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S O U T H A F R I C A

GROUP AREAS

At the Core of Apartheid

POST-APARTHEID POLICIES

The York and Carnegie Conferences

PEOPLE'S EDUCATION

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Competing Shopfloor Strategies

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THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS


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Note: In keeping with current academic practice, the following words are used to denote membership of the respective racial groups: African; white; coloured; Indian. The term 'black' is used to collectively denote those people referred to by the government as 'non-white'.

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INDICATOR PROJECT

The Indicator Project South Africa (IPSA) is a publication unit which falls under the auspices of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, Durban. It was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change. The Project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decisionmakers, through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' — namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban, and industrial — as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

Financially, the Project relies on donor subscriptions from companies and foundations in South Africa and abroad, who consider it part of their social responsibility programme to support the independent investigation and analysis of issues in all areas of South African society. A broad spectrum of individuals and institutes in the public and private sectors also subscribe to the Indicator SA journal and information service. Interested subscribers should contact the liaison officer directly at the IPSA offices.

Indicator SA draws on university-based research findings and commissions reports from prominent academics and practitioners in the field, besides maintaining a project research team who monitors issues, undertakes special studies and makes regular contributions. The main thrust of the IPSA information service is to provide objective, practical, policy-directed research. We strive to quantify published commentary and findings, through providing hard data, survey results and comparative research. Simultaneously, IPSA initiates debate on controversial issues by inviting a wide range of partisan perspectives, including government, labour, community, corporate executives, and spokespeople representing other key participants in the change process.

In the new series of Indicator SA, the five 'monitors' that make up our unique publication package have been bound together in one volume, with separators indicating each new section. With paper and printing costs constantly rising, it became prohibitively expensive to publish five mini reports under separate covers along the lines of the old Indicator SA format. Also, as the journal is now in its fourth volume, the project team felt the time had come to ring in a few changes — we hope our readership finds the new design and other innovations worthwhile and an improvement!

Professor Schlemmer, founder of the Indicator Project SA, leaves the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the end of 1986 to establish a new centre at the University of the Witwatersrand. The IPSA staff express their thanks for his innovative input and commitment to the Project, and wish him well with this new venture. Although he has resigned as director of CASS, Prof Schlemmer will retain his association with Indicator SA and remains as a full, senior member of our editorial board. As with past editions of our journal, he will continue to contribute regular analyses of major socio-political trends and issues for publication in each edition. Naturally, Indicator SA will remain housed at its current premises, generously provided along with other facilities by the University of Natal, Durban.

SOUTH AFRICA

POLITICAL

M O N I T O R



A RAPX Tour e Wil om.

A surviving black-owned business on Diagonal Street in Johannesburg's central business district. The recent opening of CBDs follows two decades of mass evictions of black businesses and communities from areas zoned for 'white' occupation only, leaving a legacy of racial bitterness and distrust.

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APARTHEID IN TRANSITION

The Collapse of Racial Zoning

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

At the centre of debate about South Africa is the question of whether or not 'apartheid' is dead or dying, or alive and thriving. Both viewpoints are defended with vigour. The most significant test of the government's stated intention to remove apartheid or, as it terms it, 'negative discrimination', is in the offing. The test will be what the government decides to do with the Group Areas Act.

The Group Areas Act (No 36 of 1966) provides for different areas for exclusive ownership and occupation by members of particular race groups. Any member of a race group for which an area has not been zoned, may not own or occupy land and premises within such a proclaimed group area. This law operates in concert with, inter alia:

- the Community Development Act No 3 of 1966, which provides the machinery for removing and resettling people within proclaimed group areas;
- the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No 49 of 1953, which provides powers to impose racial segregation in terms of any public premise, amenity or vehicle;
- the Black Land Act No 27 of 1913, and the Development Trust and Land Act No 18 of 1936; which provide for a separation of occupation and ownership of non-urban land for Africans vis-a-vis other groups; and,
- the Black Community Development Act 4 of 1984, which provides for the proclamation of townships for Africans in urban areas.

These racial zoning laws all rest ultimately on the foundation of the Population Registration Act of 1950, which defines and determines the race groups to which all individuals are held to belong under apartheid precepts.

Of all these laws, the Group Areas Act is perhaps the one which has the most tangible and direct effect on the racial patterning of South African society. It is a cornerstone of apartheid; its essence (*wese*), in Dr Malan's words during debate on the original act in parliament in 1950. As long as it remains, among

critics of the regime, apartheid will not be perceived as having been dismantled.

The Brink of Change?

The President's Council has been deliberating on the Group Areas Act since December 1984, when the Strydom Commission report (1983) was handed to it for consideration and advice. Its report, now widely leaked, is likely to be withheld until after an expected general election next year. The government's eventual response will be the first really central indication of whether or not apartheid will be replaced by freedom of association.

There has been a steady build-up to the present political juncture. In recent years, the government has repealed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and section 16 of the Immorality Act, which prohibited intimate relations between the races (although mixed couples may not yet reside legally in white areas). It has accepted one recommendation of the Theron Commission of 1976, namely that land zoned for industry in controlled areas should not have a racial character. Even so, some industrial land in proclaimed residential group areas or land of mixed usage has been excluded, however.

In 1984, section 19 of the Group Areas Act was substituted in order to allow for free trade areas. This has led to the opening of well over 40 central business districts to entrepreneurs of all races, albeit strictly for non-residential purposes only. An amendment was also published allowing for whites to work under the management or supervision of members of other race groups, in any area. An amendment to the Liquor Act now allows all licensed hotels (but not private hotels and boarding houses) to make their facilities available to all races without the requirement of a permit. Furthermore, during 1985 the government granted 2 427 applications for concessions from the application of the Group Areas Act (Annual Report of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 9/5/86).

Informally, a process of integration of some 'white' areas has begun to take place, particularly in apartment house areas close to the city centres. A study by Fick and De Coning of Rand Afrikaans University (1985) suggested that 9 000 coloureds, 6 500 Indians and 4 500 Africans were residing in Hillbrow, Joubert Park and Berea in Johannesburg. Twenty seven percent of residents of mixed apartment blocks in these areas were not white. Furthermore, some larger corporations have been purchasing houses in upper middle class white areas for black executives to stay in. The government presumably knows of the practice and has not intervened. Prosecutions in terms of the Group Areas Act have declined sharply in the last four years, and have now virtually ceased (Financial Mail 12/9/86), in part due to the supreme court judgment in the 1982 Govender case to the effect that eviction should not follow a group areas conviction unless alternative accommodation was available.

Official Debate on Policy Options

At the Cape congress of the National Party on 1 October this year, the state president reaffirmed his



The remnants of District Six are demolished in 1977 after 15 years of group area removals. The empty heart of Cape Town symbolises the consequences of racial zoning.

party's commitment to the principle of own areas for ethnic communities. He added, however, that he had no objection to a more flexible application of the Group Areas Act, to the delegation of functions to local authorities and to some black people moving into more affluent white areas.

Following these developments, there is a mood of expectation about impending policy change. South Africa may be on the threshold of a reform of even more significance than the recent abolition of influx control. Yet some ways of modifying the law could do more harm than good by making black people more immediately and critically frustrated by remaining residential discrimination than they are in the present long standing and all-pervasive system of segregation. Certain kinds of reform could also lead to inner-city black 'ghetto' developments, or affect only an elite, stimulating further protest over social injustice. In other words, change could be mismanaged, producing instability rather than effective reform. It is thus necessary to review the possibilities and prospects of change in this area very carefully.

A prominent press leak in August 1986, attributed to 'senior National Party sources', has given what appears to be a sound insight into the President's Council thinking on the subject (Natal Mercury 22/8/86). According to this report, and subsequently confirmed from other sources, residential desegregation will be approached in a 'careful and evolutionary manner'. Local authorities would decide after consultation with local residents which areas should be mixed and which should remain ethnically segregated. Provincial Ordinances would be amended to provide local authorities with the power to utilise town-planning as a means of determining the racial character of areas. At an early stage, residential areas adjacent to central business districts should be opened in order to allow groups other than whites the convenience of living close to places of employment and in order to formalise the already mixed character of such areas.

The government will not necessarily accept such recommendations. Indeed, they may even be modified by the President's Council itself, soon to be under a

new chairman. Whatever the case, one may expect a policy change amounting to either:

- the local option as described above, representing a highly selective opening of certain areas, particularly those more centrally located; and/or
- individual concessions on the basis of permits, granted particularly in more centrally located areas and in upper middle class areas of a more liberal character in major cities.

Factors Underlying Residential Segregation

In considering reform strategies in the area of residential segregation in South Africa it is appropriate to be fully aware of the depth of historical structure underlying racial zoning:

- The heritage of colonialism: South African society represents a pattern which has emerged out of entrenched 'settler colonialism'. The whites have a perception of their dwelling areas as fragments of Europe, in style, order, patterns of administration and neighbourhood interaction. The possible emergence of Third World conditions in established white family suburbs is likely to be vehemently resisted, quite apart from the racial issue.
- Lifestyle interests: The principle of segregation for whites reflects social and material interests other than simply the desire for social homogeneity. Since whites are a minority in South Africa, the principle of segregation, accompanied by white control over the agencies controlling public amenities, has meant that they have been able to benefit from relatively uncrowded community facilities. By and large, the ratio of white population to public amenities in white areas is much more favourable than the ratio of population to amenities in the overall sense.
- Reinforcement by other institutions: In South Africa residential segregation is part of an interrelated network of institutions guaranteeing privileged access to various social rewards for whites. Residential segregation and exclusive access by whites to the best financed and most efficient school educational system go hand in hand, for example. Racial zoning is also reinforced by the system of segregated voters'

rolls and the 'own affairs' principle in the tricameral parliament. White, coloured and Indian areas are voter-constituencies.

These three major factors tend to give racial zoning an entrenched quality in South Africa, which is also likely to be manifested in pervasive attitudes in support of the status quo among whites. It also means, however, that changes to the principle of racial zoning are likely to have profound effects on other institutions in society, including the political process. Change in the Group Areas Act is likely to be far from being a 'cosmetic' reform.

Dysfunctions of Racial Zoning

The operation of the Group Areas Act and other forms of racial zoning cause a variety of problems in other spheres, including:

• Distortion of the Housing Market

There is an over-supply of more than 40 000 white dwelling units in the country and an undersupply of well over ten times that number for members of other races. Apart from the fact that the prices of houses and land in Indian and coloured areas are artificially raised, the effects of a lack of inter-changeability of land means that housing provision for other groups is highly constrained by space bottlenecks.

• Purchasing and Transfer Problems

Group areas add to the amount of bureaucracy associated with land delivery for housing (thereby also creating bottlenecks).

• Sociological Effects of 'Status Incongruity'

Group areas tend to confine more affluent and occupationally mobile blacks to the predominantly working class townships. These black people would perceive their social rewards to be well below their material, educational or occupational achievements. Such perceptions tend to heighten feelings of deprivation and generate radical consciousness. Township elites are additionally likely to depreciate efforts to upgrade those areas and will challenge the legitimacy of local politicians who work within the system.

• Detrimental Impact on Race Relations

The Group Areas Act also fundamentally affects race relations, not only because of the bitterness it creates but because it prevents mutual identification of blacks and whites in terms of lifestyles. The black middle class is virtually as socially distant for the white middle class as black workers.

• Symbol of Inequality

Racial zoning also has become a highly visible and concrete symbol of inequality and apartheid, which projects a totally unambiguous image of discrimination. The following percentage comparisons of proclaimed land areas and population depict the situation very dramatically (SAIRR 1984); if figures for Africans were available, the discrepancies shown would be far more dramatic:

Proclaimed group areas:	% of total hectares	Population distribution
Whites	86%	57%
Coloureds	9%	33%
Indians	6%	10%

An even more dramatic example of discrimination lies in the statistics on removals in terms of the Group Areas Act. Here again figures for Africans are missing since they have been covered by other legislation

referred to earlier (see introduction). From 1966 to the end of August 1984, the following removals took place from residential areas and business premises (Rand Daily Mail 26/2/85):

	From residence	From business premises
Whites	2 418	54
Indians	40 067	2 530
Coloureds	83 691	187

The general pattern in our major metropolitan and industrial centres is that the most favourable and conveniently located residential areas have already been occupied by whites. The achievement of equality of housing location as it would apply to all 'non-white' people except for a wealthy class, (which might appreciate living far out of town), is virtually impossible. In particular, the prospects are remote for accommodating the up-and-coming black working and lower middle classes in segregated housing areas which might be equated with those of their white counterparts. This is particularly true in the light of the rapid escalation of building costs and costs of housing infrastructure.

No-one should lightly expect majorities among any emerging class, black or white, to be able to achieve the housing quality and area advantages of more settled and established communities which benefited from the lower cost structures and readier availability of suitable land in earlier years. Nevertheless, when entire ethnic groups, as groups, experience residential disadvantages, and see even a minority among their white job status and age equivalents being able to find houses and apartments more favourably located, a perception of relative racial deprivation must take hold. Symbolic inequality will be even more telling than the objective disadvantages would signify.

Support for Gradual Policy Shifts

Opinion poll results have shown that past reforms by government have been supported by clear majorities in the white electorate. Polls by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd among white voters showed that more NP voters supported abolition of the 'Immorality Act' than opposed it (47% vs 36%: October 1984). The same was true of the granting of full property rights to blacks (57% support vs 24% opposition: January 1986) and of the abolition of influx control (90% support vs 5% opposition: January 1986). Although attitudes are shifting quite rapidly, the opinion poll results on the opening of local residential areas to members of other race groups (see box) still show majorities of NP supporters opposed to the integration of their areas.

While the tricameral system of government remains in force there will be institutional forces militating against integration on a large scale. A recent demonstration of this has been the publication of the government's draft guide plan for the Central Witwatersrand. The assumptions made in the formulation of the plan reflect continuing commitment to a deconcentration of further black population growth to areas on relatively remote margins of the metropolitan areas (Business Day 15/8/86; The Star 29/9/86).

Extrapolating from present trends, the government will probably adopt a gradual and limited policy of desegregation at this stage, which their white voter majority will accept. As already indicated, it is likely

to involve a de facto acceptance of gradual integration of centrally-located apartment house areas, since this is already occurring. One feared consequence of this is that as the black population of these areas mounts, an 'invasion-succession' scenario will occur (Mayer 1957; Wolf 1957). Whites, anticipating further black in-migration and property depreciation, will begin to move out, rentals will fall, buildings will deteriorate, and black people at ever lower levels of income will move in. The falling socio-economic level could bring in its wake the danger of ghetto conditions emerging in such areas.

At the moment, however, the coloured, Indian and African people who are moving into places like Hillbrow and Berea tend to be middle class. Fick and De Coning (op cit) claim that 'single people and young married couples from the professional class represent the type of people who are inclined to move into such areas, on the basis of their financial means and lifestyle'. On this basis, the authors maintain that there will not be a rapid process of further integration of such areas simply because the rent structure is beyond the means of most black people. There is thus a good chance that the apartment house areas referred to will maintain their present social tone and socio-economic level, thus reassuring government sufficiently to accept similar processes elsewhere.

The government is also likely to allow, either formally by way of exemptions or informally, more affluent black people to move into upper middle class areas, particularly in non-National Party supporting cities, townships and suburbs. Apart from Durban, where there are relatively many well-to-do Indians, this process is not likely to occur on a scale which will generate strong resistance or concerns about property values among whites. There are simply not that many Africans or coloureds who can afford white middle class housing. Surveys of my own in Soweto, one of the more affluent black urban areas, suggest that no more than two to three percent of households are likely to be able to afford housing in white middle to upper middle class areas. Also, the possibilities of acquiring building society loans for superior housing in black areas at cost levels below white areas are steadily improving.

The Local Option or Abolition?

The government may be tempted (after an election) to apply only the principle of local option in the context of the current thinking on the President's Council. This will be a critical mistake.

Firstly, local authorities, with the exception of the very few PFP controlled city councils, will be very reluctant to actively encourage local residents to approve an opening of their areas. The handful of suburbs which in terms of formal procedures will become open areas will achieve little to satisfy blacks and will simply highlight the resistance to integration among the remaining areas. Hence a great deal of political controversy will be created without much benefit accruing to Africans, coloureds or Indians.

Secondly, the few non-affluent areas which are opened will attract disproportionate numbers of blacks, leading to a very real prospect of the 'invasion and succession' sequence. If anything is likely to discourage further moves towards desegregation this

will. Furthermore, the quality of the restricted areas which open may become threatened by over-concentration, thus achieving little by way of improvement in quality of life for black people.

One has to conclude, therefore, that the changes to racial zoning which appear possible at this stage will really benefit only more affluent black families and middle class single people and married couples. The problems of residential settlement of the black working and lower middle class will not be alleviated. It will achieve very little for South Africa if the policy simply shifts from one of manifest race discrimination to almost equally manifest class discrimination.

The most appropriate step therefore would be to simply abolish the Group Areas Act. Black people are very unlikely to move into areas where an active resistance to their arrival would be expected. Furthermore, the findings of Fick and De Coning (op cit) suggest that only some four percent of coloureds in Johannesburg have an active desire to live outside of 'coloured' areas. As is the case elsewhere in the world, there will be a tendency for people to continue living in areas of homogeneous ethnic concentration. The more confident and mobile professional and upper middle class blacks will move to scattered locations throughout cities without changing the character of any area.

There will also not be formal discrimination against less-affluent African, coloured and Indian people. A relatively small number of more modest white areas will gradually become fully integrated (probably leading to white out-mobility) but without any particular political stress being created. The majority of black people will continue to live where they are. The government will achieve maximum impact for a keynote reform without very great costs.

Costs and Impact of Reform

Regrettably, however, the anticipated dangers of political reform are always greater than the eventual costs. For reasons already discussed, complete repeal is unlikely. In this context the following points are relevant:

- the application of a local option as the only strategy will not be a step in the right direction. It will do the government and the reform process more harm than good, while benefiting very few Africans, coloureds or Indians;
- the present patterns of informal integration should continue undisturbed, since they contain few negative consequences for any of the parties involved;
- government should also freely grant individual concessions to 'non-white' people, attempting simply to ensure an even spread of black households across cities. By avoiding concentrations of new residents as far as possible the socio-political implications in existing white areas will be minimised;
- new residential areas should be allowed to develop without any restrictions according to race. Furthermore, the private sector, either in the form of individual companies and property developers or collectively, should be encouraged or allowed to establish new open housing schemes;
- housing provision, particularly for Africans, in or near existing urban-industrial complexes must be accelerated. The rapid delivery of land for this

purpose is urgent;

- in due course, once the white electorate has become accustomed to the new patterns and majorities of people realise that the problems they anticipate are not likely to arise, the formal legal impediments to full residential association will be able to be removed

- the problem of racial segregation in schools has to be dealt with along similar lines (see forthcoming analysis).

If this course of gradualism is followed, however, the government will be exposed to ongoing criticism in the press, from blacks and by government and

agencies abroad. It would therefore be appropriate for the government to make a statement of intent and announce a time frame for the total abolition of racial zoning. A 'buffer' of this type will also reduce resistance from conservative whites.

Expectations have developed in recent months which will make it impossible to avoid a wave of new bitterness among black people if the Group Areas Act stays as it is. The white rightwing parties and their supporters, on the other hand, probably expect the 'worst' already. The government cannot afford to avoid the challenge of reform in racial zoning. The benefits of courageous action will far outweigh the costs.

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

The Changing Attitudes of White South Africans

It is not suggested here that white voter attitudes on the issue of residential segregation or integration are in any precise way an indication of likely behaviour. Attitudes can shift very rapidly under the impact of political leadership, policy changes or actual precedents for changed behaviour. Nevertheless, attitudes at any given moment do reflect a climate of opinion or a political culture which can either encourage or discourage change. Popular attitudes feed into political

debate and politicians have great respect for the climate of popular opinion.

In two comparative surveys of white voter opinion in 1977 and 1982 conducted among identically structured national samples, using strictly comparable questions, the following trends were obtained. The studies were undertaken by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, in collaboration with Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd, using a stratified random panel and postal survey technique, sample 2 300.

Item: 'Granting of permission to certain non-whites to move into white areas'

	Afrikaans		English		NP		PFP		CP
	1977	1982	1977	1982	1977	1982	1977	1982	1982
'Acceptable'	23%	26%	53%	56%	24%	37%	80%	72%	6%
'Undecided'	8%	11%	18%	22%	10%	15%	7%	19%	6%
'Unacceptable'	69%	64%	29%	22%	66%	48%	11%	9%	87%

- Another comparison between survey findings in 1981 and in April 1986 brings us closer to the present. Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd put a rather more

pointed question to their representative national panel of 1 605 white voters:

Item: 'Assuming a referendum were to be held among residents of your neighbourhood in order to establish how they feel about the opening of the area to coloureds/Indians/Africans. How would you personally vote?'

Proportions voting in favour	Afrikaans		English		NP		PFP		CP/HNP	
	1981	1986	1981	1986	1981	1986	1981	1986	1981	1986
Coloureds	13%	26%	41%	61%	12%	38%	64%	85%	—	4%
Indians	13%	25%	43%	60%	11%	36%	67%	84%	—	1%
Africans	6%	16%	32%	51%	6%	25%	52%	77%	—	1%

- In a further item in the same Market and Opinion survey, respondents were given a choice between more graded options, paraphrased below.

RESPONSE PATTERNS: 1986

	Afrikaans	English	NP	PFP	CP
Group areas should remain unchanged and be rigidly applied	37%	6%	17%	—	83%
Group areas should be slightly modified to make individual exceptions possible	22%	17%	26%	7%	10%
Group areas should be relaxed where a majority of local residents condones it	25%	43%	37%	42%	5%
Local authorities should have the power to open areas	15%	30%	20%	45%	3%

ANALYSIS

These results show that changes in the pattern of residential segregation are likely to encounter resistance among whites - in fact, after school integration, it is one of the most problematic areas of reform in white politics. Among NP supporters, more people will oppose the complete integration of their areas than

support it. Nevertheless, it is also clear that attitudes of white voters have been changing steadily and today, over five out of ten NP supporters are likely to countenance some form of local option or gradualism as regards residential integration. With firm leadership and appropriate contextualisation of the change, the government is not likely to endanger its majority support by proceeding with certain meaningful reform options (see conclusion).

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
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THE SANCTIONS SURVEYS

In Search of Ordinary Black Opinion

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

The attitudes, opinions and interests of rank-and-file black people in South Africa are frequently taken as a pivotal reference in the debate about economic sanctions against the country. One of the favourite arguments holds that sanctions will most harm the people they are intended to help — ordinary blacks who, accordingly, might be expected to oppose the measures.

Against this view there is ample evidence from the public media that most prominent black spokespeople in extra-parliamentary organisations and the mainline churches support sanctions, ranging from trade embargoes to disinvestment. A frequent argument heard from these quarters is that most black people would be prepared to suffer additional privation in a campaign aimed at destroying apartheid. While this latter argument does not go unchallenged in black society — see former editor Obed Kunene, 'South Africa Then and Now', in the Sunday Tribune, 5 October 1986; and the regular opposition to sanctions expressed by Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha spokespeople — it is a popular viewpoint among protagonists of sanctions abroad.

The controversy has resurfaced with western government debate on the merits of imposing more stringent sanctions, and warrants reconsideration of the

survey evidence on whether or not rank-and-file blacks support sanctions.

After a plethora of social surveys published in the media over the past 30 months, great confusion exists over the extent of domestic black support for sanctions. At least eleven surveys have been conducted inside South Africa, some of them leading to diametrically opposed conclusions. In a sense social science owes the concerned political actors and apology for the confusion.

Most of the difficulty lies in the interpretations of the survey findings by authors with dissenting viewpoints, myself included, and in the necessarily brief presentation of our findings in the media. There is an obvious need to attempt to reconcile the different findings in order to shed constructive light on the issue.

Basic Propositions

A balanced interpretation of the major findings (see box) can be facilitated by the following simple propositions about the contemporary position of black people in South African society:

- Most blacks completely reject apartheid and

obviously welcome pressures or influences brought to bear on the government which will promote socio-political change.

- Most rank-and-file blacks, being people who are either in poverty, have low incomes and/or live in families with a large number of dependants, would not like to experience a fall in already precarious living standards as a consequence of slow growth or stagnation in the South African economy.

- The unemployment and under-employment rate is high in South Africa, affecting anything up to two million people, mainly blacks. Black people are unlikely to support any policy or programme which further reduces the capacity of the economy to create jobs. The best jobs available in South Africa are those created in the modern industrial, commercial and financial sectors.

In large measure attitudes toward sanctions are the result of black respondents weighing the first proposition against the second and third propositions above. The sanctions weapon is generally presented as capable of both influencing the South African government and white establishment, and of weakening the economy and employment growth. In this context the choice boils down to the extent to which black people are willing to endure increased privation for the sake of political pressure on the government, and whether they would see that pressure as likely to be effective.

An argument put forward by some conservative and by some radical protagonists is that disinvestment will benefit the South African economy by encouraging more appropriate technologies, import substitution, greater labour intensity of production, and a concentration on consumption-led as opposed to investment-led growth. As is always the case in complex economic issues, there is some truth in such arguments.

As a radical point of view, however, this argument is seriously flawed. Firstly, if the South African government were to perceive it to be possible to so redirect economic development policy as to weather the effects of sanctions in this way, the sanctions campaign would lose its whole point — that of coercing government into change. Secondly, if sanctions and disinvestment have some bad effects and some good effects they will also not be effective in influencing a determined and resilient South African government. Hence the effects will be borne by the South African population without any particular political purpose.

The truth of the matter is that the South African economy is an open one which has become increasingly reliant on external capital over the past 30 years. Sanctions and disinvestment may stimulate some short-term growth but in the long term the economy will run into severe balance of payment problems which, in turn, will constrain employment growth and expansion generally. Sanctions will probably have considerably more negative than positive effects; hence popular perceptions about sanctions are very broadly correct.

The Arbitrary Choice

Where the questions (see box) put to blacks are posed in simple terms as a choice between continued investment or disinvestment, with no embellishments or suggestive references to political effects (i.e. to

The Ayes and A Brief Guide to Ten Major

THE SCHLEMMER/INDICATOR PROJECT SA (IPSA) SURVEYS

June 1984: A controlled quota sample of 551 black male Industrial workers in all metro areas except Cape Town.

- **First question** *There are groups of people in America and England who try to encourage banks and organisations not to put their money in factories which are in South Africa. Do you think this is a good or a bad thing?*

Responses	
Good thing (disinvestment)	26%
Bad thing (anti-disinvestment)	74%

- *In a series of further questions on disinvestment, one offered the following choice:*

Responses	
'American companies should build as many factories in South Africa as they can, making as many jobs for blacks as they can'; or	59%

	32%
'American companies should only run factories in South Africa if they can pay high wages, give good pensions and help with housing, even if they make fewer jobs'; or	

	9%
'American companies should NOT run factories in South Africa because they make the government of South Africa stronger'	

November 1984: A second stratified probability sample of 1 000 black adults of both sexes, again conducted in all major metro areas except Cape Town.

- *The first question listed above was repeated:*

Responses	
Good thing (disinvestment)	14%
Bad thing (anti-disinvestment)	84%
Don't know	2%

THE HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL (HSRC) SURVEYS

July 1984: A stratified probability sample of 1 478 black adults of both sexes in Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area

- **Question** *Should the outside world apply an economic boycott against South Africa or not?*

Responses	
Yes — Boycott	10%
No — Do not boycott	82%
Don't know	8%

February 1985: Another stratified probability sample of 736 men in PWV area, with better educated people over-represented:

- *The above question was repeated*

Responses	
Yes — Boycott	30%
No — Do not boycott	65%
Don't know	5%

- **Question** *Senator Kennedy is back in America. Should he convince the United States government and United States companies to put money in or withdraw money from South Africa?*

Responses	
Withdraw money (disinvestment)	18%
Neither/uncertain, don't know	34%
Invest money (anti-disinvestment)	48%

May 1985: A third stratified probability sample of 1 200 black adults of both sexes in PWV area:

- **Question** *Should the outside world apply an economic boycott against South Africa or not? (Repeated again)*

Responses	
Yes — Boycott	16%
No — Do not boycott	76%
Don't know	4%

THE SUNDAY STAR/STAR (Johannesburg)

February 1985: A snap survey among 459 blacks in Johannesburg and Soweto — sampling procedure unknown.

- **Respondents were asked whether they 'supported or opposed disinvestment':**

Responses	
Opposed disinvestment	51%

(The percentage support for disinvestment was not published. It was probably lower than 49 percent due to non-response or 'don't know' answers.)

Nays on Sanctions

Surveys & Black Responses

THE LONDON SUNDAY TIMES SURVEYS

In association with the Mori Polling Organisation working through Markinor in Johannesburg

August 1985: A quota sample of 400 blacks of both sexes in Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Durban; apparently not controlled for socio-economic level.

● Question Do you think other countries are right or wrong to impose economic sanctions unless South Africa agrees to get rid of the apartheid system?

Right (pro-sanctions) Responses
77%

July 1986: A second quota sample of 615 metropolitan and rural blacks.

● The above question was repeated; respondents were also asked whether they knew or cared about 'sanctions'.

Pro-sanctions Responses
29%
Anti-sanctions 32%
No opinion 39%

In metropolitan areas, where most other surveys were conducted, the proportion supporting 'sanctions' was 47 percent, with 24 percent not knowing what 'sanctions' meant.

THE ORKIN/COMMUNITY AGENCY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRY (CASE) SURVEY

In association with The Institute for Black Research and Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd, Cape Town

September 1985: A stratified probability sample of 800 black respondents in all major metropolitan areas.

● The question on disinvestment was about 200 words long and is too lengthy to be repeated in full. The 'disinvestment' options were:

(No investment) 'This view says that foreign firms only help to keep apartheid alive and exploit blacks so foreign firms should not be allowed to remain here at all. This view is supported by the ANC and the PAC, many members of the UDF and some trade unions....' Responses
24%

(Conditional Investment/Disinvestment) 'This view wants to limit or restrict investment ... foreign firms should not be allowed to invest unless they actually pressure the government to end apartheid and recognise the trade unions chosen by the workers — supported by Bishop Tutu, Fosatu, Cusa and the SACC.' 49%

Comment:

In the news reports on the last survey it was claimed by the author that the results 'neatly overturned' the earlier surveys conducted by myself and (by implication) the HSRC surveys. A careful interpretation of the results, however, would suggest that Orkin's survey 'neatly' confirms the findings of the earlier surveys (see main text).

THE IMS (SA) SURVEY

Conducted on behalf of a very large South African corporation

July 1986: A stratified sample of 604 black adults in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging complex; another random sample of 607 black employees on four gold mines and two coal mines. The study was introduced to respondents simply as a 'study of business in general'.

● Question Do you think large companies should become involved in trying to bring about political or social change in South Africa or should they concentrate on industrial growth? If the former, which of the following should a large company do?

Large companies should	Responses	
	Black Adults	Black Miners PWV
● No answer/Dan't know	3	4
● Concentrate on industrial growth	31	39
● Keep quiet about politics but make sure that everyone has equal conditions, opportunities and equal pay for equal work	12	13
● Talk to SA government about change	37	28
● Talk to all people and groups about change	11	16
● Not invest more money in South Africa or withdraw from South Africa until certain changes have taken place	6	3

groups who support sanctions or to the effect on job creation), seventy five percent or more of rank-and-file black respondents oppose disinvestment (Schlemmer: June 1984; November 1984. HSRC: July 1984; May 1985). Where the respondents are better educated (HSRC: February 1985) or are selected in a snap survey which tends to bias sampling away from industrial workers towards easily interviewed unemployed youth or service workers (Star: February 1985), opposition to disinvestment drops but a majority still oppose disinvestment. In all these instances of neutral forced choice, the respondents split in favour of continued investment, putting economic welfare above vaguely understood political considerations.

In studies where the question is coloured by references to the political purpose of disinvestment, support for sanctions increases in cases where only two choices are given. The first London Sunday Times study (August 1985) obtained a 77 percent endorsement of 'economic sanctions' when the question asked linked the sanctions to 'getting rid of apartheid' (see survey box).

A subsequent poll by the same organisation (July 1986) has, however, invalidated the first poll by establishing that nearly 40 percent of black respondents did not know (or care) what 'economic sanctions' meant. Economic sanctions are big words which even most middle class people do not fully understand. To use these phrases in a poll statement which is then associated with a more easily understood political effect is a clear case of very serious bias. The use by the HSRC of the word 'boycott' is defensible since this has become a well-known phrase in black political life (school boycott, consumer boycott, etc.).

Hence, when black survey respondents are asked to balance vagueness against pressure to end apartheid they choose the latter. This can hardly be construed as support for a withdrawal of investment capital or prohibitions on South African exports, however.

The Qualified Options

In cases where more than two options are given, the qualified alternatives gain a great deal of support. This is evidenced in Orkin's CASE study (September 1985) and in the IMS (July 1986) study, as well as in the further question in my 1984 survey. There is an obvious reason for this. The qualified alternatives allow black respondents to balance and endorse both their political interests (proposition 1 above) and their economic interests (propositions 2 and 3). It is entirely predictable that this should happen.

Orkin has interpreted the qualified option as disinvestment. His middle position is really not disinvestment but rather qualified investment. Pressuring the government to end apartheid and recognising unions are stances which the various codes of employment conduct encourage and which are adopted by most larger multinationals. For most foreign firms this is 'constructive engagement' and not disinvestment.

In Orkin's survey only one quarter support full disinvestment. This is the same as the proportion supporting the total disinvestment position in my earlier surveys. It is also not much higher than the average proportion supporting the (total) 'boycott'



South Africa's will and ability to impose retaliatory trade embargoes was demonstrated on 1 January 1986 when Pretoria imposed a blockade on landlocked Lesotho's border posts.

position in the three HSRC studies or the most recent IMS study (see survey box).

In fact, if one considers the wording of the total disinvestment option in this CASE survey, it is surprising that as few as 24 percent of black respondents supported it. The total disinvestment position is presented as being supported by 'the ANC, the PAC, Azapo, many members of the UDF and some trade unions'. Given the large collective support for these organisations that Orkin's own survey shows, the 24 percent of endorsement which this option actually gained is low indeed.

The full range of surveys leads one to the conclusion that at this stage only a minority of about one quarter or less of rank-and-file blacks in major metropolitan areas (less if rural blacks are included) would support total disinvestment or full economic boycotts. Their reasons, as my surveys and others have shown, are simply that they would not wish to endure collective economic punishment in the sanctions process.

Evaluating the Findings

The 'conditional investment' position — interpreted as qualified disinvestment by some writers like Orkin — on the other hand, may well have gained support over the 30 month period covered by the surveys. The wider range of results in my earlier surveys

showed clearly that most blacks wanted pressure on the system of apartheid, and due to publicity in the media, the conditional investment option has probably crystallised as the favoured position. The CASE study and the 1986 IMS study compared with preceding findings tend to suggest this trend.

Operative sanctions against South Africa are not yet comprehensive or total in their scope. The present level of sanctions may well be supported by a majority of blacks, who might not endorse further, more punitive measures. Yet sanctions are more than likely to conform to the ratchet principle, with present measures being replaced in due course by more stringent action. Therefore, the issue of current black opinion on total or comprehensive sanctions remains highly relevant.

The main point at this stage, then, is that it can still be said that no survey in which questions were posed in simple, descriptive language has proved that a majority of blacks are willing to endorse comprehensive, punitive economic sanctions that would reduce the capacity of the economy to create jobs and welfare. It is certainly true that a majority of black spokespeople, members of the middle-class intelligentsia, students and clergymen support sanctions. This is not surprising since their interests and analyses are political rather than economic. They would undoubtedly benefit from an economic collapse if it meant a consequent collapse of the South African government — an unlikely outcome, however.

Surveys and Policy

Social surveys cannot define specific policies — it is up to policy makers to decide what mix of provisions are likely to achieve effective pressure for change in South Africa without damaging the longer-run interests of black people. In taking these decisions, policy makers abroad must be mindful not only of the immediate effects of their decisions but of the indirect effects and longer-term consequences as well.

The sanctions campaign, whether it succeeds or not, over and above the other serious pressures on the South African economy, can gravely undermine confidence among investors, importers of South African goods and international bankers. Once investor confidence is undermined it may never be fully recovered, even in a changed South Africa.

