

VOLUME FIVE NUMBER THREE

AUTUMN/WINTER 1988

INDICATOR

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S O U T H A F R I C A

THE NEW LIBERALISM

Policy Profiles & Voter Surveys

RSC REVIEW

Services with a Smile

FLOOD RELIEF

Natal's Aid Pipeline

THE GREAT TECH?

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INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA

VOL. 5 No 3

AUTUMN / WINTER • 1988

POLITICAL MONITOR

Liberal White Opposition: The Strategic Dilemma *Lawrence Schlemmer* 9

RSC FOCUS

A Metropolitan Identity: RSCs on the Rand *Nigel Mandy* 13
Servicing the PWV Megalopolis *Data Base* 15
The Politics of Black Participation *IPSA Research* 17
Centralised Control: The Cape of Services *Robert Cameron* 18

ECONOMIC MONITOR

Aids in Southern Africa *Alan Whiteside* 25
Economic Outlook *Merle Holden & Mike McGrath* 30
Through the Looking Glass: The Indaba and Development *Julian May* 33

URBAN MONITOR

Leisure Relations on the Beach *Douglas Booth & Dennis Mbona* 39
The Skills Shortage & Technical Training *Monica Bot* 42
Opposition Feuds, State Crackdown: Unrest Chronology *Deborah Quin* 46
Civil Unrest Fatalities, Sept 1984 — March 1988 *IPSA Data* 50

RURAL & REGIONAL MONITOR

FLOOD FOCUS

God said a Fire not a Flood next time *Catherine Cross* 53
Goin' Down in the Flood *Vijay Makanjee* 58
Funds for the Natal Flood Disaster *IPSA Data* 59
A Hard Rain: Flood Relief in KwaZulu *Pingla Udit & Alastair McIntosh* 61

INDUSTRIAL MONITOR

Safety Management: Yes Sir, MOSA, No Sir? *Ian Macun* 67
Legislative Proposals *UCT Industrial Health Research Group* 70
Stayaway Strikes in the 1980s: Part II *Mark Bennett* 72
Select Indicators of Industrial Conflict *IPSA Data* 74
UWUSA: Tied to the Last Outpost *Mark Bennett* 75
The Sarmcol Saga, 1983 — 1988 *IPSA Case Study* 78

Monitor Maps

Local authority constituents and boundary demarcations for five of the new Regional Services Councils (RSCs) are illustrated throughout this edition of Indicator SA. The Witwatersrand RSCs appear on the Political Monitor cover (pg7), the proposed Durban Metropolitan RSC on the Rural & Regional Monitor cover (pg51), and the Western Cape RSC on the Industrial Monitor cover (pg65).

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


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The Indicator Project South Africa (IPSA) is an applied research and publication unit which now falls under the auspices of the Centre for Social and Development Studies (CSDS) at the University of Natal. The newly renamed centre is the result of a merger between the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (which formerly encompassed *Indicator SA*) and the Development Studies Unit. The new association of units should further expand research interests and expertise within the university community, enriching the scope of our publication.

Indicator SA was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to develop statistical indicators and monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change. The project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decision makers through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' - namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban, and industrial - as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

Financially, the Project relies on donor subscrip-

tions from companies and foundations in South Africa and abroad, who consider it part of their social responsibility programme to support the independent investigation and analysis of issues in all areas of South African society. A broad spectrum of individuals and institutes in the public and private sectors also subscribe to the *Indicator SA* journal and information service. Interested subscribers should contact the liaison officer directly at the IPSA offices.

Indicator SA draws on university-based research findings and commissions reports from prominent academics and practitioners in the field, besides maintaining a project research team which monitors issues, undertakes special studies and makes regular contributions. The main thrust of the IPSA information service is to provide objective, practical, policy-directed research. We strive to quantify published commentary and findings, through providing hard data, survey results and comparative research. Simultaneously, IPSA initiates debate on controversial issues by inviting a wide range of partisan perspectives, including government, labour, community, corporate executives, and spokespeople representing other key participants in the change process.

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POLITICAL

M O N I T O R


CARVING THE RAND

Witwatersrand RSCs

Jomet Boundary - - - - -

RSC Boundary _____





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Liberal White Opposition

The Strategic Dilemma

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer,
Director, Centre for Policy Studies,
Wits Graduate School of Business

The October 1988 elections for white and black local authorities will test the public appeal of both pro-reform and pro-apartheid policies associated with parliamentary parties to the left and right of the ruling National Party. Focussing on the tremendous state of flux in liberal opposition politics, Prof Schlemmer draws on attitude survey findings between 1985/88 to redefine the policy profile and potential role of the fragmented left-of-centre groupings. He suggests the central problem of liberal political culture derives from its ambivalent and mobile constituency — those white voters who empathise with government reform policy, desire more extensive change but fear radical transformation.

South Africa is a very polarised society in at least two ways. The most obvious schism concerns the widely divergent goals and conflicting opinions about basic issues. The second sense in which our society is polarised concerns political frames of reference — the way in which events are seen — which, literally can be worlds apart; so far apart that the importance some social groups may attach to a political value seem unbelievable from an alternative perspective.

Differences in political assumptions are almost akin to the most extreme generation gap in which, say, the music passionately enjoyed by teenagers sounds horribly discordant or even obscene to an older generation.

The most marked perceptual gap in South

African politics lies precisely in the zone of our political life in which liberal parliamentary opposition parties operate. Not only does it create enormous problems for these parties in attempts to expand their support-base but it creates a constant tension within their own ranks. Dealing with the gap represents the greatest single challenge which these parties have to face.

Reform Responses

Gaps in ways of seeing the world are well illustrated by the way that different white voters will view government reforms. A recent and very crucial example concerns group areas — the expected proposal that certain areas will be declared open, while segregation is reinforced in others. A Conservative Party (CP) voter is

The range of liberal white voter responses to proposed group area reforms illustrates a marked perceptual gap in the support-base of parliamentary opposition

In past elections a split in liberal political culture has seen ambivalent PFP voter behaviour and increasing left-of-centre support for the National Party

likely to perceive the reform as a dangerous liberal precedent and the thin edge of the wedge. A National Party (NP) voter will view it (somewhat nervously perhaps) as a courageous adaptation. A former New Republic Party (NRP) supporter, equally nervously perhaps, will see the reform as a necessary change without liking it very much, whereas a right-of-centre Progressive Federal Party (PFP) supporter might like it more but still concede that his neighbours could have grounds for concerns and fears if their area were to be opened.

Notwithstanding their different views, all these voters might have one element in common. They realise and feel that the change is both meaningful and problematic in terms of what white residents have come to take for granted or become accustomed to.

Beyond this range of white voter responses there is a break in perception. A left-of-centre PFP supporter, or a person who might call himself a progressive democrat (or radical), would tend to sweep aside any awareness of the possible significance of the change in terms of vested white interests. They might switch to another type of consideration entirely; that of black interests, and will see the change as either slight, inadequate or counter-productive in terms of what black urban dwellers rightfully deserve. Hence they are not nervous or anxious about reform, but angry and impatient.

All three liberal opposition parties have to straddle this gap in voter perceptions of change. What it amounts to is that within the same party there are serious reformers who, nevertheless, have a frame of reference rooted in white interests, as well as protagonists of change who have adopted a black or majoritarian frame of reference in essence. Their emotions regarding change are significantly different. They cannot really empathise with each other's sentiments, yet their objective political goals put them in the same party.

The implications of a split or gap in the political culture of the liberal opposition are manifold. Obviously, it is difficult to reconcile the sentiments associated with concerned and anxious reform, on the one hand, and anger and impatience about the absence of substantial change on the other. The most serious implication for the liberal opposition, however, lies in the attitudes of its supporters towards the government. There is substantial ambivalence concerning the National Party among supporters of parties to the left of it.

A series of results from past surveys conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys, based on a representative national panel of some 2 000 white respondents, are indicative of this ambivalence. Their poll results in the past have been fairly

accurate predictors of election outcomes and, therefore, have a proven validity as indicators of white voter opinion. In 1985/86, the PFP was the only parliamentary party clearly positioned to the left of the government and it embraced virtually all the support which the two other parties in this particular opposition zone enjoy today (see below). Thus, the characteristics of the PFP support base as at 1985/86 represent the liberal opposition today in large measure:

- In a June 1985 survey, for example, before the government took the fairly major step of abolishing influx control, no less than 41 percent of PFP supporters (n=312) indicated that their estimation of the government had risen in the period preceding the poll. Six months later, in a November 1985 poll, 30 percent of PFP supporters indicated that they thought government policy had 'departed from apartheid' while as many as 64 percent felt that a new system had been introduced.

- In a July 1986 poll, some 23 percent of PFP supporters indicated that they were either 'satisfied' with the policies of Mr P W Botha to some degree or neutral (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied). A further 28 percent were only 'somewhat' dissatisfied. Hence five out of ten PFP supporters appeared not to be strongly or vehemently opposed to the government's performance.

- Lastly, a poll conducted in February 1987, just before the last general election, suggested that some 49 percent of PFP supporters would have voted for the National Party in a contest between the NP and the CP. This contrasted with the 34 percent of CP supporters who indicated they would vote for the National Party in a contest between the PFP and the NP — the remainder would have abstained.

Ambivalent Support

What these results suggest is that there was a significant section of liberal opposition support between 1985 and 1987 which, to a degree, was in empathy with the political culture of the government party. In fact, the size of this section of the liberal opposition in the mid-1980s was considerably larger than the actual number of defections of former PFP supporters to the National Party in the May 1987 general election.

Ironically, the problem has subsequently been largely resolved for the PFP. Since the above polls the party's share of the total vote, according to successive and comparable polls conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys, has narrowed from some 20 percent in February 1987 to roughly 9 percent in May 1988. The Independent Party (IP) of Dr Denis Worrall has grown to marginally exceed

Dr Denis Worrall (right), leader of the Independent Party, which has captured about 11 percent of the total white vote to date. Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (below), policy director of Idasa (Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa), which attempts to bridge the parliamentary and left-wing opposition divide.



Afrapix: Guy Tillim



Afrapix: Guy Tillim

the PFP support, standing at roughly 11 percent at the moment, while the National Democratic Movement (NDM) of Mr Wynand Malan has won some 4 percent of white voter support.

The shrinking of PFP support has in a sense purified its support-base to the point where for the first time in many years there is very little policy ambivalence among the party's voters. The poll conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys in January 1988, for example, suggests that 82 percent of PFP supporters endorse its position in favour of complete abolition of the Group Areas Act, and 85 percent support its principle of open schools. All else being equal, the party's

support on these two policy issues would suggest that it could lose only marginal further support on issues of policy principle.

The ambivalent support that the PFP lost has gone to the new parties established by Malan and Worrall. These two political movements have policy positions which are virtually identical to those of the PFP in most respects. Certainly, on the crucial issues of race classification and racial segregation there is little to choose between the three party platforms.

An inspection of the January 1988 poll results, however, shows that roughly 6 out of 10 supporters of both Malan and Worrall endorse the unqualified desegregation of suburbs and schools. The remainder largely endorse government policy on group areas. Although results on other issues like security and the economy are not available at this stage, older poll results suggest that IP and NDM voters are positioned roughly between the PFP supporter and the NP supporter.

In other words, both the IP and the NDM, like the PFP between 1985/86, straddle the line between ambivalence and antagonism towards the National Party. A further inspection of the poll results shows that the very substantial proportion of English-speaking voters who are undecided as to party choice (almost 19 percent in May 1988) are also positioned between the NP and the PFP in terms of average support for desegregation.

Shrinking PFP support, down from 20 to 9 percent of the total white vote between 1987/88, could purify the party's support-base and reduce policy ambivalence

Worrall's Independent Party and Malan's National Democratic Movement may straddle the liberal line between ambivalence and antagonism towards the National Party

Many supporters of the liberal parliamentary opposition approve of the pragmatic and constructive approach adopted by the new independent groups

Pragmatic Opposition

The reasons for the defections of PFP support to the IP and the NDM are very complex. Among the probable reasons, however, is a certain image which both enjoy as a result of the circumstances of their emergence before the May election in 1987. As political philosopher, Professor Andre du Toit (*Die Suid-Afrikaan*, Autumn 1987), assesses it, the original 'independent' movement, composed of former NP academics and intelligentsia, placed great emphasis on strategy, directed mainly at bringing influence to bear on the National Party to accelerate reform initiatives. Their focus was firmly on the government as the instrument of change.

It is precisely this position of pragmatic, constructive and non-antagonistic opposition to government that a substantial proportion of liberal opposition voters would like to see. A future without the National Party holds many uncertainties for these white voters; both the danger from the right and the perceived risks of black political empowerment create anxiety. They are rational and fairly far-sighted people, however, and also see the need for parties which can be catalysts for more rapid reform by government.

Meanwhile, both Worrall and Malan have increasingly taken positions in sharp opposition to the National Party; partly based on principle and partly because of an inevitable need to create a clear political profile. Wynand Malan has had formal discussions with the ANC to boot. Having divided the small liberal and liberal-conservative vote, they may have ended up inheriting the very same problems which weakened the PFP.

The IP has grown rapidly within the left-of-centre political zone, whereas the NDM seems to be fairly static at a low level of support. This may be because Worrall has come forward with a proposal for constitutional negotiations which has a ring of practicality, or because he may still retain an image of pragmatism as former ambassador and chairman of the President's Council. He has denied that he is simply a catalyst for government reform (*Die Suid-Afrikaan*, Autumn 1987:p13). Yet that may be precisely where his appeal lies. Whether or not this image will survive the storms of party-political attack is another question.

The real excitement and sense of challenge in white parliamentary opposition lies in the area of conciliation with extra-parliamentary groupings and the ANC, and in exploring prospects for a new kind of inclusive politics involving alliances across race boundaries. Regrettably, however, between 80 and 90 percent of white voters are too cautious to give this platform their full endorsement. Polls in the past have shown that over four out of ten white voters, and as many as three out of

ten National Party supporters are prepared to move towards a non-racial federal constitution with minority protection. The majority of these 'reformists' want the National Party to take that route, however. They empathise with the goals of the liberal parties but tend to fear that the commitment of liberal leaders may take them too far.

Local Elections

The forthcoming municipal elections are likely to exacerbate the hesitancy of white voters to the left of the government. The Conservative Party seems confident of gaining 70 percent of municipal seats in the Transvaal (see *Southern African Report*, 5 May 1988, for example). The fact that many National Party candidates are standing as 'independents' in conservative wards and the fact that the percentage poll in municipal elections will be lower than in general elections, hence favouring the most motivated opposition, lends some credence to CP claims.

The ambivalent left-of-centre voters are likely to find themselves increasingly attracted to supporting the National Party centre against the right-wing threat. The already considerable confusion among white liberal opposition is likely to deepen.

South Africa needs courageous, longer-term thinking, and it needs politicians who are willing to explore conciliation right across the spectrum of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups. White voters must not be left behind, however. The vast majority of these voters, in the present time of uncertainty, need massive reassurance that change will not bring greater anxieties than the present. The challenge for the liberal opposition parties is to combine their goals with the kind of reassurances that the majority of their potential voters need.

Perhaps the only way to accomplish their objectives is for these parties to give as much emphasis to practical plans for transition as to ultimate goals. These plans must cover the difficult issues of managing desegregation in housing and education, of coping with rapid urbanisation and of stimulating employment growth, as well as promoting the grand plans for national conciliation.

In order to be realistic, the new pragmatic approach must take account of the institutional interests of all major political parties and groupings. A peaceful solution to South Africa's problems is going to have to include the National Party, the Conservative Party and the extra-parliamentary groups. For this reason alone we have to break away from strong sectional antagonisms. The liberal opposition parties could set an historic precedent.

A Metropolitan Identity

RSCs and the Rand

By Nigel Mandy
Urban Affairs Consultant, Johannesburg

An era of multiracial regional administration has opened up tremendous opportunities for the metropolitan development of South Africa's fragmented cities. Through the participation and co-operation of local authorities on the newly inaugurated Regional Services Councils (RSCs), traditional racial barriers between municipal areas are being slowly broken down. Nigel Mandy reviews progress made by the Central Witwatersrand RSC in redirecting resources and planning expertise to overcome the backlog in infrastructural facilities in black townships. Although still constrained by race restrictions on settlement areas and local government, RSCs have been hard at work since mid-1987, nurturing a new metropolitan sense of community in the process of solving overlapping civic problems.

A metropolitan area may be defined as a large urban area, integrated economically and socially, but with local political authority fragmented into several municipalities. This phenomenon occurs throughout the world as city activities expand beyond traditional boundaries and satellite towns grow together, so that the most serious problems of all are common problems. The new metropolitan constituents must stand or fall together, municipally and economically.

Metropolitan areas are communities in the sense that they comprise settlements of people living within a certain geographic space and interacting with each other daily. However, their residents tend to identify not with the metropolitan area but rather with the municipalities and other subcommunities which are components of the greater whole. This lack of shared civic identity and loyalty is exacerbated in the South African context not only by racial and cultural differences, but also by institutionalised racial segregation.

In metropolitan areas there is a compelling case for establishing some form of regional government to handle shared problems. Possible approaches include amalgamation, a two-tier system on a federal model, or a looser co-operative and consensual model. In South Africa political considerations have precluded the first two of these options, so a fairly unique version of the third model has been adopted — the Regional Services Councils or RSCs.

Demarcation Debate

The Central Rand is a high-density metropolis, having Johannesburg as a core city whose leadership in matters of local government, services and planning has long been established and accepted. Covering an area of 1 045 square kilometres (a fraction of one percent of the country's land surface), the Central Rand produces more than 30 percent of South Africa's gross domestic product. According to the much criticised 1986 draft guide plan, the region's population numbered over two million in 1980. Current guesstimates are much higher, exceeding four million inhabitants.

At earlier demarcation board hearings, the Johannesburg City Council proposed the entire Witwatersrand should form a single RSC area. This was opposed by organised commerce and by other local authorities on the grounds that it was too extensive an area for inhabitants to have genuinely shared interests, and the Council for such an area would be too large and unwieldy. The existence of three distinct regions in the PWV megalopolis (East, Central and West) was generally acknowledged (see map: p7), so argument before the demarcation board was directed mainly towards establishing where the actual boundaries should be drawn.

Germiston wished to be the core city of the East Rand, but most other local authorities there urged it should fall within the Central Rand. Roodepoort, on the other hand, although primarily a dormitory satellite of Johannesburg, aspired to a leadership role on the West Rand. In the end, Roodepoort was brought into the Central Rand RSC while Germiston became the core city of the East Rand RSC. The deciding considerations in drawing the dividing line between the two regions appear to have included:

- the desire that the Central Rand should not be of an overwhelming size relative to the other two neighbouring RSCs;
- the need for the East Rand's finances to be underpinned by levy revenue from the powerful industrial and commercial components of Germiston, Alberton and Kempton Park; and
- the role of local political factors.

In general, the demarcation has been

The lack of shared civic identity because of racial and cultural differences is exacerbated in South Africa by institution-alised racial segregation

The development of a core city within an RSC area and the experience of common problem-solving help to overcome the local patriotism of municipal units

Servicing the PWV Megalopolis

The PWV region is the most developed and densely populated part of South Africa. Pretoria, the Witwatersrand and the Vaal Triangle (Vereeniging, Vanderbijl Park and environs) can be distinguished as three clearly separate, though closely related entities (see map: p7). Of these, by far the largest is the Witwatersrand. Stretching over a hundred kilometres from Nigel and Springs in the east, through Johannesburg at the centre to Randfontein on the west, this economic and industrial heartland has a population more than three times greater than the country's next largest metropolis, Greater Cape Town (see map: p65).

Transport

For purposes of the Urban Transport Act, two natural commuting watersheds have been identified within the Witwatersrand. Since 1978, each of these has had a Metropolitan Transport Advisory Board (MTAB) on which local authorities and advisory committees of all races are represented:

- The Jomet area stretches from Randburg, Sandton and Kempton Park in the north, through Germiston, Johannesburg and Roodepoort in the centre, to Alberton, the coloured suburb of Ennerdale, the Indian suburb of Lenasia, to various African townships in the south.
- The Ormet area covers the East Rand. The eastern section of the Jomet area will shortly be transferred to Ormet, so that RSC and MTAB boundaries will then coincide.
- Traffic on the West Rand is not sufficiently intense to justify a MTAB there.

Black Administration

Earlier historic demarcation related to jurisdiction over influx control and black local administration:

- The West Rand Administration Board ran from Johannesburg westwards.
- The East Rand Administration Board ran from Kempton Park, Germiston and Alberton eastwards.

Regional Services

During the second half of 1987, five Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were established for demarcated metropolitan areas within the Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vaal Triangle (PWV) megalopolis:

- Pretoria (with its seat in that city)
- Central Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)
- East Rand (Germiston)
- West Rand (Randfontein)
- Vaal Triangle (Vereeniging).

By February 1988, a further seven RSCs had been established to cover the country regions comprising the remainder of the Transvaal Province:

- Hoëveld (Middelberg)
- Loëveld Platorand (Nelspruit)
- Bosveld (Nylstroom)
- Northern Transvaal (Pietersburg)
- Oosvaal (Bethal)
- Rustenburg/Marico (Rustenburg)
- Wesvaal (Potchefstroom).

accepted and appears to be working well.

Central Rand RSC

There are fourteen participating units on the Central Rand RSC — four African, two coloured, four Indian and four white local bodies. Voting strengths have been calculated in accordance with the percentage formula prescribed in the Regional Services Councils Act, No 109

of 1985. Table one illustrates these arrangements and inputs in descending order of size and according to racial classification.

Participation by local authorities is calculated on the basis of one representative for each 1-10 percent range of voting power (see table). In other words, Johannesburg (45,5%) has five representatives, Roodepoort (15,4%) and Soweto (12,76%) two each, and the other participating bodies have one each. The African town council of Alexandra has disintegrated, therefore, the township's interests are represented for the time being by an appointed white administrator (see legislative box: p17).

The voting strengths of black municipalities can be expected to increase steadily as the upgrading and redevelopment process leads to greater use of the services on which the calculation is based. The mere fact that each local body has a say and a right of appeal on the RSC is of great value in the present transitional stage of the country's constitutional development.

Thus, the Central Rand RSC consists of a chairman appointed by government, plus twenty representatives of local bodies which are all situated in a compact metropolis. The Council is of a workable size for debate and negotiation, and each representative generally has a good knowledge of the affairs of nearby neighbours.

East Rand RSC

High density and overlapping interests similarly make it necessary for the East Rand to have a form of metropolitan authority. Here, there are well over two million people in an area of 3 000 square kilometres.

As noted earlier, one drawback is that the multi-nucleated East Rand does not have a core city which previously performed an overarching leadership function. There is a chain of substantial towns of fairly similar magnitude, each with its own local patriotism, such as Springs, Brakpan, Boksburg and Benoni. On the western fringe of the region, Kempton Park and Alberton have shown rapid growth in recent years. Germiston is by far the largest centre, but its regional function has hitherto been primarily as headquarters of the now-defunct East Rand Administration Board for African townships. Large regional settlements have been established for coloureds and Indians, and also at Tembisa, for Africans.

The pattern of voting rights on this RSC is much more diffuse. Thirty-two units participate — 10 African, 4 coloured, 5 Indian and 13 white local bodies. Among the white towns, Germiston with 12,65

percent voting power and Kempton Park with 12,08 percent, have two representatives each. All the other participants have one representative each; thus, the total size of the Council is 34 members plus the appointed chairman.

The racial breakdown of voting strengths on this council includes:

- For the white local authorities Boksburg (9,78%), Benoni (8,76%), Springs (7,95%), Brakpan (5,96%), Bedfordview (5,2%), Edenvale (4,57%), Nigel (2,49%), Heidelberg (1,38%) and Modderfontein (,02%). With another four units added, the voting power of white local authorities comes to a total of 77,67 percent.
- For the major African authorities, Katlehong (3,93%), Tembisa (3,3%), Daveyton (3,21%), KwaThema (2,7%) and Vosloorus (1,72%).
- For the largest of the coloured and Indian communities, Actonville has 1,59 percent, with the other eight participating units having under one percent each.

Most decisions on the East Rand RSC have been made by reaching consensus. When a vote does need to be taken, however, the spread of subregional interests might make it difficult to obtain the 66,6 percent majority required by law. This potential obstacle became apparent when there were lengthy delays before a vice-chairman was eventually elected.

The Administrator of the Transvaal has actively encouraged the establishment of multiracial, local authority co-ordinating committees for 'own affairs' within each historic municipal area. On the East Rand, as in the widespread country regions, these units can effectively supplement the work of RSCs by fostering sub-regional loyalties across colour lines.

Country RSCs

In metropolitan areas, RSCs can serve a constructive and indispensable purpose to tackle shared problems such as commuting networks, land use, transport planning and the bulk supply of certain services. In country areas, administrative units cover much larger and more sparsely populated areas. Problems relate to the interdependence of local bodies for each race within the various traditional municipal areas, rather than to the wider region as a whole.

The farming community has good reasons for resisting the payment of levies at the same rate as commerce and industry. In any event, the latter's economic base is considerably smaller than their counterparts in the metropolitan regions.

The last of the country RSCs to be established in the Transvaal was Oosvaal, headquartered at Bethal. Its area measures 34 400 square metres — thirty-

Table 1 **Composition of Central Rand RSC**
By Voting Power Percentages

LOCAL BODY	WHITE	AFRICAN	COLOURED	INDIAN
Johannesburg	48,5			
Roodepoort	13,04			
Soweto		12,76		
Randburg	8,26			
Diepmeadow		5,34		
Sandton	4,68			
Eldorado Park			2,18	
Lenasia				1,58
Dobsonville		1,14		
Ennerdale			0,81	
Lenasia South East				0,89
Alexandra		0,60		
Davidsonville				0,21
Marlboro Gardens				0,01
TOTAL VOTING STRENGTH	74,48	19,84	2,99	2,69

NOTE

The coloured and Indian bodies are not independent local authorities but have been granted representative status on the Central Rand RSC by the Administrator, in terms of section 3(1)(a) of the Regional Services Councils Act, No 109 of 1985.


three times larger than the Central Rand, and eleven times larger than the East Rand — but has a much smaller and more widely dispersed population. In the past no town in this country region has been called upon to play a leadership role, and shared interests are few. With 62 participating bodies and 64 representatives, RSC proceedings are inevitably cumbersome and travelling and administrative expenses higher than in the metropolitan areas.

It is a pity that the central government has dogmatically sought to impose a single regional system on the whole of South Africa, instead of allowing a measure of individual tailoring. Each metropolis is likely to develop a suitable style and operating method. One wonders whether RSCs are appropriate for country regions, where the apparatus would seem to have potential mainly for raising levy funds to improve infrastructure in local areas which are widely separated. Greater promise is seen in the multiracial co-ordinating committees for local authorities, which are becoming active even in very conservative towns.

Township Inputs

In delivering an inaugural budget of R504m (7 July 1987) for the Central Rand RSC, chairman Gerrit Bornman declared the most important objective would be to clear the backlog in infrastructural facilities in African local authority areas, by

To administer 'own affairs', co-ordinating committees for local authorities have been set up which assist RSCs to foster regional loyalties across colour lines



Phototeach: Adele Gordon

A training scheme in home construction for black workers, 1988. In accordance with the requirements of the RSC Act, the Central Rand RSC has allocated major budgetary resources for infrastructural development in African townships.

raising these to an acceptable minimum standard. Once basic township facilities are improved, attention will be given to other priorities such as building sidewalks and recreational facilities. From 1987 levy income, R31m (more than 33,3%) was allocated for roads and stormwater drainage, with an additional R14m (17%) for electricity and R12m (14%) for piped water supply in these areas. One of the Council's main concerns has been to rationalise the provision of joint facilities, e.g., water towers and electricity substations.

Prior to the formation of the RSC, few local authorities had attempted to quantify the cost of clearing infrastructural backlogs because they knew only too well that funds simply were not available. To meet the most pressing needs of African townships in the Central Rand requires expenditure estimated at R364m over the next four to five years — R58m for Alexandra, R98m for Diepmeadow, R18m for Dobsonville, and R190m for Soweto. Accordingly, the 1988/89 RSC budget, delivered in June 1988, has allocated R19,2m for Alexandra, R22,6m for Diepmeadow, R4,6m for Dobsonville, and R31m for Soweto (see major development items below).

Development priorities are established in terms of section 12(6) of the Act, which requires that 'the Council shall give preference to the establishment, improvement and maintenance of infrastructural services and facilities in areas where the greatest need for them exists'. Devoting major resources to township development has overcome apprehension that established white local authorities would use their voting preponderance on RSCs to favour their own suburbs.

On the Central Rand work started immediately on some development projects.

For others there has been an unavoidable short delay while RSC-financed professional planning was undertaken. Each local authority is responsible for contracting out projects within its area, under the aegis of professional RSC supervision to ensure efficiency and reduce risks of wasteful administration.

Revenue & Budget

More than a year before the establishment of the Central Rand RSC, many working committees had been set up under the Johannesburg City Council's leadership. Teams of experienced officials and consultants made technical analyses of possible RSC functions and put forward recommendations for the rationalisation and expansion of metropolitan facilities. At the same time a computerised system was designed for the collection of levies by a compact section within the City Treasury. Preparatory work made it possible for this RSC to get off to a flying start.

Until recently a chairman and chief executive, and their personal secretaries, have been the only staff of the Central Rand RSC. In June 1988 a financial advisor and a technical planning consultant were added. Everything else is undertaken by the staff of local authorities on an agency basis or by private sector consultants. In short, fears of a cumbersome RSC bureaucracy have been refuted.

The following points are extracted from the budget speech delivered by chairman Gerrit Bornman on 21 June 1988:

- the estimate of levies for 1987/88 was R70m but the total sum expected to be received is R85m;
- unavoidable start-up time in planning and awarding contracts meant that only R17m could actually be spent during the 1987/88 financial year, the balance being carried forward;
- operating expenditure for administration was R2,6m, i.e., only 3 percent of revenue; but in fact this expense was more than covered by interest income of R3,1m;
- for 1988/89 levy receipts are projected at R120m, to which is added R68m carried forward, for a total of R188m before taking interest receipts into account;
- R139m has already been allocated for projects, of which 92 percent by value are for the benefit of black local authorities. The instruction to apply funds where the need is greatest is thus being well-observed.

