intractability of the problems posed by 'free contestation' usually means that those responsible for certifying the poll prefer to err on the side of certainty.

Better to declare an election legitimate, flawed though it may have been, than to risk another round in which heightened frustration may lead to an even less credible result. It is all too tempting to turn a blind eye, or explain away, some of the very real restrictions voters face in accessing the political information needed to make an unhindered choice.

In the PWV region three sets of constraints have converged to create a milieu largely adverse to open contestation by political parties.

Consensus politics

One of the primary pressures on voters is the expectation that they conform to the political character of the locality in which they live. Research suggests that those parties which have historically used community based organs of civil society to advance their struggles, today claim the strongest presence at a local level, regardless of their ideology or national policy orientation.

In the eyes of most township residents, civic associations (to which they can appeal for advice on any concern, from lack of access to resources through to domestic problems), street committees (which forward grievances to civics or take action when someone has been attacked or robbed), even churches and burial societies, are not politically neutral entities.

The right of all groupings to openly compete for support is what lies at the very heart of democracy

Those responsible for certifying the poll are tempted to turn a blind eye

The partisanship of community structures imbues whole areas with a definite political identity

When it is apparent that their leadership or membership is clearly aligned to a political party, their efforts on behalf of residents are regarded as being undertaken by that party itself.

This partisanship of important community structures seems to imbue often whole areas with a definite political identity. Standing as proxy for political interests, civics and street committees provide controlling parties with a pervasive presence in every facet of township life.

Residents are thus compelled to associate themselves with a prevailing party ideology, not because of explicit coercion, but because the sheer weight of community consensus fundamentally narrows the field of political choice.

Residents are compelled to associate themselves with a prevailing party ideology because the sheer weight of community consensus

Certainly not every person will succumb to this implicit pressure to conform. Many may quietly transfer their allegiance to other competing forces. But most will find it more rational simply to acquiesce in the face of what publicly appears as a single, homogeneous political community, over which one party holds a monopoly of power.

In the PWV it is almost universally the African National Congress (ANC) that enjoys the benefits of such monopoly, although the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) does seem to exercise control over parts of some townships where it has managed to organise strong community structures.

Parties such as the Democratic Party (DP) and National Party (NP), however, go into the election with a profound disadvantage. Without a history of involvement in community committees, without prominent local members serving on civics and street committees, they have virtually no local profile. They will find it all but impossible to break the symbolic stranglehold of the ANC over most areas.

A few sympathisers may of course be found in virtually every township, but since their very presence is regarded as an offensive ripple of difference in the smooth surface of consensus, any who make themselves known are quickly muscled into silence.

The closure of political spaces is exacerbated by the content of the campaigns of the major parties

A few illustrative incidents of such intimidation, where the implicit expectation that everyone support the same interest has hardened into clear prohibitions on unwelcome new parties, are worth quoting:

- The DP's postering team refused to enter Soweto after posters were repeatedly torn down and their lives threatened.
- The house of a DP member and organiser was reportedly firebombed in Meadowlands, and when DP posters were placed in the window of a spaza shop, the owner was threatened with death and the burning of his business.
- In the same township, Azapo members have been informed that they will be 'dealt with' if they pursue their anti-election campaign.
- The chair of the ANC branch in Kagiso has been charged with threatening to kill an NP organiser in the township.
- Civics in the townships and rural areas surrounding Pietersburg have taken a decision, which they say reflects the will of the people, not to allow what they term 'regime parties' the right to campaign.

Interestingly, the closure of political spaces is exacerbated by the content of the campaigns of the major parties. For the most part, campaigning has not focused on substantive policy issues, meaning that support for any party is less a reflection of conscious decision-making than it is of simple, gut-feeling likes and dislikes.

Campaign messages revolve almost exclusively around the single symbolic reference of past versus future. The ANC and PAC like to evoke the image of their history of struggle, setting themselves up as the parties representing final liberation - 'jobs, peace, freedom' - from the apartheid past as embodied by the National Party. The NP, too, presents itself as the party of the future, having shrugged off its disagreeable past, and it relishes pointing out that the ANC is still tied down by its own 'communist heritage'.

With parties being judged on what they have previously done for or to people, it is not surprising that many believe that to 'fight an election' means to aggressively combat political opponents intent on depriving the liberation movement of the fruits of its struggle.

The common refrain that 'regime orientated' parties need to be barred from getting access to people 'they have always repressed', or from using resources such as halls and schools 'which only the community has paid for', can therefore hardly be unexpected.

No-go areas

Serious though it may be, 'consensus politics' and attendant instances of real intimidation, does not constitute the only or even the most severe constraint on parties' electoral activities. Of far more concern is the phenomenon of rigid no-go areas, hard

political territories seen to 'belong' to openly antagonistic political parties. On the PWV, surprisingly perhaps, these seem to have emerged as a result of processes wholly unrelated to the election.

In Bekkersdal on the West Rand a long-running conflict between the IFP and Azapo, sparked by relatively insignificant incidents late in 1993, has escalated into a full scale war with clearly demarcated enemy territories, access to which by unrecognisable persons is now impossible.

With both the IFP and Azapo boycotting the elections, large parts of the township have simply become off-limits to campaigners from other parties. The Bekkersdal violence has furthermore given impetus to similar dynamics in other parts of the West Rand.

The foundations for this type of open conflict between territorially placed political interests have certainly been laid elsewhere too. In certain townships, residents have been quick to condemn probably quite innocent actions by 'Zulu speakers' from the hostels as evidence of Inkatha's 'violent expansionist policies'.

In turn, the IFP has frequently read community struggles over housing or crime as an implicit assault on their political space.

No-go areas, with IFP and ANC supporting residents squaring off against each other in their respective localities, can develop from the smallest incident. Their effects are crippling politically. Voter education and preparation of polling stations, let alone unhindered campaigning, is clearly impossible in such contexts.

Crime and violence

Just as serious are townships racked by endemic violence, not necessarily of a party-political nature. In Kwa-Thema, ongoing clashes between the school-going youth and the police over the arrest of Cosas members, as well as simmering tensions between rival taxi associations, has fueled an environment in which campaigning, other than a few ANC rallies, has been all but impossible.

The political climate in Tembisa has recently become just as volatile after a series of shoot-outs between warring gangs battling for control of the area. The violence, while criminal in origin, has potentially severe political implications, with many residents expressing concern over the safety of voting.

Even in relatively peaceful Soweto, clashes between factions of a number of taxi associations, coupled with suggestions that the differences may have political overtones, has resulted in heightened political unease.

It is not difficult to see how a scenario of warring taxi associations, with one having aligned itself to the IFP, may become a severe constraint on free political activity, by inhibiting people wishing to travel to campaign meetings and rallies, and increasing the risks of voting on polling day.

Many believe that to 'fight an election' means to aggressively combat political opponents

Conclusion

If free and fair elections are defined, at least in part, as ones where the electorate has had complete access to the available pool of information from which choices can be made, we might feel justifiably distressed over just how legitimate we can declare the results of the up-coming poll.

Of even more concern is the phenomenon of rigid 'no-go' areas

In at least half of Reef townships a climate presently inheres in which it is quite simply impossible for competing parties to convey their messages to potential supporters. Either because public spaces have been deliberately closed off to opposition voices, or because the situation is so volatile that normal campaigning is denied to virtually all groups. A substantial proportion of voters will not have enjoyed the right to consider possible alternatives when the time comes to exercise their franchise.

Just as serious are townships racked by criminal violence

There is a need for drastic measures designed to induce an environment conducive to free political activity. First and foremost, these should involve proactive steps to ensure that political parties are accorded the chance to organise meetings, rallies and campaigns free of disruption. But just as important is a highly visible, large-scale operation aimed at restoring the sense of security of ordinary township residents.

As the Democratic Party campaign director for the PWV suggested in an interview:

> unless something decisive is done now to open up the space for political contestation, to ensure that parties like the DP do not feel completely 'stifled' every time they enter a township, the elections might as well be declared not free and fair today.

In at least half the Reef townships a climate exists in which it is impossible for competing parties to convey their messages to the voters

The Independent Electoral Commission indeed has a difficult task, and an even more difficult decision after the election if its efforts are not successful. IPA

Great White Hope

By Herman Giliomee
Department of Politics, University of Cape Town

The National Party is likely to hang onto the Western Cape after the elections, leaving Afrikaners in control only of the area where they arrived three and a half centuries ago. If coloured people manage to consolidate their representation in NP ranks, writes Herman Giliomee, the non-racial promise of the Cape Colony's 1853 constitution will finally be realised.

The Western Cape and Northern Cape are the only regions dominated by a minority group

The most exciting electoral contest in South Africa is taking place in the Western Cape. Along with the Northern Cape, it is the only region dominated by a minority group. Coloured people comprise 57% of the Western Cape's 3,7 million voters, compared to a black and white share of 23% and 21% respectively.

With voters in the rest of the country locked into 'white' and 'black' parties, the coloured vote is crucial for any party wishing to claim to be non-racial in its popular support.

Coloured people

The election in the Western Cape will be influence by major changes which coloured and black communities have undergone in the past couple of decades. The coloured community has remained largely working class. In 1988/89, 85% had a monthly household income of less than R2 000, against 34% of whites and 97% of blacks.

The Tricameral system brought the coloured community not inconsiderable benefits

Nevertheless, the coloured community has become a largely stabilised, predominantly urban community in which a small nuclear family is the norm. The fertility rate in the community has plummeted from six children per woman in the 1960s to 2,9 in the late 1980s. In Cape Town it is estimated to have been as low as 2,5 last year.

The Tricameral Parliament provided benefits to the coloured community which are not inconsiderable. More than 100 000 houses were built during the last decade, 60 000 of them in the Cape town metropole. Coloured education improved considerably. The number of children in secondary school increased by a third, while successful matriculants doubled.

The effect of these developments was not a radicalisation of the coloured people but a desire to consolidate their gains.

Africans

African people in the region have been caught up in rapid, often chaotic urbanisation since the collapse of influx control in the mid-1980s. Its black population quadrupled from 189 000 in 1981 to more than 800 000 at present.

Between 1983 and 1988 the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) provided 27 000 serviced plots, but no new plots were added because of intense political rivalry between the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), the Western Cape Civic Organisation and others.

As a result some 70 000 black families in Cape Town are presently without access to rudimentary services provided under site-and-service schemes. According to a recent CPA account, 36 534 African families live in formal houses, 51 400 in informal dwellings and 15 861 in backyard structures.

Major divisions about development demands have opened up in the black community. SANCO, whose leaders at the grassroots level are often democratically elected, has pressed hard for an improvement of services in established townships.

WCUSA, dominated by traditional leaders, considers the construction of formal housing a priority. Nevertheless, the ANC manages to straddle these divisions fairly easily.

Whites

Whites, on the other hand, have experienced political continuity. The Western Cape is the only region where the National Party (NP) establishment, with its overlocking leadership in the party, press, church, university and business communities, has not split.

The Conservative Party (CP) has made no serious inroads in the NP's support base, while the Democratic Party (DP) has largely succeeded in retaining the support of English-speaking middle-class whites.

At the end of 1993, the support for both the NP and DP among whites in the Western Cape was greater than their nationwide white support - 47% against 40% for the NP and 15% against 5% for the DP.

Poll findings

In the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (MPD) poll of November 1993, the NP was the first choice of 36% of Western Cape voters, followed by the ANC Alliance will 28%, the DP with 6% and the PAC and rightwing parties with 2% each. The 'do not know' and 'would not vote' categories amounted to 25% of respondents.

The biggest surprise was the NP's substantial lead in the race for coloured support. It had the backing of 45%, followed by the ANC Alliance with 18% and the DP with 4%.

With majorities varying from 2:1 to 3:1, coloured people expressed the view that the NP was better equipped than the ANC to create a climate of peace and reconciliation, enforce law and order, prevent intimidation, be effective rulers, promote economic growth and health care, and provide housing. Coloured support for the ANC was considerably higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Rural ANC supporters tend to have a below average household income, while urban coloured supports tend to have an above average household income.

The poll showed the ANC supported by 78% of Africans against 8% favouring the PAC. Of those who live in formal houses, 71% supported the ANC. The NP drew the backing of 1% of those living in formal houses but did not win the endorsement of a single respondent who lived in a shack. The PAC attracted the support of 11% of those living in formal houses and 5% of shack dwellers. The surprise was the DP attracting the support of 4% of the former and 5% of the latter.

In the February 1994 MPD poll, NP support in response to the question: "For which party are you likely to vote?" was roughly the same as in November (35%). But support for the ANC had dropped to 24%.

The DP now stands at 4%, the PAC at 3% and rightwing parties at 1%, whole those in the uncertain categories total 32%.

Taking into account the responses to this and other questions, the following election result for the Western Cape could be projected during March: NP 51%; ANC 35%; DP 7%; PAC 5%; rightwing 2%.

Significant shifts occurred between the November and March polls (Table 1).

The Western Cape is the only region where the National Party has not split

Table 1: Shifts in Voter Preference Nov 1993 - Feb 1994

	NP	ANC	DP	PAC
November1993				
coloureds	45	18	4	-
whites	47	3	15	-
blacks	1	77	4	8
February 1994				
coloureds	42	16	3	-
whites	54	3	9	-
blacks	1	64	1	13

Campaigns

The election campaign until mid-March was relatively peaceful. The DP was prevented by black students from campaigning at the University of the Western Cape, the Good Hope College in Khayelitsha and the Peninsula Technikon.

ANC supporters tried to disrupt some of the events of President FW de Klerk's 'roadshow' on the West Coast and NP supporters threw stones at an ANC motorcade when Nelson Mandela visited Cape Town on March 20.

The election could still be seriously affected if violence occurs just before or during the polling days, although at the time of writing this did not appear to be likely. In such circumstances, the proportion of whites declaring that they will definitely vote declines from 83% to 58%; that of coloured people from 65% to 47%; and that of blacks from 86% to 74%.

The biggest surprise was the NP's lead in the race for coloured support

There is a well established coloured tradition of apathy or rejection of voting

NP organisers express concern about the willingness to vote among coloured people, upon whom it vitally depends for victory. Only a fifth of coloured people have voted before, and there is a well established tradition of apathy or rejection of voting.

The election campaigns of the various parties got into full swing early in the year. The publication of the election lists appeared to put the NP at a disadvantage, both in terms of the quality of its candidates and the 'population mix' of its lists. Most attention focused on the inclusion of two black squatter leaders who had been embroiled in township faction fighting.

The NP nevertheless pointed out that if it meets its goal of winning at least 55% of the vote, a third of the candidates on its national and regional lists for the Western Cape will be coloured. The party leadership also observed that at present already 45% of its paid-up members are coloured, something which will change the composition of its lists greatly in future.

The NP appears to benefit considerably from the Afrikaans language, which Afrikaners and coloured people share

As in the past, the party's strong point is its organisation. With functions and funds decentralised to the branches, the NP seems to perform much better than the centralised ANC. Unlike the ANC its meetings start on time and are never cancelled.

Whereas the ANC in the African communities relies heavily on trade unions, civics and street committees to influence voters, these structures have limited sway in the coloured community. Like whites, coloureds attach by far the most importance to television and newspapers as sources of political information.

Preferences

The NP appears to benefit considerably from the Afrikaans language, which Afrikaners and coloured people share. A quarter to a third of the readers of the NP-supporting newspapers, *Die Burger* and *Rapport* are coloured.

The coloured community is slowly moving towards the centre-stage of politics

NP organisers declare that the party has not changed its well-tuned canvassing strategy for coloured voters. This is understandable, for coloured people do seem to want similar things to whites. Whereas black people rate jobs, affordable houses and education as the policy or plan they like most in their favoured party, both whites and coloured people mention 'equal opportunities/equal rights'.

There is widespread concern in the coloured community that both the state and private sector employers will give preference to blacks over them in job appointments. When, in October last year, black squatters occupied houses built in Cape Town for coloured people, fears were aggravated that they will suffer under a black government.

The ANC has found the task of keeping both its black and coloured constituencies on board increasingly difficult. It alienated large sections of its coloured constituency by its choice of the controversial Alan Boesak as leader, largely at the behest of Mr Mandela.

Dr Boesak still draws large crowds, but he and other ANC speakers are unable to assuage fears that the ANC reconstruction and development policy are unrealistic and that an ANC-led government will not defend coloured interests.

At the same time, the ANC's black support base has shrunk somewhat. At a meeting with Thabo Mbeki, black community leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the ANC's campaign focus on coloured voters, saying the party was taking its black constituency for granted.

The DP has not had a happy campaign so far. The quality of its candidates is clearly better than its rivals, but the party suffers from the fact that it has no leader like Mr Mandela or Mr de Klerk who can rally support.

The PAC has had great trouble getting its campaign underway. It has serious financial difficulties and some of its leaders are still in detention following the Heidelberg Tavern massacre. Its decision to participate in the election has turned some township youth to the Azanian People's Organisation.

Conclusion

The election campaigns so far have given ground for cautious optimism that democracy can take root - at least in this part of the country.

The coloured community is slowly moving towards the centre-stage of politics and it may not be long before it makes its influence more strongly felt within the region and within parties in which is is now represented.

If so, the non-racial promise of the Cape Colony's constitution of 1853 will finally be realised. IPA

The Wild Card

By Mike Morris
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In KwaZulu/Natal the big issue is whether the election process can be completed with a measure of legitimacy. If the new government is unable to portray the election process as a reasonably legitimate test of the electorate's wishes, it will be utterly hamstrung in attempting to deal with the violence.

The 1990s heralded a sea of change in the form of politics and hence in the nature of political violence. Unbanning the African National Congress, releasing Mandela and negotiating a new constitution broke the previous mould within which politics was cast. The axis shifted from the politics of opposition and confrontation to the politics of negotiation and incorporation.

Whether from the vantage point of the National Party (NP) and the state or the African National Congress (ANC) and the liberation forces, apartheid was predicated upon a politics of total victory and control. At its heart was a politics of violent suppression or overthrow and the political exclusion of the 'enemy'. Small wonder that at the grass roots competition and conflict were played out in the form of violent power struggles over who was defined as the 'enemy'.

However, the onset of negotiations for a new non-racial constitution, inaugurated a dramatically new form of national and local politics which was characterised by the need to seek compromises, be politically inclusive, and replace armed confrontation with political debate and contestation. Within this new political paradigm the right to exist of those previously defined as political enemies is taken for granted. The struggle is rather over how they are included in the new political system.

But inherited historical legacies cast a long shadow over the stage set for the new politics of negotiation. The abrupt turn to these politics unleashed internal tensions and conflicts within the major power blocs, leading to their fragmentation and the continuation of the old forms of confrontation, particularly within localised centres of power seeking to secure territorial dominance.

The abrupt turn to politics of negotiation unleashed internal tensions and conflicts within the major power blocs

In Natal, sub-regional power bases, for example in the Midlands, continue to advocate armed struggle and the overthrow of the enemy, in this case the KwaZulu authorities. On the other side, sub-regional forces within the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) sought to shore up shrinking power bases by deploying open and clandestine violence against ANC-aligned communities.

This combination of fracturing and the continuing political traditions from the past, led to a see-sawing between armed confrontation and negotiations, whether at local peace committee level or at the regional and national levels where negotiation is over the constitution and regional powers.

The turn to negotiations also led to the fracturing of white politics and to internal fissures within state security forces, with further consequences for the level and forms of violence. In Natal, the relationship between Inkatha and the KwaZulu authorities on the one hand, and the NP and central state on the other, has come under increasing strain in constitutional negotiations. The result has been growing uncertainty over the capacity to curb violence, maintain order and control crime.

The turn to negotiations also led to the fracturing of white politics and to internal fissures within state security forces

The major influence in the pre-election period is Inkatha's decision to boycott the elections

Trends in violence

The 1990s have seen the amplification of pre-existing and emergence of new forms of violence. In summary some of the major new features are as follows:

- There is a general increase in violence, spreading from the black residential areas to the countryside.

- Some of this takes the form of anarchic criminal violence taking advantage of political conditions.

- Random attacks on individuals, white and black, by political organisations trying to disrupt the negotiation process.

- In Natal, a shift towards more atomised, targeted and clandestine killings, with increased hit squad activity and revenge killings, some associated with political rivalries and others with more personal localised conflicts.

Everything points to increased violence in the short term, directed both against the election process as well as specific parties

- Violence has started to turn more in on itself in Natal, with an increasing shift from township-squatter conflict to intra squatter conflict, as well as the spread of violence into semi-urban and rural areas.

- Much of the violence has become even more peripheralised, displacing the burden on to the poorest in the remotest urban peripheries and the rural areas.

  This has been associated with an increase in conflict within the ANC and Inkatha as factions compete for control over the same territory.

- The growth of squatter settlements on vacant land within core city areas, as in the case of Cato Manor, or near middle or upper income (white, coloured or Indian) suburbs, has in some cases led to outright hostility between squatters and the established groups.

- Core city squatter communities have been prone to internal power struggles leading to violence over allegiance and control of resources.

Any black person simply going to vote in Inkatha areas will be seen as declaring themselves to be anti-Inkatha

- Home invasions have led to tensions between middle income and squatter groups, with strong racial connotations.

- An upsurge of transport related conflict.

- The involvement of the security forces in the violence is becoming more complex, reflecting the different political tendencies in the society. Old patterns of destabilisation are still present but there is greater acceptance of the need for policing within violence-torn black residential areas.

- The KwaZulu Police still operates with a blatant bias towards Inkatha.

Electoral violence

What are the prospects for violence in the build up to the first democratic elections? The major contextual factors are how parties relate to the constitutional negotiations and whether they include or exclude themselves from the election process. These two factors are a direct source of potential violence and create an environment for violence emanating from other sources.

If all parties were included in the elections there would be a major decrease in violence aimed at disrupting the process. This would not, however, necessarily mean that violence and intimidation aimed at particular parties and their supporters would cease.

The indications in this regard seem to be clear. The white right wing has split and the AWB suffered defeat in the BOP debacle. One would expect this to lead to a decrease in spontaneous general violence emanating from that quarter, although it will not stop that grouping (particularly the AWB) who have elected not to participate in the election, from continuing to perpetrate violence.

But the major influence in the pre-election period is Inkatha's decision to boycott the elections and King Goodwill Zweletini's continuing brinkmanship over the resurrection of a Zulu Kingdom.

Everything therefore points to increased violence in the short term, directed both against the election process as well as specific parties, from those organisations rejecting the new constitution and electing to boycott the elections.

Many rural areas and squatter settlements are controlled by Chiefs or *warlords* demanding the total allegiance of all the inhabitants to their political line. This will mean that people attempting to vote are inviting violence against themselves. Clearly any black person simply going to vote in Inkatha areas will be seen as declaring themselves to be anti-Inkatha (and taken as pro-ANC).

Inkatha will be constrained by the presence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and international observers. The spotlight of the world is sympathetically

focused on these first ever non-racial elections, and there is a lack of sympathy for Inkatha's cause amongst most social and political forces in society. However, Inkatha has painted itself into a corner where very few options other than disruption (and ensuing violence) are open to it.

It is unlikely that those parties participating will be exempt from violence against parties campaigning in what they regard as their territory. One of the legacies of the previous period of struggle against apartheid is that of the *'politics of territoriality'*. Politics came to be identified with space rather than individuals making free choices.

Driving out perceived supporters of apartheid in a particular geographical area, very quickly came to be synonymous with only tolerating those claiming to be supporting one's particular brand of opposition to apartheid. This intolerance has already been demonstrated during NP campaigns in such areas. Inkatha and the King's fervent opposition to the constitutional process and the elections reinforce these political tendencies emanating from the 1980s within ANC held areas.

In some instances one can trace violence directly to the constitutional conflict and the build-up to the elections. In addition, one can expect that further directed violence will occur as Inkatha followers attempt to stop people voting and ANC activists attempt to campaign in what they regard as Inkatha areas.

