

(831)

MAKERERE
INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL RESEARCH
RURAL DEVELOP-
MENT RESEARCH
PROJECT

R.D.R. No. 87
B. Brock
28th October, 1969

THE SEARCH FOR "SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS"

Note: Rural Development Research papers are written as a basis for discussion in the Makerere Rural Development Research Seminars. They are not publications and are subject to revision.

First Draft - for limited distribution



THE SEARCH FOR "SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS"

This paper is essentially a procedural paper in preparation for a short period of field work in connection with the evaluation (Phase I) of the Dept. of Agriculture's Extension Saturation Projects now being carried out by David Vail and Ron Watts of the Rural Economy and Extension Dept.

One of the four aims of the extension approach, as enunciated by H. Dusenberry, (extension methods advisor with Uganda Dept. of Agriculture) was "the removal of social obstacles". Before one can assess whether an extension program has removed social obstacles, one has to be clear about what social obstacles consist of, and whether they are actually potent in any given situation.

As my share of the project, I have been asked to look into this question of "social obstacles" or "social constraints". In view of the ludicrously short time available for field work, it has been decided to concentrate on only one of the four sample areas studied in Phase I, and the sample and control parishes in Teso district have been chosen.

Before discussing specific procedures, this paper will try to examine what is meant by the phrases "social constraints" or "social obstacles"-- the two seem to be used interchangeably. Then, by a circuitous route, one possible approach to the question is set out, not very satisfactorily. Some suggestions about specific "social obstacles" and "social factors" operative in Teso District are reviewed, and finally, an attempt is made to delineate a segment of the problem sufficiently small that it might be tackled in the limited time available for fieldwork.

PART I

What are "Social Constraints"?

The phrase seems well-established in the vocabulary of development economists and people involved in action programs in underdeveloped countries. It seems to be rarely used by sociologists or anthropologists anywhere, nor by economists in developed countries.

a) the economists' usage

My own search for "social constraints" started some time ago with an attempt to find out what my economist colleagues meant by "social factors". Most answers were along the line

of "anything which may affect our results, but which we do not want to, or do not know how to, fit into our models". Another was "any factors that might be constraining but lie outside our own field of interest". "Social factors" thus tend to be thought of as different from and in addition to the usual "economic factors". It is a residual category defined, insofar as it is defined, in rather negative terms.

An attempt to enumerate "social" and "economic" factors influencing decision-making at the peasant farm level proved the futility of this approach. Q. Are kinship obligations a social or an economic factor? A. They are both. Q. Is a woman weeding her husband's coffee performing a social or an economic action? A. Both, simultaneously. This approach obviously cannot lead ^{to} clear-cut exclusive analytic categories. In the empirical situation, there are no such divisions; we introduce them by using two different modes of analysis of a unitary situation. The mode of analysis and the analytic categories chosen naturally differ according to the purposes of the analyst.

For my purposes, it is convenient to start with the concept of action. These actions are social which are taken with regard to the expectations of one or more other persons. Hence the vast majority of human actions fall into the class of social action, with only our absent-minded head-scratchings and similar undeliberate acts falling outside the class. This is a very loose definition that would make sociological theorists squirm, but it will do for present purposes.

Within this class of social action, there is obviously a sub-class that can be labelled "economic actions", which is, presumably, the empirical subject matter of economists. Precisely how economists delineate the boundaries of this sub-class of actions which they study is unclear to me, and a cursory review of elementary economics texts, where one might expect to find a clear statement of the subject matter of the discipline, has not helped very much. The definitions seem of two main varieties: those who think of economics as concerned with the production of goods and services, and those who think of economics as concerned with the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends-- the "economizing" viewpoint. For this paper this difference among economists themselves is not crucial. By the first definition a considerable number of actions might fall outside the sub-class of economic actions, might well be virtually co-terminous with By the second definition, the sub-class of economic actions

the class of social actions, since time in which to act is by its nature limited. In this meaning of 'economic', a man with only one calabash of beer and several gods to offer it to is making an economic choice.

