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APPLIED POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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The central concern of this paper is with that image of political science which depicts it as not only the least scientific of the social sciences, but also--and presumably thereby--the most irrelevant for the solution of fundamental human problems. It is an image that characterizes its practitioners as only journalistic spectators of the political game, and not socially responsible contributors to the improvement of the human situation. Coming directly home, it is the image reflected in the characteristic disbelief one encounters when it is suggested that political science research can contribute significantly to development and the nation-building process, or that there is, or ever can be, such a thing as "applied" political science research. It is our contention that this is a false image, for which political scientists are largely to blame; and that there is an important contribution their research can make to development problems. What is required among political scientists is a greater self-awareness of the applied potential of their research and a visible commitment to the idea that such an emphasis is desirable. They should make an earnest and continuing effort to demonstrate and maximize its constructive relevance for public policy. As several of the most effective demonstrators of the "applied persuasion" in the discipline are present for this discussion, it is our hope that we can seize this opportunity to make the argument for it as explicit and persuasive as possible for the benefit of those who are unconvinced.

I. PAST INDIFFERENCE OR AVOIDANCE

Since our objective is to increase the number of political scientists with an applied persuasion it is in point to examine some of the factors which help to explain past indifference toward this orientation. These can be conveniently grouped under the headings of two perspectives--that of political scientists and that of the potential users of their research.

A. The Past Perspective of Political Scientists

No sharp dividing line can be drawn to periodize the history of political science as a discipline. The basic tendencies (normative vs. empirical theorizing, institutional vs. behavioral, descriptive vs. comparative, static vs. developmental, and so forth) have always been present under one guise or another, and they still have their respective proponents. For analytical purposes we can, however, distinguish very roughly between the era when the foci of interest among the practitioners were predominantly normative, institutional, descriptive and static (herein called "Traditional Political Science") and a later--the contemporary--era when the opposite emphases (empirical, behavioral, comparative and developmental) are clearly in the ascendent (herein called the "New Political Science").[1] The beginning of the shift occurred in the 1930s, and has vastly accelerated since World War II. The causes and nature of this ferment in the discipline are too complex, and, in any event, not necessary to detain us here. What does concern us are those aspects of Traditional Political Science which militated

against, and continue to act as a deterrent to, the emergence of a self-conscious applied persuasion as a respected feature of the discipline. Three of these aspects seem particularly in point: (1) the preoccupation with normative theory, (2) the reformist "muckraking" tradition, and (3) the dichotomy which developed between "politics" and "administration."

The past emphasis upon normative theory (i.e., political philosophy and the history of political ideas) has had several consequences, but for our purposes two are particularly in point. The first and most obvious one is that because there was not, by definition, any interest in scientific observation, comparison and generalization, there was no basis for the formulation of empirical propositions regarding the probable consequences of various policy alternatives. The second is that value enquiry and the normative orientation reinforced, if indeed it did not explain, the pronounced tendency toward political moralization, toward either the justification or the condemnation--rather than simply the understanding--of existing institutions and behavior. Not only were political scientists of this persuasion uninterested in systematic research of policy relevance, but they more than any other group contributed to the moralizing image of political science as viewed by other scientists as well as the ordinary laymen.

This strong moralizing orientation is closely linked with the reformist and muckraking tradition which characterized the early period of American political science, and which is not entirely dead. This tradition reflected "applied" research with a vengeance. Its object was the exposé, the unmasking of the gaps between the democratic ideal and the harsh realities of political life. Among those whose zeal carried them beyond reasonable bounds of moral judgment, the purpose of political science research was viewed as the illumination of shortcomings and abuses in the political process and in the exercise of political power. As Waldo observed, it was also thought to be scientific: "the scientific method was thought of as the natural partner of a practical reformism". Although there has been a strong reaction against this early tradition, most pronouncedly by the modern scientific empiricists, traces of a reformist atmosphere can still be found in not a little political science research. Reformist-oriented research is, of course, "applied" research of a sort, but when it is heavily laden with crusading zeal it hardly commends itself to policy makers in developing countries who are eager to have scientific help in solving their problems but not particularly keen for an exposé of what outsiders may regard as their limitations.

The dichotomy which developed within the discipline between the study of "politics" and the study of "administration" has also been a serious obstacle to the emergence of the discipline as a genuine policy science. This cleavage, characterized by the tendency for public administration to "hive off" from political science and to establish itself as a separate discipline, has been most marked in the United States for reasons peculiar to the development of the American political system during the past eighty years. As Thomas Davy has described it:

> "The politics-administration dichotomy was fundamentally a conception of the role of administration in a democratic system of government. Since administration was thought of principally in 'office management' terms, it was rather easy to draw the distinction between politics and administration and to assume that the role of the bureaucracy merely carried out as efficiently as possible the policies decided upon by the political agencies of the government. . .

> Since constitutional and legal analysis was a major preoccupation of political scientists at the time that public administration emerged as a separate area of study, this kind of analysis became prominent in public administration. much of the research of these early scholars was devoted to analysis of the legal powers and duties of administrative officials."[2]

This unfortunate politics-administration dichotomy has had three distorting effects upon conceptualization and research in the discipline: (1) "political science" came to be viewed increasingly as mainly concerned with the acquisition of political power (the central orientating concept), perhaps best epitomized by the title of Lasswell's classic of 1936: Politics: Who Gets What, When, How; (2) political scientists became ever more indifferent to problems of administration and policy effectuation, and ever more condescending toward students of administration, viewing them as dullards concerned with the formalistic and boring "nuts and bolts" study of "office practice"; and (3) students of administration, ostracized and self-isolated, became recluses in their own world of "span of control" and "scientific management", indifferent if not hostile to politics. In this bifurcated state of affairs it is little wonder that political scientists, as well as the potential users of their research, had little vision of their applied potential for major policy problems.

B. The Past Perspective of Potential Research Users.

National policy makers have tended in the past to be either unaware of or indifferent to the potential practical uses of much social science research. There have been, however, marked variations in their valuation of research of the different disciplines; they do not regard the social sciences as an undifferentiated whole. The high instrumental value of economic research has been readily --indeed, almost uncritically--accepted; to a lesser extent that of psychology and sociology. It is the research of the political scientist which has seemed to have the least relevance. The latter has confronted the difficulties of acceptance common to all of the socialsciences, aswell as some special ones of its own.

The difficulties common to the social sciences have been discussed at length elsewhere, and need only brief mention here: (1) the failure of social scientists effectively to communicate (i.e., interpret or translate) the results of their research in a demonstrably useable form; (2) the opposition of some social scientists to applied research on grounds of scholarly purity; (3) the scarcity of qualified social scientists capable of effective applied research; (4) the research climate-spoiling acts of omission and commission by social scientists, in their field research; (5) the reluctance of some social scientists to make claims to greater policy relevance because of the feeling that "we are not yet ready"; (6) the fact that few policy-makers (bureaucratic and political elites) are social scientists or until recently have been exposed to modern empirical social sciences in their education or experience and therefore require some highly visible demonstration and persuasion regarding the value of research in their decision-making; (7) the scarcity or non-existence of funds for applied social science research because of the higher priority attached to other activities; and (8) the fear of some insecure elites that social science inquiry ("question-asking") might be subversive of the established order, or of their present leadership. These and other factors, in varying combinations, are some of the common problems of the social sciences in establishing the relevance of their research for policy purposes.

Beyond these common difficulties of the social sciences, political scientists also confront the fact that political problems tend to be perceived by political elites as uniquely and inherently unamenable to scientific analysis and prognosis; rather, their resolution is viewed as singularly dependent upon that mixture of intuition and manipulative skill which constitutes the personal grace of effective political leadership. Such intuition and skill can indeed be enriched, they would agree, by the research of the economists, and even by the sociologists, and psychologists, but the peculiarly political aspects of the problem fall within the realm of individual political genius. This narrow concept of what constitutes the "political" realm, as viewed by political leaders, coupled with the equally narrow, unbalanced and fragmented conceptualization of the discipline by traditional political science, as already depicted, goes a long way to account for the fundamentally negative past attitude toward political science research held by both producers and potential consumers alike.

II. THE POSTWAR SOCIAL SCIENCE REVOLUTION

During and since World War II a major revolution has occurred in the social sciences. They have acquired not only a vastly greater applied capability, but there is a heightened awareness among both producers and consumers of the potential contribution social science research can make to problems of public policy. Athough many political scientists have been in the forefront of this revolution, the discipline itself has tended to acquire acceptance and legitimacy in the new era only as one of the social sciences, and not on its own terms. It basks in the reflected credibility, so to speak, of such social sciences as economics and psychology. The older pejorative images and perspectives of political science continue to affect present attitudes, on the part both of political scientists and of the potential users of their research. The problem is essentially one of image and attitude change: both the New Political Science and the New User Receptivity are ready for a fruitful union.

A. The New Political Science.

Three conceptual and methodological innovations in political science account for the fundamental re-orientation now in progress in the discipline which are of special interest to those of us concerned with the developing areas: (1) behavioralism, (2) system analysis, and (3) developmental change. Behavioralism, as espoused by Heinz Eulau and Herbert A. Simon (in political and administrative settings respectively),[3] stresses empiricism, the mutual interdependence of theory and research, and the scientific method. It is a refreshing antidote to the normative, moralizing, and muckraking aspects of traditional political science. Moreover, it promises a capacity to make potentially significant probablistic statements, which are the closest thing to predictive power for policy guidance in the social sciences.

Systems analysis, as espoused by David Easton and Gabriel Almond,[4] among others, stresses analytical categories rather than concrete structures, holism, input-output analysis, the interdependence of parts and processes, and functionalism. For our purposes there are at least five consequences which flow from the systems analysis approach in the discipline.

(1) It nudges political scientists to consider the political system analytically, to conceptualize the "political" as all those interactions in a society relevant to the authoritative allocation of values, rather than confining it narrowly to the "state" or to the ensemble of concrete political and governmental struc-

tures (parties, legislatures, etc.) conventionally thought to make up the "political". This broadened conceptualization of what constitutes the "political" realm gives the political scientist a legitimate interest both in other institutional spheres (the educational system, the economy, the stratification system) and other processes (urbanization, communication, socialization) as well as in the reciprocal relationships between these spheres and processes on the one hand and the polity, analytically defined, on the other.

(2) This shift from the concrete to the analytical in defining the political realm has also sharpened the sensitivity of the political scientist to the absolutely essential, but frequently ignored, social science distinction between analytical aspects (i.e., "political", "economic", "cultural", etc.) of concrete objects, behavior or problems, and the concrete things themselves. It is now a commonplace that when we do research on concrete objects, we do so through the analytical spotlight (or blinders) which highlights only those aspects of concern to our discipline. This partial "aspect-only" comprehension of the concrete thing "in the whole" is frequently about all that we can expect to achieve given the complexity of human affairs and the need for an academic division of labor. But when we come to concrete practical policy problems which we want to help policy makers resolve, the insight of only one "analytical aspect" quite obviously, provides little guidance for the solution of the "concrete problem in the whole." As Merton and Lerner have shown, this elementary fact compels interdisciplinary collaboration in applied research and policy guidance relating to practical problems:

> "Practical problems are many-faceted. They can be examined from the perspectives of several different disciplines. Increasingly, policy-makers have been weaned from the naive view that a practical problem is invariably in the orbit of one specialized body of science.... For many if not most practical problems demanding applied research, collaboration among several disciplines is required. . . a major function of applied research is to provide occasions and pressures for inter-disciplinary investigations and for the development of a theoretic system of 'basic social science', rather than discrete bodies of unco-ordinated specialized theory."[5]

Thus, by defining the "political" analytically the political scientist committed to policy relevant research is nudged into either becoming a multidisciplinarian himself or pursuing interdisciplinary collaboration.

(3) The holist imperative in systems analysis leads the political scientist to give equal attention to inputs and outputs, thereby helping to reduce the unfortunate politics-administration dichotomy. This reunion of politics and administration, brought about in part by systems analysis, has resulted in political scientists--as distinguished from public administrators-turning with fresh enthusiasm and scientific interest to the output processes--planning, regulation, enforcement, and so forth, not as office managers, but as scientific political analysists of the "whole system". They are now looking not only for input patterns, but also for patterns in the impact of policy outputs upon the functioning and development of the political system as well as upon its socio-economic environment. In due course this correcting of the input-output imbalance, this "closing of the circle" in the way in which the whole political process is conceptualized, should, through comparative research, enable political scientists to provide ever more valid policy guidance in the form of hypotheses about the probably consequences of particular policy outputs.

(4) Heightened sensitivity to the interrelatedness of institutional spheres which systems analysis encourages, has provoked a debate about the character of the relationships between the polity and its setting (i.e., the socio-economic characteristics of the society), namely, which determines which. The first wave of analysts who discovered the socio-economic "setting" of the polity were led, in the typical pendulum-like swing of the growth of science, to a sort of social and economic determinism, that is political phenomena were derivative of more basic economic, social or cultural forces. As the pendulum swung back in the inevitable reaction one finds the reassertion of the "primacy of the polity" over objective socio-economic conditions. The result of this Great Debate among those political scientists exposed to it has been an intensified interest but healthy scepticism, and presumably a stronger commitment to empiricism, in approaching the problems of development, including in particular the interrelationship among development in the economy, the society and the polity. The issue of the "primacy of the polity" will be examined subsequently in greater detail.

(5) Functionalism follows logically from the conceptualization of systems as wholes, a basic feature of systems analysis. Functionalism in political science postulates the existence of several universal political functions performed in all systems. It is the task of the researcher to discover the structures which perform these functions. Despite the many methodological - and, unfortunately, eschatological - polemics provoked by the functional way of asking questions, it has the enormous advantage of minimizing the ethnocentrism of the researcher (e.g., one asks "how are laws made?" not "where is the national parliament?", or "how are interests articulated?" rather than "where are the political parties?"). In approaching new political systems where specialized political institutions are still in the process of formation, and where their relationship to functional performance may be very different from the pattern found in the foreign country serving as the model, one's capability of penetrating and interpreting the reality of the political process is vastly enhanced if through the functional approach one is emancipated from culture-bound structural categories.

The third component in the New Political Science is a vastly increased concern with developmental change and capabilities analysis. It reflects the effort of political scientists to find a mode of conceptualizing and studying the political equivalent of economic growth and social progress. There is a burgeoning body of literature on the subject which we cannot tarry to examine here. Prominent themes include such macro concepts as systemic crises (e.g., legitimacy, identity, integration, penetration) - those fundamental problems every political system must continuously seek to resolve, but which are found in their most acute - and initially unresolved - form in new and evolving political systems. In these terms, the measure of the "development" of a political system is the extent to which it has acquired a capability not only to resolve or cope with such major systemic problems at one level of magnitude, but also to absorb continuous change and acquire fresh capability for coping with the more complex problems of the developing system. This new developmental orientation marks a dramatic shift from the static equilibrium models pervading most of the social sciences since the debacle of early evolutionism. The new quest is for dynamic neo-evolutionist models for studying the processes of political change in both historical and comparative perspective. The motivation behind this new thrust in the discipline is both theoretical and applied.

One striking feature of all of these new developments is the extent to which they are related - indeed, are a response - to developments in the real world. In fact, one overpowering impression one gets is that much of the New Political Science is the product of the encounter between political scientists and the developing areas, and among the latter Africa is preeminent. The case would include many arguments, of which the following are only illustrative.

(1) The forced encounter with sociologists and anthropologists. As Eckstein has put it, "when political scientists turned to the study of non-Western systems, they found other social scientists [both cultural and social anthropologists] occupying the ground; and so they naturally went to school with them and absorbed their techniques and style". Prominent among the theoretical tools were the concepts of system, function, structure, etc. One of the major centers of diffusion of social science theory and methodology has been the East African Institute of Social Research. The intellectual impact of such anthropological greats as Audrey Richards, Lloyd Fallers and Aiden Southall upon political scientists David Apter and Fred Burke, acknowledged by the beneficiaries, is only an example in point.

(2) The nature of the societies encountered. These were - or were presumed to be - marked by much less differentiation between institutional spheres (i.e., the "political" stood out much less clearly). This fact, coupled with the relatively fragile character of the formal structures of government, has fostered a deeper concern among political scientists for the relationship between the polity and its socio-economic setting.

(3) The value identification between many political scientists and national elites and new state builders. This has been a subtle predisposing factor in the former's search for non-culture-bound concepts and theoretical approaches (e.g., functionalism, and developmental change). In these and other ways Africa has made a major contribution to the modernization of political science. (It is now time for reciprocity!)

Once all this is noted, however, one special point should be made about the significance of the New Political Science for applied research. This is that exposure or conversion to behavioralism, systems analysis, and the study of developmental change were and are not requisites of an applied persuasion. Some of the most committed applied political science researchers look upon the New Political Science with varying degrees of amusement, condescension, contempt - or comprehension, their common observation being similar to that of Arthur Schlesinger, namely, it all seems to be nothing more than the reassertion of common-sense predictions in mysterious and tortured technical jargon. In any event, the central point here is simply that the New Political Science significantly enhances our capacity to contribute more meaningfully to an understanding and a resolution of problems of public policy - particularly problems of nation-building and national development in new states. This should be welcomed, and its existence recognised.

B. The New Need and Consumer Receptivity

The postwar revolution in the social sciences has also been characterized by increasingly explicit high-level recognition of their importance for public policy, both in complex industrialized countries as well as in the rapidly changing developing countries. Major public documents recently published in the developed countries, of which the following are illustrative, have

made the case for policy-oriented social science research most persuasively.* In each of these broad-ranging surveys political science is included as one of the social sciences, but in the specific examples illustrating the usefulness of social science knowledge, political science research is not mentioned. Ironically, it has been from the U.S.S.R., where, for more than forty years, political science as a discipline has been totally ignored, that the most forthright and explicit argument has been made in support of the policy relevance of applied political science research.**

> "More and more frequently we come across the concept of scientific guidance of society....An intelligent and carefully weighed solution to problems, based on precise knowledge of the facts, on the study of social processes and on evaluation of various viewpoints and alternatives, and a businesslike approach are imperative demands of life and a feature of our time....In recent times the Party has warned particularly strongly against haste and subjectivism; it is teaching that facts must be carefully analyzed and the decisions taken must be thoroughly weighed. The lessons of the reorganizations undertaken in recent years show how urgently a really scientific approach to problems of management is needed....The concept 'political science' has of late become increasingly more acceptable to our public. This is not accidental. It is a branch of knowledge whose development has now become essential in connection with the important and complex tasks that face the country. This science is called upon to provide answers to basic questions involved in perfecting the forms and methods of guiding society, in accurately assigning functions, rights and duties to all levels of the management apparatus, and in handling problems of the promotion and training of cadres."

Some Westerners will probably cringe at such terms as "scientific guidance" and "guiding society", but all they need to do is substitute the terms "scientific management" and "planning". The point is that the output, policy making, plan implementation aspects of the political process are an integral part of the discipline of "political science" and that it has a significant policy contribution to make.

It is in the developing African countries where the case for political science research would seem to have particularly great policy relevance. The case rests on arguments such as the following:

(1) The new states have highly statist political systems in which the bureaucracy is overwhelmingly dominant. Most authorities concerned with development of any kind in these countries stress the fact that enhancing their administrative capacity is the absolute prerequisite of all other types of

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*See Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences: Report of the Presidential Commission on Science and Technology (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1962)

Report of the Committee on Social Studies, Department of Education and Science (London: HMSO, Cmd. 2660, 1965) (Lord Heyworth Report)

The Social Sciences and the Policies of Governments: Report of the Ministerial Meeting on Science, Organization for European Cooperation and Development (Paris: 1965)

**Pravda, January 10, 1965

development. Systematic research on this problem falls squarely in the field of Development Administration, one of the more promising fields in the New Political Science.

(2) The new states are heavily involved in and dependent upon planned change. A capacity to anticipate the probable political consequences of different plans and courses of action is crucial.

(3) The elites in new states, even the most democratic in aspiration, are reluctant to institutionalize political opposition. Yet one of the major systemic functions of the latter has been to provide information, elite-mass communication, alternative policies, evaluation, and new ideas to governing elites. Its absence heightens the importance of alternative channels of information. This actual need can be partly - but not entirely - filled by policy-oriented research.

(4) The elites in new states lack the security and guidance in planning and public policy decisions, long experience and accumulated precedent. As F.X. Sutton has put it, "Once African development became a massive movement of social change, its problems could not be readily understood either by Europeans or Africans on the basis of their own past experience. A new order of need for factual knowledge, guiding ideas, and planning has arisen which evidently offers new opportunities for using research".6

(5) The central structures of government in new states are characteristically weak and the penetration of the periphery by the center tends to be tenuous, uncertain and sometimes only intermittent. The capacity of a political system is not determined alone, or necessarily even mainly, by the efficiency of its central structures of government. Capacity is also a function of the extent to which the society itself - the economic, social and political infrastructure - can absorb, deflect or respond to the enormous demands of a modernizing country, and thereby minimize the decisional load upon the formal structures. Political science research can identify those traditional structures, values and processes in the society which can perform - or fail to perform, indeed, sabotage - this critical reinforcing function.

These and other considerations are appreciated by many of the elites in the new states. Indeed, most of them perceive the magnitude of their problems, yet remain confident that they can cope with and ultimately surmount them. There are two bases for this confidence. One is their high valuation of science, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary they are disposed to accept the social sciences under the rubric of science. The second basis for confidence is their belief in the "primacy of the polity" - or, more poetically, "the political kingdom". It is their conviction that the fusion of science and political power can provide the requisite modernizing capacity to transform the societies they lead.

III. RESEARCH NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

To the question "What should be researched?", the late Morton Grodzins answered:7

> "anything....I know of no way, in advance, to choose topics for research guaranteed to produce important research results. The importance of research is not a function of the topic chosen. Good research is done by good researchers ....What is importance? /Predictive capacity/....is only

> one attribute of research importance, and, in the present state of the discipline (of political science) not its most important attribute at that. I believe that insight, rather than predictability, is what makes research important - insight with respect to the enduring problems of politics and administration."

Few would quibble that the first research need is for qualified researchers; most of us would contest the proposition that there are no research priorities. The indestructible kernel of truth is that any political science research which contributes insight into enduring problems of the polity has applied relevance. This is the ultimate rationale for not mercilessly haranguing very good researchers to be explicitly applied in their orientation - if they are very good they probably are going to produce very good insight only if allowed, as Grodzins argued, "to choose their own routes to significance".

But why is just any insight its own justification, irrespective of whether it has demonstrable and immediate applied relevance. The answer to this question opens up a hornet's nest of controversies with which we are all familiar and do not wish to become encumbered here. Only two points need detain us:

(1) The applied relevance of self-awareness. Research resulting in any increment of knowledge or insight regarding the human environment of a country has an applied aspect for the obvious reason that comprehensive knowledge of that environment is indispensable for effective social engineering and planned change. You can neither manipulate, nor avoid the consequences, of the unknown. Moreover, as Sutton has observed, the existing stock of general ideas and basic principles that can guide development, and which have been generated elsewhere, cannot be applied as a simple matter of routine. "There is a great fund of knowledge and analysis of local conditions that needs to be worked up in any field of social and economic development",[8] and much of it is quite remote from direct application. At the very least, substantial - obviously, the more the better - general knowledge of the human environment of a country is a first requisite of productive application. It is this sense in which "mere" fact-grubbing descriptivists, devoid of any theoretical interest or any applied concern, are in fact engaged in "applied research" of a sort.

(2) The falsity of the theory-applied dichotomy. Certainly there is a difference in commitment and intent (i.e., purpose) between a scholar singularly concerned with testing a theoretical proposition and one singularly committed to doing research only applicable directly to a concrete policy problem. But this is the only sense in which one can justify the much-discussed difference between theory-oriented and policy-oriented research. One can even go further, namely, the product of research inspired solely by theory building has in the past, and will continue to have in the future, a vastly greater applied potential than "applied research" uninspired and unguided by theory. The history of science is replete with examples of the lag between the findings of theory-oriented research and the subsequent, frequently accidental, discovery of their applied value. As Sutton notes:[9]

> "It is notorious that ideas often ramble over long and round-about courses from their origins to the minds of political leaders. In the Western world, we live with many ideas that had their beginnings in research well removed from any immediate executive responsibilities.....freedom of academic

> research from the confines of urgent practical problems, and the pursuit of generality and conceptual novelty, give chances that research will have deep and distant consequences, in shaping development efforts as in other matters."

Indeed, theory-oriented research has an overpowering applied rationale: not only are its findings frequently saturated with delayed applied payoffs, the perception and exploitation of which are situationally determined, but a theoretical orientation (or at least a sensitivity) is required of an applied researcher if he is to be of maximum effectiveness.

The argument is simple: (1) much applied research is aimed at enhancing the capacity of policy makers to anticipate the probable consequences of particular policy measures; (2) the ability to suggest probabilities is the product of theory-oriented comparative research, the purpose of which is to develop social science generalizations; and (3) the application of such generalizations (developed by theory-oriented comparative research) to concrete policy problems is the essence of good applied research. Moreover, applied research guided by theory also contributes greatly to a further enrichment of theory. It is in these various ways that the theory-applied dichotomy is false. We believe, in short, that a socially responsible researcher must have both a theoretical orientation and be of an applied persuasion.

In what ways can political scientists be socially responsible researchers and make a contribution to the problems of national development in the new Africa? At least five types of activity seem to us to particularly in point:

(1) <u>Increased knowledge of the political system and its environment</u>. The point that any increment in knowledge is an applied contribution needs reaffirming. Because Africa's new political systems are so very new, a vast number of conventional descriptive studies of their dominant political structures and processes are urgently required. George Graham has called these "basic constitutional studies" and likened them to a geological survey "which not only maps the surface of the country but goes beneath the surface to the underlying strata, the buried sources of energy, the solid bedrock on which great super-structures may be reared safely, the fault lines which produce earthquakes, and the subterranean formations which may erupt violently".[12] Such basic anatomies of a country's political system are indispensible to policy-makers. Moreover, Graham notes that these will provide the basis for an indigenous political science, "and the prosecution of such research can also train political scientists". The applied research imperative here is that new researchers should concentrate upon the unknown parts of the jigsaw puzzle. Replication is scientifically important, but a fairly comprehensive basic constitutional study is of even greater significance at this stage in most new states. Researchers engaged in this task should be spared the calumny of being "non-applied"; they are also essential workers in the vineyard.

(2) <u>Continued Development of General Theory</u>. To many persons no two types of activity seem further apart than what they believe to be the arid neo-scholasticism of general theories of social and political systems on the one hand and applied research on concrete and very practical socio-political problems on the other. While recognizing the highly abstract quality of general theorizing, particularly when done by professional colleagues who never leave their studies to "dirty their hands" with the empirical problems of the real world, we are nevertheless persuaded that macrosociological and macropolitical system-

building and theorizing serve an important function and are important for middle-range theory-oriented research, or even for what essays to be entirely applied research. Although we remain agnostic regarding the "truth" of the various grand schema of the general theorists, we believe that macropolitical theories have a high heuristic value, or, as someone indelicately stated, they at least do provide useful master checklists of what to think about, look for and consciously relate. As Harold Lasswell put it, "particular questions need to be examined in the perspective of comprehensive theories of political process. Such theories provide guidance for the task of locating any detailed pattern of variables in the setting in which and with which they interact".[11] We believe, in short, that the works of many of the general theorists such as L.T. Hobhouse, Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, Edward Shils, M.G. Smith, Lloyd Fallers, David Apter, Gabriel Almond, David Easton, and many others, are very relevant for our purposes; moreover, several of them have dirtied their hands very considerably with "real data" and have produced, we would argue, far more policy relevant insight in their pure theory-oriented research than many, if not most, of their critics.

For those of us concerned with political development in new states some of the most interesting and suggestive - though by no means operationally useful - types of general theory "to guide the task of locating any detailed pattern of variables" are those relating to patterns and sequences (or stages) in political development - the neo-evolutionism of political science, so to speak. We have particular reference to the recent works on political modernization and development by S.N. Eisenstadt, David Apter, Fred R. Riggs, Leonard Binder, Gabriel Almond, Seymour Lipset, Lucian Pye, and several others.[12] Of special interest to those concerned with an overview of the process of nation-building in both historical and comparative perspective is the notion of certain universal systemic crises (or problems, if you prefer) and the need to develop certain types of political capability to overcome them.

(3) Maximization of the applied potential in theory-oriented research. For the many reasons presented in the previous argument regarding the relationship of theory and applied research we believe that the most strategic group to convert to the applied persuasion are those who are theory-oriented, at least to the extent that they consciously seek to relate their proposed research, however it is labelled, to more generic problems and to the comparative insight already embodied in existing theoretical propositions in the professional literature on development. We believe further that the strategy is not to bludgeon them into becoming full-time applied researchers as a display of virtue or social responsibility, but that they be very self-conscious about maximizing the immediately applicable applied insights derivable from their research. For those not committed or prepared to testing or developing a particular theoretical proposition, we would agree fully with the recent applied-theory research strategy proposed by the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations:

> "...the social scientist must respond to the felt needs of his society and take guidance from these in his choice of problem, rather than depend too exclusively on his own theoretical predilections. This is why it is best that much of the research undertaken should grow out of attempts to help with practical problems. That is to say, one proceeds in terms of a professional rather than a pure science model. This means beginning with practice, however imperfect scientifically, and working back to theory - and the more

systematic research that may test this - and then back again to improved practice. This is what has long since been happening in medicine, engineering, and architecture, and what now needs to happen over a wider range of activities with which social scientists are concerned than has so far been recognized. It is of no use for the social scientist, before offering to help with the work of the world, to wait until principles of wider and more fully tested generality become available in his subject."[13]

(4) Direct Involvement in Applied Research. There are many kinds of advice and guidance on national planning and policy making which can be derived from applied political science research. The following are a few examples of relevant studies and research activity:

(a) Systematic surveys of existing social science literature for the purpose of culling from them--and converting into understandable language and visible utility--insights which could alert planners and decision-makers to the political feasibility of particular policies or plans, or otherwise contribute to realistic planning. Although an explicit policy orientation was generally lacking in much past social science research, retrospective analysis of accumulated data and theoretical propositions could provide considerable policy guidance.

(b) Attitude surveys and systematic comparative studies of political culture for the purpose of determining the degree of support for the regime, thelikely receptivity of specific policy measures, the probable reaction and adaptability to planned change by different ethnic or occupationsl groups, and, in general, the "limits of tolerance for economic growth and social change," to quote the title of Francis Sutton's paper.

(c) Evaluative studies of the capacity of existing administrative and organizational structures and processes to ensure effective plan implementation. To quote a recent survey: "Most economic and social development plans are made upon an unrealistic basis....Usually lacking is an evaluation of the operative capacity of the administrative machine to accomplish that part of the over-all development plan that is the responsibility of the public sector."[14] The recent research of Anthony Rweyemamu is here very much in point.

(d) Detailed "clinical case studies" of particular governmental actions or of the application of plans for particular development schemes which would include from conception to completion (or failure) a step-by-step review of what was done. These detailed critiques of the decision-making-and-execution process when researched and analyzed, provide excellent case study materials for teaching purposes. They have been used particularly effectively at the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam. Embodying the wisdom of hindsight they are a fairly effective substitute for personal experience. George A Graham notes:

> "All in all, what he learns from clinical case reports adds greatly, if vicariously, to his experience and enables him to grow in wisdom and maturity....(the case study)... permits a reexamination and review of the action for evaluative purposes. If a difficult situation was handled successfully, one can perhaps discover why. Similarly, if there was failure, the causes may be evident from a careful review of the clinical case report....Ideally every new program should be studied. The reporting scholar should catch and record the events as they occur, in close touch with responsible participants, postponing evaluative judgements in order better to understand their picture of the realities they face, what they are doing, and

why....Such clinical case reports are a means by which each country can learn from its own experience immediately, feeding back into new programs lessons from each prior effort."[5]

(e) Preparation of policy problem studies. Here crucial problems of public policy are selected for research, the problem is carefully defined, the constraints of the environment and situation are analyzed, and through logical analysis the various alternatives available, with the probable consequences of each, are specified. These can be researched and prepared in response to an immediate expressed need for a decision, or they can be prepared by a policy adviser of a policy-oriented research scholar cognizant of the need for a new policy should political decision-makers desire to move in the direction indicated. The study by Eugene C. Lee, Local Taxation in Tanganyika, prepared under the auspices of the Institute of Public Administration of the University College, Dar es Salaam, is a model of this type of applied research endeavor.

(f) Conventional organization-management and personnel studies, and all other types of research coming out of the "scientific management" school, designed to improve the efficiency of the machinery of government.

(g) Comparative studies of the structure and processes of other governments similar in as many respects as possible to the government being advised, in order to profit from both successes and failures of the foreign experiences being compared. How, for example, does the organization of the planning process in the experience of Mexico, France, Yugoslavia, India, or the Soviet Union provide guidance in organizing the planning machinery of Tanzania? This type of applied research is not just an exercise in comparative foreign experience. It is that plus intensive and focused research on the local situation for the specific purpose of identifying in what respects the foreign experience is relevant for the specific problem of the government concerned.

(5) The Development of Teaching Materials. This is probably the most urgent and most obvious way in which the research of political scientists, whatever their orientation, has an applied value and contribution to make to the development process. It means making special efforts to synthesize, simplify, relate and communicate all existing knowledge on the political system and its environment (both internal and external) to enhance the self-awareness of students at the secondary and university levels irrespective of their future career paths--the aim being a responsible and participant citizenry--and particularly those students in the university, institutes of public administration, and other professional training centers, who are actual or presumptive members of the public service at all levels of government.

IV. POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN EAST AFRICA

Prior to the mid-1950's there was little political science research in East Africa. There was a widespread lack of interest in colonial and underdeveloped countries among political scientists, little research support by governments and foundations, and an understandable lack of sympathy for political research by colonial governments. The only political studies undertaken were those by anthropologists on traditional political systems. The results of such research, when they appeared, had obvious policy relevance for colonial regimes that tried to rule through traditional political structures.

Beginning in the mid-fifties the scene began to change radically. Research support became available on an increasing scale for political scientists desiring to work in colonial and underdeveloped areas. The number of political scientists then in East Africa was small, but growing ; most of them came from Britain and the United States. Among the first political scientists of the new era were David Apter, Fred Burke, Gus Liebenow, and Carl Rosberg, all of whom were Foreign Area Fellows under the new Ford Foundation training program.

Nationalist sentiment in East Africa was still in gestation and the colonial government was still anxious to postpone its overt appearance as long as possible. The first wave of political scientists also focused on traditional and local politics, but with a significant change in emphasis from the anthropologists. They were not interested in the traditional systems per se, but how they were changing, adapting, and fitting into the new and emergent political order. They profited immeasurably from the earlier and ongoing work of the anthropologists, which greatly enhanced their understanding of the processes of change and adaptation to the new, secular structures and procedures.

Towards the close of the decade increased attention was given to the growth and evolution of the legislative councils (studies by Geoffrey Engholm and Carl Rosberg) [16] and systems of administration (M. Griner, E. Bustin) [17]. Attention rapidly shifted to the far more arresting drama of nationalism and self-assertion - to Tanganyika where the nationalist movement was so beset by ethnic problems (B.T.G. Chidzero, R.C. Pratt, David Apter [18]. In Kenya at this the future was much more in doubt, and the colonial administration was much less permissive in allowing scholars to study the growth of nationalism. Shortly before independence, and just afterwards, crucial elections were held which largely dictated the direction of events in each of the East African territories. Political scientists gave the elections due coverage (Engholm, George Bennett-Carl Rosberg, R.O. Byrd, John Nottingham-Clyde Sanger)[19].

With the attainment of self-rule and then independence after 1960, interest centered on those instuments of power that were directing the new nations - the political parties (Margaret Bates, Micheal Lofchie, D.A. Low, Bennett)[20]. Within the broader East African perspective there was intense interest - fostered by the statements and goals of the political leaders - on the possibilities of federation. This, and the broader phenomenon of Pan-Africanism, emerged as prominent subjects for research (Jane Banfield, Joseph Nye, Aaron Segal, Rosberg, Colin Leys-Peter Robson, Ali Mazrui)[21].

With the attainment of independence, and the consolidation of power, and with the broad outlines of the East African polities already sketched in by earlier researchers, the interests of political scientists have increasingly been directed to nation-building - the ways in which the new states are developing, improving the lives of the people, unifying the nation, and striving to achieve their national goals. This latest wave of political science researchers (which in numbers is considerably greater than ever before) is addressing itself to problems like the following:

- development planning, administration, and implementation (Cherry Gertzel, Michael Tordoff,*Lionel Cliffe, John Saul, Anthony Rweyemamu);
- the role of the party in development planning (Henry Bienan);
- the role of local governments (Everett Chard, T.V. Sathyamurthy, Emory Bundy);
- village development (Norman Miller, Goran Hyden, Rweyemamu);
- political implications of self-help schemes (E.I. Maluki);
- the politics of agricultural development, land settlement, co-operatives (Brack Brown, Robert Chambers, John Nellis, Crawford Young, E.A. Brett, Saul);
- trade unions, wages, interest representation, and resource allocation (Roger Scott, H. Bretton, Brett);
- education and political development (James S. Coleman, Kenneth Prewitt, David Morrison, Maluki);

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* also Michael Lofchie

- the evolution of legislative bodies (J.H. Procter, Goeffrey Engholm, Gertzel);
-the building of national identity (Martin Doornbos);
- the study of political bureaucratic elites (David Koff, Raymond Hpkins);
- international relations of East African states (Yash Tandon, Catherine Hoskyns, Koff, Sathyamurthy);
- the Organization of African Unity (Tandon);
- pan Africanism (Catherine Hoskyns);
- theoretical work on political development (Coleman, Bretton).

This change in research emphasis reflects the change in the objective political situation in East Africa, as well as the growth of the New Political Science, which has sought to develop concepts and methodology appropriate for the study of the process of political change in developing societies.

The foregoing listed research topics indicate that today's researchers in political science are far more policy-oriented than ever before. The papers presented to the present conference provide still more impressive evidence of this trend. Even subjects of such long-standing interest as election studies have changed their focus: in the Tanzanian election study, for example, Lionel Cliffe, Belle Harris and their colleagues have consciously sought to distill from that interesting event as much insight as possible for policy-makers.

Two aspects of this healthy shift to policy-oriented studies should be noted. First, as we have argued earlier, there is still a need for both theory-oriented research and descriptive studies. Research today is enriched and informed by the theoretical work of the past, and the contemporary generation of scholars in Africa has a responsibility to further test and refine theory. In the long run, this is likely to prove the greatest contribution that can be made to rapidly changing societies. Descriptive studies, with no clear objective of aiding decisions by the political leaders are vital for a more comprehensive understanding of the political environment in East Africa - an important requisite for research of any orientation. Freedom for wide-ranging research is likely in the long run to be of greater benefit to all concerned than an exclusive concentration on narrow problems, or on those subjects of immediate interest to policy-makers.

Secondly, despite growing attention to problems that are clearly of policy relevance, there continues to be evidence that many government officials feel research scholars are not proving very helpful in the solution of critical national problems. Their image still appears to be one in which social scientists pursue their research interests, indifferent to policy problems, imposing on the time and goodwill of many persons, and then depart with their findings, never to be heard from again.

Perhaps a part of the problem can be explained by the absence of a category of "research converters" frequently found in more developed countries. A competent political scientist in the United States, for example, has a fair assurance that if his work is respected and considered relevant for public policy it will be used in one way or another. At every level of government - local, state, and national - and in every branch - executive, legislative, and judicial - cadres of trained people perform the task of converting vast amounts of research products into usable information required by policy-makers. A scholar can simultaneously be independent of the government and have the satisfaction that if his research is relevant it will in all probability be utilized. In East Africa, by contrast, because of a lack of qualified manpower and adequate funds, there is virtually no one to perform the

conversion function. The moral is clear. If political scientists working in East Africa want their research to be utilized if relevant for public policy, they must themselves explicitly draw out the policy implications and see that they get into the hands of the appropriate officials in usable form. For policy purposes, the topic of research may be less important than what one does with his results.

V. A TERMINAL CAVEAT

The challenge and opportunity is twofold, namely, (1) to take immediate steps in any of the most appropriate ways - only some of which have been discussed here - to maximize the policy relevance of present and future political science research: and (2) to ensure, by these and other measures, that political science as a discipline (both its teaching and research components) becomes institutionalized, specifically in the academic and policymaking traditions of the new states, but also in the general culture of the emerging national communities. In pursuing these twin goals with full vigor and commitment, one caveat must be made. There is a very real danger of political scientists overselling themselves. Modesty and humility are not usually companions of crusading evangelism and high pressure salesmanship. However, the limitations of our product compel us to emphasize both elements. The following admonition by the editors of a recent volume on The Planning of Change has reference to the social sciences in general, but it is a wise caution particularly to political scientists:

> "At times, we fear, the social scientist labors, unwittingly or not, under the burden of a...false omniscience. It should be noted that it is only relatively recently that... he...has had a willing lay clientele, and that the newness of this relationship may produce utopian hopes on the part of clients - professional practitioners or harried policy-makers - who believe that by receiving some magical amulet, such as the memorization of non-understandable social-science jargon, all their day-to-day organizational headaches and heartaches on their part - with their zealous faith in the fruits of scientific method - can over-tout their wares and set up unfulfillable expectations. The danger here, of course, is that both parties may get trapped in false dreams,"[22]

It is not simply disillusionment we should fear, but the devastating consequences this would have for the future credibility of the discipline, particularly in view of its still fragile status.

FOOTNOTES

1. This distinction between "traditional" and "new" is in one sense ideal - typical - chronologically, "traditional where refers only to the more recent past, that is, from roughly the turn of the century until the "new" tendency became more pronounced following World War II. In many respects the "new" is nothing more than a rediscovery of an older tradition in which Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Hume, to mention a few, would be regarded as very "new" indeed.

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No. 381

Robert Chambers

SOME BACKGROUND TO PROPOSALS FOR DEVELOPMENT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AT PROVINCIAL AND LOWER LEVELS IN KENYA[1].

National development planning is among the most important initiatives taken in Kenya in recent years. Philosophically, it has provoked the working out in some detail of the ideas of African Socialism, with which planning has been closely associated, and of the goals towards which the Government is working. Organisationally, it has led to the formation of a new ministry whose machinery for influence and control over other parts of the Government is still being created but which may have implications for the future functioning and style of Government activity right down to the grass roots. This paper attempts to outline the ideas of planning that are current, some aspects of the social, economic and organisational context out of which they arise and into which they are being injected, the proposed machinery for implementation in the provinces, and the emerging definition of the roles of civil servants and of politicians in implementation.

In the official Kenya orthodoxy, planning has been closely related to African Socialism. In the words of the Development Plan:

> "A fundamental characteristic of African Socialism is its strong commitment to central economic planning as the organization and technique for marshalling the nation's resources in efficient pursuit of Government's economic and social objectives".[2]

This statement has been elaborated in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya",[3] a statement both of philosophical background and of Government intentions. The strength of the acceptance of the idea of national planning is clear throughout the Sessional Paper, and can be understood in the light of the implicit argument that planning is not only socialist, which needs no explanation, but also, in the context of the modern state, African. The argument can be interpreted as follows. The essential basis for African Socialism lies in the traditions of political democracy and mutual social responsibility (8)[4]. The mechanisms whereby a member contributes to society, and society shares its benefits among members, change with the nature of the economy (14). Thus, mutual social responsibility in the context of African Socialism involves an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole (11). The rights, duties and sanctions which obtained in traditional African society have been transferred, with suitable adaptations, to the modern state. Thus, just as African society had the power and duty to impose sanctions on those who refused to contribute their fair share of hard work, or who misused resources, so African Socialism expects the members of the modern state to contribute willingly and without stint to the development of the nation (13), and has the power and the duty to control resource use. But this can only be done through planning and a range of controls to ensure that property is used

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1. This paper discusses the position towards the end of December, 1965. The author is grateful for assistance and comments from a number of people, but bears sole responsibility for the views expressed, which are in no way official.
2. Development Plan 1964-1970, Government Printer, Kenya, 1964, p.3.
3. "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya", Government Printer, Kenya, 1965.
4. Ibid, paragraph 8. Here and subsequently, figures underlined in brackets refer to the paragraphs of the Sessional Paper relevant to the preceeding statement.

in the mutual interests of society and its members (48). The conclusion is that "... it is a fundamental characteristic of African Socialism that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the uses of all productive resources". (30). Without national planning, in fact, there could and would be no African Socialism.

The idea of national planning is so widely accepted in developing countries that it is easy to fail to appreciate its implications for Governmental style, organisation and function. In Kenya before Independence there was no planning in the sense of comprehensive national planning. There were, rather, a series of individual projects at different levels, many of them the result of the enthusiasms or even eccentricities of individual officers or ministries, co-ordinated on an ad hoc basis by bodies responsible for the administration of development funds such as the African Land Development Board or the Joint Irrigation Board, with the Treasury exercising a general oversight through its traditional controls. There were some plans covering parts of sectors, such as the Swynnerton Plan of 1955 for the development of agriculture in African areas, but there was no overall plan which tested projects and ministerial plans for consistency, which set targets, or which laid down a co-ordinated strategy by which they should be attained. Nor was the civil service geared or oriented towards achieving centrally determined development targets. In contrast, the policy now is that "Planning is a comprehensive exercise ... Any activity that uses resources is a proper subject of planning" (138). Communication and co-ordination within Government are essential:

> "No organization can operate efficiently so long as its right hand does not know what its left hand is doing. Planning cannot be done effectively unless every important activity is accounted for and every important decision-maker involved." (139)

Indeed, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development has summed it by saying that "... it is important that planning pervade the entire Government machine."[1].

The implications for Government organisation and functioning are potentially far-reaching. At the centre, where the emphasis until recently was necessarily on drawing up and revising, rather than implementing the plan, some reorganisation has already taken place. The Development Plan 1964-1970 was prepared by the planning staff of the Treasury, who were formed into a Directorate of Planning within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. However, towards the end of 1964, these planners were taken over by the newly created Ministry of Economic Planning and Development under Mr. T.J. Mboya as Minister. Though this Ministry has remained physically in the Treasury Building, and its relations with the Ministry of Finance have been close, the act of creating a special ministry has raised the priority and status of planning and drawn greater attention to the Plan. It was indeed with the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development that responsibility lay for drafting Sessional Paper No. 10.[2] It leaves no doubt about the decisive new approach that is intended to rule the relations of ministries on development matters:

> "If planning itself is not to be a waste of resources, discipline must be firm and enforced. And discipline is not simply something that the Government imposes on the private sector. It is also a discipline that Government imposes on

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1. "Economic Development Planning and the Kenya Plan". Speech by Hon. T.J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, delivered at the Kenya Institute of Administration, 4th March, 1965.
2. The procedure followed was outlined by Mr. Mboya in his speech to Parliament delivered on 4th May, 1965, when he introduced the Sessional Paper. After various discussions in the Development Committee of the Cabinet and the Cabinet itself, a final version was unanimously approved by the Cabinet.

