

VOLUME FIVE NUMBER TWO

SUMMER 1988

# INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A

## PROTEST PATHOLOGY

*The Pietermaritzburg Legacy*

(86)

## ANC DATA

*Insurgent Acts 1976 - 1987*

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL.  
Centre for Applied Social Sciences.  
Indicator Project South Africa.

## INDABA DILEMMA

*The Economic Factor*

## CORRUPTION COUPS

*Bridge Over the River Kei*

## CINDERELLA SCHOOLING

*Reforming Rural Education*

## REPUBLICAN ENTERPRISES

*Unionising Public Servants*



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THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS



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
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forward to the  
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*Indicator SA* was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to develop statistical indicators and monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change. The project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decision makers through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' – namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban, and industrial – as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

Financially, the Project relies on donor subscriptions from

companies and foundations in South Africa and abroad, who consider it part of their social responsibility programme to support the independent investigation and analysis of issues in all areas of South African society. A broad spectrum of individuals and institutes in the public and private sectors also subscribe to the *Indicator SA* journal and information service. Interested subscribers should contact the liaison officer directly at the IPSA offices.

*Indicator SA* draws on university-based research findings and commissions reports from prominent academics and practitioners in the field, besides maintaining a project research team which monitors issues, undertakes special studies and makes regular contributions. The main thrust of the IPSA information service is to provide objective, practical, policy-directed research. We strive to quantify published commentary and findings, through providing hard data, survey results and comparative research. Simultaneously, IPSA initiates debate on controversial issues by inviting a wide range of partisan perspectives, including government, labour, community, corporate executives, and spokespeople representing other key participants in the change process.

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'Indicator SA, that most valuable barometer of social trends.' *Sunday Times, September 1986*

'That absolutely indispensable publication... We need better research, the kind of research published inter alia in Indicator SA.' *Cape Times, August 1984*


'The latest Indicator SA publication... a timely and penetrating assessment of the government's local and regional reform programme.' *The Natal Mercury, January 1986*

The staff of *Indicator SA* express their great sadness at the recent loss of Professor Jill Nattrass, one of the founder members of our Project. Her many important contributions to the journal, along with her editorial input and interest, will be greatly missed.

# POLITICAL

M O N I T O R

## PIETERMARITZBURG METROPOLITAN AREA



### Administrative Units

<b>BOROUGHS</b> Pietermaritzburg City Council Howick Town Council	<b>DISP OF CO-OPERATION &amp; DEVELOPMENT</b> Edendale Complex
<b>TOWN BOARDS</b> None	<b>NATALIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD</b> None
<b>HEALTH COMMITTEES</b> Ashburton Mt. Michael	<b>KWAZULU</b> Edendale Empiphomeni
<b>DEVELOPMENT &amp; SERVICES BOARD</b> Regional Suburbs Midmar Development Area East/JL Plesislaer	<b>LAND OWNERS</b> White Farming Areas

Source  
Pietermaritzburg 2000 Information Dossier





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- FOR COMMUNICATION • FOR EVERYBODY
- FOR PARENTS • FOR DRIVERS • FOR TAXIS
- FOR WORKERS • FOR STUDENTS
- FOR BUSINESSMEN • FOR BUSINESSWOMEN
- FOR HOSPITALS • FOR NURSES
- FOR PATIENTS • FOR CYCLISTS
- FOR MINERS • FOR PLUMBERS • FOR PEOPLE
- FOR GRANDPARENTS • FOR FARMERS
- FOR THE COUNTRY AND THE FUTURE
- FOR TEACHERS • FOR DOERS
- FOR FRIENDS • FOR JIVERS • FOR SHOPPERS
- FOR HOUSEHOLDERS • FOR RELIGION
- FOR T.V.ADDICTS • FOR COOKS • FOR HOMES
- FOR DOG OWNERS • FOR THE YOUNG
- FOR THE OLD

**FOR EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING**

# FACTIONALISM IN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer,  
Director, Centre for Policy Studies,  
Wits Graduate School of Business

*South Africa is not a gentle society and the harshness of security force action against dissidents has caused the world to recoil in horror. However, the current bloody conflict between black political factions in the areas around Pietermaritzburg, which has thus far claimed a staggering 530 lives, has capped a phase of particularly violent struggles between opposed groupings in the township protests from 1984 onwards. On a recent visit to South Africa the world-renowned political journalist, Simon Jenkins, argued that these conflicts, almost above anything else, demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in the popular resistance to white rule.*

*In analysing the contagious internecine violence in the Natal region, Prof Schlemmer shows that although the current conflicts are uniquely vicious, factionalism in the resistance movement is nothing new in South Africa. Indeed, the roots of the rivalries in the present conflict stretch back to the forties.*

The earliest intra-resistance conflict in the modern pattern emerged after the sharp split between the 'Africanists' and the more inclusive faction of the ANC in 1949 — a grouping which included communists and some non-African liberals. Author Edward Feit records that large pro-Africanist branches were violently expelled from the ANC in the fifties after grassroots rejection of the role of white radicals in the top leadership of the movement. Potlake Leballo, later to informally lead the PAC in exile, at the time referred bitterly to 'Eastern functionaries just returned from Moscow, Warsaw and China' (Feit 1967: p44 passim).

Other internal strains also surfaced in the ANC during this period, causing Mandela to decry the presence in the movement of shady characters ranging from political clowns, place seekers, saboteurs and agents provocateurs to informers and even policemen (Feit: p68).

After tension between the 'Charterists' (adherents of the Kliptown Freedom Charter) and the Africanists had become critical in the late fifties, the latter broke away under Sobukwe's leadership to

establish the PAC. A rhetorical animosity very reminiscent of present political rivalries became established. When the organisations were declared illegal and underground military movements were formed, a more lethal strategy emerged. Judge Snyman who presided over the enquiry into the PAC underground, Poqo, recorded evidence of many brutal murders aimed at frightening unwilling people and forcing them to co-operate (Kotze 1975: p21).

The factional conflicts of the past few years, therefore, are no unique pathology in the struggle. The continuities are striking.

Soon after the establishment of the United Democratic Front, broadly sympathetic to the older Charterists, verbal barbs were directed at the black consciousness movement, mainly Azapo. An early example came from Zinzi Mandela, who referred to Azapo as 'ideologically lost political bandits'. Saths Cooper of Azapo claimed the attacks were the result of a 'threat to their little hegemonies' (*The Sunday Tribune* 16/10/83). At about the same time hostility between the Joint Rent Action Committee, a Durban organisation later to join the UDF, and Inkatha in the greater Durban region, was building up to crisis proportions.

The older, more experienced politicians attempted to prevent fragmentation. Prominent UDF personalities attended the launch of the black consciousness orientated National Forum committee in 1983. At the time it was indicated that even membership by Inkatha would be considered. In 1984 there were various instances when the UDF and Azapo held joint meetings. The two organisations held joint memorial services after the incident at the University of Zululand when five students were killed in clashes with Inkatha.

The suspicion of white radical and liberal influences in the UDF felt by black consciousness leaders was too strong, however, and tensions grew, defeating the efforts of numerous truce committees

*A rhetorical animosity reminiscent of present rivalries between the ANC/UDF, Azapo and Inkatha had already emerged in the opposition politics of the 1950s*

The mid-1980s rebellion turned on itself with a vengeance — by 1987 interfactional and community conflicts led to far more fatalities than security action

The Pietermaritzburg feuds have become a way of life, with a spiral of tit-for-tat revenge as the original causes of township conflict are forgotten

and peace initiatives in the months that followed.

### Multiple Causes

In 1985 conflict among township movements and groupings accounted for about one third of deaths in the civil unrest. By 1986 half the deaths were due to factional conflict and only about one third due to security force action (*Race Relations News* April 1987). In 1987 interfaction violence accounted for a dominant majority of deaths in the townships. (see table on unrest fatalities, *Indicator SA Vol4/No4*: p26).

The peculiarly brutal nature of many of the attacks is a macabre chapter in South Africa's modern history. A new term has officially been added to the English language — that of the 'necklace', a burning petrol-soaked tyre placed over the heads of victims. In the Eastern Cape in 1985, in particular, scores of people were summarily executed after informal hearings in ad hoc 'people's courts'. In one episode in 1985, some 1 000 UDF-aligned youths and adults armed with weapons launched planned and systematic attacks on the homes of Azapo supporters in KwaZakele, Port Elizabeth. Similar attacks on a slightly smaller scale continued into 1986. From time to time prominent leaders in the opposing factions would agree to a truce, but splinter groups would continue the violence. In Soweto-By-The-Sea, near Port Elizabeth, one campaign alone resulted in five necklace deaths.

In other parts of the country patterns of conflict have been different. An early phenomenon in Transvaal unrest was the attacks on shops owned by Indians in the Vaal Triangle. Then, in 1985, Indian residents in Inanda (near Durban) were attacked by African youth, and 1 500 Indians fled their homes, many of which were looted and burned.

It is tragic to note, therefore, that in terms of life loss, forces within the black communities have done at least as much damage to their own neighbours as the State. The rebellion turned on itself with a vengeance.

Seeking reasons for this kind of violence is never a simple matter. There are several salient features but most certainly no single cause:

#### The self-perpetuating feud

The first and most obvious feature is that this type of violence, like feuds, feeds on itself. There is always a score to settle, and the spiral of revenge can continue long after the original causes have been forgotten. In the current Pietermaritzburg conflicts even black policemen are accused of becoming involved in personal vendettas. As Paul van Uytrecht of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce

suggests, the violence in that area has become a way of life (*Financial Mail* 5/2/88).

#### Status & ideological competition

At the source of the initial violence, however, more systematic causes can be discerned. Among the more obvious is political rivalry among three broad loyalties — those sympathetic to the UDF/ANC tradition; those aligned, directly or more loosely, with Inkatha; and those in the black consciousness movements, which, in a rather distant sense today, are linked with PAC traditions.


These current tensions have had a long incubation, with roots in the immediate post-war period. There was a resurgence of rivalry in the early seventies when the ANC in exile sought to discredit the black consciousness movement which had emerged as the dominant commitment for dissident youth within the country.

In the speech by ANC President Tambo at the ANC National Consultative Conference of June 1985, reactions to the black consciousness movement of the early seventies were outlined. The national executive committee of the ANC in 1973 had cautioned the black consciousness movement that the assertion of the national identity of the black people was not an end in itself. In the speech reference is made to fears that the black consciousness movement could have consolidated itself to replace the ANC, or at least to enjoy the same legitimacy; the ANC felt it was of primary importance to deny the movement both these opportunities. A 'third force' such as black consciousness was referred to as counter-revolutionary.

The ANC's official mouthpiece, *Sechaba*, had echoed these warnings in 1976 (third quarter), in 1977 (first quarter) and in 1979, and has done so frequently since then. At the time there were accounts that both the ANC and PAC tried to recruit the youthful refugees from the 1976/77 township disturbances.

Although containing additional elements, particularly differences in strategy, the same type of ideological rivalry underpins the hostility between Inkatha and the ANC. Buthelezi, an earlier follower of the nationalist-inclined ANC President Luthuli, maintained viable relations with the non-communist groupings inside the ANC in exile. When in October 1975 eight prominent African Nationalists (the Makiwane faction) were expelled from the ANC, the stage was set for a widening gulf between Inkatha and the ANC. Differences of political style, strategy and the implications of vastly different locations have aggravated the conflict ever since then.

As suggested in the speech by Tambo (op cit), affirmed continuously in the pages



Peter Elond

*Violence at a commuter point as a worker stayaway is enforced on the East Rand — there has been intense interfactional and township conflict over protest strategies and political affiliations.*

of Sechaba and made clear in statements at the Dakar meeting between the ANC and opposition Afrikaners (attended by this author), the ANC, for understandable reasons, sets great store by its leadership of the revolutionary movement. Sechaba frequently claims that the ANC alone has the experience and wisdom to lead the struggle for liberation. It also has a key commitment to holding the 'nationalist' and the 'socialist' tendencies within its ranks in balance — a precondition for the Congress movement's continued unity and coherence.

In these commitments the ANC enjoys common cause and compatibility with the UDF. The black consciousness movement's rejection of the role of 'non-Africans' and communists, and Inkatha's rejection of socialism and revolutionary strategies are absolutely fundamental challenges to the rallying calls of both the ANC and the UDF, linked in their acceptance of the Freedom Charter as an enabling document. In the mutual perceptions of all three movements, the rivals break the most basic ground rules.

The two factors above are probably the most basic causes of the tension among black organisations. A number of other factors enter the local situation to exacerbate factional conflict and to pitch it at the high level of violence one sees today:

#### Displaced, mobilised aggression

One of the most common features of collective human behaviour is to redirect aggression if it is frustrated or blocked by a stronger agency. In the 1984 to 1986 civil unrest the highly mobilised township street committees and other formations, both within the umbrella of the UDF and other movements, were on the whole effectively contained within black residential areas. Once these townships had become destabilised and the local authorities evicted, the mobilisation of

youth had to be put to some use. Policing consumer and rent boycotts was one activity. Action against criminal elements also occurred in some townships, as did 'clean-up' campaigns (e.g. refuse removal, park renovation). Nevertheless, the temptation to turn the pent-up readiness for action on the closest political rivals must have been irresistible.

#### Delinquent fellow-travellers

South Africa's townships are disadvantaged ghetto communities with more than their share of poorly socialised and deviant street youth. A category of youth marginal to the social order in the townships became involved in the protests, and behaved in such a way as to confront all forms of authority without necessarily subjecting themselves to the discipline of the organisations they are nominally part of (Swilling 1986). These 'lumpen activists' contributed greatly to the escalation of violence in township conflict, dispensing vindictive justice and acting with excessive zeal in the policing of consumer boycotts.

Out of this type of participation arose the brutal punishments at people's courts, the private vendettas in the name of liberation, the lurid punishments meted out to people caught breaking consumer boycotts (being forced to drink cooking oil, women being stripped and forced to parade on buses, or being daubed with paint) (*Sunday Times* 20/10/85). Pottinger has referred to these marginal youth as akin to the 'year zero' children of Cambodia's Pol Pot era (*Sunday Times* 15/6/86).

The observations of Paulus Zulu, an experienced black researcher into township dynamics, are that even in the most recent conflicts between Inkatha and UDF-aligned elements in Natal, the formal machinery of the two organisations is hardly involved to the extent of directing day-to-day affairs. He argues that the daily chain of violent action

*Misshapen by security action, the ungovernability strategy has produced a power vacuum without leadership, alternative structures or disciplinary codes*

Violence establishes supremacy where different movements cannot test their relative strength through properly conducted political activities and polls

A security strategy of containment without negotiation is also at fault — the State should encourage participation by a responsible extra-system leadership

and reaction is among localised groupings only tenuously connected to the wider organisations, although attempts at the elimination of UDF/Cosatu leadership reflects a purposive, concerted effort. The daily struggles, in his words, are more a conflict among uncontrolled marginal elements and local level bureaucrats, functionaries and headmen (affiliated to Inkatha), who are perceived as being self-seeking and corrupt. He ventures to say that both organisations could withdraw recognition of the combatants if they so wished (personal discussion).

#### Township alienation

In any society where upwards of 40 percent of youth are unemployed (and possibly never likely to be employed), where administration is remote and unsympathetic, where family life and authority have substantially disintegrated, and where few institutions exist in which individuals can acquire a role, status or a feeling of meaningful involvement, young adults are likely to feel that, in the context of the wider society, they are meaningless cyphers. This alienation creates a compelling pressure for personal rebellion and self-actualisation, whether through sex, drugs, violent crime or political violence. Political violence can be a relatively minor elaboration of more commonplace 'gang' organisation, so typical of ghettos.

Booth (1987: p6) expresses the implications in South African townships of recent events and experiences as follows: '... what counts more than anything else is the act of decision making (i.e. "having control over our own lives" regardless of the costs of that decision. Not surprisingly, spontaneous resistance has resulted in numerous "blunders" which have contributed directly to the mobilisation of reactionary forces.'

#### Ungovernability & power vacuum

When activist Thami Mali, head of the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee, said in 1984, 'Our duty is to create an ungovernable situation and actually force the State to declare some of the area as liberated zones' (*Rand Daily Mail* 7/11/84), he was half-correct in his strategic analysis. The ungovernability did emerge in many areas of the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, but the liberation did not. The leadership which had pursued the ungovernability strategy was hobbled and curbed by security action and ungovernability without social authority resulted.

The resultant power vacuum has allowed a free-for-all. In the absence of real authority in the townships the drive to assume control has been replaced by a competition for status and following. Without structures being created within which different movements could establish their relative strength in properly

conducted political contest, the only way to establish supremacy is through violence.

#### After the Unrest

These factors have all contributed to the internecine conflict in the townships. Both the history of ideological divisions and the conditions of protest have made pathologies in township mobilisation inevitable. Both the strategies of protest and the strategies for containment, the latter whether through security force action or recent statutory restriction, can be questioned.

Mufson, a journalist since deported, raises critical issues on the side of the protest movements in an article entitled 'The Fall of the Front' (1987) — in his analysis the UDF pushed the school boycotts too far, creating resistance from parents; the mobilisation was incomplete and the UDF did not have control over the township youth; the comrades victimised black shopkeepers by rationalising superficial ideologies of redistribution; and the rank-and-file became as oppressed by the months of upheaval as by the system itself.

The State, on the other hand, without lifting its control over violence and overly spontaneous dissidence, should have been able to identify opportunities to negotiate with more responsible, extra-system township leadership, to give them a share of local decision making. Admittedly, the plethora of over-arching revolutionary rhetoric and the public refusal to be 'tainted' by contacts with government made this type of initiative extraordinarily difficult.

There are painful lessons to be learned on both sides. South Africa has gone through a period of agonising disruption of township life and of white security and confidence, with effects far below the expectations of all parties. For the government the unrest and violence have hopefully underscored the need for prompt alleviation of grievances and for institutions in which all people can participate in the democratic process.

For the resistance movements, hopefully, the lesson will be that mobilisation has to be far more thorough and disciplined. The oversimple ideological cleavages, which have persisted for nearly a half-century, can do little more than weaken the black political struggle. JBA

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Special Report

# THE MARITZBURG FEUDS

By Wyndham Hartley  
News Editor, The Natal Witness

*It has often been asserted that truth is the first casualty of war. That may certainly be said of the violence lacerating Pietermaritzburg's townships. People are mortally afraid to talk; the authorities refuse to; the new restrictions on opposition groups will hamper further negotiations; and other emergency regulations surround a frightening situation in an eerie half-silence. This report does not pretend to be the final word on the causes of the conflict — it presents an overview of the build-up and recent events, in the hope that correct diagnosis is essential for any lasting peace.*

**H**undreds of people have died, scores have fled the violence to become refugees in other parts of Natal, many homes have been destroyed, millions of rands in property have been lost, and thousands of people have been injured in the ten months of conflict in Pietermaritzburg's Edendale Valley.

A source at the Edendale Hospital has revealed that the number of patients passing through its theatres with violence injuries (bullet and stab wounds, skull injuries, etc.) increased by 80 percent in the final month of 1987. A new male surgical ward has had to be opened. Most of the patients hurt in the violence are between 15 and 25 years old; the youngest victim was seven years old and the oldest 85. The number of burn victims from arson attacks on township homes, largely women and children, is rocketing. These facts (see also table 1: p20) offer as alarming a glimpse into the scale of the fighting in the townships as the daily body counts released by the police. Edendale Hospital has become a war hospital in a civil war zone.

There are several theories about the causes and nature of South Africa's civil unrest. The first is the conspiracy theory, which asserts that everything is orchestrated by a preordained plan. The violence is supposedly the work of 'agitators' from outside the affected areas. This explains, according to the theory, why the national unrest has moved from area to area between late 1984 and 1987, flaring up and then dying down in the PWV area, the Eastern Cape, Durban, Western Cape, NE Transvaal, Crossroads, Soweto and now Pietermaritzburg.

The conspiracy theory does not fully explain why Inkatha and the UDF should be at loggerheads in the Edendale Valley, unless it is coupled with another. This can be broadly called the Marxist-Leninist theory, according to which moderates cannot be tolerated in the ranks of the revolutionaries if the struggle is to succeed. Inkatha members are the moderates in this deadly scenario of interfactional conflict, and the movement of the violence in the Pietermaritzburg area coincides with strategical advances and physically shifting battle lines.

A third theory assumes that communities are dynamic



THE NATAL WITNESS: Mike Matthews

and can act of their own volition. Without detracting from the salience of the other theories — indeed, such interpretations may loom large in the minds of many of the protagonists — the latter account seems to be the most persuasive explanation of the war in the Edendale Valley. The fighting is a manifestation of a profound and fundamental division which has sundered black society and the Zulu 'nation' in the region.

## Origins

The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 gave voice, and an identity, to one side of the community, as Inkatha had for many years given the other. The split was, without any doubt, between rural-based traditionalists on the one hand, and the new progressive ideas from the cities, which challenged traditional norms and beliefs, on the other. The divide also should be seen in terms of a generation gap of startling proportions. The traditionalists were adult Zulus, loyal to Ulundi and proud of the KwaZulu State; the young people in the cities were coming to reject Zulu nationalism as a political option. They began to regard the KwaZulu administration and Inkatha as part of a system designed by Pretoria and based on ethnicity, which they could no longer tolerate.

Ironically, in 1983 both Inkatha and the UDF were implacably opposed to the new tricameral constitution for the same reason — the exclusion of Africans from parliament. But beneath the surface a deadly struggle had begun to win over the grassroots support. It essentially became an ideological struggle between political activists who believed in the power of their own nationalism, and activists who perceived Zulu nationalism and its traditions to have been used by the State to ensnare people in the bantustan trap.

Key manifestations of the emerging conflict in KwaZulu/Natal were the assassinations of civil rights lawyer Griffiths Mxenge (1981), community leader Harrison Dube (1983) and Victoria Mxenge (1985); the killing of five students at the University of Zululand (1982); and the attack on the Gandhi settlement near Phoenix (See *Indicator SA Political Monitor*: pp6-11). From August 1985 recurrent violence swept through the Durban townships of Umlazi, Lamontville and others, surfacing in the Pietermaritzburg area also. Conflict developed between the Imbali township council, controlled by Inkatha, and the Imbali Civic Association, which

later affiliated to the UDF.

Tensions between the two movements in the region were exacerbated by the organisation of a consumer boycott and stayaway in mid-1985 to support the fired BTR Sarmcol workers from nearby Howick. During the bitter labour dispute between the Metal and Allied Workers Union (then under the Fosatu umbrella) and the management of Sarmcol, Uwusa, shortly after its formation on May Day 1986, began to organise among the replacement workers at the factory. The struggle between two unions associated with Cosatu (launched end-1985)/UDF and Inkatha respectively, shaped deep divisions in the communities around Pietermaritzburg.

Throughout the civil upheavals which shook the country and Durban's townships in 1985 and 1986, Pietermaritzburg's townships had been generally subdued, however. The national violence, in spite of later internecine conflict, was fundamentally a conflict between rulers (the State) and the ruled. Can the same be said of the violence in Pietermaritzburg?

It would be foolish to assume that the potential for this type of confrontation does not exist in the Edendale Valley. Indeed, there have been direct clashes between activists and the security forces. At the moment, though, most people in Pietermaritzburg's townships appear to welcome the presence of the police or military. And it would be simplistic, in spite of allegations of collaboration, to see Inkatha as merely another vigilante force, carrying the State's battle to its predominantly youthful enemies. Or, as a local interviewee remarked: 'Did the vigilantes in Crossroads or Soweto have a King?'

## Classic Conflict

The struggle in the Edendale Valley seems much more fundamental. It is a manifestation of the classic conflict of post-colonial Africa — traditionalism against the newer idea of a kind of social democracy in a 'unitary state'. The conflict is profoundly exacerbated by the apartheid structures under which black people have laboured for generations. The question is often asked, 'Why Pietermaritzburg, when the rest of the country is relatively calm?' The answer is, at least in part, geographical. Nowhere else is the mix of urban and rural socio-political identities so complex and entangled as in the Edendale Valley.

'I saw a youth of no more than 14, a firearm in each hand.' This comment by a township dweller sums up the horror, the desperation and the deadly seriousness of the conflict. But it provides no clear picture of the real nature of the two sides. Inkatha and the UDF — the latter a loose association of 'progressive' organisations followed, inter alia, by the township youth cadre; the former a closely-knit cultural organisation fashioned on para-military lines. On the one side, the conservative, proud and disciplined Zulu; on the other a wild, angry and radical youth.

Many township residents say that the single most important cause of the violence is apartheid. The State's attitude to urbanisation, and especially to the educational needs of black people, has sown the seeds of the anger which is being so horrifyingly vented today. Limited concessions seem irrelevant

to the black youth. 'They beat our fathers; they have not beaten us' is their slogan. Deprived of a stable family life, of the discipline inherent in a stable community, the youth have emerged as a formidable force which cannot be ignored. And their power is growing; more than 50 percent of KwaZulu/Natal blacks are under 16 years of age.

The concepts of exclusion and inferiority have remained in the minds of millions of black people. Even though the need for skills, development and massive injections of capital is at last realised, the spirit and economic disparities of 'bantus education' still survive. The legacy is a semi-literate population and a youth which feels cheated, to put it mildly, out of not only a decent education but reasonable employment prospects as well. That boy with a firearm in each hand almost certainly sees himself as someone with nothing to lose. Although many of the 'comrades' (called the *amaqabane* in the Edendale Valley) have no official affiliation with the UDF, it would be a mistake to perceive them simply as unstructured bands of criminals and desperadoes. They are capable of desperate deeds, certainly, yet in some spheres their actions have remarkable cohesion.

'In some rural communities high up in the valley,' a black intellectual from Imbali said recently, 'the youth are emerging as a stabilising force. They are tackling the problem of crime ... in one case, they have repaired a road so that the buses can get through; in another, they have asked for permission to repair a school. They are also challenging the powers, so often abused, of the chiefs and indunas, and are winning the hearts and minds of the people' (anonymous interview).

Seen in this light the conflict is tragic. Neither side is blameless; and neither side is wholly right or entirely wrong. Indeed, it is impossible not to respect the fundamental position of both the traditionalists and the young. However, if the conflict is also marked by downright thuggery and more importantly by the 'revenge phenomenon', is there a way of resolving it? Or is the situation out of control? Is the 14-year-old with a firearm in each hand simply running amok, or is he controllable? Could it even be that he is acting on someone's orders? There is no clear evidence either way.

Some observers believe that the leadership of both parties, who have twice sat down at peace talks, could stop the conflict if they wanted to. On the other hand, the pessimists (and many realists) believe that, 'Only the complete crushing of one side by the other will stop it now. The introduction of more police will only prolong the process' (ibid). When asked if the respective leaders had lost control over their followers, my interviewee replied, 'They have lost control, but not all of it.'

Is there, then, a way forward towards peace through negotiation? Or must the Edendale Valley, and indeed the city of Pietermaritzburg, brace itself now for the 'complete crushing' of one side or the other?

## Policing

The police in the city have maintained throughout that the situation in the townships of the Edendale Valley is under control. Shortly after the floods in September 1987 a ten-year-old boy, Sikhumbuzo Shezi, was decapitated when the family home was visited by a group of men searching for the

youngster's parents. The furore in the local press caused the National Party MP, Brian Edwards, to become involved. This led in turn to an announcement by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf Meyer, that the Pietermaritzburg conflict should receive top priority from the police.

Shortly afterwards, the riot control unit in the city was reinforced with members from Pretoria. But in spite of continued assurances from the politicians that the situation was under control, national servicemen were sent into the Edendale townships next. The dramatically increased police and military presence in the townships could not stop the death toll and the number of incidents from increasing still further. December was the most violent month of 1987.

At a police function on Christmas Eve in Pietermaritzburg the officer in command of all riot units in the country, General Bert Wandrag, promised a plan for the new year. This plan, he said, would ensure that peace was restored in the townships. Early in January large numbers of police reinforcements were sent to the city, followed by a flying visit by General Wandrag and the assignment of even more manpower to the area.

At a press briefing, Brigadier Jan Kotze, and the new security police head in Pietermaritzburg, Brigadier Jac Buchner, announced that the violence would be stopped and that police action would be absolutely impartial. This assurance was prompted by a statement from UDF President, Archie Gumede, that any reinforcements would be to support Inkatha.

Senior police officers also explained, during a tour of the townships, how difficult it was to stamp out violence in an area without formal infrastructure. The Edendale Valley is hilly, criss-crossed with ridges and gullies, without street lighting and, indeed, without streets in many areas. At night the valley is very dark and early evening mists descend the valley. The mist hampers helicopter operations, virtually the only rapid way of reaching rural settlements not served by any roads. It was described how, on one occasion, a foot patrol heard a woman screaming but it took the police four hours to reach her body. The murderers were long gone.

## Negotiations

While the unrest did not begin with the horrific floods which struck Natal in September last year, the plight of flood victims focused media attention on township areas. The extent of the internecine violence, which continued unabated through the natural tragedy, began to be known. The effects started to be felt in Pietermaritzburg as more and more workers were tired and unproductive on duty, and domestic servants arrived exhausted at their places of work. Many workers — domestic, commercial and industrial — simply disappeared, becoming faceless statistics in the township body counts.

At this time both Inkatha and the UDF made approaches to the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce to establish some neutral meeting ground where the possible cessation of violence could be discussed. After a number of meetings with both parties, the chamber, led by its second vice-president, Rob Pater, and its manager, Paul van Uytrecht, managed to get delegations of both parties to the conference table in November. After more than

four hours of discussion between the parties, the chamber released a five point statement on the meeting.

Certain points relating to the perpetrators of the violence could not be agreed on, so the parties agreed to 'reflect' and raise them again at a further meeting, tentatively set for 9 December. The points of agreement were:

- A call for the release of members of organisations party to the talks.
- The freedom to meet with their constituencies without interference from the security forces.
- Endorsement of the principle of freedom of expression, with agreement to discipline those who violate it.
- Condemnation and dissociation from the 'current' violence.

On the day these talks began a further three unrest fatalities were reported by the police. Yet, so positive were the first impressions of the peace talks that spokesmen for the parties believed that peace could be established within a few days. This was not to be, however. UDF/Cosatu applied for permission to hold an open air rally to address membership at the grassroots level. The rally went off with little incident and with agreement on only employing violence as a means of self-defence. Thus the stage was set for a second round of talks.

At the second meeting the Inkatha delegation raised the issue of an article in the banned journal, *Inqaba Yabasebenzi*, issued by the Marxist Worker's Tendency (an expelled faction of the ANC). The document criticised Inkatha/Uwusa and called for their destruction — Inkatha demanded a public repudiation by the UDF/Cosatu grouping. In response, on 16 December, the same day as an Inkatha rally at Taylor's Halt, UDF/Cosatu published a full-page advertisement in *The Natal Witness*, repudiating the document and calling for an end to the violence in the area. This statement was welcomed by the Inkatha leadership who said they were now prepared to resume talks. The peace negotiations were, after a serious hiccup, back on course.