The most important question for responsible policy makers abroad is whether sanctions will be sufficiently effective to induce the South African government to make concessions which are substantial enough to satisfy the pro-sanctions lobby. There is hardly any convincing evidence that this will be the case. Minister Pik Botha's statement in Witbank on 3 July 1986, suggests the opposite: 'The sooner sanctions come the better. We will show the world we will not be made soft.' This view seems to be increasingly pervasive in government circles. Statements like these could be bluff and bravado but they could also reflect hardening collective determination. If there is any doubt on this issue, then protagonists of sanctions should be very cautious about the effects of their strategy, as the mass of rank-and-file blacks in South Africa undoubtedly are. Clearly, the majority of black people welcome external pressure on the South African government. The question is how much and of what kind. *IPQA*

A SANCTIONS SCOREBOARD

	EEC																	COMMONWEALTH*								
	NORDIC																									
	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	NEW ZEALAND*	AUSTRALIA*	CANADA*	AUSTRIA	ICELAND	FINLAND	SWEDEN	NORWAY	DENMARK	SPAIN	PORTUGAL	IRELAND	ITALY	GREECE	LUXEMBURG	NETHERLANDS	BELGIUM	FRANCE	WEST GERMANY	UNITED KINGDOM*	JAPAN	USA		
New investment			•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•										•			•	•	
Loans to SA gov/parastatals			•	•	•				•												•			Dis	•	
Loans to SA private sector			•	•	•																•			Dis	•	
Import of SA gold coins			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Dis	•	
Import of SA steel (s) iron (i) uranium (u) coal (c)			•	•	•				C	All Trade	All Trade	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	S I U	•	S I U	S I U		•	
Import of SA agricultural produce/wine			•	•	•			Spirits	•	•	All Trade			•											•	
Export to SA of crude oil/petroleum products		•	•	•	•					All Trade	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Export to SA of computers/computer technology			•	•	For SAP SADF	For SAP SADF	•	•	•	•	•													For SAP SADF	•	
Export to SA of nuclear equipment/technology			•	•	•	R				All Trade	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
End to gov export incentive schemes • export credits • risk cover for exports • assistance for commercial relations			R	R	R	R				All Trade	All Trade			No Official Assistance				Ban Risk Cover	Ban Export Credits		Ban Export Credits			R		
Withdrawal of trade attaches				Closure of Trade Office																						
Landing rights SAAir links			•	•	•				•		•														•	
Promotion of tourism to SA			•	•	•																			V		
Withdrawal/expulsion of military attaches			•	•	•						•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Export/import of military equipment		•	•	•	•						•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Diplomatic relations	Sever	Sever	Sever							Sever	Sever										Freeze on Govt-govt Agree					
Sporting/cultural/scientific links			Dis	Dis	Dis				•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Dis	R		
Codes of employment conduct for firms in SA			V								•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	V		V	
Assistance to anti-apartheid groups in SA					•						•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	

KEY
 Each • represents a total statutory ban or severance of contact with South Africa, unless other less stringent forms of sanctions have been placed on South Africa by individual governments. The latter are identified by the following acronyms: **Dis:** Discourage
R: Restricted
V: Voluntary

NOTES
 This table was compiled from news reports collected over the past three years and does not reflect the various anti-South African measures adopted by the international community before 1984. As many anti-South African sanctions have been adopted collectively by a number of regional, political and economic groupings - eg. the Commonwealth, the EEC, etc. - some individual measures may not be currently in force as they still have to be ratified by each member country's own legislature.

SOURCES
 Indicator SA Press Clippings
 Financial Mail

Chronology

COUNTDOWN

South Africa's Growing

Compiled by Indicator SA

	DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES <i>Constructive & Broken Engagements</i>	ANTI-APARTHEID ISSUES <i>Postures, Protests & Pressures</i>
1984 Sept - Dec	<p>9 Oct French Minister of External Relations warns UN that anti-SA sanctions would be counter-productive.</p> <p>Mid Oct UK Labour Party MP Donald Anderson visits 6 UDF fugitives in British consulate (Durban).</p> <p>15/21 Nov US government protests detention of trade unionists involved in Transvaal work stayaway, and defends policy of constructive engagement at UN. Canadian UN representative calls for readmission of SA to General Assembly.</p> <p>7/14 Dec Bishop Tutu meets President Reagan in White House who rejects calls for economic sanctions.</p>	<p>7/30 Sept UK Trade Union Congress (TUC) denounces apartheid and calls for increased pressure on multi-national corporations operating in SA. Irish government bans purchase of SA medical products and refuses leave for state employees participating in SA sport events.</p> <p>18 Nov Bi-partisan coalition in US House of Reps protests arrests of UDF and other activists in SA.</p> <p>21 Nov Protests begin outside SA embassy in Washington DC — by mid-December demonstrations spread to other US cities with more than 88 protestors arrested.</p>
1985 Jan - Mar	<p>Jan Senator Kennedy visits SA for 8-day tour. US ambassador to SA Herman Nickel recalled to advise Reagan on ways to counter disinvestment. UK Minister of State Malcolm Rifkind says UK has no confidence in SA because of non-return of 4 arms smugglers and Namibian independence blockage.</p> <p>11/14 Feb US closes Windhoek liaison office because of successful disengagement of SA/Angolan armies; France urges SA to grant Namibia independence.</p> <p>Mar UK parliamentary committee urges stronger action against SA diplomats if they abuse diplomatic privilege. Ten EEC and 5 Nordic nations send protests to SA government over detention of UDF leaders and events at Crossroads.</p>	<p>By end January, 1 500 US demonstrators have been arrested after protests at SA diplomatic missions and at corporations with interests in SA.</p> <p>Mar 42 UK local authorities launch co-ordinated week of action against apartheid and ask government to review SA policy. Report released outlines steps taken by 121 UK authorities against SA; boycott of SA goods; refusal of use of local facilities for SA sporting and trade delegations, and naming of streets and buildings after SA political prisoners. Irish government donates R33 000 for legal costs of UDF treason trialists.</p>
April - June	<p>16/20 Apr In major policy statements US Secretary of State George Shultz and UK Prime Minister Thatcher reject sanctions.</p> <p>9 Apr Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) calls for isolation of SA and asks UN members to cut SA links.</p> <p>21/22 May All Irish government departments ban SA goods; Australian PM backs Commonwealth moves to introduce sanctions. French government rejects calls for disinvestment from SA.</p> <p>9 Jun UK government rejects sanctions calls in spite of pressure from UN, EEC and Commonwealth.</p> <p>14/24 Jun SA ambassador to UK Dennis Worrall summoned to Whitehall after SA military raid into Botswana; US ambassador in SA returns to US for consultations. Commonwealth lashes SA over raid and Namibia issue. Swedish Foreign Ministry recommends curtailed scientific, cultural and sports contacts with SA.</p> <p>26 Jun SA sends 6 Indian MPs at state expense to US to counter disinvestment campaign.</p>	<p>Early Apr Trustees of pension funds asked by TUC to withdraw investments from 10 UK companies if they fail to report on conditions of service of black employees in SA. New Zealand government decides not to issue visas to Springbok rugby team.</p> <p>10/18 Apr Special meeting of International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) considers world-wide trade union action against SA, while EEC passes 3 resolutions to cut economic, military and cultural ties with SA. Five Nordic countries examine ways in which pressure can be exerted on SA.</p> <p>Mid Apr In US mass demonstrations continue at universities, and outside SA diplomatic missions and US corporations — at least 2 800 protestors in 28 cities arrested since November 1984.</p> <p>8 May Reverend Leon Sullivan claims he will call for full economic sanctions if SA does not dismantle apartheid in 2 years.</p> <p>16/21 Jun UK Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) holds mass rally outside SA embassy. International Labour Organisation (ILO) meeting calls for complete isolation of SA, but Western nations oppose motion.</p>
July - Sept	<p>Early July US government announces increased surveillance of SA diplomats in US. 66 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ask to meet EEC foreign ministers in effort to end apartheid.</p> <p>4/9 Aug Swedish PM Olof Palme supports stronger economic sanctions against SA.</p> <p>Mid Aug 10 EEC, Spanish, Portuguese, and 5 Nordic ambassadors withdrawn from SA because of Emergency. Claimed that only 6 ambassadors — from Israel, Switzerland, Taiwan, Paraguay, Malawi and Austria — are still in Pretoria.</p> <p>Brazil bans oil and arms exports to SA, cuts sport/cultural links.</p> <p>31 Aug/Early Sept European Commission, which administers EEC, declares it will back sanctions if members agree. Delegation of 3 EEC foreign ministers from Holland, Italy and Luxembourg</p>	<p>15/23 Jul NZ rugby tour to SA cancelled, rebel Australian cricket tour of SA announced. SA handicapped athletes banned from special games in UK.</p> <p>31 Jul Transport union (TGWU) backs UK dockers' refusal to load goods destined for SA claiming breach of arms embargo.</p> <p>Mid Aug 5 500 attend anti-apartheid demonstration in Washington DC.</p> <p>19/21 Aug UK National Union of Seamen lead campaign to stop oil shipments to SA. Belgium bars 12 SA delegates to International Nuclear Energy conference. World conference of mayors urge 700 members from 26 countries to fight apartheid through divestment of city funds.</p> <p>By Mid Aug 7 US states have passed some form of disinvestment legislation while another 28</p>

TO SANCTIONS


Isolation 1984/86

Researcher Mark Bennett

SUBJECT SOUTH AFRICA <i>Responsive & Offensive Actions</i>	THE SANCTIONS SAGA <i>From Disinvestment to Trade Bans</i>	
<p>1/3 Sept Severe rioting erupts in black townships in Voul Triangle. 24 Sept During consular affair, Foreign Minister Pik Botha announces 4 South Africans will not be returned to UK to stand trial on arms smuggling charges, and forfeits R800 000 bail. SA refuses to pay R36m outstanding to UN until it is reinstated. 26 Oct Pik Botha meets US African Affairs Secretary Chester Crocker on Cope Verde islands and in Cape Town to discuss Angola/Namibian issues. Later, Botha holds discussions in Israel with counterpart. 23/27 Dec Pik Botha returns from E Africa where landing rights for SA Airways are discussed. SA and Swaziland exchange trade reps.</p>	<p>25/30 Sept SA Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis attends IMF meeting, where report by world bankers ranks SA as the country with the 29th best credit rating. 2 Oct US Congress Committee approves bill which could ban US bank loans to SA government and parastatals, and require US firms to report on employment practices. 28 Oct Italian Minister of Trade and Industry visits SA. 14 Dec A major Danish power company halts import of SA coal.</p>	<p>1984 Sept - Dec</p>
<p>5 Feb After SA protest, Botswana gives assurances it will not allow ANC insurgents to enter SA via its territory. Later SA asks Botswana to expel ANC members. 20 Mar Pik Botha and Defense Minister Malan visit Maputo for second time in 6 days; to stop smuggling of armaments to MNR, entire SA/Mozambique border declared no-go zone to aircraft. 21 Mar Police fatal shooting of 20 mourners in Longa (Uitenhage) evokes worldwide condemnation. Pik Botha and Crocker meet in Cape Town to discuss Namibia; later SA declares commitment to UN supervised independence for territory.</p>	<p>Legislation in New York aims to cut city dealings with banks/companies that underwrite securities/loans for SA government. By February, 5 US states and 11 cities have adopted laws that require state pension funds to be withdrawn from SA linked companies. Mar US Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 14 to 0 to initiate sanctions unless SA implements reforms within 2 years. 4 major US banks refuse to loan funds to SA public sector.</p>	<p>1985 Jan - Mar</p>
<p>17/18 Apr SA announces completion of SADF withdrawal from Angola, Namibian Multi-Party Conference (MPC) to form transitional government. 17/21 May Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Nel claims Joint Monitoring Commission has disbanded after disengagement of SA/Angolan armies; inside Angola, capture of 1 SADF soldier and 2 killed in Cabinda raises strong international protests. 14/17 Jun SADF raids alleged ANC targets in Gaborone, with 14 exile fatalities. SA transfers power to MPC interim government in Namibia despite international rejection.</p>	<p>Mid Apr At least 20 anti-SA bills at various stages in US Senate and Congress, and at least 29 states have own anti-SA bills. 2 May US House of Reps Foreign Affairs Committee approve Kennedy/Gray Anti-Apartheid Bill, which provides for bans on new bank loans to SA government and parastatals, export of computer technology, future Kruger Rand sales and new US investment in private sector. Australian government bans SA firms from competing for government construction projects and Aust business in SA asked to adopt voluntary employment code. 4/5 Jun US House of Reps approves the Anti-Apartheid Bill of 1985 by 295 votes to 127. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves Lugar/Dole Bill to end US/SA nuclear commerce, bank loans to SA government, make Sullivan Codes mandatory and allow Reagan to implement stronger sanctions in 18 months.</p>	<p>April - June</p>
<p>1 Jul SADF raid on Swapo bases in Angola condemned by US. 9/18 Jul SAP release alleged ANC member Klaas de Jonge to care of Dutch embassy in Pretoria over breach of international law. 21 Jul Government declares state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts. 25/30 Jul SA threatens to repatriate 1,5m migrant workers if frontline states support anti-SA sanctions. SA recalls ambassador designate to Washington for consultations. 1/11 Aug Pik Botha in Austria for discussions with senior Reagan officials. 15 Aug State President P W Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in Durban dashes hopes of substantial</p>	<p>7/9 Jul Canada implements limited sanctions which; abrogate double tax agreements, ban arms and computer sales to SAP/SADF, discourage Kruger Rand sales, scrap export assistance for SA trade and tighten Gleneagles sport boycott of SA. Extended in mid-September to voluntary bans on new bank loans to the SA government, end of crude oil sales and SA/Canada flights. 25 Jul France suspends all new investment in SA including reinvestment of profits made by French firms. 1 Aug Although Chase Manhattan Bank denies it is to withdraw from SA, rumour plunges value of Rand. 19 Aug Australia implements limited sanctions which; close JHB trade office, halt export</p>	<p>July - Sept</p>

	DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES <i>Constructive & Broken Engagements</i>	ANTI-APARTHEID ISSUES <i>Postures, Protests & Pressures</i>	SUBJECT SOUTH AFRICA <i>Defensive & Offensive Actions</i>	THE SANCTIONS SAGA <i>From Disinvestment to Trade Bans</i>	
	visit SA and reject sanctions. 5/11 Sept US government demands end to 'excessive force' used by SA police; Ambassador Nickel returns after 3 month absence, with message from Reagan to abolish apartheid. UK government rules out formal contact with ANC. 15/30 Sept 6 Frontline states call for increased international pressure on SA. Belgium withdraws accreditation for SA military attache while UK withdraws 2 defence attaches from SA. Swiss government rejects anti-SA sanctions.	have divestment bills at various stages. 10/12 Sept Six W German MPs from Greens Party stage anti-apartheid sit-in at their embassy in Pretoria. Italian trade unions enforce week-long boycott of flights and ships from SA. 25 Sept TUC writes to 50 major UK retailers urging boycott of SA goods. International Energy Agency adopts resolution calling on all members to halt nuclear cooperation with SA. Trustees of University of New York vote to sell R28,75m investments in companies doing business in SA.	relating to... 28 Aug/9 Sept Detention of Rev Alan Boesak and banning of Congress of South African Students provokes world condemnation. Currency and share trading on the JSE suspended for 5 days and SA freezes all foreign debt repayments for 4 months, capital repayments frozen until end of year. 25 Sept Govt of SA Reserve Bank de Kock leaves for US/Europe to meet officials and bankers, and invites Swiss banker Fritz Leutwiler to mediate between SA and foreign banks on debt moratorium.	assistance to Aust firms, ban direct investment in SA and import of Kruger Rands. 9 Sept Reagan Emergency Presidential Order: ● bans computer and nuclear goods sales to SA ● ends bank loans to SA government and parastatals ● establishes advisory commission to encourage peaceful change in SA. 10/25 Sept EEC Brussels Package. EEC, Spain & Portugal impose sanctions which: ● ban export/import of arms and oil to and from SA ● end military co-operation with SA and exchange of military attaches. 26 Sept Austria implements sanctions package (see data base).	
Oct - Dec	10/11 Oct UK Foreign Secretary Howe reaffirms opposition to sanctions. 6 UK Conservative Party MPs in SA urge government to abandon apartheid and free Mandela. 15/25 Oct Commonwealth agrees to form 6 person Eminent Persons Group (EPG) that will report back on SA situation in 6 months. UK government summons SA ambassador in UK to explain that Commonwealth will call off sanctions if SA government: ● scraps apartheid and terminates state of emergency ● allows immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and unbans political organisations. 1/3 Dec Denmark severs diplomatic relations with SA. Eleven foreign diplomats attend funeral of 12 Mamelodi unrest victims. US government admits meeting ANC in Lusaka. 12/16 Dec UK government resists pressures to meet ANC, condemns landmine blasts and states that if EPG mission fails it will not impose sanctions.	4 Oct India calls for international anti-SA sanctions. 21/30 Oct Australian trade unions start month ban on mail service and servicing of communications equipment at SA diplomatic missions and SAA. Nordic transport unions refuse to handle goods — dockers and seamen from all over world meet to stop 'secret oil trade' with SA. 2/10 Nov 50 000 anti-apartheid demonstrators gather outside SA embassy in London. ICFM representing 99 countries and 83m workers, meets SA unionists in Brussels and calls for isolation of SA. Norwegian trade unions refuse to handle mail destined for SA until end of year. 17 Nov US figures reveal that 12 US states, 39 cities and 67 universities have withdrawn about R13,5bn worth of investments from corporations with SA connections; at least 20 US companies have ended or begun winding down SA operations. 21 Nov Demonstrations outside SA embassy in Washington DC continue unabated after one week of protest actions. 12 Dec 36 nations of Franco-African summit reveal detailed plans for total boycott on all air links with SA.	11/10 Nov Pik Botha in Maputo to discuss violations of Nkomati Accord, later Mozambique depends joint security committee. Botha meets Lesotho's foreign minister to discuss alleged cross-border violations by ANC and SADF. 23 Oct SA threatens international counter-sanctions package if sanctions are imposed on SA. 7 Nov In terms of emergency regulations, SA authorities restrict access of media in unrest areas. 7 Nov Reagan accepts credentials of new SA ambassador to US, Beukes. 14/26 Nov SA Mint halts production of Kruger Rands. SA gives permission for Commonwealth EPG to visit country. 3/10 Dec Emergency lifted in 8 magisterial districts. SA Reserve Bank introduces further exchange controls to alleviate pressure on Rand. SA freeze on repayment of foreign debt extended for further 3 months until March 1986. 17/20 Dec After landmine blasts and invasion threat, Zimbabwe informs SA government it will not allow ANC guerrillas transit or a base. SADF raids into Angola go on for more than week. SA State Security Council warns neighbours, particularly Zimbabwe, that ANC activity within their borders could be countered militarily.	11 Oct Reagan bans US imports of Kruger Rands. Japan imposes limited sanctions against SA. 15 Oct Nassau Commonwealth Summit. 49 members attend Bahamas meeting. Despite strong opposition from UK, measures taken against SA include: ● ban on import of Kruger Rands into member states, and government to government loans ● end of state funding of trade fairs where SA companies are present ● bans on new sales of nuclear goods and technology, crude oil sales ● end to military co-operation and arms purchases from SA ● discouragement of cultural and scientific exchanges. 18 Oct 5 Nordic nations issue joint declaration to ban new Nordic investment in SA, import of Kruger Rands and export of computers to SA. 12 Nov NZ implements Commonwealth package and ends government export assistance to companies doing business in SA. France bans import of SA coal. 11/17 Dec Six UK firms refuse to stock SA goods. Sweden bans import of SA agricultural goods.	Oct - Dec
1986 Jan - Mar	6/18 Jan After visit to SA, 6 US congressmen leave committed to increasing pressure for sanctions. US government asks permission to reopen consulate in Port Elizabeth (PE) because of importance of region. 31 Jan France joins Belgium and Luxemburg, expels SA military attache, followed by Portugal. 3/5 Feb UK Foreign Office holds first official talks with ANC and hints at further meetings. Howe meets representatives of frontline states and they jointly agree to increase pressure on SA. 13 Feb UN Security Council votes 13 to 0, with UK and US abstaining, to condemn SA destabilisation in Southern Africa. 25 Feb UK ambassador in SA meets officials to express concern over events in Alexandra township and KwaNdebele independence issue. 4 Mar UK and US welcome end of (first) emergency and independence for Namibia by 1 August 1986, but condemn banning of PE community leaders.	2 Feb New South Wales (Australia) state bans all SA exchange students for 1987. 25 Feb UK's 660 000 strong National Union of Public Employees to back members who boycott SA goods. 12/13 Mar SA choirs banned from taking part in Welsh music eisteddfod. UK cinema and television union vote to ban all film and video productions from SA except news items.	Jan Strict SA border controls delay goods and migrant workers entering or leaving Lesotho; after subsequent coup, SA signs non-aggression pact with new Lesotho government which gives ANC deadline for departure. SA asks Botswana to halt ANC activity; later both hold talks in Pretoria. 14/15 Jan Crocker in SA for 2 days for discussions on SA/US relations. 13 Feb SA/US representatives hold talks in Geneva and discuss release of Mandela, among other issues. Early Mar Pik Botha in Mozambique to refute allegations of SA assistance for MNR. Botswana expels some ANC representatives. 7 Mar State of Emergency ends. 19 Mar SA/US government officials again hold talks, in Frankfurt and Pretoria.	21 Jan Norway bans import of SA agricultural produce. 26 Jan Leutwiler warns SA bankers that SA assets overseas could be seized if no agreement is reached on debt standstill. 30 Jan San Francisco withdraws funds from companies with SA interests. 20 Feb SA reaches agreement with creditor banks to resolve debt crisis by rescheduling repayments — SA to pay 5% of outstanding loans during next 12 months; in interim SA creditor banks suspend judgment on SA's credit worthiness. 30 Mar Ireland bans import of SA agricultural produce.	1986 Jan - Mar
April - June	20 May Reagan admin studies further punitive steps to be taken against SA following SADF cross-border raids — but discounts economic sanctions. 28/31 May Australia warns SA it will consider further economic sanctions if the EPG mission fails. France asks State President P W Botha to postpone visit to France. Argentina severs diplomatic links. 13/16 Jun International condemnation of imposition of (national) state of emergency in SA. All EEC members close embassies in SA for tenth anniversary of Soweto riots. 18 Jun Bolivia announces closure of 2 consulates in SA. Australian government expels SA diplomat after assault on embassy demonstrator; W German government condemns expulsion of 4 German nationals by SA. 24/29 Jun UK official, Lynda Chalker meets ANC head Tambo, while UK Labour Party MP Denis Healey visits SA. Reagan undertakes major review of SA policy. EEC summit in The Hague postpones decision on sanctions for 3 months and sends Howe to SA in order to initiate black/white dialogue.	Apr UK Gloucestershire County withdraws R2,2bn of investments from companies with SA interests. Jun Anti-SA demonstrations in Canada, Australia and Washington DC, where 250 000 participants; 70 000 attend rally in London. 18 Jun US and UK veto UN Security Council motion for punitive sanctions against SA, in retaliation for 'persistent aggression' in Angola.	23 Apr In Bonn Pik Botha meets Crocker to discuss Namibia/Angola as well as W German counterpart over developments in SA. In Taiwan, SA Minister of Trade and Industries Dawie de Villiers signs agreement to exchange mineral and energy technology, expand wine exports, and possible sale of Kruger Rands. 19/21 May SADF raids alleged ANC targets in Harare, Gaborone and Zambia; SA/Botswana security talks cancelled. 27/30 Jun SA government again warns of counter-sanctions against neighbouring states if sanctions are applied to SA. Worrall threatens SA will not repay foreign debt if Commonwealth imposes further anti-SA sanctions, but is refuted by SA financial authorities after furore from world bankers. 12 Jun National state of emergency declared.	23 May UK bans import of all SA gold coins. 10 Jun US House of Reps Foreign Affairs Committee approves 25 votes to 13 further anti-SA resolution which includes ban on SA banks from operating in US and import of SA coal, steel and uranium. 12 Jun EPG Report. Recommends further economic sanctions: ● ban on air links ● denial of trade credits for SA commerce ● freeze on SA assets abroad, ban on SA agricultural and mineral exports. 17/19 Jun Denmark bans all trade with SA, while Canada, France and Sweden further curb trade links because of emergency. UK Conservative Party defeats Labour Party sanctions bill by 331 votes to 206. W German coalition government defeats opposition motion for imposition of stronger anti-SA sanctions. US House of Reps approve Dellums Bill which aims to ban export of all US goods and technology to SA, import of all SA goods into US and gives US business 180 days to leave SA. Bill allows Reagan to continue to import strategic minerals.	April - June
July - 2 Oct	3 Jul W German government protests treatment of nationals detained under emergency. Klaas de Jonge still in refuge in Dutch embassy in Pretoria. 13/22 Jul Canadian and Australian PMs demand stronger anti-SA sanctions. 30 Jul In first official Reagan admin contact with ANC, US ambassador in Zambia meets ANC officials. 14 Aug Nordic nations meet in order to get UN to adopt binding resolution on anti-SA sanctions. 21/22 Aug Australia revokes diplomatic visa of SA trade rep and residents permits of 2 other officials. Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference reaffirms commitment to sanctions. Early Sept US appoints Edward Perkins to replace Nickel as ambassador to SA. NAM summit in Harare adopts number of resolutions condemning SA. 18/21 Sept At UN, EEC spokesperson urges SA to quit Namibia; General Assembly approves 126 votes to 0, with 24 abstentions, that Security Council should impose mandatory economic sanctions on SA. Howe and Crocker hold discussions with ANC president Tambo. Switzerland says it will not back sanctions but will prevent SA using it as a way to bypass sanctions.	6 Jul Church of England calls for immediate and effective economic isolation of SA. 30 Jul New York City pension fund divests R100m in companies with SA interests. 7 Aug Demonstrations outside SA embassy in Canberra (Aust). 25 Aug State of California divests R30bn of stock in companies with SA connections — a total of 19 US states, 68 cities and 119 universities have now withdrawn R55bn from companies with SA connections. (In November 1985 only R13,5bn had been divested.) 26 Aug Australian dockers at port of Fremantle decide not to unload ships with any SA connections for 24 hours. 21 Sept UN votes 126 to 0, with 24 abstentions, for anti-SA sanctions because of its illegal occupation of Namibia. 22 Sept Moss demonstrations at Yale university in US. University of Georgetown divests R63,5m of stock from companies with SA interests.	9 Jul SA and Lesotho meet to discuss labour agreements. 5 Aug SA announces imposition of levies on all goods passing through SA destined for Southern African states. Late Aug SA customs inspection of all goods destined for Zimbabwe and Zambia causes long delays at border posts. Early Sept Pik Botha visits Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. 1 Oct Controversy over Pik Botha's telephone calls to some US Congressmen to lobby on sanctions legislation.	1 Jul Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves by 15 votes to 2 Lugar Bill (see above). 10 Jul/1 Aug EEC parliament votes 228 to 114 in favour of full economic sanctions against SA. Finland restricts trade with SA, while Sweden refuses to sever SA trade links. 3/4 Aug Commonwealth Mini-Summit. In Marlborough (UK) Commonwealth nations discuss EPG report. Canada, Australia, Zambia, India, Zimbabwe and the Bahamas support further sanctions including: ● ban on all new private/public bank loans and air links ● ban on SA agricultural, coal, iron and steel imports ● withdrawal of SA consular facilities. 4/12 Sept Reagan extends September 1985 Presidential Order. Despite White House opposition, US House of Reps approves, by 308 votes to 77, stiffer sanctions bill. 16 Sept The Hague Package. Further EEC sanctions, with limited support from UK, Portugal and W Germany; ban new investment in SA, SA gold coin, iron and steel imports. 19 Sept Japan bans import of SA pig iron and steel, issue of tourist visas for South Africans and denies SAA landing rights. 2 Oct The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Passed after Congress overrides Presidential veto by 78 votes to 21. Act provides for: ● ban on all new US investments and bank loans to SA, except for reinvestment of profits ● ban of US import of uranium, coal, iron, steel, ammunition, textiles, agricultural products and food; export of crude oil and munitions; air links ● enactment of earlier Presidential Order (see September 1984).	July - 2 Oct
			Sources Indicator SA Press Clippings		

SANCTIONS ON THE FRONT- LINE



By Alan Whiteside, Research Fellow, Economic Research Unit, University of Natal

The Non-Aligned Movement Conference held in Harare in early September ended with 102 African, Asian and South American leaders agreeing on the need for sanctions against South Africa, but reaching little consensus on how to impose them. Many observers had expected some grand gesture on the part of an African leader, such as closing a border or cutting flight connections, while at the same time it seemed likely that South Africa might, with its unusual brand of diplomacy, invade or strike against its neighbours during the course of the important summit.

Nonetheless, it is not business as usual — pressure on South Africa has since reached a new pitch with the imposition of a comprehensive US sanctions package and it is clear that the rest of the world community will gradually follow suit.

Sanctions will undoubtedly impact on the whole region, with dilatory effects for development both inside the country and in neighbouring states. Directed against the economic power house of Southern Africa, the consequences of sanctions are likely to be felt in African countries as far afield as Zaire and Tanzania (Maasdorp 1986). Who, then, are the actors on the frontline in the sanctions roadshow?

Knock-On Effects

The centre stage is held by South Africa — world pariah and, ironically, also the main unifying factor for various world bodies. Some sympathy can be felt for its leaders who are in the dark as to what action

is necessary to stave off further sanctions. Will the dismantling of apartheid suffice? The white nationalist government could accomplish that and still rule the country! Will a black government be sufficient or will only an ANC government satisfy the world? South Africa is left with a stick and no carrot, and cabinet reaction has not been overtly constructive. In fact its response has been rather schizoid — on the one hand it tells the world that the country will survive sanctions and they will not really hurt; on the other it threatens to strike back if the effects are damaging and warns of the consequences to its neighbours.

The relative impact of sanctions on the various frontline states will depend on each one's particular relationship with South Africa. There may be knock-on effects as sanctions begin to bite, which could exert both positive and negative influences on neighbouring countries. For instance, rising unemployment in South Africa, in conjunction with tensions with those pro-sanctions frontline states, may lead to cutbacks on employing migrant workers from these countries as occurred in the recent case of Mozambican mine labour. On the positive side, however, certificate of origin rules may lead to increased South African investment and operations across its borders, allowing exports to break sanctions trade barriers.

There also may be retaliatory sanctions designed to bring the frontline states into line with Pretoria's views, and ones which simply lash out against these nations in a 'beggar your neighbours' attitude (Hanlon 1986). Before assessing the likely effects of sanctions and counter-sanctions, it is necessary to examine the attitudes prevalent among the frontline

governments. These states may be divided into hawks and doves.

The Hawks

Chief among the hawks are Zimbabwe and Zambia. Both have called for sanctions to be imposed against South Africa by the West and have made threatening noises about closing borders, cutting airlinks, etc. This is understandable coming from Prime Minister Mugabe who appreciates that sanctions helped end the Smith regime and so benefited his cause directly. However, President Kaunda's response is rather more surprising, as Zambia suffered severely when it imposed sanctions on Rhodesia. Perhaps to some extent Kaunda is responding to a challenge from Mugabe for the elder statesman's established role as leader of the frontline states. Also, foreign policy is an outward expression of domestic problems and these are legion in both countries.

The spiral of pro-sanctions rhetoric has been rewarded by South African retaliation. Since August 1986 a deposit has been required for all goods passing through South Africa to Zambia; permissible in international law but of dubious merit and without precedent in the region. This ploy delays cargo movement and puts pressure on Zambia's minuscule foreign exchange reserves. In addition, all Zambian and Zimbabwean goods passing through Zimbabwe's borders with South Africa were temporarily subject to delays as 'checks for a statistical survey on the nature and extent of exports' were carried out. Although this had never been done before, Pretoria's Department of Foreign Affairs described it as routine and the timing as coincidental (*The Star* 7/8/86). The checks have now ended.

Zimbabwe did not counter-retaliate. Zambia responded by refusing to issue letters of credit for any imports from South Africa. This move would have stopped the purchase of South African goods, but the ban lasted no more than a week — Zambia needs South Africa more than South Africa needs Zambia, for the present at least.

Despite the hawkish attitudes of these two frontline leaders, the level of rhetoric will remain high and concrete actions low. Zimbabwean politicians are said to agree that they cannot afford a serious sanctions effort as this would create havoc in the economy. Nonetheless, a point may be reached where Mugabe and Kaunda have no choice but to impose sanctions simply to save face, no matter what the cost.

The Doves

The states who oppose sanctions are Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. Malawi, the most enigmatic of all and the only state to have full diplomatic relations with South Africa, has tacitly opposed sanctions on the grounds that they are ineffective and harmful to all concerned.

Swaziland, on the other hand, is probably the most vocal opponent, its politicians having no illusions about the likely effect of sanctions on their country. Speaking to West German parliamentarians, Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi said the imposition of sanctions would increase the South African refugee population in Swaziland, adversely affect the country's economy and cost many lives in the Republic (*Swazi News* 23/8/86).

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Lesotho has taken a similar stand although it is more prepared to speak out against apartheid and the South African government. The military council was brought to power partly as a result of Pretoria's actions (Laurence 1986) and Lesotho's new governors therefore have firsthand experience of the stranglehold that South Africa has over their country.

Lesotho has not one, but two swords of Damocles to contend with. In 1985 merely 40 000 citizens were in wage employment within the country, whereas about 140 000 were legally employed in South Africa — accounting for over 50 percent of the country's Gross National Product. Secondly, Lesotho's main hope for the future is the bilateral Highland Water Scheme which is dependent on South Africa agreeing to buy water and power. The treaty was signed in late October 1986 and is one of Pretoria's strong bargaining chips in dealings with its landlocked neighbour.

The Others

Of the two remaining frontline states, Botswana is a dove forced to adopt a hawkish position, while Mozambique is a hawk in dove's feathers.

In the past Botswana adopted a policy of neutrality towards Pretoria while making clear its opposition to apartheid. It has been jolted out of this complacency by several South African military raids since mid-1985, none of which have been expected nor justified by events. By carrying out these raids South Africa has lost its closest thing to a friend in the sub-continent. Their government press says 'Our foreign policy should be as it is, principled and pragmatic and having the best interests of Botswana at heart' (*Daily News* 22/8/86).

But it is Mozambique which has suffered most from South Africa's destabilisation strategy in the sub-continent. The MNR, allegedly with South African support, brought the Machel government to its knees before the Nkomati Accord was signed in 1984. Since then Pretoria has been widely accused of violating the Accord and it is clear that South Africa/Mozambique relations have entered a new period of flux.

Pretoria's recent decision to cut down drastically on the recruitment of Mozambican migrants perhaps heralds an assertive policy shift to counter-sanctions, although there have been reports that the decision might be reconsidered. The tragic death of President Machel on 19 October will have far-reaching implications for frontline politics but it remains to be seen what stance the new leaders will take. Mozambique needs South Africa — it needs remittances from migrant workers on the mines, trade through Maputo, technical assistance and electricity.

SADDC United?

In spite of their interdependent relationships with the South, the frontline states have principles they will stick to above material considerations. This was illustrated when the SACU member countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) were summoned to Pretoria in mid-August, because 'South Africa wants to discuss with her Customs Union partners the effect economic sanctions will have against them and the entire region' (Swazi

Observer 14/8/86). According to certain sources, South Africa really wanted to involve these states in schemes to minimise the effects of sanctions, and sought agreement on ways in which the BLS nations could be used as conduits for goods. They were not prepared to agree to this, however.

Although there are divergent attitudes, the degree of solidarity among the frontline states is underestimated by many observers. The Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) has been operating for six years now and member states have come to identify with the goals of the organisation and to stand together against South Africa. This was demonstrated by the visit to Malawi by Mugabe, Kaunda and Machel during September 1986. They essentially sought to bring Malawi's relationship with Pretoria into line with the other SADCC countries and to end its supposed support for the MNR. It was while returning from a similar meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire that Machel was killed in an air crash on South African territory.

SADCC has had a powerful psychological effect not only on its members but also on the West. Political scientist Robert Wiesfelder has pointed out that SADCC has developed rich networks overseas — these institutional ties will give the frontline states more resilience in facing up to South African pressure and potential counter-sanctions (The Star 16/9/86).

Compensatory Aid

The West — the EEC countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan — undoubtedly will continue to impose sanctions. The effect on the frontline states will depend on the intensity and efficacy of the sanctions and on South Africa's reaction to them. It is generally felt that sanctions will gradually increase in pressure over the next year and that by the end of 1988 there may be full mandatory sanctions.

There is little likelihood that the frontline states will receive additional aid to offset the impact of sanctions on the region. The attitude of Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan is that whoever places sanctions on South Africa must bear the cost of their actions. Relations between Zimbabwe and the USA are at an all time low and no new US aid is likely to be forthcoming. Meanwhile, Zambia blotted its copy book with the UK during Sir Geoffrey Howe's mid-year visit, when Kaunda told him that he 'was not welcome, not as a messenger of the British and American governments which were worshipping apartheid and opposing economic sanctions against South Africa' (Zambia Daily Mail 27/7/86). The arrest of two West German tourists in July nearly resulted in the complete cutting off of West German aid to Zambia.

Ironically, if South Africa were to take drastic retaliatory action against the pro-sanctions frontline states, some assistance (although not sufficient) might well be forthcoming. The forerunner of this type of aid can be seen in Reagan's announcement of a US \$500m aid package, to be directed mainly at improving regional transport links, especially the Beira corridor. According to a US spokesman, the package will send clear signals to black Africa and South Africa that the Reagan administration is not in cahorts with Pretoria on apartheid (Daily News

23/9/86). The death of Machel will probably be a further unifying factor in the region. Initial reaction has been that support to the beleaguered Frelimo government will probably be increased both within the region and from outside aid donors.