> itself at every level and in every Ministry. With planning, no ministry is free to act as an undisciplined, unrestricted entrepreneur promoting funds and projects to maximize the status of the ministry. Instead all must accept the discipline of planning and join in maximizing the resources available for development, determining the best use for these resources, and ensuring that resources are in fact used as planned. If DISCIPLINE is rejected, so is planning and with it - African Socialism." (141)

The principal means of exercising this discipline are first, through liaison between the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and planning units in other Ministries such as Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Education, and Health; and second, through the Development Committee of the Cabinet which has the Minister as Chairman and the Chief Planning Officer of the Ministry as Secretary, and which receives progress reports and approves development proposals.

The purpose here, however, is to consider not the operation of planning at the centre, not the economic policy instruments which can be employed at the centre to achieve the targets of the Plan, but the problems and methods of implementation in the Provinces. The latter assume particular importance in Kenya because of the great stress placed both in the Plan and in official pronouncements on the development of agriculture. The Plan states: "The major burden of ensuring Kenya's economic growth during the 1964-70 period will continue to be borne by the agricultural sector"[1] and a recent article[2] has pointed out that both technically and in its relevance to national aspirations, the agricultural sector is the best formulated part of the Kenya Plan, while it is the weakest in both respects in the plans of Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania. Further, this focus on agriculture has been repeatedly emphasized by President Kenyatta in his call of "Back to the Land", as for instance in a speech of 29th August, 1964:

> "... to make money, we must return to the land. It is often laughable to see a man with some acres of land going off to the town to seek employment, sometimes for a hundred shillings a month as a cook. If a man can effectively cultivate his own farm, it can prevent him being dependent on employers. What you want to do is return to the land ..."[3]

Part of the strength of this appeal lies in its overtones of security: both personal, in that a man with land feels secure, and national in that a landed population is more stable than a floating population of landless unemployed. But the main benefits of this emphasis on agriculture are economic and more strictly social: economic because of the lack of minerals and prime movers in Kenya, and the recognition by economists that, to quote one, "Agricultural development is vastly more important in modernizing a society than we used to think"[4], and social because the agricultural sector is predominantly African, so that developing agriculture provides a quick means of increasing the African share in the economy. These economic and social arguments combine when it is understood that "The high potential areas, 80 per cent of which are in areas of African smallholdings, promise the greatest return on investment ..."[5] While plan implementation at

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1. Development Plan, 1964-1970, p.45.
2. Reginald H. Green: Four African Development Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. The Journal of Modern African Studies 3, 2 (1965) p. 259.
3. Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's speeches 1963-1964, Nairobi. Oxford University Press 1964, p. 63. Pages 60-74 are devoted to "Back to the Land" speeches.
4. W.W. Rostow: Economic Development - The Importance of Agriculture. Kenya Weekly News, March 26th, 1965.
5. Development Plan, 1964-1970, p.45.

provincial and lower levels has other aspects, such as the co-ordination of projects, the allocation of funds for self-help activities, and the control of educational development, the most important function may well be Government penetration of rural society, reaching down to the people to stimulate increased agricultural production.

Some problems of penetration result from the particular nature of rural society in Kenya. It should be a platitude that Kenya is a nation of smallholders, but this obvious fact has tended to be obscured. The community development ethos imported from Asia, Latin America and West Africa concentrates on "the village" and "the village level", phrases which are frequently used in Kenya in areas where nucleated villages do not exist. Further, the survival of the rumps of Emergency villages in Central Province, the existence of villages near the Coast, and the prominence given by community development workers and journalists to the larger Masai manyattas, have distracted attention from the reality that the vast majority of the rural population of Kenya outside the former Highlands live not in villages but on individual homesteads. This is, however, implicitly recognised in both the Plan and the Sessional Paper in the attention they pay to land consolidation and registration, and the importance of the security of individual title to land. The criticism that the Plan and the Sessional Paper are too "capitalist" misses the point that they are appropriate to the social and agricultural conditions of Kenya. It is through individual accumulation and consumption (33) and the adoption by smallholders of entrepreneurial attitudes that a predominantly smallholder economy will develop. While co-operatives, particularly for marketing, fit into this framework well, the basic values are individualistic. The effect will be to produce a sturdy yeomanry (to draw on the mythology of Europe), a rural bourgeoisie, a nation whose style of living combines land-rootedness and physical dispersal on individual homesteads with the attitudes of the small shopkeeper or businessman.

Reaching smallholders is more difficult than reaching villagers. Accepting simplifications, and recognising that there are many exceptions, it is generally true that village societies demonstrate a syndrome of characteristics: physical concentration of population, frequent interaction, a hierarchy with relatively clearly defined status differences and structure of authority, and often communal control over agricultural activities. Smallholder societies demonstrate a contrasted syndrome: physical dispersal on farmsteads, less frequent interaction, a tendency towards democratic egalitarianism with relatively weakly defined differences of status and structure of authority, and individual choice and control of agricultural activities. In villages, change may be induced by converting the leaders. Among smallholders, change has to be induced much more by individual persuasion. In villages, more people can be expected to listen to a radio or to read a newspaper; news may circulate more quickly by word of mouth; and meetings can be called more easily and quickly. With a scattered smallholder population, both radios and newspapers can be expected to reach fewer people. In Kenya, certainly, there is evidence that both are unimportant at present as sources of information about farming. A recent Marco Survey[1] of heads of rural households found that only 17% ever read newspapers,[2] and only 66% ever listened to the radio[3]. While the radio was an important source of information about Kenya, and might therefore be used effectively in a general national campaign for development, neither the newspaper nor the radio was found to have been an important source of information of economic value. What the Survey suggests is that most economic information reaches the farmer through the civil service. The increases in income and food supply that he achieves depend mainly on his own efforts and the services and advice he receives from junior Government servants. The point of commun-

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1. A Baseline Survey of Factors Affecting Agricultural Development in Three Areas of Kenya, June-August, 1965, prepared for the Ministry of Labour and Social Services by MARCO Surveys Limited. A summary of some findings is given in Appendix A.
2. Ibid. p.93.
3. Ibid. p. 91.

ication between the junior extension officer and the small farmer is thus the main point at which the development intentions of Government engage with the producer. Although little is known of the motivation, behaviour and effectiveness of agricultural instructors, veterinary scouts, community development assistants, the lowest co-operative inspectors, headmen and chiefs, they are the key figures without whom the development plan would have little bite in the rural smallholder areas.

Their problem is not new. The Colonial regime in Kenya had difficulty in organising control over society both because of the lack of indigenous chiefs, and because of the scattered nature of the population. Chiefs had therefore to be created, and Chiefs' barazas, which could collect the population together for the purposes of communication and control, were instituted and attendance was made obligatory in law. As the Marco Survey shows, these barazas remain a most important source of information to the smallholder. However, attendance at these barazas, which in some areas are held weekly, is often sporadic, and it may be necessary for the Government either to insist on greater attendance, which might be difficult politically, or to tackle the problem by initiating on-going groups with which the extension staff can communicate, in both cases the object being to get advice and information across to many people at once, rather than to dissipate effort entirely on individual visits. Some groups have already been formed, mainly by the Agricultural Department, including farmers' clubs, the 4K Clubs for young farmers, co-operative societies, and agricultural self-help groups, but less has been achieved than had sometimes been hoped. Further, KANU, which might have fulfilled this function, did not appear during 1965 to exist at the grass-roots in a sufficiently predictable form to be a suitable medium for agricultural extension. To achieve the production targets of the Plan, the Kenya Government may, therefore, have to create new groups to facilitate communication between junior Government staff and smallholders.

An initiative in creating such groups has been taken by the Department of Community Development which, in October 1963, before Independence, submitted a National Policy for Community Development. This plan sought a considerable expansion of community development staff and called for political support to stimulate the self-help movement. The primary function of the community development worker was seen as through the use of his specialised skills in human relations to create a mental climate conducive to the acceptance of new ideas in all aspects of rural development and to bring to the specialised extension worker communities that were eager to adopt new methods of production and new ways of living. In this sense, the object was to assist penetration by Government, and the groups through which this was to be achieved were to be formed around the idea of collective self-help. A whole hierarchy of committees from the "village", through the location, the county (district) and the region was to be formed, with a National Committee for Community Development at the apex. Progress has been made in forming these committees particularly at the lower levels.

The self-help movement, however, raises the central problem of the mix and knit between the desires of the people and the intentions of the planners. The essence of community development is that people should discover for themselves what they want. The essence of planning is the controlled achievement of objects that would not come about on their own. Thus the National Plan for Community Development stated that: "Priorities for self-help schemes cannot be made (in) advance as priorities will be assessed by the communities that conceive and execute their own community development."[1] On the other hand, the Sessional Paper is categoric that "self-help is an integral part of planned development and must be subject to the same discipline as other parts of the development effort." (100) The problem is to work out at what level, through whom, and in what way, the upward flow of the wishes of the people can be reconciled and integrated with the intentions of the planners.

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1. This isolated quotation is a little misleading: the dangers of unregulated self-help were foreseen in the National Policy for Community Development and measures suggested to overcome them.

The problem is exacerbated by the bad fit between the felt needs of the communities and the targets and direction of the planners. The people in the rural areas, particularly the more densely populated rural areas, have had little difficulty in feeling their needs: they want more services, most notably health services and secondary schools. At the same time they have often received strong encouragement from politicians to go ahead and start building in the spirit of Harambee. In the spirit of nation-building - an unfortunate and misleading phrase with its structural instead of organic connotations - ad hoc groups have formed to build dispensaries and schools. Unfortunately, this well-intentioned dynamism, inevitably uncontrolled during Regionalism, has often misfired. Self-help, like aid, has a propensity to leave behind monuments. Just as an aid-giving agency retires when its monument is built, leaving the recurrent costs and maintenance to the luckless recipient, so self-help groups expect the Government or the local authority to take over the running and staffing of the would-be institutions they have created. In Kenya, by July 1965, there were thought to be at least 80 Harambee secondary schools[1], nearly all of them built illegally, without laboratories, poorly equipped and staffed, facing grave problems over meeting recurrent expenditure, and providing a low standard of education.[2] It is not suggested that the building of these schools was the responsibility of the Department of Community Development. The Education Commission found two reasons for "the breakdown of the sanctions of the law" which allowed the building of these schools: the administrative confusion produced by Regionalism, and the popular response to the contraction of opportunity for secondary education in 1964 and 1965. In 1965, as a result of the difficulties faced by these schools, there was a danger of serious disillusion. In the view of the Commission:

> "The survival of a spirit of self-help in our communities is of the utmost importance to the future of Kenya, but it will be quickly destroyed if, by undertaking tasks that are too big for them, communities experience the frustration of failure. We consider it essential - for the sake of the spirit of self-help as much as for the sake of its objectives - that the impulse towards self-help should be diverted into the performance of tasks that lie within the capacity and resources of a community to discharge successfully."[3]

The Commission concluded that "Central Government Planning and uncontrolled community enterprise cannot exist side by side."[4]

The problem of co-ordination of wishes and plans is complicated by the functioning of local government. In theory, it would appear that local government, which is responsible in law for maintaining many health and educational facilities, should act as the reconciling and controlling mechanism, both between local wishes and local resources, and between central government planning direction and local implementation. Indeed the Development Plan, published during Regionalism, indicated that the Government depended upon local authorities to carry out both their own programmes and those of the Government for which they had executive responsibility[5]. But many local authorities, and most notably the County Councils responsible for rural areas, have run into multiple difficulties as a result of which services have often had to be curtailed. Dissatisfaction with this position was voiced by a Member of Parliament in October 1965 when he gave notice of a motion in the House of Representatives calling on the Government, in view of the incompetence of some local authorities in Kenya, to take over from them direct

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1. Kenya Education Commission Report, Part II, 22nd July, 1965, Government Printer, Kenya, p.21.
2. For a full and critical discussion of this problem see ibid. pp.21-32.
3. Ibid. p.24.
4. Ibid. p.23.
5. Development Plan, 1964-1970, p.101.

responsibility for education and public health[1]. President Kenyatta himself recognised this unfortunate state of affairs:

> "... we deplore a position in which people in many areas are blaming their local authorities for inefficiency, while the councils blame the local people for not paying taxes that are due. All this means in effect that thousands of families are unable to enjoy all the services they need. We shall therefore continue to examine the whole local government position and see how present difficulties can best be met and put right."[2]

Some of the reasons for this ineffectiveness of County Councils illustrate the problem of Government penetration in relation to local authorities. In the first place, most of the councillors who were elected around the time of Independence were new, and most of their generally better educated and more experienced predecessors either did not stand for re-election, or, when they did stand, were not re-elected. Secondly, the electoral promises made by these councillors tended to inhibit any leadership they might otherwise have shown in encouraging the payment of local government taxes. Thirdly, local government staff, confined to their tribal areas by the strong demand that all staff should be local people, were subject to strong pressures, felt insecure in their jobs, and often left the local government service to find more amenable, less exacting and more rewarding work. Fourthly, during Regionalism, County Councils were largely, in law, subject to the supervision of the regional assemblies; but those bodies, themselves new and engaged in working out their own organisation and functions, were unable to carry this out effectively. And finally, during Regionalism the reaction, part nationalist and anti-Colonial, and part tribal or local, against the Provincial Administration was at its strongest. County Councils, anxious to assert their independence, almost without exception resolved to abandon the practice of using the offices of the Provincial Administration, its District Officers, Chiefs, Headmen and Tribal Police, to collect their taxes, despite the fact that the Councils usually had neither the staff nor the machinery to do this effectively themselves. The resulting financial and administrative crises provoked a growing civic awareness among the electorate, and a number of reforms. In 1965, tax collection was restored to the Provincial Administration, and training courses for councillors were held at the Kenya Institute of Administration. Nevertheless the conclusion was inescapable that County Councils were not suitable organisations for close integration into the direct lines of action and reporting necessary for implementation of the Plan. In any case, County Councils were principally concerned with the provision of services of a social and welfare nature, while the targets of the Plan were likely to emphasize production and therefore involve the local officers of the Central Government more than the local authorities.

The co-ordination and implementation of the Plan in rural areas is, in fact, to be entrusted neither to the Department of Community Development nor to the local authorities, but to the Provincial Administration (hereafter termed, as it is colloquially, "the Administration") in conjunction with departmental officers and officers ofthe Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. In order to understand this, the changes which have taken place in the Administration, and in its relationships with the rest of Government, will be summarised.

In the Colonial period in Kenya the Administration was both powerful and political: Provincial and District Commissioners and their staffs combined executive, judicial, and assumed representative functions. The Administration, being responsible for law and order, was strengthened by

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1. Hansard, 14th October, 1965, column 1056.
2. Main Address by His Excellency The President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta at the State Opening of Parliament on 2nd November, 1965. Government Printer, Kenya, p.3.

the Emergency. Its seniority over other departments was formalised in that the District Commissioner was Chairman of the District Education Board, the District Agricultural Committee, the District Security Committee, the District Intelligence Committee, the District Team where there was one, and, above all, the African District Council. A circular as late as 1960, after stating that officers of the Administration must respect the rights and obligations of departmental officers, went on to say:

> "The Provincial Commissioner is, within the limits of his province, the principal executive officer of the Government. It is his duty to supervise not only the work of his administrative staff, but also what is done in his province by all Departmental Officers."[1]

This circular did not, however, prevent a steady erosion of influence. District Education Boards and District Agricultural Committees became more representative, and District Commissioners often ceased to be chairmen. More important, District Commissioners began to be replaced by local persons as chairmen of African District Councils. Then, before Independence, the ultimate responsibility for law and order, and with it the chairmanship of the Security and Intelligence Committees, was transferred to the Kenya Police. Regionalism further weakened the Administration. Provincial Commissioners became Civil Secretaries, working, in theory at least, to the elected Presidents of Regional Assemblies, and District Commissioners became Regional Government Agents. There was uncertainty about career prospects, powers, roles and responsibilities.[2] At the same time the Administration was the first department to suffer the inevitable disruptions of rapid postings resulting from resolute Africanisation. In 1964, one district had at least ten Regional Government Agents, and Kisii District, which may have been typical, had three. Towards the end of 1963, the average length of time a District Commissioner had been of District Commissioner rank was 7 months, and his average length of service in his district 4 months.

In this situation, the role of the administrative officer was bound to change. Departmental officers were also affected: less subject to the control and influence of the Administration, they acted more on their own. An example of what was happening can be provided by the Local Committee of the Mwea Irrigation Settlement, which was chaired by the District Commissioner. In the three years 1961, 1962 and 1963, there were six different District Commissioners as chairmen, but the Manager of the Scheme, a departmental officer, was unchanged. During this period, the function of the Committee shifted from direction of the Scheme, in which the District Commissioner had played a large part, to advice and assistance to the Manager, particularly in handling problems of a political nature. Indeed, during the period 1963-64, jealousy of the Administration on the part of other departments ceased to be a serious issue. Departmental officers, who were still often expatriates, welcomed a new role assumed by administrative officers, who were during this period usually Africans. Before, the administrative officer had sought to represent the civil service to the people and the people to the civil service. This traditional "political" role was now adapted, and he became a buffer and a broker between the departmental officer and the politician. It was now to the politician that he represented the civil service, while to the civil service he represented and interpreted the views of the politician.

Since December 1964, however, with the ending of Regionalism and the reorganisation of ministries, the roles and position of administrative officers changed again on the rebound. Following its transfer from the

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1. Circular No. 12 of 1960. reproduced in The Journal of African Administration, Vol. XIII, No.1, January 1961, pp. 50-52.

2. For a summary of the position of the Administration in 1964, see C.J. Gertzel "Regional Administration in Kenya 1964: Precis", delivered to the EAISR Conference, Makerere, in December, 1964.

Ministry of Home Affairs to the Office of the President, the Administration worked direct to the Permanent Secretary to the President, who was also Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service. Provincial and District Commissioners were restored to their original titles and, as the personal representatives of the President in their areas, gained high prestige. They were again chairmen of Security and Intelligence Committees, and responsible for the licensing of public meetings. They appeared in uniform with senior members of the Government, and were publicly recognised as the principal representatives of Government in their areas. On important occasions, Provincial and District Commissioners held parades and made speeches of a national character which were reported in the Press. Working direct to the President, and usually in areas other than those in which they were born, Administrative Officers were able, and indeed required, to assume an important role in national integration which was in keeping both with their continuity of aspiration to lead and with the policies of the Government. Further, particularly through its ability carefully to organise the detail of visits for Ministers, the Administration displayed decisiveness and a capacity for effective action.

In view of this re-emerging primacy of the Administration on the one hand, and the high priority of plan implementation on the other, the Administration was the obvious choice for a co-ordinating and implementing agency for the Plan. The first involvement was in the preparation and submission of Provincial Development Plans by Provincial Commissioners. However, at the end of 1965, the degree to which it would prove possible to incorporate these plans in the first revision of the National Plan remained to be seen, though the indications were that it would be difficult. In May 1965, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development, after emphasizing the importance of provincial planning as a training exercise and means of involving field officers in the planning process and encouraging local enthusiasm, said:

> ".... However, the provinces do not at this stage have enough personnel, information or experience for effective planning. In any case planning for the nation as a whole could not be left to the provinces - for they are likely to produce uncoordinated programmes. It is therefore important that planning in the provinces be done under guidance and direction from the Central Planning Organization in my Ministry, so that attempts can be made towards the most efficient allocation of resources of the country as a whole."[1]

To achieve this guidance and direction, the Ministry intended to recruit a Provincial Planning Officer for each province.[2] While much communication with the centre and responsibility for the detail of planning and reporting would rest with this Provincial Planning Officer, the ultimate responsibility for the co-ordination and implementation of the Plan would lie with the Provincial and District Commissioners, working through Provincial and District Development Committees which were being set up and had in many cases already met by the end of 1965. These were civil service bodies, chaired by the Provincial and District Commissioners. The Provincial Planning Officer was to be secretary and the appropriate Community Development Officer alternate secretary, with the local heads of the departments concerned with development as members.[3] It was intended that the Community Development Self-Help Committees should be fitted into the structure as sub-committees of the development committees. The development committees were to be charged with inter-departmental co-ordination, planning and controlling major self-help projects, achieving the targets of the Plan, and making recommendations about the Plan and its implementation.

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1. "Economic Development Planning and the Kenya Plan". Speech delivered by the Hon. T.J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, at the Kenya Institute of Administration on March 4th, 1965.
2. By the end of 1965 no Provincial Planning Officers had yet been recruited.
3. For the full proposed membership see Appendix B.

These committees were a new departure, in keeping with the newness of national planning and the setting and achievement of area targets in development. Any superficial resemblance to the Provincial and District Teams before Independence is misleading. The Teams were bodies of varying composition and frequency of meeting, depending on the inclinations of the administrative officers; they often included the Police, who will not be on the development committees; they often did not keep minutes; and above all they were not subject to central direction, the achievement of targets, or regular reporting, all of which can be expected to make the development committees more influential and effective bodies.

It is intended that local political representation shall be provided on Provincial and District Development Advisory Committees, again chaired by the Provincial and District Commissioners respectively. These Advisory Committees will include Senators, Members of Parliament and others[1], as well as all the members of the Development Committees. The purposes of these Advisory Committees are to provide a forum to discuss general economic and social problems of the area concerned, to provide M.P's, Senators and leading citizens with an opportunity to participate in the Plan, and to enlist the support of the politicians in securing mass enthusiasm and participation in planned and co-ordinated development. The Development Committees will report to the Advisory Committees from time to time on targets and projects planned for the area. By mid-December 1965, although some Development Committees had met, few, if any, of the Advisory Committees had been convened. It is too early to guess how this system will work in practice.

These two types of committee, one for civil servants only, and one including politicians, reflect the official and explicit separation of politics, politicians and the Party on the one hand, and the civil service on the other. Much was said on this subject during 1965. The official view was that civil servants were subject to the discipline of their ministries and must carry out the policies of the Government loyally, enthusiastically and impartially. They might not join any political party (Kenya is not constitutionally a one-party state, although KANU is the only party). They should never criticise Government policies in public, and should not get into the position of defending themselves and their actions on political platforms. But the civil servant had a duty to explain policies to the people, to persuade and to lead them. The civil servant "should not be a passive sponge, a routine implementer of Government policy", but "dynamic and an innovator full of ideas."[2] His neutrality was from personal political activity, not from taking an interest in the political activity of his country, since he must avoid an "island mentality" and must become personally involved in the hopes and aspirations of his country.

The intended role of the politician in rural areas will not be discussed at any length here. Actual roles vary with the level of the politician, Ministers being involved to a greater extent in supporting Government programmes, Senators and Members of Parliament with representing the interests of the constituencies, and junior local politicians with less clearly defined local activities. Emphasis has been placed on the intended role of the Member of Parliament in mobilising the people for development and encouraging them to follow the advice of civil servants. Members have, for instance, been told that they have a special responsibility for persuading people to adopt modern methods of farming and development on the land.[3]

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1. See Appendix B for proposed membership.
2. Hon. T.J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development - "The Role of the Civil Service in Developing Countries": a talk to the East African Staff College, 25th November, 1965.
3. Hon. T.J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, reported in the East African Standard of 18th December, 1965.

There is, however, an overlap of the roles in rural areas of civil servants and politicians. Both are required to encourage development, both are in a position to receive and act on grievances and both can hold meetings, and calling them "barazas" for civil servants and "public meetings" for politicians does little to distinguish them in reality. It is partly as a result of this overlap that, at a local level, there have been difficulties between civil servants and politicians, as the newspapers and Hansard have shown from time to time. In order to iron out these differences and improve relations in the interests of development, a seminar for Members of the KANU Parliamentary Group with senior civil servants on the implementation of the national development plan was held in December 1965 at the Kenya Institute of Administration. Part of the purpose of the seminar was that civil servants and politicians should avoid blaming one another, should meet more often informally, and should assist one another in the development effort in which both had an interest. The seminar appeared to be a successful move towards better understanding, and further seminars, at the same and lower levels, were to be held. But the basic problem remains: that the Member to be re-elected needs to appear to the people to be the person whose efforts have brought about development, while the proposed structure of authority and committees directs attention to the administrative officer as the person responsible.

It is interesting to compare Kenya's proposals for Plan implementation with Tanzania's experience. Although Tanzania lacks Kenya's explicit separation of the civil service and politics, it has evolved at regional level a committee system remarkably similar to that proposed for Kenya. The Tanzanian Regional Development Committees are large bodies, sometimes reaching attendances of over forty people, including politicians, civil servants, local government officials, businessmen and prominent citizens. When these bodies were found to be too large and diffuse for detailed technical work, smaller civil service committees, with a membership of about ten, and including Regional Heads of Departments, were formed. While these two bodies in Tanzania correspond roughly in their composition with those proposed for Kenya, Kenya's civil service Provincial Development Committees will probably carry more weight with the Provincial Development Advisory Committees than their Tanzanian civil service counterparts with their Regional Development Committees. A further difference can be found in the types of targets set for implementation. In Tanzania, regional targets for the Five Year Plan are for investment as well as production[1]. It has proved difficult, however, to schedule investment realistically, to assess farming investment particularly with smallholders, and to obtain the figures for private sector investment. In addition, the opportunity cost of the staff and time absorbed in obtaining such figures is high. Again, the focus on investment, on spending, has the disadvantage of diverting attention away from the services or production that is the purpose and justification of the investment. In Kenya, in contrast, if targets are allocated to Provinces and Districts they will probably be mainly for agricultural production. Whether they will be subdivided below District level - a task that would fall principally to the Agricultural Department - is not yet clear, but the fact that in Tanzania targets have not always reached the Village Development Committees may be a warning that subdivision is difficult to carry out within districts and to make meaningful at the lower levels.

Another significant difference between Kenya and Tanzania lies in the degree of individual specialisation. In Tanzania, partly because of the pervasiveness of TANU, partly because of the shortage of trained manpower, there has been a tendency towards fusion of different offices and functions in the same persons. In Kenya, partly as a result of the historical position of the Administration and departmental attitudes to it, partly as a result of the sustained formal separation of politics and the civil service, there has

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1. G. Karmiloff: Regional Plan Implementation: Tanzania's Experiment. The East African Economic Review, Vol. 1. New Series No. 2. June 1965, pp. 85-93 passim.

APPENDIX A - FROM "A BASELINE SURVEY OF FACTORS AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THREE AREAS IN KENYA"
MARCO SURVEYS June-August 1965, pp. 66, 67.

Q. To whom do you go or from where do you get your information about .....?

	Self-Help Activities %	News about Kenya %	Cash Crop Market Prices %	Livestock %	Land Consolidation %	Farming %
Extension Officer	56	20	56	78	52	72
Chief's Baraza	42	29	31	37	41	50
Friends/Neighbours/Word of mouth	26	36	20	14	22	19
Chief/Sub-Chief	32	17	19	28	29	36
No source of Information	2	5	17	6	18	3
Local Co-op. Society	5	-	7	1	3	2
Radio	4	41	4	4	4	5
Newspaper/Magazine	1	12	2	2	2	3
Teacher	1	1	-	1	-	-
Mission Station	-	1	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	169%	162%	155%	171%	171%	191%

There were 624 informants.

The three areas were - Bomet, Samia and Kabondo Locations.

APPENDIX A.

APPENDIX B

MEMBERSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEES

(a) Provincial and District Development Committees

Membership
Provincial

the Provincial Commissioner (Chairman);
the Provincial Planning Officer (Secretary);
the Provincial Agricultural Officer;
the Provincial Veterinary Officer;
the Provincial Education Officer;
the Provincial Medical Officer;
the Provincial Co-operative Officer;
the Provincial Community Development Officer (to act as Secretary in the absence of the Provincial Planning Officer);
the Provincial representative of the Ministry of Works, Communications and Power.

In addition, Provincial representatives of other Ministries may be co-opted at the discretion of the Chairman and will be required to attend meetings when matters to be discussed lie within their portfolios.

District

the District Commissioner (Chairman);
the Provincial Planning Officer (Secretary);
the District Community Development Officer (alternate Secretary);
the District Agricultural Officer;
the District Medical Officer;
the District representative of the Ministry of Works, Communications and Power;
the Chief Administrative Officer of the Local Government Authority;
the District Co-operative Officer.

In addition, District representatives of other Ministries may be co-opted at the discretion of the Chairman, and will be required to attend meetings when matters to be discussed lie within their portfolios.

(b) Provincial and District Development Advisory Committees

Membership
Provincial

the Provincial Commissioner (Chairman);
all Members of the Provincial Development Committee;
one M.P. and one Senator from each District (the M.P. to be selected by the M.P's of the District);
the Chairman of the Provincial Advisory Council;
two Provincial Advisory Council members (to be selected by the Council);
two leading citizens (to be nominated by the Provincial Commissioner in consultation with the Provincial Development Committee).

District

the District Commissioner (Chairman);
all Members of the District Development Committee;
all M.P's and Senators in the District;
the Chairman of the County Council;
two Members of the County Council (to be selected by the County Council);
the Chairman of the KANU District Branch;
two or three eminent citizens (to be selected by the District Commissioner in consultation with the District Development Committee).

POLITICS IN AGRICULTURE IN KENYA - 1920-1940

No.387.
L.W. Cone.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
(A draft - subject to revision.)

L.W. CONE.

The sound and fury of settler politics in Kenya has died away and been replaced with politics of another nature in present day Kenya. Fortunately or unfortunately depending on one's own inclinations and sense of romanticism the politics of Kenya has not turned full cycle and reverted to the inter-tribal warfare of a century ago. However, in terms of settler politics a very formative and dynamic period in Kenya politics has gone full cycle in a matter of some sixty years - settler politics did not exist sixty years ago and it does not exist today; but the settler interval has played an important role in the development of modern Kenya.

I would like to take a few moments to look at this brief period in Kenya politics with an historical per spective. Kenya is fortunate to have had a good deal written about the political, economic, and social developments during the past sixty years. We are therefore, most fortunate in being able to have not only the official records of these events, but the impressions of the people who have participated in these developments. There are gaps, however, and we hope they will be filled at a later time. But with the material now available on this important formative period in Kenya history, the time has come to view the developments of this period historically and analytically.

Such an historical and analytical view is necessary to relate the various developments which took place during this period and assess them objectively as much as is possible in terms of the overall development and final outcome. We need to look for many of the elements and factors of these developments that can so easily be lost in the sound and fury of day-to-day politics. Also we can now assess these developments with the perspective of hindsight now that the major struggles of that period have been decided and other groups are presently engaged in the political struggle to promote and protect their interests within a new national society.

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The period 1900-1963 is too broad and varied to assess as a whole. To more easily assess the various developments of the period we can arbitrarily divide the sixty-three years into three period of approximately twenty to twenty-five years. The first period, 1895-1920, could be called the formative period. The second period, 1920-1940, could be called the decisive period. The third period, 1940-1963, could be called the transitional period.

The three major elements which were involved in the political struggle and the factors which affected the struggle between these major elements during these three periods developed and were organised during the formative period. The three major elements in the political struggle during this time were the settler interest, the government administration interest, and the African interest.

Most of the clash of interest between these three elements revolved around the agricultural development in Kenya. In the formative period the settler interest and the government administrative interest dominated the scene. The African interest when involved directly had to be protected by the government administration. In the second or decisive period the African interest began to play an increasingly important role but its interest was basically protected by the government administration dominated as it was by interests outside Kenya and supported by the forces of another government. In the third or transitional period the decisions resulting from the conflict of these three elements during the second period were consolidated and played out with the African interest increasingly developing its power and significance until it is the only remaining element at the end of this third period.

To emphasize the importance of agricultural development as the focus of the political conflicts between these three elements during the three periods I would like to take time to establish the context within which these major elements were formed and why some of the factors became important as a source of conflict. It is also important to keep in mind that one of the major elements, the government administration played the stabilizing role and provided the

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framework within which the clash of interests took place and in the final stages not only acted as the arbiter but made crucial decisions important to the fortunes of both the settler and African interests.

There is no question but what Kenya was originally penetrated and then officially put under administrative control not so much for Kenya itself which offered no gold, little ivory, or trade at that time but because it was on the shortest but not necessarily the easiest route to Uganda. But Uganda, the site of the source of the Nile was important to Egypt and the friends of Egypt. After the Imperial East African Company went bankrupt and was taken over by the British Government it soon became apparent that the Uganda railway was a financial liability. M.F.Hill in a recent editorial just before he died last month summed up the problem faced by the British Government and the alternatives to its solution when he stated:

> "In the early days of the East African Protectorate the Government's conception of its task was to administer the country, not to develop it. The Government's concern was to enforce Pax Britannica, to impose law and order, and to collec t taxes to pay for its services. It was not concerned with development and it remained unconcerned with development until the financial burden of an uneconomic railway fell upon the Protectorate's budget. Reluctant to shoulder the risks and losses inseparable from the development of a raw country, the Government chose the alternative of calling upon private enterprise in the form of white settlement."
>
> (M.F.Hill, Kenya Weekly News, Dec. 3, 1965,p.4).

The government decided to call in settlers to create a money economy which would pay for the railway. This could not be done through a subsistence economy. However, the settler whoever he might be - English, Dutch, German, French, Irish, American, Australian or Scandinavian found himself within a tight network of government control. M.F.Hill shows how effective the government control over the settler was from the beginning and was to remain for the most part during the three per iods:

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"The early settlers were faced with a formidable system of state-control. The Government held the land; they owned the railway; they held the key to the flow of labour; they issued laws and regulations and imposed taxes by decree. mineral and forests were owned by the State. Transport, except by ox or mule wagon, was a State monopoly. The settler had to acquire land from the State andcould sell land with the State's consent. He could not cut timber on his land nor draw water from a river flowing through his land, nor destroy vermin on his land without the State's consent."

(M.F.Hill, Kenya Weekly News, Dec. 3, 1965, p.4).

The government continued to be the buffer between the settler and the indigenous African people who found themselves temporarily at a disadvantage economically and politically to the European settler. The settler had come to a new land devoid of any type of agricultural development that he had known elsewhere. There was little else to do but to pioneer and this he did under the most difficult conditions as described by M.F.Hill:

"The settler's difficulties, now long forgotten, were enough to defeat the stoutest hearts. Everything related to agriculture had to be found out by the expensive process of trial and error. Little or nothing was known about the climate, the rainfall, the qualities of the soil, about epidemic and endemic livestock diseases, about the multitude of pests and diseases which attacked the crops and reduced the prospect of a fair harvest to the certainty of another depressing interview with the bank. Many an early settler lost all his own capital, and all that he could borrow, in the learning of lessons which proved of inestimable benefit to those who followed." (M.F.Hill, Kenya Weekly News, Dec. 3, 1965, p.4).

No wonder that the settler felt he had to safeguard his own interest and carry on as he did a running struggle to represent his interest to the government administration on questions of land, labour customs, railway management, water supplies, development, research, and roads.

But it seems that they had other ideas which had become part of the ir thinking. They saw that the only way to protect their interest ultimately was "... the gradual devolving of power and authority by the colonial government on to local democratically formed bod ies, the gradual assumption of more responsibility by these bodies as their members proved

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themselves fitted for it. 'Self-government' meant government by Europeans only, with due safeguards for the rights of the native population. (E. Huxley, Settler of Kenya, 1948 p. 62).

The standard-bearer of this idea of self-government by the settlers was Lord Delamere. "Like Rhodes, he was a man with vision, and his vision was of a white dominion stretching from the Kenya Highlands to the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika-prosperous, loyal to the Crown, offering to men and women of the British race new outlets for the spirit of adventure, and to Africans the example of industry and the leadership they needed to conduct them from primitive tribalism in which they had lived with little change for thousands of years, to a more civilized and improved form of existence. From the earliest days of his political leadership, Delamere kept his objective steadily in view-an objective which had been shared, in the beginning, by the Government. He remained true to Eliot's statement: 'The main object of our policy and legislations should be to found a white colony'. To this end he took the lead in pressing for settler representation on various Government bodies - for election of members of the Legislative Council, and, in later days, for a majority in that Council of unofficial representatives over Government officials." (E. Huxley, Settler in Kenya, 1948,pp.62-63)

Delamere also felt that as long as the Imperial Government held a trusteeship over the indigenous population that the settlers who were on the spot had the right to show in this trusteeship as much if not more than the transient official or politician or civil servant who had never been to Africa. In the long run the home government did not share the views of Delamere, in fact, the government usually felt that there were other ways of handling the situation other than sharing trusteeship and handing over the power of government to a small oligarchy o f settler landlords or employers. E. Huxley stated it more completely when she said:

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element was the settler group which seemed bent on establishing a new society based on the older traditions in British culture as a reaction against the breakdown of what many considered to be the finest hour in British prestige and culture - the Victorian age. Last but what was firmly establishing itself as the more permanent of the three elements were the African people, in this instance effectively represented by a most dynamic and determined group, the Kikuyu.

It mattered not whether the group was to speak for all the African interest at this time or for its own interest because as time has shown the Kikuyu interest has become generally the African interest through the necessity of promoting the end of colonial rule through the African population generally and then consolidating the establishment of a national society through the African people as a unified whole.

One other fact regarding the Kikuyu activities as it affected the future developments of this period and the succeeding final period was the geographical location of the Kikuyu people to the settlers and the government administration. This geographical proximity resulting first in the land alienation and other grievances as well as the direct contacts thr ough labour on the farms, missionary institutions, government administration, urban labour in Nairobi and elsewhere, and political associations beginning in 1922. These all became decisive factors in the ensuing political struggle.

Looking back on this decisive period of 1920-1940 with an historical perspective we should be able to analyse the reasons for the outcome of the conflict in the disappearance of two of the elements, namely the settlers and the government administration which represented outside people and was dominated by political and other forces external to the internal problems of the people of Kenya. At the same time the third element, the African interest has emerged as not only the dominant element but the only remaining element.

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From the outcome of this conflict of interest in the Kenya scene from 1900 to 1960 I want to consider here two of the most important themes. One of these would be the developments occurring in this period which led to the elimination of the settler interest as a political force and the rise of the African interest. The second theme co ncerns the developments which have played and will continue to play a vital rcle in the development of the economy of Kenya, namely, the development and evolution of a modern agricultural economy in Kenya.

In the light of recent events in Kenya there has been a complete reversal of roles in the political sphere between these two elements but this development is closely related to the second theme, the evolution of a modern agricultural economy. In historical perspective the passing of the settler interest in the political sphere is a passing phase, but the evolution of a modern agricultural economy is a more permanent aspect of the present-day Kenya and must continue to develop if Kenya is to become a stable and prosperous society within the modern Africa.

It is this second theme then, that must provide the foundation and basis for the future historical study of Kenya. There are important factors which must be considered in the development of any modern state and society but I feel that running through the fabric of the society of any people is the one central theme which carries most of the other developments and sets the pace and level of development for the society as a whole. Revolving around the central theme of the developing of modern agriculture may be traced most of the political, economic and social changes and advances in Kenya. It is primarily in this decisive period 1920-1940 that many of the factors were set in motion that were to eliminate the other two interests as major political forces and bring about the rise of the African interest and these factors are merged in the one central theme, that is the development of a modern agricultural economy.

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It is not my intention and even if I had the time it would not serve our purpose to detail the development of each factor as it affected the decline of the settler interest and the emergence of the African interest. Most of the details of these developments can be found en masse and amply footnoted in Volume II of the History of East Africa, edited by Vincent Harlow, and E.M.Chilver, assisted by Alison Smith, which was published by Oxford University Press under the auspices of a project of the University of Oxford Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Makerere University College.

Some other references detailing many of these developments are books by Elspeth Huxley, including White Man's Country, the story of Lord Delamer e in Kenya and No Easy Way, the story of the Kenya Farmers' Association; W. McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within; Lord Altrincham, Kenya's Opportunity, J.F. Lipscomb, White Africans, George Bennett, Kenya a Political History; as well as the reports of the many commissions held in Kenya during this period, such as the Carter Land Commission Report and the Economic Commission Report of 1935. All these and many other books and periodicals, tell gener ally the same story but we must allow for the particular background and inclination of the authors.

Let us consider the first theme - the developments leading to the elimination of the settler interest as a political factor and the rise of the African interest. In most inst ances the development of the factors which are important to the rise of African interest were the same factors which led to the disappearance of the settler interest. This does not mean that most of these factors were working for one interest and against the other interest. It means that when most of these factors began to play their appropriate role in terms of each of the interests it provided one interest with more political and economic power than the other. The settler interest apparently benefitted for various reasons during this period and even up to the la+ stages of the third period. In fact effects of the developments of this decisive period in Kenya's development were not to be too apparent during the first half of the third period or transition period,

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although the forces which had been set in motion during the second period brought about the final outcome as we now know it.

There is no need to lose ourselves in the detail of each factor. It will suffice, I believe, if we me rely relate the significance of the development of each of the factors to the particular element such as the African interest and the settler interest.

There is no doubt a good deal of study required to give us a more complete picture of the significance of each factor to the rise and fall of these interests. I am hoping that the presentation of this thesis will encourage such study and in turn support or disprove those factors which are important to the success or failure of these interests.

One of the major elements which was to favor the African interest and work against the Settler interest was the growth of population especially in the reserves. This had its effect on the land and other agricultural problems but in terms of pure numbers it was an important factor in increasing the political and economic position of the African interest and lessening that of the Settler interest.

During the formative period the settler found himself moving into an area that had reached a low point in population and itseemed that much of the vacant land which seemed to be waiting for occupancy was land that was temporarily in fallow or unused because of the decrease in population due to inter-tribal wars, famine or disease. Without trying to prove or disprove Lugard's and Francis Hall's description of Kikuyuland in the 1890s when they said that most of the land was not being used or later accounts that much land was lying vacant we can assume that that there was a decrease in popul-ation in the early part of the period 1900 and 1920. But according to Goldthorpe there was a gradual increase in population during the 1920s. Today the population is estimated at some 9 million, so there has been a tripling of the population if the early figures are correct at about 3 million in the 1920s.

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The European population never did reach the number of 100,000 thus the increasing African population in the reserves with the support of government policy for the African interest and the later developing mass participation in political activity which was to come after World War II was to inevitably favor the African interest and work to the detriment of the settler interest.

Land was the second most important factor in the decline of the settler interest and the rise of the African interest. The problem of land had many implications including that of government administrative policy in Kenya, the Asian question on land purchase, and finally the basis of the developing political consciousness among the Kikuyu people from gr ievances arising out of land alienation, actual or imagined.

I think that for our purpose here we might say that the crucial point to both the African and settler elements in this p eriod was the findings of the Carter Land Commission in 1934 which defined the areas of the Reserves and that of the Highlands. These areas were officially defined, as recommended by the Carter Land Commission in 1934, in the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938, and the Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council, 1939, and the Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1938, which defined the various categories of land including the White Highlands. The boundaries of the European Highlands were proclaimed in the Kenya (Highland) Order in Council, 1939.

There is no question but what the defining of the boundaries and the settling of the land areas for various groups under an administration, which had the power to maintain those boundaries settled once and for all where the political power would eventually reside. This was especially true after 1923 when the government policy had been declared to support the paramountcy of the African interest against the interests of any immigrant group in Kenya.

While this did not settle many other aspects of the land problem in Kenya, and some are still unsettled, it did help to decide who would eventually rule in Kenya. We are seeing the final playing out of this

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decision in the present period as the Highland area begins to change character and there is no longer any separated areas as such within the Republic of Kenya.

Closely related to this problem of land was the factor of labour on the European farms. The need for labour to develop the European farms was to have two effects on the settler interest and in turn to help in the development of the African interest. The first effect of the labour being employed on European farms resulted in what became a generally serio us problem for the European farmers that of squatters who had to be provided for on these farms. All labourers were not squatters but many of the squatters were used as a source of labourers. The second effect was to keep the settler interest and the government administration in constant conflict over the use of compulsory labour until it was finally prohibited and generally eliminated during this period 1920-1940.

In terms of the African interest the labour factor, especially the compulsory aspect of it led to important grievances among some African groups. This was true among the Kikuyu. This led with other grievances to help along the growing political consciousness which developed during this period and fo und expression in the third period leading to eventual independence.

The second aspect of this labour factor in terms of the African was and still is directly related to agricultural development in Kenya. There is no question but what the early knowledge of modern agricultural practices was learned on the settler farms by these labourers and eventually transmitted back to the re serves in the earlier periods by those who came to work for some cash and returned to their own shambas. It was not possible to put all these newly learned agricultural practices into use on the reserves until land consolidation and other assistance by the government department of agriculture provided a more general application of modern agricultural methods. Also today many of those who worked on European farms are now farming that land and will in time be carrying on the same type of farming that the European owners had achieved.

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The last factor which I want to include here as important to the decline of the settler interest and the emergence of the African interest and its eventual dominance is that of the growing political consciousness of the African groups during this period. This was especially true of the Kikuyu group who copied the settler methods and set up their own associations even as early as 1922 and began to promote their interest versus the government administration.

Fed by the vario us grievances such as land alienation, registratio n of all males, poll tax of 16 shs a head, the dispute over the circumcision ceremonies in 1929 and the development of independent churches and schools as well as the example of the activities of the Asian groups to promote their interests through group associations the African interest began to build up its political consciousness and organize itself through its various organizations. This was strongest in the Kikuyu but today it has become national in scope built as it was on the early developments of the 1920-1940 period.

This factor while not purely agricultural found its source among the agricultural peasant in terms of land alienation, compulsory labour in European farms, and the threat to its traditional way of life based on an agricultural society.

This political factor then was to act as the focal point for the other changes such as increasing population, land delimitation, labour problems and serve as a vehicle to bring about the downfall of the settler interest and allow the African interest to emerge successfully, but its roots were in the changing agricultural developments both European and African beginning in the formative period and gathering force through the second per iod.

Finally we must consider the second theme during this second period - the development and evolution of a modern agricultural economy in Kenya. This is the essential theme around which the history of modern Kenya must be written. The early history of the peoples of Kenya is inextricably woven around the pastoralism and subsistence agriculture with its shifting cultivation.

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The modern history will be written around the intensive mixed farming which produces not only the food supply but forms the basis for a cash economy with its concomitants of industry, commerce and a complex urban and rural society.

The arrival of the European farmer who was to form the settler interest in Kenya during the first three periods of the history of modern Kenya was a fortuitous event. Fortuitous in the sense that it resulted in a complete transforma tion of the agricultural structure of the country as well as the establishment of a commercial and industrial foundation in what was to become a potentially growing and dynamic economy. We should also remember the role played by the Asian groups in the early commercial development of the economy.

