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GROUP FARMING AND STATECRAFT IN UGANDA

Note: Rural Development Research papers are written as a basis for discussion in the Makerere Economic Research Seminar. They are not publications and are subject to revision.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to discuss, in the context of Ugandan agricultural development policy, some problems which arise when economic planning is subject to overriding political considerations. It is further intended as background to a study of the effects of group farm participation on peasant enterprise.

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Five years after a top level government decision elevated group farming from a low priority pilot project to a major thrust of Uganda's agricultural development policy, and two years after the Second Five Year Plan reconfirmed the prominence of group farms in public planning, the group farming programme is again being de-emphasized. Five year's experience permits a more circumspect economic evaluation of group farming in Uganda than has heretofore been possible. Yet some care must be taken to understand the motives of government decisionmakers for whom public sponsored development projects were elements in a strategy of consolidating national and political party power. Simplistic application of project analysis techniques to the group farm programme, suppressing political factors and 'economic side effects', would result in misleading conclusions about its impact on Ugandan economic and political development. When political leaders amend and abridge specific projects of the development plan according to their objectives and constraints - which differ from and dominate economic planning criteria - then ex-post project evaluation using only economic benefit and cost criteria is likely to reveal major inefficiencies in the use of scarce national resources. If, however, it is possible to comprehend the ways in which 'politics' altered decisions on important variables of project design and enactment, then the disparity between the project as undertaken and as an economic planner's ideal can be turned to the useful purpose of estimating the economic cost of political intervention.

Systematic underemphasis, or relegation to the category of 'side effects', of benefits and costs which are conceptually difficult and not easily quantified is a second limitation to the usefulness of overly-simple project analysis. In an economy numerically dominated by peasant farmers, important obstacles to sustained agricultural development in the early years of national development planning may be the values, beliefs, and farming abilities of the peasants themselves. Inadequate peasant entrepreneurship (the performance of four interrelated decision-making functions: production management, provision of capital, risk bearing, and innovation)¹ is one of the major limiting factors in Uganda

rural development. Thus changes in farmers' values, skills, and beliefs - which underlie entrepreneurial performance - should be considered primary benefits of the Government's agrarian program, regardless of conceptual and empirical difficulties.²

I hope ultimately to investigate changes in group farm participants as economic decisionmakers, especially their risk bearing and innovative behavior. The political context of group farming decisions is significant for the study. Termination of The First Five Year Plan's group farming pilot study - one of whose objectives was to produce information on the ways in which group farming could induce changes in peasants' economic behavior - effectively reduced farmer enterprise to a 'side effect' whose complexity and economic importance were often ignored in subsequent government decisions.

I. GROUP FARMS IN UGANDA'S FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN (1961/2 - 1966/7)

In the First Five Year Plan (FFYP), a scheme to encourage group farming ranks last in a lengthy list of measures to expand cotton production.³ The appendix on project funding indicates that "Proposals are being worked out for pilot projects in selected areas of the country to encourage farmers to merge their existing plots in order to provide more economic units for farming. Once larger units have been formed, these will be backed up with tractor hire services and improved credit facilities."⁴ The Plan allocated £63,000 to the pilot group farms, expenditure to begin in 1963/4 when the Plan actually began to function. This sum was 1.4% of the £4.5 million total central government allocation to "Agriculture and Cooperatives."⁵ Granted that a portion of the £336,000 earmarked for tractor hire services and £165,880 for cooperative society credit would be used in conjunction with pilot group farming, it was still an insignificant part of the agriculture sector plan.⁶

The Plan's stress on rapid expansion of cotton production bears notice: first as a salient example of Uganda planners' sanctioning of the recommendations of the 1960 IBRD survey of the Uganda economy; second because it served in 1963 as a vehicle for economic justification of the decision to accelerate government assistance to group cotton farms. Giving cotton top priority among

crop expansion programs, that Plan stated the, "One of the principle objectives of the program for the plan period is to increase the production of cotton from the present average of 370,000 bales to an average of 500,000 bales per annum, in order to achieve a quick increase in national income and so provide both farmers and the Government with the finance necessary for further and more long term development."