However, in the weeks before Christmas Inkatha and Uwusa members came under serious attack, prompting local Inkatha leaders to declare the peace process futile. Since then the chamber has held low-key meetings with both groups in an attempt to get them back to the negotiations. The chamber has been tight-lipped about the outcome of their meeting with Chief Buthelezi in Ulundi on 25 January.

During most of January the townships abounded with rumours of an Inkatha strikeback, dubbed 'Operation Doom'. This became a reality on 31 January when, after a 15 000-strong rally in Sweetwaters, Inkatha attacked the UDF-sympathetic township of Ashdown. There were widespread allegations, made public and denied in parliament, of police collusion in the attack.

As a result, Cosatu and 19 other individuals applied to the Supreme Court for an interdict restraining Inkatha from violence and killing. The application awaits a trial date. The redetention of many local UDF leaders, the effective banning of others, including President Archie Gumede, and the severe restrictions placed on the organisation itself, has made the possibility of further peace talks extremely remote.






	<p>Minister of Education says replacement costs for school property damaged during unrest is R47m.</p> <p>29/31 July In PE Nobandole Bani dies in detention - 5th emergency detainee to have died in custody. In Imbali (Pmb) a man arrested dies after one day in custody. 221 people detained under ISA29, including 16 children.</p>	<p>police. Thousands of mourners dispersed and journalists arrested at Ashley Kriel's funeral.</p> <p>20/21 July In Wynberg (CT) a policeman is injured by a homemade bomb while filming a court; in nearby Guguletu a grenade damages the home of a policeman. In Jozini a municipal policeman is shot and injured. In Soweto a man is injured by grenade attack. In Kaap several cars damaged after police action at high school. In Mpumalanga (Hammarsdale) a youth is stabbed to death and another injured.</p> <p>22/23 July In Soweto a security force member guarding a councillor's house is shot. In Ashdown youth is stabbed to death and another injured.</p> <p>24/26 July Near Kingwilliamstown an Idosa official is assassinated - tortured body found. In Potchefstroom (E Cape) another community leader is murdered. In Langa (Uitenhage) a man is killed. At Orkney mine, a man is burnt to death and at Witbank strike-bound metal processing plant killed by masked gunmen. In Ashdown and Makhobane (Pmb) 2 people are killed amid widespread looting.</p> <p>27/31 July Five miners at Gencor mine in Leslie (E Tvl) killed in fighting. In Orlando (Soweto) another being run over by a SADF buffel; charges of culpable homicide investigated. In Mamelodi a man is shot dead by police - they deny it.</p>	<p>3 men for harbouring ANC guerrillas. Pta Supreme Court orders the release of Cornelius Mhlangu. SAMDC finds Vereeniging district surgeon not guilty of neglecting police assault. Minister of Law and Order facing Supreme Court suits totalling more than R100 000 for destruction of KTC last year.</p> <p>Three charges of assault laid against Gomo (E) municipal policeman since May. Thirty-three charges of assault laid against Black Sash in past 3 months. Claims of murder charges; 58 alleged assaults reported to Black Sash in past 3 months. Claims of 1000 already youth (allegedly tortured in custody) on charge of burning policeman. Sixteen court orders delivered to Gomo town council, and a further R155 000 being processed.</p> <p>Police instructed not to arrest or assault Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) residents unlawfully. Minister of Law and Order to pay R20 766 damages to mother of youth shot in Langa in 1985. Sixth state witness in Pmb terror trial jailed for refusing to testify and third state witness in trial. PE Watson brothers suing Minister of Police for R500 000 for wrongful prosecution. Queenstown policeman suing Minister for R65 000 for death of son in road block. Minister of Law and Order agrees to pay out R1,5m to Langa victims 5 days after road block.</p> <p>Supreme Court orders state psychiatrist and magistrate to visit detainee after mother brings application. CT court cuts public violence prison sentences of 32 Zolani residents. Jhb inquest fails to find responsible for death of Alex youth, allegedly shot by police in Feb 1986. Minister of Law and Order declines to prosecute over police shootings of Kabokweni magistrates court in March 1986. AG declines to prosecute 63 complaints laid against them between November and June; 1 policeman charged on murder charge. Minister Heunis says total of 195 serious complaints over actions of police being investigated.</p> <p>Minister of Law and Order pays out R35 000 to Crossroads woman, husband shot dead by police. PE Supreme Court interdicts Kwaibelebe police from harassing a member of the Mhlangu clan. PE court orders remainder of Fort Beaufort found not guilty on 8 counts of assault after senior police officer charged with murder.</p> <p>PE Supreme Court finds men guilty of burning villager to death. CT inquest into death of 19-year-old in Crossroads finds he was killed by persons unknown - application to hear oral evidence. De Alh in Crossroads a man is sentenced to death for the murder of an alleged informer. PE Supreme Court sentences 13 convicted of terrorism - Liza Ngungwana is given life sentence.</p>	<p>18/20 July In Maitland (CT) a limpet-mine explodes at a garage and another is uncovered nearby, a third limpet-mine is discovered by Wynberg petrolpump attendant. In District Six a limpet-mine explodes in the parking area of flats occupied by the SADF.</p> <p>21/22 July In CT a limpet-mine explodes in airport doorkroom. Police confirm and then deny Lucas Seme abducted from Swaziland police cells in Aug 1986 is in detention in SA.</p> <p>24 July In Vloebeg (Stellenbosch) a limpet-mine explodes on railway track.</p> <p>25/27 July Kallang police seize arms after shoot-out with insurgent, no arrests or deaths. Transkei hold-up with AK47s nets only R8 000.</p> <p>28/30 July Arms cache uncovered in Mamelodi and the following day a municipal policeman is shot dead with an AK47 while guarding a house. In Jhb a bomb blast outside SADF Witwatersrand Command injures 70. Landmine near Pontdrift injures 3 people on the form of director of SA Tourist Board.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/4 Aug In Jhb Cosatu and Num offices gutted by fire; 2 Cosatu employees' property damaged. Mhluzi (E Tvl) town council has financial records investigated by government authorities following disappearance of large sums of money. UCT campus disruptions as moderate/radical students clash over addresses by former ambassador, Dennis Worrall and former Jhanyi mayor, Tamasanga Linda; 6 students suspended and 19 fined. At Matla mine (Kriel) a man is stabbed to death for refusing to observe stayaway.</p> <p>6/9 Aug Tembisa's year-long rent boycott costing the council R6m so far. Mayor and town clerk of Thokoza (Alberton) face charges over council's missing R1,3m. A further 1 100 detainees named, bringing total to over 16 000 since emergency declared. In Lenasia police disperse anti-election march. In Langa (CT) 4 000 women march on offices of Community Services to demand action against 'Widowmakers' (vigilante) leader Gaba and kitskonstabels.</p> <p>11 Aug On the Cape Flats thousands of pupils stay away from classes. Atteridgeville mayor calls for immediate withdrawal of special police after student is shot dead in township. Rent arrears in black townships now officially R267m.</p>	<p>1/3 Aug In Dobsonville (Soweto) a man is killed in a grenade attack. In Germiston a man is stabbed and burnt to death in car. W Cape violence is reported in Bonteheuwel, Elsie River and Zwelentemba; in the E Cape in Lingelihle, Graaff-Reinet, Motherwell and Schauderville. In Soweto and Daveyton on the Reef and several incidents of violence in Pmb townships.</p> <p>4/6 Aug In Kwaibelebe (Pinetown) a youth is necklaced. In Elandsdorp (Pmb) 16 youths and unknown gunman. In Kwaggaletshu (Kwaibelebe), police and Mbokodo detain family of magistrate. Arson and stone throwing reported from Bonteheuwel and Langa (CT).</p> <p>7/9 Aug In Atteridgeville (Pta) a metric pupil is shot dead by a kitskonstabel at a school. In Chesterville 2 men are injured by an unknown gunman. Stonings reported in Pmb townships (Bloem), Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn), Boksburg and Bonteheuwel (CT).</p> <p>10/12 Aug In KwaZakele (PE) a burnt and beheaded body is found. In Vendo 9 people are killed and 12 others charged for political graffiti. Continued unrest on Cape Flats.</p> <p>13/14 Aug In Chiawello (Soweto) a municipal policeman on guard is shot dead. In Mamelodi an Inkatha member is shot dead.</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>1/3 Aug Near Greytown a police vehicle detonates a landmine. In Swaziland 1 person is killed and 4 injured after car, allegedly chased by SA hit squad, crashes. Piet Relief court dismisses application to have Ebrahim Ismael returned to Swaziland from where he was abducted; now facing terror charges.</p> <p>4/6 Aug Jhb motorway chase - 3 PAC guerrillas, believed to be involved in armed robbery that day, killed. In New Brighton (PE) an ANC guerrilla is killed in shootout with police. In Swaziland a South African and a Mozambican are shot dead.</p>
<p><b>AUG</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Maphumulo (Greytown) the burial of ANC London Commissar is addressed by UDF and Inkatha officials. Soweto rent and service deficit now R111m.</p> <p>19 Aug In CT charges for refusing to administer exams against 72 Wectu teachers are dropped - all the teachers reinstated. Dobsonville mayor acquitted on 62 charges of theft and corruption over allocation of houses.</p> <p>20/21 Aug In W Cape 14 new detentions are confirmed; in Dlamini (Soweto) 13 Azayo youths are detained.</p> <p>25 Aug Seshago College of Education (Lebowe) students boycott to protest detention of SRC president.</p> <p>27 Aug In Khayelitsha 8 girls are injured after vigilantes storm school to 'teach boycotters a lesson'.</p> <p>29 Aug Salt River (CT) Community House damaged by explosives.</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Brutville (Mooi River) a Sats employee is shot dead. In Graaff-Reinet a man is killed by police; in Kimberley a youth dies and 6 are injured when municipal police disperse a march. At a Secunda mine a worker is killed in clashes with security over planned strike. Violence in Pmb and Bloem townships. In Umlazi (Dbn) a security force member is shot and passing car.</p> <p>19/20 Aug In Mpumalanga 2 men are shot dead; family of activist assaulted by 15 men and policemen who set fire to house killing 102yr-old woman. Goldfields miner killed in clash with guards, victim of 12-day gold and coal strike.</p> <p>22/23 Aug In Plessislaar (Pmb) 2 men are burnt to death and several other incidents of violence in surrounding townships; also in Soweto, Kroonstad and Matieland (CT).</p> <p>24/25 Aug In Daveyton student leader Calphus Nyoka is shot dead in his home by police. In Langa a youth is shot dead by a municipal policeman. In Boipatong a crowd is dispersed outside mine and 41 arrested.</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Mbekweni (Paarl) 2 security force members are injured in grenade attack and in Emdeni (Soweto), Vosloorus (E Rand) and KwaMashu (Dbn) houses are attacked with grenades. Maseru raid on PAC residence.</p> <p>18/19 Aug In Springs a pipeline supplying water to mine is sabotaged. CT police seize arms and arrest 2 suspected ANC members and several collaborators.</p> <p>28 Aug In Maphumulo a police vehicle damaged by limpet-mine.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/3 Sept Since emergency declared, 5 042 people charged in connection with 2 300 offences, excluding 33 people sentenced to death in unrest/security trials.</p> <p>In Jhb security police raid offices of the National Student Co-ordinating Committee. Khatoa House cordoned off by police during service for execution of 2 people, with police action at UWC protest meeting. In Guguletu police disperse pupils protesting the detention of W Cape NECC vice-chairman and another pupil. Medunsa students continue 5-week boycott. Azapo president Malala and general-secretary Wauchope detained with 8 Azayo members in Orlando and Mamelodi.</p> <p>4 Sept Daveyton funeral of Calphus Nyoka who was shot by police; thousands turned away by SADF on horseback.</p> <p>9 Sept In KwaMashu 171 people are arrested at memorial service for ANC's Andrew Zondo, executed a year ago.</p> <p>10/14 Sept In Welkom 2 workers injured in petrol-bomb attack on Num offices. In the Ciskei 4 senior Azapo members are detained after service on 10th anniversary of Steve Biko's death.</p>	<p>1/2 Sept In Clermont (Durban), a man dies in police car chase; several buses are stoned in a bus lane; in KwaMashu 35 people are arrested at barricades. In Forty Second Hills (Hammarsdale) are stoned and in Mamelodi (Petrus Steyn) security forces are stoned. Near Pmb an Education school is closed after death of 2 students; Harewood and Sinating residents claim they are being joined in Kwaibelebe.</p> <p>5/8 Sept In KTC (CT) a police cleaner is burnt to death and in Sinating (Pmb), a policeman is killed. In Lynville (Witbank) a security force member is set alight. Violence continues in the townships where 2 men are killed in Caluzu and Edendale. In Zola (Soweto) a man is killed (Greytown), Ravensmead and Elsie River vehicles are stoned.</p> <p>10/14 Sept In Edendale (Pmb) 2 people are killed and several injured in inter-township clashes. Mapumusa 2 people are burnt to death; violence in nearby Ashdown, Eskidoni and Maphumulo; Hammarsdale area 4 people die. In Guguletu a security force member is injured at. In Diazville (Saldanha) a boy is shot dead by police in industrial conflict.</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>15/17 Aug In Mbekweni (Paarl) 2 security force members are injured in grenade attack and in Emdeni (Soweto), Vosloorus (E Rand) and KwaMashu (Dbn) houses are attacked with grenades. Maseru raid on PAC residence.</p> <p>18/19 Aug In Springs a pipeline supplying water to mine is sabotaged. CT police seize arms and arrest 2 suspected ANC members and several collaborators.</p> <p>28 Aug In Maphumulo a police vehicle damaged by limpet-mine.</p>
<p><b>SEPT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/17 Sept In Jhb deputy president of Azapo is detained. The Soweto Civic Association gets court interdict to prevent Soweto council selling houses of rent defaulters.</p> <p>19/23 Sept Observatory offices of ECC damaged by petrol bomb. In Athlone (CT) Spes Bona pupils and teachers walk out after a pupil is detained. In Potchefstroom 9 actors are released after 3 weeks detention. Rent evictions continue in Emdeni (Soweto). Minister of Law and Order announces that at the end of July there was 1 child under the age of 15 in detention; 12 between 16 and 17 years; and 169 men and 21 women under section 29 of the ISA.</p>	<p>15/17 Sept In Edendale 2 people are burnt to death in house; in Madakanieni a man is stoned in Harewood youths shoot dead 2 people.</p> <p>19/20 Sept In Sinating (Pmb) a man is shot dead and another is stabbed to death; several people injured. In Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) 2 people injured by special constables at party in released after serving sentences for public violence. Violence reported in St Wendolins, Kwaibelebe (Dbn), Dobsonville (Soweto), Mamelodi (Pta), Forty Second Hills (Hammarsdale), Bophuhothwana.</p> <p>23/27 Sept Buses stoned in Clermont and Kwaibelebe, vehicles damaged in Soweto and Cape. Police report over 42 incidents of violence in Pmb, Durban and Greytown townships in past 3 weeks. In Nyanga (CT) brother of KTC squatter leader Yamilie is shot and injured. Soweto police mount a crime operation with 2 000 police deployed and arrest 234 people. In Lingelihle (Cradock) a man is burnt to death; in Makhobane (Pmb) 3 people are killed and in nearby KwaShanga, 13 Inkathas are killed, with 6 people arrested, including 3 policemen. Sept death toll in Natal Midlands includes 100.</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>15 Sept In Madimbo (Venda) 2 alleged ANC guerrillas shot dead by security forces. Tulu goes to Lusaka.</p> <p>17/20 Sept Zimbabwe authorities arrest anti-ANC spy, allegedly responsible for blast in Harare. Security force member is injured in landmine blast near Schoemansdal (E Tvl).</p> <p>24/25 Sept In Emdeni (Soweto) 10 people, including 2 security force members, are injured in a grenade attack. Police confirm arrest of Gordon Webster and 3 others with firearms.</p> <p>28 Sept At an Ellis Park boxing match a limpet-mine explodes under a car and another is discovered.</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> 1st &amp; 2nd weeks</p>	<p>1/5 Oct Minister of Law and Order announces release of 41 children from detention; 69 under 18 years still detained. Also releases the names of further 91 people detained for more than 30 days under emergency regulations, bringing total to 1 580 since 11 June 1987. In Mamelodi 4 Azayo members, including president, are detained. UDF and Inkatha release joint statement appealing to members to stop the violence in Pmb.</p> <p>6/12 Oct Stella Sigau takes over rule in Transkei after ousting George Matanzima as prime minister. In Duduza (Nigel) 4 appointed administrators are dismissed and Tvl Provincial Administration to investigate corruption, while town clerk appointed to run township. New Nation newspaper warned in terms of 6-week-old media regulations. Cape Administrator says only 9 of 87 local authorities not functioning because of unrest, compared with 23 at beginning of year.</p>	<p>3/4 Oct In New Brighton 3 people die in arson attack on house. In Edendale (Pmb) a youth is killed and 2 others injured. In Hahlabagahle (Greytown) 2 men are killed in clashes.</p> <p>7/11 Oct In Pmb townships 9 deaths reported in Sinating, Sweetwaters, Geordale and Makhobane. In Henley Dam 2 Uvusa bus inspectors are shot dead. Violence also reported in Henley Dam, Clermont (Dbn), Makhobane (Pmb) and Walmer (PE). In Daveyton (Benoni) a murder suspect is killed by a policeman.</p> <p>12/14 Oct In Edendale a burnt body is found; unrest incidents reported in Sakhile (Standardburg) (Greytown), Nomandle (Molteno).</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>1/5 Oct An explosion damages Lenasia NPP offices. Minister of Law and Order announces detention of 11 people in the Western Cape, including 4 regional commanders of Umkhonto we Sizwe.</p> <p>9/12 Oct Police announce arrest of 16 ANC members in Pta and Soweto, claim to have killed 37 suspected ANC members since 1 January 1987. In Kwarrielaogla a former Kwaibelebe MP's house is destroyed in an explosion; in Soweto a policeman's house is damaged by a limpet-mine.</p> <p>13/14 Oct In Harare 2 anti-apartheid activists and 2 others are injured in car-bomb explosion at shopping centre - Zimbabwe blames SA. In Empangeni an explosive device in CBD Post Office rubbish bin injures 5 people.</p>
<p><b>OCT</b> 3rd &amp; 4th weeks</p>	<p>15/18 Oct In Tembisa thousands stage stayaway to protest rent evictions called by anti-eviction committee. In E Cape security police raid offices of organisations including Black Sash. Minister of National Education announces drastic measures, threatening to cut university subsidies to ensure university councils police their own campuses. Wits meeting to protest subsidy measures is banned. Commemoration service organised by Kalgwanne government for Samora Machel; several road blocks delay hundreds and Albertina Sisulu is served with order banning her from the funeral district.</p> <p>19 Oct 10th anniversary of 1977 crackdown on black consciousness organisations.</p> <p>23/26 Oct In CT the president of Fedasw is detained. In Bonteheuwel 150 teachers present petition to police commander protesting detention without trial; they demand unconditional release of 5 teachers and 18 pupils. According to DPSC 38 political prisoners on death row - 5 executed since December 1986.</p> <p>29 Oct UDF executive member Dumbale and Mary Ngembu of Unemployed Workers Union detained in CT.</p>	<p>15/18 Oct Two deaths in Mpumalanga and Sinating; in Forty Second Hills (Hammarsdale) a man is killed. In Alexandria (E Cape) a priest's house is burnt; in Empangeni N Natal secretary of Cosatu is injured. In Mabopane (Bop) a Cosatu official's house is destroyed. In Uitenhage more than 100 people have fled their homes in ongoing conflict between UDF and Amo-Afrika - 40 people already arrested.</p> <p>19/20 Oct Edendale examinations disrupted by armed men; police called in to protect pupils. In Esigodeni a child is decapitated in a revenge killing; in Sobantu a policeman is shot dead. In Nyanga 2 people die and 180 squatters left homeless after fire.</p> <p>21/23 Oct In Pmb townships 5 more bodies are found at Taylors Holt, Mpumalanga; Hammarsdale, Ashdown; 324 arrests since 15 Oct. A special police team formed to crackdown on unrest.</p> <p>24/25 Oct In Pmb townships 7 people are killed over the weekend.</p> <p>26/28 Oct In Kimberley 4 DPSC and Cosatu offices damaged in arson attack. In Sweetwaters a youth is shot dead by police; in Sinating a man is stabbed to death. Pasa reports 143 deaths in Natal Midlands political violence since January - 49 this month, 111 injured, 111 cases of damage to Pmb homes, vehicles and shops.</p>	<p>17 Aug Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay an attorney R4 000 for costs of suit in Mamelodi.</p> <p>17/18 Aug In Pta Raymond Gwebisha is executed for a CT necklaced murder in June 1986. Pta Supreme Court orders release of 5 Kwaibelebe detainees after urgent application. PE court sentences Bongoletshu (Oudshoorn) man to death for shooting a bus inspector. Jhb regional court charges 13 KRA members with murder. One teenager shot by riot squad paid R5 000 in damage settlement after 3 policemen were charged with murder and assault in Feb 1987. Bloem Appeal Court refuses Layd and Lande appeals against 3 necklaced murders.</p> <p>17/18 Aug Grahamstown Supreme Court acquits 6 Humansdorp Youth Congress members of murdering 2 men. PE court sentences 4 youths to a total of 58 years for necklaced murder of a white man. DPSC orders 40 cases brought to restrain security force assaults on detainees. Pmb court convicts 2 ANC members for terrorism and grenade attacks on houses in Sobantu.</p> <p>17 Aug In Pinetown 6 SAP members expelled and questioned over death of man in custody. Crimen charges laid against 6 people accused of ill-treatment in detention of Father Mkhathshwa cancelled after one person's admission of guilt.</p> <p>18 Aug New press cards introduced.</p>	<p>15/19 Oct Police report arrest of 2 insurgents near Messina (N Tvl). At Komatipoort a landmine blast damages a police cassirer 4km from commemoration service for Samora Machel. In KwaThema (Springs) a policeman and his father are shot dead with AK47s. In Batho (Bloem) a man is shot with a Makarov pistol is arrested, nearby in Hahlabagahle police kill a man with a hand grenade after being fired at with AK47s. In Mbabane an ANC member is found guilty of illegal entry into Swaziland after police raid private house.</p> <p>22/25 Oct In Soweto a councillor's house is damaged by grenade; in Eldorado Park, suspected guerrillas hold up guards with AK47s and injure 2 at First National Bank. In London charges against 3 men accused of plotting to kidnap ANC leaders are dropped after 3 months. In N Natal police arrest 2 'foreign trained' insurgents and a collaborator.</p> <p>27 Oct Police claim 27 suspected ANC insurgents arrested in past 3 weeks in CT and Tvl. In Swaziland SADF member is shot dead attempting to prevent 2 suspected insurgents returning to Swaziland; Swazi police arrest 4 people.</p>

# SELECT INDICATORS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Table 1

**MONTHLY UNREST DEATH TOLL, WITH MAJOR INCIDENTS**  
June 1986 — December 1987




Date	Place	Fatalities	Details
14/15 June 1986	Durban	3	Car bomb on beachfront
16 June	Nationwide	16	Stayaway on 10th anniversary of Soweto uprising
12/13 July	Soweto	9	Residents and hostel dwellers clash
29 July	KwaNdebele	1	Minister Piet Ntuli, head of Mbokodo, dies in car bomb
13 Aug	KwaNdebele	160	Independence called off - 160 killed in violence since May
26/27 Aug	White City (Soweto)	26	Police and residents clash over rent boycott
13/14 Sept	Mzimphlape (Soweto)	4	Residents and hostel dwellers clash
5 Nov	Pimville (Soweto)	1	Guy Fawkes incident, 11yr-old child killed by 4 whites hidden in Putco bus
	Orlando West (Soweto)	5	Police and residents clash over evictions.
1 Dec	Mamelodi (Pta)	2	Community leaders Dr Ribiero and wife assassinated
5 Dec	Mpophomeni (Howick)	4	Mawu unionists killed by Inkatha members in BTR-Sarmcol strike
16-20 Dec	Phiri/Mapella (Soweto)	7	Clashes over 'lights out' protest campaign
17/18 Jan 1987	PE townships	7	'Wildaekes' (vigilantes) and UDF clash
21 Jan	KwaMakhuta (Durban)	13	Family of UDF activist murdered
2 Feb	Tantjia (Grahamstown)	4	Kitskonstabel shooting
16/17 March	KwaMashu (Durban)	9	Two Inkatha Youth Brigade members and 7 UDF youth congress members die in clashes
11/12 April	Zincor Mine	5	Num and Uwusa members clash
22 April	Doornfontein	3	Sarhwi workers shot by police on Sats deadline to end strike
	Germiston	3	Sarhwi workers shot by police at meeting
	Soweto	2	Stayaway to protest evictions
28 May	Kaserne (PWV)	4	Sats workers abducted and necklaced
5/6 May	Nationwide	—	Stayaway to protest white elections, widespread political violence
20 May	Jhb	4	Policemen killed by booby-trap bomb outside magistrates court
31 May	Imbali (Pmb)	+5	Children (residents claim 10) killed in Inkatha/UDF clashes after funeral
31 Aug	Pmb	39	Death toll since Jan 1987 in internecine violence
24 Nov	Pmb	160	Death toll as first peace talks are held
25 Nov	KwaShange (Pmb)	13	Attack on Inkatha members
9 Dec	Pmb	195	Death toll by second round of peace talks
4 March 1988	Natal Midlands	126	Township deaths since 1 Jan 1988 - Revised estimate for 1987 is 402

Sources  
Huisard  
Indicator SA press releases  
Institute for Strategic Studies, Report  
SANRR year books  
Institute for Strategic Studies

Table 2

**RESURGENCE OF THE ANC 1976 - 1987**  
Breakdown of Guerilla Activity & Targets



Category of Actions

Category	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	TOTAL
1 Shootouts with security forces		4	6	2	4		4	7	9	9	31	27	103
2 Attacks on government targets	1	2	4	3	5	12	11	22	14	19	37	48	178
3 Sabotage of installations & infrastructure		4	1	5	3	14	14	15	14	10	20	20	120
4 Civilian & commercial targets		4	3		1	2		2	4	22	28	27	93
5 'Collaborators' & councillors' property		1	7	2	2		3		2	25	33	32	107
6 Landmine incidents in rural areas										7	34	21	62
7 Miscellaneous incidents	3	4	6		4	1	1		1	4	20	8	52
<b>TOTAL BY YEAR</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>715</b>

**Notes on categories**

- Guerilla attacks and shoot-outs in security force raids, both in urban and rural areas. (Excludes sniper attacks in townships unless weapons used are identified as being of foreign origin.)
- Armed attacks directed at police patrols and stations, security force vehicles and property, administration boards, town council property, courts, etc.
- Sabotage of power substations, railway lines and stations, oil depots, pipelines, etc.
- Includes hotels, supermarkets, factories, shopping centres, etc.
- Includes armed attacks on (mostly) township homes of state witnesses, police, councillors, informers, MPs.
- Covers both detonated and defused landmines.
- Accidental explosions involving amateur saboteurs (5), propaganda pamphlet bombs (6), unspecified defused explosives (11), assassinations and some targets unidentified in reports.

**Notes on Data**

- A few known incidents of defused explosives, perhaps the most underreported aspect of guerilla action, have been included in appropriate categories.
- The number of incidents monitored here reflect armed actions (bullets, bombs and grenades) by both insurgents and locally trained 'comrades', which often became indistinguishable during the widespread unrest of 1984 - 1987.
- Low-level attacks on a similar range of targets during the civil unrest - e.g. crowd attacks involving arson and stone-throwing, even where fatalities result - are explicitly excluded from the above data. See table 3 in *Indicator SA Urban Monitor Vol3/No2: p5*.
- Also excluded are discoveries of arms caches, confiscated firearms, and the number of arrests of ANC members/sympathisers.



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
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# ECONOMIC

M O N I T O R



Scenes of some of the major conflicts in the KwaZulu/Natal region. In clockwise order: The ongoing UDF/Inkatha struggle in Pietermaritzburg's townships; a burnt-out bus in Ntuzuma township during election stayaway; faction fighting in shack settlements; the long labour dispute at Howick.

Billy Peddock

AFRPIX: Cedric Nunn

THE NATAL WITNESS: Mike Mathewman

Billy Peddock

# THE EQUITY EQUATION

By Jill Nattrass & Julian May

A successful regional settlement is likely to emerge only if both the centre and the region stand to gain from devolution

Relationships of unequal development between KwaZulu and Natal militate against the emergence of a common set of regional objectives

*From its inception the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has generated, predictably, as much controversy as consensus, foreshadowing the divisions likely to plague any future national convention. To justify a move for devolution of authority to KwaZulu and Natal, the enquiring mind must ask:*

- Who in the region supports the Indaba proposals, and for what reasons?
- Why should the State support the Indaba proposals?
- Can these proposals actually be implemented?

*In setting these important questions, the authors emphasise the need to identify a common set of objectives both among the major interest groups and between the two regions themselves. The feasibility of the Indaba proposals rests on a realistic examination of the political and economic constraints that face KwaZulu/Natal in the search for constitutional alternatives.*

A common set of objectives for KwaZulu and Natal will emerge only if the social and economic conditions of the two regions are reasonably similar. If this is indeed the case, it would be possible to work towards a common set of policy goals. However, if underlying conditions are dissimilar, they contain seeds that could germinate into conflicting objectives. Success will depend also on how realistic the proposed policies are, and on whether the people in apparent power have the actual strength and determination needed to implement them.

## Basic Conflicts

In any regional or national economy the organisation of the production process and the distribution of output among the population are both areas that might well generate conflict. Firstly, in South Africa as a whole, and in KwaZulu/Natal, the bulk of the productive capital is owned and administered by whites, while the major labour supply comes from the black population. Secondly, labour and capital in any capitalist economy co-operate with each other to produce a flow of goods and services, but are in conflict over the way

in which the products of their co-operation should be divided between them in the form of profits and wages. Thirdly, in our society the need for social services comes predominantly from the black population, but the revenue to pay for these comes predominantly from the white population. Although not directly involved in the production process, state institutions are not entirely disinterested parties to this basic conflict over the distribution of goods and services.

The KwaZulu and Natal administrations have vastly different power bases which carry the potential for substantial political conflict. It is believed by some people that the political dispensation proposed by the Indaba would provide a platform from which a new non-racial deal could be launched. To what extent could such a deal really be new or nurture common objectives, given the unequal ownership of capital, the inherent conflict between labour and capital, and the unequal distribution of power between the race groups living in the region?

