



**Changing patterns of migration and  
remittances in Ethiopia  
2014-2018**

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Working Paper 59

September 2019

## Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank our large team of field supervisors and enumerators for collecting the data: Amare Dagne, Mulat Kiros, Lemma Bekele, Gebremichael Wegayehu, Genetu Dagne, Teame Tesfay, Habtom Debes, Habtom Gebregergish, Yirgawesen Getahun, Solomon Kidanu, Beza Sherif , Teshome Zikarge, Abu Zeneba, Mebratu Bogale, Meaza Nugussie, Berehe Kiros, Line Kinfe, Daniel Mebrahtu, Gebremedihin Berhe and Melkamu Chefamo. Thanks also to Marta Schoch for research assistance. We also thank participants at the Income and Remittances workshop in Accra, Ghana, February 2019, for comments and discussion on early results, and participants at the Migrating out of Poverty regional workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2019.

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This is an output from a project funded by UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

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## **Abstract**

This paper reports on the changing patterns of migration and remittances in Ethiopia using a bespoke longitudinal survey of 1200 rural households. We shed light on changes in migration destinations, revealing the large scale of return migration between waves, prompted by increasing intra-ethnic conflict internally and restrictions of migration internationally to the Middle East. We highlight a decline in remittance receipt for households in our sample, but higher remittances on average for those households that continue to receive remittances. Finally, we explore descriptively changes in measures of household welfare revealing that on average living standards have fallen among all types of households, notably those with migrants in the second wave of our survey, despite a strongly held perception among all types of households that migration leads to improved incomes and to an improvement in the overall quality of life.

## Executive Summary

The Migrating out of Poverty Income and Remittances strand has designed bespoke surveys of rural households to explore patterns of migration and remittances and welfare outcomes. In Ethiopia we interviewed a sample of 1200 rural households in four regions of the country in 2014 and 2018. Thanks to careful planning during the 2014 survey and considerable efforts by the survey team, our attrition rate is very small, at less than 1%.

Our data reveal substantial return migration between 2014 and 2018 of both internal and international migrants. During this period, Ethiopia has experienced considerable and rising intra-ethnic conflict, escalating to violence in 2018. At the same time, migration of Ethiopians to the Middle East has come under scrutiny because of a number of highly publicised incidents of violence against migrants, particularly women. This has led to a suspension of migration between Ethiopia and a number of Gulf States, with agreements to resume migration yet to be implemented. We suggest that both of these factors contribute to return migration. Furthermore, shifts in destinations of internal migrants, to woredas and zones close to home suggest a caution among potential migrants to move into areas where they are recognised as ethnic minorities.

The decline in migration has had an impact on remittance receipt. Fewer households are in receipt of remittances in 2018 than in 2014. This is in part because fewer members are now migrants, but also that those migrants still away are less likely to remit. This may reflect the narrow wage differentials over short geographic distances.

Despite this, those migrants who do remit are sending more remittances, particularly international migrants. We speculate that these migrants are in more secure positions, less vulnerable to inter-ethnic conflict or to sudden deportation, and also, in occupations with higher wage differentials between home and destinations. We would argue that this may contribute to an increase in inequality between households in receipt of remittances and those not. We also observe a decline in average per capita consumption across all types of households, particularly those with migrants in the second round of our survey, despite a perception held by households that migrants improve incomes and overall quality of life.

Finally, we highlight a number of gendered dimensions of migration. Women dominate men among international migrants, have a higher probability of sending remittances and on average send more than do men. This financial connection to their households is also reflected in the frequency of contacts between migrant and family, and a greater involvement of family members in the migration decision.

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## Introduction and context

With an average growth of over 10 per cent per year between 2004 and 2018, Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Although per capita GDP (in 2010 USD) increased from \$251 to \$ 1793.40 between 2006 and 2018, it is still among the lowest in the world<sup>1</sup>. The country's economic growth was mainly driven by huge government investment and fast growth in the service sector. Ethiopia's Robust growth resulted in significant poverty reduction and improvement in human development. Based on the national poverty line, the poverty rate decreased from 46 percent in 1995/96 to 24 percent in 2015/16. Poverty based on the daily international poverty line of US\$1.90 in 2011 PPP decreased from 55.5 per cent in 2000 to 26.7% in 2017.<sup>2</sup> Inequality increased marginally over the period, but remains among the lowest in Africa, with a Gini coefficient of 0.33.<sup>3</sup> Primary school gross enrolment improved from 54.4 percent to 102 percent between 2000 to 2017<sup>4</sup>, while, life expectancy increased from 52 years to 65 years over the same period. Under-five mortality rates declined from 143/1000 to 59/1000, between the year 2000 and 2017.<sup>5</sup>

Despite strong progress, Ethiopia's main challenges are sustaining its positive economic growth and accelerating poverty reduction, which both require significant progress in job creation as well as improved governance. The Ethiopian economy is facing limited competitiveness, underdeveloped private sector and political disruption as well as social unrests. These factors are slowing the job opportunities for young educated and uneducated part of the society. As a result, most of young educated and uneducated members of the society are opting for internal or international migration to move out of poverty and cope with the economic hardship.

As indicated above, even though the Ethiopian economy has shown a significant improvement over the last 10 years, it hasn't resulted in considerable reduction in poverty or in job creation, particularly for the youth. Furthermore, the high unemployment rate coupled with poverty, lack of access to land for youth, family and peer pressure, and low public awareness on the positive and negative aspects of migration has contributed to a strong culture of migration within local communities. Furthermore, recurrent drought and environmental shocks, and inducements by smugglers and traffickers have pushed people to migrate to the capital province or abroad in search of better opportunities and to support their family. At the same time, advancement of information and communication technology, social networks, better living standards and demand for labor in major destination countries are some of the major pulling factors.

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<sup>1</sup> World Development Indicators

<sup>2</sup> World Development Indicators.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP, 2018.

<sup>4</sup> World Development Indicators

<sup>5</sup> CSA 2017.

## International migration and remittance in Ethiopia: Scale, patterns, and trends

Due to lack of proper centralized record system it is not possible to know the exact number of international migrants from Ethiopia. According to the estimates by the United Nations Population division (UNPD), more than 1.2 million Ethiopian live abroad (see table 1 below)<sup>6</sup>. However, from the Government side, this number could reach 3 million, including undocumented and irregular migrants. Undocumented migrants tend to send remittances through informal channels since they may lack access to the formal financial system in some host countries. The top three destination countries of Ethiopian migrants include USA, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. In addition, according to the data from Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) around 460,000 Ethiopians have legally migrated to the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Dubai between September 2008 and August 2013. As a result, the number of migrants reported in the graph below also indicated a drastic spike in the number of migrants deported after 2010.


**Table 1: Ethiopia international migrants' stock at mid-year by sex**

	International migrant stock at mid-year (both sexes)						
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
Male Migrants	607,284	424,117	322,219	269,725	297,534	591,876	624,222
Female Migrants	548,106	382,787	289,165	244,517	270,186	570,700	602,921
Total Migrant stock	1,155,390	806,904	611,384	514,242	567,720	1,162,576	1,227,143

Source: UN population division: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017)

<sup>6</sup> UN population division: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017)

**Figure 1 Ethiopia international migrants stock at mid-year by sex**



Source UN population division: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017)

With regard to remittances sent by Ethiopian migrants living abroad; it is also very difficult to know the exact amount of transfers from migrants since migrants can use official channels as well as unofficial or informal channels to remit their money back home. Very often, official remittance data are problematic and have a lot of discrepancy depending on which source they come from. One major reason for such discrepancy is that remittances sent through informal channels are often very difficult to capture. In the case of Ethiopia, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016)<sup>7</sup>, the volume of informal remittances is high and continues to rise because of the following major reasons: (i) limited access for migrants to reliable and efficient remittance services and (ii) the absence of legal status for many Ethiopian migrants mainly in the Middle East, Gulf countries and South Africa. According to the World Bank (2006)<sup>8</sup>, informal remittances inflows to Ethiopia could represent half of formal remittances, but for Geda et al. (2011)<sup>9</sup> this underestimates informal remittances. According to Berhuna et al. (2004)<sup>10</sup> and Aredo (2005)<sup>11</sup>, the flow of remittances to Ethiopia represents only one-sixth of its potential.

Russell (1992)<sup>12</sup> highlighted that the choice to remit money through formal or informal channels depends on the following elements: the socio-economic characteristics of the receiving

<sup>7</sup> Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) – Technical expertise request: improving quality and quantity of formal remittance flows in Ethiopia. ACP-EU Migration Action

<sup>8</sup> World Bank (2006) – Global Economic Projections: trends, determinants and macroeconomic effects of remittances

<sup>9</sup> Geda A., Tafere K., and Ademu M. (2011) – Remittance and remittance service providers in Ethiopia. Institute of African Economic Studies. IAES WPS No. A02/2011

<sup>10</sup> Berhanu Nega, Kassahun Tadesse, Seid Nuru and Zekarias Mamma (2004). Using Resources from Migrants for Development in Ethiopia Ethiopian Economic Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A report prepared for the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

<sup>11</sup> Aredo D (2005). “Migrant Remittances, Shocks and Poverty in Urban Ethiopia: An Analysis of Micro-Level Panel Data.” Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia


<sup>12</sup> Russell, S (1992) - Migrant remittances and Development - International Migration: Quarterly review 30:3/4: 267-287



household members, the level and type of economic activities in the host country, exchange rate, remittance costs, and relative efficiency of the formal channels versus the informal channels. The existence and importance of a parallel exchange rate market could draw significantly remittances inflows into informal channels. In Ethiopia, there is a parallel exchange rate market with a significant premium which could give incentives to migrants to switch from formal channels to informal channels.

Informal remittances are by nature difficult to estimate. They are not reported to official sources and even survey data may not capture them adequately. According to the NBE, formal remittances inflows to Ethiopia were about \$1.16 billion in 2011 and have increased to \$4.47 billion in 2017 (See figure 2) Figure 2 shows remittance trends between 2005/06-2016/17, using data from the NBE. As we can see, total remittances have grown steadily since 2008/09. However, the World Bank estimate remittances received by the country is far below the amount reported by National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). The World Bank migration remittance data reported that Ethiopia’s remittance received during the 2017 fiscal period was 772 million USD. Moreover, in the graph below the World Bank indicated that the remittance amount received by the country from migrants living abroad has started to decline starting from the 2014. Yet NBE recognizes these numbers underestimate actual total remittances inflows to the country. There is a discrepancy in remittance data depending on which source is used and this is an indication of a need to better understand and improve remittances data in Ethiopia. The NBE data and the World Bank reported data need to be reconciled.

**Figure 2 Ethiopia remittance inflow from individuals (in millions)**



Source: National Bank of Ethiopia and the World Bank Migration and Remittances Data

## Internal migration in Ethiopia: Scale, patterns, and trends

To analyze the scale, trend and pattern of international migration we have used three round survey of the Ethiopian Labor Force Survey (ELFS). These surveys were conducted by the central statistics agency of Ethiopia. The surveys were conducted every five-year interval and it is national representative data. The labor force survey is also the main source of internal migration data in the country in addition to the census data. Below is the summary of Ethiopia's internal migration scale, pattern, and trends based on the three round data conducted in 1999, 2005 and 2013.

The Ethiopian Labor Force Survey (2013) indicated that the internal migration<sup>13</sup> in Ethiopia remains limited and accounted for only 6.5% of adult population. In the five years prior to the 2013 LFS, about 6.5 percent of the Ethiopian adult population moved out from their original zone of residence, marginally higher than the share in 1999 (5.7 percent). In rural areas in particular, mobility is limited, with a mere 3.5 percent of adults moving out of their original zone of residence between 2008 and 2013 (the five years preceding the 2013 LFS-Table 2). Migrants account for a higher share of the population in urban areas. For instance in 2013, 17 percent of urban dwellers were recent migrants (came to the city in the five years up to 2013). At the regional level, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz attracted most migrants in the five years up to 2013, presumably related to the availability of agricultural land in these regions.