(nb. over the period 1957-62 raw cotton production averaged 15.2% of monetary GDP - cotton cake and oil products contributed a small additional amount; raw cotton provided 52.9% of export revenues; and cotton export duties accounted for an average of 10.7% of central government revenues)⁸

The World Bank Mission provided optimism and argumentation underpinning the stress on cotton: "Despite the unspectacular progress in cotton farming for many years [post war raw cotton output had never approached the 1937/8 level of 418,000 bales] we believe that cotton now represents the best opportunity for a rapid increase in output in the coming years."⁹ Their logic can be summarized as follows:

Ugandan cotton is grown very labor intensively and with simple technology on peasant farms; peasant family labor and suitable unused land are abundant in many parts of Uganda; the payoff to cotton is quick, relative to exportable perennial crops; and, because of American price support policy, international cotton prices should be fairly stable in the near future. The catalytic ingredient in the IBRD prescription was control through government subsidization of DDT sprays.¹⁰

The World Bank economists were dubious of the value of mechanization to peasant farming - and ergo of group farming, which was seen essentially as a means of making mechanization more efficient. Their reservation followed from the assumption that labor for most farm operations was relatively abundant and that significant labor bottlenecks (such as harvesting in cotton production) were not readily overcome by mechanization. Yet the possibility was acknowledged that consolidation of scattered plots would render tractorization of some operations economically feasible; consequently the IBRD survey urged "some experimentation in the evolution of a system of more rational land use and mechanization through group farming."¹¹

During their three month stay in Uganda the World Bank visitors relied extensively on the knowledge and judgements of resident economists, and agronomists.

They urged a group farm pilot study - suggesting a £5,000 pricetag - along lines suggested by a Symposium on Mechanical Cultivation in Uganda, held at Makerere College in 1960.¹² The consensus of the symposium was that Uganda had considerable long run potential for profitable agricultural mechanization. But the symposium report warned often and in considerable detail of the need for thorough prior study of existing agricultural resources and production techniques; of the capital and operating costs of farm equipment; of the natural environment; and especially of the likely peasant responses to alternative modes of mechanical cultivation. They concluded that no irreversible, large scale commitment to mechanization should be made without major investigation.¹³ Despite the financial failure and organizational demise of most of the cooperative group farms established in the 1940's and '50's (The bulk of which were not tractorized), the symposium upheld the possibility of establishing group farms - through the medium of the burgeoning farmers' cooperative movement - as foci of rural change. Ideally, cooperative societies, with group farms as ancillary organizations, could provide an institutional basis for farm credit provision, agricultural extension services, economizing scarce managerial talents, and efficient use of (farm equipment)¹⁴

The Five Year Plan was thus very largely a professional's document, firmly based on the advice and expertise of economists, both residents and itinerants. Cotton was king; group farming, as a means to increased cotton output and general agricultural development, was shown passing interest, then placed low on the list of short run priorities. In 1963 the priority list was shuffled and group farming, despite experts cautioning that it needed experimentation, came out near the top.

A Digression on Pilot Projects

A pilot project in development planning is a variant of the risk diminishing practice of prior study of a potentially desirable project: presuming that the more research is done on a project, the less uncertainty remains about its expected return and the way to maximize returns. A pilot project is an economic experiment, supplementing the contribution of deductive logic and interpretation of extant data

to determine likely costs and benefits of the larger parent project. A number of characteristics of the parent project justify undertaking a pilot study:

