



Corruption challenges and responses in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Marianne Rahmé, Legal Researcher
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Questions

- What are the most significant corruption challenges in DRC and why?
- What are the main national anti-corruption measures and structures to what extent have they been successful?
- What international programmes work on corruption and to what extent have they been successful?

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1. Summary

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) consistently scores in the lowest rungs of global indexes on corruption, integrity and wider governance standards. Indeed, corruption of different sorts pervades public and corporate life, with strong ramifications for human development. Although the DRC is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources, its people are among the globe's poorest.

Corruption in the extractive industries (minerals and oil) is particularly problematic in terms of scale and its centrality to a political economy that maintains elites and preserves the highly inequitable outcomes for the majority. The politico-economic elites of the DRC, such as former President Joseph Kabila, are reportedly significant perpetrators but multinationals seeking valuable minerals or offering financial services are also allegedly deeply involved. Corruption is therefore a problem with national and international roots.

Grand level corruption shades down into the meso-level, where for instance, mineral laden trucks are systematically under-weighted with the collusion of state officials. With severe shortfalls in public funding, certain public services, such as education, are supported by informal payments. Other instances of petty corruption facilitate daily access to goods and services. At this level, there are arguments against counting such practices as forms of corruption and instead as necessary survival practices.

To address the challenge of corruption, the DRC is equipped with a legal system that is of mixed strengths and an institutional arsenal that has made limited progress. International programming in integrity and anti-corruption represents a significant proportion of support to the DRC but much less than humanitarian and governance sectors. The leading international partners in this regard are the EU, US, UNDP, UK, African Development Bank, Germany and Sweden. These partners conduct integrity programming in general governance issues, as well as in the mineral and forest sectors.

Despite national and international initiatives, levels of corruption have proven very stubborn for at least the last 20 years, for various reasons. It is a structural and not just a legal issue. It is deeply entrenched in the country's political economy, and is driven both by domestic clientelism and the fact that multinationals buy into corrupt deals.

For Congolese and the country's international aid partners, dealing with corruption is also challenged by the difficulties of understanding it or defying its norms. The billions of dollars at stake and the collusion of wide networks throw up hurdles and dangers for its would be investigators. The use of anti-defamation laws, censure, ostracism and violence can meet those who ask questions or try to challenge its practice. Nonetheless, different approaches – from the investigative to the sociological – have produced a multidimensional picture that is indicative of the likely scale and function of corruption in the country, even if there is most probably a considerable amount of corruption that is not identified.

The sources used in this rapid review are gender blind and converge on a very negative picture. The literature ranges from the academic and practitioner to the journalistic and investigative, and taken as a whole, is of good quality, drawing on different types of evidence including perceptions and qualitative in-country research. The sources are mostly in English with two in French.

2. Corruption challenges

Evidence

Despite the dangers and difficulties of approaching corruption in the DRC, investigators and researchers of different disciplines and backgrounds have attempted to characterise the phenomenon. This study has identified four different types of approaches:

1. Indexes, either using large scale surveys to record perceptions of corruption (e.g. TI, 2020a) or mixed research methods (e.g. IIAG, 2018)
2. Anthropological studies looking at the everyday elements of corruption – e.g. civil servants and service users (e.g. Wakengi, 2019)
3. Investigative campaigns and reportage into grand corruption, for instance around former President Kabila and Israeli billionaire businessman Dan Gertler by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and media (e.g. *Le Congo N'est Pas A Vendre*, *Congo Hold Up Papers*, *The Sentry 2020 & 2021*)
 - A variety of this type is political economy pieces on the significance of corruption for national politics (e.g. Titeca & Edmond, 2018)
4. Papers based on sociological experiments aiming to see if factors in corruption can be identified and manipulated for public good outcomes (e.g. Reid & Weigel, 2016)

Indexing corruption

There exists a host of indexes that reflect on corruption worldwide (U4, 2017) and this rapid review draws on several of these. Some of these indexes rely on perceptions (TI's Corruption Perceptions Index,¹ WBG's Worldwide Governance Indicators)² or on research into law and practice as well as consultation with experts (Africa Integrity Index³ & Ibrahim Index of African Governance⁴). In the main, these are helpful in giving a general picture of the state of corruption in DRC, as well as comparison over time and with neighbours in central Africa. These indexes converge on a very negative report on corruption in the DRC:

- The country ranks in the bottom 1-15% of the world across these measures (TI's Corruption Perceptions Index, 2020 & WBG's World Governance Indicators)
- The country is comparable or worse than its immediate neighbours and much worse than Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (TI's Corruption Perceptions Index, 2020; WBG's World Governance Indicators & WBG's Enterprise Survey, 2014) and compared to the African continent (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2019). See Figure 1
- There has been little positive change in the last 20 year (WBG's World Governance Indicators, 2020 & Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2019).

¹ <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/table/cod>


² <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>

³ <https://www.africaintegrityindicators.org/>

⁴ <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>

In comparison to neighbours

Figure 1. In terms of corruption impact, the DRC is worse or comparable to its immediate neighbours across several different indexes.



Source: the WBG's World Governance Indicators for 2020, 'Control of Corruption' in 'Map View' <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports> reproduced under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0

In 2020 TI's Corruptions Perceptions Index ranked DRC as 170/200 in the world, making it equal with North Korea and Haiti. The TI ranking corroborates the picture in Figure 1, generated by the WBG's World Governance Indicators; DRC is comparable with other countries in its neighbourhood:

- Neighbouring South Sudan is 179/200.
- Neighbouring Congo, and Central African Republic are ranked 165/200
- Other neighbours are somewhat or a quite a lot less affected by corruption: Uganda at 142, Zambia at 117 and Rwanda at 54.

Overall, TI's 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index measurement shows that sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest performing region in the world in terms of perceptions of corruption.

In the last two decades

During the last twenty years, it appears that there has been little net positive change in corruption measurements, which makes DRC typical for the Central African region.

Figure 2. Measures of anti-corruption have not changed greatly in the last 20 years in net terms. (Dark grey lines represent the DRC and the blue shade the range of scores for Africa)

This image has been removed due to copyright reasons the full version can be viewed at <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>

Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 'DRC' 'Anti-Corruption' indicators packet 2010-2019

Figure 3. The DRC is typical for Central Africa in its net statis in anti-corruption terms.

This image has been removed due to copyright reasons the full version can be viewed at <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>

Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, DRC and neighbours 'Anti-Corruption' indicators packet 2010-2019



Figure 4. The DRC has not significantly improved its control of corruption since 2000. The World Governance Indicators range from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best).

Indicator	Country	Year	Number of Sources	Governance (-2.5 to +2.5)	Percentile Rank	Standard Error
Control of Corruption	Congo, Dem. Rep.	2000	5	-1,55	0,51	0,27
		2005	8	-1,42	2,93	0,18
		2010	12	-1,44	2,38	0,16
		2015	12	-1,29	8,17	0,15
		2020	11	-1,57	3,37	0,15

Source: WBG's World Governance Indicators for 'Control of Corruption' for 2000-2020 reproduced under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0

Quantifying corruption

Endemic corruption across state and society has been a critical problem for many decades in DRC (U4, 2010), but even in comparison to this record, corruption scandals in the past two years appear to have flared. This recent rash has triggered a response among media outlets and NGOs that have attempted to quantify the cost of corruption despite the noted difficulties of doing so.