The Alternatives

The future seems fairly bleak for the frontline states. They have to call for change in South Africa and, given the present international climate, this must involve support for increasing sanctions even though many observers believe this pressure will not facilitate change. The effect will be to make the South African economy more inward looking with an emphasis on import substitution, thus retarding economic growth in the region as a whole. There may be some benefits as investors relocate to evade the South African stigma: the countries most likely to benefit from this will be Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho, but they are unlikely to receive greatly increased aid. If the security situation deteriorates it will further slow or reverse economic growth in the sub-continent.

As sanctions take effect the frontline states will attempt to develop alternative routes to the sea and other markets. It should be possible for Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe to send all their goods out via Beira and for Malawi to use Nacala. The railway lines and Mozambique's ports are quite capable of carrying all the goods from these countries once renovation, which is proceeding very rapidly, has been completed. The Canadian High Commissioner recently stated that the idea that the SADCC countries would collapse if borders were closed was fallacious. The total SADCC freight is seven million tonnes — Beira's capacity could be expanded to five million tonnes a year within three years; Nacala, the northern Mozambique port, could take one million tonnes and Dar-es-Salaam a further two million tonnes (The Financial Gazette 4/7/86).

Most of the SADCC countries (except Lesotho) could still operate if they were to cut all links with South Africa, but this would be at a high price. In addition to development forgone, they would have to bear considerable costs in losing the nearest, cheapest supplier as well as a large market. In order for the frontline railways to carry the goods they must be renovated, staffed with competent technical and managerial personnel, and the lines protected from insurgents and sabotage. Full and mandatory sanctions might well lead to increased regional destabilisation and transport links are already key strategic targets, for both Unita and the MNR.

If the frontline states were to close their borders, it would probably provoke South Africa into lashing out like a spoiled child. Rhodesia's Ian Smith said never in a thousand years, but it took merely fifteen. Will State President P W Botha cry never, too? If he does it may take 30 painful years to reach a destructive resolution. The tragedy is that if only South Africa would undertake meaningful reform all of this would be unnecessary. Our neighbours have more patience and understanding than we realise or have any right to expect. JPTA

Sources

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RURAL REVOLT

TRANSVAAL'S HOMELANDS IN FERMENT

By Indicator SA Correspondent Patrick Laurence

KwaNdebele's legislative assembly eventually rejected homeland independence on 12 August 1986 — earlier, Chief Minister Skosana (with face lowered) sits alongside Interior Minister Piet Ntuli, who was assassinated in end-July.

The tide of revolt that swept across the country's urban townships in 1985 spilled over into Transvaal's homelands this year, turning them into a new frontline in the struggle for South Africa. Enos Mabuza, Chief Minister of KaNgwane, warned in February 1986 that 'The homelands are just as much potential powder-kegs of the current wave of unrest as any other black residential area'. His words were prophetic. In the next few months simmering violence erupted in Bophuthatswana, Lebowa and KwaNdebele successively, and did not completely by-pass the three remaining Transvaal-based homelands of

KaNgwane, Gazankulu and Venda. But they felt the heat of its outer edges rather than its core.

The pattern of events in Transvaal's rural unrest of 1986 was of course not identical. But there were a number of common features, indicating that they are interrelated rather than disparate episodes (see chronology). One was the central role of schools and young black scholars in political ferment. Another was the direct and indirect influence in these homelands of extra-parliamentary opposition, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and, to a lesser degree, the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo). The establishment of the Northern Transvaal region of the UDF in February 1985 was both a consequence of earlier penetration of the area by UDF affiliates and a stimulus to new activity. A third interlinking feature in the homelands unrest was the common nature of the conflict — at its cutting edge it was a struggle between young black radicals or the 'comrades' and local 'homeland' police, backed by South African security forces in Lebowa and KwaNdebele.

Bophuthatswana

The rise of opposition to the authorities in the fragmented territory of Bophuthatswana was concentrated in the densely populated Odi-Moretele districts north of Pretoria, particularly in the townships of Mabopane and GaRankua, and in the sprawling squatter settlement of Winterveld. Conflict in the Winterveld had an ethnic dimension. Many of the people there are not Tswana and there was tension between them and agents of Bophuthatswana which, of course, was established as a 'homeland' for South Africa's Batswana. The area was a focal point of resistance to the decision of Chief Lucas Mangope to opt for 'independence' a decade ago. In December 1977 the homeland's flag was burnt by angry Winterveld residents.

Ongoing ethnic tension was marked by the departure of some non-Tswanas in protest against allegedly discriminatory policies. In 1983 Bophuthatswana passed an amendment to its Land Control Act, which restricted the right to own land to the homeland's citizens. But, it was charged, non-Tswanas found it extremely



AFRAPHX: Steve Hilton-Barber

Political ferment in schools, the role of extra-parliamentary opposition, and clashes between 'the comrades' and police were common features of rural unrest in 1986

Conflict in Bop's Winterveld had an ethnic dimension, with high tensions between the many non-Tswana squatters and the homeland's Batswana officials

After the Winterveld shootings, a security crackdown in Lebowa culminated in the death in detention of UDF Northern Transvaal president, Peter Nchabaleng, on 10 April

difficult to qualify as Bophuthatswana citizens and were thus effectively excluded from owning land.

Accusations of ethnic discrimination were vehemently denied by President Mangope. Yet the language used in the National Assembly by his Minister of Land and Rural Development, Mr David Mogale, was nakedly hostile. He spoke of illegal squatters — often used as a synonym for non-Twanas — and the need for effective machinery to 'purge infested areas for once and for all'. In 1985 a special anti-squatting squad was deployed, particularly in the Winterveld. The homeland police rapidly acquired a reputation for brutality and by October last year the area was reported to be 'seething with anger'.

At the same time political activity in Bophuthatswana's high schools also began to attract attention. In GaRankua there were clashes between students and baton-wielding police at Rankailane High School and at Setlogelo Technical College (see chronology). Then, in late 1985, President Mangope closed the University of Bophuthatswana in Mmabatho after students protested against the holding of a meeting in nearby Mafikeng by the ultra-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party.

By March 1986 President Mangope was so concerned over the presence of young 'agitators' from neighbouring black townships in South Africa — Mamelodi, Atteridgeville and Soshanguve — that he called on the homeland's residents to organise themselves against the alleged 'intruders'. His call was interpreted as a thinly disguised exhortation to Bophuthatswana's residents to band together as vigilantes. The homeland police were accused of ignoring court orders granting lawyers access to detainees. In one case, a charge of contempt of court was brought against President Mangope himself in his capacity as Minister of Law and Order. The hearing was postponed but has now been set down for 28 November.

Winterveld massacre

Events in Bophuthatswana came to a climax on 26 March 1986 when 11 people were shot dead by police and scores injured at a football ground in the Winterveld. A crowd had gathered at the ground after a delegation had sought an audience with the police to discuss grievances about the detention of young people in the area and recent police action. President Mangope later ordered an inquiry into the shooting to be conducted by Mr Justice Edgar Smith of the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court.

Evidence was placed before Justice Smith's commission that the police commander, Colonel Andrew Molope, had told the crowd that foreigners had caused trouble in Bophuthatswana and that they should

leave the homeland as it was for Tswanas only. The shooting was reported to have taken place after a restless crowd began to move forward, during which 'two small stones' were thrown and a red flag raised on which the words were written: 'Please Mr Botha set the people free. They are crying'.

Lawyers representing Winterveld residents subsequently withdrew from the inquiry after President Mangope promoted Colonel Molope and his deputy, Major Mokubane. 'The executive has made what is seen by our clients as a public display of its confidence in the brigadier and colonel respectively,' the lawyers said. The promotions were 'seen by our clients as a slap in the face, both to them and their grievances,' the lawyers added. On 21 June, while the inquiry was still proceeding, Colonel Molope was assassinated. His funeral, attended by President Mangope, was reportedly greeted with jubilation in the Winterveld. The outlawed Pan-Africanist Congress later claimed responsibility for the assassination.

Lebowa

One month after the Winterveld massacre the focus of attention switched to Lebowa, with the death in detention of Mr Peter Nchabaleng, president of the Northern Transvaal region of the UDF and a veteran ANC activist. He was taken from his home by Lebowa police on 10 April and died later the same day. His wife said 'While they were waiting for him to dress, they started saying, "Today we are going to kill you"'. Lebowa police, however, countered that Mr Nchabaleng had died of a heart attack. An inquest into his death has not yet been held.


The detention and death of Mr Nchabaleng was the climax to a growing challenge to the authorities in Lebowa. Between 1985/86, it was marked by school boycotts, conflict between police and 'comrades', and witchcraft killings, which police blamed on the UDF and which the UDF rejected as a crude attempt to smear them. There were also campaigns to pressure members of Lebowa's Legislative Assembly to resign and to isolate members of the homeland police, as well as the SAP and SADF, by persuading traders not to serve or sell to them.

One year after its formation in February 1985, the Northern Transvaal region of the UDF had rapidly grown from 30 to more than 60 affiliates — its aim was to make the region ungovernable by the 'bantustan authorities'. The extra-institutional forces were strengthened by Azapo. The extent of the challenge was manifest in a secret decision taken by the Lebowa cabinet in August 1985. The minutes of the meeting were smuggled to Azapo by a sympathiser

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FATALITIES IN TRANSVAAL'S HOMELAND UNREST

Category Breakdown, 1985/86



Notes

Figures on unrest fatalities are taken from a combination of press reports, Bureau for Information press releases and other secondary sources and must be regarded therefore as provisional. These sources undoubtedly underestimate the actual number of unrest deaths nationally, especially in outlying rural areas. For example, a local priest in KwaNdebele recorded 160 deaths between 12 May and end of July 1986, but the above sources only show 117 deaths over the whole period of unrest.

- (1) Total fatality count for Bophuthatswana includes 2 deaths in detention and the assassination of Brigadier Molope.
- (2) Not included are the 10 suspected insurgents who died when their combi, thought to be carrying explosives, blew up.
- (3) Includes 2 assassinations of homeland leaders (no responsibility claimed), and one death in detention.
- (4) Includes assassination of the Minister of Interior, Piet Ntuli.
- (5) Civilian fatality count is mainly attributed to Imbokodo vigilante killings, allegedly in co-operation with homeland police.
- (6) Includes 2 SRC reps, journalist Lucky Kutumela and UDF leader, Peter Nchabeleng, who died in detention.
- (7) Includes 36 women 'necklaced' in Sekhukuneland, burnt as witches for 'hampering the struggle'.

Chronology

FROM BOPHUTHATSWANA

By Indicator SA F

BOPHUTHATSWANA

1985

7/9 Oct Students boycott Unibo after police break up march on Mafikeng, to protest Conservative Party meeting. Bop President Mangope closes University indefinitely as students stay away on national day of prayer. In Mabolane East, Technikon students continue boycott to support demands for SRC. In Garankuwa, policeman killed in shootout with ANC guerillas.

29 Oct Unibo reopened after 4 weeks, but from 1986 no 'foreign' students can register and no teachers may belong to UDF.

24/28 Nov 3 people die at festival in Garankuwa, violence over boycott of canned drinks in support of fired Metal Box workers. Bop security forces kill 4 insurgents in Tlhabane (near Rustenburg).

Early Dec Emergency session of parliament amends Bop's internal security act, to extend president's powers over educational institutions.

30 Dec Police and youths clash as bus boycott begins over Putco fare hikes in Temba region near Hammanskraal, several hospitalised after detentions.

January/June 1986

Jan Violence erupts in Mabolane, 1 person dies in police action and over 170 arrested. In Ramabele (nr Hammanskraal), 100s of youths detained after school boycott meeting. Garankuwa pupils boycott school to protest detentions, forced back to class by security forces.

4 Feb In Garankuwa a student dies when police disperse protest march. Scores detained at his funeral in Winterveld. Pupils continue boycott during public violence court cases.

19 Feb Family of Mabolane unrest victims refuse to go ahead with funeral as police ignore court order and interfere, 2 buses hijacked and local authority office burned down. Security forces in Odi and Moretele districts accused of atrocities, mainly in Garankuwa — 9 fatalities since mid-November and many abductions.

27 Feb Chief's house in Dinokana Village damaged by grenades after calls for his and councillor resignations. Pupils in Khuma on boycott, several clashes.

7/10 March Bop Supreme Court grants application by lawyers for access to 3 clients, police defy order. Lawyers apply to have President Mangope, Commissioner of Police and Commander of Garankuwa station jailed for failing to comply with court orders; interim interdict granted restraining police from unlawfully detaining or assaulting people in Garankuwa, particularly members of Catholic church and Mawu, applicants then detained.

13 March In Khuma mourners defy restrictions and attend funeral for 4 unrest victims, several injured in clashes with police.

26 March Winterveld residents meet to discuss grievances of police harassment and mass arrests with district commander, police open fire on crowd of between 5-10 000, 11 die and 70 injured with 2 500 arrested. One-man commission of inquiry appointed to investigate deaths.

1/4 April In Mabolane, a Cawusa member dies hours after detention. Bus service in Odi region withdrawn after 50 buses damaged, 51 people arrested, at least 17 houses burnt. In Winterveld, 4 houses petrol-bombed, including that of Nafac President Sam Matsenyane (resigns from Unibo board 10 days later). In Garankuwa, community councillor resigns after house petrol-bombed.

9 April Mass funeral for victims of Winterveld massacre called off as police release only 1 body; 3 youths allegedly shot dead at night vigil as police disperse 100s of mourners.

15 April In Mabolane, man dies in police custody, detained 3 days previously. Bop Minister of Law and Order issued with court order to show why 26 people arrested at Winterveld have not been brought to court. Bop government passes new legislation to prevent families of 11 Winterveld victims from holding mass funeral, only 3 bodies may be buried per day. 2 people in area burnt to death, accused of being witches.

4 May In Mabolane 2 people die in grenade attack on house.

June Daily disruption of classes at 20 schools in the Temba, Majaneng, Bosplaa, Dertig, Makoponstad, Eersterus, Slinkwater and Maubone districts; pupils demand withdrawal of security forces, release of political activists, lifting of restrictions on funerals and meetings.

11 June Promotion of 2 'Winterveld' commanding officers by the Bop government, leads to community's lawyers' withdrawal from judicial inquiry. On 21 June the commanding officer, Brigadier Molope is assassinated by guerillas.

27 June In Madikwe area a combi explodes killing the 10 occupants, believed to be carrying explosives.

July/November 1986

1 July Bop businessman shot dead, believed to be victim of hit squad as he had reported presence of armed men to security forces.

13 Aug Police in Bopang disperse students who demonstrate against headmaster, demand dismissal over misuse of funds.

26/31 Aug Bop government cracks down on sole legal opposition after demonstration directed at Tlhabane Town council, accused of inefficiency and high rentals; meeting dispersed even after magistrate grants permission and police arrest 63 people including the leader, Sefora. Security forces cordon off and raid Winterveld squatter camp, arrest 200.

29 Sept Magwase magistrate drops charges against 25 youths arrested after opposition meeting; all immediately re-detained.

3/8 Oct Unibo closed for 3 days, students demand dismissal of senior admin officer allegedly responsible for expulsion of staff and students earlier in the year.

30 Oct Police arrest several alleged ANC members arrested in connection with the death of Brigadier Molope.

LEBOWA

1985

Feb Near Tzaneen, 1 person dead and 95 injured in outbreak of unrest, with more than 30 houses and 15 vehicles burnt. Land consolidation proposals for Lebowa and Gazankulu probable cause of riots.

End April At Turfloop, University of the North is closed for 4 days after student protests demanding dismissal of lecturer.

July After mid-year vacation, 4 000 Turfloop students continue 2-month boycott to demand resignation of lecturer; violence erupts 4 days after students return to classes, leaving 1 person dead, 3 injured and several buildings damaged. In Mabolereeng, 50 students at technical college injured in clash with police, matron attacked and buildings damaged. In nearby Lebowa-gomo area, pupils at 5 schools on boycott.

Sept Intermittent boycotts on Turfloop campus over police presence; students forced into classes and 35 detained. Pupils at most schools in Lebowa boycott in sympathy with students; in Mabolereeng 104 pupils from Jhb area arrested after clashes with local youths.

18 Oct In Kgapone, SRC president of teachers training college and UDF activist dies after allegedly being assaulted by Lebowa police; 4 Azapo members also detained.

19 Nov In the Pietersburg area a month long consumer boycott of white and homeland officials' businesses begins; incidents of violence and intimidation reported in Lebowa-gomo, Feshego and Mankweng.

January/June 1986

Feb In Motatema, 3 people die during police and resident clashes, over 260 detained; at funeral of unrest victim, police open fire, killing 6 people. 2 women burnt to death in Ramakgapa, accused of being witches responsible for lightning deaths.

22 March In Namakgale near Phalaborwa, 4 die at hands of vigilantes and 1 by police during Langa commemoration service; several detained including senior Azapo members. A grenade attack on hotel belonging to chairperson of local Parents Crisis Committee kills 1 person and injures several. Pupils boycott in Seshego, where at least 12 people have died in unrest so far. Several Azapo houses attacked.

5 April In Mabolereeng Lucky Kutumela, a Mwasa journalist dies after being detained with 4 Azapo officials, who are hospitalised. SRC representative at Madadiji College of Education dies after allegedly being assaulted by Lebowa police. Nearby high schools boycott to demand renaming of school after first unrest victim.

10 April UDF's Northern Transvaal President, Peter Nchabeleng dies after being detained in Sekhukuneland. Local lawyers file civil suits against Lebowa police for R2,8m on behalf of 494 people. At Turfloop students hijack battle-store delivery vehicles in support of fired workers from local Metal Box factory.

14/20 April In Sekhukuneland 67 people detained after bodies of 36 necklaced victims are found, mainly women, accused of witchcraft and hampering the struggle. Consumer and bus boycott called in nearby Potgietersrus (SA). Restrictions on funeral of Lucky Kutumela lifted but police disperse 40 000 who attend. Schoonoord magistrate gives permission for funeral of Nchabeleng to go ahead, SADF undertakes not to unlawfully interrupt the night vigil.

12 May Indefinite consumer boycott launched in Northern Transvaal, towns affected include Duiwelskloof, Burgersfont, Phalaborwa, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen, Pietersburg, Groblersdal, Marble Hall and Roedtan. Demands include end of detentions and attacks on homes of activists, reductions of bus fares and rents, withdrawal of troops, resignation of community councillors and homeland MPs.

28 May Chief Minister Phutudi unsuccessfully applies to Pretoria Supreme Court to have January 1986 session of Moutse from Lebowa to KwaNdebele declared null and void.

June Informal curfew imposed on Pietersburg township where school boycotts continue to protest detentions.

12 June SA government declares a national state of emergency, extended to include all self-governing territories on 17th, imposing severe unrest funeral restrictions from 27th. Massive police raid on Turfloop campus.

July/November 1986

July Turfloop campus reopened after earlier closure and occupation by security forces, student activities severely restricted. Students resume boycott as term begins, after meeting of SRC, authorities and Le Grange to discuss detentions of students, May closure and indefinite postponement of exams. Classes resume on 24th.

30 Sept 3 students expelled from Turfloop, granted interim order allowing them to return to campus, immediately detained by police.

5 Oct City Press reports that at least 78 people have been 'necklaced' in Lebowa unrest so far. No inquests as yet held by Lebowa into deaths of 6 detainees and activists who have died in police action over past 16 months.

TO VENDA Civil Unrest 1985/1986

Researcher Deborah Quin

KWANDEBELE

1985

Feb In Pretoria, the Dept of Co-operation and Development announces Ekangala to be incorporated from 'white' SA into KwaNdebele; a youth dies when police disperse residents protest march to oppose move.

Mid-Dec Violence erupts in Lebowa's Moutse area as residents oppose impending incorporation into KwaNdebele. Shops are burnt, buses stoned and several people arrested; in Dennilton 4 residents die in clashes with Imbokodo vigilantes and police. Youths on picnic from Mamelodi are assaulted by Imbokodo, blamed for local disturbances.

31 Dec Moutse incorporated into KwaNdebele as part of planned 'independence' in late 1986; 261 residents claim they are abducted and assaulted by Imbokodo in presence of homeland MPs.

January/June 1986

Jan Clashes between vigilantes and residents in Moutse area leave at least 31 people dead, including 2 policemen.

Feb SA reprieves Ekangala from incorporation into KwaNdebele; grenade attack on house of secretary of Ekangala Action Committee.

March Continued violence, an assassination attempt injures Prince Mahlangu, leading MP opposed to independence. Further reports of abductions and deaths.

12 May South African government sets 11 December as date for KwaNdebele independence. 34 Imbokodo members arrested.

14 May Residents meeting at Ndzunda Royal Kraal opposes independence and calls for disbanding of Imbokodo; dispersed by police after last minute ban. In ongoing violence at least 9 people die, 41 businesses, 9 houses and 10 vehicles destroyed. Nearly 80 primary and secondary schools out on boycott. Police storm Imbokodo camp and free 54 abducted youths. Prince Makhosana Mahlangu resigns from legislative assembly over Imbokodo.

2 June In Siyabuswa, KwaNdebele's capital, residents marching on parliament are dispersed and several abducted. A 3-day work boycott begins to reject independence, dismantling of Imbokodo and removal of troops — more than 2 000 civil servants who participated must reapply for their jobs. Reports of deaths in Vlakfontein, Vlakloagte and Kwagqafontein.

12 June National state of emergency declared; Bureau for Information reports that one burnt body found in KwaNdebele, although later reports claim 10 people died in clashes with Imbokodo. By the month-end at least 21 people dead in unrest.

25 June Most stringent emergency regulations in country are imposed in KwaNdebele; people without homes or local jobs banned from homeland; no-one may play, loiter or remain on public roads; goods may not be delivered without authorisation from police.

July/November 1986

15 July Entire black workforce of KwaNdebele government goes on strike to protest forthcoming independence; chaos as schools disrupted, no pensions paid and no bail granted. 9 youths who fled from Mamelodi found shot and burnt, allegedly by Imbokodo. In continued unrest, 6 die in Waterval Boven and 5 in Vlakloagte, Kwagqafontein, Siyabuswa, Tweelfontein and Boekenhoukloof. Local priest records 160 deaths since 12 May 1986. Delegations from PFP, local white farmers and church bishops meet with SA in attempt to end bloodshed. Mahlangu starts court proceedings to have Minister of Interior Ntuli removed; already facing charges of assault, car theft and arms hoarding.

29 July Ntuli killed in car bomb outside Siyabuswa, PAC later claim responsibility. 2 week civil servants strike ends after negotiations with royalty, youth leaders, teachers and government. Primary schools return to classes but secondary schools remain out protesting detentions.

4 Aug First day since state of emergency declared that no violence is reported in KwaNdebele; 200 detainees released from Middelburg police station and homeland prisons.

13 Aug KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly decides against independence and declares Imbokodo illegal. Secondary pupils begin returning to school after 3 months' absence.

17 Aug 6 women necklored, youths claim they were 'practising witchcraft instead of fighting apartheid'.

29 Sept Allemansdrift residents stay away from work and school after reappearance of Imbokodo, 6 people injured in clashes.

9 Oct Several leaders opposed to independence detained, including Mahlangu, and Royal Kraal raided by security forces, reviving independence controversy. Valsfontein magistrate suspended indefinitely for openly criticising the homeland's justice system. 14 affidavits filed demanding R195 000 from the KwaNdebele government for alleged assault and unlawful detention.

17 Nov Chief Minister Simon Skosona dies of natural causes in Johannesburg.

Acronyms

ANC African National Congress
Azapo Azanian People's Organisation
Bop Bophuthatswana
Ccawusa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
Mawu Metal and Allied Workers Union

Mwasa Media Workers Association of South Africa
Nafcoc National Federation of Chambers of Commerce
SADF South African Defence Force
SRC Students' Representative Council
UDF United Democratic Front
Unibo University of Bophuthatswana

GAZANKULU

1985

Feb In Tzaneen, 1 person dies and 95 injured with more than 30 houses, 5 shops and 15 vehicles gutted in conflict over consolidation proposals.

5 June In Leneyenye (nr Tzaneen) pupils at 5 schools end week-long boycott after it is agreed they can form SRCs; 2 schools still boycotting.

14 July In Lulekani, Namakgale and Ga-Mothupa (nr Phalaborwa) several buses burnt in protest at fare increases, 7 students arrested.

17 Sept In Ritavi, 4 schools boycott to protest cancellation of 10-day school holiday. In Tzaneen pupils attack school and burn headmaster's car.

31 Oct In Tzaneen 71 students appear in court on charges of murder and arson.

January/June 1986

27 Feb In Dan Village (nr Tzaneen) a youth is killed in police action after residents meeting.

10 March In Letsitele (nr Tzaneen) a motorist shoots dead youth after his car is stoned.

28 March In Lulekani, 7 people killed in grenade attack on house, 4 SADF members charged.

VENDA

1986

23 April 4 detainees hospitalised for malnutrition and mental breakdown.

5 May 3 detainees go on hunger strike demanding to be charged or released, 2 of them later released.

21 May In Vleifontein (nr Louis Trichardt) residents defy incorporation into Venda, barricade schools to prevent Venda officials entering. 13 detained in mid-June for resisting incorporation.

18 July An estimated 3 000 Venda men and boys forced to undergo circumcision rituals, scores in hiding to avoid abduction allegedly authorised by President Mphahlele. The Lutheran church attempts to intercede on behalf of villagers.

KANGWANE

1985

Late December First reports of violence in Matsulu, spreading to Kabokweni, Nsikazi Trust, Lundi Trust and Liyabuswa; mainly attacks on schools and government vehicles.

January/June 1986

22/23 Feb 17 government cars damaged, 2 shops and a school burnt after 2 weeks of sporadic violence. Boycotts at 5 high schools, protest high failure rate of std 8 class in one school. Homeland cabinet meets and decides to pass all who failed.

March Chief Minister Enas Mabuza returns from visit to ANC in Lusaka.

11 March At Kabokweni (White River) 3 school children die, and 81 injured as security forces open fire on crowd outside magistrates court, where 8 pupils appear on charges of public violence. High ranking police general appointed to investigate shooting, with reports that more than 50 children were shot in the back. In Piensaarsrivier Trust, 2 people die in first report of vigilante action. Violence spreads to Kanyamazane where a man is shot dead, allegedly attacking police vehicle.

1 April Kabokweni/White River and Nelspruit, 7-day stayaway launched with widespread support; businessmen call for retaliatory measures such as closing off access to townships. Continued reports of violence in several homeland villages; in Kanyamazane 7 people are burnt, 3 of whom die.

12/14 April In Mahushu Trust, police kill std 9 pupil after 3 weeks in custody, allegedly during escape attempt. In Nelspruit, all Indian and African members of Chamber of Commerce resign over stayaway decisions.

April/June Continued violence, mainly in settlements near White River (Kabokweni, Thembeke, Mangwane Trust, Tlou-Tlou); Nelspruit (Kanyamazane, Tonga, Steenbal, Ntandini, Daantjie Trust); Hazzyview (Sandrivier Trust), Barberton and Matsulu. At least 23 people die, 18 of them burnt to death.

June The secretary of KaNgwane Council of Chiefs, who favours unification with Swaziland, is assassinated in his Mamelodi home in SA.

July/November 1986

July 4 more people die — 3 burnt and one in security force action. Chairperson of KaNgwane Public Service Commission, Zebulun Kunene, is assassinated.

7 Oct Landmine explosion near Mbuzine injures 6 SADF members; Pretoria threatens to repatriate Mozambican workers for harbouring anti-SA insurgents.

19 Oct Mozambique President, Samora Machel, and 28 others killed in plane crash near Mbuzine in homeland.

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and reflected two critical decisions: to forbid members of the civil service from belonging to either the UDF or Azapo, and to call in the SADF to help maintain order in the region.

The first months of 1986 saw the start of an intensified crackdown on Lebowa's dissidents, signalled by several police swoops on activists. One of the most serious of these clashes took place in March at the village of Motetema, where six people were shot dead by police. Another less serious clash was triggered by a police raid on an Azapo regional congress at the Evangelical Lutheran Church centre in Seshogo. Delegates were allegedly assaulted by sjambok-wielding police.

Vigilante forces emerged, allegedly with the connivance of Lebowa's police force. Early in April, shortly before the fatal detention of Mr Nchabaleng, grenades were thrown into the homes of two UDF activists, Ms Joyce Mabudafasi and Mr Peter Mokaba. Ms Mabudafasi and Mr Mokaba's brother were seriously injured. The declaration of a state of emergency on 12 June appears to have forced UDF and Azapo activists to retreat. Lebowa — like Bophuthatswana where the authorities legislated their own tough measures to enable security forces to use force to disperse gatherings — became less turbulent. Where the authorities believed order had been restored, activists had no doubt that coercion had merely induced acquiescence.

KwaNdebele

In KwaNdebele, it was the authorities who had to conduct a strategic retreat. Situated north-east of Pretoria near the farming town of Groblersdal, KwaNdebele was earmarked to become South Africa's fifth 'independent' homeland. But on 12 August 1986, after three months of fierce fighting between anti-independence 'comrades' and pro-independence vigilantes which left more than 100 people dead, the homeland government reversed its decision to opt for independence. In the words of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Mr Solly Mahlangu: 'Independence is being uprooted, eradicated and thrown into the deep ocean.'

The original decision to accept independence had never enjoyed popular backing. It was taken by a legislative assembly which consists largely of nominated members and a handful of elected members (16 out of 72), voted in on a low poll from an electorate restricted to men. But the critical factor in stirring active opposition to independence was the formation of the vigilante movement, 'Mbokodo', in January 1986. That, in turn, related to the incorporation of the mainly Pedi-speaking territory of Moutse into KwaNdebele, designated homeland of the Ndebele.

When fighting broke out between Pedis and Ndebeles over incorporation, triggered by an 'invasion' of Moutse by Ndebele on 1 January, KwaNdebele's Chief Minister, Mr Simon Skosana, and his lieutenant, Interior Minister Piet Ntuli, formed Mbokodo (which means 'millstone'). Its key objectives included protection of community interests and action against 'trouble-makers'. But Mbokodo excesses turned the people against it, not only in Moutse but more importantly in KwaNdebele proper. As the


instrument of Skosana, Ntuli and several members of their cabinet (all of whom own businesses in KwaNdebele), Mbokodo was seen not as a national movement but the private army of a few individuals determined to make this homeland South Africa's next nominally independent state. As the Transvaal Rural Action Committee put it: 'The fight against Mbokodo was soon transformed into a battle against independence.'

Independence and vigilantes

As opposition to Mbokodo mounted in the first half of 1986 (see chronology), a critical realignment of forces occurred. The Ndzundza royal family, one of KwaNdebele's two dominant tribal authorities, switched sides. The sons of the Ndzundza patriarch, King David Mapoch, namely Prince James Mahlangu and Prince Cornelius Mahlangu, took up the anti-independence and anti-Mbokodo cries of the 'comrades'. Prince Mahlangu was particularly vociferous. Both he and his brother, who served in Mr Skosana's cabinet as Minister of Health, were members of the Legislative Assembly and had earlier voted for independence. Their reasons for changing tack were a matter of debate. More cynical observers thought their opposition was prompted by fear that the Ndzundza family would be side-lined in an independent KwaNdebele under Skosana. Whatever their reasons, it was a vital factor in the rejection of the Skosana-Ntuli drive to independence. The Ndzundza family was a powerful force in KwaNdebele, nominating 22 of the 46 members of the Assembly drawn from the tribal authorities.

Discontent increased sharply after the killing by vigilantes of Mr Jacob Skosana — no relative of the Chief Minister — for voicing opposition to Mbokodo. The teargassing of crowds both at his funeral on 13 May — where a young girl was killed after falling under a bus — and at a meeting called by Prince James Mahlangu on 14 May, raised the temperature further still. The comrades stepped up their opposition, 'executing' vigilantes, often by the gruesome 'necklace' method. Local youth were reportedly assisted by militants from Mamelodi, near Pretoria, who had clashed with KwaNdebele vigilantes in December 1985.

Anti-independence, anti-Mbokodo forces were further strengthened when white farmers from Rustenburgh, led by Professor A Viljoen (brother of the former Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen), made representations to the SADF over the excesses of the Mbokodo. On 29 July Mr Ntuli was blown up shortly after leaving the heavily-guarded government complex at Siyabuswa in his car. The cause of the blast which killed him is a matter of conjecture. Some observers believed that he may have been ferrying a bomb for a new strike against the comrades. Against that the ANC claimed responsibility.

At least one well-placed observer, however, thought 'agents of Pretoria' were behind the explosion. The assassination of Mr Ntuli was, he argued, a bid to dissociate independence from Mbokodo, to sanitise 'independence' and make it respectable once again. If so, the strategem came too late. By the time the Legislative Assembly met for a special session on 12 August, the independence and Mbokodo issues were still firmly linked. Two months later, the death of Chief Minister Skosana from natural causes sealed the unhappy fate of KwaNdebele's pro-independence coalition. 

ECONOMIC

M O N I T O R



AFRPIX: Paul Weinberg

Subsistence farming in a Transkei village. Alternative policies for rural land reform, redistribution and urban settlement provide a focus for the debate on correcting macro-economic inequalities in South Africa.

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
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THE YORK CONFERENCE

Constructing a Post-Apartheid Economy

By Prof Jill Nattrass, Head of the Development Studies Unit
at the University of Natal

'The South African Economy After Apartheid' was the theme of a major conference held in October 1986 at York University in the United Kingdom. It was attended predominantly by South Africans, both locals and exiles, although academics from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and a number of European countries were also present. Some 45 papers were scheduled covering topics and scenarios which ranged from the esoteric, 'the economist's role in the apartheid debate'; through to the ideological issues of 'will South Africa be socialist?' and 'what kind of economic system?'; to the very practical issues of urbanisation, industrial relations, the future of the minerals sector, agriculture and land reform. Prof Nattrass attended the conference and reports on the key issues and debates, identifying the three main political positions that crystallised among the diverse participants.



AFRAPIX: Paul Weinberg

The independent voice of organised black labour was strongly represented at the York Conference, where differences again emerged between their strategic and constituent interests and those of the 'populist' nationalist alliance.

The conference participants were sensibly limited on the ideological spectrum to those among whom meaningful dialogue is still feasible

Centrist to far left perspectives predominated - at this stage it would be impossible to bring together the main protagonists to debate an alternative economy

The shape of an economy after ten years of civil war will differ greatly from one that emerges from a relatively peaceful transfer of power

The York Conference organisers succeeded in their intention to maximise contributions from the wide spread of participants and are to be congratulated on the very lively debate which took place on virtually all the issues at the heart of the South African conflict. The major ideological focus was essentially from the left, although some centre and left of centre views were represented. I personally found it a challenging experience to find myself located among the rightwing elements in the gathering!

Limits to Debate

With the exception of participants from the University of the Western Cape, no academics from Afrikaans-medium universities attended the conference, nor were there any representatives from the public sector.

Some might argue that the exclusion of such a large section of very influential opinion clearly weakened the usefulness of the proceedings and there may be some truth in this observation. It would be extremely difficult, however, if not impossible, to indulge in meaningful debate among protagonists across the board on the shape of the economy after apartheid. Inside South Africa, there are still those who argue either that apartheid is already dead and, since the outcome is already known it is not an issue; or even worse, that apartheid will never die, so that the shape of the economy after its death is not an issue now and nor, indeed, will it ever be!

My own opinion is that the organisers correctly identified the need to limit the spectrum of participants to a group of people among whom meaningful discussion was still possible. The range of ideologies at the conference started from the radical left and proceeded to the left-centre of the various alternative opinion groups on South Africa. The outcome of this substantial mix of ideologies was that a robust dialogue took place on South Africa's long term future. It is sobering to South Africans committed to change that the differences of opinion between even these groups was sufficient to push the possibilities for meaningful debate to the utmost.

With its post-apartheid emphasis, the topic of the conference itself, perhaps rather unfortunately, prohibited discussion on the various paths that might be taken to eliminate apartheid. Although discussion on the process of change did crop up in some of the sessions, the discussants tended to be concentrated among those from the far left who, consequently, presented a particular viewpoint and an assumption of the inevitability of radical change. In general, the debate centred on what would happen in the



economy after apartheid had been ended, and there was very little, if any, really clear discussion on the possible alternative economic outcomes from the process of change itself.

At first glance, it may seem that this 'means/end' dilemma is such a fine point that it is of interest only at the debating level. However, this is certainly not the case — the shape of an economy that has seen ten years of civil war will be very different from one that emerges from a situation in which power has been transferred from the white minority government under relatively peaceful circumstances.

Three Alternative Scenarios

Three underlying and largely unspecified views of the most likely outcome of the present racial struggle in South Africa emerged at the conference:

- View one (the far left) saw the outcome in terms of a 'one stage revolution' — either peaceful or violent, but probably the latter — leading to the creation of a socialist state. This radical transformation would ensure that power, both economic and political, rest



AFRAPIX: Gill de Vlieg

with the people and the necessary decision-making processes would take place through planning and democratic participation.