1. The pilot project "on the ground" closely resembles its proposed hypothetical parent, but on a smaller scale; that is, the full scale project must be divisible without distortion of its essential features. In the actual planning sequence, the parent project is the pilot project, corrected for discovered deficiencies, blown up 'n' times. (The parent project in group farming is a program of many group farms; the pilot study - a small number of experimental farms meets the divisibility criterion very well. Individual group farms may also have a range of scale variability without gross distortion of major characteristics, however, this form of divisibility is less crucial for evaluation of Ugandan experience).
2. There are major uncertainties about the costs and benefits of the project which planners' experience and a priori reasoning cannot resolve. Obviously no development project is undertaken with complete certainty or even with full information about persistent uncertainties. A pilot project may be justified when planners haven't enough reliable information even to predict with confidence the probability distributions of important project variables. (such was clearly the case in planning for group farms. For example, planners had little systematic information about peasant skills, learning capacity value structure, risk perception, and conflicting uses of time. They also lacked a complete knowledge of the physical environment: soil characteristics, topography, water resources, etc. Consequently, it was impossible to establish sound criteria for such diverse project decision variables as membership selection, training programs, plot size, conditions of credit, and crop rotations.
 - a) Trepidation about going ahead with the parent project is reinforced by the certainty that key cost elements will be large. (It was certain that managerial salaries and the capital, operating, and maintenance costs of farm equipment - all of which are in scarce foreign exchange - would be great on group farms).
 - b) The return to the parent project is expected to be large if information generated by the pilot study permits efficient parent

project design; i.e. there is a basic optimism about the project's value.

Although a pilot project may have directly measurable outputs, such as a group farm's net addition to cotton production, it is valued primarily as a learning process. An important implication for my study is that: if planners are prone to suppress or underemphasize important project characteristics because they involve great uncertainty or are difficult to quantify, then a pilot project specifically designed to provide information on those problematic features helps to overcome bias against their inclusion as 'direct effects' - or direct requirements - of the project. Changes in peasant behaviour - those required for group farm success as well as those seen as a partial measure of success - evolve haphazardly as 'side effects' unless project designers have sufficient understanding to plan directly for induced changes in peasant enterprise.

NB. Theoretically a pilot project can be subjected to benefit-cost analysis. Its peculiarity is that the major component of benefit is its effect on the rate of return to the parent and that a major cost factor is the opportunity cost of time devoted to the pilot study before launching - or rejecting - the ^{full} scale project. In the case of projects rejected, the major benefit of a pilot study is avoidance of losses or low returns to the parent project. Benefit can be measured by an index of the increase in expected rate of return and decrease in variance of the return to the parent project, due to more reliable information and less uncertainty about variables of project design. (As mentioned, the pilot study also permits a more systematic inclusion of factors like peasant change in estimates of expected return).

If a pilot project, like other learning processes, is subject to diminishing returns to time, then, hypothetically, an optimum project duration (T) exists, at which $dB/dt = r$ (where B is the index of Social benefit, r is the social rate of discount, time is a continuous variable, and $dB/dt > 0$, $d^2B/dt^2 < 0$). If at the end of T, the expected rate of return to the parent project is greater than and variance is within tolerable limits, then the project should be accepted. Presetting the termination date of a pilot project is a commonly used rule of thumb which notionally incorporates declining marginal return to time and positive opportunity cost of time.

II. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND UPC CONSOLIDATION OF POWER.

Uganda achieved independence in October, 1962, with a vigorously competitive political party system but with no Parliamentary majority party. A tenuous coalition composed of the Uganda People's Congress (37 seats) and the Buganda Kabaka Yekka (21 seats) - strange bedfellows considering the intense latent antagonism between Buganda and the other regions of Uganda - was pitted against the Democratic Party opposition which had 24 legislative representatives. The Uganda confederation of Kingdoms and districts was a volatile mixture of minority groups, divided into hostile camps on religious, tribal, ethnic, regional and other issues. In many of the old kingdoms - not solely in Buganda - advocates of national cohesion were challenged by parochial allegiances of the masses and elite alike. Divided loyalties, and among some radical groups active separatism, threatened the capacity of the fragile new state to survive intact a major political crisis.

