1NDICATOR

SOUTH AFRICA

a) UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
b) centre of Applied Social Sciences

THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS

*Electrical energy is the common factor
that binds us in our quest for a better
quality of life for all our peoples.
By concentrating on the positives,
on common development factors,
we are building bridges for tomorrow.
I believe that electricity could be a
catalyst not only for illustrating the
interdependence of all Southern
African states, but also for stimulating
a new development in our subcontinent.*

Dr. John Maree, Chairman,
Eskom Electricity Council.

ESKOM

EDITORIAL

As with the local government elections in KwaZulu-Natal, we at the Indicator were wondering and worrying about the late arrival of our latest *Indicator SA* issue. Mischievous though it may be to compare the two, we have delivered at last, but with few explanations that match those for postponing the local elections here: violence, the intractable problem of no-go areas and voter's rolls in disarray.

With the national Constitution now finalised, the last major obstacles to getting on with governing are local government elections and resolving the administratively crippling political dissension in KwaZulu-Natal which has cost the province dearly.

We can also only surmise that these disagreements keep political leaders from dissuading their supporters against using violence and from censuring them and taking action when they do. If local elections are successful and the political parties agree on their process and outcome, we may be one step closer to resolving the KwaZulu-Natal saga.

The month's reprieve for administrators and electioneers will be most usefully spent attending to gremlins in the voter's roll – in some cases at least 20 people have been registered to single addresses in Durban. But intolerance, no-go areas and violence cannot be solved in 30 days. These are unique products of a decade of violent political competition in KwaZulu-Natal, and articles by Courtney Jung and Sarah Frost in this issue explore some elements of this political landscape.

Ironically, political settlements such as elections, are the most favourable long term solutions. The security forces could contain violence, but it would be foolish – and expensive for the taxpayer – to expect police and army officials alone to remedy the situation.

National political developments are also interesting for relations between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress. With the National Party out of the Government of National Unity the IFP is – ironically – alone in keeping the 'national unity' flame alive. The IFP might now consider its self proclaimed position as 'the only real opposition to the ANC'. For the ANC, governing rests almost squarely on its shoulders for the first time.

The new South Africa's honeymoon is over, and the ANC will have to rely less on the personality cult of their president and get down to business. In two astute analyses, Heribert Adam and Robert Schrire in this issue, explore the myth of the Mandela presidency and its implications for governing and democracy.

Antoinette Louw

CONTENTS

Cover painting by Louisa Wassenaar

LIFE

SOUTHERN LIFE

Life tends to be two steps forward, three steps back. To keep you going forwards, Southern Life is geared to helping you manage your future better. Our wide range of inflation-beating investment opportunities, coupled with R30 billion in managed assets, is guided by more than a century of financial management advice. We can help you cut a clear path to success.

SOUTHERN

Together, we can do more to manage your future better

POLITICAL
M O N I T O R

Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa

Poverty shares by race
(% of all poor in South Africa, by race)

.2%   5.0%
.1%

94.7%

■ African   ⌐ Indian   ⌐ Coloured   ■ White

There is no national consensus on an absolute poverty line, so a relative definition has been used: the poor are defined as the poorest 40% of households and the ultra poor as the poorest 20% of households. These definitions, if based on income, result in 'cut-off' expenditure levels of: poor- R301 monthly per adult and the ultra poor R178 monthly per adult

Poverty rates by race
(% of population of each race group who are poor)

70			
60	64.9		
50			
40			
30		32.6	
20			
10			
0		2.5	0.7

■ African   ⌐ Coloured   ⌐ Indian   ■ White

The Mandela Personality Cult

By Heribert Adam
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver
and the Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town

Despite adoration from his South African voters and from fans across the globe, President Nelson Mandela's glorification as a demi-god can be viewed as dangerous. Since his word carries so much weight, few dare to criticise him, yet the super-president is increasingly displaying symptoms of what some call naivity and autocracy.

A paradox baffles the analysts of South African politics: voters are increasingly disillusioned with their elected officials but keep faithful to their party. The honeymoon with the African National Congress (ANC) continues, although the Government fails to deliver material improvements for most of its electorate.

Symbolic rewards of feeling good about national sports victories and the magic of a super-president compensate for misery as usual. Restoring dignity and respect goes a long way toward ensuring loyalty – but for how long? For as long as President Nelson Mandela lasts would be the answer of many observers.

Personalising South Africa's successful transition by attributing it mainly to the reconciling magic of Mandela has become global conventional wisdom. Mandela's charisma and astuteness notwithstanding, his glorification as the guarantor of success both insults and endangers the fledgling democracy.

Emphasising the president's crucial role assumes that the majority of his followers resemble a flock of blind sheep that disperses in every direction once the shepherd ceases to lead.

Mandela is considered a rare exception to the rule of African mismanagement. Unruly masses, so the adulation of Mandela implies, can only be held together by an autocratic strongman. The ANC's long tradition of democratic collective decision making is denied and the ability of an equally pragmatic and competent ANC leadership questioned. Clamouring for a demi-god who ensures salvation indicates how immature an electorate is that does not trust its own political autonomy.

Mandela's paternal warmth sits well with the adoring crowds who long for a super-father. This is affirmed by his rhetorical largesse:

> *"I love each and every one of you. I sincerely wish the pockets of my shirt were big enough to put all of you in. I want to be amongst our people 24 hours a day. I regard you as my children and grandchildren, every one of you."*
> (*Weekend Argus* April 23-24, 1994)

With such inclusive style, Mandela is adored by the most hardened former enemies. Eugene de Kock, the supreme killer-commander of an aberrant police force, praises Mandela as the 'most important person after Jesus Christ'. Even 93 year old Betsie Verwoerd and stubborn

> *Mandela's glorification as the guarantor of success both insults and endangers the fledgling democracy*

> *Eugene de Kock praises Mandela as the 'most important person after Jesus Christ'*

South Africa is bound into a global economy which allows little scope for foolish decisions

PW Botha confirmed the Afrikaner tradition of deference to authority after the new leader graciously dropped by for tea.

Mandela's lack of bitterness has symbolically exonerated whites from their apartheid sins. Handing over state power to such a magnanimous figure made the National Party defeat during the constitutional negotiations more tolerable.

Even the embarrassing renewed publicity about Mandela's betrayal by an adulterous wife on freewheeling shopping sprees increased his public sympathy. While he had been physically isolated in prison, his lonely nights in freedom revealed him as emotionally isolated.

Endangering stability

The worldwide personality cult directly endangers South African stability, as the dramatic plunge of the currency on rumours of Mandela's health demonstrated. The reaction by international markets reveals an underestimation of the strong institutions and economic infrastructures in place, regardless of who is at their helm.

In any case, leadership choices are nowadays severely limited. South Africa is bound into a global economy which allows little scope for foolish decisions. While Mandela's exemplary role in marketing the historic compromise must be fully credited, it reveals the political illiteracy of trembling investors who think that the 'miracle' could or would be undone after the source of divine inspiration has disappeared.

Critics fear that even Mandela cannot bring cohesion and direction into a fractious cabinet or ANC caucus

Critics fear that even Mandela cannot bring cohesion and direction into a fractious cabinet or ANC caucus. Perhaps the opposite fear of too autocratic a president is far more justified.

Without consulting any senior members of the ANC except Vice President Thabo Mbeki, the President ousted former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Pallo Jordan, from his cabinet although the outspoken maverick was by Mandela's own admission 'one of our most competent ministers'.

Flirting with Castro or Gaddafi because of past support diminishes Mandela's present moral standing

The independent minded and somewhat arrogant Jordan had repeatedly stood up to Mandela and Mbeki on various policy issues but lacked an organised constituency, which made him expendable while keeping poor performers in office.

Far from acting as a neutral 'chairperson of the board', delegating maximally and staying out of minor controversies, the cherished patriarch interferes on many issues where it would be wiser to stay aloof.

He opines on whether the national rugby team should keep its contentious springbok emblem (yes) and whether Afrikaans should be dropped as the army language (no). He tells candidates for university vice-chancellorships to withdraw and others to make themselves available. He imposes his favourite person as election leader on a reluctant provincial ANC caucus, as happened in the disastrous Alan Boesak affair in the Western Cape.

Since Mandela's word carries so much weight, few dare to contradict him. For example, the way in which the parliamentary committee on health was whipped into line when it summoned Minister of Health Nkosazana Zuma to account for wasteful spending on the infamous AIDS play *Sarafina 2*, reflects poorly on both the chief executive and the legislature.

Only in dictatorships does a parliamentary committee allow itself to be silenced because the president announces that he is 'personally satisfied' with the explanation given to him.

Indeed, as long as such behaviour risks the penalty of expulsion or non-nomination under existing rules, autonomous behaviour of parliamentarians is not encouraged. The necessary critique of government is thus unfortunately transferred outside parliament. Why should there be a taboo on criticising a remarkable president who nonetheless remains fallible?

Dubious morality

Among those errors of judgment is Mandela's problematic loyalty to dubious friends. Flirting with Castro or Gaddafi because of past support, diminishes Mandela's present moral standing. It also runs counter to the democratic values that the ANC holds dear if the party refuses to abhor publicly reprehensible regimes that violate the very human rights for which the ANC fought so hard.

To honour Iran or praise Indonesia without referring to East Timor, even devalues South Africa's moral leadership on human rights violations elsewhere. To abandon the

Western Sahara because of friendship with the feudal Moroccan regime testifies as much to moral inconsistency as the refusal to take a stand on the slaughter in Southern Sudan.

Mandela's readiness to receive the anti-semetic Farrakan or talk to a Hamas delegation with the aim of persuading them to change their course, shows naiveness. Such foreign visitors merely exploit Mandela's moral stature. Previously, the exiled ANC itself criticised a Western policy of 'constructive engagement' that aimed at convincing an amoral apartheid regime of the benefits of an alternative morality.

It is remarkable how quickly the ANC in power eschewed some of the cherished principles it upheld as a liberation movement. This pragmatic adaptation to economic expediency not only shows itself in dealings with undemocratic states such as China as opposed to democratic Taiwan, which is in the process of being sacrificed despite its frantic efforts to court the ANC.

More surprisingly, a flourishing local arms industry is kept alive in the name of job creation and export potential. With no enemies in sight, the South African air force ordered a dozen Rooivalk attack helicopters in an R875 million contract although the army brass themselves admitted that they do not need the sophisticated killing machine developed during the days of the arms boycott and Angola war. Yet without the country of origin using and subsidising the deadly toys, they cannot be expected to be sold abroad in stiff competition with foreign arms manufacturers.

Other examples abound in which the Mandela government finds itself a prisoner of circumstances not of its making but unable or unwilling to break the chains. South Africa still continues to produce land mines although of the 'humane' kind that explode automatically after a set period. With the South African navy clamouring for three new corvettes, it is not surprising that shack dwellers will have to wait longer for the 'peace dividends'.

Undermining democracy

It is to his lasting credit that Mandela admits to his fallibility, unlike other African autocrats. Flattered and embarrassed alike, he ironically strengthens the personality cult by criticising it: it is not only the implied

Tribute to Mandela at the 1991 ANC conference.

denigration of other leaders that goes with the global adulation but also an authoritarian deference that violates the very ethos of a democratic liberation movement.

Each time a fawning editorial, foreign visitor or party hack wallows in the mesmerising influence of the great leader, a healthy democratic tradition is undermined. It is a sad comment on African affairs that Mandela commands the respect of everybody because a non-corrupt, magnanimous leader has become so rare on the continent.

Ironically, there exists no other ANC leader who dares to espouse a sensible reconciliation so effectively. While some ANC Jacobeans still talk about whites and blacks having to settle accounts about stolen wealth or squaring different moral histories before the Truth Commission, Mandela alone genuinely transcends race.

Even white racists love him because this proves that they cannot be called racists in similar ways as anti-Semites proclaim that 'some of their best friends are Jews'. Yet by

The ANC in power quickly eschewed some of the principles it upheld as a liberation movement

It is to his lasting credit that Mandela admits to his fallibility, unlike other African autocrats

recognising the destructive potential of these ethnoracial remnants and cultivating their acquiescence to the new order, Mandela singlehandedly neutralises a serious threat. Who can assert, therefore, that Mandela does not deserve the praise heaped on him with such relief?

Ongoing inequality

The Mandela personality cult obscures a development far more dangerous than leadership failure. How long can the socialist legacy of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) cover up for the increased black class stratification in the new order?

Already during the last apartheid decade, the richest 20% of African households experienced a 40% growth in income, while the purchasing power of the poorest 40% of African households declined by about 40%. The gap between white and black wealth is still vast, but narrowing. Yet the internal economic discrepancies among Africans are widening.

State aligned unions and business lobbies look effectively after the interests of their constituencies in corporatist horsetrading. At the same time, the unorganised unemployed, marginalised squatters and the forgotten rural population, grow more impoverished.

The group that benefits most from the post-apartheid order is a fledgling black middle class. It consists of a growing number of independent entrepreneurs, a managerial aristocracy in high demand and a new political *bourgeoisie* eager to join in the consumerism of their former oppressors.

Gandhi associated political liberation with an alternative lifestyle. Most ANC officials measure equality by comparison with the affluence of their predecessors.

On top of the vast discrepancies in wealth, a thorough Americanisation has penetrated all segments. American habits and ostentatious consumption have become the desired yardstick by which South African progress is measured. When theatre director Mbongeni Ngema was criticised for purchasing air-conditioned luxury buses with public money he replied:

"Why must we be transported in luxury buses in the United States but come back

to our own country to be put in the back of kombis? No way! I'm proud of our bus." (*Mail and Guardian* March 9-14, 1996).

Ngema insists that he creates Broadway theatre of high standards in a Third World environment. His assertion overlooks a price that deprives dozens of community groups of state subsidies although they could spread the AIDS message far more effectively.

Even the poverty on the Cape Flats is Americanised when the Omar Sharif gambling organisation wants to erect a casino complex with the argument that it would help local communities with 'upliftment' programmes.

Promising to create 'trained and hungry entrepreneurs' from disadvantaged communities, Omar Sharif, in association with Winnie Mandela, sells his casino plans as a 'family entertainment and recreation centre'. Addicting the poor to gambling by various international sharks circling an innocent prey is hardly recognised by a new regime keen to attract any new source of revenue.

The new bourgeoisie

An unashamedly elitist self confidence pervades the new *bourgeoisie*, which claims to be underpaid compared with the exile experience. Says the *Sarafina* director:

"Am I worth R300 000? No, I should be earning at least a million."

When the state broadcasting corporation launched its revamped television schedule, it presented a glitzy show of flown-in African American entertainers, including OJ Simpson's lawyer. With no mention of world renowned South African literary or arts talents, the new cosmopolitan image of an alleged Africanised service was confined to recycled black Hollywood entertainers. The emulation of Hollywood lifestyles by the new *Ebony* elite resembles the silly glorification of royal titles, quaint British country culture or English dress codes by the old colonisers. It should be of no concern were it not for the squandering of public money amidst a sea of poverty.

The installation of an elevator and extensive redecoration of his official residence was among the first controversial decisions of Mbeki in office. At the beginning of 1996

the ANC caucus decided to halve the compulsory contributions to the party. The ANC whip complains about the monotonous subsidised food in parliament.

Although the amounts are small and corrupt self enrichment among the new elite is still rare, compared with the plundering of the state resources by the previous regime, the writing is on the wall and ever fewer of the former idealists seem to care about their deteriorating image.

The old elite, on the other hand, adores its new found disciples. White businessmen even gloat that the African masses love their rulers to display their superior status. In any case, it is said, a little bit of capitalist temptation oils the state machinery by providing influence that fanatical ideologues would deny.

Lack of Gandhian austerity would not be worth criticising were it not for the superior moral claims of the ANC to represent all the people and particularly the downtrodden.

While half of the constituency cannot afford a used bicycle, can their representatives afford to wave at them from German luxury cars? As half of the electorate struggles to buy enough food for the next day, can legislators allocate themselves salaries that are justified by the profit making of the private sector? Should politicians be expected to be more altruistic than business people in working for the public interest?

Perceptions of government

According to a falsely maligned Idasa survey, 56% of South Africa's voters feel that people in government work in their own self interest rather than the public good, 60% say that parliamentary salaries are too high, and a staggering 84% perceive of some level of corruption in government.

Half of those consider corruption to be worse than in the old regime. It is explosive when 85% believe that people elected to govern should be 'more honest' than ordinary citizens, but a sizeable number (34%) feel that, in reality, elected officials are less honest than the average person.

There can be legal or illegal corruption. While taking bribes, stealing or misappropriating public money can be easily identified and exposed, the legal gravy train is far more difficult to combat and carries far more damaging consequences.

At present the relatively high salaries of politicians, senior civil servants, consultants and members of statutory committees lure talents from less rewarded occupations, particularly university teaching and public medicine.

The relatively few prominent black professionals find themselves in such high demand to play of roles simultaneously, that they often have to short-change all of them. Other appointments are frequently made as

While half of the ANC constituency cannot afford a used bicycle, can their representatives afford to wave at them from German luxury cars?

A staggering 84% of voters perceive of some level of corruption in government

The apartheid state practised ethnic nepotism on a massive scale – almost by definition

reward for past service or because of personal relationships with officials.

Conflict of interest guidelines on ethical behaviour in such cases are clearly under developed or remain unenforced. For example, many office holders, in addition to a main salary, draw regular remuneration from other public accounts for their roles as committee members or consultants, without perceiving multiple payments as unethical.

The apartheid state practised ethnic nepotism on a massive scale – almost by definition. However, its successor cannot afford to continue that tradition, because it claims to represent the poor and powerless.

When 'the average parliamentarian earns 30 times more than the average citizen' (*Sunday Times* March 17, 1996) critique at such discrepancies cannot be dismissed as payment according to international standards. The yardsticks must be South African ones, not what similar officials in the United States or Germany earn, as ANC spokesmen insist.

The same criticism from blacks of blacks is considered legitimate, while branded as racist when it comes from white citizens

Nor can the critique of the gravy train be rejected as racism when it originates from white quarters. The assumption of racism automatically silences all white critique of black officials.

It is a convenient and cheap weapon to employ, although black office holders also react against the continued dominance and intellectual hegemony of white liberals in the media or academia. But black shop stewards or civic leaders are equally disillusioned about their own representatives in government or on company boards deserting their constituency.

The same criticism from blacks of blacks is considered legitimate, while branded as

racist when it comes from white citizens. Indeed, the racist assumption exists that blacks in charge will fail sooner or later. Operating under this self fulfilling prophecy opens the record of the new officials for exceptionally suspicious and sometimes unwarranted scrutiny.

Yet if the new patriotism proclaimed by Mandela is to succeed, the state has to live up to the highest standards, despite the adversarial undertones. Otherwise perceived legal corruption is used to justify more tax evasion and a general culture of public cynicism. It is in the ANC's own interest to prevent such a development even if it is at the cost of its own loyal and hard working officials.

Alienation from the political process undermines the new democracy. Distrust and resentment of distant leaders triggers strikes of comparatively underpaid civil servants. Cynicism leads to what the Germans call *Politikverdrossenheit*, a general apathy and rejection of the public sphere when the propagated patriotism demands the opposite of increased involvement.

SACP and Cosatu officials so far manage to be both part of the ruling privileged elite and to present themselves credibly as the champions of the growing underclass.

As long as the tripartite alliance keeps the lid on the disillusioned poor in the name of unity of the progressive forces, the 'miracle' continues. The old establishment benefits most from this stability.

Judging by their anti-social crusades in the boardrooms and business editorials few of the old elite, however, realise to whom they owe the absence of racial populism and potential class warfare. ꝑᴇꝏ

The Myth of the "Mandela" Presidency

By Robert Schrire
By Robert Schrire
Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

President Nelson Mandela is, in many respects, the least powerful head of government South Africa has had for almost half a century. Democratic government has placed restraints on the accumulation of power which Mandela's age and consensual leadership style have reinforced. Mandela dominates symbols, public affection and deference, but is only one of a strong executive team shaping policy and leadership. The 'Mandela' presidency is thus both mythical and a myth.

Most South Africans cannot conceive of a government which is not dominated by the chief executive – be he prime minister or president. There is a lengthy tradition dating back to the 1940s of strong leaders who dominated the public debate and shaped the policy agendas.

Thus in our contemporary history we think of the 'Verwoerd era', when the granite apartheid system was developed to its most sophisticated level and apparently nothing could deflect its chief architect from his chosen course. Similarly the 'Vorster era' is remembered for the dominant role played by the prime minister in parliamentary debates and the dramatic erosion of civil liberties which accompanied the rise of the security state.

More recently the Botha government created the executive state where the military and security services wielded unprecedented power and influence. In using this expanded state capacity to wage a 'total strategy' against the enemies of apartheid, Botha was the supreme and unchallenged conductor. Ironically his successor, FW de Klerk, used this same unrestrained executive power to ignore the clear preferences of his white constituency and effectively abdicate from political power.

Of course, this perspective is somewhat simplistic. No leader, no matter how energetic, able or charismatic, can dominate alone the massive and cumbersome machinery of government.

Historical research has convincingly demonstrated that even almost uniquely powerful leaders such as Hitler, Stalin and Thatcher were not nearly as dominant as conventional wisdom decrees. There is no reason to doubt that future historians will recognise that even South Africa's most powerful apartheid leaders were only participants, albeit key ones, in the continuous struggle for power, influence and policy which is the real drama of political office.

Yet conventional wisdom does contain an important element of truth. Even if we exaggerate the importance of leaders by thinking in terms of the 'Verwoerd era' or the 'Botha system', these leaders clearly dominated the government and politics of their day.

While Verwoerd did not invent apartheid, he administered it with unique ruthlessness and expanded its application far beyond the expectations of his constituency. Similarly, while Botha did not invent the executive state or create from scratch a military

> The 'Vorster era' is remembered for the dramatic erosion of civil liberties

> Hitler was not nearly as dominant as conventional wisdom decrees

capability, he personally shaped the direction of state policy and helped create a new system of administrative power.

Given this background, most observers have simply taken it for granted that the pattern of the past would continue – and given the almost mystical status which Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela now enjoys, this perception has been strongly reinforced. He has been and remains perhaps the most visible personality in contemporary world politics, and his every move and utterance is reverentially reported. Rumours of his health, however dubious, shake markets and moods.

What has been largely ignored is the reality that all political personalities operate in a given context and none has the capacity to singlehandedly write the script. In some circumstances, such as the conduct of war, powerful personalities like Churchill can play an almost uniquely influential role. In others, even the most talented of leaders are unable to shape events.

*Political power
is not what it
used to be*

The historical importance of leadership in South African politics was the result of a set of unique circumstances. The National Party (NP) represented the relatively homogeneous interests of Afrikaners, a group that recognised the importance of unity in a society where it was a demographic and economic minority. While this did not, of course, ensure unity or the absence of dissension, it did place official leaders in a powerful position.

The Afrikaner position was reinforced by the permanent threats to Afrikaner power which originated first from English speaking whites and later from an increasingly politicised black majority. Very lengthy incumbency in power and increased mastery over the instruments of state power, including patronage and punishments, resulted in a trend from Malan in 1948 to Botha and De Klerk in the 1990s of increasingly powerful NP and government leaders.

*The ANC
government
has far less
power to
transform
society than
the NP
government*

The world facing Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) as South Africa approaches the 21st Century is dramatically different. It is an historical irony that the ANC dominated government, which represents a majority of a majority, has far less power to transform society than the minority of a minority NP government enjoyed when it came to power in 1948.

While the NP government after 1948 could reward its Afrikaner constituency with the fruits of victory such as employment, improved health and education and expansion of cultural and linguistic rights, the ANC is powerless to similarly transform South Africa and reward its majority constituency with employment, improved public goods and services, and a more egalitarian society. Political power is not what it used to be.

Firstly, the emergence of global interdependence has made all states more vulnerable to external forces. South Africa is heavily dependent upon the advanced economies of Europe, South Asia and North America for trade and investment, without which the country would sink into stagnation and increased poverty.

In a world of capital scarcity and mobile factors of production, South Africa has no choice but to play the economic game according to the not always fair global rules. NP leaders from Malan to the early Botha system faced a different global regime, and had far more flexibility in shaping economic and political outcomes.

In addition, the 'automatic punishing recoil' of the domestic market limits state options. The American scholar WF Grover, described this reality as follows:

> *"...policies strongly opposed by business if adopted by government would ensure that business, fearing market instability and suspicious of inflationary pressures, would dramatically restrict investment and employment, giving rise to higher unemployment and economic stagnation. In short, a presidential initiative of this type would trigger a reaction known as 'capital strike'. Shattered business confidence would result in a swift rebuke to the president with results manifesting themselves in the form of punishment inflicted on the economy, and hence on people's economic well being."*

If these consequences would occur in the United States, one does not have to be an economic expert to predict that the result of anti-business policies in South Africa would be very much greater.

Contemporary realities

When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, the party that emerged was in many ways a

symbolic movement without a substantive identity.

The internal wing made up largely of a heterogeneous mix of trade unionists, anti-apartheid campaigners and veterans of the United Democratic Front, although constituting the overwhelming majority of party members, had had little if any contact with the official leadership based in foreign cities such as Lusaka, London and Paris. The third leadership element, small in number but decisive in influence, were those who had been in detention for many years, the most important of whom was Nelson Mandela.

During the protracted negotiations between 1990 and 1994, two sets of dynamics were at work. The most publicised were the negotiations between the NP government and the ANC leadership over an inclusive political system. At the same time, important but unpublicised negotiations were taking place between the various elements within the ANC. This constituted not only a 'getting to know each other' process but also a struggle for leadership and policy choices.

Although there were inevitably winners and losers, the outcome of the internal ANC debate was a compromise between the various traditions. New structures and processes of decision making emerged reflecting both the secrecy and centralisation of a liberation movement operating under great pressures and dangers, and the

participatory and open traditions of voluntary mass based community organisations.

The ANC alliance thus represented a collection of groups and individuals united only around the rejection of racism and an allegiance to the symbol of the movement as the historically legitimate instrument of struggle.

Policy positions ranged from conservative liberals to views which Trotsky and Stalin would have approved of. A diversity of interests were also included in the alliance: the majority urban poor and rural dispossessed, the middle class and rising entrepreneurs, and the minority but politically organised trade union movement. All believed they had found a sympathetic home in the ANC.

If the NP government's resources had been based upon control over the instruments of the state and the wealth and expertise of its supporters, the ANC had only two advantages over its rival in the struggle for power: international support, and numbers. One of the highest priorities of the ANC leadership throughout negotiations with the government was therefore to maintain party unity. This has continued into the Government of National Unity.

When the ANC became the majority partner in the new Government in April 1994, it faced the challenge of mastering the

All believed they had found a sympathetic home in the ANC

The ANC had only two advantages over its rival in the struggle for power: international support, and numbers

Not a single ANC cabinet minister had any previous government experience

machinery of government which had been carefully constructed by its predecessors over many decades.

Not a single ANC cabinet minister had any previous government experience, and the organisation inherited a public service with entrenched rights. ANC leaders therefore had to move carefully, and had to balance the desire to exercise power with the need both to respect statutory rights and to ensure that effective administration was not destroyed.

Another important restraint on the exercise of power is the Government of National Unity itself. While few would dispute that the ANC dominates the executive, it does not enjoy a blank cheque. The ultimate power of the two minority coalition partners, the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party, is to withdraw from the Government.