The early pioneers, as we have seen described above under the difficulties they faced, found on their arrival in Kenya a land with a favorable climate, but in some instances a soil which had to be especially handled to produce agricultural products on more than a subsistence level. There were no farms in the modern sense and there were no business enterprises, large or small, already developed in the interior of Kenya. The wealth was only potential and depended on the investment of capital and years of hard work, skill, enterprise, determination, and perchance a vision of what could be realized from the soil of Kenya. Also the labour had to be especially trained to work under conditions of modern agricultural practices. Lord Delamere summed up his first six years of farming with its failures and successes in these words:

> "I had 3,000 acres under cultivation-mostly wheat on the Njoro farm alone, not counting Florida. The result after a few years of working, was that sheep had proved a failure and big losses had been incurred; that the land had been proved unsuitable for improved cattle until the East Coast fever menace was dealt with; that was proved to have come to stay. That ploughing large areas in a country where the plough had never been seen was proved to be an economic proposition; that large numbers of natives had been taught ploughing and working with other implements; and that I managed to get rid of £40,000 in cash which I had invested in the country, and had for a time to live almost on £200 a year until a return began to materialize." (M.F.Hill, Kenya Weekly News, Dec. 3, 1965, p.4) contd.16

Despite these difficulties the modern farmer in Kenya faced othe r and more difficult problems and some which even hard work and other attributes which could be applied to the land would not suffice to solve in themselves. Modern agricultural practices require a ready market for the products of the farm and this market was not available in Kenya. He had then to devel op an export market which again created the need for transportation facilities. The railway did exist as a mainline from Kisumu to the Coast but adequate branch lines of the railway and feeder roads remained a formidable problem especially during the rainy season. Eventually the railway extended its branch lines during the 1920s to within 30 miles of most European farms but well graded and paved roads did not come until more recently. In terms of the reserves these roads are only now being developed on an adequate basis.

Despite the lack of branch railway lines and feeder roads, the export of maize and wheat was developed and the markets for these products expanded. Later came the export of such plantation products as sisal, coffee, and tea. But when a country opens itself to the world in terms of export trade it must be ready to meet the competition of other countries which may want to and often does import the same product into the country at a lower price. This is what happened for a time with Kenya when Bombay flour began to find its way into Kenya at a lower price than the local farmers could grow it and process it. Thus some control in the form of protection tariff rates were instituted to control the imports and allow the infant industries of Kenya to develop. As Kenya moves into a new phase of the growth of its economy, industrialization on a large scale and its neighbouring countries try to develop their local industries Kenya finds some of its exports into these neighbouring countries being banned or otherwise controlled. So the proc ess goes on and will continue to d o so as long as these conditions exist in the trade between countries.

We are still concerned with the development of European agriculture, and must now summarize briefly the other problems which the European farmer faced in developing a modern agricultural economy in Kenya.

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Besides the problem of breaking soil and establishing modern farming on virgin soil and in a land where no amenities or the necessary structures to support modern farming existed the farmer found that he must decide what products he could grow for market and what products he would need for himself, his labour, and his animals (oxen and other livestock for dairy, meat, wool, and hides).

Also, the usual farming problems of disease, pests, erosion, depletion the soil, and fencing along with such local problems as labour and squatters had to be met. Research, both organized by the government and by individuals, became an absolute necessity not only to meet diseases and pests but to develop the seeds for grasses, wheat maize, etc., as well as new breeds of livestock that would be suitable for the land, climate, and profitability. In addition, the need for processing wheat, dairy and othe r products became a necessity when no other source of these commodities were available nearby.

This so far has been a brief account of European agriculture and its development during the formative period. During the second period, 1920-1940, European agriculture continued to develop and was soon beginning to establish itself on a self-sustaining basis with its export markets, overcoming of local problems of disease and pests, and creating a labour supply which was adapting itself to modern agricultural practices. However, the early farming practices had been extensive rather than intensive and resulted in less profitable use of land, labour, crops and fertilizers. The world depression from 1930 to 1932 affected all export commodities, including those from Kenya, and eventually caused retrenchment within Kenya agriculture to such an extent that more intensive methods of mixed farming became common in Kenya. At the same time a precedent was established to help the farmer during difficult times. Under pressure of the European farmers a subsidy was granted to maintain a certain price and thus prevent the farmer from feeling at too much of a loss. In terms of agricultural credit and the development of a modern and stable agricultural economy some system of credit and subsidy has been found contd...18

necessary to help the individual farmer. It is being used today to help in the present large scale transition of agriculture in Kenya.

Another problem which the farmer had to face was the locust infestations of 1928 to 1932. Where these infestations occurred crops were almost completely destroyed, affecting the food supply of both humans and animals. The individual farmers overcame this problem as well as the others in time but without the help of the government, which goes on today, the threat of locust could preclude the development of modern agriculture in Kenya and a reversion to the subsistence pastoralism and agriculture of an earlier day.

The other side of the story in Kenya's agricultural development is the impact this European agricultural development had on the existing African agricultural and pa storal structures and practices as well as the economic, political, and social structures which had evolved around them. Naturally the first result of this impact was resistance to new methods and any cha nge. This was true during the formative period with maybe a few changes occurring when the points of contact were more direct. But on the whole the major drastic changes were not to come until some time later during the third period after 1945 when land consolidation, enclosures, irrigation, and other improvements were introduced on a large scale.

But between the first period and the third period there had to be some fundamental changes in attitude, in experimentation, and some basic economic and social changes within these conservative agricultural societies before the rapid changes of the third period could be accomplished. The story of these changes revolving around the development of a modern agricultural economy with its economic, political and social evolution into a modern society is the history of modern Kenya.

I have divided this period of the history of modern Kenya into three periods to provide a better base on which to analyze the developments and the

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significance of that period to the whole. This is especially true in the second per iod which I will call the decisive period because it seems that the developments within the African interest were fundamental and basic enough to have completely reversed the trend of events which were apparent in the first or formative period and set the stage for the trend of events which brought a completely different outcome than one would have thought possible at the beginning of the first period.

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Engholm

THE DECLINE OF IMMIGRANT INFLUENCE ON THE UGANDA ADMINISTRATION 1945-52

by

Geoffrey F. Engholm

Introduction

Much is already known of the sequence of events from 1945 to 1951 in Uganda; David Apter has unravelled and interpreted the development of Ganda attitudes and policies; Kenneth Ingham has indicated the major landmarks of Government policy; there are numerous monographs on specialised topics. There is, however, one major area of enquiry which has been comparatively neglected - the attitudes of the leaders of the Asian and European immigrant communities towards Government policy and the way in which these immigrants sought to maintain their position as influential advisers to government. This position had become a prominent feature of political life in Uganda and may be traced back to before the first world war. Outwardly, the Government of Uganda rested securely in the hands of colonial service officials who monopolised the Executive Council and kept a firm grip over the Legislative Council. In practice, however, European and Asian immigrants played a far more positive role than their numerical strength in certain organs of government suggest and this is clearly demonstrated by the appearance between the two world wars of a rough and ready division of labour in the field of legislation which had come to mark the relationship of officials and immigrants. Anything concerning native administration fell exclusively within the competance of the administration; anything concerning trade and commerce was (usually) considered the special concern of the immigrants. In more specific terms the power and influence of the immigrants made themselves felt in the following ways; through organised pressure groups such as the Uganda Chamber of Commerce and the Uganda Cotton Association and the powerful economic interests these Associations represented; through nomination by Government on to Boards and Committees covering the major aspects of economic and social activity; through direct representation on Legislative Council (the membership being drawn exclusively from the major pressure groups); through the effective use of the device of the Select Committee (see also below) within the Council and by utilizing the opportunities of influence arising (after 1935) from membership of the Standing Finance Committee.

The effect of the second world war only strengthened these arrangements for many immigrants were invited to take on quasi-official posts to man the war-time machinery of inter-territorial co-operation. This employment of officials in the process of government merely heightened the essentially discretionary character of politics in Uganda. The use made by the unofficials of the Special Committee illustrates this style which is marked by confidential procedures, the issuing of public announcements devoid of any trace of disagreement and the emasculation of legislative debate. The Special Committee (the misleading name given to what was in fact a Select Committee) was set up by mutual agreement on all those occasions when the immigrants disagreed with draft legislation and found it necessary to strike a bargain with Government. With few exceptions, the only record kept of these proceedings were a limited number of confidential and typewritten copies. An important informal dimension to the style of discretionary politics was provided for the senior members (male) of the European community (both official and unofficial)

by means of the Kampala Club, a segregated institution which provided the best food and wine in Uganda.

The economic framework within which Protectorate politics was transacted appeared as a mixture of official paternalism and unofficial dedication to the ideals of free enterprise. In practice, by the end of the war, the Uganda economy was rigidly controlled (in areas of concern to the immigrants) and fixed prices and profits heralded the era of bulk purchases and general frustration. The immigrants looked forward to the dismantling of controls and a return to the pre-war theory and practice that economic development was the sole prerogative of the private sector; that Government spending contained within itself the seeds of profligacy; and that recurrent expenditure should be kept under strict control. It was the familiar post-war cry of back to normal.

This paper is concerned with examining how the immigrants position as the sole and effective outside adviser to Government became weakened as the Administration took on a more positive attitude to its responsibilities. In practice, the Protectorate Government broke free from its high degree of "consultative" dependence upon the immigrants owing to exapnding revenues which gave it an unprecedented freedom of action. To illustrate the gradual erosion of influence four groups of examples have been taken; socio-economic legislation in the immediate post-war year (1946-49); co-operative legislation and its connection with cotton interests and the 1949 riots (1946-49); the formation and function of the Unofficial Members Organisation (1949-52); and the nature and significance of various committee changes within t Legislative Council (1948-52). For reasons of length, other developments within the Protectorate which are also relevant can only be briefly mentioned. These further themes include the structure and nature of the machinery of planning the structure, composition and purpose of the public corporations (UEB,UDC, etc. attitudes towards the setting up of the East African High Commission, and the gradual emergence of African political awareness.

The following two tables will be of assistance as background material for the subsequent narrative.

Table I

Composition of the Legislative Council 1945-52

	Colonial Service Officials	"Immigrants", Africans All Nominated Unofficials	
1945-46	8	3 Africans 2 Europeans 2 Asians	7
1946-47	10	3 Africans 3 Europeans 3 Asians	9
1947-48	11	4 Africans 3 Europeans 3 Asians	10
1949-52	17	8 Africans 4 Europeans 4 Asians	16

Table II

Revenue:Expenditure:Surplus Balances
Uganda 1945-52

Year	Revenue £'000s	Expenditure £'000s	Surplus Balance £'000s
(1939)	1.718	1.260	1.132
1945	3.366	3.199	2.078
1946	4.053	3.574	2.599
1947	5.331	4.474	3.413
1948	6.405	6.530	3.383
1949	8.094	6.687	4.694
1950	11.037	8.000	7.770
1951	14.735	12.895	9.617
1952	17.289	15.966	6.561*

* Reduced by transferring £5 million to UDC.

The Immigrants and Socio-economic Legislation

The emphasis laid by Sir John Hall (Governor 1944-51) on economic development, the commencement of schemes such as the hydro-electric plant at Jinja with its associated cement works, and the surge forward in the building industry were powerful factors in the creation of a larger labour force in urban areas. These developments revealed the backwardness of existing labour and industrial legislation as well as the urgent need for reform. In the absence of organised political parties or a viable trade union movement - even as late as 1952 there were only four registered trade unions with a total membership of 259 - the Protectorate Government took on the somewhat unaccustomed role of social reformer. Years of neglect had been compounded by the exigencies of war and the prevailing seediness seemed to have gone deeper than the deterioration of material things. The Labour Department had been abolished in 1931 as an economy measure and for twelve years was obliged to mark time as an Inspectorate under the Chief Secretary until reinstituted in 1943. By 1945 the senior staff numbered four. The effect of this abolition had been doubly unfortunate for not only did general working conditions worsen but little was done to redress the balance of the law which was highly favourable to the employers. Employer-employee legislation was embodied in the 1913 Masters and Servants Ordinance (as amended) which include penal sanctions applying to employees for neglect of duty, lack of diligence and absence from work without valid reason. It may be noted that these sanctions were temporarily suspended in 1943 to comply with International Labour Convention No. 65 of 1939. In Uganda there was no adequate machinery to check that employers satisfied minimum housing standards, or provided medical attention both of which had merely to be "proper", a term described by the Labour Commissioner in 1946 as meaning anything or nothing. The law was also vague on contracts, breaches of contract and the settlement of disputes.

In 1946, the rickety Master and Servants legislation was largely replaced by a new Employment Ordinance which had already been the subject of anxious scrutiny by employers over a period of eighteen months. The Ordinance limited contracts to two years, tightened up the inspection of accommodation and professional recruiting activities and with two exceptions endorsed the abolition of penal penalities for breaches of contract. The immigrant employers viewed the legislation as a dangerous interference with the laws of supply and demand and in three important particulars succeeded in forcing concessions from the Administration. The first was the continuance of the "ticket"

administration; that the societies might indulge in unfair competition with established businesses and if the stronger societies "bound together by racial and political ties" cornered the cotton of an area they could sell it to one selected ginnery and thus starve the other ginneries in the area. It was further added that there was every chance that the societies would fail owing to the "incapacity of the native" whose efforts could only do "incalculable harm" to the ginning industry while a different order of problem would come about if the African accepted guidance from "undesirable" non-natives. After this catalogue of anticipated disasters it seemed only reasonable to assume that legislation was "premature".

By 1945, it was no longer possible to argue with confidence about the possibility of failure for during the preceeding eight years a spontaneous growth of associations, particularly in Buganda, among cotton growers and others, only highlighted the absence of proper legislation. The 1945 Co-operative Societies Bill satisfied the criteria laid down by the 1937 Special Committee that legislation should emphasise the "controlling and restrictive features" and play down any desire "to foster and encourage these societies". All that was required to strangle the cooperative movement at birth was an unimaginative and schoolmasterish Registrar heading an understaffed department, ready to impose a mass of niggardly rules on any association foolish enough to join. In the event, these conditions were satisfied but not before the immigrants, in select committee, had brought off three amendments. Two of these were in the tradition of paternalism, the first providing for a Supervising Manager if the affairs of the society fell into a poor state, and the second giving powers to the Registrar to approve all monetary payments to officials or members of a society either by the society itself or by outside persons for in the early days "the moving spirit may sometimes possibly not be true co-operation". Of greater importance was the elimination of clause No.37 of the draft bill which related to the power given to a society if it could show that 75 per cent of all producers were members (either in the Protectorate as a whole or in any smaller area) to compel the remaining 25 per cent to sell to the society. The immigrants rejected the clause on the grounds that "voluntary membership" was one of the fundamental principles of co-operation, and the rather different point that a co-operative monopoly would lead to the cornering of agricultural produce. The Administration's defence of clause 37 rested on the view that co-operatives should not be frustrated by a relatively small minority "practising black-market methods". The Government agreed that this clause should be deleted but warned the immigrant unofficials that it did not intend to abandon the principle of compulsory marketing - a hint foreshadowing the creation of the Lint Marketing Board.

The best that could be said about the alleged challenge raised by the Co-operative Ordinance to the ginning interests was that the fuse had been lit - but it was a very long fuse. When the 1948 Cotton Commission Report was published, it was clear that far from constituting a threat to the ginning industry the co-operative movement would have to be especially assisted (by monies drawn from the Cotton Fund) to make it worthwhile for the ginners to handle the "insignificant proportion of the total crop" which it supplied. The Report asseverated that the ginning industry was in a decrepit state, that it had maintained "antiquated machinery" and unhygienic working conditions. The industry was given a stern warning to put its house in order over a five-year period on the basis of statutory monopolies (pools) and the elimination of the weaker ginning brethren.

The general attitude displayed by Government and immigrant interests makes it clear that the question of African participation in the processing industry was not of central importance in the immediation post-war period. The puny character of the co-operative movement made it difficult for the Protectorate Government to devise an appropriate institutional ladder up which aspiring Africans could ascend to the world of ginning, and the ginners themselves were not surprisingly content with the status quo and, after the Cotton Report, with problems of reorganisation. As no African voiced his disapproval of existing arrangements in the Legislative Council, and since the remaining Unofficials were also silent, it required a dramatic incident to bring about significant reforms. The riots that broke out in April 1949 and which were largely confined to the Kampala area were motivated in part by dissatisfaction over the Government's cotton policy. This dissatisfaction had been worked up by the Bataka Party (which, of course, had many other irons in the fire) and the Uganda African Farmers' Union, founded in April 1948 by Ignatius Musazi. The UAFU was created under the Business Names Ordinance to act as a commission agent mainly for cotton and coffee, to act as a suitable organization to channel African grievances against immigrant ginners, and to raise African hopes for much higher cotton and coffee prices to growers. Musazi made several attempts to persuade the Protectorate Government to build cotton stores and erect ginneries and it was in reply to one of his letters that he learnt that the Administration was examining a Buganda Government request to use the monies allocated to it from the Cotton and Hard Coffee Fund for the purpose of buying a ginnery. "His Excellency therefore consider that no useful purpose would be served by granting you an interview". Protracted negotiations to buy the first available ginnery were not completed until the beginning of 1950 when the Buganda Government leased a ginnery to the Uganda Growers Co-operative Union. Musazi, who had been in England at the time of the riots was immediately arrested on his return anddetained in the West Nile District.

There were two important responses to the riots; one by Musazi and his associates and the other by Government. Before his sequestration, Musazi arranged for the recruitment of two 'Europeans', George Shepherd and John Stonehouse to run the UAFU with the explicit aim of organising the Baganda farmers in a rival movement to the Government sponsored scheme. Stonehouse's view of the official co-operative movement may be quoted "The Co-operative Department, staffed by civil servants who know little about the principles of the co-operative movement, was disliked by the farmers. The officious way in which the Department was run made the farmers regard the co-operative societies as mere branches of the Government rather than as democratic organisations which reflected African aspirations". From the ashes of the UAFU, now banned, sprang the Federation of Uganda African Farmers whose rapid growth soon brought its own problems for it harboured "black sheep, tricksters, and crooks, who came into this mushroom organization to make a quick penny for themselves" - in Stonehouse's words.

While these developments were taking place, the Uganda Government decided to storm the citadel of immigrant ginning interests. Protracted negotiations with the ginners made it clear that a formula was sought which would allow African participation in the ginning industry without causing too much alarm among the owners. In September 1951, the Government scheme was published Proposals for the Re-organisation of the Cotton Ginning Industry which endeavoured to achieve these ends. The following bargain had been struck. Out of a total of 193 [illegible] ginneries, the Government proposed to buy up 35 "silent and/or uneconomic ginneries", thus increasing the throughput and hence the profits of the remaining units - this meant the elimination

of the 'silent' ginnery which earned an income for not ginning cotton and which had been silenced so as not to compete with 'live' units and thus lower profit levels - an arrangement which went under the polite name of eliminating excess capacity. "It is proposed that ginneries so acquired would be paid for at normal market rates for ginneries of equivalent value, as assessed by an arbitration tribunal regard being had to the pool shares held by the ginneries at the time of acquisition". The remaining 158 ginneries would then have an allocation of 2400 bales - an increase of 600 bales on the then existing figure. Next, African participation was based on a calculation made of the maximum ginning capacity required by the co-operative unions (i.e. a union was composed of a number of primary societies. The way in which the co-operative movement was revived to take up these new tasks is discussed below) over a five year period - this capacity was estimated at 50,000 bales, i.e. one-seventh of Uganda's total output. It was also estimated that during a second five-year period an additional capacity of 50,000 bales would be wanted. Working on this basis, the Protectorate Government announced its intention of compulsorily acquiring ginneries from among the 158 remaining; 20 or 21 during the first five years and an identical number during the second five year period. (As each ginnery produced 2400 bales, this multiplied by 20 or 21 reached the 50,000 bale target).

The Acquisition of Ginneries Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council in January 1952. The Government spokesman referred to the sugaring of the pill for the surviving ginners with their increased quota of bales and the need for African Co-operative Unions to provide from their own resources one-third of the capital - the balance being loaned by Government at 5¾% a year. It was, however, the Government's proposals for the second five-year period that excited the greatest apprehension among the immigrant unofficials. "In the second five-year period new ginneries would be built for African co-operative unions or existing ginneries would have their pool share expanded....". "After extra ginning capacity to the extent of 50,000 bales had been provided in accordance with increased production of crop, and further increase over 400,000 bales would be dealt with in the following manner: such part, if any, as was needed to meet the expanding requirements of the African co-operative movement would be used for that purpose, any balance remaining being divided up among all existing ginneries". The effect of this proposal was to block any further expansion by immigrants in the ginning industry. Simpson (emerging during this period as an important figure among the Unofficials) was right in regarding these steps as "perhaps the most serious this country can ever have taken". On the question of restricting entry to co-operative unions once the figure of 400,000 bales was reached, Simpson took the only line possible, namely that the co-operatives, independent African interests, and "the reduced present interests" might share competitively in the prospective crop increase. In mournful tones Simpson stated "let the African try to understand and appreciate what is being done for him. He is being given - admittedly for an element of payment - someone else's property". Kulubya, a nominated African member and a wealthy man in his own right echoed Simpson's feelings about independent African participation. "Individual independence and enterprise should be encouraged". The element of expropriation was mentioned by many speakers, one of them referring to "the extraordinarily generous consent of the (Uganda) Cotton Association and also those with vested rights in the industry". In a burst of prophecy, the President of the Cotton Association regarded the ten-year period as insufficiently long to create an atmosphere of stability within the industry, for it seemed likely to him that if immigrant ginners spent money on modernising their ginneries there was no guarantee that Government would refrain from further steps of nationalisation. Furthermore, whilst there was no objection to the co-operative movement as such

"I submit it is not right that the co-operatives should choose the best ginneries in the country". The Government should make available instead "average" ginneries. The above comments were all stated during the second reading of the Bill; in select committee the unofficials were unable to gain a single significant concession. No doubt this reflected the Colonial Office's insistance that Africans must participate in the ginning industry but equally it also marked the end of the immigrant unofficials use of the select committee to obtain concessions from Government. Or, to be rather more precise, the use of this committee could no longer be relied on.

In conclusion, a brief mention must be made of a difficulty enccuntered in select committee when the Acquisition of Ginneries Bill was under discussion - the problem of legally defining a co-operative society. In practice, the problem referred to the Federation of Uganda African Farmers and other bodies not registered under the 1946 Co-operative Ordinance. With the arrival of Sir Andrew Cohen and the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry (1952) into the co-operative movement, a way was soon found to initiate a thorough overhaul of the 1946 Ordinance. The amendments to this Ordinance (which largely vindicated the views of Stonehouse and the FUAF) together with the knowledge that African co-operative unions would acquire ginneries removed all impediments to a rapid growth of the movement. The days of the quasi-co-operative, such as the FUAF were numbered. Stonehouse wrote "The way was now open for this body to be wound up and its groups of supporters advised to form into registered co-operative societies". The immigrant economic interests had suffered a major set-back but as the two following sections endeavour to show, they were not yet without resources as advisers to Government.

The Formation and Functions of the Unofficial Members Organization

One step which the Unofficial European and Asian members of the Legislative Council could take to shore up a weakening position was to abandon the casual, ad hoc, and informal habits of consultation between themselves which had been adequate enough for twenty-five years or more, and substitute a more systematic "opposition" to Government. When African membership of the Council was increased to four in 1947 and with the prospect of further increases to be considered, it became important to induct the African members into the mysteries of a commercially orientated discretionary-opposition. Since colonial administrations were peculiarly sensitive to the views of a united "opposition", there was much to be said for trying to line up African members in a solid front together with the nominated immigrants. A further point, was the danger that the African members might vote with the Government in approval of measures which increasingly had not been subjected to the stern criteria usual in business circles. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the immigrant community there were also conveniences in forming a central organization through which could be channelled the various queries and apprehensions to which growing Government intervention in the economy was giving rise.

In January 1949, the first steps were taken to form an Unofficial Members Organization (UMO). Details were sought from already existing Organisations in Kenya and Tanganyika as well as the Central Legislative Assembly - the legislature of the East African High Commission created in 1948. The Kenya model was clearly unsuitable for Uganda, for there the UMO was additional to the racial groups which were organised separately. The UMO met to discuss "opposition" tactics. No individual group was

bound by a majority decision since the elected members considered themselves answerable to their constituents. Any racial group could veto the discussion of a topic. The danger of acrimonious argument called for a fairly formal procedure and members had to stand and address the chairman when speaking. Tanganyika, whose politics was certainly more discretionary than Kenya's, provided the model to be followed by Uganda. Holcom, a European unofficial, drew up a draft constitution for Uganda's UMO which was conceived in general terms but contained a rule that "no question of party politics may be discussed at any meeting". An elected committee was to manage the affairs of the Organization and would in turn elect a Chairman.

When, in 1950, the number of Unofficials was increased from 10 to 16, it became necessary to reorganise the UMO to improve its efficiency and lay down its scope with greater precision. A new constitution was accordingly drawn up by Simpson in January 1951. With the approval of Government, a permanent office was rented in Kampala, a full-time secretary engaged, and a small library of Government publications started including those from neighbouring territories. Simpson envisaged the revamped UMO fulfilling the following functions: keeping in touch with the Clerk of Council; ensuring that speakers were allocated for Bills; co-ordinating questions and supplementaries; circulating motions; receiving delegations from public bodies and minutes from their meetings; if necessary, briefing members, and finally keeping in touch with opposite numbers in Kenya and Tanganyika. As in the Holcom constitution, there was a reference to politics and members were extolled "not to endeavour to run the Organization as a political party".

How did the UMO work in practice? Its most valuable function was to receive complaints and memoranda from individuals, firms and "public bodies" which were then usually cyclostyled and circulated to members. From time to time, it invited Heads of Departments either to discuss proposed legislation or to bring their attention to anomalies in the existing law. The UMO thus brought about a concentration of effort which was quickly utilized not only by immigrant economic interests but also to a limited extent by the African community - the clan leaders in Busoga addressed two lengthy memorials to the UMO, and in 1951 the Federation of Partnerships of Uganda African Farmers contacted the Organization, as did the Uganda National Congress, Uganda's first political party, in the following year. Until 1952, at least, it would seem that the entire emphasis of the UMO was on issues considered important by the immigrants and there is some evidence to show that African participation was limited and uncertain. As the African members lacked "western" entrepreneurial experience it was difficult for them to appreciate the rather specialized nature of the "opposition" to Government measures. The lack of business and political experience was clearly shown in 1951 when it became known that the Secretary of State was to visit Uganda to gather views on the reorganization of the cotton industry. When the UMO met to discuss tactics, it was agreed that the Secretary of State, then James Griffiths, should be told that the Organization had never split on any racial issue, that members worked together in complete harmony, and that policy decisions preferably should be left to the Legislative Council as a whole and not be imposed from London. The reference to "London" expressed the suspicion of many immigrants that the Labour Government favoured nationalising the cotton industry. In the course of discussions it was apparent that the African members were ignorant of the meaning of nationalization so this was explained "at length" and the Africans were requested to return to their districts and consult with their people. On their return, it was hoped they "would

be able to state whether the nationalization of the Cotton Industry would be welcomed by the Africans, or whether they would prefer direct participation in the industry through the co-operative societies".

One problem which concerned the UMO related to numerous suggestions from Nairobi to form an East African UMO mainly to concert action over the territorial budgets and to ensure that the East African Governments adopted common commercial policies. These matters lie outside the focus of this paper, but it may be added that the Ugandan UMO was only prepared to support liaison with Kenya and Tanganyika on a "conference" basis and this was done to allay the fears of the Baganda that any closer links might lead to the unification of the three territories.

Only on two occasions did the UMO fail to work as a united body. The first arose when the European and Asian members decided to meet separately to discuss the reorganization of the cotton industry and the second came about when the Uganda National Congress expressed a wish to meet the African members as a separate group - this was agreed to by the immigrants provided it was made clear that the African members were acting as individuals and not as members of the UMC.

The UMO proved to be a useful organizational weapon in the hands of the immigrant members and its operation in the years 1949-52 draws attention to three important aspects of political life of the period. First, informal links between Government and the UMO were maintained throughout to the advantage of the immigrants and thus helped to preserve the discretionary style of politics. Secondly, the presence of African members in the UMO and the attempt to induce them to accept "business" attitudes could hardly be a long-term strategy; its short term success depended on the Administration continuing to find nominees who were susceptible to these attitudes. Thirdly, the UMO was not designed to deal with the fundamental problem of the immigrants - the need to influence policy (and particularly the choice of policy) at as early a stage as possible. To examine immigrant tactics in this sensitive area is the task of the next section.

Immigrant Attitudes to Committee Changes in the Legislative Council

The increasing dissatisfaction felt by Unofficial European and Asian members with their role in the machinery of government has already been noted; it had become particularly marked by 1949. This section advances some further reasons for the general feeling of disquiet. Hitherto, the predominance of the immigrants as advisors to the Governor had stemmed from the dependence of the Protectorate Government on taxes levied on the two major export industries, cotton and coffee, whose processing arrangements lay under immigrant control. Under conditions of continually rising world prices, and with the closing of the Cotton and Coffee Control Funds in 1948, the Protectorate Government had an unprecedented opportunity to seize the initiative and undertake large-scale plans of long over-due social and economic betterment by utilizing the large sums now at its disposal. This development was not itself sufficient to cause undue alarm among the unofficials whose unease must be attributed rather to the Government's tendency to take far-reaching decisions without prior consultation. Even in the cotton ginning industry where immigrant attitudes had been decisive, the Government displayed a new independence of mind by declining (during the formative stage) to disclose the nature of their reorganization plans after the publication of the 1948 Cotton Commission Report had made it clear that drastic steps would have to be taken. Furthermore, a new threat to immigrant

economic interests arose when the African membership of the Legislative Council was increased from four to eight in 1950 thus equalling the combined European and Asian unofficial membership. Here again, the danger of increased African participation was at first masked by the docile and conservative attitudes displayed by the new members. The increase in African membership coincided with a number of important changes in the committee structure of the Council so that immigrant members tended to regard the two developments as different aspects of a single problem - the continuance of immigrant influence in the counsels of Government. These political developments together with the structural changes in the Legislative Council can accordingly be regarded as so closely inter-linked as to justify their exposition as a joint problem.

The first step heralding a change in the committee structure of the Council, took the form of two Circular Despatches from the Secretary of State in June 1948 addressed to all the dependencies announcing a relaxation of existing controls over finance. It took almost two and a hlf years to bring the new proposals into effect in Uganda and the first statement of intention was not made until October 1949 when it was stated that Colonial Office surveillance would extend only to "broad issues of fiscal policy, measures against inflation, exchange and currency control, development finance, loan policy and the like". Henceforth the Appropriation and Supplementary Ordinances would require only a formal consent from London. This devolution of power involved the creation of three new committees. First, an Estimates Committee was set up which took over the main functions of the Standing Finance Committee (this committee had concerned itself with a close examination of the draft estimates). Secondly, the S.F.C. was retained but with duties now restricted to "dealing with all votes entailing supplementary or unforeseen expenditure from public funds for which the sanction of this Council is required". Thirdly, provision was made for an entirely new Committee of Public Accounts but its introduction was delayed until January 1951.

Although the "old" S.F.C. was now demoted it was the object of considerable interest among the European and Asian members. This interest sprang from the fact that membership of the "new" S.F.C. was a necessary precondition for membership of a far more important body known as the Standing Economic Committee (SEC), whose existence was unknown to the general public. The SEC was not a committee of the Legislative Council but had been set up by administrative arrangement in 1949 as a successor to the Development Advisory Committee. The immigrant unofficials attached great importance to the Advisory Committee for Government brought before it all its development plans. But with the approval of the Harris Revision Plan in 1948, the raison d'etre of the Development Committee was removed as plans were absorbed as part of normal departmental activity and this in turn meant a rapid tapering off of immigrant influence. Acting on an initiative taken by Handley Bird, the Governor was approached by the Unofficial Members Organization in the early part of 1949 with the suggestion that an Economic Advisory Committee should be set up composed of all the Unofficials together with the Governor as Chairman and the Chief Secretary, Development Commissioner and Finance Secretary. It was pointed out to Sir John Hall that the Unofficials were getting out of touch with Government in general and that a great deal of executive action was being taken either without reference to the Legislative Council or referred to it as a fait accompli. It was further suggested that the proposed committee would not usurp the authority of the Executive Council but that equally - and herein lay its attraction for the immigrants - its recommendations

would be unlikely to be turned down, especially in commercial matters. The Governor then made a counter-suggestion broadening the basis of representation to include "members of the public". As the Unofficials were mainly concerned with influencing policy, the Governor's suggestion of a "general" Advisory Committee represented a radical watering-down of the original scheme and was accordingly rejected as an inadequate substitute by them. Furthermore, the immigrants noted that the Governor was not prepared to be chairman of the committee he was proposing.

To overcome the deadlock, it was agreed that a Standing Economic Committee should be set up and its membership restricted to those already sitting on the "new" SEC. Its scope was to include matters of economic interest and development in Uganda and it was to perform some of the functions of the defunct Development Committee. Also, it was to advise Government on the economic repercussions likely to arise from the purchase prices paid to peasant producers for cotton and coffee - a most important privilege. The SEC concerned itself with a wide range of matters. For example, the following subjects were discussed at two meetings in 1950: the Future of Tanning and Footwear Industries; the Organization of the Cement Industry; the Importation of Gold; Timber Prices; Whiskey Allocations; and Joint Imports Control (i.e. with Kenya). The SEC did not justify the expectations it aroused, for the Protectorate Government sought little advice from it on important issues and it never advised on prices to be paid to the primary producers - this function being retained in the hands of other price fixing bodies. Only one major issue was referred to it, namely the setting up of the Cement Industry Board. On other important matters, such as the Governor's statement on land tenure, or the negotiations concerning an iron and steel industry and a phosphate and fertilizer plant, there had been no consultation. Meetings of the SEC were restricted to those occasions when the SFC met and membership of these committees was heavily weighted in favour of immigrant Unofficials, the small African membership being accounted for by the Governor's practice of leaving out those members who had a long distance to travel. In 1949, for example, there were three ex officio members, the Financial Secretary, the Development Commissioner, the Director of Agriculture, and seven Unofficials, 1 African, 3 European and 3 Asian.

In 1951, the setting up of the third committee mentioned above - on Public Accounts - enabled the Unofficials to reveal the unsatisfactory state of the Protectorate Government's approach to budgeting and gave added strength to the claim that they were watch-dogs of the public interest. The PAC reported for the first time in March 1952 after investigating the 1949 accounts. Under the chairmanship of Handley Bird, it carried out its task with great vigour. Twenty Heads of Departments and other witnesses gave evidence, eleven memoranda on various topics were submitted (including one which revealed an unhealthy state of affairs in the Cement Industry) and no less than 13 Departments were shown to be "seriously at fault" in their estimates. It was further revealed that a total of 389 Special Warrants had been authorised amounting to nearly £1.5m. out of a total budget of £6.7m. and not surprisingly this was considered "too great", This was one aspect at least of the growing independence of the Protectorate Government.

Finally, a very brief mention must be made of a number of events occurring in 1951-52 whose interpretation must remain at the moment conjectural. Only an incomplete and tentative sketch may be attempted at present.

The continuing dissatisfaction displayed by the unofficial immigrants with their role in the machinery of policy-making led to the Governor making an unpublicised offer, in January 1951, for an unofficial majority. This proposal involved no increase in the number of Unofficials but implied rather a reduction in the number of Officials in the Legislative Council. For unknown reasons, the Unofficials turned down this offer - in any case it may be supposed that the Baganda leaders would have regarded it with real misgivings whatever immigrant views may have been. The next step of constitutional interest was the sudden increase from two to six (opposed by nine officials) of the Unofficials sitting on the Executive Council, which was announced on 1 July 1952. This must be regarded as an important gain in the power of the Unofficials and went a considerable way to meet the Unofficials' claim to a voice in the early stages of policy-making. It was, however, an unstable arrangement for the Unofficials had no executive responsibility and the question of whether they had to support government measures remained doubtful. Certainly the oath of secrecy taken by all Councillors meant that they had to be more circumspect in their public utterings; but perhaps this was no handicap to those who accepted the style of discretionary politics.

A Note on Sources

For the preparation of this paper two main sources have been used; the official publications of the Protectorate Government and the private papers of Sir Amar Maini, a former Minister in the Protectorate Government. I am deeply grateful to Sir Amar for permission to examine his papers, now deposited in Makerere University College Library.

More specifically, the sources used in each section are as follows:

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The Formation and Functions of the Unofficial Members Organization

Maini Papers.

Immigrant Attitudes to Committee Changes in the Legislative Council

Maini Papers.
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The Study of Penetration in East African Politics: Problems in Terminology Management and Empirical Measurement*

By

Raymond F. Hopkins

In the last decade, the rapid emergence of new underdeveloped states has precipitated interest among political scientists in problems of "political development." Going beyond mere historical accounts of the emergence of new governing institutions, various scholars have attempted to spell out the basic processes involved in political change and the creation of government.[1] Ignoring traditional indicators such as constitutions, variables such as capacity for responsiveness, participation in decision-making, and provision of welfare have been suggested as key indicators of political growth and the formation of healthy and viable polities. Various causal factors such as communication, literacy, education and wealth have been offered to explain the growth of these indicators of political development. Although an important focus of these studies has been on new dimensions of political development, it is not clear to what extent these ideas about political development are valid, useful or in agreement.

Our purpose in this paper is to examine one recently suggested aspect of political development or change, that of "penetration." The crisis of "penetration" which a developing country tends to experience may provide a useful focus for studying politics in East Africa. By pene-

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*This paper is prepared for the seminar on "Penetration Problems in the Study of East African Development and Politics," at the Conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, January 3-7, 1966. In preparing this paper the author has consulted the working paper on "Penetration" and other working papers prepared for the Political Science Research Program at Makerere University, Fall, 1965.

[1] Analytic schemes for the systematic study of development are contained in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960), Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics (January, 1965), Harold D. Lasswell, "The Policy Sciences of Development," World Politics (January, 1965), Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics (April, 1965), and Leonard Binder, et al., Crises in Political Development (Princeton, forthcoming). An historical analysis of development may be found in Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations," American Political Science Review (1953), Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, editors, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964). The output aspect of development has been stressed in Joseph LaPalombara, editor, Bureaucracy and Political Development and S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 1963). Political development as reflected in attitudes and orientations of citizens and elite are treated in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), Lucien W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building (New Haven, 1962) and Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, editors, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965). Communications as a factor in development has been explored in Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge 1953) and Lucien W. Pye, editor, Communications and Political Development (Princeton, 1963).

tration we mean an expansion of governmental capabilities. Even more specifically it refers to increases in the effectiveness or power of a central government enabling it to reach a larger number of people and affect a wider range of behavior.[2] To study penetration, then, is to examine the outputs of the national political system as reflected in decisions of national governing organs. The question is to what extent are these decisions capable of affecting behavior in the system. Penetration, thusly defined, is obviously a vital aspect of politics since it is a measure of the ability of decision-making machinery in a system to respond effectively to the demands and supports it receives as inputs.

The problem of penetration is particularly relevant to developing areas such as East Africa since the strains of development are associated with particularly heavy demands for the expansion of a nation's decision-making capabilities. As David Easton has noted:

> The so-called revolution of rising expectations, the need to provide for self-defense with limited economic resources, newly discovered lateral and vertical mobility within hitherto relatively impermeable social structures, resistant tribalism and other pluralist groups, difficult options in the area of international relations, all combine to impose severe external strains on the members of newly emerging political systems.[3]

These strains may result in transformations of the system affecting the style of politics and the authority of the central regime. To understand the nature and predict the direction of these transformations will be, therefore, an important undertaking.

But is it "penetration," indeed, which really needs to be studied? I am not sure just how useful this rubric really is. In any event, for this concept to be meaningfully employed, operational indices need to be developed which allow researchers to measure various levels of penetration. This paper will, therefore, undertake two tasks: first, to discuss the meaning of penetration for political research, and second, to suggest some ways in which penetration may be measured.

I

One of the characteristics of the contemporary study of political development is the rapid development of new terms and the reworking of older language in what might be called a "jargon explosion." This rapid increase in new terms, concepts and approaches in political science is by no means an isolated phenomenon. Throughout the physical and social sciences specialization and the unfolding of new insights has produced a variety of specialized vocabularies which are virtually unintelligible to the layman. Although political science has not reached the point of specialization where studies, for example, of political personality or comparative politics are incomprehensible to a student of local government, large gaps, at least in language, exist between a study of entrophy in political systems and a study of the relative effectiveness of local government. In the face of an increasing

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[2]This definition adheres, I believe, to those suggested by Pye and Binder among others.

[3]David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), p. 61.

Setting penetration in the context of the broad study of political development, we can raise questions not only about this single dimension but about the theoretical usefulness of all these typologies of political development. To what extent do these lists represent exhaustive and mutually exclusive dimensions? Do these new terms cut across parochial, non-functional or conventional approaches to political analysis in a way likely to yield new insights, new ways of organizing data and/or more accurate barometers of political events? Within and between each of these lists one may find a number of similar or related concepts. A measure of one of these dimensions may serve well as an indicator for another. For example, voting behavior might be used as an indicator for participation, integration or identity. A positive response to a call for ten-member TANU cells could serve as an indicator of penetration - or of participation. Moreover, one could certainly question the exhaustiveness as well as the consistency and mutual exclusiveness of these lists. These possible inadequacies in the typologies presented, however, are beyond our immediate interest.

Our main focus is upon whether the particular concept "penetration" has practical utility by corresponsing to an empirical dimension of a political system. One way to resolve this would be to ask whether there is a set of measures which fit together to yield some index of penetration that is distinguishable from other political development dimensions, and is conceptually distinct from similar concepts, such as centralization, regionalism, federalism, national integration, institutionaliztion, or socialization. The first step in such an examination of penetration would be to clearly state relationships between this concept and some of these other concepts. For example, what are the analytical differences or similarities between Almond's capabilities analysis, especially his regulative capacity, and the concept of penetration; or between the traditional notion of centralization and penetration.

I am not simply calling for a clearer definition of penetration than that found in writings on the subject (including this one). Rather, I am suggesting this analytical exercise may alert one to the manifold implications the concept of penetration has. Penetration, as distinct from centralization, for example, measures change in capacity or amount of power in a political system, while centralization refers only to a change in the distribution of power (decision-making capabilities). This suggests that penetration, as a measure of change in a national system's capacity to produce outputs affecting behavior, encapsulates the very heart of politics. And this is the problem I find with the term; it is a broad umbrella which is difficult, perhaps impossible to isolate from other variables. In discussing "penetration" rather than, for instance, the question of centralization, a whole range of additional data on attitudes and behavior becomes relevant. For penetration is, I would suggest, a less coherent term pointing toward what Karl Deutsch has defined as politics itself, the interplay of probabilities of enforcement with habits of compliance,[6] or what Easton calls the "essential variables" of a political system - "the behavior related to the capacity to make decisions for the society and the probability of their frequent acceptance by most members as authoritative."[7]

My quarrel with penetration, therefore, is two pronged. Either it points toward a range of political variables of greater import than is suggest by its existence as a single item in a long list of development crises, in which case its basic significance for analyzing a political system should be clarified (thus not attempting to make it a single seperate variable) or the scope of its definition should be narrowed so that it comes closer to what may be called centralization. If the latter course is followed we can, then, focus on the traditional problem of how central authorities can or do increase their control over local government activities. For the purpose of studies in East Africa, this strategy would be of immediate relevance. Using the term "centralization" might also be helpful in improving communication between

political scientists and politicians in East Africa.)

Narrowing the concept of penetration, however, may not be desirable in the long run since in its full sence it aims at the most sensitive variable(s) of a political system. Therefore, let me suggest one procedure which might eventually help resolve the problem of to what extent penetration is a meaningful dimension for studying development. I believe a statistical inductive approach for building a new language for political development is possible which would reduce theoretical arguing over the relative merits of various lists of concepts.[8] The first step in this inductive approach would be to specify empirical measures that seem important for political development. (Lists of such variables could be complied from operational indicators for terms such as those listed in Table 1.) These would include information from surveys, content analyses, micro-studies of politics, econmic and communication data. After gathering cross-national data on these variables, a factor analysis could be performed to uncover the underlying factor structure of development. Statiscally independent dimensions of development would be obtained which then could be sompared with lists of development factors suggested by various conceptualizers.[9]

This approach obviously has a number of shortcomings. It depends on getting reliable data on significant variables. It still requires an arbitrary labeling of factors which may reintrosuce terminology problems. If, however, such a procedure were undertaken which included data on penetration variables, the results would either substantiate or cast doubt on the existence of "penetration" as a unique and manageable dimension of development. For example, if "penetration" variables loaded on two or more factors, one of which also had loadings for variables of internal violence and unrest, the tendency would be to reject "penetration" as a real dimension in favor of another dimension which we might call "compliance."

A dialogue of this sort between theory builders and data collectors built around statistical analysis might slow down the proliferation of new jargon and promote broader agreement on what are the basic dimensions for measuring political development, what operational indices are appropriate for each of these dimensions, and what are the most desirable strategies for future research.

II

One solution, I have suggested, to the terminological problem with penetration would begin by acquiring some measures related to this concept. Just as the psychologist designs a test for measuring some hypothesizes trait by choosing questions or measures which seem to him likely to be indicators of this trait, so the political scientist should begin a study of penetration by selecting variables which seem to be reflective of this dimension of development. Below I have outlined five variables or types of measures which seem to me related to the penetration concept. These measures, would have to be scaled by comparative analyses either through time or across countries or both.

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[6] Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government (New York, 1963).

[7] Easton, op. cit., p.96.

[8] Another approach, "analytic induction", recommended by Wendell Bell and others, might also be useful. This process involves beginning with an explanatory definition of a subject and then examining data. As each piece of evidence is gathered, the original definition is revised to avoid any exceptions to the generalizations being offered.

In employing these measures it will be useful to distinguish the relevant ranges of personal and activity with respect to which "penetration" is being measured. There are three levels easily distinguished which can be separately studied for the effects of penetration. These are: 1) populace as a whole; 2) political stratum or participants, e.g. elders, educated TANU, KANU members, voters; 3) those formally engaged in governing.

Below is the list of five penetration variables along with specific questions which data gatherers might ask.

1) Communication

a) hardware: roads, radios, telephones, letters etc.
b) information: charting of flows from center to periphery and back by topic to trace feedback, level of responsiveness, losses in transmission, and types of barriers.

These measures could give some idea of the extent to which up and downward flows between central and local government are balanced, that there is feedback and/or that entrophy of a closed system is being offset by growth of communication networks.

2) Rules and regulations: a study of the source, scope, and apparent objectives of the body of codified regulations accumulated by the governing process. Do these rules extend or limit local authority and decision-making perrogatives? Are these rules promulgated with or without participation by local authorities? How many rules are made at the local level as a percent of the total output? What is the level of knowledge and of compliance at various levels in a system?

3) Money: the taxation resources of the various governments and their internal transactions should give some indication of the extent of central government participation and penetration. Is local government self-supporting? Have local funds been reduced by national taxation? Who collects taxes and with what levels of government is this person associated by those who pay taxes? To what extent can locally conceived schemes be financed from the local treasury? What percent of the total economy is represented by government expenditure? What percent is local? What percent is national? At what level are the effective allocation decisions made?

4) Attitudes: Surveys of people's knowledge, identifications, expectations and commitment to respond positively to the government. These could be done at the three levels mentioned (populace, stratum, elite). The amount of and changes in identification with central and local government bodies could be measured. The degree to which attitudes and expectations are wide spread and consensual could be assessed. The willingness to accept and comply with government decrees and suggestions might be explored.

