


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THE SEARCH FOR NATIONALITY - GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN RWENZURURU

by

Mr. Shauka-Muhindo
Department of Political Science,
Makerere University

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RWENZURURU MOVEMENTS AND THE SEARCH FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

Whenever a people decide to wage a struggle, armed or otherwise, there must be a cause and a purpose for the struggle. The history of social movement is full of examples of popular mass movements. Some have been labelled "peasant insurrections"; others, "tribal" movements; others, secessionist movements and others national liberation movements. Whatever the specific category of a popular struggle the ultimate goal is to establish democracy. However democracy means different things from one struggle to another depending on a given social context in which the struggle takes place and also depending on the immediate and long term demands of the people who struggle. How long a movement struggle can be sustained will depend on a number of things. Among them are: 1) Identification of the problem and the demands which a struggling people articulate, 2) organisation and objectives of the movement, and 3) whether or not the principal demands of the movement are answered.

Where a social movement confronts a stronger force, it may be terminated depending on the relative weakness or strength of the organisation and leadership of the movement. But as long as the principal demands of the movement remain unanswered, such a movement is bound to re-emerge at a later point. And when it does re-emerge, it will respond to new objective and subjective conditions existing at the time of the movement's re-emergence, and will be reorganised likewise. It is in this light that this paper seeks to address the search for self-determination embodied in the Rwenzururu Movement. The Rwenzururu Movement is the movement of the Baamba and Bakonzo who are found in the Rwenzori Mountains area in western Uganda. Elsewhere I have discussed the historical development of the movement up to 1962. This paper will focus mainly on the movement and the Rwenzururu Kingdom which was created in the course of the struggle after the movement erupted as a political outburst in 1962. I also intend to discuss certain issues that were not raised in the previous article.

Importantly, the Rwenzururu struggle has existed within the colonial and neo-colonial contexts and also largely in a peasant environment. This is a context in which the analysis of the Rwenzururu Movement and the search for self-determination is to be made.

However, the study of peasants and peasant-based movements took time to be conducted. The first seriously undertaken studies of peasant movements are by Barrington Moore Jr.² and Eric Wolfe.³ Some of the other studies which followed Moore's and Wolfe's are by Joel S. Migdal⁴, Jeffrey M. Paige⁵, F. LaMonde Tullis⁶ and Ngo Vinh Long⁷. I do not intend to give concrete criticism on each of the above studies since they fall outside the main focus of this paper. The studies have been cited for further studies to permit the readers to acquaint themselves with the problematic of analysing peasant movements. However, general comments on the studies are in order. The first is that the attempt to explain peasant revolts or why peasants become revolutionary, the studies above have located peasants majorly in the marked situation. Their main focus being to analyse peasant situations viz a viz the development and spread of capitalism. Secondly, as James Scott has said of Migdal's and Tullis' studies, the problem has been failure to employ political economy methodology by which it is easier to understand the totality of the life existence of the peasants⁸. Scott has correctly argued that bourgeois methodology can not be useful in

explaining peasant revolutions. He has further argued that peasant rebellions have been studied from a safe distance using theories based largely on models of bourgeois calculus and that this has entailed to prove or disprove the assumptions made about peasants but they do not go a long way to study the human participants.⁹

Many studies on peasant revolutions which employ bourgeois methodology commonly agree that peasants fight for land, subsistence and against misuse of power. They also commonly agree, especially Migdal, Paige and Tullis that peasants are incapable of organising themselves. They have to be organised from without.

However, it is not bourgeois social science alone which relegates the peasants to a secondary position in social revolution. Even Eurocentric classical marxists (Marx and Lenin) visualised peasants as essentially a conservative force, who, if they are to contribute to revolution at all, they must be moved, mobilised and organised by a vanguard party which will know where and when to deploy them. Marx as well as Lenin argued that the proletariat would form the main basis of revolutionary movements. However, contemporary revolutionary situations in the third world have disproved both the bourgeois social science and classical (European) marxism. In all revolutions which have succeeded (Cuba, Viet Nam, China etc.) peasants have been a decisive force. This has been so because revolutionary leaders in these countries took trouble to analyse and understand not only the objective, but also the subjective consciousness of the peasants.

On the African scene two revolutionary theorists (also leaders) have given prominence to the consideration of culture as an important aspect of struggle¹⁰. This approach to the revolution enables revolutionary leaders to understand the different aspects of social culture that go into the struggles: the peasants' conception of their enemy, differ at cultures in the peasantry, what they claim as their rights and whom they consider responsible for their plight. By so doing, a revolutionary leader take stock of different responses from sections of the peasantry or the masses to the atmosphere of intimidation and terror and their concept of injustice and how they attempt to fight that injustice. This in turn leads to the identification of the peasants' existing forms of organisation - formal and informal, hence their conception of democracy. Thus the peasant's own record of history is important if anyone is to claim to organise them for revolution.

It is only when the totality of the life existence of the particular revolting peasants (and the masses) has been grasped that the revolutionary leadership can effectively re-organise and mobilise the people along clearly defined objectives and goals of the revolution. In a situation where the so-called revolutionary leadership does not take into account the peoples subjective consciousness, there is a danger of the masses acting as social 'escorts' to the insurgent leadership to positions of power and authority. When the new leadership is in political control the 'social escorts' - the peasants and masses - will find it necessary to struggle against the new rule. In this case what makes the masses abound with such a kind of revolutionary leadership are the whimsical promises of a better life when the revolution has been accomplished. This shortfall in the process of organisation and official practices of the new leadership may lead to the masses withdrawing their support for the new leadership. Of course, in the process new contradictions emerge and the cycle begins all over again.

Likewise, a social scientist who investigate and seeks to explain revolutionary social movements should attempt to go beyond the formal organisations and institutions. This will carry the analysis a long way to critically sum up the positive and negative aspects of a given movement as reflected through actual historical experiences. It will also help the researcher to identify the extent of failure or success of the movement, make it possible for the researcher to see whether or not a movement could be said to have achieved anything concrete as a result of the struggle.

So far five pieces of literature exist on the Kwenzururu struggle by Tom Stacey¹¹, Martin Doornbos¹², Nelson Kasfir¹³, Amon Bazira¹⁴, and my own piece¹⁵. Of the five works cited above four of them, excepting my article, are largely counter-insurgency. The theoretical basis on which Staceys, Kasfirs and Doornbos' analyses are made is modernization. The modernization theory simply explains democratic demands and social movements, which by the accident of colonial and neo-colonial history bear a nationality ("tribal") character, as "tribalism". It's method of structural-functionalism is the more limiting for it does not permit the modernization theorists to see beyond formal institutions and organisations. As a result the contradictory relationships between the people and the institutions of rule is seen in negative terms. Revolutionary insurgence is blamed either on the African state or the peoples or both. Insurgents are either seen as resisting modernity or the African ruling classes have failed to create order (or suppress the disaffected?) in civil society. Not only that, but they have also failed to do so among themselves because of tribalism!

here then comes the modernisation theorist to give guidance to the African state in the direction of suppressing democratic demands and of popular and autonomous movements. His scholarly output is nothing but a "prose of counter-insurgency"¹⁶. Such studies leave the main parts of the problem unexplained but makes pointers to the ruling classes as to how to suppress popular revolutionary movements. Both the writing of Tom Stacey and Amon bazira falls within this category. These two did not only write on the Kwenzururu struggle but they were also active participants in the conflict at different stages.

The national question in Africa

The question of nationalism in Africa has not been accorded serious independent evaluation. Even among the marxist writers the bulk of work has tended to follow orthodox European marxism¹⁷. The main problem of writers on this question with respect to Africa has been to treat Africa as if the objective conditions which underlay Eurocentric marxism postulations on the national question in the 19th century Europe are the same as those in Africa of the 20th century. The objective conditions reflected in Lenin's, Critical Remarks on the National Question ... and Stalin's Marxism and the National Question indicate that the theory of nationalism therein was a response to historical conditions particularly in Russia whereby the mature conditions of capitalism highlighted in Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia, and the desire for nationalism against 'capitalism' countries overshadowed national formations of small nations. This kind of nationalism, the nationalism of anti-capitalism, was seen as historical. Hence according to Stalin, a nation, he wrote should have the following factors: it must be historically constituted, have a stable community of people, a common language, a common territory a common economic life and a common culture.¹⁸ but as K. Coomaraswamy

has rightly observed, "Stalin was unable to predict the dynamic and powerful force of nationalism which would refuse confinement into this tightly knit legalistic categorisation"¹⁹. Hence, the classic marxist approach to the question of nationalism deliberately overshadowed the nationalistic issue.