There is already a rise in killings associated with the constitutional process and the elections. It is likely in many parts of Natal that there will be attempts to create no-go areas for political rivals.

The most important long term effect of the tensions around constitutional negotiations and the build-up to the elections, is that it creates a climate conducive to the escalation of violence. It is also likely that crime will escalate, along with large scale confrontations between politically aligned groups, clandestine hit squads and revenge killings. A number of areas that were peaceful and stable (eg. Shongweni) have recently been destabilised by conflict around the constitutional negotiations and impending election.

An escalation can be expected of most, if not all, forms of the violence unless checked by police and military presence and action, as well as the influence of international monitoring and the peace structures.

Courtesy of Natal Newspapers

It is difficult to judge what the impact of the security forces, peace structures and international monitors will be on the violence. The peace committees, though symbolically important, have had limited success in bringing about peace in areas with entrenched rival power groups.

The newly formed National Peace-Keeping Force has had an inauspicious beginning, and it seems doubtful that it can play more than a symbolical role in the election period. Similarly, the international monitors may well play an important role in reducing violence around polling stations, but will have little effect on chronic conflict outside their ambit.

The critical question concerns the role of the security forces, notably the SADF and SAP. Their capacity to act against violence will depend on their own internal reconstitution, their relationship to the TEC and to the various communities within which they operate.

Dangerous options

KwaZulu/Natal is likely to differ from the rest of the country since the issue of legitimacy refers to the election process itself. In most of the country the major conflicts (apart from right wing violence), whether peaceful or violent, are likely to be centred around particular parties jockying for position and votes, rather than the holding of elections per se.

In KwaZulu/Natal the big issue is whether the election process can be completed with a measure of legitimacy. If the new government is unable to portray the election process as a reasonably legitimate test of the electorate's wishes, it will be utterly hamstrung in attempting to deal with the violence.

The most important long term effect of the tensions around constitutional negotiations and the build-up to the elections, is that it creates a climate conducive to the escalation of violence

In KwaZulu/Natal the big issue is whether the election process can be completed with a measure of legitimacy

The difficult reality Inkatha has to face is that it cannot secure its political ideals by undermining the constitution and the electoral process

The political and administrative situation in KwaZulu/Natal will be radically affected by the results of the impending election. The national and regional government presiding over it, and the institutions administering its activities, will change. If the elections are judged to be legitimate, the KwaZulu government will not have the constitutional status that it had under the apartheid constitution and cannot operate as though nothing will have changed.

That is highly threatening to Inkatha, for it means the demise of its institutional power base. Buthelezi, who predicated his entire political existence on refusing to accept the Bantustans, would now ironically be trying to perpetuate an institutional and administrative structure that belongs to the past.

This has likewise encouraged some within the ANC to revert back to the politics of ungovernability by asserting a two pronged strategy of 'rolling mass action' and the need to arm activists and local MK cadres on the ground.

It is well within the scope of a legitimate state to act against unconstitutional behaviour through deploying lawful force

But these forces in the ANC, harking back to the triumphal glories of another political period, are playing right into the hands of their Inkatha counterparts. Such a strategy can only lead to a head-on violent collision from which no strategic nor moral advantage will be gained.

It is one thing for Inkatha to take up a negotiating position in constitutional negotiations and elections. It is quite another to refuse to abide by democratic and consitutional proceedings once the elections are clearly under way, as well as to refuse to accept a new government after the election. They would then be presented as having no respect for constitutionality, law and order, formal legitimacy and democratic governance.

If the ANC responds to Inkatha in a similar way this will merely serve to legitimise, rather than expose, Inkatha's extra constitutional stand. The real challenge facing the ANC is how to operate as a government in waiting, defend the constitution and deploy legitimate state powers. As a government in waiting it has the opportunity to take the route of defending the constitution on behalf of the general populace. This would also secure its own interests by ensuring that its path to government is not obstructed by massive escalation of violence.

A new government of national unity will inevitably have to turn to the security forces. The question is how to legitimate them

The difficult reality Inkatha has to face is that it cannot secure its political ideals by undermining the constitution and the electoral process. Nor is there a future for the party in retreating into the homeland structure and enforcing the allegiance of the civil service. Like all parties, it has to face the consequences of possible defeat at the polls.

Defending the constitutionality of the process and asserting the use of legitimate authority and force, does not mean that the path of negotiation should be slammed shut on the IFP. Negotiations should continue over the constitution and over political conduct during the elections. It is still within the power of Inkatha to continue to negotiate over possible amendments to the constitution, and over the mechanisms of reincorporation of the KwaZulu administration into a new unified regional government.

There is no alternative to the dismantling of the KwaZulu homeland authority. The real issue is whether this is done with the maximum involvement of the IFP or against its will through the deployment of legitimate force by the central state.

Lawful force

This does not mean that the forces supporting constitutionality should merely sit back in the face of escalating violent confrontation in KwaZulu/Natal. It is well within the scope of a legitimate state to act against unconstitutional behaviour through deploying lawful force. In short this means calling on the TEC and the current government to deploy the requisite security forces to ensure that elections and the constitution are not undermined, and that the KwaZulu security forces are either disbanded or brought under their control.

A new government of national unity will inevitably have to turn to the security forces. The question is how to legitimate them. A necessary step is to complete the process of cleaning out criminal and racist elements and strengthening those units and individuals moving towards a neutral policing role.

It will essentially be the same ordinary men and women in uniform who will be doing this, not security forces conjured up out of thin air. This is the opportunity for the new 'government in waiting' to redefine the language towards them and create an acceptance of a legitimate police force.

In much the same way, this approach can be applied to institutions comprising the current KwaZulu administration. Constitutionality requires them to be brought under the appropriately devolved authority of the new government.

It is doubtful that violence can be avoided in this process as long as Inkatha refuses to accept the legitimacy of the new constitution and government. What is imperative is that levels of violence are kept down sufficiently to ensure that the new government of national unity (at both national and regional level) emerges with the legitimacy and functional capability to govern.

Prospects

The three key issues affecting the prospects for violence once a new national and regional government comes into office are:

- Taking advantage of a new legitimacy;
- Developing the capacity to deploy security forces;
- Delivering development.

The aftermath of the elections will radically change national and regional circumstances. Blacks will have been able to meaningfully participate in an election to choose their government, and the government will no longer have the stigma of apartheid.

The Zulu monarch will have a new paymaster and will no longer be able to count on the administrative and formal support of the regional authority for his talk of secession. The fragmentation of the region will no longer be constitutionally enforced.

The civil service and police will be formally answerable to, and paid by, only one governing authority. One can therefore expect significant sections of these groups to jump ship and tear up their Inkatha party cards. The national government composed of all major parties can also be called on to back the new regional government if it encounters opposition from Inkatha.

Everything will have changed and nothing will have changed. A great deal depends on how the newly elected regional government handles itself in this new situation; whether it reinforces old tendencies threatening to tear KwaZulu/Natal apart, or whether it is able to take advantage of the new situation to create a very different climate.

The coming to power of a new government will provide a major opportunity to stabilise KwaZulu/Natal and grapple with violence in all its forms in new ways, but it will not automatically result in an immediate cessation of violence. Indeed it may even be associated with the opposite as groups excluded ironically seek to assert ungovernability against the ANC government.

What will be critical will be combining the deployment of force and co-opting groups which feel excluded from the new dispensation, while at the same time addressing in tangible ways the black majority's pent up demands and needs.

A great deal will depend in this period on the government's ability to build legitimacy, gain the confidence of the local security forces and secure their support in reorganising and redefining the role of a new police force, and finally its capacity to deliver development to undercut the material causes of the violence.

A new legitimacy will not just be granted by electoral victory. Critical factors will be the capacity of the regional government to establish unity, to assert authority over institutions falling under the KwaZulu government, to throw an olive branch to Inkatha or at least to moderates in its ranks, and outside the immediate party political arena, to successfully draw groups and sections of society that have the means of destabilising government into a range of social compacts.

The most likely scenario is continuing and possibly escalating violence unless the new regional government manages to do a number of things:

- be maximally inclusive in order to draw in as many players as possible and thereby to pinpoint those outside as unreasonable disruptive extremists;
- find mechanisms to disarm the population and reduce the number of firearms available;
- restructure and expand the current police forces into a new unified force giving it a newfound legitimate image so that it can secure law and order in the black and white residential areas;
- adopt and implement socio-economic development policies designed to attract support to the new government and undercut those material forces forming the foundation of the violence.

Even if it manages to succeed in doing all of the above, this will not necessarily stop violence around the elections, but it will impact on the level of violence and disruption in the crucial post election period.

Development

Over the medium to longer term, the critical issue for the new government will be its capacity to deliver jobs, housing, and

What is imperative is that levels of violence are kept down sufficiently to ensure that the new government emerges with the legitimacy and functional capability to govern

The Zulu monarch will have a new paymaster and will no longer be able to count on the administrative and formal support

The critical issue for the new government will be its capacity to deliver jobs, housing, and development

The new government will not be in a position to impose its own will with force and to set about a centrally directed single housing and development programme

development. This will affect not only political restabilisation; but will also have a major impact on the revival of the South African economy and KwaZulu/Natal's place in that economy.

The reconstruction and development of the urban areas and especially their peripheries are urgent tasks as it is here that the violence is most deeply entrenched. Some of the more important trends that a reconstruction and development policy will have to tackle in the congested and violently charged urban areas are:

- The peripheralisation of violence: the phenomenon of peri-urban squatter and rural violence is likely to persist, especially as the relative privilege of townships and new middle income housing estates are consolidated.

- The phenomenon of core city squatting, both incremental and in the form of invasions, is likely to be hotly contested in the run up to and after the elections. This will take the form increasingly of a class or income issue with white or mixed race middle income residential communities organising to prevent squatting nearby.

- The focus will shift from the core city areas and their deracialisation and development to the upgrading, integration and development of the peripheral black townships and squatter areas.

- There is likely to be a growing incidence of white/black confrontations in smaller towns and cities with well organised right wing communities.

Social Compacts

Our expectation is that the new government will not be in a position to impose its own will with force and to set about a centrally directed single housing and development programme. The reality is that a new government, especially in KwaZulu/Natal will need to prove itself to the historically disadvantaged majority, to those who are vehemently opposed to it, and finally to the threatened but indispensable privileged white and Indian minorities.

It therefore seems far more likely that the new governmental structures dealing with development will need to work through social compacts around housing and urban development at local, metropolitan and regional level. Furthermore, as we have pointed out, one way in which it can establish its legitimacy is through the promotion of successful social compacts around housing and development.

It is important to recognise that the continued existence of social, economic and political divisions within the black residential areas, and between them and white, coloured and Asian areas, means that the potential for conflict exists almost in all cases where urban reconstruction has to be initiated. This reality will remain, and indeed probably take on heightened significance in the post election period.

The potential for conflict exists almost in all cases where urban reconstruction has to be initiated

Areas in which violence has ripped communities apart will have to be treated with special care. Furthermore, there are likely to be more such areas, many within the core city and involving potential confrontations between middle income and poor groups.

In these areas it is especially important to deal first with the political dimensions of the conflict. Mediation skills and mechanisms will need to be built into planning for reconstruction because the possibility exists at almost every stage of the development process that negotiation will break down and there will be a reversion to violence.

With the installation of a new and legitimate government there can be less excuse for foot dragging over housing policy and actual investment in housing. However, it should not be assumed that a new government will automatically result in smooth policy implementation either at national or local level.

The old rivalries will remain and political contestation and division will continue especially in areas with entrenched and divided local and regional power structures. IPA

FREE AND FAIR?

By Chris de Kock and Charl Schutte
Sociopolitical Monitoring and Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council

Crucial to the perceived legitimacy of the new Government of National Unity - both locally and internationally - is the belief that the elections are 'free and fair'. There are many factors that will impact on that assessment.

It is clear that not only are there to be elections on 26 to 28 April, but that 'free and fair' elections are being aimed at. The more free and fair the election, the less its validity will be questioned and the more the Government of National Unity will be considered legitimate.

A legitimate government is essential if South Africa is to be successfully transformed into a free and democratic society.

The Independent Election Commission Act (No 1. 150, 1993) repeatedly refers to free and fair elections, describing the Commission's objectives as being to: administer and conduct free and fair elections for the National Assembly and all other legislatures; promote conditions conducive to free and fair elections; determine the results of the elections and certify whether they are free and fair; conduct voter education; and make and enforce regulations to achieve its objectives.

But what is a free and democratic election? The answer is that each person eligible to vote - there are around 22 million potential voters in South Africa - should have an equal and fair opportunity to vote for the party of his or her choice, or to abstain from voting. It also means that people cannot be forced against their will refrain from voting, to vote or to vote for a particular party.

Ron Gould, Elections Canada's Assistant Chief Electoral Officer, who has taken part in more than 20 international electoral missions since 1984, points out that the ideal free and democratic election does not exist.

The ideal free and democratic election does not exist

> In my view, this is a simplistic expectation and frankly, I doubt whether an unqualified 'free and fair' election has ever been held anywhere in the world. For example, as long as the reality of incumbent governments and candidates having a decided campaign advantage during an election continues to exist, and as long as there are inequitable financial and material resources among parties and candidates, the reality of absolutely fair elections does not exist.

It appears, therefore, to be unrealistic to expect that the elections in April can fulfil all the criteria of freedom and fairness. This is especially true in a society in which the greatest part of the voting population - at least 72 % - will be voting for the first time in a general election. The important point to consider is whether elections will help create a multi-party democracy, or would endanger or prevent this. Again Gould writes:

The focus should be on the extent to which the election, with all its flaws, contributed to the democratic evolution of the country

> Therefore, in arriving at the evaluation, after taking into account the degree of freeness and fairness of the various elements of the electoral process, the conclusions reached should clearly focus on to what extent, if any, the electoral event (with all its flaws) made a positive and significant contribution to the multi-party democratic evolution of the country.

TABLE 1: SUBJECTIVE-PERCEPTUAL CONDITIONS INHIBITING VOTING INTENTION

SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTUAL CONDITION	PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHOSE INTENTION TO VOTE MAY BE INFLUENCED NEGATIVELY OR NOT AT ALL BY THE FACTOR: Probably influenced negatively	Uncertain/ Neutral/ Not clear	Probably not influenced negatively	STRENGTH OF CORRELATION WITH VOTING INTENTION
	%	%	%	
The view of voters that their party should not participate in the election	3	20	77	1.517E-137
The view of voters that political violence shortly before and during the voting period will make them less inclined to vote	12	27	61	3.898E-131
Voters who are not interested in the outcome of the election (apathy)	9	18	73	4.2914E-88
Voters who are of the opinion that their vote will make very little or no difference to the outcome of the election (powerlessness)	31	24	45	1.6485E-67
Voters who are not at all willing to become involved in a party political campaign	41	12	47	5.2567E-54
Voters with a low level of political literacy	68	-	32	6.4167E-50
Voters finding the interim constitution unacceptable	4	51	45	8.9180E-44
Voters believing their standard of living is going to decline or is not going to improve within the next five years	18	24	58	2.3709E-33
Voters believing that the election is impossible within the present circumstances	16	12	72	7.0998E-29
Voters with a low level of voter literacy	11	44	45	1.8117E-28
Voters with no confidence in the secrecy of the vote	10	48	42	2.1871E-17
Voters fearing violence in their community during the election period	41	14	45	6.2567E-13
Voters already feeling unsafe	45	16	39	0.0001107

Influences

Conditions which may influence a voter to take part in the election or not or to vote for a particular party may be divided into two categories: the objective-technical conditions and the subjective-perceptual conditions.

The objective-technical conditions are all those factors in and elements of the electoral process that are the responsibility of the organisers and facilitators of the election, in South Africa the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

The subjective-perceptual conditions comprise voters' perceptions and evaluations of, and state of mind relating to, the election process. There is not necessarily a positive correlation between all the action taken by the IEC, for example, and the voters' evaluation of the process. The HSRC's Division for Sociopolitical Monitoring and Analysis mainly investigates the subjective-perceptual conditions.

Subjective-perceptual

Analysis of a recent countrywide omnibus survey data, undertaken in February this year among a weighted sample of 2 286 potential South African voters, identifies a number of subjective-perceptual conditions which might inhibit voters' intention to vote. The conditions are represented in order of the strength of correlations with voting intention in Table 1.

The survey revealed that less than 50% of South Africa's potential voters have the view that:

- their vote is going to make a difference to the outcome of the election
- they are involved in or would like to become involved in a party political campaign
- they have a high level of political literacy and can, for example, distinguish between different parties' policies
- they can accept the interim constitution
- they have a high level of voter literacy and are sure how to vote
- they have a high degree of confidence in the secrecy of the vote
- they do not fear violence in their community during the election
- they are safe at present

The question might now be asked what the cumulative effect of these perceptions of the respondents is on whether they will vote or note. It was established by means of a

question on voting intention that 5 % of the respondents are not planning to vote at all.

A further computer analysis in which certain extreme categories of respondents were recategorised with this original 5 %, resulted in a rise to 38%. This boils down to a prediction that between 5 % and 38 % of South Africa's potential voters may not be free to cast their votes on 26-28 April.

Analyses was also conducted with voting intention as the response variable and gender, age, educational level, home language, income, exposure to the media and party political affiliation as explanatory /independent variables. The purpose was to establish whether there is a different voting intention across a spectrum of interest groups, and to identify target groups for remedial action.

The only statistically significant relations with voting intention to come out were: political party affiliation, population group, language group, the nine new regions, educational level, and the weekly frequency of newspaper reading (see Figures 1 to 3). These figures reveal that voting intention is especially low among:

- coloured people and Asians (45% and 49% respectively indicated they were planning to vote);
- Zulu- and Afrikaans speakers (47% and 62% respectively);
- people in KwaZulu/Natal, the Eastern Transvaal and Western Cape (46%, 53% and 59% respectively);
- people with an educational level of Std. 5 and lower (62%);
- respondents not regularly reading newspapers (62%); and
- PAC, IFP and rightwing party supporters (33%, 36% and 62% respectively).

The findings indicate a definite differential voting intention across the spectrum of interest groups. Should there be no change in this situation before the election and the differential voting intention is expressed in voting participation, the following people and areas will be under-represented in the new government: coloured people, Asians, Zulus, Afrikaans-speakers, people in KwaZulu/ Natal, the Eastern Transvaal, the Western Cape, the less qualified, and PAC, IFP and rightwing party supporters.

This could cast a shadow over the election result and the legitimacy of the Government of National Unity.

Figure 1: Intention to vote by home language



Objective-technical

The following objective-technical conditions could contribute to the degree of freedom and fairness in the impending elections.

- Freedom of speech, the media and the organisation of gatherings. For example, an election cannot be completely free should a state of emergency be declared which affects people's freedom of speech or their ability to organise gatherings. A state of emergency might include a curfew preventing gatherings during the evening.
- Freedom of access to voters by parties, and by voters to parties and information. 'No-go areas' are found throughout South Africa, among them hostels, informal settlements, homelands, townships and farms. In these areas people in charge are sometimes not tolerant towards political views which differ from their own. Should a party's offices, posters, brochures and election officials not be welcome, there can be little doubt that voters there do not have free access to information.
- Freedom to register as voter.

As many as 38% of South Africa's potential voters may not be free to cast their votes

The under-representation of a number of groups and regions could cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the new government

Figure 2: Intention to vote by province



Figure 3: Intention to vote by educational qualification



Voters should be able to use any clear mark (tick, cross or nought) to indicate their choice

- Freedom from violence, intimidation, threats, bribery or any other form of coercive or manipulative exercise of power. It would be difficult to have election in parts of Natal and the East Rand because of the high levels of political violence.
- Equal access to the media and balanced media reporting. Where parties are basically ignored or seriously misrepresented by the media, it may be assumed that the voter does not have equal access to information relating to political choices.
- Reasonable and transparent access of parties to funds and other public resources.
- Comprehensive voter literacy programmes which reach all areas and social categories. Should this not occur, some voters may not have enough knowledge of voting procedures to vote. They may also arrive at voting booths without the necessary documents, or spoil their votes. Parties drawing support from isolated rural areas will have less opportunity for their real support levels to be reflected in the new government.
- An open and transparent vote counting system, including the transport of voting boxes to counting points so that there is no chance of 'disappearance', 'miscounting' and 'adding to' votes.
- Equal, fair and neutral treatment of all voters and parties by all who are charged with organising and executing the election, among them civil servants, the IEC, electoral officers, the police, observers and monitors.
- The principles of 'vote where you are' and the physical accessibility of polling booths. It should be possible for each voter to vote with the minimum cost, no matter where he or she is on the voting days.
- A guaranteed secret vote. It should be clear to voters that there is no way officials can relate a ballot paper to a particular voter. The ballot paper should preferably not be marked or numbered. Both the stamping of identity documents and indelible marking paint should be used.
- The maximum international and national monitoring and observation before and during voting.
- Attempts should be made to ensure that, as far as possible, all political parties and interest groups take part in the election. Voters who support non-participating parties are not entirely free in their voting or choice of party.
- Ballot papers should be as simple and understandable as possible, also for the illiterate. The use of acronyms, party symbols, party colours, photographs of party leaders and party names make it easier for illiterate people to make their choice. Any clear mark made in order to indicate choice (a tick, cross or nought) should be accepted. Illiterate voters would be disadvantaged should strict Western standards be adhered to.

Security measures at voting booths should be unintimidating, although there will have to be strict measures since there is a potential for electoral sabotage.

The opposite conditions, or absence of these conditions, could decrease the degree of freedom and fairness in South Africa's first truly democratic elections.

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POLITICAL MONITOR

Attitudes towards the elections by race



Intention to Vote by race



Intention to Vote by Party



Source: Johnson RW, L Schlemmer, J Seymour and C Marais. *Launching Democracy: A National Survey on Issues relevant to a Free and Fair Election. Third Report: October-November 1993.* Launching Democracy project is sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council (MarkData and Information Update)

The Public Service in Transition

By Richard Humphries
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Apartheid, by its very nature, created a myriad of segregated institutions serving different racial groups. A new government will inherit this civil service and will consider ways to transform it.This article explores some of the issues facing the civil service during the transition period.

Unlike most countries analysed in the by now well known transition literature, South Africa is about to undergo not only a change of government but the elections are also intended to lead to a change of state. The elections will not simply change the racial composition of the legislature and the executive, but will over time herald far-reaching changes to institutions of government at national, regional and local levels.

Apartheid, by its very nature, created a myriad of segregated institutions, both representative and civil service, serving different racial groups. Now that a majority-based government is about to be elected, many of the old institutions will be abolished or recast and others created in their place. It is in this sense that South Africa is about to undergo the start of a process aimed at changing the state.

It is against this background that the recent controversies affecting the various components of the civil service should be understood.

As a distinct issue in the negotiations process, the civil service only rose to prominence in the latter stages of last year when the finer details of the draft constitution were being finalised. The controversy around post-election employment guarantees for civil servants, largely orchestrated by Cosatu, illustrated the differing sensitivities by both the National Party and the ANC towards the bureaucracy.

It is widely accepted that the National Party had pressed for the provisions after pressure by white civil servants in the employ of the central government, anxious about their career prospects after the election. The civil service has traditionally been a staunch supporter of the National Party, although this has weakened with the development of rightwing political parties in the 1980s.

Homeland-based civil servants are, as recent events in Bophuthatswana, Lebowa and other homelands illustrate, also apprehensive about their future. Some of the concerns do differ but the point remains: the civil service is now firmly placed at the centre of the South African transition.

Today 95% of senior civil servants in the central government civil service are white; the overwhelming majority are Afrikaners

Civil service politics

South Africa's civil service has never been very far removed from the centre of political conflict, whether within the narrow confines of white politics or in terms of black-white politics. Recruitment patterns and civil service employment, which originally favoured English-speakers but which after the NP's 1948 election victory, shifted to favouring Afrikaners, placed the civil service within the political domain of white politics.