A successful regional settlement has as another prerequisite to win the genuine support of central government. This is likely to emerge only if both the centre and the region stand to gain from devolution. Conversely, it is unlikely to emerge in situations of unequal development.

In the KwaZulu/Natal case, the metropolitan core of the regional economy is so strongly connected to the PWV region by transport and communication networks, and by the flow of inputs, labour and commodities, that it can be considered an extension of the latter. KwaZulu and Natal already receive considerable revenue transfers from central government. At the very best, these would have to continue, and it is almost certain that the need for such transfers would increase in a post-Indaba scenario.

Relationships of unequal development may also exist between KwaZulu and Natal and, if they do, these are just as likely to militate against the emergence of a common set of regional objectives.

## Population Trends

KwaZulu/Natal contained approximately 25 percent of the South African population, excluding the TBVC territories (see data base). Other than the preponderance of the black population in both Natal and KwaZulu — regional African/white ratio of 8:1 is greater than in South Africa as a whole — growth rates are also vastly different. KwaZulu's population is increasing rapidly, whereas that of Natal is increasing only marginally. As a whole, the region's total population is growing faster than the national average.

To a certain extent, these growth rates are a result of boundary changes, and the settlement of blacks from Natal to KwaZulu. Nonetheless, there are still differences, albeit smaller, in the natural population growth rates in the region as a whole. The white population increased at a rate of 2,0 percent a year for the period 1970/85, whereas the African population increased at 3,3 percent a year over the same period. These basic demographic factors carry important implications:

- For black people, access to essential amenities is more limited than for whites. Such deprivation will worsen unless expenditure on these facilities and their physical provision increase at least as fast as the population.
- For per capita expenditure by the state on social infrastructure to be equalised, eight times more would have to be allocated in total for Africans than for whites.
- Efforts to address the existing imbalance of facilities between the white and black communities will be continually constrained by this skewed pattern of population growth.
- Blacks have substantially lower average incomes than whites, so the bulk of regional taxation revenue is raised from the white group; yet the latter is increasingly smaller in relative terms.
- In the absence of a real growth in per capita black income that is greater than the population growth rate, total per capita income in the region will decline. There will be a consequent reduction in the taxable capacity of the regional economy and a rise in the level of poverty.
- Fearing that their political and economic advantages will be swamped by population imbalance, the Indaba dispensation has become a rallying point for a number of right-wing organisations, both regionally and nationally.

## Productive Capacity

In 1978 the KwaZulu/Natal region contributed only 13,4 percent of the total product in South Africa, increasing slightly to 14,1 percent today (see data

base). Within the region, KwaZulu contributed 5,0 percent of the regional output in 1975, and 6,0 percent in 1980. Although regional estimates of GDP should be treated with caution this data does show the relative underdevelopment of KwaZulu and the almost constant gap between the outputs of the two regions in relative terms. In addition, the KwaZulu/Natal region as a whole is falling behind the rest of the economy in terms of per capita living standards. Its share of national output is smaller than its share of the population, and output is growing more slowly than population.

In all sectors, the contribution made by Natal to the combined regions' gross output exceeds 80 percent, and in the crucial growth areas (manufacturing, construction and financial services) it exceeds 90 percent. Within Natal, manufacturing is the most important sector (29,7 percent) whereas 'other services' — mostly local government and administration — are most important in KwaZulu (33 percent). Agriculture, almost entirely cash crops, contributed 7,5 percent of Natal's gross output; agriculture (mostly subsistence) contributed 28 percent to KwaZulu's output. Consequently an enormous disparity exists between the regions in terms of socio-economic conditions and growth potential. The KwaZulu economy is geared essentially towards consumption and administration, whereas that of Natal is geared to production.

In most countries or regions, movements in GDP can serve as an indication of the behaviour of total income. In the case of KwaZulu, however, this is not so. Blacks from areas close to white industry commute to jobs in Natal. In addition, KwaZulu inhabitants participate in the 'migrant labour system' on a massive scale. In 1970 the earnings of commuters and migrants from KwaZulu were 3,2 times greater than the value of production in the area. By 1976 the proceeds from these labour exports is conservatively estimated to have been 4,4 times as great as the GDP of KwaZulu for that year.

Due to the heavy reliance on wage earnings from Natal, it is quite valid to claim that Natal and KwaZulu should not be seen as separate regions. From an economic viewpoint, the productive capacity of the former is dependent upon the labour of the latter; conversely, living conditions in KwaZulu are dependent upon employment opportunities and wage levels in Natal.

## Capital & Labour

The political relationship between the regions will be coloured by the conflict/co-operation relationship between capital and labour discussed earlier. However, capital and labour are not exclusively

*The combined region is falling behind the central economy in terms of per capita living standards, high population growth and social infrastructure*

*The KwaZulu economy is geared mainly towards consumption and expenditure, whereas that of Natal is geared to industrial production*

## Data Base

Table 1 **Population of KwaZulu/Natal & South Africa 1970 – 1985 (000s)**

	KwaZulu		Natal		KwaZulu/Natal		RSA	
	1970	1985	1970	1985	1970	1985	1970	1985
<b>African</b>	2 269	4 402	1 058	1 042	3 327	5 444	11 891	18 508
<b>Coloured</b>	2,2	3,4	72	97	74	100	2 039	2 862
<b>Indian</b>	5,2	3,3	522	692	527	695	630	861
<b>White</b>	4,4	2,2	444	606	449	609	3 759	4 947
<b>Total</b>	2 280	4 412	2 096	2 437	4 377	6 848	18 319	27 178

Sources  
Population Census: 1970, 1985 (Data corrected for undercounting)

Table 2 **GDP/GGP for KwaZulu/Natal & South Africa (R million)**

	KwaZulu	Natal	KwaZulu/Natal	RSA
<b>1970</b>	221	4 205	4 427	41 628
<b>1980</b>	443	7 125	7 569	57 963

(Corrected to 1980 prices)

Table 3 **Estimated Trade Licences Issued in KwaZulu/Natal 1987**

	KwaZulu	Natal	KwaZulu/Natal
<b>African</b>	12 400	1 600	14 000
<b>Coloured</b>	0	550	550
<b>Indian</b>	0	16 400	16 400
<b>White</b>	0	20 400	20 400
<b>Total</b>	12 400	38 950	51 350

(Excludes Pinetown & Pietermaritzburg)

Although common linkages exist between white and black capital in KwaZulu/Natal, the internal divisions in black labour produce conflict

white or black in South Africa or KwaZulu/Natal. Data on the extent and importance of African-owned business in KwaZulu/Natal is difficult to obtain though the comparative number of trade licences issued or renewed provides some indication (see data base). Africans hold less than 2,5 percent of the trade licences issued in Natal. In the region as a whole, coloureds, Indians and whites hold almost four times the number of trade licences of Africans, and are also likely to have far greater capital invested in these activities.

Nonetheless, the estimates of 6 000 African-owned businesses in 1986 (Centre for Businessmen) and 7 000 in 1987 (KwaZulu's Department of Economic Affairs) yield an impressive growth rate of 18 percent. Moreover, there are also strong linkages between black and white business. One of the most important of these is through the wholesale/retail trade in the form of the supply of goods from the 'Cash and Carry' dealers, representing Indian and white capital, to the numerous trading stores throughout KwaZulu.

An additional factor is the apparent weakness of pressure groups which solely

represent black capital. The Inyanda Chamber of Commerce has experienced a massive decline in paid-up membership, from 2 500 members in 1984 to between 800 (P G Gumede, *City Press* 21/2/88) and 250 (R Still, Inyanda executive officer) at present. At the same time, almost half of Natal's chambers admit to an increasing membership of black business people. This could imply increasing integration of black and white business, whereby the need for an exclusively black chamber of commerce has fallen away.

Alternatively, political misgivings among black business people may also have contributed towards this drift. Black business has been under assault from the black community itself. This conflict has not taken place over the distribution of products, but rather over the alleged co-optation of black business into the present political-economic system. This has led to divisions within black capital (*Indicator SA, Vol 4/No 4* 1987), with regional overtones, which could isolate KwaZulu business people.

Unlike the case with capital in KwaZulu/Natal, black and white labour do not appear to have developed a common interest, and instead are divided sharply by



political affiliations. Precise estimates of organised black labour are difficult to arrive at, but in essence two main groups emerge — Cosatu affiliates against the Inkatha-linked Uwusa. Also of relevance is the fact that unemployment in South Africa is rising sharply, the burden borne chiefly by blacks, most especially by younger workers. They have set the pace of resistance in South Africa over the past ten years, and this could well be replicated in KwaZulu/Natal.

It would seem, therefore, that if black-owned business can stand to benefit from a devolution of power, either directly, or through increased linkage with white business, it would be in their interests to actively support the Indaba. The case of labour is by no means as unambiguous. The emergence of two sharply opposed union movements, the one linked to the UDF, the other to Inkatha (and thereby to the KwaZulu bureaucracy), increases the likelihood of intensified conflict in the region. Unless the Indaba proposals can offer tangible benefits to labour, it is unlikely that these groups would share any common objectives.

## Prospects

The necessary expenditure by the regional authorities implied by the Indaba proposals have been the subject of considerable debate (e.g. see Trotter 1987; Corbett 1988; Du Pisanie and Meintjies 1986). While these discussions have used a variety of assumptions to arrive at the estimated expenditure necessary to achieve parity in the essential social services, their conclusions are similar — KwaZulu/Natal does not have the means to raise sufficient revenue to meet this expenditure.

To quote only one of these studies, 'In order to achieve racial parity in the case of only two amenities, education and health, by the year 1995, and assuming a GGP growth rate for the KwaZulu/Natal region of 4.8 percent per annum, the percentage of total government expenditure on these would have to increase from 26.2 percent in 1985 to 37.5 percent in 1995. In other words, substantial cuts would have to be made in other government expenditure' (Du Pisanie and Meintjies 1986).

Meeting the costs of the Indaba is not only a matter of directing State expenditure so as to redress racial inequalities. The existing bureaucratic structures are a relevant factor also. At present, while Africans constitute 77 percent of the population in Natal and KwaZulu, the total expenditure of the KwaZulu administration makes up only 48.7 percent of direct government expenditure in the region. Even assuming that the costs of the Indaba proposals could be met, the massive outflow of funds is likely to lead

to disruptions when the already inadequate bureaucratic structures attempt to administer and deliver services.

## Development Strategy

For an Indaba-type settlement to have any chance of long-term survival, benefits would have to be delivered to all parties who subscribed to it. In the KwaZulu/Natal context, this implies both sustained economic growth and redistribution. In other words, the economic cake must get bigger, and the way in which it is cut must be changed. In the absence of the latter, the Indaba would have no impact on the existing racial imbalance. The implementation of a suitable development strategy that would be feasible under these conditions will inevitably run into a number of major problems, notably:

- The present structure and organisation of the economy — the need to protect the productive base while seeking to modify institutional aspects, so that they fit more clearly into the joint administration's economic and social objectives.
- The lack of sufficient, committed and well-trained bureaucrats to implement new government policy. While bottle necks are certainly a product of apartheid, it would be extremely naive to assume that they will disappear overnight with the system that created them.
- The need to improve black access to land and at the same time ensure that agriculture's productive base is not seriously impaired, particularly with regard to food production.
- The need to deliver some meaningful improvements in black living standards in the region without undermining South Africa's productive capacity.
- The high cost of these reforms, which is beyond the present capabilities of a region already heavily subsidised by central government.

Although this analysis paints a gloomy picture of the prospects of achieving a new dispensation in KwaZulu/Natal, this is not to debunk the efforts made by the Indaba. Instead, it should be realised that the constraints outlined above are common to South Africa as a whole, and need to be addressed if any real development is to take place in this country. JMA

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Trotter G. 'The Economics of Education', in *New Frontiers: The KwaZulu/Natal Debates*, (eds) K Roberts & G Howe. Indicator Project SA, Durban: 1987.

*All economic analysts concur that the region is unable to raise sufficient revenue to meet planned parity expenditure in essential social services*

*Even if the Indaba costs could be met, existing bureaucratic structures would be unable to administer new funds or deliver equalised services*

# THE LIMITS TO REDISTRIBUTION

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*In an economic analysis of the Indaba proposals, Peter Corbett argues that the debate on an appropriate constitutional structure for South Africa should concentrate firstly on both the quantity of public goods consumption required, and on the degree of redistribution feasible and desired. The question of federalism versus the unitary state will have relatively subsidiary importance if it is accepted that major socio-economic policy can be determined only for the country as a whole, albeit coupled with probable regional differences in implementation.*

The constitution proposed by the Indaba contains, inter alia, a list of economic functions to be undertaken by a regional government for KwaZulu/Natal. These, in turn, have important fiscal implications which are contained (incompletely) in the reports of the Indaba Education Committee and the Indaba Economic Committee. The range of functions agreed on cover many important areas of public expenditure, including education, public health, housing, roads, welfare and pensions. The implied intention is for the KwaZulu/Natal legislature to equalise social goods provision independently of the rest of South Africa, and presumably more rapidly.

Although there is no assumption in the proposals that KwaZulu/Natal would be one unit in a federal state, hope has been expressed by Indaba participants that the regional constitution might serve as a model for other regions. There has been no acknowledgment, by the Indaba itself or subsequently by its principal supporters, of the economic difficulties of implementing the proposals. The limited independence in economic action of a regional legislature vis-a-vis the rest of South Africa will result in largely unmet expectations. Placing the constitutional cart before the economic horse seems, therefore, clearly irresponsible.

## Low Estimates

The wider the range and cost of social goods provided by a regional government the less flexibility there is for fiscal differentiation between it and other units. In a commissioned report Du Pisanie and Meintjies estimated that if expenditure on functions had been taken over by a KwaZulu/Natal legislature in 1985 (current data), it would have amounted to some 26,2 percent of the regional Gross Geographic Product (GGP). This expenditure would produce social goods of similar standard to the rest of South Africa, in accordance with present government policies.

The report continues by quantifying the expenditure levels necessary to meet the longer-term Indaba objectives of equalising expenditure on different groups by the target years 1995 and 2000. Du Pisanie and Meintjies based their analysis on the list of functions contained in the Indaba constitutional proposals, but inexplicably omitted some of these in expenditure calculations. Their conclusions on the high costs of parity were essentially negative, despite reaching expenditure estimates substantially lower than other calculations (see table 1; also Indaba Economic Committee 1986). For instance, higher estimates would follow if not for their:

- exclusion of expenditure categories (like housing), which are included in the proposals;
- underestimation of the number of black secondary school pupils;
- calculation of lower per pupil State expenditure on education;
- non-equalisation of old age pensions; and
- projected reduction in regional expenditure on legislative and general executive functions.

The Du Pisanie and Meintjies report makes comparisons with the status quo difficult by not comparing Indaba expenditure levels with actual 1985 expenditure. Furthermore, the projections for 1995 and 2000 are based on assumptions not specified and the results are thus difficult to evaluate. The report does not deal with problems of financing the expenditure nor with regional ones.

A second report, produced by the Indaba Education Committee, investigated the educational expenditure needed to achieve Indaba targets and used assumptions similar to Du Pisanie and Meintjies. It also estimates black school attendance at a lower level than could be projected (Corbett 1988), and left open the questions of compulsory attendance, parental contribution, pupil/teacher ratios and other quality criteria.

The Indaba Economic Committee was unable to reach agreement, and so an unofficial final report was issued by the chairman. This report also contains data based on the earlier calculations of Du Pisanie and Meintjies. Its analysis of the overall economic implications of the required expenditure levels was that, while there is no necessary correlation (inverse) between tax rates and economic growth generally, it would not be possible to have 'markedly higher levels of taxation in the Natal/KwaZulu region (which) would probably lead to a flight of both capital and skills away from the region'. The report implies that Du Pisanie and

Meintjies have underestimated expenditure and reaches the conclusion that sufficient revenue could not be raised locally to 'parity up ... without undermining the potential for economic growth' (1986: p4).

Having reached these conclusions, this third report essentially goes on to assume that central government will fund the higher planned level of expenditure in KwaZulu/Natal, on the grounds that per capita expenditure in Natal is already higher than regional tax receipts. The entire fiscal burden of the Indaba proposals is placed on central government as a logical, just and attainable expectation, should the proposals be implemented. It does, however, state that failing this 'the new constitution would be a farce ... and ... would see its regional autonomy constantly undermined' (1986: p7).

### Expenditure Effects

The financing assumptions in all three reports imply a redistribution to KwaZulu/Natal from other parts of South Africa, either by reducing expenditure, or by generally increasing taxes in this region. Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis believes that '... the important economic implications of the Indaba had not been calculated — although it had been found that Natal did not have the money to finance the proposals and would depend on government subsidisation' (*The Sunday Tribune* 20/11/87).

There is general agreement among the critics and supporters of the Indaba economic proposals that:

- public expenditure would need to be much higher in KwaZulu/Natal relative to the rest of South Africa;
- tax levels in KwaZulu/Natal could not be raised significantly above the rest of South Africa to finance the expenditure;
- therefore either central government or some other external source of funds would be required.

If increased expenditure on the Indaba proposals were to produce public goods at intermediate standards between those currently experienced by blacks and by whites in KwaZulu/Natal, there might well be socio-economic consequences quite apart from any effects of financing that expenditure. Whites faced with poorer, racially integrated public goods (and residential areas) might well migrate to other parts of South Africa where standards would not have changed. At the same time better pensions, schools and hospitals, together with the absence of the Group Areas Act and racial segregation, might cause an unquantifiable in-migration of black families from other parts of South Africa. The out-migration would be more likely to consist of skilled or professional workers and the in-migration of less skilled workers.

The net effect of these factors could well cause a reduction in industrial development and regional income, in turn causing contraction in service industries to the detriment of employment and growth in KwaZulu/Natal, but to the benefit of other parts of South Africa. The size of these effects cannot be predicted, but they would certainly reduce the regional growth rate; even if modest, this would have serious long-term consequences on unemployment, poverty and stability in the region.

The estimated overall impact of the Indaba

proposals on expenditure is shown in table 1. Detailed estimates prepared by the author (Corbett 1988) calculate expenditure by the KwaZulu/Natal legislature as 50 percent of regional GGP in 1985, compared with the 26,2 percent assumed by Du Pisanie and Meintjies. (Neither estimate includes expenditure of local authorities, Regional Services Councils, or central government.) The data presented here implies that overall expenditure by the public sector would have been substantially greater than private expenditure, had the KwaZulu/Natal legislature existed and reached its targets in 1985.

Du Pisanie and Meintjies projected a required expenditure of R9 545m by the year 2000, while the author projects R11 004m by compounding the 1985 estimates forward at an annual population growth rate of three percent. The proportion this expenditure bears to GGP depends on the assumed regional economic growth rate. Table 1 assumes a five percent rate (probably optimistic), and on that basis Du Pisanie and Meintjies project Indaba expenditure at 32,5 percent of GGP compared with the author's projected 37,5 percent. The proportion of total public sector spending would, thus, be very high.

Figure 1 shows the growth (in 1985 prices) of both GGP and 'Indaba' expenditure from its assumed 1985 level of R3 702m to its target level of R11 004m in the year 2000. The gap between the two converging lines meeting at 2000 shows how the equalisation process would take place. The eventual proportion of expenditure to GGP depends on the per capita increase in GGP (the growth rate of GGP minus population growth rate). The Du Pisanie and Meintjies projection could be shown by connecting 26,2 percent in 1985 to 32,5 percent on the 2000 GGP column.

### Financing Gap

The difference between, firstly, the growth in expenditure from its actual 1985 level of R3 702m to the target level in 2000 of R11 004m and, secondly, the anticipated non-Indaba growth of central government spending in KwaZulu/Natal on the Indaba functions, would have to be financed. The dotted line in figure 1 labelled with a question mark represents 'normal' growth in pre-Indaba expenditure. The gap between that function and the equalisation function in Indaba expenditure is labelled 'the financing gap'.

Depending on the growth rate of central government expenditure on these functions for the whole of South Africa, the financing gap can vary substantially. A five percent growth rate in 'normal' government expenditure produces a financing gap of R3 308m, while a three percent rate produces R5 238m. The relationship of this monetary gap to either GGP or, alternatively, to 'normal', non-Indaba expenditure levels elsewhere in South Africa illustrates the revenue problem. Between 11 and 18 percent of GGP would need to be found for the regional expenditure level between 43 and 91 percent higher than in South Africa.


The burden on the central government would be substantial and requires a transfer of resources to KwaZulu/Natal from the rest of South Africa relative to the non-Indaba status quo. No political explanation is attempted as to why this might happen. To the contrary, it seems unlikely that tax payers in

## Data Base

Table 1  
**EXPENDITURE TO MEET INDABA OBJECTIVES FOR 1985 BASE & 2000 TARGET**  
(1985 Prices)

	1985	2000
<b>1 Pre-Indaba expenditure</b> (Du Pisanie & Meintjies)	R3 702m	
<b>2 Additional expenditure to meet Indaba objectives:</b> (Corbett)		
Education	R2 102m	
Health	R509m	
Pensions	R250m	
Housing	R250m	
Other	R250m	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>R3 361m</b>	
	<b>R7 063m</b>	<b>R11 004m</b>
	(3% p.a. growth)	
<b>3 Du Pisanie &amp; Meintjies</b> Projection to meet Indaba Objectives		<b>R9 545m</b>
<b>4 GGP for KwaZulu/Natal</b>	<b>R14 131m</b>	<b>R29 377</b>
	(5% p.a. growth)	

Figure 1  
**PROJECTED GGP & GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE KWAZULU/NATAL**  
(Constant 1985 Prices)



the rest of South Africa would be willing to pay for the Natal experiment. The finance could, in principle, be raised by taxing KwaZulu/Natal at higher rates than are current elsewhere in South Africa. The increase in rates would be substantial and, depending on the kind of taxes raised, it would have certain detrimental effects on the regional economy:

- Taxes on individuals would either lower real incomes in KwaZulu/Natal, thus causing out-migration of affected individuals, or, if they could be passed on to employers, would raise real wage costs and cause firms to locate in lower cost areas. Either or both of these effects would lower regional economic growth and might be substantial.
- Taxes on profits would lower the net return on capital in the region relative to other parts of South Africa and would cause firms to locate elsewhere. There would be difficulties in preventing massive tax avoidance by firms redirecting profits to non-KwaZulu/Natal subsidiaries or branches. Again regional growth would be reduced.
- Taxes on expenditure (such as GST) would lower real incomes and/or raise real wage costs leading to labour and/or capital migration. Avoidance would occur as purchases would be made outside KwaZulu/Natal with no international borders to prevent this. Again growth rates in the region would be harmed.

The size of the financing gap is large and the effects of higher taxes would be substantial. The regional growth rate could well become negative as a result. Foreign aid in the form of grants or loans could theoretically fill the gap. Several other sources of finance have been suggested, ranging from a 'Rhodesian Sweep' to acquisition of the Durban harbour as a 'free port' or profit-earning enterprise. These sources in total might make a worthwhile contribution and should be examined to see whether expectations are realistic, but in any case would be subsidiary to other sources.

## Limited Options

The prospects for financing the Indaba proposals without damaging the regional economy are poor at best. The objectives clearly require greatly increased public sector spending. Economic reality, on the other hand, makes it improbable that the necessary finance would be available to pay for the expenditure programme. What, then, are the limited options available to a KwaZulu/Natal legislature elected by a poor constituency (largely black) expecting rapidly improved standards of public goods, and a well-off (mainly white) constituency convinced that existing material (minority) rights will be protected?

Firstly, standards in badly-served areas can be improved by cutting expenditure in well-served areas. If this is contemplated seriously, then the appeal of the Indaba to white voters will be diminished. The alternative of keeping standards in white areas substantially unchanged would mean little improvement in black areas, which in turn is unlikely to generate black support. Given these quite different scenarios it is difficult to see how the Indaba proposals could achieve consensus if all information were to be made widely available.

These issues are highly relevant to the question of the limits of redistribution for South Africa as a whole. It would be valuable to extend the calculations to encompass other government functions at all levels and to consider possible levels of redistribution over various time horizons in a post-apartheid society.

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# A REGIONAL DEBATE REVISITED

**D**uring the first half of 1987 I was approached to write an article for an Indicator SA special issue on the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. Initially I refused, as it appeared from the list of fellow contributors that I was to be the sole critical voice. When, subsequently, I was assured that other critics would be approached I agreed to contribute.

Months later the publication, *New Frontiers: The KwaZulu/Natal Debates* (NF), appeared, but in such a manner and in such a form that I lodged complaints with the editor. I accepted an unsatisfactory offer of right-of-reply in the next issue of Indicator — unsatisfactory because NF was a one-off publication, with no necessary consecutive readership (in fact many more issues of the special issue were printed and distributed than is regularly done with Indicator).

I have two major complaints: the first, against the editors of NF, that a contributor, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, should have been given copy for a one-off publication. In other words, editorial privilege was being extended to a contributor. Articles were not available to all fellow contributors (in fact, I was refused access to the draft of the publication even after newspaper journalists had been given all material). Schlemmer is not an objective 'political analyst' (as he was described in newspaper articles based on the publication) on this issue, and did not simply do 'a summary' (as the editor of NF claimed in justification for passing on the articles before publication).

The second complaint is that Schlemmer maps the articles in the publication through an uncritical presentation of the Indaba position on the one hand, and a selective, at times inaccurate, and partial commentary on the articles taking a critical stance on the Indaba on the other. That is not a sin in itself, but becomes so in what is purportedly an academic debate.

Professor Schlemmer has been centrally involved with Inkatha and with the KwaZulu government and its organs. For example, he serves on the board of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation; he formed and still serves as a director of the Inkatha Institute (a self-proclaimed propagandistic body funded

in part by the KwaZulu government); he served as secretary and essential contributor to the Buthelezi Commission (clearly the forerunner to the Indaba); and he was involved in the Indaba proceedings and subsequent defence and popularisation.

These are all excellent qualifications for presenting the Inkatha/Indaba position in a debate. However, whatever Schlemmer might be in other spheres, he is not a neutral 'political analyst', with the right 'background knowledge' to qualify him to do a summary of NF contributions. This publication, and the Indicator Project as a whole, is presented as a university-based 'forum where all sides can be heard', and not another publication of the Indaba.

## Reappraisal

The only summary that is presented is an uncritical list of what 'the recommendations (of the Indaba) represent'. Professor Schlemmer says that 'authors Dhlomo, Saunders, Mansfield, Van Wyk and Wiechers' (all central Indaba personalities or employees) 'described in detail' the 'process and outcome' of the Indaba. That is simply not true, as a reading of these contributions shows. The Indaba team ignore several of the central elements that the public would need to know about, or present a selective picture even of the Indaba proposals, as does Schlemmer in his list of six points. For example, the Bill of Rights does affirm the 'rights of individuals', but then only of some of those rights (no mention is made of rights to welfare and a living wage, etc.). It offers protection only in the restricted sphere of regional constitutional competences — detention without trial, military call-up, to name but two issues, could continue because they would be central state affairs.

Schlemmer says that the Indaba is committed 'to a steady elimination of inequalities'. We have already had an outright rejection by capital that they should pay. Instead, what we have been given are what Professor Jill Natrass, a participant in the Indaba's economic committee, had called 'fatuous' solutions. Selling the Durban harbour, and waiting for the central state to fulfil its own commitment to 'equalisation of services' are

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Secret implementation studies by Indaba participants could well be part of a process to effect further compromises necessary to interest the State

Indaba personnel have stated that under certain circumstances an opinion poll might be more desirable than a referendum to test support for the proposals

two of the 'solutions' offered. In fact, if Professor Schlemmer wanted an example of what he calls 'waiting for Godot', then waiting for central state largesse seems to qualify very well. The very agency that is generally held to be responsible for the inequalities that mark South African society will somehow suddenly act as saviour.

In fact, later in the article Schlemmer explicitly follows a 'Nkrumah line', in suggesting that a prior 'political settlement (...) is necessary to extract the resources from the central fiscus to promote development'. In the 'region first' solution that the Indaba proposes, the intensity of inter-regional competition for resources, and the limbo in which the 'new Natal' would exist, would more probably result in less money coming to it. After all, why would the central state wish to antagonise the far right with which it is competing in the centre of power?

#### ● Final Product

Schlemmer admits that the 'constitutional details' are 'imperfect' (as Boule argues in NF). However, this is no problem as the negotiations merely 'develop(ed) the themes of political resolution on the understanding that a more detailed formulation would follow prior to any implementation'. I have followed the Indaba in detail, but this was the first time that I had heard that an incomplete product was being sold.

Schlemmer goes on to say that 'follow-up work is being planned to flesh out the ... content of the broad proposals'. The Indaba's Dawid van Wyk did not have much to offer by way of information when questioned about this phrase, and merely said that a 'need had been identified' for further work. Does it mean that there is an even more secretive Indaba planned or in progress? What version, after all the on-going propaganda effort, are we going to be asked to vote on in the referendum? (It appears that what Schlemmer might have been referring to are the 'implementation studies' that are to be launched — a process that could well serve to effect the further compromises that are going to be necessary to interest the central state.)

#### ● Middle-of-the-Roadism

Schlemmer claims that 'the major problem' with the Indaba proposals is 'their location in the ideological crossfire between deeply polarised political viewpoints' (the UDF and the CP?). But if left and far right attack the same thing then that proposal must be 'a creative resolution to the South African conflict' — as an Indaba employee argued, the proposals must be good because they satisfy nobody. This is exactly the same argument the National Party advanced in defence of the tricameral constitution. It

is plainly trite and refuses to address the criticisms seriously.

#### ● Singular Notions of Democracy

Were the Indaba proposals undemocratic 'by virtue of being closed to the press and public' and were they a "top-down" exercise', is how Schlemmer phrases the next 'summary point'. He agrees that I am right 'in some measure' in arguing this point — I do, by the way, address many more aspects than that the deliberations were closed to the press and the public. However, this concession to criticism is immediately qualified. Schlemmer claims that secret deliberations were in order as the results were open to subsequent rejection through a referendum. Furthermore, secrecy was a virtue in that consensus could be reached when 'participants were not playing to the gallery of the media'.

This is one way of describing a process that others would feel to be closer to the heart of democratic practice. Open scrutiny of the doings of leaders, even if only by the members to whom those leaders are accountable, is what more and more organisations are demanding. It was clearly of little concern in the Indaba process, but it was a central reason for the refusal to participate by some invitees who hold for an alternative process in transforming this country. It is possible to be cynical about a commitment to democracy, but it still does not justify one's own undemocratic practices.