To anyone living and working in present-day South Africa, this approach had a somewhat esoteric flavour, not because the prospect of a successful revolution taking place is unlikely, but because the task of political and economic re-organisation presented by this sort of scenario is, to say the least, daunting! Worse still, the socio-economic costs of failing to achieve the necessary re-organisation effectively and efficiently would be astronomical.

- View two, encompassing the views of the African National Congress participants, saw the outcome in terms of the conventional Marxist-Leninist two-stage revolution; the first stage being an alliance of interests (business, worker and peasant) designed to produce forces that would eliminate apartheid. Once this objective has been successfully achieved, a second stage revolution is envisaged that would eliminate capitalism in turn and establish a socialist state.

Between the completion of the first and second stages of the anticipated revolution, the underlying time assumptions in this school of thought seemed to range from as short a period as ten years up to as long as a

century! Rather ironically, it appeared that the more committed a particular participant was to the socialist option, the more pragmatic his approach was and the longer the time span he envisaged elapsing between the two revolutionary stages.

- View three saw the most likely outcome from the overthrow of apartheid to be the establishment of some type of welfare capitalism or social democracy in South Africa. This view was presented as the rightwing view in terms of the conference, but it is in actuality left-of-centre. Papers given by participants from this school of thought emphasised the need for the redistribution of income and wealth, as well as for improved black access to the economy as a whole. While many authors in this group would have accepted the need for an alliance of interests to eliminate apartheid, none saw any prospect of, or in many cases, any real need for a second stage revolution to eliminate capitalism.

Divergencies on Issues

The divergencies made for interesting debate, but at the same time weakened the overall usefulness of the conference. This was largely because 'the process issues' such as: how do

Assistance in home upgrading, self-help and informal settlement are ingredients of welfare capitalism in the housing sphere. The left-of-centre conference participants emphasised such schemes as part of the need to redistribute resources and income to the black majority.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

Unless efficiently achieved, the costs of failure in attempting a radical socio-economic transformation in South Africa would be astronomical

Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe addresses an anti-apartheid rally on 16 June 1986. One conference session debated the likely impact that the full regional re-integration of South Africa might have on the unequal distribution of resources within the sub-continent's economy.

we include blacks in the post apartheid economy? How do we redistribute land? how do we upgrade black incomes? were almost exclusively introduced in papers emanating from the welfare capitalism or social democracy group. Consequently, these policy positions were invariably attacked by the more left groupings as being too conservative and likely to lead to the continued entrenchment of the present elite.

Alternative scenarios offered in the leftwing oriented papers, however, were not in the main very practical. They tended mostly to conclude in generalisations such as 'we must change the nature of the economic institutions', or 'we must significantly restructure the relations in manufacturing and agriculture'; without giving any real hints of the ways in which these needed reforms could be achieved.

Eliminating Apartheid

In the absence of a formal session on the process of eliminating apartheid, the feelings of those who went to the conference could

only be pieced together from the tone of some comments from the floor and sundry recommendations in specific papers.

Probably the most useful comment came from the far left camp, when a speaker pointed out that one could not simply wish away the present government; it was an extremely strong state which could be expected to resist attempts to overthrow it with everything at its disposal.

Taking this as a departure point, one might do well to ponder exactly how we are going to arrive at post-apartheid South Africa and when?

Three suggested options emerged at the conference. The first, from the centre viewpoint, argued essentially for apartheid's elimination through reform from within. The conference as a whole found this approach to be unacceptable, either on the grounds that it was unrealistic or because it was argued that even if the reforms could be instituted, they would not result in 'meaningful change'.

The second view, shifting over to the left, was that the only viable force that could be organised to offer real resistance to the state was that of organised labour. Accordingly, the growing black union movement could be



AFRAPHIX: Howard Minnie

the vanguard for change and should be recognised as such. The third view, currently prevailing in the ANC, is that the only practical way to eliminate apartheid is to form a populist alliance between labour, capital (large and small business) and the peasantry (to the extent that this is possible). This coalition would have to be both sufficiently committed to change and strong enough to ensure that South Africa could be made ungovernable in the face of continuing apartheid.

While discussion did take place on the relative merits of the latter two paths, it did not continue to the point where any real clarity emerged.

Future Role of Unions

One of the most interesting debates of the conference took place over the role that the union movement would play in a post-apartheid South African economy.

Starting from the assumption that the post-apartheid regime would be controlled by the ANC, argument was concerned with whether or not there would still be a need for an independent union movement. Union ideologues, understandably, argued that if the new government was the outcome of a series of populist alliances, there would be no guarantee that worker interests would be paramount in the new government. Consequently, workers would still need a labour movement to protect and forward their interests. The populists on the other hand, showed little enthusiasm over the prospect of taking power in a post-apartheid South Africa where a strong, independent union movement continued to exist. The ensuing arguments were heated at times and largely inconclusive. Clearly this will continue to be a significant issue within the South African left for the foreseeable future.

Land Reform

There was much discussion on the need for land reform and on the various ways in which it might be achieved. It was accepted that there must be a redistribution of land to blacks but there were significant differences of opinion between delegates over the extent of such a redistribution. Views ranged from a conservative suggestion that this might best be achieved through the repurchase of abandoned white farms, to arguments for the wholesale implementation of that section of the Freedom Charter which says that 'the land should be divided among those who work it'.

Clearly, such a wide ranging discussion could come to no real conclusion. However, there

was consensus on two issues:

- There will be a need for a substantial redistribution of land to blacks in post-apartheid South Africa, as indeed there is in present day South Africa.
- It is important that land redistribution is accomplished in a way which does not destroy the productive base of the land itself.

Urbanisation Policy

A session of the conference was devoted to a consideration of the new state policy of 'orderly urbanisation', measured against the statements relating to urbanisation made in the Freedom Charter. The conclusions drawn were antithetical to 'orderly urbanisation', with participants seeing the strategy as undemocratic and elitist, favouring those with housing and work over new entrants into the urban area.

It was argued that urbanisation patterns are a reflection of the patterns of social and economic institutions and the effect that these have on migration from the rural areas. While these influences will still be important in post-apartheid South Africa, their precise nature will change — these differences should be recognised and incorporated into present urbanisation policies.

Interestingly, it was also argued that the emphasis on informal housing and self-help schemes was contrary to the aims of the Freedom Charter and more importantly perhaps, an incorrect strategy in a society in which wealth is as unequally distributed as it is in South Africa. These critics presented a strong case that such strategies place the burden of providing housing on the stratum of society which is least able to carry it. At the same time these strategies release the wealthy from any obligation to assist with the housing needs of the poor.

The Mining Industry

The session on the mining industry produced two main discussion threads:


- whether or not 'supply interruption scenarios' were politically and economically feasible as retaliatory measures threatened by the South African government,
- the challenges that the mining industry would pose to a new regime.

The participants concluded that 'supply interruption' was not a feasible course, since South Africa was not in a position to control the supply of strategic minerals worldwide; either because there were alternative supplier countries or because significant stockpiling had already taken place, particularly in the

With a focus on a post-apartheid order, the consequences and the actual process of eliminating apartheid were obscured apart from broad strategies discussed

ANC representatives maintained that the most practical opposition to apartheid is a populist alliance between labour, capital and the 'peasantry'

Unionists argued that workers need an independent labour movement to safeguard their interests, even under an ANC government



Mark Bennett

UDF posters at Cosatu's launch, December 1986. A Freedom Charter proposal (obscured) proclaims, 'The wealth of the country belongs to all'. The ANC's populist stance offers the business community a means of participating in change and playing a role in post-apartheid South Africa.

United States. Consequently, it was argued that South Africa's most likely strategy would be to continue to push the image of a 'reliable supplier'.

On managing the mining industry, discussion centred on the implementation of the Freedom Charter proposals, which envisage that the ANC will 'bring the commanding heights' of the mining industry into public ownership once it assumes power. The paper presented here drew on the Zimbabwean experience and argued that while centralised control of the mining industry could effect practical economies — in respect of both central policy making and the generation of a supply of technical expertise — the most crucial area for the new government would be that of marketing the minerals.

An interesting side issue debated was the role the mining unions could play in present-day South Africa to ensure that present management teams do not adopt operational strategies that could maximise their short term profits at the cost of the long-term life of the mining industry.

Southern Africa

The Southern African session largely emphasised the unequal distribution of economic resources in the sub-continent, and the corrective impact the elimination of apartheid and the full re-integration of South Africa in the regional economy would have on this inequality. Views were pragmatic and a number of participants argued that the ultimate outcome could well be an increase rather than a decrease in regional inequality.

The conference's sober conclusion has significant implications for the role that the 'frontline' states can be expected to play in the immediate future. A generally held view was that the regional inequality in productive capacity should be redressed before South Africa can be re-integrated into the Southern African economy. If this line is officially adopted by the ANC, then one can expect the neighbouring states to stall on a solution.

Impact of the Conference

The South African press appears to have largely written off the conference as representing the views of a small leftwing minority. This, I believe, is a serious mistake. There are a number of reasons why the deliberations at this conference are important to all South Africans, particularly to the business community.

The left wing of the political spectrum inside South Africa has been largely underground since the bannings of the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. This has lulled the majority of white people into believing that the leftwing views that are espoused, either by exiles or by the few unbanned radicals within the country, are those of a minority of South Africans. The truth could well be very different. One only has to look at the popular support given to the leaders in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique to see what the most likely political outcome will be in post-apartheid South Africa. At present we seem set to repeat the error of judgement we made in respect of Zimbabwe, but this time with far more costly results.

The populist stance of the ANC offers the business community a means of both participating in change and of remaining to play a major role in post-apartheid South Africa. Unless business really believes that apartheid can survive in the long term, they should make the most of this strategical opportunity. Last year's visit by business leaders to Lusaka to meet ANC leaders represents a start to communication. It is important to maintain and expand this initiative, both with respect to the ANC and even more importantly, with internally based groups working for change within South Africa.

The differences between the ideologies of business and the radical left will certainly make dialogue difficult. The pay-off could be extremely high, however. When one considers the economic destruction that is inherent in any violent revolution and the costs that this will entail, it is certainly in the interests of all parties to talk. With the exception of those presently in power and those to the ideological right of them, it is also in the interests of all parties to find a peaceful road to meaningful (revolutionary) change.

Research in Brief.

What is the nature of poverty, then, as suggested by this mass of research? By definition it is clear that poverty is a multi-faceted process. It cannot be measured solely in terms of income or capital, nor can there be a single, easily graspable measure below which poverty begins. Poverty is a function of many features — what sort of access a person has to clean water, fuel, sewerage, education, dignity and other basic needs; as well as having a say in how one's life is to be lived.

Four Area Focuses

There were four geographical focuses which emerged from the Carnegie Inquiry: the metropolitan areas, the rural platteland, the reserves, and the countries surrounding South Africa. Each area has its own, clearly distinguishable features and all share certain features. The key aspects of poverty identified in the metropolitan areas were overcrowded housing and the lack of facilities generally, both as regards the basic infrastructure for sewerage, fuel and transport, and facilities for recreation and community enrichment. One issue not properly covered in the research was transport, and how the lack of proper transport provision is part of a process of impoverishment.

But it would be wrong to think that housing is simply an urban problem. In micro-studies of platteland dorps across the country, the Inquiry found the same story of acutely overcrowded housing and of a lack of facilities. The nationwide explosion of civil unrest over the past two years is more easily understood against the background of grinding deprivation and the appalling conditions under which so many people in South Africa are forced to eke out their lives. Another striking feature of poverty in the platteland is the

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A landmark conference, held at UCT in April 1984, drew together two years of research by over four hundred academics, economists, community workers, lawyers, doctors, nutritionists and educationists. Over three hundred papers were published as part of the second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, which now form the basis for a continuing programme in the search for action. Further papers have been published or are in the pipeline, produced for four workshops on population, the budget, public works programmes, and macro-economic policy and poverty.

A forthcoming report summarises the main features of poverty uncovered in the Carnegie Inquiry and presents an overview of the network of causes exacerbating poverty in the sub-continent. It will also provide a synopsis of the various strategies that might be adopted in order to deal effectively with poverty in the long-term process of reconstruction in a democratic South Africa.

THE CARNEGIE INQUIRY

MACRO- POVERTY UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

*By Prof Francis Wilson, Director,
School of Economics, University of
Cape Town*

One of the most vulnerable groups in our society consists of children between the ages of two and five, who have stopped being breast-fed, but who are still unable to look after themselves.



Poverty is compounded in the reserves (homelands) by difficulties in obtaining water and fuel, employment, or adequate health care and nutrition

vulnerability of the poor, particularly where people are pushed off the farms, either because of the mechanisation of farming or for political reasons.

A trend which emerged across the board in the multidimensional approach to poverty was that, while a particular facet of impoverishment was most prominent in one area, it tended to be manifest to different degrees across the country. If a lack of fuel was the particular crisis of the reserves (the 'homelands'), obtaining fuel could often be extremely difficult for the urban poor too.

Poverty measured by income alone is most highly concentrated in the reserves, where over 80 percent of people subsist below the poverty datum line. Even if income alone is too narrow a measure of poverty, it does indicate where poverty is most concentrated in South Africa's economy. It is compounded in the reserves by difficulties in obtaining water and fuel, the high infant mortality rate, the severe shortage of gainful employment opportunities (particularly for women), and problems of health care and nutrition. Another important feature in these areas is

the extent to which people have to rely on cash incomes from remittances, pensions and disability payments. All of these problems are worsened by a skewed demographic picture, reflecting the absence of men on migrant labour contracts in 'white' South Africa.

The particular vulnerability of neighbouring countries in Southern Africa is revealed by recruitment policies for the mines. In the past Mozambique used to send 100 000 men a year to the mines. South Africa unilaterally reduced that figure to 45 000 and, more recently, it announced the cessation of further recruitment. Transkei has certainly benefited as more Transkeian migrants are consequently recruited, but Mozambique has suffered terribly in the process. Poverty in Mozambique remains hidden because it does not appear in any South African statistics; yet it is integrally bound up in the same regional economy.

Multiple Inequalities

A central feature of the South African economy is the massive inequality in the

distribution of wealth. Inequality exists not just between black and white or between urban and rural areas, but even within the rural poor communities, where there is a very skewed distribution of income. One Carnegie paper on Transkei's Lower Roza area showed that the top ten percent of the area's population had a per capita income eighteen times higher than the bottom ten percent. Other studies showed that poverty was acute in the surrounding countries as well, with similarly distorted patterns of income distribution.

There are similarities across Southern Africa in the conditions of poverty, but there are also important differences between one geographical area and another; between urban areas, the platteland and the reserves. These are graphically illustrated by water usage figures from the Eastern Cape. One researcher found that the per capita daily consumption of water by black people was ten litres in the reserves, 20 litres in the platteland towns, and 80 litres in Port Elizabeth. On the other hand, per capita daily water consumption by white people in Port Elizabeth was 200 litres, and as much as 300 litres in the platteland towns. Furthermore, infant mortality in Transkei appears to be in the region of 130 deaths per thousand live births, while in Naphuno (south of Tzaneen), there are only 90 deaths per thousand. What causes this difference? Is it because there are differences in attitudes towards breast feeding; or that there is an active community clinic in the Naphuno area?

One of the most vulnerable groups in our society consists of children between the ages of two and five, who have stopped being breast-fed, but who are still unable to look after themselves. Other categories are people in the reserves who have no access to employment at all; and older people within five to ten years of qualifying for pensions, who find it particularly difficult to get jobs to survive in the interim. Then there are those aged who for one reason or another are without pensions. Because of the inequalities of income and resource distribution in South Africa, it is people from these vulnerable groups who suffer the worst effects of impoverishment.

Some conventional economic factors are also part of the causal web of poverty. Recession causes unemployment which is different in nature from the structural unemployment which is deeply entrenched in this society. Inflation affects the poor with far more devastating consequences than those who have some savings or resources to fall back on. Another interesting paradox that emerged from the Carnegie Inquiry is that poverty is often very expensive. Research revealed that people living in the platteland, or on the reserves, often pay far more for items than do people living in the metropolitan areas. Water in one Karoo dorp was twenty eight times more

expensive than it was in Cape Town, and even higher than that in Gazankulu.

Holistic Approach

One of the common paradigms on development within Southern Africa holds that there are two economies in the region — a highly industrialised and sophisticated First World economy, existing side by side with a Third World economy. This model, in development planning, has Pretoria acting as the dispenser of development aid with the rural areas, particularly the reserves, as its recipients. The entire thinking of the Carnegie Inquiry is opposed to this view; instead, the whole of the southern sub-continent should be regarded as having a single economy, centred on the mineral wealth and the industrial complex in the PWV (Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging) area.

Within this single economy is a wildly skewed distribution of income and access to wealth. Accordingly, it is a mistake to consider decisions affecting rural South Africa without fully appreciating the effect of those decisions on the metropolitan areas, on the reserves, and even on the countries outside of our political borders. The organic economic unity of Southern Africa requires a development policy that holds this interconnectedness of issues and policies very prominently in mind. Macro-economic choices at the centre, such as interest rates or monetary policy, have decisive effects on policy decisions regarding development in the rural areas. For instance, what the Margo commission recommends on food subsidies might well be one of the single most important factors affecting the poor.

We need to consider the historical roots of the accumulation of capital at the centre to show how the periphery, particularly the reserves and the neighbouring states, have been and are still being impoverished to the advantage of the centre. Rural poverty itself is part of and has been brought about by the underdevelopment process. The bias in the accumulation of capital, brought about by a century of industrialisation, goes hand in hand with the migratory labour system.

A further consideration is apartheid's war on the poor; active moves by the state that have further impoverished people. There are a number of themes which could be dealt with here, including resettlement, the colour bar, Bantu education, the policy of anti-urbanisation for black people, the radical bias in the public allocation of resources by the state, and the accumulative consequences of this over the years. Some of these, of course, have their roots deeper in South African history than the policies introduced after 1948.

Macro-economic choices made at the centre have decisive effects on policies and possibilities for development in the rural areas

Active moves by the state, such as resettlement, the colour bar and an anti-urbanisation policy have further impoverished black people

Appropriate development strategies include land reform, public works or employment guarantee schemes, and the encouragement of community-oriented organisations



AFRPIX: Poul Weinberg

Child farm labour in the Magaliesberg. A striking feature of life in the platteland is the vulnerability of the poor.

Deciding on Strategy

Given all this, what can be said about strategies to bring about the alleviation and ultimate eradication of poverty? Essential to the Inquiry's thinking here is the distinction between short-run and long-run strategies. Even where one assumes political flexibility, there are nonetheless severe restraints on what might be possible in the long term. The urban areas are where they are, the rainfall is what it is, the historical process has brought us to where we are now.

Given these constraints, what type of strategies can be developed to make life better for the bottom forty percent of people in this society, including people in neighbouring countries who have helped to build the wealth? Some of the strategies under consideration include land reform, public works or employment guarantee schemes, and a hard look at all central government macro-economic policies.

In the short run, though, there are all kinds of things that need to be done. Two kinds of non-governmental organisations need to be encouraged:

- the do-it-yourself, co-operative venture, such as centres like Ithuseng Community Medical Centre near Tzaneen, or the Tiakeni textile co-operative near Elim (both in the northern Transvaal)
- those organisations that can help to

shift the balance of power in society, such as trade unions, parent/teacher/student associations, and legal resources centres.

In thinking through short-run strategies, activists, planners and policy makers must always be conscious of long-run strategies as well. These strategies should be training people in skills which can be used not only to secure a living wage, but also to develop and maintain organisations on democratic and enabling principles, so that they are consistent with long-run goals. So too with development policies.

Any rural focus must not concentrate solely on the reserves — the development of the platteland, dorps as well as farms, is also vitally important. So too is consideration of conditions in the neighbouring countries, like Lesotho and Mozambique, which are an integral part of South Africa's economy. Whatever happens in the rural areas impinges immediately and directly on what occurs in the cities, and vice versa. If black communities have been pushed off the farms into reserves like QwaQwa, the abysmal conditions there will impel them into the urban areas. In short then, any development policy which does not recognise the full interconnectedness of all areas of the single Southern African economy including, importantly, full consideration of the macro-economic policies at its core, will be inequitable and deficient. **IPJA**

By Dr Merle Holden and Prof Mike McGrath of the
Department of Economics, University of Natal

RETROSPECT

Since 1980 the South African economy has fluctuated on a long run path of zero growth. The mini-boom of 1984 that followed the higher gold price of 1983 was abruptly halted as the price of gold again fell in 1984 and 1985; the negative growth of real GDP in 1985 revived fears of secular stagnation, in the face of the debt crisis and the attendant necessity to maintain a surplus on the current account. Subsequently, an apparent increase in economic activity in the third quarter of 1985 persuaded many economists that the recession had perhaps ended. Nevertheless, these optimistic views were altered as the first quarter of 1986 registered a decline of 2,5 percent in real GDP per annum, and pessimism again prevailed on the future of the economy.

Preliminary estimates by the Reserve Bank for the second quarter of 1986 have since shown a moderate increase in real GDP of 1,5 percent at an annualised rate. Observing that positive growth had been experienced in three out of four of the last quarters, the Reserve Bank has concluded that the turning point of the cycle was indeed the third quarter of 1985 and that the economy is once again on an upward, longer term growth path.

The net increase in real output in the second quarter of 1986 was due largely to increases in the agricultural, wholesale and motor trade sectors — increases sufficient to offset the accompanying decline in real output in manufacturing and retail trade. Value added in agriculture rose as farmers economised on intermediate inputs rather than increased real output. The cutback on inputs by farmers was also felt by the manufacturing sector which was already suffering from the effects of the continued decline in fixed investment and the running down of inventories. On balance the picture is still mixed, however, with economic recovery benefiting few sectors of the economy.

Despite the increase in real output in the second quarter of 1986, total real gross domestic expenditure declined at an annual rate of three percent. While real private consumption expenditure rose in the second quarter in all categories, expenditures on transport equipment, petroleum products, motor parts and accessories were particularly buoyant. Real government expenditure rose even more rapidly at an annual rate of 15,5 percent, with most of the increase concentrated on goods and services. Despite these increases, real total expenditure declined as gross fixed investment continued its strongly downward trend, accompanied by a substantial drawing down of inventories.

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Labour and Inflation

During the second quarter of 1986 labour income rose at a faster rate than did gross operating surplus. The latter rate of increase, particularly in gold mining, was moderated by the appreciation of the rand in the first four months of 1986; whereas workers employed in the mining and government sectors enjoyed substantial increases in income.

It is difficult to establish any trends in employment and unemployment for the first half of 1986. Although the seasonally adjusted number of registered unemployed declined from January to July, it is not clear whether this should be attributed to government training and job creation programmes. Total employment certainly has stagnated over this period, with the rise in public employment being balanced by a decline in private employment. Workers in the non-agricultural sectors (except for mining and government) found that in real terms their remuneration in the first quarter of 1986 was 7,7 percent less than for the same period in 1985. At the same time, there was a decline in both labour productivity — measured by real GDP per worker — and the rate of increase in labour costs.

Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, also continues to be of major concern. In January inflation peaked at an annual rate of 20,7 percent, declining to 16,9 percent in June. This slower rate of inflation was attributed to the lagged effect of the appreciation of the rand from December 1985 to March 1986, coupled with the decline in international oil prices. By July, despite the elimination of demand pull factors, inflation had once more increased to an annual rate of 18,2 percent with sharp increases in the costs of housing, food, other services, beverages and tobacco. The inflation rate rose once again in September to 19,7 percent, due largely to increases in the price of foodstuffs. The producer price index followed a similar path, falling from 22,2 percent in January to 19,7 percent in July.

Imports and Exports

In view of the substantial outflow of capital from South Africa over the last year, it has been imperative to maintain a healthy surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. Both the depressed external value of the rand and the low level of economic activity have aided in this goal. Although domestic savings declined in the first half of 1986 to 22,5 percent of GDP, domestic investment declined even more to 17,5 percent of GDP. This

excess of real saving over real investment has effected the real transfer or redistribution of goods and services from South Africans to foreigners that accompanies a capital outflow.

At seasonally adjusted annual rates the balance on the current account stood at a reduced level of R4,3 billion in the first quarter of 1986, but improved markedly to R6,0 billion in the second quarter. Export volumes of coal, ferro-chrome, asbestos, sugar and diamonds increased markedly and net gold exports improved steadily with increases in both price and volume. Despite the decline in export prices, the value of merchandise exports also rose. In October the price of gold rose substantially to levels of \$435 an ounce, reflecting fears of a possible gold supply curtailment and renewed inflation abroad. As the dollar weakened, investors also rearranged their portfolios to include more gold and fewer dollars.

Merchandise imports increased at a seasonally adjusted annual rate from R23,7 billion in the first quarter to R24,6 billion in the second quarter. As world import prices declined in the second quarter, volume increases solely accounted for this increase

in the value of imports. Agricultural products, textiles, transport equipment as well as mineral products, chemicals and machinery registered sharp increases. Imports continued to increase in July and August, lending credence to the view that the economy was indeed recovering from the recession.

The capital account of the balance of payments continued to reflect a withdrawal of foreign capital and credits. In addition previous credits from the International Monetary Fund were being repaid as scheduled. South Africa has become a capital exporting country at a time in its development when capital is most needed. Although the capital outflow has continued through 1985 into 1986, it declined from a high of R4,4 billion in the fourth quarter of 1985 to R1,6 billion and R1,0 billion for the first two quarters of 1986. Reflecting these changes in the current and capital accounts, reserves of gold and foreign exchange rose from R3,2 billion in April 1986 to their highest level in several years and stood at R5 billion in September. If the rand had not appreciated against the dollar from June to September, reserves would have been even higher.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

The trade weighted, effective exchange rate of the rand has also mirrored the above developments in the foreign sector of the economy. The recovery of the rate from the end of 1985 to March 1986 reflected the tightening of exchange control regulations in December last year and the unwinding of unfavourable leads and lags. With evidence of further unrest in the country the exchange rate declined precipitously — by 12 June 1986, when a national state of emergency was declared, the rate was only slightly above its previous December low.

After 12 June the rand initially recovered against the dollar and the pound sterling. By the beginning of September the rise in the price of gold effected a strengthening of the rand against the other major currencies, to the point where the effective exchange rate was 17,9 percent higher compared with 12 June. The fact that the Reserve Bank has been able to accumulate reserves in this period indicates that it has partly been resisting the upward movement in the rand. Meanwhile, the financial rand rate has followed these movements in the commercial rand rate, maintaining an average discount of 50 percent vis-a-vis the commercial rand.

Stimulatory Measures

Certainly the objectives of eliminating excess demand and producing a current account surplus have been achieved. South Africa has been in the unique position of being able to repay approximately \$3 billion of foreign debt since the end of 1984, and the recent increase in reserves will enable the economy to

cope with further financial and trade sanctions. Nevertheless, both inflation and unemployment remain at unacceptably high levels.

The low level of economic activity and the inability of monetary policy to stimulate the economy is reflected in the low growth of the broadly defined money supply (M3) during 1986. From mid-November 1985 to the end of July 1986, M3 was well below the lower limit of its targeted rate of growth of 16 percent. This can only be attributed to the slackness in the economy and the decline in gross fixed investment and inventories. Unfortunately this is not due to normal cyclical causes but largely to a lack of business confidence in the political and economic future of the country. Stimulatory monetary policy in the face of such uncertainty is unlikely to be successful in raising the level of economic activity.

The Treasury has recognised the need for old-fashioned Keynesian economics and introduced two packages of stimulatory fiscal measures — one in September 1985 and additional measures in June this year. Although the repayment of the loan levy may have filtered through to increases in consumption spending, and the relaxation of taxation of fringe benefits with respect to company cars may have favourably influenced car sales, the other expenditures and measures will operate with long and unpredictable lags on the economy.

Costs of Sanctions

The approval of trade sanctions by the US Congress in September 1986 came as both a psychological and



Demand from South Africa's black consumer market, hit by high unemployment and inflation, is unlikely to offset the effects of trade sanctions on a wide range of commodity exports.

economic blow to the economy, following selected sanctions imposed by certain European countries. The total effect of sanctions imposed to date will affect R2 160 million of export trade. Employing a methodology suggested by a recent comprehensive study of the economic effects of sanctions (Hufbauer 1983), it is estimated that the cost of these trade sanctions to the South African economy will range between two percent and 0,4 percent of GDP per annum, most likely at the lower end of this range. The comparative study found that when the cost of sanctions exceeded one percent of GDP, target countries were more likely to capitulate to the sender countries' demands.

Although trade sanctions have been the focus of attention in recent months, financial sanctions in the form of withdrawals of credit and capital outflows have been in existence for over a year now. The governor of the Reserve Bank is of the opinion that 'this politically induced pressure on the capital account of the balance of payments poses a greater threat to the South African economy than the kinds of

trade sanctions that are likely to be imposed. It has already resulted in a weaker exchange rate, a higher inflation rate and a lower rate of real economic growth than would otherwise have prevailed' (De Kock 1986).

Taking the total capital outflow since the debt standstill of August 1985 to the end of June 1986, it is estimated that the cost of 'financial' sanctions has amounted to seven percent of GDP over the year. Compared with a maximum of two percent of GDP for present trade sanctions, it is clear that Governor de Kock's emphasis on the greater threat of financial sanctions is fully justified. It is also apparent that there will be pressure for further trade sanctions by other countries, probably encompassing a wider range of commodities. However, it has been found that as the costs of imposing sanctions mount within sender countries, pressures will arise within these countries to abandon such measures. In short, the whole exercise of sanctions turns on a fine balancing of the imposition and incurrence of costs in both target and sender countries.

PROSPECT

The Reserve Bank and other forecasters do not expect GDP to increase by more than one to two percent in 1986 with the rate of inflation in the region of 17,5 percent. There is also consensus among forecasters that a short run cyclical upswing is at last getting underway. Although evidence in the real part of the economy is mixed, with some indicators declining while others have picked up, Assocom's latest business confidence index shows improved optimism.

A recent survey by the Bureau of Market Research of 100 top industrialists showed that although most executives were gloomy about prospects for 1987 they nevertheless predicted:

- higher real economic growth, ranging between 6 - 0 percent with a median of 2,1 percent;
- unemployment would not diminish (45 percent believed this);
- inflation would remain high, ranging between 17-23 percent with a median of 17,9 percent; and
- sanctions and disinvestment pressures would intensify next year.

Despite predictions of high rates of inflation in 1987, most observers expect interest rates to decline further. The Bureau of Economic Research expects a 'marginal future relaxation in monetary policy' next year. The governor of the Reserve Bank lent support to this view in his annual report, where he indicated that further expansionary monetary and fiscal strategies would be adopted in order to ensure more rapid economic growth.

Length of Upswing

For most observers, forecasting the exchange rate for the coming year has been an exercise fraught with uncertainty. While businessmen foresee a strengthening of the rand vis-a-vis the dollar, economists are more pessimistic. The uncertainty introduced by sanctions and future capital repayments, coupled with the large differential between the inflation rates of South Africa and her main trading partners, projects a downward future trend for the rand. On this basis, a median of 40 US cents to the rand has been forecast for 1987 as compared with the present 44 cents.


If the economy does indeed recover strongly, it is certain that imports will rise sharply. The Bureau of Economic Research anticipates 3,3 percent growth in 1986 coupled with imports rising by 24,1 percent, while merchandise exports rise by 13,3 percent. However, the current account surplus is forecast at R6,4 billion for 1986 and R6,2 billion for 1987, largely on the strength of a 21,9 percent increase in net gold output. While most forecasters and businessmen have committed themselves to predicting an upswing in the economy, no one is prepared to estimate its duration. The Financial Mail (10/10/86) maintains that the upswing will sustain itself for at least six months, noting that while political reform would do the most for confidence, good summer rains

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Table 1

ACTUALS AND ESTIMATES OF SELECTED ECONOMIC VARIABLES

	1985 (Actual)	1986 (Estimate)	1987 (Estimate)
GDP (%)	-1,1	1,5	3,2
Inflation (Decimal %)	18,5	17,5	16,0
Prime Interest Rate (Average %)	21,5	14,0	13,0
Rand (Average US cents)	45,6	43,0	40
Gold Price (\$ per ounce)	318	370	420
Current Account (R bill)	5,6	6,5	6,0



White and black apprentices learn together at Volkswagen's new R1m training centre in Uitenhage. Black communities must be brought into the capitalist economic system at all levels.

would also be beneficial. In addition, a higher gold price of \$435 an ounce is also a necessary ingredient for any upswing in the present climate.

Table 1 lists the actual and consensus estimated levels of selected economic variables for 1985, 1986 and 1987.

In the long run, one theme which emerges is the gradual erosion of the economy via debt problems, no new foreign investment, trade sanctions and depressed business confidence, all of which will cause low growth and continued (although low level) civil violence. This is a scenario in which per capita incomes will fall for possibly 20 years or more, and in which the trade and industrial structure of the economy will be substantially distorted by 'strategic' needs on the one hand, and by lack of direct access to markets on the other. Investment may grow but it will be investment in import substituted manufacturing which is highly costly. The social capital of the economy, however, will run down, taxes will undoubtedly increase, and in real, per capita, after tax terms, South Africans will be a great deal worse off.



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ALTERNATIVES

The future looks bleak — on the immediate horizon is 'a slow bleeding of the economy' (De Kock, quoted in *Financial Guardian* 3/10/86); while there may be an attempt further down the line to transform the South African economy into a socialist utopia. An alternative possibility is the Zimbabwe-type model — in which political power changes hands but economic relationships are left substantially intact. More likely is the very radical scenario, involving wide scale nationalisation of mining and manufacturing enterprises, which is also likely to have costly effects on economic growth.

There are now very real prospects which can no longer be ignored by politicians, the business community, or leaders of the white trade union movement. In economic terms, in both the short and the long run, they will represent a Pareto worsening — as there are not likely to be any gainers from the processes at work. It is also likely that the distribution of income will worsen as employment contracts and wage growth for all but the most skilled groups come to a halt.

However, there are still possibilities for salvaging the situation. Without any delay the government should commit itself to the provision of equal educational and health services as well as pensions for all race groups, and implement these as quickly as possible. This will involve reallocation of resources, particularly at the educational level. Secondly, black communities have to be brought into the capitalist economic system in South Africa, from which they have had such a bad deal in the past. Here, black union groupings should be incorporated in the process of decision making in industry at the very highest level.

Ownership of wealth and land are the source of major inequities which cannot be justified. One possibility is to transfer immediately a proportion of all quoted shares to a 'people's trust' — which uses the dividends for social pension payments and the cushioning of unemployed persons. The transfer (of at least 20 percent of shares) could be made by appropriate rights issues to the people's trust by all quoted companies, to spread the burden proportionately across the board. Large private foreign controlled companies could be treated in a similar fashion.

On the land issue, immediate steps should be taken to move African farmers onto areas of land which can be farmed viably and which are not being used by white farmers. This initiative would involve extending land areas of the homelands, improving the marketing of African agricultural produce and providing risk capital to the rural areas.

Simultaneously, the business community must use its power to convince government of the need for constitutional reforms that are tangible. This is not a radical programme — it is the last defence that moderates can offer to hold back the heightening sea of radicalism. Further time cannot be lost in its implementation. J.P.A.

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
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Billy Paddock

March 1986: Exuberant participants at the National Education Crisis Committee Conference, convened in Durban to reassess the progress that has been made towards achieving various short-term demands.

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THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN EDUCATION

Two Opposing Strategies

By Indicator SA Researcher Monica Bot

For the third year in a row, widespread boycotts of African schools have occurred, especially in the Eastern Cape and Transvaal. The Department of Education and Training (DET) has stated that the number of schools involved in boycott action varies from 210 to 450 at any one time out of a total of approximately 7 500 schools. Yet there are only 328 secondary schools for Africans, and only 1 964 schools in urban areas — in other words the boycotts, which mainly occur at secondary level and in urban areas, have had a far more concentrated impact than DET's national statistics suggest.

In addition, 400 000 African pupils did not re-register in July/August 1986, and consequently are not at school anymore; 33 schools have been closed for the rest of the school year; in certain areas, no effective teaching takes place, and, according to DET's liaison officer Peter Mundell, the many schools that remained open had covered only a third of this year's syllabus by September. In this article, Monica Bot reviews the events leading to the present impasse between DET and various community organisations, and stresses the need for increased participation of the African community in their education.

A decade after the Soweto upheaval, African education completes its third year in the current phase of serious and widespread school unrest, especially in secondary education. The present state of emergency and the strict security measures that surround school attendance have brought a temporary impasse to the process of mobilisation among parents, pupils, teachers and community organisations around the future shape of African education.

Recent Events — 1985/86

Pupil demands have shifted over the past ten years from an initial rejection of Afrikaans and Bantu education to a demand for equal, 'free and compulsory education' in 1980; from the slogan 'liberation now, education later' in 1985 to this year's rallying cry of 'people's education for people's power'. Prior to the (select) state of emergency of 1985, pupils' short-term demands centred around education-related issues such as demo-

cratically elected SRCs, grievances regarding corporal punishment and age limit restrictions. Once the state of emergency was imposed, however, issues generally focussed nationally on the release of detainees, the removal of troops from the townships, and the unbanning of political groups.