Chairman Bornman said that it would not be necessary to increase the rate of the levies beyond the presently applicable 0,1 percent on turnover and 0,25 percent on payroll. Bornman added, 'However, taking into consideration the tremendous needs

The politics of Black participation

IPSA Research

Over the last five years, the National Party has set up new constitutional structures at the local, regional, and now, national levels to provide, *inter alia*, for African participation in government. The first initiative, black local authorities, sparked off widespread civil unrest between 1984/87, leading to the collapse of many of these bodies under the weight of election/rent boycotts and assassinations of councillors. Recent legislative moves to overcome 'non-collaboration' strategies and enable African participation in local authorities, and thereby RSCs, are listed below:

The Regional Services Councils Amendment Act (No 49 of 1988)

- To grant the Provincial Administrator the right to perform the duties of a local authority where it refuses or fails to perform duties as laid out by the Administrator.
- As part of this process, the appointed township administrator is deemed to be the local authority and represents its interests on the relevant RSC.

The Black Local Authorities Amendment Bill (June 1988)

- To further empower the Provincial Administrator to order a person or body to act for the local authority where it is found that the object of legislation is being frustrated.
- The Administrator may remove a person from elected office if he/she fails to take office or refuses to participate in the lawful proceedings of a local authority.
- Where there are no elected officials, e.g., through en masse resignation under community pressure, the Administrator can appoint members to manage or control the authority until an election can be held.

Proclamation R97 of 1988 (Emergency Regulations), read with Government Notice 1112 of 1988

- To prohibit the activities of 18 organisations, including the United Democratic Front (UDF), Azapo, the National Education Crisis Committee, township civic and youth organisations.
- To ban any attempt at initiating or encouraging boycott tactics, which includes the October 1988 municipal elections.
- By implication, the boycott ban also appears to disallow participation by UDF and Azapo groups.


The Promotion of Constitutional Development Bill (June 1988)

On 20 June, President PW Botha announced plans for a national council:

- To facilitate the inclusion of African people at a third-tier level of parliament.

- To be a forum to debate and negotiate a new constitutional framework that will bring African people into parliament.
- Provision is made for 36 members, including 9 members elected by black local authorities and the Chief Ministers of the self-governing homelands (see pie-chart).

Debate on the Bill marked the first ever joint debate between the three Houses of Parliament. Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis said, 'It is the first time in the history of our country that legislation is being introduced with the goal of laying a foundation for the participation of all South Africans and communities in the political and governing processes' (Business Day 22/6/88). However, KwaZulu Chief Minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, rejected the proposals because the proposed council is 'fundamentally flawed by its racist cornerstones' (Weekly Mail 17/6/88). Opposition groups from Azapo to the UDF have rejected earlier proposals for a national council (1985 and 1986), saying it will pave the way for a fourth parliamentary chamber for Africans.



of the region as far as infrastructural development is concerned (especially in respect of the development of new land for housing), the financial plight of the black local authorities, and the possibility that RSCs may have to supplement their income to a certain extent ... further depending on the extent to which RSCs are going to be called upon to contribute to the subsidisation of transport in the region, it might become necessary to review the levy rates in the 1989/90 financial year'.

RSC budgets show very large balancing amounts for revenue and expenditure under the heading of bulk services, namely, water, electricity and sewerage. However, they have not yet exercised their power to make surcharges on the tariffs for the supply of those services, so that the figures are used only for calculating the voting percentages. The amounts for revenue and expenditure shown under those

headings may therefore be disregarded for the purposes of financial analysis.

Political Issues

Debates and decision-making within the RSC have been of a good standard, with the representatives of all local bodies co-operating in a harmonious spirit. White local authorities are also giving effective assistance on 'own affairs' matters to their black neighbours in many ways. In general, the advent of the RSC has materially improved the prospects for peace, order and good government within this most important metropolis. The Central Rand RSC is making this experience available to other RSCs, e.g., through providing as precedents the various forms of contracts which it has evolved. The current chairman, Gerrit Bornman, also heads the national association of RSC chairmen, and participates on an

The activities of these new metropolitan bodies are essentially technical and non-political, so RSCs are unlikely to be an issue in the municipal elections

The main remaining constraint hampering proper metropolitan development is the government's insistence on segregated residential areas and local authorities

association of Transvaal RSC chairmen.

Neither the Central nor the East Rand RSC borders on a black homeland. Thus, they are able to tackle problems without recourse to those ticklish questions of co-operation across 'federal' political boundaries. Nevertheless, the RSCs Act does make provision for these issues which will be of considerable concern in other regions, e.g., in the Greater Durban Area.

Under the tricameral constitution, local government and housing are supposed to be 'own affairs', with race-based municipalities falling under the Ministers of Local Government in the respective coloured, Indian and white Houses of Parliament. The provincial administrations have multiracial executives which handle general affairs, including African local government. Regional Services Councils constitute the lowest level of general affairs; they have no say in own affairs. Membership comprises representatives of the 'own affairs' local bodies within a region, however.

The questionable legitimacy of African local authorities, and thus, of their representation on RSCs, has given rise to concern. RSC activities will benefit black residential areas but there will be a time-lag before this becomes apparent to township residents. Progress made is not likely to be a factor in the forthcoming nationwide municipal elections in October. However, neither electoral actions by the radical white right nor the radical black left are likely to disrupt seriously activities of the new metropolitan bodies, which are essentially technical and non-political.

The Act has endowed the Administrator and the Minister of Finance with considerable powers, leading to apprehension of a strengthening of central and provincial powers rather than a devolution of powers to lower levels. In fact, former Transvaal Administrator Cruywagen and MEC Griffiths were active in motivating and enthusing the process but have stated that they have no intention of getting involved in the conduct of RSC affairs. The records of the new Administrator, Danie Hough, and MEC Olaus van Zyl, lead one to believe that this policy will continue.

The main constraint hampering proper metropolitan development remains the central government's insistence on separate local authorities and settlement areas for members of the different race groups, as exemplified in the draft guide plan for the Central Witwatersrand. Segregation is crumbling under the pressure of demographic, socio-economic and metropolitan realities. It is difficult to see how the Indian suburbs of Mayfair East and Fordsburg, or the coloured suburbs of Bosmont and Westbury, could ever be linked effectively to racially-exclusive municipalities. *UPA*

Case Study 2

CENTRALISED CONTROL

The Cape of Services

By Robert Cameron,
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The central-local relationship is the cardinal issue affecting the operation of local authorities because the extent of devolution of power determines the scope of their activities. Recent developments appear to confirm earlier predictions that local government restructuring is, despite government statements to the contrary, leading to a centralisation of powers.

In the following case study, Cameron argues that a 'top-down' strategy has shaped the formation of the Western Cape RSC to ensure that government objectives will be implemented. Demarcation board proposals were overridden, CBDs and industrial areas excluded to reduce the voting strength of the anti-apartheid Cape Town City Council, and a National Party politician has been appointed as the RSC chairman. The draft RSC Amendment Bill will further increase the arbitrary powers of the Provincial Administrator.

In terms of upliftment and rationalisation of social services, there has been little activity by the Western Cape RSC while priorities are investigated in the first phase of RSC implementation.

Local government is not an island. The extent of operational autonomy at the local level is defined also by the State of Emergency and the general state assault on opposition organisations, the media, church and universities. The surviving vestiges of pluralism in South Africa are slowly being eradicated. A plural society is a pre-condition for the existence of autonomous local authorities, however. Despite their formal status and powers in law, local authorities cannot flourish in an authoritarian climate.

In this context, has the restructuring of local government in the 1980s added to the centralisation of powers on a scale hitherto unknown in South Africa? Professor Willie Breytenbach (1987) has argued that RSCs will probably be controlled from the 'bottom-up' and not from the 'top-down' because constituent local authorities on RSCs have the right to participate, the right to vote in meetings and the right to appeal.

Friedman (1987), on the other hand, seems to regard local government power as a zero-sum game between RSCs and primary local authorities, i.e., one form of local government gains at the expense of its counterpart.

The last couple of years have been self-evidently characterised by an increased centralisation of power. The most important measure is the current RSC Amendment Bill, though other recent precedents include:

- the Administrator's removal of the powers of local authorities in the Cape to desegregate beaches;
- the Fire Brigade Services Act, which provides for the co-ordination and standardisation of uniforms, and vests in the Minister of Constitutional Development discretionary power to issue regulations;
- the statements by senior government figures that deregulation is critically important for job creation, which imply that local authority autonomy in town planning is going to be eroded (*Cape Times* 21/5/87).

In terms of the RSC Amendment Bill, the Provincial Administrator will be empowered to change the voting composition of local authorities on RSCs in order to achieve a result which, in his opinion, is fair to all parties. Further, if a majority cannot be obtained on any matter, the RSC chairman is compelled to refer the matter to the Administrator for a final decision. This means that the Administrator has the final say if deadlock is reached and may override the entire RSC appeal mechanism. With decision-making being centralised by government there are limited final powers to contest at the local level in general.

Western Cape

The largest and most affluent local authority in the Western Cape region is the Cape Town City Council (CCC). It has a liberal political reputation, having a history of conflict with both central and provincial government over apartheid measures that the Council has been forced to implement at local level. The CCC has made no secret of its hostility to racially-based RSCs.

There are a number of small local authorities in the region, most of them orientated towards National Party policy. There is no Conservative Party presence at the local level in the Western Cape. Many of the local authorities have one or more advisory coloured management committee(s) under their control, and there also are a few Indian management committees and four African town committees in the region.

The determination of boundaries for an RSC in the Western Cape was shrouded with political controversy. A detailed submission from the CCC to the

demarcation board recommended that the RSC should encompass the Greater Cape Town region (see map: p65) because it is an economically integrated area (CCC 1985). The CCC suggested the urban authorities in the region did not have the same community of interests as rural municipalities further north.

The Divisional Councils (DCs) of Paarl and Stellenbosch recommended there should be two RSCs in the region — firstly, an urban RSC with boundaries roughly approximating the boundaries of the CCC proposals; and secondly, a rural and peri-urban RSC, consisting of the two former Divisional Council areas. These smaller local authorities feared they would lose autonomy and not obtain their fair share of funds from one metropolitan-wide RSC, which could well be dominated by the liberal CCC (*Argus* 5/3/86). Implicit in these objections was the Paarl and Stellenbosch DCs' desire to escape meeting the costs of subsidising services in poorer African and coloured areas, mostly located in the proposed urban RSC area.

The Provincial Secretary recommended in his submission that the Cape, Paarl and Stellenbosch DCs should all become constituents of one Western Cape RSC. Based on demarcation criteria specified in schedule one of the RSC Act, the Province's main argument was that a separate RSC for the Paarl and Stellenbosch areas would not be financially viable. The Department of Finance estimated that 91 percent of the services levy and 89 percent of the establishment levy would be generated within the Cape Divisional Council area. (These figures include projected revenue from all independent local authorities in the Cape DC area.) The corresponding figures for Stellenbosch were four percent and four percent, and for Paarl, five percent and seven percent (Cape Provincial Administration 1985).


Despite initial misgivings expressed by a number of National Party-orientated municipalities (for similar reasons as the Paarl and Stellenbosch DCs), most of the other rural local authorities eventually supported the Provincial Secretary's recommendation. It is believed that the Minister of Constitutional Development, who is also Cape leader of the National Party, and the Administrator, who is a senior Cape NP figure, cajoled and persuaded a number of local authorities to drop their objections to being included in one RSC for the metropolitan area.

In a surprise move, a second CPA report from the Provincial Administrator asked the demarcation board to look at the desirability of including the Swartland DC in the Western Cape RSC (*Argus* 6/2/86). However, it is doubtful whether the Province was really serious about including Swartland. The proposal was probably a sop to Swartland business

Decision-making and appeal mechanisms for RSCs are being centralised by government, so there are limited powers to contest at the local and regional levels

The determination of boundaries for a Western Cape RSC was shrouded by political controversy, with Province overturning the demarcation board's final proposals

The eviction of 'illegal' shackdwellers from informal settlements used to be undertaken by Divisional Councils, which now form the bureaucracy of the new Western Cape RSC.



Victor Maron

Boundary delimitations and CBD exclusions are critical issues which determine the voting powers and the role of constituent local authorities on any RSC

groups who were concerned that if all government transport subsidies were phased out and Swartland excluded from the RSC region, the area would suffer financially. The CPA probably (and correctly) anticipated that the demarcation board would find no community of interest between Swartland and the urban Cape heartland.

The eventual delimitation of the Western Cape RSC was a virtual fiasco. The demarcation board, no doubt impressed by the well-argued CCC case, recommended the smaller area. This decision was accepted initially by the new multiracial Provincial Exco. At a subsequent meeting, however, the new MEC for Local Government, Mr P Schoeman announced that the Western Cape RSC would finally consist of the Divisional Councils of Cape, Paarl and Stellenbosch! The sudden reversal of the demarcation board's decision was supposedly due to other factors which now came under consideration, namely:

- to stimulate balanced regional development;
- to spread the new regional taxes as widely as possible; and
- to minimise the strong leakage effect that a smaller RSC could have on the city's fringe (CCC 1986).

Minister Chris Heunis was strongly suspected of being behind the surprise move. The final delimitation is probably designed to achieve a more effective redistribution of RSC revenue through including rural areas. However, the larger RSC area also serves the purpose of reducing the CCC's voting strength.

Voting Strengths

Commercial and industrial areas are excluded from the ambit of RSCs as far as the calculation of the consumption of services for voting purposes are concerned. Delimitation is of cardinal importance because it directly influences the voting

powers of constituent local authorities on any RSC.

The CCC was very aware of the voting equation factor when submitting a proposal on the exclusion of such areas to the Province. It recommended that in the case of industrial areas, only areas in extent of 20ha or more should be excluded, whereas in the case of commercial areas, only the Cape Town CBD should be excluded; alternatively, only the CBD of each constituent body should be excluded (CCC May 1987).

According to a CCC official (personal interview), there was a strong feeling within the CPA that the CCC was trying to sabotage the RSC and had to be dealt with accordingly. The delimitation gave the CPA a golden opportunity to downplay the CCC's influence. In terms of the criteria adopted, six CBDs and 20 industrial areas within the CCC area were excluded, infinitely more than areas excluded under any other local authority (Cape Town Bulletin, March 1987). (In terms of the CCC's own criteria, only one of its CBDs and ten industrial areas would have been excluded.) This outcome has diluted the CCC's voting strength on the Western Cape RSC quite considerably.

It was announced in January 1987 that the Western Cape RSC would consist of 56 local bodies, namely, the three (now dissolved) Divisional Councils, 19 white local authorities, 24 coloured management committees, four African town committees and two rural coloured management boards (CPA 1987).

According to the CPA, the voting powers of the constituent local authorities were determined on the basis of how much each body pays for sewerage, water, refuse, civil defence, tourism promotion, land use and transport planning. These were the functions initially taken over by the RSC (*Cape Times* 2/5/87). It would have been highly problematic to quantify the last three functions, so it is presumed

that voting strengths actually were calculated on the basis of consumption of the first three services.

The total voting strength of the white local bodies amounted to 65,79 percent, the coloured bodies 20,71 percent, the African town committees 12,68 percent, and Indian bodies 0,72 percent.

Furthermore, each local authority can nominate from its membership, one RSC representative for every ten percent or part of ten percent of the total number of RSC votes to which it is entitled.

Accordingly, the CCC has the largest amount of votes at 36,51 percent, with the next highest being the CT Town Committee at 11,82 percent. The CCC's voting strength is somewhat less than major cities in the other metropolitan RSCs, which perhaps is an indication of the government's determination to ensure its objectives are not frustrated.

Nevertheless, at this stage it still appeared as if the CCC would have a veto on RSC proceedings because all decisions require a two-thirds majority. However, this outcome is going to be nullified by subsequent developments. The CPA has appointed three new management committees and is in the process of appointing another one in the CCC's area of jurisdiction. When these new local bodies are given a seat on the RSC, their voting strength will be at the expense of the CCC's current total vote and will effectively remove its veto power.

In any case, the RSC Amendment Bill will give the Administrator discretionary power to re-apportion votes, and also, compel the RSC chairman to refer any matter on which a majority cannot be obtained to the Administrator for a final decision. It is highly probable that these amending clauses were included to promote centralised control and prevent liberal-orientated local authorities, as well as right-wing ones controlled by the Conservative Party, from using their numerically powerful voting strength to control the RSCs.

Going Operational

In the Cape, unlike the rest of the country, RSCs are not newly created structures but have taken over the infrastructure of the abolished Divisional Councils. Inherited functions include both general and own affairs. The Western Cape RSC replaced the Cape, Stellenbosch and Paarl DCs when it came into existence on 1 July 1987. Appointed by the Administrator, the RSC chairman is Mr P J Loubser, a senior Cape National Party member and former MEC in the now defunct Cape Provincial Council.

The Minister of Finance pegs the regional services levy (0,25%) and establishment levy (0,10%), which came into effect on 1 August 1987. The services levy is

expected to raise some R17m and the establishment levy, R36m (*Cape Times* 14/9/87). This revenue is way below the amount needed to meet RSC objectives, and it has been periodically hinted that central government subsidisation may be forthcoming to meet the shortfall.

However, such a step will violate one of the financial principles of the RSC, that of fiscal equivalence. In other words, the representatives of the community or group of citizens who pay for the services in the first place are supposed to take the actual policy decision on the distribution of such revenue raised by the RSC. If the government becomes involved in the direct financing of RSCs, a depoliticisation strategy of devolving conflict over resources to the local level will be somewhat undermined.

At the first meeting of the Western Cape RSC, six standing committees — for finance, liaison with local areas, works, amenities and services, DC functions, land use, and liaison with management committees in former DC areas — were created, as well as two advisory committees for staffing and identifying priorities (*Argus* 30/6/87). In terms of achieving the objectives of socio-economic upliftment and rationalisation of services, there has been little activity by the RSC to date. This is partly due to the fact that its 'priorities' committee is examining what further functions can be entrusted to the RSC (CCC September 1987).

A senior CCC official has alleged that one of the reasons why there has not been much activity is that there is an enormous power struggle going on behind the scenes. The Western Cape RSC is attempting to colonise as many CCC regional functions as possible (the CCC operates a number of functions on a regional basis) but is facing fierce CCC resistance. In the Cape, unlike the rest of the country where RSCs are being run with a minimum bureaucracy, Divisional Council staff have been assigned to the RSC. Ironically, this has meant that the RSC has had to look for functions to allocate to new staff.

Interim Evaluation

To ensure central government objectives are implemented by the Western Cape RSC, demarcation board proposals have been overridden, CBD industrial areas excluded, and the RSC Act amended again to increase the arbitrary powers of the Administrator. The very process of establishing and enabling RSCs reflects the style of centralised authoritarian decision-making that occurs at the national level in general. This approach ensures that the limited autonomy of the Western Cape RSC (and all other RSCs) will function within the parameters set by government.

The RSC Amendment Bill will empower the Administrator to re-apportion votes and to take a final decision on any RSC issue where a majority vote is not obtained

While RSCs have been slow in getting development objectives off the ground, the tricameral 'own affairs' departments and the JMCs are making substantial headway

However, government objectives are not necessarily going to be implemented in an uncritical manner at the regional or local level. While there appears to be little autonomy for constituent local authorities, the joker in the pack could well be the role of the bureaucracy inherited by RSCs, which consist of the abolished Divisional Councils in the Western Cape. The original intention was to entirely disband the DCs, but these 130 year-old institutions have proved to be a powerful lobbying group. They managed to influence the government to change its original plan and convert DCs into the new RSC bureaucracy instead.

The biggest of these Divisional Councils, that of the Cape (DCC), now forms the rump of the Western Cape RSC bureaucracy. The DCC had a reputation of being secretive in its operations, of making little information available on internal decisions and deliberations. It also enjoyed a rather conservative reputation, e.g., of being unresponsive to black needs and of taking severe action against shackdwellers in informal settlements.

Although CCC representatives are chairmen of four of the six standing committees, they will have to rely primarily on ex-DCC bureaucrats for policy information. These bureaucrats have so far acted in a way to preserve their own power, and their own bureaucratic preferences could possibly produce policy outcomes that are different from both central government and liberal CCC objectives.

What about the upliftment objectives of the RSC? Will they succeed? Although it is perhaps too early to make a final evaluation, it seems unlikely that the RSCs will generate sufficient revenue to undertake the upgrading of black areas on a large scale. Nevertheless, redevelopment is occurring through other administrative conduits. The House of Representatives, for instance, has made over R7m available for the upgrading of coloured areas on the Cape Flats. Joint Management Centres (JMCs) are also heavily involved in this process, so much so that Bekker (1987: p11) suggests the focus of decision-making on infrastructural development has shifted under the state of emergency to the non-elected, non-accountable JMCs and their sub-units. JMA

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



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Chamber of Mines of South Africa

AIDS in Southern Africa

By Alan Whiteside, Senior Research Fellow,
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal

Aids is a disease which will have a profound effect on all aspects of human society. Since it was first recognised scientists have learnt more about Aids, in a shorter period of time, than about any other disease. Although drugs which treat the symptoms and slow the progression have been discovered, it will be at least 10 years before a vaccine is developed. There is currently no prospect of finding a cure. In the first major study of Aids in southern Africa, Alan Whiteside interprets and projects seminal data on the economic impact of the epidemic, while stressing the urgent need to allocate precious resources in the race to reduce the virulent growth pattern of Aids.

Aids, or Acquired Immune Deficiency System, is a new disease. It may have been present in Africa since the early 1970s and in isolated cases in the West, since 1979. First recognised in America in 1981, it was named Aids in 1982 by the Centre for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia (Shilts 1988). The number of cases grew at a geometric progression; by January 1988 there were 51 916 cases in the USA. Aids shortly will be the major cause of death in young adults in North America (Scitovsky 1988).

Cases of Aids have been reported worldwide in 133 countries (see cover map: p23). According to the World Health Organisation there were an estimated 81 433 cases in the world in 1987, with 74 percent in the Americas and 12 percent in Africa.

Aids is caused by a virus that attacks the human immune system and allows various opportunistic infections to invade the body. For every person who has the disease in its final stages there are at least ten people with Aids Related Complexes (ARC), and possibly 100 people carrying the virus in their blood, who have no symptoms but can transmit the virus. Known as the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV), it is transmitted through blood and other body fluids. Aids is the final manifestation of the development of the disease.

The exact proportion of HIV positive cases who will develop AIDS is not known, but present estimates range from 30 to 80 percent (Kitchen 1987). It is possible that all HIV positives may develop Aids given

enough time. People who are HIV positive remain infectious and can pass the virus on whether or not they develop Aids.

Aids in the developed and developing countries has distinct epidemiological patterns. In the West the main victims are homosexuals, haemophiliacs and intravenous drug users. While Aids is a growing problem among heterosexuals it does not appear to be spreading as rapidly as among the high risk groups. In the developing world, particularly Africa and the Caribbean, the mode of transmission is predominantly heterosexual, although poor hygiene and contaminated blood may play a role in the spread of the disease. Differences in the spread of the disease seem to be accounted for by several co-factors including poor nutrition, more genital and sexual diseases, and differences in sexual behaviour. These are areas which need to be carefully studied.

It is not commonly realised that Aids in the developing world, particularly Africa and the Caribbean, is mostly transmitted by heterosexual contact

Regional Spread

Aids was first reported in Central Africa. It appears that there is a band of countries across the region comprising Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi and Zambia, where the disease is particularly rife. The disease has spread slowly south and cases have now been reported throughout the sub-region (see table 1).

The first case in South Africa was reported in 1982. By mid-March 1988 a total of 118 cases had been reported, including 22 foreigners. South Africa is the only country to keep data on transmission category and race. Table two shows that

Table 1

AIDS and HIV Positive Cases in Southern Africa

	No of reported Aids cases & date of report	No of reported HIV positives
Botswana	34 (May 1988)	160
Lesotho	2 (Feb 1988)	0.05%
Malawi	583 (Oct 1987)	-
Mozambique	9 (Apr 1988)	3.1% Maputo \ 5.1% Nampula
South Africa	118 (Mar 1988)	0.06 per 1,000
Swaziland	9 (Mar 1988)	55
Zambia	536 (Dec 1987)	-
Zimbabwe	100 (Jan 1988)	250 000

Table 2

Breakdown by Transmission Category in South Africa

	South African	Foreign
Homosexual/Bisexual	77	1
Heterosexual	10	20
Transfusion	11	-
Haemophilic	5	-
Intravenous Drug User	-	1
Total	96	22

Table 3

Breakdown by Ethnic Group and Sex in South Africa

	South African	Foreign
White	88	5
African	6	16
Indian/Coloured	2	1
Male	93	17
Female	3	5

Table 1 sources

Botswana: Daily News 15 March 1988, Natal Mercury 17 May 1988;

Lesotho: Lesotho Today, 26 February 1988; Malawi: WHO Report on AIDS cases;

Mozambique: AIM Information Bulletin No 141, 1988 (Also reports on random samples in various cities);

South Africa: AIDS Update, SAIMR;

Zambia: WHO Report on AIDS cases; Zimbabwe: Financial Gazette, 15 January 1988.

the majority of victims have been white homosexual males. As this group has responded to the Aids threat in a positive manner — adopting safe sex practices — it seems likely that the rate of growth among this group will level off.

On the other hand, it is probable that South Africa will experience a rapid growth in heterosexually spread Aids. At this stage it is not known whether the disease will affect all population groups equally. Obviously, if it follows the same pattern as in the rest of Africa, Aids will spread most rapidly among those who are less well nourished, more prone to other diseases or subject to social stresses leading to a greater number of sexual partners. Clearly, the country's

black population will be particularly at risk.

In the rest of the region the problem of Aids only recently has been seen as a major issue. The rapid increase in the number of cases has made it a growing source of concern, however. As there are many more HIV positives than actual Aids sufferers, the Aids epidemic is only just beginning in southern Africa.

Economic Costs

The cost of Aids for society can be divided into two types — direct costs which will be incurred because of actual use of resources, and indirect or opportunity costs. The first type can be directly attributed


to the disease, including the payments made by both the patient and society. Direct costs can be divided into three groups, namely preventative, palliative and research expenditure. Prevention involves testing of blood, to avoid transmission through blood products, and education to reduce the number of cases in future years. In order for blood testing to be effective all blood that is donated has to be tested, which is an expensive process. There is no cure, so prevention is crucial. Expenditure on education, which will reduce the number of future cases, is money well-spent. In general this will be the responsibility of government although major employers and educational institutes may take some responsibility.

Treatment is the second area of expenditure. At best the patient's life may be prolonged through inhibiting the action of the virus and treating the opportunistic diseases. The most successful drug developed so far is zidovudine or AZT which is known to prolong the life of an Aids patient. In 1987 it was the most expensive drug on the market with a year's course costing \$10 000. While increased production may reduce cost it will never be a cheap drug (Conner and Kingman 1987: p144). The major cost of Aids will be determined by the length of time a patient spends in hospital. In the USA this period has averaged 168 days in the year prior to death, whereas Germany has reduced hospitalisation to 67 days in the third year of the disease (Goebel 1988).

Research is the final major area of expenditure. In 1981, when Aids was first identified, the US government spent \$200 000 on the disease. By 1988 the allocation had increased to \$790 million, with two-thirds marked for medical research and the balance to be spent on prevention and health education. In 1987 the British government announced it was giving £14.5 million to the Medical Research Council, specifically for research into Aids (in 1984 the council received only £500 000 for this research). Expenditure of a similar magnitude and increased allocations are being experienced throughout the developed world.

The indirect costs for society are those of lost production. These can be divided into morbidity costs, wages lost because people cannot work as a result of their illness; and mortality costs, or the present value of future earnings lost by people who die prematurely. It should be noted that Aids is mainly a disease of the sexually active, and possibly, of their children. In other words, it affects most people as they enter what should be their most productive years. The process of evaluating these indirect costs is complicated and beyond the scope of this analysis, however.

The AIDS Pyramid



Compared with the number of Aids cases reported thus far, a more than ten-fold worldwide increase in Aids cases may be anticipated during the next five years.

The estimated size of the HIV pandemic and the relationship of HIV infection to Aids, leads to the conclusion that an imminent and precipitous global increase in the number of Aids cases is inevitable.

Source: World Health Organization (1987)

Southern Africa

To assess the economic impact of Aids in southern Africa it is necessary to have some idea of the present extent of the problem. The most essential data concerns the number of people with Aids or ARC, in any given year, by age and sex, and how much will be spent on their treatment. The number of Aids victims in the region to date is known fairly accurately, although it is likely that there has been under-reporting, particularly in areas where medical coverage is inadequate.

An alternative method of projecting trends would be to use the number of HIV positives as a base. A random sample would make this exercise more accurate, leaving aside questions of ethics. But HIV numbers are not known at present, though there are estimates for some specific groups — most notably, blood donors, pregnant women, and migrant workers. It is possible that both the rate of spread and the rate at which HIV positives will develop Aids will depend on the levels of health and nutrition among the various groups in society. There could be resultant differences among urban and rural people, rich and poor, and in South Africa, between the various race groups.

So far, the best estimate for the future number of cases in South Africa has been the pioneering work of a medical officer employed by an insurance company. Table four shows a best case scenario that is

The rate at which Aids will spread among different groups in southern Africa depends on awareness, health, nutrition and social stress levels

Table 4

Expected AIDS Cases in South Africa (cumulative)

	Best Case Scenario	Worst Case Scenario	Average
1988	72	129	102
1989	126	344	235
1990	221	1 032	626
1991	388	2 750	1 570
1992	678	6 536	3 607
1993	1 187	22 016	11 597
1994	2 077	66 048	34 062
1995	3 634	176 128	89 881

Table 5

Direct Cost of Aids to South Africa

	No of cases total	No of patients	Cost of hospital	AZT (R'000)	Blood testing & education (R'000)	Total (R'000)
1988	129	65	975	122	15 000	16 091
1989	344	172	2 580	172	15 000	17 752
1990	1 032	516	7 740	516	15 000	23 256
1991	2 064	1 032	15 480	1 032	15 000	31 512
1992	4 128	2 064	30 960	2 064	15 000	48 024
1993	8 256	4 128	61 920	4 128	15 000	81 048
1994	16 512	8 256	123 840	8 256	15 000	147 086
1995	33 024	16 512	247 680	16 512	15 000	279 192

Assumptions:

- The number of cases using van der Merwe's worst case scenario is assumed to double every 8 months up to 1991. It is hoped that education programmes will slow the rate to every 12 months.
- It is expected that half the cases will require treatment in any one year. As the life span of an AIDS patient is 2 years this is probably accurate.
- Hospitalisation is assumed to be 100 days per patient per year.
- This, in turn, assumes that 10 percent of patients are treated with AZT at a cost to be reduced from R18 000 per year to R10 000 per year in 1989.
- Blood-testing costs at least R10 per unit, and there are approximately 1 million units donated nationally per annum. Education, which should have a large slice of expenditure, is assessed at R5 million per year.

based on a regression derived from the number of cases reported since 1983; a worst case scenario shows a doubling time of 8 months for cases, which has been the experience for much of Africa (van der Merwe 1988).