Interestingly enough, Schlemmer seems to reject 'the attractive notion' of a national convention 'to be preceded by a massive round of consultation with the people'. That is exactly the notion, if not the practice, prescribed by chief minister Buthelezi, who called for a 'politics of negotiation' that had to be preceded by 'a mandate (from the people) to negotiate about that which is being negotiated ... We must have an agenda'. That is what negotiation politics will have to be about, but it is not what the Indaba was about.

Schlemmer argues that the 'final safeguard for democratic interests, will be a referendum to which the actors in the Indaba are firmly committed'. It is probably more accurate to say 'only' rather than 'final' safeguard, but even this commitment means little at this stage. Firstly, Indaba personnel have several times indicated that under certain circumstances an opinion poll might be necessary and more desirable as a test of the democratic voice. Secondly, there is a state of emergency nationally, and a civil war locally — hardly conditions for a referendum. It has not been possible under these circumstances to meet, in any way, the concerted and unperturbed advertising campaign launched by the Indaba. Detentions, bans on meetings and on organisations and individuals, and many

other state and bantustan actions serve to make a mockery of free politics.

That the Indaba 'was no sudden idea or imperious imposition' as Schlemmer states is precisely the argument that I have been making. It did indeed 'involve a great deal of consultation at all levels at various stages', but the question remains about who was consulted, and how anyone could expect all invitees to gratefully join a process that had created structures and agendas over several years when they had had no previous say.

#### ● *Rewarding Ethnic Competition*

Schlemmer concedes that 'South Africa is deeply divided enough without any reinforcement of group boundaries' but goes on to say that 'ethnic group consciousness is pervasive among minorities in South Africa. It is simply a political fact'. The Indaba could, therefore, either ignore it 'or ... attempt to ... integrate it into a broader political unity'. Within this strategy lies a 'reasonable chance that much of the social poison of intergroup hostility could be dissipated', argues Schlemmer on behalf of the Indaba.

He says there are frequent 'precedents' that I and other authors want to sweep under the carpet of a supposedly deeper, class-based analysis'. He then lists some of these examples. I support arguments that pervasive and tenacious ethnic sentiments must be taken seriously. However, the list does not describe the origins and manipulation of ethnic sentiment. As frequent as the cases he mentions are studies that have revealed that under the superficially obvious form of ethnic conflict lie fundamental material issues (frequently of class conflict).

Many studies, both in South Africa and elsewhere, have also shown how cultural differences (themselves the result of social historical processes) have been politicised by unscrupulous politicians in their quest for wealth and power. We are not born with cultural characteristics, but into them. And they are easier to get rid of, or contain within an appropriate sphere, than class positions. To reward ethnic identification, as the Indaba does, is to continue with a central element of apartheid policy and of Inkatha's practice.

It would be interesting to take up this important issue of the immutability or otherwise of ethnicity. The options do not seem to me to be between 'smothering it in non-racial ideology', which Schlemmer admits to be an inclination he might share with the 'progressive extra-parliamentary movements', or rewarding it, which the Indaba proposals do. Ethnic sentiments have to be understood and a programme of action against their politicisation has to be devised.

#### ● *Profits on the Agenda*

No, I do not 'hugely overestimate the sophistication of businessmen', nor is an interpretation that acknowledges the political agenda that some capitalists have 'monastically removed from everyday realities', as Schlemmer puts it. My argument is that capitalists look after their interests, and with the clout of money and supported by the state in the final instance, they do so reasonably effectively (i.e. profitably). I could give many examples of the publicly stated political agenda of capitalists. Frequently that agenda is anything but sophisticated.

#### ● *Ethnic or National Populism*

Schlemmer says that I make 'an uncomfortable distinction between "the people" and the Zulu nation'. He leaves out the inverted commas that I had placed around 'the Zulu nation'. His comment then becomes either a cheap point through misrepresentation, or he does not actually understand the context of debate around both populism (appeals that deny differences while mobilising 'the people') and more limited appeals ('the Zulu nation') in what I, in the same sentence, called 'an ethnic populism'.

Significantly, Schlemmer concedes that majority interests could be suppressed, even if not 'significantly'. He argues that the veto is there for minorities, but that frequent use would 'undermine constitutional legitimacy'. Why then draw up a constitution that has a contradiction built into it, and where its success is its failure?

#### ● *The Future*

Finally, the Indaba has been deafeningly silent on the state of emergency that was extended to Natal during its deliberations; on the repressive acts that have removed many of the non-Inkatha opponents of the central state, and the Indaba, in the region; on a firm commitment to a referendum process that would be preceded by a period of open politics and freedom of movement and association, even within chief Buthelezi's 'liberated zone' (i.e. KwaZulu); on the oaths of allegiance demanded of employees of KwaZulu (of some relevance as it involves the senior partner in the Indaba); etc. When these, and other matters fundamental to democracy, are addressed, critics may see the anti-democratic Indaba process as less of an indication of the mode of operation to be expected of those who signed the proposals.

In conclusion, I have no objection to a fair debate on the merits and dangers of the Indaba, and have engaged in a few such interchanges with Indaba personnel. I do object most strongly to being used in a manipulated process that is then presented as debate. *TPJA*

*It is often found that fundamental material issues, frequently based in class conflict, underlie the superficially obvious form of ethnic conflict*

*To reward ethnic identification, as the Indaba does, is to continue with a central element of apartheid policy and of Inkatha's practice*

*Editorial response*

**ECONOMIC TRENDS**

# RESPONSE TO MARE

It is regrettable that Mr Mare has taken umbrage over the editorial presentation of his contribution to the Indicator SA special edition on the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. We hasten to assure our readers that there was no intention to single out Mare for criticism, and that the right of rejoinder was offered to air publicly the author's protestations. In brief response to the editorial issues:

- From the beginning several spokespersons for the UDF and its affiliates in Natal were formally invited to contribute, agreed to do so, but repeatedly failed to deliver the promised articles (with the exception of NIC's Mewa Ramgobin), even though the research coordinator made repeated efforts and later deadline allowances. Nevertheless, the wide range of perspectives elicited, delivered and published amply covered the broad political spectrum in South Africa, from the left to the right (Mare was never 'the sole critical voice').
- Indeed, the publication stands as an unusual achievement in our polarised society, with its often polarised media, and the editors felt entirely justified in entitling it, *The KwaZulu/Natal Debates*. To publish such an exchange of views and promote 'paper debates' between protagonists (both in the spheres of realpolitik and academia) is a founding aim of *Indicator SA*; to describe this declared function, in Mare's words, as 'a manipulated process ... presented as debate' is an illogical conclusion.

By Prof Merle Holden & Prof Mike McGrath

## RETROSPECT

Growth in the South African economy during 1987 accelerated from one percent in the first quarter to five percent in the fourth quarter, with an overall rate of growth of 2,5 percent for the year. On the demand side of the economy the increase in real gross domestic expenditure of 4,5 percent for the year was due largely to strong private consumption expenditure. The Reserve Bank identifies rising personal disposable income (after tax) and the continued low savings ratio as enabling factors in the growth of consumption expenditure in the third quarter of 1987. Spending on personal transport equipment and consumer durables was particularly buoyant.

After declining during the first two quarters of 1987 real gross domestic fixed investment increased marginally in the third quarter, finishing the year with a decline of 1,5 percent. Capital spending on housing and infrastructure by government departments has not occurred on the scale planned, and the reductions in capital spending by public corporations contributed to depressed fixed investment. Nevertheless, spending by the private sector at an annual rate of 13 percent contributed to the slight increase overall in investment in the third quarter. Though this is an encouraging sign, investment by the private sector is still far short of the levels achieved in 1983. However, in 1987 gross domestic investment did show the first rise for a full year since 1981, indicating that business confidence in the economy is returning.

Real government consumption expenditure increased markedly in the first quarter of 1987, less rapidly

Professor Schlemmer was fully entitled to access to copy as a member and guest referee of the editorial committee of *Indicator SA*, an association that is well-known and credited in our quarterly reports. A pre-publication 'peek' enabled him to prepare a critical summary for the general reader of the sometimes confusing range of issues and themes raised in 16 different articles and 11 appendices. (Along with another guest contributor, Mare was generously given a draft copy of the publication within 24 hours of making his request, coinciding with the expiry of a sensitive 'exclusive' embargo for a national newspaper group.)

Schlemmer was not listed as an editor because he was not involved in any actual editing or subediting of copy. On later reflection, perhaps we should have included a full listing of our editorial committee in this special edition, but any oversight certainly was not tantamount to an editorial conspiracy intended to 'manipulate' Mare's contribution. Further, the epithet 'objective' to political analyst was not used by the editors or the newspaper reviewer to describe Schlemmer, as alleged.

To conclude, there are obvious points of intellectual disagreement between Mare and Schlemmer, which must stand or fall on the strength of their own persuasiveness or logic. In defence of our independent editorial stance, however, I would like to emphasise that the closing critiques by Professors Magyar and Schlemmer tilt at the sacred cows of the right, centre and the left. Further, in covering South Africa's major conflicts it is often not possible to avoid controversy or to tread the mythical 'objective' tightrope of 'academic debate' (to quote Mare). This is especially so when a new political creature such as the Indaba is naturally put under the keen microscopes of academics, business people and politicians.

Graham Howe, Editor.

during the second quarter, and actually declined in the third quarter. Nevertheless, on average this was almost five percent higher than it was for the same period in 1986. Government expenditure was not excessive for this period — indeed, if it had been kept to the levels of 1986, growth in GDP would not have been stimulated. The budget deficit before borrowing and debt repayment amounted to R6 142m for the first seven months of the fiscal year 1987/88, equal to 73 percent of the budgeted deficit. However, during the first six months of the fiscal year only 20 percent of the deficit was financed in an inflationary fashion through the banking sector, thus restraining the growth of liquidity.

Employment in the first quarter of 1987 showed little change over 1986, but during the second quarter increased rapidly at a rate of 2,6 percent in both the private and public sectors. Despite this increase the number of registered unemployed rose in September 1987, reflecting the rapid rise in the economically active population beyond the growth in available jobs. Although aggregate real salaries and wages increased during 1987, average real wages per worker declined. Lower real wages combined with improved labour productivity moderated the rise in unit labour costs to 12,3 percent in the first half of 1987, contributing to a decline in the rate of inflation.

Although inflation continues at a rate which is low by comparison with some developing economies, it is markedly higher than that experienced by our major trading partners (see Table 1).

For South Africa to maintain its international competitiveness at these rates of inflation the external value of the rand would have to depreciate by approximately 11 percent. A strengthening of the rand contributed to a decline in the rate of increase in the prices of imported goods from 32,5 percent in

## Comparative Inflation Rates 1987

22,6%	New Zealand 18%	Korea 3,9%
13,3%	South Africa 15,5%	Germany 0,5%
11,6%	Australia 9%	Japan 0,3%
7,1%	USA 4,3%	
7,0%	UK 4,5%	

January 1986 to 12 percent in September 1987. A strengthening of the rand will initially contribute towards maintaining competitiveness, but in the longer term will increase inflation. It is encouraging that the quarter-to-quarter increase of the CPI declined to 1,2 percent in the fourth quarter of 1987 and the consumer price index to 9,2 percent.

In the balance of payments the current account continued to register a large surplus. A moderate inflow on the capital account was insufficient to outweigh the surplus, and foreign reserves grew from R3bn at the beginning of 1987 to R8bn at the end of the year. Approximately 90 percent of the increase in reserves was due to an increase in the value and quantity of gold holdings, while the balance was due to a small rise in foreign exchange holdings. Movements in the exchange rate mirror these changes in reserves with the rand strengthening substantially against the dollar (ten percent) while weakening against the other major currencies, so that the weighted average of the rate rose by five percent for the first ten months of the year.

The stance of monetary policy over 1987 remained accommodating in the sense that growth in the broadly defined money supply only entered its targeted range in September 1987. Up until then growth in M3 reflected a depressed demand for money due to the recession. The prime rate has since risen to a half-percentage point to 13 percent as economic activity picked up in the last quarter of 1987. If inflation is not to be fuelled by increases in the money supply, the Reserve Bank has a very delicate task ahead of it — balancing a sustained upswing without a rise in inflation. Economists have noted the rapid increase in M1 of 23,9 percent in the latter part of 1987 as an early warning signal.

## PROSPECT

At the beginning of each year economists and financial commentators provide forecasts of the most important economic variables. These forecasts range from estimates derived from sophisticated econometric models to guesstimates. Table 2 summarises some of these.

Most forecasters are expecting growth to exceed that of 1987. Notable exceptions are Volkskas who expect growth to lie between one and 2,5 percent and Nedbank with 2,1 percent. Both banks are sceptical that consumption expenditure will continue to support growth and pessimistic about future growth in exports. Conversely, the Stellenbosch BER (with the most optimistic growth forecast) is emphasising the role of the confidence factor in generating a consumer-led recovery in 1988, while the Reserve Bank's

Table 2  
Forecasts for 1988

	Reserve Bank	Sanlam	Wits Business Economics Consensus	Standard Bank	Stellenbosch BER
Growth	3%	3%	2,7%	2,5 - 3%	3,4%
Inflation	14%	15%	15,3%		14,1%
Current account surplus	R3 - 4bn	Decline on 1987	R3944,8m	Decline on 1987	R3,8bn
Rand	45c - 50c	Firmer on \$, weaker on other	47c	Weaker	50,5c
Gold price	Higher than \$440	\$500			
Interest rates	Prime Long	14 - 15% 1% point higher	13,7%	Higher Higher	13%

forecast is dependent on some recovery in the gold price. To the extent that the government is able to hold the line on spending, the boost to private consumption expenditure by civil servants will be tempered. Nevertheless, by comparison with growth performance in the sixties of 5,8 percent on average, forecasts of three percent for 1988 are way below potential for the economy and will barely enable per capita income levels to be maintained.

All forecasters are predicting a high rate of inflation for 1988 in the range 14 — 15,3 percent. It is also true that the observed decline in the CPI in December 1987 is partly illusory, based as it is on a revision of the base of the CPI from 1980 weights to 1985 weights — which of these is the 'correct' set of weights is a subject of some controversy. However, it should be pointed out that 1985 was an unusual year due to the severe recession. What is clear from the forecasts is that inflation will remain a problem in 1988 and show little abatement from December rates.

It is predicted that the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments will decline from R6bn in 1987 to R3bn and R4bn in 1988. This forecast is consistent with anticipated growth in 1988 to stimulate growth in imports. It is interesting that not all the forecasts of the value of the rand are consistent with this decline in the surplus. Assuming that capital outflows remain at much the same level as those of 1987, it would be expected that with a floating exchange rate a decrease in the surplus would depreciate the rand. On average, however, the forecasted value of the rand is only marginally lower than the average rate for 1987. If forecasters are confident that the current account surplus will diminish, presumably they also see the Reserve Bank intervening in the foreign exchange market to maintain the value of the rand. This intervention ensures that growth in the economy will of necessity be constrained by the balance of payments. As long as South Africa remains a capital-exporting country, development and growth will be reduced.

Consistent with their predictions of higher growth in



the economy all forecasters foresee higher interest rates for 1988. Both the prime rate and long-term rates will rise. Upward pressure on interest rates has already been felt and undoubtedly there will be pressure on the Reserve Bank to supply additional reserves to the banking system. The forecast for a somewhat higher prime rate in 1988 takes cognisance of the Bank partially accommodating these demands while remaining in the target range for growth in the money supply.

In all these forecasts there is one element of uncertainty — the future course in the price of gold. Its movements in the recent past have been unpredictable, and the traditional link between the value of the dollar and the gold price appears to have been broken. However, investors are more concerned about the future of inflation, and as long as inflation in the major industrial countries remains low, gold is not the attractive asset it was in the late seventies. Investors are still fumbling around in the aftermath of the worldwide stock market crashes and the international gold price will depend on how they decide to rearrange their depleted portfolios.

## GOVERNMENT POLICY

On 5 February 1988, President P W Botha unveiled the government's longer-term strategy for the economy in his opening address to parliament. The strategy purports to deal with the problem of inflation, tax reform, government expenditure and efficiency. Three main instruments of dealing with these problem areas emerged:

- privatisation of State and parastatal bodies
- replacement of GST with VAT
- freezing of public sector employees' salaries and wages for 1988.

The Deputy Finance Minister has subsequently revealed that the type of privatisation envisaged is a 51 percent majority shareholding by government in the bodies to be privatised. The prospective benefits from efficiency gains in the new management rationalisation of these operations are unlikely to materialise as government is unwilling to hand over the reins of control to the private sector. It would seem that the underlying rationale for this type of privatisation is to partly sell off the family silver to enable the family to pay off its outstanding debts and to reduce its debt servicing burden. As a first priority the President has stated that the proceeds from privatisation will be utilised for the redemption of public debt.

Interest payments on the public debt as a proportion of total expenditure have risen from 4,9 percent in 1975/76 to 14,2 percent in 1985/86, complicating the task of controlling the growth in government expenditure. It is to be hoped that the savings effected by a reduction in servicing of the public debt will not be dissipated in the milieu of competing claims within the bureaucracy. It is clear that this saving will only be felt in the longer term

— constrained as it is by the pace of privatisation and the redemption of the debt — and that the planned privatisation will not directly affect the short-term growth path of the economy.

One of the most important recommendations of the Margo Commission was the introduction of a value added tax (VAT) and the reduction GST. In response the government has decided to adopt an invoice-based VAT to replace the existing GST as from March 1989. The ability to evade VAT should be severely inhibited to broaden the tax base. Furthermore, an equal application of the same rate of tax across the board will eliminate the distortionary effects introduced by the existing, differential GST.

### Wage Freeze

If the desire of the government is to reduce the rate of inflation significantly, then the implementation of a wage freeze for civil servants is an inadequate tool. Indeed, much of the current rate is the result of core inflation based on expectations formed from past experience. The prospects are for heightened private sector wage demands as the upswing continues, and the latent power of the trade unions will make these demands difficult to resist.

In formulating wage policy the government has not attempted to deal directly with the unions, or to address the issues of price increases and profitability. Unless the private sector, parastatals and trade unions can agree on an integrated wage and price policy (which seems politically impossible) the consequences of industry restricting wage claims will be disruptive strikes, township unrest, eventual capitulation to wage demands, an accelerating rate of inflation, and an inevitable collapse in the public sector wage freeze. The captains of industry urgently need to fill the leadership vacuum created by the State President, and negotiate realistic wage increases at the national level with all union groupings, while holding rates of price increases and profits to levels acceptable to industry and labour.


Otherwise consistently applied restrictive monetary and fiscal policy would be required to break inflationary expectations — a policy which would stifle the present upswing and raise the unemployment rate. This was attempted in 1984/85 when the prime rate rose to 25 percent. The political unrest fuelled by rising unemployment led to the abandonment of this policy and the prime rate declined to 12,5 percent. Given the experience in other countries with reducing inflation it has become apparent that if people revise their inflationary expectations downwards very slowly, the unemployment rate would have to remain high for an extended period — a policy option which is not politically acceptable for South Africa. A gradual reduction of the target range for the broad measure of the money supply may be what is called for in preference to freezing the monetary base and going 'cold turkey'. The Governor of the Reserve Bank has indicated that the target range could be reduced to between 12 percent and 16 percent for the coming year from the present 14 percent to 18 percent.

Although the President's speech has been hailed as a 'watershed switch to a new economic era' (*Sunday Times* 7/2/88), it is clear that the envisaged policy changes are neither far-reaching nor particularly timely and for the next year it will be business as usual. J.P.A.

# RURAL & REGIONAL

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
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GRINAKER

On 30 December 1987, the 31-year-old commander of the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Major-General Bantu Holomisa took control of the government in the Transkei, South Africa's first 'independent' black homeland. His coming to power followed two bloodless coups which ousted premier George Matanzima in September 1987 and his successor, Stella Sigcau, both implicated in a corruption scandal in the homeland.

Holomisa was appointed TDF leader in March 1987 after being freed from detention by an action committee composed of senior TDF officers. He then initiated the deportation of military advisor Ron Reid-Daly (and others from the former Rhodesian regime employed in the homeland). The ex-Selous Scout mercenaries were in turn implicated in the abortive 19 February 1987 attack on the residence of the neighbouring Ciskei homeland's president-for-life, Lennox Sebe.

Chairman of the ministers' council, the military council and Minister of Defence and Audit, Holomisa has declared war on the corruption that has allegedly plagued previous Transkeian administrations. Evidence on land deals, preferential contracts, tax evasion, etc., unearthed prior to the second coup, has been placed before a commission of inquiry into the homeland's Department of Works and Energy. The commission has had its brief extended to consider alleged corruption in granting lucrative gambling licences in the homeland.

With a mammoth task ahead of him, Holomisa is adamant that he is not a politician, but a soldier playing the part of administrator. In an interview conducted in late January 1988, the Transkei's transitional head claims that the recent takeover was primarily motivated by the desire to rid the homeland of widespread bribery and corruption. Holomisa appears committed to a return to civilian rule in the region while supporting a convention of the major actors in South Africa to bring an end to the national conflict.

# A Purge of the Two-Armed Bandits

*Major-General Bantu Holomisa, military ruler of the Transkei, talks to journalist Janette Bennett*

*IPSA: What is the current role of the military in the Transkei?*

Holomisa: Our role now is to clean up the administration and make sure that everybody is protected, especially those who want to give information about wrong things which were conducted in the past. Our task is also to make sure that the police are protected, and that the judiciary is independent and doing its job with no interference or influence of whatever kind. So our task really is non-political at this stage. It is purely administrative.

*IPSA: When will a general election be held?*

Holomisa: That will depend solely on the attainment of the military's objective, which is to clean up the administration.

*IPSA: How long will that take?*

Holomisa: I don't know. We are still waiting to be briefed by the commissions, the auditor-general, the attorney-general and the police. In other departments there have been no commissions of inquiry and it seems there have been misuses of government funds. There could be more commissions, but on a lower scale to cut costs ... We might institute departmental inquiries.

*IPSA: Former Prime Minister Stella Sigcau*

'Misuse of funds in other departments means that there could be more commissions but on a lower scale to cut costs'

'This government is seeking to address the problem of the unfair distribution of wealth'

*told the commission of inquiry into the Department of Works and Energy that an unknown person had spread disinformation alleging she had signed warrants of arrest for the top hierarchy of the TDF. Do you have any comments?*

Holomisa: The TDF will never take decisions based on mere rumour and speculation. When we came into possession of documentary evidence of the involvement of the deposed prime minister it was decided to effect the change of government, and clean up the evil of bribery and corruption that has bedevilled our country for so long.

*IPSA: After the general election, will the military still play a role, perhaps as watchdog?*

Holomisa: Well, the military's role in any country is that of a watchdog. They guard the strategy of that government so that it does not collapse. We will still be doing our job, assisting the relevant authorities on matters which would lead to public dissatisfaction.

*IPSA: Pretoria has now officially recognised the military government of the Transkei. What is your reaction?*

Holomisa: This recognition is highly appreciated by our government. We have no doubt it will facilitate continuity in the conduct of affairs, in pursuit of development, improvement of the quality of life and the peaceful co-existence between our peoples.

*IPSA: What sort of support do you have from the people in the Transkei? You seem very popular among the youth.*

Holomisa: According to the TDF intelligence reports, I would say that many people are happy with the action we have taken. They are aware of the problems highlighted by these commissions ...

I'm also dedicated to improving youth conditions and recreational facilities in the Transkei. I mix with them — even when I was a commander and a brigadier — so it is easy to take advice from them. I'm not neglecting the youth.

*IPSA: That hasn't been done before ...*

Holomisa: On new year's day I flew around the Transkei with other members of the military council, requesting the people to come and serve in the council of ministers. These are the cabinet ministers you see today. The trip was also to see whether the whole area was stable. We went along the coast to see that the tourists were happy — that there was no exodus as a result of the coup two days before.

*IPSA: The commissions of inquiry into the Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, as well as that of Works and Energy, uncovered the corruption of*

*government officials, and also cases of businessmen bribing officials. Will any action be taken against these people?*

Holomisa: After the commissions of inquiry have submitted their recommendations to the government, a decision will be taken by the office of the president, through the council of ministers and the military council. Then the attorney-general and the police will be given their task to do. It is common and usual that when someone has done something wrong, he goes and faces the music in a court of law.

*IPSA: So it will ultimately be up to the courts?*

Holomisa: It will be up to the courts. The military itself will not dictate what action must be taken; so the judiciary is purely independent.

*IPSA: What about the Matanzimas? Do you think any action will be taken against them? They have been implicated ...*

Holomisa: I don't think the Matanzimas are above the law. They are citizens of this country. If the allegations that they have been tainted by corruption are true, the courts and the Department of Justice must take a line of action.

*IPSA: Previous administrations have banned trade unions using this as a calling card for businesses to relocate to the Transkei. Do you think that trade unions should be allowed to operate here?*

Holomisa: I think the question of trade unions was handled by the previous government, even in parliament if I'm not mistaken. There seems to be a relaxation of previous restrictions imposed on trade unions. But the whole issue needs to be formalised through the relevant departments. Last year the Department of Manpower and Utilisation was preparing a document to be submitted to the government.

*IPSA: Would that still be valid?*

Holomisa: The documents would still be valid. As we said when we took over, every commitment which was undertaken by the previous government will be honoured. We will review those which we feel do not suit us.

*IPSA: Many development plans formulated seem to have been selectively applied, benefiting only certain people. Will new plans be drawn up?*

Holomisa: The commission of inquiry into the Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism addressed the issue of development — there are recommendations which I cannot go into detail about now.

All genuine developments, like five-, ten- or 15-year development plans are to be

### Another One Flew the Coup's Nest

The 10 February coup attempt in Bophuthatswana, a possible 'spillover' from the two successful coups in the Transkei, was promptly put down by the South African security forces. The attempted takeover by the Bophuthatswana opposition, the People's Progressive Party, led by 'Rocky' Malebone-Metsing, failed to dislodge President Lucas Mangope. The occurrence and timing of the Bophuthatswana coup were more than coincidental — in the 'spillover effect' a power-hungry and disgruntled politician or army chief might feel that 'if they did it there, why can't we take matters into our own hands here'.

A ring of steel now embraces the subcontinent, with militarised governments in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho (the setting of General Lekhanya's 1986 coup) and South Africa. Commenting on coup d'états and civil rule, Samuel Decalo, professor of Comparative African Government at the University of Natal, says, 'Coup leaders have overt and covert reasons for staging takeovers':

- corruption
- mismanagement of the economy
- nepotism and patronage
- traditions of military involvement
- failure of legitimacy
- political liberalisation or repression
- external manipulation

Coups tend to occur where military leaders are antagonised by administrative inefficiency, political crises and the management of socio-economic problems. They enter the political stage essentially to root out ills, then either continue to rule themselves or pass back leadership to civilian parties. While such issues are often cited for staging coups, the question of these being genuine motivations or reasons varies in individual cases.

Decalo also emphasises that there is usually an external variable in coup attempts. The intertwining of the homeland economies with South Africa implies that Pretoria has a vested interest in the conservative, stable government of these territories. In justifying selective intervention in Bophuthatswana but not in the Transkei, President P W Botha stated that, in the former case, the elected head of state was violently deposed, and there was an appeal for military assistance from Mangope's ousted government. There is also a mutual assistance agreement between Bophuthatswana and South Africa.

Non-intervention in the Transkei coup indicates the extent of implicit support that General Holomisa has from Pretoria. (South Africa granted formal recognition to Holomisa's transitional administration in early 1988.) The aborted Bophuthatswana coup, on the other hand, clearly gives lie to the de facto 'independence' of the TBVC territories. It appears that the four homelands are clearly regarded as 'independent' by South Africa only if their political conduct and governments are acceptable to Pretoria.

Source: Decalo S. Coups & Army, Rule in Africa: Studies in military style. Yale University Press, New Haven: 1976.

'We have taken rule militarily and have issued a decree which prohibits any political activity in the region'

'As a soldier I have no choice but to obey the government which has been elected by the people'

reviewed by the relevant departments. In the past these development plans were just filed and directives issued, such as, 'you will give priority to this project' — projects we had not even budgeted for! So when we say that we are addressing the improvement of administrative standards, we are catering for issues of that nature.

IPSA: You have said that you are not a politician ...

Holomisa: No ways. But if there are political issues that require the attention of the Transkei government, we will address them as and when needed during this period. For instance, if the South African and the Transkeian governments reach an agreement that blacks should be treated like this or that, it could affect our people working in South Africa.

We will go to the prominent organisations in the country, like business organisations and law societies to get their views. We'll even go to the regional authorities, to the heads of regions and the chiefs to get their views. And we will issue a political statement. Even my cabinet is a mixture of professionals and people experienced in political fields.

IPSA: The Transkeian security police have a reputation for being the private political arm of the government. There have been recent shuffles in the SP hierarchy.

Would you seek to limit their power or control them constitutionally?

Holomisa: I have no intention of interfering with the police. They have their own minister. But what I will demand from them is that they must be professional in their conduct. At no stage should a minister or senior government official issue an order that so-and-so must be arrested. If the police are in possession of information, they must bring it to the relevant authority. They must investigate it, go to the attorney-general, up through the correct channels. Then they will be respected.

But what we have noticed in the past is that the police were ordered to arrest people, just to settle scores that were personal — if I could put it that way — personal differences.

IPSA: Do you support the idea of having a Bill of Rights which guarantees freedom of speech and expression?

Holomisa: Well I think, without being boastful, that it's the first time in the Transkei that people can say what they like in the press. Let me give an example. If the deposed prime minister (Sigcau) was in another country, she would be barred from speaking to the press. But we have allowed her to say whatever she likes, to try to clear her name. At the

'If either the DPP or TNIP win the elections, they could open negotiations with the ANC'

moment I don't think there are restrictions on freedom of speech here.

*IPSA: There does seem to be a more relaxed attitude among people in the streets.*

Holomisa: Yes, and there are no politics. Sometimes, restrictions on freedom of speech are based on politics. So we have no politics — we are administrators.

*IPSA: Political power in the Transkei has been based on the chieftancy system. Would you seek to change it at all?*

Holomisa: Chiefs form half of the members of parliament and this structure will not be altered by me. Whoever wants to repeal anything must have the backing of the people of this country. Unfortunately I don't have a mandate from them. I am here because of a mandate through the Transkei Defence Force.

*IPSA: There have been stories that the traditional chieftancy system is open to abuse. For example, someone who is supported by a chief would have greater access to the economy to set up a business. Would you try to stop that kind of abuse?*

Holomisa: I think it boils down to one thing. There is no doubt that there was not fair distribution of wealth in the past. This government is seeking to address the problem.

*IPSA: There has been a state of emergency in the Transkei since 1980, renewed annually. Will you renew it again when it expires?*

Holomisa: Anything to do with security, one cannot just say 'I will do that', until such time as one reviews the situation. It's subject to being reviewed.