Almost 500 000 persons are employed in the various homeland structures - a very sizeable chunk of the total civil service

The civil service has played a crucial role in Afrikaner economic advancement ever since it was linked to the so-called civilised labour policy developed in the 1920s. After 1948 the Afrikanerisation of the civil service impacted most notably on the senior management echelons of the service. Today 95% of senior civil servants in the central government civil service are white; the overwhelming majority are Afrikaners.

Within the black community the key role of the civil service in implementing apartheid policies - which extended to outside the civil service to include structures such as administration boards - was primarily responsible for its poor standing, notwithstanding discriminatory recruitment patterns.

Only in homeland civil services, effectively from the late 1970s, did senior positions begin to open up for blacks in a substantial way. This was most marked in the TBVC territories where these regimes reduced their reliance on seconded white officials from Pretoria.

Homeland civil servants have realised that they have to help destroy the system, in order to protect and advance their own interests in a post-apartheid society

This rapid upward mobility points to a characteristic common to all civil service structures in South Africa: that they operated within a 'closed ideologically confining patronage system'. Although this comment was originally applied to the Transkeian civil service by Southall, Segar and Donaldson (1992: 276) it has much wider relevance.

Since February 2 1990, these issues have increasingly been interlinked in critiques of, and debates over, the future of the civil service. This is now most commonly expressed in statements, such as the recent one by Khaya Ngema of the Wits School of Public and Development Management: 'we are faced with the challenge of moving from a bureaucracy that is ethnic and control orientated to one that is non-racial and developmentally orientated' (Ngema, 1993).

Within the black community the key role of the civil service was in implementing apartheid policies

While few would quibble with this statement of the goals of public service change, it does illustrate an important characteristic of academic debate on the civil service. With few exceptions civil service analysts target or limit their remarks of 'the South African civil service' to a single component of it, namely the central government civil service.

Put another way, critiques and suggested policy options virtually ignore the existence of ten homeland civil services and the coloured and Indian own affairs administrations. For example, in a recent publication examining civil service issues (*DSA in depth*, August/September 1993) only one contributor, himself a former homeland civil servant, paid specific attention to homeland structures, albeit a critical perspective (Mokgoro, 1993). Almost 500 000 persons are employed in the various homeland structures - a very sizeable chunk of the total civil service.

Various factors explain this almost myopic vision. The most important is clearly a reaction against the centrality of 'white Afrikaner males' in the policy-making process within the Pretoria civil service and fears that this group could hinder the adoption of radically new post-election reconstruction policies. Options to limit any such resistance are thus high on the agenda.

A related explanation is rooted in the realisation that since the 'pool of technically competent bureaucrats in the bantustans is a shallow one' (Mokgoro, 1994: 32), personnel in these structures will generally play a limited role in the process of transforming the senior echelons in Pretoria.

Thus a much greater role is accorded to bringing in persons who have had little or no experience in civil service structures in the country, and to widening processes of policy-making to include organs of civil society.

A further factor might follow from earlier influential political-economy analyses of the homeland system which generally posited that these civil servants would develop vested interests in the homelands and serve as a conservative force. The opposite has largely been proved in the last few weeks. Homeland civil servants have realised that they have had to help destroy the system, in order to protect and advance their own interests in a post-apartheid society.

One final point needs to be made. These views tend to mirror the political and administrative divisions within the broader civil service. The Commission for Administration in Pretoria has had no jurisdiction over the TBVC territories, let alone those in the self-governing territories. In some senses we will only have 'a South African civil service' after the April election when these apartheid-derived barriers will formally end and the structures integrated with one another.

ANC-NP convergence

Somewhat ironically, it would appear that within both the ANC and the NP a much more nuanced view is held towards civil service reform that is suggested by much

academic writing or the public debate on the civil service.

This is perhaps not surprising however given that the two parties have accepted that a government of national unity (GNU) should rule for a five year period. This GNU is predicated upon an acceptance of certain 'political realities' which the ANC and the NP are prepared to accept as short term givens. This extends to the civil service.

The first signs of such a convergence seem to have emerged in late 1992 after the Record of Understanding between the ANC and the NP revived the negotiations process. In effect the ANC accepted the need for continuity within the civil service while the NP accepted that affirmative action was needed in the senior ranks of the civil service. Both these positions accepted that the changes to the civil service would be through a process of bureaucratic reform and that there would be no 'large scale dismantling of apartheid institutions' (Mokgoro, 1994: 73).

What's being said?

Formally the ANC is committed, through its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to ensuring that by 1999 the personnel composition of the public sector, including parastatals, reflects the national distribution of race and gender. This date coincides with the scheduled end of the GNU. Within two years of the start of the RDP recruitment and training patterns should 'reflect South African society in terms of race, class and gender' (RDP, 1994: 51).

Although the Commission for Administration no longer publishes racial composition figures, an estimated 60% of all civil servants, including those in TBVC states, are black while 26% are white (Van der Merwe, 1994: 69). Some 46% are women who are obviously disproportionately represented in health and education sectors. Meeting the RDP projections entails a substantial increase in black employment in general, at senior levels in particular, with a greater emphasis on female representation in sectors outside of health and education.

However the ANC, or some senior spokespersons within it, have for some time accepted the need for continuity in civil service operations. For example, in November 1992 Nelson Mandela said that a new government would have to have the support of the civil service, army and police. Whites in these structures would not be 'cruelly cast aside' by a non-racial government and 'existing contracts would be respected' (*Citizen*, 30/11/92). In early 1993 Gill Marcus said of civil servants: 'We are not asking them to go. We will need their skills and experiences' (*Cape Times*, 9/2/93).

Albie Sachs has said that the ANC did not want to start a civil war by getting whites fired from their jobs and that the ANC accepted that it would not be possible to retrench large numbers of white civil servants in order to advance affirmative action (*Beeld*, 25/10/93).

Another ANC civil service specialist, Dr Paseka Ncholo, pointed out to an ANC workshop on civil service reform that while it would appoint new Directors-General, thereafter 'the administration must continue, there must not be a break in continuity' (ANC/IDRC, 1993: 56).

The stress on continuity is also partly explained by an acceptance that levels of skilled black personnel are more limited than might be popularly imagined (Mokgoro 1994). Political idealism aside, the public sector has to compete with a private sector anxious and willing to pay better salaries to improve black representation in its upper echelons.

Traditionally local government bureaucrats too have received higher salaries than civil servants. This suggests that rectifying racial imbalances at the senior level in the short term might be more difficult than expected. It is no coincidence that the government department which the ANC expects to make most rapid progress in rectifying racial imbalances is the Department of Foreign Affairs. From its exile years the ANC has a core group of 'exile diplomats' which it has trained.

The National Party, for its part, accepted in August 1992 that the racial profile of central government departments would have to become more representative of the population. Government departments were instructed to attempt to ensure this change at all levels. At senior levels higher salaries could be paid, if necessary, to attract blacks into the civil service (*Beeld*, 10/11/92).

Although the government denied that white bureaucrats were being offered retirement packages to create opportunities for black advancement, its principled commitment to affirmative action was signalled by this circular. Debates on the parameters could still be conducted.

The government seems also to have accepted that some senior civil servants might have to be replaced, especially those who are not

Both the ANC and the NP have accepted that the changes to the civil service would be through a process of bureaucratic reform

The ANC have for some time accepted the need for continuity in civil service operations

The government seems also to have accepted that some senior civil servants might have to be replaced

More fundamental changes can be expected at the regional level, with the immediate focus of a new government directed at the directors-general

prepared to serve under an ANC government. The former chairperson of the Commission for Administration, Dr PJ van der Merwe, accepted that there were some worn or cracked bricks in the civil service; 'one would not have to break down the entire wall; one just has to remove some of the old bricks and replace them with others' (Van der Merwe, 1994: 69). The issue was thus one of under what conditions such persons could retire or resign from the civil service.

Conclusion

This article has suggested that the central government civil service, at least will be marked by a great deal more continuity at senior levels than might be expected. More fundamental changes can be expected at the regional level, given the need to amalgamate the existing regional civil services.

Continuity does not suggest that no changes will be made. Clearly the immediate focus of a new government will be directed at the directors-general, not only for their symbolic importance but because their conditions of employment in the civil service are regulated by personal contracts. They are not, in effect life-long appointments, to the civil service staff.

Other changes that can be expected are some directed at opening up extra-civil service inputs into the policy making process. IPA

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SISTERS
are doing it for themselves

By Pat Horn
Association for the establishment of a Self-Employed Women's Union

Ninety-four women's organisations and coalitions joined forces to draw up the Women's Charter for Effective Equality. After April elections, armed with a Charter and taking advantage of transition, they intend mobilising support to pressure a new government to ensure equality in a new South Africa.

The Women's National Coalition adopted the Women's Charter for Effective Equality at its second national conference, on 27 February 1994. It was the result of a massive participatory research project involving a wide cross-section of South African women.

It was agreed by the conference that the Women's Charter would be a 'living' political document, capable of further development, to be used by organisations in their campaigns for women's rights.

It would also form the basis of clauses to be included in the new constitution to be drawn up by the Constitutional Assembly of the Government of National Unity, to ensure constitutional guarantees of effective equality for women in the new South Africa.

The Women's National Coalition - a collection of 81 national organisations and 13 regional coalitions representing women of different races, class backgrounds, religions, political affiliations, and rural and urban areas - planned and commissioned the research project.

A combination of research methods was used, including focus group interviews, single-issue questionnaires, chain letters, community report cards and a range of activities conducted by the member organisations and regional coalitions. Findings were submitted to the Women's National Coalition, for inclusion in the project.

There were strong similarities in the findings of the various research methods, as well as between different groups. Notable among the findings was evidence of widespread subordination of women, and violation of their human rights. The vast majority of women placed great importance on being seen and treated as equals in all areas of life.

Working women (especially black women) reported experiencing serious discrimination and expressed dissatisfaction at not being recognised as breadwinners despite the large number of families headed by women.

The research also revealed widespread frustration about the lack of control women have over their lives or their bodies within the family, about the high incidence of violence against women, and about their lack of protection against violence.

The issues contained in the Women's Charter are not the specific interests of any particular small group of women but represent the aspirations, which came out of the research, of a broad range of South African women.

Working women (especially black women) reported experiencing serious discrimination and expressed dissatisfaction at not being recognised as breadwinners

The Women's Charter

In the Charter's preamble, it is stated that:

> At the heart of women's marginalisation is the patriarchal order that confines women to the domestic arena and reserves for men the arena where political power and authority reside. Conventionally, democracy and human rights have been defined and interpreted in terms of men's experiences. Society has been organised and its institutions structured for the primary benefit of men.

Women want to control their lives. We bear important responsibilities but lack the authority to make decisions in the home and in society. We want shared responsibility and decision-making in the home and effective equality in politics, the law and in the economy.

There is also frustration about the lack of control women have over their lives within the family

Substantive equality requires the redressing of inequality and necessitates affirmative action

Article 1: Equality calls for substantive as opposed to formal equality. Formal equality requires only that all people are treated equally, while substantive equality requires the redressing of inequality and necessitates effective affirmative action programmes, if it is to be achieved.

Article 2: Law and the Administration of Justice address how to work towards equality in the development, application, adjudication, interpretation and enforcement of the law. This includes equal representation of women in various legal institutions, equal legal status, education programmes to address gender bias and stereotypes, and accessible and affordable legal services for women, to enable them to exercise their legal rights.

Article 3: Economy identifies the place of most women in those sectors of the economy characterised by low wages and poor working conditions. 'Low remuneration is worsened by discrimination against women in the receipt of social benefits. As a result, many women are forced to make a living outside of the formal economy'.

Low remuneration is worsened by discrimination, forcing many women to make a living outside the formal economy

The article goes on to identify key steps which would be needed to rectify this gender imbalance, including equal access to jobs, training and promotion, maternity leave for women, equal parental rights for women and men in the formal sector, and equal taxation.

It also identifies measures needed outside the formal sector to give women some protection against exploitative business practices, unhealthy or unsafe working conditions, and access to credit and group social benefits. A controversial clause suggests the decriminalisation of prostitution to enable health issues to be addressed.

Article 4: Education and Training states that education must meet the economic, social, cultural and political needs of South African women to allow them to realise their full potential. It addresses negative gender stereotyping in curriculum development and education practice, the need for women to be represented at all levels of the education system, including policy making, and the need for protection against sexual harassment and abuse in educational institutions.

A controversial clause suggests the decriminalisation of prostitution

Article 5: Development, Infrastructure, and the Environment highlights the plight of women in rural areas and informal settlements who bear the responsibility for maintaining the household and community in situations where they lack basic resources. To correct this women, including those living under customary law, have to have equal access to land, security of tenure, affordable and secure housing and safe transport networks. Adequate water supplies and services such as communications and electricity to all communities would dramatically improve the situation of women and their ability to participate in public life.

Article 6: Social Services states: 'Social services should be a right and not a privilege. Inadequate social services place the burden for providing these on women, since women are primarily responsible for maintaining the household and the community'. The provision of social services is seen as the responsibility of both the state and the private sector. Special attention should be paid to the needs of rural and disabled women.

Article 7: Political and Civic Life stresses that 'democracy requires that the political playing field between men and women be leveled by acknowledging women's right to participate equally in all political activities'. This includes the right of rural women to be part of decision-making structures in traditional communities. For this to be possible there have to be adequate support services to facilitate women's full political participation, and women have to be free from political intimidation and physical threat.

Article 8: Family Life and Partnerships mentions that all of the many different types of families in South Africa should be recognised and treated equally, and that women should have equality within each family, as well as after the dissolution of marriage.

Women within families should have the right to: choose her partner; decide on the nature and frequency of sexual contact; inherit from her husband (even under customary law); equal access to the household's financial resources; decision-making powers over household economic management; absence of external interference except where physical, sexual or emotional abuse occurs; guardianship over her children; and adequate maintenance for herself and her children.

Article 9: Custom, Culture and Religion points out that customary, cultural and religious practices frequently subordinate women, and insists that custom, culture and religion have to be subject to the equality clause in the Bill of Rights. The point is made that women have to be free to practice their own religion, culture or beliefs without fear.

Article 10: Violence against Women highlights the pervasiveness of sexual and domestic violence, and the fact that 'women experience secondary victimisation at all

stages of the criminal justice system'. The state is held responsible for public education about the integrity of the person, as well as for appropriate training for police, prosecutors, magistrates, judges, district surgeons, etc. It is proposed that facilities be provided to report cases of rape, battery, sexual and racial abuse and assault, as well as shelters and counseling services.

Article 11: Health demands 'equal, affordable and accessible health care services which meet women's specific health needs', and access to information to enable women to make informed decisions in this area. Every person should have access to adequate nutrition, free family planning services, and mental health care services. Women should also have the right to control their bodies, including the right to reproductive decisions.

Article 12: Media states that women are marginalised and trivialised in the media, and proposes that media representation of women be monitored and negative stereotypes eliminated. Affirmative action was needed to promote equality and redress imbalances in the status of women in the media.

Mobilisation

Now that the Women's Charter has been produced, the question is how to make the issues contained in it a reality. Women's constitutional and legislated rights may be a necessary but are not a sufficient condition for achieving women's equality in practice.

This has certainly been the experience of women in other parts of the world. In Canada, for example, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women reported its findings and recommendations in 1972. More than 20 years later certain of the recommendations have yet to be implemented.

Some of the recommendations implemented were the first to be discarded when times became lean and the government started making cut-backs. When it was decided in Canada to cut back on shelters for battered women, it was only the occupation of government offices throughout the country by women which persuaded the government to cut-back in other areas instead.

Women in the Women's National Coalition have been discussing some of the mechanisms which need to be in place to ensure implementation of measures demanded in the Women's Charter. It is emerging that there is no one mechanism that can do the job, and there has to be a package of different mechanisms all dovetailing towards the same objectives.

One such mechanism could be a Ministry of Women's Affairs. But this should be backed up by Women's Desks or Committees in each of the other ministries to ensure that they are taking care of women's issues pertinent to their area of work.

To create equal opportunities and equal pay for work of equal value where this does not exist, there would have to be specialist bodies such as Equal Opportunity Commissions and Pay Equity Commissions with powers to enforce change.

To keep up a strong pressure on the government and its institutions, there would also need to be non-governmental mechanisms such as a full-time Standing Committee on the Status of Women, structured mechanisms for consultation between government bodies and women's organisations, relentless monitoring mechanisms and a litigation fund to ensure access to legal protection and redress by ordinary women.

Women should have the right to reproductive decisions

To keep up pressure would need relentless monitoring mechanisms and a litigation fund to ensure access to legal protection

Conclusion

Political parties in South Africa are aware that women constitute 54% of the electorate. Thus we see all of them displaying varying degrees of consciousness about women's issues in their policy statements and election manifestos in a bid to win women's votes - even the National Party, which ruled for 46 years without apparently being concerned about women's rights.

But we cannot be confident that women's issues will remain prominently on the political agenda after the elections. It is precisely because women are aware of this that they have got together across political divides to draw up the Women's Charter. Women's organisations will have to pressurise the new government, and support women within government, to secure implementation of aspirations contained in the Women's Charter.

Women of all political persuasions have expressed the need for a strong women's movement to take the Charter further than being a mere document: to lobby, pressurise and monitor progress. Should such an active movement emerge - and the basis already exists in the National Women's Coalition and the regional women's coalitions and alliances - then armed with the Women's Charter as its fighting document, it will not allow political parties to easily forget their election promises to the women of South Africa. IPA

We cannot be confident that women's issues will remain prominent after the elections

The Future of Civics

By Khehla Shubane
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It is generally believed that civics will not survive for long in the new democratic order. They will be replaced, it is argued, by new and democratic local government institutions. This article seeks to cast doubt on that view.

Some people who became members of civics did so because there were no other groups for them to belong to

Until now the debate on civic associations has focused on their history, and specifically their emergence. Many have sought to point out that radical civic associations formed as part of the broad township-based resistance movement in the 1980s.

In that form, civics had two broad focuses. They took up local issues - bread and butter issues like rent hikes and collective consumption matters - and attempted to build an organisation around them. It is this focus which gave them their specific local character.

Their second area of focus was national political concerns. This was predicated on the fact that local bread and butter issues were shaped by nationally-derived power relations, particularly around race.

Because of the close link between apartheid policies and the policies pursued at a local level, it made little sense for civic associations to attempt to separate local issues from apartheid; that is, local from national issues. To fight a rent hike in any township was *ipso facto* to fight the broader system in which that hike was ultimately rooted.

There was little or no turnover of people in the leadership of the civics

This location of civics in the resistance movement has led to the broad conclusion that civics are unlikely to continue to function widely in the post apartheid era. Some have gone so far as to suggest that they will not exist at all. Brought into existence by apartheid in the first place, civics will cease to their existence once apartheid is gone.

Formation

Civics have indeed been sustained by specific issues which derived from apartheid. In the period during which township civics were formed, they relied on one or the other apartheid initiative to do so.

The first wave of civics was formed in the aftermath of the 1976 revolts. The second around the introduction of the 1983 constitution and the Black Local Authorities (BLAs), and the third around the defiance campaign and the liberalisation measures of 1990.

In the 1980s, some people who became members of civics did so because there were no other groups for them to belong to. Their opposition to apartheid prevented them from participating in existing institutions of local government, if they were interested in local governance. Options for people in such a position were very limited.

This implied that there was little if any turnover of people within civics. Many of those who left civics, did not do so for reasons of trying some other political activity, but rather they became politically inactive. To be sure, some left civic associations to participate in BLAs, much to the chagrin of their former colleagues.

Once a person became part of the civic it was likely that he or she would be part of it many years later. At a leadership level, this meant that civics were more often than not led by the same group of people which had played a leadership role in their formation.

Those who moved on from civic associations - when this became possible, especially in the post-1990 period - became part of unbanned political movements, joined the private sector, and as it became politically acceptable for erstwhile anti-apartheid campaigners to join groups associated with the state, some did so.

Existing research suggests that under circumstances where people can belong to other groups, as is the case now, people who were previously readily available to civics will not be once they have a wider choice.

Under these circumstances, even if objectively there were still reasons for civics to continue their existence, the lack of willingness of many people to be be members might not allow this. Thus they might become moribund.

No decline

Yet another suggestion from existing research is that, with the glue which has held together many groups among blacks removed - apartheid - there could be a great deal of difficulty in weaving together organisations. This will also affect civics.

The time for these predictions to be proven is upon us. It is four years since the reform process began. Civic associations, however, have not shown any significant decline. A significant number of people who played leadership roles have left to join political and other organisations, but this has not led to the collapse of civics.

It might be too early to expect the predictions to be realised, but the trend towards decline ought to be starting to show. Organisations do not usually die suddenly. Their death is most often preceded by a long period of decline, during which it becomes clear that the organisation is indeed going to die.

Without seeking to rebut predictions emanating from existing research, I wish to suggest that it has not paid sufficient attention to variables which might suggest opposite conclusions. There are a number of variables associated with civics which, if taken into consideration, suggest the emergence of long-term trends which open up new bases for the continued existence of civics.

Forum links

There is a tendency towards a disaggregation along functional lines in the work of mass organisations. This trend is most visible in national forums. These tend to be sectoral forums. Civics participate in many of them, either directly or indirectly, and their involvement has benefited them significantly. It has afforded civics an opportunity to learn and incorporate into their work considerations which they would not have taken on board in the past.

In spite of research predictions, civics have shown no significant decline

Participation in the Electricity Forum, for instance, has helped civics develop technical views on a range of aspects around electricity. Some of these views were incorporated into important policy documents in which SANCO participated. Similarly, their participation in the National Housing Forum has facilitated development of views on housing and related issues, which would otherwise have taken some time to occur.

These groups could have learnt without participating in these forums. But until they got involved, they were far too narrowly focused on the political, rather than technical, details of processes.

With a few exceptions, and for a variety of reasons, the work performed in a number of forums will continue beyond the transition. It is highly probable that if indeed forums are durable, that will influence civics.

It is highly probable that if forums are durable, it will benefit the civics

They will be included in the work of forums, whether or not they are organisationally strong. Even if it would have otherwise been correct that civics would not survive the new order, involvement in forums might sustain their existence long enough to give civics time for find a new basis.

On the other hand, if forums are indeed going to assist the continued existence of civics, they could do so in ways which will fragment civics. This fragmentation might follow the sectors in which forums are organised, disaggregating civics along sectoral lines.

Each one of the sectors within which forums operate at a national level is of sufficient critical mass to keep an organisation going. Backlogs in housing are so big that even if all the policy recommendations coming from the National Housing Forum were to be accepted, it would still take between 10 and 20 years to house all who require it. Similarly there are so many dwellings without electricity that with all the right policies and the best will in the world, it will take a long time to deliver.

Forums are a good basis for civics to shift from their apartheid-derived basis to a new set of problems and issues

In other words, the continued existence of forums, together with the real hardships experienced by people, are a good basis for civics to shift from their apartheid-derived basis to a new set of issues and problems.

The trend towards a strong civil society gives theoretical justification for civics

Civil society

Another emerging trend is the elevation of civil society. So important has civil society become that a large number of groups are keen to define themselves in terms which make it clear that they are located in civil society.

So popular has the concept become that even people who are going to be in the state are advancing the view that for the sake of good governance in future, a strong civil society is crucial. It must be built, nurtured and supported. Some have gone to an extent of suggesting that the state should fund civil society groups.

This trend gives theoretical justification for civics, as a part of civil society, to continue to exist and play a role in governance. It is a lofty and laudable objective and seems a sufficiently attractive base for some to seek to build civics which will engage in this role.