Cosas, the national student organisation that emerged in 1979, was banned in August last year, and amid calls for a boycott of exams and '1986 — a total class boycott', the Soweto Civic Association convened an important public meeting in October 1985. This led to the formation of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) to negotiate with the authorities over the above demands and also, the deferment of school exams, the lifting of the state of emergency, the scrapping of Bantu education and the establishment of SRCs. Widespread boycotts occurred of the standard six to ten exams, especially in the Eastern Cape and Soweto — DET estimated a 50-60 percent turn out in their schools (Sunday Tribune 1/12/85). At centres disrupted by unrest, 11 212

Strict security measures have resulted in a temporary impasse in the process of mobilisation around the future shape of African education

candidates enrolled for the matric exam while only 3 210 actually wrote; elsewhere, 13 019 enrolled and 7 313 wrote the final matric exams (The Star 23/4/86).

Early in December 1985, the SPCC was asked to organise a national meeting, 'to address itself to the problems we face in the educational sphere', which was attended later that month by 161 organisations. The resolutions taken at the University of the Witwatersrand conference covered a wide range of issues (see box 1), and the new, more radical focus turned to 'people's education in people's schools for people's power'.

An overview of consequent events in 1986 is provided in the accompanying chronology. In March, after two months of continued unrest in certain Cape, Transvaal and Natal areas, the subsequently formed National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) convened in Durban to reassess the progress that had been made towards achieving various short-term demands. While DET evidently felt they had met these, with the exception of the unbanning of Cosas, the NECC took a different perspective. Nevertheless, it was decided that pupils would remain at school, or if on boycott, return (see box 2 for full conference resolutions). Control over the running of African schools should be handed over to the community, and



THE SOWETO PARENTS CRISIS COMMITTEE CONFERENCE

Resolutions taken at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, December 1985

- To struggle against bantustan education departments and to support teachers in their struggle against these agents of apartheid and to replace statutory parents committees with progressive parent/teacher/student structures at all schools
- That teachers should work actively with students and parents in forming democratic SRCs and in dealing with the educational crisis
- To call for the unconditional release of all students, parents and teachers detained in their struggle for people's education
- To intensify the campaign to unban Cosas, to implement democratically elected SRCs, to forge close links between student, worker and community organisations and to encourage different student organisations to unite in struggle
- That parents should refuse to pay school fees in 1986 and that textbooks and other educational materials be provided free
- To form a National Parents' Crisis Committee (to consist of seven regional representatives) that will liaise with local and regional organisations in the implementation of the decisions of this conference and to actively strive for people's education as the new form of education for all sections of our people
- To call on all students throughout the country to return to school on 28 January 1986
- That unless the following demands are met before the end of March 1986, another conference shall be convened to consider what action to take:
 - the erection of school buildings where such buildings have been damaged
 - the postponement of all exams until March 1986
 - the release of all students and teachers in detention
 - the reinstatement of all dismissed, suspended and forcibly transferred teachers
 - the unbanning of Cosas
 - the recognition of democratically elected SRCs
 - the lifting of the state of emergency.

Let all our organisations and people strive for the implementation of these resolutions, adopted at this historic conference.

FORWARD TO PEOPLE'S EDUCATION
(Replicated verbatim from a document issued by the SPCC)

'alternate people's education programmes' should be implemented.

DET's Solution

In response to these developments, the Department stated that it 'remained committed to separate education, whilst striving for parity'. In April, a ten-year plan was announced for African education, according to which 'all the country's educational institutions will fall under one umbrella, with the same standard for all' (City Press 18/5/86). Measures include:

- Increased finance (despite the considerable increases, DET's 1985/86 budget is R1 157 831 000, compared with R3 222m spent on white education)
- Teacher training: DET hopes to have trained another 69 000 qualified black teachers by the end of the century
- The improvement of teacher qualifications through various in-service training programmes (of the present teaching force, 94,6% do not have matric and three years teacher training — Natal Mercury 29/7/86)
- An improved teacher-pupil ratio of 1:30 (the Department anticipates recruiting teachers from other races to achieve this)
- Improved facilities such as laboratories, libraries, workshops and playing fields, and an improved pupil:classroom ratio



Billy Paddock

- Guidance and councillor teachers, and a system of career-oriented education
- A pre-school orientation year is being worked out
- The availability of technikons and technical colleges, of which there are 40 countrywide at present; in addition, Minister of Education and Development Aid, Gerrit Viljoen, has stated that 'black people can also be admitted to white institutions'.

More recently, announcements have been made with regard to the SA Certification Council Bill, which makes provision for pupils of different race groups to write the same matric exam, if this is agreed to by two or more ministers heading the four 'own affairs' departments of education; and proposes the same matric certificate, shorn of any reference to the racial identity of the issuing authority. Furthermore, Minister de Klerk (National Education) stated that it would be preferable to have a black education minister taking decisions for members of his own race or group (Eastern Province Herald 19 and 22/8/86).

Doubts have been expressed by DET, however, about the success of their strategy; Viljoen has stated that although there will be 'dramatic progress', he does not foresee 'full parity' after ten years because the backlog is so great, and that 'I don't think we will solve the education

THE NATIONAL EDUCATION CRISIS COMMITTEE CONFERENCE

Resolutions taken in Durban, March 1986

- 1 To call upon students nationally to support the Mayday celebrations in the most appropriate form
- 2 To expose, isolate and to fight against Inkatha
- 3 To condemn all repressive actions taken against teachers (e.g. dismissals) and to urge all obstructive organisations and teachers to stop their negative and repressive roles and to stop collaborating with the authorities against democratic teachers
- 4 To declare June 16 the National Youth Day
- 5 That Cosas is unbanned forthwith, and call on all students to plan for national united action to give effect to this declaration
- 6 That banning orders on all organisations including the ANC be lifted; all political prisoners and detainees be released (including the Sharpeville six) and exiles be allowed to return home; all treason trials be stopped; the banning order on meetings be lifted; and that apartheid be completely dismantled
- 7 To form a National Action Committee which will be made up of representatives from all national organisations that subscribe to the decisions/recommendations of this conference
- 8 To call on all those countries, corporations and individuals with investments in South Africa to immediately withdraw such investments, and to call upon all countries to cancel landing rights to South African Airways
- 9 To accept recommendations 1,2 and 3 of the Ad Hoc Committee of People's Education
- 10 To make it known to the entire world that we consider the Reagan Administration as accomplices in the crimes of apartheid; to call on all freedom loving people all over the world to further isolate the apartheid regime internationally and call on the American people not to support the murderous policies of the Reagan administration, particularly their attempts to destabilise the legitimate and popular government of MPLA in Angola
- 11 To urge all communities and democratic organisations to launch appropriate regional and/or national mass action campaigns, by considering all forms of rent, consumer and other boycott
- 12 To demand that the state should provide creches, nursery schools and after-school centres for all children; and that legislation be implemented giving women the right to job security and adequate maternity leave
- 13 That all students should return to school when the new term starts to:
 - in such cases where schools have been closed, they must be occupied and we must demand the right to education
 - use the presence of students at schools to assist in building and regrouping of our student organisations
 - implement alternate people's education programmes immediately.

crisis ... until we have a more acceptable political formula' (City Press 18/5/86). DET's deputy minister Sam de Beer also said that 'what we are experiencing in black education at the moment can only be dealt with in depth if the reasonable political aspirations of blacks are dealt with' (Cape Times 13/4/86).

The NECC Responds

The NECC rejected the ten-year plan, however, because the content of education and the structure in which it is taught remains intact, and despite increased buildings, teachers and inspectors over the last ten years, the crisis had increased (City Press 18/5/86). The NECC went on to say that 'we have completely different criteria for educational legitimacy — namely community acceptability in the form of parent, teacher and student participation, and the contribution by progressive intellectuals'. Therefore, they proposed to 'work vehemently on an alternative education program ... suitable to all the country's inhabitants', which will 'harmonise relations between mental labour and intellectual labour by merging

DET's ten year plan for improving African education was rejected by the NECC, which emphasises community acceptability and participation

theory with practice'.

The state clamped down in June 1986, however, and additional security measures became applicable in African schools in July. A large number of NECC members were detained, and as a consequence, the momentum of people's education has slowed down considerably. Local and regional crisis in education committees, SRCs, student congresses and parent/teacher/student associations have sprung up to voice pupils' demands — which once again centre on more direct issues such as the removal of security forces, identity documents and other measures; as well as for DET to negotiate with the NECC. Some organisations, such as the Transvaal Students Congress (Trasco) and the Soweto Youth and Students Congresses (Soyco and Sosco), are very strong and efficient.

During personal discussions with people from the SA Council for Higher Education (Sached), the Programme for Technological & Engineering Careers (Protec) and the NECC, it became clear that there are wide variations in what happens in different parts of the country; in some, like the Eastern Cape, pupils refused to re-register despite the NECC's decision to resume schooling, resulting in the eventual closure of schools. In other areas, such as Soweto, although there is no actual boycott, little or no learning takes place on the school premises. In the second half of the year, the NECC has tried to re-establish communication channels again — in some areas, student confidence in the NECC has waned as deadlines have passed and there are no results (especially in Alexandra, where a 'non-academic year' is being held, and the Eastern Transvaal).

Recently, the NECC has reiterated its call for the government to give control of the schools to the community — 'we want to resume the duty of setting syllabuses ... education itself must rest in our hands (the community) and boycotts will be a thing of the past' (Sunday Times 14/9/86). The NECC hopes to regain some of its momentum by, among other planned projects, bringing out a booklet on the aims of people's education to guide discussion nationwide.

People's Education

There is a need for a clear and workable definition of what exactly is envisaged by 'people's education'. It is articulated as an objective in many forums and its applied form varies broadly from freedom songs to political education. Various organisations, however, are taking a serious look at specific curriculum changes and are involved in developing history and English materials. Apart from the NECC's Education Secretariat, the

1986: STASIS

	ATTENDANCE PATTERNS & ISSUES
JANUARY	Low to no attendance as African secondary schools open, esp in Soweto, Pretoria, E and W Cape. Natal: boycott of 3 high schools. Generally high attendance by the end of the month, except in Port Elizabeth (PE).
FEBRUARY	W Cape: schools half empty in Guguletu, Langa, Nyanga, Boland. Soweto: pupils show up but refuse to enter class in some schools. Boycotts in Alexandra (Alex), Witbank, some N Tvl areas, Soshanguve, Alteredidgeville (All), Kagiso, Tembisa, Mamelodi (unrest, grievances re school fees).
MARCH	Classes temporarily suspended at Pace College (Soweto), 7 Imbali and Sabantu township schools (Pmb) and in 3 Witbank townships; boycott continues in Alex unrest. W Tvl: over 20 schools indefinitely suspended due to continued unrest. In Daveyton (Benoni): thousands boycott (colleague's detention). Cape: 'inferior' free stationery books burnt at 2 schools. In New Brighton (PE), 5 schools closed, leading to stayaway protest by all pupils.
APRIL	By 8 April, about 100 000 pupils on boycott, esp in W Tvl, E & W Cape. DET: 136 out of 7 362 schools have less than 80% attendance (1,8% stayaway). Boycotts to support demands in: W Cape, Alex, Att (detentions), Stillfontein (police presence), Soweto (worn automatic promotion), Tembisa, Warmbaths (detentions), Bekkersdal (Azam and local youth congress feud), PE (adequate stationery, setbooks); Umlazi, Chesterville (Dbn), Humansdorp (educational demands). Classes temporarily suspended in Grahamstown, Patchelstraan, Soshanguve, Pmb Lamontville, Bloemfontein.
MAY	Mayday: almost complete stayaway in Tvl, Cape; attendance varies in Natal and OFS. Att: 40 schools boycott (demands: resignation of police and councillors, SRC offices, refund exam fees, urban Cosas, free stationery). DET threatens to close 6 schools (no effective attendance or discipline). Situation in Soweto much the same. In Mangungu (OFS), classes in 6 schools suspended (similar demands); in Mamelodi classes also suspended at a technical high school. Cape Peninsula: near total stayaway after Crossroads unrest. DET: boycotts down from 300-450 schools to 210 in May.
JUNE	School holidays.
JULY	Attendance low, esp in secondary schools in the Vaal, E Rand, Alex, Pretoria districts. At some schools, new identity documents refused or torn up. Re-registration of African pupils varies from 30-50% in the Cape, up to 60% in Natal. Overall, DET says 80% re-registered; some 1,3m out of 1,7m pupils. By end of month, approx 74% attendance overall (in primary schools over 90%). Very poor attendance in Jhb area, Vereeniging, E Cape (in a number of schools, classes are suspended) and Lamontville high school.
AUGUST	Boycotts by about 60 000 pupils (62 sec schools) in Alex and Soweto (remove security measures, DET negotiate with NECC, release detained pupils); in Durban's Lamontville, Chesterville & Clermont (Mxenge commemoration); PE, Bekkersdal and Tembisa (security measures). Classes suspended/closed in 29 E Cape sec schools, 1 Pmb school, 11 Durban Village schools (E London), a Kallehang school.
SEPTEMBER	In E Cape: 10 primary and 10 secondary schools closed for rest of year due to no re-registration of pupils or no attendance. Low attendance at Lamontville high school; in PE, delegation meets with DET resulting in return to school subject to certain conditions re attendance rate and standards. Pupils at one school walk out again (identity document issue); at some schools, pupils leave after first break. Soweto: at almost all secondary schools no lessons take place (demand withdrawal of troops, release of detainees). A further 13 secondary schools are closed, bringing total to 33 (10 in Soweto, 2 in E Rand, 1 in Natal); affecting some 8 000 pupils. Cape Peninsula: by 20/9 DET attendance is between 75-85 percent at senior secondary schools and over 90 percent at primary schools.
OCTOBER	Pamphlet distributed by National Student Co-ordinating Committee, in conjunction with Trasco, calls for continuing stayaway until DET meets pupils' demands. Thousands of pupils continue boycott in E Rand, Soweto, Vaal Triangle and E Cape (demands: release detainees, scrap security regulations, lift state of emergency, withdraw security forces, urban Cosas and reopen all schools). Astonists attempt to set fire to four E and W Rand schools, in one incident books are burnt. Kallehang and Soweto: disturbances at matric exam centres. Security forces and police on premises of exam centres to ensure candidates' safety. Pace Commercial College to close temporarily due to ongoing education crisis and decrease in income from donors.

IN THE SCHOOL STRUGGLE

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS & STATEMENTS	COMMUNITY ACTIONS & STATEMENTS	
Declared official tolerance of late enrolment. Rescheduled internal exams postponed from 16/1; new exam and promotion plan announced, whereby 1986 academic year is to start on 2/4. Police requested not to ban those SPCC meetings that DET is informed about. Free basic stationery supplied to 4m pupils; DET reiterates schools do not have school fees but a school fund (sports facilities etc). Security guards to be placed at all school gates as from 28/1.	Transvaal Students Congress (Trosto) is formed. Various regional report back meetings take place on SPCC conference, resolutions are endorsed (Mamelodi, Witbank, PE, Bloemfontein, Durban). SPCC sends telex messages to state president, DET, Law & Order, asking not to station security forces near schools when pupils return.	JANUARY
Prescribed books will be supplied free from next year. Exam date for secondary schools changed to March, following meeting of DET, SPCC and principals.	SPCC warns there will be problems if DET insists on pupils writing exams before March, urges parents not to pay school fees at state-owned schools. Rev Tsele (SPCC) says they want parents to control the education of their children, the role of DET diminished, and 'an education that will be part of the people's political, social and economic aspirations'.	FEBRUARY
Official stance: only pupil demand not met is unbanning of Casos — school fees not applicable, free books since 1979, free stationery as from 1986, free prescribed books next year, exams postponed, some SRCs are functioning, teachers are reinstated on educational grounds, regulations exist regarding corporal punishment and sexual harassment. First state of emergency lifted on 7/3, hundreds of detainees released.	SPCC and DET representatives meet. NECC claims school problems have deepened (police/pupil confrontations, detentions, insistence on school fees etc). NECC Durban conference: attended by parents, teachers, pupils, and some 160 civic, political and labour organisations; calls for pupils to remain at school, and to help parents and teachers devise a new education system.	MARCH
PE: DET representative says department will not tolerate 'people's education'. Minister of National Education F W de Klerk makes various statements on increased government spending on black education, and says that apartheid in education is the only means to advance. DET warns that candidates who have not paid exam fees by 25/4 will not be allowed to sit for November matric exams. Matric exams (1985) postponed from Mayday to 2 May.	NECC executive is elected: Vusi Khanyile and Rev Malefe Tsele (Jhb) and Ibram Rensburg (PE). The People's Education Secretariat is created under the convenorship of Zwelakhe Sisulu (other members: Provin Gardhan of the NIC, Fr Smanaliso Mkhathwa of the SACBC, Fr Albert Nolan and UDF's Rev Siqofiso). Various NECC report back meetings take place. Concern is expressed in some areas over matric exam registration deadline, over Mayday exams and payment of exam fees. Atosa president, R Peteni, says nothing less than people's control of education would satisfy demands.	APRIL
From January to March, R11m worth of textbooks and nearly R9m of stationery were supplied to DET schools (by 16 April, R27 597 destroyed by pupils). Minister of Education and Development Aid G Viljoen: dissociates his department from Verwoerd policy, and says they are fully prepared to negotiate over formation of liaison bodies for parents, teachers and students; the government will appoint a black person to head black education; and he is willing to negotiate on people's education, if it means providing education which satisfies a community's aspirations. He does not think that the school unrest situation will be solved until a more acceptable political formula is found. 6 858 African pupils write std 10 exam, held over from 1985.	NECC says it is 'insensitive' of government to present a 10-year educational plan to an angry country; a broader political solution is needed. W Cape: the Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSA) W Cape is formed, demand a democratic system of alternative education, SRCs, PTSA's etc. PE: Crisis in Education Committee asks DET to relinquish control of township schools. Trosto calls on pupils not to pay school fees, demand return of fees. NECC president V Khanyile says NECC has set up the Sisulu Commission, to work out an education system 'until liberation'.	MAY
Schools closed a day early for winter holidays. National state of emergency declared on 12/6, number of NECC members detained. African schools will reopen two weeks later (14/7), to implement plans against disruptions; special afternoon sessions and Saturday tuition will be given to catch up.	Parents of private school pupils call for 16 June closure, and form a steering committee to discuss how they can participate in the struggle. Khanyile: pupils can attend private schools until the end of the year.	JUNE
Official plan of action: security guards at all urban African schools, id cards for pupils, re-registration, teachers not to get involved in political organisations, teachers and pupils to stay indoors during school hours, etc. Special 'catch up' programmes distributed to principals. Pupils can be barred from registering without reasons having to be supplied, and can be placed in any standard or class. Additional security measures applicable in 6 districts, preventing pupils from being on street during school hours and enforcing adherence to the syllabus. Funds to be transferred from educational institutions where disorder persists. A base figure of actual enrolment will be fixed and regarded as the standard enrolment for the rest of 1986. DET sends 2m letters to parents, appealing for their active involvement and support for 'meaningful education', etc.	NECC demands: DET to withdraw all security and disciplinary measures on schools unconditionally; release detained NECC members, students and teachers; legalise NECC and SRC meetings; and address itself to real problems, from state of emergency to involvement of community in educational decision making. Pupils had returned to school on the basis that a people's education programme would be implemented. NECC would be unable to prevent a renewed call for 'liberation now, education later', as a consequence of new security measures.	JULY
DET threatens to invoke 1981 ruling that any student absent without cause for 10 consecutive days will be regarded as having left the school (R1 143 of 29/5/81). Viljoen claims NECC wants to replace current education system with 'the people's education system', an instrument to mobilise black communities to overthrow the government and replace it with a black regime. Re-registration deadline extended to 22/8 for those pupils who have been unable to re-register for 'valid reasons'. Entire education situation declared to be 'sub judice'.	NECC and 2 parents take DET to court over summary dismissal of 300 000 pupils, challenges the right to refuse registration or change any class or standard a student is placed in. (The case is dismissed with cost in September.) Soweto parents appeal to government to release detained NECC members 'because the people have faith and trust in them'. NECC plans alternative programmes for pupils out of class, to enable them to write DET exams.	AUGUST
DET meets delegation of church ministers and parents to discuss PE education crisis. E Cape schools to give special teaching programmes to catch up. DET requests Lekoo Town Council to normalise education crisis in Veol Triangle townships. All pupils will write some exams at end of year, and internal exams must be completed by 22/12. Schools where pupils registered will continue functioning if a daily attendance rate of at least 80% is maintained. Deputy Minister of DET Sam de Beer: many pupils refused to re-register because of security force presence.	Tuina calls for desegregated schooling and a single ministry. NECC says they are still committed to holding talks with DET, NECC, Azasrn, ECC, Aranyu and parents of private school pupils call on DET to reopen schools as closure will deepen the education crisis.	SEPTEMBER
DET starts transferring teachers from 33 closed schools, teachers unhappy with move face dismissal. PFP MP Roger Burrows intervenes on behalf of 20 Lamontville teachers. Matric exams: a total of 106 000 full-time pupils have registered for matric exam, in addition to 130 000 private candidates. Centralised exam venues might be set up by DET if current situation in black schools deteriorates. Candidates who do not sit for October/November exam will have to repeat full year or enter as private candidates next year. Sam de Beer says he is still prepared to meet with the NECC provided they submit a memorandum as a basis for discussion. DET does not provide daily information about what is happening at exam centres 'in the interest of individual candidates'.	NECC requests Turret Correspondence College to turn down applications of pupils who have boycotted and dropped out of school during the last two years. Lamontville Parents' Committee proposes committee of elected student and teacher representatives, DET officials and principal to negotiate school's reopening and other issues. Soweto: the All African Students' Action Committee is launched to look into various students' demands, particularly the postponement of final matric exams. The SPCC and SCA call on DET to grant permission to those pupils unable to write to do so early next year. NECC says it finds it difficult to 'steady the boat' unless government allows it to speak freely and directly to pupils. With regard to people's education, English and history subject committees have been created and the syllabi of all departments are being examined.	OCTOBER

**THE SPCC CONFERENCE
Resolutions on People's Education — 1**

This conference notes that apartheid education
1 is totally unacceptable to the oppressed people
2 divides people into classes and ethnic groups
3 is essentially a means of control to produce subservient, docile people
4 indoctrinates and domesticates
5 is intended to entrench apartheid and capitalism.

Therefore, we resolve to actively strive for people's education as the new form of education for all sections of our people, declaring that people's education is education that:
1 enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares them for participation in a non-racial, democratic system
2 eliminates capitalist norms of competition, individualism and stunted intellectual development and one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis
3 eliminates illiteracy, ignorance and exploitation of any person by another
4 equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial democratic South Africa
5 allows students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilised into appropriate organisational structures which enable them to enhance the struggle for people's power and to participate actively in the initiation and management of people's education in all its forms.
6 enables workers to resist exploitation and oppression at their work place.

On People's Education — 2

This conference notes that the implementation of programmes to promote people's education is an urgent matter.

Believing that
1 all student/teacher/parent and community-based organisations must work vigorously and energetically to promote people's education
2 all programmes must enhance the organisation of all sections of our people, wherever they may be
3 the programmes must encourage critical and creative thinking and working methods
4 the programmes must promote the correct values of democracy, non-racialism, collective work and active participation.

Hereby resolves:
1 that the recommendations of the commission on people's education be referred to the incoming committee for use as a guideline for the formulation of programmes to promote people's education at all levels
2 that all local, regional and national structures mobilise the necessary human and material resources in the first instance from within communities and regions and then from other sources.

In addition to demanding a more relevant curriculum, the NECC aims at increased community control over education

Education Charter Campaign is collecting demands from students, parents, teachers and workers regarding a 'compulsory, dynamic and democratic education'. These will then be written into the Education Charter. Definitions of people's education to date have emphasised different aspects:

- 'broad anti-apartheid education' (SPCC meeting, Cape Times 11/12/86)
- an education 'in which each person can develop his or her talents to their greatest potential' (Beyers Naude, in The Star 31/3/86)
- 'education at the service of the people as a whole, education that liberates, education that puts the people in command of their lives' (Sisulu in Freund et al, 1986: p110)
- 'people's education will probably begin extra-murally ... It will most likely focus on alternatives to official history and the humanities' (Khanyile, Financial Mail 18/4/86)
- '... real people's education is a process ... We will formulate our own history syllabus, which will include people's perceptions of what history is, international and African history ... also consider the applications of science subjects ... the language question' (Rensburg in WIP 42, May 1986)

- '... one that liberates and puts the people in command of their lives. The struggle for people's education involves the transformation of the system of education to a new democratic society' (Trasco, in Sowetan 2/6/86).

What is clear from the above conceptions is that a lot of serious organising, thinking and writing still needs to be done to give content to people's education. Minister Viljoen has stated that 'education authorities will be prepared to negotiate about, and correct, shortcomings in these respects', and mentioned history and literature as two examples. He went on to say that 'Alternative choices which kept the interests and aspirations of all communities in mind could possibly be offered' (The Star 15/7/86).

Whether the conflict over demands and alternative forms of education could be worked out between DET and the NECC and other organisations is another big question, of course. It seems unlikely, if DET insists on these negotiations occurring through their official committees, from which various African teachers' associations have already withdrawn. Zwelakhe Sisulu said, however, that they will present their curriculum proposals to DET.

Community Control

The resolutions taken regarding people's education at the SPCC conference (see box 3) show the linkage with concepts developed in other countries, such as education for liberation and consciousness raising of the oppressed. Whatever actual content is given to people's education, critical attention will have to be given to problem areas that Prof Mike Ashley of UCT's Education Department has pointed out; those of standards, education of the critical intellect, and the fact that ethnicity and culture cannot be avoided. He concluded by warning that heavy ideology in education must be avoided (Sunday Times 27/7/86).

A case in point is China, where the cultural revolution started by Chairman Mao approximately twenty years ago 'left some 130m Chinese now in their late twenties to late thirties unschooled in the chaos that all but destroyed China's education system ... Some 17m young people were removed ... to the countryside, to "learn from the peasants"' (The Economist in The Sunday Star Review 3/8/86).

In addition to the demand for a more relevant curriculum, however, is the strategy of increased community control over education. There are several countries where conflict over education was resolved by giving increased control over education to each of the conflicting groups. In an article on education in plural societies, renowned sociologist Theo Hanf names one consociational democracy



AFRAPIX: Guy Tillim

where education has almost never been in the centre of political conflict — Switzerland, which has a highly decentralised educational system, without a national authority for educational matters (in van Zyl Slabbert et al, 1980: p230).

To break through the present impasse in education, therefore, government attempts aimed solely at improving the quality of educational provision are clearly insufficient. In order to gain a long-term commitment to educational structures as well as content, intensive negotiation regarding increased participation in education will have to take place between government and the African community. Both have a considerable contribution to make in this process — the DET with their administrative structure of all the schools and their expertise, and the NECC and other organisations, their credibility in the community.

Part of these negotiations will have to focus on the development of a curriculum that meets both the needs and aspirations of the African community and that will contribute to the development of a democratic process in this country. Teachers associations should play an important role in this process, through their widespread organisations. Over the past

years, teachers have been in a difficult position, and looked upon with suspicion by pupils who identify them with the department. They are in a powerful position, as DET's Peter Mundell pointed out; 'Nobody restricts teachers to their syllabus, they can add to it ...'. Similarly, Curtis Nkondo (NECC member) stated that 'teachers are the ones who will be able to effect changes in the curriculum, syllabus and in textbooks. They should be able to identify the ideology in the subjects ...' (Saspu National Vol7/No3, 1986).

Finally, decentralised control not only over African education but all education departments must be considered — even if, initially, only to allow all schools and tertiary institutions to exercise the 'local option' if they want to become non-racial. *IPJA*

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 Murray T R (ed). *Politics & Education, Cases from Eleven Nations*. Great Britain: Pergamon Press, 1983.
 On 18/19 August of this year, the author held discussions with John Samuel of Sached; David Cramer of Protec; Zwelakhe Sisulu of the NECC, and in early September, with Peter Mundell of DET.

To break through the present impasse in education, government attempts aimed solely at improving the quality of educational provision are clearly insufficient

'AFRICAN MATRIC RESULTS'

The Disintegration of Urban Education

By Dr Ken Hartshorne, leading educationist and former member of the De Lange Commission

In his annual overview of African matriculation results for Indicator SA, Dr Ken Hartshorne warns of the possibility of an 'education vacuum' developing in many urban townships, and suggests possible alternatives.

DET is losing any authority to influence the education crisis in many urban townships

The recent official closure of 33 African schools, many of them high schools, brought a new element of desperation into the rapidly deteriorating relations between the Department of Education and Training (DET), and its teachers and pupils. The situation had already been exacerbated by the introduction of a security apparatus into black schools in July, and the detention of the secretary-general of the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA), who has since been released. The subsequent closure of schools indicates that the security control measures have not in fact succeeded, and that DET is losing any authority to influence the education crisis in many urban townships. Against a backdrop of endemic civil

unrest, many urban African schools have become 'no go' areas for departmental officials. With the closures, it is probable that DET policy has stepped onto a slippery slope which can lead only to the shut-down of more schools. Responsible estimates suggest that about 250 000 African pupils who enrolled at the beginning of 1986 were out of school by the final term.

High Attrition Rate

At the standard ten level the position is likely to be even worse than in 1985. At the beginning of that year 25 584 pupils were enrolled in standard ten classes in DET schools; 24 231 registered for the senior certificate examination, but in the end only

Table 1

AFRICAN MATRIC RESULTS, UPDATE 1984/85

1984 (revised data)	Department of Education & Training		'Self-governing' Homelands		'Independent' Homelands (TBVC)		NATIONAL TOTALS	
CANDIDATES	18 146 ¹		38 965 ¹		29 081 ²		86 192	
PASSES: Matriculation	2 154	11,9%	3 596	9,2%	3 977	13,7%	9 727	11,3%
PASSES: Senior Certificate	6 932	38,2%	13 605	34,9%	11 684	40,2%	32 221	37,4%
TOTAL PASSES	9 086	50,1%	17 201	44,1%	15 661	53,9%	41 948	48,7%
1985 (provisional data)								
CANDIDATES	10 523 ³		43 502 ²		31 273 ²		85 298	
PASSES: Matriculation	1 327	12,6%	4 329	9,9%	4 543	14,5%	10 199	11,9%
PASSES: Senior Certificate	3 570	33,9%	14 695	33,8%	11 181	35,7%	29 446	34,5%
TOTAL PASSES	4 897	46,5%	19 024	43,7%	15 724	50,2%	39 645	46,4%

NOTES ON SOURCES:

- 1 Data from DET Annual Report: p335. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985.
- 2 Data from Education and Manpower Production, No6: p14. Research Institute for Education Planning, UOFS, 1985.
- 3 Data from Hansard 1986, Parliamentary Questions: Col 1276.

ERRATUM: See Indicator SA Urban Monitor, Vol3 No3, Table 1: p19.

Data for Independent Homelands and Self-governing Homelands were transposed — headings of columns should be interchanged.

Table 2

SENIOR CERTIFICATE/MATRICULATION 1985

DEPARTMENT	Std 10 Enrolment March 1985	Wrote Examination	Passed		Passed		TOTAL PASSES		As % of Enrolment
			Matriculation	%	Senior Certificate	%	No	%	
Education and Training (DET)	25 584	10 523	1 327	12,6%	3 570	33,9%	4 897	46,5	19,1
Transkei	13 279	12 853	1 440	11,2%	3 709	28,8%	5 149	40,0	38,8
Bophuthatswana	11 169	10 498	1 600	15,2%	4 409	42,0%	6 009	57,2	53,8
Venda	4 953	4 668	1 250	26,8%	2 155	46,2%	3 405	73,0	68,7
Ciskei	5 226	3 254	253	8,1%	908	27,9%	1 161	36,0	22,2
Gazankulu	4 617	4 323	578	13,4%	1 872	43,3%	2 450	56,7	53,1
KaNgwane	1 974	1 671	207	12,4%	747	44,7%	954	57,1	48,3
KwaNdebele	1 818	1 681	140	8,3%	592	35,2%	732	43,5	40,3
KwaZulu	20 991	19 592	1 579	8,0%	5 570	28,4%	7 149	36,4	34,0
Lebowa	15 578	14 479	1 605	11,1%	5 328	36,8%	6 933	47,9	44,5
QwaQwa	1 833	1 756	220	12,5%	586	33,4%	806	45,9	44,0
TOTALS	107 022	85 298	10 199	11,9%	29 446	34,5%	39 645	46,4	37,0



Billy Paddock

February 1986: Pupils march through KwaMashu (near Durban) en route to the DET circuit office to protest the alleged non-expenditure of R5,7m set aside for text books and stationery.

Although DET standard ten enrolments were about one-quarter of the national total, they provided only 12,3 percent of total black passes in South Africa (including all homelands)

10 523 wrote the examination, of whom 4 897 passed (see tables 1 and 2). This overall pass rate represented 46,5 percent of those who wrote, but only 19,1 percent of the original standard ten enrolment; matriculation passes represented 12,6 percent of those who wrote, but only 5,2 percent of the beginning of the year enrolment. In other words, only one out of every five African pupils of the original enrolment passed standard ten (senior certificate), and only one out of every 20 ended up with a matriculation pass (matric exemption).

The DET has claimed that the results of those candidates who decided to wait until May/June 1986 to write will improve this gloomy picture, but these results have not yet been published. There are allegations of widespread irregularities and indications that candidates performed even worse in these held-over examinations than at the end of 1985.

Table 2 indicates that in 1985, with the exception of Ciskei, the homeland education departments did not have 'drop-



out' on the scale experienced by DET. The latter department, governing African education in 'white' South Africa, accounted for nearly 70 percent of the total drop-out number. In the end, DET provided only 12,3 percent of the total passes although its standard ten enrolments were about one-quarter of the national total. It should be noted, too, that pro rata to overall enrolments DET should be providing 30 percent of all standard ten African candidates (comparative totals include all ten homelands).

Quality and Quantity

Graphs 1 to 4 indicate that there has been little change overall in the statistical markers of educational quality — the overall, national passrate remains below 50 percent and matriculation passes range around 10 to 12 percent. However, the new tendency that is very clear is quantitative:

- Nationally, there is an actual decrease

AFRICAN MATRIC



both in the number of candidates and of ordinary standard ten passes (see graph 1).

- Graph 2 indicates a severe falling off in numbers in DET schools between 1984/85;
- yet graphs 3 and 4 show a normal pattern of growth in the self-governing and independent homeland departments.
- Overall normal growth patterns would have suggested a minimum of 110 000 standard ten examination candidates nationwide in 1985, instead of which there were 85 000 in practice.

The picture presented in graph 2 dramatically illustrates the disintegration of African education in the urban areas of South Africa. However, even more serious than the fall-off in numbers — certainly for the longer term well-being of education — is the breakdown of the learning environment in DET schools. The physical presence of pupils at an urban township school is no guarantee that learning is taking place, in spite of efforts to enforce it by the presence of troops or police. Teachers are demoralised, pupils are restless and disturbed by events, regular

learning habits are breaking down, pupils do not bring their books to school, and they are not prepared to do homework or have their work evaluated by means of tests or examinations.



Furthermore, there is considerable lack of trust in the reliability of the senior certificate examination and too common an attitude that cheating 'the system' is justified. While in the present socio-political and educational context much of this is understandable, the growing breakdown in the learning environment holds grave dangers for the future. Things have gone so far that even radical changes in the political dispensation in South Africa are unlikely to bring about immediate and positive restoration of an educational environment in which learning can take place.

Alternatives outside the formal school system could be the negotiation of a new kind of local community management, and the setting up of private community schools

Informal Alternatives

Given the unlikelihood of radical political change in the next few years and the continuing breakdown of

OVERVIEW 1980/85





AFRPIX: Anna Zeminski

The breakdown of the learning environment is evidenced by pupils not bringing their books to school, not doing homework or tests and, in some instances, burning their exercise books (Diepkloof, Soweto, 4 June 1986).

departmental authority in the urban townships, the existence of an education 'vacuum' becomes a real probability unless alternatives are sought outside of the formal school system. There would seem to be two possibilities deserving consideration.

The first alternative will depend upon whether DET, as it loses control of the situation and closes more schools, will be prepared to negotiate a new kind of local community management. If based on parent/teacher/pupil bodies and a new agreed upon curriculum, this approach might to some extent accommodate the specifically stated goals of 'people's education'. The outcome would also depend upon the negotiating strengths of the NECC movement (the National Education Crisis Committee) and its local community representatives; whether they will survive the pressures of the state of emergency and maintain a high enough level of credibility and acceptance among parents, teachers and pupils to provide sufficient national cohesion and leadership, if the opportunity for

negotiation should present itself. Until the state of emergency is lifted and strong security controls removed, however, the possibility of this kind of negotiation taking place must remain very questionable, productive as it might be under happier circumstances.

More likely would be the second alternative, which would involve setting up private community schools, without the support of the state. There are many historical precedents for this kind of initiative in South Africa, from the CNO schools at the beginning of the century to those that were set up on the East Rand in the mid-fifties to resist Bantu education. Such a movement would require disciplined, planned involvement and commitment from parents, teachers and, in particular, pupils. There would inevitably be problems of registration and recognition, and attempts at control by the Department, but these obstacles should not be insurmountable if local community organisations were strong and united.