In this context of precarious political relations the UPC attempted to secure greater popular support and a clear parliamentary majority by pursuing a two-front strategy: one set of tactics to encourage defection of its nominal allies, the KY legislators, to the UPC; and a second, more intense competition with the DP throughout the rest of Uganda.¹⁵ Fragmentation of the Uganda polity into overlapping minorities, each with a set of demands on its particular vital issues, had important implications for UPC strategy. First, separatistic loyalties and divergent local interests precluded erection of a single, coherent ideological roof over a majority of the Ugandan people (or, more precisely, over the electors of a majority of MP's). Consequently, the UPC adopted an essentially non-ideological and rather ad-hoc platform in order to coalesce minority groups into a nation-oriented majority. The UPC appeal was conveyed largely by means of pledges specific issues of local importance. As dominant party in the post-independence cabinet, the UPC was well situated to use patronage - in allocating both recurrent expenditures and development project funds - to fulfill its pledges and to enhance state building and its own control over national politics.¹⁶

The group farm pilot project was a low priority experiment in

the First Five Year Development Plan -- by consensus of economic advisors. Thus, the top-level cabinet decision in early 1963, to quadruple the allocation to group farming (to about £250,000 in 1963-66) and to press for quick establishment of numerous group farms was a major reversal of agricultural development policy. The decision to import a large number of tractors and to begin preparatory land clearing was apparently a hasty one, taken without public discussion -- except in the form of campaign rhetoric -- or even consultation with civil service advisors and UPC membership.¹⁷ Lacking evidence that new insights had radically boosted the expected economic benefits from group farming, motivation of the policy reversal must be sought in its political payoff.

Hypotheses on Cabinet Level UPC Motives

There is no inside account of the process through which the decision to accelerate group farming was taken. I cannot identify the time or place of the decision, nor most of the participants in decisionmaking, their sources of power and weakness, their areas of conflict, or mechanisms of conflict resolution. My discussion of the 'decisionmakers' calculus is, therefore, highly conjectural. Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn by observers of the UPC rise to power¹⁸ corroborate my impression that some combination of the following objectives and contingencies prompted the group farm decision:

1. In the 1962 parliamentary election campaign and in post-election politicking, both UPC and DP candidates appealed to farmers, especially through the Cooperative movement, by promising tractor services to relieve the drudgery of farm labor. Group farming, with tractorization, was apparently a powerful lure to rural voters who envisioned the program as a government giveaway, simultaneously labor saving and income increasing. The anti-communalistic sentiments of most Uganda farmers underlay campaigners' stress on individual family plots on the promised group farms.¹⁹ The Symposium on Mechanical Cultivation had presaged the appeal of mechanized farming to Ugandan peasants: "There is evidence that in Uganda there is a remarkable awareness of the existence of tractors. Requests for tractor services have been received from all over Uganda"²⁰ Considering that tractor hire services had existed

since 1948 and that many of the large estates employed tractors, peasant awareness was not "remarkable", but it was politically significant.

The decision to expand group farming, utilizing the cooperative institutional structure and stressing mechanization, must be seen both as a part of the partisan UPC- DP competition for rural support, and as a means of eroding citizens' traditional loyalties. Specific (interrelated) motives may have been: to come through on campaign promises, establishing the credibility of UPC pledges and proving its 'good faith'; to neutralize the DP appeal to individual voters and its incipient control over some farmers' cooperatives; to use group farm activities as a medium for establishing UPC party cells, on the group farms and in the cooperatives; to encourage defection of DP leaders to the UPC bandwagon by convincing them that UPC control of "pork barrel" expenditures made it opportune to be on the side of the Government instead of the opposition.