5) Armed force: the size and loyalty of the police, army and other special forces, such as Tanzania's National Service, need to be scrutinized. One would want to know about the

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[9] Exploratory efforts of this sort are reported by Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey," American Political Science Review (Sept., 1965), pp. 602-614. At Yale University, yward Alker, Jr. and Raymond F. Hopkins have also engaged in milar studies.

training, traditions and availability of such military units. The problem Kenya confronts of control in its Nothern Province due to the Shifta is a good example of the immediate relevance of this variable to the penetration capacity of developing nations.

It is clear that access to this type of data would not always be easy in East Africa due both to the underdeveloped state of social accounting and to the sensitivity officials may have to having their private matters examined. Moreover, as political leaders become aware of the value of information of this sort, problems of access may not diminish. Nevertheless, if political science is ever going to advance as a science or prove useful to decision-makers faced with coping with the strains of development, it will be necessary to step up the pace and systematization with which empirical data of this sort is gathered or generated. Moreover, as allocation of research projects are made, priorities should be based, at least in part, on whether the results of the research can positively effect future events. That is, research on penetration should have policy as well as theoretical consequences.[9]

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[9]From a study of penetration based on measures of these four types, strategies could be devised for national government policy to increase its effectiveness (i.e. to penetrate). The balance of indulgences and deprivations available to central government could be used in a way to spread the power, wealth, and well-being of those who actively support the central government. This would demand the critical abilities of the central government to identify those acts and individuals which are in fact "supportive." In pursuing such policies it would be important not to posit a model of centralized direction and lack of local initiative as the end goal. This narrow view of central loyalty and identification could foster a rigidity inimical to penetration. In order to have a government pursue effective policies with respect to expanding its administrative capacities, therefore, it might be wise to build in institutional checks to prevent bottlenecks in the upward flow of demands and responses to policies (e.g. an Ombundsman - as in Sweden - for government officials). The upward flow of communication is crucial for responsiveness and the growth of reciprocal social networks - the nerves of government (the image of a human nervous system denied its sense receptors and still trying to run or coordinate the body is, I believe, a good analogy). For this reason, perhaps, the study of communication flows may be the most essential of the four variables listed above.

POLITICAL PRENETRATION IN A RURAL AREA.

by Goran Hyden

I. Introduction:

It is generally recognized in African countries that the Government should or even has to be the principal agent of social and political change. Unlike the situation, for instance in the United States during the 18th century, when "the new nation" grew without any deliberate direction by a strong central authority, developing countries tend to stress the role of the state in promoting change. One of the major important questions, therefore, raised after independence in most African countries is how to organize political structures in order to achieve highest possible mobilizing response among the people for the purpose of building the new nation.

The study of this aspect of political development has in recent political science literature been sorted out under the concept of "penetration". The empirical research that falls under this heading has focussed mainly on how national policies are implemented at the peripheral spheres of the political system, how unity around a national ideology is achieved - or fails to be achieved - how the communications system is organized to promote the flow of ideas from the centre to the periphery, how a multi-tribal society can be effectively administered by a central authority, etc. Implied in most of this research is that at a certain stage of development a crisis will occur unless the Government can break the isolation of traditional societies and gear human and material resources towards an established national goal. Ward and Rustow(1) points out that motion away from a condition of massive political apathy is an important part of the process of political modernization.

Audrey Wipper in a recent paper pays attention to another aspect of penetration: (2)

> A problem of mobilization is that in breaking down traditional ways and creating new desires and values, the government runs the risk of unleashing a Pandora's box of discontent and frustration that may eventually be channeled into dissident-rebellious forces it cannot control, let alone effectively harness for its development programmes.

Ward-Rustow's assumption is that unless the government penetrates into the periphery of the system a crisis will occur. Audrey Wipper's point is related to what happens when the government puts too much emphasis on penetration, that is, mobilizes more forces than it can cope with. My feeling is that so far political scientists have concentrated too much on the assumption that, among others, Ward-Rustow have made. The reason for this seems to be our strong inclination to compare with modern political system. Penetration is an important feature of the latter type of systems and no government in developing countries can do without an apparatus that provides for penetration of values from the centre. The assumption is correct, but nor could a traditional tribal system penetrate without an effective system of talking drums.

* The research for this paper has been pursued during 1965. For much of its success I am indebted to my assistant Mr. Dominic Joseph, Bukoba and local government authorities.

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I think it is now time to shift the focus more towards the implications of the penetration process itself. What will happen in the traditional system if some drummer by mistake or deliberately misinterprets a message that he is supposed to deliver on his drum? What actually takes place in an African country when the government pumps new values into the system? Audrey Wipper has pointed to one possible consequence, over-penetration, that might lead to the creation of rebellious forces.

Obviously this is a crisis. The word itself is fashionable today, but often used in a very narrow sense. A crisis in a political system is generally thought of as a sudden explosion that wrecks the whole thing. But a political crisis does not necessarily have to be like an atomic explosion. It has no necessary time limit. It could equally well be thought of as a series of grenade explosions during a certain period of time, in other words, a series of incidents, that in the long run will create a breakdown situation in the system.

The purpose of this paper is to show the implication of government penetration in a rural area in Bukoba District, West Lake Region, Tanzania. Our intention is to show how traditional values relate to new government policy measures and their implementation, how difficulties might occur because of the survival of strong traditional beliefs. I will start describing relevent aspects of the traditional system, then turn to what happened during the colonial period and finally to the penetration of new ideas in the post-independence period. I feel justified to include so much history in this paper, simply because it points out the survival of traditional values and shows that the new government in Tanzania has a no easier task in penetrating than the colonial government used to have.

It should be mentioned that Bukoba District is situated in the north-western corner of Tanzania. Till 1959 it also used to consist of what is today known as Karagwe District, which lies to the west of Bukoba and bordering Rwanda (See Appendix I). Bukoba and Karagwe Districts have a common history, their people speak the same language, Luhaya, and the economic and social structures are the same. The total population of the two Districts today is estimated to 400,000, out of which three quarters live in Bukoba District. There is a concentration of people in the eastern part of the District along Lake Victoria. There is only one township in the area, Bukoba (about 4000 inhabitants). The rural population lives in clearly defined village units, some of which nowadays also function as trading centres. The cash crop of the area is coffee, Robusta along the lake, Arabica on the inland escarpments. Staple food is ebitoke-bananas.

We are mainly concerned with three villages in Bukoba District, Bugombe, Kitendagulo and Bwatangabo (geographical location, see Appendix I). My research includes two other villages, Kabagunda in Bukoba District and Kiruruma in Karagwe District, but the material from these two places are not considered in this paper, since it has not yet been coded and analyzed.

My justification for focussing on the village level is partly based on the fact that the village is the most important social unit in the area, partly because agriculture determines not only everyday life but also politics in the area. Moreover, not too many political scientistis have so far geared their interest towards the village level.(3)

II. The Traditional system:

a. The Bahinda invasion:

Like most of the Interlacustrine tribes the Hahaya have long been ruled by a Hima or Hinda aristocracy. It is believed that the ruling Hinda dynasty in Buhaya originates from Bunyoro.(4) Two

sons of the king of Bunyoro, Igaba, emigrated to the south at the end of the 16th century; one of them, Ruhinda, is supposed to have settled in Karagwe, the other Kibi, in Kiziba. According to the tradition, or at least one widely accepted version of it, the sons of Ruhinda established themselves in Karagwe, Ihangiro and Kyamtwara, which then comprised Kianja, Bugabo, and Bukara as well. The whole of Buhaya was conquered by the invaders and it is of importance to keep in mind that Kiziba traces its history back to Kibi instead of Ruhinda. Even today, Kiziba is considered different from the other chiefdoms.

The Bahinda were different from the indigenous Bantu population. They were taller, with distinct Hamitic features; they were a pastoral people, mainly depending on their long-horned cattle. While the Bantu population had a very loose clan organization, the Bahinda were bound together by adherence to a common chief. There is no evidence that the Bantu population fought the invaders. They seem to have peacefully accepted the Bahinda as their new rulers. The latter brought two new ideas to the area, that of chieftainship and that of cattle-breeding. Another aspect of the Bahinda invasion was the wide acceptance of their religious system. Cory-Hartnoll points out that there was not much difference between the religious ideas held by the indigeneous population and the invaders. Since the Bahinda were the mighty men of the land, their spirits were accepted as more powerful than those of the lesser men. (5)

This had great implications for the social system that emerged. It provided for a unified system of cultural values, at the same time legitimizing the newcomers as rulers. It turned out that unless you belonged to the right clan you could not become a member of the ruling elite; there was little room provided for social mobility for others than the "top" clans.

b. The position of the Chief:

The introduction of the Chief as a ruler meant integration of the many various clans and the creation of a tribal consciousness. The Chief was the leader of all clans and he determined their functions in society; specific occupations were as a rule given to members of certain clans. In other words, there emerged a certain division of labor in the traditional Buhaya society.

The position of the Chief was sacrosanct. It was recognized that he had a special relationship to God, the creator of all life on earth. As has been pointed out by C.J. Hellberg: (6)

> The Chief was the guarantor of the continued existence of all things living, and for the cosmic order. His link with the source of life meant that he was the possessor of life-force, magara.

Of special importance in Buhaya was the relationship of magara to the phases of the moon. It increased with the waxing and decreased with the waning of the moon. Every time at full moon the tribe gathered at the Chief's palace and by appearing to the public he reinforced his position as holder of the key to order in the tribe. Similarly, when the moon was down and invisible, the Chief was inaccessible. He was hidden in his residence and no decisions concerning the tribe could be taken or any decisions carried out.

As is the case among many Bantu tribes in East Africa, the Chief was by virtue of being related to the founders of the tribe closer to God. The source of legitimacy for the absolute power of the Chief was divine. Now, could a Chief do anything wrong in such a situation? The answer to that question is yes. It is true, that everything a Chief did was right as long as he could do it. But his sphere of action was limited by the notion that the people held about his performance as holder of the power over life and death.

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If his tribe did not rosper or he killed people without any reason could be disposed.

A consequence of the position of Chiefs in Buhaya was the recognition that he owned all land and all cattle. As representative of the community he had the ultimate right to ownership of property. Cattle could be "borrowed" from the Chief according to a complicate system and land ownership depended upon the Chief. If some pieces of land were allocated to his favourites, these people were always liable to dispossession if their popularity with the Chief vanished.

There never emerged in Buhaya one single strong centralized chiefdom. Instead, the common feature was a continuous inter-chiefdom war that led to the splitting up of the original chiefdoms. The intra-tribal war also caused the need for a stronger internal organization of every chiefdom. The Chiefs combined a number of villages under the leadership of a sub-chief, known as the mwami, and almost exclusively a Muhinda. Some of these bami were quite powerful but the Chief remained the undisputed leader, all the others in the power structure depending on him.

c. Village organization:

In due course after the Bahinda invasion, the boundaries of the spheres of influence of the various clans were settled. The common principle followed was that the clan of the first settler in a village was recognized as the leading one and in most cases its head became the Chief's representative in the village. Some villages had a large number of clans and conflicts could not be avaoided. The Chief, therefore, had a special arbitrator appointed; he was either a rel tive or a favourite and became known as the mukungu. In most cases he became the most powerful man in the village, superceding that of the leadering clan head; this was reflected in his taking over the allocation of land in the village.

The village was the natural building block in the system. The family was the smallest unit in the social system. Between the family and the village was the clan, but not so important socially as the family or the village. The most common pattern in the village was that every family owned its own piece of land. A number of households varying from 30 to 100 made up an ordinary traditional Buhaya village. There was no open centre in the village and all plots of land were linked together by narrow paths. It happened in quite a few villages that one man had been given a large plot of land because he had done a favour to the Chief. Such a person held the rights to that land even if it happened that other families already had settled on it. That is the origin of the feudal nyarubanja system.

The villages generally thought of themselves as being part of a self-contented unit. If one asked them from where they came, they would always answer the name of their village. The main concern for the individual villager was obedience and harmonious social relationship with the neighbours in the village. The strong authoritarian system under which the Bahya lived was reinforced in the time of child rearing. The character of a young boy was almost exclusively determined by one single factor, obedience to his father, which also implied respect for elders. We have been told that in former times, a boy who tried to defend himself against his furious father could be sentenced to death as a result of his "obstruction".

In short the ideal situation for a Muhaya was to live in peace and harmony with the forces of life and death, to enjoy omugisha, blessing from hunger and disease and to be on good terms with his neighbours, to have emilembe, peace. There were many ways this could be shown, the most common being sharing coffee or local beer with the villagers. Friendship and trust were confirmed over a

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gourd of local beer **ar by** chewing coffee.

d. Cultivation of coffee:

Cultivation of coffee has always been important in Buhaya. The Robusta coffee plant is native to the area and it has always had great social and religious significance. The Arabica coffee is supposed to have been introduced in the area during the tribal wars with the Buganda. Each coffee plant was considered belonging to the Chief. Behind this lay the belief that the first coffee plant had been brought there by the Bahinda Chief Wamara, who was by then a great spirit in the religious hierarchy. The life and death af men was closely connected with the cultivation of coffee trees. Should it die, the man would also die. There were moreover certain religious rituals, in which coffee played an important role.(7)

When the Bahaya discovered the benefits of the Arabica plant they started to trade with the people in Buganda and especially on the Ssese Island. They had found that "coffee served as a useful dry ration when cooked, dried and made into a paste." (8)

On the whole, therefore, the foundations of coffee growing were laid for social and religious reasons rather than any other.

III. The Colonial Period:

a. The German Rule:

When the Germans arrived in Buhaya they found the area divided up into eight separate chiefdoms, Karagwe in the west, Ihangiro in the south, Missenye and Kiziba in the north and around Bukoba, Kianja, Kyamtwara, Bugabo and Bukara. The Germans used the principle "divide and rule" in trying ti impose their administration. They lacked sufficient manpower to run their new colony in East Africa and in Buhaya, Buzinza and Buha they decided to use the local Chiefs as their instruments; in short, the Germans adopted a system of indirect rule in the above-mentioned areas. Mr. D.L. Baines, the first British District Officer to arrive in Bukoba after the German defeat in 1916 gives the following description of the German administration (as quoted in Hans Cory: "The History of Bukoba District"):(9)

> Except when German interests were concerned the Administration interfered as little as possible in the interanl affairs of the various Sultanates (chiefdoms). Implicit obedience was required and undoubtedly obtained to all orders issued by the Government or the Sultans. Complaints against the Sultans were discouraged, presumably in accordance with true Prussian spirit that authority must be obtained right or wrong. Authority was entirely concentrated in the Sultans and they appointed, re-appointed or removed chiefs of all grades at will, a slavish subservience to themselves being the sole qualification for office."

A German ordinance in 1900 made it clear that all claims to land dependent upon the sovereign rights of chiefs now were transferred to the German Empire. It seems as if this ordinance was never enforced, however, because, as Cory points out(10) fees payable for allocation of land remained the property of chiefs until 1925.

The Germans made an effort to make the Bahaya plant coffee for cash crop purposes. The results were minimal and the production of coffee was during the German time still mainly determined by other reasons than obtaining a good and profitable cash crop.

The coming of Christianity was an important event. There was some hesitation on behalf of the Bahaya, but on the whole they found the Christian God much more powerful than their own Gods and spirits. The way the Chiefs reacted to Chritianity and the denomination they chose was of importance for the rest of the people. In many cases

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the Chiefs favoured the denomination they belonged to themselves.

b. The British rule and the emerging nationalism:

The administrative system in Buhaya did not change much during the German rule and the British found on their take-over in 1916 that the indegeneous system would fit as a medium of rule in the area. The British seem to have been anxious to diminish the authoritarian character of the traditional society. They gave the women equal rights to appear in court; fines and imprisonment replaced the old way of punishing criminals, the strokes. Traditional tributes were turned into local taxes and at least in theory the burden of obligations on part of the land tenants were eased; in practice however did much of the old nyarubanja system survive.

The British also made attempts to increase the coffee production by improved husbandry, proper sanitation, harvesting, drying and grading. As has been pointed out by Mr. Edward Barongo,(11) the farmers were very suspicious about the new measures and thought it was a colonial trick to destroy their shambas. Very critical did the situation become in the late 30's and early 40's when the British urged the farmers to cut down their banana trees in order to get rid of certain insects that tended to damage the coffee trees. Not surprisingly did the Bahaya ask themselves: What do the British know about cultivation of coffee and bananas that we do not know? Their doubts were reinforced by the Chiefs who had been to England and could varify that neither had the British coffee nor bananas in their shambas at home. As a matter of fact so strong was the suspicion among many farmers, that one of the main reasons for the spread of Tanganyika African Association in Buhaya, and particularly in the chiefdom of Kiziba was the reaction against this very colonial attempt to improve and protect the coffee production in the area.(12) The main advocate against the British was Mr. Ali Migeyo who remained one of the leading politicians in Bukoba till 1964.

British attempts to implant new ideas among the Bahaya almost always met with resistence. One of the effects of the effort to modify the authoritarian pattern of government in Buhaya seems to have been the spread of prostitution. The Bahaya woemn, outnumbering men, found themselves with full rights to make claims against their sometimes very ruthless and careless husbands. Many women took opportunity of the new law and ran away to practice prostitution rather than stay with their husbands. There was naturally a strong reaction against this on part of the male Bahaya. It became at an early stage a political issue. In 1932 does the Secretary of the African Association in Bukoba (13)write to the Chiefs' Council: (14)

> Most women leave their husbands and go to practice prostitution; the rate of prostitutes increase every year. In former times a Chief used to exile such girls from his chiefdom, but now the Chiefs themselves do not have the same power and have to abide the rule of the British. Marriage nowadays is like a play. The wife can leave her husband any time and since she is supported by the Government laws the husbands have nowhere to complain.

The reaction was easy to understand. The stability of relationships among the villagers was threatened and the whole ideal type of community, that a Muhaya had in mind, in danger.

Another thing that created strong protests among the Bahaya was the decision by the British to close the only Central School (Upper Primary School) in Buhaya and turn it into an Agricultural Training Centre. The concern, however, was not so much with that as the fact that they had to send their boys outside Buhaya. Again the African Association writes: (15)

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Our Bukoba boys under the age of 15 or 16 years who are sent abroad to Mwanza or Tabora or somewhere else lose the advantage or home education, they come back to their fatherland and enter into the School of the thrid teacher: World. They are grown-up people with the School education, but do not know sometimes how to speak properly their mother language, they do not understand how to live in community with their family and cannot even build a native hut for themselves and are quite alienated from the traditional histories of their country and do not know further the Geography of their local Divisions of the District they live in, they come back building castles in Spain,
A a long stay from their homes rendems them to denaturalized natives and useless for homelife as true Africans. The Central School course would be completed easily near their homes and parents, they would be sent abroad for the study of higher schools such as: Teacher Training Schools, High Schhols and Colleges.

The Chiefs were still very much regarded as the natural leaders of Buhaya and all the letters from the African Association to the Chiefs' Council were opened with the traditional greeting of the Chief, "Kamerere Lugaba". The African Association in its constitution also emphasized that its aim is to "guide people in obeying Government rules and those of the Chiefs, to obey them in every respect that is right." (16)

The British always used to side with the Chiefs and in the long run this led to local grievances especially in Kiamja, where the Bahinda were strong but divided up into two camps, the babinga and the bakimala. The latter wished to mix with the common man, while the former maintained that the Bahinda should remain with their exclusive privileges, such as not eating with ordinary people, not marry a non-Muhinda, work in the shamba, etc. After the second Worl War this dispute led to the creation of Kianja Labour Association, the objective of which was to work, "that is every kind of work, such as that a smith, preparing bark-cloth, cultivation, trade, etc." (17) The organization said moreover that a man who does not work is useless. These words were particularly directed against the Chief of Kianja, Bwogi, and the fact that the British supported him (all the time till 1956) increased the discontent with him in Kianja.

In 1954 when the KLA leaders felt that their organization would be banned, did one of their leaders exclaim: (18)

> No peace anywhere, no peace in our hearts, neither in our country nor in this world. Keep praying day and night. Be men!

The concern, again, reflected in these words is with the lack of peace, emilembe. Only by asking for help from God can an improved situation be achieved. There was a strong element of traditional thinking also among the early naticnalists in Buhaya.

During the 1950's did the power struggle between the Chiefs and the new nationalist elite sharpen. The majority of Chiefs claimed to remain as rulers and it took long time for the leaders of TANU to convince the Bahaya that this colonial Government and the Chiefs were wrong.(19)It is also significant that the major swing over to TANU took place after the visit to Buhaya by its President, Julius Nyerere. He could legitimize the new ideas and the nationalist organization. In the eyes of the Bahaya, he was not simply a spokesman for a certain political faction in the area.

To a large extent one might argue, was the anticolonial reaction in Bukoba determined by the feeling that the traditional values that the Bahaya strongly adhered to were threatened. It would be

wrong to argue that this was the single factor determining the emergence of nationalism in the area, but, as in the case of the African Association and the Kianja Labour Association, much of their concern was about the condition of the traditional society, the absence of "peace", the breakdown of the family unit, the alienation of their children from customary beliefs, change in agricultural methods, etc.

IV. The Present Day System:

a. The administrative structures:

Today, TANU is a well-organized party in Buhaya. The whole of Bukoba District at least is organized into the new cell system of ten households. Many of the old village units have been merged to larger administrative units. A "village" - nkungu - today consists of 500 to 1000 households. Much of the administrative system used during the colonial period has been maintained, however, although the role function has been changed or a differentiation of roles been introduced. The present structural organization in the district compare in the following way with the one of the colonial period:

	COLONIAL:	PRESENT DAY
District:	Representative: Buhaya Chiefs' Council (originally exclusively ex-officio, later with inofficial members elected to the Council.) Executive: Secretary to the Council.	Representative: Bukoba District Council (popularly elected Executive: Executive Officer, Specialized Officers.
Chiefdom:	Representative: Chiefdom Council - Lukiko (established after the Second World War. Chiefs and subchiefs automatically members.) Executive: Chief - Mukama	Representative: None Executive: Division Executive Officer (The seven chiefdoms in Bukoba District are now merged into five divisions).
Subchiefdom:	Representative: Gombolola Council (Introduced after the Second World War. Sub-chief plus elected members). Executive: Sub-chief - Mwami	Representative: TANU Branch committee (Chairman and six members elected by the chairman of the "kumi-kumi" cells.) Executive: Assistant Division Executive Officer (often called Mwami) and TANU Secretary.
Village:	Representative: Nkungu Council or Village Council (Village headman plus elected councillors) Executive: Village headman - Mkungu plus assistants known as babezi and clan heads.	Representative: Village Development Committee (especially elected chairman plus important men in the village also elected. Sometimes sub-branches of the VDC. At the very bottom, cells consisting of ten households each - kumi-kumi - with elected chairman) Executive: Village Executive Officer - Mkungu. Some cases assistants known as babezi).

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The major changes relate to what type of persons who hold the various offices. None of the Chiefs is left as administrative head of his chiedom. Of the five DEOs in Bukoba District, one is a former Chief (but transferred to another chiedom), one is a former sub-chief, the three others appointed on their TANU record. All of them, however, have at least St VIII education plus some administrative experience.

At the sub-chiefdom level, the Mwami used to be a favourite or a relative of the Chief. The ADEO today is most often a St VIII graduate with some experience in the party organization. As is the case also with TANU Branch Secretaries, the ADEOs are generally young. (20)

Some changes in recruitment at the village level have also taken place. The Bakungu during the colonial time had usually inherited their position; in many cases they had no education at all. The VEOs today are recruited on basis of educational achievement (St VIII) but you still find VEOs who due to their long experience have maintained their position after independence. The Mkungu is no longer chairman of the Village Council, but "executive secretary" of the VDC. He is almost exclusively a man from the village. (It had recently been suggested that VEOs should be liable to transfers after some years service in one place).

The majority of the officers of the District Council is nowadays not Bahaya. There is still a strong tendency to regard them as banyamahanga - foreigners. They are not necessarily distrusted but looked upon with suspicion particularly among the villagers. Those foreigners who work in Buhaya and who have been in contact with local Bahaya have verified to me how difficult it many times can be to establish trustful relationships with the Bahaya.

In short, considerable changes have taken place in recruitment to political roles and also in the function of certain role-holders. But as we will try to show, many of the traditional beliefs and values still prevail within the system and makes government penetration a difficult operation. Before turning to two case studies of Government efforts to penetrate new ideas into villages, let us have a look at how information is received at the village level. As Daniel Lerner has shown, mass communications media tend to be descriptive, primary, face-to-face communication prescriptive.(21) It should be of great relevence in a systemwhere so much emphasis is put on trust and respect, which if these two means prevails.

b. Communications systen

Bukoba is physically more distant from Dar-es-Salaam than most other places in the country. Although Bukoba is connected with the rest of the country by an all-weather road and regular boat services on the lake, there exists a feeling of isolation. For instance, a Government officer who wants to deliver a message by phone to Dar-es-Salaam has to call early in the morning. After 9 a.m. the connection is usually too bad. Moreover all calls have to go by way of Kampala-Nairobi.

The quality of reception of Radio Tanzania programmes in Bukoba varies. A survey that we did with VDC leaders in our villages suggests that it is almost as common to listen to other Swahili-speaking stations and preferably "Sauti ya Kenya":

Village:	Number of respondents	Listen to: Dar es Salaam	Nairobi	Kampala	Never listens
Bugombe	19	4	4	3	15
Bwatangabo	25	16	6	0	9
Kitendagulo	39	22	20	5	23
Total	83	42	30	8	47

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It should be noted that in Bwatangabo there was a clear choice; almost all respondents said that they listened more to one station than the other, while in Kitendagulo and Bugombe the respondents were inclined to give both Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam as the most common answer.

The same respondents were asked which newspaper they most often read. By far the most commonly read was "Kiongozi" published by the Roman Catholic Church in Tanzania twice monthly. It is written in Swahili and carries the most important national news. The official Government Swahili newspaper "Uhuru" that appears daily has no readers among these VDC leaders except for a few in Kitendagulo. The close distance to town make it possible for these persons to obtain a copy. The distribution of other newspapers published by religious agencies are more widespread in the political leadership group in these villages. "Rumuli" (Catholic) and "Ija Webonere" (Protestant) both written in the vernacular are the second and third most spread papers in the villages. They appear twice and once a month respectively.

No breakdown has been done here in order to show to what type of programmes village leaders prefer to listen or what type of articles they tend to prefer reading. The data is entered here only to illustrate the potential effect of radio and newspapers in an area so distant from the political centre.

On the whole, as expected, there is very high dependence on face-to-face communications in our villages, not only among the political leaders, but also among the ordinary villagers. We asked a sample of taxpayers 22 in the village, "From where do you get most of your political information:

family, relatives, friends,
radio or newspapers
government circulars?

Distributed according to the educational level of the respondent does the following communications pattern emerge:

Gets it from:	St XII	St VIII	St VI	St IV	St II	None
Fam-Friends	17% (1)	15,5% (2)	28% (9)	67% (41)	86%(19)	86% (67)
newsp-rad:	83% (5)	61,5% (8)	37,5%(12)	15% (9)	- -	6,5%(5)
govt.circ.	- -	23% (3)	34,5%(11)	18% (11)	14%(3)	7,5%(6)
total:	100 (6)	100 (13)	100 (32)	100(61)	100(22)	100 (78)

Except for a small educated "elite" in the villages almost everybody claims to get most of his information from his closest environment, that is, family, relatives, or friends.

V. Two cases of Government penetration:

a. Imporvement in coffee cultivation:

One of the big problems in Bukoba District is the low quality of the coffee produced. The reason for this is mainly traditional: the tendency to look at coffee as primarily a product for social rather than economic use, lack of knowledge and incitement to change, absence of competition from European settler plantations, etc. While the value of the coffee crop in Tanzania 1964 rose from £6 to £11 million this was almost exclusively due to improvement in other coffee-growing areas of the country. Accrding to the international coffee agreement, there are few ways available for increasing the output of coffee; one of them is to improve quality. It has been a Government target to improve the standard of coffee cultivation in Bukoba in order to increase the export value of c coffee. Moreover, the Government is aware of the danger for the Bahaya coffee farmers if they do not change methods; with other coffee-growing areas in the country, improving at a high speed,

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the Buhaya farmer will in the long run lag terribly behind. They will make up a rural slum area.

The main reasons in other words behind introducing improved methods for coffee cultivation in Buhaya have been two: a) to increase the export value of ooffee from Tanzania; b) to improve the economic standard of the individual farmers.

We have already described at length how coffee first came into use in Buhaya and for what reasons. We have discussed the implications of the attempt to improve coffee growing in the area. We will now turn to more recent events.

Bukoba Native Cooperative Union was founded in 1950. Its primary aim was to give the Buhaya farmers better security when marketing their products. Instead. of selling th individual traders, mainly Asians, the farmers were organized into local societies from which they annually obtained arrears based on a fixed price. The Union had a flying start benefitting from the price boom on the world market. But in 1955 did the price begin to fall and the short golden period was over. The farmers had got money enough to build new houses with corrugated iron roof; they could afford to buy new clothes, etc. Now they had to cut down on all expenses.

BNCU split and a rival organization, Buhaya Coffee Planters' Association was founded. It spread promises (often false) about better coffee prices if they joined the association. Many farmers were naturally attracted thereby and could not be convinced that the price was determined by the situation on the world market and not by the leaders of the Planters' Association. Moreover, since the price in Uganda was higher than in the Buhaya, large quantities of coffee were smuggled on boat or in empty petrol tanks on the trailers running across the border.

Nowadays, Bukoba Co-operative Union has the monopoly of marketing the local coffee. It has consolidated itself, the smuggling has ended - at least temporarily - and the vast majority of farmers in Buhaya are members of a local society. There is all the same not complete satisfaction with the situation among the farmers. Many of them still think back on the golden years, when they used to get high prices for their coffee. The grievances for the low coffee price is often turned against the Union itself and it is not unusual to hear farmers say that they do not really benefit from being members of the Union.

BCU's main concern has been the marketing of coffee and teaching improved methods in growing coffee has been of secondary interest, partly because they have lacked the skilled personnel required.

As is shown in the following table the total production of coffee in Bukoba District has not changed much during the last 30-35 years (23)

Year	Total production in tons, both Arabica and Robusta:
1905	234
1910	493
1920	1269
1925	2560
1929	6794
1934	10219
1939	10861
1946	4397
1951	7960
1955	7463
1960	8369

There is a higher persentage of people in Kitendagulo, the village bordering Bukoba who have seriously thought of moving. The higher inclination towards mobility might partly be explained by its geographical location. It is interesting to note, however, that except for two of the 14 respondents who want to move all of them like to go to another rural area, not a town. Although they exposed to urban influence every day because of the location of their village they prefer moving to another village, where more land is available.

In short, a very limited number of our respondents would seriously think of moving somewhere else and almost all of them have a preference for somewhere else in Buhaya, where land is available. The respondents wishing to go to town are very few.

Priscilla Reining 28 pointed out in 1952 that "the population and the land under fixed cultivation seem to be remarkably stable" and although quite a few changes in the villages organization taken place since independence, the persistence of the village as the most important social and political unit is very strong. If you ask a villager today from where he comes he will give you the same answer as his ancestors have always done - with reference to his home village. It is very common that Bahaya working in Bukoba township prefer to live in their home village and commute, by car, bus or bicycle to town. One would expect that as a result of this new influences would be pumped into the village, but except for certain things that carry a high prestige value, very little is adopted in the village. We have in our villages randomly asked people what they first ask when they meet one of their relatives or friends who has just been to Bukoba. The most common questions seem to be:

"How did you arrive and what time?"
"How are our relatives and friends in town?"

Similar non-political questions are also asked. On the whole there is little desire to obtain information about what is goind on in the "outside world" (outside the village.)

Newcomers in a village are always regarded with suspicion unless they are friends of some respected man in the village. It is for instance against village regulations to receive a guest without informing the VEO. It is not easy to break through the Buhaya wall of suspicion,29 but once you have done it and established confidence, the Bahaya are usually very accessible.

VI. Conclusion:

The Government in Tanzania has made great efforts to link the villages in different parts of the country with the outside world through a chain of "development committees" of which the VDC is the basic unit. There is a deliberate effort to create a two-way channel of information, to strengthen both penetration and participation. But the question arises: How interested in change are the villagers themselves and how much of penetration of new ideas do they stand?

As has been shown in the paper all through the history of Buhaya in this century, they have reacted when their traditional values have been threatened. So they did during the colonial period and so they keep doing. During the pre-colonial period it was the Chief who was responsible for maintaining emilembe n' omugisha in the country, later it became the colonial authority and at present it is the central Government in Dar-es-Salaam. Land is the basis for their existence, the village, the unit that determine their social life, peace and well-being, the ideal situation that the Muhaya tries to achieve. If any of these factors that determine social and political life in the village is threatened there is a reaction, and as has been shown here it is still very strongly felt. More than two thirds of our respondents in Bugombe, Kitendagulo and Bwabamgabo would answer the question

"What would you like to be admired for?" with adjectives like "peaceful","good-hearted", "honest", "faithful", "love others", etc. Only a few would say "patriotic" or"harworking", some "poor". It is generally considered that God decides who will become rich in the village. It is usually not because of own har work.

Most Bahaya live in the shadow of past prosperous years. They are aware of their had economic condition, but unaware of the possibilities to solve the problems, mainly because they are still so concerned with the traditional system and unable to break through its strong walls. Most people still regard it as the duty of the central Government - resonsible for their well-being - to help them out of their difficulties. But how can the Government do it without threatening traditional values?

It is obvious from many individual cases in Bahaya that a change in the value system can take place and mobilization of resources in Buhaya is after all not a utopian project. But is seems in the present situation, where people still are reluctant to change and suspicious because of recent political power strmggles in the District 30 that penetration is a thing that has to be considered with care. Many Bahaya leaders used in the penetration process suffer from the fact that they are associated with one particularl political faction and hence do not command full confidence with the people. People from outside Buhaya may, although they are looked upon as banyamahanga, established themselves as political and cultural brokers. But again, Government policy is to switch its officers around after short intervals and therefore the person will seldom get a chance to fulfill his function as innovator.

The Bahaya are despite their tribal consciousness, aware of themselves as being Tanzanians and their affection to the new nation very strong. They know very little about the Government and what it is doing for them, but have the highest respect for President Nyerere. Although the President himself plays down all efforts to establish him as a charismatic leader, there is a strong tendency among the Bahaya to regard him as such. Like the situation of the Chief in the old days, his authority is considered sacrosanct. He legitimizes the system and the effect of his appearances in a Buhaya village is long-lasting. In the present situation, however, the problem is that he is too far away from them, he cannot visit them so often and the message delivered by another official in the system does not carry the same weight as the words of the President. Much of the problem related to penetration in Buhaya, therefore, seems to lie not so much with which political role sons involved in carrying out the new policies. Is he an acceptable man?

This paper has been an attempt to point to some of the problems of penetration at the micro level. I am sure that what has been discussed here will not be considered a major crisis of penetration. Al the same it has its repercussions on the political system. The Government today is more aware of the need for penetration than the colonial Government used to be and there will probably be less patience with failure to obtain a mobilizational response at the local level. What will be the reaction in Buhaya if the Government feels it necessary to introduce more coercive measures to change the traditional system? As has been shown, the individual Muhaya farmer feels already deeply effected by the two Government measures mentioned in this paper - improvement of coffee growing and efforts to open new land. At the same time it is clear that the Government consider it necessary to carry through these measures as a way to icnrease the national income. In short, at the bottom of the penetration crisis discussed here lies a classical and over-important question in political science: How far should the interests of the State prevail over those of the indi-d dual in a situation where one might argue that the individual does not know what is seemingly best for him?

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Notes:

1. Ward-Rustow: Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, p 458.
2. Audrey Wipper: Pentration, Working Paper prepared for Political Science Research Programme, Makerere U.C. 1965, p 5.
3. Relevant studies of actors determining village politics are for instance, A.W. Southall: Micropolitics in Uganda, EAISR Conference paper, January 1963 and Norman Miller: Village Leadership in Tanzania, EAISR Conference paper, December 1964.
4. See Hans Cory: History of Bukoba District, Mwanza undated. There to Bunyoro as the country from which they emigrated. It has also been argued that the invasion of Bahinda took place at two different occasions separated by hundred and fifty years.
5. See Cory-Hartnoll: Customary Law of the Haya Tribe, Tanganyika Territory, Internation African Institute, London 1945, Appendix III.
6. C.J. Hellberg: Missions on a Colonial Frontier, West of Lake Victoria, Studia Missionalia Uppsaliensia VI, 1965,p 33.
7. ibid, p 71. and Jervis: A History of Robusta Coffee in Bukoba, Bukoba District Book.
8. Edward Barongo: "Bukoba Coffee suffers from years of neglect", The Standard, August 9, 1965.
9. Cory: History of Bukoba District, p 155.
10. ibid, p 161.
11. Edward Barong op. cit.
12. My main sources of information on this point are interviews with leaders of Tanganyika African Association in Bukoba.
13. African Association was the continuation of the first proto-nationalist organization in Buhaya, called the Bahaya Union; the latter was founded in 1924.
14. Letter to the Bakama Council, dated 4.11.1952, from the Secretary of the African Association, Bukoba.
15. Letter to the Government Inspector of Schools for Lake and Western Province, dated 27.1.1935 from the Secretary of the African Association, Bukoba.
16. Constitution of the African Association, Bukoba, published 31.1.1935.
17. Minutes of a meeting held at Kanazi, Kianja, on 11.1.1947 between the Chief, Bwogi, and leaders of Kianja Labour Association.
18. Report by the Deputy Mukama to the Chief of Kianja on a Kianja Labour Association meeting at Kanachumu Football Pitch, 12.6.1954
19. My main sources of information on this point are again interviews with political leaders in Bukoba.
20. See, my paper prepared for this conference on the Tanzanian election.
21. See, Daniel Lerner, the Passing of Traditional Society, 1958, p.55
22. Every village in Bukoba District has a list of the taxpayers. From that list we chose every seventh name, which gives a good sample of the village population. The total respondents in Bugombe were 58, in Kitendagulo 56 and Bwatangabo 98.
23. For this information I am indebted to Mr. Karl-Heinz Friedrich an Agricultural Economist, who pursued research in Bukoba District 1964-65.
24. For this point I am also indebted to Mr. Friedrich.
25. Everett E. Hagen: On the Theory of Social Change, MIT, 1962,p 176.

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26. See Audrey Richard's chapter, "Traditional Values and Current Political Behavious" in L.A. Fallers: The King's Men, OUP, 1964.

27. See my Election paper.

28. Priscilla Reining: Village Organization in Buhaya, EAISR Conference paper, June 1952.

29. The author of this paper has experienced the many difficulties that might occur when trying to do research in Buhaya villages. It has sometimes taken long time to convince the villagers that our research won't do them any harm, such as lead to a change in the land tenure system. We have also had to make clear that we are neither "Government spies" nor "Communists".

30. See my Election Paper.

THE TANZANIAN ELECTION.

THE WEST LAKE STORY:

by Goran Hyden

Introduction:

The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse the general election in Tanzania last Spetember with particular reference to West Lake Region. The Region consists of four districts, Bukoba Karagwe, Biharamulo and Ngara; Bukoba district which is by far t the most densely populated was for the election divided into three constituencies, Bukoba, Kianja Bukara and Ihangiro; each one of the other districts made up one constituency, Each constituency has its own characteristics and could therefore be treated separately. Our attempt in this paper, however, is to bring together as much information as possible from the various constituencies in order to illustrate some general points. As will become clear from reading this paper, some constituencies are more thoroughly treated than others. This is particularly true about the three Bugoba constituencies and Karagwe. The reason is simple: my research assistant and myself had limited time and facilities to travel around and it became a natural choice to concentrate on the above-mentioned four constituencies, which were from a national point of view perhaps the most important and from ours the most accessible. In sshort, although the information referred to in this paper comes from the whole Region, the main focus is on the Bukoba and Karagwe constituencies.

The author of this paper had at the time of the election spent almost a year in Bukoba and Karagwe districts pursuing research for a Ph.D. thesis in Political Science. Therefore the general knowledge of these two districts and the personal research interest of the author have also determined the focus of this paper.

We started our field research for this study at the end of July at the time of the district conference - and continued till mid-October. We have personally interviewed all the official candidates, have though various sources obtained information about the other nominated candidates. Thanks to the kind cooperation of the Regional administration in Bukoba we could obtain background information on the large number of the delegates at the district conference. We have atteneded about 20 campaign meetings in the Region. After the election we ran a questionnaire with a sample of the population in four villages in Bukoba and one village in Karagwe district. Our research was familiar to the people in thses five villages, since they are included in the work for my Ph.D. We could not notice any suspicion on part of the villagers towards our election study.

II. History of the Region:

West Lake Region was established only a few years ago. Until 1959 there used to be three districts; Bukoba, Ngara and Biharamulo; Karagwe was then part of Bukoba. Karagwe obtained complete independence 1965 when its first district council was established.

a) Bukoba and Karagwe have a common history. In the 16th century they were both invaded by Hamitic people from the north. The invaders, known as Bahina, established themselves as rulers with a chief as the central authority. Karagwe has always remained one chiefdom, while in Bukoba there has been a splitting up of the o original chiefdoms; at the time of the German occupation there were seven and they were all recognised as separate chiefdoms by the colonial authority. One chiefdom, Messenye, had for long time been part of Buganda, another, Kiziba, has a partly different history than the rest of the chiefdoms. This has some bearing politically, since people from Kiziba have in the other chiefdoms been regarded as "the enemies".

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The traditional system in Bukoba and Karagwe were strongly authoritarian. The chief was an absolute ruler, his power sacrosanct; in the family the father demanded total obedience from his children. Little change in the system took place during the German and British colonial rule. The foreign powers used the chiefs as their instruments of rule; their authority was never q questioned.

The people in Bukoba and Karagwe are almost exclusively living on coffee and bananas, coffee having come into use long time ago mainly for social and religious reasons. Adherence to land is very strong. To leave a land plot that one has inherited is a shame and disgrace, selling land without the consent of the clansmen even worse. The village is perhaps the most important social unit; to live in peace with the neighbours in the village is an important objective for everyone. In short, agriculture has always determined and still determines life in Bukoba and Karagwe. The life of the average Muhaya - the name of the tribe in the area - is orientated towards land and rural life, Bukoba-the only town in the Region- is sociologically rather an extension of rural life than a separate urban unit.

Missionaries, both Roamn Catholic and Protestant, have long been working in Bukoba and Karagwe. They provided education for a large number of Bahaya. The rivalry between Catholics and Protestants was sometimes very deep, and leading to division in the villages. For instance, Protestants could not enter Catholic schools and vice-versa. Moreover, those Muslims who wanted education beyond the Koran, had no chance to get into a Christian school unless there were very special circumstances. This left the area for a long time with an educated Christian elite and an uneducated Muslim minority with few opportunities for upward social mobility.

The first proto-nationalist association was formed in Bukoba in 1924 and called Bahaya Union. Some years later it changed the name to African Association. It was dominated by the new educated elite but also contained some important Muslim traders. The anti-colonialist movement really got started in the early 1940s when there was a strong reaction to government attempts to improve coffee growing in the area. Tanganyika African Association got a fairly substantial membership outside Bukoba town and was led by a farmer, Ali Migeyo. In 1954 Ali Migeyo was detained as a result of his political activities; at this time TANU was introduced in the area. It based its organization on TAA membership and members of Kianja Labour Association; this association had for ten years been operating in Kianja chiefdom. TANU spread in the area particularly after 1957, when its President, Julius Nyerere, had visited there.

TANU was first run by political veterans, such, as Mzee Lugizibwa, who was among the founders of Bahaya Union in 1924, and Zefrin Kashumba of the Kianja Labour Association. To assist this old generation came young energetic men like Edward Barongo, a former policeman and Samuel Luangisa, the son of a sub-chief.

The TANU Annual Conference in 1958 in Tabora, which led to the split in the leadership and the break-off by Zuberi Mtemvu and others into Tanganyika African National Congress, had its implications in Buhaya as well. A faction broke with the local TANU group and established their TANC branch. At the same time United Tanganyika Party, sponsored by the colonial administration, won supporters in the area. Although TANC lost the election in 1960 it remained a fairly strong group in Bukoba district and particularly in Kianja and Bugabo chiefdoms.

The relationship between the political elite, notably the local TANU leaders, and the educated and religious elites were not always the best and led to a direct crisis in the 1963 district council election. Many teachers had with concern watched the

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takeover of the local TANU machinery by, as they meant, an uneducated and Muslim dominated minority. This political "in-group" was also exclusive and did particularly not like the Catholic-educated elite to get in. This mutual suspicion made the latter ones try to get into the District council without official TANU support. They ran independently and 19 of them succeeded to get into the council, which altogether has 51 seats. Allegations were made that religion and politics had been mixed, since the Catholic Church itself was supposed to have supported the teachers, almost exclusively Catholic by denomination. The district council was dissolved a few months later by the Minister for Local Government and Housing; he holds constitutionally this power prerogative and he can also appoint new members to the council, which he in fact did in July 1965. Moreover, there was a ban on all teachers to join the politics, unless they resigned from their position. Teachers were told that they should stick to their work, contribute effectively to nation-building and not indulge in political faction wars.

In summary, one might say that around and after independence four distinct political groups had emerged in the area:

1. TANU leaders and their most loyal supporters; not dominated by but with proportionally high number of Muslims at the top.
2. The teachers and religious leaders; mainly Catholic.
3. The remaining TANC group; local areas, such as Kamachumu, very strong.
4. The chiefs and their supporters, mainly old people; particularly strong in Kianja, Kyamtwara and Bugabo chiefdoms.

b) Biharamulo district has a hsitory similar to that of Bukoba and Karagwe. The biggest chiefdom in the district, Buzina, has for years been run by a Hinda dynasty. Besides Buzinza there were two other chiefdoms in the district. Kimwani, originally part of Buzina, and Busamibro, inhabited by the Basumbwa.

The district has suffered terribly from tse-tse flies since the late 19th century, when a pest caused the death of cattle and emigration of many people. There are only about 50,000 people in the district which is dominated by bush country and a game reserve. Efforts to open up new land has been made along the lakeshore where people recently have immigrated and started cotton growing.

The principal TANU leader in the early days both in Biharamulo and Ngara was Twaibo Songoro, now Regional chairman of TANU. The organizational work suffered and still suffers from the bad communications int the district.

The chief of Buzinza Stanislaus Geassusura was in 1962 appointed Area Commissioner of Biharamulo district; he had never actively engaged in TANU before since he was a civil servant. He remained there for almost two years, when he was transferred. Early 1965 during the new area commissioner some financial irregularities which effected the political situation in the district were discovered.

c) Ngara district consists of two chiefdoms Busubi and Bugufi, of which the latter one used to be closely connected with Burundi.

Although the chiefs in both chiefdoms in some way were related to the Tusi dynasty in Burundi, the chief of Bugufi, was regarded as inferior to the other, because his mother might have been of Hutu stock. Hence the chief of Busubi would never eat or drink with him. The Busubi chief was the first to become a Christian, but due to CMS activities, education spread much faster in Bugufi. Coffee was introduced in the area during the 1920s and the chiefdom got one of the first cooperative societies in the territory (1936).

