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LIMEHILL REVISITED:
A CASE STUDY OF THE LONGER-TERM EFFECTS OF AFRICAN RESETTLEMENT

Cosmas Desmond

DSRG Working Paper No. 5

University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg
Department of Economies

ACE PMB

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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a great deal of descriptive material available on the hardships endured by the millions[1] of people who have been forcibly resettled under the Nationalist government's resettlement programme over the past 30 years. Particular attention was given to the matter in the late 1950's and early 1960's by the Liberal Party; later the cause was taken up with admirable zeal by the Black Sash, the English Press and others. Public awareness and concern probably reached its height with the detailed exposés of conditions under which people were removed to Limehill in January 1968.

Much of this material, however, is concerned solely with the actual process of resettlement and with the lack of facilities immediately after the removals. There has been no study of the long-term effects of resettlement; nor has any analysis been made which supplies an adequate theoretical explanation of the process in all its forms.

This article is concerned primarily with an empirical case study of the longer term effects of resettlement, but, secondly, we intend to show that these facts, taken together with other empirical research on resettlement and on African unemployment[2], demonstrate that, on the one hand, the Nationalists' policy cannot be explained in purely ideological terms, but neither, on the other, can the practice be fitted into a rigid, pre-conceived, deterministic and economistic framework which excludes political and ideological factors.

II. CONTEXT OF THE SURVEY

In his study of the resettlement policy Baldwin[3] lists 'six categories of forced removals', namely:

1. Removals from the rural areas which result from the elimination of squatting and labour tenancies on white farms and the eradication of 'Black spots';
2. The removal of urban townships and the resettling of their inhabitants in a reserve township;
3. A larger scale form of (2) which is centred on three major industrial areas: Pretoria, Durban and East London;
4. The removal of people in the Cape living to the west of the 'Kat/Fish' line;

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5. Removals for the purpose of consolidating the 'homelands';
6. Endorsements out of urban areas.
7. To these can be added a seventh, which is the removal of people to new sites within the 'homelands' in the interests of so-called 'betterment schemes'.[4]

The people are moved to various types of settlement, namely:

(a) 'self-contained Bantu towns in homelands'[5]. People in categories 2 and 3 above and possibly some from category 6 are moved to such 'towns'. The purpose of these towns is primarily to serve the labour needs of border industries.

(b) 'towns in the homelands with rudimentary services and housing'. These are intended for people in categories 4, 6 and some from 1; they are meant to house the families of migrant workers.

(c) 'densely populated residential areas of 1/16 to 1/8 morgen'. Most of those in category 1 are resettled in such places, which are known as 'closer settlements'. These are meant to house the groups of the population extruded from 'white' rural areas.

(d) 'On suitable Trust land where families are settled on a system of controlled squatting'. Some from category 1 are resettled in such places (a few, who had 20 morgen or more in 'black spots', as farmers), but they are usually related to the 'betterment schemes' i.e. they house those who have been rendered landless as a result of the Nationalists' attempt to establish a stable class of relatively rich peasants in the 'homelands'.

The people resettled at Limehill fell under category 1 and the settlement is of type (c), where, according to the official Circular, 'Normally only a rudimentary layout on the basis of agricultural residential areas is undertaken'.

The layout at Limehill in 1968 was certainly 'rudimentary': plots marked off with pegs, a pile of tents and a water tank in the distance. That was all. But this was in accord with the official regulations and Limehill was no different in this respect from dozens of other 'closer settlements' that are scattered throughout the country.

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III. THE SURVEY

Limehill was chosen as the subject of this study because the history of the settlement and the background of the people involved were well known to us personally and have been well documented. The timing of the survey was influenced by the fact that 29th January 1978 marks the tenth anniversary of the first removals from Meran to Limehill.

The study was undertaken in collaboration with the Development Studies Research Group of the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, who were responsible for drawing up the questionnaires, providing guidelines for the interviewer and assisting with the tabulation and analysis of the responses. A full-time interviewer, who has had considerable experience in similar field research, spent five weeks at Limehill in December 1977 - January 1978 interviewing individual representatives of 101 households and filling in a questionnaire in respect of each. Households were selected at the discretion of the interviewer. The respondents were asked in the course of the interview who they considered the most important people in the community to be. Ten of those most frequently mentioned were then interviewed using a different questionnaire.

The number of households covered by the survey represents approximately one-third of all those moved to Limehill in 1968/9; those who have been resettled there more recently were excluded.

The main difficulty experienced by the interviewer was overcoming the fear and suspicion of the respondents. 'What I have found is that people are living in fear of the Security Police and of "communists" . Some people threatened to call the police when I asked them questions. They said they had been told that there were some people opposed to the government, called "communists", going around and that if they saw one they should report to the police'.

In evaluating the effects of the resettlement at Limehill and the findings of this study it should be borne in mind that the people concerned did not come from impoverished, broken-down communities. They were from stable, well-established communities and were relatively prosperous compared, for example, to many of those removed from white farms. Virtually all of them had land and cattle and many were able to do occasional work in

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Wasbank to supplement the income from their migrant workers. The fact that they were a healthy, prosperous community, (many of them had savings to fall back on), probably accounts for their surviving as well as they have done.