Mandela has distanced himself from many day to day conflicts

This would not affect the ability of the ANC, with its overwhelming parliamentary majority, to govern. But it would shatter both domestic and foreign confidence and would dramatically heighten political tensions. Although the 'sunset clauses' which made a coalition government necessary were adopted by the ANC as a tactical necessity, they are generally recognised today as an important if temporary confidence-building mechanism.

The Mandela factor

How has Mandela filled the office of the president within this context? An important influence on the executive has been the way in which Mandela himself has interpreted the role of the president.

The President has generally chosen to lead from the rear

While all recent leaders – including De Klerk – have interpreted the office as demanding strong leadership, Mandela has had a different philosophy. He clearly believes that the president ought to consult widely, listen to contending views and attempt to create a consensus. He has thus generally chosen to lead from the rear rather than boldly pioneer new policy initiatives. We have moved from 'volksleier' to 'tribal elder'.

In part this philosophy is compatible with the changed circumstances in the governing of South Africa. The realities of power dictate that in this transitional period between white domination and majority party rule, caution is required. In addition

the complexities of party management within the ANC limit the prerogatives of executive power.

The 'tradition' within the ANC since 1990 has been one of openness and transparency in decision making. The various groups within the alliance umbrella retain considerable independence. Relations between the ANC executive and key groups such as community based organisations and the Congress of South African Trade Unions contain elements of both cooperation and of conflict.

Mandela has thus distanced himself from many day to day conflicts and has defined his own role as chairman of the board. Of course, this was not entirely a decision freely taken: the power barons within the ANC, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Kader Asmal, and Mac Maharaj, shared a view of the presidency which downplayed the inherent powers of the office and stressed the collegial aspects of political power and policy.

In a sense the old office of the president has, at least temporarily, been divided into three with the creation of two executive deputy presidents. Mandela himself has only half as many staff in his office as served under Botha, South Africa's pre-eminent executive president.

Both Thabo Mbeki and FW de Klerk have their own large staff of officials. Indeed one of the factors which has perhaps acted to limit the accumulation of power by staff in the president's office has been the perception that they may be displaced when the inevitable transfer of power takes place.

The deputy presidents, and especially Thabo Mbeki, have taken over duties normally performed by a chief executive. Mandela rarely chairs cabinet meetings, a task usually performed by his ANC colleague. Mbeki has become unofficial prime minister, undertaking demanding but unrewarding tasks such as attempting to deal with the President's now former wife.

If power has become eroded at the centre, it has also drained away to other institutions. A characteristic of government in contemporary South Africa has been the proliferation of statutory bodies with real clout in policy areas such as economic policy (the National Economic, Development and Labour Council) and

human rights (the Human Rights Commission). Commissions of inquiry have also expanded dramatically and the Government has had to wait for voluminous reports on issues such as tax policy and education before it could make final decisions.

Finally, the significance of institutional changes should be noted. Whereas all NP governments operated in a system of parliamentary sovereignty, the Interim Constitution goes at least part of the way towards a separation of powers.

The Constitutional Court can and has restrained executive power while Parliament, especially some of its committees such as justice, has not simply rubber stamped executive proposals. The provincial governments, while lacking the authority of a genuine federation, have also had to be taken into account in presidential decision making.

Mandela is thus part of a team of highly intelligent and strongly motivated cabinet ministers who have to cooperate with other institutional players if the government system is to work effectively. For now, at any rate, the days when the party leader and his close associates could crack the whip on a submissive cabinet and party are over.

Limited power

A key resource in executive politics is incumbency. The longer a leader is in office, the more expertise, prestige and gravitas he or she is likely to accumulate. All our recent leaders, from Verwoerd to Botha, began their administrations from a relatively weak position but over time steadily accumulated greater powers and status.

This option was not available to Mandela. Even when he first assumed office, he was an old man who was not expected to seek another term of office. He thus began his tenure as a 'lame duck' president.

Lacking both the means and the will to be an imperial president, Mandela has tended to take an operational interest in only a limited number of issues: the most important being the emphasis on nation building and reconciliation.

It is this policy, above all others, that has been the theme of his administration and the basis for the esteem in which he is widely

Mandela ... accumulating gravitas

held. He has acted frequently as a facilitator and peace maker: working to ensure that Afrikaners are not alienated by intervening successfully to retain the Springbok emblem in rugby, seeking to cooperate with the Zulu king and the *amakhosi* to bring about peace in KwaZulu-Natal.

Commissions of inquiry have expanded dramatically

Mandela's predecessors expanded the powers of the head of government beyond their constitutional framework. The present incumbent has used, but rarely, the inherent powers of his office. While in the case of former United States president, Ronald Reagan, this slack was taken up by powerful appointed officials, this trend has not yet emerged in South Africa.

The presidential office, headed by Jakes Gerwel, has not sought to develop genuine political clout. While inevitably any leader is, to some extent, a captive of the network of bureaucrats who surround him, power resides clearly in the hands of cabinet ministers and party leaders.

It would thus not be an exaggeration to claim that Mandela is, in many respects, the least powerful head of government South Africa has had for almost half a century. The new system of democratic government headed by a government of national unity placed structural restraints on the short term accumulation of power which Mandela's age and own conception of consensus leadership have reinforced.

Mandela began his tenure as a 'lame duck' president

If power is defined as domination over symbols, and public affection and deference, then Mandela is pre-eminent. If however, power is viewed as the ability to shape policy and determine the leadership cadre,

then Mandela is simply one member of an executive team.

The 'Mandela' presidency is thus both mythical and a myth. Paradoxically, the more public acclaim grows and the cult of personality blossoms, the more does the Mandela role in governing shrink.

The ANC executive, unlike its NP counterpart under Botha and De Klerk, remains the engine room of power in the new state. Party government, rather than cabinet government, is at least for the present the order of the day.

This is not to argue that Mandela is an insubstantial figurehead. He remains a powerful personality with a sharp mind and considerable stamina. He is politically astute and determined to remain a force in areas of importance to himself such as the choice of key personnel and the policies of reconciliation.

Indeed, Mandela is a highly skilled politician who frequently prefers to play a behind the scenes role, delegating unpopular issues to his deputies. At least in part, his massive popularity is based upon the perception, not always accurate, that he is a statesman unconcerned with the petty or dirty elements of partisan politics.

The creation of the image of Mandela as the towering statesman has the unintended consequence of making many of his cabinet colleagues, especially Thabo Mbeki, appear small minded political pygmies. However, he has recognised the limits to the role he can play both in terms of his age, lack of experience in handling complex policy issues, and the unique context of an interim government.

It is in the nature of mass society and modern communication to personalise and trivialise complex issues. Mandela has been both a victim and a beneficiary of this. The Mandela factor has been useful in placing the emergent South African democracy on the global agenda: it has been destructive in creating mass fears of life without Madiba.

In essence, however, fears about Mandela's health are not fears about the man at all. Even if he were 50 and in perfect health, the level of anxiety would remain high. The harsh reality is that many observers are not confident that any leader or government, however competent and well intentioned,

can overcome South Africa's legacy of racism and poverty.

A pause in history

In many ways the interim executive in South Africa represents a 'pause in history'. It has been characterised by a unique government of national unity and a collegial leadership style.

It has, as yet, not reflected some of the near universal trends in the exercise of executive power such as the centralisation of power and authority in the office of the president or prime minister, the institutionalisation of executive power, the decline of Parliament and the creation of informal systems of influence based upon the patronage of the leader.

It seems almost inevitable that these trends will also develop in the South Africa of the future. Indeed, they existed in all the pre-Mandela cabinets and have roots deep within society. The 'personal' presidency of Nelson Mandela is unlikely to survive its incumbent and a majority of South Africa's political elite seems to have chosen the strong state rather than the model of emasculated government.

Indeed, if the thrust of the ANC constitutional proposals are ultimately accepted, South Africa will continue to have a system based more upon Westminster than upon a separation of powers. Despite the importance of the Bill of Rights and Constitutional Court, the Constitution will give the executive the foundation to accumulate considerable powers – the rejection of a genuine separation of executive-legislature power makes this all but inevitable.

Allied to the increasingly centralist direction of ANC thinking, in part a reaction to the increasingly confederalist demands of Inkatha's Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his ethnic constituency, the prospects for genuine federalism – not entirely extinguished in the Interim Constitution – appear increasingly bleak. Centralisation of power in the hands of central government and within the executive itself appears to be the most likely outcome.

It is probable that Mandela's successors will, ironically, have more in common with their NP predecessors than the master under whom they served their apprenticeship. ꞮⱢⱣꞬ

MANDELA AND *AMABOKOBOKO*:
Nationalising South Africa

By Douglas Booth
University of Otago

The National Sports Council's decision to retain the Springbok emblem raises questions about the relationship between sporting symbols and national unification. Booth presents evidence to suggest positive shifts in attitude towards the Springbok. However, he concludes that more needs doing before black South Africans will embrace an emblem with such a tainted history.

A t the behest of President Nelson Mandela and the Minister of Sport, Steve Tshwete, officials from the National Sports Council have agreed to retain the Springbok as the emblem and sobriquet of the national rugby team.

The decision raises an important question about the construction of national identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Can, as Mandela and Tshwete insist, the Springbok emblem 'nationalise' South Africans? In other words, will the Springbok mould South Africa's people into one nation with common feelings of loyalty and belonging to each other?

Nationalism and sport

Theoretically, the answer to this question is yes. Most social observers acknowledge that sport draws together disparate political, ideological, religious, ethnic and racial interests by presenting them as a natural community.

Grant Jarvie identifies three ways that sport creates senses of national identity. First, sport is 'a form of symbolic action which states the case for the nation itself'. In this sense, victories incarnate positive images of national virtues, strengths and way of life. Likewise, hosts of international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games, display national wealth, technical expertise and organisational competence.

Second, sport provides 'shared memories'. Occasionally, these may act as 'turning points for national history' and help forge ideas about a 'common destiny'. And third, the symbols, icons, anthems and songs of representative teams separate and distinguish nations from each other.

Yet we cannot simply assume that emblems such as the Springbok will automatically 'nationalise' diverse peoples. South Africa's peoples traditionally shared few common historical, linguistic, religious, symbolic or sporting ties. Furthermore, these peoples proffered vastly different visions of the future nation.

Given this past, the current government clearly faces immense obstacles in forging one nation. Hence any verdict about the Springbok as a tool of nationalisation cannot simply rely on theoretical assumptions. Rather, it must examine the specific circumstances.

Springbok in history

The Springbok emblem became subject of heated debate early in the negotiation phase of South Africa's political transition. In 1991 Sam Ramsamy, then chairman of the interim National Olympic Committee, announced that athletes would not wear the Springbok emblem at the Barcelona Olympic Games. It symbolises 'too many hurtful associations' and 'must go', he said.

Will the Springbok emblem mould South Africa's people into one nation with common feelings?

Ramsamy felt the emblem symbolises 'too many hurtful associations' and 'must go'

Photograph courtesy of Natal Newspapers

Rugby fans celebrate the Springbok World Cup victory in Durban

FW de Klerk swore that the Springbok was 'worn with pride by every South African regardless of race'

In 1921, the Springboks refused to play against Maoris, describing them as 'kaffirs'

Black Springboks valued the emblem, but only as a symbol of sporting excellence

Ramsamy's decision outraged many. Louis Pienaar, the Minister of Education, described it as 'a slap in the face of all South Africans'; correspondents in the white press howled indignation; students from the University of Stellenbosch marched in protest; the leader of the far right Herstigte Nasionale Party, Jaap Marais, suggested that the police charge Ramsamy; a vehement state president FW de Klerk swore that the Springbok was 'worn with pride by every South African regardless of race'. Everywhere, defenders insisted that the emblem predated apartheid.

The evidence, however, is unequivocal: until the late 1970s the Springbok was exclusively white. Prime Minister John Vorster told Parliament this in 1971:

> *"The Springbok team is not representative of South Africa. It has never been that. It has never claimed to be representative of the whole of South Africa. It is representative of whites."*

Even before the National Party introduced apartheid, mixed sport was taboo. Between 1888 and 1970 – when cricket began its boycott – South Africa played 172 tests but not one against India, Pakistan or the West Indies.

On their first rugby tour of New Zealand in 1921, the Springboks refused to play against Maoris, describing them as 'kaffirs'. Sports officials even insisted that foreign teams exclude individual black players such as All Black George Nepia in 1928 and English cricketer Ranji Duleepsinghji in 1929.

Just as the Nazis allowed only Aryans to represent Germany, only whites could play for South Africa. This was especially true in rugby. British immigrants introduced rugby to (black and white) South Africans last century, but Afrikaners appropriated the game.

Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon claim that rugby symbolised the 'convictions, aspirations and dreams' of Afrikaners:

> *"...attached to their Voortrekker past, proud of their civilising mission in a savage land, perceiving themselves as elected by God to reign on earth, conscious of their vocation as warriors – not soldiers of freemen under arms – inspired by faith and an uncompromising moral ethic to defend the cause of their people and their God, the Afrikaner people ... conquered the game".*

And the Springbok, chosen by rugby captain Paul Roos on the first tour of Britain in 1906, became the passionate symbol of the white Afrikaner nation.

Blacks neither passively accepted the Springbok nor its representatives. They vociferously supported the Springboks' opponents. Even Mandela admits he rooted for opposing teams during apartheid.

The international boycott of South African sport forced the National Party to modify its sports policy in the early 1970s. But it was almost 10 years before Errol Tobias became the first black rugby Springbok.

...egrated representative sport should have united South Africans. In reality it merely gave a handful of exceptionally talented black athletes temporary respite from apartheid – be it for 10 seconds, 15 rounds or 80 minutes. Black Springboks valued the emblem, but only as a symbol of sporting excellence: they suffered no illusions about their social worth. Tobias, for example, says that it was not until April 27, 1994, that he felt like a real South African.

Springboks or Proteas?

In 1990 officials from the disadvantaged and establishment camps began negotiating democratic structures in sport. Progress varied. In some sports, notably rugby, the Springbok emblem was a major source of division.

Mluleki George, president of the National Sports Congress (NSC), the Sports Council's predecessor, said that there was 'no way we will compromise' on apartheid symbols. Officials of the old sports establishment were just as determined. Danie Craven, president of the Rugby Board, declared the Springbok 'non-negotiable'.

The mainstream English and Afrikaans press also rallied behind the Springbok. Several newspapers ran polls which they said 'proved overwhelming support' for the Springbok. The black press presented a different perspective. *City Press* columnist Jon Qwelane summed up general black sentiments:

"Those who hanker after the Springbok are reliving past glories; but, sadly, those glories were gained by locking others out because of their race."

After polling its affiliates the NSC announced in March 1992 that the Protea would replace the Springbok. Every sport complied except rugby. A few months later, shortly after the International Rugby Board awarded it the right to host the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the NSC affiliated Rugby Football Union unveiled its 'interim emblem': a leaping Springbok, vertical rugby ball and four Proteas.

But the inclusion of the Proteas was no concession. The Springbok retained its privileged position in the emblem and the name: no one was about to call South African representatives Springbok-Proteas

or Protea-Springboks, and certainly not Proteas.

Two years later, in mid-1994, rugby asked the NSC to approve use of the interim emblem in the 1995 World Cup. Citing the Springbok's economic and marketing potential, the NSC agreed.

South Africa's victory in the 1995 cup, combined with the team's 'softer' image, secured the Springbok unexpected support. Mandela, ever the conciliator and no doubt conscious of white votes in upcoming municipal elections, asked the NSC to reconsider the emblem. He said:

"There is a real possibility that if we accept the Springbok we will unite our country as never before."

In deference to Mandela, the NSC appointed a special commission. But it too rejected the Springbok on the historical evidence. It was only after private consultations with Mandela and Tshwete that NSC officials finally acquiesced.

Transforming the Springbok

Can the Springbok unite South Africans as Mandela claims? Like all emblems, the Springbok contains many, and constantly changing, meanings.

Some right wing Afrikaners have disavowed the Springbok and call Springbok players 'traitors'. Said a spokesman for the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging:

"I support any team that plays against the Springboks...the players have no national pride whatsoever. It is the Mandela team. Mandela is an enemy".

After the World Cup one newspaper correspondent even blamed the destruction of the Afrikaner nation on mixed sport:

"In 1970 Jaap Marais said that it would start with one or two Maoris in the All Black team and it would finish with black majority rule. How right he was. Saturday's victory was another nail in the coffin of the Afrikaner."

For others, the Springbok symbolises competing and contradictory emotions, sometimes simultaneously. Observers at South African games during the Rugby World Cup noted switches in mood among

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Some right wing Afrikaners have disavowed the Springbok and call Springbok players 'traitors'

*Amabokoboko
linguistically
Africanised
the Springbok
and gave
black people a
stake in the
team*

white fans – one moment they were rude and racist, the next they cheered for Chester Williams, the sole black Springbok.

Still others concede the possibility of new identities emerging in a changing South Africa. Older blacks report their children worshipping 'pale faced' Springboks and refusing to discuss the emblem's history.

There have been positive changes in attitude and behaviour in South Africa. Some black people celebrated the Springbok victory in 1995, dancing through the townships, singing the theme song *Shosholoza*, and shouting *viva amabokoboko*. Indeed, the latter, more than Mandela's blessing, seems to justify retaining the Springbok.

Amabokoboko – 'the boks, the boks' – first appeared on the front page of the *Sowetan* following the Springboks victory over Australia in the opening round of the World Rugby Cup. *Amabokoboko* linguistically Africanised the Springbok and gave black people a stake in the team.

*The innate
human desire
to look back
and search for
meaning will
lead to the
discovery of
the
Springbok's
racist origins*

Barry Hindess and Etienne Balibar both alert us to the possibilities of linguistically reconstructing identity. For Balibar 'the linguistic construction of identity is by definition open'. Individuals, he says, do not chose their mother tongue, nor can they change it at will. Yet the possibility always exists for people to appropriate language and assign it new meaning.

Conclusion

Apartheid South Africa comprised many languages including a 'white' and 'black' political language. The term Springbok traditionally reflected the incompatibility of those languages. Is it possible to translate those languages and produce a new national language which will act as a foundation for a new national identity?

*While
amabokoboko
gives Africans a
linguistic stake
in rugby it does
not give them a
physical
presence in the
team*

Grant Jarvie warns of the difficulties when he says that 'the quest for identity inevitably involves nostalgia'. In this sense the term *amabokoboko* poses a problem because the innate human desire to look back and search for meaning will lead to the discovery of the Springbok's racist origins.

Two pieces of evidence confirm this line of thought. First, the euphoria at South Africa's

victory at the World Cup quickly evaporated. *City Press's* parliamentary reporter Rafiq Rohan wrote:

> *"It's going to take a lot more than a smiling and gleeful President sporting a Springbok jersey to get everyone in the country to accept the symbol and colours of the historic enemy, the cultural, social, and political enslaver, and to proclaim them with pride."*

Sowetan columnist Victor Tsuai agreed:

> *"No amount of hype and spurious explanation will convince blacks that politically or otherwise, the Springbok is the right symbol in this day and age. The whites have had their opportunity to embrace everybody with their Springbok tentacles but have sadly left in too late."*

Second, while many South Africans have decided to forgive, they have also vowed to remember the past. They have made a commitment to making the past accessible through publicly funded libraries, museums and archives – including those dedicated to sport. Such institutions will ensure that the memory of the tainted Springbok survives.

While *amabokoboko* gives Africans a linguistic stake in rugby it does not give them a physical presence in the team, much less confer ownership. Until they contain more black players there seems little prospect of Springbok teams uniting all South Africans.

Clearly, the next move must come from the Rugby Football Union. ᴵᴾᴱᴳ

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ECONOMIC MONITOR

Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa

Rate of satisfaction/dissatisfaction among the poor
(% of poor respondents assessing their living conditions)

Very Satisfied: 3, 4, 2
Satisfied: 17, 17, 13
Neither/nor: 10, 9, 4
Dissatisfied: 45, 42, 31
Very dissatisfied: 26, 28, 51

Rural — Urban — Metropolitan

Where the government can help the poor
(Share of respondents naming indicated features ['000])

Jobs: 52, 59, 79
Piped water: 50, 18, 5
Electricity: 31, 28, 16
Food aid: 31, 30, 33
Housing: 27, 51, 55
Clinics: 19, 7, 6
Schools: 19, 21, 20
Roads: 16, 12, 2
Peace: 8, 13, 31

Rural — Urban — Metropolitan

TAXI REVOLUTION ON THE ROCKS?

By Meshack M Khosa
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Originally perceived as a shining example of free market enterprise, South Africa's minibus taxi industry – worth roughly R6 billion in asset value – is fraught with tension and conflict. To restructure it, and keep all players happy, massive changes are needed.

The minibus taxi industry captured the largest slice of the African commuting market and was celebrated as a beacon of hope

R eferring to the taxi industry, the *Financial Mail* argued in a recent article that what was once hailed as the first deregulated model to which other sectors should aspire had virtually become the 'graveyard' of free enterprise. It further argued that discussion forums have given way to battles and 'terrorism'.

Although emotive and exaggerated, the *Financial Mail* article captured some of the fundamental problems facing the taxi industry today.

The decade of the 1990s is remarkable not only for the birth of a new political order in South Africa, but it has also marked the near collapse of one of the greatest symbols of African economic empowerment in recent times. Established in the 1970s, the minibus taxi industry captured the single largest slice of the African commuting market and was celebrated as a beacon of hope and the showpiece of free market enterprise.

However, by the early 1990s it had started to show signs of decline: profit rates plummeted, violence in the industry became endemic, and several taxi operators who had accumulated huge profits in the 1980s were forced out of the business in the 1990s. This article reviews the nature of the taxi industry in the 1990s and also assesses some proposals from the National Taxi Task Team to restructure the industry.

46% of Africans in metropolitan areas typically travelled by taxi

The national transport policy process has become another site of struggle, negotiation and contestation. The first section of the article surveys passenger transport in South

Africa and the characteristics of taxi operators and commuters, and the second section looks at policy process.

The taxi industry in context

❏ Passenger transport in SA

There are three popular modes of urban transport in South Africa: buses (provided by municipalities and the private sector), minibus taxis (numbering some 100 000 countrywide and mostly provided by Africans) and trains (state provided). A national transport survey in 1992 concluded that 46% of Africans in metropolitan areas of South Africa typically travelled by taxi, 20% by bus, 13% by train, and the rest either walk or use other means of transport.

The taxi industry increased its share of the African commuter market from virtually zero some 15 years ago to 46% in 1992. This percentage increased to over 50% this year. Assuming there are 100 000 minibuses in South Africa one can estimate that the minibus industry is worth some R6 billion in asset value. To examine the challenges facing the taxi industry in the 1990s, a survey of taxi operators, drivers and commuters was conducted in Durban.

❏ Durban operators and commuters

Two taxi surveys were conducted in four taxi ranks in Durban in June 1995. The first survey covered some 41 taxi operators (only three were women drivers) and the second covered 77 taxi commuters (half the number of respondents were women taxi

commuters). The purpose of the surveys was to establish general characteristics of the taxi industry in 1995.

❏ Gender

From a survey total of 77 taxi commuters, it was revealed that 51% of commuters were women and 49% men. This indicates that slightly more women use taxis as a means of public transport than do men. The taxi operator survey, however, revealed the opposite. Out of the 41 operators surveyed, 38 were men (93%) and only three (7%) were women. All three women held positions as drivers and none as taxi owners.

❏ Age

Some 79% of the commuters interviewed were under 45 years old, with the majority being concentrated in the 31 to 45 age group, followed by 35% in the 16 to 30 year group. Much the same age distribution was evident among taxi operators. Sixty nine percent of operators interviewed were under 40, followed by 27% concentrated in the 21 to 30 group. For commuters, the third highest age category (18%) was 46 to 60 years, and for operators (24%) it was 41 to 50. This indicates that younger people tend to be most likely employed in, and users of, the taxi industry.

❏ Education

In both the taxi operator survey and the commuter survey, the majority of respondents had educational qualifications ranging from a Standard 6 to a Standard 10 (54% and 44% respectively). In both surveys this was followed by 32% of taxi operators with an education ranging from Sub-Standard A to Standard 5, and 25% of commuters. Of the commuters, 10% had a matric and a diploma, compared with 5% of operators. Again, more taxi commuters had obtained a Standard 10 and a degree (6%) than the taxi operators (2%). On the other hand, while only 7% of the operators interviewed had received no formal education, 15% of commuters had received no formal education.

❏ Marital status

Of the 41 taxi operators interviewed, 48% were married, 48% were single, and only one operator was divorced. The majority of the taxi commuters (60%) were still single, which may be attributed to the fact that most

of them are still relatively young. The other 40% of commuters interviewed were married.

❏ Length of service/use

The maximum number of years of service for the taxi operators was 15 years, with 17% of those interviewed having 11 to 15 years of service. The majority of operators (41%) tended, however, to have between one to five years service, followed by 37% having six to 10 years service. Disaggregating the length of service of operators into length of service for owners and operators reveals some similarities and differences.

In both instances, 9% of respondents had entered the industry as either owners or drivers only in the last year. This low figure may be attributed to the declining profit rates recorded for the taxi industry over the past 10 years. The majority of taxi owners (43%) appear to have six to 10 years involvement in the industry, while the majority of drivers (45%) fall into the two to five years service category. This may be due to the fact that many owners were initially drivers.

The next highest figures for both groups is 29% of owners who have two to five years service and 32% of drivers who have six to 10 years service. Some 19% of owners and 14% of drivers had more than 11 to 15 years service, with both groups having no respondents with more than 16 years service.

Regarding length of use of the taxi industry, the majority of commuters (33%) interviewed have been using the service for one to five years. This was followed by 23% using it for more than 16 years, 21% between 11 to 15 years and 18% between six to 10 years. The lowest figure was naught to 11 months, with only 5% of commuters falling into this category.

❏ Reasons for employment in/use

The majority of taxi owners (66%) said they entered the industry as a means to make money. This was followed by 24% of the owners initially being taxi drivers and then accumulating enough wealth to buy their own vehicles. The remaining 9% of the taxi owners used retrenchment money to buy their own taxis and become operators. Approximately 73% of the drivers claimed they became drivers as it was the only

Younger people tend to be those most likely employed in, and users of, the taxi industry

The majority of taxi owners (66%) said they entered the industry as a means to make money

Approximately 73% of the drivers claimed they became drivers as it was the only employment they could get

The majority of commuters interviewed said they used taxis because they were so cheap

employment they could get, while 13% said they enjoyed being drivers. Only 5% of the drivers said they had become drivers because the wages were good. Nearly 68% of the drivers interviewed received less than R300 per week (or about R1 200 per month), and about a third (32%) earned more than R300 per week. Nine percent of the drivers gave other reasons for becoming drivers.

The majority of commuters interviewed (56%), said they used taxis because they were cheap. Some 93% of them paid less than R3,75 for a one way journey, with the majority (58%) paying between R2,26 and R3,50. More than a quarter (26%) of the commuters used taxis because they considered them reliable.

It has been noted that taxis are much more efficient than buses and trains in terms of time. About 37% of the commuters interviewed said their journeys took them only 10 to 15 minutes. Overall, 79% of commuters' journeys are less than half an hour. Only 4% of commuters gave not having another means of transport as their reason for using taxis. This is not surprising considering that 90% of those interviewed did not own cars. Some 14% of commuters gave other reasons for their use of taxis.