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Busubi has remained much poorer and the area has so far not lent itself very easily to economic progress. Since the time when local poll-tax was introduced it has been the habit of Busubi (and some Bugufi) men to go to Uganda, Mwanza or Bukoba for work; that is the only way they have been able to earn money to pay tax. This emigration is very common even today and leaves the Busubi area run by women.

Bugufi is much more densely populated than Busubi. When the Rwandese refugees started to pour into Ngara district many of them wanted to settle in Bugufi, but the local people objected. It was instead arranged for their settlement in Busubi, but here the land was poor. The refugee problem became a local political issue for some time, and heightened the division between the two chiefdoms in the district.

III. Constituency boundaries and Registrations.

In the 1960 election there were two constituencies in the Region. Bukoba and Karagwe was one, Ngara-Biharamulo the other. Edward Barongo was returned unopposed in the latter, George Kahama, the manager of Bukoba Native Cooperative Union in the former. Beside these two, Mr. Shell Muhanna, was elected on a special ticket to represent racial minorities.

According to the new constitution there was to be six constituencies, Ngara and Karagwe with about 100,000 inhabitants each and Biharamulo with about 50,000 were to be three separate constituencies. Bukoba district was divided up as follows:
1. Bukoba constituency: consisting of Bukoba town, Kiziba, Missenye and Kyamtwara division(Kyamtwara and Bugabo chiefdom) Bukara chiefdom excluded.
2. Kianja/Bukara constituency: consisting of the whole of Kianja divis on/chiefdom plus Bukara chiefdom, part of Kyamtwara division
3. Ihangiro constituency: Ihangiro division/Chiefdom.

The main reason behind this division was to get constituencies with fairly equal population. Now Bukoba turned out to be larger in termd of population that the other two, Ihangiro being a bit smaller than Kianja-Bukara; on the whole however they were equally large.

The registration process started in the beginning of June and continued for two months. It has been reported from the other parts of the country that many villagers believed that they had to pay tax in order to register and therefore preferred to hide rather than register. We have not come across such misunderstandings in West Lake Region. In Bukoba district, however, the registration period coincided with payment of aarrears from the local cooperative societies and the primary objective of the village executive officers at this time was tax collection. In some cases, we know that the VEOs, did not mix the two things but preferred to do tax collection and registration separately. This way, however, registration was left till the very last days of the period. Few people voluntarily went to the house of the VEO to register. He had to visit every house to get people registered. Was he a lazy man, or occupied by his own things or simply had a too big area to cover, he could visit the houses only once. It therefore happendd in some cases that people were never approached for registration because they were not at home when the VEO came to see them about registration. It was reported from the district headquarters in Bukoba that many people came after July 31 to ask for a registration card.

Of those who registration, it is believed to have been a majority of women. The reason for this in Ngara and Biharamulo is obvious: the men are not at home. In Bukoba no particular reason could be given by the Area Secretary , except that there are more women than men in the district.

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The registration figures for the Region are as follows:

Constituency	total	men	Women
Bukoba	38.709	-	-
Kianja/Bukara	35854	-	-
Ihangiro	37.060	-	-
Karagwe	29.695	-	-
Biharamulo	10.648	-	-
Ngara	35.608	11.674	23.934

The only real breakdown between men and women was made in Ngara and this shows how much begger the number of registered women was there. In Ngara it is also worth while remembering, 22.208 people registered, in Bugufi while 15.400 in Busubi.

In Bukoba constituency it was reported that registration was lower in Kiziba division than in others.

One estimation is that the Region, of all those eligible (Tanzanians and above 21 years), about two thirds registered; the figure is a bit higher in Ngara and Ihangiro, while a bit lesser in Biharamulo and Kianja/Bukara.

IV. The Pre-selection Process:

Nomination papers were available at the Area Secretary's office from around the 15th of July and were due to be handed in on the 26th the same month. On that day 31 papers (one was disqualified because he had used supporters for his nomination who were residing outside the constituency) had been handed in by candidates in Bukoba district, 3 in Karagwe, 3 in Biharamulo and 9 in Ngara.

Some used just the very last two days to get the necessary number of names; many used the easiest way possible to get their names. Others, again, systematically went round to get names of local leaders in various parts of the constituency. Since the candidates for all three Bukoba constituencies were to be selected at the same conference it was important to get support also from conference delegates outside the home constituency. At least two candidates in Bukoba district had an agreement that aimed at extending their respective support beyond the boundaries of the home constituency.

Although many of the nominated candidates were actually working outside the constituency in which they decided to stand, the majority of them personally organized the campaign to get the twenty-five names. Mr. Edward Barongo, at that time Junior Minister in Dar-es-Salaam, managed to visit the district twice just before the district conference. Also Mr. George Kahama, Ambassador in Bonn, personally visited his constituency, Karagwe. Others failed, however, for some reason or another to organize this personally and had to ask other people to run this campaign for them.

It was clear to most of the nominated candidates in Bukoba district when the time for the district conference appraoched that a large number of delegates already were lined up certain ones among them. All the same, the evening before the conference, when most of the delegates had arrived at Bukoba, there were strenuous efforts on part of the candidates to convince the delegates to vote for them next day.

There are 34 TANU branches in Bukoba district and everyone was supposed to send their chairman and two delegates as their official representatives to the conference; besides these three who had the right to vote at the conference, the secretary of the branch attended; he had however no right to vote. Present at the conference were also district TANU leaders and the Regional Commissioner, who presided over the whole thing.

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Before making a presentation of the soical composition of the district conference delegates it should be pointed out that they, a few weeks earlier, had been elected as branch representatives by the chairman of the local kumi-kumi cells.

In the bukoba district we obtained information about the branch representatives from 28 of 34 branches.

Age distribution shows that the vast majority of the delegates were between 31 and 50 years, the secretaries almost always being the youngest:

position:	18-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
Chairman	1	10	12	4	0
delegate I	1	11	14	1	1
delegate II	2	13	9	1	0
secretary	9	13	5	0	0
total:	13	47	40	6	1 (no information: 5)

Two thirds of them mentioned as their occupation "farmer" while 9, were local governemtn officer, 9, businessmen, 5, skilled workers. Of the 28 secretaries 15 mentioned "farmer" as their occupation rather than the clerical work for which they are employed by TANU.

About 50, of the delegates were Roamn Catholics; Protestants and Muslims were equal (24); only one delegate claimed to be a Pagan. Distributed by education the following pattern emerges:

position	No ed.	St IV	St VI	St VIII	More than St VIII.
chairman:	3	11	8	4	0
delegate I	1	8	7	8	5
delegate II	2	9	9	4	1
secretary	0	0	13	12	2
total	6	28	37	28	6 (no infor: 7)

It is clear that in most branches the conferance delegates represent an educational level above the average. Education is in Bukoba district an important (if not necessary, as is shown in the table) means to reach a political psotion. Again, the secretaries, the younger generation, are better educated than the elected representatives.

Three quarters of the delegates joined TANU between 1954-58, about 20, 1959-61; only 6 delegates joined after independence. It shows that the vast majority are old TANU members, but they have not necessarily held office so long time:

	Have held position:					
Joined TANU	one year	2-3	4-5	6-7	8 and more	total
1954-58	19	14	15	11	21	78
1959-61	11	4	5	1	0	21
1962-64	3	2	0	0	0	5
1965	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	34	20	18	12	21	105

(no information 7)

More than half of the number of the delegates have held an official TANU position only three years or less. There is a substantial number of real veterans in TANU, but on the whole it is wrong to say that there is no circulation in the local leadership groups. On the contrary it seems to be fairly common that elected TANU officials either have to resign or voluntarily quits his position. This gives room for a certain degree of political mobility.

It was the above described conference delegates that the nomiated candidates had to face in the impressive assembly hall

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of the district council. The candidates were called in, one by one, for presentation before the conference. Generally, there were question put to them by the delegates or the district committee at the front. These questions varies from personal details to current political issues (Five Year Development Plan). Some candidates were in for a long time, while others were not q questioned at all. This was the case when the record of the candidate was clear. Instead of questions they were met by applause and this led in the case of at least one candidate to false hopes. He told us that he thought that the applause was a sign that he would get many votes; when the result eventually was publsihed, he had got only one vote.

The following information has been gathered about the candidates in Bukoba and Karagwe district:

Constituency	Name	Vote at district c.	Age	Religion	Occupation	Division or subdivision
BUKOBA	1. Samuel Kasano	35	36	Prot.	TAPA Sec.	Kiziba
	x2. John Kami	11	38	R.C.	Loc.Govt. Off.	Bugabo
	3. Abdu Ziad	9	32	Musl.	Farmer	Missenye
	4. Gasper Siomn	8	-	R.C.	Ed. Sec.	Kyamtwara
	5. Shell Muhanna	8	38	Musl.	Businessm	Bukoba
	x 6. Joseph Rwegasira	6	-	R.C.	NUTA dire	Kiziba
	x 7. Leopold Rwizandekwe	5	36	R.C.	Sen. Magis	Kiziba
	8. Robert Kajuna	5	32	Prot.	Princi.	Kyamtwara
	9. Emmuanuel Rukamba	2	32	R.C.	former chief	Kyamtwara
	10. Aloys Ruberatuka	2	44	R.C.	farmer	Kiziba
	11. Robert Lukyaa	2	57	R.C.	farmer	Bugabo
	x 12. Christopher Nyango	2	37	R.C.	loc.govt. off.	Missenye
	x 13. Narcis Mugyabuso	2	47	R.C.	civil ser.	Kiziba
	14. Emil Kyomushula	1	37	R.C.	coop.sec.	Kiziba
	x 15. Herbert Rugisibwa	1	61	R.C.	farmer	Inangiro
	16. Joseph Muikila	1	47	R.C.	teacher	Kiziba
KIANJA BUKARA:	1. John Kibogoyo	32	50	R.C.	businessm	Katoke/Ki
	2. Ph. Katundu	21	55	R.C.	politician	Kamachumu
	3. Sospater Zahoro	20	59	Prt.	C. Sec. loc.govt off.	Bukara
	4. J. Kahyemera	7	43	R.C.	coop.off.	Ibwera/Ki
	x 5. Ph.Mutagaywa	6	50	R.C.	com.Exe.	Muhutwe/Ki
	6. Abas Kiobya	5	31	Musl.	B. offi	Ibwera/Ki
	x 7. J. Mushwaimi	4	37	Prot.	te cher	Kishogo/Ki
	8. Petro Nyarubamba	4	35	Prot.	former chief	Kanazi/Ki
	x 9. Oscar Muhimba	0	37	R.C.	engineer	Katoke/Ki
	10. John Katano	0	52	R.C.	former	Bukara
IHANGIRO	x 1. Edward Barongo	72	37	R.C.	J. Min.	Muleba/Ihn.
	x 2. Joseph Kashaija	18	41	R.C.	P.Man.	Nshamba/Ihn
	x 3. J. Bakampenja	3	32	R.C.	area comm	Muleba/Ihan
	4. Andraa Kato	3	48	R.C.	M.ass.	Kashasha/Ihn
KARAGWE	x 1. Gervazi Kaneno	16	36	R.C.	l.govt off	Kaisho/Kar.
	x 2. Gressim Kazimoto	13	41	Prot.	salesman	Nyakahanga
	x 3. George Kahama	6	-	R.C.	ambass.	Kituntu/Kar.

x = works outside his home constituency.

Among those nominated there were two, both chief s who belong to the traditional elite, one former TANC supporter and three, who belonged to the group of independents (mainly teachers) that run in the 1963 district council election. Nobody belonging to any

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of these categories was successful at the conference. There was one real political veteran, Herbert Lugizibwa; nor did he succeed.

With a few exceptions did the candidates run in the cons in which he was b up or since long time owns land. Exceptions are Lugizibwa, who long ago moved from Kiziba to Ihangiro and George Kahama, who brought himself land in Kiziba (Bukoba district)

The National Executive Committee of TANU made one change in the preference of the district conference in Bukoba. Joseph Kashaija was dropped and instead was Jeremiah Bakampenja adopted as official candidate in Ihangiro constituency. The reason for dropping Kashaija was mainly that he was accused for having used illegitimate means to reach his position at the district conference. The decision by the NEC, however immediately led to a lot of rumour in the constituency.

The most surprising result of the district conference in Bukoba and Karagwe was the loss by George Kahama, former Minister, now Ambassador. Many reasons have been given: "He never did anything conspicuously for his home constituency"; "He moved to Bukoba and took his wife from Kiziba"; He never mixed socially with the ordinary men"; "He was too aloof"; (That he took his wife away points at the old rivalry between Bukoba and Karagwe, the former ne being much more advanced and favoured in many respects, the latter one feeling neglected, but with a much more impressive traditional history).

VI. The Election Campaign:

1. The informal campaign

The election campaign was both formal and informal in character. By informal campaign I mean anything that took place outside the officially organized campaign. The electoral law that none of the candidates was allowed to conduct a private campaign was undoubtedly interpreted in many different ways. For instance if the candidate was not allowed himself, would his friends be? At least some candidates would have answered" yes to that question. One candidates had an extensive voluntary campaign organization throughout most parts of his constituency. Others, if not so systematically, had similar arrangements. Much of the informal campaigh took place in the bars, on the road or in the house of somebody. To buy people beer was one common way of campaigning for a candidate. One candidate in Karagwe accused the other for buying people beer, implying that this was not fair. His opponent replied however that he could find nothing wrong in buying people beer as long as it took place openly.

In some constituencies there were rumours that one of the candidates used private money for campaigning, but these charges have neither been found true nor false.

On the whole it is very difficult to assess the impact of the informal campaign. It is clear that it took place; it is likely that its importance was big. Some candidates gave a wider interpretation to the electoral law than others and benefitted from that.

2. The official campaign

The officially organized campaign started in Bukoba and Kianja Bukara on the 16th of August. It was supposed to do so also in Ihangiro but some of the first meetings had to be postponed because of the late arrival of one of the candidates. The campaign in Biharamulo and Ngara started on the 23rd; in Biharamulo it was over already on September 6, more than two weeks before the actual election day.

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The campaign team, consisting of the two official candidates, the chairman and the three members of the supervisory committee travelled in a Government Landrover. The number of meeting in the three Bukoba constituencies made it necessary to have at least two, sometimes three meetings a day.

Chairman of the meetings in Karagwe and Biharamulo was the Area Commissioner, in Ngara the district chairman of TANU, the district chairman in Bukoba was chairing the meetings in Ihangiro, while two other local TANU notabilities served as chairman in Kianja/Bukara and Bukoba constituencies. Election speeches could vary in time from 5 minutes to an hour. Usually there was a mutual agreement between the chairman, the supervisory committee and the candidates themselves as to how long should they talk. Nowhere in West Lake Region was the candidate who spoke first allowed to reply if his opponent critized him. This made it almost exclusively an advantage to speak last. The meetings were so organised however that one candidate began to speak every second time. We never attended any campaign meetings where the public was allowed to question or heckle the candidates.

The manifestos of the candidates arrived late in the Region and only handed out at the last meetings.

On the whole, it seems as if the supervisory committee intervened very rarely. Although the words used by the candia tes in Karagwe were very strong and sometimes abusing, the supervisors made no public intervention. They recommended the candidates after the meeting at three or four occasions to use more gentle words. The effect of their recommendation seems not to have been to big, since the candidates continued attacking each other.

The only exception from the general pattern of behavious by the supervisory committee was in Ihangiro. One of its members, Mzee Diwani, a member of the Central Committee and National Executive Committee of the Party, quite often intervened. When for instance, one candidate said that his opponent had been sacked by the President - which was untrue - Mzee Diwani stood up after the speech and corrected the speaker. Similarly when the same candidate said that he was so cocksure to win that if he lost, he would found his own party, Mr. Diwani rose to his feet and told the audience that the candidate is simply trying to cheat you.

The campaign in Karagwe and Ihangiro was much more full of personal slander and accusations than the other constituencies. In Bukoba, Kianja/Bukara and Ngara the candidates never attacked each other. They talked about their personal records, their symbols and local issues, only.

a. Symbols

Like in most parts of the country the symbols of the candidates became more than just a means of identification. It was generally assumed that the hoe was more useful than the house as symbol. This was especially true in Bukoba and Karagwe, where there is a saying Enfuka efuka (the hoes is the father of everything) that illustrates the importance that people give to the hoe. Mr. Kazimoto in Karagwe who had been allotted the hoe as his symbol was so sure of the value of his means of identification that he quite often opened his campaign speeches by saying:

> I think it is enough for me just to stand here and show you my symbol. It is quite enough to win your support....

Mr. Barongo in Ihangiro who had the house as his symbol emphasized in his speeches that people should not get mixed up, thinking that the hoe was better than the house. And he added: "Remember that I am the Junior Minister for Agriculture and directly concerned with the hoe".

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At the first campaign meeting in Ngara the two candidates Mr, Nyamubi (hoe) and Mr. Kigongo (house) spoke almost exclusively about the value of their respective symbols. After the meeting, however, they were advised by the supervisors not to do like that, but talk on other things as well.

It is obvious that all candidates were aware of the importance of their symbols and that there was a general feeling during the campaign that the hoe was more advantageious. Mr. Kakumpenja in Ihangiro had two special shirts made in white and covered with a black hoe in the front. Mr. Kazimoto carried the picture of the hoe on an irohsheet around his neck at every meeting.

b. Personal characteristics and qualities.

Personal characteristics were also very important in the campaign. It was quite clear in Kianja/Bukara; Mr. John Kibogoyo, a businessman tried to emphasize his personal qualities: he had always given free lift on his buses to those passengers who had no money; he had never taken anybody to court, nor been taken himself; he had donated all his private buses to the Co-op; he had donated 3000/- to a local dispensary, etc. His opponent, Mr. Phillibert Katunda, pointed out that unlike Mr, Kiboyo he was just a farmer and politician; his only work for years has been to talk on behalf of the people and help solve their problems. He meant that he knew the people well and deliberately tried to associate himself with them.

Although both candidates in Karagwe were slandering each other, one of them, Mr. Kaneno, managed to draw advantage from this more than Mr. Kazimoto. It seems as if Mr. Kazimoto overdid the thing and Mr. Kaneno was available to appeal to the common sense and true judgment of the people. Mr. Kaneno used to say:

> I am confident that even if a man tries to spoil my name as much as he can; you people know is right and I am therefore sure I will get your votes....

The names of the candidates as were of some importance in Bukoba. Mr. Kaneno used to mention that his name was also Mutatima which symbolizes strength, His opponent's name Kami means hare and Mr. Kami himself often said that since he was a hare he would run much faster to attend to people's needs than his opponent. The different meaning of the names was also discussed among the people. We overheard one woman in Bukoba during the campaign telling a group of friends that she would vote for Mr. Kasano because Kasano to her means white flour(one mark of flour is called Kasano) while Kami to her means rabbit and that animal always destroys the crop. In her case the psoitive and negative connotation of the names of the candidates was obviously decisive.

c. Traditional factors:

Traditional factors were raised during the campaign in Biharamulo. At the public meeting they used to greet Mr. Kassusura, one of the candidates and their former chief, in the traditional manner by bowing down to the ground. The TANU officials tried to stop this but failed. Moreover there was much talking about Mr. Kassusura's record as chief. During his reign it fell a lot of rain in the district and it is widely believed that he was a chief brought the rain. Consequently, many were prepared to elect him with the hope that as a MP he will again bring them rain. In no other constituency did traditional factors play any significant role at the campaign meetings themselves.

d. Political record of candidates.

Political record of the candidates was brought forward forward during the campaign, either by the candidates himself or by his opponent. Mr. Kasano in Bukoba always emphasized his work to get

TAPA (Tanganyika African Parents' Association) schools in the district. Both Mr. Bakampenja and Mr. Barongo in Ihangiro mentioned extensively their respective national and international engagements in politics. Mr. Kazimoto, who was one of the first TANU organizers in Karagwe and a very active secretary of a local coop society tried to contrast his own record with his opponent's, Mr. Kaneno. The latter had been a sub-chief and deputy chief during the colonial time and he was accused by Kazimoto of having been a colonialist himself. Both Mr. Kassusura in Biharamulo and Mr. Nyamubi in Ngara took benefit from the fact that they had both been Area Commissioners in their home districts before. Although Mr. Twaibu Songoro in Biharamulo has an outstanding TANU record, being at present Regional chairman, he was accused by Mr. Kassusura for having old ideas.

c. local political issues.

Local political issues were often raised by candidates during the campaign. Mr. Kasano in Bukoba and Mr. Kaneno in Karagwe with wide personal experience from their respective constituencies had deep knowledge about what issues people in the villages would like to listen to. Moreover they both cared very much about this aspect of the campaigning. Mr. Kami, Kasano's opponent, had a number of local district issues that he raised, he stressed the important of improvement at the government hospital in Bukoa; said he would try to get all thieves restricted in work camps if he was elected, etc.

Mr. Barongo in Ihangiro had at several meetings to defend himself and the government against the reaction caused in many places in Buhaya to the new policy of uprooting old coffee and banana trees in order to improve the coffee cultivation in the area. Many villagers are dissatisfied and cannot see the value of the policy. Mr. Barongo emphasized that although he was the Junior Minister for Agriculture, the idea was not his, but of the Government. He also appealed to them not to misunderstand the situation.

Many of the candidates made promises to their electorate, but it was only in Karagwe where the question really was raised: How many of these promises can the candidate really hope to fulfill? This question in itself became important during the campaign in Karagwe; Mr. Kazimoto used to mention that if he was elected, he would get an airport for Karagwe so they could receive the President themselves (understood: they would not have to go to Bukoba.) Mr. Kaneno replied however, that Mr, Kazimoto is giving false promises. It is already said in the Five Year Development Plan, where the new airports in the country are to be, and it is nonsense to believe that Mr. Kazimotowill be able to get one for Karagwe.

In summary, the important characteristics of the campaign in the various constituencies were:

Constituency:	Important characteristics
BUKOBA	1. Political record of candidate 2. Personal qualities 3. Name of candidates 4. Symbols
KIANJA/BUKARA	1. Personal qualities 2. Symbols
IHANGIRO	1. Symbols 2. Personal qualities 3. Local political issues 4. Political record of candidates

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KARAGWE	1. Personal record of candidates 2. Symbols 3. Local political issues 4. Personal qualities
BIHARAMULO	1. Traditional qualities of candates 2. Personal record of candidates 3. Abilities to represent people 4. Local political issues
NGARA	1. Personal record of candidates 2. Symbols

It is difficult to estimate how many people who attended campaign meetings, but an average of about 300 per meeting seems most likely. Some meetings were attended by almost 1000 people, while others by as few as 30-50. These figures are based on the sample of meetings that we attended in the Region.

VII. Who voted how and why?

Election day in Biharamulo, Ngara, Ihangiro and Kianja/Bukara was on the 21st of September, while people in Bukoba and Karagwe went to the polls on the 26th. Immediately after the election we started to run a questionnaire in five villages, 1) two in Bukoba constituency one in Kianja/Bukara one in Ihangiro and one in Karagwe These villages are not necessarily typical for their constituencies. They were originally selected according to social and economic characteristics such as education, physical distance from town, commercialization and presence of modern mass media, to be the focus for Ph.D study on political development in a rural area. Since our research was well-known to the people in these villages we found it most appropriate to select the same sample population as had been used in the development study; this way we could avoid suspicion about out work that most likely would arise in case it was introduced in villages where this type of work was unknown.

1) The five villages are: Bugombe, Kiziba div. Bukoba constituency
Kitendagulo, Kyamtwara div. Bukoba cons.
Bwatangabo, Kianja div. Kianja/Bukara cons.
Kabagunda, Ihangiro div. Ihangiro cons.
Kiruruma, Karagwe. distr. Karagwe cons.

Bugombe is about 20 miles north of Bukoba in a densely populated area near the Uganda border. Christianity and education is since long spread in the area. The village has its own market and shops there are many tailors and it has two daily bus connections with Bukoba. There are 35 radios in the village.

Kitendagulo is situated on a hill just outside Bukoba township. Many people work in town. Christianit and education is well spread. Most things are bought or sold in Bukoba. There are about 30 radios in the village.

Bwatangabo is situated 35 miles southwest of Bukoba; it is part of Kamachumu which is a main trading centre in the district. Even here Christianity and education is since long spread. There are four bus connections with Bukoba. Most things are sold or bought in Kamachumu shops. There are 11 radios in the village.

Kabagunda is situated 55 miles south of Bukoba. It is the biggest fishing village in the district; part of the village is the Mazinga island, where the majority of the fisherman live. Most fish is taken on lorries to local markets in the district. There are not many pagans, but few educated. Only about 10 radios in the village. One daily bus connection with Bukoba.
Kiruruma is situated 10 miles west of Bukoba, near the traditional site of the chief of Karagwe, Bweranyange. Unlike the other villages this has many new settlers, both from Bukoba district and Rwanda. It is situated off the main road and people has to walk up to four miles to reach the road where the bus passes twice a

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week on its way to Bugene-Bukoba. Some of the local products are taken by lorry for marketing but much is wasted or given to the goats. There are only five radios in the village, little education and many pagans.

The sample in the village was selected on the basis of the list of tax-payers: this list is with the village executive officer. 15% was regarded as a reliable sample. For the development study we ended up with the following actual number of respondents:

Bugombe	58
Kitendagulo	56
Bwatangabo	98
Kabagunda	76
Kiruruma	53
Total	341

When we approached these people again for the election study some were not present and we got a drop out of 54 respondents:

Bugombe	58- 5	= 53
Kitendagulo	56-16	= 40
Bwatangabo	98-22	= 76
Kabagunda	76-4	= 72
Kiruruma	53- 9	= 44
Total		285

The total number of respondents in this study in therefore 285.

a. Who voted?

In average more than two thirds of our respondents reported that they had voted in the election:

	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwtangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
Voted	77% (41)	65% (26)	78% (59)	62,5% (45)	66% (29)
Didn't	23% (12)	35% (14)	22% (17)	37,5% (27)	34% (15)
TOTAL	100% (53)	100% (40)	100% (76)	100% (72)	100% (44)

It has been pointed out in many studies that degree of political participation correlates with level of education. No one in our villages who has reached beyong secondary school education and about 50% of our respondents have only been to school between two to six years. About 45% have never been to school or just recently obtained literacy certificate.

	No.ed	Lit.Cert	St I-III	St IV-VI	St VII-VIII	Up to XII
Voted	57% (67)	83% (5)	82% (49)	80% (69)	83% (10)	50% (2)
Didn't	45% (50)	17% (1)	18% (11)	20% (17)	17% (2)	50% (2)
Total	100% (17)	100% (6)	100% (60)	100% (86)	100% (12)	100% (4)

There is no clear correlation between voting in the election and educational level. There is a difference between those with education and without. While 80% of those with formal education or literacy certificates voted, only 57% of the non-educated did. It is a fairly high proportion, but it is still clearly below that of the eudcated. Of those who did not vote, 61% had no education.

Education itself does not however explain why people voted or not. The age of the respondent is another relevant factor.

In our villages, however, nothing suggests that younger people are less likely to vote than elders, or vice versa. It is clear that those who didn't vote in many cases had a force majeure. Of the 92 respondents above the age of 56, 55% did not vote. They gave the follwoing reason for that:

14/....

9 had not registered (indifference?)
8 had physical handicaps
5 were away from home
6 came too late to the polling station
5 had other reasons.

If one takes another age group 26-30 in which also 35, (12) reported that they did not vote, the follwoign reasons were given:

5 away from home
2 arrived but found the polling station closed
i had no permission by his employer to go to the polls
1 got tired of waiting in the line at the polls
3gave other reasons.

I have at this stage of analysis of my material no charce to further study the correlation between socio-economic status and actual voting, but it is interesting to note that more people went to the polls in Bugombe and Bwatangabo, where education is well spread, but almost all our respondents are farmer, than in Kitendagulo, also with many educated respondents, but where only 60% of our respondents are farmers; moreover they live close to town and more exposed to modern mass media. The fairly low turnout of people to the polls in Kabagunda and Kirruruma is explained by the fact than many villagers were far away from the polling station. In Kiruruma 60% (9) of those who did not vote were at the polling station but earlier got tired of waiting or arrived too late. In Kabagunda 50% of those who did not vote were "away from home" = fishing.

Our data suggests that very few shoed an attitude of indifference to the election itself and that in those villages - Bugombe and Bwatangabo - which are geographically small, where the polling station was near and the village socially homogeneous, a high turnout was easier to achieve. Of particular interest is the last point that the turnput is higher if the village is socially more uniform. Lazarsfeld-Berellson-Gaudet writes that "voting is essentially a group experience" (2) and this holds true in "the little communities" that we have studied. Here bands of loyalty are strong and people brought up to believe that what leaders say is right.

This leads us to the following question: How strong was the political involvement of the electorate?

b. Degree of political involvement

There are many ways of measuring degree of political involvement in a political system at election time we asked how often people discussed the election, the candidates or the issues at stake:

Discussed	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
Every day	2% (i)	10% (4)	5% (4)	6,5% (4)	7% (3)
Once, twice a week	7,5%(4)	7,5%(3)	15% (11)	(6)	5% (2)
less than onee a week	21%(11)	30% (12)	15% (10)	25% (18)	27% (12)
Never	62%(33)	50% (20)	63% (45)	68% (49)	61% (27)
No infor.	7,5%(4)	2,5%(1)	4% (3)	1,5% (1)	- (0)
total	100% (53)	100% (40)	100% (72)	100% (72)	100% (44)

There is great similarity between the five villages: Between half and two thirds of the respondents have never discussed the election of any issues, which suggests little degree of political involvement. But who are those discussing the election? Are they the most educated?

(2) Lazarsfeld-Berelson-Gaudet: The Peoples Choice, New York 1948 p 137

Discussed	A. educ.	- Lit Cert	St I-III	St IV-VI	St VII-VIII	Up to XII
E.day	4,5% (5)	- 100	9% (5)	4% (2)	16,5% (2)	50% (2)
Once, twice	5% (6)	16,5% (1)	5% (3)	10% (9)	8,5% (1)	- (0)
less than once	26,5% (41)	33,5% (2)	20% (12)	17% (15)	8,5% (1)	50% (2)
Never	61,5% (72)	50% (3)	61% (37)	67% (58)	58% (7)	- (6)
No infor	2,5% (3)	- (0)	5% (3)	2% (1)	8,5% (1)	- (0)
Total	100% (117)	100% (6)	100% (60)	100% (86)	100% (12)	100% (4)

The figures in this table show that involvement in the election on part of the villagers does not necessarily depend on level of education. We therfore have to look for something else: Those who have attended campaign meetings not only thereby show a degree of involvement but one might also assume that these persons would have been more prepared to discuss the election:

discussed	Attended campaign meeting	did not attend	No information
Everyday	7% (6)	5, 5% (9)	12, 5% (1)
onee twice a w.	7% (8)	7% (12)	- (0)
less than once	12,5% (14)	29% (48)	- (0)
Never	74% (83)	55% (90)	75% (6)
No inform.	1% (1)	3,5% (6)	12,5% (1)
Total	100% (112)	100% (165)	100% (8)

Nothing suggests that those who attened the campaign meeting were more prepared to discuss the election however.. The vast majority of the villagers were very little involved in the election during the actual aampaign period. There are very few voluntary association in the village; almost every villager is a member of the cooperative society but its importance as a means to raise political participation little or nil. Religious associ tions might indirectly have served the prupose of bringing people together for discussions.

By and large the little degree of political involvement can be explained by the fact that to most villagers political discussions before an election is not a good thing. It implies a kind of informal campgign and regardless of what the electoral law says, the villagers believe that everyone should have the right to make up his mind independently without actual pursuers. This is a kind og political ethic that many villagers have.

In short, it is clear that very few people in the villages were exposed to political influence by either the campaign meetings themselves or through discussion with other people during the campaign period.

It is likely that the majority of the villagers at least heard something about the election, even if they did not discuss it. We therefore asked our respondents: From where did you get the issues at stake?"

From	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kimaruma
Family, friends	42% (22)	52,5% (21)	43% (45)	61% (44)	80% (35)
Cam. meet	34% (18)	22,5% (5)	24% (18)	10% (7)	6,5% (3)
VDC leaders	2% (1)	5% (2)	15% (11)	12,5% (9)	2,5% (1)
radio-newspaper	22% (12)	27,5% (11)	16% (12)	15% (11)	11% (5)
Total	100% (53)	100% (40)	100% (76)	100% (72)	100% (44)

One sees here that radio and newspapers decreased in importance the farther away you come from Bukoba. The role of modern mass media

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in the election also correlates with spread of education and number of radios in the village. It is again significant that the campaign meetings were most important in the villages Bugombe and Bwatangabo which are socially homogeneous and easy to organize because of their geographical limitation. In these two villages more people also claimed to have attended the campaign meetings:

	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
Attended	55% (29)	20% (8)	53% (40)	22% (16)	44% (19)
Didn't	43% (23)	72,5%(29)	46% (35)	77% (55)	52% (25)
No infor	2% (1)	7,5%(3)	1% (1)	1% (1)	4% (2)
Total	100% (53)	100%(40)	100% (76)	100% (72)	100%(44)

That campaign meetings, discussions and exposure to various other cross-pressures had a limited effect on the voters is also clear from the answers we got to the questionnaire: "Can you recall when you made up your mind how to vote for your candidate?"

	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
Election Day	4% (2)	10% (4)	11% (8)	9% (7)	8,5% (4)
Within one week before the elect	6% (3)	20% (8)	17% (11)	7% (5)	23% (10)
More than a week be. the election	22,5%(12)	- (0)	37% (28)	14% (10)	11,5%(5)
When he first heard that he was a candidate	45% (24)	35%(14)	17% (13)	35% (25)	25% (11)
Don't recall	22,5%(12)	35%(14)	18%(14)	35%(25)	32% (14)
Total	100% (53	100%(40)	100% (76)	100%(72)	100% (44)

45% of our respondents in Bugombe made up their mind already when they first that the names of the candidates. Almost one quarter of the villagers in Bugombe waited to make up their mind until after the campaign meeting which was about two weeks before election day. There were less people in Bwatangulo than in any other village who made up their mind when they first heard the names of the candidates. Many people attended the campaign meeting and we have been told that in Bwatangabo there was quiteextensive informal campaigning for the two candidates. This village has a large number of former TANC members and they were campaigning against one of the candidates who used to fight them as the TANC chairman of the area. Therefore it is likely that people in Bwatangabo were exposed to a high degree of pressure from local leaders and that this explains why they made up their mind later.

Quite a few people made up their mind at an early stage - when they first heard the names of the candidates - and this might to some extent explain the low degree of involvement: people simply did not want to expose themselves to influence from other people who would make their choice on election day more complicated: Those who made up their mind when they first heard the names of the candidates were almost exclusively also in the category who never discussed the election during the campaign:

	never discussed	total number of those who made up their mind at once
Bugombe	80% (19)	24
Kitendagulo	85%(12)	14
Bwatangabo	92% (12)	13
Kabagunda	88% (22)	25
Kiruruma	82% (9)	11
Total	85% (74)	87

17/...

c. How people voted:

It might now be worth while to look into how people actually voted on election day. We want to know why people voted the way they did.

The following table shows, how our respondents voted:

	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
HOE	90% (37)	50% (13)	68% (41)	82% (37)	24% (7)
HOUSE	10% (4)	50% (13)	32% (19)	18% (8)	76% (22)
Didn't vote	- (12)	- (14)	- (16)	- (27)	- (15)

The "hoe" had an overwhelming majority in three villages, Bugombe, Bwatangabo and Kabgunda, while the "house" was clearly ahead in Kiruruma and the two symbols got equal support in Kitendagulo The voting pattern in our villages compare in the follwoing way to the overall result in the constituencies:

Const.	Overall result		Bug.		Kit.		Bwat.		Kabag.		Kir.	
	Hoe	House	Hoe	Ho	Hoo	Ho.	Hoe	Ho.	Hoe	Ho	Hoe	House
Bukoba	60%	40%	90%	10%	50%	50%						
Kianja/Bukara	51%	49%					68%	32%				
Ihangiro	51%	49%							82%	18%		
Karagwe	22%	78%									24%	76%

It would be wrong to reduce this discussions on how people voted to just a reference to the symbols used in the election, but from our survery it is clear that the symbol to the individual voter was much more than just a means of identification. When we asked our respondents "Is there any particular reason why you voted for this candidate?" the following answers were given

Reason	Bugombe	Kitendagulo	Bwatangabo	Kabagunda	Kiruruma
because of symbol	37% (14)	52% (13)	60,5%(31)	65% (26)	70% (20)
prev. serv.	55% (21)	16% (4)	21% (11)	12,5%(5)	17% (5)
knows candidate	- (0)	12% (3)	6% (3)	12,5%(5)	6,5% (2)
cand better represent	4% (2)	12% (3)	8% (4)	2, 5% (1)	- (0)
Other reasons	4% (2)	8% (2)	5,5% (3)	7,5% (3)	6, 5% (2)
Total	100% (39)	100% (25)	100% (52)	100% (40)	100% (29)

It is only in one village Bugombe where any other reasons than symbol dominates the voting behavious. The explanation is that the home of the "hoe" candidate, Mr. Kasano is in the neighbouring village and that he was responsible for starting the TAPA school in the village a few years ago. In those villages where the candidates were more or less strangers, the main reason for voting seems to have been the person himself but the symbol.

No doubt, the majority of those who voted on basis of symbol only preferred the hoe. In Bukoba district where most people have good houses and everyone knows that without a hoe he cannot get any food or money from his shamba, the choice between hoe and house seems to have been easy. It is significant that only five out of those 13 who voted for the "house" in Kitendagulo did it on basis of symbol. The rest mentioned such reasons as:

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"I like him"
"He is my friend"
"He said political words which penetrated my heart"
"He is from my chiefdom"
"I found the man fit to fight for us in Parliament"

The reasons why so many voted for the "house" in Kiruruma is different. This village is situated on the edge to real bush country and wild animals often visit it during the night. Most people still live in huts and d o not feel protected enough against the wild animals. Here necessity for shelter is more important than a hoe to dig with this is also reflected in the answers given why they chose the "house" 73, (17) of those who voted for the "house" did it because of the important of that symbol.

The symbols we e probably the most important factor determining the election in our villages. As a matter of fact the symbols must have been an issue itself. It is wrong to believe that those who voted on basis of symbol were the least sophisticated or politically least involved. On the contrary, those voting on basis of symbol only, form a larger proportion of the group of politically involved people, among those who discussed the eelection most often were the people who voted on symbol:

Discussed	Everyday	Once twice a week	Less than a week	Never
Percentage of those who discused that voted on symbol only	72%	72%	49%	55%

Similarly, more of those who voted on basis of symbol only made up their mind later:

Made up their mind	Election day	Week before	more than week before	first heard man was cand.
Per. that voted on symbol only	45%	50%	40%	35%

This suggested that in such places whe e the candidate was well-known, e.g. Bugombe, and where most people voted on basis of previous services of the candidate, Mr. Kasano, people had made up their minds at an early stage while in places where the candidates were little known, discussion on symbols became most important. Actually 72% of those who reported they remembered and issue from the campaign period mentioned "the discussion of symbols".

The symbols were not impartial, but represented basic "necessaties of life; the house gives man shelter and the hoe gives man foo. The symbols were identified with local issues; in Bukoba district people this year had not food enough, because of little rain and the symbol "hoe" would make them think that the man with the hoe is the right one to help them out of their difficulties. In Karagwe where there even was a surplus of fodd (one stock of bananas, ebitoke in Karagwe cost between -/50 to 2/50 while in Bukoba between 7/50 and 10/- and particularly in Kiruruma where people were exposed to dangers every night, the man with the "house" would be the right one; he would help them to get better shelter. In other words, it is wrong to believe that the symbols functioned as isolated factors. The discussion on symbols that so many people were involved in, was basically a discussion with references to local issues or even more basic - how people can survive.

Again it should also be noted that according to the traditional

ethic, it is not good to talka bad t ings about people and it is therefore likely that with many villagers there is an "internal" barrier to get involved in discussion about people, notably in this case, the candidates.

There are certain interesting things that we have not dealt with in this paper, such as, what was the local reaction to the NEC's decision to drop Joseph Kashaija in Ihangiro constituency. In our village Kabagunda, there was no reference made to that decision in the data we obtained, but this might be so simply because he was not well-known in that part of the constituency. Certain information suggests that there was a deep reaction in Kashaija's home area.

Nowhere in Karagwe, in Kiruruma or other places we visited did we come across any discussion about the fact that G. Kahama failed to become an official candidate.

Another thing that we have not dealt with in whether the district conference vote coincided with the popular choice. Kasano, Kibogoyo and Kassusura who all got most votes in their constituencies when the district conference made its choice, were also successful in the election. Barongo with an overwhelming majority at the district conference lost in the lection itslef. This suggests that the district conference in his case might have put more importance on the political record of the candidate.

In order to find out more about the districtconference choice as compared to the people's choice, we asked our respondents if they would have voted for any other candiate if they could:

Village	no. of people who would have voted for other cand.	total of respondents
Bugombe	1	53
Kitendagulo	9	40
Bwatangabo	12	76
Kabagunda	0	72
Kiruruma	0	44
	22	285

Only in Kitendagulo and Bwatangabo did people feel that they could have voted for somebody else. It is interesting to note that in both the constituencies the majority of those (6 in Kit. and 9 in Bwat.) who said they would have voted for somebody else, mentioned the name of the local chief on the question "Which one? Kitendagulo and Bwatangabo are part of Kyamtwara and Kianja chiefdoms respectively and in both these two does the Chief still have great influence.

VIII. Conclusions:

For the benefit of those who have struggled through this paper and for those who have no time to read it all through I wish to summarize the paper in the follwoing important points:

1. About two thirds of all eligible persons in the Region registered for the election; of those registered the following percentage actually voted:

Bukoba	80%
Kianja/Buk	70%
Ihangiro	61%
Karagwe	67%
Biharamulo	52%
Ngara	76%

2. Campaign meetings were attanded in average by 300-50 people.

20/...

Campaign speeches in Bukoba, Kianja/Bukara and Ngara concentrated on personal record of candidate local issues and symbols; in Ihangiro and Karagwe besides these characteristics the candidates attacked each other strongly. Only in Ihangiro did the supervisory committee intervene publicly against one of the cnadidates.

3. Education or age was no real indication to whether people voted or not.

4. The social structure of the village and its physical location and make-up is likely to be more important for why people went to the polls or not. Election is the little community is determined by hands of loyalty to a very large extent.

5. A very small percentage of the electorate was actually involved in the election, if involvement is measured by frequency of discussing the election and attendance at campaign meetings. Traditional values seem to have been a barrier to high degree of political involvement on part of many villagers.

6. Most people obtained their information about the election from family or friends; campaign meetings served as a major source for that purpose. Radio and newspapers were most important in villages near town and with higher percentage of educated people.

7. A large proportion of the villagers made up their mind when they first hear the names of the candidates. Those who made up their mind early did with very few exceptions not discuss the election during the whole campaign period.

8. Many people voted on basis of symbol (53%) and the majority of these voted for the "hoe". Clear exceptions however, is our village in Karagwe. Local social and economic conditions determined the preference of symbol. In those villages where the candidates were well-known, their previous services and personal qualities became important.

9. Those who voted on basis of symbol only were the least indifferent part of the electorate, they discussed more than others the election; they also made up their mind late. The symbols became an issue in itself and of those who remembered any issue from the campaign period, 72% mentioned "the discussion of symbols".

10. Not many people feel they would have voted for somebody else. For those who would, however the traditional chief was the most common choice.

Finally, it might be worth while asking what impact the election had on the electorate? - 47% of our respondents clearly stated that the election was "free" "fair", or "secret" and only a ve y small minority mentioned that the election was not fair.

In other words, almost 50% of the villagers revealed a consciousness about democratic political methods. This was the first real free election in the Region and people seem, as a result of the election, to have stopped thinking in terms of "insiders" and "outsiders". Before there was always one official TANU candidate and an opponent; intimidation and threats were not infrequent. At this election, however, everyone was an insider. There was harmoney and very little if no irregularities. This must have appealed to the villagers, for which harmonies social relationship with neighbours is so important. In short one can say that the political system because of the election has settled and legitimized itself in the eyes of the members. It should also be pointed out that the election has increased the prospects for political mobility for many people in the Region who formerly would never stand a chance of a successful political career, because they did not enjoy the official TANU support.



---- = Territorial boundaries

-.- = District boundaries

.... = Chiefdom boundaries

Bugombe
Kitendagulo
Bwatangabo
Kabagunda
Kiruruma

Villages included in original research

Bugene = main center
KARAGWE DISTRICT

Bweranyange = traditional site
of Karagwe chiefs

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN DEVELOPING POLITIES: ACHIEVEMENT BY DEFAULT+

By

JOHN R. NELLIS

With only a hint of irony, social science could be defined as a holding operation until statisticians refine their techniques and until nuero-surgeons and pyschiatrists tell us precisely what is the process of thought. For, if the logic of present social scientific endeavor is carried to the extreme, there may well come a day when all variables will be isolated and quantified, and we will be able to speak - in mathematically precise and certain terms - of behavioral cause and effect. Unless the intellectual and scholastic temper of the times has been sadly misread, the ultimate goal of social science can be said to be inter-subjectively transmissable knowledge[1] of the type presently found in the "hard" sciences.

The implications of this goal are far-reaching and dramatic - indeed, Orwellian. A story in a recent issue of a science fiction magazine described a completely computerized society. At regular intervals the omniscient machinery of this future state selected the statistically perfect representative of the population; this individual then voted on the public issues of the polity. He was the electorate. Small wonder if this story should cause a twinge of anxiety among the professionals gathered here, for in a quantified society the political scientist - the man of "half-knowledge" - is quite superflous. He has no function.

In the present flood of scholarly material concerning analytical models, empirical theory, and the symbolic and mathematical expression of previously unquantified social and political variables there seems to be little, if any, realization that at the end of this research lurks the anihilation of the profession (unless, of course, the new reasoning becomes so complex and tortured as to ensure the necessity for an interpretive priest-hood.) There are a number of excellent reasons for this lack of anxiety: First, perhaps no one has thought of it. Secondly, since the ever-goal of all science is said to be truth for the sake of truth, there may well have been an idealist or two who - seeing the problem - has said "hang the consequences." Thirdly,

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+The author is a student in the Syracuse University Program of Eastern African Studies, and wishes to make acknowledgement to the Director and to Dr. Carol A. Fisher, Project Coordinator of the Syracuse University-Tanzania Village Settlement Project, for help, advice, and permission to discuss an on-going project. Though the theory of the paper - and some of the more annoying conclusions - represents the sole opinion of the author, many of the examples in the paper were drawn from the work of other members of the Project. I wish to thank especially Mr. Rodger Yeager and Dr. A.H. Rweyemamu for permission to summarize their findings.

perhaps the ultimate implications of the process are obvious to all concerned, but they simply consider that such a state of affairs will only come about so far in the future as to constitute no present concern. And finally, there is no doubt that no matter how completely the quantifiers succeed in reducing behavior to equations there will still exist a staunch group of committed humanists who will defy the statistics and continue to expound upon the virtues of subjective speculation.