Further, the survey was confined to Limehill itself and did not cover the whole resettlement complex comprising Uitval, Vaalkop and Vergelegen - see the map) which is sometimes referred to as 'Limehill'. The outbreak of typhoid and gastro-enteritis which claimed over 70 lives from November 1968 to January 1969 affected other places, notably Uitval, more than Limehill itself.

IV. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Our interviewer, who has been familar with the settlement since its establishment, reported, 'There is very little improvement at Limehill. The only new thing is that they built an office'. This office, however, was unable to furnish him with accurate population figures for the settlement.

There are now approximately 350 houses, of which about 40 are occupied by more recent residents. The average family size was found by the survey to be 5,3, which gives an estimated total population of 1850.

The original residents have now completed building their own houses. It took them on average 3 years to do so, with 5% taking 6 years. The vast majority of the houses are built of mud (83%) a few of blocks (14%) and even fewer of bricks (3%); roofing is of thatch (63%) or corrugated iron (37%).

Many of the mud houses are showing considerable signs of wear and tear. This is attributed to the fact that the people were forced to build in an exposed place and thus the houses have no protection from the wind and the rain and the presence of termites in the soil.

The dirt 'road' that runs through the middle of the settlement is pot-holed and corrugated, while some of the side 'streets' are now completely overgrown. There is thus a general air of delapidation, desolation and isolation about the place. Limehill is about 5 kilometres from the next part of the complex and there are vast tracts of empty land on all sides.

SKETCH MAP OF PLACES MENTIONED



The people removed to Limehill were not allowed to take their cattle, but cattle from a nearby tribally owned area of Tholeni graze freely on this land.

Facilities may be described as follows:

Water is obtained from taps in the 'streets', though by no means in every 'street'. We were able to locate only 10 taps in the whole settlement, i.e. one tap to serve 35 families.

According to the official regulations, people in closer settlements are 'expected to instal their own cess-pit latrines.' This they did at the beginning but these have now been replaced with corrugated iron privies which are serviced by a bucket system. There were several complaints about the number of flies that this process attracts. (It might be true that they had even more primitive toilet arrangements in their previous residences, but there the houses were much further apart).

There is now a clinic with a resident nurse, but no doctor. Since there is no phone and no ambulance the nurse has no means of communicating with a hospital or a doctor in an emergency. Private doctors hold surgeries at the clinic. The fees are:

30 cents for a visit to the nurse
R2 for a visit to the doctor
R5 for childbirth

There are two primary schools, which also serve other parts of the complex. The main problem is overcrowded classes. One teacher, for example, is responsible for 120 children in a double session.

There are two general dealers and one cafe/store. These have limited stocks and, owing to transport costs, prices are higher than in the towns. Nevertheless most people (94%) do at least some of their shopping in Limehill, since the high cost of bus fares makes it uneconomical to go to Ladysmith, Dundee or Wasbank except for major shopping.

The fares are:

Ladysmith - R1,80 return
Dundee - R1,10 return
Wasbank - R0,70 return

Three church buildings have been erected: by the Dutch Reformed Church, the Bantu Presbyterian Church and the Methodist Church. The Roman Catholic Church has applied for but not yet succeeded in obtaining a site.

V. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES

1. Arrivals and departures

88 of those interviewed arrived at Limehill in 1968 and the other 13 in 1969. They came from Maria Ratschitz Mission (52) Meran (32) Evansdale (15) and Van Steyl (2). Those coming from Maria Ratschitz are probably somewhat overrepresented in the survey sample.

All these places are considerably nearer to the neighbouring 'White' towns of Wasbank, Dundee and Ladysmith than Limehill is.

11% of the children who were aged 5 years or less at the time of the removal are now dead.

Some young people have gone, either as individuals or as family units, to settle elsewhere - presumably illegally; others have simply 'disappeared' and their families have no knowledge of their whereabouts. The figures for the 101 families interviewed are given in the following table; the total of 68 constitutes 14% of the original population.

TABLE I

DEPARTURES FROM SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 1968-1977

	Age at time of arrival				
	Under 15	15 - 24	25 - 49	over 50	Total
Died	14	-	4	15	33
Emigrated	2	2	6	-	10
Disappeared	1	6	3	1	11
Married	-	12	2	-	14
Total	17	20	15	16	68

2. Present population

(i) Children born at Limehill

As the following table shows, almost 20% of the children born at Limehill have not survived until the survey date. If children born in the last two years, who have not yet survived the danger period for infant mortality, are excluded, the percentage is slightly higher at 23%. This is considerably lower than the infant mortality rate in some 'homeland' areas, where it is estimated that 40% of children born do not reach the age of five. But there is no reason for judging Limehill by this norm. As has been mentioned, the people at Limehill were not from an impoverished community and, although their standard of living is falling, they have not yet sunk to the same level of deprivation that prevails in some 'homeland' areas. The mortality rate, which is excessively high by any civilised standards, takes on an added significance in the light of the low total number of births.

TABLE II

CHILDREN BORN AT LIMEHILL 1968-1977 (SAMPLE ONLY)

	1968/69		1970/71		1972/73		1974/75		1976/77		Total		
	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead	Grand Total
Male	9	4	17	2	10	4	9	2	7	1	52	13	65
Female	3	3	4	4	5	1	17	3	17	0	46	11	57
Total	12	7	21	6	15	5	26	5	24	1	98	24	122

Deaths : 19,7%.