As there were already 98 Aids cases in March 1988 it appears that unless there is a dramatic change, the worst scenario may actually occur. The latter pattern means that by the end of 1991 there would be at least 1 088 cases in Botswana, 288 in Mozambique, 288 in Swaziland and 3 200 in Zimbabwe. If it is assumed that half the cases die in any given year the worst scenario means that by 1991 South Africa would have 1 375 Aids deaths. By 1996 Aids could be the single most important cause of death, with a total 88 064 fatalities (50% mortality rate).

The major costs in South Africa are outlined below:

● **Prevention**

The major cost in this area is blood-testing, which costs R32,90 per test for the Elisa

test and R43,90 for the Western Blot — if done privately. At present the Elisa test is adequate, but all positive results have to be checked using the Western Blot which costs R43,90 (van der Merwe 1988). Mozambique reports that the Elisa test costs \$5 US while the Western Blot costs \$15 US for HIV-1 and \$40 US for HIV-2 (AIM Bulletin No141).

Approximately one million units of blood are donated in South Africa each year, all of which have to be tested. While the blood transfusion services are able to do this relatively cheaply, there are considerable costs both in terms of finance and personnel. The cost of confirmatory testing of suspected HIV positive patients must also be added thereto.

The South African government has embarked on an education campaign and to date has spent R1 000 000 on Aids awareness advertising and education (*Weekly Mail* 6/5/88). There is no indication of future expenditure, but it

will have to be very much greater in order to make an appreciable difference to the spread of the disease. All the neighbouring states have embarked on campaigns which will be costly. Mozambique has a three year anti-Aids campaign costing \$7.2 million (AIM op cit). Unless funds are provided by outside donors, specifically for AIDS campaigns, expenditure will have to come out of already over-stretched health education budgets.

• Treatment

The cost per day for a hospital bed ranges from R82,50 in a Transvaal Provincial hospital to R147,00 in a private hospital, with higher costs for intensive care units. Obviously the cost of care will depend on the length of time a patient spends in hospital. The shorter the period, the lower the cost, and presumably, if the home care service is adequate, the happier the patient will be. Van der Merwe estimates the cost of hospital care per patient at 168 days per case to be R20 400.

At present very few South African patients are treated with AZT, which dramatically raises medication costs. The cost ranges from R1 600 to R2 220 per month, depending on whether the drug is supplied by the province or privately. AZT will prolong the life of Aids sufferers and therefore increase other treatment costs. The total cost per Aids case treated with AZT will be R41 200.

Table five shows the direct cost of Aids to the South African economy. The data is based on a large number of assumptions, some of which are hopes rather than scientifically based projections.

Migrants and Legislation

In 1986 there were 302 671 black foreign workers legally employed in South Africa, mainly (80 percent) on the mines. They are largely young, fit men who work separated from their families, living in hostels and compounds. Because some miners are drawn from areas where there is a high incidence of Aids the Chamber of Mines, the main employer body, decided to test blood from a representative sample of workers. The results, released in August 1986, found only 130 HIV positives in 25 528 samples. The incidence of HIV positives was 3.71 percent for Malawians, 0.16 percent for Batswana and 0,07 percent for Mozambicans.

The Chamber responded to the test results by deciding not to employ new HIV positive recruits, although current employees who are HIV positive were allowed to remain on the mines unless they became clinically unfit. A counselling and education programme would be developed also. In general, this is a compassionate and enlightened approach which is to be commended. Unfortunately,

some politicians responded rather differently and maintained that HIV positive migrants constitute a danger to society. They demanded the repatriation of these workers (*Citizen* 6/10/86).

The Chamber has fought against this, but the government predictably responded with new regulations and legislation. On 30 October 1987 two sets of regulations related to Aids were published. The most important, made in terms of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act of 1972, allows non-South Africans who are HIV positive or have Aids to be denied entrance to the country, or to be deported.

It is generally felt that such measures will have no effect on the spread of the disease in South Africa. In addition they are discriminatory. Perhaps the main danger is that they may also be applied to the TBVC homelands and produce an infected pool of rural people who will be denied access to employment and medical facilities. Once again, the already disadvantaged would suffer most (*Critical Health* 1988).

Slowing the Crisis

Aids has reached South Africa and is spreading rapidly but silently among the population. The visible aspect of the disease is that the number of Aids patients is expected to double every 8 to 12 months. By 1995 the Aids crisis in South Africa could grow to horrifying proportions, with up to 176 128 cases.

There are a number of important factors and lessons that must be acted upon if the crisis is to be averted or at least slowed down:

- Aids is no longer simply a medical problem; it will affect all aspects of society, calls for research by all academic disciplines, and requires a unified regional response.
- There is no cure and the impact of preventative approaches cannot be overemphasised. If the doubling time could be reduced from 8 to 12 months by 1991, there would be 33 024 cases by 1995 instead of a projected 176 128 cases (worst case scenario).
- The governments of the region should give serious consideration to the type of health care they are going to provide for Aids patients. Clearly, hospice or home care with relief from suffering, rather than prolonging life may be the only route for countries with few resources.
- Aids is a new disease and will become a major killer. It would be wrong to divert resources from existing public health problems such as malaria, tuberculosis, etc. Therefore, additional resources should be allocated for Aids, not existing ones.
- Finally, the region may have enough time to prepare programmes that will limit the impact of AIDS but this must be done now and undertaken imaginatively.

By 1995 the Aids crisis in South Africa could grow to horrifying proportions, with a worst case scenario of 176 128 victims

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RETROSPECT

The political stresses of the 1970s and early 1980s have slowly eroded foreign confidence in the South African economy, resulting in a net outflow of capital (including leads/lags in current payments and receipts) and a withdrawal by foreign banks of credit to South African banks and other enterprises. By 1985 the economy was forced to adjust to a lower dollar price of gold, weak international commodity prices and the effects of a severe drought.

Unavoidable exchange rate depreciation and price inflation were the inevitable toll. The rand moved from R2 per \$US in the first half of 1985 to a fluctuating level which fell as low as R2.87 per \$US in the ensuing months. The annualised rate of inflation in the third quarter of 1985 had been 14,5 percent and soared to 24,9 percent in the first quarter of 1986. The deflationary impact of the process of adjustment was substantial. In 1985 and 1986 real GDP per capita declined by an average of about 2,3 percent per year (see figure 1), real disposable income per head declined by 5,2 percent per year, and private sector employment contracted.


The economy adapted to these shocks relatively successfully, showing a huge surplus on the current account of the balance of payments that ranged between 3,7 and 5,2 percent of GDP during 1985-1987. Figure 2 shows the balance on the current

account for the last decade. Although US\$5bn of foreign debt was repaid over the period 1985-1987, gold and foreign exchange reserves increased substantially. The annualised rate of inflation declined from a high level of 24 percent in the first quarter of 1986, to 13,5 percent in the fourth quarter of 1987.

These adjustments resulted in the loss of potential welfare to the poorest groups in South African society, however. Job creation stagnated in the high wage sector of the economy, forcing a growing proportion of the population to depend on the informal sector and agriculture for their subsistence. The distribution of income became more skewed away from these groups.

By the last quarter of 1987 the economy had moved onto a path of rapid growth, achieving an annualised growth in GDP of 5 percent. Although statistics for the national accounts and the balance of payments have not been published for the first quarter of 1988, this strong growth trend appears to have been sustained. Indicators include the annualised volume of manufacturing production which rose by 18 percent compared with the fourth quarter of 1987, and the real value of wholesale and retail sales which increased by 15 and 4 percent respectively, with new car sales increasing by 35 percent.

Photo: Adele Gordon



Job and training opportunities in the private sector have decreased in the mid-1980s, forcing many workseekers to turn to the informal sector and agriculture for subsistence.

Constraints on Recovery

Economic growth can be stimulated by increased demand which originates from an injection of expenditure of a domestic economic origin, or from increased foreign demand for exports. For the South African economy, increases in domestic demand rapidly cause increases in imports — on average, about one-third of the increase in domestic expenditure is on imports. Unless exports grow rapidly, a trade imbalance soon becomes problematic.

A decade ago a current account deficit of this kind would have been a desirable consequence of an upswing, partly financed by an extension of foreign credit and other capital inflows. Circumstances have changed, however. In international financial circles there has been a major downgrading of the status of the South African economy, as a credit risk, to the extent that accommodating capital flows are no longer certain. Thus, in a cyclical upswing the current account of the balance of payments has to be kept in surplus (to repay debt) or at least in equilibrium, unless downward pressure is to be forced on the rand exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves.

In the present upswing domestic demand has been the driving force, financed by an accommodating growth of the money supply. An extremely sluggish performance of exports has been reflected in the Standard Bank's currency weighted index, which was only 2,5 percent higher for the first quarter of 1988 than for the first quarter of last year. By comparison the Standard Bank's currency weighted index of imports jumped 28,4 percent over the same period. It appears that the trade surplus in the first quarter of 1987 will be almost 50 percent smaller than the surplus recorded over the same period in 1987.

Without intervention in foreign exchange markets, or without contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, an adjustment process of the type experienced from 1985-1987 would appear to be inevitable again.

The enforced repayment of foreign loans, estimated to be over R2bn in 1988, also depresses the rate at which domestic absorption can expand. In the last year capital outflows exceeded the current account surplus on the balance of payments, and the Reserve Bank was forced to liquidate some reserves. By April 1988 the Bank's holdings of gold and foreign exchange reserves had fallen to cover less than two month's imports and no longer appeared able to cushion the rapid growth experienced since the last quarter of 1987.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY

The first initiative in response to the spectre of a depreciating rand and a new round of inflation was taken by the Reserve Bank in late February this year. The target rate of increase in the broad money supply (M3) was lowered from 14-18 percent for 1987, to 12-16 per cent for 1988. However, this lower target was still believed to be consistent with real growth in GDP of between 2,5 and 3,5 percent in 1988. In March a further indication of the intention to control the growth of money supply came with an

Figure 1
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita




Figure 2
South Africa's Balance of Payments
Balance on Current Account




Table 1

Budget Statistics at a Glance

	REVISED 1987/88	BUDGET 1988/89	% of GDP 1987/88	1988/89
EXPENDITURE	R47 836m	R53 865m	27,6%	26,8%
REVENUE	R37 822m	R44 005m	21,8%	21,9%
DEFICIT BEFORE BORROWING	R10 014m	R 9 860m	5,8%	4,9%
DEFICIT incl LOAN REDEMPTIONS	R12 607m	R12 531m		
DEFICIT FINANCING:				
Public Investment Commissioners	R 4 103m	R 4 600m		
Reinvestment of Local Stock	R 4 783m	R 2 425m		
New Stock	-	R 4 350m		
Bonds	R 1 151m	R 250m		
Debt Standstill Funds	R 1 200m	R 500m		
Short-term Net	R 582m	R 410m		
Transfer from IMF Account	R 352m	-		
Surplus in previous year	R 451m	-		

the ability of government to reduce real expenditure levels, although the enforcement of a public sector pay freeze will make the task easier in 1988/89. Budget details are summarised in table 1.

Despite reassurances from the Reserve Bank and government that they are committed to adhering to monetary targets to reduce the inflation rate, the seasonally adjusted money supply growth for April 1988 stood 19 percent above its April 1987 level. In other words, it was still above the upper limit of the Bank's target range. In May 1988 the Reserve Bank again tightened conditions for accommodation for banking institutions and increased the Bank rate to 11,5 percent. Prime overdraft rates followed, increasing to 15 percent. Additional policy measures designed to slow the growth of consumer demand were also announced in May 1988, with an increase in minimum deposits on hire purchase sales and the extension of the Credit Agreement Act to rental transactions.

Policies implemented, thus far, have been directed towards lowering the rate of growth of domestic demand, while keeping the economy on a positive growth path. It is clear from the point of view of policy makers dampening the inflation rate, that repaying foreign debt and avoiding a rapid depreciation of the rand continue to be important economic goals.

The alternatives

In considering whether there are alternatives, two relevant and provocative questions need to be asked:

- Combating inflation has been given a higher priority by policy makers than creating employment or economic growth. Given the problems of poverty and underemployment facing the economy, can South Africa afford to trade-off less growth for lower inflation rates at this time?

- The repayments of foreign debt have also depressed domestic economic growth. South Africa's access to international capital markets is hardly likely to improve in the next decade (even if the USA elects a Republican president). At this time one must ask whether the gains from honouring foreign debts will outweigh the domestic economic sacrifice?

Alternative policies which might be contemplated are: import controls or surcharges at a level sufficient to hold the volume of imports to their 1987 level, a price and income policy, or less emphasis on dampening the present upswing.

A price and income policy would never gain support from the black trade union movement which is actively using its substantial bargaining power at present. Nor would this policy be supported by business with the present variability of the exchange rate. Import controls, on the other hand, would produce some stability in the exchange rate, but would increase costs and in the longer run stifle economic growth, given the heavy dependence of the economy on imported intermediate goods.

However, such alternatives will not achieve the economic growth rates which are necessary. The economy's gold and foreign exchange reserves improved by R310m in May 1988, providing a cushion for the R400m debt repayment in June. If this improvement has occurred because inventory levels have been rebuilt and the growth in imports has slowed down now, then there is clearly room for more economic growth in 1988. In fact, the monetary and fiscal measures already implemented may be too restrictive as they were a panic reaction to the surge in imports earlier in 1988.

More than ever before, economic growth must be given priority in economic policy making in South Africa. It is the only means of expanding the supply of jobs, even if the consequences are high.

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

The Indaba and Development

*By Julian May, Rural/Urban Studies Unit,
Centre for Social and Development Studies*

Both supporters and critics of the Indaba have tended to view the plan for KwaZulu/Natal as a set of all or nothing proposals. What has perhaps been overlooked is the fact that the most widespread socio-economic (and perhaps political) problem in the KwaZulu/Natal region is one of poverty. Development economist, Julian May, suggests that the Indaba debate has the potential to provide the framework within which existing development structures can be reassessed, and to open the space for new structures to be created, where necessary. Improving the quality of life of the poor in the region would make a vital difference in the short-term without jeopardising prospects for future, more substantial change in South Africa.

The Indaba has generated a wealth of analysis concerning the regional economy of KwaZulu/Natal. A wide range of both academic and business views have been put forward, mostly comprised of differing cost/benefit type of analyses that attempt to provide a balance sheet of a dispensation based on the Indaba. Two major questions in particular have been raised and fiercely debated:

- Can the local economy actually finance moves towards racial parity, particularly in the case of social services such as education and health?
- Does the Indaba refer to no more than a fragmented, ethnically based settlement that is feasible only because of the presence of a 'moderate' African leader who is actively supportive of a free enterprise system?

Many of the practical issues raised by the Indaba concern the country as a whole, and will have to be confronted regardless of the type of political settlement which might eventually take place in South Africa. In this context, four main themes can be distinguished in the various development planning documents that have been prepared for southern Africa. These are land and agricultural reform, urbanisation, employment creation, and the improvement of social and physical

infrastructures.

While responses to these issues by planners and politicians vary according to the source and intention of the particular plan, it is pertinent to examine the KwaZulu/Natal situation along similar lines.

Land Needs

It has been repeatedly emphasised in planning documents on KwaZulu/Natal that there is a need to improve African access to agricultural land. The land question extends to those rural settlements on the periphery of the Durban metropolitan region which are experiencing increasing pressure for residential land by a rapidly urbanising and encroaching African population.

Ideally, the provision of more land for African settlement requires that land presently owned or controlled by whites should be opened up to Africans, particularly where it is under-utilised. The Buthelezi Commission recommended the establishment of a Land Commission, which could buy up commercial farmland, sub-divide the land and then make it available to African farmers in 50 hectare plots.

An alternative way to make land available

Practical issues and policy options highlighted by the Indaba are of vital concern for South Africa in a search for appropriate national solutions

To succeed, land reform has to be supported by agricultural programmes that provide training and extension services for black farmers

Improved social security must be provided in the towns to encourage permanent settlement and to enable those with small rural smallholdings to urbanise

to black farmers would be through government acquisition of white farms for subsequent transfer to African co-operatives. This type of transfer is a lower cost option than the Land Commission proposal since the farms acquired do not have to be sub-divided and they also may have the potential to provide greater employment opportunities. The approach could have significant hidden costs, however. Experience in other developing countries suggests that the failure rate of co-operative farms is often very high.

The land question in KwaZulu goes beyond increasing the amount of land available to African people. The existing system of land tenure in the rural areas of the homelands — the central control of land through the tribal authorities — has also been a subject for debate. While advocates of free enterprise support the extension of freehold rights to the homelands, those concerned with the security and welfare of the poor maintain that such reforms may be inappropriate in South Africa (Louw 1985 and Cross 1987 respectively). At present, the 'tribal' land tenure system protects the universal right to hold land, a necessary provision in areas which, though apparently rural, are almost wholly dependent upon migrant remittances.

The hybrid land tenure systems that have evolved in peri-urban areas further complicate matters. Here, an induna or 'shacklord' ultimately determines resident or immigrant access to land in return for a mix of cash and allegiance obligations. In short, tenure in both rural and urbanising areas is an increasingly complex issue that will require an appropriate institutional framework for the administration of tenure and rental arrangements. At the same time, this framework will have to be sufficiently flexible to permit evolutionary change within specific communities.

To ensure that the long-term agricultural potential of the economy is not damaged, any programmes of land transfer or tenure reform would have to be backed up by a complementary programme of agricultural education and the expansion of agricultural extension services. This would require training more extension officers and providing more facilities. The output and productivity of existing farmland in KwaZulu could be further improved through the provision of financial and technical aid. Sugar-cane farming in KwaZulu appears to have benefited substantially through assistance from the Small Cane Growers Financial Aid Fund and the various extension services of both the state and private sectors. It is estimated that there were some 14 000 small cane growers operating in KwaZulu/Natal in 1985, which has increased since to 23 000 growers (The Developer 1987).

Irrigation projects also have the potential

to provide substantial assistance to black farmers. One such scheme in the Mvoti valley between Stanger and Kranskop (part of the Tugela Basin project) appears to be one of the success stories of agricultural development in the region, with average yields far exceeding expectations. To the extent that it encourages fuller usage of water resources, the Tugela Basin project — itself a 'joint' KwaZulu/Natal exercise — could make an important contribution towards the development of small-scale agriculture in the region.

'Durbanisation'

Apartheid has led to the under-urbanisation of the African population, as well as to 'displaced urbanisation'. The latter phenomenon refers to those close settlements with no apparent agricultural base which have expanded rapidly in rural areas. There are numerous examples of these in KwaZulu/Natal.

There is a real need to reverse these trends as it is economically more efficient to provide jobs and services for people living in higher densities in areas where an adequate infrastructure already exists. In particular, those households with small landholdings and access to the urban labour market should be encouraged to leave the rural areas to resettle in the towns. Many African families view their rural landholdings, however small, as their ultimate social security net to which they can retire when work opportunities are no longer forthcoming in the cities. To promote the urbanisation of these communities some alternative form of social security in the towns would have to be provided.

Access to residential land is rapidly becoming another cause for concern. There is an acute housing shortage in South Africa's townships. In KwaZulu/Natal alone, Spies (1986) has estimated that between 1990 and 2000 an increase of 30 000 housing units will be required per annum. Further, the movement to the cities by Africans who have entirely abandoned their rural homes has led to the growth of informal or shack settlements around many South African cities.

Durban, surrounded as it is by KwaZulu, has been particularly affected, with an estimated 1.7 million shack dwellers in the Greater Durban area; that is to say, almost half the city's resident African population. While many of these people live in dense settlements alongside the existing townships, former rural areas, such as Umbumbulu and Ndwedwe, are now experiencing rapid population growth in semi-urban settlements.

Other concomitant development problems center on existing political structures in these new settlements — in particular the role of tribal authorities vis-a-vis both

Select Indicators of Quality of Life

Black Urban, Peri-Urban and Rural Areas in KwaZulu/Natal

Table 1
Household and Per Capita Income Levels by Settlement Type

Expressed in constant 1985 prices

SETTLEMENT TYPE	AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME	AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOME	NUMBER
URBAN	R513.26	R96.11	712
SHACKS	R288.50	R66.45	480
RURAL	R183.68	R37.52	1 064

Table 2
Travelling Time to Amenities by Settlement Type

TYPE OF AMENITY	RURAL			SHACKS			TOWNSHIP		
	Less than 5 mins	15-30 mins	30+ mins	Less than 5 mins	15-30 mins	30+ mins	Less than 5 mins	15-30 mins	30+ mins
POST OFFICE	12,9	16,3	70,8	0,5	20,9	78,6	24,5	43,6	31,9
SCHOOL	31,8	39,1	30,1	67,3	25,1	7,6	60,5	28,4	11,1
BUS-STOP	60,2	28,4	11,4	89,0	9,0	2,0	85,9	13,1	1,0
SHOP	42,0	34,4	23,6	72,9	23,3	3,8	82,6	14,1	3,3
WATER SOURCE	59,0	22,9	18,1	84,6	12,2	3,2	100,0	0	0
HOSPITAL/CLINIC	5,8	8,6	85,6	1,6	2,1	96,3	8,4	17,4	74,2

Source
Rural/Urban Studies Unit Data Base

the newcomers and the original residents — and on the provision of a suitable infrastructure. The first need is related to the question of land tenure, whereas the second need calls for upgrading existing shack settlements and creating new settlements. The latter policy option could take the form of site-and-service schemes such as the one at Mfolweni to the south of Durban.

Creating Jobs

Employment creation remains a desperate need in South Africa as a whole, and KwaZulu/Natal is no exception. The potential demand for employment in the region is expected to increase by between 75 000 and 125 000 per annum for the period 1980 — 2010 (Spies 1986). Substantial job losses may well result from the present movement towards sanctions and the possible effects of disinvestment. This trend, together with the very high rate of population growth indicates that employment needs are likely to be very much greater in the future.

The high cost of creating formal employment opportunities suggests that the majority of South Africa's unemployed will be forced into employment (and under-employment) in the informal sector. A successful urbanisation strategy could do a great deal to foster job creation, especially in this sector. Urban areas have their own internal economic dynamic which demonstrates considerable resilience in times of economic difficulty. Not only does the construction phase of an expanding town create jobs, but the concentration of people creates a market, which in itself encourages both distribution and production networks. Even in the region's urban shack settlements, income levels, while lower than those in the formal African townships, are very much higher than in the rural areas (see data base).

A range of policies could be introduced to support the informal sector. These include improving access to capital and to markets as well as providing training to develop appropriate skills for both formal and informal employment. However,

Densely populated areas contain a resilient internal dynamic generating employment and income, particularly in times of economic difficulty

The improvement of welfare services is crucial for the survival of the very poor, and delivery systems could be rationalised to maximise existing benefits

numerous studies have shown that in the majority of cases the informal sector acts as little more than 'a scab' in times of crisis, permitting the continued subsistence of the individual or household. Nonetheless, despite the marginal position of many informal sector operators, efforts to improve growth and employment possibilities may offer significant prospects for alleviating poverty.

Social Services

Racial inequality in social welfare services has been a key issue in the Indaba debate. Researchers concerned with the cost of providing sufficient services have estimated that in view of future population growth in KwaZulu/Natal, it is highly improbable that the regional economy could command the necessary revenue to finance parity between white and black communities. The existing system is far from adequate in the delivery of services, particularly in the rural areas of KwaZulu, and could be improved or rationalised without necessarily aiming for parity. Such a welfare input is crucial to the survival of the very poor in the short-term.

Black households who have neither land for productive purposes nor access to wage labour can only be helped at present by transfer payments. One of the most important of these contributions is state pensions. While it has been shown that the KwaZulu government has a better record of pension payments than the other homelands, substantial room exists for improvement. A more efficient registration and delivery system which allows for a wider coverage of pensions would substantially improve the position of the region's poor. Moreover, the system through which pensions are paid — by mobile teams visiting designated spots every second month — could also be improved. Other social functions such as dealing with magistrates, registering births and deaths, and UIF applications could be carried out at the same time by enlarging the functions of the pension team.

Given the uneven spatial access to physical amenities in African areas (see data base) and the low level at which these are presently supplied, there is also a need for direct government action to upgrade and extend services in KwaZulu, especially in the rural areas. Such actions would have the added spin-off of providing jobs, at least through the construction phase in the delivery of needed services. By combining welfare and developmental objectives, it should be possible to maximise the longer term benefits from such programmes.

Lastly, there are clearly significant gains to be made from the increased provision of education. The educational levels of Africans in South Africa's rural areas are

notoriously low and access to schooling facilities is also very poor. Problems are compounded by the physical quality of educational facilities — classrooms are small and over-crowded, there are insufficient desks, and modern teaching aids such as audio-visual equipment are simply not available.

Moreover, rural primary education in KwaZulu is still provided on the basis of community-financed schools, which places a heavy burden on the poorer areas, the very areas in which the need for education is greatest. An essential ingredient for the development of these areas would be the provision of adequate facilities at least, which should also aim towards the provision of free, compulsory schooling. While the cost may be beyond the regional authority, it remains a priority for those funds derived from the central government.

Conclusion

The success of policies which attempt to make an impact upon KwaZulu/Natal's poor may well be improved by the establishment of some form of joint regional authority to co-ordinate programmes in both the homeland and white South Africa. This is not a prerequisite for success, however.

The issues raised by the Indaba itself and by the debate which has subsequently taken place, reflect the key development concerns at both the regional and national level. By doing so, and in bringing together the region's administrators, the Indaba has provided a loose framework within which policy options can be evaluated and perhaps implemented. In this context, 'mini-indaba's' have proliferated, focusing attention upon a variety of crucial socio-economic concerns.

The Indaba has renewed interest in development issues which in many ways transcend the controversy and need to be addressed on both a regional and national scale. They are not therefore limited to the success or failure of some local 'new dispensation'. While there is a risk that existing oligarchies in KwaZulu/Natal may well become further entrenched by this process, if some of these potential areas for development can be acted upon as a part of (or in spite of) the Indaba debate, it could bring some relief to the region's poor. The lessons may also point the way ahead for dealing with problems of underdevelopment in South Africa as a whole.


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URBAN

M O N I T O R

DESEGREGATING DURBAN'S BEACHFRONT



LAGUNA BEACH
(formerly African Beach Two)

Paddling Pools

TEKWENI BEACH
(formerly African Beach One)

COUNTRY CLUB BEACH
(formerly Indian)

OASIS BEACH
(formerly Coloured)

DUNES BEACH
(formerly Battery Beach Two)

BATTERY BEACH
(formerly Battery Beach One)

SNAKE PARK BEACH

BAY OF PLENTY

NORTH BEACH

Rachel Finlayson Swimming Pool

DAIRY BEACH

Paddling Pools

Amusement Park

West Street Pier

Paddling Pools

SOUTH BEACH

(Whites-Only)



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Leisure Relations on the Beach

By Douglas Booth and Dennis Mbona,
Centre for Social and Development Studies

The 'deracialisation' of Durban's beachfront began in November 1982 when Battery Beach Two was officially opened as a multiracial beach. Three years later the first section of foreshore along Durban's 'Golden Mile' was desegregated. Multiracial facilities then included Snake Park, Bay of Plenty and Dairy beaches as well as the Rachel Finlayson pool and the paddling pools adjacent to Dairy Beach. In December 1987 all beaches between the Umgeni River and the West Street pier were desegregated and appropriately renamed.

Despite these moves, interracial mixing has remained confined to the interface between the 'traditional' black beaches (north of Battery Beach) and the still segregated white beaches (south of the West Street pier). Furthermore, the extent of the interface varies as it expands and contracts relative to the number of black people present on any day. Non-religious public holidays (Boxing Day and New Year's Day) are the most popular days for Africans to visit the beach, and on these occasions the interface not only contracts but moves progressively southward. The problem was expressed by one (white) North Beach resident: 'I am no racist and do not mind swimming with blacks, but not one white to thousands of blacks. I don't look for trouble' (DN 13/1/88).


Leisure Habits

Leisure is widely viewed as the ultimate expressive culture, which is characterised by ideals and values such as free choice, flexibility, spontaneity and self-determination. This interpretation obscures the deeper socio-economic conditions that affect the choices people make about the usage of recreational resources and kinds of leisure activities.

Firstly, income is a prime determinant of leisure tastes and habits. The poor, for instance, experience neither freedom nor choice in leisure. Even access to apparently 'free' resources, such as a beach or park, generally entails some expenditure (eg transportation costs). It is not surprising to learn that black beach users in Durban are particularly attracted by the 'free amenities'.

Secondly, South Africa's peculiar political economy and material inequalities deprive

A conspicuous aspect of the 'deracialisation' of South African society has been the partial desegregation of leisure amenities such as hotels, restaurants, parks and beaches. What happens to interracial social relations at the site of desegregation? Drawing on interviews with beach users and recent newspaper correspondence, the authors focus on the clash between white and black leisure culture on Durban's beachfront.



Billy Paddock

many black people of the recreational resources and time to develop leisure faculties and interests. The lack of opportunity for Africans to develop leisure interests in water sports is one example. Four pools situated at Lamontville, Clermont, Umlazi and Umlazi Glebe currently serve Durban's formal African population of over 826 000 (two pools in KwaMashu are not in use). The ratio of persons per swimming pool would more than triple if the populations of surrounding informal settlements were included.

Lastly, leisure tastes and habits are also shaped by experiences within the social milieu. Institutions such as the family, school, community and workplace act to limit leisure options by stressing the 'correct' utilisation of time, defining roles in terms of gender and age, and specifying modes of dress. Without doing so

Social control through public surveillance underlies the use of open showers, a beach facility which is an anathema to African custom and body culture

The behaviour of white beachgoers is marked by solitariness, behind barricades of magazines and headphones, and specialised swimming or surf sport interests

For African communities, beach visits on public holidays are like a medieval carnival to celebrate an ecstatic release from work and township pressures

consciously, white people display and reinforce their culture and their inculcated social conventions at the beach.