**Table 2. Internal migrants as share of the population, recent migrants and lifetime migrants**

Survey year	1999		2005		2013	
	Recent migrants (%)	All-time migrants (%)	Recent migrants (%)	All-time migrants (%)	Recent migrants (%)	All-time migrants (%)
Whole country	5.7	32.34	7.52	28.17	6.49	22.59
Rural areas	3.61	25.88	4.93	20.58	3.49	13.42
Urban areas	16.87	66.51	19.99	64.64	17.25	55.41
<i>Region</i>						
Tigray	6.56	36.72	9.98	32.94	6.64	23.58
Afar	10.57	37.36	12.64	46.21	8.56	22.29
Amhara	5.02	27.11	5.58	22.41	6.46	20.05
Oromiya	5.71	32.32	9.27	29.58	6.47	22.06


<sup>13</sup> Note however that the scale of internal migration will be underestimated as the LFS only picks up a change in *zone* of residence. Movements within zones, e.g. from one woreda to another, will not be considered as internal migration

Somali	5.51	42.24	4.82	35.45	2.19	8.51
Benishangul-Gumuz	9.77	52.67	8.55	45.08	10.37	38.53
SNNPR	4.76	27.59	5.67	23	5.55	19.74
Gambela	15.46	61.69	22.18	75.33	13.1	36.87
Harari	10.41	44.16	9.22	38.31	8.73	33.62
Addis Ababa	9.01	59.93	7.97	53.23	9.61	46.41
Dire Dawa	10.73	55.33	11.38	55.08	8.97	39.48

Notes. Based on LFS data. Recent migrants are individuals who moved less than five years prior to survey data collection. Based on the population aged 15 and over. World Bank Staff calculations.

The same survey also indicated that a shift in the destination of most of Internal migration in Ethiopia. Prior to 2008 the majority of internal migrants were rural to rural migrants; however, this trend is recently reversed towards rural to urban migration. In other words, rural to rural migration is significantly declined between the period of 1999 and 2013 while rural to urban migration increased significantly over the same period. The graph below has increasingly been directed towards urban areas. The survey data has also reported that there is no significant change in urban to rural as well as urban to urban migration.

**Figure 3. Share of internal migration, by type and time period**




Note: Recent migrants are individuals who moved less than five years prior to survey data collection. Based on the population aged 15 and over. Source: LFS, 1999; 2005; 2013.

With regard to source of migration Oromia and Amhara Regions are the main origin Regions of internal migrants in Ethiopia. On the zonal level, North Gondar zone (Amhara Region) and Arsi (Oromia) are the main origin areas of internal migration in Ethiopia (Figure 4). Other important origin areas are East and West Gojam, South Wollo, South Gondar, North Shoa, and the Addis


Ababa city administration. Taken together, these origin zones (Including Addis Ababa) accounted for over one-third of all internal migrants in 2013.

**Figure 4. Where do internal migrants go? (Internal migrants as a share of zone population)**



Source: LFS, 2013.

**Figure 5. And where do internal migrants come from? (share of migrants by origin zone)**



Source: LFS, 2013. World Bank Staff calculations

The bulk of migration in Ethiopia happens within the boundaries of the regional states. For instance, of all migrants originating from Tigray, close to 70 percent went to another zone in Tigray (Table 3). This increases to over 70 percent for migrants originating from Amhara and SNNPR and over 80 percent for migrants originating in Oromia. Migration to and from city administrations is more diverse, with most migrants in Addis coming from Amhara (38 percent) and Oromia (31 percent), and most migrants in Dire Dawa coming from Oromia (44 percent) and Somali (14 percent). Cities mainly attract migrants from the same region.

**Table 3. Destination region of internal migrants, by region of origin**

		Destination region (percentage of migrants weighted)										
		Tigray	Afar	Amhara	Oromia	Somalia	Benishangul Gumuz	SNNPR	Gambela	Harari	Addis Ababa	Dire Dawa
source migrant region	Tigray	64.25	1.69	11.76	5.25	0.23	0.52	7.51	0.18	0.21	8.17	0.22
	Afar	3.01	48.08	19.6	8.91	0.96	0.04	14.49	0.04	0.11	4.28	0.49
	Amhara	1.73	2.14	66.75	8.93	0.16	2.66	3.38	0.3	0.18	13.52	0.27
	Oromia	0.55	0.23	3.96	79.47	0.49	1.36	3.75	0.32	0.55	8.09	1.22
	Somalia	0.4	0.22	1.69	39.45	39.62	0.07	2.29	0.01	1.91	3.56	10.76
	Benishangul Gumuz	0.63	0.18	24.02	11.85	0.43	59.77	0.28	0.87	0.22	1.71	0.05
	SNNPR	0.03	0.51	0.95	14.37	0.23	0.21	68.28	0.91	0.28	13.69	0.55
	Gambela	1.65	0	6.32	10.31	0.06	0.02	19.54	58.79	0.19	3.03	0.08
	Harari	0.96	1.16	12.27	41.48	4.22	0.58	4.63	0.05	1.66	20.47	12.53
	Addis Ababa	4.66	0.46	22.01	42.86	0.46	0.6	25.37	0.3	1.01	0	2.29
	Dire Dawa	1.78	1.39	8.93	25.35	8.28	0.25	12.34	0.06	7.93	24.63	9.05
	Abroad	27.72	2.66	26.19	17.56	6.1	0.79	4.61	2.54	0.43	9.63	1.76
	Total	7.02	1.64	22.33	36.49	0.99	1.89	17.18	0.78	0.42	10.28	0.97

Note: Recent migrants are individuals who moved less than five years prior to survey data collection. Based on the population aged 15 and over. Source: LFS, 2013; researcher own calculation

Internal migrants in Ethiopia migrate in response to multiple push and pull factors. Push factors refer to conditions that push people out of their original place of residence, such as land scarcity, poverty, or lack of public services in rural areas, or the high cost of living in case of urban areas. Pull factors refer to the availability of better opportunities elsewhere, mainly related to employment. The Ethiopian labor force survey indicated that people mainly migrate to look for work. In the five years up to 2013, 36 percent of migrants mentioned search for work as the main motivation to move. Moving for work has become increasingly frequent over time, especially after 2005, which partly reflects the expansion in education in recent decades (educated people are more likely to move). Other important motivations to migrate are to live with relatives (especially for young people) and marriage arrangements (for young women). Disaggregating between type of migration, the search for work is the main motivation of every type of migration. Shortage of land is also an important motivation for rural-to-rural migration, especially for men.

With regard to migrant profile the survey result indicated that migrants are younger and better educated compared to non-migrants from the same origin area (see table 4 below). Rural dwellers who migrate, either to other rural or to urban areas, accumulated twice as many years of education than rural dwellers who stayed put, and were three times more likely to have enjoyed schooling at the secondary level (Table 4). A similar pattern is found for urban origin areas, where migrants (those who move to another urban areas) are younger and more educated to urban non-emigrants.

**Table 4. Characteristics of emigrants and non-emigrants, by type of origin area**

Migrant characteristics	Rural origin areas		Urban origin areas	
	Emigrants	Non-emigrants	Emigrants	Non-emigrants
Age (mean)	26.06	34.62	27.25	34.62
Gender (1 = male)	0.43	0.49	0.47	0.46
Marital status (1 = married)	0.46	0.63	0.46	0.48
Literacy (1 = yes)	0.59	0.37	0.80	0.75
Years of schooling (mean)	4.56	2.15	7.51	6.72
No schooling (1 = yes)	0.37	0.59	0.17	0.23
Primary school (1 = yes)	0.45	0.37	0.43	0.41
Secondary school (1 = yes)	0.17	0.05	0.34	0.30
Higher education (1 = yes)	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.06

*Note: Recent migrants are individuals who moved less than five years prior to survey data collection. Based on the population aged 15 and over. Source: LFS, 2013; World Bank Staff calculations*

## Survey background and objective

Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with University of Sussex, is conducting a study on 'Income and Remittances: a longitudinal study of how migration contributes to living standards in Ethiopia, as one thematic study area of the Migrating out of Poverty (MOOP) Project, which is funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). This research project aimed to provide evidences to migrants, organizations supporting them and policymakers to make evidence-based poverty reeducation decisions and policies. This panel survey is specifically aimed to explore and provide evidences to various stakeholders and migrants whether and to what extent migrant-sending households benefit from migration by explicitly identifying the counterfactual scenario, the welfare level that might have been enjoyed by the household if they had not experienced any migration.

Even though there is an increase in the mobility of individuals within and outside the country there is a limited study in the country to understand how migration is benefiting migrant sending households. The majority of migration studies in Ethiopia were focusing on who are the migrants and why people migrate ( Kerilyn Schewel (2018), Berhe M (2011), Kebede, E. (2002)<sup>14</sup>, Fransen, S. and Kuschminder, K. (2009)<sup>15</sup>). Few studies also tried to analyze the impact of migration or remittance on household welfare in Ethiopia (Berhe M (2014)<sup>16</sup>, Andersson, L. (2012)<sup>17</sup>, Mberu, B. (2006)<sup>18</sup>, Abdelmoneim and Litchfield (2016)<sup>19</sup>). However, most of these studies were not based on panel data and migration specific surveys. These studies relied on cross sectional data that are not collected for migration studies. Hence these studies had data and cope limitations. Hence, this survey is also aimed at minimizing the data and methodology related problems faced by previous studies. Moreover, this project helps to undertake more robust and detail analysis using panel data.

This current study will help us construct a two round panel data for Ethiopia which would allow for a dynamic analysis of living standards and other outcomes of interest for households with and without migrants. This paper reports on changing dynamics of migration and remittance behavior.

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<sup>14</sup> Kebede, E. (2002) Ethiopia: An assessment of international labor migration situation.

<sup>15</sup> Fransen, S. and Kuschminder, K. (2009). Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects. Migration and Development Country Profiles. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG), pp.15-16

<sup>16</sup> The Effects of International Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Ethiopia. The Journal of Development Studies, 50(10), pp.1380-1396

<sup>17</sup> Andersson, L. (2014). Migration, Remittances and Household Welfare in Ethiopia, UNU-MERIT

<sup>18</sup> Mberu, B. (2006). Internal migration and household living conditions in Ethiopia. Demographic Research, 14, pp.509-540

<sup>19</sup> Yousra Abdelmoniem and Julie Litchfield (2016), Does Migration Improve Living Standards of Sending Households? Evidence from rural Ethiopia, MOOP working paper41



## Research methodology


In order to answer our research questions, we draw largely on quantitative analysis of longitudinal household survey data, specifically a two-round panel survey, which is supported by a smaller qualitative data generated through interviews with migrants in major regional cities (Mekele, Bahirdar, Adama and Hwassa) and the capital city (Addis Ababa). Our already existing MOOP data consists of two waves of panel data (2014 and 2018), with 1207 households in September -October 2014 survey round and 1202 households surveyed in September -October 2018 in four big regions (Oromia, Amhara, SNNP and Tigray) and 9 dominant migrant-sending district in the country (see the sample area Map below). Migrants are defined as former resident members of the household who have moved out of the kebele within the last 10 years and have been away for a period of at least 3 months. The definition thus excludes very local and very short movements of people. We have collected all detail information from the sampled households including a contact information of the sampled households to be used as a basis for follow up surveys. This helped us to have significantly lower attrition as compared to other MOOP survey countries and easily track the sampled panel households.