Nonetheless, Lenin did suggest that the right of national minorities could be protected through a country-wide law promulgated in a consistently democratic state that does not depart from the principle of equality.²⁰ Also Lenin suggested that in order to eliminate all national oppression it is very important to create autonomous areas, however small, with entirely homogeneous populations, towards which members of the respective nationalities scattered all over the country .. could gravitate and with which they could enter into relations and free association of any kind.²¹

Here Lenin seems to recognise an important point that a national culture can not be created free of the consideration of the cultures of the component nationalities. This is true because different nationalities have different cultural beliefs which they acquire in the actual process of socio-economic development. Thus the culture of a given nationality corresponds to the level of social development reached among the particular members of that nationality. Therefore, to harmonise society national construction must take into account the need to protect the minority nationalities from national oppression of whatever kind.

Somar Amin has made a distinction between the national question in Europe in the 19th century and that of the third world countries, characterising the national question in Africa and Asia as a colonial question.²² Even when his statement of the national question in general and the nationalities issue in particular is rather lucid and satisfactory. The reason being his strong commitment to the dependency school. Focusing analysis on the global level, Amin's book does not critically examine the immediate reality of national and economic life of the third world societies. In the final analysis, the dependency school like the classical marxist theory on the national question does not throw enough light on the internal dynamic of the nationality issue.

On an important note Mamdani has made a point which makes sense as far as the nationality issue is concerned. He has suggested that the nationality problems are historically linked with the process of the disintegration of tribal societies. He argues that in the pre-colonial societies, the process of state formation was characterised by external invasion and internal differentiation, interlinked in different degrees, depending on the concrete case.²³

Under colonialism, pre-colonial nationality contradictions were transplanted and sometimes modified to suit colonial interest. New contradictions were also created, constituting the bulk of the colonial question. One would assume that the decolonisation process would lead to the re-ordering of the colonially moulded situation, but at independence no attempt was made to do so in many African countries. The new leadership simply inherited the colonial social order and made little attempt to tackle the nationality questions democratically.

On similar note nationality contradictions which give birth to socio-political movements tend to be sharpest where imperialism, among other contradictions, turned to its advantage and utilized the contradiction between nationalities; "turning nationality into an organizing principal for both the state structure and economic life"²⁴ And as members of the affected nationalities (minorities) struggle for equality (democracy) two tendencies are likely to emerge as Martin Doornbos has observed:²⁵ 1) where the population of the conflicting nationalities is widely spread over a common territory, protest by the disaffected (oppressed) nationalities tends to be limited to a continuous pressure for participation in the decision-making structure and process. 2) where the conflicting nationalities occupy fairly exclusive areas like in the case of Baamba/Bakonzu... the tendency is to fight for separate or autonomous administration. Denying a "separatist movement" the principal demand for separation would amount to "national oppression", a suppression of the democratic aspirations of the people of the nationality or nationalities involved. In this case nationality "separatist movement" might be transformed into a "secessionist movement". Hence assertion of independence.

However, it should be noted that not all secessionist movements represent the will of the people. There are some secessionist movements which are initiated from

without the society such as the Katangese secessionist movement which occurred in the Belgian Congo at independence. In the case of the Katangese secessionist movement the initiative came from the Belgian colonialists whose motive was to forestall the creation of a united Congolese nation.²⁶ Another example was the Biafran case where the Ibo sought to preserve a position of advantage which was derived from a high level of education by which the Ibo had become the dominant group in Nigeria but also faced the challenge of other groups.²⁷ The same can be said of Buganda if the Baganda had been given chance to secede from the rest of Uganda as they had attempted to do, round-about independence. All the above three cases are examples of secessionist movements where imperialism has been directly involved.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE
RWENZURURU PROBLEM.

This can be traced back to the time which bourgeois historiography has called the period of "tribal migrations" in East and Central Africa. The period when groups of people moved from one place to another within the region to find new settlements. This period marks the genesis of technological progress in pre-colonial Africa, the disintegration of tribal societies and the emergence of strong centralised states. It is also the period when the present nationalities began to take shape as a result of intermingling.

There were contradictory aspects as different groups of people came together. Sometimes there was co-operation and sometimes conflict. However, co-operation or conflict depended on the level of social development reached by either group:

1) where a migrating people felt itself strong than the inhabiting community the relationship between the two became antagonistic. Such was the case when the Hima migrated southward. In the process they displaced the weaker Bakonzo to the mountains.

2) Where the two groups coming into contact represented an equal level of social development and shared productive roles, the tendency was to intermingle peacefully. Such was the case when the agricultural Banyoro came to live among the Bakonzo in the eastern part of the Rwenzori mountains before the 19th century. In this case the new society represented a balance in the peoples culture.

3) Where the migrating people were the weaker, the tendency was to make concessions and such peoples lost their cultural identity. Such was the case when the Bakunja migrated from the islands of Lake Victoria to the Rutsuru range of the Rwenzori mountains and became absorbed by the Bandande. However, even then some cultural aspects of the migrant group are taken up by the home group.

All the three modes of integration in the pre-colonial era are represented in the Oral history of the Bakonzo. This history begins with the legendry Konjo and how he led his people from Buganda to the Rwenzoris about four centuries back. Konjo is said to have fled Buganda (on the islands of Lake Victoria) in a dispute between the Kabaka of Buganda and the people of the islands. Fleeing westwards to Rutsuru (one of the ranges of the Rwenzori mountains in Zaire) it is said that Konjo found another people there called Bandande. He made peace with the chief of the Bandande and settled in the mountains. Generation after generation the Bakunja (as Konjo's descendants were called) intermingled with the Bandande who spoke a language known as "Lukobi". That about 400 hundred years ago the Bakonzo, a bi-product of the Bandande and Bakunja began to migrate north and eastward on and around the Rwenzoris. That the agricultural clans (Baswagha) took the mountain course and other clans (Basukali clans) took the east direction until they settled in the Lake region (around Kuhokya and Katwe), while the agricultural clans spread all over the mountains. (One important aspect of this history is that the Bakunja had introduced a tradition of water transport and this should explain their preference for the lake region).

That about 300 years ago, Kibiniro led Bakonzo, chased the Baamba from Bunyangabu and Burahya driving them to present Bwamba (in Uganda) and Butahinge (in the Congo, now Zaire). He drove them further into the Ituri forest and set himself as chief of the mountains of Bwamba etc.

Later, people from Bunyoro came and found Bakonzo settling on the lowlands all around the mountain to River Muzizi. The two groups of people (the Bakonzo and Banyoro agriculturalist migrants) intermingled on the eastern side of the Rwenzori and formed a new people on the lowlands called "Bahyana". Lukobi flavoured by Luganda, composed with Runyoro to produce a new language called "Ruhyana". This is what lent Runyoro words to Lukonzo (the language of the Bakonzo). That when the Babiito of Bunyoro came, their Biito language was watered down. They spoke Ruhyana. On being rejuvenated by the British who made them rulers, the Babiito developed "Rutooro" as a chiefly language. But Rutooro is corrupted with Ruhyana. The conclusion to this part of the oral history of Bakonzo argues that the Bakonzo/Baamba are the rightful inhabitants of the Rwenzori mountains and the surrounding lowlands. So they have the right to that "country" and must fight to rule themselves.

PRE-COLONIAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE 19TH CENTURY NATIONALITY CONTRADICTIONS.

By the 18th century the Bakonzo had developed technology for production at two levels. In the first place they produced their own farm tools - hoes. The basis of this innovation was iron-smelting. Besides technology for agricultural production, the Bakonzo had advanced the technology of water transport. This was the means by which Bakonzo groups from Kivu Province Zaire crossed Lake Edward to join the Basongora, a pastoral group then living in the area stretching from River Rwizi (Luama) to the lake region. It is commonly believed that the Basongora are a 'stray case' who arrived late after the Hima invasion of the area and were unable to proceed further south. When the Hima invasion had displaced the Bakonzo to the higher altitudes of the Rwenzoris (Busongora side), the Basongora roamed the lowlands with their cattle. A similar group of people called Batuku roamed the lowlands of Bwamba. They are also cattle keepers.²⁹ Other groups of people who came to Busongora during the 18th century were the Banyampaka. When these groups of people arrived in Busongora they became responsible for increased commodity production in the lake region. They were involved in salt mining at Kasenyi and Lake Katwe. At first, they carried out some agricultural production mainly on the crater lake banks and in craters.

That many groups of people came to Busongora has been documented elsewhere. Although Ingham does not say who the other groups were he nonetheless records thus:

"The Bagabo and 'Bakingo' are new groups of people who came to Busongora to re-orient economic activities there hitherto dominated by the Basongora. The Bagabo settled on the islands in Lake George under the rule of a break-away Babito dynasty, the Banyampaka. The other group the Bakingo occupied the two islands in Katwe Bay, in Lake Edward, and the shore beside Lake Katwe. They did not challenge the overlordship of the ruler of Kisaka,³⁰ but they at once immersed themselves in salt trade. They had brought with them, lightweight canoes and in them they began to transport salt to the further shores of Lake Edward and George, shifting the main markets away from the salt lakes and making the trade more accessible to travellers on foot from distant lands. The ruler of Kisaka was delighted by the enterprise and loyalty of these new subjects whose efforts resulted in a still more rapid growth in trade and increased the income from the activities of the tax collectors. By the 19th century the Bagabo and Bakingo had ceased to grow their own food and were fully engaged in commerce and in mining salt."³¹

At this point we can establish two important facts: one, that the development of productive forces (technology) amongst the Bakonzo groups led to both increased agricultural food production mainly on the mountains and among the Banyoro agricultural migrants in Bunyangabu and Burahya counties; and two, the development of water transport was the prelude to long distance trade or it stimulated it. Water transport on Lakes Edward and George (Muhohya) facilitated the movement of people who became the main salt producers from other areas to the lake region. In turn the salt trade sensitised the ruling classes of Bunyoro-Kitara overtime exposing the entire economic potential of the region. A concrete understanding of the relationship between the rulers of Bunyoro-Kitara and the people of Busongora region which was not part of Bunyoro can only be reached from this stand point.