The quantified millenium is a long way off. More to the point, it can safely be assumed that: given the present level and sophistication of statistical and pyschological methodologies the quantified millenium will be ushered in at a much later date in the developing regions of the world than in the developed, materially affluent societies. This means that, even if we accept the idea that the social sciences - as presently known - will eventually wither away like the ultimate Marxian state, the older forms of social science will serve a useful function in the developing areas for a more lengthy future period, for half-knowledge will still serve there as the best guideline for policy.

This predication of the future throws into sharp relief the topic of discussion: prescription; the process of telling people or organizations what to do. A medical doctor, acting under the assumption that the goal of his work is the continuing good health of his patients, prescribes regularly; he is able to tell those seeking his advice, with some degree of precision, exactly what they must do if they wish to remain healthy. A lawyer, acting under the assumption that citizens will be judged according to the prevailing interpretation of the term "justice" in their society, prescribes to his clients; he tells them what they should do if they wish their case to be regarded as the "just" side of the issue. An economist, acting under the assumption that individuals and governments wish to maximize their material well-being, prescribes: he tells people and organizations what they can do if they wish to increase or maintain their assets and productivity. Note that there is a decreasing level of certainty in each of the three cases. The medical doctor is able to use the term "must"; the lawyer, on the other hand, utilizes "should", and the economist openly admits the possibility of a different choice by saying "can". This decreasing level of certainty of prescription is brought about by a decreaseing level of certainty of goals, a decreasing level of belief in the strength of their primary assumptions. A doctor is able to state clearly to his patient - "If you do not stop smoking then you will die of Emphysema." A judge, if he is truly objective, may feel less certain about admonishing law-breakers who sincerely and intensely feel that they have acted in a good cause, even though they have clearly broken an existing law. And the economist, realizing that men and polities frequently ignore his primary assumption, quickly descends to the simpler realm of the possible, and allows his clientele to make their own choices.

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In its lengthy history political science, and its forerunner, political philosophy, have utilized all three of the above forms of prescription. Socrates, for obvious and revered example, never tired of telling the Athenians what they must do. Further, since Socrates was certain that he had conclusively demonstrated the correctness of his assumptions, he never quite fully understood why the Athenians continued to ignore him. Perhaps he should have been satisfied with ignorance, for when the Athenians did listen they quickly grew tired and turned the tables by telling Socrates what to do. Much to their surprise, he remained consistent to his logic and killed himself.

Contrary to some opinions, political science has progressed considerably since the days of Socrates; political commentators are much less certain of their primary assumptions and much more cautious in their prescription; governments, for their part, have rewarded this caution by being somewhat less hasty to recommend incarceration or suicide to scholars.[2] In short, the twentieth century realization that it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively the scientific correctness of value considerations has effectively ended "must" - level prescription by the political scientist, and has cast into serious doubt recommendations utilizing the "should" or "ought" forms. This leaves the political scientist with the question: What can be done?

Now it is this "can" form of prescription that is steadily - if slowly - being pre-empted in the developed areas by public opinion polls and statistical techniques. This, perhaps, is one of the reasons why we are here, for in the area of no knowledge, the man with half-knowledge is king. Which, somewhat belatedly, brings us to the point of this paper: that it is the "sweep" of political science, the over-view that it attempts to make of conflict and value-ridden policy situations, that hinders its usefulness in developed, precision-demanding polities, yet it is this very quality that makes political science of especial effectiveness and use in developing areas. This is because precisely focused policy choices are only not demanded in the new states, but are sometimes actually undesirable.

To illustrate this contentious point, a hypothetical dialogue shall be constructed. Assume that an economist is researching a particular action-program in a developing nation. After what he considers to be a careful analysis of the program he approaches the responsible officials of the regime and states: "According to government directives this program P was originally designed to achieve goal A. My research reveals that rural administrators are twisting the program in an attempt to achieve goal B. Thus, you should direct the rural administrators to stop their attempts and return to the original plan." To this the government officials might reply, "We cannot do this, because after hearing the arguments of the rual administrators we have reached the conclusion that goal B is as

vital as goal A!" The economist could counter this statement with, "If goal B is vital, then create another program P1, to work towards B." The obvious answer to this is, "We have neither the money to create nor the manpower to staff P1." The economist then states, "Then choose a priority; choose between goals A or B, for if you insist on using a single program to achieve widely divergent goals there is a strong likelihood that you will achieve neither." The officials then neatly stalemate the conversation by saying, "You do not understand. Every goal in this society is of the utmost priority; what we are seeking from you is not the obvious advice that our hopes are somewhat irrational, but rather how may we best implement limited, yet multi-functional programs that will achieve varied goals."

This is where the political scientist is on home grounds, for his training has prepared him to be aware that everyone, in every country, wants to both eat and have their cake; he is at home with the question - How do we make the best out this miserable situation? He is equipped with the not rare, but still crucial, ability to abstract, generalize and reconcile; in a sea of muddle, conflicting - and insufficient - statistics, and emotion-charged apathy his training and background provide him with the strength to continue to talk as if a coherent whole will somehow emerge from seemingly chaotic instability.

In brief, if his training has been at all successful, then the average political scientist is equipped with an abundance of what is popularly called "common sense". Now this, to say the least, is something of an anti-climax, but in truth there is no grander term that more suitably describes the specific, policy-effecting skill of the advising political scientist. Though this skill is useful everywhere, it is in the developing portions of the world that this skill is most needed and can be best put to effective use.

This last sentence carried with it the inescapable connetation that officials and decision-makers in developing areas are not overly endowed with the quality of common sense. The easiest way to evade this charge is to state simply that few decision-makers anywhere in the world seem to possess a sufficient amount of this quality; nor - and this is the important point - should they be expected to, given the demands of their positions. Common sense is the path of least resistance, the most rational and least expensive, readily available solution to a problem that accounts - or tries to account - for all the known variables.[3] But the political decision-maker either is himself or represents a variable, and rare is the man who objectively weighs his mind and strikes an equitable balance between his own interests and goals and those of others. One can only conclude that, in conflict-full politics, common sense is quite uncommon; far from being an everyday political commodity, the requisite quality of detachment removes common sense from the grasp of the (theoretically) informed,

but involved class, and places is in the hand of the informed but (again, theoretically) uninvolved. There are, of course, the academics, and among these it is the political scientist who is best equipped to dispense this knowledge for he is not saddled with the limitations of rigor and the closed parameters of prime assumptions. The political scientist is trained to regard no variable as constant; to take no behavior for granted. It is the purpose of his training to provide him with greater knowledge of all the known variables; yet he is not surprised when a seemingly unrelated issue becomes crucial. This is his business. From our definition of common-sense it may be said that the discipline takes into account the known variables - and this is science - and also tries to account for the unknown or half-known variables - and this is politics.

II -

Perhaps it is more than a bit presumptions that in the space of a few short pages and minutes we have predicated the mortality of the discipline, then contended that it can still - for a longer time - be of practical and effective use in at least a portion of the world precisely because of the feature that will supposedly undermine it: the lack of rigor. In order to follow this, let us recap more formally what has been said:

1. Social science is presently tending towards strict empiricism and quantification. Assuming that present trends are followed and new methods and more data become available it is possible that a new, distinctly different, and far more precise (and limited) type of social science might arise in the not too distant future. Even if the quantified millenium does not arrive, or proves to be unobtainable, leading workers in social science are presently writing and acting as if the quantified millenium were the legitimate goal of present endeavor. There are some voices and critics that disagree emphatically with this goal; they do not represent the mainstream of the academic temper of the time.

2. Political science has been about the last social science to accept the challenge of empiricism because of A - a noble tradition of subjective speculation and "must" or "should" level prescription running from the time of the Greeks to the present; B - the seemingly impossible task that confronted anyone trying to distill the essence of a plurality of political systems into a sufficiently small number of prime workable assumptions (accomplished first, to our everlasting chagrin, by the structural - functional school of anthropology, and expanded for specific use in the discipline only about twenty years later); and C - finally, because nearly all variables are dependent in the political situation, and thus hard to identify, isolate and quantify.

3. In spite of these difficulties, and because of them, political scientists have been making recent and tremendous efforts to overcome the non-empirical base of the discipline and to create the solid and logical foundations for a true science. In so doing they have substantially discarded their previously highly regarded prescriptive function - and this was no great loss, since it had become embarassingly obvious that the western governments were increasingly regarding political scientists with bored courtesy when they put forth their half rational, half polemical advice. The difficulty was that just as the political scientist was reaching, through broad analysis studies, a pattern-preceiving viewpoint, it was found that portions of the prescriptive task could be more easily, efficiently and precisely accomplished by the use of pyschological testing and public opinion polls. Unable to beat them, the mainstream of western political science is now in the process of joining. There remain, obviously, issue areas in which the prescriptions of the political scientist are vital in the developed countries. As in the case with too many social distinctions, the matter is one of degree - i.e., the prescriptive task is still important, though being eroded, in the west, while the eresion has only just begun in the developing areas.

4. In most higher institutions of learning the political scientist is taught by both "before" and "after" professors; thus, he presently emerges in a confused state, trained as a cross between a philosopher-king and an IBM machine programmer. If he remains in the west, and active in the discipline, the political scientist can take his choice from a variety of fairly satisfying academic life roles, but he must do so with the clear knowledge of the unlikelihood that his work will fundamentally effect or alter basic policies and actions of his regime. To a would-be philosopher-king (and perhaps even to an IBM programmer) this is a frustrating situation.

5. Members of the discipline do, however, possess skills necessary, valuable, and of especial practical function for the developing areas of the world where the "hard" methods of determing public reaction and support are unavailable. The contention is that the faults of the discipline in developed nations - seeking the broad overview, failure to clarify conflicting value bases of the polity, failure to base prescription on sound logical foundations - are virtues in the developing nations where policies must be based on less information than can sometimes be uncovered by new techniques in the western world. Furthermore, though various technical points of programs or concepts may be beyond the ken of the advising political scientist in a developing nation, this does not detract from his value as a generalizer, communicator, abstractor, and aggregator.

> As Bertrand de Jouvenel has said, "The political scientist is competent to appreciate priorities and consistency in policies, the details of which he is incompetent to judge."4

The practicing or advising political scientist then, even more than others in the social sciences, lives by hiw words; his task and value - in developing nations lies in his ability to recognize emerging patterns of regime behavior, and population demands and response, and to interpret the meaning of these patterns, and their impact on present and future policy. The specific skill, derived from his training, that defines both the role and value of the political scientist in a developing nation is verbalization - not simply the skill to express various manifestations of a single problem, but the ability to express graphically the essence of the manifestations, the relationship of the manifestations to one another and to the solution.

Make no mistake about the virtues of this skill, for this is left-handed **praise** and the value of the advising political scientist is that of a derived, or second-level nature. There is no available set of perfect maxims that the advising political scientist carries in an attache case, ready for quick dispensation when the need arises. Because of this, his present prescription is always of the last order of certainty - he does not even say what "can" be done; rather he states, "You can try this and if it succeeds it is likely that such and such will come about." As affluent governments have learned, this sort of prescription is flimsy stuff indeed on which to build coherent public policies, though they, out of necessity, rely on this type of information on some issues. In the developing areas, where no better alternative information-processing methods are available, this half-knowledgeable, half-insightful type of advice is all there is.

This section has suggested that the nature of political science - as presently constituted - prevents it from being truly policy effecting in developed nations. A full discussion of this point is (perhaps fortunately) beyond the scope of this present work, for what has been under discussion is the other side of the coin - the nation that in the absence of alternatives, the advising political scientist in a developing nation achieves success through default.

III -

There is, on a lower level, another point, seemingly small and obvious but of great potential significance. It is that the political scientist working in the area of comparative government frequently finds that his basic research interests are closely aligned to the most pressing, unanswered policy questions in developing countries. This means that, theoretically, carefully structured research in developing nations should yield

practical, policy-effecting results. As Lucien Pye put it, "... questions of policy may interact with the concerns of the scholar, and in pursuing his research the field worker may readily contribute to solving important and pressing problems of public policy."[5] On the face of it, such an assertion is innOcuous enough, but in reality, the synthesis between political research and public policy has yet to be m made on a meaningful level.

This point, and the points contained in the more abstract theorizing of the first two sections of this paper, can be explained by the use of a detailed and individual example. My own research hopes lie in delineating more precisely the presently fuzzy relationship between political ideology - or motivation - and political action. At the same time, I am attached to a group of eight Syracuse University researchers (three of us being political scientists) who are combining their individual field research on the Ph.D thesis level with technical assistance and advice to a specific action agency of the Tanzanian Government. The impetus for such a group arose, in 1963, out of a series of discussions between Dr. Fred G. Burke - Director of the Syracuse University Program of Eastern African Studies - and Tanzanian officials. The theory behind this group approach was twofold: 1 - it was thought that, to a considerable extent, individual scholars unnecessarily duplicated many portions of their field efforts, and 2 - the practical effect, if any, of their research on policy was often dissipated due to the requisites of academic style and the lag between the time of field research and the subsequent (again, if any) publication of the results. The proposed solution to these problems was a research unit that would be attached to a single, yet far-reaching Tanzanian program, and that would - while working on purely academic research - readily share its knowledge and expertise with the Government. The operation selected was Tanzania's vast village settlement program.

The Ford Foundation agreed to finance the experiment and after consultation with the Tanzanian Government, eight Program of Eastern African Studies graduate students were chosen to participate. The first of these eight arrived in Tanzania in March of 1964; the others followed by irregular intervals with the last arriving in October of this year. The group is composed of a physical planner, an economist, an educator, three political scientists, and two anthropologists. A Syracuse University faculty member - an anthropologist, by the way - acts as Project Coordinator and serves as both liason between the group and the Government as an academic adviser to the researchers.

From the outset it appeared obvious that the Government was a bit more interested in obtaining the services of those in the more specialized disciplines. After reviewing the initial research design written by the eight chosen students,[6] a high Tanzanian official ranked the proposals in order of governmental preference; that is, he numbered the designs one through eight, the lower numbers signifying pressing governmental need. By this ranking, only one political science

proposal finished in the top four, the others being the proposals of the planner, the economist, and the educator. This ranking came as no surprise, for during a visit to the United States the relevant official had told us (and I paraphrase): "The questions and issues that you sociology types raise are important, but - in the main - unanswerable, while the information you are prepared to give us is either unusable or already known." Though it was not stated openly, the distinct impression had been created that a manpower short government would accept the not-too-useful "sociology types" because they came in a package with needed specialists.

At present, the project is still underway and it is obviously far too early to assess fully the results of this attempt to combine pure academics with pure assistance. However, a few tentative points have emerged from the operations of the past twelve months, i.e. the time period in which the project's greatest efforts have occurred. First, the pessimism expressed by the Tanzanian official concerning the relevancy of political science to policy-making and implementation seemed to be substantially borne out by initial events. The physical planner and the economist were welcomed and were immediately plunged into the pressing daily problems of the settlement organization; they were able, because of the more rigorous nature of their disciplines, to formulate recommendations after a cursory investigation period. In short, because of their ability to rely upon set and proven standards, their work was of immediate and practical effect in the Village Settlement Agency. Further, while I am hardly qualified to judge the academic work of these two members of the group, it is my present understanding that there need not be great conflict and division of efforts between their policy effecting work and their research. This is definitely not so in the case of the political scientist members of the group.

This leads us to the second point; that it is among the political scientists that the conflict between practical advice and pure research is the greatest. The physical planner and the economist can escape the conflict because their advice is able to dovetail with and be a direct product of their academic work. To a certain, though lesser, extent, the same could be said of the professional educator. On the other hand, the anthropologists in the group, adhering to their discipline's research traditions, openly state that policy recommendations resulting from their research are likely to be by-products of their ethnographic investigations. Their primary effect on policy will result from short progress reports, delivered to the central Agency from the rural sites of their participant observation. There is - or will be - a clear differentiation between their academic work and their policy advice.

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It would be most discouraging for a political scientist to have to admit that his policy-effecting material is of the type formulated by the anthropologist rather than the planner. Indeed, it would be close to absurdity if a discipline grandly titled "political science" found that only the by-products of its research were of practical, policy-effecting value. But as the first few months of the group's efforts passed it was seen that while the political scientists in the team were offering helpful information it was most decidedly not the type of material that constitutes Ph.D dissertations. Coversely, while there was little doubt that we political scientists were gathering useful, valuable, and intriguing academic data, this data was originally viewed as being of only slight use to the Government. Clearly, then, there seemed to be a wide gulf between our academic efforts and our practical advice.

The third point that emerged from our initial period was this: that it was on the lower levels that the political scientists (and the anthropologists too, for that matter) were contributing to the functioning of the Settlement Agency. In a typically manpower short organization we served in a secondary, but still important role as communicators. We carried policy directives (and attitudes) to the rural units and returned to Dar-es-Salaam with needed information on mis-interpretation of central office instructions, and small and rather obvious common-sensical recommendations on how future mishaps of this nature could be avoided. Our advice began to be accepted as meaningful, though it was still terribly unclear as to just how and where the needed synthesis between research and advice would be effected. Further along these lines, it began to plague some of the "sociology types" in the group that much of the low-level work we were doing for the Government could be duplicated by any competent holder of a BA degree in any of the humanities, or business administration. We found ourselves asking - "what specific skill derived from our discipline do we possess that makes us of especial value in this operation; what are we, as something called political scientists, doing here that could not be done as well by someone else?" Disturbingly, the history of our efforts in the first months of our research pointed towards a pessimistic set of answers to these questions.

However, if the initial efforts of the political scientists served lower level functions, after a time it was seen that the second area of Agency need was at the other extreme - in the area of grand policy. That is, we began to recognize that the policy feedback function of an implementation program (again, because of lack of trained manpower) was not being performed, and, on the other hand, the central Government's neglect to fill in with needed detail its broad-outlined policy sketches was hindering the Agency's efforts. In short, while we found that civil servants and decision-makers were dealing competently with mid-range political action and implementation, it was at the

very top and bottom of the operation that we political scientists could offer aid. At first, it was naturally easier for us to offer low level advice that could, indeed, have been duplicated from a variety of sources. But as time passed and knowledge increased we became cognizant of the over-view of the entire operation and found ourselves in a position to comment meaningfully on the highest levels of policy formulation. This task could not be duplicated by untrained personnel.

Thus emerged the fourth point: that, somewhat ironically, we political scientists were among the last to recognize our special value. As we learned more of the totality of the operation we began to make what we regarded as simple and obvious comments on policy needs and direction; we were surprised when these comments were received as revelation. We found that we possessed the seemingly simple ability, 1 - to identify and abstract the problem-causing issues; 2 - to aggregate those issues and place them under the proper area of official scrutiny, and 3 - to generalize on the type of governmental statements and actions needed. We were surprised to find that this relatively simple prescription served to fill a definite gap in the policy and implementation process. The problem was, not only had we grown accustomed to this type of thinking to the point where we took it for granted, but also, because of our western training and experience, we tended to disparage conclusions based on this type of reasoning since they were so blatantly only an approximation of reality. What we had not realized was that our approximations would be extremely valuable - indeed, vital - in a communication and information-short polity.

This point was illustrated by the reports that the political sicentists in the group began to produce after about six months in the field. Mr. (now Dr.) A.H. Rweyemamu, a political scientist member of the project interested in the politics of planning, stepped from brief reports on small-scale policy deviations on settlement schemes that he had visited to a searching critique of policy needs on the cabinet level. Mr. Rodger Yeager, a student of behavior in embryonic political systems, found that he could add to the Agency's knowledge concerning the proper role and function of the vitally important Village Settlement Manager. For my part, my interest in the motivation behind political change had led me to attach myself to the Agency's operation of recruitment and selection of new settlers. After a four month investigation period, this vantage point allowed me to write a paper that commented not only on the short-comings and mis-direction of recruitment policy, but one that also demonstrated how the Village Settlement program was so vast and vital hope on the part of highest Tanzanian decision-makers that it was never subjected to an ".... intensive, internal probing on the part of involved officials."[8] I noted that this led to the odd and disconcerting situation where the abstract notion of settlement was

"... unquestioningly accepted, but not really understood."[9] Prescription followed naturally from such analyses.

This brings us to the fifth point, a point already stated in different form in the first two sections, and a point intimated in the quote from de Jouvenel: that one major role of the political scientist is - while dealing with inadequate data - to discover and ennunciate the basic orientation of and for public policy. Manfred Halpern has explained the need for this task as follows:

> The policy-maker and the concerned public need an analytical foundation for judgment before all the returns are in. If one waits until all is known and the die cast, knowledge may do no more than let the dead bury the dead.[10]

To provide "an analytical foundation for judgement" based on inadequate data; this has been the special task of the political scientists in the Settlement Project. With some objective degree of safety and fairness, it may be said that we have substantially accomplished this task.

This summary brings the narrative to the present. It should, however, be noted that three basic sets of questions are, to date, only partially answered. These are:

1. Though we as political scientists may feel that we have discovered and fulfilled a purposeful role, do Government policy - and decision-maters agree?

2. Assuming that our research does serve higher level practical functions, does it necessarily fulfill scholarly and academic requirements? Have we truly combined advice with research?

3. And what of the possibility - as of yet, uninvestigated - of feedback of our advice on to the subject we are researching? How can we maintain scholarly objectivity on subjects and issues with which we have a practical - if not emotional - concern?

We shall take these questions in order.

1. Present indications are that the Tanzanian Government has recognized and welcomed our function as policy interpreters. As evidence of this, one Project report written by a political scientist is scheduled to be used as the basis for discussion in an up-coming Ministerial level policy meeting on settlement. Further, it has become a matter of course for the officers of the Village Settlement Agency to invite either the Projector Coordinator and/or Project researchers to Agency policy meetings, in which Agency decision-makers actively seek the advice of the Project, and its political scientist members. Though present indicators of effectiveness and acceptance are therefore promising, a full assessment can only come after completion of the Project.

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2. As for question number two, this must remain an individual issue. One political scientist in the team, A.H. Rweyemamu, has received his doctorate after presenting and successfully defending a thesis which used much of his advisory material as a case study of planning administration. In this one instance, political science research and advice have been successfully combined.

3. Question three remains as the great unknown. What effect is our prescription having on our research. For example, if an anthropologist member of the group recommends to the Village Settlement Agency that a scheme cooperative organization be given greater jurisdiction over settler disciplinary affair, then has not the researcher significantly and subjectively altered the role and functions of those people he claims to be studying objectively? If a political scientist attends a policy meeting in order to observe the decision-making process and is then called upon to offer an opinion on the subject under discussion, precisely what claim to objective reporting and analysis does the scholar then possess?11 Finally, for my part, if I recommend a massive propaganda campaign in the rural areas to acquaint the population with the realities and hopes of the settlement program, would I not, therefore, be partially responsible for the changed or increased ideological activity that would result, and that my study would normally regard as significant?

That we have posed these questions in a hopeful sign; we have not yet answered them.

The overall conclusion is this: that the true importance of our group stems not from our individual research nor from ourprescriptive advice to the Tanzanian Government, but rather from the information that may result concerning the "no-man's-land" between academies and policy-making. If our efforts do no more than illuminate some corners of this very foggy area then we may regard the operation as a success.

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IV - FOOTNOTES

1. The phrase, "intersubjectively transimissable knowledge" is Arnold Brecht's, taken from his definitive work, Political Theory, The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, Princeton, 1959, defined and explained on p. 106.

2. Perhaps this is unjustified optimism; it might be interesting to review the concept of academic licence in the modern world.

3. At first the relationship between politics and this definition of common-sense seems clear, for the ideal political process might be described in very similar terms. Reality differs, however, and a definition in these terms would be wishful thinking. As Harold Lasswell has written, "Politics is the process by which the irrational bases of society are brought out into the open." The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell, Free Press, 1951, p. 194.

4. Bertrand de Jeuvenel, "Political Science and Prevision," APSR, Vol. LIX, No. 1, (March, 1965), p. 31.

5. Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems for Research," in Robert W. Ward, edtor, Studying Politics Abroad, Little, Brown and Company, 1964, p. 24.

6. Originally, twelve students wrote research designs, but the funds available only covered the expenses of eight scholars.

7. "Need not be"rather than"is not" was used because the economist in the group has informed me that his particular research does conflict with his practical functions.

8. J. Nellis, "Transformation and Village Settlement: From Abstraction to Reality," Syracuse Village Settlement Project Report No. 23, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965, p. 4.

9. Ibid.

10. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change, Princeton, 1963, p. x.

11. Indeed, this paper has declared common-sense to be the prerogative of the uninvolved; what now happens when we become deeply involved?

Isaac Ojok

No. 367.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LANGO AND BUNYORO.

By N.I. Ojok.

INTRODUCTION:

Relationship between Central and Local Governments in Uganda are determined by quite a wide range of factors. In discussing this topic, I wish to examine one such factor, namely penetration by the Central Government at local levels - Lango and Bunyoro. This, I consider, will equally help us in studying political development that has occurred over the years as well as throwing light on the problems involved. The difficulty with this concept of penetration is that it is too broad to be isolated from other variables. However, if we agree with the rather narrower definition by Pye (1), then we shall have to consider a set of processes of social change through which the Central Government brings all areas of the nation under its effective administration; involves the various sectors with its plans, projects, values and aspirations by building up a set of formal institutions to implement its policies and also by creating feelings of oneness and confidence between itself and the people. This definition agrees more with a post-independence objective than with the colonial situation. It is fitting therefore that we review the latter case first as a preliminary approach to the understanding of Central-Local Government relationship in Lango and Bunyoro.

PENETRATION BY COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION:

This was essentially administrative, non-political, authoritarian and concerned with the maintenance of law and order. Local Government structures emerged from the British system of indirect rule (2), i.e. Government by means of indigenous institutions. This was a measure of expediency since it was relatively cheaper to rule the natives through their own political institutions, and the rather heterogeneous structure of the society justified it. Buganda's system of chiefly hierarchy provided a useful basis upon which local government grew throughout the country. In Buganda itself, there was at the top, the paramount King - the Kabaka - who rules the Kingdom of Buganda as an hereditary monarch. He was assisted by the Council of Chiefs - the Lukiko - whose members held office during his pleasures. Below him were the greater and lesser chiefs appointed by him to carry out his orders either at the county, sub-county or parish level. The British administration preserved the essential parts of this structure, but placed a Regent as its middleman to explain, or even command the Kingdom's Government to toe

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(1) L.W. Pye - An Analytical Study of Political Development. P.80

(2) Lugard: The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.

the line of the Colonial administration, in accordance with the terms of the 1900 Agreement (4). Although the Kabaka's Government was from this Agreement, later to develop as a semi-autonomous entity within a greater Uganda, ultimate power lay with the colonial government, personified by the Governor and his subordinates. In other words, the avenues of penetration into Buganda's affairs were controlled by the latter. Backing them up was the means of coersion - the militia, the police force and the court - whom they could use when necessary Buganda's system of chiefly hierarchy was carbon-copied in Lango by creating chiefs and administrative units which originally did not exist. This was the period popularly known as the period of pacification (5) and such people who appeared subservient to the new order became chiefs although they could lose their jobs anytime if a more subservient, loyal person showed up. In Bunyoro, the Buganda system was already in existence, but following the conquest of this Kingdom by the British with the help of Baganda soldiers, local government developed rather differently from Buganda's. The colonial administration had a more effective influence there through the District Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner. The same applied to Lango District. The D.C. personified authoritarian rule by the central government at the district and local level. He could tour the district at any time and hold barazas to assess public opinion and explain government policy; he could dismiss the chiefs and appoint new ones and nobody would complain since they were not even traditional; he was the magistrate at the District High Court even if he knew nothing about law, and the chiefs exercised a similar role at the local levels; he was chairman of the District Council from which he could sound public opinion since its members were mostly the chiefs themselves. In terms of finance to develop the district, this was collected by the chiefs in the form of taxes, but this would go directly to the coffers of the Central Government, and would come back through the D.C. Since he was also the chairman of the District Team, (a dynamic group of officials of all departments in Lira engaged in the overall administration of the district at the level of policy formulation, translation to suit local needs and execution(i), it can therefore be said that the central government had an effective grip on Lango local government affairs. The central government attitude towards local government during this formative period is also important. It was that of paternalism. Hence, there was no question of developing a democratic, strong local governments, or else these would challenge the very existence of the colonial power. Thus too, the British model of local government could never be practised in its pure form. Local governments in Lango and Bunyoro therefore grew on a tribal identity (this is true of many other local governments in Uganda) thereby helping the colonial regime to make its presence felt much more effectively, although this was later to undermine the sense of nationhood in a greater Uganda. Since local governments were essentially to maintain the status quo, they played only a limited role and did not concern themselves with attempts to raise the standard of living for their people. The central government's ability

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(4) The 1900 Buganda Agreement.
(5) K. Ingham: British Administration in Lango District. (1907 - 1935).
(i) Extracts from Sathyamurthy's analysis of central-local relationships at the district level.

to control the administrative, judicial and financial spheres of the local governments, meant that changes within local government structures as well as for the whole country, could only take place in favour of the central rather than of local government.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MODIFIED:

An analysis of the changes which occurred in the early 50's will show that the central government was prepared to see local governments develop as a useful channel of implementing its policy rather than to undermine it. Following Wallis Report (6) on local government, the central government 'devolved' some of its responsibilities on to local governments, especially the running of social services This inevitably led to the modification of local government structures. For example, the 1949 Ordinance (7) had stipulated that the basis of administration should consist of "the chiefs, a district council and such other councils as may be established ... ". This was by the 1955 Ordinance converted into the Council only (Buganda exclusive, according to a revised form of the 1900 Agreement in 1955). In Lango, a District Council was subsequently established in the same year. It was further given the responsibility, according to this Ordinance, of setting up an Appointment's Committee to recruit and discipline local civil servants as well as to ensure the efficient running of the newly transferred services - schools, hospitals and agriculture. The problem with added responsibilities is that there may not be the means nor the ability to shoulder them. This occurred in Lango. The District Council could levy taxes on the people and could pass by-laws, but it could not raise sufficient money to run the district's services, leave alone running the newly added ones. In this case, the central government had to intervene with grants-in-aid or by seconding officers to the district administration. To this extent, the central government was the one developing the district. Even the D.C. still had a lot of control in district affairs. Up to 1958 when direct election was introduced in district council elections, he was the Chairman and he could control procedures and decision-making mechanisms at will; he even approved of the District Appointments Committee members and the chiefs could still regard themselves as the D.C.'s men rather than the Council's men, moreso since their boss, the Secretary-General, relied on the D.C.'s backing in all administrative matters. The District Team was still intact, so that even the officials of the different departments looked upon the D.C. as the only effective authority in the district, and not the Council. The 1955 Ordinance would therefore seem to have produced nominal changes in terms of practical application. The central government could still get its authority and policies accepted and effected at the local levels as a matter of course and the masses would not consider this an interference from another government as such. In other words,

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(6) Wallis' Report.

(7) The 1949 Ordinance.

the people had for a long time been used to the provisions of welfare services as the why and the wherefore of government and not as a culmination of a gradual process. They therefore tended to justify central government penetration into local levels because it fulfilled their expectations. The changes which were to occur in the years immediately preceeding independence were engineered by the nation-wide movement for political independence. It would therefore be proper if we link this with the post-independence period, to see what effects penetration has had on central-local government relationship.

REQUISITES OF PENETRATION:

It is important to realise that the shift from a colonial era to independence poses new challenges for a newly-independent country. Essentially this revolves round the concept of nation-building. The newly created nation is immediately preoccupied with development projects to be implemented in order to raise the standard of living of the people; old problems of disunity, ignorance and disease must give way to prosperity and national unity; new policies need to be formulated and implemented throughout the country (ii). It is within this context, that when the Uganda Peoples' Congress came to power in 1962 to rule an independent Uganda, it had to face the realities of the situation. The question was, how best could she rule this country as a united piece, and how best could she rapidly develop it? There were bound to be shortcomings here and there. For instance, the ruling party found itself transformed from the longstanding position of an Opposition into a government. The difficulty of adjustment had to be overcome; secondly, the people were still not yet used to this new regime. Penetration into local levels had to be considered seriously if nation-building had to produce the desired effects. What were the requisites? This is a combination of tactics, and even those of the colonial administration were to be used equally. It is the manner in which these different tactics were and are employed that we get the picture of central-local government relationships in Lango and Bunyoro.

(a) Mobilizing Response:-

The gaining of support for the government's policies from the common people is an essential feature of penetration. The central government has realised that local governments can be a useful mouthpiece in this direction. Following constitutional conferences in London, the 1962 Local Administrations (8) Ordinance and the 1963 Western Kingdoms (Busoga) Act, were passed, defining the powers and the functions of the local governments, save for Buganda. The former grants that the District Council may debate a bill beforehand, but cannot make it law unless ratified by the Minister of Regional Administration. The latter grants that all draft bills must first be forwarded to him for scrutiny before they are debated by the Bunyoro legislature (the Rukurato). What

(ii) J.S. Coleman and Rosberg: Political Parties and National Integration in Africa.

(8) Burke: Local Government and Politics in Uganda.

it means in effect is that by controlling the decision-making body in Lango and Bunyoro, the central government can expect to have its policies interpreted and implemented in the two districts (the same applies to the rest of Uganda). The important thing therefore is to dominate the composition of the legislatures, in this case with U.P.C. members. This constitutional advantage has been exploited effectively by the central government, and it has ensured that the Rukurato and the Lango District Councils are U.P.C. composed. The relationship between the two governments is much better than that of other local government districts without a one-party rule such as Buganda. Most of the party-members in both Bunyoro and Lango can explain government policy in one common vein - that of the government's - because they share a common identity. In Lango for instance, the party publicity Secretary is also the districts' Secretary-General, and the Constitutional Head (won - Nyali) is the regional chairman of the U.P.C. Branch. They therefore make use of their prominent positions to preach the gospel and policies of the U.P.C. government during regular mass rallies. In Bunyoro, similar men are found in outstanding offices: The Prime Minister (Katikiro) is the party secretary and the Speaker is the Treasurer. It is in Bunyoro that party organisation is most efficient. Every administrative unit in the Kingdom is a party branch (9), so that this assists in the recruitment of new members and the holding of rallies very well. In Lango, there are only about 3,000 members with party cards out of a total population of 35,000 (10). This would suggest that the party officials lack the funds and zeal to recruit many members in this mass party. Lack of efficient organization of the party does undermine mobilizing response. Similarly, the factions growing within the party at the centre can undermine it at the local levels (11).

(b) Communication System:-

An effective communication system can promote penetration from the centre to the district and local levels very fast and vice versa. This requires hardware communication - roads radios, telephones, letters, railways etc. - as well as control of information to and fro to avoid leakages, losses in transmission etc. As far as hardware communication is concerned in Uganda, the Central Government is well equipped with it. There are telephone networks, the radio, government owned vernacular papers, and all-weather condition roads and railway line northwards which can be used by the central government to administer, extract resources from and provide services to both Lango and Bunyoro. At the receiving end is the District Commissioner, the Central Government's link with the local levels. He is the assessor of events in the district and he reports back to the centre accordingly. He liaison's with the district and Kingdom administrations to explain government policies to the people. The D.C.'s position is somewhat a difficult one in rendering this link between the

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(9) Interview with Speaker, Bunyoro Rukurato.
(10) Interview with General Secretary of the U.P.C.- Lango.
(11) The motion of no-confidence in the Bunyoro Government, led by Katuramu, was engineered by the Magezi group. The motion was defeated - January 1966.

government and the people (12). His powers are very much reduced in the administration of the district. He can only advise, but cannot dictate orders as his predecessor used to do. He no longer presides in District Council proceedings, neither must he be invited to attend. He is more or less cut off from the actual running of the district. He therefore poses as a non-committed observer who is at the same time relied upon for linking the centre with the localities. As such, he does not render a very effective link, and for most of the time the district administration regards him as an interferer in its affairs (13). Much depends on the personality of the D.C. on the spot, if effective link is to emerge. However, the central government has even better media of communication with the public in the persons of the cabinet ministers of the Kingdom government and the secretary-general together with his financial and administrative secretaries in the district administrations. Since these men are themselves politicians of the same party, the central government can contact any of them by phone, or by letter to extract or issue any necessary information. If the Prime Minister wishes to tour the district, they are the people to publicise and ensure the success of that tour - mainly the interpretation of government policy and its implementation. Viewing communication system from this angle alone does not explain much about the real success or failure of penetration. The populace's response needs to be examined equally, and this may be either acceptance, toleration or total rejection of central governments efforts to reach them; and this should be seen to be aired through the existing communication network in both Lango and Bunyoro. The radio is first of all too far away for them to speak through it; many of them are not articulate enough to criticise or hail the government in the newspapers and many of them cannot so easily come to the officials and air their grievances because they lack easy means of transport. The only medium open to them is the rallies and their representatives through whom they can speak out. But by the time this is channelled through to the centre, it will have undergone several modifications. The chiefs do not, for instance, sort out the real needs of the people because they do not feel directly affected, and some councillors and M.P.s are too negligent to explain the common man's real needs to the government. It is this back-flow route which undermines effective penetration from the centre because of inefficiencies inherent in it.

There are yet other variables which the central government has tried to exploit in terms of penetration - the reliance on central government revenue and personnel by district administrations to run the services. Money is the key to the implementation of development programmes, and whoever controls its source can very easily direct its use. In terms of rising expectations, certainly the central government has been able to satisfy the greater portion of

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(12) Interview with A.D.C.I. Lango.

(13) Interview with the Secretary-General, Lango. (I think here the legacy of the colonial past is still very influential - the D.C. of the old and new order are viewed at from this background).

it, thus making itself look legitimate to the populace.

(c) Financial Control.

Both the Bunyoro and Lango district administrations are not self-sufficient. Most of their revenue is derived from taxation and the collection of market fees and forest dues which are disproportional to the services to be run. The maintenance of law and order, plus the financial expenses involved in maintaining efficient social services such as schools, hospitals and agriculture, have therefore to be supplemented by central government grants. As such, the relationship between the Central and Local Administrations cannot but be one of dependence. This completely undermines the quasi-federal relationship which the constitution (14) states, should exist between Bunyoro and the central government. In effect, this is to the central government's advantage to forge ahead with nation-building in Bunyoro. For every newly transferred service, the central government meets 50% of the cost involved (15). In terms of personnel, the district administrations equally lack the money to train or attract skilled personnel to man these services. These are provided by the central government. They cannot as things stand be self-supporting; rather than surrender these responsibilities back to the central government, they would prefer to be spoon-fed to avoid losing face. Thus, the central government is the giver of bread and butter to the common man and this gives it added legitimacy to govern (16). Furthermore, the two governments, Lango and Bunyoro, cannot draw up their development plans independently; they have to submit them to the Central Government's Planning Bureau for scrutiny and inclusion in the overall planning of the country. This means, the Central Government has a final say and can, as a measure of redressing the imbalance in the country's development, give priority to places which are least developed such as Karamoja. The weakness with receiving plans from the district governments lies in the fact that they are mainly drawn by non-economists and tend to be unrealistic. If the Central Planning Bureau could delegate its powers on to the officials of departments who formerly manned the district team, they would assist with the drawing up of a fairly realistic development plan and much time and money would be saved. This too would facilitate penetration in economic spheres of the district from the centre. As things stand, the mere receiving of development plans from the local governments, without even having any official to expound on them, is a mere set-back to nation-building. The financial help from the centre to the districts also covers salaries of seconded officers as well as some of the local civil servants and officials. To this extent, the central government is in a good bargaining position with the local governements. For instance, it is the Minister of Regional Administration, through the Regional Service Commission, appointed by him, who confirms members of the Appointments Board in Lango (17) and those of the Public Service Commission in Bunyoro.(i) Both the Board and the Commission draw their

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(14) Uganda Constitutional Instrument.
(15) Interview with Minister of Social Services, Bunyoro.
(16) This became a useful propaganda tool to win district by-elections in both Lango and Bunyoro.
(17) Interview with Secretary to the Appointments Board Lango.
(i) Interview with Katikiro, Bunyoro, confirms that the P.S.C. and its members are appointed by the Omukama in whose name the Bunyoro Government operates.

allowances from the central government so that they are morally committed to co-operate with the latter in the all-important task of nation-building. (18) Even in terms of maintaining efficiency in administration, it is the central government which organises the necessary courses and conferences required for top administrators in the districts. At Nsamizi, Treasurers, Administrative Secretaries/Permanent Secretary and the like leave Bunyoro and Lango together with their colleagues from other areas to participate in such courses. What seems to be lacking here is that these officials are not indoctrinated with the ideology and aspiration of the central government towards nation-building. This would go a long way to solve the problems of penetration at the district and local levels.

(d) Identity:

All that has been said in the foregoing would seem to agree with the central government's search for legitimacy very much, and it would seem that the requisites so far outlined have considerably enabled the centre to reach the masses fairly effectively. The central-local government relationship has also altered markedly from the old order because of the results produced through the application of some of the outlined tactics of penetration in a post-independence era. There seems to be yet another tactic of penetration which the central government has attempted, to produce a more radical effect of nation-building. I have here decided to term it identity tactics, because it is the attempt to create a sense of identity with national goals as conceived from the centre. One of these was in the sphere of education.

(i) Education Policy. The process of penetration here has gone further than in many fields. The central government, mindful of the historical legacies which tend to undermine nation-building, introduced a radical move whereby all schools were henceforward controlled by the central government's ministry of education. Missionaries and other voluntary organisations who formerly controlled schools in different areas of the country were the first people to be affected by this policy. No wonder that many of them made representations before the Ministry of Education to protest against it (20). The colonial legacy was unearthed by the policy and it took some difficulty before it could be implemented throughout the country. In Bunyoro and Lango, there was little problem, due mainly to the fact that religious feuds had not been so marked as was the case in Buganda (i) during colonial administration. Education therefore was to transform the thinking of the pupils and students so radically as to make them begin to feel a source of identity with the nation which provided them with that

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(18) The Chairman of the Bunyoro Public Service Commission gets 1,200/- p.m. and six of its members get 610/- p.m. In Lango, the Chairman gets 1000/- p.m. and seven of its members get 600/- p.m. This is a part-time job.
(19) Integration of schools was formally implemented in 1964
(20) The missionaries were torn between losing their influence in the education of the country and possible withdrawal from Uganda if they persistently sabotaged the new policy.
(i) Fallers - The Kings Men.

education. They could now go to any school irrespective of their beliefs (these are taken care of) and teachers too can teach anywhere they like. This measure was also designed to destroy religious differences. The difficulty with the policy lies mainly in the fact that the very type of education provided now lacks even the Uganda-wise orientation. The syllabuses are at any rate silent on it, and even the teachers do not yet know the exact nature of this new national consciousness which they are required to impart on to the younger generation. Admittedly, the central government has to some extent achieved something in this policy - administration of the schools - but it has yet to create and propagate that sense of identity with the nation which school education purports to effect.

(ii) Legal Systems - Uganda's judicial system has changed considerably from the old order which indirect rule had created. There was formerly a dual system of courts - one by the central government for non-Africans and one by the local administrations and restricted to the Africans - with the passing of the 1957 African Court Ordinance, to be formalised in 1962 with the passing of the African Court (Amendment) Ordinance, this system took a new picture. A major change occurred two years later when another Ordinance was passed (21), integrating local and central courts and procedures. Thus, the judiciary is today separated from the administration and everyone can be tried in the Court according to the rule of law, regardless of customs, race or tribe. The magistrates are central government paid, appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Thus, through this modern court system, the central government has been able to create some sense of identity in the minds of the people, so that they can be able to identify themselves with a Uganda System and not their own tribal identity. In Bunyoro and Lango, this sense of identity with the Uganda-wise judicial system, is not yet well-marked. First of all, being a new thing, the people have not yet adjusted themselves to it. Secondly, Chiefs who originally were the judges themselves feel that they have nothing to do with the Central Government thing (22). Moreover, proceeds from the Court no longer go into the pocket of the local Government as such; the Central Government is the Treasurer. This lack of co-operation from the Chiefs stems from the legacy of history and more time will be needed before they can overcome this ntality. The role of the Chiefs has not, however, altered much. They still have to help in the maintenance of law and order and collect revenue for the Government. I think in Lango, other forces come into play to make Chiefs reluctant to assist the magistrates with their task. In Bunyoro, it is mainly the local politicians who are not co-operative. This is partly because they are not well-versed in the new court sy tem and partly because they are not mindful of the public role they play as politicians (23).

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(21) Burke: Local Government and Politics in Uganda.
(22) Interview with Magistrates in Lango.
(23) Interview with J. Ndolerire - II Magistrate, Bunyoro.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:- (i)

I think it is true to say that the relationship between Central and Local Governments in Lango and Bunyoro is a fairly healthy and workable one. The existing structures of Local Government in the two districts have been able to offer room for co-operation between the districts and Central Government in all administrative and political matters. This is not to say that the desired goal has been achieved by either side as yet.- that the services under the Local Governments are disproportional to the structures is but just one indication that some changes are required.

(ii)

The Central Governments measures to get its authority and policies accepted and effected at the local levels can safely be described as pragmatic and pluralistic. It is this measure which has demarcated its relationship with the local levels. This is partly due to the fact that there are problems involved in pursuing a monolithic a proach. Uganda is a multi-party state and as such there is a marked distinction between politicians and civil servants. The Prime Minister had once said, "I do not propose to depart from tradition whereby the Civil Service is isolated from political influence". When it comes to the implementation of policy, this is where the difficulty arises. The policy makers, the politicians, expect the civil servants to implement them in the same vein that they had conceived of this policy. This does not usually happen because the Civil Servants, who are debarred from active politics, are not quite well-versed with the politician's real meaning. Needless to say, this has led to unhealthy relations between the two, and this tends to minimise the depth and breadth of penetration from the centre. The role of the party and that of the administration needs redefining. The historical legacy is still here with us. The Central Government has inherited many things which cannot be eradicated overnight, and one of these is divided loyalties. Because the local governments were built on tribal loyalty or traditional loyalty to a ruler, one finds that the Bunyoro have to owe allegience to their Omukama first (even though he is now a constitutional monarch, following the 1955 Agreement) and then to the Central Government next. To do away with such rulers, it requires more than amending the Constitution (24). The mentality of the people must change too. Thus the Central Government avoids rash action by taking a pragmatic approach, slow though it is. It has got to please these rulers by paying tribute to their Majesties, and in this way their people may be convinced of the Central Government's action. In Bunyoro, the Omukama is the ally of the U.P.C. Government and he respects the Prime Minister because he is convinced that it was the Prime Minister's influence which made Bunyoro regain its two counties from Buganda, following the result of the 1963 Referendum. Equally, the Prime Minister had to appease the Baganda by making Kabaka the

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(24) The Uganda Constitutional Instrument.
(two thirds of the votes in Parliament and a similar majority in the district or Kingdom legislature is needed to remove such a ruler).

President of Uganda. However, divided loyalties is a grave set-back to nation-building.