In order to minimize the attrition rate of the survey we have employed a number of techniques. As first strategy we have developed a small tracking questionnaire to identify the whereabouts of the sampled panel households. This tracking questionnaire helped us to locate the sample households and also collect information on moved households. This small instrument contains the current whereabouts of the sampled panel households as well as contact information and address of moved households. As a result, the tracking data indicated that only 1% of the original sampled household have moved outside their original sampled kebele (village) while 99% of the sampled households live in their original sampled village. For the moved households we have travelled to their current whereabouts and administered the questionnaire on their current address. The second strategy we have employed to minimize the attrition was to use field workers who have participated in the first round and who had better experience and institutional memories of the study area and sampled households. In additional, households at baseline were asked to consent to being followed up in the later survey. We believe that this early signal to households that we would be returning was an important part of engaging households with the research and showing our commitment. Finally, our use of CAPI from the start of the project meant that we had accurate details of the location of households.

In the current survey, in addition to data collection at the migrant source regions, we tracked migrants to major regional cities (Mekele, Bahirdar, Adama and Hwassa) as well as the capital city (Addis Ababa) and conducted a qualitative in-depth interview. Using contacts provided by members of the migrants' former household at the origin, we tracked 30 current migrant and conducted in-depth interview. The qualitative interview conducted on the current migrants were

aimed to collect information on the migration process, well-being outcomes and other social and economic outcomes (e.g. employment, education acquisition, age at first marriage etc). The migrants also provided information on what they would have been doing and earning if they had not migrated to the current destination. This method will help us to triangulate results from quantitative analysis of migrant sending households with the qualitative results from the migrants' interview. Moreover, the qualitative data will help us to explain some of the questions that cannot be explained by the quantitative analysis.

**Figure 6: Sample Woreda (Districts)**



Source: Author own drawing

## Preparations for fieldwork

**Field work period planning:** the first wave of the field work was conducted in September and October of 2014. In order to avoid any seasonal variation on some of the key variables (specifically on consumption, remittance and other expenditures) we have planned to conduct

the follow up survey to be conducted on the same month with the baseline survey. Accordingly, all logistic and staff hiring preparation was conducted to start the field work on September – October 2018.

***Developing and revising field instruments:*** Before the start of the field work the research team revised the 2014 household questionnaire and developed new tracking and qualitative instruments. We also made minor revisions on the modules of the 2014 household questionnaire and added two major sections in the questionnaire. The newly added modules include a return migrant module and migration aspiration module. We have also considered the experience of other MOOP countries and first round data for the household questionnaire revision. The household questionnaire was also further revised during the field work training and based on the piloting results. We have piloted the household questionnaire and revised some of the questions based the feedback from the piloting exercise.


New tracking instrument were also developed to identify the whereabouts of the sample households before the start of the main survey. The tracking instrument had three sections: 1) Identification and sampled household status section, current address of moved household, and informant identification and contact information sections. The tracking data helped us to properly plan for the main survey. We have figured out how many of the sampled households are still in their original village and how many of them have moved out from their original village. 2) Once we have finalized the tracking data collection we have managed to track, and interview moved households. 3) The third instrument we have prepared for this wave were qualitative interview checklist for migrants on their destination. The instrument was developed to supplement the quantitative household survey and get in-depth information about migrant experience. the qualitative interview had seven sections (respondent general information, contact and communication with family, migration history, current situation, remittance, social network, and perception of migration. Finally, all instruments were translated to local languages and also added to the CAPI questionnaires

***Preparation of CAPI for field instrument:*** The first round of the survey was conducted using CAPI with CSPro software. The country staff had huge experience in CAPI programing using various CAPI software and data management. The CAPI programing was completed before the start of field workers training. In addition, sampled household information, member information and contact information from the first round and tracking information were prefilled to the CAPI before the training. The skip logic and other program related problems were checked during the programming and piloting exercises and corrections were made immediately on the spot by the country team. Using CAPI helped us to reduce printing and data entry costs. Moreover, the CAPI helped us to simplify data management and reduces data collection errors. Furthermore, using CAPI also helped us to undertake daily and real-time data quality check before the field workers

moved to other districts. Besides, CAPI has also simplified data merging between rounds and sections since the unique identifiers and member ID were prefilled from the first wave data

**Training of Field Assistants and Field Supervisors:** a one-week training and field piloting were conducted at Addis Ababa University Main campus. The training was conducted between 10-15<sup>th</sup> September 2018 by the authors of this paper. The first three days were content training while the fourth day was field practice and piloting. The fifth day was debriefing and revising questionnaire and CAPI program based on the pilot feedbacks. A total of 20 field staffs and one field coordinator participated in the training. About 50 percent of the field staffs participated in the baseline survey and half of the field staffs were hired from our roster who were participating in our other project and who have good experience on CAPI and panel household survey.

**Fig 7 Sampled household showing consent agreement received in 2014 during 2018 survey**



## Data collection and attrition rate

For the whole field work we have deployed four teams assigned to each study regions. Each team consists of 4 enumerators and 1 field supervisor. One additional team were trained and assigned to conduct the qualitative interview. The field works were conducted in three phases: the first phase of the field work was to collect tracking information about the whereabouts of the sampled panel households. The first few days of the field work were dedicated for tracking data collection. The tracking information indicated that about 99% of the households were tracked in their original dwellings. About 1 percent (12 sampled households) have moved to other places, dead or their whereabouts is not known. Of the 12 households, we have tracked and interviewed 7 households in their current new address.

The main household survey fieldwork was carried out in the months of September and October 2018 in the four administrative regions of the country. Despite the existence of high social unrest and security challenges during the survey period the data collection was conducted successfully with the lowest attrition rate. As shown in Table 5 and Table 6 below, a total of 1207 household took part in the 2014 survey as compared with 1202 households in 2018. We have managed to re-interview all sample households except 5 households. The table below also shows that a significant decline in the number of households with migrants. As indicated in the table below the number of households with internal migrants declined from 455 (37.7%) in 2014 to 342 (28.45%) in 2018. Similarly, the number of households with current international migrants also declined from 231 (19.14) in 2014 to 89 (7.4%). The decline in Internal migrants could be attributed to the recent ethnic based violence and social unrests in the country and this might force most internal migrants to return to their families.

**Table 5: Migration Status of households in 2014**

Region	Current Internal Only	Current International Only	Both Internal and International	Non Migrant	N
Tigray	78 (26.00%)	86 (28.67)	36 (12.00)	100 (33.33)	300
Amhara	144 (47.68%)	33 (10.93)	25 (8.28)	100 (33.11)	302
Oromia	121 (39.80%)	51 (16.78)	28 (9.21)	104 (34.21)	304
SNNP	112 (37.21%)	61 (20.27)	28 (9.30)	100 (33.22)	301
<b>Total</b>	<b>455 (37.7%)</b>	<b>231 (19.14)</b>	<b>117 (9.69)</b>	<b>404 (33.47)</b>	<b>1,207</b>

**Table 6: Migration Status of households in 2018**

Region	Current Internal Only	Current International Only	Both Internal and International	Non Migrant	N
Tigray	82 (27.42%)	29 (9.7%)	9 (3.01%)	179 (59.87%)	299
Amhara	132 (43.85%)	11 (3.65%)	13 (4.32%)	145 (48.17%)	301
Oromia	64 (21.19%)	20 (6.62%)	10 (3.31%)	208 (68.87%)	302
SNNP	64 (21.33%)	29 (9.67%)	11 (3.67%)	196 (65.33%)	300
<b>Total</b>	<b>342 (28.45%)</b>	<b>89 (7.4%)</b>	<b>43 (3.58%)</b>	<b>728 (60.57%)</b>	<b>1,202</b>

The attrition rate for the second round of survey is very low. The table 7 below shows that more than 99% of the participated in the 2014 survey were tracked and interviewed. We had only 5 households dropped in the second round of the survey. The reason for dropped out was death of sampled household, two households were untraceable (whereabouts were not known), one household was migrated outside Ethiopia, and one household refused consent to be interviewed.

**Table 7: Attrition Rate and reason for dropping in 2018 by Region**

REGION	TOTAL SAMPLE 2014	TOTAL SAMPLE 2018	ATTRITION (%)	Reasons for dropping of households
Tigray	300	299	0.33	Untraceable
Amhara	302	301	0.33	Moved Outside the country
Oromiya	304	302	0.66	Untraceable and consent refused
SNNP	301	300	0.33	Single person household passed away
<b>Total</b>	<b>1207</b>	<b>1202</b>	<b>0.41</b>	

***In-depth Interview with migrants on their current destination:*** Qualitative data collection were conducted on 30 migrants on their current destination. We have identified and tracked about 30 migrants who have moved to major regional towns and the capital city based on the information received from their family. The qualitative interview conducted on the current migrants were aimed to collect information on the migration process, well-being outcomes and other social and economic outcomes (e.g. employment, education acquisition, age at first marriage etc). The migrants also provided information on what they would have been doing and earning if they had not migrated to the current destination. This data will supplement results obtained from the quantitative data analysis. The semi structured questionnaire administered to migrants in their destination will be used as cross checking or validation or supplementary to the quantitative results. The interview was conducted in local language a double job (translation and transcription) is required to make the interview useful for the interview.

## Lessons and challenges of the field work

There is no much challenges faced during the field work, but the following minor major issues were faced during the 2018 field work time:

- **Social unrest and ethnic conflicts in study areas:** The country was facing a huge security problem during the last two years. As a result, we had challenges to send female field workers to some of the study areas and we were forced to hire mainly male field workers.
- **Unable to get proper contact information of migrants who have moved to major cities:** One of the major challenges we have faced in this field work was tracking migrants who have moved to major cities due to lack of proper contact information available with the families in the study area. Most of the address and contact information we have received from the families of the migrant are either incorrect or not clear. This has created a significant challenge to track and interview migrants. Moreover, families only know the first destination of their children and they gave us the migrants contact information of the first destination but in most cases, migrants have moved already to second or third destinations.
- **Qualitative interview translation and transcription consumes much time:** we had delays in the field work of qualitative survey due to challenges of tracking migrants in the major cities. In addition, we have faced delays in the transcription and translation works of the migrant's interview. This was mainly due to poor planning and lack of experiences that needs to be improved for next time.
- **Long questionnaire and need for more respondents in one household:** the length of the questionnaire has significantly increase in this round because we have added new modules. The newly added modules also require all adult households to respond to migration aspiration questions. In addition, the return migrant module also requires all return migrants to respond to specific questions. This has created field workers and respondents fatigue.

The following points can be considered success stories of the recent field work:

- **Proper quantitative survey planning:** we have planned properly both our logistics and staffs to start the field work on-time
- **Questionnaire review:** based on the experience of other countries and our previous survey we have managed to review and complete our instruments on time with huge support from Sussex university staffs. As a result, we have added new modules and update some of the panel questions.
- **CAPI programing:** our staffs had huge experience in CAPI programing and this has helped us to complete the CAPI program on-time and made it available for training and piloting.

Besides the use of CAPI also helped us to monitor data quality on time and minimize field workers error. In addition, use of CAPI also helped us to get final data on time as well as simplifies data management works since some of the information and household information were prefilled during the follow-up survey.

- **Managed to retain previous staffs for this round of survey:** having experienced staffs also helped us to get quality data and also minimize attrition rate of the panel respondents.
- **Lower attrition:** we have managed to track and interview all. This success can be attributed to using experienced field workers, administering tracking questionnaire before the actual survey, and because the household tracking information collected during the baseline was complete and comprehensive.

## Preliminary survey results

This section will provide some descriptive survey results of 2018 and comparison with 2014 data.

### Migration status of sampled households

The table 8 & 9 below indicates that, the majority of the households in our 2018 sample (about 60%) are non-migrant households. The number of households without current migrants have increased significant from 33.47% in wave 1 (2014) to 60.57% in wave 2 (2018). When this change is disaggregated between regions there is a significant increase in the number of households without migrants (non-migrant households in the table) between regions the table below reveals that there is a significant increase in all regions. Oromia reported the lowest number of households with migrants (31.13%) followed by SNNP (34.67%) and Tigray (40.13%).