Once there were products of labour then there was exchange. Some iron-impliments were brought to Busongora via Banyangabu and Burahya from Bunyoro in exchange for salt and grains. What must be noted is that Bunyoro was not the only source of iron impliments. The technology which produced salt came mainly from Congo (Zaire) and the mountain parts of the southern part of the Rwenzoris, i.e. the highlands above Busongora, otherwise known as Bukonzo.

SALT TRADE: PRELUDE TO FEUDAL CONTROL.

We have noted the commodity exchange was a result of increased food production, in turn, a result of the development of productive forces. Commodity exchange first harmonised the society which comprised the pastoralists (Basongora) and agriculturalists. The Basongora pastoralists were the original consumers of salt produced at Kasenyi and Lake Katwe. Among the Basongora salt became important for feeding cattle. To the agricultural people it became important for everyday use, in cooking and for medicinal purposes. Once its uses were known the demand for salt developed and the product entered commodity exchange market; both within Busongora and distant places in Bunyoro and elsewhere. As the demand for salt from Lake Katwe expanded salt production was intensified.

Given that salt was first of all largely utilised by pastoralists in Busongora, it is also true that salt trade was first undertaken by Basongora pastoralists and pastoralists in other places - the Bahuma of Bunyoro and the Bahima of the kingdoms of Ankole. The use of salt subsequently reached the agriculturalists of those areas through commodity (and labour) exchange between Bahuma and agriculturalists.

According to the above three propositions are immediately derived:

- i) The 19th century relationship between the people of Busongora and the people of Bunyoro was at first a relationship between pastoral groups - the Basongora and Babito/Bahuma. It was not a relationship between the rulers of Bunyoro and the entire people of Busongora and the mountain region.
- ii) This relationship arose on the basis of trade, i.e. exchange of commodities, but not on the basis of production or control of the means of production. Production was still controlled by the non-pastoralist working groups.
- iii) The agricultural groups (in Banyangabu, Busongora, Burahya, Mwenge and Bunyoro) joined the trade mainly as producers (of salt at Katwe and Kasenyi, grain) and labourers. The agricultural Bakonzo who lived higher up in the mountains then did not participate in the regional trade.

To facilitate a smooth process of regional commerce and long distance trade the "omukago" or blood-brotherhood system evolved. Uzoigwe explains the rationale of this system as being the conditions to bring about a sense of trustworthiness between buyer and seller who came from different places on the one hand and a condition to ensure security for both parties on the other.³² Here we can rightly say that the system of blood-relationship as a response to demands of long distance trade was first of all purely on a commercial basis, entered first by traders and progressively by chiefs and traders. Blood-relationship was not an inter-state relationship as such. So Busongora did not enter any form of political pact with Bunyoro when trade developed between the two. This is what I meant when I argued that the 19th century contacts between the people of Busongora and the 'Babiito' were not Bakonzo but Basongora, and also that the co-operation between the chiefs of Bunyangabu of Babiito origin like Kasoro and Busongora like Nyamyongo and Buraziga could have been limited to trade and not overlordsnip.³³

At this stage it is conceivable that the "omukago" system as it was carried out embraced class interests. Class relationships which are based on material property relations will always transcend kinship relationships which are only consanguine, not necessarily based on property. In the case of Busongora, once the Basongora traders and chiefs had entered "omukago" relationships with traders from the other areas, and since these were the less numerous, they had, too, to enter blood-relationship with the chiefs of the agricultural groups and those of the salt producers, to ensure security and labour from them. In that process the agricultural chiefs and the salt labourers (carriers) could quicken the rate of acquiring cattle and cattle products, and other exchangeable commodities from Bunyoro such as iron implements and bark-cloth. This explains the class relationship between the pastoralist-traders and chiefs of agricultural groups on the one hand, and the agricultural population and the Bahuma on the other. It is therefore not surprising to note that the chiefs of Bukonzo and other producer groups could take sides when later the struggle for feudal control of the wealth of the region emerged during the 19th century between the Babiito break-away groups and the rulers of Bunyoro-Kitara.

Through trade the wealth of Burahya, Bunyangabu and Busongora was exposed to the rulers of Bunyoro-Kitara. It was after that the rulers of Bunyoro sought to extract tribute from those areas. The Babiito rulers of Bunyoro could thus send agents to those areas to collect

tribute. Tantalised by the wealth of the region the agents were encouraged to aspire for feudal control. Kaboyo, a prince of Bunyoro Kingdom thus could break away from his father the king of Bunyoro-Kitara to create his own territory while he was on a tribute collecting mission.

Not until this is established as the historical development can we accept the view that Busongora and associated areas west of the present-day Busongora county had long before been vassal areas for the rulers of Bunyoro-Kitara. Those who assert the position of vassalage to Bunyoro of these areas before commodity exchange had developed beyond the enclaves of producers have misrepresented the facts of history.³⁴

KABOYO AND THE FOUNDING OF A PRINCEDOM.

Kaboyo was inspired by the wealth of Mwenge, Burahya, Bunyangabu and Busongora. We have noted already that the first contacts were made by traders from Bunyoro who came to look for salt to take to Bunyoro market and beyond. What is noteworthy here is that the traders were not necessarily of royal origin, but came from the Bahuma group. These traders also paid rent on salt to the rulers of Bunyoro. Payment of rent to the rulers of Bunyoro limited the traders commercial freedom.

During the 19th century, to the salt trade was added the ivory. Bunyangabu and Busongora were the main producers of ivory. Ivory trade had attracted the attention of coastal traders to the area via Buganda and Ankole. Trade in ivory connected markets in Busongora and Bunyangabu to coast markets. With coast contacts established cowrie shells had been introduced as a medium of exchange. The use of cowrie shells was a progressive development in commerce of the entire East African region. Such were the changing circumstances under which traders of Bunyoro origin might want to establish a territory for themselves separate from Bunyoro-Kitara, to control the trade routes with distant areas without the interference of the rulers of Bunyoro. It was on this basis that the chiefs in the area which became Toro supported Kaboyo when he broke-away from his father's kingdom.³⁵

An important point which writers of the history of the kingdom of Toro have not stressed is the development of internal forces. The development of internal forces at different levels within the region in the pre-capitalist - (pre-colonial) setting led to the emergence of broad 'zonal' occupational groups among the people. There were those who became purely

subsistence producers, particularly in the agricultural areas. These produced mainly for the market. Also there were those who became pastoralists. In between these major occupational groups or alongside them other economic and non-economic activities were also done. The non-economic activities and specialisations involved such pre-capitalist beliefs and practices such as voodoo, magic power to heal and kill and sorcery. Economic specialisations included iron-works: smelting and tool making. Class differentiation takes place in the mold of all these activities. So we have a society differentiating into social classes as a result of internal forces. This process continues alongside other process which we see below.

The other occupational group developed as a result of trade. In this group we find both local and foreign participants. This is the group of traders. It included members of all nationalities: Bakonzo, Basongora, Banyoro (including migrants) and Bahima. Within this group it was easier for an individual to establish his influence on the basis of his economic performance. The 19th century chiefs of Busongora came from this group. However, there was significant overlap between the first category and the second. There was a tendency of the successful traders to establish themselves as traditional chiefs - and traditional chiefs to become important traders such as Kakuli of Lake Katwe, and chief Kalikura who controlled the mountain trade route from Bugoye (Bughoeye) to Bwamba.

The third category were the representatives of the mukama (king) of Bunyoro who were charged with the duty of collecting tribute. These had feudal tendencies wanting to be in political control. However, they did not exact tribute by force all the time. They were assisted by the local chiefs. Their influence did not extend to Busongora (the present Busongora county) and beyond.

The problem of understanding the recent history of Toro arises from the fact that social dynamics of the pre-capitalist or pre-colonial societies therein were not treated seriously by western scholarship, of the descriptive nature. According to the history written by colonial and neo-colonial scholars, states were formed simply by breaking away from parent kingdoms and the reasons being either the weakness of father-king or ambition of son-king. The real history underlying state formations is never addressed seriously.