The crowds of whites who flock to Durban's beaches display two essential social characteristics: solitariness and specialised interests. Individuals in crowds block out other people when they barricade themselves behind newspapers, magazines and books or within headphones. At the beach individuals and intimate groups (couples) display solitariness when they mark out territories by arranging towels, umbrellas and deck chairs in 'defensive' formations. Creating space is synonymous with solitariness. As one white beach user comments: 'I don't care what colour skin sits or swims next to me, as long as I have enough space to do my own thing in' (DN 21/1/88).

Specialised interests refer to crowds gathered for specific functions, such as sunbathing at the beach or watching football. On the seashore these activities produce the enforced separation of swimmers from surfers and surfers from fishermen. Specialised interests among white beachgoers attract small crowds and require minimal policing, usually by lifesavers and beach inspectors. More importantly, interest group antagonisms which develop are resolved through the implicit controls that operate within white culture such as individual 'self-discipline' and social convention.

Desegregation challenges these institutional controls, however. Perceptions of larger 'hostile' crowds have been responsible for the transformation of the policing of Durban's foreshore; on public holidays beach crowds are now accompanied by armed riot police and circling police helicopters.

Body Culture

At the beach the body is a symbol of self-discipline and surveillance. The dominant icons promoted by the leisure industry are the young, attractive and healthy person, and the happy family. The cultural imperative is to look, act and feel in conformity with these images. The 'correct' shape, health and sexuality are critical to the sense of 'normality'—thus control over body colour (makeup and suntan creams), appearance (hair and shape), posture (movement and gesture), smell (deodorant and perfume), and adornment constitute the main elements of body discipline, which binds individuals to the social order.

Those who want to preserve the beachfront as a site to reinforce white culture portray the black body as threatening the social order. Newspapers have been inundated with white descriptions of undisciplined black bodies that demonstrate the clash of leisure

cultures:

- 'Crowd (black) behaviour in Durban over Christmas and New Year proves that body respect does not go hand in hand with what people would do when they are given "open house"' (DN 13/1/88 — parenthesis added).

- 'The paddling pools were filled with thousands of blacks of every age and size' (DN 13/1/88).

- 'I don't want to go to the beach and see large black women wearing torn underwear' (DN 10/1/88).

- 'The new beaches (sic) were taken over by hordes of blacks covered with blankets, babies, sleeping bodies, radios and even pots of food' (DN 13/1/88).

- 'What has happened to the happy family groups that one used to see on our beaches?' (NM 13/1/88).

During an interview on North Beach on New Year's Day one respondent (a young white male) complained about black people swimming in underwear. When requested to explain the difference between a woman dressed in low-cut fashion swimwear and one dressed in high-cut underwear, he replied, 'one just has a sense of difference'. The message, of course, is that perceptions of 'the body', regardless of the covering or clothing, reflect real cultural values. Ironically, in the debate over topless sunbathing by white women little mention is made of body form or numbers.

Littering is another anti-social act that is allegedly peculiar to black behaviour. One correspondent surreptitiously compared the black holiday resort at Umgababa, which he described as a 'gigantic rubbish dump', with Durban's unspoiled 'Golden Mile' (NM 9/2/88). These images do not stand up to inspection as a visit to South Beach demonstrates. In fact one interviewee pointed to the truth when she said of South Beach: 'It may be dirty but at least it's white'. Black respondents were scathing of this criticism. One African retorted: 'Can you point to a single dirt box which is not overflowing?'

Beach Carnival

African people view the beach as a site of entertainment, as a place to unite as a crowd and enjoy social interaction. In a number of respects a visit to the beach is comparable to the medieval carnival; an event celebrated as an ecstatic release from work. It is not surprising then that the beach is a popular site among Africans on only two days of the year! Just as the carnival offered escape from the rigid social structures of feudal society, the beach lightens the burden of township life.

As a site of entertainment the beach embodies unrestrained jesting, drollery and a search for pleasure. It is a place of activity, movement and noise; a place of

'all in' games, singing, dancing and partying; a place to express one's emotions. Above all the beach is a place where relationships are built. People search for what they have in common. No one is isolated or rejected; solitariness is virtually unknown.

A number of devices act to enhance sociability, for example, laying blankets on the ground, communal pots of food and drinking beer. Throughout Africa sharing food and drinking beer are the essence of hospitality, sociability and the release of interpersonal tensions. Similarly, African people congregate just above the water-line where they stand together to share their experiences.

Contrary to white beliefs (no doubt encouraged by postcard pictures of bare breasted African maidens), the African body assumes a modesty, even under the rigours of poverty. Bathing in underwear reflects poverty and not immodesty. Bikinis are replaced by loose-fitting one-piece costumes and, away from the shoreline towels and blankets are invariably wrapped around the body. Interestingly, the open shower system, which stresses control by public surveillance, is an anathema to African custom.

In short, communal traditions and customs are expressed in African leisure activity. The human interdependence of township life, so necessary to overcome the effects of shortages of accommodation and high unemployment, extends to social reciprocity and mutuality in recreation.

In contrast to white reaction to desegregation initiatives, black reaction has been overwhelmingly positive. This stems beyond the opportunity 'to enjoy peaceful surroundings', 'to get away from the violence in our places' or 'to enjoy good and attractive amenities which are unknown in the township'. For example, one middle-aged African male said: 'North Beach represents the South Africa I dream of ... a place where there is a mixing of races'. Africans urged whites to mix. One woman said: 'We want whites to stay in their numbers. The beach must be truly nonracial'. Among Indian respondents the general consensus was that beach desegregation is a 'positive reform' and not merely cosmetic.

Negative white attitudes were noted (eg 'whites give us dirty looks') but generally passed over. In one case white attitudes were even justified: 'We must expect a period during which whites will feel insecure. They grew up knowing that they can't mix with us'. The heavy police presence, however, was condemned all round: 'The police look after us in the townships day and night. Why must they look after beachgoers?' Ironically, all racial incidents during summer occurred at whites-only beaches (ie Ansteys, Mtwalume and South beaches).

Durban's Beachfront Line

Newspaper Debates on Beach Desegregation

PRO-INTEGRATION LETTERS	20	(16%)
CONTROLLED INTEGRATION LETTERS	86	(70%)
Solutions to Overcrowding		
(1) Economic Controls:		
pay-beaches	27	
hotel controlled	2	
(2) Control by Force:		
stricter policing	20	
diffusion of resources	6	
transport restrictions	5	
fenced beaches	3	
(3) Unspecified		
	27	
	Sub-total	90
SEPARATE AMENITIES LETTERS	17	(14%)
	Total	123 (100%)

NOTES

Source for Table

Letters to newspapers, 6/1 - 26/2/88. Racial breakdown (Africans - 7; Indians/coloureds - 13; whites - 103). Several correspondents (all races) wrote more than one letter. Africans were unanimously pro-integration; Indians/coloureds unanimously supported more control. Given that letter columns generally encourage critical comment, the failure of blacks to respond could be interpreted as a further indication of their positive, pro-integration sentiments.

● The first category of correspondents above showed unqualified support for the processes of desegregation. Of these twenty letters, six were written by two people (three each), including one African.

● The second category of correspondents suggested more than one form of control in some letters.

Interview Method (see quotes/analysis in text)

Three qualified interviewers undertook a systematic random sample of beach users between 1 and 3 January 1988. A total of 105 individuals and groups (couples, families and congregations) were interviewed using a structured, open-ended questionnaire format. Racial composition: Africans - 46; Indians - 9; whites - 50. A total of 90 hours was spent interviewing and recording events along the foreshore over the three days. The authors have closely monitored developments on the beachfront on a weekly basis since 1985.

Controlled Integration

In the social struggle for the control of Durban's beachfront there has been no shortage of suggestions as to how to maintain the white balance and reduce 'overcrowding' (see box). That this is a euphemism for controlling black access is suggested by comments such as: 'North beach has been overcrowded before without this disgusting anti-social behaviour. The area was a pigsty within hours of the invasion by blacks' (DN 13/1/88).

Apart from the provision of separate amenities (apartheid), economic controls (pay beaches) and control by force are the two most popular proposals. Force refers to strategies to either physically remove

Popular white proposals for economic barriers or policing to reduce beach 'overcrowding' are often euphemisms for limiting black access

The beach as a site where non-racial social relations can be developed will be limited for as long as society is afflicted by apartheid

'undesirable elements' (by policing) or or to 'encourage' them to move elsewhere through penalties (parking restrictions and fines). The diffusion of resources refers to building facilities, ostensibly in unpopular areas. The crudely explicit class and racial overtones of these solutions are obvious. Black leisure tastes are inextricably linked to free amenities and black people do not possess the 'right' cultural capital to partake under the rules of 'right of admission reserved'.

Minimal interracial social interaction has occurred at sites of desegregation. The reason is simple: white South Africans have a deep fear of blacks and of any pattern of behaviour that threatens white perceptions of the naturalness of their own behaviour (Turner 1980: p130). Yet differences in leisure tastes and habits do not reflect a fundamental clash of human values. Rather, they can be understood in rational terms of income, legal prescription and prevailing social institutions. Of course, white fears have been deliberately inculcated by apartheid policies.

Political appeals made to sectional interests that emphasise differences between 'us' and 'them' construct as many obstacles as possible between people. Normal social relationships, on the other hand, are built by politics which stress what people have in common. Leisure relations cannot be divorced from the societal matrix in which they are embedded. The beach as a site where social relations can be developed will be limited for as long as society is afflicted by apartheid. The response of a (white) middle-aged mother interviewed at the integrated paddling pools was illuminating: 'At least our grandchildren will know how to mix, and South Africa will be a better place'.

In the interim, the City Council, instead of searching for race-based solutions (eg, the provision of a free bus service to Laguna and Tekweni Beaches) should be trying to foster non-racial social relations. Although ameliorative, one politically feasible proposal would be to redefine larger sections of the beachfront as sites of carnival-style entertainment for South Africans over the Christmas/New Year week. This could be achieved by rescheduling the Easter fiesta. It was no coincidence that the one public beachfront site with a continuous multiracial presence over the New Year weekend was the amusement park. *INDIA*

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Acronyms

- DN The Daily News
NM The Natal Mercury

THE SKILLS SHORTAGE AND TECHNICAL TRAINING

By Indicator SA
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Although the South African economy's need for skilled manpower has grown rapidly, nearly 60 percent of the total labour force is comprised of unskilled workers (Bethlehem 1987: p36). Yet an expanding economy is reliant on increased industrialisation and higher skills levels, reflected in the close relationship between education and economic growth (World Bank 1980). Drawing on a research investigation into segregated technical colleges and technikons conducted for the SA Institute of Race Relations, Monica Bot discusses some of the constraints that have hampered skills training in South Africa and outlines some policy options.

In several phases of economic development the need for skilled labour in South Africa has far exceeded the actual supply of skilled workers. As a consequence, especially during periods of rapid economic growth, large numbers of skilled personnel have been recruited abroad by management. This option has become difficult and costly, however, with the long-term survival of industry commonly acknowledged to increasingly depend on the local supply of skills.

At present, while there are skills shortages in certain industries, other sectors can cope because of the effects of the recession. Should there be a sustained upturn in the economy, however, the situation will change drastically and acute shortages will be experienced. This has already occurred in the construction industry, for example. Other developments that will play a role in the expected shortage are the initiation of a number of large projects in the region, including the Lesotho highlands water scheme, the Mossel Bay gas project and the opening of new mines. These type of jobs generate further employment for lesser skilled workers in the formal economy, while they also can open opportunities in the informal or self-employment sector.

Manpower Projections

The main source of skilled manpower in South Africa will shift from the white to the black population as the former group declines in numbers through emigration and a lower growth rate. The white community has reached saturation point in supplying manpower for the professional and technical occupation group, and the situation is 'even more desperate as far as managerial and administrative occupations are concerned' (*Business Day* 14/3/88). Over the years, the white population has virtually stagnated because it is an old population with 50 percent older than 35 years, while the black population has grown at a rapid rate with 50 percent under the age of fifteen (Cristo Nel, Symposium in May 1987).

Projections by the Institute for Futures Research (Dostal 1986) indicate that the annual output of white matriculants will drop from 63 000 to 53 000 between 1984 and 2000, while there will be an increase of 146 000 African matriculants (to 186 000), of 6 800 coloured matriculants (to 18 700), and of 4 700 Indian matriculants (to 14 400). The 'already inadequate pool of highly trained whites now forming the vital growth-creating nucleus of industry and commerce will shrink even more. Potential entrepreneurs and executives will increasingly have to be drawn from the other race groups, or from other countries' (*The Star* 23/1/87).

Projections based on a (low) two percent average annual growth rate indicate that by the year 2000, there will be a shortage of 200 000 workers with a degree, diploma or a comparable skill level. At the same time, there will be a surplus of 3,8m workers with standard 8-10 or a comparable skill level and a surplus of 5,6m workers with less than standard 8 or a comparable skill level (ibid). Among the executive and managerial group, a shortage of 103 000 people is estimated for the year 2000; and among professional, technical and other skilled people, a shortage of 442 000 people (Sadie 1983).

Some Causes

The skills shortage in South Africa can be attributed partly to past neglect and the low level of interest in vocational education in favour of academic education. Nevertheless, there has been a steady improvement in numbers over the years, with a compound growth in student numbers at technical and related institutions between 1970 and 1985 of nearly 29 percent for all race groups, excluding the TBVC homelands (RSA Statistics in Brief 1987). The number of people being trained in a technical field is still far too low, however.

The continuing preference for academic education is apparent from figures given by the Minister of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) — during 1985 there were 138 000 white students at university, 32 000 at technikons and 37 000 at technical colleges (*Cape Times* 25/10/86). A total 75 percent of white graduates have a general educational background, whereas the marketplace can absorb only 40 percent of them. Among African graduates, the corresponding figures are 95 percent with a 20 percent absorption capacity (*The Citizen* 25-27/10/86).

One factor that has undoubtedly played a significant role in the industrial skills shortage is the legacy of earlier race restrictions in restricting training and certain categories of work for African workers. Although barriers have been removed, government provision was not made for the training of skilled African employees in white areas or the establishment of public training centres until 1976, when the Bantu Employees In-Service Training Act was passed (SAIRR 1976: p359). The findings of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions led to the removal of race-based job reservation, and the first Africans were indentured as apprentices in 1980.

Wide disparities exist between the number of educational facilities available for the different race groups, especially when viewed against comparative population figures (see data base). Despite the underprovision for black students in certain areas, their admission to white institutions occurs as the exception rather than rule. Segregation at all educational levels goes hand in hand with worker and employer suspicions about the inequality of standards, which further hampers improvement. In addition, the intake of trainees and apprentices by employers where there are no facilities available to certain race groups means that trainees must be sent further away, thereby increasing travel and accommodation costs. Lastly, segregated institutions prepare students for employment in a racially structured labour market, whereas employer-based training

South Africa's white community has reached saturation point in supplying manpower for the professional and technical occupation group

The skills shortage is partly explained by segregation, former job reservation and the low interest in vocational education in favour of academic education

Table 1

Provision of Technical Education by Race Group

	TOTAL POPULATION (revised for undercount)	NUMBER OF	
		Technikons	Technical Colleges
AFRICANS	24 901 139	3	43
COLOUREDS	*2 881 362	1	7
INDIANS	*878 300	1	2
WHITES	*4 961 062	8	72

NOTE

* Figures have been adjusted to include the small percentage of Indians, coloureds and whites estimated to be living in the independent homelands.
Source for population figures: Race Relations Survey 1986: p2.

Table 2

The Geographical Spread of Technikons (1987)

	CAPE	NTL	OFS	TVL	TKEI	BOP	CKEI	KZ
AFRICANS				1	*1	1	*1	1
COLOUREDS	1							
INDIANS		1						
WHITES	2	1	1	4				

NOTE

* A technikon is in the process of being established.

Table 3

The Geographical Spread of Technical Colleges (1987)

	CAPE	NTL	OFS	TVL	GaZ	KaN	KwaN	KZ	LEB	QWA	TKEI	BOP	VEN	CKEI
AFRICANS	4	2	2	12	1	1	1	5	5	1	*3	*3	1	*2
COLOUREDS	5	1		1										
INDIANS		2												
WHITES	22	9	5	36										

NOTE

* 1985 figure.

Compiled from:

DNE: Preliminary Education Statistics for 1987: p31

DET: Information on Education and Training at Technical Colleges, January 1987.

increasingly reflect the needs of an integrated economy.

At present, black admission to white technical colleges is subject to conditions determined by the director-general, which is usually granted on a permit basis, while at technikons a quota system applied until last year. Because of the difficulty of applying the quota and growing resistance to this system by college staff and employers, Minister Clase stated last year that he was holding talks with rectors of eight technikons about a new admission policy for black students, which would be 'in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the constitution' (*The Star* 1/9/87).

Pending completion of the discussions, the quota system was not being applied (*Natal Witness* 1/9/87).

Problems will continue to be experienced in areas where there are insufficient numbers of students from a certain race group. Within the tricameral policy framework there is the wasteful expense of providing separate facilities for different race groups, especially at technikon level, compounded by a major shortage of qualified staff. All of these factors impose severe constraints on solutions to overcome South Africa's skills shortage, such as the rapid expansion of technical facilities.

Employer Cutbacks

While the various education departments are placing a greater emphasis on technical and vocational education, industry in general has reduced training output due to the economic recession. Between 1984 and 1986, the total number of valid apprenticeship contracts that were registered declined from 37 130 to 29 826. The National Manpower Commission states in its annual report that 'even in the event of an economic upswing the number of apprentices that achieve artisan status will continue to decrease for some time' (1986: p74). The Director-General of Manpower, Piet van der Merwe, called on employers and industrial training boards to indenture larger numbers of apprentices because the decline is 'tantamount to short-circuiting oneself' (*Business Day* 23/11/87).

During interviews conducted by the author, many staffmembers of technikons and technical colleges mentioned that in technological subjects departments are not filled to capacity, and many institutions are under-utilised in general. While many employers have cut back on training the private demand for education in commercial subjects has increased, as evidenced by the 100 percent growth rate per annum in student numbers at the correspondence technikon (*The Star* 13/8/86) and the increase in the number of private students at technikons and technical colleges. In the technological fields, however, practical employer-based training has to be completed before a diploma can be obtained. In this way the unwillingness of some employers to provide training can severely hamper student aspirations.

The decrease in employer-based training seems to have hit the black population hardest, the very group who are supposed to become the major supplier of skills. Whereas in 1982, 10 659 new white and 3 838 new black apprenticeship contracts were registered, in 1986 the corresponding figures were 8 032 and 1 628 — a total decrease from 26 percent to 17 percent. Reasons cited for this racial imbalance during interviews were largely educational; with a lower intake employers could be more selective, and white candidates generally had a higher standard of education.

The educational requirements or selection criteria applied by employers were often felt to be too high, however. In certain geographical areas and in certain industries, resistance among white workers to black skilled labour was also seen to play a role in retarding training efforts. Further, the unavailability of nearby technical institutions for trainees from a specific race group adversely affected employer support for skills training.

Policy Options

There is a widespread recognition that South Africa needs to rapidly improve the skills level of its workforce for economic growth and for increasing employment opportunities in an increasingly complex economy. The recession has resulted in a widespread cutback in skills training, however, which will become a severe handicap when the economy improves.

It seems that the only way out of a catch-22 dilemma is to decrease the dependence of training intake and programmes on employers and economic cycles. This could be done by placing the provision of practical training in the hands of technikons and technical colleges, which will involve a great deal of finance because of the expense of providing equipment. It would then become vital to centralise specific kinds of training at certain institutions, and to remove any racial restrictions on admissions.

The establishment of industrial training boards, announced early in 1987, will place the administration of artisan training in the hands of organised industry. Hopefully, these bodies will plan and provide training based on long-term needs in their respective industries, and in addition, they will exert more effective pressure on government to open technical institutions. Initially, in an area where there is no African college or technikon employers should insist that the student is automatically accepted, subject to academic criteria only.

The case for the integration of all technical education, however necessary from the perspective of a non-racial labour market, will depend to a large extent on increasing the number of students and trainees. Until there is the real pressure of numbers, it will be difficult to persuade government of the need to change from a race-based admission policy.

Lastly, the demand for skills training will grow as a consequence of the widely recognised need for improved skills, the prospect of better job opportunities, and the government's increased emphasis on stimulating interest in technical education. The under-provision for some race groups in certain areas, especially for Africans, will then become more of a constraint, viewed against the already existing problems of poor accessibility to facilities, the need for rationalisation by government and a shortage of qualified staff. In order to improve the level of skills and training, all barriers must be removed to allow students of all races to utilise available facilities to the optimal extent. *IPSA*

The widespread cutback in skills training by employers during the recession will become a severe handicap to economic recovery and employment growth

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Opposition Feuds, State Crack

	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Negotiations, Rent Boycotts, Activist Detentions</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Pietermaritzberg Clashes, Sporadic Violence</i>
1987 NOV <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>2/5 Nov In KwaMashu the president-elect of Methodist Church is detained under ISA/529. In Grahamstown 70 black municipal policemen are dismissed after complaining their wages are lower than kitskonstabels (township unrest police). Former ANC leader Govan Mbeki released after 23 years in prison; 5 others released incl PAC's John Nkosi, the first political prisoner given a life sentence, and 2 right-wing AWB supporters. In Pmb UDF and Inkatha leaders meet to discuss ways of ending 7 months of interfactional violence in region's townships.</p> <p>7/9 Nov In Soweto SADF act to prevent unveiling ceremony for 26 victims shot dead in White City rent evictions (Aug 1986), 2 000 attend. In CT 24 women march on Parliament to demand release of family members from detention.</p> <p>13 Nov In Pmb 2 senior UDF officials, Martin Wittenburg and Skumbuzo Ngwenya are detained with 10 others during peace talks with Inkatha; UDF and Cosatu estimate 200 of their Midlands supporters now detained.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov Death toll for Sept/Oct in Pmb and Midland township violence is 143, with 223 fatalities in 1987 so far, after 6 more people killed in Ashdown, Caluza, Sinating and Georgetown. Unrest reported elsewhere in Bruntville (Mool-River), Atteridgeville (Pia) and Zamdela (Sasolburg).</p> <p>6/13 Nov Interfacine violence continues, with 2 fatalities in KwaNdengezi (Pinetown), Hammarsdale (3), Pmb townships (9), and 4 abducted men found murdered in Ashdown. In Khayelitsha (CT) a kitskonstabel and 2 teenage girls are shot dead.</p>
NOV <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>16/18 Nov In Pmb, a further 18 UDF and Cosatu members are detained 2 days before peace talks begin, incl 2 key negotiators, Mkhize and Dladla; 29 people arrested in Edendale and Plessislaer. In Orlando West (Soweto), SADF/SAP and municipal police raid houses, give residents 3 days to pay rent arrears or face eviction.</p> <p>19/20 Nov Two Pmb UDF leaders, Ngwenya and Wittenburg released from detention; 34 Inkatha members detained in new crackdown. In Emdeni (Soweto) raids continue to help council break rent boycott. In Pta security police detain at least 6 black consciousness leaders.</p> <p>21/25 Nov UDF/Inkatha peace talks hosted by Pmb Chamber of Commerce get underway. In Regina Mundi service (Soweto), UDF leaders attempt to resolve rent crisis. Soweto City Council claims more than R143 000 collected since issue of eviction warnings four months ago. During boycott 384 rent defaulters evicted but 164 reinstated after some payment. Azapo's Jhb head office is raided by security police. In Sekhukhuneland (Labowa) 4 Azaso members are detained; in the Ciskei wife of UDF's Rev Stofile and 5 others detained.</p>	<p>16/19 Nov In violent struggle for control of KTC, 3 people die in clashes between W Cape Civic Assoc and Masincedane Committee. Pmb violence claims 4 more lives; more than 500 homemade weapons confiscated by police and 500 arrests in past 2 months. In KwaDindi 2 KwaZulu policemen are injured in shootout with SAP. Violence also reported in Ratonda (Heidelberg), Kallehong (E Rand), Azadville (Krugersdorp), KwaMakulha (Durban).</p> <p>21/25 Nov More Pmb fatalities in Taylors Halt, Ashdown, Mpumuzu, Inadi, Sweetwaters and Mpumalanga; violence also reported in Smero, Imballi, Dambuza, Esibuso, Edendale and Slangspruit. In KwaShange, attack on Inkatha members leaves 13 dead.</p> <p>26/27 Nov Two residents die in Ashdown and Shongweni, Natal Midlands.</p> <p>28/30 Nov In Pmb 10 deaths reported over weekend and police disperse crowd in city. In Soweto, a crime prevention swoop by 539 police nets 241 residents. In Pmb townships 4 more fatalities in Myandu, Sweetwaters and Willowfountains, brings Midlands death toll to 61 in Nov (compared to 17 in Aug, 60 in Sept, and 83 in Oct).</p>
DEC <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/6 Dec At Diepkloof prison 120 detainees sign a memorandum demanding their release. In Jhb offices of anti-apartheid groups in Khotso house are raided by security police, pamphlets calling for 'People's Christmas against the Emergency' are seized. UDF peace rally in Edendale is attended by 10 000 people after anti-UDF pamphlets are distributed, amid speculation about third force role. In Athlone (CT), Mbeki Reception Committee (MRC) offices are raided by security police and materials seized.</p> <p>7/8 Dec In PE, stickers with 'Welcome our Boys back from Angola' are distributed in name of ECC. In Jhb, exec UDF member Molabi is detained. In Durban, 2 brothers from Chesterville are charged with terrorism, attempting to set up street and area committees. CT magistrate refuses permission for Mbeki rally.</p> <p>9/11 Dec Second round of Pmb peacetalks hosted by Chamber of Commerce deadlock over document issued by breakaway ANC faction, calling for destruction of Uwusa and Inkatha. In PE the regional co-ordinator of Idasa is detained. From Jhb prison 93 detainees petition the Minister of Law and Order for their release, incl 15 youth under 18 years.</p> <p>12 Dec In CT, 3 week ban placed on MRC meetings.</p>	<p>1/6 Dec In Pmb townships 7 fatalities, several injuries and houses burnt, 3 decapitated bodies found in Willowfountain. In Kagiso an executive member of Krugersdorp Residents Association, charged with sedition, is found stabbed to death.</p> <p>7/8 Dec In Taylors Halt (Pmb), a large group of men bussed into township go on rampage killing 7 and damaging property; police arrest 28 people, totals 1 120 charged with unrest-related offences in region. In Tjoksville (Uitenhage) a man is beaten to death, 6 youths have been killed in clashes since mid-Nov.</p> <p>9 Dec In New Crossroads (CT) 2 kitskonstabels are injured by gunman. In Sebokeng (Vaal Triangle) an armed mutiny by 60 Lekoa Council police is put down by SAP, with 8 injured and 19 arrested after refusing to obey white commander, who is suspended later.</p> <p>12/13 Dec In Motherwell (PE) the bodies of 2 municipal policemen are found. In Meadowlands (Soweto) 2 policemen are shot dead and 4 injured in AK-47 attack. In Midland townships, 6 people are killed in Mpumalanga, Edendale, Taylors Halt, Willowfountain, Sabantu and Camperdown. In Clermont (Pinetown) a man is stabbed to death after a house is petrolbombed.</p>
DEC <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>16 Dec Heroes Day/Day of the Vow/Day of the Africanists. In Pmb Inkatha hold peace rally at Taylors Halt and Cosatu/UDF hold report-back meeting on peacetalks. In PE, the official launch of Ama-Afrika is attended by UDF affiliates in attempt to end township violence. Diepmeadow Town Council is dissolved and former mayor of Soweto appointed as administrator, after council fails to recover outstanding rents or keep financial records in order. Diepkloof and Meadowlands residents owe about R145m in arrears.</p> <p>19/20 Dec In CT 3 SADF national servicemen are arrested under Defence Act.</p> <p>23/24 Dec Soweto Civic Assoc says residents who have rented houses for 15 years have paid for homes, while other houses should be sold at reasonable rates, all with fair service charges. Lekoa Town clerk Nik Louw is fired after suspension of Cpt de Bruins over confrontation between municipal police and SAP. KwaNdebele police release Prince Mahlangu, secretary of Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA.</p> <p>25 Dec Six ISA detainees escape from Protea police station (Soweto).</p> <p>28/31 Dec Ibhayi Town Council taken over by white administrator. Soweto council says illegal reconnection of electricity has cost them more than R3m, council's removal of meter boxes cuts off supply. During 1987 a total of 147 DET schools were hit by boycotts or disturbances.</p>	<p>15/17 Dec Continued violence in Pmb townships claims 4 more lives. In Nyanga (CT), a police constable is shot dead and 2 injured. In Pta former offices of AWB are burnt after Supreme Court orders them to vacate premises.</p> <p>18 Dec In Nyanga (CT), shooting and grenade attack at police station injures 10 kitskonstabels and 2 civilians. Three more fatalities in Pmb.</p> <p>19/20 Dec Unrest is reported in Soweto (PE), man is burnt to death, in Kutlwanong (Odendaalsrus), police injured when stoned, and in Khutsong.</p> <p>22 Dec At Henley Dam (Pmb) 4 people die in attack on Uwusa member's household, in nearby Ezakheni, police report death after man sets himself alight.</p> <p>25/27 Dec In Pmb clashes another 12 people die. Tribal faction fighting in Natal areas of Kranskop, Molweni, Cole and Bulwer leaves 16 people dead. Violence reported in Clermont and KwaMashu (Dbn), where police shoot dead man.</p> <p>28/31 Dec In Chesterville (Dbn) a man is shot and burnt to death. Violence reported in Motherwell (PE), Retreat and Bonteheuwel (CT). Eight more fatalities in Deda, Slangspruit, Taylors Halt, Dindi, and 5 more in Sinating in an ambush of mourners at a funeral. Final 1987 death toll in Pmb and Midland townships is 402, Dec the most violent month with 113 fatalities (at least 30 since Xmas).</p>
1988 JAN <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>4 Jan In Grahamstown, Sached offices are burnt by arsonists. Diepmeadow Town Council issues warning notices to residents to settle rent arrears, no evictions in area so far.</p> <p>6/7 Jan In Jhb police ban all meetings to celebrate the 76th ANC anniversary and the release of Mbeki. One detainee on hunger strike hospitalised since mid-Dec.</p> <p>8/10 Jan In Pmb Inkatha and UDF release a joint statement calling on members to stop committing acts of violence, catholic churches hold vigils to pray for peace.</p> <p>13 Jan All 17 Manguang (Bloem) councillors appear before OFS Provincial Exco to face charges of misconduct, allegedly incl unauthorised expenditure, failure to make residents pay service charges, and budget deficit. Official Pmb death toll rises to 44 since 1 Jan after woman dies in Taylors Halt. Pmb police conference claims 246 fatalities in 1 002 unrest incidents and 605 arrests since Sept 1987.</p>	<p>1 Jan In Pmb townships 26 people die in New Years Day violence. In Dedesiwa (Beaufort West) a 14 yr-old boy is shot dead by police. In Durban trains are stoned at 3 stations after race riots on beaches, in Guguletu (CT) a kitskonstabel is shot and injured, and in Rini (Grahamstown) a municipal policeman is stabbed to death.</p> <p>4/5 Jan More fatalities in Pmb clashes, in Mbabu (3), Elandskop (1), Smero (1), Taylors Halt (1), Deda (1), Edendale (1) and Willowfountain (3). In Walmer (PE) a UDF supporter is killed, and in Botksstabelo (Bloem) 6 people are arrested stoning buses after fare hike.</p> <p>6/7 Jan Another 5 people die in Pmb clashes and youth is killed in KwaNdengezi (Pinetown). Two black consciousness supporters killed in Walmer (PE) in renewed feuding. In Diepkloof (Soweto) the house of a security force member is petrolbombed.</p> <p>8/10 Jan In New Brighton a man is stabbed to death. In Sabantu (Pmb) a man is</p>