In May 2021, the Coalition *Le Congo n'est pas à vendre* (2021), which counts a dozen Congolese and international organisations, including the Carter Center, RAID and PPLAAF) alleged that mining and oil deals with the businessman Dan Gertler will cost the state US\$3.71b between 2003 and 2039. The coalition breaks this figure down into two periods

- Between 2003 and 2021, a loss of US\$1.95bn in revenue.
- Between 2021 and 2039, "a further US\$1.76bn in future royalty payments to Gertler's companies if current practices continue." (RAID, 2021 quoting *Le Congo N'est Pas a Vendre*, 2021)

This figure is calculated by the Coalition by comparing the price of the concessions as paid by Gertler and his businesses and the price that they were consequently sold on for (*Le Congo n'est pas à vendre*, 2021). This updates the results published by Kofi Anan's report from the Africa Progress Panel, which reported that in 2013 the DRC lost US\$1.35bn through Gertler's concessions for copper and cobalt mines.

In the autumn of 2021, the former President Kabila (r.2001-2019) and his family were alleged to have defrauded the state of US\$138mn dollars. Drawing on a leak of over three-and-a-half million documents obtained by the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF) and Media Part, an investigative coalition claims that the former president and his family improperly profited through multiple public procurement and kickback mechanisms (PPLAAF, 2021). Even more recently, in December 2021, Albert Yuma Mulimbi, former chairman of the state mining company, was removed after allegations of missing billions and replaced by President Felix Tshisekedi (Lipton and Searcey, 2021).

Other figures are also available from the preceding years. For instance, the NGO Global Witness reported in July 2018 that US\$750mn were missing in payments to tax authorities and state mining companies between 2013-2015 (State Dept, 2018). A study by the Carter Center, ten years in the making and published in 2017, alleged that US\$750mn owed to the state mining company Gécamines never arrived in its official accounts, constituting more than two-thirds of the 1.75 trillion Congolese francs (US\$1.1bn) in mining revenues earned by Gécamines during the period.

Sectors affected by corruption

As these figures indicate, two sectors that appear to be particularly affected by corruption in the DRC are extractive industries (most importantly copper, cobalt and gold) and public administration. These areas naturally overlap given the importance of the extractive industry to state revenue and the national economy and on account of the involvement of politicians in the natural resource sector.⁵ Significant players involved in these areas are DRC elites, international businesses and banking companies. Furthermore, the strategic importance of these minerals naturally brings into play large global economies, such as China.

Cobalt and copper mining (industrial and artisanal)

The Carter Center (2017)'s ten-year study is the authoritative text on the role of Gécamines in overseeing the privatisation of the mining sector since the end of the Zaire era (1997). It records a variety of practices of grand corruption. Privatisation sales of the most valuable assets were awarded to those with ties to DRC politicians. Indeed, sale peaks coincided with the runup to the 2006 and 2011 elections, a reflection of the practice of buying support through these sales. Furthermore, in spite of policies to liberalise the sector, Gécamines was able to play a “gatekeeper role”, by extracting “royalties, bonuses, rents, and other contractual fees” to raise around US\$262mn per year from 2009-2014 (Carter Center, 2017: 4). As noted above, between 2011 and 2014, around US\$750mn in joint ventures revenues went missing. Equally, although Gécamines should have been decreasing the number of concessions it owned in line with liberalisation, it actually increased them by converting its research permits into exploitation permits. The Carter Center’s report looked to the future with some concern, noting the “vast stretches of unexploited land in Congo’s copper belt” controlled by Gécamines, which could be used to secure political support with little public scrutiny (Carter Center, 2017: 7).

More recently, the Congo Hold Up papers have alleged the involvement of multinational investment and mining companies and two of the world’s largest banks in large scale corruption in DRC (PPLAAF, 2021). The Sentry’s report looks at the relationship between Chinese mining companies, President Kabila’s government and financial institutions and alleges “a massive bribery scheme” (The Sentry, 2021: 3). This centres around the Sicominex deal of 2007-2008, which traded DRC mining concessions for Chinese built infrastructure, in a ‘countertrade’ pattern. This resulted in the creation of the Sino-Congolaise des mines (Sicomines), a majority Chinese owned company. The founding contracts were criticised for lack of transparency and for exposing DRC to more debt at a time when international financial institutions were attempting to decrease

⁵ Together, copper, and cobalt in ore and refined forms made up 85% of the DRC’s exports by value in 2019 (OEC, 2019).

the country's existing burden. The Sentry's investigations allege bribes of US\$55mn aimed at Kabila and his supporters and claim that these funds flowed through CityBank and CommerzBank, with little oversight. The DRC's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has since accused the deal of massively undervaluing the concessions while serving President Tshisekedi has threatened to renegotiate the deal (The Sentry, 2021: 42).

Instead of looking at how concessions fall prey to grand corruption, Wakenge (2020) looks at the day-to-day practices in the copper and cobalt supply chains from Kolwezi mines through checkpoints in Lwambo, Buluho, Lubumbashi, and Kisanga and the Kasumbalesa border crossing. He documents how the common practice of underweighting trucks carrying the minerals is dealt with by officials manning checkpoints for financial gain. Collusion over mislabelling of copper as cobalt or undervaluing the radioactivity of minerals is also widely practiced. This work also explores the language around these practices, giving an insight into how they are conceived by officials,⁶ truck drivers and mine managers.

Oil Sector

Crude petroleum and refined petroleum constituted 6% of the DRC's exports in 2019, making it significantly less important than copper and cobalt (OEC, 2019). Given the size of its petroleum reserves, the DRC has a low production rate of 20,000 to 25,000 barrels per day (bpd) (US International Trade Administration, 2021). The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) has found that "the DRC has committed to promoting good governance" but "found progressively worsening gaps in the DRC between the quality of their rules and their implementation in laws and practices" (NRGI, 2022). Furthermore, NRGI states that practices of the state-owned hydrocarbons extraction company SOHANYDROC are opaque, as it releases neither financial or revenue reports nor has a published a Code of Conduct. The other two major extraction companies are Anglo-French firm Perenco (offshore extraction) and the French oil giant Total (onshore).

Although the oil sector is much less important to the political economy overall than copper and cobalt, corruption has a comparable political economy function. 'Clientelism' on the grand scale functions in the oil sector as it does in the cobalt and copper sectors, whereby the governing elite extract rents through controlling and selling concessions and other benefits arising from the sector. Titeca and Edmond (2018) study looks at these mechanisms and their overall effect:

- The position of Minister of Hydrocarbons can be used to award patronage and has been used to secure support in particular regions or among a certain ethnicity.
- Ministers in turn can then distribute their patronage, such as in the form of contracts, to supporters.
- Access to information and officials for would-be investors are a source of income for ministry officials.
- Informal fees can be levied from investors around contract signature, as well as through bonuses, for instance after ten million barrels.