*IPSA: The Licences Control Bill was approved by parliament when George Matanzima was still Prime Minister. Would you like to see it applied?*

Holomisa: We have asked the Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and other relevant economists to review the question of business licences. We noticed that it has also played a part in this corruption business.

*IPSA: What do you think of legislation which prevents government officials from having business interests for personal gain?*

Holomisa: Maybe there are regulations in the Public Service Act which don't permit government officials to have business interests. But I think this was abused. I am sure it will be a matter of trying to revise laws.

*IPSA: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by Ntsikayezwe Sigcau, the brother of Stella Sigcau, recently made a trip to the ANC in Lusaka. On their return they briefed you on what was discussed.*

*Why? Was it just routine?*

Holomisa: There was nothing wrong with that from what we have seen. When the DPP delegation returned from Lusaka, they requested to be briefed on the meaning of this coup, and on the future of their party. I told them that whatever political programmes they had would have to be shelved until the return of civilian rule. We have taken rule militarily and have issued a decree which prohibits any political activity in the country.

The DPP in turn briefed us on their reception by the ANC. They also talked about their thoughts on the future of this region, i.e. Southern Africa. We wanted to assure them that they would not be arrested. They still come here to Umtata now — because some of them are chiefs — if they have problems in their region. There's nothing which prohibits them from representing people.

*IPSA: What is your attitude to the ANC? Would you accept an ANC government in the Transkei?*

Holomisa: Look, I'm a soldier first of all. When civilian rule is restored, I must obey it and protect its strategy. The new civilian government will not be appointed or nominated by the military — a civilian government will be voted in by the electorate. If either the DPP or the TNIP win the elections, they could open negotiations with the ANC, PAC or military organisations in exile. If the ANC or PAC is allowed back, takes part in a general election and wins, then as a soldier I've got no choice but to obey the government which has been elected by the people.

I will give you an example. In Zimbabwe, since Mugabe got into power, members of the military who served Ian Smith's regime are still there protecting the present government.

*IPSA: What sort of role does the Transkei have in greater South Africa. Do you agree with the South African government's homelands policy?*

Holomisa: There has been some criticism, we agree. Unfortunately we cannot address that issue alone militarily ...

*IPSA: It is a very political question.*

Holomisa: I think it's more of a political issue. It needs a debate at length. I wouldn't be able to address that one at this moment. It is a reality that blacks were divided according to ethnic groups, which many influential people and even the man in the street do not agree with. So a solution would have to be introduced somewhere, somehow. Perhaps a national convention should be called — one where all South Africans, whether from inside or outside the country, could sit down around a table to negotiate. Nobody should dictate to anybody. *IPSA*

# THE FIRST 'HOMELAND'

## Self-rule, misrule or failed experiment?

Indicator SA Researcher Vijay Makanjee

### INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

The recent military takeover in the Transkei ended the 11-year rule of the Matanzima regime in the 'post-independence' period. Since October 1976, the homeland has been governed by a 150-member National Assembly, composed of 77 chiefs nominated on an ex-officio basis, 75 elected representatives and three nominees of the ruling party. Executive power has been vested in the president, who will now be advised by both a military and a ministers' council under transitional arrangements pending a return to civilian rule.

The Transkei was granted self-governing status in 1963, becoming Pretoria's first proclaimed homeland. Local government structures comprise nine regional authorities, 182 tribal authorities and 913 administrative areas. The Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), under chief minister (later president) Kaiser Matanzima and his brother George, governed the homeland between 1964 and 1987. Streek and Wicksteed (1982) claim that the TNIP's use of Proclamation 400 and other security regulations overrode widespread opposition to 'independence' in 1976.

Elections have been scheduled every five years, based on adult suffrage, with proportional representation of 28 constituencies. The president is appointed for a seven-year period by the National Assembly sitting as an electoral college. The third sitting president (K D Matanzima's successor) is Tutor Ndamase, the son of Paramount Chief Vic-

tor Poto, an opponent of independence. Ndamase's appointment in 1986 was interpreted as a shrewd political move designed to pacify the tide of resistance to government structures building up in Pondoland, the northern region of the homeland.

In 1968, the ruling party in the homeland accepted the policy of 'separate development' as the 'only policy that can be successfully applied in South Africa'. K D Matanzima again stressed in an election manifesto during the Transkei general election of 1973 that he was in full support of this policy. It is not known whether the TNIP currently adheres to this stance.

Until recently, the prime minister — K D Matanzima, 1976 - 1978, and George Matanzima, 1979 - 1987 — had been appointed by the ruling TNIP. Since the first coup in September 1987, the '86-day premier' (Stella Sigcau), her predecessor (George Matanzima), many ministers and homeland officials have been forced to resign their posts at the behest of the Transkei Defence Force (TDF).

Allegations of corruption have surfaced in a spate of commissions of inquiry into various government departments. Those accused of misappropriating funds include former president K D Matanzima (recently detained for a short period), former prime minister George Matanzima (struck off the attorney's role in 1963 for misappropriating trust funds) and, more recently, former posts and telecommunications minister Stella Sigcau.



The aspirant ruler, the nearly deposed ruler and the military ruler. Pretoria's Pik Botha, Bophuthatswana's Lucas Mangope and Transkei's Bantu Holamisa at the inauguration of Transkei's third president Tutor Ndamase, February 1986.

Vijay Makanjee



Commissions of inquiry have been set up to investigate the funding and operations of various government departments, including Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Works and Energy, as well as Social Welfare and Pensions. It is believed that these commissions have been instituted at the insistence of the South African authorities, who will also foot the bill.

### OPPOSITION POLITICS

Of the homeland's other political parties the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been the most significant opposition force, though it has had a minimal presence in the Transkei parliament. Many leaders and members of the anti-independence DPP have been harassed and detained by the homeland's security forces. Former DPP leader Sabata Dalindyebo who died in exile in Lusaka in 1986 was widely regarded as the legitimate ruler of the Tembu tribe. (K D Matanzima was installed as paramount chief of Emigrant Tembuland by Pretoria in 1966 under the National States Constitution Act.)

Those who have opposed the arbitrary actions of the Matanzima regime have met the full force of the Transkei's repressive security machine. Resistance in the homeland has come not only from those opposed to 'independence', but also from business and professional people who daily witnessed the greed and corruption of those in political power. In 1979 the Transkei banned 34 organisations, some of which were unknown or had never operated in the homeland. A state of emergency, first imposed in June 1980 and renewed annually, is currently in effect in the homeland.

Journalists, lawyers, development planners, lecturers and priests have been among those detained without trial for long periods, and subsequently banished to remote rural areas or 'deported' from the homeland. For instance, former Unitra student leader and health worker, Batandwa Ndong, was murdered in the Cala area after being kidnapped by people alleged to be police. Although affidavits from eyewitnesses were submitted to the attorney-general, no action has yet been taken.

### POPULATION

Table 1  
Demographic trends in the Transkei 1970—1985  
(de facto)

Population	1970	1980	1985 *
Rural	725 083	2 493 713	2 783 694
Urban	58 116	129 397	148 512
Total	1 783 204	2 623 110	2 933 206

NOTE \* This 1985 census count excludes 57 084 persons in educational and other institutions, 22 430 people unable to supply their ages, most migrants and non-resident Transkeians.

### Analysis

- The de facto population, based on the 1985 census, increased by almost 40 percent between 1970 and 1985.
- The de jure population, which includes Transkeians resident in 'white' South Africa, was estimated at a much higher 3 610 565 in 1985.
- There is a large rural/urban divide with more than 94 percent of the population living in rural areas.

### LAND

The Transkei comprises three distinctly separate geographical areas that cover a total 4 365 263 ha, making it the largest of South Africa's ten homelands. The population density based on the 1985 de facto population was 67 people per km<sup>2</sup>, much lower than neighbouring Ciskei's 127 people per km<sup>2</sup> in 1984. During their rule, the Matanzimas claimed that various parts of the Cape and Natal should be incorporated into the homeland. A fierce war of words also took place over the existence of Ciskei, claimed historically as part of the Transkei.

### AGRICULTURE

- About 17,5 percent (763 921 ha) of the Transkei is potentially arable land and another 21,5 percent (938 531 ha) is suitable for forestry.
- In October 1985, 34 agricultural projects occupied 43 991 ha of land. State agricultural facilities are geared towards the growing of maize and other cash crops on a vast scale with little assistance provided for growing vegetables and other crops for household consumption.
- During 1984/85 subsistence farmers contributed 87,9 percent of the agricultural sector's contribution to the Transkei's GDP.
- Of 488 ha of land available at Ncora (close to the Matanzima stronghold at Cofimvaba), 117 ha were reserved for the use of chiefs in the area, while individual plot holders in the area have use of only one hectare each.
- Between 1982 and 1985 the number of cattle decreased from 1 537 155 to 1 327 558 during the severe drought in the subcontinent.

### EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR

In 1980 only 11,4 percent of the resident population were considered economically active (DBSA 1987), compared with the 'independent' homelands of Ciskei (9,4 percent) and Venda (8,1 percent). By 1985, 19 percent (547 896) of the Transkei's de facto population were classified as economically active.

A breakdown of employment opportunities in the homeland and surrounding South Africa (1985) shows that 19 percent of all employment is in government, 16,4 percent in mining, 13,7 percent in household services and 10,3 percent in other services. Within the Transkei it is estimated that more than 63 percent of the economically active population are employed in the vibrant informal sector, which includes car washers, basket weavers, dagga merchants and workers in co-operatives.

In the Transkei there is a high male absentee rate in the age group 20 to 64, with the greatest absenteeism

(65,9 percent) in the age group 25 to 34. Working away from home as migrants, many male Transkeians spend their most productive years in South African industry, leaving rural women to bear the burden of bringing up their families.

Table 2  
Number of migrant & commuter workers


	1980	1985
Migrants	345 116	342 000 *
Commuters	9 000	8 800

NOTE: South Africa's Department of Development Aid. However, the Transkei's Department of Manpower Planning and Utilisation claims that in 1985 there were only 283 852 migrants from the homeland.

#### Analysis

- The total number of migrant workers in South Africa increased from 345 116 in 1980 to 411 421 in 1984, then decreased to 283 852 in 1985. The downswing in employment could be attributed to the recession in South Africa, although a large number of 'illegal' migrants are not reflected in official statistics.
- Most Transkeian migrants (80,7 percent in 1985) are employed in the Western Cape. Nationally, 160 827 (51,1 percent) male migrants worked in the mining/quarrying industry, and 20 486 (73,9 percent) female migrants in the community and household services sector.
- The majority of commuters (65,9 percent in 1985) are employed in Queenstown inside South Africa, but live across the border in Ezibileni. The number of registered unemployed in the homeland dropped from 163 791 in 1982 to 42 396 in 1985. This unlikely trend could be the result of non-registration with the UIF or growing employment levels in the informal sector.
- More than 90 percent of the population live in rural areas, where the highest contribution to household income is in the form of remittances from migrant workers.

A trainee in an appropriate technology unit using hand tools to make tables for nature reserves in the Transkei.



## INCOME & EXPENDITURE

Table 3 Average household income 1979

	Urban	%	Rural	%
Salaries & wages	R6 027,77	69,6	R296,56	25,7
Agriculture	R238,06	2,8	R232,37	20,2
Domestic production	R273,25	3,2	R47,48	4,1
Own business	R1 482,24	17,1	R66,08	5,7
Pensions	R127,10	1,5	R77,53	6,7
Contributions received	R135,99	1,6	R315,89	27,4
Income from boarders & lodgers	R113,23	1,3	R20,92	1,8
Other	R259,07	3,0	R95,10	8,3
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>R8 656,71</b>		<b>R1 151,93</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>R9 808,64</b>			

Table 4 Household expenditure 1979 — 1982

	1979	1982
	%	%
Food	45,5	43,4
Rent	15,6	15,0
Furniture	10,3	12,2
Clothing	8,5	8,0
Other	20,2	21,4


#### Analysis

- In 1979 there were 447 086 households with a total income of R589,3m out of a de facto population base of 2 616 220.
- The average household income, including migrant and commuter incomes was highest in semi-urban areas (R5 207), and lowest in rural areas (R1 152); 62,4 percent of urban households and 75,6 percent of rural households had only one wage earner.
- In 1982 rural people accounted for 82 percent of total expenditure, with more than 45 percent spent on food.
- Per capita income from GNP amounted to R1 061 in 1985, largely because of the high number of migrants from the homeland. Comparable statistics for the 'independent' homelands indicate that in 1980 Bophuthatswana had the highest per capita income from GNP (R609,38), followed by the Transkei (R324,39), Venda (R318,12 and the Ciskei (R268,64).
- Comparative figures (1980) for the 'independent' homelands show that the Transkei's GNP is highest at R1207,5m, followed by Bophuthatswana (R949,2m) and Venda (R229,3m). The Ciskei's GNP in 1984 was R681,8m.

## REVENUE

Table 5  
Contribution of migrant & commuter incomes to GNP

1980 total GNP = R1 207,5m  
Minus foreign factor payments — R23,7m



1985 total GNP = R3 112,3m  
Minus foreign factor payments — R37m




Table 6  
Composition of government revenue 1985





Table 7  
Composition of Transkei's total national revenue



Note

\* This includes customs and excise, taxes and levies, and other miscellaneous transfers, which in terms of various agreements are regarded as 'own sources' of income. The inclusion of these categories in 'own sources' misrepresents the actual amount paid to the Transkei by the South African treasury and makes the homeland seem more economically viable than it is.

### Analysis

- It is not accepted practice to stimulate estimates of national accounts by including all income earned by migrants outside their country of citizenship (*Rand Daily Mail* 3/3/76). In short, double accounting makes the Transkei appear more economically viable than it really is.
- Through the years budgetary assistance from South Africa has comprised a major part of all homeland revenue, demonstrating the extent to which these 'states' are an integral part of the central economy. Grants from Pretoria, combined with revenue from customs and excise duties to the Transkei (R280m in 1984/1985) contribute 64,3 percent of the homeland's revenue.

### MANUFACTURING

The Transkei falls into regions D and E of the South African regional development plan, with four industrial development points — at Umtata, Butterworth, Ezebileni and Lusikisiki/Mtonjeni. In 1985, R83,2m in decentralisation benefits was paid to industrialists.

- In 1985 total investment was R130,2m with more than R123,2m (94 percent) invested in large industry; total employment was 25 606, of whom 11 606 were employed by large industry.
- Of 3 573 industries in the Transkei, 3 500 were classified as small industries which were responsible for only 10,1 percent of industrial production. Of 274 ha available for industry more than 100 ha was vacant in 1985.
- While it costs large industries R10 617 (high — R16 786; low — R1 489) to create a single job, small industries create jobs at R500 each.

## INFRASTRUCTURE

In 1985 there were 28 proclaimed towns in the region, with a population of between 140 250 (1985 census) and 156 306 (Transkei government estimate). In 1983 there were 8 998 km of roads, with only 951 km tarred, although the number of tarred roads has increased since then, opening up access to coastal resorts. Vehicles using these roads numbered 59 666 in 1985, of which 52 191 were privately owned.

### Housing

The 28 towns have 17 714 housing units, each occupied by more than seven people. Over 53 percent of these urban houses have electricity, while more than 73 percent have flushing toilets. No electricity is supplied to 13 of the proclaimed towns by the national (Eskom) or regional (Tescor) electricity grid. The number of rural households was estimated to be 490 960 in 1982/83.

### Education

- There were 2 944 educational institutions in 1985, of which 2 923 were primary and secondary schools. The pupil/teacher ratio in primary and secondary schools was 45:1, while the pupil/classroom ratio was 49:1.

- The number of pupils increased from 732 815 in 1980 to 870 213 in 1985. Fewer males (37,8 percent) attend secondary schools than females (62,2 percent) because of the early pressure on males to seek work.

- In 1980 approximately 50 percent of the population had no or an unknown level of education. Those who could be regarded as functionally literate (educated beyond standard five) then comprised 8,6 percent of the population. The average number of schooling years for rural adults is three and for urban adults six-and-a-half.

- According to the DBSA 10 674 primary and 7 984 secondary teachers were 'professionally qualified' of which 63,1 percent had reached standard eight, 27,4 percent standard ten, and only 2,8 percent had completed a post-matric qualification.

- The presence of a large number of underqualified teachers could partially account for the low matric pass rates in 1986, when only 5 496 of 11 742 who wrote standard ten passed, while only 1 993 (17 percent) obtained a matric exemption (see Hartshorne tables: p5).

- The University of the Transkei (Unitra) is having difficulty attracting qualified staff due to the large number of university staff and students deported from the homeland in recent years. There have been numerous occasions when the Transkei police have raided the Unitra campus and attacked both students and staff. Unitra had 2 697 students registered in 1985. In 1986, despite opposition from medical workers both inside and outside the homeland, a medical school was established on the Unitra campus in Umtata.

### Health

- There are 29 hospitals and 218 clinics, including three privately owned institutions. The ratio of population per hospital bed was 392:1.

- In 1985/86 there were 254 doctors in the homeland, or one doctor to 11 548 people. This ratio is much

worse in rural areas since most people tend to visit urban centres for treatment where most doctors are located.

- During 1985, 3,2 percent per 1 000 children suffered from kwashiorkor — a disease related to conditions of poverty. There is also a high incidence of tuberculosis (146,8/100 000) and measles (7,2/100 000) in the homeland.

- A recent survey showed that only 17 percent of households had an adequate water supply (defined as 20 litres per capita per day). Food shortages were experienced by at least 51,2 percent of the population, while many experienced food shortages for six-month periods. The crude infant mortality rate (under one year old) in 1985 was 56,7 deaths for every 1 000 children.

## PIE IN THE SKY

If anything symbolises 'independence' for the homelands it is gaining independent access to the rest of the world. In the Transkei numerous schemes have been attempted to build international airports, harbours and the like. Despite the high cost of building harbours or airports these ill-conceived schemes were set underway amid great publicity. With South African ports seeing a decline in shipping, and the inaccessibility to the Transkei coast from the interior, future benefits would have been minimal.

In 1978 the Transkei government announced that a French consortium would lend its expertise and build a harbour around the Port St Johns/Umgazana area. One year and R250 000 later (with little to show for it) the scheme lost its glamour and the homeland's authorities offered no explanation for scrapping the idea. In the same year, Salim el-Hajji, later appointed the Transkei's Middle-Eastern representative, announced plans to build a R800m harbour allegedly to be financed by Arab money. By March 1980, the Transkei government admitted they had been swindled out of R9m, but it is not known if any money has subsequently been recovered from el-Hajji.

Another aborted scheme which appears to have had Middle-Eastern links was a plan by the homeland's Works and Energy Department to export its water in exchange for oil (*The Daily Dispatch* 4/6/86). The cost of the exercise was estimated between \$1bn and \$2bn, which, according to the former director of Works and Energy, would have been financed by the South African government (see section on health).

These pie in the sky schemes coupled with pervasive corruption have prompted Pretoria to exercise stronger control over the financial affairs of the homelands. At present there is a committee chaired by Simon Brand of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) investigating the use of South African government funds in the Transkei. □

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# POLARISED IMAGES OF POST-APARTHEID AGRICULTURE

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*A variety of topics was covered at the workshop on the South African agrarian question convened at the University of the Witwatersrand in mid-1987. Conceptualisations of the agrarian past were debated, and recent developments in the 'homelands' and in commercial agriculture were subjected to scrutiny. The following review focuses on the workshop's thought-provoking concluding session on the agrarian future.*

**W**hat should be the necessary/practical/viable approaches to the agrarian question in post-apartheid South Africa? Polarised images of the future presented at the Wits Workshop ranged from Matthew Cobbett's 'social democratic and capitalist framework' (See *Indicator Vol4/No4*: pp65-69) through to Jeremy Krikler's preoccupation with the problems of a direct and immediate transition to socialism. Less ambitious than the latter, but bringing to bear a more measured consideration of immediate realities and possible options, is Alan Mabin's paper on the future role of land reform policy as a means of alleviating the problems of poverty, low wages and unemployment.

The realm of theory and its role in shaping economic and political strategies is explored by Richard Levin and Michael Neocosmos. Their paper offers a thoroughgoing critique of approaches to the agrarian question, making a strong case for a

more rigorous and sophisticated conceptualisation of class differences among 'the people' in agriculture. Without such a conceptualisation, agrarian strategies cannot be properly formulated.

Cobbett poses the problem, 'What will be the demand for land redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa?' He narrows his focus to a single significant dimension on this issue — 'the possible need for the expropriation of white-owned land to alleviate the gross overcrowding and poverty which exists within the homelands'. Available data suggests that, generally speaking, homeland agricultural earnings are not of major significance, constituting just over ten percent of total household earnings. Since household earnings are substantially derived from urban sources it may be concluded that the majority of households have an urban as opposed to a rural orientation. Cobbett characterises agricultural production in white areas as having a high degree of capital intensiveness, mechanisation and farm labour unemployment, with underutilised or abandoned commercial farmland in some areas.

Having set the context for possible initiatives by a post-apartheid government, the objective of which is assumed to be the restructuring of economy and society along non-racial lines, Cobbett proceeds to outline suitable or likely development strategies. Since agricultural production is subsidiary to migrant

remittances, the need for additional rural land, although it exists, is secondary to the need for access to land, housing, and services in urban areas. His prediction is that homeland households, dependent mainly on urban earnings, will seek to establish stronger links with the urban rather than the rural areas, so costly rural development initiatives would be fruitless. Land to be expropriated and redistributed will probably be in areas adjacent to the homelands since pressure on land in the homelands is so acute, and since this is where most abandoned or underutilised white farms are found.

Cobbett's assumptions about the post-apartheid demands likely to be expressed (i.e. for urban rather than rural land) and about agricultural deskilling were a source of concern during workshop discussion. Proceeding from a statistical analysis of the prevailing realities, Cobbett, it was asserted, ignored the widespread struggles for access to land which had occurred, and ignored too the history of resistance to removals. The idea that people are no longer equipped to engage in farming was hotly disputed.

Seemingly uninformed by any sense of the complexities of claims to and struggles over land, such as are so graphically conveyed by Alan Morris in his account of the dispute over the farms Bloedfontein and Geweerfontein, Cobbett's position does appear blandly ahistorical. Through telling the story of these farms — a story of State manipulation and misrepresentation to achieve its ends of incorporation and/or removal — Morris shows that 'the racist past affects the racist present'. The weight of this racist history will as surely impose itself on a post-apartheid future, and the issues which arise will have to be addressed in a sensitive and informed way that precludes proceeding on bland assumptions derived from statistics.

On the question of 'appropriate rural strategies', Cobbett sanguinely suggests that these would include 'the opening of the white commercial sector to allow the purchase of land on a non-racial basis'. As Alan Mabin points out in his paper, it is precisely such policies which are currently being considered by the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation and by one of the working groups established by its consultants, The Urban Foundation. He suggests that the parameters of such a programme, informed by the principle of encouraging entrepreneurial skills, are likely to be limited. Only those who can afford expensive credit will be included.

## Prescriptions

Mabin's overriding concern is, in fact, to pose alternatives which might improve the material conditions of the poorest people in South Africa. It is assumed that unemployment will outlast apartheid, and that measures to create and stimulate employment will be necessary. The content and possible outcomes of strategies which focus on the use of land as a solution to the problem are investigated. The obvious constraints are legislative (the Land Acts) and institutional (private land ownership).

From the plethora of land reform possibilities, Mabin drifts to the Freedom Charter (1955) which proclaims: 'The land shall be shared among those who work it ...' What makes this proposition untenable is that 'a major social revolution has taken place in

the nature of agricultural labour, the distribution of the "rural" population and the very question of who it is that works the land in South Africa since 1955'. Since fewer than five percent of Indians, ten percent of whites, 20 percent of coloureds, and only one-fifth or one-sixth of Africans now live on white-owned farms, a sharing of the land among those who live on it (leaving aside the question of who works it) would benefit only a fraction of the population. Mabin concludes that a consideration of land reform experiences in other countries is more useful as a starting point than the Freedom Charter prescription.

Despite its limited relevance, some aspects of the Zimbabwean experience do seem pertinent to the South African situation. Land reform programmes in Zimbabwe since 1980 have been of two main types — the intensive resettlement programme involving large tracts of land, and the accelerated resettlement programme utilising small units of land. The persistence of a haphazard system of land ownership has compelled the government to introduce the accelerated resettlement system and has retarded land reform initiatives. Evidence suggests that there is a significant demand for resettlement land from families who, economically speaking, are urban-based. The rural link provides the security and economic back-up necessary for those whose circumstances dictate underemployment, or very low wages.

What bearing do these points have on the South African situation? First, the complexity of landholding means that resettlement programmes demanding the availability of large blocks of land will be even more difficult to implement here than in Zimbabwe. Unless the State could appropriate large areas, a feasible public land policy will necessarily consist of the acquisition of small units which would inevitably lead to a fragmented pattern of public land. Second, the demand for resettlement land by urban-based families in Zimbabwe corresponds to expressed needs for sites in Transvaal's semi-urban settlements. Thus Mabin concludes that, 'One



AFRANIX Omar Boshino

possible land reform policy in South Africa would seek to enable households to make "two home" choices for lessening their costs of living across the entire life-cycle, and in marginal ways, increasing their incomes.'

What Mabin puts forward, then, is a way of alleviating the situation of poorer households through providing access to publicly acquired land. This would obviate the necessity of the people themselves being burdened with the costs of attempting to improve their material conditions. Unsurprisingly, neither the State nor private sector agencies, unrepresentative as they are of the wishes of the majority, have suggested a means of improving the lot of the broad spectrum of the population. It is Mabin's view that, 'Institutions under the control of the working class and poorer people, such as unions and perhaps other political organisations, may be needed to generate the alternatives to state and business expertise which are so sorely lacking at this phase in the history of South Africa'. These institutions need to work against the privatisation of rural and urban life which, if unchallenged, will exclude the majority from opportunities to improve their quality of life.

For Jeremy Krikler, it is not merely the 'socialist rhetoric' (accompanied by social democracy) predicted by Cobbett which will characterise the post-apartheid period, but a fully-fledged socialist reality. Conceptualisation of a path to a future socialist agriculture is founded upon a consideration of the current state of commercial agriculture. Debt-ridden, suffering the impact of drought, and more severely affected by the recession than any other sector, commercial agriculture is in a parlous condition. The present crisis is at least partially attributable to the historical roots of agrarian capitalism in South Africa. An artificially created phenomenon, which arose in response to the emergence of industrial capitalism rather than as its precursor, commercial agriculture was destined to be the 'weak link in South African capitalism'.

The classical marxist position is, of course, that socialism can be founded only upon the most progressive form of capitalism — which implies a high degree of monopolisation. This is certainly not the case in South African commercial agriculture, where the level of monopolisation is still relatively low. What would be crucial in attempting a transition to socialism would be the preservation and fostering of the levels of monopoly which have emerged. 'Socialism,' asserts Krikler, 'is not posited upon the dissolution of capitalist monopolies but upon their expropriation and subjection to workers' control.' Any undermining of economies of scale would threaten productivity and militate against the proper implementation of planning.

## Expropriation

The more advanced, highly monopolised mining sector would be in a position to sabotage an attempted transition to socialism by withdrawing capital and cutting off markets. The more fragmented structure of the agrarian sector would make this sort of sabotage impossible.

To ensure that landowners had no opportunity of undermining the agrarian economy during the transition phase by running down their enterprises,

expropriation would have to be swift and immediate. Gradualist strategies would be ruled out. Though economically weak, the land-owning class has a strong and potentially dangerous social presence, which would enable it to resist expropriation effectively. It would have to be challenged by 'the broad mass of agrarian working people, mobilised on the basis of a socialist programme'. Economic difficulties would be ameliorated by a high degree of unionisation in the countryside, which 'might well be the central factor determining that agricultural production continues amidst the torments of the economic dislocation likely to attend the transition period'.

What can be learned from the Zimbabwean case with regard to socialist transition is that the elimination of restrictive legislation to allow acquisition of commercial land on a non-racial basis would, in itself, do little to alleviate poverty and land hunger. This point is in fact drawn from Mabin's piece. The abolition of the Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act and subsequent land reform programmes have not structurally altered the patterns of land ownership in Zimbabwe. Resettlement programmes may have resulted in increased peasant production, but pressure on communal lands is still acute. The failure to expropriate has meant that capitalism has remained intact.

For Krikler expropriation constitutes the only viable basis for socialist construction, and in the South African case it would have to be expropriation without compensation, because compensation on the scale necessary would impose an impossible burden on the working class. What should be avoided, however, is the division of large properties, and their allocation to the present labour force. 'The parcelling out of South Africa's white-owned agricultural land among those who work it is tantamount to converting approximately 65 000 farms into at least a million economic units — for such is the size of the agricultural proletariat today.' Such a policy would frustrate the objectives of economic planning. The Freedom Charter's land principle is thus once again rejected, here not on the grounds that only a narrow segment of the population would benefit from its implementation, but on an assessment of its economic illogicality.

A criticism levelled at Krikler during workshop discussion was that the paper is prescriptive. There was a general feeling, too, that there is no immediate prospect of constructing a socialist society in South Africa. What is not clear in Krikler's paper is precisely how socialism could possibly be achieved under present circumstances where bourgeois democratic struggles are still so central, and where unionisation of farm workers is fraught with such difficulty. Although Levin and Neocosmos do not construct a possible post-apartheid scenario, they do underline that a careful analysis of the balance of class forces in the countryside is a prerequisite if democratic struggles are to be superseded by socialist ones. *JDA*

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# URBAN

M O N I T O R

The provision and needs of black schooling in South Africa's peri-urban and rural areas are under the spotlight. In clockwise order: a teacher who lives in a rondawel adjacent to the farm school; a farm labour family in the compound; an outdoor school assembly; with no facilities, a teacher conducts a class in the open.

(PHOTOTEACH: Adele Gordon).





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DC 147

# THREE YEARS OF TURMOIL

## African Matric Results 1985—1987

By Dr Ken Hartshorne

In January 1987 African pupils and students called off a nationwide school boycott and returned to class en-masse, changing their rallying cry from 'liberation before education' to 'education for liberation'. In his annual review of African matric results for Indicator SA, Dr Ken Hartshorne identifies a dual trend of steady deterioration in the urban learning environment but improved performance and provision in homeland schools. He warns the authorities and education planners not to be complacent about a return to school in a fragile situation.

The provisional matric results for 1987 published in the press recently (*City Press* 3/1/88) indicate that 37,600 full-time candidates wrote the exams of whom 77,454 (55,3 percent) passed, compared with the 51,4 percent of 1986 (see table 1). While interim results, in the light of previous experience, have to be treated with a measure of caution, there does seem to have been some limited improvement in the overall results. University entrance passes are recorded as 28,6 percent of those who passed or 16,1 percent of all African candidates, an improvement of 2,7 percent on the 1986 results.