For present purposes the first meaning of 'economic' is slightly more convenient than the second. Since economic actions are a sub-class of the class of social actions, not all social actions are economic actions, but all economic actions are, simultaneously, social actions. By this formulation it does not make sense to talk of "economic" and "social" actions, or factors, as different things, although one can meaningfully talk of "economic" and "non-economic".

The sub-class of economic actions is of course analyzed by economists in terms of their concepts and theories, while it is simultaneously analyzed by sociologists, economic anthropologists and so on in terms of their concepts and theories. The analytical jargons differs so greatly (and are at their most confusing when the terms are the same but mean different things) that a Martian visitor might understandably conclude the two disciplines were talking about very different things. Go back to the weeding woman. Her actions in pulling the weeds out of her husband's coffee plot are "economic", to the economists, in that they relate to the production of goods, but "social", to the sociologist/ anthropologist, in that weeding her husband's coffee is, in the area she lives, part of the obligations of the role of wife. Furthermore, the time she spends pulling weeds will be limited by the obligations involved in this role to work on her food crops to meet the role requirement of providing her family with food, and also to meet her family's expectations that she will provide firewood and water, cooked food, etc.

If this action approach is adopted, all economic actions, even in a developed economy, are simultaneously social actions, in principle subject to sociological analysis. In practice of course, in a developed society, economic roles are highly differentiated and segregated from other social roles, and productive activities can be analysed with little consideration of the structure of roles and institutions. In peasant agriculture, of course, there are very few discrete economic roles, and the main productive activities are carried out as one of the many diverse obligations involved in the familial roles of husband, wife and older children. Therefore, if we wish to attempt to understand resource allocation decision-

making within peasant households, it seems advisable to get away from thinking of separate "social" factors and "economic" factors. It is impossibly difficult to attempt to disentangle the economic and non-economic influences in such a situation. This seems to resemble Vail's argument (EDRP 161, p. 21), reached by a different route, of the inherent non-separability of farming from non-farming activities.

What then are "social constraints" on economic actions? I suspect the word 'constraint' is one of those which means different things to different disciplines, and hence is very dangerous. In the plain English sense, all social actions are by definition 'constrained' to a greater or lesser extent, since they are taken with regard to the expectations of others. This does not necessarily mean 'in conformity to the expectations of others'. A defiant child is still taking account of his mother's expectations even as he disobeys. But all social actions are limited, guided, influenced by others, to a greater or lesser degree, because of the interdependence of human beings in society. Without such constraints, economic behaviour would not form a system.

If all economic actions are simultaneously social, and social actions are virtually by definition constrained to some degree, it is not very meaningful to talk about "social" constraints on economic action, as some distinct identifiable kind of constraint.

b) the change agents' usage

A second main sphere where the term "social constraints" is used is that of action programs to bring about directed change. Here, "social obstacles" or "social constraints" interfere with achievement of program aims. "Why do people not respond to the advice given by field staff?" "Why don't the farmers do what they are told to do? There must be some social obstacle.... a lengthy list of the kinds of obstacles named could be given: demands of kinsmen, social pressures against innovators, preference for dancing and hunting rather than cotton picking, dislike of fencing, time required for funerals, "leisure preference", love of drink, jealousy of the successful man, traditional values, and so on, and on.

A substantive list of "social constraints" of this sort can provide interesting pointers but no coherent framework to guide field investigations. An earlier attempt to work out such a frame in terms of deviations from rational action

oriented to the actors' goal set has not been pursued here, since this approach seemed to offer little that could be operationally useful. As an alternative, various relations between the goals of those involved in a directed change situation may prove a useful starting point.