⁶ These officials include agents from the "Agence nationale des Renseignements, ANR; Police des Mines et Hydrocarbures or mining police; and Republican Guards [...] of the Commerce extérieur, Office Congolais de Contrôle [...] and Commissariat Général à l'Energie Atomique" (Wakenge, 2020: 299).

According to this analysis, there is an intentional lack of clarity around these payments, which gives ministry staff more power. Similarly, the ministry can oblige investors to carry out research via vaguely worded agreements, allowing the ministry to renege easily and resell the plot. Furthermore, memoranda of understanding for one concession can be 'sold' to multiple investors. Additionally, trappings payments (flights, meals, conferences) paid for by the state or companies are also used or skimmed.

These practices obstruct production since decisions on concessions are not necessarily based on appropriate bids. Indeed, upfront cash payment distract officials from longer-term gains. Likewise, investors can flip plots by reselling them, which is a non-productive activity and a practice of which Gertler has been accused. This, together with historical conflict, partly explains the relatively low bpd rate (Titeca & Edmond, 2018). However, Titeca and Edmond (2018) argue that a greater structural hindrance to development is the ruling administration itself. The administration extracts rents through access rather than production – rewarding its clients through access to sites and stopping certain areas from being explored in order to exclude 'hostile' elements from profiting. For this reason, many potential oil sites remain unexplored. Indeed, most active sites are on the littoral even though the interior is likely richer to the extent that it could make DRC second only to Nigeria in terms of African oil production. Since the development of the central basin and its regions through oil extraction could threaten the status quo, their development has been blocked.

Public services

The German Development Cooperation comments, "People working in the public sector misuse their positions for personal gain – often because their wages are not paid. Corruption pervades every level of government" (BMZ, nd). As discussed above, this operates at the scale of the minerals industry, as well as in largescale procurement. The democratic process itself has been a victim in the form of corruptly awarded contracts for voting machines (State Dept, 2018).

On a more routine level, citizens and residents of DRC are obliged to make informal payments to access state services, to the extent that "In the DRC, corruption is part of daily life" (Wakenge, 2020: 294). One such instance occurs at toll booths, where motorcycle taxi drivers leaving the city of Kananga in Kasai Central Province are required to pay a toll of 2,000 Congolese Francs, equivalent to US\$2 in 2016 (Reid & Weigel, 2016). This represented a levy of approximately 13% of the average motorcycle taxi fare at the time – or they could choose to pay a bribe. The phenomenon has been used to investigate both the more familiar *demand* side of bribery (the toll officials' requests) – and rather more unusually, the *supply side* (the motorbike taxi drivers). Reid and Weigel's study focuses on the supply side to investigate the extent to which two incentive types (financial and social) were significant. Not particularly surprising results aside,⁷ this study highlights the importance of seeing corruption from the supply side, a perspective taken up by other studies looking at access to public services as well as goods and economic opportunity more generally. Studies often capture the subjective experience and conceptions of these practices among citizens (i.e. using the 'emic' approach). For instance, Alexandre (2018: 1) contrasts attitudes towards corruption of anti-corruption agencies and INGOs with that of taxi drivers of traffic police officers, who see informal payments:

⁷ "Overall, the financial incentives increased legal toll payments by drivers, while the social incentives did not lead, on average, to any improvement" (Reid & Weigel, 2016).

... as a normal expression of solidarity and a sine qua non condition for survival. For them, corruption is a system that provides job security, greater access to food, accommodation, healthcare and education in the dysfunctional and failed Congolese State.

These studies underline the role of corruption or informality in *maintaining* public services across sectors in the context of weak state provision – including in “electricity provision, garbage management, public transport and the justice sector” (Titeca & De Herdt, 2019: 1). In the education sector for instance, parents pay various types of school fees that go towards teachers’ salaries and maintaining buildings. This comes in the context that state funding for education “virtually stopped from the mid-1980s” (Titeca & De Herdt, 2019: 1). However, there are negative consequences of the bottom-up funding structure, including erosion of professionalism and accountability, since school inspectors are not independent of those they are inspecting and rely on them partly for their wages. Indeed, there exists a critique of the underlying assumptions around ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states, that warns not “to conflate the absence of government with an utter absence of governance altogether” (Kabamba, 2010: 265). Here, the difference between grand corruption and petty corruption is important, where the latter, “far from being a moral failure, in fragile states acts of petty corruption are often entirely rational; driven by the uncertainty of the environment, social pressure and needs” (Scharbatke-Church & Chigas, 2019).

International humanitarian development aid

In response to the corruption exposure in public services as well as because of conflict sensitivity issues, certain international partners, such as Germany, no longer directly fund programmes in the DRC state (BMZ, nd). Nonetheless, the humanitarian and development aid sector, worth US\$3bn net in 2019 (OECD DAC, 2020), is reportedly vulnerable to corrupt practices. After a three-month DFID-commissioned review of risks in the sector, based on interviews with stakeholders in Kinshasa, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika, Adam Smith International (Henze et al, 2020: 1), commented:

Corruption in the DRC typically channels resources through predatory practices grounded in clientelist networks based on familial, communal, political, economic, ethnic or social ties. These networks operate within the aid sector, either within organisations, or between aid organisations, private sector suppliers, local authorities, and in some cases, senior representatives of aid recipients.

In this sense, corruption appears to function in the aid sector in the same way as in other sectors, although estimations of value lost were not identified. In addition, the UN’s Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation programme (REDD+) in DRC has also come under scrutiny and is reportedly vulnerable to:

“(1) kickback payments; (2) the politicization of government forestry positions; (3) financial mismanagement by international development cooperation agencies and non-governmental organizations; and (4) non-transparent hiring practices of international consultants.” (Assembe-Mvondo, 2015: iv)

The various parts of the programming cycle (from Needs Assessment to Monitoring) are exposed to different amounts of risk (ASI, 2020). Grading exposure to corruption in aid programming, ASI sets out three rules of thumb:

1. the shorter the programme cycle, the greater the risk of corruption

2. the less relevant a programme is considered by the community, the more exposed it is to corruption risk
3. multiple actors collude in corruption across the programme cycle

Other sectors

This rapid literature scan highlights other important sectors vulnerable to corruption:

- The defence sector (Nyenyezi Bisoka & Vlassenroot, 2021; Mandrup, 2019)
- Taxation, state revenues and land registry (IMF, 2021)
- The security and justice sectors (Brosig & Sempijja, 2017; State Dept, 2018).
- Forestry and the trade in animal products (TI, 2020b)

Challenges on dealing with corruption

In the DRC, various factors converge in making corruption a very difficult issue to address, despite the establishment of various anti-corruption bodies (see Section 3) and the efforts of many internationally sponsored governance programmes (see Section 4). As policies in the mineral extraction sector show, corrupt practices are instrumentalised in the macro-political economy. For instance, the ‘countertrade’ of minerals for Chinese-built infrastructure was part of former President Kabila’s bid for election in 2016 (The Sentry, 2021). (These infrastructure promises included five great works and were framed as an equitable trade for the Congolese to win support.) Decades earlier, President Mobutu Sese (r.1965-1977) used Gécamines to sustain his “vast patronage network” even while eventually overproduction and underinvestment led to the collapse of Gécamines’ output, contributing to his downfall (Carter Center, 2017). Corruption is also entangled in the DRC’s conflicts, magnifying the difficulty of addressing the issue. The UN’s Group of Experts on the DRC stated in their submission to the United Nations Security Council’s President in 2019 that, in violation of international regulations⁸ and UNSC Resolutions,