It has to be remembered, too, that large numbers of school buildings in the urban areas were paid for and built by communities, either directly (through the loan levy system of financing), or were donated to the community by organisations such as 'Teach'. Hence the department would have a moral duty to make such buildings available. Apart from the resources which the community itself put into such schools, it would have to seek additional sources of financing in order to be able to provide effective teaching and acceptable standards. There is no reason why private sector funding should not be negotiated for such schools on conditions acceptable to both parties. Although there would be tensions in a co-operative effort between a community and private sector interests, there is no doubt that the latter could play an important role in educational change by the way their resources were allocated.

An Education Vacuum

Unless initiatives of this kind are undertaken, an 'education vacuum' will develop in many urban townships. African schools will remain empty or will be closed, the number of 'street children' will increase even further, and the baby of 'education' will be thrown away with the bathwater of 'schooling'. The outcomes of this, both for local communities and the wider South African society, could be long-lasting and tragic.

The early warning signals are surely strident enough for all of us to hear, from government and education departments through to parents and community leaders. What is happening at the level of African matriculation is but one indicator of a deep malaise in the body politic. We disregard it at our peril. *UPQA*

Reform or Transformation?

Dismantling the Department of Co-operation & Development

By Christiane Elias, Senior Researcher, Unit for the Sociology of Development, University of Stellenbosch



AFRAPIX: Gill de Vlieg

'The administrative process is one of the most secret parts of our society' (Budlender 1984: p3).

For the last ten years, practically every single statutory act concerning Africans has contained a clause requiring a vow of secrecy from each official associated with its administration. This feature gives some idea of the problem of achieving accuracy and clarity when examining the actual implementation of the legislation.

With the recent abolition of some influx controls, 40 000 employees were lost to the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning at midnight on 30 June 1986. How the responsibilities — both for legislation concerning Africans and for the officials of the now defunct Department of Co-operation and Development — were inherited and restructured by Minister Heunis's Department is investigated here, and evaluated in terms of the reform process.

Dismantling the protean Department of Co-operation and Development started on a pragmatic note in 1983, with the transfer of African taxation functions to the Department of Finance (see diagram). Then, in 1984, a more significant change occurred as part of the restructuring process when the Department of Justice took over the prosecution of 'pass law' offences. According to an SAIRR survey conducted a month after this transfer, only 30 cases a day were being heard in the courts, compared with the norm of 200 cases a day when held under the auspices of the Department of Co-operation and Development. One drawback, however, is that the monitoring of these cases has proved to be extremely difficult under the new system.

Subsequently, the introduction of the tricameral system of government saw the transfer of the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Mr Piet Koornhof, from being the head of a vast African empire


Very severe penalties still exist for African people who break the laws contained in the influx abolition act. Under threat of demolition and eviction, a community continues with their daily routine (Vlakfontein, June 1986).

The tricameral parliament necessitated new administrative provisions for the African majority

to being chairman of the President's Council — an advisory body where no African was to be seen. The tricameral parliament inadvertently demanded an instant solution to the oligarchic powers that the former Department had accumulated. In terms of part iv of the

Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 110 of 1983, legislation is divided into 'own' affairs and 'general' affairs. As there are only three segregated houses, for the white, 'coloured' and the Indian communities, some provision has had to be made for South Africa's unrepresented

URBAN TRENDS



African majority.

The solution has been as ingenious and probably as logical as any solution that excludes 75 percent of the population from the franchise could ever be. Firstly, African affairs relating to finance, crime and demography were legitimately transferred to the responsible (white) ministers in the 'general affairs' cabinet (see diagram). However, those African matters falling under 'own affairs' in terms of the new constitution initially proved to be more problematic. In another grand exercise of apartheid logic, this stumbling block was overcome by making the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis, responsible for the majority of laws, proclamations and regulations concerning Africans which had arisen over the past 100 odd years in South Africa. At one stage his ministry became responsible overnight for an extra 15 000 employees.

Reform Implications

One of the exceptions to Minister Heunis's assumption of control over African 'own' affairs was African education. Despite the De Lange Commission recommendations of one education system for all South African school children, African education has remained an 'own' affair, with a white minister appointed to head the department. The responsibility for the independent and self-governing homelands also proved difficult to re-allocate — so the portfolio of 'Development Aid' was added to 'African Education' to give Minister Gerrit Viljoen control of an empire (see diagram) considerably smaller than that of his predecessor, Minister Koornhof.

There are two major implications of this re-allocation of powers to a renamed but still separate ministry. Firstly, African education would appear to be destined to continue along a similar course as that envisaged by the first architects of 'Bantu' education. In other words, it remains segregated, unequal and ideologically committed to the apartheid policy of denying African school children the same academic opportunities and curricula received by other children in South Africa. Secondly, the balkanisation of South Africa — through continued administrative attempts to legitimise those homelands which have taken 'independence' — also appears to be non-negotiable.

Influx abolition

What impact have recent influx control reforms had on this bureaucratic version of musical chairs? On 1 July 1986, the old registration book (the 'dompas') was abolished and Africans were henceforth obliged to register for an identity document

from the Department of Home Affairs. Minister Heunis has stated in the House of Assembly that employees from the 'abolished' development boards are being seconded to the former department, 'to work on immigration control from neighbouring states and to help with the issuing of uniform documents' (Hansard 1986, Vol 14: col 5352).

Mandatory fingerprinting is not required for Africans replacing their reference book with an identity document, but all new applicants must have their fingerprints taken. These documents are now issued at the Department of Home Affairs by the director of the black population register, under the Identification Act No 72 of 1986. The abolition of influx control means in essence that all African people who live either in 'white' South Africa or in the non-independent homelands are theoretically able to obtain identity documents, with the concomitant benefits (cf Cilliers S P, Indicator SA Vol4 No1).

Provincial administrators

The accompanying diagram demonstrates which aspects of African 'own' affairs have been transferred to the administrator of each province in terms of the Abolition of Development Bodies Act and the Provincial Government Act, both of 1986.

Certain implications for the purported reform process arise out of this transfer of powers. For instance, although the provincial legislatures have been abolished, the ordinances which have been promulgated in the various provinces remain operative. Theoretically, this means that provincial administrative policies could remain effective and perpetuate a flexible legislative approach to controversial issues of national concern. However, the very extensive powers granted to the respective administrators also mean that the ideology of apartheid could be legislatively perpetuated by these government nominees.

Housing void

With the demise of the Co-operation and Development Ministry, there is no longer a housing portfolio for Africans, nor is there a minister responsible for housing, either in the urban areas or in the rural areas. Responsibility for housing now rests on the individual and the private sector. It is possible that an African local authority will be able to co-opt the new regional services councils to supply housing on an agency basis, in view of their new powers given on 11 June 1986. However, this will depend on the availability of funds.

Another hidden determinant affecting housing supply will be the availability of the relevant expertise. In view of limited educational facilities, there are few adequately trained African people to fill the

Minister Heunis became responsible for the majority of laws, proclamations and regulations concerning Africans which had arisen over the past 100 years

A separate ministry is responsible for African education and the homelands — segregation and balkanisation appear non-negotiable

The largest area of doubt concerns African housing — it is not clear who or which agency could assume this responsibility after the reshuffle of state portfolios

Data Base

The African Affairs Empire Recent Legislation and New Portfolios

Department of Finance

- The Income Tax Amendment Act No 30 of 1984. African incomes have since been taxed on the same basis as the rest of the population — domestic workers and farm labourers exempted from paying income tax; migrant labourers taxed at source.
- The Regional Services Council Act No 109 of 1985. Places an employee tax on all companies.
- The Regional Services Council Amendment Act No 78 of 1986. Exempts farm labourers earning less than R2 400 per annum from the employees tax, 'in order to save farmers making complicated calculations'.

Department of Justice

This Department took over the administration of the former influx control laws on 1 September 1984.

- The Children's Act No 33 of 1960, the Black Administration Act No 38 of 1972, the Magistrate's Act No 32 of 1944 and the Maintenance Act No 23 of 1936. The administration of these laws was transferred to the Minister of Justice in August 1985.
- The schedules of the Abolition of Influx Control Act No 68 of 1986; and the Black Communities Development Act No 4 of 1984. Effected the repeal of the pass laws. However, there is no evidence as yet of official repeal of the regulations concerning Africans living in urban areas (GGE2096: R1036:4.6, 1986). Section 66(3) of the Black Communities Development Act No 4 of 1984 states that 'Any regulation made under a law repealed by this Act shall be deemed to have been made under sub-section (1) and continue to apply notwithstanding the repeal of such Act'.

Department of Home Affairs

- The Marriages, Births and Deaths Amendment Act No 41 of 1986. Made registration of demographic details compulsory for Africans, retrospective to 1 March 1984.

Department of Manpower

- The Black Labour Act No 67 of 1964. Repealed in toto. Minister Heunis stated on 12 May 1986 that 540 employees of the development boards 'dealing with labour regulations or regulations (sic) will be transferred to the Department of Manpower. There they will continue to do the same work — but for a new employer'. This presumably means that they will be administering migrant workers from the four independent homelands (TBVC).
- Chapter 3 of the Black Labour Regulations GN 1892 of 1985. This has been repealed, but the remainder of these regulations would appear to still be in force. It is not known whether Section 66(3) of the Black Communities Development Act No 4 of 1984 will pertain, as the Black Labour Act was repealed in terms of the Schedule of Act No 4 of 1984.

Administrator of Each Province

- The Provincial Government Act No 69 of 1986. Probably the single most important act to be promulgated, to transfer powers from the Department of Co-operation and Development, e.g.:

(1) Land

Section 5 1(a-f) of the above Act gives the power to the State President, 'after consultation with the Administrator concerned', to 'alter boundaries, divide provinces into two or more, combine provinces, include in any other territory, or include any part of a province in any other province'.

(2) Local Authorities

- Section 15 of the Black Local Authorities Amendment Act No 58 of 1986. Gives the Administrator of each province complete authority over these institutions — the RSCs may supply housing to them (see main text) in terms of GN 1480 in GG 10340.

- Section 1(c) of Act No 79 of 1986 provides for UCASA representation on a national council.

(3) Development Bodies

These chameleon-like bodies, originally known as administration boards, are now officially transformed into development bodies which may be abolished in terms of the Act — it is believed that in the Cape they are being called Community Services.

(4) Demarcation Boards

- Section 2 of the Local Government Affairs Amendment Act No 110 of 1985, which amended the Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Act No 91 of 1983.

Formed demarcation boards under the control of the administrators; they are a strong means for control of land use.

technical positions involved in administering local authority and housing affairs. This factor guarantees that black local authorities will be obliged to depend on the expertise and skills of other race groups, and to co-opt other agencies to fulfil these tasks. The full implications of this void in the African housing portfolio will be evident only later — it is hypothesised that it will indirectly produce extremely powerful controls over the process of 'orderly' urbanisation.

Shack settlement

Squatting remains in the control of Minister Heunis and there are very severe penalties for those who break the laws contained in the influx abolition act. Africans may now purchase land on a freehold basis in all prescribed areas of South Africa, a reform that aims to encourage individual property ownership. Land for African settlement will still have to be set aside in the urban areas by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, together with the administrator of the province concerned, all in consultation with the state president.

Furthermore, the abolition act has transferred the right to the Minister of Health to not only administer health regulations in the 'emergency' and controlled squatting areas, but also the trading regulations. This ministry is now responsible for the health of African communities both in 'white' South Africa and in the homelands.

Land and Government

Within this restructured framework governing African affairs, an important addition to the Ministry of Education and Development Aid Act is land administration, in terms of the Land Act of 1936 (see Section 2 of the Laws on Development Aid Amendment Act No 57 of 1986). The responsibility for the land — previously vested in the governor general, then the state president — now rests overtly with the Ministry of Education and Development Aid. In other words, the seminal land issue has now formally entered the field of party politics.

Another major consequence of the transfer of administrative functions is that the statutory provision for the exclusive ownership of land by Africans in these rural areas (under the Black Land Acts of 1913 and 1936), will now be waived. According to the government, this measure is in order to 'register mortgage bonds in favour of non-black financial institutions supporting housing in scheduled and released areas' (Hansard 1986, Vol 17: col 7395/76).

On 11 April 1986 further powers and duties, falling under the National States Constitution Act of 1971, were assigned to the Minister of Education and

Development Aid. These new functions include the proclamation or reservation of land for the homeland areas and all legal tasks with regard to such lands. The Department will also now be responsible for dealing with and instituting local government in the four independent homelands (Hansard 1986, Vol 17: col 7395/76).

Within 'white' South Africa, the (African) Urban Councils Association of SA (UCASA) is playing a large role in implementing the various amendments to forms of black local government. It is a non-statutory body recognised by government that nominates ten representatives to serve on a co-ordinating national council of local government affairs.

Reshuffled Portfolios

As many of these statutory amendments and administrative rearrangements have very recently been implemented, it is not possible to predict what cumulative effect this maze of new legislation might have on the larger 'reform' process. However, a few points concerning the reshuffling of African affairs portfolios may be fairly confidently stated:

- Provincial Administrators have replaced the Minister of Co-operation and Development as the authority responsible for urban African affairs.
- The Minister of Education and Development Aid has replaced the Minister of Co-operation and Development and now administers rural African affairs in the self-governing homelands. This ministry is also responsible for all aspects of education for Africans in all areas of South Africa.
- The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning has retained authority over the controlled and emergency squatting areas in the urban areas.
- The Minister of Home Affairs has assumed responsibility for the registration of demographic details of Africans and the issuing of identity documents.
- The Minister of Justice is now responsible for both civil and criminal cases involving urban Africans.
- The Minister of Finance has taken over financial responsibility for the taxation of urban African incomes.
- The Department of Health has assumed responsibility for the health affairs of urban Africans, and will control the activities of African traders in controlled and emergency squatter areas.

Covert Controls

The largest area of doubt in this new status quo concerns African



Philip van Rynveld

housing. Because there is no Minister responsible for this group's housing needs — unlike the case in the three 'own affairs' portfolios of the tricameral parliament — it is not clear who or which agency could assume this responsibility. Black local authorities have limited powers and without the expertise nor the personnel, it is not apparent how this problem can be addressed.

There is also the problem of obtaining and administering funds for housing. The possibility of home ownership, through the introduction of conventional building loans from building societies is one method. In view of the low income range of most Africans, however, those who will have their housing needs satisfied in this way will be a drop in the ocean of the housing shortage.

It is apparent from these restructuring efforts that recognition and acceptance has at last been indicated by the state that African people are now permanently present in 'white' South Africa. The efforts to restrict their entry by proclamation and regulation has been accepted as being an impossible task. However, the overt control of both their presence and influx has now been transformed into a covert act of requiring that either the individual or the private sector should meet the housing needs flowing from black urbanisation. *UNISA*

The search for jobs in the Western Cape. The state has at last recognised and accepted that African people are permanently present in 'white' South Africa.

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
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RURAL & REGIONAL

M O N I T O R



PHOTOGRAPH: Adele Gordon

The typical standard of black housing on a white farm estate; Muldersdrift area, Transvaal. In general, the circumstances of African workers living on white-owned farms in South Africa are worse than those for their counterparts in rural homeland areas, and similar to the stark conditions of resettlement camps (see quality of life survey report inside).

FOCUS ON FARM LABOUR

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- 76 Breaking new ground in agriculture*
- 79 The legacy of labour tenancy*

DEVELOPMENT PROFILE

- 82 Venda: A one party state of affairs*

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Farm Labour's Harvest of Discontent

Trapped by extreme poverty and a formidable network of apartheid legislation but inadequate legal protection, the position of South Africa's six million black farm workers and their dependants on white-owned farms has become a prominent focus of attention. Drought, the abolition of influx control, the expectations raised by the still unreleased National Manpower Commission report on farm labour conditions, and the probable effects of sanctions on agricultural exports and employment levels have all contributed to an increased awareness of their predicament.

This Indicator SA focus on farm labour looks at the issues from the perspective of both farmer and farm worker, highlighting regional aspects of working and living conditions. In the first article, researcher Libby Ardington provides an overview of black farming communities and contextualises their total dependence on employers in terms of government abrogation of responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities. Ardington proposes the establishment of farm villages to upgrade lifestyles, encourage independence and initiative, and enable farm workers to organise and assert their needs.

The second contributor, rural fieldworker Philip van Ryneveld, has spent the past year investigating the particular grievances of farm workers in the Western Cape. He documents the widespread practice and effects of the notorious dop system, involving the daily distribution of alcohol to workers on wine farms. However, some progress is being made in improving conditions — for instance, Van Ryneveld reports that the Rural Foundation is actively involved in promoting service contracts to reform labour relations in the region's agricultural sector.

Alwyn Bisschoff, ex-director of the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU), presents an employer's point of view on farm labour, outlining progress made by NAU and individual farmers in the province. The NAU labour guidelines have found acceptance among farmers, of whom many have upgraded facilities and conditions for their workers. Bisschoff acknowledges that much still needs to be done, but feels organised agriculture now recognises the need to meet rising worker expectations.

Lastly, CASS researchers Dr Valerie Moller and Eddie Russell briefly trace South Africa's legacy of labour tenancy, the abolition of which has led to the resettlement of thousands of ex farm families in the homelands. Summarising comparative data on African perceptions of their quality of life in Natal/KwaZulu, the authors conclude that Africans working on white farms perceive themselves to be worse off than residents of the homelands in almost every way. These results indicate the urgent need to promote rural development on a national basis, improving facilities, services and employment opportunities in rural areas.

Rural workers are still not free to move to urban centres to seek employment, even though influx abolition has brought an end to the system of mandatory recruitment of African workers through labour bureaus and officials. The homeland system, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, the Slums Act and restrictions on the amount of land allocated for urban black settlement, effectively curb urbanisation. At the same time, land and labour statutes make it impossible for farm workers to improve their own position in rural areas through negotiation or union representation, and individual or co-operative farming effort. On the positive side steps are being taken to end the use of prison labour on white farms, as their commercial use is outlawed internationally under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).

FARM VILLAGES

A Relief Measure for Rural Poverty

By Libby Ardington, Research Fellow, Development Studies Unit, University of Natal

Farm workers, like the majority of South Africa's population, are generally poor, black and powerless. However, the particular causes underlying their general predicament are in some senses significantly different from those in urban or homeland areas, as are many of the possible routes for relief.

Approximately 75 percent of South African territory consists of commercial farmland owned largely by white farmers or public companies. The specific circumstances of black households on these farms are not only dependent on the nature of the farm worker's employment contract with the farm owner, but also on the relationship with the state — which differs in a number of important aspects from the interaction between government and black people resident in either the urban areas or the homelands.

Most administrative, legislative, educational, social and other facilities provided by the state in farming areas are for the exclusive use of white communities, despite the fact that black people constitute over 90 percent of the farm population. In general, the South African government provides few facilities for African communities outside urban areas, although where private individuals or organisations choose to do so certain loans, rebates or subsidies may be claimed from the state. Similarly, despite the inherent inequality between the agricultural employer and employee, little of the legal protection provided by the various labour laws is available to farm workers (see Industrial Monitor: pp94/98).

It is not simply that the government provides no schools or clinics for Africans living in white rural areas. In some areas it does not even provide the basic administrative machinery that would enable a retired farm worker to claim the old age pension to which all blacks in South Africa are entitled. Farm workers themselves can take little initiative in these matters, having no access to land on which they might establish facilities, nor to any system of representation to further their cause.

Former influx controls, which denied both spatial and occupational mobility to farm workers, were probably the chief source of a relatively stable and plentiful labour supply in the past. After abolition,

other factors remain that still discourage black residents on farms from seeking the solution to their problems through migration elsewhere. For instance:

- Current levels of unemployment and the absence of housing in urban areas undermine the attractions of urbanisation.
- Farm workers who have lived with their families for years and who have been able to hold stock and produce crops may be unwilling to forgo these rights when they have no secure access to a home or job elsewhere.
- Many of these workers were born on farms, have no foothold in any homeland, and know that incomes and basic amenities are even poorer in the homelands than on farms.

Farm Household Profile

Table 1 demonstrates that the makeup of black households is strongly influenced by location — a typical farm household differs significantly from those found in urban or homeland areas. Most farm workers live in a family situation but many have dependants elsewhere, and farm households therefore tend to be smaller than the national average. Farm households are normally headed by males as there is at present very little migration off farms to employment opportunities elsewhere. This means too that the ratio between the sexes remains undisturbed, unlike that in the homelands.

The percentage of the farm population over the age of sixty tends to be very low (see table 1). Although some farm workers continue to live on the farm after retirement, the majority (like industrial workers) are forced to move to the homelands at the end of their working lives. Educational levels of farm workers and their families are very poor and erratic, reflecting the unsystematic way in which education is provided on farms.

Employment levels on farms are generally high. Unemployed men are unlikely to be allowed to remain and women find it relatively easy to find employment, albeit sometimes of a seasonal nature only. There has, however, been a dramatic decline in the number of farm workers countrywide and there

A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF AFRICAN HOUSEHOLDS

Comparative Data on Farm, Homeland and Decentralised Areas

Farm populations vary in makeup and size from one area to the next. Similarly, farm incomes and access to amenities differ. However, certain trends and conditions are generally observable. The figures below are based on a survey conducted in 1983/84 on sugar farms on the North Coast and mixed farms in the Natal Midlands. Where comparisons are made with homeland and decentralised industrial areas, they refer to similar surveys conducted in Nkandla and Sundumbili, KwaZulu.

Table 1


African Household Characteristics

	Farms	Homelands	Decentralised
Under 20 years old	53,6	52,1	53,3
Over 60 years old	4,4	8,8	3,3
Females in 25-29 year age group permanently resident*	60,5	91,4	42,9
With no education	51,6	68,0	28,3
With education beyond standard 4	9,6	5,6	29,5
Average household size no.	4,4	10,9	7,8


* Age group in which there is usually the greatest percentage of out-migrants.

Table 2

Sources of Household Income



Sources: Ardington, E. M. *Black Lifestyles in White Agriculture*, Development Studies Unit (DSU) Working Paper No 14. Durban: University of Natal (UND), 1984.
 Ardington, E. M. *Poverty and Development in a Rural Community*, DSU Working Paper No 9. Durban: UND, 1984.
 Ardington, E. M. *Decentralised Industry, Poverty and Development*, DSU Working Paper No 10. Durban: UND, 1984.



PHOTOGRAPH: Adèle Gordon

A farm school in Southern Transvaal. Neither the state nor the farmer systematically provides educational facilities to black farm children in 'white' South Africa.

is widespread concern at present about employment prospects for the 50 percent of the farm population who are under the age of 18.

Although there is a second wage earner in many farm households, this does not have the impact on incomes that might be expected because female wages are generally far lower than male wages and they tend not to receive any of the housing, rations or other perks that male workers are given. Household and per capita incomes are therefore low, despite past low levels of unemployment and the absence of a significant number of farm workers' dependants.

The employer, by way of wages, rations and other perks, is almost exclusively responsible for the income of farm worker households. Migrant remittances and pensions, which constitute the major sources of incomes in homeland households, are insignificant on farms and the opportunity and need for generating an income from informal sector activity is very limited (see table 2). The almost total dependence of farm workers on their employer is made all the more significant by the fact that they depend on the farmer to provide nearly all social amenities as well.

Supplying Housing

Most farm workers live on the farms where they work — many were in fact born there — and do not intend ever leaving. Many do not have any other home nor access to land on which to build a house to return to when they retire or in the event of dismissal.

Clearly, therefore, farm workers require housing where they work. Yet, the government provides no housing for agricultural workers and the workers themselves are not usually able to provide their own. Even where villages are reasonably close to farms, black farm workers are normally unable to buy or rent houses or land owing to the operation of the Group Areas Act. Under present constraints, it is the farmer

alone who is expected to supply land and housing.

Although 'bachelor' migrants are found in some agricultural sectors, most farm workers are accompanied by their wives and at least some of their dependants. Indeed, one of the attractions of agricultural work for African workers especially is the ability to live with their families. For the farmer this implies more than simply providing accommodation for six people in order to obtain one worker. In addition, he must build a road to the site, lay on water which must first be dammed or pumped, supply electricity or some form of lighting and fuel, and provide some sort of sewerage. These needs and costs are a serious constraint upon employment creation on farms.

The current state and quality of labourers' housing varies enormously from one farm to another. On some farms no housing at all is provided and workers are expected to erect their own shelter, while on others there are modern family homes with waterborne sewerage and electricity. Similarly, on some farms workers are charged for housing, water, electricity and other services, while on others these amenities are provided free. Further differences occur where some workers do not live on the farm, yet receive the same wage as workers who receive housing and other significant perks.

Government legislation lays down standards for farm housing, but most farmers tend not to be familiar with the regulations. In any case, such statutory provisions appear too far removed from reality to have much practical influence. There are loans which may be claimed by farmers wishing to erect labour housing but few ever manage to obtain them.

Existing farm housing is undoubtedly inadequate and unsatisfactory. At a time when the government is calling for more private sector involvement in urban black housing it is unlikely that it will also accept responsibility for farm labour housing. In short, housing prospects for farm workers look bleak unless larger and more easily obtained loans are made

available to farmers or an alternative source of housing, such as the farm village.

Educational Cinderellas

Possibly the clearest illustration of the government's abdication from social responsibility for farm workers and their families is seen in the area of education. The provision of education in rural areas is problematic worldwide. Scattered, low density populations, undeveloped transport systems, an absence of qualified staff and other factors, pose tremendous logistical problems and make education an expensive undertaking.

In South Africa the problems are magnified by racial attitudes, legislation and linguistic differences. It is unlikely that there is a commercial farm in South Africa which, for the education of all its youth, could legally make use of only one school. The fact that all facilities have to be replicated for each racial group widens the area from which children are drawn, thus further increasing educational and travelling costs. Subsidised school transport is not provided for black children.

There is no system for educating African youth on farms; there is merely a method for government to subsidise education, if farmers choose to provide facilities. The Department of Education and Training does not and cannot take any steps to initiate the provision of education for the children of farm workers. The education the farmer may provide tends to be restricted to primary education and indeed, until very recently, it was impossible to get permission for a farm school to go beyond standard five. Today a few 'special' farm schools have standards six and seven.

There is only one high school in Natal to cater for the black children from the province's approximately 7 500 farms. Few farm workers are able to afford the boarding fees or are prepared to send their children so far away. Where the farm is situated close to a part of KwaZulu and there is no nearby farm school, a farm worker may send his children to school 'across the border'. For most African farm children in Natal, this provides the only opportunity for a high school education. This in turn places a financial burden upon the already overloaded resources of KwaZulu's Department of Education and Culture, for which it is not compensated.

There is no doubt that black children on commercial farms are 'educational Cinderellas'. They come from homes which historically are educationally deprived, where salaries are low and there are few resources (either financial or mental) to take advantage of the few boarding schools that exist. Yet to achieve an education, farm youth are required to overcome these hurdles.

A catch-22 predicament exists in that there is little hope for these children to be absorbed into their farm's workforce — yet their residence on the farms frequently denies them the education that would enable them to get employment elsewhere.

Farm Villages

The establishment of farm villages throughout the South African countryside might provide a solution to

FARM VILLAGES

PERSPECTIVES OF WHITE COMMERCIAL FARMERS AND BLACK FARM WORKERS

by V Moller & E Russell, CASS Research

For the Farmer

Advantages

- Remove the farmer's burden of 'total care' for their workers.
- Encourage a more stable workforce of people who wish to be in rural agriculture.
- Remove the financial burden of providing services and facilities (housing, water, power, education, medical care, etc.) for workers and their families.
- Remove the problems of employees' dependants; limiting the farmer's involvement in workers' personal lives.
- Facilitate the recruitment of more skilled workers, or alternatively, improve the level of skills of employees.
- Adult education programmes can more easily be arranged in villages than on scattered farms.

Disadvantages

- Loss of almost all control over workers and their families (a dubious advantage).
- Limit the availability of workers outside formal working hours.
- Increase the wage bargaining power of workers.
- Broader worker solidarity might result in external labour disputes having an unsettling effect on their own workers (i.e. occurrences on one farm affecting work on another).
- A possible increase in the cost of labour.


For the Farm Labourer

Advantages

- Security of tenure during working life and on retirement.
- Increased opportunity for mobility by separating housing from employment.
- Enhance contact with outside world and self-respect; limit inherent paternalism.
- Provision of services, water, electrical power, etc.
- Improved educational facilities for workers and their children, allowing for greater occupational mobility.
- Formalise working hours and leave conditions while creating opportunity to organise and achieve equal working conditions and rights.
- Promote self-help endeavours and worker initiative, e.g. in housing.
- Create alternate employment/income opportunities through the development of a village economy (informal services, etc.)

Disadvantages

- Transport costs to commute between village and farm.
- Possible costs of transport to seek emergency medical or other assistance.
- Potential limitation or removal of rations and other 'perks'.
- Possible loss of limited grazing privileges or access to arable land.



A farm labourer and his unemployed son in front of 'housing' provided by a farmer in the Muldersdrift area, Transvaal.

PHOTOGRAPH: Adele Gordon

many of the problems currently associated with farm life (see box). Admittedly, there are areas where population density is too low to make villages practical or where the distances to be travelled to work each day would make such a lifestyle uneconomic. There are also certain categories of farm workers who need to or might wish to live on the farms where they work. However, if the establishment of independent communities of agricultural workers elsewhere should solve some of those communities' problems, it would also provide a yardstick by which those remaining on the farms could assess their own lifestyles.

Farm villages would remove from farmers the responsibility for the 'total care' of their employees, which leads to a tendency to reduce employment opportunities. Simultaneously, this would encourage and enable the state to provide schools, medical and recreational facilities, as well as other essential services on the same basis as it does for other citizens. For farm workers, farm villages might achieve some of the following:

- Break down their separation and isolation from other farm communities and the rest of the country.
- Reduce both their total dependence on the farmer and their resultant demotivation in the workforce and at home.
- Enable them to rent, buy or build houses to their own requirements, while increasing security during

their working lives and retirement.

- Improve their occupational and spatial mobility in a way that is not possible when homes are tied to employment.
- Better enable them to protect their rights as the village lifestyle and its independence would enable them to organise.
- Increase opportunities for generating income - particularly from sources which are independent of the farm worker's employer.

The creation of farm villages would provide for the redistribution to African communities of certain small pockets of land in what are now almost exclusively white rural areas. This land would be suitable for housing and commercial purposes only. There is, however, also a need to redistribute land which could be used for agricultural purposes. This would accommodate both aspirant African farmers — who cannot obtain access to sufficient land in the overcrowded homelands — and those farm workers rendered redundant by mechanisation, who would prefer to move into agriculture rather than urbanise.

The repeal of the Group Areas Act and other relevant legislation would open up to black people farm land which, on the whole, is currently restricted to white ownership. This might satisfy those black entrepreneurs willing and able to enter large-scale commercial agriculture, but not the majority who are without the means to operate landholdings much larger than 50 hectares. For this group, perhaps suitable tracts of farm land could be obtained, subdivided into smallholdings, and then made available.

If such land were to be allocated in areas adjacent to farm villages, these new settlements could house and serve not only farm workers from large commercial farms in the area, but also the black farmers to whom agricultural land has been redistributed. The costs of redistribution would be significantly reduced if housing, water, electricity and local basic amenities were provided from one place, rather than distributed one by one to each plot of agricultural land. Furthermore, it would ensure that good agricultural land is not unnecessarily allocated for housing.

Conclusion

Farm villages would greatly facilitate occupational mobility for African people, while enabling some of them to move from industry, the homelands or commercial agriculture into small-scale agriculture. Farm workers housed in such villages might indeed become farmers in their own right without having to move house or lose access to schools, clinics or other precious facilities.

The approximately six million African workers and their dependants who are currently resident on farms have extremely limited access to services (health, education, etc.) normally provided by the state and have, to date, been excluded from most of the existing labour legislation. These factors have forced farm workers into an almost totally dependent relationship with their employers. The repeal of Group Areas legislation, and the creation of farm villages throughout the countryside could have the effect of enabling farm workers to join the mainstream of the nation's life. *UPWA*

THE CROP & THE DOP

Farm Life in the Western Cape

By Philip van Ryneveld, Rural Field Worker for the Black Sash,
Western Cape Region

The plight of farm labour in South Africa has been brought to the fore recently by welfare groups and trade unions, who have expressed the urgent need to improve their living and working conditions. Black workers on white farms must rank among the most disadvantaged sectors of the country's workforce. While some farmers in the Western Cape are certainly making attempts to improve employment conditions on their farms, life remains hard for the substantial majority of agricultural workers in the area.

Because most farm workers in the Western Cape are classified 'coloured', they have not been subjected to influx controls and formerly even enjoyed some protection through the region's coloured labour preference policy. Their position today throws some light on the general nature of conditions and controls likely to be experienced by African farm workers since being partially freed from the impediments of the 'pass' laws.

All farm and domestic workers are excluded from legislation regulating labour relations in South Africa. Theoretically the relationship between farm worker and farmer is governed by the common law of contract, which envisages two equal parties bargaining to arrive at mutually acceptable conditions of employment. In reality the relationship is between one who is a bearer of power and one who is not, and the result is oppressive in the extreme.

Worker Powerlessness

Altering the legislation will not necessarily have the required effect — advice offices established in the Western Cape have found it immensely difficult to help farm workers realise even their existing legal rights. It is generally accepted under common law that a dismissed worker who is paid weekly is entitled to one week's notice or pay in lieu of notice. Yet a worker who approaches an advice office to obtain assistance in demanding notice pay is likely to be victimised and is thus unable to obtain further employment nearby. Farmers invariably communicate

with previous employers in the surrounding area before taking on a new labourer and tend to be extremely sensitive to any suggestion of 'trade unionism'.

The powerlessness of agricultural workers and their families is largely the result of the extensive and direct control that farmers have over most aspects of their lives. The farmer does not control only the process of agricultural production. He owns the housing in which his workers and dependants live, as well as the land on which it is situated. Furthermore, he may wield much control over education if a farm school has been established with the help of state subsidies, while the worker's wife may well do domestic work in the farmer's home. Lastly, trespass laws enable the farmer to strictly control access of visitors to farm workers.

However, the strongest weapon the farmer wields is arguably not the termination of employment, but the order to vacate the house (*huisleegmaak*). On dismissal or retirement the worker and his family may find themselves not only without their means of livelihood, but also without accommodation, the immediate community of fellow workers, as well as access to education for the children. In addition, farm workers do not qualify for unemployment insurance fund benefits.

It would be unreasonable to expect any strong sense of permanence in the relationship an agricultural worker has with his immediate environment. Why take great care over improving one's home if it can so easily be lost? The permanence is in the sense of alienation. Little wonder, then, that the most common form of recreation is to get drunk!

The Dop System

Alcohol abuse is a serious problem on the farms of the Western Cape. Indications are that over 70 percent of workers on wine farms are either compulsive or very heavy drinkers. The general level of alcoholism cannot be separated from the institutionalisation of alcoholism as an important means of control over the workforce.

Euphemistically named the 'tot' system

The powerlessness of the agricultural workforce reflects the extensive control that farmers wield over most aspects of their workers' lives

For the worker and his family the prospect of overnight eviction from their farm home accompanies dismissal, disability or retirement

Institutionalised alcoholism, through the 'dop' system, provides wine farmers with an insidious means of control over their workforce

'Oom Flip', a veteran farm worker from Montagu. Male workers often contract verbally for their entire family, who are then on twelve-hour standby at harvest time.



Philip van Ryneveld

RURAL TRENDS

The Rural Foundation promotes a service contract which provides for negotiated conditions of employment but does not overcome the problem of 'tied' housing

(*dopstelsel*), it involves the distribution of reject wine (*mos*) to workers on a systematic basis — sometimes as much as two litres a day. In some instances workers are given wine at the end of the day only, perhaps a limit of one bottle. But *dop* is sometimes given more frequently — *invalidop*, *brekfidop*, *teedop*, *lunch dop* and *tshaila dop*. Each *dop* usually fills a condensed milk tin or similar size container. Farm labourers in the region consume about three percent of the entire wine crop in *dop*, although quantities are gradually reducing under pressure from the South African Agricultural Union.

Paying workers with alcohol has been illegal since 1962, but in effect it still exists in the form of a 'fringe benefit'. Farmers are understandably reluctant to abandon the system, as withholding a worker's *dop* is an extremely effective form of discipline while giving extra *dop* is a cheap means of reward. Furthermore, the *dop* system has become such an integral part of the farming culture in the Western Cape that many farmers fear that they might be unable to obtain labour if they were to end it. Nevertheless, there are some farms where coercive control is giving way to more co-optive forms of management and where the *tot* system has been successfully abolished.

Service Contracts

The Rural Foundation is probably the best known organisation encouraging reform in the agricultural sector in the Western Cape. They argue that although much time and money is spent studying the technological and financial aspects of agriculture, very little attention is given to the techniques of managing a workforce. They offer farmers the prospect of increased worker productivity, and on this basis are invited onto farms to

implement the Foundation's programmes.