What is not clear from the statistics available at this stage is in which areas these improvements took place. Previous experience suggests that it was not in the urban areas but in some of the homelands (see tables 1 & 2). Certainly the limited improvement is not to be explained by the results for the Johannesburg region (Soweto and Alexandra) where provisional statistics show the following: senior certificate 26,1 percent; matriculation seven percent; overall passes 33,1 percent (*Sunday Star* 17/1/88). These results seem to confirm the thesis of an ongoing deterioration of the learning environment, in spite of the 'return to school' and the apparently more settled situation in urban black schools.

The Soweto results have already caused considerable anger in the community and among the candidates who have failed, particularly as the Department of Education

and Training (DET) has announced that it will not be possible to readmit many of those who failed. Parents are concerned that the resulting frustration may lead to renewed violence and unrest, and that the ranks of the jobless will swell.

The urban school situation remains fragile and vulnerable.

### Data Constraints

It is becoming increasingly difficult to report adequately and in detail on what is happening at standard ten level in African schools in South Africa. Although DET administers the national matriculation certificate throughout South Africa (with the exception of the Transkei) on behalf of the Department of Education and Culture (whites), it reports only on its own schools and those in the 'self-governing states'. Over the last few years the scope of this reporting has been progressively reduced.

In turn, publication of certain data has been discontinued (namely the median marks in each subject; the percentage of successful candidates in each subject; and the results for each region within DET), until one overall, generalised table is left in the 1986 report. Even this table is incomplete — as in the case of DET it provides results only for those 'candidates who wrote the examination' in full at schools not disrupted during the examination (DET Annual Report 1986:

While the provisional 1987 African matric results show that an average 54,3 percent passed, only 33,1 percent of Soweto and Alexandra candidates passed standard ten

The return to school after two years of boycott occurred not because of pressures from education authorities or the security forces, but as a result of negotiations within the black community.



A white child has eight times more chance of successfully completing secondary school than an African child

p235). This data accounts for only 11 295 DET candidates, although the Minister reported in parliament that 16 539 wrote the whole examination; 2 087 wrote some papers; and 8 943 who had registered for the examination did not write at all (*Hansard* 1987, First Session).

In consulting tables 1 and 2, therefore, it has to be noted that the results of 7 331 candidates are not included in the data. (The total number of African candidates writing senior certificate at the end of 1986 was in fact 107 372, including the 326 African candidates writing the Joint Matriculation Board examination.) The final matric results for African schools in 1987 are not yet available.

### Comparative Results

The overall results for 1986 showed some improvement over those for 1985:

- Matriculation passes increased from 10 212 to 13 360 (a percentage pass improvement from 11,9 percent to 13,4 percent).
- Senior certificate passes increased from 29 542 to 37 867 (from 34,3 percent to 38 percent).
- However, these improvements were due largely to better results in 'homeland' schools — DET schools showed minimal improvement, even after the exclusion of the 7 331 results referred to above.
- In the urban areas more than half of the candidates are still failing to gain any secondary school-leaving certificate.

It is also important to note that, as in 1985, between the beginning of the school year and the writing of the examination, 20 500 pupils were lost from the system (total standard ten enrolments were 127 515 in 1986); more than 11 000 of them were from DET schools whose enrolments represented only 23 percent of the total. In 1985 the loss from DET standard ten classes was 15 000, so although the losses as a result of civil unrest, boycotts and the

closure of schools continued in 1986, there was some limited improvement in the situation.

In 1985 TBVC schools continued to do better in general than DET schools, particularly at the level of matriculation exemption. For instance, Venda schools showed very little wastage and produced very satisfactory results in 1986 (see table 2). At the other end of the scale, the results in KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Lebowa and QwaQwa were well below the average for all African candidates. KwaZulu, on the other hand, shows a very distinct improvement on the 1985 results.

For the purpose of comparison, table 3 shows the total number of passes (senior certificate and matriculation) for white pupils in 1986. There were 61 012 passes from 65 553 white candidates, compared with the 51 227 passes from nearly 100 000 African candidates. Moreover, the white passes come from a system in which there are only 897 964 pupils, compared with the 6,2 million enrolled in the various African educational systems. In other words, a white child has over eight times more likelihood of successfully completing secondary school than an African child. White privilege is still firmly entrenched, in spite of the rhetoric of government reform and its ten-year plans. Equality of provision, access and opportunity remain distant and vague goals, obscured by the present realities of the entrenchment of 'own affairs' in education.

Within the African system of education there are also grave disparities. A child in Soweto is four times more likely to reach standard ten than African children in the Natal and Cape regions, and is three times more likely to do so than children in the other DET regions. Among the homelands (Venda, Lebowa, QwaQwa and Bophuthatswana, in that order) standard ten provision comes closest in numbers but not in quality of facilities to that of

Table 1 **AFRICAN SENIOR CERTIFICATE/MATRICULATION 1985/86**

	Department of Education & Training <sup>1</sup>		'Self-governing' Homelands <sup>2</sup>		'Independent' Homelands (TBVC) <sup>1</sup>		National Totals	
<b>1985 (revised data)</b>								
<b>CANDIDATES</b>	10 523		44 498		31 600		<b>86 621</b>	
<b>PASSES: Matriculation</b>	1 327	12,6%	4 457	10,0%	4 548	14,4%	<b>10 332</b>	<b>11,9%</b>
<b>PASSES: Senior Certificate</b>	3 570	33,9%	15 096	33,9%	11 232	35,5%	<b>29 898</b>	<b>34,5%</b>
<b>TOTAL PASSES</b>	<b>4 897</b>	<b>46,5%</b>	<b>19 553</b>	<b>43,9%</b>	<b>15 780</b>	<b>49,9%</b>	<b>40 230</b>	<b>46,4%</b>
<b>1986 (provisional data)</b>								
<b>CANDIDATES</b>	11 295 <sup>3</sup>		53 762 <sup>1</sup>		34 568 <sup>1</sup>		<b>99 715</b>	
<b>PASSES: Matriculation</b>	1 442	12,8%	6 043	11,2%	5 875	17,0%	<b>13 360</b>	<b>13,4%</b>
<b>PASSES: Senior Certificate</b>	3 930	34,8%	20 335	37,8%	13 602	39,2%	<b>37 867</b>	<b>38,0%</b>
<b>TOTAL PASSES</b>	<b>5 372</b>	<b>46,6%</b>	<b>26 378</b>	<b>49,0%</b>	<b>19 477</b>	<b>56,2%</b>	<b>51 227</b>	<b>51,4%</b>

Notes on Sources: 1 Education and Manpower Planning No.7, 1986, UDPS: p16. (DET Annual Report shows only 7 313 DET candidates, i.e. those who wrote exam at schools not disrupted by unrest.)  
 2 DET Annual Report, Table 1.8.1, 1986: p235.  
 3 Hansard 1987, First Session (2), Questions: Col17 shows that in fact 18 626 DET candidates wrote the exam (2 087 only partially). Of the 16 539 who wrote the whole exam, DET has published officially the results of 11 295 only, on the grounds of disruption of schools at which the remaining 7 331 candidates wrote. The table is therefore incomplete.

Table 2 **SENIOR CERTIFICATE/MATRICULATION 1986**  
African Candidates — Provisional Results<sup>1</sup>

DEPARTMENT	Std 10 Enrolment March 1986	Wrote Examination	Passed Matriculation		Passed Senior Certificate		TOTAL PASSES		As % of Enrolment
			No	%	No	%	No	%	
Education & Training	29 649	11 295 <sup>1</sup>	1 442	12,8%	3 930	34,8%	5 372	47,6	18,1
Transkei	13 025	11 742	1 993	17,0%	3 503	29,8%	5 496	46,8	42,2
Bophuthatswana	13 620	13 006	1 866	14,3%	5 632	43,3%	7 498	57,6	55,1
Venda	6 838	6 466	1 589	24,6%	3 039	47,0%	4 628	71,6	67,8
Ciskei	4 556	3 444	427	12,4%	1 428	41,5%	1 855	53,9	40,7
Gazankulu	5 175	4 952	811	16,4%	2 178	44,0%	2 989	60,4	57,8
KaNgwane	3 057	2 671	215	8,0%	978	36,6%	1 193	44,6	39,0
KwaNdebele	2 365	1 956	151	7,7%	747	38,2%	898	45,9	38,0
KwaZulu	23 530	21 282	2 919	13,7%	8 818	41,4%	11 737	55,1	49,9
Lebowa	22 928	20 284	1 717	8,5%	6 736	33,2%	8 453	41,7	36,9
QwaQwa	2 772	2 617	230	8,8%	878	33,5%	1 108	42,3	40,0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>127 515</b>	<b>99 715</b>	<b>13 360</b>	<b>13,4%</b>	<b>37 867</b>	<b>38,0%</b>	<b>51 227</b>	<b>51,4</b>	<b>40,2</b>

Note 1 See Note 3, Table 1.

Table 3 **SENIOR CERTIFICATE/MATRICULATION 1986**  
Full-time White Candidates

DEPARTMENT/EXAMINING BODY	CANDIDATES	TOTAL PASSES	PERCENTAGE
Joint Matriculation Board	1 204	1 148	95,3
Transvaal	34 220	31 518	92,1
Orange Free State	4 744	4 552	95,9
Natal	8 657	8 409	97,1
Cape (incl SWA/Namibia)	16 728	15 385	92,0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>65 553</b>	<b>61 012</b>	<b>93,1</b>

The fundamental issues of separation, discrimination, participation and white domination over black education have not been addressed by reforms

The return to school by black pupils during 1987 does not mean any acceptance of the education system or the society within which it is encapsulated

Soweto. With the exception of the Transkei, all the homelands have a greater proportion of pupils in standard ten than any of the DET regions, with the exception of Soweto. This is also a reflection of the grave neglect of pupils (about 700 000 in number) in rural areas and farm schools under DET, a fact acknowledged in a recent DET report (see following article).

### 1987 Trends

Perhaps the most marked feature of 1987 was the return to school of African pupils in the metropolitan urban areas. While not complete by any means, as the mushrooming of all kinds of 'alternative schools' (e.g. in the industrial and downtown areas of Johannesburg) has to be taken into account, this return has been remarkable and it held for the whole year up to the final exams. However, it has been achieved, not by departmental persuasion or the pressures exerted by the government security apparatus, but by negotiated decisions taken by black student and parent bodies in strenuous and tough discussions with the churches, community, political and educational organisations.

It is important to realise that going to school is no longer a routine, generally accepted procedure in many areas; it is seen as a matter to be decided on, to be constantly reviewed, not as a normal matter but as part of wider strategies for the achievement of both educational and political objectives in 'the struggle for liberation'. The return to school, even by pupils outside of the student organisations with ordinary, politically uncommitted parents, does not mark an acceptance of the education system, of the society in which it is encapsulated, or of the government's reform process. It is absolutely imperative that this is clearly understood if there is to be any hope of effective and lasting resolution of the crises and conflicts in education.

It is therefore disturbing to note that, as a result of the return to school, spokesmen for the government, the education department and, to a large extent, the private sector are tending to take a rather comfortable view of what has happened. At the beginning of 1987, a senior DET official was reported to have said complacently that 'last year's unrest (1986) at black schools is a thing of the past'. Later in 1987 phrases such as 'a return to normality' were used in official parlance.

Yet the situation is far from normal, particularly as far as the learning environment is concerned. Pupils and teachers at black schools are often present 'in the flesh' but not 'in spirit' because attitudes have not changed and the fundamental issues of separation, discrimination, isolation and white

domination have not been addressed in any effective way.

### Conscious Strategy

Certainly, the return to school is to be welcomed. But it must be seen as a new, longer-term strategy adopted consciously by both parent and student bodies, with the support of educational, community and political organisations both within and outside South Africa. It is a change in strategy, not in purpose and objectives. This is underscored by the continued existence and resilience of student and youth organisations such as the SA Youth Congress (Sayco) and the SA National Students Congress (Sansco), even under the harsh circumstances of a rigorously applied general emergency.

The black press, in welcoming the return to school and expressing the great value the community had always attached to education, made its stand quite clear. For example, *The Sowetan* commented that, 'Bantu Education cannot be improved. It has to be eliminated and buried with its origination. Liberation with education certainly bodes far better for all of us in this country. Let us go for it.'

White perceptions are, in general, that 'Bantu Education' can be improved. Therefore, much is made of the increased funding, the better buildings and facilities, the growth in enrolments, government statements on 'equal but separate' provision in the 1983 White Paper, the subsequent 1984 legislation, and the government's ten-year plan for education. The emphasis is on finance, provision and quantity. Black concerns are rather to do with issues of quality, relevance, underlying philosophies, black participation, decision making and control. These are the issues that 'People's Education' has brought back into an education debate that is alive and well again in South Africa after being smothered by the White Paper of 1983.

Important as the increased funding of education is recognised to be, the provision of 'more of the same' is not seen as the way to fundamental change. What is at stake is the transformation of the whole education system within a common, non-racial, democratic, just and equitable society.

In the return to school many black people do not see normality, but a continuation of the crisis and the renewed need, through different strategies, to pursue protest, resistance and a search for alternatives. The extent to which there has been further deterioration or some healthy growth in the learning environment will to some extent be indicated by the outcome of the 1987 senior certificate/matriculation examination.

The question is whether the situation will hold and, if it does, for how long? *DESA*

# REDUCING THE URBAN/RURAL GAP

By Indicator SA Correspondent Monica Bot

In the 1983 White Paper on education the government committed itself to providing equal education for all South Africans. In one development the Department of Education and Training (DET) commissioned a comprehensive investigation into the provision of education for African pupils in 'white' rural areas. The working party's report (WPR), which unfortunately excludes the homelands, was released in July 1987, accompanied by an information document from DET, which has accepted the report in principle. Education researcher Monica Bot summarises some of the major backlogs identified, evaluates the WPR proposals and comments on the government's reactions.

One of the major problems encountered worldwide in rural areas is that of providing for the educational needs of a sparse population spread over a wide area. In South Africa these problems affect African pupils more than others, for two reasons:

- While more than 80 percent of 'non-Africans' (coloureds, Indians and whites) have urbanised, only 38 percent of Africans have done so (WPR: p25).
- School attendance is compulsory for non-Africans up to the age of 15 or 16, for which the State accepts financial responsibility. However, this is not the case with African pupils in rural areas, who are educated mainly in the 5 483 farm schools which are only partly subsidised by the State.

## Inequality Indicators

The provision of education to African pupils in rural areas is to a very large extent dependent on the willingness of white farm owners to erect school buildings on their land, and to partly finance and manage such schools. The State subsidises 50 percent of the costs of erecting facilities and providing drinking water, toilets, an office and a storeroom, subject to certain maximum amounts. It also pays the teachers' salaries in full, covers the cost of certain books and other items, and provides financial assistance for the upkeep of buildings (WPR: pp14/24/352).

Serious problems arise when a farmer decides to discontinue the school or when a farm is sold and the new owner is not prepared to take on this responsibility. Owners of some farms, especially smallholdings, will not allow the erection of schools. This schooling system prohibits effective planning, causes insecurity regarding the permanence of school facilities and leads to irregular educational provision. Some statistical indicators of urban/rural disparities in

education are that:

- In 1984, 36 percent of six- to 14-year-old African children (most of whom live in rural areas) were not at school. There are proportionally fewer rural pupils in standards four and five compared with urban pupils, because of earlier drop-out and/or the underprovision of educational facilities in rural areas.
  - While rural areas account for 48 percent of all primary school pupils, they account for only 15 percent of secondary school pupils (45 percent of whom are in standard six). Of 64 secondary schools in white rural areas, only 38 go up to standard ten (WPR: p226). The serious underprovision of secondary school facilities means that many rural pupils have to move to urban areas (or homelands) (WPR: pp183/184).
  - Forty percent of farm schools have a teacher to pupil ratio of 1:45 or higher, compared with 18 percent of urban schools (WPR: pp194/195). Many farm schools are fairly small and one or two teachers have to accommodate several standards in one class. Sixty-five percent of rural schools have fewer than 100 pupils, compared with three percent of urban schools (WPR: pp199-202).
- Before July 1984 farm owners were not allowed to add standard six and seven classes to their primary schools. Today only 49 farm schools have secondary classes, of which no more than five go up to standard seven (WPR: p223). There is only one secondary farm school nationwide (WPR: p355). A mere three percent (174 schools) of the total 5 782 rural schools offer education beyond standard five; 21 percent do not offer education higher than standard two (WPR: p223).

## Gradual Reforms

Both the quantity and quality of educational provision in South Africa's rural areas fall far short of needs. The

*A shortage of secondary schools in rural areas forces many pupils to leave school early or continue studying in distant urban and homeland areas*

*While rural areas account for 48 percent of all black primary school pupils, they account for only 15 percent of secondary school pupils*

At a farm school, some pupils clean the school-yard during a gardening lesson while others attend a long-jump practice. To improve rural schooling agricultural subjects have been introduced on an experimental basis and recreational facilities are to be upgraded.



PHOTO BY: Adels Gordon

It is proposed that the State should accept full responsibility for the erection, upkeep and management of schools on farms and smallholdings

WPR therefore recommends that the State accepts full responsibility for the erection, upkeep and management of schools on farms and smallholdings (WPR: p167). Negotiations about the DET takeover of existing buildings should take place with farmers.

To ensure the continued provision of education on farms, the report suggests that the State:

- acquires existing institutions as public schools, so that they become the permanent property of the State;
- leases the property on a long-term basis;
- centralises schools on State land; or
- expands existing facilities in towns (DET 1986: pp85/86).

In any of these cases, however, the farm owner would be within his rights to refuse to sell the school property (WPR: pp378/379).

The gradual introduction of compulsory education and its funding was proposed in the 1983 White Paper on education. Therefore it is proposed that the use of children for farm labour during school hours should be prohibited, and that transport and/or hostel accommodation is provided to pupils where no primary or secondary education is available within walking distance (DET 1987: p27).

Further, secondary schooling should be made available to each pupil with potential. It is suggested that secondary schools for a certain number of farm schools be established in villages, on land owned by the State (WPR: pp263/264). Lastly, more teachers should be employed in order to reduce the teacher to pupil ratio, with the aim of having a teacher for each class group (WPR: p264). One-teacher schools should become at least two-teacher schools (WPR: p346).

The government is to investigate the erection and/or takeover of farm schools while maintaining the subsidy system for private farm schools, subject to annual adjustments. The Minister of Education

and Development Aid, Gerrit Viljoen, has said that the conversion of selected farm schools to public schools is already possible (Hansard 7 27/7/87: col1437). Longer term planning is difficult because while there is a higher growth rate in rural areas at present, increasing urbanisation could substantially affect future trends. Also, due to various practical constraints, the full implementation of the recommendation that rural schools be placed within five kilometres maximum walking distance from pupils' homes 'will only be possible in the long term' (ibid: cols1434-1436).

One recommendation has already been approved — where numbers justify it, education up to standard five must be offered. Minister Viljoen has stated that most of the recommendations on secondary education are already official policy, and that the Department is considering:

- the development of secondary schools in all rural municipal areas where the number of pupils justifies this;
- the merger of primary and secondary schools where numbers are small;
- the introduction of standard seven to ten classes in densely populated areas outside municipal areas;
- the introduction of intermediate classes up to standard seven, with at least 30 pupils per standard where numbers do not justify the establishment of standard eight to ten classes (ibid: cols1438/1439).

Finally, the report also promotes innovative curriculum changes, notably the teaching of a second language from standard one, guidance and vocational education. The Minister supports the promotion of career education and new subjects such as 'skills and techniques', and agriculture-related subjects have already been introduced on an experimental basis. An individualised teaching approach is recommended whereby pupils proceed at their own pace, with certain changes to the structure of education, including the introduction of a pre-basic bridging period (WPR: p262).



As less than one percent of teachers at farm schools have a post-matric qualification, the general quality of education is even poorer than in urban areas

PHOTO: TEACH: Adele Gordon

## Teacher Training

While rural teachers often have to teach several standards in one class, they tend to be younger than their urban counterparts and therefore less experienced (WPR: p282). Most are also less qualified and ill prepared to cope with the additional demands posed by farm school education.

Of rural teachers, 29 percent have no more than a standard eight education, while some 84 percent of urban primary school teachers have attained standard eight or a higher level, with a professional qualification. Only 54 percent of their rural counterparts have this level of qualification (WPR: p198). Less than one percent of rural teachers have standard ten plus a two- or three-year qualification. The quality of education provided in rural areas is consequently poorer in general.

The working conditions of farm school teachers are generally characterised by poor housing facilities, dependence on the farmer, lengthy travelling distance and high transport costs, little support from pupils, parents or inspectors, and an unfavourable pupil to teacher ratio (WPR: p22).

The report proposes, inter alia, an aggressive recruitment drive and positive discrimination to ensure the recruitment of student teachers from rural areas. Teacher training facilities (and hostels) should be established in rural areas, and trainees should be familiarised with handling problems typical to rural education (WPR: p263). Furthermore, bursaries should be linked to teaching in rural areas (WPR: p312).

Other recommendations concern the increase in quality, status and service conditions of rural teachers, as well as the provision of housing in villages and State transport to school (WPR: pp263-371). Advice services to teachers should be extended through establishing more teacher centres, appointing travelling

subject advisors, and utilising radio and television to support maths and science teachers (WPR: pp168-170). In addition, available white teachers should be recruited (WPR: p263). Once there are sufficient teachers available in rural areas, underqualified and unqualified teachers can be requested to improve their qualifications (WPR: p312).

All of these recommendations have won government approval (DET 1987: p12). Minister Viljoen has singled out the subsidisation of farmers to build houses for teachers as a 'very important recommendation' (Hansard op cit: col1437). Urgent attention is being given to pre- and in-service training of teachers to meet the particular needs of farm schools — the erection of teacher centres in rural areas, the establishment of advisory, inspection and technical services, and management training (ibid: col1439).

- *quality of facilities*

In many instances, there are too few classrooms to accommodate all pupils, while older rural schools are especially neglected (WPR: p21). Many principals do not accept responsibility for facilities, nor do they have the administrative know how to manage physical infrastructure according to regulations (WPR: p344).

The report recommends positive discrimination in finance, personnel and overcoming backlogs (WPR: p168). Equal standards should apply in the provision of facilities and teaching aids at rural and urban schools. The power supply to schools should be subsidised, while mobile media units could be used to facilitate lending books and teaching aids to schools (WPR: p170). In response the Department has said that it will continually adapt the subsidy for facilities (DET 1987: p7) and give attention to the establishment of basic sporting facilities (Hansard op cit: col1439).

- *socio-economic factors*

Disparities in the socio-economic status of rural Africans and farm labourers have a

*If correctly utilised farm school facilities could be used to provide both non-formal adult education and in-service training for teachers*



The poor managerial and administrative training of principals and white farmers has had disastrous practical consequences for farm schools

While R12 million has been earmarked over four years to upgrade farm school management and teacher skills, the DET report suggests R6 million should be spent each year

negative impact on education, e.g. a low and unstable income, no long-term economic security, the often 'feudal' dependence on the farmer, inadequate housing, the lack of adult education facilities and organised community activities, geographic isolation, etc. Many parents are illiterate, while children are called upon to help with farm work, especially during harvesting, which disrupts their education. Although schooling is valued, parents often cannot afford it, and are typically uninvolved with their children's education (WPR: pp15/19/23).

The report (DET 1987:p29) recommends that educational reform must be part of a total system of reform (good nutrition, proper housing, adequate health and transport facilities, water and electricity, etc.). Parents' committees and the white community should become involved in the management of the farm school and school facilities used for community development also, i.e. both non-formal adult education and in-service training (WPR: p170; DET 1986: p53). Minister Viljoen has said that statutory provision must be made to co-ordinate the involvement of parents, farmer associations, community development associations and other interest groups in existing and new farm schools (*Hansard* ibid: cols1436/1437).

#### • administrative structures

Most principals (and many farmers) have had poor managerial and administrative training. The administration of many rural schools is described in the report as being in a state of chaos, with disastrous practical consequences, e.g. furniture and syllabuses are not requested (WPR: pp22/341). Principals usually teach on a full-time basis and have little time to supervise other staff. Inspectors cannot perform properly because of the large number of schools under their supervision, while subject advisors are often not available to assist under- and unqualified teachers (WPR: pp342-344).

The report recommends that more inspectors should be appointed, in-service training given to principals, and a number of farm schools managed by a travelling principal to be appointed by the Department or by a neighbouring public school (WPR: pp341-343).

The principle that the State accepts full responsibility for the control and administration of rural education is under consideration (*Hansard* op cit: col1437). Attention is being given to the administrative recommendations 'in a greater or lesser degree' (DET 1987: p7), while the use of 'travelling principals' has already been approved. The only specific State financial input so far has been the R12 million earmarked for a four-year farm school management and teacher development project to improve

administrative, teaching and learning methods at farm schools (*The Star* 24/11/87). The report suggests that this amount should be R6 million a year.

## Commentary

The many recommendations in the report appear to address most of the problems of rural education. While government has accepted the content of the report, implementation will be subject to 'financial, manpower, statutory and policy considerations' (DET 1986: p5). It thus remains to be seen which recommendations will receive priority attention, aside from those implemented already or existing departmental policy.

It is notable, however, that government did not comment on suggestions pertaining to the structure of education and, more especially, the provision of pre-primary education. It has also not responded to other issues of utmost importance for effective education, e.g. language differences, proper school feeding, the prevention of child labour, social conditions of farm labour, etc. No mention is made of the possible use of the existing facilities of white education for other race groups.

Furthermore, neither the report nor government responses deal with the possibility of employing farmers' wives as an interim measure, to assist with the management and administration of farm schools, or even with teaching where possible, on a paid basis. Especially where available teachers are unqualified or have standard eight or less, it is likely that farmers' wives would be better equipped to teach and their involvement would stimulate a greater interest in farm schools.

Finally, while parental involvement is supported, nothing is said about the need to improve their social circumstances through, for example, the establishment of rural farm villages. Such a broad approach would seem to be necessary in order to provide a more secure existence to rural African families, and to enable parents to develop a vested interest in the schools. Rural education cannot be seen in isolation from the marginal status of Africans in farming areas. Educational development must be part of a more comprehensive programme of upgrading these communities. □□□

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# THE INVERTED FUNNEL

## Peri-Urban Schooling

By Adele Gordon, Human Development Division,  
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
A study conducted on farm schools situated in a peri-urban area of South Africa has been undertaken under the aegis of the HSRC/Work Committee on Rural Education. The researcher involved reviews the report's findings on school and classroom management procedures, and the relationship between school, employment opportunities and community life (Gordon 1987). Also discussed are the possible effects of current upgrading programmes and the DET recommendations on farm school education.

Until recently there has been little interest in rural education and debate has focused on the more volatile urban situation. Yet more than 50 percent of the African pupils in South Africa, excluding the self-governing and independent homelands, are educated in rural areas. Of these, 25 to 30 percent attend schools situated on white-owned farms.

After publication of the De Lange Report (1981), it was realised that educational planning had neglected the needs of rural pupils. Since then a number of reports have been published and studies implemented that deal specifically with problems emanating from educational provision in South Africa's rural areas (see for example Buckland 1983; Graaff 1987; Lubbe 1986; Gaganakis and Crewe 1987). In addition a rural work committee of the HSRC Education Research Programme was established under the chairmanship of Dr Ken Hartshorne, and a DET working group published a report (1986) on farm schools. All of these studies have condemned the quality of schooling for black children living on white-owned farms.

### De Lange Study

The peri-urban area investigated by the Rural Work Committee bordered on three cities. Industrial ventures located there included small agricultural enterprises, nurseries, chicken farms and sand quarries. There were nine farm schools for black pupils. The study focused on the relationship between the schools and the community, analysing the circumstances leading to the high failure and drop-out rate from the schools. The two most



PHOTO/TEACH: Adele Gordon

important factors that prevented the effective functioning of the schools were found to be:

- scarcity of resources, including the shortage of classroom space; and
- employment conditions.

An important link in the causal chain influencing the provision of resources has been the dual control system that regulates management of the farm school. This comprises DET officials, the school manager and an appointee of the farmer or property owner. The managers are entitled to open or close schools; decide on the number of children attending the schools; whether or not children from neighbouring properties should be allowed to attend the schools; the level of

*A school principal and farmer discuss the entry requirements for a labourer's child. Between 25 and 30 percent of rural African children attend schools situated on white farms.*

*New farm schools have been vetoed by some farmers because they fear educational opportunities will lead to an influx of black families*

*Farmers pay for teacher accommodation, electricity and transport, while the State subsidises only 50 percent of classroom costs and provides R100 for ablution facilities*

education to be offered (although until recently permission was not given to provide secondary education); the hiring and firing of teachers; and decisions pertaining to the facilities and services to be provided, including teachers' accommodation.

The owners of neighbouring properties also wield power as they can object to the establishment of a school or refuse to allow children to cross their properties when walking to school, which may, in certain instances, prevent children from attending school. The white community in the area studied had in fact prevented the establishment of another school by claiming that additional facilities would serve to draw large numbers of black families to the area in search of education.

Problems arising from the dual control system have been acknowledged by the DET in its latest (1986) report, as well as in past official investigations. The working group acknowledges that certain 'crisis situations' have arisen because of the poor facilities and services at farm schools.

These problems have, in the main, been caused by placing the onus of providing essential facilities on the property owners, but at the same time not providing sufficient funds for them to do so. Although subsidies to farmers have increased in recent years, they cover only 50 percent of the cost of classrooms and a maximum of R100 towards the costs of ablution facilities. All other facilities have to be provided by the farmer, including teacher accommodation, electricity and transport.

All school managers interviewed in the Rural Work Committee study (1986) complained about the inefficiency of the subsidy system. They highlighted a number of procedural difficulties and also pointed out that they were expected to provide schooling for children not living on their properties without getting compensation. In addition, they said they could not afford to build larger schools nor to improve facilities for teachers or the pupils. It was also found that property owners who ran the school on their own did not have the resources to run the school efficiently, in contrast to schools managed by committee.

Of the nine schools in the peri-urban area, only two schools, one controlled by a church committee and one by a community committee, had better facilities than the other schools. These were:

- secondary school classes
- lower pupil/teacher ratios
- better facilities in the form of subsidised transport, electricity and good accommodation for the teachers.

### Subsidy Impact

An important outcome of the inadequate

subsidy system, and one which will not easily be rectified, is the shortage of classrooms. This played a significant part in school and classroom management procedures. The most obvious problem was the inability of the schools to accommodate all children of school-going age in the sample area. Only one in four of the children whose parents resided in the area was at school.