(ii) Present population

The high mortality rate and the low birth rate have produced an obvious imbalance in the present composition of the population. Whereas one would expect the 0-10 age group in any community to be the largest of all ten year old cohorts, in Limehill this group is considerably smaller than the 11-20 age group - i.e. those who were 0-10 at the time of the removal. (In other respects, the distribution of people by age follows the usual 'pyramidal' shape, as Table III shows).

TABLE III

PRESENT POPULATION (SAMPLE ONLY)

Age	Male	Female	Total
0-10	52	46	98
11-20	83	84	167
21-30	31	43	74
31-40	34	27	61
41-50	27	26	53
51-60	21	22	43
> 60	10	21	31
Totals	258	269	527

Average family size 5,3

No figures on the mortality rates in the former places of residence are available. But it can be established that either the mortality rate was considerably lower and/or the birth rate considerably higher, since the ratio of children under 10 to women in the child-bearing are group (assumed to be all those between 16 and 50) in 1977 was half what it had been in 1968/69.

TABLE IV

LIVE CHILDREN PER FEMALE BETWEEN 16 AND 50 1968/9 AND 1977.

(SAMPLE ONLY)

		1968/9	1977
Number of live children	0-10	167	98
Number of women	16-20	21	42
Number of women	21-30	27	43
Number of women	31-40	26	27
Number of women	41-50	22	26
		96	138
Add departures		20	
		116	
Live children 0-10 per female between 16-50		1,44	0,71

(iii) Growth Rate

The annual rate of growth for the Zulu population group for the years 1970-1977 was 2,7%[6]. In Limehill, over the past ten years, it was at most half of this; i.e. if one assumes that all those who have emigrated, married or disappeared are still living.

TABLE V

GROWTH IN LIMEHILL AND CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL POPULATION GROWTH.

	Growth in Limehill	Contribution to national population growth.
	(sample figures)	
Original population	497	497
Add live children born at Limehill	98	98
Less (i) total departures	68	
(ii) deaths only		33
Now	527	562
Increase	30	65
Annual rate of increase	0,6%	1,2%

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The high mortality and other departures are not sufficient to explain this extremely low growth rate. Other contributory factors are :

(a) Inter-natal deaths: Seven respondents mentioned that the major problem at Limehill was the absence of doctors to assist at childbirth. Consequently, they said, mothers and/or children die. Yet, according to our interviewer, none of the respondents who had lost children mentioned still-born children or ones who had died at birth. He noted that many of these children are buried immediately at home and not taken to the graveyard and he thought that most people would not think of including them among their children who had died. This was confirmed by others. And a doctor who has worked in rural areas said that people tend to forget not only about babies who die at birth but also those who live for only a couple of months.

(b) Birth control: The clinic, assisted by Radio Bantu and other government agencies, is actively promoting family planning.

In view of the impoverished conditions at Limehill it is likely that more people would be willing to practise birth control than would have been at their previous residences.

(c) Many of the residents believe that the beer which is sold in stores is doctored in order to suppress sexual desire. It is of some significance that people are prepared to believe this, but I am authoritatively informed that it is impossible to introduce a drug which would have this effect, without also endangering life.

The first and most obvious conclusion, therefore, to emerge from this survey is that, whatever the precise reasons and whatever moral, sociological or ecological judgement one might wish to pass on it, the resettlement of people at Limehill has drastically curbed the natural increase of population.

3. School attendance and employment

The one positive fact to emerge from the survey was that those children who manage to survive do attend school. Only 5 children out of 104 in the 6 - 14 age group were not attending school.

(i) Unemployment

Unemployment in Limehill, particularly among women, is considerably higher than the national average. In Johannesburg in mid-1977 male African unemployment was estimated at 28%[7]. In Limehill at the end of the year it was over 34%.

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And this is so, even though a large proportion of those in the 15-24 age group were still at school; probably, in many cases, because they had nothing else to do.

TABLE VI

MALE UNEMPLOYMENT

Age group	employed	unemployed	at school	unable to work
15-19	2	7	34	-
20-24	7	11	8	-
25-34	19	7	-	-
35-44	27	6	-	1
45-64	26	11	-	1
Totals	81	42	42	2

Total	167
Economically active	123
Unemployment rate	34,2%

It is noticeable that unemployment is at its highest among those who have reached the age for entering the labour market while resident at Limehill, i.e. the 15-24 age group.

The position among women is even worse. Although it is difficult to establish precisely how many women want to work and therefore how many may be classified as 'unemployed', it is significant that in Johannesburg in mid-1977 47% of African women over the age of 16 were in employment[8], whereas at Limehill of those in the 15-64 age group only 13% were employed.

TABLE VII

FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

Age group	employed	not employed	at school	unable to work
15-19	0	2	32	-
20-24	4	14	5	-
25-34	7	32	-	-
35-44	9	21	-	-
45-64	1	32	-	4
Totals	21	101	37	4

The number of women who could be expected to be economically active (based on national figures for African women) has been calculated as follows, (Following Simkins[9]) :

TABLE VIII

FEMALE UNEMPLOYMENT

Age group	economically active (Simkins)	total in age group	expected number economically active	actually employed	'unemployed'
20-24	66	23	15	4	11
25-34	49	39	19	7	12
35-44	39	30	12	9	3
45-64	30	37	11	1	10
Totals			57	21	36

Total	163
Economically active	57
Unemployment rate	63%

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(ii) Distribution of earners

The above tables show that there are 102 wage earners, which is one for every household of 5,3 people. The National average in 1977 was one wage earner for every 3,7 people[10].