Taxis are much more efficient than buses and trains in terms of time

❏ Dangers

Safety is the most commonly cited problem for both taxi drivers and owners. Although 39% of operators feared passengers who carried weapons, an overwhelming majority (53%) were afraid of male drivers from rival taxi organisations. These are valid fears considering the endemic violence in the taxi industry. Bad and reckless driving by other minibus operators was cited by 26% of drivers as their most feared danger, while 17% feared rude passengers. Some 7% gave other reasons.

Safety is a common fear among drivers and owners. A majority were afraid of drivers from rival organisations

With regard to dangers confronting commuters, the survey made provision only for commuters' experiences of overcrowding: 74% of people acknowledged having experienced this problem. Despite the potential dangers of overcrowding, such as a greater chance of having an accident and a higher risk of (sexual) harassment in the vehicle, 60% of respondents interviewed indicated that they would continue to use taxis, while 24% were undecided and only 6% indicated that they would not continue to use this mode of transport in the future.

❏ Consultative process

Although the National Department of Transport is currently involved in a consultative process with taxi operators in order to introduce a new transport policy, a surprisingly low number of operators (22%) were aware of the process. Although the commuters interviewed were not asked whether they knew of the consultative process, it is unlikely they would have because consultation includes only taxi owners and government officials.

Towards a taxi industry policy

Transport policy formulation in general and taxi policy formulation in particular, in the 1990s, has taken place through the National Transport Policy Forum (1992 to 1994), the Transport Policy Review (after April 1994), and the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) from 1995.

❏ The National Taxi Task Team

As part of the Transport Policy Review process, the Minister of Transport established a National Taxi Task Team consisting of nine taxi industry representatives, nine government representatives, and nine specialist advisers in March 1995. The NTTT held over 90 days of public hearings on the taxi industry in some 32 venues in all nine provinces between August and December 1995.

The task team submitted a number of policy recommendations to the Minister in January this year, suggesting restructuring the industry into cooperatives receiving some financial assistance from both the private and public sectors. Critical issues raised at three sampled venues are summarised below.

Taxi industry public hearings

❏ Empangeni: KwaZulu-Natal

The public hearings took place from August 28 to 31, 1995. Despite extensive public advertising the response was very poor and disappointing. The number of people attending the hearings ranged from four to 45 during the three days. By the end of the last session, 38 people, mostly other taxi owners, had addressed the panel. Other people who gave oral evidence included a few drivers, commuters, a municipal official, a traffic policeman, a member of the provincial ambulance service and a

Table summarising key issues at three public hearings

Issues	Empangeni	Mmabatho	Newcastle
Subsidies	Subsidise taxis	Financial assistance	Subsidise the industry
Permits	Local Road Transport Board (LRTB) issues permits without proper consultation Too many permits issued to one person Fraudulent permits and a trade in permits	Prohibit civil servants from owning taxis Permits issued to persons without taxis. Non-retraction of permits when vehicles are sold. LRTBs not representative	There are police who own taxis in the industry Vehicles designed to carry 20 passengers should be classified as a taxi
Capital and insurance	High premiums	Government should offer financial assistance	Premiums very high
Prices of vehicle	High prices of new vehicles	Keep interest on minibus vehicles within reasonable limits	Vehicles are expensive Recovered taxis are found all over in police stations/camps but are not re-issued to the original owners
Petrol and spare parts	High purchase price of petrol and spares	Frequent changes in the price of petrol	Need for a mechanism where taxi operators can get spare parts at reduced prices
Law enforcement	Harassment	Some corrupt officials receive bribes	Government should deal ruthlessly with those involved in violence Police presence in the ranks could reduce violence
Communication and consultation	Need improved communication channels between taxi operators and between the industry and government	The necessity for cross-border cooperation	Need for the government to work closer with the taxi industry
Ranks	Government should provide more ranks and also provide facilities	Improve rank facilities	Government should provide more facilities
Training	Government should provide money for training for driving skills, passenger care, management, and business skills	Need for driver and owner training	Require in service training attended by drivers New applicants wishing to enter the industry should not be able to unless they have done training
Violence	This area is not plagued by taxi violence. Conflict could be settled by consultation	Relative peace in the industry	Taxi feuds are caused by the government issuing permits in great numbers
Road building and maintenance	State of roads in rural areas appalling Need road maintenance and construction of rural roads	Improve road network	Need immediate action
Registration of drivers	Warm response that drivers should be registered with the National Economic Development and Labour Commission (NEDLAC)	Government should help with pensions, insurance and medical aid for drivers Create a pool of drivers, they should have three years' experience as a driver before being allowed to obtain a public driving permit	Need for harmonisation and clearance of drivers from previous employers
Financial assistance	Governments should offer financial assistance to defray administration costs of taxi associations	Create mechanisms for financial assistance	Government should subsidise the operations of taxi association offices at national, regional and local levels Audit VAT and petrol levies paid by the taxi industry – ensure that some of the money is brought back to the taxi industry

provincial Reconstruction and Development Programme organiser.

❏ Newcastle

The three day public hearing in Newcastle was held from September 4 to 6 1995. Public attendance at the hearing was equally limited. Audiences ranged from six to 15 people. Those attending included mainly representatives from long and short distance taxi associations, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the Empangeni Bus Company. The majority of submissions were from taxi association representatives.

❏ Mmabatho

The hearing was held in a venue accommodating around 100 people. The representatives consisted mainly of operators, a few commuters, one SAPS member, and a director from the transport training forum.

Discussion of main issues

Although attendance was generally poor and disappointing, in the majority of task team public hearings, a variety of issues were raised, and both long distance and short distance associations were represented. Most submissions to the task team were prepared in advance, rather than being simply reactions to what previous speakers had said. Few taxi drivers made submissions, fewer women made submissions or even attended the hearings and only a small contingent of community representatives gave submissions.

Overall, there was a strong plea for the Government of National Unity to get involved in the taxi industry and intervene to restructure it, produce new regulations, introduce retraining and assist the industry.

Accompanying this was a view that all taxi operators should be brought into a single framework or code of conduct, enforced by government together with stronger powers of control by taxi associations. There were strong views about the permit system and how its present operation undermined the control and authority of taxi associations.

Another priority issue was training needs for the taxi industry (business training, training to run organisations, driver training and

even commuter training). In most task team public hearings the question of government subsidies toward taxis was the most popular subject. In general, the expectation on the part of operators was that the subsidy should be in the form of direct monetary payment to taxi owners.

Violence and crime were also raised frequently by operators, followed by pleas for the government to intervene. Comments were also made about police involvement in the industry and inadequate policing related to both vehicle theft and the taxi conflicts.

What emerged from several hearings was the need for a unified or amalgamated but reorganised industry. There are many taxi organisations, estimated at 400, some claiming to be national bodies. Although this emerged at several hearings held throughout the country, there will be resistance to industry restructuring as it would tamper with some of the privileges enjoyed by a few within the current structure of the taxi industry. There are also well established networks of patronage which will make it difficult for any effective restructuring in the industry to take place.

One vital silence in transport policy formulation is recognition of the public, especially commuters. Their participation in transport policy planning is insignificant. The consultation process has also not had strong representation from rural areas, metropolitan peripheries, and small towns.

Moreover, the Transport Policy Review attracted negative criticism from civil society organisations. The fact that public hearings which were organised by the National Taxi Task Team in 1995 were poorly attended in several cities and towns indicates not only poor communication between government, the taxi industry and commuters, but also an inappropriate mechanism for resolving long term problems through short-cut mechanisms.

In March 1996, the taxi industry threatened a national mass action campaign and allegedly suspended (or threatened to suspend) further discussions with the Minister of Transport by pulling out of the task teams!

NTTT recommendations

The NTTT addressed most of the issues raised during public hearings, and the

interim report was submitted to Cabinet in January 1996. It received warm approval. The report calls for the establishment of cooperatives, registration of taxi operators and associations, and route based permits. The move to cooperativess calls for business management training for drivers, which could be provided by the Department of Trade and Industry. It is estimated that it would cost about R1 million per cooperative in the form of assistance from government.

Co-ops are expected to be self financing in less than two years. The task team report also asks for assistance of R500 000 to each co-op to employ a core management team. Further assistance of R450 000 to each co-op is envisaged to pay directors' fees and management costs for the first year. Though co-ops are intended to become self financing after the first year of limited support, there may be need for additional support from government during the second year. The NTTT report suggests that government should budget 70% of the first year figure for this purpose.

The task team report recommends R100 million and a cash fund of at least R10 million to guarantee finance houses against co-op members defaulting. In return, finance houses must agree to reduce rates from 10% above prime to 3%. Government is expected to help co-ops sidestep the present insurance rates of 25% of the value of vehicles, by enabling each to have its own insurance company with capital supplied by government in the form of cash and guarantees.

This is the first time in the history of the taxi industry that practical steps are being taken to restructure it by involving a wide range of stakeholders. However, the exclusion of the private sector – especially finance houses, employed drivers, and commuters – from the consultative process could make it difficult for some of the proposals to be 'owned' and defended by various sectors.

Other issues in the organised taxi industry also need to be resolved, especially the perception that a coterie of taxi barons controls access to the ranks, routes and entry to the industry in general. Another perception is that a cartel of taxi associations, linked to Mafia elements, controls who operates where and when. Apart from the profitability crisis which is evident within the industry, several studies

cite these perceptions as underlying causes of taxi conflicts.

In fact, a restructured industry may allow new operators to come on board and others may be forced out of the industry due to the current distorted economics of the industry. The greatest test for the task team and the government is to strike a balance between serving the needs of current taxi operators, drivers and commuters, and those of new operators who may take advantage of a newly created conducive environment.

Conclusion

In contrast to previous transport policy planning formulation processes, the government consulted with different role players and institutions to identify the issues currently affecting the efficient provision of transport. Future transport policy (at least in theory) is likely to promote coordinated affordable public transport as a safe, convenient and affordable social service.

The taxi business is faced with a number of contradictions. Their resolution requires massive and dramatic restructuring not only of the industry itself, but of the South African economy.

The way the taxi industry is structured is a product of the past political and economic landscape of South Africa. The Ministry of Transport, although committed to public consultation, is seeking in some cases technocratic solutions which may fail to restore profitability in the taxi industry. Conflict in the industry is unfortunately likely to continue because of conflicting interests.

Firstly, operators would like to see profitability in the taxi industry restored. To ensure that this happens, operators are engaged in a battle with the government to allocate funds to the taxi industry. Secondly, operators generally underpay their overworked drivers – who are largely recruited from rural areas – as a strategy to accumulate capital. Thirdly, taxi operators fight among themselves, especially with those who cross the boundaries (ranks and routes) agreed upon by established operators.

The task team's approach also needs to be supplemented with creativity, innovation and inclusion of sectors currently outside the process. ⊔⊏⊏⊔

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The Debt and the Deficit:
What Are We Talking About?

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South Africa's budget deficit for 1996/1997 is forecast to drop to 5,1% of expected GDP, but depreciation of the rand means that government debt will probably rise to R280 billion or 56% of expected GDP. The national budget should not be used as a vehicle to bring about changes to the unemployment rate, since excessive deficits can cause long term structural costs and constrain foreign capital inflows. If the Government is able to reduce the deficit gradually, the macroeconomy will be more productive in the long term.

Many confuse the debt with the deficit

If the national government's expenditures are higher than revenues in a particular year, then the national budget has a deficit. The deficit is a flow: it happens over the year in which the government spends more than it takes in by way of tax revenue. If you or I were to do this we would have to borrow the shortfall. The same is true of the government. It must borrow to finance a deficit in any year.

Say the government ran a deficit last year. It financed the deficit by borrowing money for 10 years. This year it again runs a deficit, partly because it has to spend money paying interest. This second deficit is also financed by borrowing. The government's debt is now the sum of the two deficits.

Raising taxes would raise revenue

Many confuse the debt with the deficit. The debt of the government is the sum of all its past deficits. It is a stock rather than a flow and is measured at a point in time rather than over time like the deficit flow. So the total government debt should be larger than the deficit.

For instance, over the 1994/1995 year the deficit was R25 billion or 5,7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By comparison, Italy's percentage is lower. However, the total government debt measured at the end of the 1994/1995 year was R245 billion, and this amounted to 55% of GDP or similar to that of France.

The economists' view

The budget deficit and its size is a subject of great debate between economists. What follows outlines the important features of the various approaches to the budget deficit. It is very difficult to say who is correct in this debate.

Proponents of the various ideas maintain they have empirical support for their position. However, one side's empirical support is usually the vehicle for much derision by other participants in the debate.

But for those interested in public policy and the analysis of government decisions, it is still possible to examine each view of the deficit and draw on the conclusions of each to formulate a response to the problem of the deficit.

A popular, older view

One way for a government to avoid a deficit is to raise the rates of taxation and the coverage of taxes. This would raise revenue. All that the government need do is raise taxes until the new level of revenue matches the desired higher level of expenditures.

But raising taxes is very unpopular, so governments avoid it if they possibly can. In fact, governments quickly discover that they can replace tax revenues with a budget deficit. As taxes are so unpopular, lowering them will win votes. We all know that. But does this have any implications for the macroeconomy?

Lowering taxes leaves more money in the hands of private individuals and households in the economy. Many economists think that if you give a representative household an extra R100, it will want to spend most of it, say R90, and only a small portion will be saved, in this case 10%.

Thinking of the whole economy, then, most of the tax cut makes its way back into the economy as spending on consumer goods and services. What economists call aggregate demand will be higher. And firms will respond by placing more orders to meet this higher demand. As more is produced, satisfying those orders, GDP will rise.

Now we see the government's motive for substituting a deficit for taxes. It looks as if it is a win-win situation for the government. Tax payers are happy and the macro-economy will improve.

Although the link between employment and GDP is a complicated one, many economists would argue that as the GDP increases more jobs will be created.

This is the most popular approach to the budget deficit and one sees versions of it all the time. A great deal of the analysis of the national budget presented in parliament this month is based on this view, which is standard.

We all know the macroeconomy goes through periods of strong economic growth – boom – which can be followed by a recession.

During recessions, government comes under a great deal of pressure to do something about the lower level of economic activity. It

is often called upon to spend more, so as to nudge the economy out of recession. This is nothing more than the standard view of the budget deficit applied to the business cycle.

Another version

The standard view of the budget deficit also has implications for the macroeconomy in the future.

The link to the future is through the effect of the government's borrowing on interest rates. With a deficit there is a new borrower in financial markets. The government is a new source of demand. And in any market where there is additional demand, the price determined in that market will adjust.

The interest rate is the price that is determined in these markets. Thus a higher deficit financed by more government borrowing domestically pushes up interest rates. The reduction in savings, as consumers are spending, will add to the upward movement in interest rates.

Higher interest rates affect the macroeconomy. Firstly, they cause some consumers to put off purchases of items that yield benefits for many years, as financing costs rise. Thus, while the tax cut expands consumption, the higher interest rate will reduce the overall expansion in consumer spending, especially on those expenditures by households that are really investments, such as education.

Secondly, many government expenditure decisions are affected by interest rates. For instance, the interest rate is an important variable in the decision to go into debt to acquire a house, especially if one's income is low. A higher interest rate will mean it is more expensive to acquire a house. Thus, even though there is a critical shortage of houses, individuals may seek other alternatives if faced with higher interest rates – and government funds earmarked to assist homebuilders may not be used.

Thirdly, many firms in the private sector use the interest rate to help them decide whether to increase productive capacity. A higher interest rate may mean that the future profits from a proposed investment, such as the addition of another shift at a factory, are lower as firms typically borrow in order to invest. The firm in this case could decide to scrap the project altogether and many jobs could be lost.

As taxes are so unpopular, lowering them will win votes

A boom can be followed by a depression

Higher interest rates affect the macro-economy

Like our natural resources, capital stock must not be wasted

All of these expenditures – in education, housing and factories – add to the ability of the economy to create value, not only this year but for many future years. Economists call this ability the capital stock of the economy.

A higher rate of interest that results from expanding budget deficits reduces this capital stock. In other words, future generations of South Africans will suffer as we leave them an economy that is less productive. One must think of the capital stock in the same way we think of our natural resources: they must not be wasted.

Having the deficit too high does just that. A high deficit imposes a hidden cost on the macroeconomy now and for many years to come: the loss of long term productivity and jobs in the economy. So we would be better off with a reduction in the deficit. And, in fact, the higher the deficit is relative to GDP, the more likely are we to see these negative long term effects on the productive capacity of the macroeconomy.

The Ricardian approach

A tax cut this year means tax hikes in the future

More recently, an older view of the budget deficit has been revived. The Ricardian approach is becoming more widely accepted by economists and cannot be ignored.

This approach begins with the tax reduction of the standard view. We know that at the heart of the standard view is a reduction in taxes – as a result of which this year's deficit is higher.

Adherents of the Ricardian view argue that although taxes are lower now, one thing that we can be certain of is that they are going to be higher in the future. Typically, to finance a deficit a government will borrow for a fairly long time. Twenty years or more is not uncommon.

Economists maintain the budget cannot be used as a policy tool to change GDP

So at some stage in the future, not necessarily next year, the government is going to pay back the money it has borrowed. When it does pay back, taxes are going to be higher. So individuals in the economy get a tax break now but at the cost of higher taxes later. Economists who push the Ricardian view maintain that the standard model neglects future taxes.

Accepting that future taxes are going to be higher, by the time these taxes have to be paid, the people who benefited from the tax reduction may be dead. Thus they need not worry about future taxes. But many households have children, and they will bear the burden of higher future taxes. If you do not end up paying, your children will.

In addition, you know that the government has to pay interest on the amounts it borrows. So the typical household has to be careful of budget deficits. You cannot be fooled by a tax cut this year: it means tax hikes in the future. To avoid being out of pocket in the future, all of the tax cut in the current year needs to be saved. If invested appropriately this saving should grow at the rate of interest.

Notice how the Ricardian approach differs from the standard view. Central to the standard view was that most of the tax cut is spent. Central to the Ricardian view is that most of the tax cut is saved. With good reason it seems: to prepare for higher taxes in the future.

Under the standard view, as the tax cut was spent, firms selling consumer items placed more orders with their suppliers and, as these new orders were filled, GDP rose. But under the Ricardian view there is no additional spending.

The higher deficit of the government means it is dis-saving and households make up for this by saving more. For each R1 that the deficit rises, private saving rises by R1. So as the government injects money into the macroeconomy, private interests withdraw money.

Orders for items the government buys will be filled, but orders for consumer items will be cancelled. Output and thus GDP will not change and the only employment effect on the economy will be the movement of workers laid off from the consumer goods industries to jobs in those industries providing goods and services the government is buying.

The Ricardian view of the budget deficit's ability to alter GDP is very bleak. Economists supporting this view maintain the budget cannot be used as a policy tool to change GDP.

The government has to pay interest on any amount it borrows. Thus the future taxes are going to have to be more than the tax cut. And we know exactly by how much more: the interest payable on the debt. Private

savers must earn this interest. And they can earn interest if they lend to the government.

We know the government will be borrowing. The government can run a deficit and borrow, as it will find willing domestic private lenders. Thus there is no sleight of hand under the Ricardian approach. The government can borrow an equivalent amount to the tax cut. For this reason, the notion that replacing a cut in revenues with a deficit has no effect on GDP is sometimes known as Ricardian Equivalence.

Under the standard view of the deficit we saw that the very act of the government borrowing serves to drive up interest rates. This reduces investment and the long term ability of the economy to generate jobs, and output suffers.

Under the Ricardian viewpoint, for each R1 the government dis-saves (recall it is borrowing) individuals and households have to save an additional R1 to pay the higher future taxes. So, in aggregate, national savings does not change. Thus in financial markets, the interest rate does not have to rise as national savings will be sufficient to meet current investment demand. The capital stock of the economy will not fall, as was the case under the standard approach to government deficits taking into account interest rates.

Implications

One can draw some important policy conclusions using the various approaches to the budget deficit.

The popular version suggests that short term gains are possible with a higher budget deficit. As the government spends in the macroeconomy, incomes rise and thus spending rises. Firms respond by increasing output, providing short term employment gains.

Another version of this view suggests that as interest rates rise in the economy, the capital stock in future years will be lower. A lower capital stock means the economy will be less productive. This can cause long term employment losses.

This is not to say that all government expenditure is wasteful, but there are limits to what the government can do. A budget deficit relative to the size of GDP can be too large.

Another view of the effect of a budget deficit on the macroeconomy suggests there are no short term gains, as private savings matches the amount the government borrows. The budget is neutral in its effect on the macroeconomy in both the short and the long term. Fiscal policy cannot change GDP.

Many commentators on the size of the deficit and debt relative to GDP seem to suggest that a country should aim for ratios of 3% and 60% respectively. These figures apply to developed and developing countries alike.

One rationale is that at above these levels, interest on the national debt becomes a drain on government expenditures to such an extent that if government revenues do not match the growth of the economy, then the deficit would be even higher in the next year – and the interest cost to the government would then be even higher.

If this continues for a number of years, ballooning interest payments become the overriding concern of government, seriously curtailing its role in providing much needed expenditure on health, education and housing.

It appears, given current economic thinking concerning the budget deficit, that the government is limited in its ability to use the budget deficit as a major tool of economic policy.

Under one view, while there are immediate gains there are also future losses. This does not bode well for a government committed to creating half a million jobs a year – especially if the deficit to GDP ratio is twice the size considered reasonable by many economists.

At a deficit to GDP percentage of 6%, the long term productivity losses start to offset short term gains.

So it turns out that the budget can only be used to alleviate short term job losses from adverse changes to the business cycle. But that means running surpluses when in the upswing stage of the business cycle: something that is rarely done.

The Ricardian view suggests the government is powerless in the face of private reaction. Although this is an extreme view it is nevertheless instructive. Under

There are limits to what the government can do

Fiscal policy cannot change GDP

Over the next year government debt is expected to rise to R280 billion or 56% of expected GDP

Unemployment is still of concern and it is crucial that the government address the problem

this view, if foreign investors are unhappy with the size of the deficit it can be lowered with no adverse effects.

The budget deficit for 1996/1997 is forecast to be 5,1% of expected GDP, which is a lot lower than the actual outcome last year of 6% of GDP. Over the next year, government debt is expected to rise to R280 billion or 56% of expected GDP.

So even though the deficit as a percentage of GDP fell, the debt as a percentage of GDP rose. The reason: foreign debt is valued at current exchange rates and the depreciation of the rand resulted in increased foreign debt commitments. Thus while the current budget moves the deficit as a percentage of GDP lower, the closeness of the debt to GDP ratio to the 60% level is worrisome, and indicates the need for tight monetary policy to prevent further depreciations of the exchange rate.

The government does not want to cut the deficit too quickly as the short term effects will manifest themselves

Unemployment is still of concern. While it is very difficult to come up with a precise figure for the unemployment rate, there is no doubt that it is high and that it is crucial the government addresses the problem. But the national budget is not the vehicle to bring about changes to the unemployment rate: the so-called ability of the government to create jobs in the economy by increasing expenditure.

Analysis of South African labour markets seems to indicate that the problem of unemployment in this country is largely structural: the idea that unemployment is not responsive to changes in economic activity.

This is not surprising given the economic, social and political repression of apartheid.

But the government cannot correct one structural problem – unemployment – with another, namely the long term structural costs that excessive deficits can cause. In addition, no one doubts we can benefit from foreign capital inflows. But perception is everything in international financial markets. One important perception is the size of the government deficit, and this perception acts as a further constraint on the ability of the government to use the budget to increase employment.

In the latest budget the Minister of Finance committed the government to reducing deficit to 4% of GDP by 1998/1999, hopefully by cutting spending. This thinking seems to be very close to the current thinking concerning the deficit outlined above.

The government does not want to cut the deficit too quickly as the short term effects will manifest themselves. To bring about the ratio of 4% from just over 5%, over three more years, shows that the government is mindful of the short term effects. If – and it is a big if – it is able to do this, then the macroeconomy will be more productive in the long run. LPEG

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Rural Entrepreneurship
Measuring the magnitude of the challenge

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Relieving the plight of South Africa's rural millions is an intimidating prospect. An estimated 2,8 million new jobs are required to obtain a minimum subsistence income level in these areas, and for this to happen employment growth and economic progress are vital.

Each year an estimated 700 000 people migrate from the rural areas to the urban centres of South Africa in search of an opportunity for a better life. Most of them take up residence in the 'squatter camps' which now ring virtually every major city in the country.

There is perhaps no better or certainly more visible indicator of the economic plight of rural South Africa than the 'preferable' conditions suffered by the millions who now call these places home.

These squatter camps are not symptoms of urban decay but rather of rural despair and hopelessness. It is ironic that good faith public efforts designed to improve urban conditions (vis-a-vis rural conditions) serve only to exacerbate the problem. The creation of economic opportunities in rural areas and villages is a necessary condition for economic growth and progress in South Africa. These and other issues were the focus of attention of participants during the Stutterheim Foundation Conference on Rural Development.

SA entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship is seen, often, as a rural economic development tool (see, for example, 'National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small

Business in South Africa,' White Paper for the Department of Trade and Industry, February 1995). Unfortunately, entrepreneurship is seen too often as either some kind of a magic potion cure for economic decline and stagnation or as a development placebo.

Entrepreneurship does not start with a business plan and end with a ribbon cutting, no matter how many times replicated. If entrepreneurship is to be a national policy it must be seen and applied as an economic development and growth process: a learned, conscious, systematic, planned, continuing, market-driven process of opportunity awareness, recognition, creation and pursuit. Critically, the essence of entrepreneurship is self-generating, spontaneous growth – growth as expected and natural, as an every day activity.

National policies and programmes which see the creation of 'survivalist' and even micro-enterprises as ends will yield a national economy of the same calibre.

More to the point, can creating one's own job through self-employment be called entrepreneurship? Is starting a small scale, slow growth company, entrepreneurial? According to Harvard Professor Jeff Thomas in New Venture Creation, the entrepreneurial 'threshold' is 20 employees,

Squatter camps are not symptoms of urban decay but rather of rural despair and hopelessness

Entrepreneurship does not start with a business plan and end with a ribbon cutting, no matter how many times replicated

annual sales of at least $1 million, and promise of expansion, the building of long-term value and durable cash flow streams.

It can be argued on the other hand, however, that to start a new business in a small rural town can demand substantial entrepreneurial skills and abilities. Stimulating business start-ups in villages in rural South Africa may be the biggest challenge to entrepreneurship of all.

Given the current unemployment rate in South Africa of 40%; that only one out of 10 new entrants to the labour force find employment in the formal sector; that the population of the country is expected to double in the next 25 years (not counting illegal immigration); and that the current economy is at best stagnant, sufficient economic growth through entrepreneurship of the survivalist, subsistence, self-employment, or even micro-enterprises type is at best patronising and wishful thinking.

Clearly, national economic development policy must address the realisation that rural South Africa needs many new rapidly growing labour intensive business enterprises. Any policy prescriptions short of this will be futile and perhaps counter productive.

A society and economy which generates and provides freedom of access to opportunities which then can be pursued through profit oriented entrepreneurial ventures, will foster the creation of businesses, jobs, and, consequently, economic development and growth; and, not incidentally, income and tax revenues. A key point is that entrepreneurship requires the presence of opportunities exploitable for individual and personal gain.

Necessary conditions

In a recent South African poverty study, Data Research Africa (1995) contends that 'A perfectly targeted income transfer of R9,6 billion per annum would be required to move all poor rural people in South Africa to a subsistence income.'