Table 1 (see data base) illustrates that classroom space was not evenly distributed, as for every ten junior primary classes, there were four senior primary classes, two junior secondary classes and no senior secondary classes. Therefore attrition must be seen primarily in terms of the number and level of classrooms rather than in terms of failure, the 'attraction' of wage labour, apathy and so on. In other words, scarcity of space compelled many children to leave school or attend school elsewhere (if finances permitted). Family life was severely disrupted when children were sent away, particularly if the mother had to accompany the children.

The overcrowded classrooms meant that children were often not accepted at school until they were nine or ten years old (or even older), which results in a wide range of age levels in one class. All the schools had multistandard classes. The average number of pupils in a class was 44, and the range of pupils per class numbered between 23 and 68. These conditions have made teaching abnormally difficult and the failure rate is correspondingly high (see table 2). For example, only 23 percent of the SSA (substandard A) pupils at one school took one year to pass this grade.

The difficulties experienced with the virtual lack of senior secondary educational facilities for rural pupils will not be redressed easily because of the high costs involved. The main options envisaged by the DET report, namely transport or hostel facilities, are prohibitively expensive and are unlikely to provide a solution for many pupils. Another confounding factor is that the independent and self-governing homelands may no longer be seen as educational outlets for children resident in 'white' South Africa, as they may not be prepared to finance the education of pupils who live elsewhere.

### Teacher Strategies

Teachers at the various schools in the peri-urban area had developed different strategies to cope with these problems. It was found that classroom space influenced not only the number of standards at the school, but also the pass rate. At one school the SSA and SSB classes were large, each accommodating approximately 50 pupils. Because the standard one and two classes were joined, a maximum of

Table 1

### NUMBER OF CLASSROOMS & PUPIL POPULATION IN SAMPLE PERI-URBAN AREA (1985)

Class	Percent	No of multi-level classes	No of pupils per multi-level class	No of single classes	No of pupils per single class
SSA	25%	6	54 - 107 (2 teachers)	3	58 - 68
SSB	22%	7	51 - 107 (2 teachers)	3	40 - 51
Std 1	17%	8	16 - 107 (2 teachers)	2	39
Std 2	13%	8	as for Std 1	2	40
Std 3	9%	3	31 - 49	2	36
Std 4	6%	2	31 - 43	2	18 - 40
Std 5	1%	0	—	2	18 - 29
Std 6	3%	0	—	2	23 - 31
Total number of pupils 1 546					
Total number of classrooms 35					
Average number of pupils per classroom 44,2					

Table 2

### PERCENTAGE REPEATERS IN RURAL PRIMARY & SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1986)

SSA	SSB	STD1	STD2	STD3	STD4	STD5	STD6	STD7	STD8	STD9	STD10
25	18	20	9	15	8	10	15	14	18	13	14

thirty SSB pupils could be accommodated in standard one. Therefore the pass requirements at the end of the SSB year were extremely stringent at this school, resulting in a large number of failures.

This high entry and failure rate led to an 'inverted funnel' effect as only a small percentage of the children admitted to the school reached the senior primary classes. Another option exercised by the teachers at other schools was to control intake rigorously to cope with classes of varying sizes; for example, at one school the SSA intake was reduced from 68 pupils in 1985 to 23 in 1986 because one classroom had to be used to accommodate a new teacher.

The scarcity of resources hampered the teachers considerably. This was not due to obvious difficulties caused by the cramped classrooms or shortage of resource material alone — freedom of movement was constrained by the lack of transport which prevented them from getting to a town to buy materials, to deal effectively with directives from the local circuit office and even to attend the night school in the area. Many claimed to be tired and unhappy because they realised their teaching was hampered further by the large, heterogeneous classes.

Dependency on the farmer angered the teachers, particularly because of the poor accommodation facilities. The departmental directive that school funds were to be controlled by the school managers also frustrated the teachers, as they were not given any say in how the funds should be spent. It was found that the monies collected often lay dormant in banks while the school was kept short of resources considered a priority by the teachers. Subjects particularly affected by the shortage of resources were Science, Gardening and Sewing, all of which require fairly expensive materials not provided by the department.

Classroom observations revealed that the main causes of rote learning were the lack of teaching resources and the large classes which hampered effective teaching. Therefore more classrooms, materials, equipment and in-service courses are prerequisites for improving classroom management procedures. However, these cannot be divorced from the need to increase the teachers' autonomy, particularly as the schools are often isolated from the local circuit offices. Teachers need to be given the power to make, and carry out, decisions relating to the ongoing activities at the schools.

It appears that the recommendations made by the DET working group, namely that

*More classrooms, teaching materials, equipment and in-service teacher training are prerequisites for improving schooling in rural areas*

The proposed State take-over of existing farm schools could increase the number of classrooms, improve facilities and provide secondary education

the State will take over the schools by buying the land or renting the buildings, will lead to an improvement in school facilities and an increased number of classrooms. Unfortunately, by concentrating on passing the initiative for establishing and running the schools from the property owner to the State, the role of the teachers as well as that of the community has been underplayed; no recommendations are made that aim at the creation of structures which would increase the teachers' autonomy or would lead to greater community involvement.

### Employment Conditions

Another issue considered in the Rural Work Committee study was the way in which living and employment conditions influenced schooling. The pivotal factor here was found to be the general powerlessness of farm workers. Workers and their families expressed antipathy towards living in the sample area. The senior primary school pupils saw education to be a means of escaping from the unskilled 'hard' jobs in the area so that they could qualify for what they called easy jobs, that is 'jobs that make use of one's brain and not one's hands'.

Adolescents who had dropped out of school while in the junior primary school were frustrated at having to enter the poorly paid, unskilled labour pool. Many of them said they would return to school if and when funds permitted. Education was perceived to be a long-term process and leaving school was not considered to be the end of a school career.

The farm workers' lack of tenure influenced the relationship between the parents and the schools, and only one manager had been able to establish a parent/teacher association. Other managers had not been able to enlist the parents' help in improving school facilities as the parents said that they could be evicted at any time. Thus giving workers a stake in the area by granting them tenure and some autonomy in their jobs is a basic requirement for increasing parental involvement in the schools and, hence, in mobilising community resources.

Another factor disrupting effective schooling was the inadequate health and social infrastructure. Children were kept home to look after the sick, the elderly, or the young. Some children attended school for a number of years and then stayed at home to give a younger sibling a chance to go to school. Absenteeism was exacerbated because parents were often not able to get leave to attend to sick members of the family, so that children were kept out of school to do so.

A number of pupils worked in the afternoons or over weekends. On the whole the wages earned were low, ranging

from 50c to R10 a day. The work done by junior primary pupils appeared to have had a socialisation role, aimed at inducting the children into the type of work done in the area. As one manager commented, 'We try to teach them that through labour they learn something.'

### Impact of Proposals

#### Improved school facilities

These cannot by themselves reduce drop-out and absenteeism. Until social and working conditions in peri-urban and rural areas improve, children will be drawn away from farm schools to help supplement the family income, or be exploited by employers to provide cheap labour.

#### Upgrading teacher skills

These, and the proposed management courses for farm school teachers, may lead to more efficient classroom management strategies but cannot increase the flow of pupils through the schools. They are already filled to capacity and mainly provide education to the junior primary level. Therefore, the recommendation that the State should provide more schools, particularly secondary schools, must be speedily and efficiently implemented.

#### Motivation & equipment

Motivation to remain at school can be expected to be influenced by the relationship between job level, salaries and educational level. Those pupils who reach higher educational levels can be expected to leave the area in search of better employment opportunities as they will have to contend with unskilled, low-paid work if they remain.

#### Land tenure

Land tenure rights for blacks and the mobilisation of local resources are essential elements of a reform package, as findings pointed to the positive effects of community involvement in schooling provision. To conclude, the constraints operating on farm schools illustrate that a holistic approach is urgently needed to improve farm school education. *UNISA*

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# ORGANISING THE PRESIDENT'S MEN

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

*The strike by 30 000 rail workers in 1987 clearly demonstrated that the public sector was not immune to the militant unionisation and labour action that has occurred in the private sector. In this focus on the State as an employer, Indicator SA researcher Mark Bennett surveys the labour relations codes that govern South Africa's burgeoning public service. While showing that there is great diversity in employment practices, he argues that the State bargaining institutions are often archaic, inflexible and irreconcilable with the demands of the black union movement.*

**W**hile it is difficult enough to identify precisely which workers fall within the ambit of South Africa's massive public sector, it is even more difficult to specify exactly the legislation that controls their wages and conditions of service. The distinguishing characteristic of this sector is that all organisations are, in one form or another, ultimately under direct control and management of the State (Wiehahn et al 1986: p18). Depending on definition, the broader public service incorporates all employees of cabinet ministries, State commercial services, agricultural control boards and scientific councils, through to the large parastatals such as Eskom, Iscor and Armscor.

For labour relations purposes, a large number of public sector employees are protected by the application of the Public Service Act No 111 of 1984. Although many employees are explicitly excluded from provisions of the Labour Relations Act No 28 of 1956 (LRA), there are some who have partial and others who enjoy complete access to its protective mechanisms. Employees in those State corporations excluded from both the LRA and the Public Service Act are forced to rely on 'in-house' bargaining mechanisms.

A useful way to conceptualise the entire public sector, and thus give a broad outline of how employee wages and conditions of service are determined, is to view the central civil service as the 'core' (see diagram). Around this heuristic core, in outwardly expanding rings, there are a number of other statal bodies — control boards, scientific councils, State commercial enterprises (e.g. transport), local authorities, parastatals, etc.

## The Core

Common features of 'core' public service organisations are that:

- none exist as autonomous legal entities independent of the State (ibid: p19);
- most are directly answerable to 'own' and 'general' affairs cabinet ministries;
- personnel are contracted to the State in terms of the Public Service Act. Section 7 of the Act defines

who is considered to be a public servant — included are permanent personnel in the South African Police, Defence Force, Prison Services and the National Intelligence Service;

- wages, service benefits and most conditions of employment are regulated by the Commission for Administration (CA).

Although the South African Transport Services (Sats) and the Department of Posts and Telecommunications share some of these features they are not regarded as part of the 'core'. Historically they have evolved their own labour relations forums through separate parliamentary acts.

Until 1984 the composition and powers of the Commission were governed by various public service acts. In terms of these acts the Commission designed and supervised the personnel policy of the State in the public sector core only. Primarily because of the creation of two additional parliaments, each with its own, race-based public services, the duties of the Commission were expanded through the CA Act No 65 of 1984 to promote greater control and uniformity in staffing matters.

Today the Commission defines its role as follows:

- to establish structures and processes for the effective execution of government functions and policy;
- to establish sound management practices for government departments and institutions;
- to ensure optimal utilisation of government personnel; and
- to promote sound personnel relationships in the public sector (CA 1985: p11).

Within the 'core', the Commission has direct say in the control of the white-collar component of the civil service, e.g. clerical and secretarial posts. In the blue-collar component, e.g. forestry and health workers, the Commission determines wage levels but influences only conditions of service (CA 1984: p16). Although the Commission's primary responsibility lies with the public service, it plays an important, 'usually decisive' role in setting salaries of other State employees in the 'inner ring' (see diagram). It does not regulate other conditions of



service, e.g. annual and sick leave, medical aid, travel concessions, etc.

In the 'outer ring' the Commission has no formal mandate but many of its broader policy proposals and decisions exert a 'persuasive' influence. While the Commission has no jurisdiction over the personnel matters of Sats and the GPO it frequently exchanges information and consults on broad policy with their officials (ibid: p17).

#### Business criteria

Recent policy aimed at the government's own bureaucracy stresses that the entire public sector 'core' should be run along commercial lines. To give effect to this philosophy the government has decided to privatise certain activities, while attempting to run other departments more profitably. The Commission has been given an important role in administering both of these processes.

Privatisation — the farming out of traditional public sector functions to the private sector — could affect the employment conditions of many public servants. The Commission has examined the activities of a number of departments that fall within the civil service, and in principle it has approved 26 projects for privatisation. Sats, over whom the Commission has little control, is also contemplating the privatisation of some of its operations. These projects could be undertaken by transferring some State activities to the private sector, granting the private sector concessions, operating joint projects, etc. (CA 1985: pp13-16).

Privatisation could be particularly problematic for civil servants unless the State exacts safeguards from the new private sector employers. Many workers in the overstuffed State bureaucracy could find themselves retrenched, or employed with poorer remuneration without the often 'golden' conditions of civil service. Once the State privatises certain functions it is unclear whether it will allow these new private sector employees access to the LRA.

Two incipient principles of 'profitability' and 'efficiency' have been introduced into the public service. Demands to adopt business-like practices have been placed on 'core' public service departments. Measures taken so far to effect savings include a reduction in service bonuses from 8,3 to 5,5 percent of annual salary during 1985/86; a 50 percent cut in the number of vacancies in the public service; and a (successful) request from government that all core departments voluntarily extend their daily working hours by half-an-hour (CA 1986: p23).

Almost contrary in direction, the government also maintains that pay and service benefits should be (particularly for professional workers) competitive with the private sector (CA 1985: p21) in order to retain adequate numbers of motivated staff and maintain quality of the services. Since 1981 professionals employed by the public service have generally been given greater, more frequent wage increases and service benefits than lesser skilled colleagues. This has been achieved through a 'programme of occupational differentiation'; justified by the Commission on the basis that rates of pay differ substantially within the free labour market (CA 1986: p21). It will be interesting to see how the various official staff associations respond to these potentially divisive measures.

#### Constitutional reform

An important function performed by the Commission in the past few years has been to oversee an overhaul of State bureaucracy. Mass staff transfers, connected both directly and indirectly to constitutional reforms, have taken place within all parts of the public sector (see Elias 1986). The Commission has supervised a large number of interdepartmental manpower transfers and assisted in the placement of personnel in newly categorised 'own' and 'general' affairs civil service posts.

Important changes in the composition of the public service have resulted from the integration of many provincial posts into the first tier. In terms of the Provincial Government Act No 69 of 1986, the four provincial administrations became public service departments for specific geographical areas from 1 July 1986. Before 1984, 96 percent of all provincial posts were established in terms of second-tier ordinances and thus did not form part of the core public service. The shuffle resulted in more than 135 000 personnel being transferred upwards into the jurisdiction of either 'own' or 'general' affairs administrations. Simultaneously, there was a massive overhaul of the white provincial education system with 96 149 teachers and educationists transferred to the 'own' affairs education ministry in the House of Assembly.


The Commission has claimed that all personnel involved in these moves to the 'core' public sector would retain 'certain' conditions of service, while others would be 'phased out' (CA 1986: p13). It remains unclear as to what the future status of the many provincial staff associations will be. The Commission has stated that they would remain intact for up to 12 months, whereupon their status would be reviewed (ibid: p27). It is also not known whether staff of the newly formed Regional Services Councils (RSCs) will be located in the public service 'core', thus excluding their employees from the LRA.

The introduction of the tricameral constitution in 1984 prompted the Commission to recognise some black staff associations. Establishing separate 'own' affairs administrations for the coloured and Indian groups also meant separate, race-based staff associations for public servants. A similar situation has prevailed for African employees brought into government through Black Local Authorities, homeland administrations and RSCs.

The Public Service Regulations (amended in 1985) gave the Commission the discretion to decide which new staff associations to recognise (see directory). Among the guidelines for recognition, the Commission had to consider the prospective staff association's aims, the manner in which it is organised, size and scope of membership, affiliations and the views of other recognised associations towards the applicant (ibid: pp16/17).

While the entire public service is now expected to function along business lines, civil servants are still excluded from the collective bargaining institutions and full trade union rights established in the private sector. The Commission's insistence that it will deal only with race-based staff associations is inconsistent with its acknowledgment of workers' freedom of association (CA 1985: p17). The rapid recognition of black staff associations by the Commission probably stems from the realisation

## The Public Sector



### Note

The size of the segments bears no relation to the size of the respective personnel corps.

### Source

Commission for Administration. *Annual Report*. 1984 RP17/1985.

that the newer black trade unions were entering their fold. A similar strategic response in the private sector in the mid-1970s saw many employers resisting the emergent labour movement by promoting 'in-house' works, management and liaison committees.

## The Inner Ring

The distinguishing characteristic of the personnel corps in the 'inner ring' of the public sector is that they are not contracted in terms of the Public Service Act. Instead, they are employed under a variety of legislation pertaining to specific State organisations. Further, their salaries and service benefits are wholly or partly financed from the State Revenue Fund, i.e. money originating from the Improvement of Conditions of Service Vote (Vote 2).

Included in this subsector are employees of various statutory bodies such as scientific councils, regulatory and advisory boards, commissions, the self-governing homeland administrations and universities. Prominent among the scientific boards is the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), South African Bureau of Standards (Sabs), Council of Mineral Technology (Mintek), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the South African Medical Research Council (MRC). Other well-known regulatory and advisory bodies include the National

Monuments Council, the Regional Councils for the Performing Arts and the National Parks Board.

In 1986, 163 195 African civil servants were employed in the six self-governing homelands of Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa. Of these, approximately 63 000 were labourers, 61 000 educators, 16 000 nurses and 5 000 in service capacities (CA 1986: pp18/19). Should these ethnic polities opt for independence all these civil servants will be removed from the sphere of Pretoria's indirect control.

## The Outer Ring

In the 'outer ring' there is a large number of State and State-linked organisations, which have separate budgetary arrangements through specific votes in parliament. Other bodies are financially self-sufficient because of their daily operation in the marketplace. The wide variety of this type of organisation is evident from the blacklist released by the US government (November 1986) under their Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

For labour relations purposes three categories of organisations can be identified — municipalities, State commercial enterprises and parastatals. Firstly, municipal employees are not excluded from the LRA. However, they are precluded from strike action and forced to use the compulsory arbitration provision in the LRA (S46 — see directory). The staff

complement of many municipalities could change significantly because they are considering privatising many operations, such as refuse removal, maintenance of parks and recreational facilities, and security services (Markham 1987: pp89/90).

Employees of the State transport and communications enterprises — Sats and the GPO — are excluded from all provisions of the LRA. Through the Conditions of Employment Act No 16 of 1983 (Sats) and the Post Office Service Act No 66 of 1974, both organisations regulate their own employment practices (see directory). Chaired by Professor Wiehahn, a commission of enquiry into collective bargaining within Sats was completed in late 1986. It concluded that the LRA should not be extended to Sats, and suggested that in-house structures should be renovated. Earlier the Wiehahn Commission (Part 5) had argued that all public sector employees should be included within the scope of the LRA (DOM 1981: pp52-57).

#### Parastatals

In addition to the more familiar parastatals, such as Armscor, Eskom, Iscor, SABC, Sasol, Soekor and Ucor, there are a myriad other such organisations, each with its own labour relations structure. Three broad, yet distinct, employment trends can be observed within these organisations.

All 30 000 Iscor employees are subject to all provisions of the LRA — including the right to strike (*New Nation* 23/10/86). Indeed, the steel giant is so well integrated into the private sector that it is a prominent member of the industry's employer organisation, the Steel, Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (Seifsa), and the sector's industrial council.

While Eskom employees are not excluded from the LRA they are prohibited from taking strike action. For collective bargaining, the electricity monopoly has created three colour-blind negotiating forums which cater for white-collar, monthly paid blue-collar, and semi- and unskilled workers respectively. Each forum meets biannually with a combination of the three 'in-house' and nine 'independent' unions that Eskom has recognised. Each forum is divided into two components: a national level where salaries and conditions of service are bargained, and a lower, 'strategic unit' level where decisions are implemented and managed. In the event of one union in a particular bargaining unit not accepting a proposal, Eskom will implement the decision on the concurring unions only. The dissenting union then has recourse to compulsory arbitration mechanisms (Wiehahn et al: pp24/25).

Armscor employees, on the other hand, are excluded from all provisions of the LRA because of the strategic and essential nature of the industry. This despite the fact that much of Armscor's production is geared towards export and not aimed at meeting domestic security needs. For labour relations purposes the Corporation looks to Section 8 of the Armaments Development and Production Act No 57 of 1968, which specifies an employment code for Armscor and its nine subsidiaries, and requires that all personnel associations (which cannot be multiracial) must register with the corporation. Workers involved in strikes, overtime bans, go-slows or any activity which disrupts production, risk a fine of R1 000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years. In 1968 Armscor directly employed 2 200

workers; in 1978, 18 975 (of whom 42 percent were black) and in 1982, 29 000 (Leonard 1983: p138).

Although no formal bargaining forum exists in Armscor, informal consultations take place between employees and management. In the event of a dispute, the above Act makes provision for the appointment of an Advisory Committee comprising equal numbers of employee and management representatives. The Committee forwards recommendations to the Armscor chief who then makes a determination. In the event of further employee discontent the Minister of Defence may appoint a Settlement Board which makes a final binding decision (Wiehahn et al: pp23/24).

## Conclusion

While some State employees do have access to industrial relations procedures and mechanisms akin to the private sector, most do not. Instead they are forced to rely on in-house structures which have been unilaterally imposed by government and are racially determined and constituted. Many civil servants, particularly black employees who are not a significant political constituency in government, are hamstrung by procedures that allow them no real say in the determination of their wages or conditions of service.

Ideally, any formalised system of labour relations should be based on six fundamental labour rights — the right to work, to free association, to collective bargaining, to withholding labour, to protection from victimisation, and to career development (Wiehahn et al 1986: p2). Although many of these basic rights are not applicable in their entirety to South African workers, it is in the public sector where workers have the least protection. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) believes that public sector employees should be treated no differently to private sector workers. ILO Convention 151 (Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedure for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Sector) enshrines these six labour rights (DOM 1981: p53).

Years of painstaking organisation by African unions in the 1970s involved many costly forms of labour action, but resulted in the inevitable recognition of basic trade union rights in the private sector. Unless significant changes are made in South Africa to acknowledge labour rights for all workers — including public servants, domestic and agricultural workers — significant labour conflict could develop in the State's back-yard on the scale of the 1987 railway strike. *UJWA*

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# Trade Unions Sector by Sector

## Part Five

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

### ● THE RAILWAYS & POST OFFICE ●

	Paid-up Membership
<b>Federation of Trade Unions of Sats</b>	
Artisan Staff Association (Asa)	23 722
Black Trade Union of Sats (Blatu)	63 000
Running & Operating Staff Union, Group 'C'(Rosu)	6 852
Sats Employees Union (Satsou)	11 181
Sats Indian Staff Association	1 206
Sats Salaried Staff Association (Salstaff)	29 097
SA Voetplaatpersoneelvereniging (Savoet)	8 669
Spoorbond	6 200
Staff Association for Coloured Employees of Sats (southern areas)	8 500
Trade Union for Coloured Employees of Sats	2 167
<b>Cosatu</b>	
National Federation of Workers:	
National Post Office & Allied Workers Union (NPOAWU)	2 163
SA Railways & Harbour Workers Union (Sarhwu)	34 000
<b>Nactu</b>	
African Railway & Harbour Workers Union (Arhwu)	2 400
<b>Bawu</b>	
Black Allied Air, Railway & Harbour Workers Union	888
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
National Union of Railway Workers (Nurw)	+ 5 000
Postal & Telegraph Association of SA	14 900
Post Office Employees Association of SA	1 851
Post & Telecommunications Workers Association (Potwa)	—
SA Posvereniging	2 182

#### ANALYSIS

Most public sector employers deal only with those worker associations which have met particularly selective criteria to win de jure recognition. Neither employees of the South African Transport Services (Sats) nor those of the Department of Posts and Telecommunications are covered by the Labour Relations Act (LRA). In Sats the wages and service conditions of all white workers are determined by the Conditions of Employment Act No 16 of 1983 (Sats); those of black employees are specified separately and incorporated into their contracts of service (Wiehahn et al 1986: p42). The service conditions of post office employees are specified in the Post Office Service Act No 66 of 1974.

#### Sats

The Minister of Transport is empowered to decide with what trade unions Sats management should negotiate. To date Sats has recognised ten staff associations but has steadfastly refused to deal with any other union that might represent its employees. Each of the recognised associations organises workers from a number of job grades, and seven of these bargaining units are racially segregated. The unions 'bargain' individually or collectively, through the Federation of Sats Trade Unions, with the Minister of Transport Affairs.

Three associations are open to white staff only, together representing about 47 000 workers — Salstaff represents 460 occupational grades, Satsou 277 grades, and Rosu 19 grades. They are affiliated to the conservative, white South African Confederation of Labour (Saco).

Although three of the recognised unions have 'multiracial' constitutions their membership is still predominantly white. Savoet, which represents 33 grades of workers, disaffiliated from Saco in 1975 and joined the Trade Union Council of SA in 1982, but left in 1984. Other multiracial unions are Asa, which represents 205 grades, and the Spoorbond with 315 grades.

The other in-house unions separately represent coloured, Indian and African employees from 315 grades. Perhaps the most important of these unions is Blatu, which is open to African

employees except those in grades who are allowed to join the multiracial Sats unions. Blatu was formed in April 1981 and has its power base in Natal. It has been described by the General Workers Union 'as the Sats personnel department dressed up as a staff association' (Van Niekerk 1986: p6), but attempts have been made recently to democratise Blatu's operations.

#### Emergent Rivals

Rivals to the in-house associations could mobilise black worker support over wages, poor working conditions, racially discriminatory practices, hostel conditions, etc. However, Sats's refusal to grant them recognition and the illegality of strike action restrict the tactics at their disposal. Instigating strikes in Sats carries a fine of R200 and/or one year's imprisonment.

Sarhwu, a former affiliate of the defunct SA Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), was relaunched in October 1986. Organisers claimed it had 10 000 members in the Transvaal and 4 000 elsewhere (Green 1986: p31). Between 23 March and 5 June 1987 Sarhwu led the largest and most costly labour confrontation in the public sector since the failed Port Elizabeth dockers strike of 1982. While the strike trigger was a Sats decision to fire (then changed to fine) a worker for a minor irregularity, the work stoppage developed into a fully fledged recognition dispute.

Whether the outcome of the strike — the reinstatement of fired workers with permanent posts for some black employees — was a victory for Sarhwu, is debatable. Perhaps the union could have achieved more in the long run, particularly in terms of winning concessions from Sats, if it had not adopted such a hardline approach in negotiations. (Sarhwu is still not officially recognised by Sats management.) On the other hand, the strike caused a dramatic increase in Sarhwu's membership due to mass defections from the in-house Blatu.

The unionisation of public and private sector employees are fundamentally different issues and Cosatu merger plans for Sarhwu and the Transport & General Workers Union have been shelved temporarily. Sarhwu's main independent rival is Nurw, which was launched in Soweto in November 1986 by 600 delegates (SALB 1987: pp24-28). Nurw emerged in the context of founding worker committees, allegedly independently of each other, within Sats. The union has approached Cosatu for affiliation but the Federation's executive argues Nurw should merge with Sarhwu first. This outcome seems unlikely as the unions are bitter rivals.

Unions such as Bawu's Baarhwu and the Nactu affiliate Arhwu do not represent significant numbers of rail workers at present. While there are clear differences in tactical approaches to unionising Sats workers, major political divisions also underscore relationships between the independent rail unions: Sarhwu is an affiliate of the charterist UDF, Nurw stands accused of being 'workerist', and Arhwu is in the black consciousness camp. A single united black railway workers union may never emerge.

#### The Post Office

The Department of Posts and Telecommunications has recognised seven personnel associations, most recently the African Potwa. All of these unions are differentiated on the basis of skill grading and racial criteria. In accordance with Act No 66 of 1974, relations between post office employees and management are governed by the Staff Relations Council. The Council functions much in the same way as industrial councils do in the private sector.

Potwa has shown other new unions operating in the broader public sector, particularly Sarhwu, that tactical use can be made of bargaining structures that are not necessarily progressive. However, if Potwa continues to rely on the Staff Relations Council it could be undermined by an entrenched white lobby which represents almost twice the total African workforce. In August 1985, out of the more than 94 417 people employed by the post office, 53 036 were white, 29 013 African, 10 409 coloured and 1 960 Indian (SA Labour Statistics 1986: p56).

Over the past 14 months a series of strikes, almost all involving Potwa, has severely disrupted communication functions in the Transvaal and Eastern Cape. Strike action might enable Potwa to consolidate its position and get the Department to revise its archaic labour relations practices. Potwa intends affiliating to Cosatu; given the small number of potential recruits it may well merge with Cosatu's other public service union, Nehawu. NPOAWU, which operates predominantly in Natal, is also in the Cosatu fold but will add very little membership through a merger when Potwa affiliates to Cosatu. Nactu's NUPSW has only a few employees organised in the post office.

## ● THE PUBLIC SERVICE ●

Recognised Associations	Paid-up Membership
Public Servants Association of SA (PSA)	53 769
Public Servants League of SA (PSL)	27 600
Public Servants Union (PSU)	—
Institute of Public Servants (IPS)	—
<b>Cosatu</b>	
National Education, Health & Allied Workers Union (Nehawu)	9 197
<b>Nactu</b>	
National Union of Public Service Workers	< 15 000

### ANALYSIS

The Public Service Act No 111 of 1984 and its associated regulations provide for the recognition of staff associations to represent workers in the 'core' public service. Recognition was initially linked to the various skill/grade divisions in which officers were employed — to qualify, a staff association had to ensure that it represented the majority of workers in that division (Commission for Administration 1986: p17). Formerly, there were six divisions (administrative, clerical, professional, technical, general A and B), but today only the latter, general categories are utilised.

Under the earlier collective bargaining dispensation the all-white PSA was the only staff association recognised by the government's Commission for Administration. Appointed by the State President, this two-man Commission with a secretariat of more than 500 regulates wages and service conditions, mainly in the 'core' public service. However, the inauguration of the new constitution in 1984 emphasised the need for 'all population groups' to participate and be represented in the manning of government. It clearly became unacceptable that black workers in this sector were excluded from dispute-settling mechanisms (ibid).

#### The Associations

The most important staff association for civil servants is the PSA, which is not registered as a trade union but as a company under the Companies Act. It has 38 regional branches, six regional committees in remote areas, 45 full-time officials, and is subdivided on the basis of occupational categories (Saldru 1986: p165).

It is probable that the PSA's membership will grow significantly in the future due to the recent inclusion of most provincial administration employees within the first tier of government. Professional associations such as the Provisiale Huishoudelike Personeelvereniging, SA Staatsdiens en Provisiale Werkersvereniging, Vereniging van Provisiale Amptenare van die OVS, and Provisiale Medewerkersvereniging could bolster PSA membership. In August 1985 it was estimated that about 129 000 whites were employed by the four provincial administrations (SA Labour Statistics 1986: p61), who are now potential PSA recruits.