[A]rmed groups continued to finance their activities through the illegal mining of tin (cassiterite), tantalum (coltan) and tungsten (wolframite), thereby contaminating the supply chain [...] as well as specific instances in which some Congolese government officials were involved in the diversion of minerals (UNGOE, 2019: 3)

Artisanal gold’s major destination was found by UNGOE to be Dubai, and the lack of a tracing system makes addressing this difficult. This international connection echoes connections between other mineral subsectors and other economies hungry for rare earth metals, whose multinationals are willing to risk and even drive corruption to seek resources, bringing into play billions of dollars (The Sentry, 2021). Domestic accountability is impeded by various factors (see Section 3) – for instance, the fact that “the judiciary faces many challenges in terms of resources, capacity and independence which undermine its ability to address corruption effectively” (IMF, 2020: 4)

⁸ These specifically include OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict - Affected and High-Risk Areas and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism.

Observers also point to public officials' low or absent pay, which leads them to seek informal payments to compensate (Mushine, nd). Attempting to engage with these issues, international assistance programming has had some successes but grappling with their complex and highly adaptive nature is difficult (Scharbatke-Church & Chigas, 2019). Likewise, where 'corruption' functions to facilitate access to services, international partners meet with dilemmas on how to programme:

Should one strengthen or move towards Weberian organizations? And who, given the strong presence of alternative forms of authority, should one engage with and whose ownership is one trying to cultivate? (Titeca & De Herdt, 2019: 1).

3. National anti-corruption measures and structures

Initiatives and institutions

Figure 5 lays out the major elements of the anti-corruption and integrity framework in DRC (Assembe-Mvondo, 2015). This can be elaborated with the following mechanisms (State Dept, 2018; Wakenge, 2019; TI, 2019):

- 2000 – establishment of Groupe d'action contre le blanchiment d'argent en Afrique Centrale (**GABAC**), as the body in Central Africa to assess whether members comply with FATF standards.
- 2002 – creation of anti-corruption, fraud, and money laundering commission.
- 2003 – creation of the Commission de l'éthique et de la lutte contre la corruption (Ethics and anti-corruption commission, **CELC**), followed by the Observatoire du code d'éthique professionnelle (Observatory of the code of ethics of public officials, **OCEP**), which is “an advisory and consultative body, charged with ensuring ethical behaviour in public administration” (TI, 2019: 13).
- 2004 – establishment of Cellule nationale des renseignements financiers (**CENAREF**) to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.
- 2005 – passing of a whistle-blowing anti-corruption law.
- 2004-2005, investigation of validity of financial and economic (mining) conventions signed during the 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 wars by rebels and Kinshasa Central Government, led by Christophe Lutundula Apala.
- 2004 – entry of the DRC into the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (**EITI**) compliant country, full membership in 2005.
- 2010 – beginning of the participation of the DRC in in fora held by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (**ICGLR**) on fraud, mineral contraband, and corruption.
- 2010 – creation of a national commission against mineral contraband.
- 2013 – set up by ICGLR of a regional anti-fraud and corruption committee.
- 2014 – launch of a mechanism to standardise supply-chain processes across the Great Lakes Region for artisanal cassiterite, wolframite and coltan.
- 2016 – launch of an initiative to boost the economy including measures to fight tax evasion and enforce penalties against corrupt civil servants.
- 2016 – establishment of the Corruption and Ethics Monitoring Observatory (**OSCEP**) to monitor corruption in the civil service.
- 2018 – launch of an artisanal gold traceability initiative (implementation is uncertain).

- 2018 – launch of the independent **Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre** to provide pro bono lawyers for corruption cases.

To these groups and initiatives can also be added (State Dept, 2018):

- Antifraud brigades of the Customs Authority
- Antifraud brigades of the Ministry of Mines
- General Inspectorate of Finance
- Bureau of the Special Advisor of the Head of State in Charge of Good Governance.

Figure 5. The anti-corruption and integrity framework in the DRC.

Key domestic laws	Key government entities ⁵	International Treaties
<p>2005 Anti-corruption law⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covers the conduct of public employees Reaffirms the role of the judiciary in the prevention, detection, and punishment of acts of corruption and similar offenses Protects denunciators of corrupt acts against reprisals, intimidation, and prosecution 	<p>Office of the Auditor General Office (La Cour des Comptes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has responsibility for conducting independent audits of the accounts of public enterprises Controls the payment of loans approved by the state Audits contract award procedures and public contracts Audit revenues and expenditures included in the state budget 	<p>African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (signed December 2003, but not yet ratified)</p>
<p>2006 Constitution and Code of Ethics of Public Officials</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires government officials to submit asset declarations 	<p>Office of the Auditor General Office (La Cour des Comptes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has responsibility for audits all public bodies, including the Ministry of Finance (within which it is placed as a specialised service) Controls execution of the state budget and the budgets of decentralised administrative entities Ensures the proper organisation of internal audit services Audits the financial transactions of public enterprises and bodies Controls the tax, customs, and financial position of natural and legal persons at the request of the president of the republic and the minister of finance 	<p>United Nations Convention against Corruption (signed September 2010)</p>
<p>Draft of national anti-corruption strategy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is based on resolutions adopted during the National Anti-Corruption Forum held in Kinshasa in December 2009 	<p>Observatory of the Code of Professional Ethics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Received the charge to promote ethics and the fight against corruption, including the 2002 Code of Conduct for Public Agents 	<p>Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (signed in 2007)</p>
	<p>Parliament</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can request research or investigations into government actions and the conduct of public enterprises 	<p>Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the Area of Anti-Corruption between the DRC, South Africa, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (signed in February 2008)</p>

Source: Assembe-Mvondo, 2015: 5-6. reproduced under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.

The law and its application

There is disagreement about whether the legal framework for anti-corruption in DRC is overall “strong” (TI, 2013) or “disjointed and lacks several key elements” (IMF, 2021: 5). Such a judgement requires a long elaboration, but it is clear that there are widespread differences between law and practice.

The Africa Integrity Index (2018) is an extremely rich source in this regard. It assesses 114 indicators of social, economic, political and anti-corruption mechanisms, and qualifies its numerical scores (0-100) at length. Around 60 indicators relate most directly to accountability and anti-corruption.

This Africa Integrity Index (2018) shows how practice can relate to the law in different ways. As an example, its Indicator No.48, “In law, political parties are required to regularly disclose public donations [...]” scores 100/100 while Indicator No.49 “In practice, political parties regularly disclose public donations” scores 0/100. It notes at the beginning of its analysis of this Indicator:

In practice, political parties do not regularly communicate their public donations. [...] Political parties from the presidential majority in power themselves do not receive official financing from the Government. However, it is clear that their members within the Government use state funds to finance the activities of their parties, which is punishable by law... (Translated from French)

This index also highlights areas that are vulnerable to corruption both in law and practice. For instance, both in law and in practice, there is little protection of the supreme audit institution (See Indicators 006 and 007 of Africa Integrity Index, 2018).