Kaboyo broke away from his father, Nyamutukura, the king of Bunyoro-Kitara roundabout 1830. Akingbade has given the reasons for the break-away as being a combination of the factors for Bunyoro's weakness during the 19th century: external, the existence of Buganda

as a compact, strong and well organised kingdom; internal, the administrative difficulty, economic consideration and the rising ambition of some local chiefs - the major factors for secession; size, that the size of Bunyoro-Kitara militated against any move to contain rebellion and the continual succession of strong rulers of Buganda kingdom - like Junju, Kayina etc. and above all the economic potentiality of Toro. (However, a political state of Toro did not exist before the secession!)

Kaboyo first established his principedom among the Bahuma of Mwenge to the south of his father kingdom. This is where the Toro principedom first existed when it was created in the 19th century. Kaboyo was forced to run westward when the forces of Bunyoro charged to regain control over the area. When Kaboyo was attacked the chiefs who supported his secession in Burahya and Bunyangabu quickly mobilised their forces which helped Kaboyo to ward off the Bunyoro attack. So the force that fought against Nyamatukura was a combined force of the Bahuma of Mwenge and other groups of people west of Mwenge county - the Bakonzo inclusive. Furley quoting Wilson argues for the remarkable involvement of Bakonzo and Baamba in the fight to whom the wounding of Nyamatukura was attributed. He writes:

"Nyamatukura himself followed in a litter as he was too weak to march, but in the defeat that followed he was actually wounded,... The wound was inflicted with an arrow, and this points to an interesting feature of the Toro victory: they won partly because they used bows and arrows as well as spears. Wilson argues strongly that this implies that Baamba and Bakonjo helped in the victory, for the bow was their weapon...."³⁷

Nonetheless Kaboyo moved westward to settle. He mobilized further support in Bunyangabu. He set up his headquarters 30 miles south of Buhesi, according to Furley.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KABOYO'S RULE.

Kaboyo's rule marks the beginning of the demise of a freely developing society in Toro, in the 19th century. It resulted into the disintegration of society along nationality and clan lines. Kaboyo's rule animated the hitherto diminishing role of clans in the society then holding. This unfortunate interjection in the history of the people of the area had serious negative consequences on the various groups of people found there. It was horizontally divisive and vertically

diminution of the hitherto emerging class society. Kaboyo brought with him his own ruling aristocracy and his clan hierarchy of chiefs the Babiito, the Balisa and Basita on the top. Other Banyoro clans, the Entajumba, Amalenge, Engabi, Obusito and the like fared as worst as the Bakonzo clans. Members of these clans were generally discriminated against until the collapse of the kingdom of Toro in 1967. The clan animosity first implanted in Toro kingdom by Kaboyo in the 19th century and perpetuated even under colonial rule in the 20th century could drive Samson Rusoka, the last Prime Minister (omuhikirwa) of Toro to repugnantly retort that "only a Mutooro Proper) (omutooro nyakabara) shall be Katikiro of Toro" in 1962 when Bakonzo and Baamba leaders suggested that the post of prime minister should rotate among the major nationalities in the kingdom, i.e. Batooro, Bakonzo and Baamba.

Having surrounded himself with his own people, Kaboyo undertook to assert his authority over the local chiefs. He had brought with him Bahuma soldiers and recruited other soldiers from Mwenge whom he used to suppress other chiefs, after setting up a complete state system around himself. Kaboyo's attempt to subdue local chiefs created resistance against him. Even Kasoro who had championed the planning of the secession for him is said to have resisted the new developments until Kaboyo's forces pursued him to death.³⁰ The era of peaceful co-existence between pastoral and agricultural populations was gone! Step by step Kaboyo attacked chiefs of adjoining areas. Some chiefs gave in, other completely resisted him. According to Furley, Kaboyo attacked Mairanga, the chief of Mulindi, in whose

KABALEGA DESTROYS THE BABITO DYNASTY BEGAN IN TORO BY KABOYO.

The rule of the Babiito dynasty in Toro was terminated by Kabalega during the 1880s. During that period Kabalega re-annexed Toro to Bunyoro and his power extended to Busongora. Kabalega's wars of the 1880s explain the final pre-colonial retreat of the Bakonzo to the mountains. Kabalega first raided Toro in 1876. For two years his forces harassed the people of Toro, overrunning the kingdom in 1878. By this time Kabalega's advancement was checked by two main non-Batooro forces: one, was chief Kalikura's guerrilla forces which repulsed Kabalega's forces led by Kikule when they tried to pursue Mukurasa into the mountains. Kalikura was a Mukonzo chief who supported Mukurasa against Mukabirere in a succession dispute after the death of Nyaika. He was also Nyaika's brother-in-law. Nyaika married Kalunju, Kalikura's sister. Kalunju was the mother of a boy named Kihika

Nziwa, who became known as Kasagama.

Mukurasa's seat was in Kalikura's chiefdom in the territory adjoining the mountains in Bunyangabu. However, Kalikura and Mukurasa were cajoled into making peace with Rusongoza, Kikule's assistant by making blood-brotherhood with him. Rusongoza then cynically betrayed this brotherhood by persuading Kalikura to go with him to Bunyoro to visit Kabalega, and hopefully to normalise relations. But they were promptly murdered on arrival.⁴⁴ The second force which contained Kabalega's advancement was the Baganda mercenary army in aid of Nyamuyonjo Kakende under whose rule Kabalega crashed the Babiito dynasty in 1889. Kakende would have sustained the monarchy but the war situation that resulted from succession troubles and Kabalega's incessant raids resulted in turn into a major 19th century famine in Toro known as "Bagwerekere" in 1888. The Baganda army withdrew and Kakende could not face the "abarusura" (Kabalega's soldiers) alone and so he abdicated and fled to Buganda. His defeat marked a final triumph for Kabalega's long drawn out effort to re-annex Toro.

In Busongora, the situation was compounded with the effects of famine and the outbreak of small pox and rinder pest in 1890. Kabalega's forces, it appears, did not have to fight during the period 1890. But Kabalega could only reorganize the administration of Toro thereby extending Bunyoro state control to the area. He appointed chiefs in Toro under his control and very tactically he avoided appointing people of doubtful loyalty. The appointed chiefs were from his maternal clan or war leaders.⁴⁵

During the war against Kabalega, chief Ruhandika of Bwamba hid Kasagama and his mother at a place called Kwaguiba, where Bakonzo chiefs had earlier hidden and defended Nyirika against his opponents. The fugitives were hidden under a large stone locally known as "Ibwe lya Nyirika" which is found in the Rwenzori mountains, on Bwamba side. Having hidden the boy, Kasagama, Ruhandika together with Kisyenene and other Bakonzo chiefs organised a force which repulsed Kabalega's forces after inflicting heavy casualties on them. A series of battles were fought as Kabalega's army attempted to root Kasagama and his mother from their hiding place. During one of these battles, Ruhandika killed Kayera, one of Kabalega's friend commanders. This incident took place at River Kyoghe during the battle of Kiuno in the highlands of Bwamba. Ruhandika's guerrilla forces, armed with spears, bow and arrows pursued and completely rooted the "abarusura" from the mountain region, killing many of them,⁴⁶ thereby making it possible for Kasagama to be smuggled to Ankole via Bukonzo and Busongora, escorted by Bakonzo chiefs.⁴⁷

COLONIALISM AND NATIONALITY CONTRADICTIONS
IN TORO.

The nationality contradictions began with the return of Kasagama to Toro. He was returned to Toro by Captain Lugard, an official of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). Lugard found Kasagama in Buddu. He brought him back to Toro via Ankole, entered the Toro region via Busongora and installed him as ruler of Toro in 1891. The Kingdom of Toro which had been destroyed by Kabalega was established with the help of British Colonialism.

Kasagama became ruler of Toro by a series of treaties/agreements signed between himself and the colonialists/imperialist agents.⁴⁸ These agreements and treaties had both theoretical and practical implications for the people of Toro Kingdom. This is in so far as they formed the basis on which the people of Toro were engulfed by British colonialism and also as they lay the basis for the political framework in which various nationality contradictions were to be shaped and expressed in the next century.

With the coming of British colonialism and by the support of the imperialist agents to the Batoro faction of the pre-colonial ruling class, the latter found a new ally - an external ally - British imperialism. The new social relationships which emerged in Toro were not as a result of internal historical process. Under colonialism political control was reorganised. Rather than remain the preserve of the old pre-colonial ruling classes among the different nationalities, it became a preserve, more or less, exclusively of the members of the Batoro nationality. Batoro chiefs were appointed to all areas (of the old kingdom), including those areas where Toro authority had never been experienced before, once those areas had been 'appended' the Toro Kingdom such as Bwamba, Bukonzo and Busongora. The result was the development and aggregation of contradictions of a colonial type between the Toro rule and the formerly outlying areas into a major nationality contradiction embracing even those Bukonzo or Buranya and Bunyangabu, who had during the 19th century co-existed with the Batoro, under Babito rule. Not only that, the people of these areas had a kinship relationship with Kasagama since his mother was their daughter.