Three associations represent the interests of coloured (PSL), Indian (PSU) and African (IPS) workers in the public service. The PSL, which claims to be non-racial, has a predominantly coloured membership, albeit with a significant number of African workers on temporary contract. The PSL was recognised in September 1985 and claims a signed-up membership of 30 000, organised into 19 branches. Sections of the PSL membership appear to be more militant than either workers in the PSA, the PSU or the IPS. Golding claims that during 1983/84 the PSL's membership rejected leadership attempts to jettison African members 'in order to meet the State's racial recognition criteria' (1985: p48).

The PSU is designed to represent all Indian employees in all government departments. Although no membership figures are available, it seems likely that it will gain support from the burgeoning 'own-affairs' civil service employed by the House of Delegates.

The wages and working conditions of public servants are determined by the Public Service Joint Advisory Council (PSJAC). The Council consists of 16 members, half of whom come from the four official staff associations, and the rest from the Commission for Administration. In accordance with the spirit of the tricameral system, staff association representation on the PSJAC allows the white PSA five members, and the PSL, PSU and IPS one member each! In the event of any deadlock within the Council, the government has indicated that the resolution of disputes by a third party through arbitration is not acceptable. The Cabinet has insisted that it should have the final decision over the allocation of funds for improvements in wages and other conditions of service (Commission for Administration 1985: p20).

#### The Independents

The Cosatu initiative in the public service, Nehawu, is weak at present, with most efforts focused on organising unskilled health workers and underqualified teachers. It is unlikely that the Commission or the government will negotiate with Nehawu at this stage. One way in which the union can make some headway, however, would be to somehow win recognition and then make tactical use of the PSJAC platform.

Nactu's affiliate in this sector is weaker than its reflected membership, as most members are employed in the municipal and local government sectors.



AFRAPIX: Anna Zieminski

The bombed shell of Cosatu's Johannesburg headquarters — May 1987. Sabotage by unknown agents was against a backdrop of an all-white election and a mass strike by black railway workers.

## ● LOCAL & MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ●

	Paid-up Membership
<b>Cosatu</b>	
SA Municipal Workers Union (Samwu)	30 000
<b>Federation of Municipal Employees</b>	
Durban Municipal Employees Society (DMES)	4 000
Johannesburg Municipal Employees Association (JMEA)	6 367
SA Association of Municipal Employees — Non-political (Saame)	49 384
<b>Nactu</b>	
National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW)	< 15 000
<b>Bawu</b>	
Black Allied Municipality Workers Union	611
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	
Development Boards & Black Local Authorities Employees Union (DBBLAEU)	680
Durban Integrated Municipal Employees Society (Dimes)	4 817
Durban Municipal Professional Staff Association	251
Durban Municipal Workers Union	1 400
Johannesburg Municipal Combined Employees Union	1 020
Johannesburg Municipal Workers Union	113
Port Elizabeth Municipal Employees Association (PEMEA)	3 200
SA Black Municipality & Allied Workers Union (Sabmawu)	< 35 000
Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers	—
Union of Pretoria Municipal Workers	—
West Rand Development Board Personnel Association	1 200
Western Cape Development Board Workers Union	1 338

### ANALYSIS

Formal unionisation of the municipal sector is possible as workers are able to take advantage of provisions of the Labour Relations Act (LRA), except for those concerning legal strikes. Theoretically, all disputes in the sector have to be settled through compulsory arbitration (LRA S46) as the work of municipal employees is considered to be an 'essential' service.

A variety of worker organisations exist in this sector and it is difficult to distinguish between staff associations, benefit societies and trade unions. Both large and small municipalities have been hostile to the organising efforts of the black union movement. The Municipal Employers Organisation (MEO) — to which many of the smaller municipalities belong — encourages members not to deal with any union which is unregistered or which organises non-municipal workers as well. The MEO opposes decentralised bargaining at the local level and prefers municipal industrial councils (*Business Day* 22/10/87).

### Unionisation

Of the 236 300 persons employed by local authorities in South Africa, 138 000 are African, 62 800 white, 29 000 coloured and 6 500 Indian (*SA Labour Statistics* 1986: p61). Virtually every city, town, development board, Black Local Authority (BLA), etc., has one body or more that represent employee interests along skill and/or racial lines. (The directory must therefore be regarded as selective.) However, it is difficult to assess the exact percentage of unionised workers.

The Federation of Municipal Employees is the largest coalition of unions representing skilled and semi-skilled workers. The exclusively white Saame, the country's biggest municipal union, claims to have more than 231 branches in all provinces and is party to numerous industrial councils for local authorities. Although Saame claims to have 'no closed-shop agreements', its strength is derived from the compulsory membership provisions that many local authorities have specified in conditions of service contracts (*Saldru* p181).

The DMES and the JMEA were originally all-white unions, but both have amended their constitutions to allow for black membership in the past five years. To date, however, neither

of these skills-based unions have experienced a mass influx of black workers. In 1985 the JMEA, out of a total of 6 367 members, had 145 African and 31 coloured recruits.

A number of municipal workers have been recruited by industrial unions which operate in other sectors also. These unions have organised municipal workers whose job grades coincide with the union's own industrial demarcations. For example, several unions have recruited (mainly white) skilled municipal employees and artisans — the Amalgamated Engineering Union of SA; the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA; the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers; the Iron Moulders Society of SA; and the SA Engine Drivers, Firemen and Operators Association (*Saldru* 1986).

### Unskilled Workers

A plethora of disparate unions have recruited unskilled municipal workers. Most are divided along racial lines and, in many cases, three racially based unions representing the same categories of workers exist within one municipality.

Sabmawu is a major union that predominantly recruits African workers. Originally Sabmawu formed part of the Black Johannesburg Municipality Workers Union (BJMWU), which was established in 1980 in response to a Johannesburg City Council (JCC) attempt to create an in-house union for African employees. The initiative culminated in a costly strike involving the BJMWU. In 1983 the BJMWU split on ideological grounds — the new Municipal & General Workers Union of SA affiliated to the UDF, while the new Sabmawu joined Cusa.

Sabmawu recruits workers from all sections of the public service, but has tended to concentrate on organising Transvaal local authority employees, excluding the JCC. An unregistered union, Sabmawu lost a substantial number of members, including important branches in Natal and Port Elizabeth, when it subsequently disaffiliated from Cusa in 1985. However, it has rapidly gained new members in the past two years, increasing from 13 000 (1985) to 35 000 (January 1987) after a series of strikes affecting BLAs on the Witwatersrand. The union's current strategy is to organise surrounding white municipalities and BLAs in order to consolidate a power base (*Markham* 1987: p98).

Nactu's NUPSW recruits workers in municipalities in the Transvaal and in hospitals around South Africa. NUPSW was created by remnants of Sabmawu after it left the Cusa fold. It is particularly difficult to obtain any reliable statistics on the strength of general unions operating in the sector. The Inkatha-aligned United Workers Union of SA has probably managed to recruit workers within Natal's local authorities. Similarly, the Orange-Vaal General Workers Union has recruited a number of municipal workers.

### Cosatu Initiative

Cosatu has identified the local and municipal government sector as a separate subsector within the public sector. Consequently, it has decided to establish a single, national industrial union for municipal workers. In October 1987 five Cosatu affiliates formed Samwu in Cape Town. Parties to the merger were the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), the Municipal Workers Union of SA (Mwusa), the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the General Workers Union of SA (Gwusa) and the South African Allied Workers Union. The major contributors were the CTMWA, the JCC based Mwusa and the Natal-centred TGWU which has surrendered only its municipal labourers and retained bus drivers employed by municipalities.

A broad geographical spread and longstanding sectarian affiliations within the union could make it difficult for Samwu to become a viable national force. Samwu general secretary John Erntzen has claimed that the union will talk to other unions outside the Cosatu fold with a view to forging greater unity in the sector (*Business Day* 22/10/87). This could be problematic, as Mwusa and Sabmawu are longstanding rivals. Mwusa (then known as the Municipal General Workers Union of SA) was the other half of the union that split from the BJMWU in 1983.

Priorities for Samwu will be to break the many closed-shop agreements between older 'in-house' unions and municipalities, to recruit from the vast pool of unorganised workers, and to join industrial councils. TGWU general secretary Jane Barratt argues that the creation of a single sectoral union will overcome the MEO's refusal to deal with any union which organises non-municipal workers. Acceptance by the MEO would allow Samwu to gain seats on municipal industrial councils and give Samwu a more effective voice (*Business Day* 22/10/87).

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### Notes

- No membership figures are available for some of the above unions.
- Membership figures are for 1985 except in the last sector where Bawu membership is for 1982; Samwu and Sabmawu are for 1984.
- The symbol < (less than) denotes that a union has recruited workers in a number of industries, but that the exact membership figure is not determinable for a particular sector or industry.

IP1A

# WORKER DETENTIONS

## Absent without leave?

By Theo Heffer, Human Resources Director,  
Premier Group Holdings

*A detained employee's absence is surely beyond his/her control and hardly a reason for dismissal — the most severe form of disciplinary action*

*Employers of detained workers should assist their dependants, make representations, offer legal assistance and consult with the worker's trade union*

**T**he need to curtail freedom where persons have been convicted and imprisoned by a proper court, for instance, or where some limitations upon freedom are necessary in the interest of an acceptable societal value such as public health, is recognised by all states — in this respect South Africa is no exception. However, civilised nations recognise the right not to deprive individuals of their liberty by arbitrary means without 'due process of law'.

It is in this respect that 'South Africa differs fundamentally from those countries with which she shares a common legal tradition' (Dugard 1978). Under common law an arrested person is entitled to ask the court to be released, and the court is bound to grant the request unless there is some lawful cause for the person's detention. This remedy against unlawful interference with personal liberty has given way in South Africa to a 'formidable array of statutes' (ibid), the majority of which form part of the ordinary law of the land. These stand apart from the formal state of emergency in operation since June 1986.

What are the implications of detentions, and more specifically those of trade union officials and members, for industrial relations in South Africa?

### Detentions & Dismissals

Trade unionists have been among those most severely affected by the emergency, with the detention, often in mass arrests, of hundreds of officials and thousands of members, including many shop stewards. Two major trade union federations, Cosatu and the then Cusa — which now forms part of the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) — met with the FCI and Assocom in the early days of the emergency. Discussions included the issues of job security and payment for detained employees.

Many companies are known to have been

directly affected by the detention of their own employees, and many more are indirectly affected by the detention of trade union officials. Delays and disruptions in industry wage negotiations have been reported in the mining, metal and food sectors. Statements abound by managers regarding the adverse effect detentions are having on industrial relations in their companies. How should employers respond?

Union demands on job tenure are naturally that no employer should dismiss a detained employee. This is not only because the union's prime function is to protect its members' economic interests — it is also based on the assumption that detained union members are innocent until proven guilty. Employers who believe that dismissal is warranted, rely on the common law principle that the employee's absence constitutes a breach of a vital term of the employment contract. However, they would be well advised to look at criteria applied in a number of court cases in deciding whether there has in fact been such a breach.

In his study 'Basic Employment Law' (1987) Riekert summarises the following questions posed by the courts in general cases of dismissal because of absence:

- What is the nature of the employee's work (i.e. to what extent did the employee's absence inhibit the normal business activities of the employer)?
- What was the duration of the absence?
- How long has the employee been in that employer's service?
- What was the reason for the absence?

Of course, these factors do not stand in isolation and need to be considered together. Also, the tests should be applied with great sensitivity in cases of detention. Firstly, the fact that an employee's presence is vital to the employer's business will not mean that he can automatically be dismissed, but it may well be a factor in the employer's decision to take on a replacement.

Secondly, the duration of absence in the case of detention is problematic, not only because it may be for several days and often for much longer, but because of the uncertainty and difficulty in determining this likelihood in advance.

Thirdly, detention can affect newer employees as easily as long-service employees. It is difficult to see how this general criterion can be applied in the case of a detained employee. But surely there is an even greater obligation on the part of the employer to make representations on behalf of an employee who is detained, and to retain that employee on the payroll, if the employee has had long service? (And for management to concern itself directly with the plight of the detained employee's family.)

Lastly, the reason for a detained employee's absence is surely beyond his control and hardly a valid reason for the most severe form of disciplinary action. Of course, if the employer is focusing on legality only, he may elect to treat the contract as terminated by the supervening impossibility of performance. The nature of the employment and the duration of the absence might be factors in deciding how reasonable such an action would be.

### Fairness Factors

In everything stated so far one is really considering issues of legality or contractual aspects only. Two more important considerations remain — the potential unfairness of a dismissal of a detainee, as

yet undecided in the Industrial Court, and the industrial relations implications, which should in fact override all else.

Can a detainee fairly and reasonably expect his/her job to be held open until his/her release? If a comparison is made with the re-engagement of an employee returning from maternity leave, there would be a greater obligation to re-employ a worker who was one of several persons doing the same job (say one of 25 machine operators in a clothing factory) than there would be if the worker was the only person employed in a particular job essential to the company's operation. There would also be a lesser obligation where the employer was unable to recruit a replacement on a temporary basis because of scarcity or the skills involved (e.g. in the case of a computer programmer).

Other factors that would affect fairness are the efforts made by the company to assist the employee's dependants, representations made on the employee's behalf, legal assistance provided and, most important of all, consultation with the trade union, especially if the employee is known to be a shop steward or an active trade union member. There can be no better way of handling the situation than making it a matter of joint concern through meaningful consultation with the trade union concerned. And real joint concern must lead to joint or agreed action.

There is still only a small number of companies adopting a policy of full payment of wages to detained workers. Most companies feel justified in relying on the common law principle that an employee

*Railway workers meet during the 1987 Sats dispute. Many workers were detained for long periods, then released without being charged.*



AFRPIX: Eric Miller



When the black labour movement is arbitrarily convicted through detentions the very basis of sound industrial relations is also placed at risk

Trade unions have played a crucial part in mediating industrial conflict — demands that their quasi-political role must be stamped out are foolish

who does not tender service will not be entitled to receive any wages. The unions are naturally demanding, though not always obtaining, full pay for the period of detention. The most valid reason to back this demand is the overwhelmingly large proportion of detained workers who are subsequently released without any charges brought against them. One must assume that they re-enter society with a clear record. They have then suffered the double burden of incarceration and loss of income — worse still when the possible loss of employment is added.

This leads us, perhaps, to the real challenge. Detention of unionists on the scale experienced in South Africa must erode labour reforms and undo much of the good that has resulted from management/labour agreements — the good that flows from regulated relationships in the workplace and from real, negotiated change. Are we compelled to keep on blindly assuming that 'where there's smoke there's fire'? Cosatu put it plainly in their *Open Letter to Employers* (May 1987): 'Do you wish to stand for a free society where differences are allowed, where democracy is practised? Or do you wish to remain silent and watch Cosatu convicted?'

Will employers choose to remain silent and watch the independent trade union movement arbitrarily convicted? They dare not stand aloof and watch the basis for sound industrial relations destroyed. If employers allow this, industry will not only become more difficult to govern — this is already being experienced — it will eventually become ungovernable.

Both the Minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of Police have denied that any trade unionists have been detained purely for labour activities. In the lengthy Pietermaritzburg treason trial (April 1985 to June 1986) all charges against twelve of the accused were withdrawn eventually; only four trade unionists remained on trial. An admission under oath by a major in the Security Police clearly showed the security police's extensive involvement in trying to counter legitimate trade union activities and in trying to destroy a legitimate trade union.

So clear was this interference that the eminent and respected Judge Milne asked, 'Isn't there an unsatisfactory element in representing to the outside world that you have freedom of association for all unions, black and white, while at the same time working through an official organ of State to prevent one particular organisation from having any influence in that field?' 'That will be unfair, M'Lord,' concedes Major Olivier, who also admitted several times to advising management in industrial relations matters. The four unionists were acquitted after a 13-month trial and all charges against them were dropped by the State.

## Political Role

Some large corporations have come out strongly on the detention of unionists, calling for them to be charged or released. Commendable as this stance is, it is essential that public statements be backed up by awareness training sessions for line managers if espoused policies are to become operational on the factory floor. It does seem, however, that there is still a majority view among employers that security action against unionists is justified and not linked with their trade union activities. The quasi-political role of the unions must be stamped out, it is said.

The foolishness of this thinking is not only that it is often merely based on disagreement with the unions' adopted or perceived political stance. Both parties are entitled to their views. But to try to deprive the majority of the people in the country from any political expression at all unless it coincides with our own, is impossible to achieve in the long run. Cosatu (ibid) states that '... the determination and organisation of millions of workers, youth and unemployed struggling for their human rights and dignity' cannot simply be suppressed.

These, undoubtedly, are the sentiments of the whole independent trade union movement. General Secretary Phiroshaw Camay's press advertisement (May 1987) on behalf of Nactu, expressing solidarity with Cosatu, is evidence enough. Those companies who had in the past kept Nactu affiliates at bay and now court them or others in order to keep Cosatu affiliates out, are not only guilty of bad industrial relations; they are playing with people's lives in the process. Employers have signed thousands of agreements with Cosatu affiliates and other independent trade unions. These unions have played a crucial part in mediating industrial conflict. They do play a meaningful part in negotiating change as employers deal with their elected representatives daily.

The workplace is the one area where blacks and whites negotiate on anything resembling an equal basis. It is the one sphere where democratically elected representatives negotiate to give black South Africans a meaningful say in determining their own lives to some extent. Employers dare not let this one avenue be closed or blocked in any way. We must heed the call to use our power and influence concertedly to secure and protect freedom of association and freedom of speech. *ISA*

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# BAND-AID and the SELF-MANAGED FIRM

By Prof Eddie Webster, Sociology of Work Programme,  
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*In an effort to absorb some of the growing unemployment caused by retrenchments and dismissals, the black labour movement has established co-operatives managed and staffed by workers themselves. While some of these projects provide only temporary relief to workers until they find other jobs, others are now attempting to become permanent worker-controlled enterprises which may come to compete in the capitalist economy. Industrial sociologist Eddie Webster argues that, in the long term, self-managed firms could allow working people to have greater control over their lives and provide them with a modest income on a sustained basis.*

*Workers want real gains. They want to be able to see concrete improvements in wages, in working conditions and in transport. Before the emergency many were caught up in the idea of liberation. It seemed as though we were on the move at last. Now all of that has changed. We must return to tangible gains. Workers can't be kept going on ideas alone.*  
(Union organiser, Cohen & Cobbett: 1987.)

**A**tactical retreat could be one important effect of the State onslaught on the trade union movement in South Africa. In some senses such an option would be prudent — real gains have been made by the unions in the post-Wichahn period through placing an emphasis on building shop-floor structures. The retention and consolidation of these structures are central to the future of the union movement.

Political repression and the economic recession make such an option difficult to follow in practice unless certain key demands can be met within the foreseeable future. Yet many of these demands can be met only once a non-racial democracy has been established in South Africa. What real gains can be made by workers under present circumstances?

One of the current debates on a transition towards an alternative economy and society focuses at the micro-level on the idea of co-operatives or 'self-managed firms' (SMFs) — which could be a workable, feasible form of democracy in

the workplace (see box). Alec Nove's study, *The Economics of Feasible Socialism* (1983), explores a state of affairs which could exist without having to make or accept implausible or far-fetched assumptions about society, human beings and the economy. In this context, are SMFs simply 'band-aids' where social welfare aims are primary, or can they become viable alternatives to the traditional firm?

## Direct Challenge

Over the last 12 months SMFs have been promoted actively in a number of quarters. Cosatu, for example, has resolved to 'give full support to efforts by retrenched and dismissed workers to establish co-ops based on the principles of Cosatu'. The Sarmcol Workers' Co-operative (Sawco) was set up in Howick, Natal, by dismissed Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu) workers in 1985 and it produces T-shirts, buttons and vegetables for sale. The union's newspaper, *South African Metal Worker*, argues that Sawco's principles are significant because they offer a direct challenge to the way the capitalist bosses organise workers to produce goods for profit. '... workers in co-ops are forced to organise themselves and plan democratically for future directions the co-op may take. This allows workers to plan and gain experience in processes which are at the centre of democratic socialism: democratic production and planning' (Vol1/No5 1986).

Cosatu is committed to promoting worker co-operatives for retrenched and dismissed workers

In a capitalist economy self-managed firms (SMFs) can provide only a fraction of the jobs required to meet the social goal of full employment

Workers in SMFs will have to decide whether the assets of the enterprise should be owned collectively or individually

### WHAT IS A SELF-MANAGED FIRM?

The main differences between the traditional firm (TF) and the self-managed firm (SMF) can be presented in 'ideal' terms as follows:

#### TRADITIONAL FIRM

#### SELF-MANAGED FIRM

##### Ownership

Control is based on ownership determined through the number of shares owned. The firm's owners appoint the managers.

Control is exercised by those who work in the firm. Holding equity does not give any control over decision making in the firm.

##### Decision Making

Top down decision making structure. Managers are responsible to the owners.

Collective decision making. Managers are accountable either directly to a general assembly or indirectly to a workers' council.

##### Goals

All other goals are ultimately subordinated to profit maximisation. Market regulation.

Multiple goals — income for members; wider social 'good', such as community, education in participation. Social regulation.

##### Consequences for Workers

Workers are treated as wage labourers — a commodity to be hired and fired. Relationships characterised by low trust and alienation. Managers decide on wages and wage differentials in TFs may be as high as 50:1. The profits go to owners.

Workers are treated as members of a community and develop a high commitment to the firm. Motivation is derived in part from the belief that work is undertaken for some positive collective and higher objective. High trust levels. Participation over wages and average differential is 3:1, with surplus shared among members, community and non-voting shareholders. Full skill potential of members is enhanced.

##### Consequences for Community

Outward-looking orientation for better investment opportunities. Firm reflects no specific loyalty to the local community.

Inward-looking orientation, responsible to the local community. Firm employs local people and participates in community activities. Community is also involved in decision making in the firm. Surplus is used to benefit the community.

In general there are certain obvious disclaimers about SMFs that need to be emphasised at the outset. Firstly, under the present economic system, SMFs could not provide more than a small fraction of the total number of jobs required to meet the social goal of full employment. To be effective on a large scale SMFs require a protected market that can only be provided by an interventionist state concerned to promote the interests of labour.

Secondly, SMFs cannot lead the struggle for an alternative economy and society. A strong private enterprise sector will continue to play a major role for some time to come in post-apartheid South Africa. It is difficult to imagine how South Africa can be delinked from global economic processes if Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, and even China, have been unable and, it seems, unwilling to do so (Harris 1986).

Two central theoretical problems have been identified by Pillay (1987) in attempting to implement SMFs:

#### Ownership

The most contentious and complicated point is whether the assets of the enterprise should be owned collectively or

individually. Collective 'ownership' could be in the hands of the State, as occurs in a centrally planned economy, or it could reside with a group of representatives elected by the workers and the community who manage the firm, as is the case in Yugoslavia. There are a few examples in South Africa of collective ownership, but these are small-scale enterprises, usually held by a trust, e.g. Ravan Press.

Alternatively, individual ownership of an SMF could be partially in the hands of worker-members, as in the case of *The Weekly Mail* locally, or wholly, as in the case of Mondragon, a successful co-operative in Spain. In the former case, worker-members have the option of becoming shareholders after working at the firm for a year. In Mondragon all co-operative shares are owned by the workers and every worker must be a shareholder — there are no employees. The maximum salary differential is 3:1, and salaries are apportioned according to a formula approved by the workers' assembly based on job responsibility and individual performance.

All surplus profits at Mondragon are divided three ways — ten percent for a social service fund, at least 20 percent for general company reserves, and the remainder for the workers' individual

capital accounts. These interest-bearing accounts must be kept within the company and monies can be withdrawn only when the worker leaves. The amount of profit distributed to each worker's capital account varies with his/her salary grade, within a 3:1 ratio. When money is needed for corporate losses, deductions are made from individual accounts in similar proportions. In support of the idea of worker-members as owners, Oakeshott (1978) argues that worker commitment to the success of an enterprise is strengthened by actual ownership in the firm.

Yugoslavia remains the leading example of worker self-management and its experience of self-management dominates the debate on industrial democracy. There is, however, widespread belief in Yugoslavia that the system as it functions today cannot continue. Its functioning depends on the market, yet a variety of improvised controls add up to a 'bundle of contradictions'. While this provides important lessons in 'market socialism', it is inappropriate to draw too many inferences from the system of social ownership in Yugoslavia to that of a capitalist economy such as South Africa. Mondragon, by way of contrast, has been criticised as a form of worker capitalism or corporatism. It owes its success to the intervention of the Spanish government in the operation of capital and labour markets, together with a wide array of legislation specifically aimed to promote a vigorously democratic co-operative sector (Fairclough 1987).

If it is assumed that SMFs have become self-sufficient, a further issue arises when capital is required for expansion of the firm. Does the SMF attempt to get a loan on fixed interest or does it attempt to sell non-voting shares on the money market? Both options are problematic. Investors are unlikely to be interested in equity that does not give the investor any control of the firm, or the right to realise the net worth of the firm on possible liquidation. In South Africa *The Weekly Mail* overcame this problem by obtaining the support of 'sympathetic' investors to set up the firm initially in 1985.

Some 'equity-type' finance will probably be needed by SMFs. This means that the risk which the investor accepts in making such an investment will have to be rewarded by the prospect of at least a share in the surplus earnings from the investor (Pillay op cit).

#### Decision making

Two broad positions have been identified by Pillay — those who argue that it is possible to dispense with management (what he calls the utopian democrats), and those who argue that though the function of management is still necessary, managers

must become accountable to the workforce (what he calls the feasible democrats). Pillay concluded that, 'experience of actual enterprises suggests that SMFs should attempt to maintain separate management functions rather than opt for enterprises without specific management roles. A failure to perceive the importance of separate management functions in an SMF has often proved disastrous.' The Chitseke Report (1986) on co-operatives in Zimbabwe reached a similar conclusion.

Pillay suggests that where an enterprise is ultimately controlled by its workforce, it needs particularly strong management, if only to counteract anarchical tendencies. Management in an SMF should, he proposes, be more like than unlike management in a traditional firm. The challenge facing management will be to adapt to the philosophy and style of a system based on collective decision making that allows for greater job autonomy. In Yugoslavia, for example, all students studying in the Department of Economics (the equivalent of the business school in a capitalist society) are required to do a compulsory course in worker self-management.

#### Practical Problems

In addition to these theoretical problems, a number of practical problems arise when an attempt is made to implement an SMF. For instance, members of an SMF may resist any leadership as they associate this with arbitrary authority and control from above. A solution to this problem lies in the difference between authoritarian and democratic leadership. Authoritarian leadership may operate on an informal or a formal level. But where leaders derive their authority from the general assembly of the workforce a different kind of leadership emerges.

An elected leadership can delegate specific tasks to those who have a particular skill in that area. This division of labour becomes particularly important where the firm consists of more than 20 people. All the members of the firm do not have to participate in all decisions. Decisions are delegated to the individual where there is no need for the group as a whole to get involved.

When management is subordinated to an elected body (such as a works council), management still needs the freedom to implement the agreed policy. To do this efficiently they must be able to discipline and have at their disposal the ultimate sanction of dismissal. Importantly, members must have a grievance procedure to resolve disputes.

According to Oakeshott SMFs tend to fail because they neglect to train good managers, they lack adequate finance, those who work in them do not own them,

*Line management in an SMF should be more like than unlike management in a traditional firm, with similar powers to discipline workers*

*Many SMFs fail because they neglect to train managers, lack adequate finance and workers often do not link together in a mutually supportive project*

Productivity is increased by greater democratic involvement within the workplace, provided that worker participation is correctly structured

To become feasible alternatives to capitalist firms, SMFs must break their dependence on foreign funding and become self-sufficient

and they neglect to link together in mutually supportive groups. Mondragon has overcome these problems, however. They have attracted good managers by setting up their own management trainee courses. They resolved the problem of finance by setting up their own credit union to provide accessible loans. They created a system whereby the workers became the owners. These different organisations were then formed into mutually supportive groups.

Fairclough, in a recent research report debunking achievements at Mondragon, has argued that Oakeshott underestimates the role played by the Spanish government in aiding this co-operative's development. The politics of the co-operative are ambiguous, he says, and depend upon specific political and economic conditions at different times. Under the current economic recession, as well as less protectionism since Spain joined the EEC in 1985, Mondragon has begun to show classic signs of degeneration in the face of intensified market competition.

SMFs are more likely to succeed where they have grown out of the struggles of workers — such as the struggle to save workers' jobs — than when they have been imposed on workers. It appears that a homogenous membership, coming from the same community with close ties of friendship, as in the case of Mondragon, can also be crucial determinant in the success of an SMF.

### Three Conditions

The notion of an SMF has met with considerable scepticism and criticism from traditional managers as well as orthodox social scientists. But reading the literature on worker participation, one is struck by the persistent conclusion that productivity is increased by greater involvement and democracy within the workplace, provided that involvement is correctly structured. Empirical studies, furthermore, indicate that workplace participation generates general attitudes of political efficacy necessary to animate democratic citizenship; attitudes which have not been sufficiently developed by parliamentary democracy alone (Pateman 1970).

SMFs are worth considering seriously because they have the potential, if correctly structured, to provide modest but real gains for working people. SMFs can also serve to strengthen the emerging alliance at the base — in terms of what could be called social movement unionism — between organised labour and those sectors outside of the formal proletariat, by building a relationship between employed workers and the communities they live in. Lastly, they enable working people to regain some control over their lives and become part of a wider struggle.

Unlike traditional firms, SMFs have multiple goals. They have to generate a surplus in order to become self-sufficient, but they have also been set up to serve the community and to facilitate democratic citizenship. The dilemma facing SMFs is to make these multiple objectives compatible.

To become feasible experiments in democracy in the workplace that provide workable alternatives to capitalism, SMFs must break their dependence on foreign funding and become self-sufficient. To achieve this goal three conditions are necessary:

- Adequate finance — this can be best done through a credit union. It may be possible to use the offer of capital from departing foreign companies as a form of 'primitive capital accumulation' to launch a credit union. The crucial point about finance is who controls it, rather than its source of origin.
- Systematic management training — business schools need to begin a process of restructuring and exploring the extent to which they can become resources for a different style of management education.
- Protected markets — this may well be the most difficult condition to achieve in the absence of State protection. However, the wider alliance of unions and the popular movement provides the potential for such a market, illustrated by the decision by Mawu to buy their T-shirts from Sawco.

If systematic research reveals that these conditions cannot be met in South Africa at present, then SMFs must be understood not as alternatives to traditional firms but rather as 'band-aids' in the period of transition towards an alternative society. In short, they become more flexible and relaxed alternative working environments to the factory floor. They provide members with the opportunity to learn new skills and to achieve a small income and flexible working hours, so that they can have plenty of time to spend on other activities such as household duties. But they cease to provide feasible alternative models of work organisation for the future. *TPA*

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
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