2. A less tangible, but important, government/party objective was to create a compelling symbolism of national development: an imagery in which progress, defined differently by each minority, would be identified with the governing party and its leaders. Note that in 1963 the cabinet also contravened economic advice and empirical projections by deciding to build the Apolo Hotel, a more glamorous symbol and appealing to a different clientele, but like mechanized group farming an attempt to establish the identity and progressiveness of the nation and to secure prestige to its government.²²

By my interpretation, the cabinet-level decision to expand group farming implies that these anticipated benefits were perceived to outweigh the major costs, namely: disaffection of economic planners, Department of Agriculture civil servants, and the UPC rank and file who were not consulted or whose counsel was overruled by the decision; and the net economic costs, probably stressing short run foreign exchange and public revenues inputs. If the decisionmakers expected a rapid expansion of cotton exports, and export tax revenues from the group farms, then the use of scarce developmental resources may have been the least anticipated cost of

the project. The availability of a soft, but tied, development loan from Great Britain probably further diminished concern for the short run foreign exchange costs of imported farm equipment. It is even possible that the large amount of ready credit itself induced decision-makers to "slip around" for likely projects to absorb imported farm machinery.²³ In conformance with Albert Hirschman's "Principle of the Hiding Hand," UPC politicians may have systematically suppressed the many difficulties involved in establishing economically viable group farms - the nexus of problems which led economists to propose a pilot study in the first place.

To the general lay public, however, the Government had a plausible rationale for a crash group farm program. Cotton was a cornerstone of Ugandan development: a major source of peasant income, foreign exchange, and public revenue. However, cotton production was not expanding according to the Plan target; in fact 1962 had been the worst year for cotton in recent memory.²⁴ Group farms would stress cotton production and they would begin to yield benefits quickly. Thus the propaganda problem of justifying the decision to the public must have been small.

Uganda's First Five Year Plan was an amalgamation of broadly formulated social and economic ends with a set of public sector projects, or means. The relationships between its ends and its means was fairly tenuous. Furthermore, UPC leadership was not intimately involved in its formulation. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Obote cabinet did not regard the Plan as gospel, but rather as a useful tool, selectively interpreted as the need arose, in the process of statebuilding and nationbuilding. Economic development and political stability are interdependent in a non-authoritarian and federated nation, especially over the long run. But in the short run it seems likely that the power consolidation motive dominated criteria of economic rationality in the decisions of Uganda political leaders - and that group farm policy can best be understood as part of a strategy of political development.

III. THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN A FRAGILE NATION

The idealized development process, reflected in academic models²⁵ and emulated by most published national development plans, is a pristine, coherent exercise of socio-political harmony. Political decisions, not explicitly represented in such models, provide planners - ex-ante - with a fully and usually simply specified social objective function, reflecting the national consensus on costs and benefits of economic development. Thence forward planning is fundamentally an intellectual exercise in optimum resource allocation over the plan's time horizon. The plan's constituent public sector projects are chosen for their high rank among alternative means to maximization of the social goal set. The rest of this paper is an attempt to conceptualize political decisions affecting development in early post-independence Uganda, indicating some of the limitations of simple and unambiguous 'Tinbergenian' objective functions for interpretation of project selection in newly independent less-developed countries.

Definitions:

1. Power: The ability to take binding decisions over a specific group of people or institutions on a delimited set of issues.
2. Nationbuilding: increasing citizens loyalty to the nation and their commitment to the policies and actions of its government, relative to other loyalties and commitments.
3. Statebuilding: Extending and increasing the security of governmental power over more inhabitants and more social, economic, and political activities within the nation.
4. Economic Development Objectives: Per capita income growth, equitable distribution of income and wealth, re-investment, employment expansion, export promotion, import substitution - the set of ends which, with varying emphases, typically underlie economists' project rankings.
5. Democracy: "A political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials;"²⁶ with side conditions: the electoral system is respected, i.e. the opposition acknowledges its allegiance to the constitutional process and the right of the majority to govern until the next scheduled election; all groups within the national society accept - de facto - their subordination to

the Constitution.