**Table 8: Migration Status of households in 2014**

Region	Current Internal Only	Current International Only	Both Internal and International	Non Migrant	N
Tigray	78 (26.00%)	86 (28.67)	36 (12.00)	100 (33.33)	300
Amhara	144 (47.68%)	33 (10.93)	25 (8.28)	100 (33.11)	302
Oromia	121 (39.80%)	51 (16.78)	28 (9.21)	104 (34.21)	304
SNNP	112 (37.21%)	61 (20.27)	28 (9.30)	100 (33.22)	301
<b>Total</b>	455 (37.7%)	231 (19.14)	117 (9.69)	404 (33.47)	1,207



**Table 9: Migration Status of households in 2018**

Region	Current Only	Internal	Current International Only	Both Internal and International	Non Migrant	N
Tigray	82 (27.42%)		29 (9.7%)	9 (3.01%)	179 (59.87%)	299
Amhara	132 (43.85%)		11 (3.65%)	13 (4.32%)	145 (48.17%)	301
Oromia	64 (21.19%)		20 (6.62%)	10 (3.31%)	208 (68.87%)	302
SNNP	64 (21.33%)		29 (9.67%)	11 (3.67%)	196 (65.33%)	300
<b>Total</b>	<b>342 (28.45%)</b>		<b>89 (7.4%)</b>	<b>43 (3.58%)</b>	<b>728 (60.57%)</b>	<b>1,202</b>

## Change in household migration status between wave 1 And wave 2

As indicated above there is a significant change in the number of non-migrants between wave 1 and wave 2 of our survey. The table and the figure below indicated how the households have shifted their migration status over period. As shown in the table below the majority of the non-migrants in wave 2 were non-migrants in the first round of the survey. A large number of households who had internal migrants or international migrants in the first round are moved to non-migrants in the second round. That is, 238 (32.69%) of the non-migrant households in this round come from the wave 1 group of households with internal migrants and a further 16% come from households with international migrants in wave 1.

**Table 10: Migrant change over time**

		wave 1				
		Internal	International	Both	Non-Migrant	Total
wave 2	Internal	185 (54.09%)	51 (14.91%)	32 (9.36%)	74 (21.64%)	342 (100%)
	International	14 (15.73%)	47 (52.81%)	11 (12.36%)	17 (19.1%)	89 (100%)
	Both	16 (37.21%)	16 (37.21%)	10 (23.26%)	1 (2.33%)	43 (100%)
	Non-Migrant	238 (32.69%)	117 (16.07%)	63 (8.65%)	310 (42.58%)	728 (100%)
	Total	453 (37.69%)	231 (19.22%)	116 (9.65%)	402 (33.44%)	1202 (100%)

As discussed above the number of both internal and international migrants reduced during the second round of our survey and this might raise a question why these numbers have declined significantly. Even though multiple factors have contributed there were two major reasons for the decline of both local and international migrants during the 2018 survey period. The first factor that is assumed to be a determinant factor for the decline of international migrants between 2014 and 2018 period was the government policy that bans domestic workers from travelling to the Middle East. In 2014, during our baseline survey, the Ethiopian Government banned migration of domestic workers to the Middle East. According the government estimate prior to the ban about half a million domestic workers have been migrating every year to the Middle East

through the legal channel. However, many more have migrated irregularly, , mainly using brokers at the source and destination countries that facilitate the irregular recruitment and labour migration. The government were receiving multiple reports through mainstream and social media on mistreatment and abuse of Ethiopian domestic workers in the middle east countries.<sup>20</sup>

Numerous other cases were posted on social and mainstream media and this has created anger by activists and citizens. As a result, a huge pressure was put on the government to act and give protection to citizens working abroad. Hence in 2014 the government banned any travel of domestic workers to Middle Eastern countries. The ban was lifted on December 2018, but the implementation is not yet effective since the government is negotiating with the individual countries to make sure the employers are getting proper protection. This has created a significant decline in the number of international migrants in the last 4 years.


The second factor that contributes to the decline of migrants between round 1 and round 2 of our survey was the increase in social unrest and ethnic conflict in the country. During the last three years the country was hit by severe ethnic conflict and social unrest. This has hindered citizens' movements from one place to other places to look for work or start business. This has significantly affected the number of internal migrants and forced most migrants who were working outside their region to return to their village to avoid risk of attack.

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<sup>20</sup> Human Rights Watch. 2012. "Lebanon: Stop Abuse of Domestic Workers." Accessed 20 November 2017.

**Fig 8: Change in migration status of households between wave 1 and wave 2**

NB Wave 1 on right-hand axis, wave 2 on left-hand axis



## Migrants profile

**Gender of migrants:** we have tried to compare if gender of migrants has changed between the first round and second round of the survey and the survey result shows that there is no change between the first round and second round surveys regarding internal migrants' gender status. In both rounds we have found out that the percentage of male internal migrants are slightly higher than female migrants. However, we have found out that a significant change in the gender of international migrants between the first and second round surveys. In the first round we had more male international migrants than female international migrants, but this number has significantly changed in the second round. The percentage of female international migrants has increased from 42.66% in the first round to 72.12% in the second round, whereas male international migrants decreased from 57.34% in the first round to 27.88%. Moreover, among women migrants, proportionately more are international migrants than internal migrants than is the case for male migrants. This suggests that decisions over migration destinations can be highly gendered.

**Age of migrants** There is a a very slight but not statistically significant decline in the mean age from 25.22 years in wave 1 to 24.09 years in wave 2. This might indicate relatively younger people have started to migrate now than before. The survey result also revealed that there is no significant difference in age category between internal and international migrants (see table 11 below).

**Marital status of migrants:** With regard to marital status the survey result indicated that only 30% of the migrants are married in both rounds. Most of the migrants (around 60%) reported that they are single or never married. Around 27% of the migrants in the first wave and 22% of migrants in the second wave have reported that they have at least one child either living with the sampled household or outside the sampled household.

**Education of migrants:** Most of the migrants in both waves reported that they have at least primary education. The table below indicates that about 90 percent of migrants in first wave and 93 percent of migrants in second wave have at least primary education. The survey result also indicates that about 22 percent of migrants from the first wave and 21 percent of migrants from the second wave were graduates of high school or college.

In general, most of the migrants (both the internal and international migrants) are younger household members with average age of 24 and most of them are single with no children and have at least some primary education or more.

**Table 11: Migrant Sex and age by destination**

		First round (2014)	Second Round (2018)
<b>Internal Migrants</b>	Male	525 (50.72%)	303 (50.58%)
	Female	510 (49.28%)	296 (49.42%)
<b>International Migrants</b>	Male	250 (57.34%)	46 (27.88%)
	Female	186 (42.66%)	119 (72.12%)
<b>Internal Migrants</b>	Mean migrants age	25.3945	23.86097
<b>International Migrants</b>	Mean migrants age	25.24928	24.90303
<b>All Migrants</b>	Mean age	25.2268	24.09935
<b>All Migrants</b>	Single	949 (64.87%)	490 (65.51%)
	Married	439 (30.01%)	230 (30.75%)
	Divorced	61 (4.17%)	24 (3.21%)
	Separated	7 (0.48%)	2 (0.27%)
	Widowed	7 (0.48%)	2 (0.27%)
<b>Have a child</b>	Yes	392 (26.94%)	163 (22.27%)
<b>Higher grade completed</b>	None	143 (9.72%)	55 (7.16%)
	First cycle primary (1-4)	178 (12.1%)	105 (13.67%)
	Second cycle primary (5-8)	453 (30.8%)	221 (28.78%)


	Secondary school (9-10)	347 (23.59%)	216 (28.13%)
	Preparatory (11-12)	91 (6.19%)	55 (7.16%)
	TVET	39 (2.65%)	22 (2.86%)
	University Diploma	107 (7.27%)	41 (5.34%)
	University BA and above	86 (5.85%)	45 (5.86%)
	Religious schools	25 (1.7%)	5 (0.65%)
	Others specify	2 (0.14%)	3 (0.39%)

## Migration reason, destination and decisions

**Migration Destination:** Decision to migrate to other places is the outcome of a long decision process. People decides to move to a different location than their current location where they have better social network due to various reasons and opportunities. Migrants’ expectations to get better economic or social benefits affects their decision where to migrate. Moreover, migrants’ available resource to finance migration, their social network in their destination and information about the destination also affects their decision where to migrate. Understanding the choice of migrant destination is an important research topic and has a great implication for migration policy. Understanding of migrants’ choice of their destination helps policy makers to produce sound policies and regulation to balance resource in the migration destination as well as protect migrants’ economic and social rights. This subsection is not meant to assess the determinants of migrant destination decision but will highlight where the migrants moved to and how the situation is changed overtime.

The graph below shows that the total number of migrants has declined from 1471 individuals in wave 1 to 733 in wave 2. The decline in the stock of migrants were reported both for the international and internal migrants. The stock of international migrants from our sampled households has declined from 436 in wave 1 to 165. Similarly, the number of internal migrants has declined from 1035 in wave 1 to 568 in wave 2. Various reasons have contributed to the decline of migrants from our sampled households between the baseline and follow-up survey. One of the major reasons for the decline in the international migrants was the new government directive issued after the first wave of the survey that banes domestic workers from travelling to the Middle East. The government of Ethiopia issues a new policy that banes domestic workers from travelling to the Middle East and mainly because of frequent compliments and report of abuses by the employers in the Middle East. The second reason which is considered as a major reason for the decline of internal migrants was the two yearlong violence and ethnic based clashes in the country. A significant number of young people have returned back to their households or lost interest to migrate to other places because of the increased insecurity and violence in the country.

**Fig 9: Migrant Destination**



This study also tried to explore the specific destination of the migrants both in the first and second rounds of the survey. Accordingly, the survey result more than 90 percent of the international migrants have migrated to Middle East both in the baseline and follow-up surveys. International migration outside Middle Eastern countries was limited both in the baseline and follow-up surveys. However, a change in the migration destinations was reported in among the internal migrants. During the baseline survey the largest group of internal migrants had moved away to other regions (26.72%) followed by outside their zones (), and outside their woreda and within their woreda (). In other words, most of the migrants during the baseline survey were moved to far away areas than their original places. Whereas, in the follow-up survey the percentage of migrants who have moved within their woreda has doubled. In other words, migrants are now preferring to stay closer to their areas than moving away from their original residence. This could also be attributed to the recent ethnic clashes and most migrants may prefer to stay within their ethnic group or near to their community.

**Table 12: Migrant destination**

Destination during recent migration	2014 (%)	2018 (%)
Middle east	396 (26.92%)	158 (21.56%)
In another region	393 (26.72%)	175 (23.87%)
In other woreda with in the regions	291 (19.78%)	158 (21.56%)
In other woreda with in the zone	189 (12.85%)	87 (11.87%)
In different kebele with in the woreda	162 (11.01%)	148 (20.19%)
Africa	31 (2.11%)	4 (0.55%)
International: Outside Africa and Middle east	9 (0.61%)	3 (0.41%)

When we look into the gender of migrants by destination overtime the survey result reveals that there is a significant shift in the proportion of male and female migrants' overtime. During the baseline the proportion of male migrants were higher than female migrants. Whereas this figure was reversed during the follow up survey the table below reports that the proportion of female migrants among the household member of the sampled households during the 2014 survey were 47.25% whereas the percentage of male migrants were 52.75%. However, during the 2018 follow up survey contrary to the baseline survey the proportion of female migrants were higher than male migrants (54% and 46% respectively).

The study also revealed some changes in the proportion of male and female migrants who have moved to international and within the country. The gender disaggregated result shows that there is a significant increase in the number of female migrant overtime. That is the percentage of female migrants has increased from 39% during the baseline survey to 48.77% in the follow up survey. Similarly, female migrants who have moved to international destination increased from 47.25% during the baseline survey to 54% during the follow up survey.