There are clearly limits to worker upliftment programmes motivated essentially by the farmer's desire for greater efficiency. On the other hand, freedom of association may become more acceptable to farmers through these reform programmes, while workers could become more skilled at organising themselves in pursuit of their own goals.

An example of the Foundation's activities is the service contract which they have drawn up and which farmers are encouraged to use. This document seeks to lay out in writing details of conditions of employment. For example, it makes provision for agreement on working hours and overtime rates, holidays and sick leave, housing rights, etc. Most of the actual details are not specified or filled in, however, so while the document could benefit workers, it could also result in exploitative provisions being included. The contract can be terminated by either party at one or two weeks' notice, as agreed upon when the contract is entered into. Essentially, the contract encourages clarity regarding the basic conditions of employment. This in itself is conducive to better labour relations, even if the conditions written by individual farmers are still far from ideal.

One of the few conditions that is already specified in this service contract is that a worker must vacate his house when the contract expires or within a week of receiving notice. However, if there is one problem which remains a persistent hindrance to the improvement of the position of farm workers nationwide, it is the very question of 'tied' housing. For as long as housing is dependent on employment, farm workers are unlikely to be able to wield much power themselves or negotiate to improve their position.

Summary

THE GRIEVANCES OF FARM WORKERS Labour and Socio-Political Issues

Farm workers do not often have the opportunity to air their grievances publicly. In May 1986, a Rural Interest Group (RIG) established by the Black Sash hosted a gathering of representatives from welfare, community and trade union organisations operating in the rural areas of the Western Cape. Focusing on the specific problems of farm labour, the grievances identified at the RIG meeting have an authenticity born from the experience of working closely with these communities over a long period.

WAGES are very low — between R15 and R50 a week. In 1985 farm workers in the Western Cape were earning R32 a week on average. Sometimes wine is regarded as part of the wage, although payment in the form of alcohol is illegal — however, there is no law against freely dispensing liquor to workers.

HOUSING is tied to employment and is used to control workers. The farmer pays lower wages on the grounds that he provides housing. Yet members of workers' families living on the farm but working elsewhere usually have to pay rent — at harvest time they are usually expected to help on the farm, and some lose their town jobs in the process.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION. Contact with people off the farm is a problem because the farmer controls telephone and transport facilities, and thus access to medical and outside help.

WORKER ORGANISATION. The farmer's readiness to invoke trespass laws makes it difficult for unionists to get onto farms to recruit members. Workers may face dismissal or victimisation for attending meetings off the farm or for seeking legal advice.

CHILD CARE is not available, although employers expect all young women to work on the farm if needed. The male head of the family contracts verbally with the farmer for the entire family — females are on 12 hour standby at harvest time.

GRANTS AND PENSIONS. Workers are dependent on the farmer for government grants and pensions, as all applications are made through him. Workers are often unaware of how much they should be receiving, whether the farmer is making any deductions, and if so, how much and why.

WORKING CONDITIONS are not controlled by law. Farm workers are specifically excluded from most labour legislation (see Industrial Monitor: p98), which means there is no legislated minimum wage, paid leave provision, hours of work, sick leave, UIF, etc.

SCHOOLS are few, and children must walk long distances to get to them. Teachers are often not properly qualified and children are frequently expected to work on the farm instead of going to school.

FARM SHOPS. Workers often have no option but to buy at farm shops where goods are more expensive — they then run up substantial debts and are unable to leave the farm, or must have their debts transferred to a new farmer employer. *IPJA*

Breaking New Ground in Agriculture

RURAL TRENDS

By Alwyn Bisschoff,
former Director,
Natal Agricultural Union



CAPTION: A cane cutter on one of Natal's sugar farms — the agricultural sector employs a large number of unskilled workers.

In 1981 the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU) published guidelines on conditions of employment for farm workers, after protracted discussion within the commercial farming sector in the province. The need for a labour code had arisen as a result of several factors:

- the demise of the labour tenant system
- the possible threat of labour action among farm workers
- a concern for security in the rural areas
- an awareness of the side effects of rapid industrialisation and increasing urban wages (NAU, 1981: pp1/2).

The diversity of the agricultural sector inevitably places certain limitations on framing standardised guidelines. Farming in Natal is divided into 14 different sectors (dairy, sugar cane, timber, maize, poultry and others), undertaken on an intensive or extended basis, and labour may fall into permanent, casual or seasonal categories. Despite these complexities and the inability of NAU to enforce the guidelines, there has been a keen demand for the document among farmers from Natal and other provinces, and even from neighbouring states.

Pioneer Projects

The improvement of working conditions began with a 1972 NAU Congress debate, when a pension scheme for farm workers was adopted and subsequently established. Individual farmers then introduced their own pioneering schemes with some notable examples of success.

Mr Dougie Horton of 'Cosmoore' in the Eston area initiated novel training schemes and delegated management functions to a senior supervisory cadre. His team soon took over responsibility for the practical operation of the farm's dairy, vegetable and cane projects. Farm housing, education, recreation and health facilities were upgraded and administered in a joint programme run by the workers on 'Cosmoore'.

The experience of pioneers who recognised the merits of building a stable and motivated workforce enabled NAU to devise guidelines and promote them among farmers and their employees. With labour being the single largest factor in production costs and the use of expensive machinery, it became evident to

Farmers have realised that a better trained labour force is essential, as high wages and expensive machinery constitute major running costs



AFRAPH: Cedric Hunn

agricultural employers that a better trained and educated labour force was essential. To attain these goals and higher productivity in turn warranted paying higher wages.

In the late 1970s, the concept of improving working conditions, wages and training prompted a number of farmers in the Nottingham Road area to consider establishing their own training facilities. A farmer's wife stepped in and helped set up a technical centre to provide further education for local African farm children. As government support was not forthcoming, the necessary funds were raised from other sources and the project's scope extended to include courses for the wives of farm workers. Today, as a result of popular demand, the Midlands Centre for Further Education also provides specialist training for Midlands farmers and their managers.

Local farmers, banks, mining houses and other businesses have financed capital needs and contributed towards running costs. Overall response to the project has been excellent and the Centre is now an established training institution. Courses include training for the following jobs: learner tractor drivers, stockmen, tractor maintenance, welding, haymaking, maintenance of farm machinery, electric fencing, dairying, bricklaying and irrigation.

Future Trends

Several recent developments in Natal could have a major impact on the position of farm workers. These are:

INDICATOR SA Vol 4 No 2 SPRING 1986

NAU GUIDELINES TO CONDITIONS OF SERVICE ON FARMS

First published in 1981, this document sets out a list of proposals to be implemented as soon as possible by all Natal farmers.

WRITTEN CONTRACT

It recommends that a written employment contract be drawn up for each employee. Other proposals concern the enforcement of specific and regular working hours, the provision of protective clothing and regular annual leave.

REMUNERATION

Annual wage increases should take into account both inflation and worker performance. A guideline for minimum rations is also provided.

TRAINING

Specialist training is recommended — the Baynesfield Training Centre near Pietermaritzburg provides training courses for farm employees.

PROMOTION

NAU suggests that all employees be given clear job descriptions. Opportunities for advancement should also be clearly indicated, with every attempt made to develop an African supervisory cadre.

HOUSING AND RECREATION

The proposals lay down minimum standards for housing, and include suggestions for the provision of loans to employees so that they may build their own homes. The provision of recreational facilities on farms is also recommended.

HEALTH

Employers are encouraged to arrange and finance adequate medical care for all their employees. It is suggested that they consider establishing regional clinics — these may be set up in conjunction with the Department of State Health, but at the employer's expense.

EDUCATION AND PENSIONS

A strong emphasis is placed on the importance of providing adequate educational facilities for the children of farm workers.

NAU recommends that farmers provide a private pension to retired workers, which is more substantial than the state pension. They also suggest that pensioners be allowed to remain on white farms after their retirement.

Source
Natal Agricultural Union. *Guidelines to Conditions of Service on Farms*. Pietermaritzburg: 1981.

Cotton picking families in KwaZulu's Msinga district. In August 1986 a group of Natal farmers and Zulu farm workers signed the landmark Louwsburg agreement to improve labour relations and facilities.

● **The abolition of influx control**
With the repeal of the pass laws, rural Africans are now able to move freely to the urban areas to seek employment. The superior educational facilities, housing and employment opportunities available there constitute major attractions. In contrast to the rural areas where many social services have to be provided and financed by individual employers, services in urban areas are provided by the state or local authorities.

Despite the high costs involved in upgrading conditions, most farmers have been aware of the inadequacy of rural facilities for some years and there are now excellent facilities on many farms. Workers are also aware of the disadvantages of city life — the breakdown of family life and, more recently, the civil unrest that has disrupted some urban centres.

● **Trade unions**
The question of trade unions has been raised in the farming sector from time to time. The Federated Chamber of Industries has stated that it believes farm workers should fall under the Labour Relations Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. Organised agriculture is fully aware of these issues, but it is clear that industrial relations in the

farming sector are complex and require understanding.

Because the agricultural sector draws on a large pool of relatively unskilled labour, employers must provide training through self-financed training centres. Further, the escalating costs of agricultural production have left many farmers in a serious financial situation, which could worsen if agricultural exports decline. Wages constitute a major cost and unreasonable industrial action or talk of minimum wages is bound to encourage farmers to increase mechanisation and reduce their workforce, despite high unemployment in rural areas.

● **Employer/employee co-operation**
Farm labour in Natal must be placed within the context of most farmers being within short distance of KwaZulu, and conversely, most Zulu workers being within relatively short distance of the province's commercial farming sector. This has resulted in the evolution of unique advantages for both parties.

One of the most exciting developments in this regard occurred in August 1986, in the Louwsburg district of northern Natal. Mr Tjaart van Rensburg, Chairman of the Louwsburg Farmers Association, and Mr David Masuka, an employee representative, entered into an agreement of co-operation on behalf of the farmers — and the local Zulu community, respectively. Mr van Rensburg stated that '... the two groups need to co-operate in the fields of labour relations; the creation of school facilities, additional employment opportunities and other facilities'. These are admirable sentiments and will be a further catalyst for other areas.

Conclusion

There is a general consensus within organised agriculture on the need to meet the rising expectations of its workforce. NAU is committed to ensure that farm workers not only retain their jobs, but that further skills can be drawn into the farming sector. This augurs well for the industry, given goodwill and a mutual commitment to the ideals and objectives agreed upon at Louwsburg and, previously, at other centres within our province.

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AFRAPIX: Paul Weinberg

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
THE LEGACY OF LABOUR TENANCY

By Dr Valerie Moller & Eddie Russell, Research Fellows, Centre for Applied Social Sciences

Agriculture is fast becoming a marginal sector of employment in South Africa. The abolition of the labour tenant system and mechanisation have displaced farm labour in many areas. Elsewhere the hidden costs associated with labour intensive farming raises the question as to whether commercial farming based on black manpower will survive in the future. What effects have these developments had on the life chances of farm workers living on white-owned agricultural land?

Under the former tenant system African families supplied their labour to the landowner for part of the year as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of this land for themselves. The Surplus People's Project (1983: p43) estimated that in Natal alone some 300 000 farm labourers and their dependants may have been involved in a tenant relationship in the mid-sixties. At that time labour tenancy was a deeply entrenched system that had provided many African families with land which had been worked by several generations. Attempts to reduce labour tenancy and related systems since the 1960s have uprooted thousands of families over several decades.

State action caused larger-scale evictions, but individual evictions of older or dissatisfied farm workers were not negligible. Farm workers who were evicted from white farms did not have an easy time finding another place to settle or a new livelihood. Some former labour tenants were rehired as full-time farm workers, sometimes under similar or worse conditions than before. It has been observed that labour tenancy has ceased in name only in some areas. Other former labour tenants found alternative roots in the homelands and drifted to urban-industrial centres to find work. Resettlement camps



AFRAPIX: Paul Weinberg

were set up specifically to cope with successive waves of evicted farm tenants.

Historical Predicament

The past history of farm labour partially accounts for its current predicament. Although the tenant system was finally abolished in 1979, the legacy of this anachronistic system has remained:

- The basic relationship between employer and employees on white-owned farms is still a paternalistic one.
- Farm workers are paid low wages in cash and kind, and tend to be totally dependent on their employers for all their basic needs.
- The provision of more than rudimentary services are beyond the capabilities of all but the largest employers of agricultural labour.

The trapped situation in which farm labour finds itself is perhaps most evident in the case of the younger African generation raised on white-owned farms. Not all dependants of farm workers can be absorbed into the farm labour force — especially during periods of drought and economic recession — while their poor education means they cannot compete on the open labour market. The occupational mobility of Africans from white-owned farms was severely restricted by influx controls until recently. After abolition, most farm workers still do not have access

Black children on white farms are doubly disadvantaged — poorly educated, they cannot compete on the open labour market, yet the farms often do not provide sufficient employment

Attitudes

RURAL AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF QUALITY OF LIFE

These two tables indicate the different perceptions of quality of life found among Africans surveyed who lived on white farms in the Natal Midlands (AF), in resettlement areas in Natal/KwaZulu (AR), and in the KwaZulu homeland (AH). The total number of people surveyed was AF = 158, AR = 144 and AH = 131.

Table 1

Broad Responses to Life Situation

	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE
(1) Overall dissatisfaction with life, and unhappiness (3 indicators)	Perceiving themselves to be 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'
	AF 67%
	AR 57%
	AH 51%
(2) Negative Mood (10 indicators)	Giving negative descriptions of their lives.
Farm workers perceive life as miserable, tiring, restricted and frustrating.	AF 43%
	AR 41%
	AH 36%
(3) Negative Effect (18 indicators)	
Farm workers perceive themselves to be often frustrated, justifiably angry, bored, worried and despairing.	AF 23%
	AR 20%
	AH 15%

Table 2

Levels of Dissatisfaction on Specific Issues

	Perceiving themselves to be 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'
(1) Income (5 indicators)	AF 64%
Wages, ability to provide for family and material possessions are major areas of discontent.	AR 52%
	AH 51%
(2) Occupational Opportunities (6 indicators)	AF 60%
Farm workers are more dissatisfied with progress, job security, treatment at work, respect from superiors and independence. All groups are dissatisfied with job opportunities.	AR 38%
	AH 41%
(3) Educational Opportunities (2 indicators)	AF 64%
	AR 59%
	AH 55%
(4) Socio-political Issues (5 indicators)	AF 63%
Farm workers and dependants view their life situation — compared with other race groups — in unfavourable terms. Africans on white farms are relatively more dissatisfied with race relations than Africans in resettlement areas.	AR 58%
	AH 58%
(5) Community Facilities (8 indicators)	AF 60%
African labour on white farms perceive access to facilities to be relatively poor, but transport and physical security services to be comparatively better.	AR 64%
	AH 67%
(6) Housing (6 indicators)	AF 52%
Security of tenure, availability and choice, space and privacy are problematic. (Housing costs are largely irrelevant to farm labour, and were thus excluded.)	AR 35%
	AH 30%
(7) Health and Health Services (2 indicators)	AF 57%
	AR 45%
	AH 43%
(8) Intimate, Private and Social Life (15 indicators)	AF 30%
Farm workers are relatively more discontent with their ability to achieve personal goals and pursue leisure activities. Their expectations for the future are relatively depressed. They have little peace of mind.	AR 28%
	AH 23%
(9) Family Life and Religious Life	AF 6%
Contentment with the more personal aspects of life is not affected by external conditions.	AR 6%
	AH 6%

NOTE: The number of indicators refers to the number of specific questions asked for each broad category.

to land to work in the homelands, yet also lack the job skills which would open up alternative employment in the industrial centres.

An awareness of this cycle of poverty and insecurity may cause farm workers to experience frustration and discontent, alternating with feelings of resignation and apathy. Despite harsh working and living conditions there has been little unrest in the ranks of farm workers to date. Physical isolation and powerlessness have most likely prevented farm labourers from acting on their grievances.

Survey Consensus

A nationwide study of 676 African migrant workers (Schlemmer and Moller, 1985) — which included a sub-sample of former tenant farmers and dependants — highlights the disadvantages and frustrations experienced by men with a labour tenant or farm worker background. Approximately 28 percent or 188 of all the survey participants had worked as farm labourers at some stage of their careers. About half of the men originating from white-owned farms had left before they were 18 years old. The majority in this group (56 percent) had gone to seek work in town, while their families relocated to the homelands. A further quarter of this sub-sample had moved to another white-owned farm before coming to town.

The survey results suggested that the men who had managed to escape the drudgery of farm labour continued to feel relatively unhappy and insecure about their life chances. A high degree of urban commitment born of landlessness was evident in the profile of the men who had worked or lived on white farms at some stage in their lives. Poorly educated compared with the other migrants in the sample, higher proportions of former farm labourers in the city worked in menial jobs or were unemployed.

A second nationwide study of quality of life conducted during 1982/83 (Moller et al, 1986) confirms that farm workers and their families perceive their lot in life to be generally unsatisfactory. The overall picture emerging from the survey data is one of a severely depressed quality of life among African people living and working on white-owned farms. In contrast, African people living in the homelands, who depend on remittances and subsistence agriculture, regard themselves as being better off.

Comparative Position

The second survey (ibid) found that higher percentages of African people living on white-owned farms than in the homelands are dissatisfied with their standard of living and ability to provide adequately for their families. The accompanying tables show that farm workers are relatively much more discontented with their working and living

conditions, and their opportunities for educational advancement and occupational mobility. They also perceive their housing and job circumstances to be very much less secure; further major grievances concern their diet and access to medical and other facilities.

Virtually the only perceived advantage afforded to farm workers appears to be no or low housing costs (see table 2). Road conditions and protection from crime on white-owned farms are considered to be relatively superior. Yet even here, some 40 to 50 percent of the survey participants expressed dissatisfaction. Farm people, more than people in the homelands, tend to describe themselves and their lives as miserable, unfree, tiring and uninteresting (see table 1).

According to the survey findings the mood of farm labourers and their dependants is one of worry, anger and despair. At the same time, owing to their lack of confidence in the future and inability to achieve personal goals, farm people also appear to be resigned to their condition. The survey results also suggest that the lack of facilities and job opportunities in resettlement areas contribute to feelings of intense discontent among resettled Africans. In fact, the perceived quality of life in resettlement villages may be as depressed as in labouring communities on white-owned farms.

Relative Deprivation

In general, Africans living in white rural areas express stronger feelings of deprivation in their living standards than their counterparts living in the rural homelands. Moreover, this feeling of relative disadvantage tends to persist among people who have escaped from the clutches of labour tenancy and have left agricultural employment. These are the major findings that emerged from the two recent studies cited above, conducted by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences.

Far from advocating a 'pollyanna' attitude among their employers, these results point to the need to promote rural development. Projects should aim to bring additional services, educational and employment opportunities within reach of a wider spectrum of rural people who live in severely depressed circumstances. The provision of improved services and income opportunities on a broader front may also assist in stemming the tide of rural migration of surplus landless people, who face an uncertain future in the urban industrial centres.

Sources

Surplus People's Project. *Forced Removals in South Africa — Natal*. Vol 4, Cape Town: Citadel Press, 1983.

Moller V, Schlemmer L, and du Toit S H C. *Quality of Life in South Africa: Measurement and Analysis*. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, Durban: 1986.

Schlemmer L and Moller V. 'Constraint, Stress and Reaction: The Responses of Migrant Workers to their Situation' in H Giliomee and L Schlemmer (eds), *Up Against the Fences*, pp 126-157. Claremont: David Philip, 1985.

After the abolition of labour tenancy, resettlement camps had to be established to accommodate the thousands of evicted black farm families

The isolation and powerlessness of farm workers have most likely prevented them from protesting against their harsh working and living conditions

Survey results show that Africans on white farms and in resettlement areas feel their quality of life to be similarly depressed

Africans in the homelands, who depend on migrant remittances and subsistence agriculture, perceive their position as being better than workers on white farms

Homeland Series 3

VENDA

A ONE PARTY STATE OF AFFAIRS

IPSA Researcher Vicki Cadman

On 13 September 1979, Venda became the third homeland to take 'independence', under the direction of Chief Minister Patrick Mphahlele and his Venda National Party (VNP). Since it attained self-governing status in 1973, three elections have been held in the territory. Although the opposition Venda Independence People's Party (VIPP) won an overwhelming majority of the elected seats in both the 1973 and 1978 elections, the ruling VNP has reassumed power each time. The predominant VNP support of nominated chiefs and appointed members in the Legislative Assembly (where initially only 18 out of a total of 60 members were elected) effectively overturned these earlier electoral results. In 1983 Mphahlele became life president of the homeland.

Venda's first post-independence elections were held in 1984. The ruling party won 41 of the 45 elected seats, but VIPP members alleged that the elections had been rigged by homeland officials. In the seven years since independence, frequent reports of the harassment and detention of political opposition, and the death of several detainees in Venda's prisons, have earned Mphahlele's administration a reputation for ruthlessness (Star 11/8/86, Fund for Free Expression, 1984). The homeland recently announced it was considering moves to declare Venda a one party state because it felt that Western-style democracy was inappropriate in an African country that already enjoys the leadership of a life president. This objective would appear to confirm the Mphahlele administration's alleged intolerance of political opposition.

POPULATION

Table 1 Demographic trends in Venda

Population	1970	1980	% Increase
Urban	681	7 318	975,0%
Rural	271 771	337 614	24,0%
Total	272 452	344 932	26,6%

Analysis

- The preliminary estimate for the 1985 population census for Venda is 459 986, which represents an increase of 33,4 percent from 1980.
- Compared with other homelands, Venda's population has not increased as dramatically, partly because there have been no mass removals from 'white' South Africa. According to the Surplus People's Project (1983: p131), however, thousands of people will have to be moved if consolidation proposals are to be fulfilled.
- Many people have been resettled within the homeland as a result of extensive betterment planning in the agricultural sector.

LAND

- Venda lies on the far northern border of South Africa, and is separated from Zimbabwe by a narrow 'security' corridor under the Republic's jurisdiction.
- As of June 1985 the total area of Venda measured 687 500 hectares, comprising two physically separate entities (see map). Negotiations concerning consolidation proposals are still underway.
- The homeland has a population density of 67 people per km², which contrasts dramatically with the 'low' 17 people per km² for 'white' South Africa, or the 'high' 127 people per km² in the Ciskei.

AGRICULTURE

- About 11 percent of Venda's total area is potentially arable land, which means an average of 1,2 hectares per family of six. This figure is just below the average 1,3 hectares per family for all the homelands; and contrasts with the 4,3 hectares per family in 'white' South Africa.
- There are 36 agricultural projects in Venda at present. These cover an area of 8 536 hectares and include dry-land crop production, irrigation schemes, dairies and piggeries.
- The training and establishment of individual farmers through agricultural projects is one of the major aims of agricultural development in Venda.

There are 4 296 private commercial farmers in Venda, farming an additional 8 436 hectares on a co-operative or individual basis.

For Betterment or Worse?

Large areas of Venda — about 75 percent of its agricultural land — have been allocated to betterment schemes, which aim at rationalising land use by dividing it into arable, grazing and residential areas. The majority of the homeland's rural population is now settled in planned agricultural villages, yet betterment planning has had little effect on solving the problems of landlessness and unemployment — as early as 1978, it was reported that over 10 000 people who had settled in betterment villages had no land rights.

The steady increase in the size of the rural population has placed further pressure on the land and produced several denser settlements. Rural poverty continues to grow in the homeland as the agricultural sector is increasingly unable to provide an adequate living even for those with land rights. Like many of South Africa's other homeland residents, migration is the only hope of gaining employment for those in Venda's betterment villages and denser settlements.

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

Table 2 Average household income: breakdown of sources

	1980	1983
Salaries and Wages	39,5%	56,2%
Agriculture	4,8%	0,9%
Domestic Production	7,2%	0,4%
Own Business	2,1%	3,4%
Pensions	7,6%	7,9%
Contributions received	30,4%	24,9%
Income from lodgers	0,6%	0,1%
Imputed rent	5,5%	4,0%
Other	2,0%	1,2%

Table 3 Number of migrant and commuter workers


	1978	1982	% Increase
Migrants	29 000	37 000	27,5%
Commuters	5 100	6 000	17,6%

Analysis

- In 1980, only 29 715 people (8,1 percent of the total population) were classified as economically active.
- The average per capita income from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1982 was R318,12. This was lower than the equivalent figures for Transkei

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TRANSVAAL'S NORTH-EASTERN HOMELANDS



(R324,39) and Bophuthatswana (R609,38), but higher than that of the Ciskei (R268,64). Per capita income from Gross National Product (GNP) increased to R491,36 for the same year, and on this scale Venda still ranked third among the independent homelands.

- Limited local employment opportunities force many workers to migrate to the central economy to seek work, while the isolated position of the homeland — situated far from the major growth points of the South African economy — accounts for the relatively small number of daily commuters.


- Salaries and wages have become the major source of household income. This source — as a percentage of total household income — has increased by a significant 16,7 percent between 1980/83. 'Contributions received', which includes migrant remittances constitute a further 24,9 percent.

- The high dependence of all households on the above two sources of income, indicates the increasing inability of Venda's agricultural sector to provide a living for rural inhabitants. Agriculture constitutes only 0,9 percent of total household income.


REVENUE

Table 4
Contribution of migrant and commuter income to GNP

1978 Total GNP = R84m		
GDP	R38,9m	46,0%
Commuter income	R7,5m	8,9%
Migrant income	R39,2m	46,3%
Minus foreign factor payments	R1,0m	- 1,2%



1982 Total GNP = R229,3m		
GDP	R117,5m	51,3%
Commuter income	R17,1m	7,5%
Migrant income	R97,5m	42,5%
Minus foreign factor payments	R2,8m	- 1,2%




Analysis

● GDP as a percentage of GNP has increased by five percent over the period 1978/82, but migrant and commuter income still constitutes half of the latter. This illustrates the homeland's typical dependence on sources of employment and income within 'white' South Africa.

Table 5
Composition of Venda's total national revenue

	1982	1984/85
Grants from, RSA	R80,6m (70%)	R125,6m (65%)
Own Sources	R35,0m (30%)	R67,7m (35%)



● 'Own sources' of revenue have improved by five percent from 1982/83 to 1984/85, but direct financial aid from South Africa continues to constitute the major part of Venda's total national revenue.

MANUFACTURING


● Two industrial development points have been identified in Venda, Thohoyandou and Muraleni, where decentralisation incentives now apply.
● By January 1985, the Venda Development Corporation had established 35 manufacturing enterprises in conjunction with the private sector. These industries have provided 2 461 employment opportunities, at a cost of R6 190 per job.

HEALTH

● In 1984/85 Venda had 336 people to each hospital bed. This figure is almost the same as the ratio of

337:1 for Africans in 'white' South Africa, but significantly lower than the 61 people per hospital bed for whites.

Table 6 Per capita expenditure by the South African government — Comparative data for seven homelands



Source
Trevisan I. *Independent Homelands: An Analysis of Selected Issues in South Africa/Homeland Relations*. MA thesis in political studies, University of Cape Town, 1984.

Analysis

Table 6 shows that per capita expenditure in Venda by the South African government has soared since the year prior to independence (1978), giving the homeland the highest comparative figure of all the independent and self-governing homelands. Several possible reasons may explain this favoured status:

● Trevisan (1984: p206) points out that South African expenditure assigned to the four independent homelands increased noticeably in the actual year of independence (by 76 percent for Venda). Increasing expenditure just prior to and just after independence can be interpreted as enticing and rewarding a homeland for taking independence.

● Venda is also the homeland situated furthest from the economic centre of South Africa. It has few natural resources and a limited possibility of autonomous

growth — to overcome this limitation greater expenditure from external sources is needed.

● The third possible explanation is a security strategy. Situated on the border of Zimbabwe, the large amounts of money spent on Venda may well constitute an attempt to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people. The geographical position of Venda and Gazankulu in the Northern Transvaal makes them likely targets for ANC guerillas operating from across the border.

Sources
Development Bank of Southern Africa. *Venda Development Information*, 1986.
SA Institute of Race Relations. *Survey of Race Relations*. Johannesburg: 1978-84.
Surplus People's Project. *Forced Removals in South Africa*, Vol 5. Cape Town: 1983.
Trevisan I. *Independent Homelands: An Analysis of Selected Issues in South Africa/Homeland Relations*. MA thesis in political studies, University of Cape Town, 1984.
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


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M O N I T O R



Billy Paddock

Elated Sazwu officials Thozomile Gqweta, Isaac Ncgobo and Sam Kikine leave a Pietermaritzburg Court after treason charges against them were withdrawn in June 1986. The extensive involvement by general unions in community and national politics has undercut their shop-floor presence and drawn continued state harassment.

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NEW LABOUR ARENA

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103 *Trade unions sector by sector: A directory*



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THE RISE & FALL OF THE GENERALS, or whatever happened to the National General (and everything else) Black Allied Workers Union of South Africa/Azania?

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Advocates of general unionism argue that most workers feel a universal affinity to the working class movement rather than to any specific industry, trade or union. Accordingly, general trade unions attempt to recruit workers across a number of widely differing industries and sectors into a single organisation. In theory, their ultimate objective is to unite all workers within a movement which can be simultaneously used as a vehicle for improving the social and economic conditions of the working class, on the shop-floor and in the wider society.

Although the current generation of black general unions in South Africa share these objectives, they have been singularly unsuccessful in establishing themselves either as a viable force on the shop-floor or as an effective extra-parliamentary opposition group. While in the immediate post-Wiehahn era a myriad of general unions were able to organise thousands of workers and lead the political campaigns of township residents, most play a minor role today compared with their counterparts based in single industries.

Saawu Lessons

The demise of the best known general union, the South African Allied Workers Union (Saawu), epitomises the major problems experienced by these groups in the mid-1980s. Saawu's declining influence has been primarily attributed to its extensive involvement in national and community politics, which resulted in the neglect of factory organisation and shop-floor issues. The union's political activism has also drawn continual state harassment by the South African and Ciskeian security police, and many union activities ground to a halt during the marathon treason trial of 1984/86.

The union's militant stance has been

reflected in its reluctance to register and participate in many of the collective bargaining channels open to African workers since 1979, such as industrial councils and conciliation boards. A refusal to mute idealism with pragmatism has left Saawu out in the cold, unable to represent its members' interests effectively.

Like other general unions, it has failed to consolidate membership through developing effective decision making and administrative structures. As most day to day affairs were left in the hands of a few officials — who at the same time were organisers, negotiators, administrators and political activists — the individual needs of workers were often overlooked. In many cases the only contact members had with the union was when they were recruited or when union officials addressed political meetings in the townships. Consequently, many disillusioned members joined other unions which were better able to safeguard their interests on the shop-floor.

Their departure was hastened by Saawu's failure to prevent various regional branches from acting independently. Once regional bases were established in other provinces, various union officials in each area attempted to assert their independence over the parent body. For this reason, during 1984/85, Saawu expelled general secretary Sam Kikine and two other executive officials from Natal and the Transvaal. The ensuing dispute featured a number of court cases over who controlled union offices and assets, as well as violent clashes between supporters of each faction.

The experiences of Saawu are not unique. Other general unions (see data base), such as the General and Allied Workers Union (Gawu) or the Municipal and General Workers Union of South Africa (MGWUSA), have been plagued by similar problems.

SA general unions have been unable to establish themselves as a viable force on the shop-floor, or as an effective political grouping in the wider society

Because general unions have neglected shop-floor organisation in favour of political activism, disillusioned workers have joined other unions better able to safeguard their interests

A Guide to General

UNION	ORIGINS	AFFILIATION
African Allied Workers Union of SA	Founded in 1982 after breakaway from Black Allied Workers Union (Bawu)	Council of Unions of SA (Cusa)/Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (Azactu)
Black Allied Workers Union	Founded 1972	Independent federation with 17 affiliates
Black General Workers Union	Founded 1983	Cusa/Azactu
General and Allied Workers Union	Founded in 1980 after breakaway from Bawu	Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
General Workers Union of SA	Founded 1980	Cosatu
Municipal and General Workers Union of SA	Founded 1982	Non-aligned
National Federation of Workers	Founded in 1980 after breakaway from Bawu	Cosatu (But operates as an independent federation with 11 affiliates)
National General Workers Union	Founded 1980	Cosatu
National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union	Founded 1979	Inkatha affiliate
National Union of Workers of SA	—	Cusa/Azactu
Orange-Vaal General Workers Union	Founded 1981	Non-aligned
South African Allied Workers Union (1)	Founded in 1978 after breakaway from Bawu	Cosatu
South African Allied Workers Union (2)	Since 1984 a faction of expelled union officials has maintained control of Durban and other regional offices	Non-aligned
United Peoples Union of South Africa	Founded in 1986 after breakaway from SAAWU	Non-aligned
United Workers Union of South Africa	Founded 1986	Inkatha-aligned

The formation of Cosatu, which aims to consolidate its members into 12 industrially-based affiliates, has heightened speculation over the future of general unions

Changing Strategies

The origins of many of these general unions are to be found in the aftermath of the 1973 Durban strikes. In this period a number of economic and political conditions emerged which made this form of unionism a particular attraction for some union strategists.

Firstly, the continued introduction of capital-intensive technology in South African industry had led to many jobs being reduced to simple, monotonous routines. Most labourers had become mere 'machine minders' or operators and performed very similar production-line jobs.

Consequently, labour activists argued that the general tasks that workers performed and their skill levels should determine which union they belonged to, rather than the specific industry or sector they were employed in (Jones 1984).

Secondly, the increasing concentration of business activity into the hands of a few large corporations had undercut the bargaining position of labour. It was argued that only the collective power of all workers, concentrated into a single organisation, could counteract the consolidated power of capital. Finally, trade unions were believed to have a vital role in acting as agents for political and social change. Because of the absence of extra-

Trade Unions in South Africa

AREA OF OPERATION	MEMBERS	RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & STATUS
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area and E Cape	3 500 paid-up 6 000 signed-up	None — not registered
Durban, Empangeni, Ladysmith, Newcastle, Vryheid and JHB	150 000	8 — not registered
Pietersburg, Tzaneen and JHB	7 450 paid-up 9 030 signed-up	1 — not registered
JHB, Kuruman and Vryburg	19 076 paid-up 34 000 signed-up	1 — not registered
Port Elizabeth and Pretoria	2 205 paid-up 5 000 signed-up	4 — registered
JHB and environs. Claims branches in Bloemfontein, Dobsonville, Durban, Krugersdorp, Kuruman, Newcastle & Welkom	13 000 paid-up	None — not registered
Natal	11 551 paid-up 20 521 signed-up	1 —
Pretoria and environs	6 057	None — not registered
Durban, Natal north and south coasts, and E Transvaal	4 100	Claims 80, i.e. one per 50 members on average! Registered
—	1 500 paid-up 3 000 signed-up	—
Vaal Triangle	2 603	None — not registered
National	25 168	22 — not registered
Durban; also claims branches in Dannhauser, Port Shepstone, Stanger, Tongaat, Krugersdorp, Heidelberg and JHB	523 000	—
Durban, Port Shepstone, Newcastle, Krugersdorp and Olifantsfontein	50 000 signed-up	—
National, but concentrates in PWV and Natal areas	Unknown, claims more than 85 000	—

parliamentary organisations in the 1970s, it was argued that a single, nationally operative union could best represent the political aspirations of workers.

Labour strategies changed rapidly though and by 1979 the demise of general unions was already predicted, with the emergence of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) and the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa), both of which committed themselves to industrial unionism. Six years later, the emergence of Cosatu with its rallying cry of 'one union, one industry' has heightened doubt over the generals' ability to compete with a new breed of professional unions. Many companies have come to prefer

negotiating with stable, solidly constructed unions, which are more able to ensure their members' observance of terms of recognition agreements or dispute procedures.

Although some general unions have concluded significant recognition agreements — Saawu with Chloride SA and GWUSA with Rowntree-Mackintosh — they have tended to be less and less successful in competing with the burgeoning industrially-based unions. For instance, by 1986 Cosatu's Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu) had cumulatively negotiated more than 50 recognition agreements and the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union

Sources
Indicator SA press clippings.
Karelse K, Levy M, Allie N
and Young G. *Directory of South African Trade Unions*. University of Cape Town: Saldru, 1986.

General unions have been unable to establish a national presence because regional branches have often left the parent union to operate independently

Union officials' limited knowledge of dispute-settling procedures has resulted in many workers losing their jobs after taking ill-advised strike action

Recruiting workers from a wide variety of industries, general unions have found it impossible to provide members in each sector with specialist support

25. In contrast, the 15 most important general unions had collectively concluded less than 50 agreements (SALDRU 1986), excluding the maverick National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NSRAIEU) (see data base). In this regard, the latest general union, the United Workers Union of South Africa (Uwusa), has still to prove its negotiating mettle in a transformed and complex IR environment.

General Characteristics

What factors best explain the initial successes of general trade unions in South Africa? Why have industrial unions been able to out-organise them?