This group also found, among other things, that 'Involvement in the primary labour market brings the highest return to rural households...', and 'Gaining access to the primary wage market appears to be a critical factor in improving household and per capita income.'

The R9,6 billion figure, whether its source is by transfer, economic growth, or a combination of the two, represents at least one measure of the possible job and wage creation challenge facing entrepreneurship efforts in rural South Africa. Assuming a subsistence annual income level of R4 000, the equivalent of 2,8 million jobs would need to be created and retained in rural South Africa to generate R9,6 billion of gross income per annum -- roughly the employment levels of Detroit or Philadelphia.

More jobs, and/or higher paying jobs, of course, would need to be created to move the rural population beyond a subsistence level of living. Based on the Data Research Africa minimum income transfer requirements by province, the distribution of jobs would be as follows:

Western Cape	0
Northern Cape	0
Eastern Cape	950 000
KwaZulu-Natal	450 000
Free State	200 000
Mpumalanga	220 000
Northern Province	670 000
North West	310 000
Gauteng	0
Total	2 800 000

Given the measure of the challenge, what about the business and job creation and sustaining capabilities – what one might call the entrepreneurial infrastructure – of rural South Africa? Van Vlaenderen and Nkwinti in their article 'Participatory Research as a Tool for Community Development' describe a typical rural South African resettlement community:

"... deprived of most of the basic resources, such as housing, employment, health facilities and recreation facilities ... 45% live in mud houses ... only 54% of the families possess toilet facilities of some kind; 96% of the households cook on the floor...; all residents use paraffin and candles for lighting. There is no electricity or running water in the village ... very few people are employed or self-employed. ... There are three shops in the village with limited stock.. There is no reliable transport between the village and the nearest town... there is one telephone in the village ... The closest clinic is 7,5 kilometres away... There are no sports or recreational facilities in the village."

Excluding the homeland area and measuring only accessibility, the Department of National Health (1992) found that less than 70% of rural South Africans had access to safe and adequate water; about 35% to housing; 20% to lavatories; 45% to refuse removal; 70% to effluent disposal; and 65% to hygienic handling of food.

In rural Natal 50% of blacks had not received any education; only one-third of the population was within 10km of a permanent health clinic; and many rural communities were essentially economically isolated due to poor roads. It is little wonder that 68% of people living in rural households live in poverty and that more than 75% of South Africa's poor can be found in rural areas (Data Research Africa, 1995).

Jobs, of course, are created by business enterprises and business enterprises can take many forms. Using only employment size as a determinant, the number of establishments required to employ 2,8 million would be as follows:

Enterprise	Average Employment	Number of Enterprises
Family (owners)	2	1,4 million
Micro	5	560 000
Small	25	112 000
Medium	100	28 000

One can also expect that there would be a direct relationship between the size of the business venture measured by employment and the business support infrastructure requirements like transport, electricity, water, communications, security.

While fewer large employers are necessary to achieve an employment goal, business enterprises employing 100 people or more would likely require a greater, more comprehensive, and more costly business support infrastructure than family owned and operated businesses 'employing' two people.

'Clusters' of several micro and small businesses in communities might have similar infrastructure requirements as one large employer, however. The secondary contribution of infrastructure to the obtainment of social goals and political stability needs to be taken into consideration as well.

Economic development strategies have their trade-offs.

In all likelihood job creation of the magnitude suggested here will have substantial, complex, and diverse impacts on communities in rural South Africa. In addition to economic turmoil, the social, cultural, and political shocks associated with growth – especially rapid growth – must be anticipated and prepared for.

If sufficient and sustainable economic growth is to come to rural South Africa, some degree of economic concentration is inevitable and with it will come rapid community growth.

The debate then revolves around the alternative development paradigms: are communities to grow based on some form and degree of public planning or the 'natural' selection process of the marketplace?

Both have been tried in South Africa with mixed results (Wilsenach, 1993). South Africa's 1982 attempt at a 'Regional Industrial Development Programme' (RIDP) employed the socio-political method, with unsurprising results. In the absence of objective, enforced and adhered to guidelines, it was not surprising when the public selection of community economic growth centres, and accompanying public infrastructure investments, became quickly and very politicised.

Development-by-special-interest, especially given the diversity of interests in South Africa, resulted in limited resources being fractionalised with the consequence that little economic development was actually accomplished.

In 1991 the objective of the RIDP became more market driven with expectations that the new programme would lead to the concentration of industrial resources at locations with a greater 'natural potential' for industrial development. There is evidence that the 1991 programme has caused some investment capital concentration, at least in regard to metropolitan areas and secondary cities. But this programme too required adjustments.

The most effective economic growth paradigm for rural South Africa where secondary, tertiary and even lesser towns may be the focus of development, whether public-sector or private-sector orientated, is yet to be fully debated, including the apparent promise and hope many attach to rural entrepreneurship.

In 1992, less than 70% of rural South Africans had access to safe and adequate water

'Clusters' of several micro and small businesses in communities might have similar infrastructure requirements as one large employer

If sufficient and sustainable economic growth is to come to rural South Africa, some degree of economic concentration is inevitable

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

By Mike McGrath and Richard Simson
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RETROSPECT

Since 1993 the South African economy has been in an expansionary phase of the business cycle, and this expansion has revealed some of the economic benefits which have flowed from the ending of apartheid.

Despite poor economic performance in the primary sectors of the economy linked largely to drought in agriculture and labour militancy in mining, the 3,3% real growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the highest attained since 1988, and in the non-primary sectors a real growth of 4,5% was attained.

However, because of increased levels of foreign indebtedness over the year the growth in Gross National Product was lower at 3,0% and incomes per capita increased by only 0,8%. This is nevertheless a welcome development following on the positive growth in incomes per head attained in 1994, and reversing the fall in incomes per head (measured in constant 1990 prices) from R7 497 in 1988 to R6 590 in 1993.

A description of the features of this upswing gives important insights into the growth path which the economy is following. Important features of the present upswing have been:

❏ A recovery in real gross domestic fixed investment and inventory investment which grew respectively by 10,7% and 7,7% in 1995. New investment in manufacturing was exceptionally strong, rising by no less than 21% in 1995.

The present high level of real interest rates (prime stands at a real level over 10%) are undoubtedly depressing investment, as too are concerns about the Government's commitment to economic policy which will produce sustainable economic growth, concerns about the regression of South African society into a state of violent anarchy, and concerns about the stability of production in an economy which seems to be captive to a militant and uncompromising trade union movement.

❏ Annual levels of gross investment will have to rise above 25% of GDP if the economy is to attain a 6% growth rate, and there seems little prospect of such high rates of investment being attained unless there are dramatic changes in the climate which determines the expectations of domestic and foreign investors.

❏ The upswing has been founded on domestic and international credit. The current account of the balance of payments moved into a R2,2 billion deficit in 1994, and in 1995 this deficit grew to R12,5 billion, notwithstanding a healthy rise in merchandise and gold exports of R13,6 billion over the course of 1995.

In the sanctions years a reduction of the current account surplus would have precipitated the end of any upsurge in the economy, whereas access to foreign funds now allows cyclical expansion to be continued beyond the narrow threshold imposed by the current account balance.

Indeed there was a healthy net inflow of foreign funds of R21,7 billion in 1995, but the downside of the capital inflows are that 42% were short term, and of the remaining long term inflows almost half were portfolio investment.

Short term inflows are highly sensitive to interest rate differentials, and will reverse if real interest rates are lowered in South African money markets, while portfolio investment is also volatile and will flee at the first hints of impropriety in the economic policies of the government. What has not yet commenced on a large scale is direct investment in new industrial ventures.

On the domestic front consumer expenditures grew at a real rate of 5% during 1995, exceeding the increase of real personal disposable incomes by 2,5%. The consequence has been a fall in the average propensity to save from 3% to 1% of GDP, and a rapid expansion in the use of consumer credit. Gross Domestic Savings are

only 16,5% of GDP, and the net savings of the private sector are a meagre 7% of GDP.

☐ The upswing has thus far produced exceptionally weak growth of employment, with 12 000 net new jobs created between the start of the recovery in May 1993 and the latest statistics for June 1995. Some explanation for the slow response of employment growth lies in the rise in real unit labour cost in 1994 as a result of real wage increases in excess of the growth of labour productivity.

☐ Inflation has slowed dramatically in the last few years to a rate of 8,7% for 1995. The appreciation in the external value of the rand from May 1995, and the removal of the remaining import surcharges in October 1995 contributed positively to the lowering of the inflation rate, but the fall in the rand exchange rate in the last month (even though it again restores purchasing power parity) will fuel cost and push inflationary forces.

☐ Against a partial relaxation of exchange controls which has allowed South African banks easier access to foreign borrowing, the Reserve Bank experienced increasing difficulty in controlling the growth of the money supply. The money supply (M3) grew by 14,3%, which was well above the guideline range of 6% to 10%. The strong demand for credit drove most short term interest rates upwards during the first half of 1995, and they remained high thereafter.

The lessons which can be learned are that the growth path which the economy is following is not very different from the pattern during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Although the foreign exchange constraint on the upswing of the business cycle has been loosened, the economy has not as yet moved onto a higher growth path which will start to provide jobs on the massive scale which is needed. The foreign inflows of funds are potentially volatile and a reduction of the high level of interest rates or signs of instability in government could see a sudden outflow of capital.

The inflation rate has fallen but may now be about to begin accelerating upwards again. Monetary policy has become more difficult in this intermediate stage of relaxation of exchange controls, and the very low level of net domestic savings cannot sustain investment at levels which will cope with job creation at the rapid rate needed to address South Africa's massive unemployment problem.

THE 1996/1997 BUDGET

Introduction

This is the third budget of the Government of National Unity – although their first allowed little scope for new direction – and it is thus somewhat worrying that the provincial budgets have not yet been finalised. Central to the 1996/1997 budget is a reduction in the deficit, and in the eyes of the Government it is a budget tailored to influence international investors.

Expenditure

The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP has fallen from the very high levels of 1993 and 1994.

This is shown in Table 1. In the coming year the deficit is expected to fall by R1,29 billion, reducing the deficit as a percentage of GDP to 5,1%. In each of the last two years, this percentage based on the actual government figures, has remained very close to 6%.

The budgeted fall is welcome, but we must see it brought to fruition – and it is still too high. International investors use a benchmark deficit of about 3% when assessing country specific risk, and although international markets are likely to view the lower percentage favourably, the Government might have done even more.

It is instructive to compare last year's budgeted outcome on the deficit, with the actual outcome. The Government budgeted for a deficit to GDP percentage of 5,8% but the actual outcome was higher at 6% due to higher than expected expenditures.

The inability of the Government to achieve its budgeted percentage when the economy grew as expected is worrying, especially when it expects a GDP growth rate of nearly 4% in the coming year. If the Government fails again to control expenditure – and there are severe doubts about holding provincial government to account – or if the economy fails to grow as expected, the actual deficit could be much higher next year.

The need to control the deficit is especially evident when we examine the interest paid by the Government on its debt used to finance profligate spending. At the beginning of the 1990s the interest costs as a percentage of expenditure amounted to 14,2%, and 4,1% of GDP. For the coming year, these interest payments will amount to 19,8% of expenditure.

Table 1: Budget Deficits and Debt Service Costs: Selected years 1990/91 to 1996/7

Deficits and Debt Service Item	Actual 90/91	92/93	93/94	95/96	Budget 96/7
Deficit (Rm)	8 690	31 280	38 635	30 091	28 802
Deficit (% of GDP)	3,1	9,0	9,8	6,0	5,1
Interest (% of Budget)	14,2	14,8	15,2	18,6	19,8
Interest (% of GDP)	4,1	4,9	5,3	5,8	6,1

In other words, for each R100 the government borrows, R20 is for interest costs. This is especially evident in Table 2, where some of the main increases and decreases in national government expenditure are noted.

If the Government is committed to deficit reduction it must deal with these ballooning interest payments. The Government needs to convey to those against privatisation that unless debt is reduced through reducing state assets, the budget will become completely ineffective as a tool to alter employment conditions in the macroeconomy.

In this budget, the Government continues with its goal of redirecting expenditure under the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Last year the budget allocated R5 billion for this purpose and this year the allocation is budgeted to rise to R7,5 billion. We cannot understand the need to allocate nearly R400 million to promoting the RDP when most accept the crucial need for the RDP.

The Government clearly needs to do something about the perception of higher crime rates and, to this end, the South African Police Service is to receive R9,9 billion: an increase of 4,6%. However, this increase must be examined in light of the decrease of 5% in the allocation to defence spending. Despite the reservations of many, the South African National Defence Force has been used extensively as a substitute for police activities. So the overall effect may be that no additional resources are available for crime prevention, especially if Defence Force involvement is reduced.

The education budget increased from R4,3 billion to R5,5 billion, and it is planned to provide some financial relief to tertiary educational institutions. Many of these institutions are undergoing major changes and are using their own reserves in the process. Education is seen by many as the only public good. Thus the Government missed an ideal opportunity in this budget to unveil a fully functioning student financing scheme with adequate safeguards to ensure timely repayment of loans.

Government in the past has paid lip service to its partial price-indexed policy on pension increases,

and the 1996/1997 budget continues this practice. Prior to the past year, we have seen food prices rise at a rate three times that of the increase in civil pensions: the budgeted increase of 6% in pensions is therefore hardly likely to restore the purchasing power of many of the poorest members of our country.

Revenues

The Government has followed a policy of including in revenue the proceeds of oil sales from its strategic oil reserves. Some feel that this should go directly to reducing the national debt instead of reducing this year's deficit.

Last year the reduction in the deficit from oil sales was R1,2 billion, and this year it will be R1,9 billion. One could argue that the actual deficit is understated by about R1,9 billion. This would raise the deficit as a percentage of GDP to 5,4% from the budgeted 5,1%.

Reforms being implemented to foster greater efficiency in the collection of taxes and the payment of arrears should help the Government boost revenues. In October last year the Government took steps, via the creation of the South African Revenue Service, to adopt a more businesslike approach to

Table 2: Total Revenues as Budgeted for 1996/7, R millions

Changes in Budgeted Expenditures, Rm	
Category	Increase/-Decrease
State Debt Interest	5 232
Education	1 162
Health	-729
Housing	-2 504
Public Works	453
SA National Defence	-537
SA Police Service	438
Transfers to Provinces	2 727
(Selected Items)	

the collection of revenues. Hopefully this can be brought to fruition. Table 3 shows budgeted revenues for the next fiscal year.

Tax brackets have also been shifted somewhat in the 1996/1997 budget. The effect of the changes to tax brackets will be to reduce the tax burden of individual taxpayers, but the reduction is only significant for those with a taxable income of more than R70 000 per year.

In other words, the effect of the changes has been to slightly shift the burden of taxes lower down the distribution of income. Hopefully the disincentive effects of these changes on employment and investment will not be too burdensome on those who can afford it the least.

It is instructive to examine the marginal tax rate proposed in the new budget: the marginal rate leaps from 30% to 41% at an income of R40 000 per annum, and then climbs slowly to a maximum of 45% at a threshold of R100 000 per annum.

The high marginal rate of 45% is regarded as harmful to incentives. The 41% marginal rate at an income of R40 000 must have a stifling effect, and could drive income generating activities underground when possible. An urgent reform of the system of personal income taxation is vital.

Another significant change in the budget is acceptance of the Katz Commission proposal that the income of retirement funds be taxed. From March 1, 1996, a tax of 17% will be imposed on the interest and net rental income of all pension, provident and retirement annuity funds.

Those at the lower end of the income distribution, with little scope to reduce discretionary expenditure to make up savings, will be hard hit by the change. The Government should take active steps to encourage private savings in the economy. The tax adds another distortion to an economy full of distortions.

While the Government speaks of a commitment to deficit reduction, the lack of any safeguards at the provincial level, the poor record of the Government in keeping to its budget and the very generous forecasts of GDP growth on which the budget is based, means the deficit as a percentage of GDP targets must be treated with considerable scepticism.

A government serious about deficit reduction would only want to use its resources in providing those goods and services that the market fails to provide, namely, public goods. Trimming government expenditures so that only public goods and services remain is the only way to reduce the deficit and create the conditions for sustained foreign and domestic investment in the macroeconomy.

Table3: Total Revenues as Budgeted for 1996/7, R millions		
Total Budgeted Revenues, Rm		
Category	Amount	% Change
Total Revenue	144 688	13,9
Taxes on Income	81 054	17,3
Persons	57 975	13,2
Corporate	22 329	26,6
Other	750	-5,7
Taxes on Property	2 047	-4,7
Taxes on Goods and Services	54 712	12,6
VAT	36 930	13,3
Excise Duties	17 278	11,7
Financial	455	-2,2
Other	49	4,3
Trade Taxes	6 365	6,2
Customs Duties	6 230	15,4
Import Surcharge	-	-100
Customs Union Agreement	4 363	12,1
Other	135	-
Stamp Duties	1040	1,5
Sale of Assets and Property Income	3 833	3,8
Includes R1,9 billion transfer from oil reserve sale.		

There is a strong possibility that the economy may attain a real growth rate in excess of 3% in 1996, but by 1997 it will most probably be entering the contractionary phase of the business cycle, and the economic growth rate will once again fall.

However, the surprise cabinet reshuffle on March 28, which replaced a conservative banker Finance Minister with the ANC's Trevor Manuel – who is of unknown economic persuasion – could erode domestic and foreign investor confidence, leading to a disappointment of expectations about economic growth, inflation and the budget deficit.

We ask: how can confidence in the continuity of macroeconomic policy be created when the Government has three finance ministers in 18 months?

Mounting pressures are building in the private sector for the Government to confront reality and introduce a programme of economic reforms which will set the stage for the attainment of high sustainable economic growth. To this end, the programme must of necessity:

❑ Tackle the high unit cost of output in the manufacturing and mining sectors.

❑ Address the role of unions in the economy and implement ways of holding wage increases to productivity increases.

❑ Restructure a civil service which is inefficient and bloated in many areas, and under resourced in others.

❑ Continue to push through its plans to liberalise the economy to foreign competition, and break from the exchange controls which are severely distorting the domestic economy.

❑ Make headway with meaningful propositions which can generate revenue to reduce the massive public debt.

We believe that the economic honeymoon the Government of National Unity has enjoyed is over. Meaningful structural reforms must now be introduced or the economy will remain permanently on the 1% to 3,5% economic growth path of the last decade. ᴵᴺᴰᴬ

REGIONAL

M O N I T O R

Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa

Provincial poverty shares
(% of all poor in South Africa, by new province)

E CAPE 24%

N CAPE 1%

W CAPE 4%

GAUTENG 6%

NORTH WEST 9%

KWAZULU 21%

N PROVINCE 18%

FREE STATE 9%

MPUMALANGA 9%

There is no national consensus on an absolute poverty line, so a relative definition has been used: the poor are defined as the poorest 40% of households and the ultra poor as the poorest 20% of households. These definitions, if based on income, result in 'cut-off' expenditure levels of: poor- R301 monthly per adult and the ultra poor R178 monthly per adult

Poverty shares
(% of all poor in South Africa, by former province/homeland)

69%

31%

■ Former Homelands   □ Former Provinces

Understanding Zulu Identity

By Courtney Jung
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The ANC and IFP have been uneasy bedfellows for almost 20 years. Both have strived, aggressively, for control of black politics in KwaZulu-Natal. Each has challenged the other's ethnic and tribal identity, each has tried to 'out-Zulu' the other. The forthcoming elections may pave the way to clearer identities for both.

South Africa's transition from apartheid has opened and transformed its political system, rendering political and politically mobilised ethnic identity more fluid than usual.

As the state moved from a white minority government which excluded blacks, Indians, and coloureds from most meaningful political participation to a black majority dominated power sharing system, political parties began to reconstruct their constituencies.

Identity in general, and political identity in particular, is never static. In a political transition, however, it is more fluid than usual.

Political identity results from the complex interaction of structure and agency. Structure – available history, system of government, material conditions, critical moments, and to some extent ideas, provides the parameters within which agents – political entrepreneurs and individuals acting politically, construct a political world.

In a transition period some of these things change completely and most are in flux. In South Africa, traditional alliances have disappeared or shifted as laws governing political competition have been adjusted to accommodate the previously disenfranchised.

Although the reconstruction of ethnic identity in the post apartheid era is still very much a work in progress, it is possible to identify changes in collective identity and to discern the strands of legitimation and ideology which serve to support it.

It is not my intention to suggest that those identities which have emerged, or are emerging, from the transition period will necessarily form the basis of South Africa's democratic experiment. Rather, I intend highlighting the changes which have taken place in the context of transition and the first democratic election in order to demonstrate more broadly that collective identities cannot be assumed

and should not be accommodated as if they were static features of the landscape.

This article – a shortened version of a paper which is a building block for a dissertation comparing the reconstruction of identity among coloureds, Zulus, and Afrikaners in South Africa's transition to democracy – focuses on Zulu political identity.

It is based on interviews conducted between April and June 1995 with political elites from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC), engaged in 'Zulu politics'.

I make two disclaimers. The first is that Zulu political identity is being mobilised in multiple ways simultaneously. Any trend highlighted, therefore, coexists with other trends and should not be represented in isolation.

Secondly, by loosely defining politics as a power struggle, it is easy to see why political parties would try to mobilise ethnically based constituencies. Whether or not people respond to such mobilisation, to what extent and under what circumstances, completes a picture of the construction of identity in transition. This article deals only with the attempts of elites to reinvent their political space and identity.

1990 to 1994

Inkatha ka Zulu was resurrected as a Zulu cultural organisation by Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in 1975. Renamed Inkatha Yenkululeko ye Sizwe and opened to all blacks as a pan-African liberation movement the following year, in reality, what it became was the government of the self governing homeland of KwaZulu.

Self government gave Buthelezi and Inkatha almost complete control over KwaZulu, which received funding from the central government but also had an independent revenue base. Its legislature comprised mostly Inkatha members, and had an independent police force.

Initially Inkatha was set up with ANC approval as an internal and complementary wing of the liberation movement. ANC activists, however, were uneasy with Buthelezi's willingness to operate in the apartheid system and the two split irreconcilably in 1979, ostensibly over the issue of the use of violence in the struggle.

Buthelezi became more the conservative, anti-communist and reasonable alternative to the ANC in South Africa. He gained the support of a coalition of like-minded minority, business and political groups, especially in Natal, through initiatives such as the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba.

Buthelezi's high profile and status as the self proclaimed 'leader of six million Zulus' earned him national and international recognition. In the 1980s he was courted at a high level by the United States and Britain, which also funded projects directly through the KwaZulu government. By the mid-1980s the National Party (NP) was secretly funding and training Inkatha units to attack and kill ANC supporters in Natal.

The legitimacy of Inkatha as a representative of the black majority was first undermined when the United Democratic Front (UDF) began operating in South Africa in 1983. But Inkatha's position was further eroded in February 1990 after the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) were unbanned, and the ANC assumed its place as South Africa's national liberation movement.

Nelson Mandela's much higher profile sidelined Buthelezi, and bilateral talks between the government and Mandela – begun even before he was released from prison – threatened to exclude Buthelezi from transitional negotiations altogether.

Finally, the imminent end of an apartheid government spelled the demise of the homeland system and Inkatha's access to institutionalised power, funds and means of coercion. This precipitated a partial reinvention of Inkatha.

As its name implied, Inkatha ka Zulu was an explicitly Zulu political organisation at its inception. As the party governing the Zulu homeland, Inkatha's existence was constructed within and around an ethnic dispensation. Inkatha was the political expression, or official representative, of the largest such political unit in South Africa: the Zulus.

The dramatic change in Buthelezi's personal position, as well as the threat to the apartheid structure which 'legitimated' Inkatha, precipitated a reevaluation of Inkatha's role and future in 1990. It changed its name to the Inkatha Freedom Party and opened its doors to all races.

"...we thought, as a party in 1990, after de Klerk's speech and the release of Mandela, politics had changed dramatically in South Africa. It was no more a case of fight against apartheid. That was gone. So we entered a new phase of politics where we had an open political market and were now moving away from protest politics to the politics of building one South Africa that includes everybody...

"... there was a big exodus of whites into the IFP...they played a very crucial role, getting the IFP to understand...how whites in this country think politically. They are an important constituency in this country.. any party that wants to be taken seriously has to address white concerns. That's why you see so many whites in the IFP hierarchical system... and a lot of Indians as well." (Senzo Mfayela, IFP MP, chair local government election campaign)

Thus the IFP's first priority appeared to be to strengthen its regional base. It recruited prominent members of white political parties in Natal and publicly eschewed its Zulu, and even black, identity.

Nevertheless, the IFP continued to manipulate its Zulu credentials to increase its profile at democratic negotiations. Although the IFP was officially granted a seat in the Codesa negotiating forum, Buthelezi boycotted talks in his capacity as traditional adviser to Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini because Zwelithini, as monarch of the Zulu nation, was not represented at talks.

Thus Buthelezi rejected a role for the IFP as the representative of the Zulu people while at the same time insisting that the Zulu people should be represented, as a political unit, by the King, at that time a political pawn of Buthelezi. It became necessary for Buthelezi to deny that the IFP represented the Zulus in order to claim an independent base which would guarantee separate political roles for him in his dual capacities as IFP leader and traditional adviser to the king.

In 1991 and 1992, violence in Natal reached unprecedented heights and thousands died in pitched battles between ANC and IFP supporters. The IFP also demanded that its followers, as Zulus, had the right to carry 'traditional weapons' in public, at IFP rallies etc. They argued that the prohibition of traditional weapons would stifle the cultural expression of the Zulus.

The IFP's latitude to mobilise Zuluness in the political arena was eventually circumscribed by the ANC's response to the 'traditional weapons' debate. Throughout most of its career the ANC has espoused non-racialism. It has self consciously ignored ethnic and racial divisions from the perspective that such

divisions were artificial constructs of apartheid, fostered to divide opposition to the government. Many argue that the tactics and ideology of the UDF in the 1980s inherently alienated traditional and conservative parents and rural people of KwaZulu-Natal.

The UDF intended to make the structures of apartheid unworkable and townships ungovernable. In other provinces their primary target was the white government, but in Natal it was (partly) Inkatha, which enforced apartheid policies and was therefore targeted as 'the system'.

At the same time, both organisations vied to control black politics in the region and were engaged in a battle for supremacy. UDF supporters were pitted against mostly IFP aligned Zulu chiefs who were the frequent victims of deadly attacks.

Chiefs in turn led armed units of their own followers against UDF supporters. The UDF ridiculed and derided the king, attacking the symbols of Zuluness because they represented collaboration with the apartheid structure, since traditional Zulu structures were controlled by Inkatha.

In 1992 the ANC made a conscious decision to challenge Buthelezi's construction of Zuluness and his exclusive use of the symbols and history of Zulu culture for political purposes. After 18 months of contesting the IFP's right to carry traditional weapons, the ANC changed tack:

"... until about 1992 the issue of traditional weapons was a big issue here. Because the government of de Klerk said that Zulus were allowed to carry their traditional weapons. And we were trying everything, going to the police, de Klerk, Goldstone, whomever, to get them to make it illegal to carry traditional weapons. We were saying, but we are also Zulus and we are not carrying traditional weapons.