Other notable vulnerabilities with regards to corruption raised by this index include (Africa Integrity Index, 2018):

- Indicator 11. In law, there is an independent body/bodies mandated to receive and investigate cases of alleged public sector corruption: 0/100
- Indicator 12. In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body: 25/100
- Indicator 13. In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective: 0/100
- Indicator 14. In practice, appointments to the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption support/s the independence of the body: 0/100

Leaving aside the legal framework, the anti-corruption initiatives and institutions have been very limited in effectiveness (Wakenge, 2020), a fact that is reflected in the general stasis across the indicators in the indexes reviewed above and in section 2. OSCEP is considered not to be independent of political interests in addition to being under-capacitated (Global Integrity, 2019 from Bac, 2019). CENAREF is financially independent and while tasked with investigating money laundering, its independence is dubious, and it may face political interference (Sentry Foundation 2018, from TI, 2019). Furthermore, its role is somewhat limited to analysis and data processing and advisory (Global Integrity 2019 from TI, 2019). The auditors, although financially dependent on the Ministry of Justice, is reportedly free of political interference, even while it suffers from funding delays (Global Integrity 2019). It also has problems with low capacity.

4. International programming on anti-corruption

The DRC's international partners engage with integrity and other governance issues within their wider assistance portfolio. This section puts that integrity/anti-corruption programming in the wider assistance context and then maps integrity/anti-corruption programming (see Figure 8).


The two largest portions of international aid assistance to the DRC goes into action relating to debt and emergency response (see Figure 6). Governance and civil society, in which anti-corruption and integrity support would largely fall, ranked fifth by dollar value between 2008-2018 (Aid Atlas, 2018).

Within the scope of the study, the most active donors in anti-corruption and integrity programming in the last five years appear to be, in approximate order of spending, the EU, US, UNDP, UK, African Development Bank, Germany and Sweden. This would correlate approximately with the largest spenders across development assistance as a whole (see Figures 6 and 7).

This result should be taken with some caution as the identification of programmes was done at speed and may not be comprehensive; in addition, it can be difficult to draw a line around which programmes constitute integrity/anti-corruption programming specifically as opposed to which represent broader governance. The programmes have been ranked as 1 (somewhat focused on integrity/anti-corruption) and 2 (strongly focused on integrity/anti-corruption). Hyperlinks are included in the programme titles in the table.

By dollar value, around one sixth of programming focuses on forestry, one sixth on mining, and around two-thirds in general governance areas (e.g. institutions, elections, taxation, health, and local government). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which these programmes have been successful in their own right because of the shortage of evaluation and assessment documents identified. Individual successes are included in the tables below. Overall, it can be surmised that they have not yet been successful in improving the DRC's overall standards of integrity, if judged simply on the basis of the indexes discussed above.

Figure 6. Support to Government and Civil Society constituted 7.2% of international assistance by dollar value between 2008 and 2018.



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Figure 7. The top ten partners by dollar value between 2008 and 2018 for all assistance types.

1.	United States	\$5,999.77mn
2.	International Development Association	\$4,814.11mn
3.	EU Institutions (excl. EIB)	\$2,708.91mn
4.	Belgium	\$1,954.13mn
5.	Germany	\$1,838.74mn
6.	African Development Fund	\$1,371.38mn
7.	France	\$1,359.91mn
8.	Global Fund	\$1,302.38mn
9.	United Kingdom	\$1,207.56mn
10.	African Development Bank	\$1,127.73mn

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Figure 8. International assistance in anti-corruption and integrity

	Project / Programme Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Police Reform Support Programme	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2021 - 2025	EU		“This new European aid programme is aimed at improving governance, protection for human rights and efforts to combat impunity and corruption. It has four specific objectives: improving the implementation of reforms and the accountability of the police; increasing the professionalism of the police and the criminal justice chain; improving human resource management; and, lastly, getting community policing up and running in order to restore public confidence.”	US\$22,722,000
	Reflections on effectiveness	<p>Project documents commented on prior successes “Older programs have contributed to the implementation of police reforms in the DRC including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of the Police Reform Monitoring Committee - The drafting of a framework act on the Congolese National Police (PNC) - strategic plans for the implementation of the reform - The creation of a database of police officers - The modernisation of the administration - the creation and construction of a police academy (ACAPOL) <p>This support has helped professionalise the police, paving the way for a civilian police force that is impartial and at the service of the community. According to previous impact these kinds of projects had on the police sector, we are optimistic to the results of this project.”</p> <p>However, ISSAT criticised projects on the basis that it was based on an "inadequate methodology and means at EU-level" and that this "has hampered the development of up to date, useful and comprehensive analyses of the security sector and its principal actors". According to those interviewed by the ISSAT, "EU actors ... spent too little time on the ground". They add, "the relevance of the EU's support to national DRC strategies and plans is good on paper, but this does not always lead to successful implementation or the realisation of expected results. [...] A recurring lament that came out during interviews was the inability or lack of effort among DRC authorities to implement many of the initiatives that the EU had helped create or laid</p>					

the groundwork for through its various assistance programmes. An example is “*la loi organique de la police*” which, whilst ratified with a great sense of pride and local ownership, has encountered serious problems in implementation.”

2	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Sustainable economic development in the mining sector	Mining	2019 - 2021	GIZ		<p>The DR Congo supports the establishment and expansion of local production chains in mining to ensure improved economic development that creates job opportunities.</p> <p>The project primarily supports the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dialogue and participation: The project supports multi-stakeholder dialogue formats. - Standards in artisanal cobalt mining, the project supports mining cooperatives with implementing and providing evidence of standards in artisanal cobalt mining. - Promoting local procurement: The project links mining companies, SMEs and business development services (BDS). - Vocational training. The project aligns vocational training programmes with the actual demand of the mining sector. 	
	Reflections on effectiveness	No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value

2	SHINE - Students acting for Integrity, Honesty and Equality	Humanitarian, Community Building	2017 - 2021	Norad (Norway) Allan and Nesta Ferguson Charitable Trust	International Alert	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 enabled and capable Civil Society Organisations in DRC, Afghanistan, Kenya, OT Palestine and Nepal are leading on embedding education sector anti-corruption and transparency measures directly benefiting 10,500 youth - 10,500 engaged and supported 14-19 years old youth monitors are active agents of positive change championing anti-corruption and transparency learning and youth monitoring - Encouraged secondary schools embedded Integrity Clubs to ensure long-term sustainability of anti-corruption and transparency efforts in education - Exemplified success attracts wider support and demand for anti-corruption and transparency measures in education 	Project budget US\$0
Reflections on effectiveness		No budget has been disbursed for this project yet.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Budget Strengthening Initiative (BSI)	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2010 - 2018	DFID GIZ Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency African Development Bank Australia - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade European Commission	Overseas Development Institute	<p>Support to the Budget Strengthening Initiative, promoting more effective, transparent and accountable budget policies, processes and systems in the poorest and most fragile states.</p> <p>The project works in collaboration with a network of international development partners (including the IMF, African Development Bank, and World Bank) to provide high-level, country-tailored policy advice on budget issues, revenue administration and mobilisation, aid and debt management, and financing service delivery to governments of fragile states. The project is hosted by ODI's Public Finance and Institutions (PFI) programme, which covers research on public finance policy and institutional reform, the role of public finance reform in driving</p>	Project Budget: US\$34,598,434 Spend to Date: US\$34,032,204