In many instances organisations which purport to represent the marginalised tend to reflect the preferences of elites

Yet another trend which might contribute towards ensuring the survival of civics is a relatively new theory of development which has won adherents even among conservatives. This is the peoples-centred development theory, which posits that in all processes of development, people must come first. Possibly without intending it, this theory has made organisations representing the marginalised prominent in the development process.

In South Africa groups like civics have benefited considerably. In an attempt to adopt a peoples-centred approach, developers in a number of areas have sought out the local civic before embarking on their work.

Organisations of the marginalised and the marginalised themselves might in many circumstances not be the same thing. In many instances organisations which purport to represent the marginalised tend to reflect the preferences of elites. While it is laudable to elevate the position of groups representing the marginalised in development processes, it should not be assumed that the interests of the two categories always coincide.

The organisational form of civics might change, but not their essence

This rise of the importance of civil society is crucial because it signals that groups like civics should ensure that they are around for democracy to survive. It gives a politically astute justification for some to continue to work in civics and make sure that they exist in the future. It reserves a proud place for civil society in the emerging democratic order.

Shack settlements

The staggering housing shortage in South Africa has spawned the growth of vast informal settlements. There are more informal houses being produced than formal houses. Community growth is therefore in informal settlements, where basic collective consumption items are either under-supplied or not available at all.

Civics-like groups and a variety of community organisations have been formed in many of these settlements. An emerging trend here is that groups which purport to be civics, but are different from the dominant forms of civics, are likely to be around in the future.

Some of these groups are identical to civics, and are affiliated to them, such as the Orange Farm Civic Association. This trend suggests that the organisational form of civics might change, but not their essence. There is a distinct possibility that civics-like groups which emerge in informal settlements will in time adopt radical methods of advancing their demands, similar to those employed by the civics in the 1980s.

Conclusion

The new order is dawning but civics are not disappearing as anticipated. In fact, rather than vanishing, civics continue to play a role and are sought out by groups wanting to engage in development work. There is a possibility, however, that the form in which civics have existed until now might change.

Not only could the constituencies of civics change, but also the context within which their struggles are waged. However, considering how loudly the African National Congress Alliance has been extolling the virtues of civil society, it would be difficult for a Government of National Unity not to support them in the future. IPM

ECONOMIC MONITOR



Changing Party Choice (inc luding all population groups, TBVC states and no-choice respondents



Source: Johnson RW and L Schlemmer. *Launching Democracy: Second National Survey on Issues relevant to a Free and Fair Election: February 1994.* Launching Democracy project is sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council (MarkData)



Anyway, we hope you enjoyed the Vivaldi

THE MAGIC CIRCLE

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South Africa needs a new economic growth path that finds a different relationship between mass production and consumption, more skills and genuine education qualifications, and a greater spread of benefits and opportunities to far wider circles of its population if it is to successfully participate in a rapidly changing world.

South Africans like to think of themselves as different. It is true that they have a penchant for Grail seeking. They look for utopias in foreign polities or foreign economies, whether it be the City of London or the beaches of California, Cuba or the workshops of the Republic of Korea.

But they are apt to see their own situation as unique, and are in dialogue far more with themselves than with the wider world. It is a characteristic more typical of far bigger nations, such as Russia or the United States, and it is one which South Africans of various colours share.

There are two useful ways to consider the South African situation within a broader international framework. The first lies in South Africa's presence as a significant economic actor in international trade and the impact of global trends on South Africa's economy.

Here South Africa shares the problems of every modern country. Increasingly, each country must attempt to find the most effective and appropriate niche in the complex of international economic activities and then work to advance its situation.

The second lies in the process of democratisation. Failure in the first category is apt to make gains in this second category transient and unconvincing. The painful events being experienced by some of our fellow African countries, such as Burundi, Zaire and Nigeria, are salutary in this regard.

Extroverted

South Africa has had a relatively extroverted economy. Exports and imports play a fairly large part in her economic relationships by international comparison. The most important contribution this country has made to the international economy has stemmed from the mining industry, both precious and industrial minerals. For a long time, mining laid the fiscal basis on which a modern state could develop and around which urban and industrial activity took off.

Until the last decade, this was a very impressive contribution compared to colonial Africa. In countries such as Ghana or Zambia, mining did not generate more than revenue for the state. Little industrial activity resulted and the mines have the character of enclaves created for the purposes of overseas industries. South Africa utilised its mines to 'take off' industrially - or so it seemed.

Intimately linked to state initiatives, a modern agricultural sector which exports substantial amounts of grains, fruits and wine has also developed. But the quality of South African land has required a mounting spiral of inputs over the past 20-30 years especially.

Inputs in the form of chemical additives and financial support from the state has built up indebtedness and cost in terms of imports. South African agricultural capitalism is characterised by a negative international trade balance in most years, heavy debts and low productivity in many spheres.

Secondary industry in South Africa has complex origins but it has never been competitive internationally. Important sectors such as automobiles and chemicals are heavily import-dependent while others such as textiles rely on stringent state protection to survive.

While a modest industrial development emerged historically, much industrial development has depended on protection

South Africa shares the problems of every modern country - to find the most effective and appropriate niche in the international economy

South African agricultural capitalism is characterised by a negative international trade balance, heavy debts and low productivity

Few ventured to consider that the size of the South African economy was not such that these benefits could not simply be extended to the majority

behind tariff barriers that either encouraged international firms to produce locally or South African capitalists to produce without fear of international competition.

South African industrial exports historically depended on the regional market which consisted of countries with small and poor consumer populations but linked to South Africa by a good transport infrastructure.

The main successes further afield have come from sectors such as timber and steel. The quality of South African industrial products is quite respectable but manufacturers have never had an exporting vocation nor are their costs competitive taken in conjunction with quality.

Growth

Despite these weaknesses, until quite recently South Africa would have been placed by most in the ranks of those countries which have put this kind of specialisation to good use through the high quality of its primary products and to the perennial demand for agriculture and mining products.

Much of business sees the answer in a business-led corporatism and more competitive wages

For its white minority, the resource-based economy paid for a high living standard and an infrastructure impressive by global standards. However deplorable it was that this economy limited its benefits to a minority, few ventured to consider that its size was not such that these benefits could not simply be extended to the majority.

This was arguably true even for the radical school that propagated the centrality of low wages and 'extra-economic coercion' - compounds, passes, migrant control etc. - as built into the successes of the mining economy. The radical never took the logical step to conclude that the economy might collapse without these features. The Freedom Charter and other political documents raised demands for redistribution while taking economic growth essentially for granted.

The minority approach argues instead for critical interventions by the state to favour niches that can become internationally competitive

Unfortunately, the changing global economic environment has become increasingly unfriendly to countries like South Africa. Economic growth, apart from a deceptive early phase when gold prices skyrocketed, has been faltering and particularly unimpressive compared to population growth or as measured in job creation.

The mining economy increasingly lost it capacity to deliver. No longer the goose that lays the golden egg, it now fails to produce a very substantial tax base for the state. The diamond industry suffers from glut in years of trade stagnation. Industrial metals, such as chrome, tin, iron ore, copper and uranium have steadily declined in value as international commodities while international commerce is rapidly shifting not just to manufactured goods, but to higher quality manufactured goods.

South Africa's natural 'captive market' for industrial production in the region consists of countries seriously affected by these trends, coupled with the losses suffered through the destabilisation efforts of the South African. It is not easy to see a cooperative economic network building mutually beneficial growth of real significance in these circumstances.

Those structural features which, within a particular social and political context, served South African capital well and allowed for many years of impressive economic growth, while not yet rendered useless or disastrously counter-productive, have been leading down a cul-de-sac, the end of which is now far more clearly in sight.

New directions

The international trading and financial situation in which post-apartheid South Africa finds itself is no longer one where growth is unproblematic or simply a phenomenon that will flow from good management and a restoration of more peaceful conditions.

South Africa will have to expand her economic relations with the rest of the world on a new basis, one in which more sophisticated industrial products play a key part and where diffusion of information and competition in prices and quality take on a new dimension.

Much of South African business, beset by the militant and intensely politicised trade unionism of the past 15 years, sees the answer in a business-led corporatism and in low, supposedly more competitive wages that work together with higher productivity in the context of a defanged labour force, defanged perhaps by the African National Congress.

There is a minority view which rejects this approach, arguing instead for a differently constituted industrial policy. In the era just ending, South Africa's industrial policy focused on security and self-sufficiency.

The critical approach argues instead for critical interventions by the state to favour niches that can become internationally competitive, improved Research and Development and a more enlightened

corporatism. Unsurprisingly this approach has achieved much support within the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

In some respects this model is copied from the Newly Industrialising Countries of Asia, where strategic state industrial policy has been fundamental to economic growth. Such countries have been able either to bully or to appeal to their own capitalists, who historically have been in very weak positions.

South Africa is different. Big business is relatively strong and sure of its ways. Yet, given the political compromise currently being enacted, the post-apartheid state is not going to be in a position, even were that the wishes of a new government, to nationalise enterprise on a significant scale. Much of the dynamism for a new direction will have to come from the private sector.

At the same time, the South Africa's political and social situation is a crucial component in assessing the economic dimensions of the whole transitional era that is now underway. If one takes the crude indicator of per capita-income, the South African population as a whole now finds itself at a level not very different from, amongst other countries, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, Malaysia.

Latins and dragons

Such countries are often very dynamic. They may logically be expected to be quite good at producing relatively inexpensive consumer goods, to have a pulsating informal sector and a labour market which provides low-wage jobs.

One key advantage of many such countries is that workers can afford to live on low wages because of the nature of the infrastructure. The availability of land to a peasantry following significant land reform has been a great benefit to social stability and a useful handmaiden to industrialisation in a number of Asian countries.

These features are hardly true of South Africa. If anything, South Africa has completely different strengths that one would associate with a far richer country. It is surprisingly sophisticated in some economic sectors. But it is particularly ineffective at producing for the mass market.

For a country of South Africa's level of wealth, the broad health indices are surprisingly bad. One reason why wages are higher than in many Asian countries is that the cost of living, notably transport but also to some extent food, is also high. Transport costs, in part because of the spatial dimensions of apartheid policy, often take up a huge percentage of wages, sometimes higher than the percentage devoted to housing. The diffusion of work related skills and adequate levels of numeracy and literacy, despite considerable spending on education, is low. This is part of the reason for the drastic differentials in wages and salaries.

Skills and educational qualifications are munificently awarded and scarce, perhaps artificially scarce. Managers and professional people in South Africa expect to live at a standard far higher than in eastern Europe or Asia. The gap between skilled and semi-skilled wages is also very big.

Balance

The power relations in South African society reproduced a relatively small affluent society. Outside that circle, the state attempted to preserve as much as possible a rural African society at a low standard of welfare with a minimum of demands on industrial society. Today that rural society has largely collapsed. At the most basic level, the need is for bringing some of that security back through access to cheap land, a major impetus for land reform.

However, more crucially, there is a demand for jobs. The global circumstances for job provision for men and women with limited skills and education is very negative. Everywhere production is becoming more efficient in its use of labour and outstripping the expansion of the labour market more and more dramatically.

The most impressive feature of Korea is that its economic development, which contains many very negative features, nonetheless has occurred in a context of balance between industry, agriculture, wages and population growth.

In South Africa, this balance is lacking and the relationship out of control. As agriculture lets workers go, there is little space for them in the urban economy. The rural economy contains few opportunities outside agriculture for self-employment or other productive forms of survival. The decline of the large, extended family unit has pushed forth onto the job market very large numbers of needy individuals.

The 'growth path' which South African capitalists know and practise is one singularly lacking in opportunities for the poor, focused as it is on diminishing use of labour now that it is no longer so cheap or dependent. Census

Much of the dynamism for a new direction will have to come from the private sector

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The growth path which South African capitalists know and practise is one singularly lacking in opportunities for the poor

This is an economy which cannot readily meet the demands placed on it by the masses

results suggests that the proportion of Africans in the industrial workforce of this country is actually slightly diminishing today.

Apartheid worked hard to restructure the economy away from the informal sector, away from untidiness and petty trade and manufactures that can soak up the poor, to create society of high standards and expensive forms of production. With the decline in apartheid controls, the informal sector in South Africa has expanded again rapidly but it is rather marginally involved in production as opposed to commerce and service.

Delivery

This is a society which bears the mark of strong administrative control and little democracy, an economy which cannot readily, despite impressive capacity in some respects, meet the kind of demands placed on it by the masses.

A decaying and dangerous urban environment will militate against the economic provision of improved services

The newly enfranchised will have multifold demands and those who will depend on their votes need to worry about delivering. Corporatist solutions that are too detached from the delivery issue will be difficult to make stick in this new environment.

Failure to deliver in legitimate terms is apt to encourage the world of crime, anti-social behaviour and decay of the built environment that will actually make qualitative changes in the economic environment hard or impossible to implement.

A decaying and dangerous urban environment can only inhibit the development of a service sector which could serve much of Africa, or the expansion of a tourist industry. It will militate against the economic provision of improved services. Moreover, the divisions in South Africa will simmer in a way which can be politically explosive even if the consequences of non-delivery may not initially be revolutionary.

Effective delivery means turning around the resistance that characterised the struggle against apartheid

Effective delivery means turning around the resistance that characterised the struggle against apartheid: creating incentives for getting things done and maximising the distribution of resources and opportunities.

The current nostrum of development studies are not going to be sufficient for this purpose. The most considered formulae derived from the best industrial practice in the developed or the developing world will need to be applied within new relations between the state and business. But they are not enough.

Two basic additional actors are at play: the need for jobs at lower skill levels, job growth which can feed into productive and/or socially useful activity without disastrous monetary inflation accompanying it; and the need for less striking differentials between those inside and outside the magic circle. Skill levels need to be raised and skills diffused while becoming less scarce and expensive.

Improvements in infrastructure and the social wage need to be instituted. This may make possible a more competitive wage structure at the workplace whilst living standards go up. State services need to be made more efficient and less wasteful.

Conclusion

In summary, the economic development of South Africa has of course reflected its political life: an authoritarian, at times paternalist and colonial type system for Africans and a relatively democratic society for the white minority.

Ironing out the differences, getting it right in the new era at first sight would seem to call for strong state leadership that could manipulate and force its way on civil society. This does not currently seem to be an option.

It is not going to be possible for economic policy in South Africa to be made in authoritarian ways with discipline derived from the firm command of a hegemonic state.

The transition process accords with pressures for social and economic democratisation and which may not tolerate guidance from Big Brother even for the best of reasons.

The challenge of transition is a major one. The economic aspects of the transition require at their deepest the formulation by major players of a historically new 'growth path'.

That growth path will have to find a different relationship between mass production and consumption, far more widely diffused skills and genuine educational qualifications to bring about successful participation of South Africa in a rapidly changing world economic order, and to ensure a more acceptable of benefits and opportunities to far wider circles of the population.

Meeting both these goals is a tall order. If the path is not found, the achievement of the transition will be tarnished and the road ahead potentially full of troubles. IPA

Financing the Future

By Mike McGrath
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As one of the most disadvantaged regions in South Africa, KwaZulu/Natal needs to find mechanisms to tap into a greater share of central government funds. To do this, it needs to establish a commission which will, among other things, lobby this region's preferences for fiscal arrangements.

South Africa's interim constitution heralds major changes to the ways in which regions will be financed. It specifies that regions, which until now have received vastly different levels of funding, should have a right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally.

A Fiscal and Finance Commission is to be created to make recommendations on they way regions should be funded in future, and how financial allocations can be made more equitable A significant increase of resources to underfunded regions will be needed if comparable levels of service are to be attained across South Africa.

Changes made will in the long term crucially effect the future of all the regions and the lives of people living in them. The short-term working group of the KwaZulu/Natal Regional Economic Forum commissioned this report on the allocation of central government revenue to the region, as well as criteria for allocating revenue and funds for infrastructural provision.

It represents only the beginning of research on fiscal issues relating to this region. Many other areas will require urgent attention, including the financing of local government; the attainment of cost-effectiveness in the delivery of services; the minimising of overhead costs and administrative rationalisation; and the expansion and redistribution of government services. A growth and development strategy is needed to inform these decisions.

Present funding

The provincial administrations relied heavily on central government to finance about 88% of their expenditures, and received these funds in much the same way as central government departments, with allocations made according to central government priorities and available resources.

In the past, these allocations were made largely on a incremental basis, instead of analysing fiscal needs according to the principle of zero-based budgeting. The result is that over the years, biases were built into the relative shares of the different provinces.

Allocations were in the past made largely on a incremental basis, resulting over the years in biases being built into the different provincial shares

Hanlie Croeser notes the following problems with the present system of financing regional government:

- A lack of own revenue sources has resulted in reliance on central government transfers, and the absence of any direct link between expenditure decisions and their financing.
- Lack of economic viability of some of the regions, especially the self-governing territories and the TBVC states. Though these regions have access to various own revenue sources, their receipts are very limited due to lack of economic development, while their expenditure needs are high.
- The ad hoc nature of current transfers to regional governments creates uncertainty, hampers long-term planing and undermines accountability.

To bring about comparable levels of services across the regions will require major transfers from central government

For KwaZulu/Natal there is a further problem that the present system of financing has not produced horizontal equity in the provision of services at the regional level.

Regional inequalities

Deloitte and Touche consultants report a high level of poverty and undervelopment according to economic indicators in KwaZulu/Natal. Their report showed that in 1990 the region accounted for 23% of South Africa's population, but generated only 14,7% of its Gross Domestic Product.

Its level of GDP per head of population was the second lowest among the nine development regions. KwaZulu/Natal can only provide employment for only 35% of its labour force, compared to an absorption rate of 49% in South Africa as a whole.

The Deloitte and Touche report shows that despite virtually equal populations in terms of size, government consumption spending in KwaZulu/Natal is less than one third of that of the PWV region.

In the short term the transfer will be of such a magnitude that they will impose severe strain on the fiscal system

Health expenditure per capita is 12% less than in the Transvaal, 24,2% less than in the OFS, and 77% less than in the Cape. In aggregate, KwaZulu/Natal receives less than 20% of total health funds to provide service to 25,9% of the country's population. In education, the region delivers the third lowest expenditure per pupil and the highest pupil teacher ratio of 40:1.

In terms of urbanisation and infrastructure, Deloitte and Touche also argue that there are severe shortfalls in terms of needs. They report that even though the urbanisation ratio is below the national average, housing is in short supply and informal settlements have mushroomed.

The road network is in a state of crisis. KwaZulu/Natal's roads carry the heaviest traffic per kilometre, but road funds have shrunk by 55% in real terms over the past decade.

A Fiscal and Finance Commission (FFC) is to be created to recommend on a wide range of fiscal and financing matters

The conclusion is that a significant increase of resources must be effected to regions with low per capita expenditures on services, if comparable levels of service are to be provided irrespective of region of residence.

However, provincial per capita income disparities indicate that financing this will require major transfers from central government. In the short term, the transfers will be of such a magnitude that they will impose severe strains on the fiscal system.

Economies of scale

In providing regional services, there are fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs are irrespective of the output of provincial government services. The variable costs relate to the size of the population served - particularly of services rendered to specific individuals, such as education, welfare and health, but even the cost of road provision relates to population size.

Andre Du Pisanie estimates that for most of the proposed regions, population size is sufficiently large for differences in average fixed cost per capita to have a relatively small effect on the cost of services. Nevertheless, the differences in cost attributable to economies of scale are not insignificant if equity in levels of funding is desired.

New criteria

The new fiscal regime for provinces will introduce major changes in goals and financing arrangements. It is specified that services should be provided at the level of government at which decisions can be made most effectively, but that the constitution should empower the national government to establish certain minimum standards. It is also specified that regions should have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally.

Finally, a Fiscal and Finance Commission (FFC) is to be created to recommend on a wide range of fiscal and financing matters, including equitable financial allocations to the provincial governments.

The constitution sets central government the following tasks, subject to constitutional constraints, with respect to regional finance:

- To determine the total sum of grants from the centre, taking account of the requirement of an equitable distribution;
- To balance general purpose and specific purpose grants;
- To fix the level of regional borrowing;
- To determine what taxes are under regional control; and
- To set the parameters within which regions may vary the taxes under their control.

Regional governments have the following responsibilities:

- To set the base and rates of their own taxes, within central government parameters;
- To decide the regional budget;

- To decide regional borrowing within the rules of the centre; and
- To set user charges for certain services, subject to the constitution.

The FFC is given a central role in fiscal matters. It is required to make recommendations to government on fiscal policies, equitable regional allocation of central revenues and the raising of provincial or local government loans.

It is likely to be especially useful in the early years of the new constitution in helping to set precedents regarding what equitable and efficient systems of fiscal governance are.

The FFC is likely to be especially useful in setting precedents regarding equitable and efficient fiscal governance

From its inception, the FFC will have to consider problems such as the funding of KwaZulu/Natal. A recommendation of this report is that the provincial government should establish a regional body, similar to the Commission, to guide the formation of regional fiscal policy and prepare submissions to the FFC.

Fiscal principles

The Consultative Business Movement (CBM) has attempted to develop norms for fiscal relationships under the Interim Constitution. It suggests that two overarching principles should govern these relationships: that of governmental fiscal responsibility, and that of fiscal equalisation.

Fiscal equalisation requires that each region should receive a level of general revenue funding from the surplus pool of funds, which would enable it to provide government services comparable to the standards of other regions.

Full application of this requires that each region receive financial assistance equal to the difference between the expenditure required to maintain agreed standards and the revenue available to it, given a revenue-raising effort equal to that of the other regions.

In general, the pool of resources available will be less than the assistance required by all regions to meet the standard level of services. To address this, the contributions to the regions should be such that the disparity in the level of services is minimised.

The CBM argues that disparities will be reduced most quickly by setting the basic standard at the level of the region with the highest overall standard. Given the inability to satisfy the need deficits of all regions, a weaker principle of constrained fiscal equalisation is proposed in the interim. This requires that the gap between needs and resources be distributed across the regions in a way that minimises the impact for regions with the greatest need for equalisation.

The CBM argues that disparities will be reduced most quickly by setting the basic standard at the level of the region with the highest overall standard

Because of widely varying provincial inequalities in per capita levels of services, the attainment of minimum differentials will not be possible in the short-term and will require sustained economic growth to expand government revenue.

It is not inevitable that either of these norms will be applied. Norms could be based on expenditure per capita in the provision of services. In the short term, norms might be derived from the average level of funding of all regions, and during the transitional period provinces with above average levels need not have their funding reduced to lower than the average. However, average levels of expenditure embody the structures of the present system of government and the apartheid system.

Regional financing

The academic public finance literature and conventional wisdom provide pointers which might be material in arguing for a fiscal regime which the KwaZulu/Natal region considers most conducive to promoting the welfare of its citizens:

- Greater regional autonomy and devolution in expenditure powers will exist when a region has greater powers over its revenue gathering.
- Wide differences in tax arrangements by region can lead to inefficient decisions in resource allocations, migration of labour and capital, and horizontal inequity in the sense that people could pay very different levels of taxes while receiving similar provisions of service.
- Greater regional autonomy will be attained when tax sharing arrangements from the centre are enshrined in the constitution, and when transfers in the form of grants from central government are made in general purpose rather than specific grants.
- Central governments have often used specific grants to finance spending on particular services, but evidence in the United States indicates that specific grants do not necessarily encourage greater levels of the service targeted than equal value lump some grants.
- Taxes should be collected in the most cost-effective fashion. The CBM's conclusion is that in practice, the major sources of tax revenue in the South

The KwaZulu/Natal provincial government should establish a regional body to make submissions to the FFC

The experiences of developing countries is that limited tax bases and vast inter-regional economic disparities can impose severe strains on the political system

African economy should continue to be collected centrally.