down November 1987-March 1988


Government Response	Black Nationalist Activity	1987
<i>Bans, Restrictions, Court Interdicts</i>	<i>Insurgent Shootouts & Sabotage</i>	NOV
<p>3/9 Nov In Pmb Supreme Court, 3 Slangspruit and 9 Harewood residents seek urgent interdicts to restrain Chief Zuma, an Inkatha leader from attempting to kill or assault them. David Ntombela, local Inkatha chairman of Maswazi, and 7 others ordered to show why restraining order should not be imposed, in application by Mkhize family after murder of 2 members.</p> <p>Pta Supreme Court dismisses applications for release of KwaNdebele royal heir, Prince Cornelius Mahlangu, and KwaNdebele businessman. PE Supreme Court sentences Zwide resident to death for necklacing murder of policeman in Sept 1985.</p> <p>10/11 Nov Jhb magistrate serves subpoenae on doctor to reveal identities of patients he treated for injuries received in detention. Minister of Law and Order offers R40 000 out-of-court settlement to widow of Mabopane (Pta) resident who died hours after surrendering to police in 1986. Grahamstown Supreme Court grants interdict restraining 14 kitskonstabels from assaulting or detaining 8 Holmeyr residents. Pta Supreme Court acquits 15 yr-old youth of necklacing 71 yr-old man. Wynberg court fines policeman R1 100 for culpable homicide, driving his casspir over a shack in Langa, killing occupant.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov London High Court grants injunction to restrain former SA man from conspiring to kidnap or assault ANC members in England. CT Supreme Court refuses to grant prisoner-of-war status to ANC member Petane. Same application in Pmb Supreme Court for 4 accused in terrorism trial is also turned down. Bluehills substation on old Pta/Jhb road is damaged by bomb blast. In Pta Magistrate's Court, a security policeman admits assaulting 1 of 7 alleged PAC members facing terrorism charges.</p> <p>10/14 Nov Mbabane magistrate fines ANC member for illegally entering Swaziland and possessing firearms. British Foreign Office officials meet ANC London representative for talks. In Walvis Bay an explosive device in post office injures employee. In Camps Bay (CT) an explosion in rubbish bin injures SADF member on 75th commemorative roadrun. In the W Tvl 3 people are arrested at roadblock and firearms seized.</p>	1st & 2nd weeks
<p>16/20 Nov Rand Supreme Court dismisses application for release of Zwelakhe Sisulu, New Nation editor. East London magistrate acquits policeman on charges of assaulting 7 yr-old. In Pmb Supreme Court, 4 Inkatha members restrained from committing acts of violence against 2 Imbali residents.</p> <p>23/27 Nov Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses second appeal by Mamelodi Town Council against earlier court ruling that 1984 rent increases were invalid. Pmb Supreme Court restrains police from killing or assaulting UDF negotiator, Dladla. Bisha Supreme Court grants Mdantsane (Ciskei) resident interdict against police torture. In PE police ban Mbeki rally after earlier approval is granted by local magistrate. In Pta, Minister of Home Affairs invokes new emergency regulations against New Nation newspaper, paving the way for later 3-month banning.</p> <p>28/30 Nov In Namakgale (Lebowa), Nactu president and 54 FBWU workers are detained after meeting is banned. In the Transkei, ex-president Kaiser Matanzima is detained, following the September 1987 coup which ousted prime-minister George Matanzima.</p>	<p>16/22 Nov In South Hills (Jhb) a limpetmine is defused in the post office. In Soweto, Zola municipal offices are damaged by a bomb. Near Zeerust (W Tvl) an anti-tank mine is uncovered.</p> <p>23 Nov In the Ottoshoop district a landmine is defused. In Umlazi 2 ANC members and an alleged collaborator are killed by police using grenades, 2 policemen injured. Near CT station a limpetmine is defused. Pretoria sends warning note to Botswana over 'large scale ANC infiltration'. Nigeria offers military training facilities to black nationalists from South Africa.</p> <p>25 Nov Piet Retief terror trialist, Ebrahim, sues Minister of Law and Order for kidnapping, unlawful detention and torture. A senior MK member, Ebrahim was abducted, along with Swiss couple and Swazi national, by security forces from Swaziland in Dec 1986. In Piet Retief area 2 landmines are uncovered.</p> <p>30 Nov In Dube (Soweto) 3 limpetmine blasts damage police training centre and barracks.</p>	NOV 3rd & 4th weeks
<p>1/3 Dec Ka-Gapane (Lebowa) magistrate indefinitely postpones inquest into N Tvl student leader Ramapole, who died on 19 Oct 1985 after being arrested by Lebowa police. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining police from assaulting or killing Mpumalanga court clerk. Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses appeal by 'the Sharpeville Six' against death sentences for killing of a Lekoo deputy mayor (Sept 1984); in the past 2 years 44 people sentenced to death in political violence trials, with 5 executed. (During 1987, 164 people were executed in Pretoria prison, highest number since 1910.) Pta Supreme Court sentences 2 former security policemen to 14 yrs jail, for spying for ANC. Dbn Supreme Court convicts Umlazi youth of murder of policeman.</p> <p>7/11 Dec Pta Supreme Court orders release of a former KwaNdebele magistrate, who is immediately rearrested. Pta magistrate finds SADF member not guilty of attempted murder of witness to Ribiero's killing (Dec 1985) in Mamelodi.</p> <p>12/14 Dec Rand Supreme Court dismisses application for release of UDF leaders Morobe and Moosa. Mbeki restricted to PE magisterial district and prohibited from giving press interviews. CT Supreme court sentences kitskonstabel to death for murdering man in Crossroads, no indemnity under emergency regulations.</p>	<p>9 Dec In Mbabane 4 ANC members are arrested in Swazi police raid. In Soweto (PE) 4 suspected ANC members are killed in shootout with security forces. In CT, ANC leader Petane is imprisoned for 17 years in terrorism trial.</p> <p>12/14 Dec In QwaQwa a suspected insurgent is arrested, and in Swaziland paramilitary police raid ANC homes in Mbabane.</p>	DEC 1st & 2nd weeks
<p>16 Dec At Nylstroom prison, 25 detainees write open letter to Minister of Law and Order to demand release before Xmas. In East London ECC chairperson is detained with a UCT researcher.</p> <p>22/29 Dec Pta Supreme Court orders SA government and KwaNdebele to release 3 detained activists; arrests and detention are unlawful as the three were taken from Jhb by homeland police. Also orders KwaNdebele to release 2 schoolteachers from detention.</p> <p>31 Dec General Holomisa, head of Transkei's defence force, stages second coup in homeland in 3 months, ousting Stella Sigcau.</p> <p>A total of 9 194 people were detained in 1987, and an estimated 25 000 detained since emergency was declared in June 1986. During 1987 more than 1 338 youths under the age of 18 were detained under the emergency regulations, but only 343 charged. About 50% of all those detained in 1987 were released without being charged, 75% of known detainees were brought to court and only 3,46% convicted.</p>	<p>15 Dec Near Bloemfontein a suspected ANC insurgent is killed when his own grenade detonates at a roadblock. In Emdeni (Soweto) a house is damaged in another grenade explosion.</p> <p>17 Dec A Soweto cinema is damaged by an explosive device.</p> <p>29/30 Dec In QwaQwa police arrest another alleged ANC insurgent and 2 locally trained members. In Kroonstad, Dutch ANC member Pastoors - linked to Ebrahim trial in Messina - is caught while allegedly attempting to escape from prison. Police figures for the first 9 months of 1987 show '132 trained terrorists arrested and 32 killed', with 195 guerilla attacks between Jan and Oct.</p>	DEC 3rd & 4th weeks
<p>8/11 Jan PE magistrate finds KwaZakele resident was unlawfully detained and assaulted by Ibhayi municipal policeman. Sarhwi president and 6 officials released on eve of court challenge, detained under ISA/S29 for over 6 months after railway strike.</p> <p>13 Jan Farmer mayor of Thokoza township and town clerk are charged with theft from town council.</p>	<p>8/11 Jan In Francistown (Botswana) an ANC member is shot dead by an unknown gunman. In Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) 2 people die in a car bomb explosion outside an ANC residence.</p> <p>12 Jan In Soweto an ANC insurgent is shot dead by police and 6 'collaborators' arrested. In Carletonville, a high school is damaged by an explosion. In the Transkei a detainee, former MK and Sactu official, is shot dead by security forces.</p>	1988 JAN 1st & 2nd weeks

	Non-Collaboration Politics <i>Negotiations, Rent Boycotts, Activist Detentions</i>	Civil Unrest <i>Pietermaritzberg Clashes, Sporadic Violence</i>
1988		shot dead, with unrest also in KwaMakhuta (Dbn) and Rockville (Soweto). 11/12 Jan In Boipatong (Vaal Triangle) security forces shoot dead 1 man; in Sweetwaters (Pmb) a youth is stabbed to death, with unrest in Forty Second Hills (Harrismith). In CT townships 3 security patrols are shot at in Khayelitsha and Nyanga.
JAN <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>15 Jan In Tshiawello (Soweto), 6 families evicted for rent arrears. Paarl magistrate postpones funeral of youth killed in police action in Dec. Education officials claim 100% turnout of African pupils as primary and secondary schools reopen.</p> <p>20/21 Jan In Jhb, RMC offices are raided by security police and material seized. In Soweto rent evictions continue in Klipspruit, Naledi and Tshiawello.</p> <p>25 Jan Pmb Chamber of Commerce meets with Chief Minister of KwaZulu in ongoing peace initiative. In Jhb, Sahrwu shop steward is released from 9 months detention after 33-day hunger strike; 11 shop stewards still in detention after pre-May 1987 election strike. In Dbn, Cosatu regional secretary for S Natal is detained.</p> <p>26/27 Jan In PE, 5 000 municipal tenants owe over R1,25m in rents, 12 families evicted during Jan. Soweto City Council continues to employ SADF/SAP in rent raids, claims highest success rate. In Taylors Halt (Pmb) bus drivers stop work after bus driver is shot, 10 killed since May 1987. Uitenhage town clerk to take action against rent defaulters in shack areas.</p> <p>28/31 Jan Minister of Law and Order says no children younger than 14 yrs held under emergency regulations, one 14 yr-old held, and 'a few' aged 15 and 16 yrs. In Mannenberg (CT) 3 teachers and a pupil are detained.</p> <p>After 15 000 Inkatha members attend Sweetwaters rally, raid on UDF area, Ashdown, leads to more clashes and stayaway on 1 Feb by workers to guard property.</p>	<p>15/17 Jan Pmb unrest fatalities in Hammarsdale (1), Taylors Halt (1), Mpumulanga (1), Mpumzu (1), Mafunzi (3), and Mafakadini (1). In Enhalakahle (Greytown) violence 3 people, incl a baby, are killed. In Bongolethu (Oudtshoorn) 3 people are killed in clashes with police, unrest also in Matlawangwang (Steynsburg), Sebokeng and Michausdal (Cradock). In Mdantsana (EL), police disperse mourners at funeral of anti-apartheid campaigner and 3 yr-old daughter killed 3 weeks ago.</p> <p>18/19 Jan In Mpumulanga 6 men are killed in 2 AK-47 attacks, with another 6 fatalities in Sweetwaters, Henley Dam, Taylors Halt, KwaShange and Elandskop (Pmb). Violence reported in Sakhile (Standerton) and KwaNdengezi (Pinetown).</p> <p>20/24 Jan In Pmb townships 2 youths killed, with 11 more deaths over weekend. Violence also in Ikakeng (Potchefstroom), Bethal, and Kokstad where man is killed after cars are stoned. In Crossroads (CT) a kitskonstabel is shot, 14th injured in area since Dec.</p> <p>25 Jan Four people die in Pmb townships. In Soweto, Siculo Dlomo, a DPSC worker is found shot dead, detained previous week over foreign TV interview.</p> <p>27/28 Jan Pmb violence claims 6 more lives. Violence erupts again in KTC camp after hit squad assassinates Masincedane clan leader and destroys property of 2 other members. Violence reported in Bongolethu and Niha (Lindley OFS).</p> <p>29/31 Jan In KTC clashes at least 5 fatalities and 300 homeless after 50 shacks burnt, residents flee area. Another 14 people die in Pmb feuds, reaching 161 death toll in Jan, the worst month of clashes.</p>
FEB <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/3 Feb Ashdown (Pmb) residents stay away from work to protect homes after Inkatha members go on rampage in UDF-aligned township. Four people die, with more police reinforcements brought in as 700's flee Ashdown and Mpumzu. Sobantu (Pmb) high school closed, with clashes feared between UDF and Azapo/Azasm. Police arrest 46 people in Pmb city centre after 700 Inkatha youths bussed into town attack Cosatu offices. In CT, 1 000's of pupils return to school after 3 week delay over late registration issue. In Soweto, DET refuses to release matric results to former detainees.</p> <p>4 Feb Rent boycott by Soweto residents since June 1986 has cost council R132m in arrears, town clerk Malan says 30% of residents now paying rents. Mayor of Altheridgeville and 2 councillors suspended over irregularities.</p> <p>10/11 Feb In Pmb, UDF Midlands secretary Wittenburg and Ngwenya, members of peace committee, are redetained with 3 other UDF officials.</p> <p>12/14 Feb In Sweetwaters (Pmb), a 70 yr-old man is killed after supporting court application against Inkatha on 12 Feb, wife and daughter injured. Official records show 234 people under 18 yrs in detention in SA, 169 from Natal. During 1987, 1 338 people under 18 were detained and only 343 were charged.</p>	<p>1/2 Feb Renewed fighting in KTC squatter camp claims another life, over 400 shacks destroyed in past 5 days leave 3 000 homeless. In Gugulethu (CT) a man is stoned to death.</p> <p>3/4 Feb In Ashdown and Taylors Halt (Pmb), 2 people stabbed to death, and in Mpumulanga a policeman and friend are shot dead. KTC patrolled by armed Masincedane supporters, to enforce curfew after 6 deaths.</p> <p>5/7 Feb More fatalities in Pmb (3) and KwaNdengezi (Pinetown); a Cayco member is killed in KTC. In KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) a man is shot dead by municipal police; unrest also in Sharpeville and Wesslton (Ermelo).</p> <p>8/10 Feb In Protea (Soweto) a youth is shot dead after attack on municipal police; violence also in KwaThema (Springs) and Emoyolweni (Hofmeyr). Coup in Bophuthatswana put down by SADF who reinstate President Mangope.</p> <p>11/12 Feb In Clermont (Pinetown), wife of advocate is shot dead outside her shop; in Hammarsdale, a pupil is abducted by armed men from classroom and shot dead.</p> <p>13/14 Feb In Kakamas (N Cape), police shoot dead 2 children (4 and 14 yrs), allegedly throwing stones during narcotics raid - police sergeant later suspended. In Stutterheim a man is shot dead by police. More fatalities in Pmb, Caluza (1), Shongweni (2), Taylors Halt (4), KwaNdengezi (3).</p>
FEB <i>2nd & 3rd weeks</i>	<p>16 Feb In White City (Soweto), 15 more families evicted for non-payment of rent and furniture confiscated; town clerk claims arrears of R200m, SCA disputes figures. In CT more than 150 teachers ordered to return to work after occupying DET offices for 2 hours.</p> <p>17 Feb White City residents stay away from work to resist evictions, police disperse 1 000 people outside municipal offices after 28 families are evicted.</p> <p>18 Feb CT teachers at black schools return to classes after refusing to teach for 3 days, protesting DET refusal to extend deadline for late registration of pupils.</p> <p>20/23 Feb In Gugulethu police confiscate coffin of KTC violence victim, claim funeral restrictions not complied with; in KTC 4 members of church mediating committee arrested and charged with arson. At Soshanguve technikon (Pta) 1 700 students on boycott sent home, after police action in which 68 students are assaulted. In KwaThema the national organiser of Azasm is detained. W Cape chairman of NECC released after 1 month in detention. Minister of Law and Order releases names of 976 more people detained for over 30 days under emergency regulations.</p> <p>24/25 Feb In wake of new state crackdown, 100's of activists go into hiding after restriction orders are placed on 18 people and many groups. In CT, 4 detainees released, incl UDF's Zoli Malindi and Christmas Tinto, all served with restriction orders.</p> <p>26 Feb Soweto debt for water and electricity is about R80m, to recover arrears council plans further electricity cuts, removal of meters and substations, unless estimated 40 000 illegal users start paying.</p> <p>27/29 Feb Nationwide services held on tenth anniversary of death of PAC founder president, Robert Sobukwe. In CT, 150 clergymen arrested after attempted march on parliament to protest state clampdown on 17 organisations.</p>	<p>15/16 Feb In Mafunzi and Caluza (Pmb) 2 men die, and nearby in Sweetwaters, mutilated body of youth is found. Violence also in Ezakheni (Ladysmith) and KwaMakutha (Durban). In Khayelitsha (CT) a kitskonstabel is injured in attack.</p> <p>17/18 Feb In KwaNobuhle (CT) a school is stoned, and in KwaThema (W Rand), homes of 5 school principals, vehicles are petrolbombed; with police action in Moranjani (Dewetsdorp) and Soshanguve (Pta) technikon. Pmb church leaders estimate 60 000 residents have been displaced by ongoing violence.</p> <p>20/22 Feb In Mpumulanga an Inkatha leader is stabbed to death, police arrest 15 youths. An Imbali resident dies in hospital, allegedly shot by Inkatha leader Zuma, a day before interdict granted to restrain latter. Violence in KwaMakhuta (Dbn) and Dindli (Pmb).</p> <p>24 Feb In Pmb armed groups clash in city centre, several arrested, and in nearby Imbali township, a man is stabbed to death. In Grassy Park (CT) a school is petrolbombed, and in Ikakeng (Potchefstroom) several schools are stoned.</p> <p>25/26 Feb In KwaNdengezi (Pinetown) a man is shot dead, and nearby in Hazza, 2 men are shot dead and 2 youths injured. In nearby Clermont wife of deputy speaker of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is injured in armed attack on home. Renewed violence in KTC leaves 2 people dead and 20 shacks destroyed; SADF erects barbed wire fence to keep warring groups apart and installs floodlights. In Kallehong, a Seawusa shop steward is shot dead.</p> <p>27/28 Feb Clermont man, headmaster and advisory board member, is shot dead. In Oukasie (Brits) a house is burnt by arsonists after 2 weeks of tension and detention of 15 community leaders.</p>
MAR <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1 Mar New black consciousness movement, the ACC, formed to fill vacuum left by government bannings; deputy director detained 2 days later. In Pmb 300 new kitskonstabels begin duty after 8 weeks on training course.</p> <p>4 Mar In parliament names of 66 more emergency detainees released, totals 2 622 since 11/6/87; 17 596 held for more than 30 days since emergency declared in June 1986. According to Minister Heunis, black local authorities owed more than R321,2m in Tvl; R16,9m in OFS; R2,5m in Natal and R46,9m in Cape, mostly because of rent boycotts. In Dobsonville (Soweto) 20 more families evicted.</p> <p>7/9 Mar After new state bans the Committee for Defence of Democracy (CDD) is launched in CT by churchmen, incl Tutu and Boesak, and anti-apartheid activists. In Jhb, 50 Fedtraw women present petition to Chamber of Mines, calling on them to oppose LRA amendment bill and pressurise government to lift restrictions. UCT student march to protest bannings is dispersed by riot police. In Pmb 5 kitskonstabels are discharged for alleged involvement in crimes, one arrested who is second respondent in interdict in Imbali violence and Inkatha youth member.</p> <p>13 Mar On National Detainees Day 2 000 attend prayer meeting at Regina Mundi church in Soweto.</p>	<p>1/2 Mar In KwaNdengezi (Pinetown) a youth is decapitated, and in Ximba (Camperdown), a member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is shot dead in AK-47 attack.</p> <p>4/6 Mar In Sobantu (Pmb) another decapitated body is found, and in Pmb, a kitskonstabel kills a colleague. In Clermont (Dbn) a second advisory board member is assassinated, and nearby in KwaNdengezi, a man is stabbed to death. In KwaMakutha (Dbn) a man is shot dead by police and 4 injured. In Soweto 5 undertakers are beaten to death and burnt after rumours of gangs in hearses who abduct children. Violence also in Magabeni (Umkomaas) and Tembisa (Kempton Park).</p> <p>7/10 Mar In KwaNdengezi and Shongweni, two men are shot dead. In Belville Reverend Boesak's house is attacked, violence also in Louwville (Vredenburg).</p> <p>14 Mar In Mhlekeng a man is stoned to death. Minister of Justice reports that there are 165 unrest cases awaiting trial in Pmb, involving 400 accused.</p> <p>Decreasing sharply from death toll in Feb, 14 Pmb fatalities in March is lowest since June 1987 (12). Worst months of interfacional violence in Pmb townships were Sept 1987 (60) to Feb 1988 (50), peaking between Dec (113) and Jan (161).</p>

Government Response <i>Bans, Restrictions, Court Interdicts</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>Insurgent Shootouts & Sabotage</i>																													
<p>14 Jan. CT police ban all meetings aimed at encouraging boycotts of black schools until the end of month. Grahamstown Supreme Court orders 2 policemen and 12 kitskonstabels to refrain from assaulting inhabitants of Thembalesizwe (Aberdeen).</p>		1988																												
<p>18/19 Jan Rand Supreme Court sentences Alex youth to 9 years for necklace murder. Grahamstown Supreme Court sentences 4 Kwezi (Hanover) residents to death for killing man in 1985 unrest. In CT senior police investigate alleged police torture of 2 Nyanga pupils after attending Idasa meeting. CT Supreme Court grants interim interdict to restrain police from unlawfully shooting or killing residents of Bongoletu (Quthuborn). Pta Supreme Court restrains KwaNdebele police from assaulting 2 emergency detainees, and keeping them in unhygienic conditions. 23 Jan Jhb funeral of Percy Qoboza, editor of City Press, who died of natural causes, restricted under emergency regulations. 25 Jan Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict to restrain 3 Inkatha members, and an Imbali town councillor, from killing or assaulting Imbali resident and 4 sons. PE regional court fines kitskonstabel for murder of colleague, magistrate finds inadequate 6 week training course to be a mitigating circumstance. 28/29 Jan Pmb Supreme Court grants temporary interdict against Inkatha leader Zuma, after 2 members of Mthembu family injured. CT police extend ban on advising or encouraging pupil boycotts of black schools in the W Cape.</p>	<p>19 Jan In Lusaka a bomb explodes outside ANC office, 2 Zambian children are injured. 24 Jan In Kokstad, explosion in country club of unknown origin.</p>	JAN <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>																												
<p>1 Feb Pmb Supreme Court extends interdict against Inkatha leaders Zuma, Ntombela and 7 others, to restrain them from attacking Mkhize family. Also in Pmb, 3 Descom officials summonsed on charges under Fund Raising Act after police investigations last year. 4/5 Feb In CT a military tribunal sentences 3 SADF members to 18 months in detention for conspiring to commit an offence, allegedly leaking information on anti-ECC campaign. Pmb magistrate refuses permission for Inkatha rally at Taylors Halt. 11 Feb In 87/88 financial year police paid out R1,2m in 126 cases of injuries resulting from police action; paid out R192 626 as a result of unlawful arrests.</p> <p>12 Feb CT Supreme Court declares subsidy conditions imposed on UCT and UWC administrations to discipline student protests, to be invalid. Grahamstown Supreme Court extends interim order to restrain 14 kitskonstabels from acting unlawfully against all Hofmeyr township residents. Dbn Supreme Court imprisons policeman for 2 years for his part in death of 17 yr-old KwaNdegezi youth in Feb 1986.</p>	<p>4/5 Feb In Brussels (Belgium) 1 person is injured by shots fired at ANC offices. Transkei police shoot 3 suspected insurgents.</p> <p>13/14 Feb Near Messina a farmhouse is attacked by rockets and grenades, limpet mines found in follow-up operations; SA warns Zimbabwe government it will launch hot pursuit operations.</p>	FEB <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>																												
<p>15/16 Feb CT Supreme Court orders Minister of Law and Order to pay R6 000 damages to man shot and assaulted by police in Crossroads; in separate case minister agrees to R35 000 out-of-court settlement to CT advocate arrested and charged under emergency regulations. Pmb Supreme Court extends 3 interim interdicts to restrain Inkatha leaders and members from threatening or attempting to kill certain township residents. Charges laid against 254 Pmb residents, now awaiting trial. 17 Feb Rand Supreme Court application by detained UDF publicity secretary, Eric Molobe, fails to win release. Minister of Law and Order undertakes in CT Supreme Court to ensure 15 kitskonstabels in Bongoletu would not unlawfully kill, assault, detain or arrest any resident. 22/23 Feb PE Supreme Court sentences man to death for second conviction of necklace murder, 2 others also sentenced to death for murder of police informer in 1985 KwaNobuhle violence. Also in PE, a youth is convicted of necklace killing of Azopu member outside UDF leader's house. In Dbn an informal inquest into death of Victoria Mxenge (Aug 1985) finds she was murdered by persons unknown, but recommends further AG investigation. In controversial move, magistrate refuses to hear oral evidence. 24 Feb Government cracks down on extra-parliamentary groups, gazettes new regulations in terms of Public Safety Act which prohibit 17 organisations from performing any acts or activities, whatsoever.</p>	<p>15 Feb In Tembisa 3 people are injured in grenade explosion in shebeen.</p> <p>17 Feb In Lusaka 4 Dutch Reformed churchmen hold talks with ANC. 19 Feb Government lists 2 senior ANC members, Palla Jordan and Gqiba, not to be quoted. 20/21 Feb In Osizweni (Newcastle) police van is attacked by gunman with AK-47's, injuring 2 policemen. 22 Feb In London police agree to allow ANC access to most of 3 000 documents covering ANC kidnap plot and trial. 26/28 Feb In Mdantsane a limpetmine is discovered near police station. At Jan Smuts airport in Jhb, 2 replica limpetmines are detonated by police.</p>	FEB <i>2nd & 3rd weeks</i>																												
<p>1/2 Mar KTC (CT) is declared a restricted area under emergency regulations, open only to residents. In Parliament a bill is tabled to prevent overseas funds being sent to organisations incl trade unions, church, student and community groups. Minister of Law and Order pays schoolgirl R15 000 in out-of-court settlement over police action. 3/5 Mar Wynberg magistrate finds policeman negligent in death of 3 children in 'Trojan Horse' incident in Athlone Oct 1985, refer case to AG for decision on prosecution. Conscientious objector Ivan Toms, given maximum sentence for refusing to serve in military camp. Grahamstown Supreme Court extends interim interdict for third time, granting 8 Hofmeyr residents protection from 14 kitskonstabels. CT Supreme Court restrains Minister of Defence from placing 3 convicted SADF conscripts in detention barracks. Pta Supreme Court overturns police prohibition on Moutse residents travelling to Bloemfontein to hear appeal against incorporation into KwaNdebele. 8/9 Mar Rand Supreme dismisses application by New Nation against 3-month banning. 12/14 Mar Government prohibits new CCD from performing any activities. Pmb Supreme Court rules subsidy conditions imposed on University of Natal are invalid. CT Supreme Court reserves judgement in application to re-open inquest into death of George De'Ath, ITN journalist killed in Crossroads, request for oral evidence to be heard.</p>	<p>1 Mar In Benoni a limpet-mine explodes near bus transporting SAAF personnel. 4 Mar In Mlungisi (Queenstown) 2 men are killed and 6 policemen injured in shootout and grenade attack. 8 Mar In Soweto municipal police are attacked with AK-47s and grenades at Phiri hall. 10 Mar PE regional court convicts 3 PAC members on charges of terrorism.</p> <p>Acronyms</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>ACC Azanian Co-ordinating Committee</td> <td>ISA Internal Security Act</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AWB Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging</td> <td>LRA Labour Relations Act</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Azanyu Azanian National Youth Unity</td> <td>MK Mkhonto we Sizwe</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Azapo Azanian Peoples Organisation</td> <td>MRC Mkheli Reception Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Azomm Azanian Students Movement</td> <td>Nactu National Council of Trade Unions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cayca Cape Youth Congress</td> <td>NECC National Education Crisis Committee</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CDD Committee for the Defence of Democracy</td> <td>PAC Pan Africanist Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions</td> <td>Sached SA Council for Higher Education</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DET Department of Education and Training</td> <td>Sactu SA Congress of Trade Unions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee</td> <td>Sahrwu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ECC End Conscripted Campaign</td> <td>Sayco SA Youth Congress</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FBWU Food and Beverage Workers Union</td> <td>SCA Soweto Civic Assoc.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fedtraw Federation of Transvaal Women</td> <td>UDW University of Durban Westville</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Idasa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA</td> <td>Uwusa United Workers Union of SA</td> </tr> </table>	ACC Azanian Co-ordinating Committee	ISA Internal Security Act	AWB Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging	LRA Labour Relations Act	Azanyu Azanian National Youth Unity	MK Mkhonto we Sizwe	Azapo Azanian Peoples Organisation	MRC Mkheli Reception Committee	Azomm Azanian Students Movement	Nactu National Council of Trade Unions	Cayca Cape Youth Congress	NECC National Education Crisis Committee	CDD Committee for the Defence of Democracy	PAC Pan Africanist Congress	Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions	Sached SA Council for Higher Education	DET Department of Education and Training	Sactu SA Congress of Trade Unions	DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee	Sahrwu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union	ECC End Conscripted Campaign	Sayco SA Youth Congress	FBWU Food and Beverage Workers Union	SCA Soweto Civic Assoc.	Fedtraw Federation of Transvaal Women	UDW University of Durban Westville	Idasa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA	Uwusa United Workers Union of SA	MAR <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>
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DPSC Detainees Parents Support Committee	Sahrwu SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union																													
ECC End Conscripted Campaign	Sayco SA Youth Congress																													
FBWU Food and Beverage Workers Union	SCA Soweto Civic Assoc.																													
Fedtraw Federation of Transvaal Women	UDW University of Durban Westville																													
Idasa Institute for Democratic Alternatives in SA	Uwusa United Workers Union of SA																													

CIVIL UNREST FATALITIES, SEPT 1984 – MARCH 1988

Category Breakdown for Emergency Periods



KEY

Total Deathtoll
3/9/84-30/3/88 **3 315**

FIVE UNREST PERIODS PERIOD DEATHTOLL

National State of Emergency YEAR 2
12/6/87-31/3/88 **763**

National State of Emergency YEAR 1
12/6/86-11/6/87 **695**

Post-Select Emergency Phase
8/3/86-11/6/86 **577**

(Select) State of Emergency⁶
21/7/85-7/3/86 **797**

Build-up of Unrest
3/9/84-6/5/87 **483**

Source: Indicator SA Press Clippings

Notes

¹ The figures on unrest fatalities are compiled from a combination of daily press, police, Bureau for Information, parliamentary estimates and independent monitors. In mid-1986 the state established the Bureau for Information as the only legal source for unrest data/incidents (for confirmation thereof), a function which has since reverted to the police. The paucity of detail in official reports and a wide range of media restrictions has made it increasingly difficult to attribute specific responsibility for unrest fatalities since mid-1986.