Situations of directed change are extremely diverse. If we take only agriculture, or rural development, we still have numerous government departments, para-statal corporations, voluntary agencies, co-operatives, private companies and so on, all trying to bring about some change in individuals, farm households, or rural communities, ^{as regards} agricultural methods, health, literacy, and so on. As a convenient shorthand, the various organizations trying to bring about change can be referred to as change agencies, those at the receiving end, whether individuals, households or communities, as recipient systems (also called client systems or target systems), and the staff of the agency more or less directly involved with the recipients, as change agents. The term 'recipient system' should not imply a passive acceptance of direction from the change agency. The change process thus involves actions within the change agency as a social system, within the recipient system, and interactions between the two.

It is interesting to note that all the specific "obstacles" mentioned above, which are quoted from change agents, are located within the recipient systems... in this case the farmers or the farming community. This common phenomenon has given rise to the suspicion, voiced from the sidelines by academics, that "social obstacles" in the recipient system do not really constitute significant factors in peasant farmer decision-making, but are used by change agents to rationalize the failures of their programs. According to this argument, program failure can usually be accounted for by technically or economically inappropriate innovations, poor administration, poor communications methods, and so on. This argument is a valuable corrective to the tendency to explain program failure solely in terms of the recipient system, but it can be overextended. As usual, in East Africa there is such a dearth of solid empirical studies of directed change programs in their totality that sound generalizations cannot be made. For numerous reasons, change agencies have seldom been accessible to social scientists, while the recipient systems have been defenceless against them.

A useful rule might be, to start looking for "social obstacles" to explain non-adoption of an innovation only after it has been demonstrated that the innovation offered is

- a) technically sound in relation to conditions in the specific area.
- b) appropriate to the recipients' level of resources
- c) does in fact offer the recipients some relative advantage
- d) any material inputs required are in fact available.

If these conditions were satisfied, yet the innovation was not adopted, why not? Are we at last in the realm of "social constraints"?

Who wants what?

Those in a directed change situation will have sets of goals which will, presumably, guide their decisions. In addition the change agency as such will probably have a set of "official" goals and recommendations as to ways of achieving these goals.

Some possible relations between these goal-sets are set out here.

1. No overlap between the goal set of the change agency and the recipient system. The birth control propagandist wants to reduce rate of population increase, but the recipients want the pleasure, prestige and security they think of as coming from a large number of children. The conservationists want to stop poaching and increase national income from tourists, but those who live near the game parks want some meat. The pasture experts urge de-stocking, but the pastoralists wants enough cows, here and now, to keep them in the style to which they are accustomed.

In this kind of situation, the change agents may feel strongly that their innovation is in the best interests of the recipient system, but the "best interest" is often a long-term one, and the long-term benefits are not perceived by the recipients. In some cases, the benefits are indirect. Increase in national or district income is not of much concern to the meat-hungry poacher. The change agents may, in such cases, ascribe the recipients failure to follow advice or directions to "social obstacles". This is perhaps not a wrong usage, since lack of any shared goal at all certainly constitutes an obstacle to co-operative action. The recipient systems, however, see only the obstacles created by the change agency, the "no hunting rules", controlled grazing rules, and so on.

Two alternative lines of action seem possible in such situations: a) modification of the goals of either or both systems until there is some overlap. This can sometimes be done by de-emphasizing the long-term aims in favor of the short-term benefits to the recipients, as can be seen in Family Planning Association advertisements showing a few healthy, happy, educated children.

b) dependence on coercion, forcing compliance to the change agency's demands through the recipients' fear of punishment.

2. Where both change agency and recipient system have a set of goals, at least one of these goals is common. Let us say the change agency and the recipient system share the goal of an increase in cotton production, the first as instrumental to reaching national targets, the second as instrumental to increasing cash income to achieve a better standard of living.

But, say the tired and frustrated change agents, if the farmers want more cash, why don't they pick all their cotton? Why do they plant it late? Why do they take time off for funerals in the picking season, and so on?