According to the 1900 Agreement, Bwamba and Busongora were appended as counties of Toro Kingdom hitherto a confederacy of the bazas of Mwenge, Kitagwenda, Kitagweta, Kyaka and Nyakibimba according to the treaty of 1894. The 1894 treaty affected practically the people living in the areas of the confederacy.

The 1894, treaty bore serious implications for the people of Toro. In it three important elements are introduced for formalization:

- 1) land alienation or the privatization of the most important means of production and resources. Kasagama was entitled to hold private land in all the Sazas, but with initial emphasis on "Toro Proper". Thereafter all land which at the time of signing the agreement was waste (sic) or uncultivated, together with all minerals and salt deposits, was to become the property of the British Crown.⁴⁹
- 2) Kasagama was granted the right to receive 10% of the taxes collected throughout the whole district, as well as a further 10% from "Toro Proper", while the Saza chiefs in their own counties. Hut and gun taxes were to be paid by all adult males in the district...⁵⁰
- 3) The administration of justice between Africans was to be placed under the monopoly of Kasagama's appointed Saza chiefs, to be subordinated only to the "Rukurato".⁵¹

Briefly these three components of the treaty point to one important thing, namely that a state externally doctored was instituted in Toro and a class rule imposed in the context of colonialism. And once the 1900 Agreement brought Busongora and Swamba into the fold of Toro Kingdom the people there would be subjected to the whims of the Toro state.

Immediately Kasagama was made ruler of Toro he appointed administrative chiefs of the areas which immediately fell under his control, i.e. Toro Kingdom as it existed under the rule of Nyaika. He made the first appointments at Nserere in December 1891. Yoswa Rusoke of the Rusita (Basita) clan from Butanuka was appointed Prime Minister; Kahaibale, son of Kato Rukide I was appointed chief of Kibale, Bagaya, sister of Kahaibale was appointed Kubuga (i.e. "Queen Sister"), Mukira was appointed chief of Buryangaou and Rukambuza was appointed chief of Nyagwaki.⁵² He did not appoint a Mukonzo chief. It is not clear why Kasagama did not appoint Bakonzo chiefs, given the history of his escape to Ankole, coupled with the fact that he partly descended from the Bakonzo through his mother.

Some people argue that the Bakonzo were excluded from Kasagama's list of chiefs for three reasons: Firstly, the Bakonzo chiefs had fled their stations to the mountains during Kabalega's brief control of the region after he conquered it. Secondly, that some Bakonzo chiefs had made peace with Kabalega, because Kabalega had appointed his chiefs carefully and had made sure that he did not appoint a Mubito. Many of Kabalega's chiefs were recruited from his maternal uncles, from Bulegga (Bulegna).

the fear that Bakonzo might betray Kasagama to Kabalega. And thirdly, Kasagama himself fled from Toro at the attack of Kabalega in 1893. He however, fled to the mountains where many of his people died of cold.

When the British heard of Kabalega's attack on Kasagama towards the end of 1893, Colville sent Owen and Villiers to re-occupy Fort George (at Lake Katwo) and Fort Gerry at Kabarole, and after the defeat of Kabalega, Kasagama returned to Kabarole. On 3rd March 1894 Owen and Kasagama signed a new treaty to replace Lugard's Company treaty. This was the 1894 treaty. This treaty was of protection but it also accorded Kasagama the status of King of Toro (sic) and its dependencies.

Furley argues that:

"The treaty was by no means a guide and text for his future peaceful rule over the kingdom, but it at least gave Kasagama the breathing space to develop some other characteristics of his rule, especially his personal influence over his people, which are very noteworthy".⁵⁴

However, contrary to Furley's submission Kasagama's innovation did not involve charting an independence ideological line. He simply adopted protestantism which was also the colonial state religion and attempted to impose it on his subjects. By 1896 Kasagama's appointment of chiefs was taking a clear sectarian line based on this new religion. He strengthened the position of protestantism as the "established" religion by appointing protestant chiefs wherever possible, and all administrative regions except Kitagwenda were under the rule of christian chiefs by the time Bishop Tucker, the Anglican Bishop, visited Toro in 1896.

This development is important in the history of Toro kingdom because it marked a radical shift in recruiting for administrative function, paving the way for the development of a colonial administrative stratum. Whereas in 1891 Kasagama had appointed chiefs from those with whom he had socio-historical relationship in 1896 he was appointing "brothers-in-christ", thereby overlooking the historically dominant classes - the so-called traditional chiefs. Thus through the ideology of the imperialists Kasagama was able to de-link with chiefly notable unless they gained his new religion. This enabled him to develop a purely colonial administrative or bureaucratic stratum independent of the hitherto established socio-economic classes. It is not surprising therefore that between 1896 and his death in 1928, even commoners who had embraced christianity, mainly protestantism rose

to the rungs of the upper classes.⁵⁵

THE BAKONZO REVOLT OF 1919-21.

This was the climax to the initial resistance to the colonial situation. Resistance to Toro rule began immediately Batoro chiefs were dispatched to Busongora and Bwamba areas. The local chiefs there resented the idea of Batoro chiefs being superimposed on them.

Hierarchically, Batoro chiefs were accompanied by Batoro askaris. When they arrived in Busongora and Bwamba they began to exact tribute and corree. Initially Bakonzo/Baanja labour was required for the building and maintenance of public projects. Soon they were required to labour on the official and private chiefs' estates. Then a system of taxation was introduced alongside numerous forms of tribute. The new situation affected both the peasants and clan chiefs - the peasants by expropriating their surplus labour and the clan chiefs by encroaching on their interests and privileges - the control of peasant surplus product and labour.

Before monetary taxes were introduced all men were required to hunt elephants and once they killed one, the tusks and tails were handed over to the chief. Then those who participated in a successful hunt would be regarded as having paid tax. Likewise those who surrendered a minimum of three skins of an animal locally known as "Isuku" were exempted from hunting the elephants. This pre-monetary system of taxation turned out large quantities of Ivory and hides and skins which were expropriated by the colonial state. Besides, all families were required to pay tribute to the Toro chiefs, through their local village headmen who had been turned into tribute-collectors and organisers of labour for their new overlords. Sometimes clashes occurred between Bakonzo chiefs and Batoro agent-chiefs. But these were isolated incidents and often un-coordinated.⁵⁶

Towards the end of the decade (1910s), two new developments took place. One, was the "land-grabbing" by the Toro oligarchy, and the other was the introduction of a hut tax, the latter introduced in 1919. Large tracts of land were declared "Omukama's lands", "Crown lands" and Toro official estates. Also individual chiefs and their friends attempted to grab land from the people.⁵⁷ This embittered the Bakonzo chiefs who had been controlling land but were reduced to tribute-collectors and labour organisers and were being subjected to paying taxes to a 'foreign' authority. Forced labour, taxes and tribute paying angered the peasants who were readily mobilized by their clan leaders to fight the Toro rule.

Chief among those who organised the revolt of 1919 were Tibanwenda from Bukonzo and Ruhandika from Bwamba. Others were Nyamutswa, Kapoli, Rujumba Kyaneka and Mukulho of Bwamba. However, chief Ruhandika did not actively participate in the revolt because of old age. He deployed Nyamutswa to join hands with the chiefs of Busongora and Bukonzo, especially Tibanwenda. Nyamutswa was not a clan leader as such. He was a mediciner and as a young man he had gone to be apprenticed in Bwamba where he became a confidant of chief Ruhandika. His real name was Rihokolho but he was named Nyamutswa (Nyamucwa) by the Batoro when he began to agitate against the new Toro rule. Kapoli and Mukulho were Nyamutswa's aides. Nyamutswa engaged Batoro forces in a series of fierce encounters on his way to Bukonzo beginning with the battle of Ndalibana in 1919.⁵⁷

The revolt quickly died out in Bwamba because the king of Toro and the colonial state managed to manipulate the old ties between Ruhandika and Kasagama. Kasagama promised Ruhandika a post in the new administration, which his son, Samwiri Bukamoi took as sub-county chief in Bwamba following the suppression of the revolt. There is also Ruhandika Street in the Town of Kabarole (Fort Portal). But most important is that the colonial state intervened in the land issue and Batoro chiefs and other interested parties were urged to stop grabbing land in Bwamba in 1920. Also the collection of hut tax was temporarily suspended.

Nyamutswa had taken with him several Bukonzo chiefs from Bwamba. He hoped to link up with Tibanwenda and Muyogha of Bukonzo. His back-link with Ruhandika was curtailed by the new development between chief Ruhandika and Kasagama and also the fact that the more active chiefs had followed him. While in Bukonzo, Tibanwenda, Nyamutswa and Kapoli emerged as the main leaders of the revolt.