The Central Governments' pragmatic approach in Lango and Bunyoro is also seen in the Co-operative Unions and other voluntary organisations. These are financially assisted by the Government. The Lango Co-operative Union Ltd. for example, gets about 90% loan from the Government (25) It organises farmers into primary societies and these affiliate to the Union; it supervises several group farms in the district and it now owns seven ginneries. Last year, it ginned 75% of the cotton in Lango, thus the Union, as an interest group, is encouraged by the Government to carry out shared objectives and in this way the people develop a sense of identity with the long arm of the Government. The District Co-operative Officer, stationed in Lira, liaisons with the Union and gives the necessary advice and report.

(iii)

At the moment, the fear of Government-party penetration into all sectors is slight simply because the means are not available. As was pointed out earlier, communication system is not very effective, particularly backwards. The main weakness lies in the absense of party cadres, and in effective control of the communication system. This would need re-organising the party at all levels if penetration from the centre is to achieve its desired effect. However, the relationship between the Central-Local Governments in Lango and Bunyoro (as well as in other areas) will still revolve round this objective. The Government seems to have all the freedom to get in touch with the public anytime. At this stage of development, it is hard to see how the Central Government can so easily give up control over the development of services in the districts which are relatively inefficient, for the sake of local government autonomy. Even if the constitution of Uganda is from time to time referred to for guidance (26), it would seem that much of its provisions are in favour of the Central Government's free action. For instance, it does not delinate the extent of Central Government's influence in local Government affairs, this is to the Central Government's favour, since not many local Governments are well-acquainted with constitutional arrangements either - whereas local Governments need to be well-acquainted with these if they must govern democratically, the fear that they can become fanatic pressure groups capable of undermining the country's unity is still there, more so since they grew on a rather negative foundation - tribal autonomy. The Central Government could help to democratise them further for the advantage of penetration by forming smaller councils at the county, sub-county levels. In Bunyoro this is most needed because they do not exist as yet; In Lango they need to be elected as well as capable of making by-laws and raising small revenue, subject to the District Councils ratification. Such Councils could help the party to propagate its ideology to the people more effectively since they are closest to the people; it would also help councillors to gain first-hand experience in parliamentary Government.

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(25) Interview with Ben Emor, Union Official.
(26) - Buganda Government V Central Government for failing to transfer her things to her - the police force, finance.
- Delegations have visited Min. of Regional Admin. from Bunyoro etc. from time to time for clarifications.

No. 386

MANAGING PLANNED DEVELOPMENT: TANZANIA'S EXPERIENCE

By Anthony H. Rweyemamu

> And it is true that the examination of the bases of morality can destroy morality and lead to disintegration. It may even be true that a civilization can remain integrated only so long as its ancient, unthinking morals are stronger than its head. When men begin to see that nothing is sure they can begin to drift toward the ethics of Hitler or Alcibiades. As Lycon says in the trial (of Socrates) - "no faith will bear examination, a tree cannot live if you look at its roots."
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> Yet freedom can live only when life is constantly examined and where there are no censors to tell men how far their investigations can go. Human life lives in this paradox and on the horns of this dilemma. Examination is life, and examination is death. It is both and it is the tension between.
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> - From Maxwell Anderson, "Notes on Socrates," New York Times, October 28th, 1951.

All the new states in Africa have drafted economic and social development plans, for varying periods. Everywhere one sees political leaders and party functionaries singing the popular song of nation-building while crowds respond with enthusiasm. Thus national planning is increasingly becoming synonymous with nation-building throughout the developing nations of Africa. A common problem facing the leaders of the new nations is not how to draft a brilliant plan or organisational charts; this any state can do by seeking the assistance of planning experts and artists. The problem centres on plan management and implementation. This article raises some of the questions and critical problems implicit in plan execution which have arisen during Tanzania's brief experience of nationhood.

Plan implementation in a new state is conditioned by many variables, some controllable but most uncontrollable. But the most crucial variables in determining plan execution and implementation is the quality and quantity of the bureaucracy and the degree of commitment of the political leadership available.

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What is National Planning?

For the purpose of this article, national planning is defined as a complex yet continuous process of fashioning socio-economic goals and seeking to attain them. Thus defined, a national plan has political as well as economic facets. As for a state like Tanzania, which only recently emerged from colonial status, it is the political aspect which should command prior consideration during the initial stages of a long but slow progress towards modernity. Such a view necessarily puts less emphasis on the economic magnitudes of savings, consumption, and investment. National planning is, as Robert Dahl has asserted, and inter-related social process for reaching and implementing national decisions within the rubrics of the political system.[1]

What else could a national plan mean to a poorly endowed country like Tanzania? The masses of Tanzania to date still live in rural areas, where they constitute over 96 per cent of the country's total population; the preoccupation of most rural dwellers is still peasant agriculture and animal husbandry. Tanzania is not rich in mineral resources like South Africa, Zambia, or the Congo (Leopoldville). Because of the low taxable capacity of the nation, the state cannot even mobilise local capital in sufficient amounts to supplement or even to utilise external aid, beyond a certain point. The climate, vegetation, and population maps of the country suggest that certain areas are pre-destined to attract industry while others will never do so.

Under these circumstances, Tanzania's national planning effort should be judged as a means of integrating and mobilising the political system. In this sense, a national plan is partly a statement of political ideology, a kind of doctrinal formula for attaining society's goals. In short, an evaluation of plan implementation should seek to measure not only the economic and social outcomes of the plan but, even more crucial, the extent and degree to which it serves to mobilise the people's energies, bring about national integration, and secure a measure of political consensus, all of which are requisites for nation-

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1. He argues that the politics of planning 'is nothing less than the total behavior of the political order within which planning takes place.' See Robert Dahl, 'The Politics of planning', in International Social Science Journal (Paris and New York), XI, 3, 1959, pp. 340-50.

building and development.

From this concept of the crucial role of national planning it follows logically that the role of government and administration in Tanzania, as elsewhere in pre-industrial polities, is that of 'development administration'. The term 'development' is here used in its widest sense, to include the economic, social, and political development of all the inhabitants. And, as Merle Fainsod has argued, the most favourable setting for progress in development administration exists where a politically confident and dynamic, modernising leadership strongly desires development and can successfully project this attitude into both the bureaucracy and the population at large.[1]

Few students of East African politics would dispute that Tanzania possesses a politically influential and highly committed leadership. However, I would argue that the problems of planned development lie elsewhere. The central focus in the analysis of the planning process in developing polities should centre on the bureaucracy: its quality, quantity, and consequent relationship with the political leadership.

Very often we fail to realise how much influence, both real and potential, the bureaucracy does and can command in any political system. Too often we talk of the political aspects of, say, a national plan, meaning I suppose that the formulation of the broad goals of the plan is normally the responsibility of political leaders and that the sole function of the bureaucracy is to implement what it is told. In actuality, the bureaucracy's influence permeates even the policy-making areas. For normally ministers rely heavily upon the expert advise of the bureaucracy to interpret and spell out the broader implications of whatever policies are proposed. In so doing, the bureaucracy can and in fact does influence the policy makers and indirectly the policy itself.

Furthermore, once broad development goals have been formulated and approved by a country's legislature, it is again the bureaucracy which must interpret and translate policy into

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1. Merle Fainsod, 'The Structure of Development Administration', in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), Development Administration: concepts and problems (Syracuse, 1964), pp. 1-24.

actual accomplishments. This process includes drafting memoranda to solicit capital resources and technicians from possible external donors; working out a priority list of projects to be implemented as funds and manpower become available; collecting taxes and other local monies to meet both recurrent and development budgets; interpreting and implementing the national plan; and constantly evaluating plan implementation so as to maximise results, economic efforts of all sorts, and check achievements against the overall national plan goals. It is because of this critical function of the bureaucracy that its role has been termed 'development administration'.

It follows that should the quality and efficiency of the bureaucracy break down, for whatever reasons, the nation's development efforts would be placed in serious jeopardy. This fact is starkly illustrated by Tanzania's recent experience. During the first year of planned development endeavour, the Government failed to recruit sufficient skilled personnel - both administrative and technical - even to balance the attrition of expatriate staff caused by the termination of contracts and retirement. Partly as a consequence, the existing bureaucracy was overworked and was not able to spend all the Treasury allocations for capital investment in the public sector. It is reported that only about 88 per cent of the development funds issued to various ministries for the financial year 1964-65 were actually spent.[1]

Of course, that is not the whole story. There has been no public- and little or no official-discussion as to whether or not the existing bureaucracy is in a condition to ensure the optimum performance of its administrative functions. The remainder of this article is addressed to this question.

Tanzania's Bureaucracy

In order to comprehend the complexity and magnitude of the problems besetting Tanzania's bureaucracy and to appreciate the Government's efforts since independence to reconstruct the entire administrative structure, one needs to know and understand the state of the bureaucracy in the period prior to independence.

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1. Periodic Progress Report on the Implementation of the Five-Year Development Plan (Dar esSalaam, 1965), pp. 1-3.

The story must, as it were, start with 'once upon a time' - with the colonial legacy.

It should be recalled that it is only since independence that the African has been permitted to play an active role in the civil service. Throughout the inter-war period, and up to 1945, the African did not even have a chance to reach the higher grades of the civil service. In 1954 the Lidbury Commission observed that the division between the senior and junior services was 'synonymous with European and non-European'.[1]

During 1947-48, the East African Governments appointed the Holmes Commission to study conditions in the civil service, particularly with regard to salaries and grading. The Commission's recommendations, which were accepted and adapted by the British authorities, introduced the following civil service system: (1) all posts were to be open to candidates of all races; (2) economic laws of 'inducement' were invoked to justify different salary scales for Europeans, Asians and Africans, in that order, on the principle that salaries for the higher posts should be determined in the light of the amounts necessary to secure the services of Europeans; (3) non-Europeans appointed to such jobs were to receive three-fifths of the salary paid to Europeans of the same qualifications and doing the same job.[2] This was the beginning of the so-called 'three-fifths rule' in the civil service, which lasted through 1954; when it was replaced by a smaller 'inducement allowance' for civil servants recruited from European countries.[3]

By mid-1960 Tanganyika had 33,000 employees in the civil service, excluding manual or daily paid workers. Of these, 3,898 held senior posts as shown in the official staff list; the remainder, who were exclusively Africa, held lower positions. Among the senior staff Africans totalled 346; Europeans 2,463; and Asians 613.

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1. Report of the (Lidbury) Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories and the East African High Commission (London, 1954), vol. I, para.21.

2. Report of the (Holmes) Commission on the Civil Services of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, 1947-48 (London, 1948), para.92.

3. The 'inducement allowance' was recommended by the Lidbury Commission in 1954, which maintained that this was needed to attract the services of European expatriates, but argued that 'the men must come up to the standards, and not the standards down to the men'; op.cit. pp. 31-6

A second feature was that under the British colonial regime no government employee could join or participate in political associations - particularly T.A.N.U. President Nyerere has said that, in consequence, T.A.N.U. had to be organised and run by uneducated people, with the further result that, on the attainment of independence, the new Government had to be run by politicians who themselves lacked education.[1]

With independence, all these things pertaining to the civil service had to be changed. In the Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64), the nationalist Government specifically allocated money for a crash programme for training indigenous civil servants. The pressure upon the new ministers for Africanisation and 'localisation' was both political and practical. The political drive for Africanisation came from trade union organisations and the African members of the civil service who for decades had been subjugated and subordinated; the practical need for localisation was due to the fact that with independence there was likely to be an exodus of expatriates who were not prepared to serve under an indigenous government.

By the end of December 1961, of the total 4,452 senior and middle-grade posts in the civil service, 1,170 were filled by Africans. Three years later, the total number of officers serving in senior and middle-grade posts on permanent terms had increased to 5,389. Of these 3,083 or 57 per cent were local citizens.[2] This was as far as any well-meaning government could go. For Africanisation without drastically lowering standards of performance could only go as far as there were men and women possessed of a minimum education. No matter how much in-service training is given, it is only in very rare, exceptional circumstances, that a man who has had only primary schooling can possibly rise to the senior scale of the civil service hierarchy.

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1. Tanganyika Parliamentary Debates: National Assembly, Official Report (Dar es Salaam), 1st Session, 10 December 1962 to 16th February, 1963, vols. 1-10.

2. Establishment Circular No. E.B.18/013 of 26th January, 1965.

The problem was vividly summed up by the Africanisation Commission of 1962. Pointing out that there were only 200 Africans entering Form I of the Secondary schools in 1962, the Commission added: 'it will take at least five years before these 200 emerge as University graduates or qualified professionals'.[1] On the other hand, a survey of high-level manpower needs revealed that between 1962 and 1967 the additional administrative and professional manpower needed for growth and replacement was at least 5,600.[2] The latest government analysis of the situation and needs over the next five years is as follows:

Revised Estimate of Manpower Requirements, 1962-67[3]

	Five Year Requirements	Estimated supply	Shortfall
(1) Science/Maths-based occupations	1,437	843	-594
(2) Occupations requiring special training (graduate teachers, social workers, lawyers, etc.)	943	599	-344
(3) Occupations open to non-specialists with general degrees (administration, business administration, etc.)	525	522	- 3
Total	2,905	1,963	-941

Throughout 1962 and the first half of 1963, Tanganyika underwent administrative changes on a scale never before witnessed. The first innovation was to replace the former civil-service Provincial and District Commissioners with political appointees. All

1. Report of the Africanisation Commission, 1962 (Dar es Salaam, 1963), p. 2.
2. George Tobias, High Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Tanganyika, 1962-1967 (Dar es Salaam, 1963)
3. Source: Speech by A.Z.M. Swai, then Minister of State, President's Office, to the National Assembly on the 1965-66 Estimates.

Provinces were restyled 'Regions' and all Districts, 'Areas', under Regional Commissioners and Area Commissioners respectively.[1]

Beginning early in 1963, the local government system also underwent changes. With the abolition of traditional chieftainship, the former colonial-inspired local authorities were transformed into elected councils for rural areas and town councils in the urban areas.[2] The District Council Chairman is normally (and since the new constitution invariably) the T.A.N.U. District Chairman, while the Secretary is also the Area Commissioner for the Administrative District. The Executive Officer, who is appointed by and is responsible to the Local Government Commission, does most of the administrative work for the District Council. The District was further subdivided into divisions and villages, each under Divisional, Assistant Divisional and Village Executive Officers, respectively. Sub-district officers were appointed by the District Council, but since January 1965 they, too, come under the Local Government Service Commission. Their duties include the maintenance of law and order, the collection of local rates, and the stimulation of local development effort.[3]

The Problems

Structural changes and innovations are here considered from the point of view of administrative efficiency and their fitness for tackling the problems of nation-building with the maximum speed but without disrupting society.

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1. Regional and Regional Commissioners Act, No. 2 of 1962, and Area Commissioners Act, No. 18 of 1962. It seems that the term 'Area' and 'District' continue to be used interchangeably.

2. The Chiefs were abolished by the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) act, No. 13 of 1963.

3. Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 'Local Government in Tanganyika' (mimeo, Dar es Salaam, 1965); Ministry of Local Government and Administration, Circular to all Regional Commissioners of 1o July, 1962. For a good analysis of recent changes, see William Tordoff, 'Regional Administration in Tanzania', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, (Cambridge), III, 1, May, 1965, pp. 63-89. The Court system was also reorganised to comprise a three-tier system of High Court, District Courts, and Primary Courts - all under a unified and independent judicial system.

Under the British colonial system, the Governor, as head of the administration, maintained a clear line of command, by way of the Chief Secretary in the Secretariat, down to the Provincial and District Commissioners. These links provided a solid hierarchy of the establishment, performing the same services and sharing a common loyalty. This solidarity was so strong that in the field Provincial Commissioners were in fact identified by the masses as 'the Administration'. It was therefore imperative that, following independence, changes should be made in the structure to ensure loyalty and solidarity to a new government. The politicisation of the civil service commissioners and the subsequent opening of T.A.N.U. membership to all government employees took place in response to this need.

The British colonial civil service was particularly renowned for efficiency and dedication to duty - albeit, duty as defined by the Colonial Office. It comprised men and women who, while priding themselves for being apolitical, nevertheless possessed sound academic training. Those who managed to secure promotion to the level of, say, Provincial Commissioner of District Commissioner were men who had spent many years in public service and had therefore proved that they were capable of assuming major responsibilities. But, as a result of the failure to promote Africans, by the time of independence there were very few local people who had in fact benefited from the British administrative skills and experience.

Thus the politicisation of the regional and local administration was not and could not be matched by complete Africanisation, nor indeed localisation, of the civil service. When, for example, the Regional Commissioner took over, the former expatriate Provincial Commissioner, if he decided to stay, became the Administrative Secretary in the new Regional Administration. At the same time those few Africans who had obtained higher education and/or administrative skills during the colonial era were moved to the capital as Assistant Permanent Secretaries, on their way to the top posts vacated by retiring British expatriates. The consequences - for administrative efficiency, accountability, communications, staff relationships, and morale-would require a separate essay, and space precludes their discussion here.

Tanzania's bureaucratic capacity to fulfil its development role has also been beset by a number of less obvious factors and, paradoxically, by the very changes which were meant to enhance it. Some recent innovations have adversely affected the bureaucracy from a number of angles, especially: (a) the relationship between expatriates, both old and new, and the newly recruited or promoted local civil servants; and (b) the relationship between the bureaucracy viewed in totality and the populace at large, on the one hand, and the political officials and party functionaries, national and local, on the other. The combination of the two factors, compounded by (c) the over-centralisation and monopolisation of power by T.A.N.U., has tended to produce an extreme weakness of the bureaucratic organisation and management, thus adversely affecting the rational and efficient allocation and execution of duties, and harmonious 'line-staff' relationships (the chain of command and responsibility). These factors should be examined more closely.

(a) It is a truism that the interaction between the inherited colonial officials and the newly promoted local civil servants, especially at the regional and local level, created problems of mistrust and suspicion between them. This situation, especially in the early stages, hampered the bureaucracy's capacity to play its proper role in the development administration.

It should hastily be pointed out, however, that this problem is not unique to Tanzania; rather it is a universal one facing all developing states at the same stage of growth and in similar circumstances. One student of political development in other countries has summarised the problem vividly in the following manner:

> The relations between the older bureaucracy and the newer echelons were not always easy, especially in the first period after independence when an attitude of district on the part of the nationalist leaders towards the remnants of the older colonial services usually prevailed. In some cases this may have led to an almost complete destruction of the older structure. In most cases some sort of modus vivendi developed between the older and the new echelons in which one or the other tended to predominate.[1]

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1. S.N. Eisenstadt, in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, 1963), p. 108.

(b) In Tanzania, we have already seen how this situation led to 'an almost complete destruction' of the inherited system of provincial administration and a resultant predominance of political commissioners over the civil service. At the national level, 'some sort of modus vivendi' was developed by Africanising all 'window' posts. The new men who took over the top positions in the administrative structure invariably had less training and administrative skills than their new subordinates. The result has been smoothness and contentment on the outside; but, within the organisation, Max Weber's essentials of 'hierarchy, responsibility, nationality, and professionalisation' are conspicuously absent.[2]

(c) The bureaucracy's capacity to play its crucial role of development administration is even more critically affected by the over-centralisation of power and its complete monopolisation by the party-government structure. This phenomenal situation has in turn given rise to a related series of and adverse effects on the bureaucracy. At the local level, the primacy of the party has meant that the populace in general, and party functionaries in particular, have tended to view technical and administrative officials with even less confidence than their colonial predecessors were regarded.

I have seen many cases where farmers in village settlements, who had either disagreed with or misunderstood official actions, felt that the Commissioner for Village Settlement who was there to answer their queries, was not pursuing the government-party policy. In consequence, the farmers would bypass the Commissioner and his officials and send a delegation to the relevant Regional Commissioner, or sometimes to the Vice-President or Secretary-General of T.A.N.U.

The absolute supremacy of the political over the administrative structure, and the resultant insubordination of the latter, together could possibly incapacitate and effectively preclude the bureaucracy from performing its administrative and executive functions. That this problem

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2. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, (ed), from Max Weber: essays in sociology (New York, 1958), ch. 8.

is a reality rather than speculative theory can be determined by an examination of the recent history of village settlement policy making and execution.

Village Settlement - a Case in Point.

Tanzania's massive and bold rural resettlement programme was officially inaugurated by President Nyerere on 10 December 1962. By mid-March, 1963, the machinery had been planned for policy making, administration, and execution. Implementation commenced immediately and continued with dynamism and a sense of urgency throughout the following financial year, that is, 1963-64. By June 1964, there were 11 new village settlement communities in the country, each designed to contain a maximum of 250 families. In the next financial year, however, the rural-resettlement programme, as originally conceived, remained at a standstill.

The reasons for this slowing down of the pace of village settlement are many and varied. A shortage of capital resources; rising costs of local materials; a shortage of skilled manpower; a fall in the prices of some cash crop and overproduction of certain other exportable crops in other parts of the world: certainly all these are sound reasons. However, the most important single cause was none of the above. Rather, it was the failure on the part of the Government to set up optimal organisations, mostly governmental but also administrative and operational, for making policy and stimulating programme execution.

When the village settlements were introduced in 1963, they were to be administered by a Rural Settlement Commission (R.S.C.), a corporate statutory body created by an Act of Parliament for the purpose.[1] As originally constituted, the R.S.C., under the chairmanship of the Vice-President, consisted of five ministers -for Agriculture; for Communications, Power and Works; for Development Planning; for Co-operative and Community Development; and for Local Government - together with the chairman of the Tanganyika Development Corporation.

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1. Rural Settlement Commission Act, No. 62 of December, 1963.

The Rural Settlement Commission Act empowered the R.S.C. to 'promote, develop and control rural settlement', and in particular (a) to establish maintain, and develop rural settlements, and (b) to allocate priorities for the establishment of rural settlements. The R.S.C. was further empowered to hire the staff necessary for carrying out its functions.

The detailed planning and day-to-day execution of village settlement policy was, however, to be done by a Village Settlement Agency, which was appointed by and answerable to the R.S.C. The Chairman of the Agency was the Commissioner for Village Settlement, and the other members were: two Assistant Commissioners -for Co-operative Development, and for Community Development - a land planning officer, a senior executive engineer from the Ministry of Lands and Water Development, an agricultural extension officer, an economist, and the general manager of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation.

The above arrangements reflect a number of assumptions that prevailed at the inception of the programme: first, that village settlement was a top-priority domestic rural programme; and, secondly, that because the programme cut across and touched nearly all ministerial responsibilities, it had to be administered by an inter-ministerial body comprising all the ministers directly involved. Also implicity in the arrangements was a realisation that the R.S.C., as constituted, could only deal with broad policy matters. The day-to-day planning, interpretation, and execution of policy was left to the body of experts headed by the Commissioner, who was in direct communication with the Chairman of the R.S.C.[1] Under these arrangements the village settlement programme was carried out with the maximum speed and efficiency, until it became necessary to reconstruct the administrative structure in June 1964. The immediate occasion for this was the proclamation of a Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26th April, 1964, and the announcement of the Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development on 12 May 1964, which together necessitated a number of changes both in government policy and organisation.

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1. Under the original arrangements the Commissioner for Village Settlement was the Secretary to the Rural Settlement Commission.

to effect either of these measures, the Minister for Lands, Settlement, and Water Development ignored the existence of the Rural Settlement Commission, with the consequence that the R.S.C. never met again after June, 1964, either to make or to review village settlement policy.

Thus, throughout the second year of the village settlement programme, there was no official policy to guide the Village Settlement Agency. Furthermore, the Agency's staff became concerned and bewildered about their positions and future - whether they were to become part of the government establishment, with all that entailed or to remain employees of a semi-autonomous public body. This official procrastination and indecision eventually led to the resignation of the first Commissioner for Village Settlement and to threats by other employees of the Agency to follow suit. In December 1965, the National Assembly approved a government proposal to abolish the Rural Settlement Commission and to transfer all its functions, assets and liabilities to the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development, thus confirming the primacy of political over administrative considerations.[1]

The lessons to be learned and the implications which could be derived from this analysis of the village settlement story are many and varied. One should be particularly noted. Administrative performance cannot be assessed outside the political environment of the bureaucracy. For example, over-concentration and monopolisation of power by the political and the governmental structures can sometimes, if not invariably, incapacitate and demoralise the bureaucracy, thus rendering programme implementation impossible. This problem, especially as it weakens the development efforts of emerging nations, has been summed up by Fred Riggs:

> Top administrators become embroiled in continual inter-agency conflicts, while subordinate piddle away their energies waiting for requisite approvals. Moreover, because many personal far from the scene of action become involved in decision making, questions are often referred to persons with only remote interest in them, it becomes difficult to assign responsibility for action, and final decisions hinge on the outcome of power struggles among individuals only indirectly concerned.[2]

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1. See Rural Settlement Commission (Dissolution), Act, No. 17, of 1966.

2. Frederick W. Riggs, 'Public Administration: a Neglected Factor in Economic Development', in The Annals of the American of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), 305, May 1965, pp. 70-80.

The issues which have been raised thus far are only symptoms of a larger, and in a way more crucial, problem. The problem lies in the upper echelons of the civil service and its interaction with the political heads of government ministries and agencies. What has happened in Tanzania in recent years is that in each case the new Principal Secretary, Assistance Principal Secretary Junior Minister, and Minister have tended to perform - more or less - the same political functions. This tendency to overlapping has in turn enhanced by the injection of expatriate 'advisers' and technical experts in the top levels of the civil service hierarchy, with the consequence that the top-level generalists - the Principal Secretaries - have tended to rely too heavily upon the services of the expatriates, both old and new, who continue to draft technical memoranda and policy papers for an on behalf of them. Thus the Principal Secretaries, instead of acquiring the skills of co-ordinating and running the ever-expanding administrative machine have found themselves with 'extra' time, which enables them to get deeply involved in intraministerial politics.

The consequences of all this have been adverse to the bureaucracy's overall efficiency and effectiveness in handling the tasks of plan implementation. First, there is an ever-growing tendency for the administrative structure to split up into antagonistic camps. Those in the lower echelons of the structural hierarchy, comprising mostly the new, and often better educated but inexperienced college graduates, have felt 'left out'. They rest being told by their superiors -- in some cases yesterday's classmates - that, despite their newly earned higher degrees, they have not enough experience to qualify them for promotion and good houses. The 'gap' between these two levels, with a consequent breakdown in communication between the two, continues to grow with each day that goes bym thus rendering the whole structure of administration precarious.

Some five years ago Francis Sutton wrote an optimistic article concerning the future prospects of nation-building in Africa. He asserted that the African nations are guided by a vision of 'planned development', and that they are characterised by faith in 'government leadership and planning', faith in the 'competence and potential helpfulness' of the industrialised nations, and above all by faith in the 'transferability of knowledge and technique' from the developed countries.[1]

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1. Francis X. Sutton, 'Planning and Nationality in Newly Independent states of Africa', in Economic Development and Cultural Change (Chicago), X, October, 1961, pp. 42-50.

One hopes Sutton is right. Nevertheless I should like to raise one question, without providing the answer. To what extent, in what manner, and at what pace are the expatriate advisers and technical experts transferring their knowledge and sjilled techniques to those who work both above and below them in the bureaucracies and other government institutions? Is it not conceivable that some categories of expatriates are in fact operating in such a manner as to impress their advisees with their indispensability? Here I must hasten to add that I am not proposing that the Tanzania Government should dismiss the expatriates. On the contrary, they are needed in even larger numbers, and for some time to come. I simply ask whether the location of advisers in government ministries and public institutions, and the resultant working relationships, are such as to maximise the opportunities for an optimal transference of the skills and techniques that we all assume these advisers possess. This entire area of Tanzania's bureaucracy, including the role of expatriates, would be an extremely interesting and useful topic for further academic inquiry.

I should like to conclude by emphasising that this article has sought to identify and analyse some crucial problems which have tended to inhibit the rational and efficient management of planned development in Tanzania. Of necessity, therefore, it is one-sided. It puts too much emphasis on 'problems' and makes no reference to premises. Another essay could be written spelling out the advantages of Tanzania's innovations. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the problems identified as not confined to Tanzania alone; they may be found often in even greater number and magnitude in most other developing states. Again, given the fragile nature of the polity and the economy in the wake of independence, it is obvious that the T.A.N.U. Government, of necessity, had to resort to the agregation and concentration of power in order to build a new society. Most of the problems which have been analysed therefore are the inevitable consequences of a polity and economy undergoing rapid change, and it is to be hoped that they are transitory.

AHR/ta
10th March, 1966.

CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS AT THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

by T.V. Sathyamurthy

In the study of the political development of new states, considerable attention has been focussed on the "penetration crisis". The extent of theoretical speculation has, however, not been matched by empirical work on actual new states.(2) While the growth of theory is hindered by the lack of empirical data, our understanding of the over-all process of political development to a very large extent depends upon the detailed knowledge of the levels, extent and agents of penetration. From the perspective of this study, the concept of penetration is exclusively restricted to one area of the whole spectrum of central-local relationships, viz., the area covered by the chief intermediary between the central and local governments, namely, the district commissioner (assisted by a staff of central government representatives at the district level in various specialised fields of development and maintenance of existing services). In so restricting its meaning I am not denying the broader aspects of implications of the concept of penetration but am only suggesting that any concept in order to be operationalised needs to be restricted, artificially if need be, in its scope and meaning. Thus a whole area of "political penetration" of the type which Dr. Hyden discusses in his paper is omitted in this case in favour of what might be termed "penetration through the administrative machinery" without discounting the inevitable overlapping of the two kinds of penetration.(3)

Much of the field work was carried out in the headquarters of the districts of Kigezi and Toro. The district commissioners and their assistants , districts heads such as the district educational, agricultural etc officers, as wella as Secretary-General of the district and his staff were among these I was able to interview. I was also provided with access to non-classified documents and files. I shall attempt to present some tentative results in the form of a description of the working of the district administr tive machinery and its relationships with the different authorities in the district, at the centre and at certain levels below the district.

I

The district level of administration represents the most crucial link between national goals and the microcosmic, tribally differentiated, religiously fragmented and politically competitive rural society. The district level of administration in Uganda serves as the channel of communications (4) through which commands flow to the periphery, central policy is explained to local politicians and the local people at large, and such central policies as directly affect the regions are executed.

During the colonial period, the dis rict adm nistration was vested with the overall responsibility for the execution of the policy formulated in Entebbe, In order to facilitate a quick and and efficient performance of their duties, the district officers, pre-eminent among them the Dsitrict Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner,were given adequate powers, and provided with sufficient scope for the execise of initiative. Thus the district boma during the colonial era might be said to represent not merely the symbol of central authority but the central authority itself. No doubt central authority was administrative rather than political in character thus enabling the central government to exercise its way in the districts in a simple, direct, hierarchial (in the vertical sense) arrangements. The district commissioner was thus the focus of attention of all people affected by government. They looked up to him and he in turn provided them with the rudiments of governmental protection which they felt they needed, The more geographically remote the district was from the centre, the greater

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was the dependence of the people in the district on their district commissioner (e.g. Western and Northern provinces).

With the estension of the scope of governmental activities to include welfare policies of various kinds, and with the gradual growth of political consciousness among the African people, this simple colonial administrative arrangements was considered no longer sufficient. Furthermore, the colonialists themselves recognised the need to promote democratic political tendencies among people by allowing adequate scope not only for politicians of different persuasions to form themselves into lawful political parties, but also by introducing the techniques and structures which were necessary for democratic self-government at the grass roots level. This meant that both structural innovations had to be made and administrative training and responsibilities had to be given in a phased manner to people capable of adminstering local units. Such was the thinking which inspired them promulgation, of a policy of gradual decentralisation of the administration. Under the plan, more and more direct power of administration would devolve upon local atuhorities set up for the purpose, whilst the district commissioner's own position would eveolve from one of ruler to one of guardian; from one of fiat-giver to one of umpire. (5)

Since independence, the transition in the role of the district commissioner from one of guardian to one of a merer adviser without any built-in capacity to get his advice accepted has taken place even more rapidly than the pre-independence transition to w which reference has already been made. The district commissioner is now the representative of the central government in the district. He is the district level coordinator of the work of the various heads of departments who are sent to by the appropriate central ministries to the districts as their representatives and executors of policy in their respective departments, In some cases, such as Public Health and Medicine, where there has been a wholesale transfer of responsibility from centre to district, central officers have been seconded to district administrations to perform their duties under the aegis of the district council or the Kingdom government as the case may be.

From a survey of the current trends in district offices and from a cursory examination of the work done in district headquarters in the past, one may be in a psoition to glean some of the difficulties and problems besetting the administrative infrastructure in the context of rapid development. The observations contained in this paper may be relevant to the work of anyone involved in the various phases of development work in Uganda.

II

When the colonial power was still in control, the district council was not intended to be a powerful body. Although the district council consisted of politicians, a good many of its members were nominated and very often the district commissioner, invested with important powers of prorogation and dissolution, was the chairman of the council. The activities of the council were thus taking place under the direct supervision, if not the over control of the commissioner. Important powers of a financial nature were also given to the district commissioner and the authority of the council was thus restricted.

The notion of district autonomy was first introduced during the later years of the colonial regime and became a significant aspect of politics and government in the years immediately preceding and since independence. There was a widespread demand that political maturity should be reflected in the increased political responsibility given to local leaders in the running of their affairs at the level of the district. It was also felt that as it became clear that more and more direct interest had to be taken by government in various matters affecting the lives of the people, it

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would be difficult to expect the central government with its rather small core of administrative staff to cater to the widely carrying demands of different regions.(6) Furthermorethe capacity of the rural people to articulate their political desires demands and expectations has in recent years increased at a rapid rate, and this could be adequately taken into account only by the creation of new structures for effective exercise of authority (or by the infusion of new vigour into existing structures) and discharge of their expanded responsibilities.

What in fact happened during the mid-fifties by way of administrative reorganization at the district level amounted to a redressal of the balance between the district commissioner and the district council, although in the process the pendulum swung too far in the opposite direction. The district commissioner was stripped of the powers that he had enjoyed in the colonial regime. The district council was vested with an independent constitution, while the role of the district commissioner in the previous set up was assumed in a much more attenuated form by the central Ministry of Regional Administrations. It was generally understood that the central ministry would act as the general approving authority of the actions taken and the choices made by the various district councils. The district commissioner himself was to be the vehicle of the Ministry of Regional Administration in the district. A high degree of decentralisation of authority achieved in the actual government at district level was balanced by a new and loose form of centralizatio the initiative for which lies with the Ministry of Regional Administration which depends for advice on matters concerning district administration on the district commissioner.

The district council as it is at present constituted is primarily a political body which is intended to carry out three important functions. It formulates policies concerning development and day-by-day administration affecting the entire district, Its development policies would be coordinated by the central ministry of planning to fit into the overall national plan of development. Secondly it has to find the funds for most of the recurrent and new activities in which it wishes to engage itself. In fact, the extent ofwhich a district is capable of obtaining aid from the central government would in many cases be directly dependent upon the capacity of the district to raise money from within (7). Thirdly, the district council has to execute its own policies (through officials appointed by its own Appointments Board) in addition to maintaining at the same time law and order within the district. The district council is an elective body with an considerable range of law making powers. The entire administration of the district (apart from a few spheres in which the central government is still responsible for policy execution at the district level e.g. agriculture) is carried out by staff recruited by and under the authority of the district council. The main bulk of the administration is handled by the saza, gombolola and miluka chiefs (each has his own elected council), who in the past were appointed and remained in office vertually at the pleasure of the district Commissioner the Provincial commissioners, but who are now recruited and controlled by the district council. The policy making and direc tion of the district is undertaken by the council itself with the assistance of central (8) administrative, technical, accounting and secretarial staff recruited by the district public service c commission (or Appointments Board) and under the control of the Secretary-General who is immediately assisted by the administrative Secretary. In the case of the Kingdom governments (Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Buganda) these structures constitute an almost exact replica of the corresponding administrative and policitical apparatus of the central government. (cabinet is the most important decision-making body in these cases.)

The district commissioner is thus outside the pale of the council; and the recerse is eqaully true. The extent of his

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influence on the district policies and administration is entirely dependent upon the receptivity of the council. At the present time, when drastic readjustments in the relationship between the district commissioner and the district council seem to be under way, an attitude of reserve if not active jealousy on the part of the district council can be detected of its new found powers and its over-arching position in the district. Such an attitude is reflected in the rather insufficient extent to which the council is willing to avail itself of the professional administrator's experience. Furthermore, as an outsider to the district, the district commissioner is neither willing nor welcome to involve himself to too great an extent in local politics which usually dominate the district council. The party or faction in power is unwilling to listen to the advice of the district commissioner wherever political advantage is likely to be jeopardised by the administrative soundness of the district commissioner's advice. The opposition sometimes, understandably though not necessarily wisely, seeks the latter's help in the redressal of grievances of which it feels it has been the subject.[10] In the sazas and gombololas, where once the writ of the district commissioner was law, he has now to tread warily and take into account the political and other susceptibilities of the chiefs, who are nominally supposed to be free of political affiliations. Cast in the new mould of an observer on behalf of the central government, the district commissioner's role seems to have been greatly reduced.

Precisely because the district councils have been completely politicised, the central government has come to depend more and more upon the impartial judgement of the district commissioner whenever the affairs of the council become confused and difficult to disentangle by purely political means. It is yet difficult to assess whether the district commissioner is too divorced from the actual happenings and goings on in the district to be of maximum usefulness to the Minister for Regional Administration in this particular role. Such tentative indications as are available point to the conclusion that the district commissioner has been too suddenly removed too far away from the centres of action to be of maximum use to the minister as his chief adviser on matters affecting the district. This general observation should nevertheless be qualified by a statement to the effect that in certain quarters there is already an awareness of the need to buttress the position of the district commissioner with at least a limited degree of statutory authority.

Having outlined the generally defensive nature of the district council's attitude to the district commissioner, it would be useful to consider some of the more important functions of the former and the extent to which, under present conditions, it is capable of discharging them. The new thinking about national planning requires that planning should be done at the district level by district authorities to whom the central government will provide advice and assistance when necessary. The centre, has however the ultimate veto on the individual items of the plan but the use of central veto will, as far as possible, be dictated by considerations such as the condition of the international market in a particular commodity and the feasibility of production of certain kinds of objects.[11] Otherwise, the only criterion affecting central approval of district plans is the availability of resources.

The district council is expected to draft the plan[12] (usually to cover a period of five years) which is then sent to the central government for approval and integration into the overall national plan. This would normally entail the computation of available resources, and accurate estimation of revenues that can be collected, a detailed consideration of the best ways and means of mobilising the revenues and resources available in order to achieve maximum production, a thorough examination of the various developmental needs of the district, and an awareness of the importance of planning in perspective. Even a well-equipped and well-qualified battery of economists, administrators and technicians would find such a combination of inter-woven tasks formidable. In the actual context of a district planning is almost beyond the scope of the existing local talent.

The policy aspect of planning is left to the district planning committee of the district coundil. In a circular dated the 11th May 1964, the central ministry of Regional Administrations advised each district government to set up a Planning and Development Committee.[13] The new committee was to consist exclusively of members elected to the couneil, preferably including Chairmen of the Education and Housing committees of the council, the Chairman of the Land Board, the Finance Secretary and the Secretary-General.[14] Central government officials who form the District Team would be available to advise the committee. The planning functions entrusted to the committee (district development committee) are manifold and complicated - preparation of the educational development plan under the Education Act of 1963, survey of resources and manpower available in each district to execute the plan, securing the money for the plan, make practical proposals for raising the prosperity level of the people through agricultural and livestock production, securing fast and realistic industrial development etc. In short, the districts development committees should heed the wishes of the people without in any way adversely affecting national policy objectives. The development committee is required to produce a realistic statement of what local effort can achieve during a given plan period without omitting any of the mandatory functions of the federal government and the district administration, and possibly performing a good number of the permissive functions listed in the first schedule of administration.[15]

The planning responsibilities as devolved to the district level are thus of a very highly technical character. But the main district development committee consisting entirely of legislators elected by the people is as yet poorly equipped to execute these responsibilities. District level legislators are for the most part men with very poor qualifications and little understanding of the broader issues involved in district-wide planning, let alone national planning.[16] Their past professional and political experience (most of them are ex-traders and ex-teachers of primary schools) being confined to the narrow limits of a village or a group of villages, it is extremely difficult for them to expand their horizon in the general interest of the district as a whole and to view with detachment their own political position in the district. Thus internecine political strife and jockeying for positions interfere with planning which is initially rendered difficult by the lack of qualification of those in charge.

The administrative support staff in the employ of the district is barely capable of handling the technical issues involved in planning. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, qualified people prefer to find work elsewhere than in the district administration. Secondly, and for reasons understandable, appointments to various jobs in the district administration are made at least as much on the basis of political patronage considerations as on qualifications and suitability. The only persons capable of giving responsible advice to the district planning body are central government officers in charge of the various departments at the district level, and the district commissioner himself. Some of these are coopted as members of the planning dommittee (e.g., the district commissioner) but it is often made clear that they are at meetings by invitation rather than by right. Others are called in to give advice and evidence before the committee or its sub-committees. The usefulness of these officers is at best marginal. The generalist officers such as the District Commissioner and his assistants are not aware of the intricacies of planning, and the specialist officers (district veterinary officer, district agricultural officer etc.) are too specialised to be able to speak for their respective departments against the background of a total perspective which is very important because the whole process of planning depends for its success upon the manner in which different sectoral needs of the various regions are welded into a single national plan.

One of the basic requirements of a sound plan is a realistic estimate of the expenditure anticipated and revenue available. For most districts, the major portion of revenue available comes from graduated tax which is collected by county and gombolola chiefs as the revenue collecting agents of the district government. These chiefs do not even know the rudiments fo double-entry book-keeping and their accounting methods are shockingly bad.[17] It is impossible to make out from the welter of monthly returns of tax received sent by each chief, the exact amount of tax revenue that is due, that has been collected and may be expected at the end of each year.[18] These returns are allowed to gather dust in the archives of the district council and in the office of the District Commissioner. There is no one among the staff of the District Commissioner who is capable of extracting from these files the figures that are essential for any plan. Add to this the not inconsiderable extent to which corruption is practised by chiefs in the collection of taxes.[19] Considering the slender tax resources of most districts, the amounts of tax money misappropriated by chiefs and evaded by tax payers are by no means negligible. The district commissioner is alive to the need for trained accountants and cashiers to assist the administrative chiefs in the collection of taxes and in the accounting thereof, but it cannot be said of the district authorities that they share to any significant degree the district commissioner's concern in the matter.

Long range planning requires an intensive technical expertise which the district administrations do not have at their disposal. The political background of the members is such that most of the discussion time of the councils, during session, is consumed in rivalries between opposing clan groups, or religious groups, or tribes competing for political influence. When rival factions are not quarelling over their political differences they find

themselves engaged in jobbery and nepotism with respect to the numerous administrative and clerical jobs at the disposal of the district council. If a time-motion study of the discussions which take place in a district council were to be made the above two items would be found to occupy a disproportionate amount of importance in the day to day business of the council. The result is that serious policies of planning, development and extension of services on a district wide basis rarely get a place of importance in the discussions of the council. Even the planning committee minutes reveal that the members are primarily interested in the advantages that are likely to accrue to their particular sub-groups rather than in the overall economic advantages resulting from intelligent planning with the whole district as the reference focus.

Political considerations thus assume great significance when one assesses the role of the district council in the formulation of the district plan.[20] Economic considerations are subordinated to political necessity, if not completely ignored. For instance, the Kigezi District Council is, by its won admission, unaware of the content and method of planning. The central government sent a few of its planning officers round to the various districts to discuss with district governments ways and means of formulating their five year plans which the centre wished to have in its possession by the end of June 1965.[21] The planning officer who was detailed by the Central government to visit Kigezi spent about two days in the district headquarters of Kabale sometime during September 1964, when he met district officials as well as central government officials working in the district. These meetings produced no results whatever because the degree of contact between the expert and the planners (District planning committee) was so slight as to have left no impact on the latter. By April 1965, the central government had heard nothing of the progress of the plan in Kigezi. In the meantime, district countil elections had taken place and the new council had begun its work. The election was followed by intense intra-party rivalry which threatened to deadlock the choice of the Secretary-General. Apparently, there were two strong factions of the U.P.C. in the council - one ostensibly supported by the Minister of Regional Administration(who happens to be from Kigezi) and the other by his personal rival, Mr Bikangaga, the Rutakirwa Engabo ya Kigezi who is also the leader of the local chapter of the U.P.C. Each side had its own preferred candidate for the secretary-generalship and it was only after a great deal of compromise and politicking that a secretary-general was appointed.[22] Certain other offices such as the Chairman of the Council were also centres of controversy and factionalism. In any case, all the energies of the new council (at least until the deadline for the submission of thedistrict plan was well past) were concentrated on personal political rivalries which sometimes reached extraordinary proportions of bitterness and mutual animosity.

The central government, not having heard anything from the district headquarters for a long time, despatched the planning officer to find out on the spot the reasons for the delay and also afford such assistance as was required by the district planning committee and the district commissioner. When the officer arrived in Kabale he was prevented by the administrative secretary from seeing the secretary-general (who was alleged to belong to the opposite faction) and

such last minute meetings as could be arranged ended in failure. Thus by the end of June, Kigezi had not given much thought to its five year plan. So far as the district council was concerned the economic plan was seen as something separate from and less important than the pressing political problems of who gets what in the of the recent council elections. So far as the central government was concerned, the main aims of communication and penetration had been frustrated by the intransigence of the distbict council members who were politically free of central control although administratively and technically dependent on the centre.

Decentralization, at least so far as planning was concerned, had not achieved its objective. The entire episode relating to the visit of the central planning officer to Kabale, a forcible illustration of one other point. Before the advent of independence, the district commissioner happened to be the mano on the spot who knew everything about the district and could be depended upon to do the right thing and issue the right orders. He was the man on whose shoulders lay the responsibility for mistakes but in the context of independence characterised by an almost religious conviction in the sancitity and necessaity of planning even the district commissioner who is at best an expereicned generalist officer, and in a majority of cases lacks experience due to lightning Africanisation, is unable to act as an effective liaison between the district and the centre in matters of planning. What is needed is a qualified permanent officer on the central payroll stationed in Kabale and every district to assist in drawing up the economic development plans of the district of Ligezi. On the other hand, it is obvious that with its shortage of well qualified officers the centre can ill afford to send its few best economists frequently to the districts. The present arrangement by which the district commissioner is expected to be aware of what is going on in the sphere of economic planning without any authority to use pressure in district administration. Which is in effect a new dimension on governmental activity is most unsatisfactory.

The district council is thus a highly political body with its own unique system of bossism and patronage distribution. It has been prematurely charged by the central government with the lack or producing a district plan to fit into the overall national five year plan.[24] The central government itself lacks the strength in terms properly qualified economists which would be required before constructive and real reforms could be undertaken. The district commissioner functionally speaking is not as useful in technical matters such as planning as he is in general matters affecting the welfare of the district. This means that seniormost representative of the centre in Kabale is not reliable so far as economic planning is concerned. A beehive of political activity, the district council is still a hindrance so far as the urgent tasks of planning are concerned.