There have been enough studies of peasant farmers to give us a general idea that increased cash income is rarely their only goal; security especially secure food supply, maintenance of social harmony, enhancement of their prestige in the community, are just some of the other possible goals. The choices made by the peasant farmers have to be understood in relation to these other goals, which are not shared by the change agency. Diagram Ia represents the shared goal of increased cotton production by the overlap, and the "other" goals are on the right hand side. These goals will act as constraints on full achievement of the shared goal, although it does not increase our understanding of the situation to call these constraints "social", as I hope I have shown above.

These goals, or actions stemming from them, will be perceived and complained of by the change agents as obstacles to success of their programs. Whether they are perceived as constraints by the actors in the recipient system is problematical. A farmer might well complain at having to go to his neighbour's funeral when his cotton was ready for picking, but feel funeral attendance essential to maintain social harmony and his secure position in the community. We know little of the extent to which peasant farmers consciously articulate the choices they must make. This point is of

considerable practical importance, as will be discussed later.

But, it can be seen from diagram Ia that all of the change agency's goals do not lie within the overlap. These unshared goals of the agency can also act as constraints on effective effort towards the shared goal. There is no logical reason why the "social constraints" should be found only within the recipient system, although this is often assumed in practice. If "goal displacement" has occurred within the agency, so that maintenance of the organization and its customary procedures has become more important than achievement of its "official" goal, this displacement would detract from efforts to achieve the shared goal. One can talk only hypothetically about agency goals that might be constraining, in view of the lack of empirical data.

Furthermore, there is every reason to expect that the personal goal-sets of the change agents will not be fully congruent with the "official" goals of their agency, although let us hope there is some overlap. This situation can be represented by Diagram Ib. Again, in the absence of sound data, one can only hypothesize about the kinds of private goals of change agents that might be constraining: maintenance of social distance from the "ignorant peasants", in some cases the desire for rapid promotion, or if morale is low, the desire to expend the minimum energy required to collect one's salary-- could have a deleterious effect.

A comprehensive study of the "social constraints" operative in this kind of situation would require:

- a) knowledge of the goals of actors within the recipient system who make decisions relevant to the shared goal
- b) knowledge of the goals of the change agency
- c) knowledge of the goals of the change agents
- d) the optimal procedures to maximize the shared goal
- e) the extent to which actions observed deviate from e)
- f) why these sub-optimal actions were taken.

The feasibility of such a comprehensive study is dubious, although this list might be broken down into feasible segments, perhaps for a team project.

3. In the third type, an actor within the recipient system wishes to achieve his own personal goals by means not institutionalized within his social system. This might be phrased as: actors within a social system who wish to change their economic actions to better serve their own goals,

but feel unfree to do so, because of their expectation of the reactions of others in the social system. This would apply to those of us who would like to rob a bank and retire from work, as well as to the farmer who hesitates to fence communal grazing land because of his anticipations of neighbours' opposition. This is the situation of many innovators, or the "progressive farmers" who have deviated from the local norms. They are trying to play the economic game by somewhat different rules.

The situation of the isolated, unaided innovator is represented in Diagram IIa. In most cases he probably still shares some goals with others in his social system, perhaps some desire for social harmony and peace. If not, he is rather less vulnerable to certain types of sanctions such as withdrawal of esteem, quarrels and so on.

But the innovator is often not so isolated. He may be a "Progressive Farmer" visited by agricultural workers, for example. In such cases, there may be considerable overlap between the goal of the Progressive Farmer and the change agency, as in Diagram IIb.

Since the innovator or progressive farmer is deviating from local norms, he will be subject to sanctions of various kinds in an attempt to restore conformity. These sanctions will be perceived by the change agents as "social obstacles" impeding agricultural development, by others in the community as legitimate actions to maintain the established rules (and in some cases such as enclosure, to protect their own economic interests). The innovator is highly likely to perceive himself as threatened, in one way or another, or victimized by those around him.