			(EU) Directorate- General for International Cooperation and Development Ministry of Finance and Development Planning		development outcomes, and work on promoting effective resource management and mobilisation.		
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Appui à la lutte contre la corruption en République Démocratique du Congo	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2021-2024	UNDP Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency		Translated from French: The objective of this project is to reinvigorate the fight against corruption, which plagues Congolese society, This project will also contribute to the evaluation and strengthening of the capacities of state and non-state actors in the field of anti-corruption, as well as to the development of the country's economy. This project will also contribute to the evaluation and capacity building of state and non-state actors in the fight against corruption in order to mitigate the inefficiency of government structures and the bias of audits.	US\$4,000,000
Reflections on effectiveness		It is too early to assess this project.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value

2	Country Development Cooperation Strategy	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2020 - 2025	USAID	USAID + partnerships with private sector/public sector	The integrated strategy includes three Development Objectives (DOs). USAID will: 1. Focus on strengthening the government's ability to provide and regulate services equitably, thereby deepening its social contract with citizens, increasing their trust, and promoting transparency. 2. Help citizens become more resilient, gain greater access to basic services, such as health care and education, and demand institutional accountability. 3. Expand and diversify access to economic opportunities	Not specified
Reflections on effectiveness		It is still too early to assess this project.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Country Development Cooperation Strategy	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2014 - 2021	USAID	USAID + partnerships with private sector/public sector	In order to achieve this, USAID will support three Objectives under this Country Development Cooperation Strategy: Development Objective 1: Selected national level institutions more effectively implement their mandates. Development Objective 2: Lives improved through coordinated development approaches in select regions. Transition Objective 3: Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern DRC	Not specified
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value

2	DRC Elections Integrity Activity	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2018 - 2021	USAID	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening	Increases transparency and inclusion in elections, promotes citizen engagement of political and electoral processes, and conducts impartial ongoing analysis and reporting on political and electoral processes. It supports the capacity of domestic observation groups to coordinate efforts and make recommendations to improve the credibility of the process.	US\$5,600,000
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	Capacity Building for a Responsible Minerals Trade	Mining	2014 - 2018	USAID	Tetra Tech Inc	This USAID-funded project supported the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) and the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to establish and scale up a responsible minerals trade (RMT) from the region and transform the region's mineral wealth into a tool for economic growth and development. To achieve these aims, CBRMT worked with the GDRC Ministry of Mines (MoM) and targeted mining sector actors to increase the volume of conflict-free minerals and improve the integrity of due diligence and traceability systems in the DRC. The project also strengthened the ICGLR by improving its financial and management capacity as well as its monitoring and auditing of conflict-free supply chains.	
Reflections on effectiveness		<p>According to the implementor, "the project strengthened the capacity of local and regional actors to manage conflict-free supply chains and introduced a new system to trace and conduct due diligence of artisanal tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (3TG)."</p> <p>But, illegal mining is still an important challenge in the DRC that needs more involvement and more binding and compelling actions.</p>					

	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Addressing Imbalances of Power and Information in the Collection of Tax in the DRC	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2018 - 2019	DFID	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development	The purpose of this project is to increase the DRC's tax revenue by reducing informal taxation and improving the understanding of the officially recognized taxes at the provincial and ETD (territorial entities) levels, as well as the behaviour change of citizens in regard to informal taxation. For 18 months, the project will build the capacity of 100 key multipliers-actors (MAs) (heads of household, micro-business leaders and business initiatives, civil society leaders) on tax nomenclature and tax procedures. The trained and connected MAs will sensitize 10,000 households, small businesses entrepreneurs and community associations to pay taxes. They will use light and handy agencies (mobile banking) and new technologies (FrontlineSMS and Smartphones) to pay taxes, monitor and report harassment and tax evasion. The MAs will act as a network within existing Participatory Local Governance Committees (PLGCs) and will be encouraged to initiate and innovative actions to fight informal taxation that will change the MAs themselves and the environment within which these actions will be implemented.	Project Budget: US\$360,629 Spend to Date: US\$335,086
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund Round 4	Deforestation	2018 - 2021	UK Department for Environment,	Lancaster University, Lancaster Environment Centre International	Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is the fifth most lucrative transnational crime, worth up to £17bn a year globally. IWT fosters corruption, feeds insecurity, and undermines good governance and the rule of law. Defra manages the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund, which is a competitive grants scheme with the	Project Budget: US\$6,121,900 Spend to date: US\$3,991,879

			Food, and Rural Affairs	<p>Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) ; Stop Ivory ; Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas) ; Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) Limited ; Wildlife Conservation Society ; Southern Tanzania Elephant Program ; Zoological Society of London (ZSL) ; WILD Foundation - Mali Elephant Project ; Fauna and Flora International ; Alliance of Religions and Conservation</p>	<p>objective of tackling illegal wildlife trade and, in doing so, contributing to sustainable development in developing countries. Projects funded under the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund address one, or more, of the following themes: • Developing sustainable livelihoods to benefit people directly affected by IWT • Strengthening law enforcement • Ensuring effective legal frameworks • Reducing demand for IWT products</p>	
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Reflections on effectiveness		Over £23 million has been committed to 75 projects since the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund was established in 2013; five projects were awarded in 2014, fourteen in 2015, fifteen in 2016, thirteen in 2017, fourteen in 2018 and in the latest round in 2019 (last data we have). The fight against IWT is getting a lot of funding but, as we already mentioned for the mining sector, IWT is still an important challenge in the DRC that needs more involvement and more binding and compelling actions.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	National Indicative Programme (NIP)	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2014-2020	EU		Health sector – aiming to support the government in developing a quality, financially efficient health system easily accessible to all. Environment and sustainable agriculture – the EU's programme will cover conservation needs and socio-economic development with actions in sustainable agriculture and access to electricity.// Governance and the rule of law – aiming to strengthen policy reforms in the areas of police, justice and defence. // Transport – construction of 150km of national road 1 contributing to the completion of the most important transportation axis of the country.	US\$704,382,000
Reflections on effectiveness		Sources not identified.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Promoting Democratic Local Governance	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2021 - 2024	GIZ	Ministry of Interior, Security, Decentralization and Customary Affairs	The project is improving the socio-political environment in two provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to enable peaceful and inclusive local elections. The Local Democracy Fund helps selected Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to implement innovative initiatives that promote the spread of a democratic spirit based on inclusive dialogue. Decentralised institutions are given training on topics related to democratic values and civic participation	not mentioned