**Table 13: Gender of Migrant by Destination**

Migrants	2018		2014	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Internal	291 (51.23%)	277 (48.77%)	631 (60.97%)	404 (39.03%)
International	46 (27.88%)	119 (72.12%)	145 (33.26%)	291 (66.74%)
Total	337 (45.98%)	396 (54.02%)	776 (52.75%)	695 (47.25%)


## Reason for migration

Migration is increasingly becoming a global phenomenon to respond to multiple issues including economic, social, political, cultural, environmental, health, and other factors. Migration mainly occurs because of push factors in the origin or pull factors in the destination. Lack of socio-economic opportunities in the most rural areas in the country and high youth unemployment and under employments were mentioned as major push factors of rural urban migration in Ethiopia. Moreover, the increase in the demand of housemaids and daily laborers in urban areas of the country and in the Middle East were mentioned as major pull factors of Ethiopian migrants to Middle East and major urban areas in Ethiopia. The result from this study also reported consistent results with similar studies in the country that about two third of the migrants have reported that they have migrated to for work or seek better job.

The majority of the migrant household members reported that the main reason for their migration is for work or search for better work. The percentage of migrants who have reported that work or looking for work as main reason for their migration is higher during the first wave as compared to the second wave (82.4% and 62.7% respectively). As noted before there was a

significant decline in the number of migrants in the second wave as compared to the first wave and this could be the main reason for the decline in the number of migrants who were in the job market or in job search as most of the returned migrants are those who were working or were in the job market. Marriage and study/training was mentioned the second and the third most important reason respectively for the migration of the sampled household members. Very few migrants have also reported that disputes, medical treatment, job transfer and joining other family members as their reason for moving out from their household to other places.

**Fig 10: Reason for migration**



We have also tried to look at the gender disaggregated survey result on the reason of migration overtime and the survey result reveals that the majority of male and female migrants in both rounds of the survey have migrated to work or search for work. However, when we compare the percentage of migrants who have migrated to work or search for work overtime the survey result reveals that there is a significant decline in the percentage of migrant workers between wave 1 and wave 2. The percentage of male migrants who have migrated to work or search jobs have declined from 90.85% in wave 1 to 71.63% in wave 2. Similarly, The percentage of female migrants who have migrated to work or search jobs have declined from 77.27% in wave 1 to 57.83% in wave 2. However, there is a significant increase in the proportion of both genders who have migrated due to other reasons including study, marriage, divorce, natural disaster, medical reasons and seeking for better lifestyle.

When the survey result on reason of migration is compared between male and female migrants a significant proportion of female household migrants have been reported that they have moved out from the household due to family union or marriage or divorce as compared to the proportion



of male household members who have migrated due to the same reason in both survey rounds. However, the proportion of male migrants who have migrated for study or training reasons is significantly higher than their female counterparts in both rounds.


In general, male household member tend to migrate more due to work and study reasons as compared to their female counterparts while higher proportion of female household members have migrated due to marriage, divorce, family reunion or natural disasters. In other words, female household members tend to be affected significantly by natural disaster and family related problems than their male counterparts.

**Table 14 Reason for migration by Gender**

Migration reason	2014		2018	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>work/seeking for work</b>	705 (90.85%)	537 (77.27%)	250 (71.63%)	240 (57.83%)
<b>Study/training</b>	55 (7.09%)	46 (6.62%)	57 (16.33%)	46 (11.08%)
<b>family union/separation/ conflict</b>	12 (1.55%)	103 (14.82%)	33 (9.46%)	118 (28.43%)
<b>Natural disaster/Shocks</b>	2 (0.26%)	5 (0.72%)	4 (1.15%)	6 (1.45%)
<b>Other Reason</b>	2 (0.26%)	4 (0.58%)	5 (1.43%)	5 (1.2%)

We also examine the employment status of migrants at their destination. The survey result shows that, most of the migrants are in paid employment. The percentage of migrants in paid employment (both as professional and law skilled employment) is higher in 2018 (71.17%) as compared to the percentage of migrants in paid employment in 2014 (57.2%). Whereas the survey result reported a significant decline in the percentage of migrants who are unemployed or in school. The graph below shows that the percentage of migrants who are unemployed or still looking for job in their current destination has declined from about 13% in wave 1 to 10% in wave 2. However, there is no significant difference between first and second round survey results regarding the percentage of migrants who are self-employed in own farm or own businesses. In both rounds the survey result reported that about 10%of the migrants are engaged in their own businesses or farm.

**Fig 11: Current employment status of migrants**



## Migration decisions and social networks

Multiple studies indicate that migration decisions can be motivated by multiple factors, reflecting both individual concerns and priorities, those of their households and opportunities and constraints.<sup>21</sup> The role of social networks has been highlighted by many studies.<sup>22</sup> These studies also indicated that in addition to the individual migrant’s motive for migration, parents, family members, friends also play a determinants role in the migrant’s decision to move out and migrate. In this study we have asked households with migrants who made the decision to migrate. Accordingly, the survey result indicated that the primary decision maker to migrate was the migrant themselves. More than 80% percent of the primary decision to migrate was made by the migrants themselves. When comparison is made between the male and female migrants, a higher proportion of male migrants made decision by themselves than female migrants in both rounds of the survey. There is no significant difference on who made decision to migrate between the two waves of the survey. However, parents and family members involvement in the decision making of the migrant to immigrate to other places is significantly higher among female migrants as compared to male migrants. About 18% of the female migrant’s decision to

<sup>21</sup> See for example Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. “The New Economics of Labor Migration.” *The American Economic Review*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1985, pp. 173–178; World Bank (2018) *Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets*.

<sup>22</sup> See for example David Mckenzie and Hillel Rapoport, (2007) “Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico” *Journal of Development Economics*, Volume 84, Issue 1

immigrate to other places was primarily made by their parents' relatives and other family members which is higher than male migrants that accounts for about 14%.

We have also tried to look at how migration decision is made between internal and international migrants and the survey result also reveals that most of the migration decision was primarily made by the migrants themselves in both waves of the survey. However, relatively higher percentage of international migrants (86.67%) have made decision to migrate by themselves as compared to internal migrants (82.75%) in the 2018 survey year. Whereas, during the baseline survey higher percentage of internal migrants were made decisions by themselves than international migrants.

In general, most of the decision to migrate to other places is reported to be made by the migrants themselves however, parents, relatives and other family members participation in the migration decision of the migrants is relatively higher among female migrants than male migrants. The other surprising result we have observed from this study is that decision by spouse or partner is higher among female migrants than male migrants and the involvement of friends in decision making is almost nonexistent.

**Table 15: Who made decision to migrate by gender and Destination**

Who Made decision	2014		2018	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>Migrant Self</b>	666 (85.82%)	556 (80%)	300 (85.96%)	340 (81.93%)
<b>Father</b>	64 (8.25%)	65 (9.35%)	31 (8.88%)	43 (10.36%)
<b>Mother</b>	21 (2.71%)	24 (3.45%)	11 (3.15%)	19 (4.58%)
<b>Spouse/partner</b>	2 (0.26%)	22 (3.17%)	2 (0.57%)	8 (1.93%)
<b>Siblings</b>	9 (1.16%)	11 (1.58%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.24%)
<b>Relatives</b>	8 (1.03%)	10 (1.44%)	2 (0.57%)	2 (0.48%)
<b>Friends</b>	2 (0.26%)	4 (0.58%)	1 (0.29%)	0 (0%)
<b>Joint family decision</b>	0.26 (%)	0.29 (%)	2 (0.57%)	2 (0.48%)
	Internal	International	Internal	International
<b>Migrant Self</b>	837 (80.87%)	385 (88.3%)	470 (82.75%)	143 (86.67%)
<b>Father</b>	119 (11.5%)	10 (2.29%)	63 (11.09%)	9 (5.45%)
<b>Mother</b>	34 (3.29%)	11 (2.52%)	22 (3.87%)	6 (3.64%)
<b>Spouse/partner</b>	8 (0.77%)	16 (3.67%)	5 (0.88%)	5 (3.03%)
<b>Siblings</b>	17 (1.64%)	3 (0.69%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.61%)
<b>Relatives</b>	12 (1.16%)	6 (1.38%)	3 (0.53%)	1 (0.61%)
<b>Friends</b>	2 (0.19%)	4 (0.92%)	1 (0.18%)	0 (0%)
<b>Joint family decision</b>	4 (0.39%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)

Most migration studies consider the importance of networks and job security at the destination. Different studies consistently indicated a strong and positive effect of migrant networking and

securing job before migration on predicting migration decisions. In other words, migrants are often attracted to destinations with larger population of migrants from their areas of origin. Having families or friends on destination or having communities who speak the same language and share the same culture leads to lower psychological costs associated with migration. Networks may also reduce the economic costs of migration by helping migrants find employment and housing, as well as helping the migrant assimilate to their new location. Over time, as migrants assimilate to their new destination, their reliance on their network or social capital may decline. With this assumption we have tried to analyze by gender and destination of migrants in the table below regarding network, contract, employment opportunities and source of migration finance before they migrants moved to the current migration

**Migrants Network prior to migration:** Migration decision is the most important social and economic decisions a human being can make. The decision to migrate can be influenced by multiple push and pull factors. In addition, migration decision can be influenced by job opportunities, aspiration for better life, individual risk taking and aspiration behaviors and migration costs. In addition to these factors social network plays an important role in migration decision. Through social networks and contacts migrants learn opportunities, living conditions, and risks of the destination. Hence social network shapes the ability and desire of individuals to leave their home. In this study we have tried to assess the social network and employment opportunities of migrants before they leave their home. The survey result shows that more than half of the migrants never had any contact or connections in their recent migration destination. The disaggregate result of the survey also reported similar result that the majority of male and female migrants have immigrated without prior contact or connection at their destination. Less than half of both the internal and international migrants have reported that they had contacts at the destination prior to their recent migration. Similarly, less than half of both male and female migrants have also reported that they had contacts at destination prior to their current migration.

However, when we looked to the cross-tabulation result between internal and international migrants; internal migrants tend to have better contact at the destination prior to their migration (43.81%) as compared to the percentage of international migrants who had contacts prior to their migration (40.68%). Further gender disaggregation was made to see who has better contact between male and female migrants and the survey result reveals that male migrants (44.55%) had better social network than female migrants (40.45%) prior to their current migration. This result implies that female migrants are relatively exposed to risks than male migrants and international migrants have relatively higher risks than internal migrants.

We have also tried to see the contact at destination for the migrants who have reported they had contacts at destination before they moved to the current destination and the survey result reveals that the majority of the migrants had family or relatives as a contact in their current destination. When this result is disaggregated between male and female migrants, higher percentage of female migrants as compared to male migrants have reported that their contact at destination were family members. Similarly, the comparison result between internal and international migrants, the survey result reveals that higher percentages of international

migrants as compared to internal migrants who have reported that they had contact at destination indicated that family members were their main contact. Higher percentage of internal migrants as compared to international migrants reported that they had friends as contact in their current destination. Similarly, higher percentage of male migrants as compared to female migrants reported that they had friends as a contact at their current migration destination. Having agent as a contact before migration is common among the international migrants as compared to the internal migrants.

**Employment opportunity at destination:** as indicated before the majority of the migrants have decided to move to their current destination mainly to for work or looking for a job. Accordingly, we have also asked the households of the migrants whether the migrant fixed a job before he/she moved out to the current destination. The survey result indicated that only about 31% of the migrants had secured job before their migration to the current destination. There is no significant difference in the percentage of male and female migrants as well as internal and international migrants with regard to securing jobs prior to migration.

## Source of finance for migration

Money from family, family savings and personal savings were reported as the main source of migration finance by the households of the migrants. About half of the migrant households indicated that money received from family members were the main source of finance for the migrants to go to the current destination. The surprising result in this study was the level of credit financing for migration is reported to be low. The majority of the migrants tend to finance their migration from their family, relatives and own source. This result implies that either there is limited access to credit by migrants to finance migrants or only individuals who have better resources or finance can migrate. Migrating free of cost is most common among the internal migrants and female migrants as compared to international and male migrants respectively.