In an extremely interesting seminar paper, B.T. Van Velsen characterized these people as "climbers" who become subject to various kinds of "levelling manoeuvres". The nature and intensity of these "levelling manoeuvres" will vary according to the kind of society, at their most extreme in egalitarian, much weaker in overtly-competitive societies. He suggests numerous procedures by which these pressures on "climbers" can be detected, although he points out that the character of a levelling manoeuvre is not always clear.

To study constraints of this type, the observer ideally needs a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the local community and especially its informal means of social control.

To assess the influence of such constraints on agriculture we need

- a) to isolate the kinds of sanctions brought to bear on "climbers" and the kinds of people most likely to suffer them. (One hunch of mine is that in some kinds of E.A. communities, the higher the social status of the actor when he starts climbing, the less severe will be the sanctions, or "levelling manoeuvres".)
- b) to get some idea of the frequency of such sanctions
- c) to get some estimation of the deterrent effect, if any, on the decision-making of potential innovators or "climbers".

One could hypothesize that an extension saturation approach, or any other sort of program aimed at changing group norms rather than individual norms on agricultural practices, is most appropriate and will have the biggest payoffs, in those societies where constraints of type 3, are most severe.

PART II

The proposed research in Teso District

The primary limiting factor on the proposed research on "social obstacles" ^{is time;} at the most, two months should be available. This period is so ridiculously short that one could hope to achieve nothing, were it not that some information on the Iteso generally is already available (Gulliver and Gulliver, 1953; Lawrence, 1957). Uchendu and Anthony (1969) provides an extremely useful review of factors affecting agricultural development in the district. Most important, Vail has already gathered a great deal of information on the ESP project in Miroi parish, Bukedea county, and the nearby control parish, Aligoi. The results of his lengthy first questionnaire are summarized in his interim report (Aug. 18, 1969). A detailed input-output study on a sub-sample of farmers is continuing. Questionnaires have been administered to extension staff who have been connected with the project, and are now being analysed by Watts. Fairly detailed information on the physical environment, marketing situation, communications, etc. is being gathered. Thus, it is hoped that any results I get can be fitted into the wider context of this material. Furthermore, it is hoped that any hypotheses suggested by my field work can be given more extensive testing by inclusion in the second questionnaire Vail plans to run at the end of the year.

I plan to focus on the existence or non-existence of constraints of Type 3, that is, of pressures or sanctions

against innovators, progressive farmers, or "climbers".

Ideally, determining whether or not such sanctions are used is only the very beginning; one needs to enquire into the dynamics, the frequency and the effect such sanctions have on the decision-making of potential climbers. It is unlikely that any answers can be provided to these questions in the time available.

A supplementary question, which, it is thought, can be investigated simultaneously, concerns change agents' perceptions of "social obstacles". What kinds of things do change agents regard as "obstacles" and what part do these perceptions play in change agents' thinking about the programs they are administering?

On the face of it, Teso district is an unlikely place to look for "social obstacles". The district is generally regarded as progressive and Teso culture has been characterized as receptive to change (Uchendu and Anthony, p. 1). In his tentative description of the culture, Uchendu says the achievement orientation, utilitarian and practical outlook, and this-worldly values have proved helpful to economic development. This report concludes that labour bottlenecks at certain times of the year, and the lack of ox-drawn implements to alleviate it, are perhaps the most serious constraints. In his interim report, Vail also comments that labour shortage limits expansion, but adds that unavailability of crucial inputs is also a serious problem (op cit., p. 22).

In his first questionnaire, Vail attempted to get at the influence of "social pressures" on adoption or non-adoption of recommended practices. His list of possible reasons for rejection included "others would disapprove", "custom/tradition does not permit", "others weren't doing it". Reasons for rejection were obtained for 33 different recommended practices on seven crops (plus soil conservation), but responses falling into these categories were negligible. Vail concluded that "social obstacles" were not revealed by the questionnaire to be important.