						<p>carried out by CSOs.</p> <p>Awareness campaigns are to be conducted to raise the interest of citizens and make them participate more in local governance issues.</p> <p>A coaching programme to prepare potential future local political leaders will provide training on leadership, democratic values and behaviour, gender matters, tolerance and communication.</p>	
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management	Deforestation	2016 - 2020	GIZ	Ministère de l'Environnement et Développement Durable	<p>The project is strengthening the skills and capacities of the local population and the private owners of forest smallholdings, as well as those of the specialists and managers of the relevant ministries, service providers and decentralised state structures.</p> <p>In so doing, it is laying the foundation for the conservation of biodiversity and a legal, sustainable approach to managing natural resources. The project sets out to involve the people in environmentally sound, economically sustainable resource management, and to help develop a technically competent and sustainably financed administration which is equipped for and open to dialogue.</p>	
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD)	Governance, Country Development,	2018 - 2025	UK	Eswatini Revenue Authority,	The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) helps to address evidence gaps on how to make tax systems more equitable, efficient and	Project Budget: US\$18,072,728

	Elections, Policy Change			<p>Foundation for studies and Research on International Development, Harvard University, London School of Economics, McCulloch Limited, Overseas Development Institute, Paris School of Economics, Queen Mary University, Rwanda Revenue Authority, The Université catholique de Louvain, Uganda Revenue Authority, University of Cape Town, University of Toronto, Vagaurd Economics</p>	<p>conducive to poverty reduction, stable economic growth, and better governance. ICTD works closely with tax administrations in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia to i) deliver a high quality set of research findings, ii) build tax research capacity in low income countries, and iii) engage with policy makers to facilitate the uptake and impact of this new research.</p>	<p>Spend to Date: US\$6,370,080</p>
Reflections on effectiveness	No sources identified					

2	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Improving security, social cohesion and human rights in conflict mineral rich regions of Eastern DRC	Mining	2019 - 2023	Dutch Embassy	International Alert	To strengthen regional stability in the Great Lakes Reduced levels of violent conflict and improved security in targeted 3T red and gold mines in South Kivu and Ituri	Project Budget: US\$12,130,496 Spend to date: US\$1,388,628
Reflections on effectiveness		According to the implementor, this project features many "success stories": hygienic latrines are being built by the local mining activities monitoring sub-committee, children have left artisanal mine sites after the awareness raised by the local monitoring sub-committee, etc. As we mentioned before, illegal mining is still an important challenge in the DRC that needs more involvement and more binding and compelling actions to have a sustainable improvement in human rights and social cohesion.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
2	UNDP Country Programme Cycle in the DRC	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2020 - 2024	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	UNDP recovery and development program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	This new Swedish funding agreement will allow UNDP to: Support the capacities of the Congolese State to accelerate the process of territorial decentralization in all its dimensions (political, administrative and fiscal) Support national institutions, provinces and decentralized territorial entities (ETD) Contribute to strengthening the rule of law by supporting the efforts of the authorities and other stakeholders with a view to a significant and lasting reduction in acts of corruption; Support efforts in favour of a better supervised, responsible, more efficient and respectful of human rights justice, meeting the justice and legal protection needs of populations, in particular vulnerable and at risk populations, with a view to stabilization and development of the country and given the announced gradual withdrawal of MONUSCO over the next few years; Contribute to the stabilization, the restoration of	To reach US\$45,444,000

					peace and the strengthening of the resilience of the populations.	
Reflections on effectiveness	Too early to tell.					
Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1 Public Financial Management and Accountability in the Democratic Republic of Congo	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2013 - 2022	UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ; Institute of Development Studies ; PwC ; Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD) ; Overseas Development Institute ; International Rescue Committee (UK) ; World Bank, The ; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) ; United Nations	The project was established to strengthen the capacity of key institutions of democracy (Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), Political Parties, Police, Judiciary) to deliver inclusive, credible and peaceful elections.	Project Budget: US\$23,100,419 Spend to Date: US\$21,459,020

				Children's Fund (UNICEF) ; Mokoro Ltd. ; Fondation Hirondelle ; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)		
Reflections on effectiveness	This project didn't do as well as expected (scored a B in 2019). Nevertheless, it made a good progress, some key achievements: budget transparency norms have been established, inclusiveness of the budget cycle has begun to embed, the supreme audit institution is engaging on sensitive topics and adopting a new law... The 2019 assessment sets bold corrective actions to reorient the programme. We have no data to whether improvement was made to this program or not.					
Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1 Our rights, Our duties in DRC (Haki Na Shurti Zetu) - Mbandaka	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2018 - 2021	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Oxfam GB Oxfam Partner(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enable communities, local public institutions and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to adopt new or change current practices and attitudes to increase respect for human rights and women's rights • Support community -level governance committees, including women's forums, to build the capacity and confidence for collective action that engages territorial and provincial authorities to improve the accountability of governance, respect for gender equality and effectiveness of protection processes; • Establish and facilitate a citizen -state consultation process by which authorities at provincial, territory and local levels adopt practices and procedures in response to citizens' demands for increased accountability, transparency, inclusiveness of governance, increased respect for gender equality, 	Project Budget: US\$1,258,241 Spend to Date: US\$1,082,710

						increased protection of citizens' rights; • Strengthen the capacity of national level advocacy organisations to apply an evidence -based approach that represents the views and incorporates the testimonies drawn directly from local civil society organisations and ordinary citizens	
Reflections on effectiveness							
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Our Rights, Our Duties in DRC (Haki Na Shurti Zetu) - Tanganyika	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2019 - 2021	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Oxfam GB Oxfam Partner(s)	Same as G27	US\$743,823
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Our Rights, Our Duties in DRC (Haki Na Shurti Zetu) - Kinshasa	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2018 - 2021	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Oxfam GB Oxfam Partner(s)	Same as E27	Project Budget: US\$1,207,335 Spend to date: US\$465,809
Reflections on effectiveness							
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value

1	REDD+ National Fund (FONAREDD)	Deforestation	2012 - Present	UNDP		REDD+ is a framework created by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) to guide activities in the forest sector that reduces emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, as well as the sustainable management of forests and the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.	US\$225,000,000
Reflections on effectiveness		This project reached 70% of the milestones (fully or partially) by the end of 2018, which means it's performing well according to its objectives, progress was witnessed across almost all sectors and major political and technical results were achieved. But, a number of challenges were identified and recommendations were made in an action plan. The DRC's plan was ambitious, in order to enact political momentum but time wasn't taken well into consideration. We hope the new action plan factors in the needed time to implement real change.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Programme conjoint des Nations Unies d'appui à la réforme de la Justice	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2020 - 2024	UNDP		<p>Translated:</p> <p>The general objective is "To rehabilitate the rule of law in the DRC through a better supervised, more responsible and more efficient justice system that responds to the needs of the population for justice and legal protection, in particular vulnerable and at-risk populations, with a view to strengthening stabilization and social cohesion in the areas of intervention" through four results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Result 1: The steering of the National Justice Reform Policy is improved and coordinated; - Result 2: The accountability of actors in the penal chain is improved, allowing institutions to function in accordance with the principles of the rule of law; - Result 3: The provision of quality justice is improved by strengthening the institutions of the criminal justice system in the prosecution of offenses, with an emphasis on crimes under international law and sexual violence committed during the war and sexual violence committed in times of conflict; - Result 4: The demand for justice is improved for the 	Project budget: US\$8,619,774 Spend to date: US\$1,672,918