15 households have no wage earner at all. 74 have one - sometimes a female member of the family - 9 have 2; 2 have 3; and one has 4.

(iii) Places of work

There never has been, and there is not, any intention on the part of the government to provide employment opportunities in or near Limehill. The nearest border industry area is Ladysmith, from where they have been moved further away . Limehill is just over 50 kms from the Ladysmith border industries.

In any event, these border industries draw their labour primarily from Ezakheni, which was established for that purpose and is much closer. It is only 17 kms away and this distance will be shortened when the proposed tar road directly linking the township with the border industries has been built. Ezakheni presently has a population of some 45 000 and the proposed population is 80 000. It is most unlikely that these industries will ever develop to such an extent that their labour needs will not be met from this population. Even if they do,the next logical place to draw labour from is the new 'township' of Ekuvukeni (or Zandbult), which is 20 kms nearer to Ladysmith than Limehill is and into which thousands of people are presently being moved.

None of those interviewed were employed in Limehill itself. 2 were employed by the Kwazulu government in Uitval, about 5 kms away, and 1 in the tribally owned area of Tholeni, about 5 kms away in the opposite direction. For the rest, 58% of the men were long-term migrant workers in Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria, Vryheid, Newcastle and Estcourt; the other 38% were daily or weekly commuters to Wasbank, Dundee or Ladysmith. One of the women was a long-term migrant worker; the others commuted to the towns mentioned. (Those who commute to Ladysmith leave at 5 a.m. and return between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. Many, therefore, 'prefer' to return home only at weekends).

There is a considerable amount of confusion among Limehill residents about the procedures to be followed in finding work. It appears that there is a labour bureau in Uitval, to which those desiring employment must report in

the first instance. Relatively few (if any) people actually get work through the Uitval bureau; in most cases, permission is required from it for people to register with the Ladysmith labour bureau. This permission is often withheld, reportedly with remarks like 'go and ask Kwazulu for a job'.

Under such circumstances, older workers probably fare better than younger ones, the former managing to sign up for new contracts with firms that had employed them before resettlement. Legal access to work appears much more restricted for the young.

4. Local authority.

Limehill forms part of Kwazulu and the local administration is in the hands of a chief and his councillors, all of whom are appointed. There appears to be some confusion, however, on the respective roles of Ulundi and Pretoria. It is not unusual, I was told, for the reply to a matter referred to Ulundi to come from Pretoria and vice versa.

There are three different groups of police operating in the area; the Kwazulu police, the chief's police, and the South African police.

Those interviewed were virtually unanimous in stating that they had no say in decisions affecting the community. 2 out of 101 said that they did participate in decision making; one of these noted that he was a councillor.

79 replied that being part of Kwazulu, as opposed to being directly under Pretoria, had made no difference to them.

22 claimed that being part of Kwazulu had made a difference. However, this claim was based more on promises which they said the Kwazulu government had made than on anything which had been done. Some respondents gave more than one example of the difference Kwazulu had made:

Had supplied water	6
Was going to build a secondary school	6
Was going to provide land	13
Other	3

5. Problems experienced and their possible solutions

The most frequently mentioned problem was the absence of job opportunities and the distance from places of possible employment - 45 times. Only fractionally less frequent were such stark statements as 'hunger', 'poverty' 'we have no food' - 44 times.

10 just mentioned the lack of land, but many also mentioned this as the reason for their hunger, etc. Other problems mentioned were:

Moral problems - delinquency, broken marriages, etc.	19
Absence of doctors	7
Unsatisfactory water supply	4
No secondary school	2
Unsatisfactory facilities - shops, road, etc.	8

83 of those interviewed either did not know what progress to expect in solving these problems or did not think that they would be solved. Some added that they thought conditions could only become worse.

The Kwazulu government provided the only ray of hope for some respondents:

2 thought it would provide land
1 that it would improve facilities
11 that it would 'do something'.

The other 4 hoped for such unlikely events as the provision of job opportunities.

6. Opinion of life at Limehill

3 respondents described life at Limehill as 'good'; another 4 considered it 'fair'.

The vast majority described it as a 'place of suffering', 'a land of sorrows', (34) a bad and difficult place to live in, (19) as causing increased deprivation, (23).

One respondent commented: 'I do not think there is anyone who does not know that Limehill is a place of suffering'. Another: 'Life at Limehill is half-prison'. A more biblically-minded person:'Life at Limehill is half Egypt for us'. 'Limehill is the land of the outcast people and we feel it'.

A further 10 described the life as 'breaking us down'; and they considered that this was being done of set purpose. The population statistics given in the earlier tables add some substance perhaps to such comments as: 'Life at Limehill is to me a sign of what is the aim of the government to us Blacks, because he moved us to this place so that we may suffer till we die'. 'Life

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at Limehill is bad and everybody knows that it was meant for that - that we should suffer'. 'Limehill is destroying our people'.