The Pragmatic Imperative in a Nominal Democracy

My working assumption is that the complexly interrelated government objectives of statebuilding, nationbuilding, and economic development are in partial conflict: if all resources available to the government are used efficiently, in the Pareto-Edgeworth sense, then no increase in attainment of one objective can be achieved without some sacrifice of another. Even without appealing to this notion of efficiency, political leaders can be conceived of as facing trade-offs among objectives. No explicit function relating objectives need exist for ex-post scrutiny of decisions to reveal something of decisionmakers' probable motives - that they behaved "as if" they had a maximand. My contention is that the bias of governing politicians, who make use of the trade of possibilities latent in development plan projects, reflects the intensity of their anxiety about the insecurity of their control of the government and the nation.

It is impossible to identify a monolithic decisionmaker; even in the most rigid dictatorship, the ruler relies in many overt and subtle ways on information advise of others. decision to expand group farming in Uganda was apparently taken within a small (and hypothetically identifiable) group of top UPC cabinet members and advisors - that is, by the leadership core of the dominant party in a coalition government. Lindblom asserts that in such a situation no objective function can be - or need be - specified because the individuals participating in the decision do not fully agree on objectives. The important condition for a decision to be taken is that participants, in pursuit of diverse ends, can reach agreement on a common means - a policy.²⁷ If certain criteria are met, the group can usefully be identified as the decisionmaker. In the case of choices made in the inner sanctum of the dominant party in a parliamentary system, Lindblom's necessary condition (agreement on means) will be overfulfilled because party leaders, regardless of their ultimate personal objectives, share the proximate goal of perpetuating the pre-eminence of their party. Intra-party conflicts over authority and objectives

can never be eliminated, but they can be accommodated. Assuming that party leaders perceive their individual interests to be best served by remaining within the organization (and that otherwise they will disassociate from it), then, by members' consensus, the first rule of action must be to attain and to reinforce party power through party solidarity. If the party and its leaders can only achieve their ulterior social^{and} personal goals by control of the government, then attainment or continuance of control is their pragmatic imperative. Thus, according to T.H. Marshall, "The power variable has an autonomy of its own - the holders of power tend to establish it as the most important criterion - - to which all others are subordinate." 28

Anthony Downs has developed the concept of efficient policy choice in a multi-party parliamentary democracy: characterized by strict party discipline and regular periodic elections.²⁹ Under conditions of uncertain voter preferences, the governing party (or inter-party bargaining in a coalition) selects a mix of policies - activities and their operation levels - which it anticipates will maximize its vote in the pending elections. At first glance this non-ideological basis of policy choice appears similar to the UPC strategy which I described in Part II above. However post-independence Uganda qualified only as a nominal parliamentary democracy because the side conditions of my definition of democracy (page 11) did not obtain. Neither the opposition party nor .. dissident groups could be relied upon not to foment insurrection encourage party defections, secede from the nation, or otherwise challenge the constitution and the authority of government. In these conditions of great political uncertainty and instability, the pragmatic imperative dictated both a short^{er} time-horizon than the next scheduled elections (set by the Uganda constitution for 1967) and the dominance of statebuilding over economic development criteria in policy selection. The strength of the imperative, in these circumstances, is reinforced by leaders' certainty that their vision of the good society and their blueprint for achieving it are a 'right'³¹ though attainment of ultimate social goals be reckoned distant and economic development of prime importance to their achievement, short run and non-economic considerations are

paramount when the cost of underfulfilling the pragmatic imperative is loss of power - and possibly heads.

The Uganda First Five Year Development Plan was, among other things, a vehicle for legitimizing UPC statebuilding activities. Some of its projects were ripe to be exploited for short run political ends. As I have argued, the group farm pilot program was such a project: originally intended as a source of information on desirable long run developments in Ugandan agriculture, it was reinterpreted and exalted by political leaders who, after all, were the Plan's spokesmen to the nation.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Bert F. Hoselitz, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ch. 6 "Entrepreneurship and Growth".