						populations in the intervention zones, promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Results 1 and 2 will be implemented at the central level and results 3 and 4 at the level of the targeted provinces."	
Reflections on effectiveness		Too early for an assessment					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Commercially viable, conflict-free Gold Project	Mining	2018 - 2023	USAID		Seeks to scale-up exports and sales of conflict-free, artisanal gold from eastern DRC by developing market linkages with responsible gold buyers, particularly in North America and Europe. Through these partnerships, the project will deliver a transparent, private-sector co-financed supply chain model for clean artisanal gold which is led by market actors, but will also benefit economically disadvantaged artisanal or small-scale mining communities. Activities will address and remove existing downstream blockages within the artisanal gold supply chain through engagements to support artisanal or small-scale cooperatives, responsible gold wholesale buyers, retailers, insurers, transportation companies and banks.	US\$11,999,691
Reflections on effectiveness		No sources identified					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Sustainable Mine Site Validation Project	Mining	2018 - 2022	USAID		Uses an innovation approach to refit and strengthen current methods for mine site Qualification and Validation (Q&V) to better address the long-term viability of clean gold and 3T exports sourced from	US\$3,700,229

						the DRC. The new Q&V approach will promote rigorous and transparent traceability of minerals which provides ongoing security analysis and monitoring of mine sites, increases the capacity of Ministry of Mines personnel, and strengthens artisanal or small-scale mining cooperatives to reduce issues like child labour and improve the status of women present in artisanal mine sites. The project will also reduce the overall dependence on donors to manage the Q&V system, enabling new conflict free 3T and gold mine sites to be verified quickly, at less cost, and in better alignment with local needs.	
Reflections on effectiveness		<p>According to its donors, "this project will fully capacitate DRC Mining Inspectors and local multi-stakeholder committees (CLS) in conducting Q&V missions, adequately monitoring mining activities at all sites, and addressing/mitigating identified risks at these sites. New CLS or sub-CLS will be set-up and capacitated in (new) areas identified as appropriate, following a risk-based approach. Independent monitoring will be ensured through a whistleblowing and rapid-alert mechanism." For its first quarter, no important impact was made since it focused on assessing the sub-recipients, establishing the field office, recruitment and onboarding, etc. To our knowledge, no other quarterly reports were published on the donor's website since 2019.</p>					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Integrated Governance Activity	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2017 - 2022	USAID	Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI)	Strengthens key governance institutions to improve the delivery of health, education, and economic growth services at the community level and support the social contract between citizens and the government in the DRC. This activity 1) strengthens the capacity of select Congolese government institutions to fulfil mandates; 2) increases effective development of targeted sub-national government entities through collaboration with citizens; 3) increases citizen demand for accountable, transparent, and participatory government services. It operates in Kinshasa and select priority provinces (i.e. Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Haut Katanga, Lualaba, South Kivu, and North Kivu).	US\$40,706,095

Reflections on effectiveness		After USAID's analysis of the baseline data, USAID concluded that they are not optimistic about meaningful change happening after this project. On the other hand, important health outcomes were observed. We conclude that this project does not look very impactful in the DRC.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Media Sector Development Activity	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2019 - 2024	USAID	FHI 360	Promotes a more open and vibrant media sector that contributes to more responsive and transparent institutions. The activity 1) strengthens the legal and regulatory environment for media; 2) supports targeted media outlets to become more independent and professional; and 3) increases access to high-quality public-interest reporting. The activity is implemented in the provinces of Kinshasa, Haut-Katanga, Lualaba, Tanganyika, South-Kivu, North-Kivu, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Central. With additional \$2.5 million funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation and \$600,000 from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the activity will expand to Equateur and Tshopo provinces.	US\$15,000,000
Reflections on effectiveness		By January 2020, this project had conducted political economy analysis "to support advocacy and legal activities of media and civil society organizations", had "hosted round tables about media legal reform", had "established technical assistance framework" and created a Media Training and Resource Center. According to its indicators, this program is on track.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Garamba Chinko Protected Areas Project	Deforestation	2016 - 2021	USAID	African Parks Network	Strengthens wildlife law enforcement in the protected areas, which in turn improves security for local people. Garamba National Park in north-east DRC and Chinko Reserve in south-east CAR both have suffered greatly from insecurity over the last 15 years. This activity strengthens law enforcement, builds	US\$9,998,650

						protected area management capacity, and develops a local and regional constituency in support of conservation.	
Reflections on effectiveness		The last assessment identified was made in 2017, quantifying impact e.g. through number of elephants collared.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	UKAID-USAID ACCELERE! Improving access, quality and governance of primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo.	Governance, Country Development, Elections, Policy Change	2014 - 2022	USAID DFID (UKAID)		This project supports more children to access high quality education and have a shared policy voice with more influence. ACCELERE! supports the Government of DRC better to deliver universal primary education through increased access to education, and by improving learning outcomes for girls and boys. The project aims to reduce barriers to primary education by providing access to alternative/accelerated learning programmes. It will also improve the quality of primary education through teacher training and the provision of new learning/teaching materials. To build sustainable sector improvements for the long term, ACCELERE! supports better governance of the education sector at all levels. ACCELERE! targets eight provinces across DRC including those which are affected by conflict and displacement.	Project Budget: US\$51,228,599 Spend to Date: US\$48,662,486
Reflections on effectiveness		In 2020, key achievements were made: implementation of the education emergencies (managed by UNICEF), quality studies by Cambridge Education and has been rated "A" for 4 consecutive years.					
	Project / Program Name	Sector	Start / End	Donor	Implementor	Objectives / Description	Monetary Value
1	Forest Governance Market and Climate Outsourcing (Phase 3)	Deforestation	2018 - 2021	DFID	KPMG	ISO 639-1 Supporting governance and market reforms that reduce the illegal use of forest resources and benefit poor people	Project Budget: US\$59,420,611

					Forest Governance Markets and Climate (FGMC) is a 10-year programme executed in phases. It supports reform of the global timber market to: tackle illegal logging; promote legal timber trade; support community engagement in the management of, and benefit from, forest resources. It promotes policies, incentives and business standards that secure rights and rule of law, while protecting livelihoods linked to the forest sector, promoting growth and reducing deforestation.	Spend to Date: US\$49,391,722
Reflections on effectiveness	<p>IATI noted in 2019 that "FGMC is making very good progress, with most milestones being achieved or exceeded. Highlights include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthened policies and practices to tackle illegal timber trade. Strong progress on policy and legal reform in focal countries. The DRC scored significant positive change when it comes to inclusive public policy. - Good progress when it comes to shifting demand in consumer countries - Improved mechanisms for forest governance - Increased knowledge to inform international policy processes and shift global business norms to safeguard forests and combat deforestation. " 					

Source: Authors' Own

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