- When regional surcharges (for example on personal income tax - an option recommended by Croeser) are allowed, a concomitant reduction in the basic rate at central government level should be implemented.
- Grants from central government which are some function of regional tax effort will promote efficiency in resource allocation at the regional level, but will increase uncertainty in central government budgeting. It is possible to devise several variants of grant schemes which attain the dual goals of revenue sharing and fiscal equalisation.
- The experiences of developing countries which have implemented variants of fiscal-federalism is that limited tax bases and vast inter-regional economic disparities can impose severe strains on the political system.

Recommendations

From the start of the new financing regime, regions should be given some discretion in setting surcharges on certain overlapping taxes

The FFC will be charged with recommending the financing arrangements which will be followed in future years, and it is clear that regions should prepare to make submissions to this body as soon as it comes into effect.

The new regional government of KwaZulu/Natal will need to formulate its inputs to the FFC, devise financial relationships with local and metropolitan governments, investigate the intra-regional distribution of services and establish its expenditure priorities.

It is recommended that the new regional government establish a regional body, a Regional Financing and Fiscal Commission (RFFC), to advise on regional financing and fiscal issues. Their key tasks could be:

- To prepare submissions to the FFC on the needs deficits of the region, the estimated cost of improving services such as education, health, housing, water supply and sanitation and roads. Capital costs and current operating costs should be estimated, and an attempt should be made to indicate expenditure priorities and indicate, if possible, a tentative programme over time for redressing the shortfall. This should be done within the context of a regional development strategy.
- To research the intra-regional distribution of government services, and advise on the financial implications of regional growth and development strategies.
- To make recommendations about inter-regional norms for the provision of services for submission to the FFC. Norms to guide the equitable distribution of revenues to regions have yet to be devised at a national government level and the region must make an input on this crucial matter.
- Make recommendations about KwaZulu/Natal's preferences for fiscal arrangements.

While deciding preferences for future fiscal arrangements, a regional Commission should take into account that any future financing dispensation should allow scope for the evolution over time of the financing models of the regions.

The system adopted should be as simple to implement as possible, and operation of the financial allocation process should be completely open and transparent, and the evolutionary goal of the system should be to attain fiscal equalisation in the sense of equal levels of expenditure per capita by region, after compensating for variations in fiscal capacity and unit cost.

Indexes of need should not simply be based on historical levels of per capita expenditures - either average expenditures of the regions or the expenditure level of the most favoured region.

In the early years of developing the financing model, considerable use will have to be made of grants for services and capital expenditures. However, the aim should be to move away from specific grant finance over time and as regional disparities in levels of service and fiscal capacity are narrowed.

From the start of the new financing regime, regions should be given some discretion in setting surcharges on certain overlapping taxes. One which should be considered is individual personal income taxation. In this way fiscal responsibility will be promoted. However, upper limits on these surcharges should be prescribed by the centre.

And, finally, a proposed 'ideal financing model' should be developed by the FFC and should be widely debated as the target towards which the system could evolve. The Australian model - which provides an example of evolutionary change and an attempt to ensure fiscal equalisation, while taking into account regional needs - looks promising because of its adaptability to South African conditions and it simplicity. IPM

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Manufacturing Change

By Avril Joffe, David Kaplan, Raphael Kaplinsky and David Lewis
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Researchers spent two years investigating the competitiveness of South African industry: its ability to grow, to withstand global competition and to meet basic needs, and the role policy plays in industrial evolution. The major findings of the Industrial Strategy Project, initiated by Cosatu and the Economic Trends Research Group, are reported here.

South Africa is making the transition to democracy in an inauspicious economic climate. There are, of course, multiple causes for the fall in real per capita incomes since the early 1980s, but it would be a mistake not to flag the central role played by declining rates of industrial accumulation.

More particularly, since 'industry' includes both utilities and mining - which, with the exception of gold, has performed strongly over this period - it is in the weak growth record of the manufacturing sector that the key to South African economic decline lies. Similarly it is almost certainly in the reinvigoration of manufacturing that a rosier economic future rests in the post-apartheid era.

These inauspicious domestic circumstances are compounded by the current global environment. With the exception of China and a few of the second-tier Asian and Latin American newly industrialising countries (NICs), there has been a universal downward trend in growth rates.

Entry in external markets is increasingly difficult, partly because of the growth of protectionist barriers in key, large economies and partly because of heightened competition. At the same time, most of the developing world (including South Africa) is being forced to open domestic markets to imports. Thus global competition increasingly impinges upon manufacturing in virtually all economies.

Competition

The challenges posed by these global developments do not only arise from a heightened level of competition, but also from its changing structure. There is growing evidence from a range of economic sectors that the basis of competitive performance has been changing.

South Africa is making the transition to democracy in an inauspicious economic climate

In the past competition has largely been determined by price, but it is increasingly coming to be affected by a range of additional product-oriented factors. These include product quality, product variety and differentiation, and the speed of innovation.

In order to achieve these competititive attributes, producers are required to be increasingly flexibile, both with respect to their output structures and the use of their inputs. Although a number of factors contribute to this flexibility, it is clear that organisational components play a prominent role.

This organisational restructuring involves different types of inter-firm linkages, new types of relationships between design, marketing and production specialities within firms, and flatter corporate hierarchies that permit the introduction of new forms of work organisation and which play a critical role in achieving the necessary flexibility and product-qualifying production parameters.

The basis of competitive performance has been changing

Comparative global evidence suggests that the search for greater flexibility is also

Table1: Investment overall

Year	Gross Domestic Fixed Investment to GDP
1978	26,4
1979	26,2
1980	26,2
1981	27,8
1982	27,9
1983	26,8
1984	24,4
1985	23,3
1986	20,2
1987	19,1
1988	19,9
1989	20,8
1990	20,0
1991	18,0
1992	15,9
1993	15,0 *

* First Quarter, 1993. *South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin*

associated with rises in both capital and labour productivity; it hence also facilitates price competitive production.

In these changing global circumstances the ability to compete internationally arises less from access to reservoirs of cheap labour and natural resources, than from an endowment of widely spread skills. A post-apartheid South African economy thus faces a series of critical challenges.

The ability to compete internationally arises less from access to reservoirs of cheap labour and natural resources, than from an endowment of widely spread skills

Over the past two decades the manufacturing sector has been unable to compete effectively in external markets and the recent moderate growth of manufactured exports has arisen primarily from a combination of exports subsidies and the recession in the domestic market. In many sectors the ability of manufacturers to compete in the domestic market has reflected the effectiveness of import controls.

Research

A large group of researchers - representing between 25 and 30 person years of effort - have been addressing both the threats and opportunities facing South Africa's industrial (and especially its manufacturing) sector.

This project - the Industrial Strategy Project - initiated by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the Economic Trends Research Group has, since January 1992, been investigating the competitive status of 13 of South Africa's industrial sectors, assessing not only their abilities to withstand global competition, but also their potential for meeting basic needs.

The Industrial Strategy Project has also considered the role played by competition policy, trade policy, technology policy and regional policy in South Africa's industrial evolution.

This article reports some of the findings of this team and suggests a framework in which a policy agenda for promoting the international competitiveness of South African industry may be developed. This enhanced competitiveness is necessary both to meet the threat of import competition and to penetrate external markets more effectively.

The strategy which is laid out shows the strong positive association between the requirements to increase the rate of growth and those which will address some of South Africa's more pressing basic needs.

In addition to specifically targeting the basic components of low-wage consumption, the strategy rests on the premise (based on research findings in South Africa and abroad) that the roots to a revival of productivity growth lie in an altered distribution of power relations, within production and in the social determination of resource allocation.

Unless the underlying problems of productivity-growth are overcome, there will be little chance of a more development-oriented government tackling South Africa's acute social and economic problems.

Performance, 1970-1992

Over the past two decades the manufacturing sector has developed a number of distinctive characteristics:

- Manufacturing value added has not increased since 1981.
- Employment in manufacturing has been stable since 1980 and has fallen by seven per cent over the past two years.
- The economy-wide rate of investment fell from more than 26% of Gross Domestic Product in 1980 to 15% in the first quarter of 1993. The size of aggregate capital stock in the industrial sector fell by 10% between 1984 and 1990.
- It is the most capital intensive sectors which have maintained their growth rate. For example, the sanctions-busting chemicals sector (with a capital cost per job in 1990 of R631 000) now accounts for almost 40% of total capital stock, whereas the combined share of the labour

intensive clothing (R2 400 per workplace) and shoe industries (R7 400) is only 0.6%. The absolute value of capital stock in the clothing sector fell by almost 40% between 1972 and 1990.

Export performance has been poor, in part because of sanctions. The recent growth in manufactured exports has been fuelled by a costly export incentive scheme and our researchers have found little evidence of a strategic reorientation by manufacturing firms towards the external market.

Total factor productivity growth in manufacturing declined by 1,02% per annum between 1972 and 1990.

Unlike other countries with similar per capita incomes, South Africa's informal manufacturing sector is poorly developed.

Strategy objectives

Four linked objectives can be feasibly targeted by Industrial Strategy.

❑ ***Raising productivity***

Raising productivity in manufacturing lies at the heart of the proposed Industrial Strategy. This involves a dual challenge of bringing South African firms closer to the international frontier and closing the gap within manufacturing between high and low-productivity firms.

As noted, there is extensive international experience which makes it clear that the raising of productivity requires paying particular attention to the disembodied organisational components of production.

❑ ***Employment creation***

Outside of the microenterprise sector, manufacturing's direct contribution to employment is unlikely to be significant and will be in high productivity-high wage jobs. But indirectly it will facilitate employment growth by relaxing the balance of payments constraint and by making it possible to create employment in the service sector and in the provision of social infrastructure.

❑ ***Reviving investment***

While there is considerable scope for improving the productivity of investment, the decline in the absolute size of the capital stock makes it imperative that the rate of industrial investment be enhanced if output growth is to be revived.

❑ ***Improving trade performance***

Past economic growth has been hampered by poor performance on the trade front. For example, the capacity to import index (which reflects both the terms of trade and export growth) fell over the 1980s. This suggests the need both to improve overall levels of manufactured exports and to make the transition to higher value products which are not subject to declining terms of trade.

It is imperative that the rate of industrial development be enhanced if output growth is to be revived

The proposed strategy

Partly because of past policies promoting import substitution and partly as a consequence of sanctions, South African manufacturing is unusually diversified and is characterised by a lack of specialisation. A greater measure of focus is thus necessary if the objectives of Industrial Strategy are to be met. Five strategic initiatives are required to meet the objectives outlined above.

❑ ***Moving up the value chain***

The ability of the South African manufacturing sector to compete internationally is circumscribed by wage levels which, while similar to those in Mexico and Brazil, are significantly higher than those in many of the Asian developing economies.

Instead of reducing South African wages to these low levels, it is proposed that the value added in production be raised to reflect the need for a 'living wage'. This involves the move both to sectors of higher value added and the transition within sectors to niches of higher value added.

In each sector this will require the choice of products and processes which involve higher levels of skill and design, make better use of the sophisticated financial and technological infrastructure and South Africa's unique endowment of natural resources.

Instead of reducing, it is proposed that the value added in production be raised

❑ ***Lowering the cost of living***

One of the paradoxes of South African manufacturing is that high relative wages coexist with low standards of living. This is a complex phenomenon, partly arising from apartheid's grotesque priorities in social infrastructure provision and partly as a consequence of the underspecialised nature of South African manufacturing.

In this latter respect, the price tag of basic wage goods has been increased by a combination of low productivity and the high costs of production of many domestically manufactured goods.

One of the paradoxes is that high relative wages coexist with low standards of living

It is unlikely that South Africa will be able to replicate the successful experience of South Korea

The strategic response to this paradox is twofold. First, there is a need to gradually vacate those sub-sectors producing for basic needs in which South African producers are unable to compete effectively with imports from low-wage economies. Secondly, there is considerable opportunity for lowering the cost of production of many wage goods, including by promoting the activities of the microenterprise sector.

❑ *'Targeting': improving the competitive fundamentals*

Moving up the value chain and lowering the cost of basic wage goods presupposes a measure of targeting. For a variety of reasons it is unlikely that South Africa will be able to replicate the successful experience of South Korea in which specific sectors and sub-sectors were identified for expansion in the context of a relatively undiversified economy.

Instead, the strategic focus should lie on targeting the competitive fundamentals which underlie manufacturing productivity growth to encourage an appropriate transition in industrial structure. These fundamentals include skill acquisition, technology diffusion and the institutional fabric required to upgrade key industrial capabilities.

There is an urgent need to improve productivity growth

However, there may be particular circumstances where private capital is unwilling to invest in projects which are of a longer term nature, and where there may be the need for a more targeted approach towards investment.

❑ *Enhancing productivity*

In the light of the performance of the South African economy over the past two decades, there is an urgent need to improve productivity growth. This is necessary inorder to compete effectively with imports, to penetrate external markets and to supply basic wage goods (with low tradeable content) at low cost and with high quality.

The domain of policy formation cannot be confined to the state

Through a flattening of managerial hierarchies, changes in work organisation and the development of a more skilled labour force, the path to productivity enhancement is simultaneously redistributive.

❑ *Addressing distributional issues*

The major distributional challenges facing a post-apartheid administration will have to be met by a policy response at the level of macroeconomic management and resource allocation. Nevertheless, in addition to the productivity enhancing changes in work organisation necessary to revive productivity growth, there are a number of respects in which an appropriately focused industrial strategy can help to meet these distributional targets.

Sector specific strategies in the building materials sector will facilitate the provision of basic housing and infrastructure. In addition, the higher wages which will come as a consequence of moving up the value chain will contribute to a reduction in one element of income inequality.

Thirdly, the promotion of the micro-enterprise sector will increase employment as well as incomes within this sector and hence reduce another element of income inequality. And, fourthly, the Industrial Strategy will need to focus on the supply of basic housing and infrastructural goods which are important elements of low income consumption.

Industrial policy

The central elements of both the objectives and the strategic focus of an Industrial Strategy designed to promote appropriate forms of industrial restructuring have been briefly described. These need to be translated into policy if industrial growth is to be revived.

But 'policy' should not be thought of as an abstract process in which restructuring emerges from an elegant definition of direction. Instead it only has concrete meaning when it leads to changes in the allocation of effort and resources.

Hence the domain of policy formation cannot be confined to the state, but must also include active participation by other stakeholders in the process of production, distribution and consumption.

The policy framework addressed in this Industrial Strategy is composed of three elements. The first recognises the powerful productivity enhancing incentives that can flow from market relations.

The key market signals affecting allocations in South Africa are those which affect the inward and outward bias in production (that is, trade policy) and that which focuses on the competitive environment (competitions policy).

Nevertheless even when markets function effectively, they do not provide adequate signals to facilitate the industrial restructuring which is required in South Africa. It is also

necessary to specifically target the need to build industrial and technological capabilities, particularly those which are relevant beyond the short-term.

For these capabilities to be built, attention will need to be given to institutional design which compensates for the prevalence of market failure in the process of industrial accumulation.

Effective markets

❑ *The trade regime*

In the past, trade policy in South Africa has been hotly contested. Over the past 18 months there has, however, been a surprising degree of consensus on the steps which are necessary to rationalise the trade policy regime.

The first step is to reduce the excessive degree of dispersion which currently makes South African import tariffs almost uniquely complex. Second, there is an agreed need for import tariffs to be liberalised over time; the high protection of basic wage goods plays a particularly important role in reducing low income consumption standards.

However this process of liberalisation must be carefully crafted to complement the other elements of the Industrial Strategy which are designed to foster appropriate forms of industrial restructuring.

Further, since there is a joint need for protecting the industrial sector and for removing the inward bias, an export promotion programme is important. This will need to include both an effective form of duty drawback as well as the development of a suitable institutional framework.

Linked to the promotion of exports is the question of the exchange rate. One important element here is to diminish South Africa's high exchange rate instability since international experience makes it clear that this is a major constraint to manufactured exports. Another important element concerns the level of the exchange rate itself.

There is some agreement that the current level is too high, although it is unclear how significant this over-valuation is. The realignment of the exchange rate will however need to be a real one, and at the same time steps will need to be taken to ensure that it is not at the cost of low income consumers.

South Africa's comparative manufacturing performance, 1991



❑ *The domestic market and ownership*

South African producer, financial and distribution markets are highly concentrated. While in some circumstances the aggregation of power may promote the rapid growth of industrial capabilities (as for example in Korea), research shows that this has not hitherto been the case in South Africa.

Even when markets operate effectively, they are not adequate to facilitate the industrial restructuring needed

There is little evidence of productive inter-firm collaboration between different firms within the large conglomerates, between conglomerates, between small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and between the conglomerates and SMEs. At the same time there is considerable evidence of competitive collusion within and between the major conglomerates.

The function of policy should not be aimed primarily at market structure in itself, but at market performance. Enhanced competition and more productive forms of competition - these two policy objectives are not contradictory - may be achieved either by breaking up the conglomerates or by forcing them into a different pattern of behaviour; it all depends on how the conglomerates respond to this policy initiative.

There has been a surprising degree of consensus on the steps necessary to rationalise trade policy

One way of promoting more desirable forms of market performance is to strengthen competitions policy. This can be achieved by enhancing the power of the competitions authorities and by a closer monitoring on conglomerate behaviour to inhibit past patterns of inter-conglomerate collusion ('conglomerate forbearance') . Specific steps will also need to be taken to protect and to promote SMEs as a countervailing power to the large conglomerates.

Better market performance can be promoted through policies designed to affect corporate ownership and governance

Another way of promoting better market performance is through policies designed to affect corporate ownership and governance. A number of the conglomerates have begun to 'unbundle' their activities, and this process would be enhanced by prohibitions on the pyramiding control of ownership on the stock exchange - this is widely practiced in other countries.

Two of the six major conglomerates are mutual associations, and this suggests that their corporate strategies may be subject to different forms of influence. Partly through this it should be possible to increase the participation of other stakeholders, by diversifying ownership structures and promoting ownership by managers, small businesses, community trusts and workers.

Finally, corporate disclosure requirements in South Africa are undemanding, and these should be revised. Amongst other things, it is difficult to monitor market performance without adequate disclosure.

Corporate disclosure requirements in South Africa are undemanding and should be revised

❑ ***Reducing the cost of inputs***

Despite being exceptionally well-endowed with natural resources, many South African manufacturers find themselves paying high prices for their inputs. In some cases South African-sourced inputs are cheaper in Europe than in the domestic economy.

Where South Africa produces these inputs at competitive prices and quality, they should be made available locally at the 'free on board' (FOB) international price.

Evaluating the cost of labour inputs is more difficult. Yet real unit labour costs can be significantly reduced by enhancing labour productivity, increasing the social wage (through better housing and infrastructure), through other interventions designed to reduce the cost of living (including through tariff reform), and through the promotion of some limited forms of labour market segmentation which allow manufacturers to take advantage of the lower wages in rural areas and disadvantaged regions.

There is little evidence that South African manufacturers pay unduly high prices for capital

It is sometimes asserted that South African manufacturers pay unduly high prices for capital and that this accounts for the declining levels of investment in manufacturing.

Our research has shown little evidence of this, but there is evidence of the need for quasi-public investment in large projects (such as the new aluminium and stainless steel plants) to facilitate a process of crowding-in investment and by spreading the risk to the private sector in these very large projects with long payback periods.

Building capabilities

The prevalence of market-failure requires an effective Industrial Strategy to explicitly focus on capability-building. Three key elements are relevant in the South African context: human resource development, technological capabilities, and SME and microenterprise development.

❑ ***Human resource development***

There is a particularly marked segmentation of skills in South Africa, reflecting the inheritance of the apartheid regime. On the one hand professional skills are highly developed and often achieve international excellence. On the other hand, artisanal and basic educational skills - especially in the black population - are limited.

This poses acute problems for the manufacturing sector, especially as the new forms of competition are very demanding of human resources. Consequently, the need to explicitly target human resource development requires the highest priority in any programme of industrial restructuring.

Industry's needs require attention to be given to adult basic education, both for new entrants to the labour force and to those currently in employment. But this must be complemented by a crash-programme designed to enhance industrial training.

A key component of this boosting for industrial training lies in tying wages to skill acquisition and Cosatu has made a number of important proposals in this regard (modelled on recent Australian experience) which are an important step forward. It also requires a reformulation of the national industrial training system and possibly the introduction of a training levy on manufacturers.

But, in itself, enhanced skill development makes little sense unless programmed as part of a comprehensive restructuring of work-organisation in the industrial sector. Here a few South African firms are beginning to reorganise themselves to take advantage of Japanese management techniques (such as just-in-time production and total-quality-control). They have begun to show the way forward and are developing what might be called a 'learning production strategy'.

These changes in work and factory organisation are not only absolutely essential

Table 2:
International labour cost comparison 1991

	Ratio to US cost: %
USA	100
Canada	135
Mexico	27
Denmark	177
France	122
East Germay	87
West Germany	164
Greece	56
Holland	176
Portugal	31
Spain	75
UK	96
Austria	150
Hungary	13
Norway	154
Sweden	189
Israel	71
Egypt	4
Kenya	6
Nigeria	3
South Africa	16
Tanzania	3
Zimbabwe	7
Argentina	24
Brazil	15
Colombia	16
Australia	109
China P R	3
Hong Kong	33
India	5
Japan	159
S Korea	35
Malaysia	9
Taiwan	48

Note: Comparative calculations of wage rates are always approximate rather than accurate, and indicators vary by sector. However, they do reflect wage discrepancies between South Africa and the rest of the world.

to the revival of productivity growth in South Africa (and for that matter in all economies) but also provide the key towards meeting the objectives of lower unit labour costs and reduced the costs of living.

These changes in factory politics present a sharp contrast to the legacy of apartheid industrial relations and emphasise the extent to which industrial competitiveness is intertwined with social processes.

❑ ***Technological capabilities***

The strategic refocusing of the industrial sector will require a transition from the current technological trajectory, and it is unlikely that this refocusing will arise as a consequence of more effectively functioning markets.

These changes in factory politics present a sharp contrast to the legacy of apartheid industrial relations

Off a relatively low base, Research and Development (R&D) spending has declined significantly over the past three years; moreover, while R&D output performs well in terms of scientific outputs, its performance in relation to technology-related parameters is weak.

Consequently there is a need to stimulate appropriate technological activities and a number of measures are proposed.
Tax-credits for R&D will be an important start. Sector-specific support programmes, complemented by measures supporting innovation-oriented, inter-firm linkages, may be focused within a Sector Partnership Fund involving joint private/state sector initiatives to foster industrial restructuring.

In addition, in the past much of South African industry's technology has been derived from imported and largely unadapted technology, and measures can be taken to increase domestic technological inputs, as well as to limit the restrictive clauses which often hold back exports.

Tax-credits for R&D will be an important start

But the primary focus with respect to technological upgrading lies in speeding-up technology diffusion in order to meet the twin objectives of closing the gaps between South African and global best-practice and between leading and lagging South African firms.

A key part of this agenda is a programme designed to assist firms in strategic refocusing, to reorganise their production operations to meet the challenges of the new competition and to take advantage of efficiency-enhancing changes in work-organisation, factory layout and production organisation.

The diffusion of university and research establishment based R&D to industry is another important area of policy concern, as is the need to develop specific programmes to foster the utilisation of technologies by SMEs.

The primary focus of technological upgrading lies in speeding-up technology diffusion

❑ ***Building capabilities in the SME and microenterprise sectors***

The dominance of the large conglomerates finds its expression in a very underdeveloped SME sector; it is this sector which has been the source of dynamism in many global economies. In part the proposals made to enhance competitions policy will compensate

The path to productivity lies in moving away from the conflictual relations of the apartheid era

for the underdevelopment of these firms, but additional support is required.