3 respondents described the life as causing 'stagnation'; 3 others gave not entirely relevant comments and 2 questionnaires were incomplete.

In the light of the above it is not surprising that 84 respondents said that they would return to their former place of residence if given the opportunity; 14 said they would not; 2 questionnaires were incomplete.

The breakdown of the answers to the previous question shows that there were not 14 people who were enjoying life at Limehill. There must, therefore, be other reasons for their not wanting to leave. As one such respondent explained, he 'had no hope that to go back would help him now and that the only thing he wants is to die and not to try anything, because whatever a Black man is saying it will become a source of death'.

Virtually all the reasons for wanting to return to their former residences were related to the fact that they had had land and cattle in those places. Some mentioned this explicitly while others who said they were 'happier' or 'more prosperous' in the former places explained that this was because they were not entirely dependent on cash income or because they did not have 'to buy everything, including firewood'.

Reasons:	
Happier in the old place	29
Had land/cattle	35
Were richer	10
Lived more like people	9
Climate	2
	85

The answer to these last two questions explode the myth - if it still needed exploding - propagated by, among others, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.C. Botha, that 'the Bantu people like being moved' [11] and the even more popular myth that once the initial hardships have been overcome the people adapt to their new life and prefer it to their old way of life.

There has been no effort on the part of the government noticeably to improve the conditions at Limehill over the past ten years. For Limehill there are

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no plans even on paper for the provision of further facilities as is the case for Ezakheni and Ekuvukeni - though even there they are still very much at the paper stage. Any development that is taking place or which is planned is centred on those townships that will serve the border industries. The people themselves appear to lack both the will and the means to make any progress.

This survey, we believe, confirms the conclusion that we will expand upon below that the people of Limehill and similar places belong to 'a social category of dispossessed and broken individuals superfluous to and discarded by the system which created them'.[12]

VI COMMUNITY LEADERS

In reply to the question on who they considered the most important members of the community to be, the respondents referred to categories of people - usually two or three - rather than to individuals. The most frequently mentioned were :

Councillors	73 times
Ministers/priest	46
Teachers	42
Shopkeepers	22
Nurse	14

5 councillors, 2 teachers, 2 shopkeepers and the nurse were interviewed. (No minister of religion was available).

The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain their perception of the life and problems of Limehill and of what progress could be made to see if these differed from those of the 'ordinary people'.

They tended to view the problems from the point of view of their own particular interest. Thus the teachers were concerned about overcrowded classes, the shopkeepers with their low profit margin, and the councillors with the difficulty of maintaining law and order. One, a minister's wife, thought that she and other Church members could do something to provide health education and to improve the moral fibre of the community. The others, however, did not see anything they could do, but placed their hopes in the Kwazulu government and/or Inkatha and the African Chamber of Commerce.

The most striking fact was the frequency with which Inkatha was mentioned by community leaders. None of the 101 respondents to the previous questionnaires referred to Inkatha members as such as being among the most important members of the community, nor did they express any hope that Inkatha would bring about an improvement of their condition. Of the community leaders, however, six of whom were members of Inkatha, 5 listed members of Inkatha among the most important people; 4 considered Inkatha to be the most likely organisation to help solve the community's problems; and 6 looked to Inkatha for the solution to their own problems. This doubtless says something about Inkatha, but that is not our concern here.

VII INTERPRETATION

This survey shows that the long term effects of the Nationalist government's resettlement policy are no less dehumanising and demoralising than the initial suffering and hardship inflicted when people are uprooted from their established homes and dumped in the barren veld. The position does not improve with time. People die and those who live become poorer and poorer and more without grounds for hope. The purpose of the survey, however, is not simply to rekindle the moral outrage which was aroused among government opponents when the inhuman conditions at Limehill were first exposed. Such outrage, while it is understandable and necessary, does not help us to understand the policy and what it will take to change it.

Until fairly recently, most commentators on the South African social, political and economic scene were content simply to describe and denounce the evil effects of Nationalist policy. If any explanation at all was sought, this was located in the irrational and immoral desire of the Nationalists for racial separation as a means of maintaining their own ethic purity. This, of course, provides no explanation at all, either of the apartheid policy in general or the resettlement policy in particular, for, as Johnstone in particular has pointed out, to say that people practise racial discrimination because they are racists is simply tautologous [13].

Radicals, on the other hand, tend to dismiss all ideological factors and attempt to fit the 'facts' into rather rigidly preconceived theoretical frameworks. Much of the debate then centres around the conceptualisation of problems; less attention is paid to new empirical analysis. Indeed, many of the 'facts' adduced by these authors are somewhat oversimplified,

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even on occasion false. The general drift of the analysis might well be sound, despite the factual errors; at best, the details would need to be reformulated, while, at worst, people might take inaccuracies as grounds for rejecting the validity of the whole analysis.