Tibanwenda attacked the sub-county offices at Kisinga and burned them down. He quickly advanced to burn the sub-county of Bwera which was then located at Kanyampara west of Kisinga. He wanted to turn and rejoin Kapoli who was operating in the eastern parts of Muhohya and Kasese to push the struggle towards Kabarole when the colonial state intervened to quell the revolt. Towards the end of 1920 eight Bakonzo leaders were captured including Nyamutswa, Kapoli and Tibanwenda. Mukulho and Rujumba Kyaneka who had accompanied Nyamutswa from Bwamba and others were killed in various ways. It is alleged that some had their eyes gouged; others were burned to death and thrown in Lake Kaitabarongo near Muhoti in Kabarole.

Tibanwenda, Nyamutswa and Kapoli were hanged in public at Nyabirongo in Tibanwenda's territory and buried in one grave as punishment for leading the rebellion.

Unlike the others who were killed either while fighting or otherwise, Nyamutswa, Tibanwenda and Kapoli were the ones whose case ever reached the colonial court of law. In spite of this they were executed without trial after their appeal had been dismissed by the East African Court of Appeal.⁵⁸ So the resistance was suppressed by British Imperialism.

The method used by the Bakonzo in the resistance included refusal to provide free labour to the Toro chiefs, refusal to pay tribute to Toro government, demolishing of administrative posts and to chase away Batoro chiefs and individuals from grabbed land.

The real weakness of this movement was the class character of its leadership. It was bedevilled by internal divisions as a result of local feuds among rival chiefs. Kigheri, brother of Tibanwenda, betrayed the leaders of the movement to the colonial state. Internal divisions in turn put limitations on the leaderships organisational capacity.

However, after the suppression of the resistance an administrative reform was introduced in Toro. But it was also a reform which opened avenues for co-optation in the Toro oligarchy. Some Baamba and Bakonzo were appointed chiefs in the lower administrative positions, mainly as parish chiefs.

With the reorganisation of the Toro oligarchy, also beginning in 1923, the colonial state instituted fixed salaries for all grades of chiefs in lieu of tribute, rebates and rent. Tribute, rebates and sometimes rent formerly pocketed by Saza chiefs, gumbelala chiefs and private land owners were now to be paid into European supervised coffers of the District Native Administration.⁵⁹ In the revolt areas private acquisition of land by chiefs and individuals had been temporarily halted during the strife in 1920 (in Bwamba). But also this halt was part of the colonial land policy.⁶⁰ However, land grabbing continued elsewhere in the kingdom, causing a peasant outcry in Toro to which the colonial government responded by appointing a Committee of Inquiry in 1926.⁶¹ Nonetheless Colonial Land Policy formulation for Toro was part of the general Land Policy for the rest of the kingdom areas, and aimed at boosting peasant production during the inter-war period.⁶² So ideally after 1923 the land issue was not a crucial problem in the revolt areas.

TRANSITION TO THE SECOND PHASE OF THE
STRUGGLE 1921 - 1950s.

There are main issues to address. The first is that after 1921 Toro government administration was consolidated in Bwamba and Busongora. The second was the development of the colonial economy in which new contradictions emerged.

We have already said that one of the outcomes of the 1919-1921 revolt was the inclusion of Baamba and Bakonzo chiefs in the oligarchy of Toro. However, rather than being the representatives of the masses of the oppressed, this inclusion was a mere co-optation of individuals, whom, as members of the oligarchy operated within the framework of Toro kingdom government. They became part of the oppressive state of Toro kingdom.

But even within the Toro oligarchy the Baamba and Bakonzo chiefs, neither had the capacity to influence the Toro government decision-making process nor did they have the capacity to expand their numbers within the oligarchy. whereas their Batoro counterparts were able to prepare their children for entry into the rungs of the oligarchy as chiefs, the first batch of Baamba/Bakonzo chiefs were never succeeded or did not have their children become chiefs after them. Yet this was the trend among the Batoro chiefs.

Kasfir has noted the following on this subject:

"A study of chiefs in the 1950s revealed that the royal clan provided 12.5% of high or low rank, 45% of the chiefs were sons and of chiefs. While 40% of the county chiefs were grandsons of chiefs. At the same time 6 out of 2 county chiefs and 10% of all Toro chiefs (down to parish level) had secondary education, while 80.5% had some primary education. These figures suggest that under colonial rule chiefs (who were mainly Batoro at the sub-county and above) were forming an elite based on education and bureaucratic position, but not on traditional system."

However, the Bakonzo and Baamba chiefs in the Toro government were not able to undergo this class transition. Thus the relative importance of Bakonzo and Baamba chiefs diminished overtime as they could not rise to higher ranks, and also they could not numerically increase in relation to the number of Batoro chiefs who were becoming an elite group based on education and bureaucratic position. Because the Bakonzo and Baamba chiefs could not rise in the ranks they never held positions of major decision-making. Major decisions were made beyond their reach. As a result Baamba and Bakonzo areas became disadvantaged. This characteristic of the

Baanba and Bakonzo chiefs discredited themselves as a group. So any hope of improvement in the political conditions of the two nationalities would have to await new leadership, the petty bourgeoisie.

Beginning in the 1940s a petty-bourgeois class began to form on the basis of the colonial economy and education. The emergence of the petty-bourgeoisie among the Baamba and Bakonzo and the development of the colonial economy in the two areas was a simultaneous occurrence. During the 1940s, the Omukama of Toro, on the instructions of the colonial government sought to improve the education conditions of Baamba and Bakonzo in the kingdom. Chiefs in the Baamba and Bakonzo areas were ordered to pay for the education of a minimum of two Bakonzo or Baamba children. So towards the end of that decade a number of them went to school in and around Kabarole. Most of those who benefited from that development became primary school teachers in the 1950s. It was from them that the initial leadership of the Rwenzururu Movement of the 1960s came.

On the other hand the period between 1940 and 1960 is the period in which intensified agricultural activities took place in Busongera, Bukonzo and Bwamba. Colonial cash crops were introduced in these areas during this period. And commodity production for the external and internal markets in these areas was relatively advanced by 1962. Within Bwamba Coffee (Arabica and Robusta), rice production and some amount of fishing on Lake Albert were the main income generating activities. Busongera and Bukonzo produced coffee (Arabica), cotton, salt from Lake Katwe and Kaseanyi and fishing activities were taking place on Lakes Edward and George. The opening of Kilembe mines took place in the 1950s, adding to the domestic market for locally produced food products. Also county townships emerged during this period leading to commercial activities. Society in Busongera, Bukonzo and Bwamba became sufficiently monetarised as a result of increased commodity production and exchange.

At the same time as economic development i.e. production advanced the Toro government correspondingly over-relied on these areas for revenue. As a result these areas bore a larger proportion of the tax burden. Consequently the people became sensitised and demands for social services-education, health etc. emerged. This brought about the issue of political representation, economic exploitation - in short the question of democracy. The emerging petty-bourgeoisie was to champion the struggle for equality, i.e. democracy.

The new petty-bourgeoisie among the Baamba and Bakonzo approached the political question quite separately from each other at first. The Baamba faction were the first to express political dissatisfaction in the 1940s, and their method of struggle began with the formation of Associations (agitation groups) which sought equal opportunities with their Batoro counterparts. At that time the demands of the Baamba petty-bourgeoisie were exclusive to this class and did not originally include popular demands for the emancipation of the entire Baamba nationality. The first of the Baamba agitation groups to be formed was "Musana Society" (i.e. the Sun), founded in the 1940s by Erisa Nyamusesa, a Mwamba clergyman. Its objective was to demand the appointment of Baamba to government jobs. In 1957 "Musana Society" split into two equally militant groups: The "Baamba Students Progressive Association" and Balyobulya. As Doornboss has already argued: "the importance of these organisations lay in their articulation and stimulation of a consciousness of social inequality and the reflections which they induced about the future role of the Amba (Baamba) in Toro Society"⁶⁴

Criticising Edward Winter, Doornboss further argues that:

"Although in the nature of the concerns of these groups caused them, at that time to avoid official (i.e. Batoro) scrutiny, it is surprising that an anthropologist who spent considerable time during the 1950s in Bwamba did not notice anything of this activity"⁶⁵

Winter had erroneously submitted that:

"of enormous importance, since it affects almost all contemporary questions, is the fact that the Amba, far from resenting the attitudes which the Toro hold toward them, admit that they are inferior people. Their greatest desire at the present time is to emulate the Toro and to become as fully Toro-ised as possible. One important implication of this is that the Amba are by no means restive under the rule of Toro but are more than willing to submit to their authority"⁶⁶

It is apt to submit that Winter neither understood the forms of political resentment nor could he understand the dynamics of the society he studied in a dialectical perspective, a limitation imposed on him by the structural-functionalist method of analysis which he used in his study.

THE BAKONZO LIFE HISTORY RESEARCH SOCIETY (BLHR).

The most important agitation group in the history of the Rwenzururu struggle was the Bakonzo Life History Research Society (BLHR), founded by Mw. Samwiri Bukambi in 1954. Its approach to the political question was different from the Baamba organised groups. Its starting point was to research into the history and culture of the Bakonzo in light of the social and political problems the Bakonzo community was suffering under Toro kingdom.