"Finally I made a decision and it caused quite a stir within the ANC even. I said 'we are also Zulus, we also have the right to carry traditional weapons'. And I said that to the people, because...we don't have the right to tell any Zulu not to carry those weapons... It was at Inanda. There were about 60 000 or 70 000 people there... carrying anything that could vaguely be called a traditional weapon. They had spears, clubs, everything. ...And we were using the same slogans about Zuluness and about the King, and Shaka. We were using the same slogans." (S'bu Ndebele, ANC provincial parliament MP)

Other ANC strategies were designed to acknowledge Zuluness and link it historically to the ANC, as well as defuse its politically separatist dimension.

"Then we had the Sonke festival. Sonke means 'all of us', and the slogan of the festival was 'many cultures, one people'. It was a response to ethnic mobilisation...in October 1993...80 years from 1913, the anniversary of 80 years after King Mtimizwe, king of the Zulus then and grandfather of the present king, who was made the first honorary president of the ANC.

"So we used the symbolism of the king, and we also used many other symbolisms. A hundred years since the arrival of Gandhi, 50 years since the start of the ANC Youth League, 20 years after the Durban workers' strikes, which led to the legalisation of the trade unions. And we invited all the kings of southern Africa. From the Eastern Cape, the Transkei, the Lesotho king, the Swazi king, from KwaNdebele in the Northern Transvaal." [S'bu Ndebele]

Thus even before national elections in 1994, the space in which politics in KwaZulu-Natal was played out had changed significantly. Politics had become multi-racial. The homeland structure had begun to lose substance as its territory was subsumed into the provincial territory and its police force incorporated into the South African police. And the ANC had begun to challenge the IFP's monopoly over the symbols of Zuluness.

1994 to now

The IFP agreed to participate in South Africa's national election in 1994 only after the ANC and the NP consented to international mediation on issues such as provincial powers, the role of traditional authorities, and the constitutional role of the Zulu king.

The IFP won the election in KwaZulu-Natal with 50,3% of the vote, giving them dominance in, but not complete control over, the province. For most legislative votes they need to seek alliances, and to pass a provincial constitution they need a two thirds majority. Opposition to the IFP at the provincial level, which comes most consistently from the ANC, is strong and voluble.

As an opposition political party in the national government and the governing provincial party, the IFP uses various tactics and strategies. The first is to delegitimise the national government. The IFP has continued to demand that outstanding issues not covered in the Interim Constitution be subject to international mediation. The ANC contends that these issues should be resolved through negotiation among parties in the Constitutional Assembly forum.

The IFP sought to undermine the moral authority of the government by highlighting the ANC's refusal to abide by the agreement it signed for mediation. By

demanding international mediation on issues clearly internal to the South African state, the IFP has also tried to undermine state sovereignty and legitimacy: it boycotted the multi-party Constitutional Assembly drafting South Africa's permanent Constitution.

"We will not recognise the Constitution, and in not recognising it we will not be bound by it. We already passed a resolution at our conference in March. We don't recognise the Constitution at all, and we will determine our policy on the basis of that...We write our own constitution here (in KwaZulu-Natal), ignoring the national constitution." (Peter Smith, IFP MP)

KwaZulu-Natal is the only province to have drafted a provincial constitution, although the national Constitution allows provinces to do so provided they do not contradict the national Constitution. The IFP has been unable to unilaterally draft its own document because of the two thirds majority requirement. Nevertheless, the national leadership of the IFP pulled provincial IFP leaders out of constitutional negotiations with other parties.

After months of difficult negotiations, multi-party agreement was obtained on a provincial constitution, aspects of which are likely to be challenged by the ANC in the Constitutional Court.

Federal claims

The IFP claims for itself strong federalist credentials. Its more scientific arguments revolve around power claims.

"And if power then is concentrated in the centre, and everyone begins to become restless, central government will respond in the only way it knows. To crush. It's a given fact that if you put a big pair of boots onto someone's feet, they'll use that to walk all over you...Power is a corrosive thing and it should never be given to anyone in large measure. Power... as Lord Acton says, corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely... Power must be divided." (Farouk Cassim, IFP MP)

"After liberation, to ensure that there's freedom, there has to be plurality, by which we understand different centres of power that check each other but also by which we understand cultural expressions being expressed as diversity that also finds itself in the unity of the state as a whole. But diversity in terms of autonomy for regions." (Ziba Jiyane, secretary general IFP)

Such arguments place responsibility for power checking at, and devolution of power to, the provincial level. The power base of the IFP is at the provincial level, which makes it important to legitimate and strengthen the province as the primary level of government.

Buthelezi has even threatened to withdraw from the Government of National Unity and from national politics altogether to focus his energies on governing KwaZulu-Natal. Some political analysts suggest that the IFP did poorly in local government elections in Gauteng because it urged its supporters to wait and vote in KwaZulu-Natal in March.

Eight of South Africa's nine provinces have newly drawn boundaries. Only Natal has retained its original boundaries, although it too has undergone territorial amendment as the KwaZulu homeland was reincorporated after 20 years of separation. The IFP, therefore, is busily retrieving a communal KwaZulu-Natal history and forging a provincial identity.

"We're the Cinderella province, we done out because, of the four provinces, we had the fewest number of whites and the fewest number of NP supporters. The national budget was allocated on the basis of how many Nationalist supporting whites there were in the province... we got the lowest budget in the country for the last 40 or 50 years.

"...the notion of having your budget determined by Pretoria is anathema to everyone... Then you've got the whole history of central government interference in things like education... the whole country had one National Christian Education system. But Natal had its own system and we didn't have anything to do with that. The whole issue of the kingdom. It's the only kingdom. The whole issue of the Indaba and the Buthelezi Commission. The IFP had a particular place here in the 1970s and 1980s." (Peter Smith)

In this case, provincial identity is established primarily through reference to the other. The people of KwaZulu-Natal have common cause because they have all, regardless of race, been victimised.

The people of Natal did not vote for the NP. But such political affiliations were not merely ideologically based. They are inherently linked to the ethnic peculiarities of KwaZulu-Natal. The English and the Zulus, who dominate Natal, had another trait in common: they were not Afrikaners, and were punished because of it by the central government, dominated by Afrikaners. Such history, retrieved to tell a story to unite a people, serves a dual purpose when extended into the present day. The IFP has substituted the ANC for the NP, although they have so far refrained from attributing ethnic difference to their central government oppressors.

"Already, what the ANC is putting on the table is a clear indication that they want the power. Listening to what Mandela was saying, had this Constitution not been in place and there was some other constitution, he would have turned the taps off. But not because this province deserved that treatment, simply because it was a province that was out of line with the other provinces in not having put the ANC in power...

"...as fine a man as he is...for him to think like that, subliminally indicates that the dangers we have been talking about....What happened in South Africa happened because the Nats were able to lay their hands on the power...once they got the power they went berserk. And now another group gets their hands on the power and they do the same..." (Farouk Cassim)

The unofficial renaming of the province 'The Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal' has served a similar identity building purpose for the IFP. The actual historical basis for a kingdom is fragmentary and inconclusive. No Zulu kingdom ever governed the entire territory now demarcated as KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, a kingdom implies territorial integrity, an essential element of a demand for autonomy. Such territorial integrity is particularly important in South Africa because it differentiates KwaZulu-Natal's demands from those of the volkstaat.

While the kingdom is clearly tied to, and based in, a history and traditional structure of government which is particularly Zulu, the IFP has tried to partially uncouple the kingdom from any Zulu ethnic claims or attributes.

"If we were to take a referendum tomorrow my safe bet is that 80% of the people would show allegiance to the king, would support the kingdom. That's a high percentage on any poll. Across the board. Whites, Indians, Zulus. They would say yes, the king is here, he has a very important role to play, he's been, and others have been this whole chain and link... these things here identify us as being somebody different. And we are quite conscious of the right to have that degree of freedom." (Farouk Cassim)

"The whole history of the Zulu people has been one of accommodation. From the time whites came here. This very city was given, quote, unquote, by King Shaka, to the settlers who came here. So there's a long history of accommodation and tolerance of other groups." (Arthur Konigkramer, IFP MP)

"Zulu self determination is inclusive of everybody who resides within the kingdom. And

they would refer to Shaka's welcoming of whites, for example, into their kingdom. So you can even talk of Zulu self determination freely embracing the constituents of the province. Which overlaps with the kind of regional self determination that I would talk about as a federalist." (Peter Smith)

Rurally based

Despite this quite significant effort to create a single KwaZulu-Natal identity, to demonise the central government to present a credible threat to the province, and to make a kingdom out of an arbitrarily drawn territory, the IFP's power base remains rurally based Zulus. At Shaka Day celebrations last year in Umlazi, Buthelezi, in his capacity as chairman of the KwaZulu-Natal House of Traditional Leaders, said:

"The Zulu nation face(s) misery and more suffering in its quest for autonomy... Zulus will have to bear further sacrifices and difficulties to achieve the promised land of our freedom and prosperity...I will never, ever divest myself of the heavy responsibilty and often painful duty to lead our nation into the promised land." (*The Mercury* September 9, 1995)

Nevertheless, it has become increasingly less relevant and more difficult for Buthelezi and the IFP to mobilise ethnic Zulu sentiment for political purposes. It is less relevant because South Africa's political system is no longer organised on an ethnic basis and the IFP, as a provincial government, has a greater incentive to consolidate the entire territory it dominates by reaching beyond its ethnic base. It is more difficult because elections proved that the ANC commands the allegiance of roughly 50% of the Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal, and the ANC is effectively challenging the IFP's use of traditional symbols and structures to mobilise an ethnic support base.

The ANC began to use ethnically charged symbolism for political purposes in the transition period, a departure from its previous position. It has continued to consolidate its own ethnic credentials in the province since the elections by wooing the king, making plans to pay chiefs from central government, contesting the IFP's version of the traditional relationship between chiefs and the king, and retrieving the Zulu history of the ANC.

After a couple of unsuccessful bids for power and an independent political position, Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini became a political ally – and pawn – of Buthelezi for some 15 years. The king, an important symbolic building block of the traditional tribal structure on which Inkatha power was based, was given a relatively high profile and evidently commanded the respect and allegiance of many of his 'subjects'.

Soon after the April 94 elections rumours surfaced that the relationship between Buthelezi and Zwelithini was souring. Zwelithini allegedly invited Mandela to Shaka Day celebrations in September 1994 and, when Buthelezi insisted the invitation be rescinded, the king tried (unsuccessfully) to cancel the event. Buthelezi denied rumors of a split, but the rift was fully exposed when he stormed into a television studio to attack the king's spokesman, Sifiso Zulu, who was being interviewed live.

The ANC began to make overtures toward the king at least as early as 1992.

> *"And of course we invited the Zulu king (to the Sonke festival). He did not attend because he was blocked by Buthelezi. But importantly, two of his daughters attended, demonstrating that the alliance was building even then between the king and the ANC."* (S'bu Ndebele)

Newspaper reports allege that part of the king's motivation for switching his political allegiance was promises of significant remuneration from the ANC. While such stories are probably true, the ANC probably also offered the king greater independence and the opportunity to escape from Buthelezi's control.

It is still relatively unclear how much of a political role the king has to play in KwaZulu-Natal. Provincial ANC leaders believe the king represents an important ethnic asset for them and that the allegiances of those Zulus whose politics are ethnically mediated will be divided by the split between the king and the IFP.

It was fascinating to witness the enthusiasm with which the king's spokesman was met at the Durban campus of the University of Natal in May 1995. Five years ago those same students, or their equally ANC oriented predecessors, would have attacked any spokesman of the king and derided any reference to Zulu history and tradition.

In the face of the defection, the IFP claimed that the king does not command a political following among the Zulu people, even as it refuses to relinquish its special relationship with the monarchy.

> *"... this whole war with the king is helping us a lot... people have been saying there's no Buthelezi, there's no IFP. They just milk from the king and if you remove the king from them they'll fall apart and then...Now, it's happened and there's still Buthelezi and there's still the IFP."* (Senzo Mfayela)

> *"... the first mistake they're making is that they don't understand that the king doesn't have any influence. They think the IFP won because of the king. They are making a serious mistake...I hope*

they carry on, because the more they do the more votes they'll lose. Not gain. And the Zulu people will see that the Zulu king is being bought. Then he's of no utility to them. Those days, of the Zulu king having political influence, are gone...The vast number of Zulu people revere the monarchy as an institution, not as a political power."* (Arthur Konigkramer)

> *"Even if there is that problem, those that believe Dr Buthelezi, or are followers of Dr Buthelezi, but all of us still respect our king. We are not separated from our king. Even Dr Buthelezi himself still likes his king. But the ANC is coming in and trying to divide us from the king because we are IFP members... we still love our king and nobody will ever separate us from him. That is a fact and a promise..."* (Thomas Shabalala, IFP provincial parliament MP)

Shabalala was the only IFP leader who intimated that the rift between the king and the IFP might have political repercussions.

> *"...any Zulu person likes the king. All Zulus. What is taking place now, where there is this breakdown amongst the royal family with our leader...Dr Buthelezi as our prime minister, we as the Zulus still recognise him as the prime minister (sic) of the Zulus. But that is where the Zulus are being divided... some say, no, we still recognise Dr Buthelezi, but some people from the royal family say no we don't want him here. There's just that division between him and the king. Although some people are pushing for that...causing some problems among the Zulu nation."* (Thomas Shabalala)

By and large the chiefs continue to be affiliated to the IFP. The IFP claims that some 260 or 270 of the 300 chiefs operating in KwaZulu-Natal are aligned with the IFP, even though not all may be members.

In rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal the network of chiefs is a crucial link between political leadership and the people. They have sufficient power to significantly affect, if not determine, the life chances of people living under them. They control communally held land. Under the colonial, apartheid, and homeland governments, money for development – roads, clinics, schools – has been funneled through the chiefs, and pensions and job opportunities are controlled by them.

In KwaZulu-Natal, chiefs are also able to dictate which way their subjects will vote. A chief who is himself affiliated to the IFP can almost guarantee that his people will vote IFP, depending on his power base and the level of political violence in the area: if there is political violence, the chief will more easily guarantee affiliation.

There are clearly demarcated ANC and IFP 'areas' throughout the province where outsiders are wise not to trespass. In an atmosphere of heightened tension, where politics is characterised by violence, allegiance to one side or the other has become a crucial survival strategy. Any hint of political independence can be punishable by death, and an individual or family relies on protection from its neighbors in case of attack.

The ANC also has warlords who control certain urban areas and can guarantee an ANC vote, but the ANC needs to undercut the links between the IFP and the chiefs before it can begin to make significant inroads into rural KwaZulu-Natal.

Whereas the ANC tried during the 1980s to sideline the chiefs altogether, it is now trying to sever the relationship between the IFP and the chiefs by having chiefs paid by central, and not provincial, government. Mandela has even suggested that chiefs be paid as much as MPs, a proposal almost certain to woo some chiefs, many of whom make under R500 a year.

Now that the traditional Zulu hierarchy has been divided by political parties vying for provincial dominance, with the king siding with the ANC and the chiefs remaining loyal to the IFP, the two sides have begun to tell different stories about the inherent structure of traditional Zulu government.

The ANC's historical precedent retrieves a strong Zulu king with authority over his chiefs. The IFP argues that the Zulu king was mostly a figurehead with unique status but who was finally bound by the chiefs' decisions.

The ANC and the IFP also use the language of legitimacy to strengthen their own allies while undermining their opponents. ANC leaders stress the transient and tenuous history of the institution of chiefs, arguing that the chiefs today were mostly made chiefs by the (illegitimate) colonial and apartheid systems. IFP leaders use the language of tradition, heritage, inviolability.

"In the 1970s or 1980s the chiefs was a dying institution... the bantustan system revived those chiefs... Now the whole system of rulership of blacks was to be based on that. Therefore they got more power over their subjects for one thing, the magistrate would only listen to them, the police would only listen to them...they would then start with the KZP (KwaZulu Police) and they were strengthened by giving them automatic weapons. So then they became tyrants over their own people." (S'bu Ndebele)

"...in some areas the chiefs were actually removed from the areas they occupied. Totally

removed and occupied by other people... in some areas they were killed. The process of that fight, because they understood that the chiefs were critical, they were actually installing other chiefs, people who were never chiefs before, in order to ensure that they had a chief who was under the control of the authorities then." (Jacob Zuma, ANC MP)

"... the ANC is doing exactly what the Nats (NP) did and what all the colonialists did. They are in fact a new set of colonialists. The first thing you do when you want to manipulate black people is you want to manipulate the chiefs. The amakhosi. The British did it. The Afrikaners did it. The Nats did it. And now the ANC's doing it." (Arthur Konigkramer)

"Because the real mission is to destroy the amakhosi. And that is not possible. It's got nothing to do with what the IFP believes or doesn't believe in...You cannot destroy them. That's thousands of years old. It just doesn't go away. And if you think that you can manipulate it by buying the chiefs off, you're making a big mistake. Because again, the chiefs are the people. And if you buy a man off, the people will soon get to know, and the chief will be removed." (Arthur Konigkramer)

The ANC is also playing the 'Zulu card' by highlighting those aspects of its own history which are particularly Zulu, establishing its Zulu credentials in the province. During the 1980s Inkatha made much of the supposedly Xhosa character of the ANC: tales about the history of enmity between the Xhosa and Zulu people abound in both white and black communities.

After 1991 the ANC stacked its provincial government and party hierarchy with Zulu leaders, and these leaders retrieve an ANC lineage intimately connected to Zulu kings, chiefs, and politics in KwaZulu-Natal.

"...then the Union of South Africa was established, you had already modern people, people who had received education, helped in the main by churches, some of them were actually ministers, who thought now we have to fight things the modern way. And in order to fight the modern way..they thought they needed to establish an organisation. And you needed an organisation that would take the character of a national organisation. That's when and why the ANC was formed.

"Because of the role (the chiefs) played in the struggle against colonisation, they were then recognised as an important strata in society and formed part of the new political leadership. They

were talked to, some of them, before. That's why in the very first officials of the ANC some of the chiefs participated from as far as Lesotho and Swaziland. But the then Zulu king was an honorary president of the ANC. King Dinuzulu. The father of Solomon. Once that happened, that the chiefs were seen as part of a new organised political force in the country, by the ANC, and they were therefore, because the talk then was we were defeated because we fought separately, in different areas, because we were not united. The ANC seeked to unite everybody. Every other African tribe into one kind of nation. With amakhosi occupying what was called the House of Chiefs within the ANC structure." (Jacob Zuma)

Conclusion

Zulu politics in South Africa is no longer controlled by the Inkatha Freedom Party or by Mangosuthu Buthelezi. South Africa's transition to democracy has opened the space and transformed the parameters of political expression to create a new context and new incentives for the redefinition of Zuluness. It is still unclear what direction Zulu ethnic mobilisation will take, although at least three trends can be identified.

Firstly, Zuluness has become less, not more, politicised as a result of the changing political structure of South Africa, and because of the ANC's decision to challenge the IFP's monopoly of the symbols of Zuluness.

The demise of political structures based on ethnic constituencies undercut the incentives for ethnic mobilisation. The introduction of a federally-inclined system gives the province more substance than the ethnic group as a political unit. And, finally, the symbols of the ethnic group have become more universal.

Secondly, however – and as a direct result of this – the structures, or representatives (chiefs and kings) of Zulu government may be strengthened. As each major party in the region, the IFP and the ANC, tries to out-Zulu its rival, each vies to strengthen the position of its own ally within the 'traditonal Zulu hierarchy'.

The ANC is not talking about sidelining the chiefs and ensuring that the rural areas are represented by democratically elected representatives. It is talking about paying the chiefs more than the IFP does.

It seems likely that both parties will continue to use the chiefs as a conduit to the people, which means that the people will continue to vote for whomever the chief tells them to vote for. Thus Zuluness is not likely to disappear from the South African political screen as a salient identity, but neither is it likely to become an indicator of political affiliation.

Thirdly, the IFP is trying to reconstruct South Africa's dominant cleavage lines to reposition itself within the nascent democracy. Abandoning an identity constructed on the basis of class or racial interests, and even partially reinventing its ethnic nationalist interests, the IFP has begun to seek alliances along lines of tradition versus modernity, conservatism versus liberalism, and federalism versus centralisation.

To this end the IFP has sought alliances with traditional leaders outside KwaZulu-Natal and championed the rights of other groups, such as Sothos and Xhosas, to retain their traditional political structures and customs.

In 1993, the IFP entered into a tenuous alliance with the Bophuthatswana homeland government and white nationalist groups opposing transitional negotiations (although it now chooses to distance itself from such interesting bedfellows).

Both the National Party and the Democratic Party espouse federalist ideals, and the IFP has sought to draw both of them into an alliance against the ANC. So far, the three have mostly limited their relationship to voting the same way on matters involving provincial powers.

Moving into a democratic system has involved, for both the IFP and the ANC, revising framing techniques, reconceptualizing both self and movement, setting different goals, using different mobilization strategies, and trying to redefine the broader political structure to accommodate oneself within it. As a result, since February 1990, the political meaning of Zuluness has changed significantly and its political expression evolved in various directions. Which expression emerges dominant has yet to be determined, and may well be affected by the results of local government elections in 1996. If the IFP loses control over KwaZulu-Natal it is likely to change tacks once again, and will try to use its Zulu credentials to rebuild a power base. Whether or not such mobilization resonates among the people also remains to be seen.

The Men Behind the Minister

By Sarah Frost, Indicator SA

Ziba Jiyane, Walter Felgate and Mario Ambrosini are arguably the three most important and controversial figures in Inkatha after Buthelezi – the party's founder and leader. Based on interviews, this article traces their histories, relationships with Buthelezi and their much debated futures in the party.

Ziba Jiyane, Walter Felgate and Mario Ambrosini are all linked to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Jiyane is secretary-general of the IFP, Felgate is an IFP politician closely involved in the recent negotiations around a provincial constitution for KwaZulu-Natal, and Mario Ambrosini acts a special advisor to IFP leader and Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

This article attempts to create a picture of the individuals' respective relationships with Buthelezi, and the political motivations behind their support for the IFP. To do this I have traced the histories of Jiyane, Felgate and Ambrosini, focusing on their political involvements and particularly on time spent working within IFP mandates.

Ziba Jiyane

I went to see Ziba Jiyane at the IFP central offices in Albany Grove in downtown Durban at the end of January. I was welcomed by a chatty secretary sitting in front of a solemn picture of Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Beside the picture was a register of morning prayers listing who was to lead them. This overtly Christian focus surprised me.

Jiyane's office was spacious but sparsely decorated. The man himself was genial, and welcomed me cordially from behind a large wooden desk. I told Jiyane I wanted him to give me a sense of his political philosophy and belief system. What I wanted from him ultimately were reasons why he had chosen to work in the IFP, along with his personal history before that.

Ziba Jiyane was born in the Kwakhoza tribal area in 1958, the son of Agnes Phoqiwe and Hambayedwa Jiyane. His father was a chief councillor to the tribal court Reserve 5 Kwakhosa, Nseleni. His mother was a housewife and leading member of civic organisations, active on school and church committees.

As a young boy he often heard about the 'government', which he thought was one person, and when asked what he would like to be when he grew up he would declare that he would like to be a government. His family was deeply religious, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church of which he is still a member.

Jiyane described his family as 'perhaps average by black standards – we were quite poor.' He described himself as 'lucky to have good results in my education so that in secondary school from form one to form five the school used to pay for my books and tuition.'

Jiyane became involved in politics at school. He was chair of the Students' Christian Movement, often a platform for Black Consciousness. One of his school teachers, Ronnie Mhlapo, hailed from the University of Zululand, and was influenced by the black consciousness activity happening there at the time. 'He was the first to open my mind to political reality.' Jiyane recalls asking Mhlapo about placards containing voting information that he saw in Empangeni:

> *"which we didn't understand in our communities – we saw the faces and heads of people that were foreign – so we asked what they were for – and he explained the voting procedure to us – basic things about democracy."*

Jiyane joined the Inkatha Youth Brigade in 1975 because he saw it as a way of channeling black consciousness. In the eyes of some black activists Inkatha was too moderate – but for young black militants then it was the only organised way of expressing their political views.

The Soweto student uprising of 1976 had a profound effect on Jiyane. Although he advocated non-violent resistance to apartheid, he wanted the Youth Brigade to become more active in civil disobedience.

He tried to convince the Youth Brigade to adopt this strategy at their national conference in 1978. Inkatha leadership however, was not prepared to sanction that – they wanted to wait until the Youth Brigade had a broader support base:

> *"we argued all night in the big youth conference. There was a debate, and in the long and short of it – we who advocated a more radical policy ended up being sidelined."*

Labelled by the police Security Branch as a radical and fearing arrest, Jiyane went underground in July 1978 and with the help of the Black Consciousness movement in Umlazi travelled to Botswana where he gained political asylum until December 1978. Here he interfaced with other parties, aligning himself finally with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) when he moved from Botswana to Dar es Salaam in January 1979. He argues that the PAC was attractive because of its history of being disillusioned with a more conservative African National Congress (ANC).

Jiyane served as director of Publicity and Information of the PAC and head of Radio Freedom. He was the leader of the youth division of the PAC and represented the PAC at international conferences in many countries including Kenya, Zambia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Germany, France and England.

Jiyane describes himself as having socialist beliefs during this time. He also calls himself a maoist:

> *"I became less of a religious person. I didn't go to church anymore and I didn't think it was problematic. But I never became an atheist, I think because of my strong religious background. I still found it difficult to believe there was not a God in my life."*

However, the international conferences that Jiyane attended proved an eyeopener in terms of ideological evolution. He perceived a huge disparity between communist theory and practice. He agrees that this time was disillusioning in terms of his socialism, but:

> *"I still thought there was a theoretical justification – countries like Yugoslavia and Rumania were just deviating from the correct theoretical implementation, these were just aberrations."*

Then Jiyane was awarded a scholarship to study Political Science, History and Public Administration at the University of California, Los Angeles, by the African American Institute. While doing this he began to question the core of Marxist thinking, the labour theory of value – and in rejecting this he rejected communism and began to appreciate free

enterprise. At the same time he saw how the system of encouraging free enterprise often caused social injustice.

During this time he was very active in the United States Anti-Apartheid Movement and the disinvestment campaign. He describes his understanding of liberation politics thus: 'In terms of liberation I was no longer as naive to think it was merely a question of ending apartheid and colonial oppression.' Instead Jiyane thought the most important thing was human rights after apartheid. 'My whole education I thought was organised around equipping myself to play a role to contribute to the human rights culture of South Africa.'

I asked Jiyane if he would describe his interest in human rights culture as a liberal one. He agreed that he was fuelled by a liberal inclination, ascribing it partly to the experience of illiberal practices within the liberation movement. He referred to his time in exile as a formative experience:

> *"being a volunteer and having sacrificed not having seen my parents for seven years or any relative of mine – and then to be treated badly in the camps – and then I was not the worst – there were many people who were killed actually – and I thought, these are people who are for freedom but they're treating each other like this. It became very important to me therefore that after apartheid the important thing would be to ensure a democratic South Africa that preserved freedom for all."*

Jiyane used these dramatic words to describe his experience in the camps:

> *"Revolutionaries eat their own children. Under the ethic of revolution people were sometimes killed. For instance the ANC had a big camp for people who were said to be mad, but they were not actually mad – they were questioning the standard ... It's very easy to become mad by the way. I realised this when I was there in the camps. You make a conscious effort to fight against it. In my case, when I was suspended in Tanzania I read a lot of books to keep myself from falling. A lot of people were not as fortunate. I don't know where they are now."*

Jiyane completed his degree at UCLA in three years, instead of the allotted four, graduating *Magna Cum Laude*. From here he went on to Yale where he completed a Masters degree in Political Science in 1988. He was then admitted to a prestigious dual degree programme in Law and Political Science, specialising in Constitutional Law and International Law which he completed in 1992. He describes these decisions also as part of his desire to involve himself in the human rights debate.