Morris, for example, has shown that Lipton assumed that she had rebutted Wolpe's analysis [14] simply by demonstrating that his factual claim that African real wages had not risen was false [15]. There are two further assertions, relevant to our study, made by Wolpe,which need to be criticised. The first is related to the absorptive capacity of border industries. He asserts that 'between 1960 and 1968 .... approximately 100 000 Africans were employed in these industries which were absorbing 30% of Africans entering jobs each year by 1969'.[16] A source for these statistics is not cited, but they appear to be too high. Bell cites statistics of the Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas to the effect that employment in 'border and Bantu areas' increased by 87 000 over the period 1960 to 1970 and goes on to argue that even this figure is probably on over-estimate [17]. The second relates to the cost of living in the 'homelands'. 'Not only, as has already been indicated, in the level of subsistence extremely low in the homelands', but in addition there are virtually no urban areas which might tend to increase this level. The assessment by the State, employers' organisations and so on, of African subsistence requirements in the Reserves is much lower than in the main industrial centres' [18]. The assessment may be much lower, but it is wrongly so, at least at a place like Limehill, since the cost of living is higher there. This is principally because the cost of transporting the necessities of life from urban areas is high and this gets reflected in prices at local stores. This is not pointed out, and it makes a difference to a more central part of Wolpe's argument. He claims that apartheid 'can best be understood as the mechanism specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialisation, of maintaining a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour force' [19]. Wolpe's explanation of the cheapening of labour in the 'early period' by the use of migrant workers who maintained a subsistence base in the precapitalist mode of production makes sense. But how, for example, does the removal of people from a place where they did have a subsistence base, to a place which is further away from border industries and where the cost of living is higher cheapen the cost of labour? Those who were previously migrants remain migrants, but now they have additional expenses to meet. Migratory labour is not in itself necessarily cheap; it would appear, for

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example, that educational qualification have at least as much effect on the reserve price which people place on their labour as their place of residence does [20].

Legassick, too, appears to be out of touch when he writes 'The creation 'from above' of capitalist relations of production in agriculture has been completed only in the 1960's with the eviction of the last labour tenants in Natal and the Transvaal' [21]. If the creation of capitalist relations of production depends on the eviction of all labour tenants, the process was most certainly not completed in the 1960's and it still has a long way to go. Whether or not farmers retain labour tenants, as many still do, at least in Natal, seems to depend more on their political affiliations and their relations with local authorities than on their particular mode of agricultural production.

A final example : Morris says that 'apartheid is a system of ensuring an adequate distribution of labour by means of state bureaucratic intervention rather than the operation of a "free" labour market. The two prime elements in this system have been influx controls and a system of national labour bureaux. The purpose of influx controls it would seem ...is in fact not to expel Africans from White areas but to organise and rationalise the distribution of African labour within a complexly structured economy' [22]. In support of his explanation of influx controls he quotes official statements of just the sort which radical authors usually dismiss as 'ideological'. In fact, the vast majority of the victims of influx control are simply packed off - sometimes under police escort - to their de facto or de jure 'homelands'. They are sent to 'closer settlements' and rural 'townships' where there is no labour shortage. Influx controls doubtless do rationalise the distribution of labour, but they also do far more than that.

Morris continues 'the labour bureau system has also been a means to cut down wasted labour time ... they are obviously effective as labour distribution centres' [23], presumably likewise in a 'complexly structured economy'. But are they? A survey of 900-odd unemployed people in Durban, Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg showed that in the former two cities, registration at labour bureaux as a means of finding employment took third place to 'asking employed relatives and friends' and 'visiting potential employers'.

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In Pietermaritzburg, however, 'the overwhelming majority expect to find work through the labour bureau and the intensity of the search (as measured by the average number of ways in which people look for work) is much lower. This raises the interesting possibility that in a relatively undifferentiated labour market (as we have seen Pietermaritzburg to be) the labour bureau either functions better as an agency for placing people in employment or that workseekers are more constrained to use it; the corollary would be that 'labour direction' techniques will be less successful as African employment becomes more occupationally differentiated' [24].

None of these authors, as far as I am aware, have given a comprehensive analysis of the resettlement policy, although many refer to it in passing. Such analysis as is supplied, however, does not provide an adequate explanation of the policy in all its forms. The most comprehensive recent study is that of Baldwin, who concludes: 'At one level the reason for such massive upheavals described above is the pursuit of an ideological goal, that of separate development. But that policy itself is not so much concerned with racial separation as with maintaining the system of white domination and super-exploitation of blacks. The present Nationalist government sees this aim as being least pursued through separate development, a policy which necessitates the forced removals' [25].

This conclusion is rejected by Morris who writes: 'Contrary to Baldwin's claim that mass removals are the implementation of the "ideological demand for race separation", their analysis can (indeed must) be grounded in the qualitative changes taking place in capitalist agriculture. Forced removals and resettlement, as an aspect of apartheid, are the social form of the extrusion of labour from this branch of production' [26].

Morris was quoting from an earlier version of Baldwin's paper which might have differed from the published version. But if Baldwin's analysis is not entirely adequate, neither is Morris'. Baldwin was dealing with almost all forms of resettlement, whereas Morris' suggested analysis can only possibly be applied to one part of the process - a part which accounts for possibly 40% of the removals; and even then it does not explain the precise form of their resettlement. The capitalisation of agriculture has undoubtedly created a large 'surplus' of workers, but this does not determine how they are 'disposed of'. But, considered as a partial explanation, Morris' suggestion does have some merit.