² Security forces include SADF, SAP, SA Railway police, municipal police, kitskonstabels, security guards and homeland-based soldiers or police. Insurgents killed by security forces in township shootouts are not included here (see fifth category).

³ The second category includes fatalities in several distinct types of political conflict which are statistically inseparable in most media and police reports, however. All unspecified reports of burnt bodies, often the victims of 'necklaced' killings (whose political affiliation is mostly unknown), have been included here. The sub-categories include:

● feuding between extra-parliamentary opposition groups, eg UDF and Inkatha in KwaZulu/Natal. The huge sub-total (591) for ten months of year two of the emergency, mid-1987/March 1988, is mostly comprised of fatalities (545) in UDF/Inkatha feuding in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands

● left-wing activist attacks on 'collaborators' (black town councillors, alleged informers, Biko singers, etc) and vigilante or third force groups

● right-wing township, shack settlement and homeland vigilante attacks on opposition groups

⁴ The third category includes white unrest victims (except for security force fatalities), assassinations of leaders by 'death squads' (unidentified killers), deaths of detainees and prisoners awaiting trial for unrest offences. The deaths of 65 Crossroads (CT) victims from May/June 1986 are included here because specific responsibility cannot be attributed to 'widoekes' (vigilantes), the 'samredes' or security forces.

⁵ The fourth category mostly reflects security force casualties in unrest clashes but includes a few members killed in township or rural shootouts with insurgents.

⁶ This period covers the regionalised State of Emergency declared by government in 36 magisterial districts on 21/7/85, extended to another 8 areas in Western Cape on 25/10/85.

RURAL & REGIONAL

M O N I T O R

Durban Metropolitan Region

Administrative Boundaries



LEGEND

- Local Authorities - - - - -
- Proposed Regional Services Boundary - - - - -
- KwaZulu - - - - -

CREDIT
Town and Regional Planning Commission, Natal Provincial Administration

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GRINAKEK



God said a Fire not a Flood next time

By Catherine Cross, Mathilde Nzama and Obed Dlamini
Centre for Social and Development Studies

Well, well, well, who's that a-callin'?
Well, well, well — hold my hand!
Well, well, well — night is a-fallin'
Spirit is a-movin' all over this land ...
God said to Noah, build him an ark
Rain start fallin' and the sky got dark
Old ark a-movin', water start to climb
God said a fire, not a flood next time!

(US spiritual, 19th Century)

In the last week of September 1987, the province of KwaZulu/Natal experienced what is being called the worst natural disaster in South Africa's recorded history. Transformed into a deluge that continued for four days, the spring rains of 1987 threw raging floods across the province, drowning hundreds, washing away houses, roads, bridges and livestock, destroying crops and livelihoods, leaving 500 000 homeless, disrupting the lives of people in rural and urban areas.

The province's major rivers rose to their highest ever recorded levels. Dams overflowed, unable to deal with the volume of water. For days, the newspapers reported bodies washed out to sea or retrieved by helicopter. When the rains stopped, hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless. A mere three months later, renewed flooding from

heavy mid-summer rains brought further damage and set back reconstruction efforts. The final death toll is thought to be more than 500.

The destruction experienced by the core economy was massive:

- Major bridges were entirely washed away or severely damaged and are still being rebuilt. SATS has put the cost of damages to rail links at a minimum of R12 million.
- The Post Office has repaired 30 000 telephone lines which were torn down.
- An estimated 200 000 tons of sugar, worth some R8 million, was lost on farms on the upper North Coast alone.
- Natal's tourist industry suffered severe financial losses also.
(Sunday Times, 1987)



Durban residents queue for water rations from a fire hydrant after the floods damaged water pipelines and household tap supplies were cut off, September 1988.

The Homeless

In isolated black rural areas, uncounted communities were left starving as washaways broke all links with the larger economy. A relief effort on an unprecedented scale began as the outside world struggled to reach afflicted communities in time. Aid efforts concentrated at first on the provision of food and clothing, but as the scale of destruction became evident, emphasis began to shift toward helping the homeless.

While many areas in the deep rural districts of KwaZulu were completely cut off and went through severe hardships, the magnitude of suffering in the densely populated areas of Durban's peri-urban zone may have been even greater. The area holds at least 350 000 black people, living under conditions that made them very vulnerable to flooding. On one day, the St John's Ambulance organisation fed more than 5 000 flood victims at the shack settlement areas of Inanda. At Lindelani, after mudslides tore open the cemetery, 'coffins protruded grotesquely from the ground, and the remains of relatives were strewn over the area' (*Sunday Tribune* 11 October 1987). Unknown numbers of shacks were flattened or made uninhabitable in this settlement, with 3 000 people left homeless.

In the more remote communities in the Valley of a Thousand Hills, roads were

impassable and relief supplies were delivered by helicopter. In the area's five tribal districts, 20 000 out of a population of 80 000 were left homeless.

In the deep Mgeni Valley, devastated communities on high ridges suffered from exposure to sustained violent rain and wind; nearly all were cut off from the outside world when home-built dirt roads were blocked by mudslides. The most severe consequences were food shortages and widespread homelessness, caused when mud-walled shelters became so waterlogged that they collapsed, sometimes killing their occupants. In the flooded river valleys below, the rising water caused many deaths from drowning as well as loss of homes and crops.

Throughout the province, relief operations were overburdened, and serious suffering sometimes went short of relief in favour of worse suffering elsewhere. A de facto division of labour seems to have emerged among the non-governmental aid agencies, with certain regions being informally handled by particular operations to avoid duplication of effort. Attempts were made by radio to let rural disaster victims know where they could find assistance. It was reported that, 'With the civilian communications network virtually wiped out, military and police communications were used to rush aid and rescue services to stranded people' (*The Daily News* 3 October 1987).

The Built Environment Support Group (BESG) based at the University of Natal contributed the first independent estimate of the extent of homelessness and destruction caused by the floods. Using teams of students sent out directly in the aftermath to do a field survey, BESG reported that in the Durban Functional Region alone 'about 528 900 people had their homes either completely destroyed or so badly damaged they would have to be rebuilt' (*Sunday Tribune* 10 October 1987). These figures were '17 times higher than those for the Port Natal area released by the government', which estimated that 54 351 were left homeless in the whole of the KwaZulu/Natal area (ibid).

The Minister of Health, Dr Willie van Niekerk, dismissed the University's field survey estimates, arguing that 'some people might want to create the impression the social structure was supporting more "squatters" than it actually was' (*Sunday Times* 11 October 1987). Dr van Niekerk maintained his department had 'actual figures, based on the number of people being housed in churches and halls, and based on the supplies, like tents, we have sent out' (ibid). Presumably, the central government has used these official estimates to define the extent of its contribution to the relief effort and longer term reconstruction.

The Setting

Against this general background of devastated communities and infrastructure, CSDS researchers carried out a brief inquiry in the Valley of a Thousand Hills. The project grew out of pre-existing community research in an area referred to anonymously in reports as 'KwaNgele'. Researchers Nzama and Dlamini collected a quota sample of experiences from some of the people in their home community who qualify as flood disaster victims. Not surprisingly, accounts by women and the poor predominated. The impressionistic but powerful interview texts are to be published in the following edition of *Indicator SA* Vol 5/No 4.

KwaNgele is located on the high ground of the Valley on an interfluvial ridge above the Mngeni river. Far above the actual watercourse, it was not one of the worst hit areas. In relative terms this community is neither remote nor poor. With a dirt road connected to the Pinetown/Durban road, KwaNgele forms part of the region's peri-urban zone. It has enough linkages with the urban core economy to allow workers to commute weekly or daily, bringing home more of their salaries than migrant workers in outlying districts.

In 1981 average income per household was just under R400 per month, which is above the minimum level estimated for a reasonable rural life and well above the poverty level (Cross and Preston-Whyte

1983). Today, and waiting the results of an ongoing re-survey, average income may be as high as R800 or more. Consequently, the area has considerable economic dynamism, with strong widespread informal sector activity capable of providing some permanent jobs inside the community.

At the other end of the economic scale, about 12 percent of the community live in conditions of extreme poverty. People in this category usually belong to weak or 'damaged' families, with abnormal social structure. Normally unable to move into the formal job market, most of KwaNgele's poor get by through casual work — 'working around the neighbourhood' — very low-paid work performed on a daily contract basis, such as digging or weeding (ibid).

KwaNgele is well connected into the aid network. It lies within the sphere of a local aid agency which has been very active in relief efforts during and after the floods. BESG operates here also, building demonstration housing for communities in the Thousand Hills area. Lastly, the community fell within the area reached by a motorcycle campaign to deliver relief supplies to districts cut off from normal communications.

If any disaster area was destined to be fortunate enough to have urgent needs met through the relief aid process, KwaNgele should qualify. In the inhabitants' eyes, success was uneven, however. While comparatively large quantities of relief aid did reach the area, the research findings raise questions about the effectiveness of supply and disbursement relative to expressed needs, especially for the poorer members of the community.

The Brokers

What was the impact of the flood on this particular community? Some bitter social consequences have followed, emerging out of pre-existing fault lines and points of weakness. The flood disaster has been the last straw for maintaining social control in a rapidly modernising community hit by income differentiation and population movement. KwaNgele's social institutions were creaking under heavy strain even before the heavy rains of 1987 fell.

In the sequence of events that followed in KwaNgele, the rich appear to have come out buoyantly or even improved their position through the relief process, while the poor — with no skills in manipulating the system — have received little assistance. The rich are well connected, while the poor lack the information they need to reach help. The interviews demonstrated that the poor do not know how to gain access to bureaucratic procedures in the core economy.

In flooded river valleys, several hundred people drowned, waterlogged mudwalls and homes collapsed, crops were destroyed, cattle swept away and food supplies buried

Disputes over government and independent estimates of the homeless must be resolved as they define the extent of relief needs and aid contributions

A sense of isolation and bafflement were shared by flood victims, who felt aid institutions and procedures were complex, remote and beyond direct contact

In the absence of outside assistance with reconstruction, opportunities for self-help rehousing are limited to families with the resources to build again

Third world peasant communities usually have an acute need to be put into effective contact with the larger society (Wolf 1962). This need is normally filled through the brokerage function. People living in the community who have connections operate as 'brokers', selling their services in mediating the transactions that peasants need to conduct with outside agencies and bureaucracies.

Where people desperately need a channel of contact, the role of intermediaries is open to abuse. Where no effective links exist between a rural community and the regional and national bureaucracy, each natural disaster spawns a new host of brokers; usually, people who exploit the relief process for their own gain while claiming to help the community. However, the research findings do not suggest that the KwaNgele community is being widely exploited in this way. Instead, it suggests the immediate problems were the lack of brokers and the absence of information about acquiring access to relief.

KwaNgele was the object of several determined and well-mounted outside assistance campaigns by committed aid agencies. Official aid appeared to be a less reliable channel, however. Given little official direction by local government institutions, many of the homeless seem to have been reduced to wandering between official aid points, knocking on a dreamlike series of unanswered bureaucratic doors.

In the community a typical reaction seems to be one of bafflement — a feeling of being entitled to help without reaching it, of being beyond direct contact. In this situation it becomes the responsibility of leaders and bureaucrats to establish a conduit for help to reach the poor, and to re-establish the weakened social order. To date, the local administrative system has struggled with these problems without achieving much success. In fact, much flood relief in this area came directly from concerned white employers to their distressed black domestic workers. Personal linkages to the core economy are often the most effective ones.

The Anger

Widespread comments from interviewees reflect a pervasive dissatisfaction with the community's role in recovering from the disaster, rooted in a perceived underlying state of affairs. The KwaNgele community is going through severe dislocation as it becomes fully integrated into the developed economy. The rapid immigration of rural outsiders attracted by urban job opportunities is difficult to integrate into a stable community. The rift between the rich and the poor is expanding, leaving a yawning gap between the strong, well-organised and upwardly-mobile families, and the

disrupted households made up entirely of women and children which are found frequently in the peri-urban zone

In the flood cases reported, community help to members seems to have been limited mainly to immediate emergency aid, e.g., shelter, food and help in the form of labour power. While neighbours responded sympathetically and effectively to the crisis, their help does not seem to have continued in the longer term. Refugees and homeless individuals were often taken temporarily into the households of relatives, but community assistance rarely seems to have carried through into active aid in reconstructing houses or lives. In a community struggling to come to terms with the new economic order of individualism, there were no reports of separate families offering each other the kind of material help that would cost substantial amounts of money.

At the same time, the distortion of society by the disaster seems to have freed anti-social impulses. For instance, thefts became more common and more blatant, and may have targeted weaker community members. The frustrating and dangerous position of older single women, caught in emergencies with no reliable assistance, was clearly evident. In the aftermath of the disaster, the weakest — widows and single mothers — found themselves largely on their own, responsible for finding whatever resources were necessary for rebuilding their homes.

After the floods there is an acute scarcity of resources, and outside assistance would appear to offer the only realistic chance of helping the very poor in devastated areas. It is precisely this stratum of the community that appears to get the least response from outside agencies, however strong their expressed commitments. They may be condemned to live indefinitely as unwanted dependants, marginal people in the households of economically stronger relatives.

Opportunities for self-help rehousing are limited to families with the resources to build again. They are often not the ones who were left homeless. Flood victims are now afraid to rebuild mud-walled houses. Even this kind of housing means an investment, and families wanting to rebuild fear the heavy rains will return. The demand for more permanent but expensive building cinder-blocks has increased, creating acute scarcity and requiring extra capital. In the absence of outside assistance, KwaNgele families continue to function economically as best they can, but reconstruction is being delayed by the lack of supplies and capital.

The Issues

In view of the degree of effort which has been concentrated in the KwaNgele vicinity, it is discouraging to note that so

many respondents reported they were unable to obtain assistance at all, what they received was not what they really needed, or that they knew little about the aid available. The scale of the disaster and the size of the province-wide relief operation made some shortcomings and failures inevitable, however.

Facing severe logistical difficulties of bringing food and relief supplies into an area where roads were blocked, the record of success compiled by the main aid agencies was remarkable. Food and blankets were made available quickly, while some homeless families were provided with tents. Enlisting the help of off-road motorcyclists also was effective in delivering supplies to interior aid stations like the tribal courthouse.

From these experiences, another issue emerges clearly. The 'social structure' referred to by the Minister of Health appears to be sheltering a vast number of refugees who have never come under any roof covered in his ministry's count of the homeless. The KwaNgele neighbourhood provided accommodation to nearly all of its own people whose houses were destroyed, in addition to sheltering a fairly large number of people from the Mngeni Valley and other areas. It is very probable that the same principle applies in other disaster-struck regions of KwaZulu. If so, the official count should be drastically revised.

The central government is being forced to allocate resources to restore public sector infrastructure and services disrupted by the floods. This demand comes on top of putting aside huge amounts for white farm relief and increased spending on the needs of the urban black population. Government resistance to allocating adequate resources to meet rural needs will probably rise in relation to these former commitments. The voiceless refugees in rural communities, living in temporary shelter and searching for the help they were promised in rebuilding their homes, may well be ignored.

In the aftermath of the disaster, important questions arise as to the kind of aid supplied, information gaps, brokerage services, and the role of aid agency, national and local administrations in dealing with the disaster. From research findings, it appears that there are some discrepancies between attempts to supply effective disaster relief and the on-the-ground needs of the community:

- *Information is a desperately short commodity under the present administrative format.*

What is needed is a regular pipeline into the community that supplies information in a form accessible to those rural families with least resources and least connections, in order to mediate the link between community and relief bureaucracy. Rural people need information

on what is available and how they can get it, but the donor agencies also need information on what is needed and how much aid is getting through.

- *The relief process needs to be monitored at the grassroots level.*

While a fair amount of abuse is inevitable in a large-scale emergency operation, the systematic effect has been to exclude those groups which are universally conceded to be most in need. An adequate liaison system put in place by non-governmental agencies and tested beforehand could help to contain the harm done.

- *Help with rebuilding is at least as vital in the medium term as immediate welfare and health assistance.*

The acute drain on available building materials, even in areas not hit with the full force of flood disaster, is a tremendous logistical problem for communities with limited resources and weak outside communications. Commercial costs of materials and transport are beyond the resources of those most in need and least able to get official assistance.

- *Modern communities no longer supply the kind of solid social support once normal in black rural areas.*

The consequent need for effective welfare organisations at the grassroots level is that much stronger. It may reflect a need to offer local aid organisations that people can join directly, so as to combine efforts effectively.

- *The capacity of the social structure to take in the homeless is still very substantial.*

Experiential data suggests that far more refugees may be at large in the social structure than are officially counted, and therefore, government relief commitments are likely to be inadequate. Quantitative research is an urgent priority.

With a large rural population crowded in conditions of poor services and infrastructure, combined with an unpredictable climate, KwaZulu/Natal is clearly a high-risk, disaster-prone region. Within the last decade, years of continuous drought have been punctuated by two major floods. Obviously it is time to set up the kind of rational planning structure needed to anticipate and alleviate any future natural disaster in the province. *JPTA*

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Many victims, especially poorer community members, either reported they knew little about available relief or the aid received was not what they needed

Shortcomings in the community's own role in helping members recover from the disaster reflect the modernising tensions of class division and population movement



GOIN' DOWN IN THE FLOOD

By Indicator SA Researcher Vijay Makanjee

The breached Umlazi canal flooded the Jacobs industrial area. Many factories, located close to rivers for cheap and regular access to a water supply, suffered heavy losses of stock and equipment.

In the aftermath of the floods that deluged Natal, twice in six months between 1987/1988, extensive planning is necessary to respond to possible natural catastrophes in more appropriate ways.

The unseasonal high rainfall in the catchment areas of Natal and the Drakensberg, combined with a dramatically raised water table, led to devastating flooding in many parts of the province. The large-scale loss of dwellings and facilities — largely a result of the subsidence of land, buildings being too close to riverbanks, and erosion from inappropriate ploughing and cultivation techniques — has not yet been fully measured in economic terms.

Ecology

With few resources and a fragile infrastructure, black communities in Natal's rural areas were worst affected by the floods.

The racial demarcation of areas for different 'population groups' in South Africa has meant that black communities have been allocated too little land for too many people. In KwaZulu there are 124 people per square km on average (1985). When overcrowding occurs, rural people tend to use the best available land for

agricultural purposes and build dwellings elsewhere, e.g., on barren and exposed slopes or hilltops. Often, because of the need for maximum harvest returns, ploughed land is extended as close as possible to a riverbank. In ecological terms, this typical practice of poor farmers has severe drawbacks, especially for maintaining the delicate ecological balance between human settlement and nature.

Conditions of overcrowding result in a frenetic search and intense competition for scarce resources. The consequent degradation of the top-soil, accompanied by erosion, sanitation and health-related problems, makes the land and its people even more vulnerable to natural disasters.

In other words, the setting for the floods that hit Natal in September 1987 and again in January 1988 reflects three related features. Briefly, pressure on people (in this case, black communities) to live in certain areas produced overcrowding and attendant problems. Secondly, the continual silting of rivers has been experienced over the past 20 years in the region, and conservationists have found that rivers have widened also. Lastly, industry needs access to water on a cheap, regular basis, and factories are sited as close to rivers or canals as possible.

For some industries proximity to water

sources is more economic and results in a high level of efficiency so factories tend to be located close to rivers. Apart from obvious problems such as silting of the riverbed and water pollution, there is the possibility of floods being more frequent than the 1-in-10 year estimates. Consequently, when swollen rivers burst their banks many factories were flooded, with equipment damaged and extensive stockloss.

The combination of the prolonged heavy rains and these three environmental features resulted in severe flood damage in the province (see data base).

Relief Phases

Following the floods, numerous organisations attempted to dispense aid. The scale of the disaster appeared to catch many agencies offguard, however. A variety of institutions and groups mobilised resources to bring relief of different types to affected communities.

Internationally, relief aid is dispensed in three phases:

- Immediate relief focusses on the need to avoid loss of life.
- Rehabilitation facilitates reconstruction and the rebuilding of a local economy.
- Reconstruction efforts attempt to deal with the structural causes of the disaster.

The University of Natal's Built Environment Support Group (BESG) points out that while the state was very active in responding to the crisis, it has failed to move beyond the first phase (1988: p2). The central government set up a disaster relief fund (see data base) and drew in resources from a number of independent fund-raising efforts. While this gave the state control over most financial and strategic resources, 'space' was also available for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other relief agencies to work within. No attempts are being made to co-ordinate the activities of NGOs as the later two stages unfold, however.

KwaZulu, with little resources for disaster relief, attempted to mobilise some outside agencies (like the Red Cross) for shelter relief. The authorities relied on these organisations not only for resources, but for information and to implement shelter programs. Linkages were not created between aid agencies and local communities: 'The South African government and the KwaZulu authorities failed to extend their legitimacy in shack and rural communities' (BESG: p2).

The NGOs used two divergent approaches to flood relief. Some worked with local authorities which tended to reinforce existing institutions and controls, while others were more cautious in their approach. The failure to co-ordinate aid schemes at the regional level created a

Funds for the Natal Flood Disaster

INFRASTRUCTURE LOSSES

Relief allocated to:

Major items:

- Natal Provincial Administration R 160 m
Mainly to reconstruct roads and bridges
- Department of Water Affairs R 30 m
Repairs to pipelines and canals
- SATS and the Department of Transport R 29 m
- Department of Development Aid R 20 m
For damage in KwaZulu and South African Development Trust areas
- Post Office R 6,5 m
- Government Housing Agencies R 63,7 m

Funds to rebuild houses will be channelled through the various 'own affairs' departments, the Department of Development Aid, the Natal Provincial Administration and the KwaZulu government

AGRICULTURAL LOSSES

Relief allocated to:

- African farmers R 16,5 m
- Coloured farmers R 350 000
- Indian farmers R 15 m
- White farmers R 50 m

BUSINESS LOSSES

Insurance companies are facing a bill of more than R400m, mainly made up of claims from industry and commerce.

INDIVIDUAL LOSSES

- Flood Disaster Fund (private contributions) R 6,5 m
- Shortfall made up by government at 23/2/1988 R 30 m
- Amount raised through surcharge on postage stamps R 600 000

Relief allocated to:

- 12 200 applications for aid from flood victims were to be paid out (February 1988)
- 6 031 cheques totalling R7.2m have already been posted.

Source
Indicator news clippings

measure of local autonomy. Organisations which sought to promote more accountable local structures were able, in the circumstances, to win variable space for political development work.

Security Role

In the first phase of the relief operation, the security forces played a major role in rescue attempts and in distributing

Relief aid is dispensed in three phases: to meet immediate needs and alleviate distress, to promote economic rehabilitation, and to achieve structural reconstruction

Without follow-up, short-term crisis measures can place people in the same vulnerable position they were in before the natural disaster

emergency supplies (medical, shelter and food). Information on needs, damage and relief distribution during this period was co-ordinated by the SADF. While this is common in most countries, many aid organisations outside state structures were unable to gain access to this information.

Initial attempts were made by the state to co-ordinate the work of aid agencies at the local level through the Joint Management Committees (JMCs). Set up in 1979 as the government's early warning system for internal threats to state security, JMCs are drawn from representatives of the military, police, government departments, and more recently, from business groups. JMCs bypass the normal channels of government and are answerable only to the state intelligence services, thus usurping the function of elected public representatives (*Weekly Mail* 21/11/87).

The JMC structure in control of the official flood relief programme in Natal operated from SADF headquarters in Durban. During the first week of the floods in September 1987, churches and other agencies with no access to helicopters, personnel or other resources available to the security forces, had to channel almost all assistance through the local JMC. This process enabled the central government to present the JMCs as being both politically legitimate and as apparent benefactors to black communities. However, once the initial crisis ended and political stability ensued, the state moved away from all direct relief efforts in black rural areas in the region.

Relief Claims

Although the state has allocated R63.7m for shelter relief, it is uncertain how much has been earmarked for rural and shack areas. Claims for relief aid have to be made individually to the disaster relief fund. To prevent fraud, elaborate bureaucratic procedures have been used. Shackdwellers often had to get other, more literate people to assist them with filling in forms. Initially, a 12-page form was used but after many complaints it was replaced by a 3-page form.

Although the simpler form was devised, verification of the claims by a person of authority, including chiefs and councillors, still has been necessary. Claimants are paid by cheque, which creates banking problems and delays. Many of the tribal authorities have used the form completion process to raise funds, entrench patronage systems and to impose sanctions on disloyal or non-allegiant groups (*Sunday Tribune* 22/11/87; *Daily News* 29/10/87).

The poor performance of local authorities in properly facilitating the relief

process created more space for NGOs to deliver a practical and useful service to shack communities.

The Lessons

While it was impossible to avoid the flood disaster, the extent of the impact in the aftermath could have been reduced. There are many lessons that could be learnt.

Firstly, state planners will have to look at new strategies for dealing with natural disasters. A greater state input in terms of finances and resources needs to be made available. Information and the identification of problems need to be shared with all agencies dealing with disaster relief and not just with those groups located inside state structures. Secondly, the relief process must have a follow-up system built into it. Short-term measures to alleviate distress are not enough, especially if the provision of crisis aid merely places people in the same impoverished and vulnerable position they were in before the disaster.

Further, long-term contingency plans for the reconstruction of devastated areas need to be drawn up. There is little point in rehousing people on an ad hoc basis without considering future population growth and the pressures on land due to enforced racial concentration and resettlement. Lastly, claims for compensation through elaborate forms has tended to make flood victims reliant on individuals who sometimes abuse illiteracy and enrich themselves at the expense of the poor. By making monetary payouts, the state facilitates the involvement of unscrupulous traders.

Once emergency food, clothing and shelter have been provided, longer term aid should take the form of materials rather than money. It would be possible for agricultural extension officers and community workers to dispense building and other materials to flood victims. This approach would avoid the problems and inefficiencies of individuals buying and transporting materials, while developing a more decentralised approach to disaster planning. Many victims claimed that building materials were needed rather than cash handouts.

Another future possibility would be for the South African government and aid agencies to use the public works programmes (PWPs) for reconstruction (see *IPSA* Vol4/No3; Vol5/No1). This would allow victims to be paid for reconstruction work, assist in rebuilding local economies and increase the employment skills of rural dwellers. *IPSA*


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A HARD RAIN

Flood Relief in KwaZulu



Billy Padlock

By Pingla Udit & Alastair McIntosh
Institute of Natural Resources, University
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The capacity of existing institutions to cope effectively with the allocation of flood relief in the rural and peri-urban districts of KwaZulu/Natal has been severely tested over the last nine months. Problems encountered by government, other relief agencies and flood victims after the September 1987 flood offer important lessons for the handling of future disasters and long-term reconstruction.

The following report on flood damage and relief in a district near Pietermaritzburg draws on extensive interviews conducted with KwaZulu magistrates and agricultural officers, the Amakosi or chiefs, tribal councillors and secretaries, non-government agencies and flood victims. In obtaining a variety of opinions from disparate interest groups, the researchers hoped to piece together a coherent picture of the regional catastrophe at a grassroots level.

The rains that ravaged KwaZulu/Natal in late 1987 lasted from Friday, 25 September, to the following Tuesday, 29 September. A total rainfall of 400mm was recorded at the Nansindlela Training Farm, an INR facility abutting the region. Similar readings at Louis Botha Airport were considered to reflect the highest rainfall for over 100 years in the region. Total flood damage was estimated at one billion rand, and the death-toll reached 317 with 163 reported missing. Approximately 50 000 people were left homeless, the majority of whom were from peri-urban shack settlements outside Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Hardship was compounded by the fact that road and communication links were severed, preventing the flow of food and relief to some areas.

District Study

The district investigated in the INR study lies between Durban and Pietermaritzburg. It comprises six wards which are each administered by a tribal authority. No official assessment of flood damage within the area has been made available yet — the authors' rough estimates of flood damage in the three wards investigated were based on discussion and visual observation. A few names and places have been changed owing to ongoing research in the district and to avoid compromising informants, some of whom feared unfavorable consequences from expressing their views.