In our interview Jiyane referred with approval to a contemporary theorist he read during his studies in the United States called Michael Walzer. Walzer wrote a book called *Spheres of Justice* in which he set out the thesis that there is no universal search for principles that can be said to be the just manner of how to live. Walzer sees principles rather as context bound – each culture has the sources of self-reformation at all times – there is an ideal which is never really kept, 'although every dictator or every governor says this is what we do', when in practice there is a challenge for all those who want to make society better to keep narrowing the gap between what is asserted and what is in fact happening on the ground.

Jiyane came back to South Africa in January 1992 on a grant from the United Nations. He became a senior lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Zululand and was a lecturer and consultant in the political leadership programme of the Institute for Multiparty Democracy.

In May 1993 he formally rejoined the IFP and was appointed to its central committee executive in July 1993. He was appointed IFP spokesperson in the same month. In November 1993 Jiyane was appointed national political director of the IFP. At the IFP's annual conference in Ulundi on 17 July 1994 Jiyane was elected IFP secretary-general. This position had been vacant since the resignation of Oscar Dhlomo in 1990 and was re-established to deal with wide ranging changes to the party's constitution. Jiyane says, 'being secretary-general of the IFP empowered me to go in and be part of my people using the idiom of my culture and being able to reform and improve from within.' This can be linked to Michael Walzer's thesis that the way to improve society is to narrow the gap between what is asserted and what actually happens.

Jiyane also spoke of self empowerment as starting at home 'with family values, hard work, discipline – with less blaming of others.' He gave himself as an example:

"look, I was very poor myself but I got a distinction at Amango Secondary School in my JSE and that distinction enabled me to get a bursary – I'm not saying that there were no stumbling blocks posed by apartheid. But my upbringing and strong family values enabled me to transcend them – I'd like to see more of that with our people."

Asked about his views on women's rights, Jiyane said he saw himself as an ally of those who want to fight for women's rights, articulating support for the IFP Women's Brigade and its endeavours. He pointed out that there are not enough women in authoritative positions in IFP structures. At a press briefing in early February on the provincial constitution for KwaZulu-Natal Jiyane said, around the issue of abortion:

"I don't know that parties would be so strong in opposing the abortion clause. Put as a positive principle – it's not a make or break issue to protect babies in their mother's wombs."

Could his dismissive approach to this crucial issue be a telling reminder that there is often a gap between what is said and what is believed?

I asked Jiyane whether he brings to his work the fierce Africanism with which he has been associated in the past. He was quick to define his Africanism as 'not racist', – 'I see it more as the need for self empowerment for black people.' Elsewhere Jiyane said:

"I see cultural diversity in South Africa as a strength, not a weakness, but I detest chauvinism." (The Mercury, 23 September 1993)

and:

"I strongly believe in African leadership and the cultural pride of Africa." (The Mercury, 8 August 1993)

Jiyane linked his Africanism with his support for federalism by saying:

"it will take blacks a long time before they become competent in the management of a modern industrial society like South Africa, even political management. But having federal provincial governments provides a laboratory where you can put more black people to train them for the task of managing the government of the centre. It shortens the time therefore for us to equip competent managers."

Another reason Jiyane gave for supporting federalism was that central government would be enriched by different provincial governments because it would be able to use those different learning experiences from within. More philosophically, Jiyane thinks that federalism offers an institutional arrangement for freedom in a way that central government cannot, in that it allows for partnership rather than hegemony. He explained his support for a federal provincial constitution in these terms:

"South Africa would be the first country that is heterogeneous and so large and yet that is not federal and remains free and democratic. There should be exclusive political powers with which to check the centre."

My impression of Jiyane was of a shrewd, independent and astute thinker. His work has won him praise from the party's leadership, including its president Mangosuthu Buthelezi. However it has been suggested that Jiyane's relationship with Buthelezi is an erratic one. Although Jiyane is a competent organiser with a fair amount of clout as party secretary-general, he has been excluded from provincial constitutional negotiations and from planning for local government elections. This sidelining suggests that old histories die hard within the IFP – Jiyane left the country after a falling out with Buthelezi. Perhaps distrust from that fallout lingers?

What ties Jiyane to the IFP is a resistance to what he perceives as ANC intolerance, as was made evident to me when he spoke of his time in exile when he was exposed to ANC brutality in camps. He found an alternative in the IFP. But as to whether Jiyane is blindly loyal to this party remains to be seen – political commentators speculate about a possible move on his part into the private sector should the costs of remaining within a party which struggles to contain both moderate and conservative impulses, traditional and modern ideologies, be too great.

But which way the IFP goes depends on a great deal of factors. When the interim constitution falls away in 1999 the urban wing of the IFP, where Jiyane is most powerful, could shift into the nexus of power within the IFP. On the other hand, the balance of power could shift in favour of the chiefs leaving Jiyane in a less powerful position.

Walter Felgate

Walter Sidney Felgate has the reputation both within the IFP and beyond of being an uncompromising and tough negotiator. I went to interview him at the IFP daily management committee centre with this in mind.

Felgate is of a fierce craggy demeanour, with deepset observant eyes and a measured gruff way of speaking. He thought carefully about all my questions before answering them, and gave studied concise answers.

Walter Felgate was born in Pretoria in 1930. He attended Pretoria Boys' High School where he matriculated in 1949. When he completed school he worked on SA Railways as a ticket clerk, and later at Lever Brothers where he introduced computerised stock control.

After this Felgate went to study at the University of Natal, Durban, and completed a degree in social anthropology in 1958. This was followed by an Honours degree in 1959. When asked about the significance of his studies at UND he answered:

"I came into the University of Natal from an experience with church and politics and became very keenly aware that the humanities were important. I went into university late, I was 27 when I went to university, went to study very seriously about how people worked and how society worked."

From here Felgate was employed by the Institute for Social Research at the university and undertook research in Tongaland (north-eastern Zululand). When the government withdrew his permit for the area, he was seconded to Lisbon University through the University of Lourenco Marques and worked in the rural areas of southern Mozambique for a year.

Felgate claims about this time that it had a fundamental impact on his political beliefs. He tells this story about his introduction to political thinking:

"I went into politics in the first place – actually – as a teenager, when one of our farm labourers went missing – I eventually tracked him down to a central jail and went to open the gate, but they wouldn't let me through. I saw through the doors that some prisoners had been marched into the courtyard and that Piet was one of them. I greeted him and with that the warder slammed the butt of a rifle into his back and broke his ribs – that shook me solidly – that act of inhumanity towards someone that I'd grown up with. It opened my eyes. I felt a real affinity for the people who lived on that farm. Then I did research for social anthropology and felt a similar affinity for the tribal people I lived with, having insights into their poverty and disadvantages made an enormous impact on me."

During the 1950's when Felgate was a lay preacher in the Methodist Church, he began to question the morality of apartheid when confronted with segregation in the church. He left a white congregation to worship with an Indian mission in Durban. Arguing that 'the whole debate about race and church had become more politicised during that period', he explained that he joined the Liberal Party because it 'offered a whitie such as myself some kind of entry into the whole political scene.'

When asked about his links with Beyers Naude's Christian Institute, Felgate said:

"I joined the Institute after a fair degree of radicalisation when the Liberal Party was disbanded because of the Affected Organisations Act. There was a hardcore group of us who did not agree that it should be disbanded and that we should impact or go underground or go into protest politics – but not lie down under the apartheid steamroller. After the mass arrests in

1978 we went to the UN and there publicly declared the Institute's commitment to furthering the ANC's struggle – which caused quite a revolt because the Institute didn't want to take sides, for instance against the PAC."

Felgate described the interesting dynamic that was developing at this time in liberation theology:

"A struggle was emerging between the established churches and the ANC and that whole idiom was picked up by the World Council of Churches. Entry into the Christian Institute was entry into Christian activist politics – it was entry into the Christian commitment to be pro-ANC, pro-liberation and pro the involvement of the church."

On his return from Mozambique, Felgate lectured at Rhodes University for three years in the Department of Social Anthropology. He then undertook labour motivational research with the Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg for the following three years. Thereafter he was appointed African Affairs adviser to Rio Tinto Zinc's Phalaborwa Mining Company. It was here that he first established contact with Buthelezi. Felgate established an external monitoring panel to assess Rio Tinto's labour policies, and invited, amongst others, Beyers Naude and Mangosuthu Buthelezi to serve on this committee.

In his Christian Institute capacity, Felgate often functioned as a contact between Steve Biko, Oliver Tambo and Mangosuthu Buthelezi. I asked him whether it was a rewarding process to cooperate with such charismatic people. He answered:

"There are two ways of looking at it. The greater the men, the more closely you work with them, the more closely you see their clay feet – holy wars between cardinals and bishops and priests are just as dirty as politics or boardroom wars. I came out of boardroom politics and I certainly wasn't overawed by it. Very rewarding in one sense – very frustrating in another."

In 1974 Felgate played a role in advising Buthelezi about the establishment of Inkatha and its constitution. By the late 1970's tensions between Inkatha and the ANC had developed, partly, in Felgate's view, because of Inkatha's rapid growth. In 1977 Felgate helped to plan a summit meeting between the two organisations for 1978 but this failed when both Tambo and Buthelezi declined to attend it.

After the break between the ANC and Inkatha in 1979, Felgate parted with Naude and his colleagues from the Christian Institute, which had been banned in October 1977. He maintains that he was expected to take an anti-Buthelezi and anti-Inkatha position, but that he believed that Buthelezi, rather than the ANC, was the injured party in ANC-Inkatha relations, and he decided to continue working with him.

From 1980 onwards Felgate became closely involved with the work of Inkatha. He explains the IFP's massive political impact in these terms:

"When the ANC was banned and had actually left the country to go into exile, they had very little by way of structures left on the ground, this huge vacuum – lots of people with no structure – from '76 into the '80's people were flocking to us – we were flying the symbols of liberation, the colours of the ANC."

I asked Felgate whether he thought that the IFP had changed over time. He answered that its commitment to fundamental principles remained the same, couched in the same language as in the early 70's. But he pointed out that IFP policies had changed over the years. Initially the IFP supported liberal politics – coming out against sanctions and the armed struggle – trying to pursue a policy of unity and diversity (as opposed to the ANC policy of unity and conformity.) But years of exposure to rejection from the ANC and Black Consciousness movements:

"produced enormous pressures from within the organisation which changed its nature – there was suddenly a need to survive on your own and survive in a hostile world in which there is no ANC support, no Western government support, no trade union support, no church support – so that the self-sufficiency notion started to emerge, which left the IFP with indelible differences between its early cooperative approach – the experience of being put under siege left its mark."

When membership of the Inkatha Freedom Party was opened to all races in 1990, Felgate was the first white to join. He was appointed to its central committee and served on its executive committee with the portfolio of organisational development, structures and leadership development. He also undertook research and provided a documentation service, initially on a part time, but later full time, basis.

Felgate has represented Inkatha on various committees relating to Natal violence and was active in the process leading up to the signing of the National Peace Accord. He served as an IFP representative on the National Peace Committee, and as a representative at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and attended its plenary sessions in December 1991 and May 1992. He was also a member of the Codesa working group dealing with interim transitional mechanisms. He

served as the IFP's chief negotiator at the World Trade Centre in 1993 until the party walked out over the issue of 'sufficient consensus' in decision making concerning the election date of 27 April 1994.

I asked Felgate whether he thought his being labelled a hardliner was justified. He answered that:

"Images build up over time and they sometimes become the master of everything else – deserved or undeserved. I don't see myself as hardline at all – I have a mandate from a party, and I've never done anything else other than pursue the mandates that I've been given from the party, and I think that over time I've shown the extent to which I've been in step with the party. I don't think I've ended up in a small minority which hasn't been shared by the party. To say I'm a hardliner – I'm merely a functionary. I report to National Council, I report to Buthelezi, I'm faithful to mandates – but I don't regard myself as a hardline person."

He pointed to his uncompromising stance around the negotiations about the April 1994 elections as an example:

"I had a very strong mandate from the special general conference of the IFP which debated this issue of entering the elections from that Saturday morning right through the night. Nobody who attended that could possibly have doubted what the intention of the IFP was – again it was a matter of mandates – I didn't have a personal issue – I was again a party functionary and I had to pursue what I thought was a mandate from a real party conference."

Felgate was also quick to deny that he had any particular sway over Buthelezi:

"Nobody who knows Buthelezi says that – nobody has sway over Buthelezi whatsoever – if there's any sense of me working closely with him it's not because I dictate to him because that's impossible – it's simply that we're working according to mandates."

It has been said of Felgate that he sees smaller parties as entities which can be bullied. Interestingly, Felgate denied that aggressive IFP actions have unified opposition parties:

"The IFP has shown that there is scope for membership-based independently minded groupings in politics – one doesn't have to only be running with the hares and not with the hounds – there's a need in multiparty democracy for that kind of fierce independence of mind and an ability to stick to your guns. I think that over

time the IFP will shake the apple tree and other people will pick up those very apples."

In September 1993, following the dismissal with costs of the KwaZulu government's Supreme Court application to have certain negotiated decisions taken by 'sufficient consensus' set aside, Felgate allegedly threatened that the IFP would launch a mass action campaign to ensure that the scheduled April 1994 elections would not take place. He indicated that if the elections went ahead there would be civil war. He also stated that the IFP would not abide by the decisions of the Transitional Executive Council as it was viewed as a 'weapon of the ANC to carry on its political vendetta of annihilating KwaZulu and Inkatha.' Following his statements there were indications of internal discontent over Felgate's role in the IFP and his close relationship with Buthelezi.

In March 1993 Democratic Party MP, Kobus Jordaan, implied in a question in parliament that Felgate could have been a spy or informer for one of the state's intelligence agencies. Felgate strongly denied these allegations.

Following the agreement by the IFP in April 1994 to contest the elections at the end of the month, Felgate stood as an IFP candidate for the national assembly and became a member of parliament.

Felgate is optimistic about the role of the IFP in 1996:

"I think that the IFP has an important historic role to play and I think that other provinces are increasingly over the next five years going to be moving towards making the kinds of demands the IFP has made right from Codesa onwards. I think it has played some kind of important forerunner role to the politics of provincial expression."

Felgate has been a fierce strategist in the negotiations around the provincial constitution – encouraging action for results, with a hardline view of the consequences of political power in constitutional negotiations. He describes himself as predominantly concerned with constitutional issues.

Approached for comment on the provincial constitution as agreed upon by all negotiating parties on the 15 March 1996, Felgate said that it captured the elements of provincial autonomy fought for by the IFP since Codesa. He argues that the inclusion of the list of provincial competencies stands as a tribute to the negotiating capacity of all involved in drawing up the provincial constitution. He described his role in the final stages of constitutional negotiations as one where he matched the ANC's concession to include sunrise clauses in an integrated constitution,

by agreeing that the provincial constitution would follow the precepts of the national constitution, providing that provincial powers were not diminished. He is:

"not happy with the outcome. The provincial constitution is a compromise document, each party has paid a steep price."

Yet Felgate argues that:

"the constitution is worth having. It will prove an important benchmark in the future."

Local tribal authority and the composition of regional councils are issues which have not been authoritatively dealt with in the provincial constitution. Felgate says of tribal authority that:

"tribal societies rest on a partnership between the chief and the people. If you look at dominantly tribal society which lives on norms and mutual acceptance – there are no jails, there are no policemen, there is no written law. There's a real extension of democracy at work in which the chief who ignores what the people say, is just ignored. When you've got massive poverty, huge areas, lack of development – to replace tribal authority with elected officials is hugely problematic."

The IFP finds traditional leadership compatible with membership of national and provincial assemblies and local government functions. The ANC believes that traditional leaders should stay out of elected assemblies and that their role in local government should be circumscribed and confined to an advisory and consultative, rather than executive role (*KwaZulu-Natal Briefing*, Number 1, March 1996).

Felgate was adamant that these issues will be favourably resolved within the near future.

I asked Felgate how he thought the IFP could combat violence within KwaZulu-Natal. He answered that:

"The IFP cannot combat violence on its own, no party can and no government can. It can only come about as a result of concerted effort across party lines and in partnerships between the government and the people. There is a desperate need to recognise that political violence shades easily into criminal violence and that violence is inherent in divided and deeply poverty stricken societies in which there are no community problem solving mechanisms. Structural problems within the community are productive of conflict on their own. The IFP's insistence on the importance of structure – of people on the ground – is noteworthy. We fought for, in fact we

still fight for the Commissioner of Police at provincial level to be appointed at provincial level by provincial forces; for the control of peace at a provincial level. To have community police in KwaZulu drawn from the ranks of ex Mkhonto people from Gauteng hasn't worked."

Felgate is critical of the police force under Mufamadi. He accuses the ANC of:

"rewriting history where some people get painted as baddies and some people get painted as goodies. As heinous as the events in Port Shepstone were, a task force come from outside, without any cooperation from provincial quarters – moving out of the blue and into the dark, just zapping people who have their own sense of grievances – is highly politicised."

I found this statement ironic considering the ease with which Felgate was prepared to tarnish the ANC's image.

I asked Felgate about his independent approach to political action. He spoke of a farm he spent time on as a child:

"I learnt the value of being on my own, standing on my own and not requiring social groups to support what I'm doing. That goes pretty much with an independence of mind. When Oliver Tambo told me in 1979 that as somebody from the ANC I had to assist in the destruction of Buthelezi – I could say no – and when Beyers Naude turned to support Oliver Tambo in opposition to Buthelezi I could say no to him. I've never had too much to lose – I've never had either security or image which couldn't be sacrificed. I'm not a person who withers under peoples' criticism."

Felgate said of his continued involvement in politics:

"When you're 65 as I am and you've spent most of your life in politics you'd hope by now that you'd be over this phase of struggle – and that you'd actually start to enjoy living in a free and open society."

At the same time he stated that:

"After having spent years in a tribal society – one has a deep empathy with the politics of poverty and for one to settle down in a middle class suburban society and pretend this problem doesn't exist and do nothing about it – is rather odd to me."

Walter Felgate is clearly a man with a sense of mission, and moreover, a sense of duty. Now that the provincial constitution has been adopted, Felgate

61

envisions his continued involvement with the compunctions of rationalisation:

> *"the rationalisation process of all the laws will be a very involved process – so I think that's where I'll be tied up – constitutional issues and the development of the constitution."*

For the meantime, we can expect to continue observing Felgate's rugged, resilient, and often ruthless actions in the realm of IFP provincial and national 'realpolitik'.

Mario Ambrosini

Dr Mario Oriani-Ambrosini, the publicity-shy advisor to Buthelezi is a former colleague of Professor Albert Blaustein, of Rutgers University in New York, who was temporary advisor to the IFP at Codesa. Blaustein is understood to have played a key role in the drawing up of the IFP's constitution.

It is believed Ambrosini collaborated with him and picked up from where Blaustein left off as an advisor. He is now formally employed as advisor to the Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Little else is known about the elusive advisor who refuses to grant interviews or issue copies of his CV to journalists.

It has been suggested that the nature of Ambrosini's relationship with Buthelezi is a mercenary one. It is rumoured that his generous salary is paid in US dollars, and that his role is out of all proportion to his status within the IFP. He has the confidence of Buthelezi. However, Ambrosini and others have been criticised for the role they play as Buthelezi's advisors. They are seen as ultimately more of a problem to Buthelezi than assistance.

> *"They are not au fait with African interplays. He [Buthelezi] is either getting the wrong advice from people with their own political agendas, or in desperation he is losing his head and making tactical mistakes"* (*Sunday Tribune*, 1992).

After the exit of Konigkramer as chairperson of the IFP in October 1995, a new constitutional committee chairperson, Mike Tarr, was appointed. Walter Felgate and Ambrosini thereafter took control of drafting negotiations on behalf of the IFP:

> *"The result was a sharp change of mood: many observers felt that their arrival removed any meaningful input from IFP MPP's in the process, for example"* (*KwaZulu-Natal Briefing*, Number 1, March 1996).

Ambrosini has lived for some years in the United States. It has been said that his experience of the American legal system has coloured his understanding of the law, so that working within the parameters of the South African legal system (strongly influenced by British law) has been difficult for him.

It has been suggested that Ambrosini's personal agenda was to control the whole process of constitutional negotiation: 'in a political sense he is Machiavellian. He will intervene with cleverness and shrewdness in what he understands as a political game.'

The relationship between Ambrosini and Felgate, as constitutional negotiators, has been described as strained. This is ascribed partly to Ambrosini's difficulties with the English language which have hindered him in negotiations.

There is also a difference of approach between Ambrosini and Felgate. Ambrosini 'is a young man – interested in making his mark', while Felgate is an older, hardened, possibly wiser negotiator. Ambrosini has been called abrasive.

Senator Ruth Rabinowitz says of Dr Ambrosini that he is 'in his personal and academic capacity, a proponent of women's rights and plays a pro-active role constitutionally, recommending ways to achieve empowerment for women'.

Although the provincial constitution was passed on 15 March 1996, it still needs to be re-drafted, cleaned up and submitted to the Constitutional Court for ratification. There is thus still a role for negotiators like Ambrosini.

Moreover, as local government elections approach, campaigning has begun in earnest. Will Ambrosini play a role here – and if so, what kind of role?

Conclusion

What effect Jiyane, Felgate and Ambrosini will have on the politics of the new KwaZulu-Natal depends on whether they remain within the IFP's orbit. The mysterious future of the IFP hangs in the balance.

To beg one of many questions: will it be Jiyane who stands in line to replace Buthelezi as leader of the IFP? What will Felgate's role be once constitutional rationalisations are over? And Ambrosini's position is also opaque.

Local government elections are set to provide answers about the direction the IFP will take. Moreover, these elections will provide a basis for future understandings of the political identities of Jiyane, Felgate and Ambrosini. ISSA

MEASURING THE METROPOLE

SETTLEMENT AND POPULATION OF THE DURBAN METROPOLITAN AREA

By Carol Wright and Ken Breetzke
Urban Strategy Department, Corporate Services,
Central Transitional Local Council, Durban Metropolitan Area

The Settlement Areas and Population Estimate projects – now publicly available – provide a valuable new database for policy and development planning in the Durban area. An important research finding is the lower than expected population estimate of 2,3 million.

To plan for the future of a metropolitan area, urban planners need access to reliable information. The Urban Strategy Department (USD) of the City of Durban is involved in metropolitan planning and depends on reliable demographic and spatial information for improved decision making.

As a result of rapid urbanisation and a legacy of mostly fragmented data collection, available information on settlement and population covering the entire Durban Metropolitan Area, was often drawn from secondary sources and was considered outdated and in many cases unreliable. There was general consensus within the research community that new primary research was required.

With the aim of filling this strategic information gap the USD initiated the Settlement Areas and Population Estimate projects in December 1994.

Some of the findings

❏ There are an estimated 2,3 million people living in the Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA).

❏ Approximately 69% of the population live in formal dwellings, 26% in informal and 5% in peri-urban dwellings.

❏ The lower than expected population figures reflect and confirm documented trends towards lower occupancy rates

per dwelling and lower population growth rates in the DMA and in South Africa as a whole.

❏ Within *formal* housing areas the lowest occupancy rate (OR) of 2,99 was found in the predominantly white residential areas and the highest, an average of 5,3344 in African townships.

❏ Within *informal areas*, although the average total occupancy rate for all dwellings is 4,7 persons per dwelling, there is a range of average ORs from 3,71 in infill backyard to 6,07 in peripheral cluster dwellings.

❏ *Peri-urban* dwellings in the DMA have an average total occupancy rate of 6,24.

A computerised database has been constructed and linked to a Geographic Information System (GIS). This enables one to calculate the estimated population within all formal and informal settlements within the DMA and to view the spatial location and extent of human settlement.

Common features

While the two projects have their own aims and methodology, they have a number of aspects in common:

❏ Their focus initially was on those areas for which information was unreliable or not readily available, that is on informal and peri-urban settlement areas.

Available information on settlement and population covering the entire Durban Metropolitan Area, was outdated and unreliable

DURBAN METROPOLITAN AREA

Empirical Context

Map 1

Map not to scale

❑ Both projects were pursued under the direction of an Advisory Group comprising recognised experts in the research and development planning field.

❑ They both attempted to build on existing work and to avoid duplication of effort and the waste of resources.

❑ Both projects have the same study area (the Durban Metropolitan Area or DMA boundary as of September 1994).

❑ They both reflect the January 1996 changes to the metropolitan boundary (see notes on page 68). Map 1 reflects the current metropolitan and the six Transitional Substructure areas and indicates how the metropolitan area has been divided as well as the relationship

The focus is primarily on the complexity within informal settlement areas but integrates tribal and formal local authority areas

of the DMA to the Durban Functional Region (DFR). Note that the DMA is much smaller in extent than the DFR.

❑ Both projects together form a base for spatial demographic analysis and contribute significantly to the understanding of the metropolitan area.

❑ The findings of both projects have been prepared for public release.

Settlement Areas project

❑ Main aims

➡ To establish a geo-referenced spatial base for the metropolitan area on Atlas GIS to contribute to planning and development policy formulation for the DMA.

➡ To input local knowledge and reflect the settlement pattern as it occurs on the ground. The focus is primarily on the complexity within informal settlement areas but integrates tribal and formal local authority areas.

❑ Approach and broad methodology

➡ In the field, with the aid of people living or working in the area and hence having extensive local knowledge of informal and peri-urban areas, settlement boundaries were drawn and verified on aerial photographs (flown in July 1994). These settlement boundaries were the geographic boundaries of 'communities' as they had established themselves on the ground.

➡ A settlement base comprising 555 settlement areas in the DMA was created through digitally combining the informal and peri-urban settlement boundaries with the Local Authority and Durban Planning District boundaries.

➡ In order to make this spatial base both more understandable and more simple for data analysis, these settlement areas were aggregated into 78 clusters using documented criteria. Map 2 shows this detailed clustering. Well known or distinct areas of major population concentration (e.g. Inanda, Pinetown South, Clermont etc) have been clustered as have farming areas and similar type residential areas (e.g. Western Farmland and Southern Suburbs). Tribal boundaries have been utilised in the clustering process and distinct industrial areas are also present.

❑ What does the settlement area's spatial base represent?

The new spatial base represents in map form the 'new reality' for planning where formal and informal settlement are both seen as integral components of the metropolitan landscape.

The spatial coverage comprising 555 settlement areas and 78 clusters has been directly linked to the population estimate project and has been used as a base for estimating the population within every settlement area.

Population Estimate project

❑ Main aims

→ To obtain an estimate of the population in the Durban Metropolitan Area living in formal, informal and peri-urban dwellings.
→ To establish a geo-referenced informal and peri-urban dwelling database for the DMA.
→ To assist in the development of a demographic and socio-economic profile of defined households and communities in the DMA.

❑ Approach and broad methodology

The general approach adopted for the research involved a process of obtaining accurate dwelling counts and current occupancy rates in formal, informal and peri-urban settlements in the DMA. These key elements were then used to estimate the population in all the settlements in the study area, ie (dwellings) x (averaged, weighted occupancy rates) = population estimate.

❑ Dwelling counts

In *formal* areas dwelling totals were obtained from local authorities and township administrators. Dwelling counts in *informal* and *peri-urban* areas were obtained from the dwelling count survey undertaken by Geomap for the USD. Here, July 1994 aerial photography was used as a base for the identification of dwellings.