This should target the technological needs of SMEs, as well as their requirement for finance (including venture capital). It is also proposed that a multi-tiered wage structure should be utilised to recognise the variation in wage rates between different areas and different sized firms. But this should occur with the recognition that this multi-tiered system will not undermine industrial wages as firms grow in size.

Finally, one of the key challenges facing South African SMEs is the need to develop suitable cooperative relationships of the sort which have fostered the remarkable growth of SMEs abroad. This should be a specific target of industrial policy.

The problems of the microenterprise sector are especially marked and arise from a combination of a hostile external environment and low levels of skill and entrepreneurial capabilities.

The path is not easy or conflict-free, but unlike the past trajectory of industrial growth, it does represent a viable option for the future

These constraints will in part be met by a peaceful transition to democracy, but will also require continued policy support with respect to training, access to finance and the development of sub-contracting relationships with the formal sector. NGOs will have a particularly important role to play in this sector's future development.

Institution building

The mediation between more effective market relations and capability building will require the development of appropriate institutions. Many of these institutions have been identified in earlier sections, for example, with respect to export promotion, support for microenterprises, technology diffusion to SMEs, and the diffusion of new organisational practices to the industrial sector.

Some of these institutions are already currently in existence and seem to play an effective role, particularly with respect to meeting the needs of the conglomerates and the formal sector. But there is clearly the need for extensive additional institutional development if the policies identified above are to be implemented effectively.

But in addition to these task-specific institutions, there are two critical elements of institutional structure which are required to support this proposed path of industrial restructuring.

The first involves the pattern of industrial relations, at the national, sectoral, firm- and plant-levels. International experience makes it abundantly clear that the path to productivity lies in moving away from the conflictive relations endemic to the apartheid era.

In both the interests of greater equity and efficiency it is important that a legislative framework be adopted to facilitate the growth of these cooperative relationships insofar as they affect the allocation of resources and the productivity with which they are utilised.

Second, Industrial Strategy is not a well-crafted document, but an effective process of consultation, consensus-building and rapid implementation. Based upon South Africa's specific experience these are only likely to be achieved in the context of tripartite policy formulation.

Such negotiations already exist in the National Economic Forum and the various sectoral working groups which are emerging, but they need to be strengthened and linked into wider discussions of the future trajectory of the postapartheid economy.

Conclusions

The past trajectory of the South African industrial sector has not been appropriate to meet the needs of the economy or of the population's basic needs.

Based upon the work of a large team of researchers and on extensive discussions with key stakeholders in the political and economic arenas, an Industrial Strategy has been identified to meet the objectives appropriate to a democratic South Africa.

The path laid out is not easy, nor is it conflict-free. However, unlike the past trajectory of industrial growth, it does represent a viable option for the future. IPA

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COMPARATIVE
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

Reactions of respondents to an election boycott by various parties



Source: Johnson RW and L Schlemmer. *Launching Democracy: Second National Survey on Issues relevant to a Free and Fair Election: February 1994*. Launching Democracy project is sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council (MarkData)

Settlers in Search of a State

By Alexander Johnston
Department of Politics, University of Natal

Rationality appears to cut little ice with racial separatists. But South Africans who dream of their own, ethnically-cleansed states in the sun would do well to heed the experiences of similar societies, such as Northern Ireland, where a centuries-old drive for self-determination has achieved little but loss of life.

The most serious threat to political stability in South Africa's transformation comes from a rejection of the very basis of the emerging dispensation favoured by the principal political movements - equal citizenship in a unitary state.

The ragged chorus of demands for alternative bases of statehood compensates in vehemence for what it lacks in coherence, and in recklessness for what is lacks in force of numbers.

This chorus of dissent represents different and sometimes incompatible interests, as illustrated by the intriguing possibility of rival claims to land in Northern Natal on behalf of an Afrikaner volkstaat and an ethnic Zulu state. The principal medium, however, is the same: the claim to recognition of the political force of ethnicity.

This will surprise few people. To some it will confirm the belief that ethnicity is a universal and timeless dynamic in social and political life, and to others that it is an opportunistic invader of societies whose immune systems, bereft of legitimate democratic institutions and traditions, are deficient.

These contrasting views of ethnicity set the parameters within which the struggle for the form of the new South African state is taking place. On the white right, the politics of ethnic and racial identity, overlaid by the ideological baggage of anti-communism, struggles to find coherent territorial expression in an Afrikaner volkstaat.

The politics of Zulu ethnicity and the historical legacy of the Zulu kingdom advance and retreat in salience in the confusing discourse of federalism, confederalism and outright secession which marks the Inkatha Freedom Party's single-minded mission to establish a bridgehead in a post-apartheid landscape which by sheer force of numbers will be dominated by the ANC.

Meanwhile, the African National Congress (with the ambivalent support of the National Party) struggles to keep intact the notion of self-determination as the passing on of a territorial and demographic unit whose continued integrity is the rightful legacy of the heirs to colonial rule.

Although the ANC is notably reticent on the subject of South Africa's colonial past, ceding for tactical reasons this potentially rich vein of grievance to the Pan Africanist Congress, it firmly hangs on to the post-colonial interpretation of self-determination, which is the only widely recognised variant of the idea in the post-1945 international community.

The ragged chorus of demands for alternative bases of statehood compensates in recklessness for what is lacks in force of numbers

Both the Ulster Protestants and the Afrikaners display a high degree of self-conscious identity and a propensity to define political association and conflict in 'group' terms

Belfast to Beirut

As a result of this configuration of conflict, South Africa takes its place on a list of contests which combine maximum familiarity of global agenda - self-determination, ethnicity, secession - with the maximum obscurity of local peculiarities.

Given this paradoxical mixture, it is not surprising that participants in South African conflicts claim to hear echoes of distant ethnic wars and invoke Belfast, Beirut or Sarajevo as dark warnings of the likely consequences of allowing or denying expression (according to taste) to the political dimension of ethnicity.

Since such comparative references are invariably self-interested and by nature tend towards caricature rather than analysis, there is an incentive beyond simple academic curiosity for social scientists to attempt more thoroughgoing comparison. Several such studies have placed South Africa in comparative context with Northern Ireland and Israel.

Both are physically situated among larger 'native' populations, which are regarded as at best culturally alien and at worst primordial enemies

This is a logical point of departure for comparison since in all three, settler (or settler-descended) populations have historically disputed claims to self-determination with native majorities whom they perceive as alien or even hostile, and with whom they have refused political assimilation.

My study narrows the focus to South Africa and Northern Ireland, and the social and political movements in which the dominant communities mobilised themselves for their conceptions of self-determination, Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism.

Patrick Buckland's (1988) summary of the Ulster Protestants' dilemma helpfully indicates some parallels with the situation of Afrikaners:

> Like their colonial counterparts elsewhere, they were faced with three broad options as they saw power and privilege about to be ripped from their grasp. They could simply succumb. They could try to come to terms with the nationalists and carve out for themselves a position of influence in the new order. Or they could resist and try to maintain the status quo.

Each has faced recently the dilemma of choice between accommodation and repression

Buckland was referring to the late 19th and early 20th Centuries and the Home Rule struggle, but the essential configuration of the issue has remained unaltered.

Parallels

The similarity of Ulster Protestants' and Afrikaners' predicaments is attributable to common characteristics and to parallels in the historical forces which have shaped them. Both display a high degree of self-conscious identity and a propensity to define political association and conflict in 'group' terms. These characteristics are vigorously expressed as aspiration to self-determination.

It is true that the Ulster Protestants' determination to control their own political destiny has been more ambiguous than Afrikaners' full-blown nationalism and claim to statehood. But they have made it clear at least since the defeat of the First Home Rule Bill (1886) that they reserve the right to determine their own political status independently of any understanding between British authority and the forces of Irish nationalism.

Both Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners inhabit industrial societies, although rural interests are important in each. Yet both draw on settler origins in the historical mythologies which express their identity needs and self-determination aspirations.

Both are physically situated among larger 'native' populations, which are regarded as at best culturally alien and at worst primordial enemies. Neither has unambiguous title to a well-defined territory and both are economically integrated with those whom they reject politically.

Each has attempted through partition to concoct and control a political system in which they could claim to be a majority. Each has proceeded from the assumption that political absorption into the alien majority is unacceptable, in the forms of a united Ireland and a unitary South Africa, in which all would enjoy equal rights.

As a result, both have faced endemic legitimacy crises associated with ethnic domination, discriminatory practices, and repressive *de facto* one-party rule. Each has faced, especially in recent years, the dilemma of choice between accommodation and repression.

An important feature of all this has been the political mobilisation of both groups along ethnic lines, in response to crises. In the case of Afrikaners, impoverishment, urbanisation, resistance to British imperialism, and the dangers of economic and political competition from the black majority constituted the elements of the crisis.

For Ulster Protestants, the long-drawn-out confrontation between Irish nationalism and British imperialism which culminated in partition and the creation of Northern Ireland bred the stressful conditions under which they mobilised into an integrated block of interests.

After this period of growth, both matured in the capture and exercise of state power. Since then in each case, the movement has partly decayed in a sharply renewed and heightened legitimacy crisis.

These crises have comprised resistance from those excluded from political power (blacks and Catholics), external pressures (from a broadly based movement in the international community and from the British government), and social and economic changes inside their own constituencies.

Fault lines

The fault line in each case has been between those who have tried to carry out reform from above - violating some of their own populist and 'democratic' premises - emphasising power-sharing to broaden the basis of government, and those who have resisted such accommodating moves on the grounds that they presage surrender and assimilation.

The most interesting aspect of this study lies in the break-up of the coalitions which successfully mobilised and integrated support from all social classes for the projects of Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism. These coalitions centred on the National Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, both of whose political leadership coordinated networks of religious, fraternal, social, industrial and paramilitary organisations.

Opportunities to study such integrated social and political movements in their phases of growth and maturity are not in short supply. After all, many nationalist movements are of this type. But the patterns of decay and dissolution under similar combinations of internal strain and external pressure, give the life-cycles of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism a mark of singularity.

Competing political parties and industrial and paramilitary groups which have been prepared to undertake independent direct action marked the fragmentation in both cases of what had been well-integrated coalitions.

In South Africa, the Conservative Party, the white trade and agricultural unions, the AWB and a host of other militaristic splinter groups vye with each other to reclaim the lost unity of Afrikaner Nationalism.



Paul Weinberg - Southlint

In Northern Ireland, Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Workers' Council have represented strands of uncompromising loyalism which owed nothing to a temporising and rapidly vanishing unionist ruling class of landowners and industrialists.

Neither during the Botha era's long years of authoritarian reform, nor in the politics of negotiation since 1990, has the white right been able to wield a veto over either the convoluted schemes of power-sharing or negotiated assimilation into a common political system, through which National Party reformers have tried to safeguard the interests of Afrikaners and (by extension) all whites. They have not even as yet managed any significant revision of the political agenda to accommodate a reconstructed version of Afrikaner territorial self-determination.

Paramilitary groups prepared to undertake independent direct action marked the fragmentation in both cases of well-integrated coalitions

Unlike Ulster, it was difficult for Afrikaners to find any politically viable territorial base

By striking contrast, in a coup of stunning effectiveness, Ulster Protestant dissidents, led by industrial workers and mainly working-class paramilitaries, overthrew the modest package of power-sharing reforms to which all constitutional parties including moderate nationalists, reforming unionists and the governments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic had committed themselves as the solution to Northern Ireland's legitimacy problems.

The UWC strike of May 1974 destroyed the reform wing of the Unionist Party, demonstrated the continuing vitality of the sectarian, populist forces of lower-class Protestantism, successfully claimed for them a veto on unacceptable change and forced the political agenda thereafter to reflect their concerns.

Identity crises

Enough Afrikaners acquired the capital, education and skills to look on political accommodation as a lesser evil to perpetual legitimacy crises

In explaining why these similar social and political movements with closely parallel historical situations have experienced thus far such different outcomes, it is necessary to look at two groups of factors.

A number of geographical, demographic and political factors combine to underpin the Ulster Protestants' sense of separate identity and claim to self-determination. Firstly, patterns of English and especially Scottish settlement created a settler Protestant majority in the north-east corner of Ireland with a sense of identity different not only from the native Irish, but from the Anglo-Irish settlers of the south and west.

Secondly, the uneven development of industrialisation in Ireland concentrated the major industries in the north-east, accentuating the island's two different identities with a series of dichotomies: urban/rural, worker/peasant, modernised /'backward'. These helped flesh out the existing dichotomies of Protestant/Catholic and native/settler.

Afrikaner Nationalism sought full sovereign statehood, unlike Ulster Unionists who settled for an ambivalent quasi-autonomy within the United Kingdom

Demography, geography and economics helped to give Ulster Protestants what all self-conscious ethnic groups want and not all have: concentration of population on a coherent territory with control of resources sufficient to give a material basis to self-determination. It was these material factors that made partition the most likely outcome of the rise of militant Irish nationalism.

In contrast to this, the sheer physical size of South Africa, the dispersed pattern of settlement and economic development and the demographic ratio between settler and native, combined to mean it was very difficult for Afrikaners to find any territorial basis which had the resources and the demographic concentration to be politically viable without ruthless population removals or the denial of political rights to non-Afrikaners.

Perhaps it is because of this that Afrikaner Nationalism has displayed such an obsessive concern with cultural identity, compensating through the heroic construction of metaphysical identities for the absence of a material basis for self-determination. Certainly the Afrikaner's immersion in matters of language, literature, philosophy and theology is wholly absent from the Ulster Protestant's sense of ethnicity.

A second group of factors is concerned with the nature of the movements themselves. The principal point here is that Afrikaner Nationalism was a sense of ethnic kinship allied to a heroic project of transformation. This project meant spectacular social mobility for many of the small farmers, workers and the rural dispossessed who made up such a large part of Afrikaner Nationalism's support base.

In turn this meant that in the years of crisis after 1976 when reform appeared on the agenda, there was a substantial element in Afrikaner Nationalism's constituency for whom change and adaptation had a strong personal resonance. In addition, enough Afrikaners had acquired the capital, education and skills to look on political accommodation or assimilation as lesser evils to perpetual legitimacy crises.

Ulster Unionism was not like that at all. It was a doctrine of immobility, empty of social content, not inspired by a vision of fraternal mobility, and riven by class tensions and antagonisms. Unlike Afrikaners who enjoyed the spoils of elaborately formal discrimination in the midst of boom times, many Ulster Protestants were prey to class vulnerabilities in a declining industrial economy.

In addition, Afrikaner Nationalism sought expression in full sovereign statehood, unlike Ulster Unionists who settled for an ambivalent quasi-autonomy within the United Kingdom. Reforming Afrikaner nationalists could draw on the considerable resources of patronage which went with controlling a modern state, in order to retain their hold on the greater part of a fragmenting constituency.

Reform

Lastly, the elements which made up the two movements were in each case integrated in different ways. This point is best illustrated with reference to the working-class elements in each coalition.

The Afrikaner workers who were integrated into nationalism through Christian National trade unions and state sponsored schemes of employment were recruited in large measure from marginal and impoverished groups (many of them 'poor whites') who had no previous history of independent political action.

In contrast, working-class Protestants had traditions of independent political consciousness and action prior to their integration into Unionism. This independence was manifested in ultra-sectarian, populist and labourist directions, including voting for 'their own' candidates, striking over industrial issues, marching in ritual demonstrations of territoriality and in endemic sectarian riot with their Catholic neighbours.

To an important extent, lower-class Protestants in both rural and urban areas have always felt that the defence of their identity and liberties lies in their own hands and not in those of the kind of powerful state apparatus which Afrikaners came to rely on.

It is in this combination of differing material situations and contrasting forms of social organisation, that we can explain the different trajectories of these outwardly similar ethnic movements, as they addressed crises of resistance and reform.

Bolstered by state patronage and the support of English-speaking voters, Nationalist reformers in South Africa fought a long action on two fronts to take an ill-defined and ever-changing reform project beyond the point where it could be overturned by an ethnic backlash from among their own disgruntled erstwhile supporters.

Reform was driven by a strong pragmatic and adaptive imperative and had willing helpers in the numerous bureaucratic and military cadres who were the beneficiaries of Afrikaner Nationalism's drive to lift its people from poverty.

Reform found no such imperative, no such resources, and no such adherents in Ulster Unionism. The volatile and vulnerable elements in the Unionist coalition were able to overthrow reform and demonstrate their veto, although their victory in 1974 could not reconstitute the unity of Unionism under new leadership.

Conclusion

The study on which this article is based did not have as its principal purpose an investigation of the viability of Afrikaner self-determination under present political conditions, although the comparison which is its focus makes clear some of the difficulties.

To be told that their prospects are less favourable than those of another social movement whose historical situation was and is quite similar, is likely to cut very little ice with ethnic separatists. The very notion of ethnicity requires a leap of faith which bypasses prosaic comparative calculations of this sort.

It would be very foolish for any academic to believe otherwise, and he or she would be well-advised to concentrate on whatever light a study like this can throw on the diverse and often sharply contrasting examples of social and political organisation to which the term 'ethnic' attaches itself.

Despite this, it is worth pointing out one last thing to those who still dream of an ethnic veto and an ethnic place in the sun. The Protestant backlash had its day in May 1974 and triumphantly demonstrated its veto on change and compromise. But the problems of coexistence have not gone away and the war of attrition continues. IPA

Nationalist reformers fought a long action to take an ill-defined reform project beyond the point where it could be overturned

The Protestant backlash had its day and demonstrated its veto on change and compromise. But the problems have not gone away and the war of attrition continues

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ORIGINS OF WAR

By Gavin Williams
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In the late 1960s, friction in Nigeria over regional autonomy and ethnic domination led to four years of bloody civil war, Biafra and the death of tens of thousands of people. Let South Africa learn the lessons of history.

There has been much talk of civil war and secession. Those unable to get their way through negotiations insist they will be left with no option but to fight. Sometimes, the threat to resort to civil war engenders the reality.

Sometimes, the threat to resort to civil war engenders the reality

Military force and control of territory come to be the new and terrible instruments of negotiation. Processes are set in motion which interact in unforeseeable ways. Wars rarely turn out as intended and usually go on longer than expected. One thing only is predictable: large numbers of people get killed.

These points are awesomely demonstrated by the civil war in the United States, the second Anglo-Boer war, and the Nigerian civil war. More recently, by the ongoing dismemberment of Bosnia. There are no exact parallels between these events and the current situation in South Africa. In history, things are never equal. It may, nevertheless, be helpful to reflect on the lessons of history - in this case Nigeria.

Coups and pogroms

Wars rarely turn out as intended and usually go on longer than expected

In 1951, three parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG) and the National Convention of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later Nigerian Citizens - NCNC), formed the first elected governments of the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. They consolidated their regional control in subsequent elections.

At a series of conferences they agreed to the federal constitution under which Nigeria became independent from Britain in 1960 - though not without threats of secession from the North and West.

After the 1959 federal elections, the NPC and NCNC formed an uneven coalition. The AG went into opposition and sought to challenge the coalition by aligning with 'minority' interests in the North and East.

A split in the AG in 1962 allowed the federal government to declare a state of emergency in the West. This opened the way to the creation of a separate Mid-West Region and a transfer of power in the West to the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), which aligned with the NPC. It sought to win support in the Yoruba-speaking West with allegations of Igbo domination of universities and the civil service.

The 1964 federal elections pitted the NPC and NNDP against the NCNC and AG. Facing defeat, the latter coalition boycotted the election. Subsequent negotiations left the NCNC in the NPC-led federal government and in control of the East and the Mid-West, with the AG out in the cold.

The AG looked to the 1965 regional elections in the West to reclaim its position, but a fraudulent victory by the NNDP led to a spate of virulent political violence.

On January 15, 1966, a group of majors killed the Prime Ministers of the Nigerian Federation and of the Northern and Western regions, and key political and military figures. However, the coup failed. Power was transferred to General Ironsi, head of the army and, like most of the coup-makers, an Igbo from the Eastern Region.

The new military government tried to apply the military virtues of discipline, hierarchy and central command to the ills of regionalism and corruption. Ironsi issued a decree which abolished the regions, which became 'groups of provinces', and unified

the public service. Northerners interpreted the decree as a means of displacing them from official positions by better-educated southerners. Student demonstrations opened the way for attacks in the North on Igbos, of whom perhaps 600 were killed. On the night of July 29, 1966, Northern soldiers murdered Ironsi and the military governor of the West.

Federal civil servants and UK and US diplomats persuaded Northern officers and soldiers to abandon their demand for separation. A Northerner, Lt Col Gowon, became head of the government and Supreme Commander of the Army - but the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt Col Ojukwu, refused to recognise his appointment.

Representatives of the four regions and Lagos met at a constitutional conference in September. Initially the East and North favoured a 'confederal' solution and maintenance of regional integrity. The West, Lagos and the Mid-West preferred a federal government and the creation of new states. All agreed that the army be reorganised into regional units.

The North changed its position to favour a federal government and accepted the creation of new states, under pressure from soldiers from the Northern minorities, younger officers, academics and civil servants who recognised the economic and political weakness of a separate North.

Full-scale violence erupted on September 28, when soldiers and civilians took part in a renewed wave of attacks on Igbos across the North, killing perhaps 8 000 people and leading to an exodus of a million people to the East. The constitutional conference adjourned on October 3 and the East did not return.

Secession

Ojukwu and the government of Eastern Nigeria pursued three related strategies. One was to negotiate a confederal solution, giving them control of their own territory, security and resources, while sharing common services with the rest of Nigeria. The second was outright secession. The third was to form an alliance with the West, itself threatened by Northern dominance of the army, which would lead to separation of the North from southern regions.

The first strategy complemented the second. If confederation could not be negotiated, eastern Nigeria would secede, and doubts among senior officers and civil servants quelled. The strategy of detaching the West from the North fitted uneasily with the pursuit of Eastern autonomy or independence, and would depend on the actions of westerners.

If confederation could not be negotiated, eastern Nigeria would secede, and doubts among senior officers and civil servants quelled

The federal government followed two alternative strategies. One was to try to meet Eastern demands for security and control of their own region while maintaining the ultimate authority of the federal government. The other, pressed by federal civil servants, was to bring civilians into the government, restore its powers, and create new states.

The Supreme Military Council (SMC), including Ojukwu, met in January 1967, at Aburi in Ghana, where they agreed that the army be organised under regional commands, and that decisions be made by the SMC or with the 'concurrence' of the military governors.

Agreement was reached by not dealing with the fine print. Ojukwu announced that the agreement had gone a long way towards confederalism - which was just what the federal civil servants feared - and demanded its implementation in full.

Agreement was reached by not dealing with the fine print

In March the SMC met to approve Decree Eight, which made provision for the concurrence of the regional governors on such key issues as public finance, communications, defence and new states, but required only three of the four regional governors to concur for a state of emergency or to invalidate regional legislation impeding federal authority. Ojukwu refused to attend the meeting or to accept the decree. The federal government returned to its earlier programme.

Biafra

Last minute attempts at mediation failed to curb the momentum towards secession and civil war. Gowon decreed a state of emergency and the division of the regions into 12 states. Three were from the east: the largest, East-Central, was almost entirely Igbo, the smaller two, Rivers and South East, mainly non-Igbo. Ojukwu declared the 'Republic of Biafra' independent on May 30, 1967.

Last minute attempts at mediation failed to curb the momentum towards secession and civil war

The Nigerian Army invaded from the north and from the sea in July 1967. Biafran forces entered the Mid-West, but were checked and driven back across the Niger. The leaders of the mid-western adventure sought to remove Ojukwu and negotiate a cease-fire, and were executed for plotting against him. Enugu, the Biafran capital, fell on October 4. Nigerian forces soon took control of most of the



Biafra won the propaganda war, but Nigeria won the diplomatic war

'minority' areas, and denied Biafra access to the coast. Relief and arms had henceforth to be flown into Biafra.