When Bukambi set up the organisation, the Omukama of Toro challenged its existence and Bukambi explained that it was not a political organisation, but a good-will association set up for purposes of mobilising the Bakonzo to raise funds to educate their children. This, he argued, was in line with the Omukama's call to the Toro chiefs to promote education. Bukambi alluded the Omukama that if properly organised for the purpose the Bakonzo themselves were capable of educating their children.

However, the Omukama's initial response caused the Bakonzo leaders to rethink the question of re-organising the leadership of the BLHR. This was necessary because Bukambi was a gonoolola chief in the Omukama's government. So within 1954, a few months after the formation of the BLHR, Isaya Mukirania took over its leadership. With Mukirania as the leader of the group, a clear sighted leadership was inserted in the process of political agitation. He transformed the goals, and re-organised the BLHR, leading it into political activity. He set up branches of the BLHR from Bwamba to Busongera. Each branch was led by a chairman and Mukirania became the president of the organisation.⁶⁷ In each of the branches different people researched on different aspects of life - History, politics, culture and the economy in the context of Toro Society. All types of people - occupational groups - among the Bakonzo were consulted - Medicinemen and women, blacksmiths, clan leaders and the public. The information collected was selectively used when writing the numerous Rwenzururu memoranda, particularly the one of 15th August, 1962 addressed to the rulers of Uganda⁶⁸ and the bulk of the evidence given to the Sembeguya Commission.⁶⁹

TRANSLATION OF BLHR ACTIVITIES INTO
POLITICAL ACTION.

The first active political role of the BLHR came in the wake of the 1955 Ordinance which provided for direct elections. In 1955 and 1956, the BLHR presented to the Toro government memoranda demanding direct representation in the Toro Rukurato, and recognition of the Baamba, Bakonzo and Batoro as the three main nationalities in Toro. However, the rulers of Toro kingdom refused to reorganise their political system along the proposals laid down in the 1955 ordinance. Instead they insisted on a new agreement which would secure more local control (similar to Buganda) - a ministerial system, a bicameral Rukurato and a reduction of the powers of the District Commission. 70

Nonetheless realising the gravity of the matter the Toro government attempted to deflate the Bakonzo pressure. In 1957, a Mukonzo and an active member of BLHR was appointed gonbolola chief and several Baamba and Bakonzo were appointed to lesser administrative positions in the Toro government service. They were deployed in parts other than their home-areas. 71

In 1958 a general meeting was held of the BLHR at which the findings of the research were aggregated; and a decision taken to step up the struggle for democracy.

PROCLAMATION OF THE RWENZURURU MOVEMENT.

Following its general meeting in 1958 the BLHR began to send memoranda to the Governor at Lntebbe, petitioning for democratic representation in the Toro Rukurato. In 1961 Bakonzo/Baamba 18 representatives were elected to the Rukurato. The number became 21 including two specially elected members and a minister of the Toro government. For the first time Baamba/Bakonzo were to voice the grievances democratically to the Omukama's government. And as the Sembeguya Commission noted, given an opportunity for the first time to air their grievances, they quickly attempted to show their strength. 72

A critical point in Toropolitics came when the new Rukurato appointed a Constitutional Committee on which no Baamba/Bakonzo were included. Upon agitation from Baamba/Bakonzo representatives the Batoro dominated Rukurato reluctantly included two of them on the committee, Mr. Isaya Mukirania and Mr. Yerehiya Kawamara. The Bakonzo/Baamba members on the committee made among others two principal proposals:

1) that the names of Bakonzo, Baamba and Batoro should be entrenched in the new Independence Constitution under negotiation. The Toro Agreement of 1900 did not even acknowledge the existence of nationalities other than the Batoro. 2) All posts shall be shared equally among the nationalities with the post of Prime Minister rotating. Both demands were refused by the other members of the committee. When this happened Kawamara and Mukirania walked out of the meeting to brief the other Baamba/Bakonzo leaders. Instead of persuading them to return to the subsequent meetings the Toro government began to intimidate them. Mukirania was arrested and detained for two days at Bundibugyo Saza Headquarters (February 6th-7th, 1962).

Meanwhile political tension developed in Toro, the Governor invited the Toro Constitutional Committee to discuss its proposals. The Batoro members of the committee went alone, leaving the Baamba/Bakonzo representatives behind. But when the Baamba/Bakonzo leaders learned that the Constitutional Committee was going to leave for Entebbe without their representatives, they got in touch with the D.C. at Fort Portal Mr. R. Purcell who assisted the Bakonzo/Baamba party to meet the Governor before the Batoro delegation returned. Isaya Mukirania and Mr. Stephen Kyabihire went ahead of Mr. Kawamara and Mr. Mupalya. Mr. Kawamara and Mupalya delayed because they were making final touches on a memorandum which demanded a separate district, i.e. separation from Toro kingdom. This document was handed to the Governor on 26/2/62 while the Toro Constitutional Committee was in session at Entebbe. Thus interrupted the meeting. Thereafter the delegations returned to Toro.

On 13 March 1962, a special meeting of the Rukurato was called to review the proceedings of the Constitutional Committee and the growing discontent among the Baamba/Bakonzo leaders. The Toro party reported that they were disturbed by Mukirania's

call for a separate district while at Entebbe. At this meeting (of 13 March 1962) the Baamba/Bakonzo leaders proclaimed the Rwenzururu Secessionist Movement and walked out of the Rukurato. They returned to their constituencies to mobilize the masses for an armed struggle in case their demands to the Governor^{were} not answered.

Soon they learned that the Uganda Constitutional Conference held in London during the month of June, 1962, was going to be the last round of the constitutional debates. On 25 May 1962, they wrote to the Governor asking for permission to send representatives of Bakonzo/Baamba to the Conference. On failing to be granted this permission, the Bakonzo/Baamba leaders declared the Independence of Rwenzururu on 30th June 1962. Intentions to declare and instal complete independency for the Bakonzo and Baamba from Toro kingdom had earlier been communicated to the Premier by telegram with copies to the Governor and the Colonial Secretary. In a letter that accompanied the telegram they further demanded that Toro authority be destroyed within a fortnight, emphasizing that after June 30th, Bakonzo/Baamba would neither pay taxes to Toro government nor serve it. By this time the three main leaders of the movement, Isaya Mukirania, Yeremiya Kawanara and Mupalya had been arrested.

THE BEGINNING OF VIOLENCE

The first violent activity broke out in Karambi Gombolola in Busongora county. The Lutoro Gombolola chief there had gone to the field to collect taxes and this triggered off a wave of mass violence. Within one week mass violence had spread all over Baamba/Bakonjo areas.⁷³ It was directed against Toro government institutions and officials. Large crowds of Bakonjo and Baamba attacked Toro chiefs, burned chiefs houses and administrative buildings and destroyed other government property. In other words Bakonjo/Baamba masses in action concentrated on the destruction of Toro state.

Central Government Response

Initially the central government responded by sending troops to the area. But this did not deter violence. Secondly, it instituted a commission of inquiry⁷⁴ "to inquire into and report to the government on the underlying reasons for the recent disturbances amongst the Baamba and Bakonjo people of Toro District, and to make recommendations in light of the investigations"⁷⁵. The commission opened its inquiries at Fort Portal on the morning of 18th September and subsequently had evidence in the counties of Busongora, Bungungabu and Bwamba. It concluded its work in Toro with local hearing of evidence at Fort Portal on 25/9/62.

However, the problem of the members of commission was their inability to grasp the problem from its historical roots and their failure to address the question of democracy. The commission saw the issues as essentially bureaucratic. It ignored the key political issues (rights, democracy)

and even economic issues (land, taxes and labour). It did not even make a distinction between the demand for a new district and secession. Once these issues were not properly tackled and no concrete recommendations made, violence which had subsided during the investigations was resumed in October 1962 and the struggle acquired new dimensions.

The central government responded by sending more troops to what became known as the disturbed areas - Busongora and Bwamba. By 14 November, a total of four Special Force Units had been deployed in the area. Each unit comprised 50 men and officers which made up a force of 200 men and officers.⁷⁷ By January 11, 1963 massive reinforcements were sent to the area including six Special Force Units (i.e, 300 men and officers), two and half companies of the 1st battalion of Uganda Army, five additional CID teams, three dog teams and even part of the Fire Brigade. This information was reported to parliament by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Felix Onama.⁷⁸ Other forms of state repression and intimidation were employed including detention without trial, but this

did not break the movement. By 25 February 1963, 354 arrests had been made out of whom 269 persons had been hurriedly convicted on various charges.⁷⁹ More repression was meted against the Baamba and Bakonjo people.

The nature of central government intervention broadened the scope of the struggle. The central government was seen as part of the very forces which frustrated the struggle for democracy in Toro. As a result the Baamba/Bakonjo struggle was transformed from being merely a nationality issue to a struggle for self-determination.