An agreed upon typology which was simple, representative and capable of replication was used in the study. The typology basically allows for the categorisation of dwellings according to dwelling structure and spatial location within the DMA (see box).

TYPOLOGY

DOMAIN	DWELLING TYPOLOGY	DEFINITION OF DWELLING TYPE
FORMAL	SUBURB	House, flat.
FORMAL	TOWNSHIP	House.
INFORMAL	INFILL SINGLE	Single shack, close to formal dwellings & other landuses.
INFORMAL	INFILL BACKYARD	Single shack, occur in backyards of formal dwellings.
INFORMAL	ROWS OF ROOMS	Shack rooms joined together.
INFORMAL	PERIPHERAL CLUSTER	Single shacks grouped together, one path to cluster. Small scale agriculture.
INFORMAL	PERIPHERAL SINGLE	Single shacks, edge of formal areas.
PERI-URBAN	CLUSTER	Single dwellings grouped together, more than 50% square shape. Agriculture activity.
PERI-URBAN	SINGLE	Single square or round dwellings. Agriculture activity.
PERI-URBAN	UMUZI	Traditional dwellings, clustered into a homestead. Agriculture activity.

Note: Inner city street dwellers, hostel dwellers and farm workers were not included in the project due to access and violence problems. Information on institutions, outbuildings and granny flats was also uneven. An estimation of these residents is included as a separate total for the whole region. The study did not take into account any illegal immigration, refugees, intra- and inter metropolitan migration trends.

SETTLEMENT AREAS & POPULATION ESTIMATE PROJECT 1995

DURBAN METROPOLITAN AREA
Spatial Clustering

Map 2

There are indications of a possible future trend towards lower occupancy rates in all formal residential areas

An occupancy rate survey was seen to be a key input into the process of estimating the population in the DMA. Since to date, occupancy rate surveys have been restricted to certain spatial areas or have focused on specific population groups, there was a need to obtain current occupancy rates and associated socio-economic data for different settlement types across the whole of the DMA.

In this survey, the occupancy rate (OR) is the average number of people living in a particular type of dwelling. This is expressed as the number of persons per dwelling. The survey was undertaken by Data Research Africa (DRA) during July 1995 in 211 sample areas linked to the settlement areas' spatial base.

A comprehensive sampling framework and methodology was developed to ensure that a well designed probability sample could be drawn and valid conclusions made from the sample.

The average OR in informal dwellings in the DMA is five persons per dwelling

DMA occupancy rates

Mean weighted occupancy rates were established for each of the dwelling types within each of the four transitional substructures. Details of the ORs can be found in the full research document, and only mean weighted rates for the main dwelling types are listed in the box below.

DOMAIN	TYPOLOGY	STRATUM	1995 MEAN WEIGHTED OCCUPANCY RATE
FORMAL	TOWNSHIP HOUSE	AFRICAN	5.3344
	HOUSE/FLAT	COLOURED	4.2750
	HOUSE/FLAT	INDIAN	4.3958
	HOUSE/FLAT	WHITE	2.9978
		MEAN FORMAL	4.2507
INFORMAL	INFILL SINGLE	TOTAL	4.1161
	INFILL BACKYARD	TOTAL	3.7104
	ROWS ROOMS	TOTAL	5.0000
	PERIPHERAL SINGLE	TOTAL	4.7788
	PERIPHERAL CLUSTER	TOTAL	6.0730
		MEAN INFORMAL	4.7224
PERI-URBAN	PERI-URBAN SINGLE	TOTAL	7.0417
	PERI-URBAN CLUSTER	TOTAL	6.4566
	PERI-URBAN UMUZI	TOTAL	5.9307
		MEAN PERI-URBAN	6.2387
		MEAN ALL DWELLING	S5.0539

Observations about ORs

The formal, informal and peri-urban residential areas have differing occupancy rates, however, an overall trend is the lowering of the occupancy rates.

❏ Formal residential areas

The mean OR for all the formal areas is 4,3 persons per dwelling, with the lowest OR, 2,99 found in the predominantly white residential areas and the highest, an average of 5,3344 in African townships.

There are indications of a possible future trend towards lower occupancy rates in all formal residential areas. This may be explained in part by a process of class decompression: in the upward movement of people from one residential area to another based on socio-economic criteria, large, extended families break up into small nuclear families. It may also be due to declining population growth rates in urban areas. The lower occupancies will have an impact on the long term provision of housing and all services in urban areas.

❏ Informal residential areas

In informal areas, although the average total occupancy rate for all dwellings is 4,7 persons per dwelling, there is a range of average ORs from 3,71 in infill backyard to 6,07 in peripheral cluster dwellings. This study is one of the first to identify dwellings and ORs in a range of dwelling typologies in informal settlement areas and it has important implications for service provision in the DMA.

It appears that the average OR in informal dwellings in the DMA is following a trend identified by researchers in the early 1990s of five persons per dwelling. Reports of ORs of eight or more people per dwelling in the DMA are thus not substantiated by this study. It is likely that there will continue to be a range of ORs in informal dwellings, with infill single and backyard dwellings having lower ORs than peripheral dwellings. Once new housing and basic services reach the informal areas, the OR may start to decline further as family units begin to decompress.

❏ Peri-urban residential areas

An average total occupancy rate of 6,24 was found in peri-urban dwellings in the DMA.

The ORs in these residential areas are the highest in the region and indicate relatively dense concentrations of people on the urban fringe.

Peri-urban single dwellings have an average OR of 7,04 persons per dwelling which is slightly higher than the 6,45 OR for peri-urban clusters and 5,93 for *Imizi* which usually form around family groups.

The ORs in peri-urban areas seem to have been stable around an average six persons per dwelling and may have declined slightly in certain areas from the average of seven reported in studies undertaken in the early 1990s. Many factors may be impacting here, with movement of people closer to the urban core to have access to facilities and opportunities and in response to conflict and violence.

It is likely that the average ORs in peri-urban areas will continue to be around an average of six person per dwelling.

The brief overview of the ORs found in the 1995 DMA survey points clearly to declining ORs in the region. These lower ORs must have an impact on the estimated population in the region. A detailed breakdown of the estimated population in the DMA is outlined in the box above.

Estimated DMR population

The formal, informal and peri-urban dwelling counts and the occupancy rates from the survey were inputted into the Urban Strategy Department GIS database and matched to the settlement areas within the study area. These layers of data formed the base for the population estimate calculations.

Dwelling counts, occupancy rates and population estimates were calculated for the 555 settlements areas in the DMA.

❏ DMA population estimate and dwelling totals

DMA population estimates and dwelling totals for the three domains formal, informal and peri-urban are summarised above.

➡ There is an estimated 2,3 million people living in the Durban Metropolitan Area.

➡ The lower than expected population figures reflect and confirm documented

DURBAN METROPOLITAN AREA
(January 1996 boundary)

TOTAL POPULATION	2 146 987
TOTAL POPULATION (Including hostels, institutions, out buildings)	2 359 787
Estimate for hostels, institutions and out buildings.	212 800
TOTAL DWELLINGS (Excluding hostels, institutions etc)	492 092
FORMAL POPULATION	1 478 633 68.9%
FORMAL DWELLINGS	352 184
INFORMAL POPULATION	565 177 26.3%
INFORMAL DWELLINGS	124 284
PERI-URBAN POPULATION	103 177 4.8%
PERI-URBAN DWELLINGS	15 624

trends towards lower occupancy rates per dwelling and lower population growth rates in the DMA and in South Africa as a whole. For example, recent research on the 1991 Census published in an authoritative publication by the Centre for Development Enterprise (1995: 8), highlights that '... the South African population is not growing as rapidly as was previously thought'.

➡ The apparent large discrepancy between past figures quoting anywhere up to 5-6 million people and those of this study can in part be explained by the fact that previous figures for the metropolitan area were calculated for an area larger than the current DMA (an area known as the Durban Functional Region – Map 1). The areas now excluded however, would only constitute in the region of 400 000 people. The difference can possibly be ascribed to the lower ORs found in this study and the fact that many of the past estimates were arrived at through escalation factors being applied to already inflated figures.

➡ Comparisons of the 1995 population estimate totals with 1995 CSS and Eskom population estimates were undertaken and reveal that Eskom figures are generally the highest, then CSS, then Urban Strategy.

On the whole, the USD figures for the DMA are comparable with the CSS

The apparent discrepancy between past figures and those of this study can be explained by the fact that previous figures for the metropolitan area were calculated for an area larger than the current DMA

Durban Metropolitan Area

Informal and Peri Urban dwellings (July 1994)
Settlement areas and Population estimate project 1995

MAP 3

Dwelling type
The original of this map indicates dwelling types in colour. Now it merely shows densities and location in the DMA. For the colour map please contact the Urban Strategy Department at the numbers below.

N

Durban Transitional Sub-structures

Km

0 2 4 6 8 10

Population Estimate and Dwelling Total by DMA Transitional Substructure

TRANSITIONAL SUBSTRUCTURE	TOTAL POP	% DMA POP	TOTAL FORMAL	TOTAL INFORMAL	TOTAL PERI-URBAN	TOTAL DWELL	% DMA DWELL
NORTH	121 842	6	109 624	9 881	2 337	28 117	6
NORTH CENTRAL	736 836	34	520 050	214 701	2 086	173 725	35
SOUTH CENTRAL	604 456	28	481 530	120 072	2 855	141 243	29
SOUTH	118 519	6	95 160	23 298	60	27 498	5.5
INNER WEST	305 855	14	196 517	107 907	1 432	71 657	14.5
OUTER WEST	259 479	12	75 752	89 318	94 409	49 852	10
TOTALS	2 146 987	100	1 478 633	565 177	103 179	492 092	100

Note: The above figures exclude persons resident in hostels, institutions, outbuildings and granny flats.

figures: both USD and CSS estimate the population in the DMA to be 2,3 million. The main differences between CSS and USD are in the township areas (USD recorded lower ORs) and the tribal authority areas (spatial unit differences and USD recorded lower ORs).

➡ Approximately 69% of the population live in formal dwellings, 26% in informal and 5% in peri-urban dwellings.

➡ Considering the DMA as a whole, the project indicates that the majority of people live in formal residential areas and a quarter of the population in informal settlement areas. A small, yet significant portion of the DMA population live in peri-urban areas.

➡ There appears to be a concentration of population in North Central and South Central substructures, which together with Inner West account for 76% of the total. A further 12% of the population occur within the Outer West, whose population is equivalent to that of the North and South transitional substructures combined.

➡ In terms of the percentage of total DMA dwellings, the North and Central transitional substructures have a slightly higher percentage of the total dwellings relative to the population – 64%. This is explained by the relatively high number of formal dwellings in each of these areas.

➡ The North, North Central and South Central, and South and Inner West transitional substructures have a majority of residents living in formal areas. Outer West has a predominance of peri-urban

(36%) and informal residents (34%), with a total of 70% non-formal.

➡ The Inner and Outer West have 35% and 34% informal residents respectively, whereas North Central has 29% and South Central 20%.

Significance to planning

Apart from a comprehensive population analysis, the research is significant in a few other areas:

❑ The fact that the data allows one to differentiate for example, between informal dwellings in peripheral areas, those occurring as pockets of infill and those in the backyards of formal houses. This is of major significance since these categories of dwelling have very different servicing implications and hence varying budgetary impacts for service providers.

❑ The data can potentially be utilised by the private sector in making more informed business location decisions. It thus has a positive spin-off for the economy of the DMA.

❑ By establishing the location of every informal and peri-urban dwelling in the metropolitan area, the identification of the best potential sites for facilities (such as clinics, schools, sportsfields, landfill sites etc) or the best alignment of pipelines or other utilities can be dramatically aided.

❑ Development projects in disadvantaged communities across the metro can now potentially be assessed holistically in relation to other development initiatives (utilising the GIS) and action can be

Strategic planning for services, social and engineering infrastructure can possibly be more complimentary given a common demographic and spatial base

directed at communities which are in need.

❏ The research methodology has highlighted the viability of utilising aerial photography and GIS techniques for accurately capturing and monitoring settlement and population data.

Conclusion

The Settlement Areas and Population Estimate projects both form a comprehensive and valuable database for planning and development in the Durban Metropolitan Area. These bases are a reliable and well documented source of information which should be updated and monitored at regular intervals.

The public disclosure of this information will establish a common basis for policy and planning decisions. This has potentially very positive spin-offs for the metro area since strategic planning for the provision of services and social and engineering infrastructure can possibly be more complimentary given a common demographic and spatial base.

The spatial and demographic information is being utilised as an aid in a current initiative aimed at formulating a strategic plan for the spatial development of the DMA. ᴵᴺᴰᴵᶜ

NOTES

The base and analysed data from the two projects are available in report and document format, with supporting maps and spreadsheets. In addition, all the data will shortly be available on CD-ROM. Documents can be purchased from the Urban Strategy Department, 3rd floor, Shell House, Durban. Tel 3074920.

The drawing of the boundaries involved a considerable amount of additional work and has delayed the project release but it was important that the data reflect the latest proposed political scenario. The September 1994 (study area) metropolitan boundary has shrunk in a number of areas to accommodate the January 1996 changes. The main areas affected are: Umnini Trust, Toyane and Sobonakhona-Makhanya Tribal Authorities, Folweni, and the Tribal Authorities of Nyuswa, Ngcolosi and Qadi, as well as Buffelsdraai and Fraser. Additional transitional substructure changes have also been effected since September 1994 but these have been supplanted by the current six transitional substructures (January 1996).

REFERENCE

Centre for Development Enterprise (1995) 'Post-Apartheid Population & Income Trends: A New Analysis'. *Research* No 1, CDE.

Eskom population estimate totals: Manning, Hoffman & Partners and Seneque, Maughan -Brown, SWK. CSS Pretoria. Computer Foundation, Johannesburg.

COMPARATIVE
M O N I T O R

Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa

Transport modes
(% of all South Africans - transport to work)

Bus 11.5%

Taxi 24.5%

Other 5.6%

Walk 28.3%

Car/Motorbike 30.1%

TRANSPORT MODES TIMES AND COSTS

Types of transport used to go to work (%)	All S.A.	Households ranked by consumption groups of 20%				
		Ultra-poor				Rich
		1	2	3	4	5
Bus	11,5	11,3	15,5	15,0	12,1	5,7
Taxi	24,5	16,3	28,9	38,6	33,3	7,0
Car/Motorbike	30,1	6,5	7,3	9,8	26,1	76,7
Walk	28,3	62,1	42,3	28,6	21,3	8,1
Other	5,6	3,8	6,0	8,0	7,2	2,5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Transport time (min)	72,5	66,3	76,6	83,7	79,7	57,4
Average transport cost (R)	5,4	3,0	4,0	4,5	5,3	7,2

Note: People who walk to work are excluded in the calculation of average transport costs.
Transport times and cost are per return trip.

Australian Multiculturalism: Lessons for South Africa?

By Patrick McAllister
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University

The 'multiculturalism' to which some of our politicians occasionally refer, has long been official policy in Australia. But these two countries are very different from each other in terms of population make-up. Would formal recognition of cultural differences, as practised down under, work here?

> South Africa and Australia are both ethnically diverse. But so are most countries in the world

'The politics of identity', as a field of inquiry which spans a number of academic disciplines and an issue of major importance to policy makers and political commentators around the globe, has long been a crucial aspect of South African life.

Ignored as a topic of serious discussion for much of the country's recent history – although the manipulation of cultural identity under the Nationalist government was consistently condemned by anti-apartheid critics – identity politics has recently become increasingly relevant in South Africa.

The trends, as always, are contradictory. On the one hand we have the ideology of the 'rainbow nation', which seeks to minimise the boundaries between different identities, language groups and cultures, although acknowledging their value and legitimacy. On the other hand, we have had a recent resurgence of ethnic separateness, and manifestations of cultural exclusivity (De Haas and Zulu 1993; Sharp and Boonzaaier 1994; James 1995).

> 'Multi-culturalism' may become an important aspect of social and political life in South Africa

This article deals with a form of cultural pluralism often referred to as 'multiculturalism' in Australia and elsewhere. It is based on some of the preliminary findings of a research project in which I am engaged, which aims to examine the meaning of cultural diversity in South Africa and Australia and to analyse the way in which the state deals with diversity in the two countries.

South Africa and Australia are both ethnically diverse. But so are most countries in the world. They are also very different kinds of societies – in South Africa indigenous people are in the majority, while Australia is made up primarily of the descendants of settlers and more recent immigrants, with very few indigenous people left.

Why bother with a comparison? The main reason is that every now and then, politicians and others use the term 'multicultural' to refer to the South African population and situation, and there have been hints that 'multiculturalism' may become an important aspect of social and political life in South Africa in the near future.

Australia

In Australia, multiculturalism is an ideology which holds that cultural diversity is tolerated, valued and accommodated in society, within a set of overarching

principles and a democratic system which stress the civic unity and equality of all people within the state.

It is seen as providing every individual with a cultural reference point and sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group, none of which is (in theory) superior or inferior to the other. Ideally this occurs simultaneously with allegiance to Australia and a sense of national unity which cuts across ethnic groups.

Multiculturalism in Australia is official policy – not just another word for ethnic diversity. Not all culturally diverse societies have multiculturalism. In Australia the latter includes a set of official attitudes, structures and strategies, superimposed on cultural diversity, in terms of which diversity is seen (officially) as beneficial to the country as a whole, bringing variety as well as strategic and economic advantage in the form of certain skills and talents (for example, in the linguistic field).

More generally and vaguely, diversity is valued and perceived as 'enriching' everyone, although this is poorly defined and is often taken to refer to the cultural and culinary benefits of multiculturalism – often disparagingly referred to as 'food and folksong', or 'polka and polony'.

What this all means in practice is a large number of ethnic, migrant and cultural associations, officially encouraged and sometimes funded by government. There are around 2 000 such associations in Australia.

In each state these ethnic community organisations are represented by an Ethnic Communities Council which acts, among other things, as a lobbying organisation. At the national level there is the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia.

At formal government level there are Ethnic Affairs Commissions in each state, an Office of Multicultural Affairs – part of the Department of the Prime Minister – an Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs, and a Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (immigration and multiculturalism are two sides of the same coin).

There are also a variety of state funded organisations such as the Australian Multicultural Foundation and policy research units and institutes, usually attached to universities, which are concerned with issues related to multiculturalism and immigration.

Federal government funds also support the Special Broadcasting Service, a TV service which broadcasts in a variety of languages and is seen as closely linked to the ideology of multiculturalism, and a variety of ethnic radio programmes.

Cultural pluralism in some form or other is found in many aspects of life. Multicultural education is propagated in schools, some tertiary institutions have Multicultural Education Units, there are multicultural book fairs, church services, festivals, art groups etc.

In the business pages of newspapers one reads of multicultural marketing or advertising. There is a thriving ethnic press, and some sports are organised along ethnic lines.

Strongly associated with multiculturalism is the Access and Equity strategy and a number of other state initiatives arising out of the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, a major policy document articulated in 1989. These and other measures represent a widespread engagement with cultural diversity which has produced a thriving 'multicultural industry'.

The Access and Equity programme requires each government department to address the question of cultural diversity and to take steps to ensure that migrants and people of 'non-English speaking background' (NESB), in particular, have full access to government services and are not disadvantaged by their cultural or migrant status.

In some cases this means specialised services for specific migrant-ethnic groups, in relation to things like family counselling services, child care, care of the aged etc. Similar measures are extended to the workplace, courtrooms and so on.

Critics say that Access and Equity is an inexpensive way of appearing to put multiculturalism into practice, since these are all services which would be provided whether there was a multicultural policy or not. Others feel that it disguises an assimilationist agenda: it is a way of tying immigrants into Australian institutional structures and values.

Multiculturalism in Australia is official policy – not just another word for ethnic diversity

Generally, diversity is valued and perceived as 'enriching' everyone, although this is poorly defined

Some sports are organised along ethnic lines

Official ideology

South Africa may be multicultural in the sense that it is culturally diverse, but it does not have multiculturalism. Should it ever opt for the latter it may have to explicitly politicise cultural difference in a way that differs radically from the way in which it was politicised in the past, to prevent it from becoming a basis for political mobilisation, competition and domination.

This will be difficult, since even without official multiculturalism, and in the face of the ideology of the 'rainbow nation', difference has been – and is being – used in precisely these ways.

In theory, multiculturalism means the formulation of a policy and associated practices aimed at making cultural diversity formally constitutive of the nation rather than a threat to it.

This is the course that policy has taken in Australia, but from a different starting point. In Australia, earlier conceptions of the nation were as homogenous, with diversity – along both cultural and racial lines – seen as a threat.

Through the development of a multicultural ideology from the early 1970s onwards this has been transformed, officially at least, into a recognition of Australia's cultural diversity, now positively valued as a source of benefit and enrichment to all and, it must be acknowledged, without the development of serious ethnic rivalry and conflict.

However, the official ideology of the state may or may not accord with people's assumptions and world view. Although the official structures and rhetoric do not portray the nation as culturally homogenous, stressing heterogeneity, social equality and the value of difference, it is possible that at the level of individual Australians (including politicians) a different picture emerges.

Society's 'value infrastructure' may differ from what politicians devise (Degenaar 1993).

For South Africa, with a very different history and political culture from Australia, the question we have to bear in mind is how an official multiculturalism would work itself out in practice, how it would translate into society's value infrastructure, how it would be perceived, and thus how it would

affect society in general. It is in this respect that we might learn lessons from down under, superimposing these on the local context.

Preliminary findings

The methodology on which these preliminary findings are based combines some of the methods of the 'ethnography of communication' with linguistic pragmatics.

The former means, in a nutshell, that one has to pay attention to 'ordinary', everyday speech and writing and study all aspects of it. Linguistic pragmatics, as applied by Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, refers to the study of implicitness in language: a technique through which people's shared assumptions about society and relationships may be exposed.

I cannot present much empirical material here – only give examples of it. Applying Blommaert and Verschueren's methodology in Australia, but supplementing it with a broader contextualisation of the texts, the conclusion one comes to is that Australians think in terms of two major categories of people, which are explicitly named as 'migrants' and 'Australians'.

This has nothing to do with citizenship, which is a technical matter, but with culture, politics and social behaviour. From the point of view of Anglo or Anglo-Celtic, English speaking Australians, there is a clear implicit and explicit division between 'us' and 'them', Australians and the 'other', with the other being conceptualised as 'migrants' – that is, not Australian born.

This is often extended to include Australian born children of migrants, as in the statistic frequently cited by social scientists and others, to the effect that four out of every 10 Australian citizens have at least one parent who is not Australian born.

Many other labels carry the same implication – the category 'ethnic' Australians, for example, is common. Take this extract from an election speech by Bob Hawke:

"There is one thing that our seven years of government will have proved to our ethnic communities... It [the government] does not remember its ethnic communities only when there is an election on. It consults with them,

with their representatives, with their media...the hall mark of the Hawke government is to listen to ethnic communities..." (Hawke 1990)

Often the term 'ethnic minorities' is used, and contrasted with the 'dominant' majority segment of the population: non-ethnic, true blue, fair *dinkum* Aussies. And Access and Equity suggests that 'we' (the dominant formulators of policy) owe it to 'them' (the newcomers) not to absorb them into the dominant section, but to give 'them' equal treatment.

Other frequently used terms reinforce a dualistic conception of society. A common one is 'non-English speaking background', which places the emphasis on language, and obviously contrasts with those of 'English speaking background' (ESB).

It extends the category of the other through a definition which emphasises a negative characteristic, to include the children or possibly even the grandchildren of migrants. The term emphasises the fact that the structures and institutions of Australian society operate in English, but also that 'old Australians' are conceptualised as Anglo or Anglo-Celtic.

It is also associated with 'disadvantage', which itself elaborates on the construction of the other in these terms, as in 'migrant disadvantage', which naturally contrasts with those who are of ESB and born in Australia. These terms are used across the political and social spectrum and constitute a widespread way in which the Australian population is conceptualised.

Other contrasts can also be found – for example in the use of 'mainstream', usually contrasted with migrant or NESB or 'immigrant' population. This suggests that the latter are on the fringe, outside the 'mainstream', peripheral, 'them' as opposed to 'us'. Similarly with the term 'core' society. 'Core' (us) contrasts with 'them' (migrants or the descendants of recent migrants).

These terms and the way in which they cluster suggest a conceptualisation of Australian society as consisting of two groups (Aboriginals excluded), Anglo and other, rather than of a variety of cultures. And the attributes of one are dominant, mainstream, advantaged and superior, while the attributes of the other are subordinate,

peripheral, disadvantaged and inferior. Similar findings have been reported from other avowedly 'multicultural' societies.

It bears repeating that this analysis is based, not on the official ideology of multiculturalism (which would naturally contradict these findings), but on ordinary everyday discourse, as represented in the print and visual media, in popular as well as academic articles, and in political discussions and speeches.

Individual ethnicities

In the media, statements about multiculturalism, ethnicity and such matters surface most frequently in relation to specific incidents or issues, rather than in the abstract.

Some I have found revealing are the debate about female circumcision, the murder of a prominent New South Wales politician in late 1994, the controversial question of 'Asian gangs', and the 'Greek conspiracy', when a large number of people of Greek origin were unsuccessfully prosecuted for alleged social security fraud.

The contexts are usually negative ones, and elicit negative comment about individual ethnic groups. One recent example is the anti-French sentiment which swept the country following France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific, sentiment which one observer has described as 'the vindictive hypocrisy which shows how negotiable the rhetoric of multiculturalism really is', and which indicates 'the ease with which the political correctness of multiculturalism can be suspended' (Condren 1995).

What one often finds in the discourse associated with these sorts of events is the reification of ethnicity. Reification also occurs through exaggerating difference. For example, the Hmong of Hobart are described in a Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs publication in terms which emphasise not only their difference, but also the near impossibility of such people ever becoming fully 'Australian':

"The homogenous nature of the Hmong and their close knit family groups makes for difficulties in understanding the individualism of Australian culture...Modern technology is not only new to them but fraught with unexpected

'Old Australians' are conceptualised as Anglo or Anglo-Celtic

'Immigrant' population suggests that the latter are on the fringe

*obstacles. A simple everyday task, such
as cooking a meal in a modern kitchen,
becomes a fearful activity...Crossing the
road, shopping at a supermarket,
visiting a bank and consulting a
doctor...make for almost unbelievable
trauma and isolation..."* (DIEA 1993)

On reading this I was struck by the very
similar way in which black people in South
Africa were often described in publications
sponsored by successive apartheid
governments, such as the South African
Yearbook.

The Vietnamese community became an
object of scrutiny and discussion after the
murder of New South Wales politician, John
Newman, which was widely assumed to be
the responsibility of 'Asian gangs'.

The news clips and discussion programmes
which followed are full of statements which
emphasise the 'otherness' of Asian
Australians, propagate stereotypes and reify
culture (for example, the 'code of silence'
that is widely believed to be typical of Asian
communities). On a panel discussion shortly
after the murder, a large white Australian
man, pointing at the Asian members of the
audience, exhorted them to come forward
with information on the killers 'if you want
to be proper Australians'.

Attitudes to differences

The texts which I have collected indicate a
majority view that multiculturalism is not an
easy matter but a 'challenge', difficult to
achieve, potentially problematic, possibly
undesirable and not terribly interesting or of
much importance in everyday life.