Regional vs National Orientation

In the mid-1970s, as a result of limited union resources, many general unions tended to initially concentrate on organising all workers within a specific region; usually adjacent to or in major metropolitan areas. For example, it was only once Saawu had consolidated a base in the Eastern Cape that it expanded nationally, revitalising its original Durban base while expanding into the Transvaal. Likewise, the Inkatha affiliated NSRAIEU initially organised workers on Natal's coastal belt, and only then moved to the Eastern Transvaal, where there was a comparatively low level of unionisation.

The prospects for national expansion of general unions were rapidly undercut, however, once emergent industrial unions had greater success in organising workers in companies that had branches throughout the country. Most of these companies, especially the larger corporations, have preferred to develop a single labour relations policy involving unions constructed on a national basis.

Breakaway Tendencies

A common feature which has persisted in placing regional restrictions on general unions is their tendency for internal fracture. For example, soon after the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union of SA (MACWUSA) and its sister GWUSA, based in Port Elizabeth, established a branch in Pretoria in 1983, the new regional office declared UDI and started to organise under the banner of the National General Workers Union (NGWU). The same tendencies have recurred in the Black Allied Workers Union (Bawu), the 'grandfather' of South African general unionism, whose splits have spawned Saawu, Gawu, the National Federation of Workers and the Orange-Vaal General Workers Union (OVGWU), among others (IR Data, Jan 1984: p25/29).

Although many industrial unions have also had their share of secessions — during 1984 there were breakaways from Mawu

and from the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA) — they are not that common nor that serious in comparison.

Primacy of Politics

The general unions in particular have actively involved themselves in community affairs with non-worker activists and endorsed or promoted the rent, transport and school boycotts of the 1980s. MACWUSA/GWUSA were closely involved with the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), and Saawu constantly intervened on behalf of the residents of Mdantsane in opposing bus-fare increases and Ciskeian independence. In many cases workers often joined these unions because of their vociferous anti-apartheid stands rather than because of their performance on shop-floor issues. Furthermore, organising within a specific township environment presented critical problems, for general unions have been unable to build plant-level support, recruit workers who occupied similar class positions, or cut across racial group areas and divisions (Hindson 1984: p101).

The banning, frequent detention and arrests of unionists have severely curtailed union organisation. The ongoing confrontations between the Ciskei administration and Saawu eventually resulted in the union being banned in the homeland. More recently, four key Saawu officials — Gqweta, Njikelana, Kikine and Ngobo — were precluded from taking part in union activities for a two year period after being detained and tried for treason — along with 12 executive members of the United Democratic Front.

General vs Specialist Support

General unions have recruited workers from too wide a variety of industries and have thus been unable to provide all members with specialist union support. It is an arduous enough task for an industrial union only recruiting textile workers to be aware of most of the relevant industrial council agreements, wage determinations and health/safety issues. For a general union that could (hypothetically) represent workers in the textile, metal, paper and food processing industries, it is nigh impossible for officials to have a specialist knowledge of conditions in each sector.

Furthermore, in their efforts to recruit workers from all industries, general unionists have tended to use 'trigger' grievances such as wages or retrenchments to recruit workers during disputes (IR Data, Feb 1983: p25/26). Saawu's flamboyant Sam Kikine blazed a trail across Natal industries in 1981 and 1983 with a series of wildcat strikes, when the government attempted to interfere with worker pension schemes. Although the strikes served as a central focus to recruit

workers, events have since shown that it is one thing recruiting unorganised or poorly-organised workers on the basis of highly inflated promises, but quite another to deliver the goods once they have joined (Morris 1986: p18/24).

Inflated Power Base

Many industrial unions have concentrated on organising workers in industries with large workforces, leaving general unions to eke out new membership through recruiting workers in smaller companies (typically, those companies which employ between 20 and 60 workers). Thus together a series of small factories of little significance on the national IR scene can collectively over-inflate the power base of general unions.

In addition, these unions especially tend to over-estimate their membership strengths so that distinctions must be made between signed-up and paid-up membership. To illustrate this point, one faction of Saawu currently claims a membership of 523 000 workers — making it the biggest union in South Africa! (SALDRU 1986: p180). Collectively, 15 general unions claim to represent more than 904 000 workers (see data base).

Other Shortcomings

The particular reluctance of some general unions to take advantage of industrial relations channels has limited their overall effectiveness. Most, in contrast to industrial unions, have a principled objection to collaborating with any state institution. In the unity negotiations leading to the formation of Cosatu, seven major general unions, including GWUSA, Gawu, Saawu and the OVGWU, insisted that a principle of unity should be that no unions should register with the Department of Manpower.

Many general union officials appear to have limited knowledge of dispute settling procedures and legal pitfalls, and have an inept track record in handling labour disputes. Tragically, many of their members have lost their jobs after taking ill-advised recourse to strike action.

To counteract criticisms from mainstream industrial unions, who have accused them of poaching their members, it has become common for general unions to create token industrial affiliates. The creation of industrial divisions within general unions are convenient from the standpoint of administration, but these manoeuvres sometimes take on ludicrous dimensions. When Saawu organised some blind workers at a Durban factory it created its own Blind Workers Union (IR Data, May 1983: p15); Donsie Khumalo's National General Workers Union organised workers in a tombstone factory, a taxidermy concern and even tried to recruit personnel in the South African

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Defence Force! (IR Data, June 1985: p6/7). Similarly, Bawu boasts 17 'industrially' demarcated affiliates in diverse sectors — but for all intents and purposes it still remains a single general union.

Future Directions

What are the chances for the continued survival of general unions in South Africa? Although general unions have not been as successful as the industrial unions, many still continue to function; in some cases five years after they were formed. Indeed, their apparent lack of success has not deterred the formation of new general unions — 1986 saw the birth of Inkatha's Uwusa, and a new Saawu breakaway, the United People's Union of South Africa.

The fact that some general unions are already affiliated to either Cosatu or the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (Azactu)/Cusa alliance could ensure a brief respite for them. One year after the launch of Cosatu many of the general unions affiliated to it have shown a reluctance to merge into the ten industrial unions that Cosatu leaders have indicated will be formed. For the moment both Saawu and Gawu have refused to permit the transfer of their workers in the food processing and transport industries into Cosatu's merged Food and Allied Workers Union, and Transport and General Workers Union.

The politicisation of South Africa's black labour movement could well ensure the continued survival of general unions. While the power struggles between different ideological tendencies within Cosatu's ranks continue — tensions which have already seen a faction of the National Union of Textile Workers disaffiliate — the general unions could become obvious attractions for isolated worker factions if they are unable to find a home in some of the larger federations. On the other hand, should Cosatu successfully resolve internal political tensions, general unions could become the targets of its strong industrial affiliates and disappear altogether. □

The Saawu delegation at Cosatu's launch on 1 December 1985. Even though one faction of Saawu has joined the 'super-federation' it has been reluctant to channel its members into its industrial components.

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UNIONISING FARMER WHITE

Jan Theron, former General Secretary of the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU), speaks out on Farm Labour

Founded in 1941, the veteran FCWU recently merged with Cosatu's other two affiliates in the food processing industry, to create the new Food and Allied Workers Union with a combined strength of 60 000 members. Indicator SA researcher Graham Howe interviewed Jan Theron on the federation's plans to form an independent farmworkers union, and the stumbling blocks encountered.

IPSA: One of Cosatu's founding resolutions was to recruit unorganised workers, including labourers in the agricultural sector. Will your union officials, of whom some have experience in organising workers in rural areas, be involved in setting up an independent farmworkers union?

Theron: Certainly we have a major stake in unionising farm labourers. But organising agricultural workers raises specific problems which most unions do not have experience of; frankly, we do not claim to have all the answers.

IPSA: Have many farm workers been unionised during the course of organising workers in related food sectors?

Theron: We did end up recruiting some farm workers in the fruit, poultry, animal feeds and sugar sectors, although not with any specific intention of doing so. The FCWU saw no point in recruiting a handful of workers on an ad hoc basis unless it had some strategy of how to assist them. Some unions have done that, but we disagree with this approach — one must know what to do with workers once they join your union.

In general, the relationship between farm labourers and factory workers is quite remote. A food union comes into the agricultural sector where factories it organises are located in rural areas; where there is a close relationship between workers it organises and labourers on farms; and where it has members living on farms, or members with relatives on farms.

IPSA: What are some of the specific problems which make the agricultural sector, compared with the modern urban sphere, difficult to organise in?

Theron: Well, first of all there is no concentration of farm labourers as is the case with industrial workers. Obviously there are some farming sectors with a relatively higher concentration of workers than others, but compared with industry, union organisers have to cover immensely wide areas. Also, most farm labourers live and work on privately owned land and getting access to them is very difficult.

Then there is the issue of organising seasonal workers, some of whom are dependants of farm

workers. Lastly, negotiating with employers is going to be very difficult unless some sort of regional employer organisation emerges.

IPSA: To your knowledge, are farm employers at the regional or national levels — e.g. through the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) — attempting to co-ordinate an employer approach to labour relations in agriculture?

Theron: I don't know, but maybe individual farmers could form a group with whom unions could negotiate. As yet, few agricultural unions have adopted an industrial relations approach. Obviously corporations with farming interests have been the first to come under pressure and have already indicated a willingness to recognise us.

In some fruit packing areas where there have been strikes, farmers have held meetings to discuss their attitudes and policies towards labour. However, a situation where a union would actually negotiate with these employers and agree collectively over an issue such as a minimum wage is quite another matter. There are huge obstacles to overcome — for a start, one deals with both big and small farmers. It might be in the interests of big farmers to lobby for a minimum wage in order to squeeze the small farmers out.

IPSA: So in some cases it might be better to negotiate on the 'farm floor' with individual farmers?

Theron: I cannot see that taking place either. I expect the small, marginal farmer who is in a sense economically less able to pay higher wages — and I am not justifying this at all — to take an extremely hard line on any form of unionisation or negotiation intending to establish a minimum wage. In short, union strategy will really be developed only once we begin to organise workers in the agricultural sector.

IPSA: Since Cosatu's launch, has any progress been made in establishing a farmworkers union? What are some of the problems that will be encountered here?

Theron: A new farmworkers union cannot be established just like that. There is certainly a need for an independent farm union, but there will be many



Archie Gumede and Jan Theron at a Durban memorial service for FCWU official Neil Aggett who died in detention.

problems. Also, there is sectoral overlapping. For example, the former FCWU organised some very large fruit packing co-operatives which are factories in every sense of the word. They compete with packing stores on privately owned farms, which are therefore legally regarded as part of a farming operation. In cases like these we will have to organise those farm workers as well, to ensure that they are not undercutting wages paid to our members by big co-operatives — otherwise they would put union members out of jobs.

For instance, employers in co-operatives have argued that if they paid the wages our members demand, it would be in their interests to withdraw from the co-operatives and set up packing sheds on their own farms It will only weaken our case to have another union organising there. Because of this kind of overlap, any new union will have to maintain a very close working relationship with us.

IPSA: There is obviously a considerable overlap between the food processing and agricultural industries in the wine, tea, sugar and poultry sectors. How will you demarcate areas so as not to overlap with the activities of other Cosatu affiliates or an independent farmworkers union?

THERON: We can't have a specific formula; there will have to be an understanding between unions about who should organise in these areas. If unions respect the principle of 'one union for one industry', there should not be any major conflicts. There may be minor disagreements about whether a particular factory belongs to one or the other industry, but it should be possible to settle these according to a set of objective criteria — e.g. what union traditionally organised that kind of factory, who organised those workers first, or who owns the factory.

IPSA: Agricultural workers are specifically excluded from the provisions of the Labour Relations Act (LRA). Has the landmark Rainbow Chickens judgment, demarcating the farm/factory divide made by the Industrial Court (Nicholson, 1984: p12/15) had any impact on union organisation in agri-business?

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THERON: I am not sure if it is regarded as an important legal precedent; we certainly thought it was at the time. Rainbow Chickens is a massive industrial operation. The only point on which they claimed to be a farm was that they raised the chickens — but that is taking things to their most absurd conclusion.

IPSA: What about cases where there is no clear legislative or legal distinction between industrial and farming operations?

THERON: It is clearly a matter of scale It is also a question of whether employers wish to take shelter behind legislation which makes no provision for unions. Of course there is nothing at the moment which prevents farmers from recognising a union that organises farm labourers — whatever the law says, it does not forbid trade unions! However, it would obviously help if there were ways of compelling employers to negotiate with a representative union; but who knows how long we will have to wait for that situation to arise.

IPSA: The National Manpower Commission (NMC) investigation into the conditions of employment of farm workers was commissioned in February 1982, completed in late 1984 and has been gathering dust ever since. Were you consulted by the inquiry or did you submit evidence?

THERON: The FCWU did make brief submissions to the NMC inquiry. We demanded that the LRA should be extended to cover agricultural along with domestic workers; and these workers should be allowed to join trade unions which should be recognised and negotiate collectively on their behalf.

IPSA: Did the FCWU advance any more specific demands concerning working conditions in their NMC submission?

THERON: No, that would have been premature. We would want some kind of mandate from workers themselves, as I think they would want to make particular demands.

IPSA: The Minister of Manpower said in parliament in February this year that the NMC report would be released only once the Department had consulted with 'organised agriculture and other organisations'. Have you been approached?

THERON: No. The FCWU did write asking when they were going to be consulted about the contents of the report — they got a reply which, in effect, said that they would not be informed until everyone else had been! Obviously, as people who are in close contact with farm workers, we would like to know what that report contains. As far as we are concerned, there are no justifiable reasons for keeping the report back.

To judge by the reactions from big corporations, some of which have already recognised unions organising farm workers, the report might well make some kind of recommendation for trade unions to be recognised.

IPSA: No minimum wages are set for farm workers and wage levels are notoriously low, with many well documented abuses such as payment 'in kind', child labour, long working hours, permanent indebtedness

to exploitative farm stores, etc. Some critics characterise these labour and social relations as 'feudal' — would you agree with this description?

THERON: One certainly cannot characterise farm workers as ordinary workers — they are not free to sell their labour where they choose.

Firstly, there is the housing issue. If farm labourers living in farm houses are evicted, there is seldom alternative housing. Farmers use the situation to victimise or scare labourers and many are evicted without notice or, if the farmer is generous, with one week's notice. Secondly, farm workers are paid extremely low wages, so many are dependent on loans and get into debt simply to survive. They then virtually belong to the farmer — the only way they can change jobs is by negotiating the transfer of their debts to another farmer. This is like a form of ownership in a real sense; there is no way a worker can break out of this cycle.

Lastly, farm schools, with few exceptions, are not geared to giving labourers' children adequate education to allow them to move off the farms. They are not able to get educated beyond preparatory school level; there are no high schools except for expensive boarding schools in distant towns.

IPSA: Will the abolition of influx control break this cycle of dependence?

THERON: Even without influx control restrictions, farm workers are not able to move to urban centres where there is no housing either. Also, there will now be 'urbanisation controls'. I do not want to say that influx abolition will have no impact at all. It

might encourage farmers to offer better wages and improved working conditions to retain workers, but on the other hand, there is a massive pool of unemployed in rural areas.

IPSA: Child labour is another problem. A recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) study claimed that at least 60 000 children were employed on South African farms (Levy, 1985).

THERON: It's not just a case of children being employed as workers, but the fact that they are actually required to work in return for accommodation. The whole family that resides on a farm is often required to contribute and they are threatened with eviction if their children do not work. This practice even disrupts the schooling of those children lucky enough to attend farm schools.

I have encountered a similar situation with adult factory workers who work in Cape Town but stay on farms. Many have had to stop work at their factories to go and help harvest crops, because the housing shortage forces them to accept accommodation on the farm.

IPSA: Surely these workers then break their employment contracts and could lose their jobs?

THERON: Yes, they could lose their town jobs just because they have to pick fruit for a few weeks a year.

IPSA: What sort of protection could be extended to farm workers? Would you like to see temporary 'reinstatement orders' operating in circumstances of dismissal and eviction?

Past and present farm workers — labourer and pensioner outside their shack on a mealie farm in the Heidelberg area, Transvaal.



THERON: There is a problem with relying on legal controls. Even if there were legal controls, they would not mean anything unless there was an organisation farm labourers could rely on to enforce them. In most of these farming areas there are no resources and the nearest place people could get help from would be in distant urban centres.

IPSA: The Black Sash is establishing rural advice offices and have plans to extend them to operate in the same way as urban pass-law advice offices. As an interim measure, will you liaise with them in offering legal and welfare assistance to farm labourers?

THERON: We would not, in regard to worker rights, see advice offices as being of much help in the long term, because it does not solve the problem of people not being organised. But in the absence of any resources, I think they could play a really important role for farm workers. At the moment it is a case of advancing basic rights and demands.

IPSA: Payment by alcohol in lieu of cash wages was outlawed on wine farms in the Western Cape in 1961, yet one still hears reports that the dopstelsel remains in widespread use. In 1984 a Black Sash survey claimed that 18 farms in the Somerset East/Stellenbosch area dispensed daily dop. They described the 'tot system' as 'a form of coercive management and a system of institutionalised alcohol addiction' (Sash, Feb 1985: p9). Could you comment?

THERON: I don't know what the situation is now, but I imagine this iniquitous system still applies quite widely. About ten years ago I conducted an investigation into some farming areas and found that the dop system was very much in use. It seemed to be directly related to 'the lower the wages, the more the dops, and in some cases it was as high as ten dops a day. As the wine is so potent, there is no way one could drink that amount of alcohol regularly without becoming addicted. Farmers continue to give their labourers dop because they claim the workers themselves demand it; yet they established their workers' dependence on alcohol in the first place!

IPSA: To what extent will mechanisation, with the related threat of retrenchment, be a factor in negotiations between a farmworkers union and farmers?

THERON: In general, mechanisation is an implied threat that is always present in labour/management negotiations. I would imagine it will be an important factor in farm labourers being organised, as there is a further degree of mechanisation which can be introduced in South Africa. In fact, some farmers are now adopting methods and technologies from the United States.

IPSA: Pesticides and poisonous drying agents such as methyl-bromide and sodium metabisulphate, are common work hazards for agricultural workers. Did the FCWU in conjunction with some of the safety support groups monitor safety measures and abuses?

THERON: No, we never had a safety programme as such. We really respond to the problems reported to us and we become aware of. It will be the same with farm workers; we have come across problems in food processing plants which are closely related to

work safety issues on farms.

Workers use pesticides and no thought is given to masks until there is actually a strong objection from organised workers, or when half the workforce falls ill and is absent ... There are many incidents like this: e.g. the pineapple industry in East London is using Deldrin with the permission of the state. I am very sure no thought is given to how it is applied.

IPSA: The ILO study I referred to earlier alleges that there are about 1 600 worker fatalities from pesticide poisoning in South Africa every year. Who is monitoring this?

THERON: I don't think anyone is. It takes place on farms where workers are unorganised and until farm workers are organised not even half this sort of stuff is going to come to light. The only way that there can be a general change of attitude among farmers will be when workers themselves say they are not prepared to work under dangerous conditions, and demand that farm owners provide safety equipment.

IPSA: Farm workers are now protected under the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. Are the notification procedures being observed and are Manpower inspectors monitoring these practices?

THERON: I think we have the same situation here — some people obviously do get assisted and get workmen's compensation. But again I think there are many workers who do not know their rights.

IPSA: Legislation, from trespass to security laws, hampers union work and curtails their right to organise workers. How have they affected your union, particularly during the state of emergency?

THERON: A number of our organisers have been detained during the emergency. Other examples of harassment have come in the form of ongoing approaches by the security police to our members, offering them money in return for information. Our members in the Border region are continually harassed in the Ciskei — the authorities there are a law unto themselves and the courts offer little protection.

IPSA: Union veteran Oscar Mpetha, a former FCWU general secretary, was imprisoned in August 1985 and is serving a five year sentence under security laws. It is claimed that considering his age (76) and poor health, this amounts to a death sentence. What steps has the union taken to campaign for his release?

THERON: It is absolutely appalling that Oscar is still in jail. He is constantly in and out of hospital; understandably he must be in bad health simply because he is in jail at his age. It seems to be a purely political decision by the government to punish him; even the courts — who were compelled to impose a minimum sentence — recommended that he should not serve a sentence. We have tried to raise the issue in whatever forums we have had access to, so that the public is aware of the situation. *IPSA*

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Down on the Farm

LABOURING OUTSIDE THE LAW

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

The wages, working conditions and general quality of life of South Africa's estimated 1,3 million farm workers and their five million dependants are notoriously poor. Unlike the regulated labour relations found in the modern industrial sector, farm workers are not guaranteed minimum wages or a set working day/week; allowed unemployment benefits; protected from unfair labour practices; nor are trade unions legally recognised.

In recent years the provisions of a few legislative safeguards have been extended to cover labour in the agricultural sector, but farm workers, along with domestic workers, still remain excluded from the official definition of an 'employee'. This 'non-status' puts farm workers outside the broad body of labour legislation — a situation compounded by other factors:

- farmers are not compelled to negotiate with representative trade unions
- union access to workers on privately-owned farms is difficult because of trespass legislation
- rights extended to farm workers will be of value only if they are aware of those rights and farmers are aware of their obligations
- the abolition of influx controls could, unless other substitute legislation is enacted, worsen the position of farm workers (see below).

Legislative Protection

Statutory safeguards for farm workers are provided for through provisions in the:

- *Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA) No 6 of 1983*
Compels all employers to ensure the adequate protection of the health and safety of their employees at the workplace. However, farmers are not obliged, as other employers are, to appoint workers as safety representatives.
- *Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA) No 30 of 1941*
Compels employers to contribute to a state-administered accident fund which is used to compensate workers — for loss of income and medical expenses — who have been temporarily or permanently injured while at work.
- *Black Labour Act (BLA) No 67 of 1964 — subsequently Black Labour Regulations (BLR) R1892 of 1965 and R74 of 1968*
Sets controls and procedures for the recruitment of labour by labour recruiters, labour bureaus and employer organisations. The regulations also partially specify the relationship between farmers and their labourers: the standard of farm workers' rations and housing, how much credit a farmer can extend to them, and that common law employment contracts have to be in writing.

With the abolition of influx control, the BLR R74 of 1968 has been repealed and the government has also stated that it intended to repeal the BLA No 67 of 1964. Sections 69 and 70 of the Black Communities Development Act No 4 of 1984 provide for the repeal of the BLA by proclamation, but the necessary legislation has not been gazetted yet.

Legislative Omission

The legislative definition of the term 'employee' was altered in 1979 to include African workers, allowing them to belong to registered trade unions; participate in official bargaining forums; embark on legal strikes, etc. However, although the government agreed to extend these collective bargaining rights to African workers in the modern industrial sector, it refused to accept the Wiehahn Commission's proposals that farm workers should be covered by the same legislation. Instead, in 1982, it authorised the National Manpower Commission (NMC) to investigate the legal relationship between farm workers and their employers.

The NMC completed its report in late 1984 but, as yet, its findings have neither been tabled in parliament nor made public. In early 1986, the Department of Manpower indicated that it wished to 'consult with organised agriculture and other interested organisations' before releasing the report.

Farm workers are expressly excluded from the provisions of the:

- *Labour Relations Act (LRA) No 28 of 1956*
Controls the activities of trade unions and employer organisations. Creates the machinery and procedures to facilitate the prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and employees by using industrial councils, conciliation boards, the Industrial Court, etc.
- *Wage Act No 5 of 1957*
Regulates the wages and conditions of service of workers employed in industries which are not covered by agreements made in terms of the LRA.
- *Unemployment Insurance Act No 30 of 1966*
Provides state financial assistance to registered, unemployed workers who are willing and able to work and, while employed, contributed to a government insurance scheme.
- *Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) No 3 of 1983*
Regulates and establishes minimum conditions of employment for workers concerning annual and sick leave, working hours, overtime, notice pay, etc.

Employment Contracts

In theory, the wages and working conditions of farm workers are regulated by common law contracts of employment, in addition to provisions of the MOSA, WCA and BLR.

Although industrial workers also sign employment contracts, they are given further protection through legislation such as the LRA, BCEA, Wage Act, etc. The rationale behind the legislature granting extra-contractual protection to workers is that individual employees can be forced, by employers in stronger bargaining positions, into accepting terms of employment contrary to their interests.

A common law contract of employment between a farmer and his workers, on the other hand, need only specify the exact wage to be paid and define the type of work to be performed. Consequently, unless there are terms to the contrary, farm workers' contracts do not:

- allow them the right to take public holidays and have sick leave, leave or overtime pay
- impose any limit on working hours
- prevent farmers from dismissing workers if they believe a period of sickness to be unreasonably long
- outlaw the use of child labour.

In reality, however, written contracts seldom exist between farm workers and their employers. Most of their working conditions and wages are determined verbally or through local customary law. Even if contracts are signed, the weak bargaining position of farm workers is further eroded because of the farm worker's dependence on farm accommodation and employment — the greater the dependence on the farmer, the less ability the farm worker has to contract for improved wages and better conditions of service.


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INDIA



VWSA

UNION SHOP STEWARDS

Riding on the Volksie Bus

By Brian Smith, Manpower Resources Manager,
Volkswagen SA

In an earlier Indicator SA article (Vol3/No1), former unionist Mike Morris argued that management could improve labour relations by allowing shop stewards to attend, on full pay, union-run training courses. In response, Brian Smith of Volkswagen SA provides a case study of the company's experience of employing shop stewards on a paid, full-time basis, a system implemented as early as 1980. This move has had many beneficial effects, improving collective bargaining and institutionalising labour conflict at their factory situated in the volatile Eastern Cape.

One union demand that is starting to appear on a number of negotiating agendas is the issue of full-time shop stewards. Like the many other demands put forward by organised labour, it arouses strong feelings on the management side of the table. Comments such as 'why should I pay people to work for the union and to organise my workers against me?' are not uncommon.


The Eastern Cape has proved to be somewhat of a testing ground for this as well as other industrial relations issues. Both Ford in Port Elizabeth and Volkswagen in Uitenhage agreed to employ full-time shop stewards as early as

1980. Their experiences could provide other employers with valuable ideas on which to base their response to this particular union demand.

Shop-Floor Contact

During late 1979 and 1980, both Ford and Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA) experienced major strikes which marked the start of real industrial relations in the country's manufacturing industry. These events brought home to management the obvious need to urgently review labour practices in order to bring about more effective shop-floor communication.

The 4 500 hourly-paid black and white employees at Volkswagen's Uitenhage plant are represented by seven full-time and 20 part-time shop stewards



Volkswagen SA's factory in Uitenhage. Workers enjoy rights of co-determination and co-operation in staff welfare and industrial relations.

The issue of paid, full-time shop stewards was first raised in 1979, not by union officials, but by the stewards themselves, who then performed this function on a part-time basis. After much discussion, an agreement was signed at VWSA the following year, which allowed the African, coloured and white unions to appoint one full-time shop steward for every 750 hourly paid employees eligible for membership of that union at the plant. At VWSA this arrangement produced one white and three black shop stewards. Today, the giant National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU) claims a total of ten full-time shop stewards in South Africa's motor manufacturing industry.

The initial decision to appoint full-time shop stewards was not made without controversy. While considered a sell-out to the unions by some managers, the move was also criticised by those on the left as an attempt to co-opt shop stewards and turn them into management puppets. However, those who have lived with this decision for the past six years believe it to be the correct one — one which has been of benefit to the company and unions alike.

The Company Philosophy

All industrial relations decisions, whether concerning recognition of a trade union or the appointment of full-time shop stewards, must be taken against the

background of a basic company philosophy and policy. VWSA subscribes to the pluralist model of industrial relations which acknowledges that management and workers will pursue different interests. Although a certain amount of conflict is inherent in the system, it can be resolved by a system of collective bargaining that will allow some sort of balance of power or equilibrium to be reached.

This model recognises the legitimate role of a trade union and its shop stewards in helping to resolve the natural conflict in a constructive manner. For the system to work effectively, negotiations must take place between strong and representative groups who have the ability to honour agreements and build relationships of mutual respect.

The preceding philosophy contrasts sharply with the unitarist view of industrial relations as a system of rules, with harmony, trust and common objectives in the workplace as the norm. The trade union then has no purpose other than as a force that upsets the natural equilibrium, creating tension and conflict. Under this model, unions and shop stewards are resisted and every effort is made to reduce their influence, rather than to develop formal structures.

Stewards and Co-determination

The pluralist view is further strengthened at VWSA by experience of the German system of co-determination which allows for direct worker representation at board

level and for a system of statutory works councils. The latter enjoy rights of co-determination and co-operation in staff, welfare and industrial relations matters in all factories with more than five employees.


At VWSA, shop stewards are seen as a vital part of our industrial relations system, in much the same way that management is a vital part of the company. The functions of stewards — particularly those that relate to upward and downward communication (see diagram) — are regarded as critical to maintaining effective shop-floor relations, especially in an industry where lost production can be very expensive. In a sophisticated factory with over 6 000 employees one cannot expect senior shop stewards to perform these functions in addition to their normal jobs on the production line. It will result in one or both tasks being inefficiently performed.

In the current climate, it is essential that management maintain ongoing contact with elected representatives on shop-floor and community issues. These areas of communication should cover advancement, training, discrimination, social responsibility, work methods, production schedules, etc. We see the shop steward's role as being equally as important as that of the personnel officer, who is a full-time employee. If we are serious about promoting collective bargaining and avoiding disruptive industrial action, we have to spend sufficient time and money providing the necessary 'infrastructure'. After all, this is a small price to pay for effective communications and, perhaps, greater industrial peace.

Historical Background

In the Eastern Cape, wage negotiations in the automobile industry started with the formation of an Industrial Council in November 1969. At that time the parties to the Council included Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen and the SA Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union (SAISAIU), which represented white workers only. In 1970 the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of SA (NUMARWOSA) for coloured workers also joined the Industrial Council.

Then in 1973 with the assistance of NUMARWOSA, a union for African workers was formed — the United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union (UAW). By 1977 UAW was recognised by the three employer parties on the Council, although it could not join because of the legislative restrictions formerly placed on African unions. During this period, both the coloured and African unions established good overseas contacts and became affiliates of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF).



Overseas visits by VWSA employees in the 1980s enabled them to observe the successful roles played by full-time stewards in other automobile factories

External union officials are seldom called on because most disputes are resolved by stewards who have a vested interest in forging workable solutions

A factory committee of stewards and management consult monthly on production problems, social responsibility projects, company sales, training issues, etc.

During the late 1970s, it became obvious that worker/management relations in South Africa would alter dramatically and that new structures and procedures would have to be found to cope with these changes. VWSA looked to the industrial relations system that seemed to work successfully in Germany as a model for possible worker representation within VWSA. In 1978, IR managers and three worker nominated employees from VWSA — who were members of the respective African, coloured and white unions — visited Volkswagen and Audi factories in Europe. They also met with representatives of the German metal workers union, I.G. Metall, as well as with full-time members of works councils at these factories.

Between 1979 and 1980, two part-time black VWSA shop stewards were invited to attend an IMF conference in Germany and one of them also attended a conference of the United Automobile Workers in the United States. During these overseas visits, local stewards gained significant exposure to the workings of German and American industrial relations and observed the important role played by full-time shop stewards or works council members.

Entrenched Role

Six years later, VWSA has five full-time NAAWU shop stewards who represent over 90 percent of our hourly paid complement of 3 755 black workers. We also have two full-time SAISAIU shop stewards who represent almost 80 percent of the 800 hourly paid white workers. In addition, there are 20 part-time shop stewards at the plant. The full-time stewards form part of the NAAWU and SAISAIU negotiating teams and play a direct role in council negotiations on wages and other service conditions (see diagram).

Direct shop-floor representation on the Industrial Council has given it credibility in the eyes of workers and enabled it to survive the strong anti-Council lobby of a few years ago. At plant level, grievances and disputes are resolved by management and shop stewards, and it is seldom necessary for external union officials to visit the plant. This is a positive situation as both management and shop stewards have a more detailed knowledge of the issues at hand and have a vested interest in forging workable solutions.

At plant level, the full-time stewards and senior management, including the managing director, meet monthly as part of a factory committee (see diagram). This committee does not negotiate wages or conditions of service but acts as a consultative forum at which issues and problems are raised by either party. Each month, company sales performance, production problems, training issues,

revised plant layouts, social responsibility projects, etc. are discussed and actions agreed upon. Shop stewards have also acted as an important link between management and the local community, which has certainly helped to maintain a degree of stability during some very difficult periods in Uitenhage.

The agreement governing shop stewards at VWSA stipulates that they are responsible to, and under the direct authority of, their union. However, in the event of misconduct or any contravention of the rules, the company is entitled, in consultation with the union, to withdraw its approval of a steward's appointment. Luckily it has not been necessary to implement this clause over the past six years.

Furthermore, shop steward training is regarded as being very important. Full-time stewards are allowed ten days' paid leave a year for this purpose, while part-time stewards are allowed five days' paid leave for training.

An Appraisal

As with all inexact sciences, industrial relations systems cannot be clinically evaluated. However, feedback from production and IR management and the trade unions would indicate that the shop steward system at VWSA has proved to be successful. It certainly has not prevented strike action since 1980; some may even claim it contributed to the number of strikes experienced over this period, but this is difficult to judge. However, recent years have seen the focus of conflict move from the Eastern Cape — where manufacturers have experienced relative labour peace — while record strike levels have been experienced in other regions.

One of the major functions of a shop steward is to police agreements and limit managerial prerogative. It is to be expected, therefore, that shop stewards, particularly those who are experienced trade unionists, will test the abilities of company management and industrial relations policies and procedures. Perhaps this partly explains why the Eastern Cape motor manufacturers tended to be the trendsetters in labour relations in the early 1980s.

The VWSA experience has certainly been an important factor in institutionalising labour conflict in recent years. Its greatest contribution has been to develop a collective bargaining climate in which management and shop stewards meet as equals, each with a clear understanding of the rules and a strong stake in the outcome. While this relationship may not always deliver entirely satisfactory short-term results to all parties, it seems to be an effective way of promoting the dialogue and negotiation so badly needed in South Africa today. *DPWA*

Trade Unions Sector by Sector

Part Three

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

● THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ●

	Paid-up Membership
Azactu/Cusa	
African Allied Workers Union of SA (AAWUSA)	<11 000
Black Allied Mining and Construction Workers Union (BAMCWU)	<58 000
Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union (BCAWU)	40 774
Bawu	
Black Allied Building and Construction Workers Union	2 173
Confederation of Metal & Building Unions (CMBU)	
Amalgamated Engineering Union of SA (AEUSA)	<30 000
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of SA (AUBTWSA)	18 000
Cosatu	
Brick, Clay and Allied Workers Union	748
Building and Allied Workers Union	—
SA Woodworkers Union (Sawu)	3 642
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU: construction members only)	±4 000
Unaffiliated	
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA	758
Building Workers Union (BWU)	<22 036
National Union of Brick and Allied Workers	4 830
Orange-Vaal General Workers Union	<2 603
South African Operative Stone Masons Society	—

ANALYSIS

Special Features of Sector

In many cases in the building sector, labourers are employed on a short-term contract basis only until a particular construction project is completed. Further employment is guaranteed only if builders have other contracts to fulfil, which makes sustained union organisation of unskilled black workers difficult in this sector. Furthermore, the Central Statistical Services estimates that the number of construction workers employed has fallen in the past year by at least 25 percent — from 402 400 in March 1985 to less than 300 000 in March 1986 (IIR, June 1986). In response to these sectoral conditions, black trade unions have tended to avoid recruiting workers on construction sites and have concentrated instead on the building supplies sector, e.g. brick and tile manufacturers, timber and hardware merchants, etc.

Azactu/Cusa Mergers

Among the black unions recruiting workers in this industry, unions affiliated to the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) and the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (Azactu) have the largest membership. Once unity talks between Azactu and Cusa are finalised, the probable mergers of AAWUSA, BAMCWU and BCAWU (see above) will further consolidate the new federation's position, especially in the Transvaal region.

The well-organised BCAWU, a Cusa affiliate, is active in the construction and building supplies sectors, predominantly in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging area. Although BCAWU claims a membership of 40 000, independent observers believe the figure to be closer to 10 000. This still makes it the industry's largest black trade union (IIR Data, March 1986: pp21/22). In 1985 some members of the building industrial council refused to allow BCAWU to join it, thus limiting the union's ability to negotiate improved wages and conditions of service.

The Cosatu Initiative

In September 1986, in accordance with its intention to create one union for each industry, the Cosatu executive established a co-ordinating committee to carry out the task of creating a single union in the construction and associated industries. It is expected that this new affiliate will be formed in 1987.

Currently, most of Cosatu's members employed in the building industry belong to Sawu and the recently formed TGWU. The new union is the result of the merger in May 1986 of the Transport and General Workers Union established by the Federation of South African Trade Unions, and the formerly non-aligned General Workers Union. Both Sawu and TGWU are predominantly active in the Western Cape. Two other Cosatu affiliates — the Brick, Clay and Allied Workers Union; and the Building and Allied Workers Union — are much smaller in comparison and will add few members to a new construction workers union.

The Artisan Unions

The two unions affiliated to the CMBU operate nationally and have tended to concentrate on organising skilled artisans only. The AEUSA has recruited mainly white workers, while AUBTWSA has a membership comprised of coloured, Indian and white workers. The BWU recruits skilled coloured workers in the Western Cape.

INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA

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