Infrastructure and residential dwellings

Traditional mud-walled rondavels were more susceptible to flood damage than wattle and daub structures with corrugated iron roofs

Food shortages occurred due to the breakdown of communication networks, rain spoilage, and burial of foodstuff

were damaged in all three wards. Two bridges and a causeway were washed away, leading to the effective isolation of four areas. The greatest damage occurred in ward C where 200 homes were totally destroyed and 2 000 partially damaged, rendering 1 000 people homeless. A reconnaissance survey indicated that the other two wards were less severely affected. In ward A, traditional rondavels were more severely affected than wattle and daub structures with corrugated iron roofs and guttering.

No estimates of livestock losses are available, but verbal reports indicated a considerable loss of cattle, goats and fowls. Food shortages occurred because of the breakdown of communication networks and rain spoilage, after the collapse of kitchen rondavels and the burial of foodstuffs. Loss of income from transport delays and the inability to get to work were also reported. Schooling was disrupted for about three weeks after areas were cut off and schools damaged by the floods. Lastly, substantial damage to community gardens and equipment occurred.

Since agricultural officers in the region were not involved in flood allocation in any way, or directly accountable to either tribal authorities or non-government relief agencies, it was felt that their selection of flood victim interviewees would be as impartial as possible. In this manner, 67 households which fell victim to the flood were selected for interviews; a greater number were from ward C (37), which was more severely affected than the other two wards (15 from each area). A cross-spectrum of the views of flood victims and those involved in flood relief should provide a fair reflection of events. Mention is made where views and allegations expressed by respondents were not corroborated by other sources.

Ward A

In the aftermath of the flood the tribal authority was responsible for co-ordinating flood relief from the local clinic. The first supplies of food and blankets were delivered from the Red Cross between 4/5 October, and a subsequent delivery was made by the Camperdown Methodist Church. The South African Police from Camperdown also arrived to assist. Initially, flood relief was distributed from the clinic by indunas and councillors.

One of the indunas involved in distribution said that the tribal authority personally identified recipients and distributed goods according to need. Ten of the 15 flood victims who were interviewed within the ward felt there had been discrimination in the distribution of relief from the clinic. Claims were made that certain individuals were shown favour, and that the amount of relief obtained had no bearing on the extent of damage to recipients'

property. Of the remaining five victims interviewed, two claimed they were unaware of such problems and three claimed they did not know.

The complaints levelled by 10 of the flood victims would appear to gain some credence as only 3 of the 15 households surveyed in ward A actually obtained relief. The comments of Nkosi B from the neighbouring ward and an agricultural officer also indirectly substantiated these claims — both linked the maldistribution of relief to violence among flood victims queuing for relief outside the clinic. The Nkosi ascribed the move from ward to ward by flood victims in search of relief to the failure to distribute fairly and according to need. He further suggested that the murder of a security guard at the clinic and the stabbing of the clinic sister was related to maldistribution.

Whether these developments had anything to do with the decision to transfer the balance of relief supplies to the tribal courthouse is unclear. What is clear, however, is that flood victims were unhappy that relief supplies were no longer being distributed from the clinic. Numerous reports were made about relief supplies being transferred from the courthouse to Nkosi A's house at night. These rumours and the apparent discontinuation of distribution appear to have precipitated a break-in at the courthouse, where youths flung out food and blankets for people who had come to enquire about relief.

When asked whether there had been any problems in the area, Nkosi A, his indunas and his councillors, claimed there had been none. It is noteworthy that the two outside agencies which offered to assist in distribution, the Camperdown police and the Good Shepherd church, were both refused permission to participate.

Ward B

Two sources of flood relief were forthcoming in ward B. People described as 'students' dispensed aid privately, while the tribal authority distributed relief obtained from the Red Cross via the District Magistrate. In the latter instance, the tribal courthouse was used as the co-ordination point for distribution.

Two of the social workers for the district, with the assistance of the tribal secretary, drew up a list of flood victims. They claimed relief was allocated on the basis of identifying the extent of loss and distributing accordingly, within the constraints of available assistance. Since ward B is relatively isolated, Nkosi B and relief helpers believed they were disadvantaged in the amount of relief obtained relative to the other wards. Nkosi B also complained that two Red Cross trucks destined for ward B had been incorrectly routed to ward A.

Although only 7 of the 15 households

identified in ward B actually had received aid, 12 of these felt there had been no problems with distribution — except that the amount given to recipients relative to their loss was considered to be very small. Of the remaining three households surveyed, two claimed there had been discrimination by the tribal secretary and one did not know. Six out of the eight households which did not receive aid appeared to accept the tribal secretary's explanation that supplies had run out, and that they would receive priority assistance if further aid materialised.

Ward C

Relief was provided to ward C by the Red Cross, the Islamic Relief Agency, the South African Council of Churches and the Pietermaritzburg Christian Centre. Some thirty tents were also received from the Department of Development Aid. The considerable amount of relief provided can probably be ascribed to the fact that it was one of the rural areas worst hit by the floods.

Initially, the Red Cross provided aid directly to the tribal authority in the ward. Within the first week, after complaints were received about aid not reaching flood victims, the Red Cross rechannelled all relief supplies through a local church minister. Apart from some relief distributed from the roadside, however, all aid from other sources was channelled through the tribal authority. According to Nkosi C, relief was distributed by the indunas who allocated a separate collection day for victims from each ward. He also claimed that almost all victims received some aid, although not sufficient to compensate for their great loss.

Of the 37 households interviewed in this ward, only 8 had received assistance from the tribal authority. The other flood victims either received Red Cross aid via the church minister or received assistance directly from 'missionaries'. Two of the households had obtained assistance more than once from the tribal authority. Twenty of the flood victims interviewed felt that packets of food had been unfairly distributed. A few (six) commented that aid blankets brought in were distributed to people who live near or work for Nkosi C. One source claimed that some of the tinned food provided by the relief agencies was not freely distributed but sold through a local shop.

Concerns about favouritism are encapsulated in one victim's statement that, 'Some people who suffer severe losses didn't get relief, but those who had no problems benefited as a result of dishonesty'. Another victim complained, 'Some people received large amounts of blankets — others didn't — others got more foodstuff — others didn't'. These comments stand in sharp contrast to how victims perceived the efforts of the



Billy Paddock

church minister allocating relief, who was not accused in any instance of maladministration or discrimination.

Agency Role

The greatest contributors of relief in the aftermath of the crisis were non-government organisations. The Red Cross was the major relief agency, distributing food, clothing, blankets and tents donated by the public. It also co-ordinated a number of other relief funds, including the Daily News and Sunday Tribune Relief fund, and the Capital Radio Relief Fund. Other church agencies which provided relief through tribal authorities in the area are mentioned above. Reports were also made of some relief being handed out from the roadside by persons or agencies which could not be identified.

While the Red Cross initially provided relief through the tribal authorities, it became more circumspect in distribution methods once reports of maladministration filtered through. The redirection of assistance through the local church minister in ward C was corroborated by Nkosi C, who complained in an interview about the little assistance received by the tribal authority from the Red Cross. The agency also expressed concern about the 'hijacking' of their vehicles from intended destinations on two occasions when personnel were misinformed about directions to areas.

Apart from the provision of tents by the Department of Development Aid, their involvement in flood relief operations, thus far, appear to have been restricted to rescue operations in the immediate aftermath of the flood. In short, little appears to have emanated on the ground from central government agencies in the

Non-government organisations were the major contributors of relief in the aftermath of the flood

Flood victims would prefer non-governmental organisations to distribute relief directly and personally to communities

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allocation of flood relief. One area of concern, expressed by the district magistrate, is that tribal authority officials have been charging between 50 cents to two rands for compensation forms.

Alternative Framework

The Valley Trust acted as a crisis relief centre for five tribal areas where 20 percent of the population were left homeless. Most of these victims were sheltered in neighbouring houses, schools and courthouses. The principles of crisis management employed by the Valley Trust were:

- to establish crisis relief and communication centres near disaster areas;
- to identify community leaders who would co-ordinate each centre;
- to have community leaders list those requiring immediate assistance;
- to establish a simple but effective method of receiving, despatching and delivering aid which should be 'received' at all levels;
- to establish a credit fund to enable the bulk purchase of building materials by flood victims.

The Valley Trust has been lauded, justifiably, for the effectiveness of its relief distribution methods. Over the years the Trust has assisted the formation of community garden groups, individual farmers, health committees and woodlot groups, thus providing the necessary framework for the emergence of a relatively efficient and accountable local administrative structure. Efficiency at local levels appears to have been developed through the experience of managing various local projects; accountability, on the other hand, would appear to be a product of the process of implementation.

This experience contrasts markedly with tribal authority areas which lack either administrative capacity or significant levels of accountability. Tribal authority structures employ few full-time workers (usually the tribal secretary), with most councillors holding part-time office and obtaining nominal or no monetary reward for their services. Relief agencies are either forced to rely on the goodwill of individuals in these areas or to utilise inefficient and ad hoc methods such as roadside handouts.

Despite such difficulties, the flood victims interviewed indicated that they would prefer non-government organisations to distribute relief directly and personally (35 cases out of 67). A common concern was, 'It would be better if the people who bring in relief distribute food. If they can organise to distribute and not to delegate to the people in the area ...'. Another concern expressed was that agencies should take measures to prevent the overlapping of flood relief in the future.

A few particularly astute interviewees recognised the dilemma faced by low levels of accountability within tribal authority structures, on the one hand, and the inefficiency of relief agencies distributing aid without having real access to communities, on the other hand. They suggested that relief agencies could remain responsible for allocation while tribal authorities could assume responsibility for organising meetings to enable distribution.

Relief Proposals

Given the competition for scarce resources in a crisis situation, non-government agencies should be able to insist on involvement with tribal authorities in the distribution process as a pre-condition for providing relief. Agency effectiveness in assisting local structures also would be contingent on developing an administrative capacity consistent with their fundraising ability, while introducing methods to keep proper records of resources during the various phases of allocation. It might be argued that this kind of institutional framework is not only necessary for effective relief allocation in the short term, but also for reconstruction in the long term.

The allocation of flood relief concerns immediate problems of distribution that are primarily questions of administrative capacity. Accountability becomes much more important when referring to long-term reconstruction for objectives that shift from alleviating immediate needs, to servicing, maintaining and providing continued access to resources. Initiatives such as rebuilding community gardens or replacing housing stock cannot be divorced from the need to develop accountable structures at local levels. In the absence of a long-term approach to reconstruction, gains made from efficient distribution will be undermined when the relief agency withdraws from managerial involvement and existing patronage structures are then reasserted.

The importance of effective participation in reconstruction is particularly apparent in rural areas, where populations consisting largely of dependants lack the necessary power base to muster public resources. Their urban colleagues, the township dwellers and workers, have been able to effect better subsidisation of resources such as housing and transport. In this context, the process of transferring management skills to local interest groups becomes as important as the provision of a particular resource.

Lastly, the negotiation of accountability in resource management, as a pre-condition for provision, is a similar priority to ensure that intended recipients continue to benefit after the relief agency's withdrawal.

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DC 1477

SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Yes Sir, MOSA, No Sir?

By Ian Macun, Industrial Health Research Group,
University of Cape Town

After five years of implementation, what has been the impact of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA) of 1983 on health and safety at work? How do managements and trade unions perceive the law and the area of health and safety? These are just two of the questions that lay behind a research project carried out in industry in the Greater Cape Town area between 1986 and 1987 by the Industrial Health Research Group.

The research was conducted by way of structured, questionnaire interviews with a random sample of 36 companies and a select sample of 14 trade unions. The project is not complete yet, and the sample size (particularly as regards companies) imposes limits on the extent to which quantitative assessments can be made. One of the researchers, Ian Macun, summarises some of the main survey findings, offers some tentative observations, and suggests an alternative approach to MOSA.

The outcome of research to date broadly confirms early criticisms of MOSA over the lack of union and worker participation in the creation of Safety Representative (SR) and Safety Committee (SC) structures. The majority of SRs in the companies surveyed by the Industrial Health Research Group were appointed, and mostly drawn from the job categories of top management to skilled worker. In 51 percent of the sample, management decided on the use of explicit criteria in the appointment of SRs, such as seniority, authority, responsibility, literacy and degree of skill; all of which tend to exclude semi-skilled operatives and labourers.

Companies with more than 20 employees are by law required to have a Safety Representative and where there is more than one SR, there has to be a Safety Committee. In nearly all cases the SCs are dominated by management, which determines both the structure and membership of these bodies. Moreover, the survey found that larger companies have a central SC — consisting of top

management, departmental heads and the safety officer — as the principal decision-making committee in the area of health and safety. Below are a number of SCs consisting of departmental heads, the SR and/or supervisory staff. Reports go up to the central SC, where decisions are made, and are then relayed back down to the departmental SCs.

Not only does this type of structure tend to act as a transmission belt for management orders, but it also fragments health and safety organisation in the workplace by dealing with matters on a departmental basis. The 'top down' approach adopted tends to be divisive as well. Given the hierarchical nature of implementation and the appointment of SRs, worker access to the structures, and the SR in particular, is limited. In most cases, it appears that management has assumed that the organisation of health and safety is its business.

There are other interesting features in the way MOSA is being operationalised. The most striking is the fact that only 42 percent of the companies surveyed actually use

While there is formal compliance with MOSA the role of unions within a company and the economic climate determine changing approaches to health and safety

Smaller companies which struggle to remain competitive, or those suspicious of union politics, often put less into improving health and safety standards

the SR and SC system as the main mechanism for addressing health and safety issues in the workplace (see box). Often, problems are still dealt with on an individual basis, that is, between the individual concerned and the foreman, supervisor or company medical personnel. In other cases, pre-existing mechanisms are still used, ranging from the primary use of safety committees that pre-date MOSA, to using foremen or departmental heads as the individuals responsible for monitoring health and safety in the plant.

The findings on the actual functions of SRs show that while all of those established carry out the required inspections, only 47 percent undertake accident or incident reporting as well. Although MOSA is not insistent on SRs having to be responsible for this function, the Act does allow for the possibility. Yet it would seem that a significant number of SRs are limited to one basic function only, namely, to undertake the monthly inspection.

Unclear Strategy

In general, the companies surveyed tended to confirm the obvious assumption that the area of health and safety constitutes a managerial prerogative. This viewpoint is bolstered by MOSA itself, in that the Act places full responsibility on management for safety in the workplace and requires self-regulation for the monitoring and improvement of health and safety standards. Prerogatives do not necessarily imply clear strategy though, and the way in which MOSA is being implemented is evidence of this. Only 25 percent of the companies surveyed have a specific policy on health and safety.

The effect of MOSA on many companies has been to increase management awareness of health and safety and to alert them to some hazards in the workforce. This response is not necessarily thorough-going, however, and very often involves the provision of more protective equipment to workers rather than addressing the problem at source. Management attitudes are constrained by the predominant framework within which the issue is viewed, namely, that of loss control.

In effect there is formal compliance with the law, beyond which a number of variables come into play to shape the way that health and safety is dealt with. The size of the firm, nature of company activity, past practices in health and safety, the role of unions in the company, and the effects of the economic climate all play a role. For instance, smaller companies that are being pushed fairly hard to remain competitive put less into the area of health and safety. This does not mean that companies do not comply with MOSA, but that they generally do so in a way which reduces the issues to a mere legal formality.

On the other hand, quite a few of the companies investigated (47 percent) did express dissatisfaction with the Act over the inadequate training of SRs, the fact that SRs have insufficient authority and responsibility, the lack of employee involvement, and the extent to which MOSA is management-orientated. Nevertheless, many companies remain suspicious of the prospect of union involvement in health and safety structures. This response is often based on the assumption that unions are politically motivated on the issue.

Union Attitudes

For the majority of unions sampled (72 percent), health and safety has not been an area where members have expressed much concern or where any action has been taken (see box). Occupying a relatively low place on the labour agenda, only one out of fourteen unions surveyed actually had any written policy on MOSA. This was by way of an inclusion in recognition agreements to ensure a situation whereby shop stewards would, for the purposes of the Act, be recognised as SRs. It should be pointed out that interviews were conducted with officials only and it is their views that are reflected in this study — a survey of shop stewards is still to be conducted.

An important exception involved a union with members in one or two companies who have consistently put forward health and safety problems of an acute nature. Moreover, organisers in this union have had some awareness of the issue, which has clearly been increased by worker demands. This has ensured, in turn, a more systematic approach within the union as a whole. Although not part of this investigation, a similar situation could be expected to exist in the case of both members and officials of the National Union of Mineworkers.

Three general responses to MOSA can be identified among unions across the spectrum, that is, from the more conservative establishment unions to those affiliated to Cosatu and Nactu. Stances could be categorised as follows:

- *Uncritical participation*

The more conservative unions have accepted MOSA as a step in the right direction. Such unions are usually well-established and have Sick Benefit Funds, so that complaints are processed in a kind of bureaucratic and individual way. Consequently, a general awareness of health and safety as a matter to be dealt with systematically on the shop floor, between workers and management, is often absent.

- *Boycott*

This was the initial response of a few unions that today are affiliates of Cosatu, who felt unions were not consulted and

MOSA was undemocratic in nature. For some of these unions health and safety would be dealt with via the normal channels through which grievances are raised with management, that is, through their shop steward committees.

• *Strategic participation*

This is a relatively recent stance adopted by some unions, including affiliates of Cosatu and Nactu, with some variation:

— a minimum position implying union participation via the election of SRs where management agrees to this, coupled with a recognition that SRs are accountable to the workers who elected them.

— a maximum position embodied in a Health and Safety Agreement, which codifies a set of principles, procedures and structures for health and safety organisation in a particular company.

Only one union in the Cape Town area has a health and safety agreement, although others have achieved some rights via negotiation. However, overall it would appear that this is not an area that has been looked at thoroughly and systematically by unions in Cape Town. This is not to imply that unions are not concerned with the issues, but that they have not adopted a thorough-going approach for various reasons. Most often, the way in which health and safety is dealt with by unions constitutes an ad hoc response to a particular situation.

The fact that at least one union has responded regularly to health and safety grievances raised by members and that others do have varying responses to MOSA, would seem to suggest that the area is seen by unions to be a legitimate part of any industrial relations agenda. Whether they view it as an area for mutual co-operation with management is another question altogether.

Legitimate Interest

The majority of companies interviewed and some observers (see Bendix 1984) regard health and safety as an area for co-operation between management and labour, involving mutual interests. In summing up the debate on MOSA in Parliament, the Minister of Manpower clearly supported this view: 'For the first time there will be co-operation between employers and employees in the many factories of South Africa ... this meaningful co-operation will be established in the interests of safety on our factory floors.' (Hansard Vol105, 1983: p1007).

Within this kind of framework there is little scope for 'bargaining' on safety and health issues, but much scope for 'constructive discussion' and 'participation' in devising solutions. It would be difficult to contradict this view to the extent that it is not legitimate to 'bargain' health and safety in exchange for a special allowance

Survey findings on implementation of MOSA in Cape Town

Industrial Health Research Group

COMPANY RESPONSES TO MOSA

Some 36 companies in ten diverse industrial sectors and sub-sectors, situated in the greater Cape Town area, were interviewed by the Industrial Health and Research Group. Significantly, 30 of the companies surveyed believed that health and safety in the workplace is a matter of mutual concern for employers and employees. Only four managements regarded it as an area of conflict. A mere nine companies had a specific health and safety policy, however.

How did companies establish Safety Representatives?

Appointed	27
Elected	3
Co-opted	4
Volunteered	2

What are the functions of Safety Representatives?

Reporting inspections, accidents	17
Reporting inspections, some accidents/emergencies	4
Inspections only	12
Accidents only	1
'Close observation'	1

Which mechanism did companies adopt?

Via SRs and SCs	15
On individual basis	5
Via SRs, SCs and Others (e.g. Shop Stewards, Company Nurse, Engineers, etc)	4
Via SC	4
By Management and Foremen	3

UNION RESPONSES TO MOSA

A total of 14 trade unions were interviewed by the Industrial Health Research Group. Of the select sample, eight unions were unaffiliated, five were members of Cosatu, and one was a member of the National Council of Trade Unions. Eight of the unions surveyed believed that a conflict of interest with management occurs in the area of health and safety; while five unions regarded it as an area of mutual interest.

What is the level of interest in health and safety among union members?

	Most	Some	Few	None
Unions with members who express concern about working conditions:	4	3	3	4
Unions with members who take up issue of dangerous conditions with management:	3	1	6	4

How are Safety Representatives designated?

Appointed	6
Elected	3
Appointed in consultation with union	2
Do not know	3

In early 1988 the Department of National Health and Population Development issued two closely related draft bills for comment - the Occupational Medicine and Occupational Diseases Bill (OMOD) and the Compensation for Occupational Diseases Bill (COD). The Bills are the latest in a series of state initiatives aimed at revising legislation that deals with industrial health and safety. They seek to replace and amend the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (ODMWA) of 1973.

Appointed in 1978 the Nieuwenhuizen Commission recommended a single uniform system of compensation based on the WCA; that compensation should be based on wages and degree of disability, and not on race; and that the ODMWA be replaced. A White Paper response in 1983 accepted a uniform system of compensation based on the ODMWA but taking over permanent incurable diseases now under the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA). The government has also suggested

a rearrangement of government functions in the area of health and safety between the ministries of Health, Manpower, and Mineral and Energy Affairs.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The IHRG believes that:

- The diagnosis, treatment and compensation of occupational disease and injury should be linked to a preventative approach.
- All aspects of occupational health should be managed by a single, comprehensive administrative and legislative system, which would deal with prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation and compensation for occupational disease and injury. At least, a system of worker compensation should be developed.
- It is unclear what the relationship between the Bills and the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act or the Mines and Works Act (both of which are concerned with prevention) is going to be.

Proposals

OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (OMOD) BILL

Response

Regulatory Management

- Advisory Council to be created with jurisdiction limited to evaluation of evidence submitted by Minister of Health.
- Medical Bureau for Occupational Disease (MBOD) to enforce major provisions of new Act.
- Occupational Health Officers to enforce employer compliance with provisions for medical examination, and to control hazardous substances and practices at work. Officers to fall under jurisdiction of local authorities.

- Advisory Council should also develop data base to facilitate rational planning, policy formation and preventative action. These statistics should be made available to the public, including researchers.
- Occupational Health Officers are also welcomed, but must be trained. They should fall under jurisdiction of either Health or Manpower ministries.

Risk Management

- To extend coverage to include risk work in industry as well as mines.
- Risk work occurs when workers are exposed to high levels and/or over lengthy periods of time to defined dangerous substances.
- Factories where risk work is performed to register with Department of Health.
- Risk Committee to decide on level of risk for a particular workplace once it is registered.

- Workplace registration procedure is arbitrary and depends on Minister's declarations and instructions. No registered employer should be allowed exemption from Act.
- Guidelines are needed on how registered workplaces should implement controls.
- Risk Committee also should have guidelines for risk assessment and determination, linked to MOSA's hazardous substances list, comparative foreign legislation and occupational health literature.

Medical Examination & Certificates of Fitness

- System of compulsory, pre-employment medical screening and periodic examinations used on mines to be extended to all registered risk industries.
- Workers without certificates of fitness (valid for 3 years) will not be eligible for employment in a registered risk workplace.
- Miners and ex-miners lose right to have free examinations at any time if they suspect occupational disease.
- The state will not pay for examinations; companies engaged in risk work will have to employ doctors to carry out examinations on all workers.

- Compulsory examinations will reveal workplace disease at earlier stage.
- Anti-victimisation procedures are needed so that workers who fail examination do not lose their jobs.
- Removal of free examinations, where an ex-employee suspects compensable disease, will deter workers from seeking early diagnosis, thereby defeating object of legislation.
- Employer-provided health services will need backup from state-provided expert service, which could be provided by an expanded, decentralised MBOD or NCOHO.
- MBOD has better facilities and expertise to test workers than private doctors who have little experience of occupational health problems.
- Medical examinations by company doctors may be biased and supervision of screenings by expert state services may ensure neutral evaluation.
- Cost of examinations to smaller employers may result in non-compliance.

Certification Committee & Review Authority

- Compensation applications to be referred to Certification Committee comprised of 2 doctors nominated by employer and employee bodies, and 6 doctors nominated by Minister.
- Review Authority can oppose or accept decisions of Committee. In case of disagreement, joint meeting will make final decision which will be binding and beyond court challenge.

- Clear, published guidelines are needed on how physical impairment is to be determined by Certification Committee.
- A review procedure and the courts should have power to set aside Review Authority findings.

Degrees of Disease

- The Committee's classification of disease as first degree (less serious) and second degree (more serious) is stricter in some cases than the ODMWA procedure.
- Compensation payments to be made according to degree of disease.

- Stricter criteria for diagnosis means workers might not be compensated unless disease is severe.
- Compensation should be based on disability and not on physical impairment.
- The range of compensable occupational diseases should be extended.
- Tuberculosis, which is a compensable disease should not be changed to 'incurable' tuberculosis because this would exclude the majority of workers now receiving compensation.

COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (COD) BILL

Payment of Compensation

- Compensation should not be based on racial classification (as was case in ODMWA) but on degree of disease and monthly earnings of worker, which will not be deemed to be less than R400 a month.
- Payments to be made in form of monthly pensions rather than lump sums, determined by last salary paid to worker.

- Abolition of racial criteria for compensation payouts is welcomed, though it is noted that wage levels in South Africa depend on race - thus payments will still be unequal.
- Pensions are better in long-term for workers, but they should be given the right of choice.
- Compensation payment must be linked to inflation formula which accounts for cost of living increases.
- Last wages, from which compensation is calculated, should include overtime and payment in kind. They should be based on wages when work was last performed, or most recent wages (whichever is greater), adjusted for cost of living increases.

Death Benefits & Training Bursaries

- Dependents of deceased workers with first degree disease will not receive benefits, whereas under ODMWA they had all or part thereof.
- If worker with second degree disease dies, dependents are to receive a percentage of pension.
- White and coloured miners no longer to receive training bursaries.

- Removal of posthumous compensation for these dependents is opposed.
- All workers removed from further hazardous exposure should be offered training to enable them to perform other useful work.

or some other improvement in conditions of service. However, to the extent that this approach assumes there is no conflict of interest between management and labour over health and safety it is problematic. It simply does not take account of the way in which management views health and safety in terms of a cost-benefit analysis or as an exercise in loss control. Where different variables in the workplace are seen to be commensurable with one another, health can be treated as a market commodity rather than a right which is of paramount importance to workers.

That occupational health and safety constitutes an area of conflict has been adequately argued on more than one occasion (see Maller and Steinberg 1984). Of the union sample, 57 percent viewed the area as one embodying a conflict of interest — this is an important indicator of likely union responses to MOSA in the future.

If there is to be proper organisation of health and safety in the workplace, geared to effectively preventing hazards and accidents, worker participation is necessary. Directly exposed to dangerous and hazardous conditions, workers are in the best position to improve work practices and monitor the situation on the shopfloor. In the present circumstances, this would imply adopting a response to the law which requires flexibility on the part of management and 'watchful participation' on the part of the unions.

Given the conflictual nature of the issue, any approach to health and safety organisation would need to recognise the existence of two entirely different functions:

- setting policies and defining practices;
- monitoring and assessing the way in which practices are carried out.

The first function should obviously be a subject for negotiation between management and trade unions, whereas the second could be a joint exercise as long as dual structures are established. Thus, MOSA could be implemented in a way that allows for a separation of management and worker functions in the area of health and safety, via separate Safety Committees, and Safety Representatives if necessary. The job of inspecting the workplace and day-to-day policing would be the role of an elected Safety Representative.

These arrangements would not exclude the possibility of management appointing a Safety Representative too, although it would seem superfluous given the presence of supervisory staff in the workplace. A separation of functions is embodied in the type of health and safety agreement mentioned above (see Finnemore 1987), particularly in the two-tier committee structure which is a new arrangement, at least in South Africa. Agreements can,

however, involve a long and fairly arduous process and may not be appropriate to smaller companies with a relatively low risk profile, or even in larger companies where management may, for various reasons, be keen on delaying the issue. In situations like these, SR functions could be carried out by union shop stewards.

Bilateral Scenario

An adequate response to MOSA would have to address the major failing in the Act, namely worker participation. More importantly, MOSA could be viewed as a baseline which needs to be improved upon through negotiating over issues that are fundamentally important to workers.

Industrial health and safety, where management seldom sees a need to negotiate and where the unions do not regularly attempt to bargain, remains an 'emerging industrial relations issue'.

More importantly, the legislative framework within which the issues may be raised remains flawed. It may be possible, however, to draw a parallel with the state of industrial relations in the mid- to late 1970s. At that time a number of employers gave de facto recognition to powerful, emerging unions with whom they were having dealings, but which had no legal standing and no access to the statutory system of collective bargaining.

The position obviously changed in the post-Wiehahn period and with subsequent changes to the Labour Relations Act. As far as MOSA is concerned, it may be possible to envisage a similar scenario, whereby incremental changes in the law will come about, reflecting the improvements that are established in practice between employers and trade unions in the area of health and safety.

In general though, it takes time and money to establish a proper working environment. In South Africa it will probably take a particularly long time given problems of high financial costs of improvements due to past neglect, lack of motivation, inadequate legislation, and given that a structured approach to health and safety is a relatively new concern for both employers and trade unions. TPA

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Managements often view health and safety in terms of a cost/benefit analysis or as an exercise in loss control

Directly exposed to dangerous conditions, workers are in the best position to improve hazardous work practices and monitor standards on the shop floor

Stayaway Strikes in the 1980s (Part II)

June 1986 - June 1988

DATE & REGION	SUPPORT GROUPS
14 July 1986 Nationwide	Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
15/28 July 1986 KwaNdebele (Central Transvaal)	Anonymous pamphlets are distributed
31 July 1986 Uitenhage (E. Cape)	Cosatu
14 August 1986 Duncan Village/Mdantsane (East London)	Community groups
Evictions and Deaths in Rent Boycotts	
4 September 1986 Soweto	Soweto Civic Association, with support from community and student groups
15 September 1986 Sharpeville (Vaal Triangle)	Community groups
1 October 1986 Nationwide	National Union of Mineworkers (Num) and Cosatu
17/22 November 1986 KwaNdebele	Anonymous pamphlet is distributed
21 November 1986 Mamelodi (Pretoria)	Community groups
Detentions Under the Emergency	
12 March 1987 Nationwide	Detainees Parents Support Committee and 15 other organisations, including Cosatu
15 April 1987 Transvaal	Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu)
21 April 1987 onwards Nationwide	Mawu
22/24 April 1987 Soweto	Anonymous pamphlets are distributed
Parliamentary Election Protests	
5/6 May 1987 Nationwide	Labour, extra-parliamentary, community and student groups
16 June 1987 Nationwide	Some loose alliance
15 October 1988 Tembisa (Springs)	Anti-Eviction Committee
1 February 1988 Ashdown (Pietermaritzburg)	No organisational initiative
17 February 1988 White City Jabavu (Soweto)	Unknown
21 March 1988 Nationwide	Unknown
6/8 June 1988 National	Cosatu and Nactu, with support from community and student groups
16 June 1988 National	No organisational initiative

Sources:
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Reports of Port Elizabeth Labour Monitoring Group (PE LMG),
South African Labour Bulletin, 1986/87.