III

District Commissioner and the District Team

The district commissioner under the colonial regime was the main fountain of governmental authority in the district. He was generally supervised and advised in his work by the Provincial Commissioner although he also enjoyed direct communication links with the central government on certain matters. For the most part, he had a wide latitude in matters affecting the district and was in a position to make a variety of decisions without reference to any higher authority. In many respects, the district commissioner in Uganda was placed in a situation similar to that of his couterparts in most of the other British colonies. A district commissioner could thus play a decisive role in the appointment, promotion, demotion, trasfer and dismissal of the chiefs at the gombolola and miruka levels and punish and recommand dismissal of chiefs at the saza level. He constantly toured his district and through the practice of holding barazas with the people of various localities he directly

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N.B. The Buganda Government unlike most District Governments entrusts the tasks of planning to experts whose report is considered

and acted upon by the Government.

acquainted himself with the state of the various parts of his district at any given time. Thus the ways of errant chiefs were bound at some stage or other to be brought to his attention by some intrepid people; thus also the problems peculiar to a particular village or tribe or clan or occupational group were made known to him through his direct contact with those concerned.

The direct rulership of the district was by no means the district commissioner's only functional role. He was also the chief member of a team of officials who served as district heads of various departments such as education, medical service, public health, public works, agriculture, veterinary services, community development and so on. Although he was a generalist by training, his intimate acquaintance with the problems of the district as well as his unique position in the decision-making machinery eminently fitted him for the role of the primus inter pares of a cabinet like team charged with tasks requiring specialisation in the various fields of public service. In this capacity he was head of the District Team which consisted of all the heads of department in the district boma.[25] These pfficials presided over by the District Commissioner and attended upon by one his assistant district commissioners meet periodically to review the state of the district both as a whole and in each particular branch of governmental activity. The central government and the provincial commissioners attached the utmost importance, to the regular meeting and effective functioning of the District Team.[25] The function of the Team consisted of more than mere coordination. It went into the requirements of district administration in different departments in detail and recommended appropriate policy measures to the appropriate authorities. As a collective body engaged in frequent mutual interaction both at the social and at the professional level it accummulated a valuable body of integrated knowledge and experience of the district. Any proposal from above was examined carefully by the team with special reference to the district. In short, the District Team was a dynamic collegiate body which was engaged in the overall administration of the district at the level of policy formulation, policy translation (translation of central policy to suit district needs) and policy execution.

With the introduction of progressive features of government such as an increasing effort in community development, the techniques or planning and the expansion of trade and industry as well as cautious Africanization, the District Team was placed in a position of increasing responsibility in the different spheres of district administration and as a main channel of communication between the centre and the district. Nevertheless, the fundamental changes brought about in the nature of administration, division of responsibility and powers between centre and district and through the introduction of representative government brought in their train a radical transformation of the role and function of both the District Commissioner and the District Team. Although the present incumbents of various district departmental leaderships including the district commissionerare generally less experienced, less qualified and educated and perhaps less self-confident than their colonial predecessors (for a variety of good reasons), they still represent the best available talent in administration at the district level for several reasons. Objectively speaking, they are the most qualified, certainly much more qualified than those in the employ of the district councils, By virtue of the mode of recruitment and the established achievement crietria observed in their promotion, transfer, etc. they are in much more secure position than the officials appointed directly by district council and dependent upon it for their progress. Because they have no particular attachment to the district in which they serve, they are in a unique position to be objective about its problems and the solutions necessary to meet them. As the most qualified among any serving the administration

at the district level, development is more likely to take place if these men are given proper training and an appropriate place in the decision-making structure.

In fact, however, the condition of the centrally recruited civil service has undergone a radical change for three important reasons. For political reasons, Africanisation has had to be speeded up. The irony of the situation lies in the law of inverse proportion by which such changes are always dictated. For political and symbolic reasons, the posts carrying the heaviest responsibilities and occuping the vital points in the political-administrative network need to be Africanised first. In the older colonies such as Ghana, this was a comparatively painless process because even before the war, the colonial government had started gradually to appoint Africans into the civil service administative posts. In such countries, post-independence Africanization was but a continuation on an intensified scale of policies which had already been set in motion by the colonial power. In East Africa however the appointment of Africans to the higher echelons of civil service did not ake place until recently (No doubt the East African situation was easier and more fortunate than the Congolese e.g.)

Secondly, the number of channels through which civil servants and administrators are recruited have increased. A number of people with local experience and with a modicum of education have been recruited to replace departing expatriates without such opportunity of understuying them later. These officials have to function alongside their more experiencec, better qualified and more confident compatriots who are occupying similar posts with greater distinction on the one hand, and on the other the young recruits from institutions of higher learning both in East Africa and abroad. Each of these three categories of recruits have their own ideas of good administration tinged with its special background. The promotees as a result of the process of decolonisation are generally men who lack vision and whose approach to problems are stereotyped, For this reason they sometimes have a greater appeal to the district authorities and are sometimes listened to with respect. The civil servants who were already in good positions at the time of independence continue to retain their regal flavour vis a vis the populace, but find it difficult to combat the envy of the district officials. The new blood from the universities often finds itself at odds with both the other groups with the "promotees" because they have nothing in common, with the "old elite" because they tend to view with suspicion the radical ideas of fresh graduates in matters of administration (and also because in the foreseeable future the former cannot hope to occupy crucial decision-making roles unless the number and variety of administrative positions are allowed to increase at a fairly rapid rate)

Thirdly, because of the rapid change in the character of the civil service, relationships among civil servants has tended to change. In colonial days, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that the district commissioner was the superior officer of the district and all others were subordinate to him. In the context of independence two important changes have taken place which tend to erode his position. On the one hand, the district commissioner can no longer enforce obedience from the saza, gombolola and miruka chiefs (this in turn affects his position among the people at least in some districts). On the other hand because he has no disciplinary powers over the heads of department in the district (they are directly responsible to their respective ministries at the centre), he is unable to insist on a minimum cooperation from these officers without which smooth running of a district in the context of development becomes difficult. The only channel of influence a district commissioner has direct access to is the Minister of Regional Administration. When the latter tours the district, he usually consults the District Commissioner and is guided by him provided that political pressures are not too formidable.

The district team is thus faced with the problems attendant upon

sudden systemic changes in the administrative structure and its changed relation to the political structure. Although it was made clear at the time when district administrations were advised to set up district development and planning committee that the district teams would continue to exist and function vigorously, it was generally assumed on all sides that the district teams would sooner or later cease to exist. Clarifications were sought from the centre for a problem which from the centre's point of view never arose. It was evident that in the immediate aftermath of independence a crisis psychology led to unfortunate misunderstanding Within the district team itself, enthusiasm is lacking because of the arduous nature of the problems it has been called upon to face and often also as a result of the frustrating belligerance or the complete indiference which its views meet with in the district administrations. Apart from these shortcomings, the district commissioner's new role as coordinator has been further attentuated by the increased leeway given to technical officials to refer not only technical but also administrative matters to their central ministries very often over the heads of the commissioners, Despite repeated appeals by the district commissionersand the ministry of Regional Administrations, attendance at district meetings (held once a month on a date previously agreed upon) has no occasion been appallingly low. Certain officials make a habit of never turning up for the meetings. In a particular district, the district agricultural office never attended a meeting of the team for more than six months (he often sent an agricultural inspector to attend on his behalf bit without any brief or instruction). The poor quality of the meetings when they do take place is due to reasons which we have already discussed.

IV

Conclusions

In his new position, the district commissioner is not in a position to wield as much influence as would seem to be necessary for local appreciation of central policies and goals. He is no doubt the best propagator of these goals and aspirations in the district. There is still a considerable vestige of the old p restige attaching to his position but this is constantly undermined by such factors as the gradual awareness on the part of the people of his weakened position, the jealousy of district administration officials and the increased political leverage which the saza and gombolola chiefs are able to exercise through their position in the district administration and his general importance in dealing with the district council when political considerations are involved (political considerations seem to be involved in almost any matter, big or small) [27]

It is now generally conceded that mere prog agation of centrally held goals and aims in the districts is not enough. Implementation is really crucial factor. Implementation cannot take place unless the power to implement is shared by the central representatives and the district authorities. One way of sharing would be to leave politics to the district while putting more teeth into the central administrative machinery at the district. One suggestion often repeated to the author was that the district team should be required to draw up its own development plan for the district and induce the district development committee and through it the council to give it full consideration. According to the present procedures, the advice of the district team is hardly ever made use of in the district (becuase of this the district team is reduced to the level of merely collecting progress reports of the various departments). The plan as drafted in the district development committee goes direct to the Ministry of Regional administration which applies its own criteria an evaluating it. The Ministry may or may not

request the advice of the district commissioner or the district team in specific matters. In any case, the more competent of the two bodies available at the district level is not, under the present arrangements, given scope to utilise its potential.

All these considerations can have only limited short range applicability unless the questions of education, training, recruitment and powers of the centrally recruited civil services are given serious consideration in the light of the declared goal of achieving modernisation through a process of planned development I have only touched the periphery of this vast and complex subject, but am the first to recongise that without attention to these problems applied research on penetration of central government into the districts can be of little to anyone but the researcher.

Footnotes.

1. The main theoretical contributions in this area have been made by Lucian Pye, Leonard Binder and F.W. Riggs.

2. Penetration as "An index of politicisation" has in fact been studied by Ward and Rustow in the cases of Turkey and Japan vide Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey.

3. Considering the different directions in which independent Tanzania and Uganda have developed during the last two years, it makes sense to concentrate on the political aspect of penetration in the former case and to view the same problem from the administrative angle in the latter. In Tanzania, the entire administrative apparatus has be n politicised by deliberate policy (Regional Commissioners, Area Commissioners are political representatives of the Centre), even though Nyerere's first circular letter of 1960 as Chief Minister of Tanganyika emphasised the paramount need for a civil service totally free from political influence. In Uganda, apart from a radical alteration of the formal powers of district officials, no fundamental changes have occurred in their character, recruitment and responsibilities; the District Commissioner and the district heads of department constitute a very important link between the central government and the district governments, and in some cases between the district governments and the people of the district in general.

4. Although political parties and, in particular the U.P.C., are being strengthened and popularised, they have not yet been structurally developed to a point at which they can be used as effective means of penetration. To a large extent, the district boma is still the place through which contacts are maintained between government and people, and the D.C's baraza is still the important focual point in the network of relationships between the ordinary people and the political rulers. In fact, there has of late been a tendency in certain districts on the part of those who are dissatisfied with the district government to appeal to the D.C. for a redressal of wrongs. In one case, an opposition group in the District council made an open representation to the D.C. requesting him to intervene in a quarrell between it and the party in power. Numerous instances can be cited of individuals and groups who are aware of the diminished stature and powers of the D.C. since independence, trying to put pressure on the central government and in particular the Minister of Regional Administration to restore some of the lost powers and authority to the D.C. (especially in matters of discipline over saza and gombolola chiefs).

5. This development was parallelled by a redefinition of the roles of the D.C. and the P.C. vis a vis the heads of professional services. By about 1957 it became recognised official policy that while a physical integration of the administrative and professional branches in the district headquarters should be achieved, technical officers should be entrusted with complete authority in technical matters. Thus the D.C. and P.C. came to be viewed by the central government more and more as general government agents in their area with coordinating functions in technical spheres restricted to administration matters only.

6. One has only to contrast the Kigezi district plan drafted in 1952 with the plan envisaged in 1965 to appreciate the enormous gap between the needs of the district as a whole as expressed in government regional plans in 1952 and 1965.

7. The handling of the Road grants for 1961-62 made available by the Uganda Ministry of Regional Administration to the Kigezi District Administration and the triangular correspondence on the subject between the Kigezi District Administration, the D.C. and the central government provide interesting insights into the complex relationships that have developed in recent years between central and district authorities both in financial and in technical matters.

8. i.e., Central with respect to District Administration.

9. The contrast between the Regional and Area Commissioners in Tanzania and the District Commissioner in Uganda in this regard is very striking indeed. Although technically speaking the District Council in Tanzania is independent of the Regional Commissioner and the Area Commissioner, the latter in fact exercise considerable influence on the deliberations of the former both by virtue of the fact that they arethe representatives of the central government in the Area or Region and because their position in the TANU enables them to exercise political influence locally. In Uganda, the District Commissioner cannot play an effective role in the policy making, deliberative and legislative bodies of the district because of his avowedly unpolitical character. Secondly, any influence he may exert is confined to the officialdom of the district. Thirdly, he is the administrative rather than the political representative in the district of the Central government. The approaches to the nature and functions of the District level official adopted by Uganda and Tanzania are almost totally contradictory to each other. Like his counterpart in Uganda, the R.C. or A.C. in Tanzania is almost invariably sent to places other than his own. But there the comparison ends.

10. A few months ago the opposition group in Bukedi directly and publicly appealed to the district commissioner to interfere in the political controversies in which they were engaged at the time with the group in power.

11. The district governments often indicate to the central government a strong desire on their part to expand cash crop production (of such crops as cotton, coffee and tea). The central government which has to find an international market for these commodities restrains the enthusiasm of district governments having regard to international trade limitations on national crops.

12. The 1952 Plan for Kigezi was virtually drafted by the District Commissioner with the assistance of district heads of department. It was the plan of a body of administrators and technical experts. Post-independence plans will have to take into account political factors as the district council is primarily a body composed of politicians.

13. In the wake of this circular, the Finance and Development Committee of the District Administration was re-named the Finance Committee and the Community Development Committee was abolished. Each kingdom government like the central government had its Planning and Development Committee.

14. The committee could appoint sub-committees which may consist of people not elected to the district council. Usually central government officers in the district are appointed to sub-committees to give expert or technical advice to the politicians.

15. The schedule groups permissive functions into three major categories, viz., functions aimed at increasing prosperity; projects involving physical construction and maintenance (wholly or partly by Community Development methods); and, social developmert projects.

16. This observation was made to the author by many civil servants, especially heads of department in the district. There seems to be little doubt that quite apart from the parochial pre-occupations with job distribution, angling for political plums and tribal strife, the major obstacle to fruitful communication between the district politicians and the central government officials in the district seems to be the ignorance on the part of the former of both the broad and the technical implications of planning. An analysis of the qualifications ---------of the members of the district council of Kigezi shows that a great majority : have obtained the barest minimum of education (more than 50 % are ex-primary school teachers) and have no previous administrative or fiscal or legal experience. This phenomenon is inevitably linked with the fact that talent and experience being the scarcest among resources, get quickly drained from the periphery to the centre, from the district level to the national level. Furthermore, service at district level is infintely less attractive to rising, ambitious, young people, than service at national level. Here again Tanzania affords a contrast. Perhaps because the national government has set much conscious store by its villagization projects, perhaps because the President himself is anxious to pump as much energy and send as many qualified and inspiring middle and low level leaders as possible into the countryside, one gains a generally more favourable impression of the comparable areas and regions in Tanzania. The author has come across many officials and villagisation leaders who are genuinely happy and excited about being in the interior. He has also come across several officials in Dar es Salaam who would welcome the opportunity of leaving the capital for a region or a district.

The district development committee meetings are poorly attended (at one meeting, for instance only 8 out of 23 members were present). The level of discussion is low. The committee seldom considers concrete actions, rarely discusses figures and quantities, and often shifts responsibility for specific programmes to other bodies or to the central government. [Here again, the Kingdom governments, in contrast to district administrations, are likely to resist, for prestige reasons any suggestion to the effect that certain services, e.g., feeder roads be removed from their hands and placed under temporary central control.]

17. This is a problem which is not unique to Uganda. It plagues all three east African countries. One of the high officials in the Audit Department of the Government of Tanzania told the author that during the last four years public accounts at regional and district leveks had deteriorated to such a degree that the auditors had to be instructed to scrap all their audit objections and the Treasury officials were asked to start a completely new set of accounts. This shortcoming is viewed mainly as arising from a lack of knowledge. It is hoped that with the training of sub-regional officers in accounting, the state of accounting will perceptibly improve during the next two years.

In Uganda, District Commissioners are empowered to check the cash balances in the district treasuries, whilst a properly

authorised official of the district administration periodically checks the cash in hand of the various saza and gombolola chiefs in the district. The district commissioners often complain that very poor book-keeping methods are adopted in the district treasuries.

18. One of the stumbling blocks in the drafting of the district plan is that nobody is the district has any idea of what these three crucial figures are. The District Commissioner in one district asked his Assistant District Commissioner to go through tax returns from saza and gombolola chiefs for the last three years and arrive at tentative revenue figures from which rough projections could be made. The Assistant District Commissioner was averse to undertaking the task partly because of his lack of interest and partly because of his lack of training in accounts. It must, however, be pointed out that although these returns are enormously cumbersome and involved, it should be possible with patience and time to extract from them the revenue figures necessary for planning purposes.

19. One Assistant District Commissioner told the author in an interview that corruption cases involving a few thousand shillings of tax money at the level of gombolola chiefs are not uncommon, and that saza chiefs are known to have embezzled as much as Sh. 35,000 from tax collections. This does not include money that may originate in extortion. In one case, a saza chief whose embezzlement of tax money to the tune of Sh. 40,000 was proven beyond doubt was sentenced to four years imprisonment but not a shilling could be recovered.

20. Contrast this with pre-independence conditions (at least until 1957) when political factors could be blithely ignored by district commissioners.

21. As of October 1965, there was no evidence available to the author suggesting that a five year development plan was actually in process.

22. It is perhaps misleading to suggest that factional rivalries in the district are centred in these two personalities. The style of local politics are such that rival factions seek to obtain popular support by invoking the names of these two leaders between whom, no doubt, some differences of a fundamental character do seem to exist.

23. A majority of central officials seem convinced that the only way of ensuring central government's penetration of local areas would be by giving some <u>real</u> powers to the District Commissioner over local chiefs, and at the same time compelling district authorities to accept his advice (through the District Team) at least in certain technical matters such as planning and education.

24. The government of Buganda, unlike most district governments, entrusts the task of planning to a body of experts whose report is usually acted upon.

25. The Secretary General of the district or his representative is invited to be present at District Team meetings.

26. In a circular letter dated April 16, 1952, the Governor of Uganda (Sir Andrew Cohen) wrote as follows:

"The right method of administration in this country (outside Buganda of course) seems to me to concentrate on the District Team and the District Council as <u>the unit</u> of administration. To be effective this method of administration requires a certain degree of decentralisation so that the District Team may to a large degree be given its head to get on with the job with the local African Government. For this reason, the Provincial Commissioner with the Provincial Team should have a considerably greater degree of responsibility than they have at present. They will be the supervisory and controlling officers in the field, responsible for keeping

the districts in line with the general policy. At present, a good deal too much has to come from Entebbe.....We are, I think getting beyond the stage where we can insist, on a rigidly uniform policy for the whole country. Better results would in my view flow from a decentralisation of a certain amount of authority." (emphasis supplied)

27. Independence poses among other problems, the almost complete transforration of a society from an administrative into a political state (with the notable exception of a few French African countries). This transformation which seems to take place in a much more marked manner in the districts than at the centre, may be temporary in character but it needs to be studied and typologised carefully.

U.S.S.C. Conference
3 - 9 January, 1966.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF UGANDA: A METHODOLOGICAL ENQUIRY.

Yash Tandon
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I. Importance of the study of the foreign policy of developing states:
   1. Fallacious generalisations current about them
   2. No study of the politics and government of a state is complete until account is taken of how the state behaves in the international environment.

II. Definition of foreign policy
   1. The aims of the state
   2. The attitudes of the state
   3. The processes by which aims and attitudes are formulated in the political system.

III. How to study foreign policy

(I) Objective factors analysis approach

(A) The legalistic-institutional model

(B) The functionalist (input-output) model



(II) Phenomenological approach

(A) Single or multiple case study model

(B) Historical sequence model.

IV. What are the relative merits and limitations of the ~~xx~~ various approaches?

V. How big is the problem of accessibility to source material ?

VI. What kinds of research are feasible on the foreign policy of Uganda ?

1. Content analysis of speeches at the U.N. and the OAU. (attitude survey)
2. Case studies of international issues at which Uganda had to take positions (action survey)
3. A legalistic-institutional account of the formulation of Uganda's foreign policy.
4. Give some content to some of the dimensions in the input-output model.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF UGANDA: A METHODOLOGICAL ENQUIRY

by Yashpal Tandon

> "Revolutionary leaders, like women, have a privilege of changing their minds; more specifically, they can behave like gay divorcees. Taking the sweet air of freedom, courted by many, they can make lack of commitment a virtue, and enjoy the freedom and pleasures of the moment, which this condition makes possible."
> (Paul Seabury, writing about the foreign policies of Nkrumah and Sukarno, Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1964, p.174.)
>
> "Blessed are the weak states, for they can blow up the world and even acquit themselves like teenagers before the bar of history, which condemns only the mature. Big states, being the ones with responsibility, are for this reason less free."
> (Same as above.)

This paper is not an attempt to test the validity of the above statements to Uganda's foreign policy. In any case, social scientists are not as yet fully equipped with psycho-analytical tools to gauge the extent to which "states" can behave like "gay divorcees" or "teenagers". The above statements are given mainly to show how, owing to lack of an adequate empirical study of the foreign policies of new states, dangerous, and some might say nonsensical, generalisations are made about their international conduct, and images are built up which are largely of a disparaging character. More recently, I heard a remark by a fairly senior official of the British High Commission in Uganda that Nyerere was being utterly "irresponsible" in breaking off relations with Britain over the Rhodesian situation, but one could "excuse" him for "after all....., and what else can you expect?" Nyerere's action apart, there is a tendency to prejudge the foreign relations of the new states in terms of orthodox images, and to apply a double standard in excusing their "errors". There is a tendency even among social scientists to analyse the foreign policies of new states from the perspective of London, Washington, or Moscow rather than from the perspective of Kampala or Dar-es-Salaam. There is an immediate need therefore for International Relationists working in African states to rectify this lacunae in the knowledge about how the African states operate in the international system. This paper tentatively suggests some lines of research that may be pursued in regard to Uganda's foreign policy, but may well be applicable to other states in East Africa.

There is yet one more reason why the foreign policy analysis of new states is important, and that is that no study of the politics and government of a state is complete until account is taken of how the state behaves in its international milieu. One of the most important functions of any political system is to survive, and some of the most challenging threats to its survival may come from the international environment. To put this in other words, one most important function of a political system is to guarantee the security of the people from intervention or war by another political system, and the character of the needs of security will largely be determined by the international environment and not the domestic. To be yet more specific in relation to the new states, one of their

common declared objective is to maintain an independent hand in the conduct of their foreign relations, and therefore unless an adequate study is made of the demands made upon the system to achieve this objective and the intensity of this demand on the political system and the amount of resources expended on it, any study of the politics and national development of the country is bound to be partial.

Definition of Foreign Policy and the ways of studying it: Like many other terms in the social sciences, the term 'foreign policy' is vague, indeterminate, nebulous, multi-dimensional. If inter-state relations are compared to the game of chess to which they are analogous, it may in fact be useless to talk about 'foreign policy'. States may have strategies, and tactics; they may have certain defined or undefined aims and objectives; they may have interests, principles, positions, judgements, attitudes and images; but seldom 'policies', unless of course all the above dimensions were to be included under the rubric 'foreign policy'.

The first task of a political analyst, therefore, is to ask himself what is it that he needs to examine when he is studying the foreign policy of a state. In this paper, whenever the term 'foreign policy' is used, it shall refer to, depending on the context, to one of the following three dimensions:

1. The aims of the state. These may include broad strategies, like world conquest, maintenance of an independent role in international affairs, isolationism in international affairs, or even subordination of foreign relations to the needs of internal economic development. These may also include narrower, and more specific, aims like winning the war in Vietnam, or helping to change the character of the South African regime or the Rhodesian government. Not all these aims are likely to be consistent with one another; there may be choices to be made in particular situations.

2. The attitudes of the state. These may include the general attitude toward the international society (whether it is seen to be characterised basically by a state of conflict, or by a condition of harmony which is occasionally disturbed by some conflict), toward the role of international law in the international society (whether is viewed as sacrosanct, or viewed more cynically as the instrument of the dominant states of the international society and therefore liable to be ignored when interests so demand), toward the use of violence in the relations with other states, and toward the use of tactics like threats, deceits, manipulation, and so on. All this cluster of attitudes may be called the 'diplomatic style' of the state: the way the state views and conducts its international affairs. But this dimension may also include the attitudes or the images the state holds of other states in the international political system, for this will importantly condition the state's behaviour toward particular alter-states.

3. The processes by which aims and attitudes are formulated in the political system. This will include the "political culture" of the state from which will emante its basic orientations toward the objectives to be pursued in the international system and the means to be adopted in the pursuance of these objectives.

The above analysis of the term 'foreign policy' may, of itself, suggest a line of enquiry on the basis of which research could be pursued on the foreign policy of Uganda. A systematic approach need, however, be formulated to ensure "guided" research. Actually, there is no one single approach that may be deemed to be the best. We outline below two approaches, there may be others, each of which has its merits and handicaps.

I. Objective factors analysis approach
   (A) The Legalistic-Institutional model
   (B) The functionalist (input-output)model
II. Phenomenological approach
   (A) Single or multiple case study model
   (B) Historical sequence model

I. Objective factors analysis approach

The assumption behind this approach is that the foreign policy of any state is determined by certain factors "out there", and that it is the function of the political analyst to discover them, and their interaction. It differs from the phenomenological approach the assumption behind which is that whatever might be the reality of the objective factors that exist "out there" for an outside observer, these do not become operative in the formulation of a foreign policy unless these are "internalised" in the psychological environment of the decision-makers. The task of the political analyst of foreign policy therefore is not to discover an objective "reality", but to discover the "image of reality" held by the relevant people who formulate foreign policy. We shall discuss the relative merits of the two approached later.

(A) The Legalistic-Institutional model.

A traditional method of studying politics, still widely used, this method yields a fairly straight-forward account of the agencies that are instrumental in the formulation of foreign policy, the relationship between them, and the factors that condition the formulation of the policies. A typical outline of this model,when applied to the study of Ugand's foreign policy would read this way:

The Constitution of Uganda gives formal executive authority to the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, acting in consultation with the cabinet, is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is assisted by a full-time Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of cabinet rank. The role of the Parliament in the formulation of the formulation of the foreign policy is very much in line with the British tradition: the President outlines the main lines of foreign policy in his speech at the opening of each Parliamentary session, at which there is a full-scale debate on general policy orientationa; the main executive decisions on foreign policy, because of the need to preserve secrecy, are taken by the Prime Minister, subject to scrutiny at question time in the Parliament; the treaties entered into by the executive are placed before the Parliament for ratification, and so on.

The Ministry of External Affairs, headed by apermanent secretary, provides a continuous link between changes in government. It is divided into four divisions: Protocol Division, African Affairs, the United Nations, and Europe and America. The Ministry has liasions with other ministries on specific issues for example with the Ministry of Planning and Community Development on the problem of the refugees. Uganda has a permanent mission in the United Nations, and by 1966 has established consular relations (at the Embassy or High Commission levels) with the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,West Germany, India,Ghana and Egypt. Any assessment of the role of the Ministry in the formulation of foreign policy must take into account the important function it performs of actual interpretation and formulation of issues (eg. on the question of Rhodesia) on the basis of which the Cabinet reaches decisions. But it is hardly likely that the Ministry should have developed, during the brief

span of three years since independence, any set traditions in foreign policy, in the way that similar bureaucratic agencies have developed in the older states. (For example, the British Foreign Office has a tradition of pro-Arab orientations in its Middle Eastern Department, and a tradition of luke-warm support for international organistaions).

Among the non-governmental agencies must be mentioned the political parties, interest groups, public opinion and the press. The current ruling party, the U.P.C., has an annual conference at which issues of foreign policy are discussed, but the conference does not lay down more than general policy orientations on foreign affairs. The main political parties, however, and the Government are agreed on the main foreign policy issues like non-alignment, anti-colonialism, the United Nations, and so on. The English press in Uganda is not indigenous. The local press is, on the whole, more interested in domestic issues than foreign; public opinion correspondingly less vocal on foreign policy issues.

And so on.

The above model is obviously not a full picture, nor necessarily a correct one, of the foreign policy of Uganda, outlined as it is mainly to illustrate one line of approach to the study. The merit of this approach is that it is simple, direct, and mostly descriptive of the sort of things one would immediately like to know about the foreign policy of any state.

(B) The functionalist (input-output) model.

One does not have to accept all the[2] inflated claims made sometimes for the functionalist approach[2] to recognise the usefulness of the undoubtedly sharper tools for analysis it provides. This model starts with the basic premise that the function of the polity is, in the words of Talcott Parsons, the "mobilisation of societal resources and their commitment for the attainment of collective goals, for the formation and implementation of 'public policy' ". For analytic purposes, the functionalist separates the "political system" from the rest of social activity, and represents it as a unit on which demands are made by the p polity. As well as making demands on the system, the political community also provides it with the resources which the system expends to satisfy the demands. To put this in the jargonised language, the political system is kept going by two kinds of inputs demand inputs, and support inputs, which are converted by the processes of the system (called the political conversion function of the system) into outputs, which in turn, have consequences both for the system and the setting in which the system exists.



The international dimension is added specifically in the above diagram to emphasise our own particular concern with this dimension in this paper.

How do the demands arise (demand inputs): Demands, in terms of which the foreign policy, and other, goals of the system are formulated may arise from the international environment. It may be useful to distinguish between two kinds of demands from the international environment. Demands presented by the international events requiring the state to take up certain position on them, eg. the declaration of the U.D.I. or the American-Belgian rescue operation in the Congo. The second kind are demands presented in the form of expectations of responses from the political system. These expectations may arise from allies (eg. to show willingness to fight a war over the Rhodesian issue, if this became neces sary), from co-members of a caucusing bloc (eg. to vote in the U.N. on

one side or the other on a particular issue), from co-members of an international or regional organisation (the U.N., the OAU, the Commonwealth - eg. to contribute men or material to a peace force), from minorities residing in other countries (Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus), or from donor countries (eg. not to supply uranium to the donor country Y's opponent, or to support the donor country's position on a particular international issue).

Demands may arise from the domestic environment, for example, from interest groups which might feel the pinch of say an American reprisal to the persistent anti-American stance taken by the Government.

Finally, demands may arise from within the political system as well, for instance, by certain sectors of the policy-making elite, or by the higher echelons of the civil service that a pro-Western, or pro-Chinese for that matter, approach is called for.

Here one may formulate a hypothesis, obviously subject to test, that in the developing countries like Uganda, foreign policy is likely to be a response to demands made on the political system from the international environment and from within the political system itself, rather from the domestic environment. Demands made by the domestic environment are likely to be more general in character, and broadly defined, eg. in terms of the principle of non-alignment, or support for African unity, and so on. The "real" issues of foreign policy are likely to be defined in terms of the events and expectations which call upon the political s system to respond. The responses are likely to be the function more significantly of the political system itself. This is particularly true of the new states, where changes in government could revolutionise foreign policy orientations (Burundi, Brazzaville Congo).

Theaabove calls for a word of caution. Domestic environment may not play a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy on the demand side, but it cannot entirely be ignored. Foreign policies have still to be "sold" to the public, for some at least of these policies will call upon the people to make sacrifices - join the armed forces, pay higher taxes, and so on. (Nyerere, in his speech to the people prior to breaking off of diplomatic relations with Britain in December,1965 warned them of the sacrifices they might have to make , and asked them whether they would be prepared to stand by him. In this case, he had received their support, but this may not happen every time).

<u>Supports input:</u> Supports, like demads, come from the internationaa environment as well as the domestic. From the international environment the state may receive <u>diplomatic support</u> (support for a foreign policy position from other states or int.organisations), <u>material support</u> in the form of aid or equipment, or market for domestic exports, and so on, and <u>supporting action</u> from within individuals or groups within other states (eg. liberal support in Western countries assisting African states in the process of decolonisation). A particularly interesting variety of support from the int. environment comes from the mistakes of other states (eg. Britain's Suez folly in October 1956 helping Egypt to mobilise opinion in her favour), and may be termed <u>support by default</u>.

In the category of support from the domestic environment, we may list down all those factors that are traditionally placed under the rubric of 'national power'. These will include the non-human elements (size of the territory, the size of transport and communications network, industrial equipment, material reserves, etc.) as well as the human ones (size of the population and its distribution according to age, sex, and so on, the degree of participati on in the political system, etc.) Sometimes, domestic support can be converted into international support, (eg. Obote's goodwill tour in the Far East in 1965 at the cost of expending some of the resources of the country so as to build an "image" of Uganda that might better be able to elicit "diplomatic support" in future).

At this point a word must be added in favour of the terms 'supports' rather than the traditionally used term 'national power'. The term 'supports' sensitizes us to the fact that the support for a foreign policy may vary from one occasion to another depending on the two variables, the domestic support and the international support (people may be prepared to offer some sacrifices for one kind of policy but not another, and so on). Therefore, although quantification of national power is a useful exercise, its usefulness must necessarily be limited.

A more sophisticated analysis may go two steps farther. (1) It may distinguish between the support provided by the domestic as well as the international environments to (a)the political community, (b) the regime, and (c) the government. Some kind of support (eg. some forms of foreign aid) may buttress the government, but may produce harmful effects for the political community. (2) It may include an analysis of how the political system mobilises support, both in the domestic environment and the international, for increasing the acceptability of the foreign policy.

Outputs of foreign policy: Almond[3] mentions four classes of o outputs into which demands and supports may be converted by the political system. Extractive output - policies designed to draw spoils, booty of war, tribute from the international environment, or protection of trade or investment. Regulative output- conquest and assimilation of other territories and peoples, or limiting the freedom of other political systems through participation in international conferences and organisations. Distributive output - tariff arrangements, granting of subsidies, subventions, loans and technical aid. Symbolic output - appeals to common tradition, glory, ceremonies, etc.

Almond leaves out a fairly important output of foreign po policy, namely, services to other states or international organisations (eg. express support for the position held by an ally on an international issue, or providing troops for service in a United Nations peace force). Indeed, it may simplify matters, and make analysis much more poignant, if outputs of foreign policy were divided into only three categories: Regulation of behaviour of other states and international organisations, services to other states and international organisations, and symbolic outputs.

Political conversion functions: this is the process by which the political system converts inputs into outputs. Almond makes a sixfold classification of political conversion functions, which may be adapted for use by analysts of foreign policy. First, the articulation of interests or demands - this will lead us into an enquiry of not only how demands arise in the different ...

environments, but also how they become politically relevant for the political system we are studying, (to give an example, disarmament might be an important international issue for all states, but it may not have posed a serious problem for Uganda to compel it to define its interest in disarmament, or for that matter, in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in terms more specific than the broad position of in favour or against the issue). Second, the aggregation or combination of issues or interests into policy proposals - this will include the process of selection as between competing demands made on the system (eg. Bandas refusal to live up to some of the "expectations" made of him as regard, for instance, the Rhodesian problem, because of the more immediate demands made on the political system in terms of economic development or even economic survival). Third, the conversionof policy proposals into authoritative rules - an elucidation of these rules might enable the political analyst to classify states as revolutionary in their foreign policy orientation or aggressive, or reactionary, and so on. Four, the application of general rules to particular case. Five, the adjudicature of rules in individual cases. And six, the transmission of information about these events within the political system from structure to structure and between the political system and its domestic and international environments.

The above is the caricature of the simplest input-output model as applied to the study of the foreign policy of a new state like Uganda. It is simple in the sense that it takes only the three basic dimensions of the model: the inputs, the outputs, and the conversion process . But the model can, however, be amplified to include other dimensions to adapt it to organise data on a different of order of questions. To instance only one possible range of enquiry: namely, assissing the performance magnitude of the political system in its foreign relations. How well, in other words, is the system able to achieve its foreign policy goals? The "capabilities" concept of Almond is again suggestive of possible use for our purposes.

II. The Phenomenological approach.

I have already indicated how this approach differs in its basic assumptions from the objective factor analysis appraach. In a sense, this approach goes farther than the functionalist approach in emphasising the role of the decision-makers in the formulation of foreign policy. It is ultimately the "situation perception" of the decision-makers that will indicate why they decided the way they did, rather than the objective factors which other observers may be able to indentify, but which the decision-makers might have missed. Obviously, these factors are "not taken into account" during the formulation of foreign policy, when they were not perceived in the first place.

Later, we shall indicate some of the shortcomings of this approach, but let us, for the moment, see the kinds of methodological questions this approach opens up for an analysis of the foreign policy of Uganda. One merit of this approach is that it makes possible the study of the foreign policy of a state in relation to a particular issue, a number of issues, or a sequence of issues over a period of time.

(A) Single or Multiple case study model: Supposing we take, for purposes of elucidation, Ugand's foreign policy with regard to Rhodesian issue, the following may seem some of the more pertinent questions to raise.

(1) Who became involved in the decision-making, how and why ? In other words, what was the decision-making unit involved? This is not so sinple a question as it may seem at first sight, because the decision-making unit may vary from event to event. It is wrong to think of the "foreign policy-making machinery" as if it was an isolated department of state dealing exclusively with foreign policy, even if there is a core body of men(the P.M., the Foreign Minister, the Permanent Secretary

or his Deputy,etc) who may be involved in every issue, although even this seems unlikely(eg. the P.M. may be on a trip abroad). Besides, most foreign policy issues cut across the departments and agencies of state. The Ministry of Planning and Community Development becomes part of the decision-making unit when discussing about foreign aid,or the problem of the refugees. One subsidiary question that becomes relevant is whether the Parliament,interest groups, and other private citizens could be included in the unit. A strictly phenomenological answer to this would be in the negative, since any influence they will exert will have to pass thrcugh the agency of some officials in the actual decision-making unit. In other words, the Prime Minister's (to mention only one decision-maker) conception of the obstreperous character of the Parliament may become a relevant factor, but not the Parliament itself. (This must not, however, exclude some real powers that the Parliament might have eg. the power to ratify,or refuse to ratify, treaties).

(2) How did the decision-makers define the situation? It is a reasonable hypothesis that although the decision-making unit may actually be large, there will be some key men whose perception of the issues involved may be generally acceptable to the whole unit. Did the Rhodesian situation, for instance, raised that, if Uganda failed to take any action, might prejudice Uganda's international image?

(3) What connections did the decision-makers see between the diverse elements in the situation? What interests were deemed affected by the situation? What were the sources of these interests or demands?

(4) What were the specific or general goals considered and selected? What were choices as seen by the decision-makers? By what criteria was the selection of goals made?

(5) What courses of action were deemed desirable? Why?

(6) Finally, what general conclusions can be derived, from the study of one case or more, about (a) the influential people in the political system who make foreign policies,(b) their image of the international reality, (c) their ideologies, interests, and positions, (d) their diplomatic style - what means they deem justified in the conduct of foreign policy, and so on?

(3) Historical Sequence model: The methodological approach adopted, and therefore the questions asked are the same as above, with the difference that the study is related to a historical period rather than to one or more case studies. This model may involve case studies, or rather all the case studies in the relevant period but with a conscious effort to discover inter-relations between them so that the end product yields some more or less valid generalisations about the foreign policy objectives of the state, or the general trends in the evolution of the foreign policy over the period. One important area for research may, for instance, be to find out the extent to which experience gained in one situation will have feedback effect on the perception of the international reality by the decision-makers in other similar subsequent situations or the extent the precedents established over a period of time may condition future decisions.

Having outlined above, not very exhaustively,some of the approaches to the study of the foreign policy of Uganda, three questions need still be asked:
(1) What are the relative merits and limitations of the various approaches?
(2) How big is the problem of accessibility to source material?
(3) What kinds of research are feasible on the foreign policy of Uganda?

Relative merits of the various approaches: One merit of the phenomenological approach we have already mentioned, namely, that it can the more easily be geared to individual or ~~xxxx~~ multiple case studies in foreign policy. The functionalist approach has a more ambitious purpose, ~~xx~~namely, identifying the main variables that determine the foreign policy of a state at any time, and giving content to these variables. The second great merit of the phenomenological approach is its very simple, almost tautological, assumption that to find out the foreign policy of a state one must put oneself into the shoes of the decision makers themselves, or in other words, one must be able to visualize the "situation perception" of the decision-makers. The objective factor analysis approach may have the merit of exposing all those variables that should determine the foreign policy of a state, but in so far as these may not necessarily form part of the perception of the decision-makers, at the moment of making decisions, a knowledge of these variables will not always give correct answer to the question: why is it that Uganda acted the way it did on, for instance, the Rhodesian question.

But the very fault (if it is a fault) of the objective factor analysis approach is its merit when it comes to critically assess the foreign policy of Uganda. Equipped as the analyst would be of the various factors that should determine the foreign policy, he would more critically be able to assess just which of these factors were neglected by the foreign policy makers; and therefore a study of Uganda's foreign policy might have practical usefulness for the decision-makers in the future.

A second point that may be made in favour of the objective factor analysis approach, and against its rival approach, is that although it may be true that the formulation of foreign policy would be determined by the situation perception of the decision-makers, its actual implementation may be conditioned by the hard realities "out there" which might not have been perceived by the decision-makers (e.g., a failure to gauge the power, or input supports, of an enemy state in a particular situation). Ultimately, by a process of feedback, and through accumulation of experience and precedents, to guide future actions, the decision-makers' perception of the situation, and the objective situation may come nearer. They rarely coincide, however. This indeed suggests a line of research that may be worth while: to find out the extent to which the new nations' perception of the international reality in the context of which their foreign policies are to be formulated conforms to the reality as analysed by the social scientists. (To give an instance of how the disparity between the decision-makers' image of reality and the reality itself can cause anomalies in foreign policy, let me give an example from another country. The Chinese misconception of identifying every revolution in Africa as a popular revolution of the masses against bourgeois stooge governments prompted them, in January 1964, to interpret the neo-colonialist attempt to re-instate the British rule there.)

The conclusion seems to be that both the approaches outlined above have their own usefulness. The phenomenological approach may be the more useful in answering problems like why did Uganda act in the way it did in a particular situation, and in pursuing case studies, but the functionalist approach may better provide a checklist of variables that ought to be considered in determining foreign policy, and a set of the right sort of questions that ought to be asked, Besides, the functionalist approach may provide a more critical tool for analysis than the other approach.

The problem of accessibility to source material:

Although we do not want to minimise the degree of this problem for the researcher, at the same time it would be a pity if research were neglected on the grounds that no material is available. There is always some types of materials that are available: the problem is one of identifying research problems that could make use of the material available, and one of how best to use the material. Obviously, there will always remain certain kinds of research problems the material for which may not be available for a number of years (and in this respect, the problem is not new to Africa), and there are again certain types of problems, which may never be answered definitively.

The ultimate sources for research material are words and actions - actions of foreign policy, and statements made by decision-makers on issues of foreign policy. Not all types of statements relevant to a particular research may be available, particularly those in confidential documents, reports, memoranca, or note-verbale. But there are always some statements that are possible to obtain. For instance, statements made in the forums of the United Nations may form only a part of the foreign policy of the state; nevertheless, since debate in the U.N. forces states to take a public, recorded position on many kinds of issues, statements made in the U.N. is a very important indicator of basic foreign policy orientations of the state: they may reveal not only the objectives of the states on particular issues, but also the "images" or attitudes held by some of the decision-makers towards a whole lot of issues that they were doing ressarch about, e.g., attitude towards the cold war, toward the probability of war and the ways to avoid it, toward the binding character of international law, and so on. Statements made in the U.N. are the only ones mentioned here, because they are easily available, but there may be a number of other sources.

Of course, there is always the chance that statements are made not to elucidate positions, but to confuse issues. They may not even portray a consistent picture of the states foreign policy. There may be double standards adopted, and so on. But making sense out of these statements, in spite of what they are, is what will distinguish a shrewd political analyst from one who is less so.

Then there are always the actions of the state open to scrutiny which may provide data for testing research hypotheses. But actions again may not be a true reflection of the foreign policy of a state, for actions may fall short of intentions. Ultimately, a judicious selection and analysis of statements and actions is needed to provide hypotheses that may stand up to critical testing.

Kinds of research that are feasible on Uganda's foreign policy

The criteria by which to select research problems are: the immediate needs for research that can be of practical use, and the availability of source material. On the basis of these, we may suggest a few lines of research that might well be undertaken on the foreign policy of Uganda.

(1) Content analysis of speeches made at the U.N. and the O.A.U.

By a quantitative content analysis, by some coding scheme, of a representative selection of speeches made by

the Uganda delegates at the U.N. and the O.A.U. over a period of time, say since independence to the present day, it is possible to obtain a useful profile of the attitudes of Uganda toward some general problems like the following:

i) Attitude toward the dominant attribute of the contemporary international system (whether it is characterised by basic conflict between states, or harmong occasionally disrupted).

ii) Attitude toward the cause of the present cold war (whether it is a conflict between two ideologies, two social systems or two centres of power, or whether it arises owing to the wickedness of one or the other of the cold war contestants).

iii) Attitude towards how peace may be established in the international system (by world government, disarmament, U.N. Peace Force, and so on).

iv) Image of Uganda's role in world affairs, and in Africa.

v) Views on the possibility or likelihood of a nuclear war.

vi) Views on whether small powers are pawns of the big powers, or whether they have an independent power of their own.

vii) Views on their ability to pursue a neutralist foreign policy.

viii) Views on what the principle of non-alignment means in the context of the present international situation.

ix) Views on whether the "east-West" conflict is going to continue or whether the "North-South" conflict is likely to gain ground.

x) Views on how the international disparity between the rich nations and the poor may be bridged (whether this requires an institutional remedial action by the organs of the U.N., an international moral revolution, or some kind of political action).

xi) Views on the role of international law.

And so on.

At first sight it may seem that the results of such an analysis are not likely to add anything more to the existing knowledge (based mostly on speculation) of the attitude of Uganda on the above questions. This, however, would be too bigoted an attitude toward research. A comparable study carried out by an American team led by David Singer of the foreign policy attitudes of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. has yielded some very surprising results which exposed some of the earlier biases held about these based on speculation, and predetermined ideas. (see Journal of Conflict Resolution, November, 1964).

(2) Case studies: (action study)

(3) A legalistic-institutional study (good for a simple text-book)

(4) Give content to some of the concepts in the input-output model

(5) Study of developmental diplomacy (processes and institutions of new diplomacy)

Conclusions: In conclusion, I want to emphasise just two points:

1) For immediate purposes, it may be advisable to concern ourselves mainly with descriptive and analytical studies: the type of questions to be asked should be: What is Uganda's position on this or that international issue and how did it arrive at this position? Why did Uganda act or vote the way it did? What are Uganda's attitudes toward China? and so on. And later, to go on to the evaluative studies of foreign policy.

2) Secondly, it may be best to recognize that one cannot plan a foreign policy the way you plan economic development. "Five Years Plan of foreign policy" is an absurdity. And, therefore, a more exhaustive study of foreign policy will have to be historically-oriented, rather than futuristic.

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1. I owe a debt to the following in the preparation of this study.

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2. I do not believe in Almond's claim that "the concept of function pushes us into realism and away from normative or ideological definitions", Ibid, p. 186. Normative judgements are unavoidable even for the funtionalists.

3. Ibid, pp. 193, 202.