Despite the rhetoric of multiculturalism, the
texts collected reveal that cultural diversity
is tolerated only within strictly defined
limits and valued, at the official and
business level, primarily for its potential
economic and trade benefits and, at the
popular level, for what it provides in terms
of ethnic food, entertainment and the arts.

There is frequent reference to the 'core
values' and key principles of Australian
society, which are not negotiable and to
which cultural diversity is subordinate.

The beliefs and practices of any group can
be tolerated only if they do not challenge
these principles and values and if they can
be accommodated within the Australian

legal and institutional framework. Tolerance
of diversity, respect for other cultures, are
conditional.

Many statements about multiculturalism and
ethnicity contrast 'Australian' with 'ethnic'
values and imply that there is an ever
present danger, that ethnic behaviour and
values may be un-Australian and thus not
acceptable. This is a threat to national unity,
in many eyes. In a TV programme called
One Australia (1991) the narrator asks:

*"Is it inevitable that we will slide from a
relatively stable country into one torn
apart by a diversity of cultures? Can
multicultural Australia ever be a truly
cohesive society?"*

The phrasing of the questions suggests that
the answers are 'yes' and 'no' respectively.

The texts reveal that multiculturalism is a
problem for established Australian churches,
in particular with regard to how to respond
to non-Christian religious beliefs, and it is a
problem for the law (in areas such as female
circumcision, domestic violence, family law
and so on). The following title of a recent
publication by the New South Wales Child
Protection Society makes it quite explicit:

*"Child Protection in Non-English
Speaking Background Communities:
Culture – No Excuse."*

The main message of this publication is that:

*"Intervention within a family on the
grounds of suspected abuse should not
be inhibited or delayed by cultural
considerations."*

But the title implies that culture might well
be used as an 'excuse' in 'NESB
communities' (lumped together) for abusing
children.

So the overall message is that
multiculturalism is acceptable and cultural
diversity tolerable within limits, and that it
ought not to change or challenge the 'basic
values' of Australian society.

Conclusion

Only a few parts of the jigsaw puzzle have
been examined here, but something of a
pattern already starts to emerge. The
perceived division of Australian society into
two major parts – Anglo-Celtic and migrant,

them and us – is consistent with a view of society as made up of a dominant majority on the one hand, and minority newcomers on the other. The latter are seen as different, and it is a short step to that difference being problematic.

It is also consistent with the view that this difference has to be managed, and that this is partly what multiculturalism is about. Such management is not, however, seen as an easy business: instead, it is fraught with problems. Thus the management of difference has to be done within the framework of Australian law and practice, so that the core values of the 'we' group should not be threatened by the 'other'.

How does this square with the ideology – the professed value of diversity? Obviously, diversity is only valued if it is properly controlled, but who does the controlling and the managing: who does the valuing, who is the valued?

Answers to these questions indicate that there is an entrenched dualism in Australian society, bordering on racism. Diversity is 'enriching', but who is enriching whom? Economics and trade are of primary concern here, thus the term 'productive diversity' which is currently popular. Diversity is seen as economically beneficial to the country as a whole and thus, of course, to those with wealth and power, who are predominantly Anglo-Australians.

A pragmatic analysis indicates that diversity is perceived as basically dangerous but that it can be enriching too, if properly shaped and managed by the dominant majority. Value is only produced if diversity is under control and non-threatening. In other words diversity has to be domesticated, shaped and harnessed to the yoke of the Australian economy.

Language diversity in itself, for example, is not useful: it is only useful insofar as it might facilitate trade. Migration itself is constantly subjected to debate, in terms of how many people to allow in, of what kind, where they should settle, what conditions should apply to them etc.

Migrants themselves participate in this process of managing diversity, although the parameters are set by the formal institutions and formal government. In doing so, migrants are contributing to their own domination. All accept, for example, that

English second language teaching is desirable, that English is the national language, that the number of migrants should be limited, that migrants who will be a burden should be kept out etc.

Lessons for South Africa?

The current metaphor for South African society is that of the 'rainbow nation'. This is appropriate for a post-apartheid society – the rainbow consists of a variety of colours but they are blurred: as a colleague put it, 'it's a smudge' – each shades into the next, none is completely distinct, and each is essential to the composition of the whole. The rainbow cannot exist without each of the colours, none of the colours or strands is dominant over the others.

Multiculturalism, on the other hand, immediately conveys the idea of 'many cultures', each distinct from the other, and this could imply boundaries rather than continuities, logically followed by separateness and distinctiveness. This is certainly the case in Australia where, if one attends a multicultural festival, one is likely to find Greeks doing Greek folk dances and selling Greek food, Japanese demonstrating Sushi, Chinese doing a dragon dance, Scots playing bagpipes and so on.

This contrasts with a CCTV programme one Sunday in July 1995, just after my return from Australia. It was a programme featuring choirs, and the presenter said we were in for a 'multicultural evening'. With the Australian experience fresh in my mind, I expected to see, say, a Zulu choir singing Zulu songs, the Potchefstroom University choir singing Afrikaans songs and so on.

Instead it was all 'smudged' – predominantly white choirs singing African songs, Africans singing in English and Afrikaans, and all of them singing negro spirituals. This version of 'non-denominational multiculturalism', to coin a phrase, is only possible if the boundaries between groups – cultural, racial, religious – are not formalised and institutionalised, and if culture is not reified.

Anyone espousing formal multiculturalism for South Africa should ask themselves what the consequences might be at the level of public consciousness. Would it lead to a categorisation or polarisation of people, with greater ethnic stereotyping and mobilisation along ethnic lines? Would a division

Diversity is only valued if it is properly controlled

Entrenched dualism in Australian society borders on racism

Value is only produced if diversity is under control and non-threatening

Is cultural diversity recognised, understood and valued, or repressed and misunderstood?

If South Africa formally tolerates diversity, who is going to accommodate whom?

Would multiculturalism in South Africa lead to power differences?

between a dominant majority and ethnic or cultural minorities develop? Would this lead to power differences? Who will the 'other' be? How will this affect the quest for national unity? Would it fuel the fires of ethno-nationalism?

If South Africa is to develop a formal policy in terms of which diversity is tolerated, valued and accommodated, how will the core values be established, who is going to accommodate whom, and who will set the limits of tolerance and accommodation? What will be valued and what will be prohibited?

Is a formal recognition of cultural difference required to facilitate reconciliation, redistribution of resources, and the elimination of disadvantage? Would institutional development and reconstruction on the basis of culturally distinct groups and services be acceptable or would it seem like a new kind of 'separate development'?

The American anthropologist Terence Turner (1993) specified the potential benefits of multiculturalism as official policy in the following way:

❏ A recognition of the fact of cultural diversity within a country or society.

❏ Incorporation of the facts of heterogeneity into public policy in a way which accommodates rather than represses cultural diversity.

❏ As a framework in terms of which society is understood, it may help one to better understand the nature of culture in contemporary societies.

❏ A way of reversing the devaluation of the contribution and importance of ethnic and other minorities.

Thinking of South Africa in these terms, it does not strike me that there is much to be gained by adopting a form of multiculturalism. We are already doing these things – or trying to – without it.

Is cultural diversity recognised, understood and valued, or repressed and

misunderstood? Officially, at least, the former. Is there a dominant ethnic group exercising cultural hegemony at the expense of various minorities? Most would answer 'no'. Is there a struggle for social equality along cultural or group lines and which may be resolved through some form of multiculturalism? Yes and maybe.

But if the process of social transformation is already underway, do we need to cast this process in terms of multiculturalism, or devise new policies in terms of a multiculturalist ideology to facilitate the process of transformation and to pay more attention to cultural issues within it? I don't think so. ᴸᴸᴱᴬ

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DEVELOPMENT
M   O   N   I   T   O   R

Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa

Educational attainment among the poor by location (%)
(% poor aged 16+ educational levels)

Legend:
- None or incompleted primary
- Completed primary and incompleted secondary
- Completed secondary and beyond

Rural: 53, 41, 7
Urban: 41, 51, 8
Metropolitan: 31, 59, 9

Housing characteristics among the poor by location
(Number of poor households with indicated features ['000])

Shacks / Traditional Dwellings: 130, 185, 128
No piped water: 739, 15, 0
No modern sanitation: 2198, 204, 60
No electricity: 2386, 308, 78
Wood as cooking source: 2132, 367, 155
Metropolitan: 1663, 50, 4

Legend: Rural, Urban, Metropolitan

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The Silence of South African Scholars

By Simon Bekker
Department of Sociology, University of Stelienbosch

Since democratic elections in April 1994, many scholars have shelved critical discourse and dedicated their efforts to inventing the new South Africa. Their status, dedication and zeal has diminished, and opportunities for material reward through prudent and conformist labour have increased. The silence of South African scholars is largely self imposed, and may become self sustaining. An abridged version of this paper was published in the Institute of Race Relations publication, Frontiers of Freedom.

Recent South African scholarship on human society has attained high international standing. Isolated as they were from rapid global changes, historians and social scientists stood up against totalitarianism and apartheid, and stated their cases with both passion and justification.

South Africa was their case study; the ideology and practice of its government and state were their objects of criticism; and the new international values of human equality, of non-racialism and of emancipation were their defences.

Today, after the demise of apartheid, those who have remained scholars have fallen silent. The new national ideology of nation building and human development – based on these international values – dominates the intellectual landscape.

South Africa has been reinstated in the international world, and domestic scholarship must take its place on the international stage. South African universities are in turmoil and in parlous financial straits, and the community of scholars has lost important segments of its membership – some to the new Government, some to the new state, some as consultants

to the new policy making community, and some to universities overseas. Those who remain appear to have lost their voices.

The reason for the silence is found in the changing perspective on scholarship in the country: scholars of South African society are expected to serve the new Government in the pursuit of its leading project, the invention of the new South Africa.

This project, which comprises nation building and human development as its two primary ideological objectives, requires useful contributions from scholars who adhere to its underlying values. Insofar as scholars conform to this brief, they receive state support, economic rewards and public recognition. In a phrase, scholars are viewed as an important resource associated with the invention of a new society.

Their role is to contribute knowledge and experience to the project, as defined by the South African government. To be relevant – and, accordingly, to be rewarded for relevant contributions – scholars need to remain loyal, acquiescing where necessary and silent where prudent.

That such a view of scholarship in a modern country experiencing rapid change is

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dangerous, is self evident. Without critical informed reflection, evaluation and public debate on change from within the country, the new South Africa project will forfeit essential self evaluative elements to its development.

At best, critical reflection and evaluation will be imported from off shore sources which are guided by different agendas. At worst, emerging mistakes will be identified and corrected too late.

That South African scholars comply with the imposition of silence is at first puzzling. In the recent past, scholarship on modern South Africa was extraordinary in reflecting quality, dedication and courage. Scholarship implied much more than simply the cerebral task of having one's say.

It implied constantly applying to apartheid society – the society to which they, together with their families, colleagues and friends, belonged – the values and principles used during their work. In such a hostile environment, many scholars developed a zeal, a determined political commitment and a deep sense of moral outrage about the nature of their society.

Today, the environment has changed radically. Colleagues, particularly black, brown, and Indian colleagues, are in positions of political and state authority. The new Government adheres, at least in word, to values espoused by these scholars.

History is rapidly being forgotten by those in authority who require new policies and new strategies aimed at inventing the new South Africa. Scholars are expected to contribute faithfully toward, and to be rewarded for, its invention.

Critical discourse about the project itself is strongly discouraged. Zeal and moral outrage have accordingly diminished. Career and material considerations have increased. Prudence and conformity identify the new scholarly orthodoxy.

In practical terms, prudence and conformity translate into policy research. The goals of nation building and human development have already been set. Policies and strategies to achieve these goals are the primary tasks to which scholars look for work.

One consequence is scholarly 'groupthink' and premature foreclosure on the project's

design. That policies and strategies have yet to be implemented and tested is rarely debated. Lessons of the past – failures and successes – are seldom considered. The invention of a new society proceeds from a clean slate.

It ought to be our scholars who point to continuity as well as change, to past lessons as well as new directions, to the pitfalls of ignoring memory and territory in different South African communities and provinces.

It ought to be our scholars who research and openly debate the changing identities which different South Africans are presently developing of themselves and of others, the differing reactions to state driven human development programmes, and the imminent weaknesses and mistakes of the new Government and state.

It is common knowledge that open critical research, reflection and debate on nation building, affirmative action and the Reconstruction and Development Programme – to give but three examples – are not taking place. Such activities are perceived to be disloyal, and harmful to the invention of the new South Africa.

It is also common knowledge that many among our finest scholars of society are deeply committed to policy work, to the exclusion of more critical reflection on the project.

Accordingly, the new perspective on South African scholarship as service for the state has entrenched itself surprisingly rapidly. Having lost privilege and the moral high ground, scholars have shown little resistance. Their silence is largely self imposed, reflecting narrower and more direct self interest than in the past.

Historical roots

The silence we are addressing refers to the smothering of critical scholarly discourse. In order to analyse how this came about, we need to look at its historical and cultural roots, as well as scholars' economic motives for complying with constraints that are contrary to an essential element of their professions.

During the 1970s and 1980s, South African scholars were deeply divided. Part of the reason for the division was to be found in differing assumptions about human and social behaviour.

Liberal scholars were consistently and sometimes fundamentally challenged by growing and increasingly sophisticated marxist scholarship. Afrikaner nationalist scholarship, though clearly in decline, with many of its scholars questioning establishment orthodoxy or breaking from the *laager*, remained a significant third alternative, albeit increasingly marginalised.

In effect, there was no agreement among local scholars about the basic features which made up modern South African society. The result was to be locked into a particular intellectual position, the fate of so many scholars writing about South African society.

Simultaneously, these divisions signalled different political commitments which related directly to potential change in South African society as a whole. As Merle Lipton put it in 1985:

> *"The issues are bitterly contested because this debate is an integral part of the political struggle over the future of the country from which many of the aspiring future leaders have been exiled; and these issues, apart from their theoretical and scholarly interest, have important implications for policy and strategy towards South Africa."*

Tom Young's reflection, in the late 1980s, is instructive in this regard:

> *"Where else but in relation to South Africa can moral totalitarianism be presented as an academic virtue."*

The scholarly community was also increasingly isolated, faced with an academic boycott and a policy, in effect, of non-collaboration by international development agencies.

As a result, knowledge about different circumstances in other societies, particularly societies outside the north eastern quadrant of the globe, was limited.

Isolation led to a pervasive emphasis on South African society on its own. The object of enquiry became a 'state isolate', a unique society rejected by the international community and yet succeeding in retaining autonomy through central state repression. Writing in 1977, RW Johnson observed:

> *"In most of the enormous literature on South Africa there is a strong tendency,*

> *in which left wing radicals and Afrikaner nationalists are at one, to depict South Africa's development as if it were dictated solely by the internal dynamics of her own history. This assumption is false at least for the whole period since white settlement in South Africa began in 1652."*

This portrait of South African scholarship does not imply that most of the ideas and theories were superficial, of little use or deeply flawed. To the contrary. Most South African scholars benefited from extensive material support from their institutions and from high esteem for their vocations.

A number of institutions struggled consistently to defend the rights of scholars to study and publish their work in an intellectual environment free from ideological and other state imposed constraints.

Accordingly, a number of South African universities and non-government organisations developed sophisticated research cultures within which major dimensions of South African society and the challenges facing it were tackled.

What the image carried was scholarship which was both highly contested by different scholarly traditions – each of which had strong mutually reinforcing influences – and which was largely indigenous domestically produced by scholars who were born, and had lived and worked, in the society.

South Africa today

The environment within which South African scholars live and work has been radically transformed. The new Government is internationally accepted. Foreign scholars are visiting the country in increasing numbers.

Scholarly comparisons between South Africa and other societies multiply. The ideological battles fought by scholars have been laid to rest. Liberal orthodoxy and constitutionalism in a new world order have become the common language of government and the state.

The current prudence and conformity of South African scholars, accordingly, may be partially explained by the radical transformation of environment. The new political and state leaders represent the

The silence we are addressing refers to the smothering of critical scholarly discourse

Knowledge about different circumstances in other societies, particularly societies outside the north eastern quadrant of the globe, was limited

Isolation led to a pervasive emphasis on South African society on its own. The campaign of international sanctions strengthened this view

promise of the better society to which many aspired.

The invention of the new society fits well with these aspirations. Conformity to political ideals is not alien to many scholars tempered by the turbulence of political life in opposition in the old South Africa. In exchange for a role to play in the invention of a new society, for many the sacrifice of critical discourse is an acceptable price to pay.

Global influences

The new perspective on scholarship as service to the state and to civil society is not unique to South Africa. It is common cause that a new international global order is being established.

Everywhere, the old order of Western and Eastern blocs, of capitalist and communist ideologies, of Third World countries as pawns caught up in the Cold War, is disappearing. The great ideological battles of the past decades appear to have been laid to rest.

The expectation in the new world order is that scholarship on society ought to produce useful information. Accordingly, scholars are no longer the only group which produces information. So do governments, political parties, and organisations in civil society and in the private sector.

As a consequence, the notion of scholarly debates in an ivory tower is antiquated. Knowledge has become a public commodity with value.

Under such pressures, prudence and conformity on the part of scholars appear sensible. With the products of their professions under competition, and their careers potentially at risk, such a stance is for many both instrumental and rational.

Cultural roots

The South African scholarly community may be viewed as an isolated anglophone fragment of Europe. Most scholars are white. Though mainly South African born and bred, they belong to the international anglophone culture. The Afrikaner minority have been drawn increasingly into this international culture.

Few brown and Indian South African scholars, and very few blacks, belong to this community. There have, of course, been

exceptions. For example, Nolutshungu in England; Biko, Manganyi, Mphahlele, Maphai, Ngubane, Ramphele and Zulu are, or were, prominent black scholars.

Nonetheless, as a result of sustained discrimination and exclusion over a long period of time, such scholars have had little opportunity to develop skills and to find positions which would enable them to compete with their white compatriots.

In a work bearing the subtitle 'Insider Accounts of Apartheid', published in 1990, the highly skewed constitution of the South African scholarly community was described as follows:

"The accounts provided in this book make something of a break with the intellectual traditions of South African scholarship in history and the social sciences. The authors represented here reflect the coming of age of a new and vigorous strand of scholarship, drawn from the small ranks of black intellectuals, professionals, and social scientists.

"In the past this group has been intellectually marginalised by the hegemonic position and numerical dominance of white scholars in the old 'liberal' universities, or prematurely dismissed because they were forced to work in institutions created by the apartheid planners."

In the past few years, the distortion of the cultural profile of South African scholars has increased. A majority of the finest black South African scholars have departed, to take up positions in Government, in state organisations, or in the private sector. Many brown and Indian scholars have done the same.

As a consequence, the scholarly community finds itself in a cultural bind. On the one hand, in the interests of building capacity they feel required to apply affirmative action strategies within their profession. On the other, new emerging scholars are rapidly recruited by other institutions.

Simultaneously, pressure on black scholars to conform to the expectations of the new Government and state are deep. In a book on Southern African states which appeared in 1989, Leroi Vail summed up the issue of peer pressure thus:

"...although I canvassed African academics widely for papers, not a single one would undertake the writing of a paper which might be seen as 'subversive' to the goal of political 'nation building'."

As a consequence, the scholarly community perceives itself to be trapped. Prudence and conformity, the preferred stance of most of the few remaining black scholars, has become the norm.

For Afrikaner scholars, the sudden passing of the old order has come as a shock. Increasingly deprived of access to state information, stigmatised – sometimes fairly and sometimes unfairly – as apartheid's ideologues, they lack an alternative vision of a new society.

Career reasons

Most South African scholars are employed by universities. Over the past two decades, remuneration in real terms for university academics has decreased steadily and the South African academic is no longer materially privileged.

Until recently, state allocations for tertiary education were decreasing as greater emphasis was being placed on the primary educational sector. Simultaneously, research funds began increasingly to be earmarked for proposals qualifying as relevant in terms of the invention of a new society.

Over the past five years, as international development and aid organisations entered the South African arena, opportunities for consultancies appeared. These organisations were aware of domestic knowledge and expertise and, accordingly, established a culture of project consultancy which has taken root in the scholarly community.

South African state departments, parastatals and large non-government organisations have been quick to follow suit. Their need was, and remains, policy work. The work of scholars, accordingly, is being penetrated by a burgeoning commodity market.

One consequence is a change in accountability. Scholars who regularly inflate their university remuneration through consultancies increasingly view accountability in terms of the values and needs of their commissioning agencies.

A second consequence, as mentioned, is the loss through resignation or secondment of a significant proportion of scholars to the policy making community.

A third consequence is avoidance of controversy, the delivery of as professional a product as possible. Questions regarding more general ideological issues underpinning policy demands are smothered: weaknesses apparent in commissioning agencies ignored.

Conclusion

For how long will scholarly silence be maintained? After the miracle of South Africa's first general election in April 1994, have scholars decided temporarily to combine efforts across a wide front with a view to inventing the new South Africa? Is it probable that critical discourse will return after the honeymoon period, after the changing of the guard?

The prospects for a return to scholarly critical discourse on the new South Africa are gloomy. Having lost status and the moral high ground in South Africa, scholars' dedication and moral courage have waned. Internationally, scholarly work on society is increasingly commoditised and under competition from other institutions which require packaged information for specific purposes.

Culturally, in a rapidly Africanising society, the South African scholarly community will probably remain a largely international anglophone fragment, trapped by this heritage and unable to nurture and retain new black scholars within its ranks.

Financial considerations will become increasingly important. University scholars, together with others in tertiary institutions, receive salary packages that are manifestly and consistently in decline. Alternative sources are found in other jobs or in consultancy.

It would seem that the smothering of critical discourse among South African historians and social scientists may continue. Dedication and zeal, privilege and status have diminished. Opportunities for material reward through prudent and conformist labour have increased. The silence of South African scholars which is largely self imposed, may become self sustaining as well.   ᴵᴺᴰᴵᶜᴬ

Prudence and conformity, the preferred stance of most of the few remaining black scholars, has become the norm

Over the past two decades, remuneration in real terms for university academics has decreased steadily

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Land, poverty, power and authority

A rejoinder

By Ross A Haynes
Development Officer, ELC Property Management Company

The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa, through a holding and management company, owns 95 properties throughout the country and 67 in KwaZulu-Natal. In a previous issue of Indicator SA, Professor Tessa Marcus wrote about the land reform and other aspirations of people living on church farms, and the problems they face. This article looks at developments favouring communities on ELCSA farms since then.

An umbrella body representing communities on church farms has contributed much to the development process

Professor Tessa Marcus's article in the Spring 1994 (Volume 12 Number 4) edition of *Indicator South Africa* gives interesting insights. Of importance is the fact that the study was aimed at gathering a 'community perspective' of the socio-historic situation on church farms and was not meant as an objective analysis of the current situation.

Considering the relevance of church land in the current climate of land reform in the country, a further contribution to the debate might be valuable. At the same time it will provide an opportunity for an update on happenings on the ground and to share something of the Church's perspective.

The church already has land which it holds 'in trust' for the benefit of resident communities

Marcus's article highlights some important areas that need attention if meaningful development is to occur on church farms. As reported, central to these is the issue of communities' tenurial relationship to the land and the authority that they exercise in this and other matters that affect their well being.

Some of the initiatives which have made a positive contribution to introducing change in these areas are discussed below. Some of the difficulties experienced are also recounted.

Community forum

The emergence of an umbrella body representing communities on church farms has contributed much to the development process. This body interacts with other role players responsible for church farm matters – namely the Diocese and the property management company – in the Farms' Development Forum.

A new farms' constitution has emerged from a consultative process and is in the final stages of adoption. This represents major change from the original Common Farm Community Scheme, placing most of the authority in the hands of farm communities through their leadership bodies. It represents a major shift in power and control.

The new constitution is considered a forerunner for a constitution suitable to enact some form of community ownership. Legal responsibility for the land is at this stage still with PMC, the Church's property management body. The Farms' Development Forum now represents the communities' 'authority of last resort'.

In addition the ELCSA Church Council, the penultimate authority structure in the church hierarchy, has established a sub-committee to formulate a Church Land Policy. The sub-committee held its first meeting in March 1996. An outcome favourable to the church farm communities is expected from this process.

Church contribution

In the positive climate of land reform in South Africa, the church is in an ideal situation to contribute a new dimension to the issue. The church already has land which it holds 'in trust' for the benefit of resident communities.

Any land reform arrangement need therefore not identify recipient communities: sufficient goodwill exists in most cases to facilitate negotiations, and representative structures are present to facilitate the emergence of institutional structures necessary for the success of the project.

Challenges

Development of church farms poses a massive challenge to the church, whether viewing it from the perspective of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in particular or the Church in its broader context.

At a recent conference on church land a central theme was 'ethical divestments of land' versus 'irresponsible abdication', the former offering the church a significant opportunity to exercise a ministry of reconciliation.

The temptation exists for a church, being aware of the current political sensitivity surrounding the issue of 'church land', to rid itself of its land holdings by whatever means possible, placing expediency before ethical responsibilities to recipient communities.

ELCSA acknowledges this ethical responsibility and is grappling with the difficulties of preparing and assisting the resident communities to take on the role of owners and administrators of the land.

Facilitation of this process has not been straightforward. Communities have in the past had little or no opportunity to gain experience in governance, nor in democracy. The emergence of effective leadership groups has been, and in some cases still is, fraught with difficulties.

Communities have not always been able to keep their leadership structures accountable. Natural leaders are often employed elsewhere and have in the past rejected the Farm Committees as potential vehicles for meaningful inputs. Scepticism still exists in some quarters.

The study also reveals how difference between community perspective and certain ascertainable facts can negatively influence their relationship with the church. Regrettably, poor information exchange is probably responsible for many such cases.

An example is the grossly inflated figure – by a magnitude of almost 10 – of company cattle holdings on Bethel farm, along with the intimation that this was achieved by moving people.

In truth, consolidation of homesteads took place to divide the land into camps for the community's own livestock, this apparently in consultation with the community.

Another example is that limitations introduced to the communities' stock numbers were based on the carrying capacity of the grazing and legislation applicable to all commercial farms. One church farm (and almost a second) was in fact placed under direction in terms of the Soil Conservation Act due to overstocking.

Management strategies for the land should be aimed at benefiting the resident community, as also future generations. Apart from meeting the communities' residential preferences and needs, the land offers significant opportunities for household income generation.

Utilisation must, however, be within sustainable bounds as exceeding these is obviously detrimental to the long term interests of the community.

Resource management strategies and functional institutional structures, which are acceptable to the majority of community members, are necessary on the ground.

Sufficient goodwill exists in most cases to facilitate negotiations

The 'ethical divestments of land' offers the church significant opportunity to exercise a ministry of reconciliation

The temptation exists for a church to rid itself of its land, placing expediency before ethical responsibilities to recipient communities

Responsibilities

A church abdicating the responsibility of assisting a community to develop these tools is simply opening the doors of opportunity to the powerful and the unscrupulous, reintroducing a microcosm of exploitation and oppression which the country has after so many painful decades just shrugged off. Such abdication would be intolerable in terms of the church's basic teachings of peace and justice.

The study is valuable and the facts presented carry a strong message to those involved in development of church farms, both at a community leadership level and within the hierarchy of the Church.

Regrettably the one ingredient so necessary in facilitating the process of change, namely finance, has been a limiting factor all along. In spite of this it is felt that the changes that have taken place are of an organic nature and that a process is in motion which cannot be reversed. ᵕᴇᴏ

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