The 1963 Reform and The Guerrilla Struggle

In February 1963, the central government invited and deployed Tom Stacey, a British journalist, to assist in resolving the Rwenzururu problem. He had had personal contact with some of the leaders of the Rwenzururu Movement in 1954 when he researched among the Bakonjo. Isaya Mukirania, the president of the Movement had then served as his guide. Now Mukirania was leading a political movement. Before Stacey arrived in the country, Mukirania had escaped from Kampala where he was being restrained in October of the previous year. He had gone into hiding in the Rwenzori Mountains from where he was leading the movement. Stacey was able to find Isaya Mukirania and tried to persuade him to negotiate with the leaders of the central government.

However, Mukirania gave three conditions which would have to be fulfilled before negotiations could take place. The first, was that a conference of all leaders of the Rwenzururu Movement would have to be held to consider the content of the settlement. Secondly, he suggested that the central government must withdraw all the military forces from Bwamba and Busongora to allow for free movement of the delegates and create a state of peace in which such a conference could take place. Thirdly, Uganda government would have to release persons arrested in connection with Rwenzururu activities, notably Kawamara and Mupalya, the Baamba leaders to participate in the "All Rwenzururu Leaders Conference" before a meeting with any Minister of the central government took place. Short of that, he concluded the whole arrangement would be a trick. He argued further, "How can we feel a meeting would help Rwenzururu? How can we know unless we have discussed it with all our leaders everywhere? We ourselves shall talk first before we say if we shall talk with Uganda - Batoro government!" Finding Mukirania rather difficult to manipulate, Stacey searched for the petty bourgeois leaders on the low-lands and sold the idea of peace talks to them. By then he had proposed to the Prime Minister of Uganda, H. Obote,

"...That Bakonjo areas should henceforth be placed under the charge of the central government, with Baamba and Bakonjo filling the administrative posts as 'central government agents' and the administrative power on the spot would be the District Commission, representing the central government." Obote accepted this proposal. So did the petty bourgeois leadership

of Bakonzo and Baamba who lived in the lowlands.

But there was a problem Obote feared to bring the above proposal to parliament for discussion its implementation would spark off a wave of similar demands in other parts of the country, especially in Buganda where there was the issue of lost counties. Obote knew that even within his UPC party which was in power, the proposal might be opposed by some members. So to give it constitutional dressing a commission of inquiry would be appointed to inquire into the administration by the government of the Kingdom of Toro in some parts of that kingdom. The recommendations of the commission of inquiry would then be basis for government action. This was the rationale behind the "Commission of Inquiry into the administration by the government of the Kingdom of Toro of the services for which it is responsible in certain counties of the kingdom", which was chaired by L. Lubowa. The Commission was appointed on the 28th, February, 1963, under the commissions of inquiry ordinance (Cap.p37, Revised Edition, 1951) to cover the counties of Busongora, Bunyangabu, Buhabya and Bwanba. And the scheduled services to be investigated were: education, medical and health services, Roads, water supplies and prisons. These had also signed prominently in the Baamba and Bakonzo grievances during the Senbeguya Commission.

The report of the Lubowa Commission was submitted to the government in March 1963. The commission's report is interesting. Evidence was taken only from the lowlands of Busongora, Bunyangabu and Bwanba as Mukirania's group then effectively controlling the mountain parts was opposed to the gimmickery of the inquiry. It was also too empirist and lacked any historical approach or analysis but it largely implicated the colonial's government!

Immediately the report was submitted to government, central administration was introduced in Bwanba and Busongora. The District Commissioner of Toro was empowered to appoint an ADC to administer each county and to arrange for the people to select 'agents' who would carry out the duties of sub-county and parish chiefs. The exercise of selecting 'agents' was undertaken in 1963. They were not elected by the people but selected through arrangements made by the ADC. Some of the leaders of the Rwenzururu Movement, the lowland petty bourgeoisie became 'agent-chiefs'. This development resulted into a complete split in the leadership of the Rwenzururu (Secessionist) Movement. The petty bourgeois leadership in the mountains led by Isaya Mukirania opposed the reform. But since the movement was now split the militant leadership on the mountains could no longer organise openly. It therefore resorted to armed guerrilla struggle supported by the peasantry in the mountains. A government of Rwenzururu was set up in the mountains with 'parallel hierarchies.' In 1964 an attempt was made to unite the Bakonzo (Bandando) living in Zaire with their brothers - the Bakonzo of Uganda. Hence an attempt to create a nation of Bakonzo. These were split by colonial boundaries during the 20th century.

Over time the Kingdom of Rwenzururu was created. A discussion on the Rwenzururu Government would require a separate paper.

But attention must be made here that the militant section of the Rwenzururu created a participatory system of democracy in the mountain areas by which the movement was strongly rooted in the people. Such is the history underlying the Rwenzururu struggle and the search for self-determination.

Conclusion/Summary

This paper demonstrates that there is no such a thing as tribalism for tribalism's sake. Pre-colonial societies were formed by people of different ethnic origins coming together. Nationality contradictions among them emerged only when a dominant class in one ethnic group sought to dominate corresponding classes in other groups or nationalities. Also demonstrated is that a peoples struggle is rooted in their history and that a people have begun a struggle and have made concrete demands, the struggle will not end until principal demands have been answered. These demands are made on the basis of concrete socio-economic and political conditions.

The Baamba/Bakonzo demand for separation from Toro Kingdom arose from the socio-economic and political problems of the two nationalities. Before resorting to violence, the leaders of Baamba/Bakonzo had tried to struggle for the rights of their people through peaceful means - petitions. Colonialism in Toro, the nature and process of decolonisation in Uganda and the neo-colonial state created the conditions which drove the Bakonzo and Baamba to seek self-determination. The example of the Rwenzururu struggle demonstrates that nationality contradictions can not be resolved in countries which lack a national democratic program. The absence of national democracy encourages some leaders to turn to their nationalities for support.

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42. See Ibid, p.11
43. See Ibid, p. 10.
44. See Ibid, p.13.
45. See Ibid, p.14.
46. See Syahuka, M. Op.cit; and Tom Stacey, op.cit p.12
47. Setting off from Kitandi on the foothills of the Rwenzori Mountains, north of Kabarelo, Kasagana and his party were escorted by Bakoko chiefs to chief Galikenza's place in Bonyangabu, then to Kyanya near Bujoye at the home of the chief of Banyabindi; to Kasese, Muhelya and finally to Kakuhi at Lake Katwe, from where he set off for Ankole.
48. Syahuka, M. op.cit
- 49.
50. Ingham, op.cit. p.91.
51. Ibid. pp.95
52. Ibid. pp 91-92.
53. Wilson quoted in Furley op.cit.
54. Furley, Ibid. p.29.
55. The case of Mikoiri Mundu and Uwahin Kitalikibi who were royal attendants. Kitalikibi was appointed sub-county chief of Ewera (in Busongora) and Mundu, parish chief of Buhungamuyaga in Ewera. Both had been captured and taken to Buganda where they served as domestic slaves by Baganda soldiers. They later returned to Toro and stayed in the Kings palace as attendants. They were among the first subjects to be converted to Christianity. Mundu came from Ewanba and Kitalikibi rose from Baghera (Burahya)

56. The period 1900 - 1920 was full of such incidents and the battles of Nyanugason and Kasese were in this category.
57. Source: Interview with elders of Ibanda in Kasese, Oct. 1966.
58. See Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Recent Disturbances amongst the Basamba and Bakonjo people of Toro. (1962).
59. See J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda A Modern History p.83
60. See Mahmood Mandani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda op.cit p.128
61. See reference 58 above.
62. See Jorgensen, op.cit pp.128-129.
63. Kasfir, op.cit p.44.
64. Doornboss, op.cit p.1121.
65. Ibid, p. 1121
66. Writer, E.H. Bwamba: A Structural-Functionalist Analysis of Intertribal Society, p.7 also quoted in Doornboss, Ibid.
67. Original branches and their chairmen.

Bughondera Branch	-	Mr. Muliwabyo
Busumba-Kikyoo (in Bwamba)	-	Mr. C. Lohigwa
Kakuke in Gongo	-	Mr. G. Hute
Burahya Branch	-	Y. Balyananzihu
Bunyengebu Branch	-	Mr. O. Munyakenya
Busongora Branch	-	Mr. S. Mutooro.

Source: Interview Mr. Y. Muliwabyo.
68. See Rwenzururu Kingdom Government General Memorandum (1950-1967) (authors files)
69. See reference 58.
70. See Annual Report, Toro Kingdom, 1956-58.
71. Source: Interview with Mr. Y. Muliwabyo the one who was appointed Gonbolola chief.
72. Senbaguya Commission (ref:58) p.3.
73. See Ibid. For the chronology of violent activities.
74. See Ibid.
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76. Ibid, p.5.
77. See Uganda Argus of Nov. 14, 1962.
78. See Uganda Argus of Jan. 11, 1963.
79. See Uganda Argus of Feb. 2, 1963.

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