However, when we look at the source of migration finance from loan (Borrowing from families, money lenders and agencies) international migrants tend to have more access for loan as compared to the internal migrants. That is 16.36% of households with international migrants have reported that the migrants financed cost of migration for his/her current destination using loan from various sources (from families, money lenders and agencies); whereas only 2.11% of internal migrants uses credit to finance their migration. Similarly, higher proportion of female migrants (6.02) financed their migration from loan as compared to male migrants (4.3%). The gender difference for the source of finance for migration could be attributed to the difference in their destination. As indicated previously, higher proportion of female migrants as compared to male migrants have migrated to international destination.

**Table 16: Migration network, employment opportunities and source of finance for 2018 survey**

	Destination of current migrants			Gender of current migrant		
	Internal	International	Total	Male	Female	Total
<b>Prior to moving, did migrant have any contacts/connections at the most recent destination? (%)</b>						
No	56.19	59.32	56.92	55.45	59.55	57.84
Yes	43.81	40.68	43.08	44.55	40.45	42.16
<b>Who was the MAIN contact/connection at the most recent destination (%)</b>						
Family Member	47.06	58.33	49.54	46.94	51.2	49.33
Relatives	31.18	20.83	28.9	30.61	28	29.15
Friend	15.88	6.25	13.76	16.33	12	13.9
Previous workmate	2.35	2.08	2.29	4.08	0.8	2.24
Agent or broker at origin or destination	1.18	12.50	3.67	1.02	5.6	3.59
Employer at destination	1.18	0	0.92	1.02	0.8	0.9
Other specify	1.18	0	0.92	0	1.6	0.9
<b>Did (ID) already have a job fixed up prior to moving? (%)</b>						
No	68.84	66.67	68.35	68.19	69.4	68.85
Yes	31.16	33.33	31.65	31.81	30.6	31.15
<b>How did (NAME) finance his/her most recent migration? (%)</b>						
Receiving from family	51.94	53.94	52.39	53.01	53.49	53.27
Borrowing from immediate family	0.7	5.45	1.77	1.72	1.69	1.7
Borrowing from extend Family	0.35	4.85	1.36	0.57	2.17	1.44
Borrowing from moneylender	1.06	3.03	1.5	1.72	1.2	1.44
Advance from recruitment agency	0	3.03	0.68	0.29	0.96	0.65
Family savings	17.96	12.12	16.64	15.19	16.63	15.97
Personal savings	17.43	12.73	16.37	21.78	10.84	15.84
Sells assets	0	0	0	0.57	0.96	0.79
From govt. scheme	0.18	0	0.14	0.29	0	0.13
Don't have to pay	8.98	1.21	7.23	4.3	10.36	7.59
Land mortgage	0.18	0	0.14	0.29	0	0.13
Other (specify)	0.7	2.42	1.09	0.29	1.69	1.05

## Migrants contact and relationship with the migrant households

In this study we describe the relationship of the migrants with their household before they have moved out to their current destination. Overall the majority of the migrants seems to have close relationship with their households before their migration to the current destination. This result seems consistent with the result for reason of migration. The majority of the households with migrants indicated that the reason for migration was work related or study related reasons. This may justify that most of the migrants have good relationship with their household and their intention was to provide economic support to their households back home. Relatively higher percentage of households with internal migrants reported that the migrant had very close

(79.22%) or somewhat close relationship with the household as compared to household with international migrants (73.78%). When we look at how the relationship between migrants and their households back home changed overtime; the survey results indicate that the percentage of households who have reported that they had close or somewhat close relationship has significantly declined between the two waves. Higher percentage of households with both internal and international migrants in wave 1 reported that the migrants had better relationship with their households back home as compared to the percentage of households who have reported close or somewhat close relationship with their households back home in wave 2. This result may imply that there is a decline in family relationship between migrants and the household members overtime.

Looking at the gender disaggregated result of household relationship with migrants before they moved to their current destination; relatively higher percentages of households with female migrants (79.47%) have reported that they had close or somewhat close relationship with the migrants before he/she moved to his/her current destination as compared to household with male migrants (76.70%). With regard to the change in the relationship of the migrant households with migrants overtime the survey result indicated that there is a decline in the relationship of migrants and their households back home before they moved to their current destination. The decline in the relationship between wave 1 and wave 2 is reported both for the households with female and male migrants.

Frequency of contact between household members and migrants may depend on geographic proximity and access to technology and infrastructures. The more geographically closer the migrant with the households is the more frequent contact the migrant might have with his/her household. Similarly, better access to communication technology and transport infrastructures also determines the frequency of contact between the migrants and the households. As one indicator of social relationship of migrants with their households back home we have also tried to look at how frequently the migrants contact with the households. The table below reports that internal migrants have more frequent contacts with the households as compared to the international migrants. About 74% of internal migrants in wave 1 and 78% of internal migrants in wave 2 were contacting their households at least once in a month while this figure is lower of international migrants. Only 52% of international migrants in wave1 and 62% of international migrants in wave 2 were contacting their households at least once a month. In general, there was an improvement in the frequency of contact between the migrants and household members back home over time, but more improvement was reported among households with international migrants as compared to the percentage reported by the households with internal migrants. This improvement can be attributed to the improvement in access to mobile phones and other communication technologies in the country.

Moreover, the survey result summarized in the table below also reported that that female migrants have more frequent contacts with the households as compared to the male migrants. About 69% of female migrants in wave 1 and 78% of female migrants in wave 2 were contacting their households at least once in a month while this figure is lower of male migrants. About 68%

of male migrants in wave1 and 72% of male migrants in wave 2 were contacting their households at least once a month. There is also an improvement in the frequency of contact to their households by both male and female migrants but the survey results between wave 1 and wave 2 indicated that more improvements were reported by female migrants than male migrants. In other words, higher percentage of improvement in the frequency of contact between the households and migrants were reported by households with female migrants as compared to the percentage of improvement reported between male migrants and the household. This result may imply that female migrants have better social relationship and contacts with their households' members back home than male migrants.

How migrants communicate or contact their households also depends on the geographic proximity of the current destination of the migrant as well as access to communication technologies and infrastructure by the migrants and the households. Migrants who are living closer to their households have better opportunity to contact in person. That is the closer the geographic location of the migrant current destination with their household's location the better opportunity either for the migrant to visit their households in person or the migrant households to visit the migrant in person. However, this opportunity is so remote for the international migrants due to high cost of transport or other barriers such as access to visa limits personal visit by the migrant to their households or personal visit by the households to the migrant. Accordingly, in this survey we have tried to look at how migrants communicate with their households and the change of means of communication overtime. The table below summarizes means of communication between the households with migrants and the migrants over time by gender and location of the migrant.

Consistent with the above assumptions; significant percentage of households with internal migrants (27.25% in wave 1 and 33.52% in wave 2) as compared to households with international migrants (0.92% in wave 1 and 3.47% in wave 2) reported migrants or household member personal visit as means of communication between migrants and households with migrants. Therefore, personal visit by international migrants or households with international migrants is almost nonexistent. Almost all the households with international migrants (96.56% in wave 1 and 93.75% in wave 2) reported that they use telephone as means of communication between with the migrants whereas only 67.92% in wave 1 and 66.11% in wave 2 of households with internal migrants reported that they use telephone to communicate with the internal migrant. In general, the majority of households with both internal and international migrants reported that they use telephone as main means of communication with the migrants, but telephone is most commonly used to communicate international migrants than internal migrants. Moreover, there is a slight increase in the percentage of households who have reported personal visit as main communication mechanism between the migrants and the households overtime but personal visit is more common among households with internal migrants than international migrants. In other words personal visit as major communication mechanism between international migrants and their households is almost nonexistent.



When we look at the survey result on communication mechanisms between households and male and female migrants there is no significant difference on how households communicate with their male or female migrants. Telephone communication was common both for households with male and female migrants and followed by personal visit. The survey result also shows that there is a slight decline in telephone communication and increase in personal visit either by the migrant or his/her household members overtime both for households with female and male migrant. Hence, this result implies that gender of migrants does not have a significant effect on how the household communicates with the migrant.

**Table 17: Migrants contact and relationship with the migrant households**

	wave 1		wave 2		wave 1		wave 2	
	Internal	International	Internal	International	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>How would you describe your [the respondent] personal relationship with migrant before s/he went away?</b>								
Very close	669 (64.64%)	263 (60.32%)	250 (44.01%)	69 (42.07%)	466 (60.05%)	466 (67.05%)	142 (40.69%)	189 (45.65%)
Somewhat close	242 (23.38%)	110 (25.23%)	200 (35.21%)	52 (31.71%)	195 (25.13%)	157 (22.59%)	126 (36.1%)	140 (33.82%)
Neither close nor distant	59 (5.7%)	29 (6.65%)	64 (11.27%)	27 (16.46%)	51 (6.57%)	37 (5.32%)	42 (12.03%)	54 (13.04%)
Somewhat distant	34 (3.29%)	24 (5.5%)	31 (5.46%)	8 (4.88%)	36 (4.64%)	22 (3.17%)	20 (5.73%)	19 (4.59%)
Very distant	31 (3%)	10 (2.29%)	23 (4.05%)	8 (4.88%)	28 (3.61%)	13 (1.87%)	19 (5.44%)	12 (2.9%)
<b>On average How frequently does migrant contact any household member?</b>								
Everyday	22 (2.13%)	1 (0.23%)	17 (2.99%)	4 (2.44%)	12 (1.55%)	11 (1.58%)	12 (3.44%)	10 (2.42%)
A few times each week	91 (8.79%)	6 (1.38%)	67 (11.8%)	15 (9.15%)	54 (6.96%)	43 (6.19%)	42 (12.03%)	45 (10.87%)
Once a week	286 (27.63%)	17 (3.9%)	162 (28.52%)	20 (12.2%)	166 (21.39%)	137 (19.71%)	79 (22.64%)	104 (25.12%)
Once or twice a month	377 (36.43%)	204 (46.79%)	202 (35.56%)	63 (38.41%)	294 (37.89%)	287 (41.29%)	119 (34.1%)	165 (39.86%)
A few times a year	170 (16.43%)	163 (37.39%)	66 (11.62%)	35 (21.34%)	170 (21.91%)	163 (23.45%)	57 (16.33%)	47 (11.35%)
less than a few times	44 (4.25%)	34 (7.8%)	29 (5.11%)	7 (4.27%)	46 (5.93%)	32 (4.6%)	20 (5.73%)	17 (4.11%)
Not at all	45 (4.35%)	11 (2.52%)	25 (4.4%)	20 (12.2%)	34 (4.38%)	22 (3.17%)	20 (5.73%)	26 (6.28%)
<b>How does household communicate with migrant while s/he is away? (main communication mechanism)</b>								
In person, s/he visit	243 (23.48%)	3 (0.69%)	160 (29.47%)	2 (1.39%)	135 (17.4%)	111 (15.97%)	87 (26.44%)	84 (21.65%)
In person, we visited	39 (3.77%)	1 (0.23%)	22 (4.05%)	3 (2.08%)	21 (2.71%)	19 (2.73%)	6 (1.82%)	19 (4.9%)
Landline/ Mobile	703 (67.92%)	421 (96.56%)	359 (66.11%)	135 (93.75%)	583 (75.13%)	541 (77.84%)	232 (70.52%)	282 (72.68%)
Text/SMS	1 (0.1%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.18%)	1 (0.69%)	1 (0.13%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.52%)
Talking on internet	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.69%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0%)
Word of mouth	1 (0.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.39%)	1 (0.13%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.61%)	1 (0.26%)
Fax	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.18%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0%)
No contact	48 (4.64%)	11 (2.52%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	35 (4.51%)	24 (3.45%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

## Remittances

Various studies on remittance and impact on poverty indicated that remittance recipient households generally have higher levels of consumption expenditure and lower incidences of extreme poverty than households who do not receive remittances. Studies by Ratha (2013)<sup>23</sup>, Stratan et al. (2013)<sup>24</sup>, and Adams and Cuechuecha (2010)<sup>25</sup> indicated that remittances play a significant role in reducing severity of poverty by increasing the income of recipient households. Studies by Adams and Page (2005)<sup>26</sup> and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010)<sup>27</sup> also indicated that remittances contribute a statistically significant role in reducing the depth and severity of poverty. Moreover, studies also indicated that remittances are often used as risk-spreading strategies or shock coping mechanisms of recipient households. A study on Egypt by Kapur (2004)<sup>28</sup> indicated that remittance helps recipient household to resist external shocks that arises due to economic or political instabilities.