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It may be supplemented by observing that a further 'surplus' has been and is being created by the changing nature of South African capitalism in general - increased capital intensity, the growth of monopoly capitalism and the increasing importance of manufacturing. It is these people who constitute the 'reserve army of labour'; in part they are being organised into a cheap labour supply for border industries by resettlement in townships within commuting distance of these. Their cheapness is assured by their supply outstripping the still small demand for labour in border industries, their powerlessness and by the lack of legislative protection for people working in the border industries.

So it is reasonable to argue that the form of production in industry and agriculture in South Africa 'necessitates' a large proportion of the removals. It cannot account for the whole process, however, as the Limehill case demonstrates. The removals (from Maria Ratschitz) were not necessitated by the capitalisation of agriculture, since the people were located on mission land (still partly occupied by 50 families) where farming activities continue in the same way as they have gone on for decades. Neither are the people at Limehill a source of cheap labour, not even potentially. We have already noted their position in relation to border industries and the unlikelihood of their finding employment there. The urban areas have their own reserve army of labour and there is no reason for the residents of such settlements being able to compete more cheaply.

Such people, therefore, can only be described as the subjects of marginalisation, which 'occurs as a by-product of the process of proletarianisation, i.e. the process of separating producers from their means of production and commoditising their labour power. Thus while the development and extension of capitalist relations frees agents from their means of production, it leaves a proportion of these without any possibility of functioning in capitalist production' [27]. A necessary condition for the occurrence of marginalisation is the existence of large labour surpluses; this condition has been shown to hold in South Africa [28]. The evidence which justifies the introduction of the concept of marginalisation has already been discussed - the fact that places like Limehill are far from places of employment while providing no opportunities for subsistence agriculture, the extremely limited opportunities for work offered by the local labour bureau (which seems to serve as a means for blocking legal employment search) and the high rates of unemployment

among the young and among women workers. Here, then, there is no question of simply controlling a labour force; it is a matter of controlling all the people. Perhaps that is why they need three police forces!

Thus far, the limitations of existing explanations of the resettlement policy have been pointed out. A more comprehensive account should, in my view, start from the observation that the policy is an obvious example of the extra-economic coercion which Legassick points out is characteristic of South African capitalism [29]. But Legassick does not tell us why such coercion is used. He does not explain, for example, why the Progressives (also committed to capitalism) do not advocate the same forms and degree of extra-economic coercion and in particular why they have opposed forced removals.

The reason must lie in the greater dependence of some sections of South African capitalism and their supporting classes than others on existing political arrangements for the furtherance of their interests. Certain sections of Afrikaner business have been greatly expanded under state patronage since 1948 and agrarian capital benefits from a whole series of state interventions in agricultural markets. The position of white labour, too, is directly bolstered by state measures of various kinds.

The growth of mass-based African political power would undoubtedly limit the ability of the state to maintain its support of these interests. By contrast, other sections of capital can entertain a greater range of political alternatives (including those which involve a growth of African political power) in the confidence that they will still have the means to advance their interests.

In other words, there are differing interests in the extent and form of political control over Africans, the Nationalist state being committed to a particularly complete form.

Virtually all forms of resettlement subject the people moved more or less directly to greater political control. For example, people moved to Limehill now fall under the authority of chiefs which they did not in their former places [30]. People removed from urban areas are prevented from organising political struggle there, where it would be most effective. People moving into townships supplying labour to border industries are removed from the scope of such legislation as exists, limiting super-exploitation, and people removed as a result of betterment schemes suffer as a result of the creation

of a class of which at least the more affluent part can be expected to support 'homeland governments' to which the state is delegating some of the control functions.

Such an extension of control has its origins in the dominance of the particular sections of South African capital which require complete exclusion of mass-based African political influence. This is not quite the same as saying, with Baldwin, that at one level the reason lies in the pursuit of an ideological goal. This implies that ideological and economic factors operate independently; however, racial separation is not in itself in the interests of whites, but only if such separation meets the demands of capitalism. Ideology, in other words, is not independent of economic interests. Then again, this is not to say that ideological factors (of the most irrational kind) are not sometimes at work. Why, for example, are people moved simply from one side of the road to the other, or, even in extreme cases, forced to pull down their houses and rebuild them five yards away?

The resettlement policy, therefore, is not on the one hand, the work of demented racists. Nor, on the other, is it simply a result of the development of production on the dominant sectors of the economy. Rather, it is a complex, comprehensive and effective way of exercising political control, arising from the present form of South African capitalism as a whole.

VIII SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The principle conclusions of this study may be summarised as follows:

(a) The Limehill resettlement was one type of forced removal (a removal from 'white' rural areas which results from the elimination of squatting and labour tenancies on white farms into a 'closer settlement'); there are a number of other types, serving rather different purposes.

(b) Facilities at Limehill remain rudimentary. There is a Bantu Affairs Department office, a water supply (with one tap for every 35 families), corrugated iron privies served by a bucket system, two overcrowded primary schools (shared with other settlements), a clinic (without a telephone), two general dealers and one cafe/store (where prices are higher than in town) and three churches. Internal roads are in poor repair. The majority of houses are made of mud and thatch and many are delapidated, being exposed to wind and rain and termites.

(c) About 20% of the children born at Limehill have not survived to the date of the survey. It addition, it appears that the birthrate has dropped and the rate of population growth is about half the average rate among Africans. Possible explanations are that deaths at birth or shortly thereafter were not mentioned by respondents and that, in a context where family planning services are available and wellpublicised, people may choose to practise birth control in view of their impoverished conditions.