It could be argued, however, that the questionnaire technique is not able to get at such influences. The more intensive, unstructured techniques of the anthropologist are often thought more appropriate for such enquiries. The proposed research may constitute a test of this argument. If such social pressures are ∕ found to be negligible, it ∕again could be interpreted as a validation of the questionnaire

approach, in this case at least. However, anthropologists could still argue that any negative result I produced would not be a true validation because time in the field was too short to really get at the subtleties of these kind of pressures. One wonders if pressures too subtle to be detected in two months can be very significant.

On the basis of the evidence available, which of the three types of constraints would one expect to find in this part of Teso? The relevant goals of the extension saturation project, as enunciated by H. Dusenberry, are 1) to increase the efficiency of farmers... 2) to improve the overall net income of the farm thus providing a higher standard of living for the family... 3) the reduction or removal of social obstacles that restrict progress in farming. (Quoted from Vail, op.cit., p. 1.)

Given these goals, the Type I situation, where change agency and recipients share no goals at all, seems unlikely to be common. It can be assumed that most people have some interest in improving their well-being through increased agricultural output. Or can it?

If we assume that most people share goal 2, increased income and higher standard of living, constraints of Type 2, will probably be most common. That is, decision-makers must allocate their resources not only to serve the shared goal, but other unshared goals as well. What these others are, the relative priority accorded to them, and the extent to which they inhibit maximization of ESP goals, are not known. Some of the kinds of things needing study can be suggested here. On present evidence, we know that the strong preference for labour-intensive finger millet as a food, and the priority accorded it over cotton, probably interferes with cotton production and contributes significantly to the labour bottleneck, (Uchendu and Anthony 1969). Since labour is the scarcest resource, factors influencing allocation of labour are crucial. It may be that such goals as maintenance of harmony with one's social group require attendance at customary ceremonies and funerals, detracting from labour on crops. The need to maintain harmony within polygynous families may interfere with optimal allocation of labour, especially child labour, at times of peak demand. (These two points were both suggested to me by a Teso student, D. Osiru, on the basis of his Special Project research results.) We know nothing of the effect on resource allocation of status and prestige

as a goal, and greater understanding of the status system and bases for allocating prestige is highly relevant. The effect of leisure as a goal is more complex, since the interpretation of the goal of "higher standard of living" may differ as between the change agency and the recipients. To some farmers, a higher standard of living might well involve an increase of leisure. To most people, perhaps, beer-drinking and the accompanying social intercourse is a part of the general goal of leisure. To some, drinking may become a goal in itself, with obvious deleterious effects on improving agricultural production. While any shreds of information relevant to these or other aspects of Type 2 constraints will be picked up during the field work, this problem is too vast to tackle in the short time available.

Even though Type 3 constraints, the "social pressures" or levelling manoeuvres brought into play against innovators or climbers, are probably less significant over all, there are still enough indications of their existence to warrant study. Uchendu says there is strong loyalty to one's small group in Teso, and aggressive behavior is channelled outwards; the wealthy and their wealth are among the targets of aggressive behavior. He mentions that there is noticeable hostility against those who attempt to adopt enclosure, although it may be that this applies only to Ngora and other very densely-populated parts. He says this attitude, backed by overt aggression, is a major constraint on innovators. (Land is not yet a limiting factor in Miroi parish.)

Theft of cattle and crops is said to be increasing, and burning of huts is not unknown in the two parishes. Are these used as levelling manoeuvres? Who are the main targets?

Increased use of ox-cultivation and implements seems an important means of breaking the main obstacle, the labour bottleneck. Vail, in informal discussions with people in the area, has found some indications that "social pressures" may be a factor impeding this highly strategic development. Therefore, considerable attention should be given to this point, during my time in the field.

The opinion of Teso students, as expressed in an assignment on informal means of social control in their home areas, was that under certain conditions, an increase in prosperity would cause jealousy and some social isolation of the climber.