Various studies also found out that remittances have positive impact for recipient households to invest on healthcare, education, and fixed assets. Besides remittance also enhances recipient households' access to financial services and other business opportunities. Remittances also used as startup capital for recipient households to invest on non-farm business and improve their income sources.

Therefore, in this section we will focus the proportion of households receiving remittances and amount of remittance received by the households with migrants. Moreover, we will try to look at how the remittance is sent to the households and use of the remittance by the recipient households.

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<sup>23</sup> Ratha D. (2013) The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. *Migration Policy Institute*, Washington, D.C.

<sup>24</sup> Stratan, A. et al. (2013) *Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: the case of Republic of Moldova*. CARIM-East RR 2013/25, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI).

<sup>25</sup> Adams Jr., R.H. and A. Cuechuecha (2010) The economic impact of international remittances on poverty and household consumption and investment in Indonesia. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5433, World Bank, Washington, D.C.


<sup>26</sup> Adams, R. and J. Page (2005) The impact of international migration and remittances on poverty. In: *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects* (S.M. Maimbo and D. Ratha, eds.). The World Bank Group, Washington D.C., pp. 277–306.

<sup>27</sup> Anyanwu, J.C. and A.E.O. Erhijakpor 2010 Do international remittances affect poverty in Africa? *African Development Review*, 22(1):51– 91.

<sup>28</sup> Kapur, D. (2004) *Remittances: The New Development Mantra?* United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva

In this study we have tried to look at the proportion of households who have received remittances over time. The survey results indicate that there is a significant decline in the percentage of households who have received cash and in-kind remittances. As indicated in the figure below in the first wave of the study 41.94% of the households reported that they have received cash remittance and 17.95% of the households reported that they have received in-kind remittances. However, the percentage of households who have reported that they have received remittances from migrant has declined significantly in the second wave of the study. Only 28.93% and 10.09% of the households reported that they have received cash and in-kind remittances during the second wave. This decline in the percentage of households who have received remittances can be attributed to the decline in the migrant population in the second round of the survey.

**Fig 12: Remittance receipt by remittance type and year**



Further disaggregation of the survey result was made to see how sending remittance varies by the location of the migrants and gender of the migrant. Accordingly, the survey result shows that a significant higher proportion of households reported that they have received remittance from international migrants than from the internal migrants. That is in the second round of the survey about 58.54% of households with international migrant reported that they have received remittances from international migrants while the proportion of households with internal migrants who have reported that they have received remittance from internal migrant is significantly low (21.3%). Similarly, relatively higher percentage of households with international

migrants reported that they have received in-kind remittances from the international migrant 14.55% as compared to the proportion of households who have internal migrants and received in-kind remittance from the internal migrant (9.52%). In general, higher proportion of international migrants as compared to the internal migrants tend to send cash or in-kind remittances. That is, 25.88% and 59.76% of the households reported that they have received either cash or in-kind remittances from the internal and international migrants respectively.

When we look at the disaggregated result of sending remittances by gender of the migrant; the survey result indicated that higher proportion of households reported that they have received both cash and in-kind remittances from female migrants as compared to the proportion of households who have reported that they have received cash or in-kind remittances from male migrants. In the second wave of the survey 31.16% and 13.49% of households with female migrants have reported that they have received cash and in-kind remittances respectively from the female migrants. Whereas, only 26.36% and 6.88% of households with male migrants have reported that they have received cash and in-kind remittances respectively from the male migrants. In general, female migrants in both rounds of the survey higher proportion of female migrants are sending either in-kind or cash remittances back home as compared to male migrants.

**Remittance amount per migrant** The amount of remittances sent home by migrants is the most important information to determine the impact of remittance on recipient household investments or consumption smoothing through increased income. Most studies indicated that remittances do not necessarily lead to long-term investment, because either the amount remitted is too small to invest in businesses or other long-term investment opportunities. Most remittance recipient poor rural household's primary use of remittance is social insurance. Migrants and their relatives usually spend them on consumption or 'consumptive' investments (food, health, household's needs) and rarely invest in long-term businesses. Hence, the amount of money remitted by the migrant determines whether the households will have extra money for long-term investments in addition to investing the money on consumption investments. Therefore, in both rounds of the survey we have tried to collect the average amount of remittances sent back home by the migrant both in the form of cash or in-kind. The table below summarizes the average value of remittance sent either in cash or in-kind and the sum of the two types of remittances.

The survey result indicated that the average total remittance (both cash and in-kind remittances) sent by international migrants (21100 Birr or about 770 USD) is significantly higher than the average total remittance sent by internal migrants (3455 Birr or about 126 USD) in one-year period. Furthermore, the amount of cash remittances sent by migrants back home has

significantly increased between the baseline and follow-up survey. That is, international migrants cash remittance has increased from Birr 15733.21 (equivalent to USD 310.35 in 2014 exchange rate) in the first round of the survey to Birr 19287.63 (equivalent to 704 USD in 2018 exchange rate) in the second round of the survey. Similarly, internal migrants cash remittance has increased from Birr 994.65 (equivalent to 48 in 2014 exchange rate) in the first round of the survey to Birr 3164.1 (equivalent to 158 USD in 2018 exchange rate) in the second round of the survey. However, there is no significant increase in the value of in-kind remittance sent by both internal and international migrants between the first and second wave of the survey.

When we look at the amount of remittance sent by gender of the migrant; female migrants are sending significantly higher amount of both cash and in-kind remittances than their counterpart male migrants. During the 2018 survey households reported that they have received Birr (14419.36 Birr or about 526 USD) total cash and in-kind remittances from female migrants while they have reported that they have received on average (9235.464 Birr or about 337 USD) amount of cash and in-kind remittances from male migrants. Similarly, female migrants cash remittance has increased from Birr 6196.8 (equivalent to 310 in 2014 exchange rate) in the first round of the survey to Birr 11637.94 (equivalent to 425 USD in 2018 exchange rate) in the second round of the survey. There is also a significant increase the amount of cash remittance received by the households from male migrants' overtime. However, there is no significant increase in the value of in-kind remittance sent by both male and female migrants between the first and second wave of the survey.

In general, there is a significant increase in the amount of cash remittances send by migrants between the two rounds of the survey. However, there is no significant increase in the value of in-kind remittances send back home between the first and second rounds of the survey. In other words, migrants are preferring to send more cash remittances than in-kind remittances. This could be mainly because either its simple to send cash than in-kind remittances or households prefer cash than in-kind to make decisions on how to use the money by themselves. It could be possible that any items are now abundantly available in the local market and both migrants and households may prefer to get cash and buy the items at the local market.


We have also asked households what kind of items they have received as remittance from migrants in both rounds of the survey. The survey result reveals an interesting result in terms of the change overtime in the type of items remitted overtime as well as difference in between different migrant groups. The survey result indicated that food and clothing are the two major items received by the households as a remittance from migrants in both rounds. However, the parentage of households who have reported that they have received food items and clothing

have declined between the two survey periods and started to be replaced by cellphones. Specifically, international migrants are now sending more cellphones now compared to the baseline period while food item remittance is almost nonexistent among the international migrants during both the first round and second round survey periods. Clothing remittances is also significantly higher among the international migrants than internal migrants.

When we look at the gender disaggregated survey result, female migrants send more food, household and school items than their male counterparts. Whereas male migrants send more clothing and mobile phone as a remittance to their households as compared to their female counterparts. In general, there is decrease in the proportion of clothing items remitted by both male and female migrants. This decline is replaced by slight increase in the food item remittance and significant increase in the mobile phone remittances.

**Frequency of remittance:** with regard to the frequency of remittance the migrant send cash back home the survey result indicated that migrants don't send cash remittances more frequently. A majority of the migrants (more than 90% of them) send cash remittances back home at 6 months or more intervals. The survey result also indicated that there is no significant difference between the different groups of migrants with regard to frequency of remittance.

**Fig 13: Frequency of remittances by gender of migrant**



The transfer channels used by migrants to send remittances home are one important area on which policy debates have focused. In sub Saharan African countries, a large proportion of remittances is transferred through informal mechanisms than formal channels. Non-availability

of formal financial institutions and poor financial literacy of rural households is limiting the use of formal channels to send remittances home by migrants. Studies indicated that a variety of factors determine the choice of remittance channel (official vs unofficial) by the migrants. The World Bank<sup>29</sup> indicated that transaction cost (the fee to be paid by the sender) plays a significant role in determining how to send remittance home by the migrant. Besides transaction costs there are other factors influencing the choice of remittances transfers' channel. Lücke M. et al. (2007)<sup>30</sup> consider a variety of possible channel choice determinants: costs of transfer services, confidentiality, speed of remittances, seasonality of migration, urgency and frequency of remittances, migration destination countries, etc.

In this study our focus was not how migrants decide their choice of remittance channel but what different channels they use to remit money back home. Accordingly, the survey result shows that there was a significant increase in the percentage of migrants who are using formal channel (bank and formal money transfer) in wave 2 as compared to the percentage of migrants who have used formal channels to remit money back home. That is the total percentage of households who have received money through formal channel from current in wave 1 was 60.13% and this has increased to 76.79% in wave 2.

When the result for remittance channel is disaggregated between internal and international migrants; the survey result indicated that there is a significant increase in the uses of formal channels both for the internal and international migrants (see table below). However, even if there is an increase in the use of formal channels between the two waves international migrants tend to use mainly formal channels than internal migrants. That is, about 34% of the households in wave 1 and 60.66% of the household in wave 2 reported that they have received remittance through the formal channels from internal migrants. However, the percentage of households who have reported that they have received remittances through the formal channel from international migrants is significantly higher (83.7% in wave 1 and 95.88% in wave 2) as compared to the percentage households who have received remittances from internal migrants through the formal mechanisms.

Furthermore, we have also tried to look at the gender differences on the choice of remittance channel between male and female migrants over time. Accordingly, the survey result shows that higher percentage of households reported that they have received remittances through formal mechanisms from female migrants than male migrants. In other words, more male migrants tend to send remittances through the informal mechanisms than female migrants. However, this

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<sup>29</sup> World Bank (2012). Remittances to developing countries will surpass \$400 billion in 2012, Migration and Development Brief 19, The World Bank


<sup>30</sup> Lücke, M., T. Omar Mahmoud and Pia Pinger. 2007. Patterns and Trends of Migration and Remittances in Moldova



difference is significantly narrowed over time. That is the percentage of households who have received remittances through the formal channel from male migrants has increased from 47.87% in wave 1 to 75% in wave 2; whereas the percentage of households who have reported that they have received remittances through formal channels from female migrants increased on slightly from 72.12% in wave 1 to 77.87% in wave 2.

From these results we can generalize that there is a significant improvement in the use of formal channel to send money home by migrants. This could be attributed to the improvement in the access of formal financial institutions or improvement of financial literacy of rural households. That is there was a significant increase in the coverage of bank branches and mobile phone service in rural areas in the country and more migrants are now able to send money through formal financial institution. However, the level of use of formal channel by internal migrants is still low. This could be mainly because internal migrants can travel back home, or their household members can collect the remittances from the migrant in person since the geographic distance as barrier for remittance is not significant for internal migrants.