PROTEST ISSUES	WORKER PARTICIPATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The declaration of a national State of Emergency on 12 June 1986 Widespread detentions of workers and union officials, police raids on Cosatu offices 	Labour Monitoring Group (LMG) estimates that in PWV region 12% of all African workers observe stayaway. Negligible support in S Natal while protest is cancelled in W Cape. In Port Elizabeth (PE) stayaway is extended for second day, with average 39% African worker support on both days.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opposition to planned independence, with calls for resignation of homeland cabinet Security force presence in villages and actions of Mbokotho vigilantes Forced removal of Africans from Kabah suburb (Langa) to KwaNobuhle township Concern over Department of Education and Training ruling that all African pupils must re-register in order to attend school after boycotts To commemorate civil unrest deaths of 1985 	By fourth day the entire African workforce of region, including civil servants, participate in stayaway. LMG survey of 23 companies shows that 79% of African and 43% of coloured hourly-paid staff participate in stayaway, which is strongest among African workers in Cosatu organised factories. Stayaway achieves partial success.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To attend funerals of 15 unrest victims killed during rent protests 	LMG estimates that 85% of Sowetans stayaway, resulting in 38% drop in worker attendance in manufacturing sector and 27% in retail sector in Johannesburg region. Only 5 000 to 8 000 attend funeral because of restrictions and security force presence. Putco claims only 50% drop in bus passenger loads.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residents protest evictions during rent boycott campaign 	Stayaway achieves partial success. Residents claim no buses enter township in morning.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Day of mourning for 177 Kinross miners killed in underground fire on 16 September 1986 	In mining industry Num claims 325 000 workers observe stayaway, management claim 250 000 and LMG estimates close to 300 000. In non-mining sectors in PWV region LMG survey of 49 firms finds 40% of workers engage in 1 to 2 hour sympathy stoppages. In PE, 19 out of 40 Cosatu plants surveyed experience some stoppages lasting from 5 minutes to 3 hours. Little support in Natal or in rest of country.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unconditional release of two tribal princes and 9 other anti-independence activists To commemorate first anniversary of police shooting of 13 rent protestors in 1985 	All African workers, except for medical personnel and those employed in 'white' South Africa, observe stayaway. Protest continues for at least 5 days. At least 80% of residents support stayaway.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The nine month-old State of Emergency, detentions and security force actions Detention of union members and shop stewards Continued detention of union's general secretary, Moses Mayekiso, first held during July 1986 Rent evictions, with demands that State-owned homes should be given to residents End to State of Emergency and resignation of town councillors 	LMG shows 20% of workers surveyed in PE participate in 1 hour (non-lunch time) stoppages. Fawu claims 40 000 members participate, but companies estimate that only 4 000 workers respond to call. Union holds weekly one-hour work-stoppages and claims 62 000 members had already stopped work on 3 separate occasions. Putco claims 50% decline in bus passenger services. Government estimates that less than 10% of Jhb workforce participated, while only 30% stayaway in Soweto
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All-white elections for the House of Assembly on 6 May 	Largest stayaway in South Africa ever. LMG estimates 1 million workers participate on each day. In retail and manufacturing sectors 500 000 stayaway on 5/5/87 and 600 000 on 6/5/87. In PE/Uitenhage 99% of workers observe stayaway on 5/5/87 and 96% on 6/5/87; in Cape Town, 12% and then 42%; in Transvaal, 57% and then 70%; and in Natal, 60% and then 70%.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To commemorate eleventh anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion 	LMG estimate from sample survey that 60% of black workers (82% of Africans) participate in stayaway. In PWV 75% of African workers in manufacturing sector and 54% of workers in commercial sector stayaway; in PE/Uitenhage total of 93% African workers stayaway; in Durban, 55%; and in Cape Town, 75%.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eviction of rent and service charge defaulters during boycott campaign 	No public transport enters the township of 200 000 residents.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Township residents, predominantly aligned to the UDF, form defence committees to protect homes and families from vigilante attacks during Inkatha/UDF clashes Eviction of rent defaulters by security forces during boycott campaign 	100% observation of stayaway is reported. Hundreds of residents observe stayaway.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To commemorate third anniversary of Langa (Uitenhage) and 28th anniversary of Sharpeville shootings The Labour Relations Amendment Bill 	LMG sample survey estimates that average 80% of African workers observe stayaway in PE/Uitenhage and 51% of coloured workers. Police estimate 80% stayaway on the Witwatersrand and in the E Cape, while work attendance is higher elsewhere. Largest stayaway in South Africa ever. Cosatu estimates 3 million workers participate on each day. LMG estimate average 77% of manufacturing workers in Natal and the PWV participate. Support for stayaway in mining, commercial and public sectors is very low. While attendance at all E Cape undertakings is low, it is relatively high in the Western Cape.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To commemorate twelfth anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion 	Many unions negotiate paid day-off for workers. South African Transport Services estimate that overall train occupancy for day is 70% below normal. Chamber of Mines estimates that only 5% (24 500) of miners participates; the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce claims stayaway is more successful than 6/8 June 1988 protest.

Select Indicators of Industrial Conflict

Compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Table 1 **The Official Strike Count 1976 - 1987**




Table 2 **Registered Trade Unions and Membership 1976 - 1987**




Table 3 **Conciliation Boards and the Industrial Court 1979 - 1987**

Year	Number of Conciliation Board Applications	Number of Cases Received by Industrial Court
1979	29	4
1980	23	15
1981	24	30
1982	60	41
1983	118	168
1984	279	399
1985	514	801
1986	1 294	2 042
1987	2 312	3 533

Sources ●Report of the Director General of Manpower for 1986 ●Indicator SA press clippings

UWUSA

Tied to the last outpost

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

It can be argued that Uwusa (United Workers Union of South Africa) was launched by Inkatha with the primary intention of countering the ascending political influence of Cosatu and its affiliates among African working class communities in Natal (see Bennett & Howe 1986; Andrew Levy & Associates 1986; Fine 1987). As a political initiative it is particularly difficult to assess Uwusa's impact on the broader South African political malaise. Although eliciting some business and government support with anti-sanctions and pro-free enterprise policies, it is debatable whether the new federation has been successful in wooing more black South Africans into the Inkatha fold.

However, it is on the trade union terrain where one ultimately must judge Uwusa. As a labour 'federation' Uwusa appears to have been almost universally disowned by organised workers, commerce and industry. In the following report, Mark Bennett sets out to establish precisely how Uwusa — the trade union — has fared in the past two years.

In early 1986 Uwusa's founders calculated that a close connection to Inkatha, which claimed more than 1.1 million members at the time, would enable the new union to rival Cosatu's inaugural membership of 450 000 in no time at all. The same officials were also under the impression that Uwusa's industrial relations passage would be made easier by employer resistance towards Cosatu because of its shop-floor militancy and socialist objectives (Conco 1986). Both expectations have proved to be erroneous. Indeed, two years later neither Uwusa's current membership nor the number of finalised recognition agreements come anywhere near initial targets set.

It is extremely difficult to estimate Uwusa's actual membership or the number of recognition/access agreements concluded because union officials keep releasing contradictory figures.

According to the union's first general secretary, Simon Conco, Uwusa had already recruited 29 000 members on its spectacular May Day launch in 1986. Two days later Conco alleged that membership had swelled to more than 85 000 (*FM* 9/5/86) but he gave no breakdown of paid-up and signed-up members. Six months later 100 000 'applications' for membership were claimed but an 'administrative shortage' meant only 35 000 had been processed as such. A press statement concluded that this 'flood' of members followed worker resignations from other federations (*NN* 6/11/86).

Although Uwusa initially claimed more

than 200 signed recognition agreements — an unlikely 33 each month since its launch — a more plausible list of 54 recognition and interim agreements was released in November 1986. On Uwusa's first anniversary Conco claimed the union had signed up 100 000 workers including 60 000 paid-up members (*BD* May 1987). In the same month the union's new general secretary, GST Hadebe, said Uwusa only had about 100 000 members and that a number of workers had left due to Cosatu 'intimidation' (*WM* 29/5/87). In April 1987 Conco claimed Uwusa had concluded 70 recognition agreements — 50 in Natal and 20 in the Transvaal (*WM* 30/4/87). Later in May Hadebe announced that Uwusa had signed 100 recognition agreements (*WM* 29/5/87), while another official, S Magagula, claimed it had concluded 200 recognition and 250 access agreements (*CP* 31/5/87)!

By September 1987 Hadebe alleged Uwusa had 150 000 paid-up members and a further 50 000 signed-up members. He added that the union was then fully recognised at 150 companies, with an additional 300 access agreements (*FM* 11/9/87). The union's conflicting claims, particularly of paid-up membership, must be treated with caution. In April 1987, while various Uwusa officials claimed between 100 000 and 130 000 members, leading IR consultants estimated actual paid-up support to be in the region of 30 000 (*IR Data* Vol6/No4 1987: p14). Today, Uwusa's actual paid-up membership probably amounts to less than 50 000 workers.

Most of Uwusa's membership has come from the enrolment of previously unorganised workers employed in smaller enterprises

The biggest threat posed by Uwusa will occur when Cosatu affiliates are involved in some form of industrial action over shop-floor or broader community issues

Many unionised workers have been reluctant to join Uwusa as it has no proven track record in industrial relations

The obvious rationale for making such ambitious membership claims is reminiscent of the heyday of South African general unionism, circa 1979-1985 (see Bennett 1986). Then, groups such as the South African Allied Workers Union or the Black Allied Workers Union (Bawu) repeatedly exaggerated membership figures, mainly in the hope that they could give potential recruits, critics, employers and foreign sponsors the impression that they were a force to be reckoned with.

Acid Test

From where and among what type of worker has Uwusa recruited? Prior to the formal launch Uwusa and Inkatha officials warned the new union was going to take Cosatu 'head on' to build membership from mass Cosatu defections. On other occasions they stated that Uwusa was not particularly interested in undermining Cosatu's base in a situation where 92 percent of South Africa's economically active population were un-unionised and therefore potential recruits (Conco 1986: p115/116).

It seems likely that most of Uwusa's membership has come from the enrolment of previously unorganised workers employed in smaller enterprises, i.e. those which typically employ between 20 and 60 workers (BD May 1987). The only published list of recognition agreements released by Uwusa (November 1986) reveals a predominance of smaller concerns. In comparison to the major companies organised by Cosatu, it is particularly difficult to see the IR significance of concluding agreements with a garden nursery, a small Chinese takeaway chain or a restaurant!

In its first two years Uwusa has been unable to make serious inroads into the membership of any rival union grouping. Uwusa's 'advances' have usually occurred where it has entered a labour conflict involving an incumbent (Cosatu) union in a vulnerable situation (see box). For example, Uwusa signed a recognition agreement on behalf of more than 900 'scabs' taken on by BTR Sarmcol during its recognition dispute with Mawu in Howick (NN 14/5/87). In another dispute, at Premier's Jabula Foods, Uwusa attempted to organise the company's East Rand plant while Fawu was trying to re-establish majority support lost during strike action. In future the biggest threat posed by Uwusa will probably occur when Cosatu affiliates are involved in some form of industrial action, on shop-floor or broader community issues.

There are three indicators of Cosatu's resilience to the Uwusa challenge. Firstly the strategic reduction in the general level of anti-Buthelezi rhetoric emanating from Cosatu quarters, which has undoubtedly contributed towards fewer pro-

Inkatha workers leaving the Cosatu fold. It was partly the 'vilification' and 'denigration' of Chief Buthelezi by Cosatu president, Elijah Barayi, at the new federation's launch in December 1985 that created space for the Uwusa initiative.

Secondly, Inkatha's labour thrust has been treated with a great deal of suspicion by Cosatu rank-and-file. Unionised workers have justifiably been reluctant to transfer allegiances to a union which has no proven track record. In contrast, most Cosatu affiliates have shown over time that they can 'deliver the goods' through winning wage increases, improving working conditions and protecting jobs. Although sympathetic to the political visions and agendas of Uwusa and Inkatha, many workers thus have found it easy to remain loyal Cosatu union members.

Uwusa's 24-month track record shows a style of operation that is significantly different from other black unions. There is no record of any strike action by Uwusa. Conco has claimed that it is irresponsible for unionists to strike and disrupt production to achieve their goals 'except as a very last resort' (Star 5/4/86; WM 2/5/86), and that Uwusa prefers to negotiate satisfactory agreements instead. In a few instances members have downed tools but the union stepped in and major strikes were avoided (BD May 1987). The refusal to use strike action may well be Uwusa's acid test as docile South African unions have generally proved less able to negotiate substantially improved wages and benefits than the more aggressive ones.

Thirdly, it seems likely that Uwusa has alienated substantial numbers of Cosatu members in situations where Uwusa's mentor, Inkatha, has appeared to be anti-worker and been ultimately responsible for escalating inter-union conflict in the Natal region. For instance, in 1985 the consumer boycott in Pietermaritzburg to support 970 dismissed BTR Sarmcol employees was abandoned by Fosatu after an Inkatha affiliate, the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, made it clear that neither of these groups supported the boycott. In Ladysmith, an Inkatha branch disrupted the national consumer boycott of OK Bazaars initiated in support of a union wage demand.

Direct Clashes

Direct Cosatu/Uwusa conflict has had a more serious impact on labour relations. Violent confrontations between the rival factions, which have usually occurred during Uwusa recruiting forays (see IPSA Vol5/No1: p70), have affected industry in both Natal and the Transvaal, leading to more than 15 deaths. On the other hand Cosatu rank-and-file have not remained aloof from precipitating violent and intimidatory acts either. One newspaper columnist did note though that it

might be reasonable to conclude that Uwusa had spent so much time disrupting the activities of rivals, that it had neglected to concentrate on building up its own organisation (*WM* 29/5/87).

The significant features of the inter-union conflicts are:

- In Natal much factional violence has occurred in the industrial decentralisation points of Isithebe (Mandini), Ezakhweni (Ladysmith) and Madadeni (Newcastle) as well as in isolated factories and mining communities in rural areas. Relatively little conflict of this kind has taken place in the major metropolitan centres of Durban/Pinetown or Pietermaritzburg, where direct UDF/Inkatha clashes occur.
- Employers have found it difficult to avoid becoming embroiled in factional conflicts which often disrupt production, e.g. Jabula Foods and Clover Dairies. Both Cosatu and Uwusa have accused employers of siding with the opposing union.
- Shop-floor recognition issues have rapidly assumed community dimensions and inter-union conflicts have occurred in township environments too. Further, many of the shop-floor conflicts have involved extraneous community-based supporters of each group. For example, according to police reports the Hlobane colliery battle, in which 11 miners died, erupted after bus-loads of Inkatha supporters entered the mine premises. In another incident at a Ladysmith furniture factory, a ballot between a Cosatu affiliate and Uwusa went in Uwusa's favour after 200 amabutho (vigilantes) turned up at the factory gates, allegedly to 'witness' the ballot (*NM* 5/5/86).

Judging Uwusa's relationship with employers is a difficult task. The economic philosophies of Inkatha and Uwusa might be expected to produce some degree of collusion at the union/management interface. Cosatu has accepted this stereotype and frequently claims to have 'exposed' instances of co-operation. Cosatu's chairperson in Northern Natal, Matthew Oliphant, claimed employers in Isithebe had displayed a willingness to support Uwusa over Cosatu unions (*NM* 5/5/86). At Cosatu's second Central Executive Committee meeting held in Soweto, employers again were accused of assisting Inkatha's labour initiative (*NN* 24/4/86).

Certainly, no broad trend of employer collusion with Uwusa is identifiable. Soon after Uwusa was launched spokespersons for various major Natal employers (un-named) claimed they would not take sides and would remain neutral over the question of recognition (*NM* 5/5/86). Some larger national employers were not overjoyed with the formation of Uwusa and correctly predicted Uwusa would further politicise factory-floor relationships and jeopardise the sound day-to-day relationships managements have

painstakingly established with the newer African unions over the past seven years (Bennett and Howe 1986: p111).

On the other hand, there are some employers who stand to benefit from recognition of Uwusa. Three categories can be identified:

- enterprises which have had an acrimonious relationship with Fosatu and Cosatu affiliates, or are on the verge of costly industrial action;
- smaller enterprises which until the mid-1980's were relatively un-unionised, but face the spectre of Cosatu-style unionisation;
- farmers, who are still excluded from the scope of the Labour Relations Act and therefore of formal unionisation, who might view the penetration of Cosatu and Nactu unions into the field with concern. The Ngotshe Co-operation Agreement (August 1986) has been interpreted as an attempt to cement an alliance between farmers and Inkatha in order to exclude Cosatu's militant brand of unionism. It is speculated that more of these agreements will be signed in future (Mare and Hamilton 1987: pp25/43).

Natal Bound

To dispel criticism that it is a minor regional union 'federation' Uwusa has attempted to establish a presence beyond an obvious Natal and KwaZulu home base. Uwusa officials once boasted that the union would undertake a major recruitment drive in the country's industrial and mining heartland — the Witwatersrand. Despite opening and staffing a number of offices in the Transvaal, however, Uwusa has not made much headway, even among the hundreds of thousands of Zulu migrants there (*CP* 31/5/87). Perhaps Uwusa decided to hold its first congress in Soweto in October 1987 to make it appear that they have a stronger presence in the region than is acknowledged by most observers.

While Uwusa aspires to operate nationally, like Inkatha, it has not attempted to recruit in the industrial and commercial centres of either the Eastern or Western Cape. In Natal it would appear that Uwusa's main support originates from those Zulu workers who owe political and tribal allegiances to Buthelezi and Inkatha.

In comparison to Cosatu affiliates, Uwusa has little support from Natal's Indian and coloured communities. A noticeable feature of Uwusa's launch, which was attended by more than 65 000 people, was the almost complete absence of any non-Zulu worker. Nevertheless, Uwusa, like many other South African unions, is keen to project a non-racial image. A mere 17 days after Uwusa's launch the new union's Germiston branch claimed to have recruited

Although perhaps sympathetic to the political agenda of Uwusa and Inkatha, many workers in Natal have remained loyal Cosatu union members

Despite opening a number of offices on the Witwatersrand Uwusa has not made much headway, even among the thousands of Zulu migrants who work there

The SARMCOL Saga 1983 - 1988

LABOUR RELATIONS

1974 - 1983 Despite initial Sarmcol efforts to promote works committees Mawu starts organising Sarmcol employees. In 1983 union claims recognition failure is due to continual retrenchment of its members - company reduces weekly-paid staff from 2 160 in 1974, to 1 800 in 1981, 1 050 in 1984 and 950 in 1985.

27 June 1983 With increased worker support for Mawu and after Industrial Court (IC) application, Sarmcol signs preliminary recognition agreement which grants union:

- stop-order facilities and weekly one-hour union access
- opportunity to negotiate procedural and substantive recognition agreement within 3 months of union recruiting a majority of weekly-paid workers
- prior notice of retrenchments.

Recognition Dispute

11 Aug/27 Sept 1983 Mawu recruits majority of employees as paid-up members, then submits draft recognition agreement. Sarmcol submits counter-proposals and places further retrenchments on negotiating table. Subsequent struggle over agreement centers on managerial prerogatives.

11 Oct/14 Dec 1983 Both parties appeal for establishment of Conciliation Board (CB) to settle issues of severance pay for retrenched workers and union failure to negotiate in good faith. Disputes ultimately settled in IC.

8 Feb/22 June 1984 Regular meetings between Mawu/Sarmcol to end recognition deadlock. Mawu members begin overtime bans, stage canteen sit-ins, go-slows, refuse to work in certain departments, and hold periodic workstoppages from now on. In 4 months prior to legal strike management estimates labour action costs company R1 million.

22 Aug/28 Nov 1984 Recognition talks re-open but deadlock again.

7/21 Dec 1984: Mawu declares dispute with company but urges members to return to work after illegal strike. Further negotiations fail and union applies for CB.

Legal Strike

4 Feb/17 April 1985 Mawu conducts strike ballot; later, both union and company place 'final terms' agreements on negotiating table.

30 April/6 May 1985: Legal strike begins and Sarmcol dismisses 890 weekly-paid employees. Company employs replacement workers on temporary basis and offers strikers re-employment, which 66 accept.

13 June/12 Sep 1985 Strikers announce willingness for unconditional return to work, but temporary workers given permanent jobs. Sarmcol challenges Mawu to take dismissals to IC if it acted unfairly. Union counter-proposes independent arbitration, including consideration of EEC employment code, which is rejected by company. Mawu asks Sarmcol to agree to use Court, but company refuses; union then applies for CB.

14 Nov/30 Jan 1986 After Sarmcol opposes establishment of CB, Minister of Manpower appoints Board which fails to resolve dispute. Mawu proceeds to IC, argues that strike is legal, and alleges unfair labour practices because Sarmcol refused to recognise and bargain in good faith with union. Sarmcol counters it had not fully recognised Mawu because of its 'unrealistic expectations', and that strike was 'unnecessary, unjustifiable and calculated to disrupt negotiations.'

Hourly-paid workforce is reduced to about 800 after 50 replacement workers are retrenched and dispersed by police outside factory gates.

17 Nov 1986 Industrial Court sits for first time in Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre (near Pmb).

5 May 1987 UWUSA and Sarmcol sign recognition agreement.

10 Sept 1987 Court judgment is in favour of company and finds that workers were misled by union officials. On average 1 000 people (mostly strikers) attend all 39 full court days, spread over nine months (case is second longest in Court's history.) Union questions objectivity of Court and claims judgement will be challenged in higher civil court.

BTR Sarmcol - a subsidiary of the British Tyre and Rubber (BTR) Industries - was established in Howick, near Pietermaritzburg, in 1919. During the 1950s one of the first unions that attempted to organise Sarmcol workers was the Howick Rubber Workers Union (HRWU), an affiliate of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (the Congress Alliance's labour wing). HRWU were granted trade union rights by Sarmcol. Two decades later in the aftermath of the 1973/74 Durban strikes, the newly formed Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu), later to become a leading Cosatu affiliate, resumed attempts to organise Sarmcol workers.

POLITICS & COMMUNITY

7/10 May 1985 Consumer boycott of white-owned shops in Howick is launched to support strikers; later extended to all white businesses in Pmb. Strikers ask Empophomeni residents not to scab; five strikers arrested by police on intimidation charges.

17 June 1985 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions launches worldwide campaign against Sarmcol managements. Pmb Chambers of Industries, Commerce and Afrikaanse Sakekamer issue joint statement rejecting Mawu and Fosatu appeals to intervene in dispute.

21 June/8 July 1985 Strikers stage protest outside Sarmcol's Johannesburg headquarters. Homes of replacement workers burnt; while one scab worker dies in bus stoning incident. Police teargas striker meeting in Empophomeni, and later Howick town clerk asks strikers not to use Catholic Church in town for meetings. KwaZulu Commissioner for Yulindlela bans meetings in Empophomeni for 21 days. Strikers stage demonstration in Pmb CBD and Imbali township, hold meeting in Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre.

Stayaway Support

9/18 July 1985 Mawu again asks Chamber of Industries to intervene, threatens general worker stayaway unless Natal Midland employers lobby Sarmcol to re-employ strikers.

At least 92 percent of Pmb workers participate in stayaway.

Police teargas and arrest 37 strikers, outside Sarmcol factory gates.

International Metalworkers Federation urges Thatcher to intervene in dispute, which is also raised in European Parliament.

5 Aug 1985 Pmb employer chambers and city mayor agree to Mawu request to lobby Sarmcol.

19 Sept 1985 Mawu and Fosatu representatives give evidence on Sarmcol activities to UN Subcommittee on Transnational Corporations in SA/Namibia. Consumer boycott called off in region due to pressure from Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, an Inkatha affiliate.

Nov 1985 Sarmcol Workers Co-operative (SAWCO) launched to provide strikers with employment and income. SAWCO produces printed T-shirts and grows vegetables for food and profit. Strikers and families also receive food parcels donated by aid agencies, community groups and Mawu.

European Lobby

April 1986 Transvaal Regional Secretary of Mawu, Moses Mayekiso, tours UK for three weeks to lobby labour movement and parliamentarians. He appeals to UK Sarmcol employees to strike and/or hold demonstrations to persuade Sarmcol to negotiate with Mawu. Mayekiso argues Sarmcol should either re-employ workers or leave SA.

After merger of BTR Sarmcol and Dunlop operations (1/1/86), BTR Dunlop workers engage in wildcat strike action. Major two week strikes end at 5 BTR Dunlop plants in Natal and Transvaal.

Oct 1986 6 Sarmcol shop stewards due to testify at Brussels EEC hearings into employment practices of foreign companies in SA are refused passports by Pretoria.

5/6 Dec 1986 Two senior Sarmcol shop stewards, Phineas Sibiya and Simon Ngubane, and daughter of striker, Florence Mnikathi, abducted by vigilantes and killed. Mawu sues commissioner of KwaZulu police.

22 March 1988 Nine Inkatha members are held responsible by inquest magistrate for killing of three unionists. National Union of Metalworkers of SA (contains Mawu) claims union is pursuing civil claim for R400 000 against Inkatha and KwaZulu police to compensate families of unionists.

Sources

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126 white workers (*Star* 18/5/86). It also has been alleged that in order to swing a recognition ballot Uwusa tried to 'manufacture' a majority at Jabula Foods by recruiting white supervisory and secretarial staff.

Uwusa does not appear to be too particular about what categories and grades of workers it organises. Union president, Petros Ndlovu, has stated that Uwusa would 'fight for the right to organise all employees' (*NN* 6/11/86), which presumably includes supervisory and managerial staff. Uwusa's first executive was comprised of a range of businessmen, entrepreneurs and personnel officers; the current general secretary, GST Hadebe, was a corporate IR officer between 1979 and 1984. The recruiting targets and the class character of the union's executive are consistent with Inkatha's own strain of 'populism', which proclaims that class divisions are secondary to the liberation 'struggle' in South Africa. Uwusa's attempts to represent diverse class interests within union structures could pose problems in the future.

Other Failures

Cosatu's dominant position owes much to the infrastructure inherited from its original 33 affiliates, particularly from the Fosatu unions. The merger of these unions into Cosatu and the subsequent internal rationalisation into 14 industrial-demarcated affiliates enabled the new federation to rapidly develop:

- a competent core of full-time union organisers;
- efficient, functioning shop steward structures; and,
- a large pool of union resources, e.g. education programs, media and legal resources.

Obviously one of the most important factors behind Uwusa's lack of success is that it inherited few skilled personnel or any established and functioning union resources. Conco claimed Uwusa was going to 'import' experienced unionists from the USA and Europe to organise its stewards (*Conco* 1986: p117), but this has not occurred. Attempts by Uwusa to develop these resources internally, through education and training programs, have begun only recently. In August 1987 Uwusa employed a private sector IR consultancy run by Tjaart van der Walt to train its stewards. The courses started in Natal in August 1987 and are being held at the KwaZulu Training Trust offices in Umgababa on the Natal South Coast (*FM* 11/9/87).

Uwusa has also, according to spokesperson Pauline Dlamini, established training centres so as to improve the quality of its members' work and thereby convince employers to review salaries

(*Star* 30/5/87). Dlamini stated that the courses would include the teaching of English and Afrikaans. Through programs of this sort Uwusa hopes to become a 'benefit society', which will attract workers by offering them skills useful in the employment market rather than to improve working-class organisation.

A potential source of competent unionists for Uwusa has lain in it attracting other unions as affiliates. Although no unions have affiliated, four have publicly declared their support for Uwusa — the National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NSRAIEU), the African Domestic Workers Association, the National Union of Brick and Allied Workers (NUBAW), and the Black Staff Association of the South African Transport Services (Blatu).

The latter three unions were all officially represented at the Uwusa launch. In May 1987 Hadebe claimed that Uwusa still had the support of 40 000 NUBAW members and both factions of NSRAIEU (*WM* 29/5/87). NSRAIEU, the only union to formally affiliate to Inkatha, split into two factions after the conviction of General Secretary Selby Nsibande on fraud and embezzlement charges. As for Blatu, since the 1987 railways strike it has attempted to shed a pro-management and pro-Inkatha image, remaining aloof from Uwusa.

Uwusa had particularly high expectations of attracting other unions into its ranks. Inkatha and Uwusa officials held unsuccessful merger talks with Cusa's Norman Middleton (now with Nactu). Uwusa officials claim to have approached the ineffective black consciousness relic, Bawu, with a view to merger — although Bawu has denied the contact. Conco has also disclosed that Uwusa was negotiating closer links with five other (unnamed) unions which had a combined membership of more than 200 000 (*Star* 16/5/86). Coincidentally, it was revealed that former Tuca president, Robbie Botha, had met with senior Uwusa officials. Whether these meetings were aimed at discussing labour developments in general or constituted an attempt to form a pact between the two groups is open to speculation. It is not known whether these contacts continued after the formal collapse of Tuca in November 1986.

In line with the current vogue of trade unionism in South Africa Uwusa officials maintain that the union will become an umbrella federation of unions with affiliates demarcated on industrial lines. They claim that this transition will occur with worker approval and when more than 5 000 workers are organised within any particular industrial sector. To date Uwusa has no industrial affiliates except perhaps for one obscure union — the 'First Union' — which organises security guards in Pietermaritzburg (*NW* 15/10/87). *PPA*

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Acronyms


- BD Business Day
 NW Natal Witness
 CP City Press
 NN New Nation
 FM Financial Mail
 WM Weekly Mail
 NM Natal Mercury

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