Research procedures

1. The research will, regrettably, have to be carried out through an interpreter, so a suitable person must be located and hired.
2. Interviews with the District Agricultural Officer, the A.A.O. in charge of the project, and other agricultural officers involved, to get their suggestions as to the specific kinds of "social obstacles" operative in the research area.
3. Identification of the "progressive farmers", innovators, or "climbers" in Miroi and Aligoi. It is hoped that Vail's data, and the lists or knowledge of the local agricultural field staff, will be a first step here.
4. Intensive, semi-structured interviews, probably in several instalments, with the farmers so identified. It was noted above (p. 9) that those who have been subject to negative sanctions or levelling manoeuvres should feel themselves threatened or victimized; the hope is that these farmers may be more aware and more able to articulate the "social constraints" facing them from their community, than farmers whose main constraints stem from their own conflict of goals. Whether these farmers will be willing to articulate their perceptions of pressures to a female, white stranger remains to be seen.
5. Clarification of the Teso concepts of "progressive farmer", "good farmer", "big man"/or ^{"innovator"} "climber" and general attitudes towards such.
6. Identification of the individuals placed by local residents in the various categories discovered under 5. This may result in additional semi-structured interviews, as under 4. It will be interesting to note whether the local residents' identification of the "progressive farmers", etc., resembles or differs ^{from} the change agents' identifications. (As a by-product, this procedure may cast some light on the qualities valued by, and allocation of prestige in, the community.)
local
7. Attempts to study the attitudes of others in the ^{local} communities towards the specific individuals identified under 4 and 6. If I am lucky, some specific event or events-- dispute, court case, witchcraft accusation, fence-cutting or other-- may turn up whose history can be unravelled, in a sort of abbreviated extended-case method, to illustrate the dynamics of the relations amongst those involved. But as always with the extended-case method, the question arises as to the

representativeness of the case.

Once the necessary interviews with officials in Soroti have been completed, it is hoped to find somewhere to stay within Miroi parish, preferably near, but not with, some of the "progressive farmers" or climbers. Time is insufficient to follow the classic anthropological methods of participant-observation and slow absorption of the culture by a sort of osmosis. Nevertheless, it is felt that living within the community is essential to supplement the interview method. On a problem such as the one posed here, it is often the casual comment, the passing remark during ordinary conversation, that provides the essential clues. Language is of course a problem, when one's interpreter-assistant is off-duty. But in such a place as Miroi, English and Swahili may be of some use.

Time-table

I intend to leave for Soroti very early in November. Teaching and other commitments require a break for the first ten days in December, but the rest of December should be free for fieldwork. Hopefully, by this time, some points requiring more extensive testing should be clear, ready for inclusion in Vail's questionnaire.


Field work will be impossible for at least the first two weeks or so of January, and this time will be spent in analysis and isolation of points needing further enquiry. I hope to follow up these points by returning for a short time in January or early February. The report on the work must be completed before I leave Uganda, at the end of March.

The project as outlined is far from ideal; and any suggestions for improvement, within the fundamental constraint of time, will be very welcome.

REFERENCES

- Gulliver, P. and Gulliver, P. H., 1953
The central Nilo-Hamites, London, International African Institute.
- Lawrance, J.C.D., 1957
The Iteso - fifty years of change in a Nilo-Hamitic tribe of Uganda, London, Oxford Univ. Press.
- Uchendu, Victor C. and Anthony, Kenneth R. M., 1969
Economic, cultural and technical determinants of agricultural change in tropical Africa; Preliminary report No. 3, Field study of agricultural change: Teso District, Uganda. (Manuscript).
- Vail, David, 1969, Programming concepts and peasant farm decisionmaking, EDRP No. 161, Aug. 22nd, 1969.
1969, Interim report - Makerere University College - Extension Saturation Project.
- Van Velsen, B. Thoden, (n.d.), Some notes on the study of social locomotion.

Diagram Ia



C.Ay = Change Agency
C.At = Change Agent
R.S. = Recipient System

Diagram Ib




Diagram IIa





Diagram IIb



Cl. = "climber"
S.S. = his local social system
C. At = change agents

This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence.

To view a copy of the licence please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>