Biafra continued for two more years to defend a small and densely-populated area, while Nigeria attacked from three fronts. Arms from France and medicine and relief supplies from charities allowed Biafra to prolong its resistance, but never gave it any chance of winning. Biafra won the propaganda war, but Nigeria won the diplomatic war, ensuring its international recognition and access to British and Soviet weapons.

War did not end negotiations. Neither side wished to appear intransigent. Throughout the series of meetings in different countries, each side kept to its conditions. Nigeria insisted on an end to secession and acceptance of the 12 states. Biafra demanded a cease-fire and return to its pre-war boundaries. Neither had any intention of settling the matter by negotiation, except on their own terms. Finally, Biafran resistance collapsed and it surrendered on January 12, 1970.

Neither side wished to appear intransigent, but neither had any intention of settling the matter by negotiation, except on their own terms

Regions and Politicians

Power was initially devolved by the colonial authorities to the regions. Two of the three main parties, the NPC and AG, were initially formed as regional parties. All three appropriated public revenues for private and party use and used patronage, supplemented by coercion, to secure their political interests.

After independence in 1960, power at the regional level came to depend on control of the federal government. At times, politicians from the major parties appeared to be willing to accommodate one another's interests. Federalism, and power-sharing at the centre, did not disperse power. It merely gave shape to the struggle to monopolise power and patronage in the regions and at the centre.

Politics in Nigeria was a game of winner takes all. Consequently, politicians used all their resources, constitutional and extra-constitutional, to gain and maintain control of office. In the 1950s politicians were able to compromise on constitutional issues and on the allocation of revenues among regions because all gained access to something, though some gained more than others.

After independence in 1960, they competed for shares of the same, limited resources. Negotiators each sought to protect sectional gains, not to arrive at a solution to common problems. Compromise amounted to no more than backing down in the face of superior force.

Prior to 1966, the most serious outbreaks of political violence took place between members of the same language groups. The killings of 1966 were directed against the Igbo. In May 1966, the Igbo were attacked because they appeared to northerners to have become too powerful. By September-October 1966, they could be killed because they were too weak

Some northern interests were threatened by the agreement of their own representatives to the break-up of the region into new states. Conversely, soldiers and civilians from the non-Hausa 'middle-belt' saw people from the East to be standing in the way of their demands for the creation of new states in the north. Both groups were involved in the killings.

Political violence, whether against local agents of government or against outsiders, was most likely to break out when changes in control of government at the federal and regional levels, appeared to threaten the access of members of particular communities to opportunities and resources within their own territories, and to symbolise their political humiliation.

The three large regions, dominated respectively by Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo speakers, failed to reconcile their conflicting interests through the political process or, after January 1966, by constitutional negotiations.

The military

When the military assumed power, they ascribed the nation's ills to tribalism, regionalism and politics. The Ironsi government tried to solve these problems by abolishing the regions, excluding the politicians from government and replacing 'politics' with a rational administration, following the unified command structure of the army.

But Nigeria's problems could not be signed away by decree. Coups divided the military and declared that power rested in the hands who controlled the means of violence. At Aburi the soldiers assumed that, with the politicians out of the way, they could get together and reach agreement. They were unable to produce a clear agreement, allowing Ojukwu on the one side and federal civil servants on the other, to expose the issues which separated them.

'Biafra' was invented by members of the eastern, mainly Igbo intelligentsia. It gained mass support after the exodus of refugees from the North in 1966. The secessionists never laid claim to an 'Igbo' territory. They proclaimed the secession, as Biafra, of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, including the non-Igbo speaking 'minority' areas and excluding the Igbo-speakers of the Mid-West.

The civil war was fought over a constitutional issue - the respective claims to authority over a specific territory of the government of the Federation and of the 'Republic of Biafra' as successor to the government of Eastern Nigeria.

From July 29, 1966, the drift towards civil war seemed inexorable. However, the outcome was not inevitable. Secession only became militarily feasible because of the ambiguous outcome of the July coup, which left easterners in sole military control of the Eastern Region.

In 1967, the federal government could have accepted all the Aburi compromise terms, even where this appeared to compromise its own authority. The East might have accepted Decree Eight as meeting the substance of their demands and agreed to the federal government's claim to sovereign authority.

Ojukwu used the threat of civil war as a way of imposing his constitutional demands. He did not draw back when his strategy took to him the brink of civil war, or confronted his people with certain military defeat.

The outbreak of war was the result of decisions made by different people, in Nigeria and abroad, often without foreseeing - or even having regard for - the consequences. In some cases, the people who made the decisions have never been publicly identified.

Ojukwu lead the people of eastern Nigeria into a war without the means to fight it. The federal government and army preserved the unity of Nigeria, but killed many fellow citizens to do it.



The lessons

Our analysis of the origins of the Nigerian civil war provides no basis for predicting what will happen in South Africa. It does, however, identify some lessons which can be ignored only at our peril.

In South Africa, as in Nigeria, different parties have sought to gain exclusive control over power and patronage

In South Africa, as in Nigeria, different parties have sought to gain exclusive control of power and patronage. When they have been unable or unlikely to exercise power at the national level, they have sought to create domains within which they can do so.

Hence the decision to create nine regions in South Africa, several of which are likely to return legislatures overwhelmingly dominated by the ANC, creating a number of one-party governments at regional level, while power is shared at the national level. Federalism in Nigeria failed to provide an appropriate framework for democratic politics or political stability: the attempts to rectify this by creating a unitary administration led towards civil war.

The democratic process cannot survive if parties only participate on condition that they win

In Nigeria at independence, power was shared at the federal level by a coalition of unequal partners, joined by a concern to keep hold of some of the levers of power, but each formed their own electoral alliances in preparation for the following election.

Since 1990, the African National Congress has reached out to include other parties in an electoral front, often to the distaste of its own supporters. The National Party's ambition to form a broad conservative alliance has been undermined by its own need to agree a constitution and prepare to share power with the ANC.

For all the money spent on educating voters on democratic principles, elections and electoral alliances are, for all parties, a means for gaining access to office, and have been rejected by those unable to attract enough votes to keep their positions by electoral means.

The shortage of whites to form a majority in any single part of the country has put paid to attempts to concede the principle of a *volkstaat*. The democratic process cannot survive if parties only participate on condition that they win.

It is hard to envisage a successful secession of KwaZulu/Natal

In Nigeria, all the major parties threatened secession when they were unable to get their way over particular issues. Ojukwu used the threat of secession to secure concessions from the federal government, but when they did not give him all he wanted, he turned the threat into reality.

He failed to recognise the opposition to his strategy among non-Igbo minorities, which cost him dearly. However, he could claim overwhelming support among the Igbo. It is hard to envisage a successful secession of KwaZulu/Natal which is bitterly opposed by Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and which divides rather than unites the Zulus. As for the white right, they lack a territory to defend.

In South Africa, as in Nigeria, political violence has often arisen from struggles to secure political domination of an ethnic group. Battles to monopolise scarce economic resources have fuelled political rivalries. Violence and intimidation has been a means for obtaining local political hegemony.

The uncertainty introduced by political changes has generated fears of being subjected to others and, in particular, has opened the way to the outbreak of political battles - with their inter-ethnic dimensions - in the Transvaal. Political leaders do manipulate the fears of their supporters, but they do not just manufacture them.

Civil wars are made by people, usually without adequate regard for their bloody consequences. They are not inevitable. Wars are another means of pursuing political ends, but are a clear mark of the failures of the political process.

In South Africa, control of political power has always rested on the imposition of force and the exclusion of opponents from office and the spoils of office, and even from the political process. The creation of a democratic polity requires a constitutional framework which allows all to compete within a common set of accepted rules.

The new South African constitution arises from negotiations to share power among parties, which is not the same thing, even if it has been adapted to try to include those most determined to disrupt it.

If a victorious ANC seeks to impose changes in this flawed constitution after the election, it will appear as a partisan instrument even if it represents the will of the people.

Their opponents are not only ensuring that the ANC is able to get enough votes to be able to rewrite the constitution if it wishes to do so, but also rejecting the possibility of competing for office within a constitutional framework.

At the end of his study of *The Nigerian Military*, Robin Luckham commented that both sides of the Nigerian civil war, and many before them, contracted with the means of violence. So too have the main actors in the South African political drama. They must all bear responsibility for the consequences. IPA

* This article draws on G. Williams *The Nigerian Civil War*, an Open University Case Study.

DEVELOPMENT MONITOR



Voting Intentions by Social Categories



Source: Johnson RW and L Schlemmer. *Launching Democracy: Second National Survey on Issues relevant to a Free and Fair Election: February 1994.* Launching Democracy project is sponsored by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council (MarkData)

Unsocial Science

By Blade Nzimande
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African National Congress candidate for Parliament

Lack of representation of black and women academics in the social sciences presents a serious problem to this country's intellectual community, if it is to assist in democratic transformation. Blade Nzimande argues that a new scholarship should be developed whose thrust is to transform South African society, the production of knowledge and the racial and gender composition of the social sciences.

The launch of a progressive forum for social scientists marks a milestone in the struggle to transform research in South Africa. The Social Science Research and Development Forum (SOSRDEF) is an institutional mechanism for carrying forward the task of transformation.

Although this initiative is a radical departure, it builds on earlier attempts by progressive intellectuals to change the nature of social science, such as the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, before it merged with its Afrikaans counterpart.

The difference with SOSRDEF is that it is an initiative that is driven primarily by blacks and women, people who have been excluded from the processes of production of social science knowledge in South Africa. In past initiatives, blacks and women have been targeted beneficiaries of programmes without participating in their conceptualisation and implementation.

In this article I will discuss three issues: the production of knowledge in South Africa, locating the Forum's primary concerns within this; the framework within which the task of transformation should take place; and identifying key arenas of intervention for an organisation like SOSRDEF.

Knowledge production

Tackling this issue is of paramount importance for two main reasons. Firstly, most of the debates in South Africa around the production of knowledge and knowledge relations have been rather esoteric, taken from Western European scholarship and not related to conditions in South Africa. As a result they have obscured the issues rather than clarified and simplified them.

Most of the debates have been rather esoteric and not related to conditions in South Africa

Secondly, unless the relations generally governing the production of knowledge are changed, it will not be possible to achieve the objective of producing black and women intellectuals.

The content of knowledge is predominantly a reflection of the relations of knowledge production: who defines the questions to be asked and who has the means to deploy intellectual power towards what ends.

I am not stating this so mechanically as to not understand that processes of knowledge production can be autonomous from the dominant relations in society, but they are located within definite bounds. It is therefore not enough to look narrowly at the issue facing us in terms of the production of black intellectuals and researchers, without looking at structural conditions dominant in society.

Much research is to the benefit of corporate interests and is not necesssarily accessible to the wider research and intellectual community

Under South African conditions, the primary determining factor in relations of knowledge production is capitalism. In Western capitalist countries, more than 60% of research is commissioned by and serves the interests of the big corporations. The pattern in South Africa is not very different. In effect, most research and knowledge production is not easily accessible even to the wider research and intellectual community.

It is an indictment that almost three decades of radical scholarship have failed to produce a core of black intellectuals

However, the dominant relation in knowledge production in South Africa is that of race. Not only is knowledge production monopolised by a small white intellectual elite, but the content of that knowledge is largely racist and serves the interests of reproducing racial domination.

Since the 1970s, there have emerged in South Africa pockets of radical scholarship with a largely neo-Marxist paradigm. Small as it is, this scholarship made an enormous contribution, particularly by posing new questions about the nature of exploitation and racial oppression. From this scholarship has emerged a large body of research that has laid the basis for the developing an alternative to the dominant apartheid discourse and liberal scholarship.

However, there have been major weaknesses in this radical scholarship. The first is that it never targeted as problematic the relations of knowledge production in South Africa, thereby being guilty of being a terrain for a small radicalised white petty bourgeoisie located in white liberal universities.

Some neo-Marxists in retreat began to assume reactionary positions that they had spent their lives exposing and criticising

At another level, through its rather crude class analysis, it came close to suppressing the contradiction of national oppression in South Africa. It tended to reduce race to an epiphenomenon of class, to the point of almost obscuring national oppression. Because of this weakness, this scholarship reproduced white domination within itself, and that has not yet changed.

It is indeed an indictment that almost three decades of radical scholarship in South Africa have failed to produce a core of black radical scholars and intellectuals. By this, it is not meant to deny the problem of location within inaccessible white liberal universities, which contribute to the failure to produce black intellectuals.

The second weakness of radical neo-Marxist scholarship in South Africa has been its failure to relate economic exploitation to questions of national oppression, thereby depriving itself and the country of an opportunity to deepen their understanding of the nature of the South African problem.

There is an erroneous assumption that it is only scholarship by blacks that is politically correct

Flowing out of this is a very serious failure to address the question of lack of black intellectuals. When some of these issues have been raised, as I and others have tried to do, a defensive posture has been adopted. The tendency has been to dismiss these issues as concerns of a black petty bourgeoisie wanting to establish its hegemony in the wider South African society, or as a reflection of black consciousness thinking.

As if non-racialism means being silent on or blind to matters of racial domination. It was as if the practitioners of radical scholarship in South Africa were themselves not part of a petty bourgeoisie wanting to protect its privileged position in the relations of knowledge production in academia.

It was not until 1990 that the nature and flaws of the radical neo-Marxist scholarship were finally exposed. Not only was there a retreat, but some of the representatives began to assume reactionary positions that they had spent their lives exposing and criticising.

This has largely been reflected in the stance taken by some of the white (ex)radical academics in struggles to transform white liberal institutions, such as the University of the Witwatersrand, displaying some of the classic tendencies of a petty bourgeoisie whose class positions are threatened by the impending democratic transformation.

Some of these scholars are beginning to seek refuge in the very same unproblematised notion of 'academic freedom' for which they so passionately criticised the liberals. Others have also started arguing for the retention of a dual system of university education, where white liberal universities will maintain their status of being so-called 'centres of excellence' specialising in research, while black, particularly bantustan, universities become teaching centres.

This approach would reproduce the dominant racial relations in the production of knowledge, where white universities are producers of knowledge and black universities 'recyclers' of knowledge produced outside of themselves.

Exposing and criticising the weaknesses of radical scholarship and its intellectual and political practices must not be confused with its opposite, a conservative nationalist type of intellectualism displayed by some black intellectuals.

This attitude has not been displayed through a highly developed intellectual discourse, but through responses to white-dominated radical scholarship at conferences and workshops. Underlying this attitude is an erroneous assumption that it is only scholarship by blacks that is politically correct.

Through this, one sees the attempted justification of some of the most conservative and nationalistic, if not chauvinistic, approaches to intellectual and research work.. This must be continuously exposed and criticised. This attitude is characterised by a vehement opposition to class analysis,

thereby serving as the ideology of an aspirant and conservative black petty bourgeoisie.

The aim of the above points is to show that attempts at producing black intellectuals - a noble objective indeed - must be related to an analysis and fuller understanding of the political economy of South Africa.

It is also a means of illustrating that intellectual production is not, and cannot be, an abstract exercise, but is a reflection of the nature of society and strategies to change that society. Therefore, our task of transforming relations of knowledge production and the production of black intellectuals is closely related to the wider task of changing society itself.

Producing black intellectuals and researchers does not merely involve laying our hands on existing knowledge and recycling it among a larger section of society. That would simply lead to quantitative and not to qualitative change. It would merely fit those new intellectuals into existing relations of knowledge production without changing the relations and content of scholarship itself.

In summary, the relations of knowledge production embody in themselves class, race and gender relations reflective of wider society, both in their separation and interrelatedness. These issues raise very sharply the important question of a framework within which the production of black intellectuals should be undertaken.

A new paradigm

Unless one grapples with the question of the political economy of South African society and the kinds of changes required to advance towards a democracy, our task will not be fulfilled. The production of black intellectuals is not an abstract but a concrete exercise rooted in the realities of South Africa and the struggles of the majority.

Therefore, the point of departure should be the development of the necessary intellectual tools that will assist the transformation of society. This does not mean that there will not be disagreements or debates, but it is within these parameters that black scholars, researchers and intellectuals will be produced.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme being drawn up by sections of the national liberation movement provides a framework within which to locate our goals and objectives. This is not to suggest that this is the only framework, but it serves as an example of a possible framework.

The main point I wish to advance is that national liberation should provide the framework for achieving our goals and shaping new scholarship. It is a holistic understanding which recognises that national liberation cannot be understood outside of the economic exploitation which forms the fundamental relation of production in South African society.

While in many instances analyses and programmes of national liberation in various spheres like the economy, education, health, have been formulated, the same amount of work has not been undertaken in the area of knowledge production. Unless the task is located within the framework of national liberation, some of the mistakes of the scholarship criticised above are likely to be reproduced.

Producing black intellectuals and researchers does not merely involve recycling existing knowledge among a larger section of society

Action

The luxury of complaining or endlessly theorising about obstacles to the production of black intellectuals is a thing of the past. The structures that need to be changed must be identified. A framework within which this is to be done must be developed, and there must be clarity about some of the desired outcomes. The following are some of the structures and processes that need to be targeted in order to realise our objectives:

National liberation should provide the framework for shaping new scholarship

❑ ***Higher education institutions***

Proposals on how higher education should be transformed in such a way that they realise that the objectives of SOSRDEF need exploration. Concrete programmes must be developed within this transformation process: for example, the sponsoring of postgraduate studies of junior university staff members, and the setting up of a policy regarding expatriates.

Another area requiring consideration is how to insert our objectives within the debates on and processes of the transformation of higher education. This can be done through a number of existing structures and forums, as long as we develop our own policy positions.

Universities need to develop transformation programmes which, for example, sponsor black postgraduate studies.

❑ ***Research bodies***

SOSRDEF provides an institutional basis through which statutory and non-statutory research bodies can be systematically targeted as the institutional expression of dominant relations of knowledge production. Some are genuinely but others are opportunistically engaged in change, in order to legitimise their role in a democratic order.

One should not be ashamed of accessing the resources of the democratic state

❑ ***Funding and financing***

Without financial resources it is almost impossible to attain our objectives. Our first target should be access to the resources of the democratic state. One should not be ashamed of accessing these resources, as is sometimes implied in now fashionable anti-state postures. It is our task to ensure that in the democratic government's programme of transformation, the issue of knowledge production is one of the priorities.

The democratic state must be actively engaged to ensure that research becomes a priority. Unless this is done, this issue will be forgotten. Our approach should be that the issue of transforming relations of knowledge production is an integral component of meeting the basic needs of our people.

A role of this new body should be to engage the state so that funding is tied to training - to the production of black and women intellectuals. Recipients of funding must be able to demonstrate that they are involved in such training.

Local researchers are overlooked and sometimes deliberately underdeveloped in order to make them dependent on foreign researchers

Over and above state funding, donor funds need to be systematically targeted. Donors should be lobbied: criteria for funding must include a very clear affirmative action component. The importance of this lies in the fact that there is a danger facing a democratic South Africa, whereby international research and funding agencies would like to position themselves as the providers of policy research and other such services.

In the process, local researchers are overlooked and sometimes deliberately underdeveloped in order to make them dependent on foreign researchers. Coupled with this, the pressure on the democratic government to obtain quick information may lead to massive research contracts being given to these bodies as they can deliver fairly quickly. Those of us in the policy research world are already beginning to experience these difficulties.

SOSRDEF should not be just another academic talkshop or platform for self-perpetuating academic indulgence

With regard to funding, the following areas should be targeted as priorities: student financing, including intensive post-graduate training, research funding, research networking, and publications.

Perhaps the most important thing is the development of a comprehensive human resources development programme. Such a programme must be multi-faceted and creatively developed within a multiplicity of settings. This body could play a very important role in policy development and back-up.

It might sound very ambitious, but there is no choice other than to carefully think through how this will happen. I am not arguing for a Broederbond-type role for this organisation, but it is important to intervene in shaping policies and realising our objectives. It could act as a base and a reference point for social scientists committed to our project in whatever spheres they find themselves.

Within this context, careful thought needs to be given to the type of internal activities SOSRDEF should embark upon. There are a number of possibilities, including research projects, research training and publications. The big task will be to relate internal activities to external linkages with a variety of other agencies and institutions. The primary criterion in deciding on activities is that they should become the guiding force behind networking and a multiplicity of initiatives outside the association.

Conclusion

The question of the production of black and women intellectuals is closely related to the wider project of transforming and reconstructing South African society. There is a need for a scholarship whose thrust is changing South African society towards an egalitarian, non-sexist and non-racial society.

There must be a realisation of the role of capitalism in reproducing existing relations of knowledge production and, finally, a realisation that in the end a radical programme of eradicating national oppression and class exploitation should form the basis of a new scholarship and paradigm within which to realise our objectives.

I am under no illusion that SOSRDEF should be a monolithic organisation; its directions and activities will be contested by the different interests located within the Forum itself. This is not unhealthy. What I have outlined could merely constitute a minimum programme for SOSRDEF if it is not to be considered as just another academic talkshop or platform for self-perpetuating academic indulgence. IPA

South Africa's system of land surveying is equal to the best in the world. But its complexity and cost could delay by years ambitious African National Congress plans to deliver land, houses and basic services to millions of needy people.

The country's cadastre, or parcel-based land information system, is highly accurate. Boundaries in surveyed areas are secure and property coordinates are recorded in a national reference system.

The system has become used, however, by buyers with time and money available for the myriad bureaucratic and legal procedures that back up a state-of-the-art system, and has been criticised for being inappropriate to a rapidly urbanising society and a rural land redistribution programme.

It is a little-known problem with serious political consequences which are only beginning to be realised. Current ANC thinking is that the country's entire land registration system must be changed to ensure the rapid delivery of land to large numbers of people. This has far-reaching implications for existing and future land ownership in South Africa and for all those involved, from land surveyors to lawyers, in the registration process.

SETTING THE BOUNDARIES

By Clarissa Fourie
Researcher in the Department of Surveying and Mapping at the University of Natal

The role of land surveyors in South Africa is often perceived as unnecessarily expensive and time consuming. But surveying is a small and speedy part of a cumbersome land administration process. It takes only hours to survey a plot of land but months to register it.

To inform debate as new policies are put in place, some aspects of the land surveyor's present part in South African society and in the development process must be understood.

Security of tenure in this country is rooted in its highly exact surveying system and method of checking any overlapping land rights by conveyancers. The security of tenure of each registered property, in relation to its boundaries, is based on two aspects.

Surveys that produce a set of coordinates unique to that property (Diagram 1). These are linked to a national reference system of co-ordinates known as the LO system, based *on longitudinal zones.*

A range of administrative procedures undertaken by the Surveyor-General's offices that ensure that these coordinates, which are held as a public record, are correct.

The coordinates show how a property has a different spatial position to any other. Problems arise if coordinates are not measured accurately and the administrative system does not pick this up. This can result in overlapping ownership of properties affecting security of tenure (Diagram 2).

DIAGRAM 1.



COORDINATES WHICH ARE REPRESENTED AS BEACONS ON THE GROUND.

Boundaries

South Africa's system of securing people's boundaries can be found only in a few other countries, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka. *Therefore,* any attempts at cadastral reform in regard to adapting or changing the system of securing people's boundaries, are complicated by the fact that it is not possible to draw simple comparisons with land reform programmes elsewhere.

DIAGRAM 2





In other countries different mechanisms are used to secure property boundaries. In the United Kingdom, for example, before a person buys a property, he or she pays a lawyer to search all available records on that property. Often these records are incomplete.

Ultimately, despite an expensive legal search, a person can at best be only reasonably sure of being the undisputed owner of their house. Whether the bottom of their garden belongs to their neighbour or the local council often remains open to question. A system of general boundaries would probably not work in South Africa because of high levels of hostility: property disputes are minimised by our system of fixed boundaries.

Australia uses the Torrens system, in which land is surveyed but not connected to a national reference system of coordinates. Land owners rights are guaranteed, but neither the dimensions of their property, nor its placing, is guaranteed.