(d) Unemployment rates are high even by contemporary South African standards; in particular, very few adult women are in wage employment. The rate of unemployment among young adults is also particularly high; many of the 15-19 age group and some of the 20-24 age group probably stay on at school because of the poor prospects of finding a job. Distance from places of possible employment and discouragement in finding work at the nearest labour bureau make things difficult for new entrants into the labour force. We may speak of the Limehill population as 'marginalised' as there appears to be no formal sector of the economy which requires its labour.

(e) There is a general feeling of hopelessness amongst the residents of Limehill. Virtually no-one believes that he participates in decision-making; few believe that becoming part of Kwazulu has made any difference to their lives. Unemployment and poverty with attendant social disorder were most frequently mentioned as problems; the great majority did not believe that it is possible to make any progress towards solving these problems. A small number of respondents rated life at Limehill good or fair, but the vast majority said it was a place of suffering and difficult to live in or that they were more deprived there than formerly. Some also mentioned social disintegration. Over four-fifths of the respondents would return to the places they came from, chiefly because they had had land and cattle and were more prosperous, not having to rely on cash income for everything.

(f) The task of explaining all aspects of resettlement policy is not one that has been much or satisfactorily attempted in the past. It is clear, however, that an explanation wholly in terms of ideological factors, as is an explanation only in terms of the development of production in the dominant sectors of the economy, is inadequate. Rather, it appears that resettlement is a complex, comprehensive and effective way of exercising political control arising from the recent development of South African capitalism as a whole.

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NOTES.

1 A. Baldwin, Mass Removals and Separate Development, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 1 No.2. October 1975 pp. 215-227 quotes a S.A. Institute of Race Relations Fact Sheet (African Population) (14.2.1972) which estimated that 1,82 million people had been removed by 1972. This figure did not include those removed from 'badly situated' reserves nor the hundreds of thousands who have been resettled within the reserves. Further, the process has continued unabated since then. Therefore the total figure must by now be well over two million.

2 Cosmas Desmond and Charles Simkins; South African unemployment: causes, effects and responses (in preparation)

3 Baldwin, op. cit. pp. 221-226.

4 This process is seen at its most complete form in the Transkei. In my earlier research, I found attempts to establish it throughout the 'homelands'. See my The Discarded People, Penguin, London, 1971 pp. 52-53, 90,99 et passim.

5 Quotations in this section are from General Circular No.25. of 1967 of the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development.

6 Calculated from data in Department of Statistics, Midyear population estimates - Republic of South Africa, Statistical News Release P.11. Pretoria, 5.12.1977.

7 This figure is based on a survey done by Market Research Africa. The unemployment rate quoted in their study is the percentage of all males older than 16 who reported themselves as unemployed, whereas it is usually regarded as the proportion of economically active persons who are without work. The figures used here is an estimate of the usual measure made by C. Simkins in the appendix to African Unemployment in three South African cities (to be included in South African unemployment: causes, effects and responses).

8 taken from the Market Research Africa survey.

9 Table 4 in C. Simkins, Measuring and predicting unemployment in South Africa, 1960-1977, in C. Simkins and D. Clarke: Structural Unemployment in Southern Africa, Natal University Press (forthcoming).

10 Total wage employment in 1977 is estimated at 7,13 million (from a total employment figure of 7,97 million less 0,85 million in subsistence agriculture - both figures taken from C. Simkins, Measuring and predicting unemployment in South Africa), whereas total population (including the Transkei) is taken to be 26,5 million (based on Statistical News Release P.11. of 5.12.1977)

11 Quoted in the Star, 21 November 1969.

12 D. Innes and D. O'Meara, Class formation and ideology: The Transkei region, Review of African Political Economy, no.7, September/December 1976 p.76.

13 See F.A. Johnstone, Class, race and gold: A study of class relations in South Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

14 H. Wolpe, Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa, Economy and Society vol. 1. no.4. 1972.

15 M. Morris, Capitalism and Apartheid: a critique of some current conceptions of cheap labour power in ed. Adler Perspectives on South Africa: a collection of working papers, pp. 51-95, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1977.

16 H. Wolpe op. cit. p. 452.

17 R.T. Bell, Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa, OUP, 1973, pp. 235-236.

18 H. Wolpe op. cit. p.453.

19 H. Wolpe, op. cit.

20 see Part II in ed. Desmond and Simkins (forthcoming).

21 M. Legassick, South Africa: Accumulation and violence, Economy and Society, vol. 3, no.3, 1974.

22 M. Morris, op. cit. p. 76.

23 M. Morris, op. cit. pp. 78-79.

24 see Part II in ed. Desmond and Simkins (forthcoming).

25 A. Baldwin, op. cit. p. 227.

26 M. Morris, op. cit. p. 75.

27 D. Innes and D. O'Meara, op. cit. pp. 75-76.

28 C. Simkins, Measuring and predicting unemployment in South Africa.

29 M. Legassick, op. cit.

30 The absence of chiefs accounted, in part, for the fact that (black spots) in Natal were strongholds of the African National Congress and the Liberal Party in the 1950's and early 1960's.

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