2. Increased stress on agricultural extension services in Uganda is an acknowledgement in theory if not in practice of the importance of intervening directly to influence peasants' entrepreneurial performance; extension aims partly at improving the factors available to farmers, but it also attempts to change peasants: their organizational skill, perceptions, attitudes, etc.

3. THE FIRST FIVE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1961/2 to 1966/7), (hereafter FFYP) Uganda Government, pp. 27.

4. FFYP OpCit., pp. 81

5. " OpCit., pp. 24

6. " OpCit., pp. 79, 81

7. " OpCit., pp. 26.

8. Source: 1964 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, Uganda Government, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1965.

Table UD3	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
A. Raw Cotton Exports (£ '000)	17476	18141	15428	14930	18716	8260	14350
B. Total Exports (£ '000)	52157	52614	48455	49620	48112	48005	63739
Table UD2							
A/B (%)	33.5	34.4	31.9	30.1	34.7	17.4	22.9
C. Monetary GDP							
Current Prices (£ '000)	109,375	105,931	107,982	110,815	111,170	107,928	128,704
Table UN1							
A/C (%)	16.0	17.1	14.3	13.5	14.9	7.7	11.1
D. Table UN4							
Cotton Export Duty (£millions)	3.4	2.3	1.9	2.3	2.3	1.0	1.9
E. Table UM1							
Central Govt. Revenue (£millions)	23.7	22.4	24.1	21.9	22.3	19.2	25.1
D/E (%)	14.3	10.3	7.9	10.5	10.3	5.3	7.6

9. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UGANDA, Johns Hopkins, 1961, pp. 169-170

10. Planners were sanguine that cotton yields could be raised from the prevailing average of about 400 pounds per acre to 1000 pounds or more per acre by the simple means of a heavily subsidized DDT spraying program: £ 1,588,340 was allocated to this purpose, THE FIRST FIVE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, pp. 77.

11. IBRD, opcit, pp. 245.

12. IBRD

13. J. L. Joy, ed., SYMPOSIUM ON MECHANICAL CULTIVATION IN UGANDA: Uganda ARGUS, Ltd., 1960, pp. 141-149.
14. Joy ed., opcit. 1 pp. 149.
15. C. Leys and M. Valentine, "The Party After Independence - the Case of the UPC"; EAISR Conference Papers, January, 1965, Part B. Political Science, page 1.
16. Leys and Valentine, opcit. page 2.
17. Aaron Segal, "The Politics of Land in East Africa", ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, Vol 16, no 2 January, 1968; pp 283-4
18. see, for instance: Leys and Valentine, opcit.; Segal, opcit.; M Crawford Young, "the Obote Revolution" in AFRICA REPORT, vol xi. no. 6, June 1966; Cyril Ehrlich: "Some Social and Economic Implications of Paternalism in Uganda", JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY, Vol iv, no. 2. 1963.
19. Segal, opcit. page 283.
20. Joy, ed. opcit., PAGE 131.
21. Segal, opcit., page 283.
22. Uganda ARGUS, 9/10/1968, page 1.
23. I have no documented evidence of these hypotheses, although I hope to be able to verify or refute them in the future.
24. See data for 1962/3 in footnote eight.
25. Viz., for example the essays of Jan Tinbergen and Hollis D. Chenery - or Van Arkadie and Frank: ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING AND DEVELOPMENT Planning, Part IV.
26. Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 55, no 1, March, page 71.
27. Charles E. Lindblom: "Tinbergen on Policy-Making" THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. LXVI, no. 6, December, 1958, page 534.
28. T.H. MARSHALL: CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, page 130. Cited in James S. Coleman, "Political Science and Economic Development", USSC Conference Papers, January, 1967, Part B.
29. Anthony Downs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, Harper and Row, 1957.
30. It is a truism that: the less stable a political regime, the more extreme will be its short run bias in decisionmaking, if its greatest concern is to retain control of the government.
31. My assumption is that UPC leaders, though 'pragmatic' in their choice of policies, may nonetheless have had an idealized image of Uganda's future: that they were not cynics.

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