There the state has set up a fund to pay out on what are termed 'encroachments', where there are overlapping claims to ownership. In the USA, people insure their titles every year against such possible claims.

Who pays?

Somewhere along the line security of tenure has to be paid for within any society - either through insurance, the law courts, the government or even through the use of thugs. In South Africa, survey and registration changes are where the costs lie, paid for by the individual and the state.

With millions more South Africans, most of them poor, needing security of tenure, the issue of payment becomes crucial. Who is going to pay and at what point? If security of tenure cannot be afforded by a prospective owner, the person runs the risk of losing the land, in which case financial institutions will not grant a bond. It's a Catch 22 situation in which security of tenure for the poor within the wider society becomes extremely difficult.

Without security of tenure, potential hostility between neighbours becomes difficult to resolve and owners are reluctant to invest in their high-risk land. It is unrealistic to argue that all poor South Africans would work in groups to solve land ownership disputes, given the levels of territorial conflict that already exist.

If South Africa's land cadastre is changed to speed up and facilitate land ownership by black people, but security of tenure is not catered for, the ability of the poor to own land security will be undermined. As seriously, land ownership in developed areas will become insecure, with implications for investment.

Reform

Adapting South Africa's system is difficult not only because of the few international comparisons available, but also because

changes must be made in a way that limits unplanned and undesirable knock-on effects on individuals, society and the economy as a whole.

A black smallholder acquiring land through a future land reform programme and a factory owner in the developed economy have an equal interest in what type of land registration system underpins their security of tenure.

It is not simply a matter of making existing systems of surveying cheaper, or employing new technology. Rather, workable technical and administrative adaptations to the present system need to be made to speed it up, make it cheaper to the individual and the state, and also to deliver security of tenure in a way which is acceptable to a wide range of people and vested interests.

Land relations

A cadastre serves a country's resource management; the raising of rates and taxes; and the underpinning of an economy in regard to bonds, loans and whatever form investments take. A range of national institutions form part of the relationship between an individual and his or her land.

Some of these institutions are central and/or regional governments, the judiciary, the Receiver of Revenue and/or local government rates department, the various planning and environmental bodies and financial institutions - both public and private. In other words, a wide range of institutions have a vested interest in any cadastral reform undertaken in a country.

Land surveyors trigger, but do not create, time-consuming administrative procedures. Obtaining reliable coordinates and measuring a property can be done very quickly. However, before this can be done, what are known as 'subdivisional consents' have to be obtained.

In South Africa, permission to subdivide land, both in the rural and urban areas, has to be obtained from a range of authorities for a variety of reasons. As many as 130 different laws affect subdivision. A land surveyor has to obtain the consent of dozens of bodies (the provincial administrator, department of transport, local authority for electricity, sewerage drainage etc) before the land can be subdivided.

This procedure is extremely time consuming, but no subdivision can take place legally until permission is obtained from all the relevant authorities. Complicating matters further is the fact that procedures vary from province to province, and also from municipality to municipality.

It is difficult to make changes in a way that limits unplanned and undesirable knock-on effects

It is simply not a matter of making existing systems cheaper or employing new technology

This arial photograph depicts the difference between orderly, formal settlements (Inanda New Town to the left) and the dense informal settlements (Nhlungwane on the right)

As many as 130 different laws and the consent of dozens of bodies affect subdivision

If large housing development projects are to succeed, money for services will almost certainly have to come from central or regional governments

Hitches

If, for example, a developer applies to have land subdivided the local authority concerned has to check with a variety of departments within it as to whether their services are sufficient to supply that area. If the local authority is under-capitalised, and cannot provide the necessary services it will not give consent to the subdivision.

Developers are reluctant to pay for servicing since it puts up the cost of what they are selling. This creates a constant tension between developers and local authorities which is exacerbated by massive developments, and which can cause delays or destroy development plans.

If large housing development projects are to succeed in South Africa, money for services will almost certainly have to come from central or regional governments, since local authorities will be unable to raise such money in the short to medium-term through rates. If the consent route is bypassed, subdivisions could go ahead with disastrous results, such as the overflowing of sewerage systems.

If conditions of title aimed at maintaining certain standards of living are removed, land values would drop

There are important legal and economic implications involved in the densification of urban areas, which will almost certainly be the result of mass housing programmes. Every local authority has by-laws governing subdivision. If conditions of title aimed at maintaining certain standards of living are removed, land values would drop.

For local authorities to be able to deliver on the type of housing programme envisaged by the ANC, they would have to review many of their by-laws. Given the devolved power to local government and housing policies of a future central government, the type of tension found between the different tiers of government in the country, manifested in health and education, can also be found in land.

In the case of rural land, before subdivision can proceed the Minister of Agriculture has to be satisfied that each subdivision is capable of producing a net profit of at least R50 000 a year. This, too, flies in the face of ANC land reform programmes, which argue the case for black smallholdings. Changes in rural planning and surveying procedures are therefore also on the cards.

The major challenge will be making institutional, rather than policy changes

Land registration in South Africa involves two separate but linked administrative processes. The steps outlined above only relate to the role of the land surveyor in the system of land registration.

The land registration process involves conveyancing by attorneys in conjunction with the Deeds Registry Offices, who are responsible for other steps in the process such as the checking of additional rights held within the land that is being subdivided, payment of rates and/or taxes etc.

These areas, and especially conveyancing - where real cost savings could be made - also need to be investigated with a view to change.

Conclusion

South Africa has developed a particular surveying system and cadastre upon which the security of property boundaries is based. Whether or not this system will survive in a future South Africa depends on at least two factors.

Firstly, whether it can deliver to the poor and, secondly, whether those who are now responsible for the system can sell the usefulness of the present, or an adapted, system to a future government.

Because of lack of precedent South Africa will have to largely go it alone in adapting its surveying system. The major challenge will be making institutional, rather than policy changes - by far the most difficult thing to do given the myriad institutions and interests involved.

A major new frontier of the reconstruction process will be local government, because it is at this level that adaptions will have to be made to existing property owners' conditions of title, expansion of services, the densification of areas, consent procedures and interaction between developers and local authorities.

Nuts and bolts changes at local level are needed to facilitate reconstruction in South Africa along the lines envisaged by democratic forces. Land surveyors are keen to raise the issues described with political parties so that they can be dealt with pragmatically within the land reform process. IPA

St Lucia

What Rules for the Referee?

By Simon Bekker
Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal

Plans to mine titanium oxide ore on the Eastern shores of Lake St Lucia prompted five years of argument, the largest Environmental Impact Assessment ever undertaken in South Africa and a Review Panel which recommended that mining should not be allowed. But a final government decision is still to be made, and indications are that the matter remains unresolved.

The debate over whether mining should be allowed on the Eastern shores of Lake St Lucia, launched by the South African government five years ago, appears to be drawing to a close. Mineral and Energy Affairs and then the cabinet will soon take a final decision on the matter.

Since the pre-election South African government is a severely constrained decision-taking body, it is probable that the final decision will be taken after the April general election.

The necessary work, comprising an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a review process, has been completed - albeit amidst substantial dispute, contest, and controversy - and a clear recommendation has been put to government.

The procedure followed (Box One) describes a policy instrument intended for use in the increasing number of cases where environmental and economic aims are deemed by some to be in conflict with one another.

This article explores the effectiveness of this policy instrument as it was used in the St Lucia case. In particular, I will discuss the proposed methodology, and how this methodology was applied in to St Lucia.

Subsequently, I will discuss the reliability and authority of the Review Panel (RP) report which proposes and justifies the primary recommendation: 'that no mining should be allowed in the Greater St Lucia Area'.

St Lucia Review Panel

The Review Panel under the chairmanship of the Hon R. N. Leon included four other members: Professor Charles Breen, Dr Sybil Hotz, Professor Harriet Ngubane, and Professor Ramanlal Soni. This group of five was asked to evaluate the EIA process and product. They found the product to be 'thorough, competent and highly professional'.

The procedure describes a policy for use in the increasing number of cases where environmental and economic aims are in conflict

They were also requested to conduct public hearings on the EIA and its findings, which they did during the second half of 1993.

Thirdly, they were asked to make clear recommendations to government on whether or not mining should take place on the Eastern shores. In so doing, they were asked to indicate whether mining (or other land use options) would cause unacceptable damage to the area. It is worth quoting the Panel's report in this regard:

> In the Panel's judgement, mining the Eastern Shores would cause unacceptable damage to a place which is special because of its rich history, ecological and biological diversity and the significance it has in the eyes of its many visitors. This unique combination makes the Greater St Lucia Area a very special asset for the nation. There is no substitute.

The Greater St Lucia Area is a very special asset for the nation. There is no substitute

Strictly, this conclusion is a value judgement, particularly regarding the 'specialness' of the area (as resolved by Panel members).

Environmental Impact Assessment

By B van Wilge and A v B Weaver
CSIR Environmental Services

The St Lucia Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was begun after a Cabinet instruction in September 1989. The Department of Environment Affairs was given responsibility for seeing that a comprehensive EIA was successfully executed.

The EIA investigated two land-use options for the area - the nature conservation and tourism option, and the mining option. The mining option included conservation and tourism as far as it would be feasible in conjunction with mining. The Department established three committees to guide the EIA process:

- a Coordinating Committee was appointed under Chairmanship of the Department to report to Cabinet;
- an Assessment Management Committee was ratified by the Coordinating Committee to ensure that the impact assessment was carried out;
- a Review Panel was also ratified by the Coordinating Committee to recommend to the Cabinet whether 'unacceptable damage' was likely, which land-use option was to be preferred, and conditions under which a given option should proceed.

Over 120 individuals and groups came forward as interested and affected parties (I&APs). Fourteen of these, identified as representing the majority of I&APs, were frequently involved in the EIA process. The Assessment Management Committee facilitated communication with all I&APs through information circulars.

In addition, a rural liaison programme established the concerns of black communities, and communicated the results of the EIA to them. Further input from I&APs in the form of written comment on the Environmental Impact Report (EIR), and participation in public hearings, was obtained.

Over 50 scientists and experts, selected on the basis of their professional standing in their particular fields, contributed to the three volumes of the EIA. These specialists were drawn from universities, research organisations, museums and other bodies in South Africa and overseas.

Initially, 23 specialist studies provided basic information on the Eastern Shores area. The lead I&APs commented on these Specialist Reports, which were amended where necessary. Major comments, together with authors' responses, were captured in Volume 1, Parts 1 and 2 of the EIA.

The response to the first three circulars to I&APs provided a basis for generating a list of key issues. As a second stage in the EIA, reports on these key issues were compiled into Volume 2 of the EIA.

The Environmental Impact Report (EIR), Volume 3, drew upon information from both the Specialist and Key Issue Reports in Volumes 1 and 2. It included conclusions drawn on the impacts of the two land-use options for the area, and recommendations on the conditions under which either option should be allowed to proceed.

The EIA was specifically required to address the question of irreparable damage. Irreparable damage was defined, for the purposes of the EIA, as an impact of the highest order: there could be no possible mitigation of the impact in the long term.

The final report, Volume 4, was prepared in response to comments on Volumes 1 to 3. Volume 4 revised the Environmental Impact Report and made a series of conclusions and recommendations based on comment received and additional work carried out as a result of these comments.

The independent Review Panel conducted a series of open public hearings in Durban and St Lucia after which its findings were published in December 1993.

The Panel's recommendations have now been passed to cabinet for consideration, after which the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs will make a final decision on the land use option to be adopted. The Cabinet will provide a written record of the decision.

Simultaneously, it is a judgement that should be based upon rational and reasoned argument, particularly regarding the 'unacceptable damage' linked to the mining option. This argument relies upon evidence found in EIA reports or assembled during public hearings.

Since I intend to identify a difficulty in the EIA process, and a number of inconsistencies and factual errors in the Review Report, and thereby point to flaws in the argument contained in the Report, it is worth discussing at this point the implications of these flaws for the Review Panel's recommendations.

It is impossible to ascertain from the Review Report what importance the various elements of the overall argument enjoyed on its path to a conclusion and main recommendation. This is so because no indication of relative weights of these elements is given in the Report. Accordingly, it is impossible to conclude whether the main recommendation is flawed.

What is apparent, however, is that this recommendation does carry less authority - to my mind - than it would have had these flaws not emerged in the argument. The decision to be taken by government is thereby rendered more difficult to take.

Difficulties of method

The Environmental Impact Assessment was required to deal with the question of 'irreparable damage' potentially caused by each of the land use options. The Review Panel, on the other hand, was required to deal with 'unacceptable damage' in the same regard.

'Irreparable damage' was initially defined as an impact of the highest order, for which no possible mitigation over the long-term could be found. As a result of written criticisms and acknowledgement of the 'contentious' nature of the definition, this definition was changed toward the end of the EIA process.

The thrust of the criticism was that 'because any impact could be mitigated to some degree, no impact could qualify as irreparable damage'. The Review Panel expressed agreement with this criticism.

The question of 'unacceptable damage', on the other hand, was the primary criterion to be used by the Review Panel to justify its recommendation. The relationship between the irreparable and unacceptable damage criteria is defined in the EIR as follows:

> The role of the Review Panel is to assess whether any development would result in unacceptable damage. Unacceptable damage is a matter of judgement and it falls outside the brief of the EIR to make assessments of acceptability. The purpose of assessing irreparable damage is to assist the Review Panel in identifying any impact which could be important in the context of unacceptable damage.

After rejecting the initial tight definition of irreparable damage, the Review Panel developed an implicit criterion for identifying unacceptable damage. This criterion rested upon the degree of uncertainty of the scientific results contained in the EIR. The Review Report's Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations illustrates the use of this criterion:

> Mining could irreparably reduce the biodiversity in its path, and would significantly alter the sense of place that ordinary people have. The exact effects are impossible to predict.
>
> The effectiveness of rehabilitation is questionable, and ecologists are unable to predict precisely the outcome of the plant succession after mining.
>
> The water used in mining could percolate through to the lake, lowering salinity levels and thus altering the ecological balance. The additional water could raise the water table and cause slumping of the dunes.
>
> Mining involves uncertainties and risks. Because of the unanswered questions, it remains a leap in the dark. Because of its special value, St Lucia is too precious to risk.

Accordingly, the Review Panel's definition of unacceptable damage rests in large measure on the uncertainty they maintain exists in the experts' scientific findings in the Environmental Impact Report. This has led a commentator (Lloyd) to observe that:

> (i)n saying that it was not proved that restoration was possible after mining, Mr Justice Leon's panel showed that it believed that positive proof was possible, and unwittingly introduced a whole new concept into our legal system - the balance of absolute proof.

Such ambiguity and variation in the definition of two criteria crucial to the outcome of the EIA process - irreparable and unacceptable damage - highlight a significant flaw in the policy instrument. This flaw also detracts from the credibility of the arguments made to justify and underpin the St Lucia recommendations.

The Review Panel's definition of unacceptable damage rests on the uncertainty they maintain exists in the experts' findings

Difficulties of substance

Particular elements in the argument justifying the Panel's recommendations also suffer from flaws. Five separate deficiencies or factual errors have been identified and each will be discussed separately.

❑ *Alternative ore reserves*

The Review Panel urged Richard's Bay Minerals to locate alternative titanium oxide ore sites in less sensitive areas. It subsequently argued:

> The CSIR was never asked to investigate whether there were alternative sources of ore available. The result of this omission was that the Panel had no independent evidence before it on this topic. The Panel regards this as an important matter since the land use of the area under consideration is predominantly nature conservation.

The argument is factually incorrect. Chapter Five of Volume Three of the EIR includes several pages directly addressing alternative sources of ore. The conclusion drawn from this independent evidence is that no suitable alternative sites have been identified.

Ambiguity in the criteria highlight a flaw which detracts from the credibility of the arguments justifying the recommendation

❑ *Creation of local jobs through mining*

When addressing the job creation strand of the mining option in St Lucia, the Review Panel stated that the mining proposal would not create many jobs. It gave the number as 159, and wrote that even if full credit was given to the multiplier effect, that number became 312.

In Volume Three of the EIR, the following employment estimates linked to the mining option are given: 313 life-time jobs created by Richards Bay Minerals; 300 temporary jobs related to the establishment of the mine; and between 1 275 and 4 675 life-time jobs due to the multiplier effect.

The discrepancy between the two estimates is very large. The Review Panel justifies its drastically lower estimate by arguing that 'there are too many uncertainties involved'.

The job creation strand of the mining option in St Lucia would not create many jobs

❑ *Dune slumping and damage to wetlands*

If mining were established on the Eastern Shores, dune coversands would be removed

The St Lucia Rural Communications Programme

By Bonga Mlambo and Themba Mzimela
Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, University of Natal

The Centre for Social and Development Studies was commissioned by the CSIR in 1993 to undertake a rural communications exercise in St Lucia. Researchers in the Centre's Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit were entrusted with the responsibility of communicating the St Lucia Environmental Impact Report (EIR) to local communities, and assessing how its results could affect their lives.

Community participants were requested to express their views on the two land use options developed and described in the EIR: the Richards Bay Minerals' option to mine the sand dunes in St Lucia to rehabilitate the area after mining; and the Natal Parks Board (NPB) conservation and ecotourism option.

The basic objective of the exercise was to inform the communities of the content of the EIR and to enable them to make an input into the review panel which sat in St Lucia in November 1993. (See Volume Four of the EIR for greater detail).

In-depth group discussions were held with a number of local communities at their homes. Most questions raised were open-ended in order to allow participants to express their opinions without inhibition. These discussions were preceded and guided by oral presentations by the authors in which the two land use options and the recommendations of the EIR were highlighted. The presentations were supplemented by EIR information pamphlets, in Zulu, which were distributed among participants.

Ample time to ask questions and to voice concerns was built into group discussion sessions after the presentations. It is worth noting that participants, on a number of occasions, became emotional and angry about the negative attitude of the Natal Parks Board towards mining.

Since the authors were also responsible for identifying local interested and affected parties (I&APs) who would subsequently be invited to make representations at the Review Panel's public hearings, the following criteria for such identification were developed :

- proximity of the community to the mining site (the Dukuduku community is a case in point);
- historical connection of a community to the land under dispute;
- black employee groupings of RBM and NPB and their allied labour organisations;
- regional and tribal authorities in the area.

Certain limitations in the communication exercise's research method and identification of I&APs have been described in the EIR.

During the public hearings organised by the Review Panel, the authors acted as a bridge between the Panel and the local communities. Arrangements were made to transport spokespersons of these communities to St Lucia where the hearings were held. Oral translations of speeches, questions and answers were made to ensure that those who could not present their views in English could do so in their mother tongue.

Most local community input addressed land claims. Spokespersons argued strongly that communities had lost their land as a result of apartheid policies. Though Review Panel members repeatedly explained that land claims were outside the scope of the exercise, they were urged to make note of claims.

Finally, attempts were made by the authors to inform local communities of the recommendations of the Review Panel. The main objective was to ensure that local people were kept informed of this stage of the EIA.

The authors encountered widespread local disappointment about the main Panel recommendation, not to proceed with mining, and deep suspicion that the Panel had sympathised with white pressure groups while undervaluing black local community inputs.

and this could negatively affect the supply of water to the St Lucia wetlands. The Review Panel argued that there is no agreement among professionals on the consequences for the wetlands of such mining activity. Accordingly, they concluded that risks to the wetlands are too high.

The EIR is explicit in arguing that there is agreement among professionals that the consequences for the wetlands would be insignificant. Insofar as disagreement does occur, it involves not professionals but laypersons, as reflected in a number of submissions to the public hearings.

❑ *Ramsar Convention and Mining*

The Eastern Shores forms part of the St Lucia Ramsar site, proclaimed as a wetland of international importance in terms of the Ramsar Convention. The Review Panel claims that mining would be in conflict with the Ramsar Convention.

The EIR came to a significantly different conclusion, since it found that mining would not affect the functioning of wetlands in the area. Consequently, it may not be necessary to change the status of the Ramsar site, in the event of mining taking place.

❑ *Attitudes of affected black communities*

Finally, given the political context within which the Review Panel operated - significant land claims in the target area, a difficult squatter situation in indigenous forests within the area, and a probability that a future government more sensitive to rural black community needs would take the final decision - the Review Report's interpretation of local black attitudes to mining are important.

The EIA process is designed to involve interested and affected parties (I&APs) from the outset. In the St Lucia case, some 120 parties were involved and fourteen of these were identified as lead I&APs.

The Review Panel criticises the EIA process for not having identified 'local communities and their leaders' as lead I&APs. The rural liaison programme, launched toward the end of the EIA process, was intended partially to address this deficiency (Box Two).

This programme confirmed and extended the finding that local black residents supported the mining option. This result, if found to be reliable by the Review Panel, would have represented a significant counter-argument to the Panel's main recommendation.

The Review Report stated the Panel's case in the following terms:

> Despite the respect for nature among the indigenous population, they overwhelmingly support mining, because they identify ecotourism with the Natal Parks Board, an organisation which they dislike because of its low wages and the perception that it seizes people's land. RBM (Richards Bay Minerals) is praised because of its wage levels and social responsibility programmes. Because of this there was no fair comparison between mining and ecotourism in these communities.

With regard to the report of the rural liaison programme which diverged substantially from this Review Panel conclusion, the Review Report states that the programme was defective. Two reasons are offered:

> (i) In the case of the National Union of Mineworkers, there was a material discrepancy between the report of the Rural Liaison researchers, and the evidence given before us on behalf of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) by Miss L James.
>
> (ii) In the case of Mr Phineas Mbuyazi, who appeared before the Review Panel at St Lucia, it was quite apparent that he was under a misapprehension as to what the Review Panel was dealing with. He being under the impression that we were dealing with land claims.

Both criticisms are invalid.

In the first case, the material discrepancy clearly revolves around inconsistencies in evidence provided by different parties within NUM. One party provided evidence during the liaison programme to the researchers whilst the other party, a spokesperson based in Johannesburg, provided contradictory evidence during a public hearing. The fault lay with neither the rural liaison researchers nor the programme they were executing.

In the second case, the researchers, in their rural liaison programme report, make it clear that Mr Mbuyazi was informed of the purpose of the EIA and of the rural liaison programme. The fact that he insisted on speaking to his community's land claim reflects the over-riding importance of this issue to him, rather than any form of misapprehension. The rural liaison researchers wrote the following:

> In general for the Mbuyazi clanspeople, the current negotiations on the land-use options and the recommendations of the EIR are of no relevance to them.... In spite of our painstaking explanation that the land claim issues were out of our scope, they made it clear to us that we should not come back to them without any concrete information regarding the developments of their land claim.

Conclusion

The EIA for the Eastern Shores of Lake St Lucia was judged as thorough, competent and highly professional. Simultaneously, with regard to the criterion used to decide how damaging mining would be in the area, the EIA process reflected both ambiguity and alteration of definition.

This EIA has also, possibly for the first time in South Africa, attempted directly to involve in the process local rural communities who may be described as 'living within or adjacent to the subregion, who are largely illiterate, whose first language is Zulu, (and) who are not contactable by post'.

This form of participation, though implemented at a late stage of the process, does create an important precedent and an important new challenge to EIAs in countries like South Africa.

Simultaneously, criticisms that community spokespersons misunderstood their involvement and, accordingly, that their attitudes portrayed points of view different from those sought, point to difficulties in meeting this challenge.

The process of integrated environmental management and its environmental impact assessment phase represent a policy instrument of increasing importance. It is used to address sensitive issues of protection and economic growth.

In South Africa, it will be used in future to address sensitive issues of protection, economic growth and equity in a more democratic environment than currently exists. The instrument needs refinement, and decisions taken on the basis of findings produced by the instrument will need wisdom.

IPIA

Despite the respect for nature among the indigenous population, they overwhelmingly support mining

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

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