**Fig 14: Remittance Channel by destination and gender of migrant**



**Table 18: Remittance: amount, frequency, channel and use**

	wave 1		wave 2		wave 1		wave 2	
	Internal	International	Internal	International	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>During the past 12 months, has this household received any money from migrant?</b>								
No	731 (70.63%)	123 (28.21%)	447 (78.7%)	68 (41.46%)	471 (60.7%)	383 (55.11%)	257 (73.64%)	285 (68.84%)
Yes	304 (29.37%)	313 (71.79%)	121 (21.3%)	96 (58.54%)	305 (39.3%)	312 (44.89%)	92 (26.36%)	129 (31.16%)
<b>During the past 12 months, has this household received any goods from migrant?</b>								
No	816 (78.84%)	391 (89.68%)	514 (90.49%)	141 (85.45%)	628 (80.93%)	579 (83.31%)	325 (93.12%)	359 (86.51%)
Yes	219 (21.16%)	45 (10.32%)	54 (9.51%)	24 (14.55%)	148 (19.07%)	116 (16.69%)	24 (6.88%)	56 (13.49%)
<b>Average remittance amount in the last 12 months <sup>31</sup></b>								
Average remittance in Birr	994.6528	6207.624	3164.098	19287.63	1022.783	6196.833	8829.891	11637.94
Average value of goods remitted	810.1656	6338.332	1073.333	6470.833	1027.484	2677.444	1875.417	3016.964
total goods and cash remitted	1848.829	15733.21	3455	21100	2327.683	9235.464	5952	14419.36
<b>How frequently in the last 12 months has migrant remitted money to the household?</b>								
Weekly	1 (0.33%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.82%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.33%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.09%)	0 (0%)
Fortnightly	1 (0.33%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.03%)	1 (0.33%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.09%)	0 (0%)
Monthly	38 (12.5%)	8 (2.56%)	8 (6.56%)	3 (3.09%)	32 (10.49%)	14 (4.49%)	7 (7.61%)	4 (3.05%)
Every couple of months	7 (2.3%)	3 (0.96%)	3 (2.46%)	3 (3.09%)	3 (0.98%)	7 (2.24%)	1 (1.09%)	5 (3.82%)
Every three months	17 (5.59%)	35 (11.18%)	5 (4.1%)	6 (6.19%)	20 (6.56%)	32 (10.26%)	5 (5.43%)	6 (4.58%)
Every six months	17 (5.59%)	34 (10.86%)	5 (4.1%)	5 (5.15%)	15 (4.92%)	36 (11.54%)	3 (3.26%)	8 (6.11%)
Every year	98 (32.24%)	70 (22.36%)	22 (18.03%)	30 (30.93%)	78 (25.57%)	90 (28.85%)	19 (20.65%)	34 (25.95%)
Only on special occasion	113 (37.17%)	160 (51.12%)	55 (45.08%)	34 (35.05%)	143 (46.89%)	130 (41.67%)	39 (42.39%)	52 (39.69%)
Only if household req	12 (3.95%)	3 (0.96%)	23 (18.85%)	15 (15.46%)	12 (3.93%)	3 (0.96%)	16 (17.39%)	22 (16.79%)
<b>What was the main method that household used to receive money from the migrant? [main is for majority of the money]</b>								
Bank, Mobile, post office transfer	103 (33.88%)	246 (78.59%)	73 (59.84%)	85 (87.63%)	138 (45.25%)	211 (67.63%)	68 (73.91%)	94 (71.76%)
Formal Money transfer	6 (1.97%)	16 (5.11%)	1 (0.82%)	8 (8.25%)	8 (2.62%)	14 (4.49%)	1 (1.09%)	8 (6.11%)
HH collects money in person	37 (12.17%)	4 (1.28%)	13 (10.66%)	1 (1.03%)	25 (8.2%)	16 (5.13%)	4 (4.35%)	10 (7.63%)

<sup>31</sup> Average exchange rate Birr to USD in wave 1 was 20 Birr for 1 USD. In wave 2 one USD was 27.40 Birr

Migrant brings the money home	113 (37.17%)	6 (1.92%)	27 (22.13%)	1 (1.03%)	79 (25.9%)	40 (12.82%)	17 (18.48%)	11 (8.4%)
Friend or other person travelling back home brings home	45 (14.8%)	32 (10.22%)	7 (5.74%)	2 (2.06%)	49 (16.07%)	28 (8.97%)	2 (2.17%)	7 (5.34%)
Informal money transfer	0 (0%)	7 (2.24%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (1.64%)	2 (0.64%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Other (specify)	0 (0%)	2 (0.64%)	1 (0.82%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.33%)	1 (0.32%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.76%)
<b>In kind remittance Items</b>								
Food	66 (30.14%)	0 (0%)	27 (50%)	0 (0%)	30 (20.27%)	36 (31.03%)	8 (33.33%)	21 (37.5%)
Clothing	136 (62.1%)	39 (86.67%)	19 (35.19%)	13 (54.17%)	102 (68.92%)	73 (62.93%)	10 (41.67%)	22 (39.29%)
Jewelry	3 (1.37%)	2 (4.44%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (2.03%)	2 (1.72%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Household Utensils	4 (1.83%)	1 (2.22%)	1 (1.85%)	1 (4.17%)	1 (0.68%)	4 (3.45%)	0 (0%)	2 (3.57%)
School Items	2 (0.91%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.85%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.35%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.79%)
Computers, Accessories	1 (0.46%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.68%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Agricultural inputs	2 (0.91%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.35%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Bicycles and motorcycle	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.85%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (4.17%)	0 (0%)
Mobile Phones	1 (0.46%)	0 (0%)	4 (7.41%)	10 (41.67%)	1 (0.68%)	0 (0%)	5 (20.83%)	9 (16.07%)
Blankets	3 (1.37%)	1 (2.22%)	1 (1.85%)	0 (0%)	4 (2.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.79%)
Other specify	1 (0.46%)	2 (4.44%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.35%)	1 (0.86%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

In this study we have also tried to look at how the households use the remittance money and survey result is summarized in the table below. The majority in the sample are much more prone to use remittances for everyday consumption. More than half of the sampled households who have received remittances from household member migrants reported that they have used the cash remittance mainly for everyday consumption. The survey results also indicated that a slight shift in the use of remittances between wave 1 and wave 2. Less percentage of households are now using remittances for purchase of household assets, cover expenses of special occasion, construction of homestead and investing in farm activities as compared to households who have reported the same in wave 1. Surprisingly, more rural households are now investing in business and enterprise development now. Especially use of remittance money for purchase of commercial lands has significantly increase in addition to the increase in the use of remittance for non-farm business activities. This may imply that remittance is helping rural households to diversify their income to non-farm activities.

**Table 19: Main Purpose of remittance**

<b>Main purpose of remittance</b>	<b>2014 (wave 1)</b>	<b>2018 (wave 2)</b>
Everyday consumption	261 (53.81%)	100 (57.14%)
Education	8 (1.65%)	5 (2.86%)
Health and medical	19 (3.92%)	9 (5.14%)
Pay off migration-finance loan	10 (2.06%)	4 (2.29%)
Pay off other loans	16 (3.3%)	3 (1.71%)
Purchase of homestead land	2 (0.41%)	2 (1.14%)
Purchase of agricultural land	1 (0.21%)	10 (5.71%)
Purchase of commercial land	1 (0.21%)	21 (12%)
Mortgage-in agricultural land	1 (0.21%)	3 (1.71%)
Mortgage-out agricultural land	4 (0.82%)	2 (1.14%)
Construction and development of homestead	56 (11.55%)	2 (1.14%)
Farm agricultural production (purchase of seeds/irrigation/water/employ workers)	36 (7.42%)	0 (0%)
Off-farm agricultural production (animal/poultry/feed)	18 (3.71%)	3 (1.71%)
Business and trade (shops/stock/transport)	1 (0.21%)	5 (2.86%)
Purchase of transport equipment	1 (0.21%)	0 (0%)
Enterprise development (factory/purchase equipment/employ workers)	0 (0%)	5 (2.86%)
Special occasions (e.g. weddings and funerals)	14 (2.89%)	0 (0%)
Religion (Pilgrimage of family members)	1 (0.21%)	1 (0.57%)
Household goods (e.g. furniture and home utensils)	7 (1.44%)	0 (0%)
Savings and fixed deposit	20 (4.12%)	0 (0%)
others	8 (1.65%)	(0%)

## Migration and household welfare

In various studies (Taylor 1999 and Lucas 2006) migration is considered as part of household coping strategy for market, economic and other livelihood shocks. In addition, rural households use migration as a strategy to escape from poverty and climate related shocks that affects their major means of livelihood. Migration and remittances can have positive effects on the welfare of household members left behind through an increase in income, which subsequently can lead to an increase in consumption and investments, given that the remittances the household receives compensate for the loss of one or more members in working age leaving the household. In this section we will try to investigate the impact of migration and remittances on household welfare by examining household subjective economic well-being and household consumption.

The subjective measures of wellbeing are derived from two questions in the survey: one related to the household's assessment of its economic standard of living (both currently and the current situation compared to five years previous) and one related to how the household assess its economic situation relative to other households in the community (currently and compared to five years previous). What the household believes about its own well-being is important per se. It also offers a more multi-dimensional measure of welfare that goes beyond measures such as expenditures and consumption. In addition, subjective well-being measures are likely to capture the direct impact of remittances on household welfare if the household internalizes the possibilities remittances may hold for the household in the future. However, this approach has also its own limitation that must be taken in to consideration. That is, responses might be sensitive to the current mood and memory of the respondent, recent events in the respondent's life and the immediate context in which the interview is conducted.

The first set of subjective well-being variables is based on the question, "Comparing now and five years ago, how would you describe the overall quality of life (based on indicators of economy, health and education) in your household?". The five response categories are the following: 1. Much Improved; 2. Improved; 3. Neither improved nor getting worse (neutral); 4. Worse; 5. Much Worse. In the next question, the respondent is asked the question "Comparing now and five years ago, how would you describe your household's income situation?" with the same five response categories as above.

Using these questions, a number of variables are created. The first is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the household rates its current situation as either 'Improved' or 'Much Improved, called *Life Improved*, and zero otherwise. We also create a variable for "life is worsened" equal to 1 if the household rates its current situation as either 'worse' or 'Much worse', and zero otherwise. Similar variables were created for income improved and income worsened.

We also measure monthly household per capita consumption across a range of food and non-food items, including the value of own food production, to provide a less subjective indicator of household welfare.

Accordingly the results reveal a strong positive effect of migration on household subjective well-being. Households with migrants are more likely to have positive perceptions of their current economic subjective well-being and their current position compared to other households in the community. Furthermore, more households with migrants now and during the baseline tend to have positive perception of their current economic subjective well-being and their current position compared to other households in the community.

In strong contrast however, our estimates of consumption reveal a decline in living standards, with the steepest declines for those households in both years or just in 2018. This suggests that while households perceive migration to be associated with better outcomes, migration may be a response to declining living standards. We analyse the changes in living standards in a second paper, addressing concerns that migration status of households may reflect other characteristics of households which in turn are related to living standards.

**Table 19: Migration and welfare outcomes**

	<b>Household with migrants in both rounds</b>	<b>Household with migrant now but not in baseline</b>	<b>Household had migrant in baseline but not now</b>	<b>Households with no migrants in both rounds</b>
<b>Income IMPROVED</b>	0.623 (0.485)	0.663 (0.475)	0.541 (0.499)	0.498 (0.501)
<b>Income Worsen</b>	0.110 (0.313)	0.152 (0.3611)	0.170 (0.376)	0.184 (0.388)
<b>Life improved</b>	0.626 (0.484)	0.641 (0.482)	0.545 (0.498)	0.515 (0.500)
<b>Life worsen</b>	0.120 (0.326)	0.152 (0.361)	0.177 (0.382)	0.188 (0.391)
<b>N</b>	382	92	418	309
<b>Monthly Real Household per capita consumption in 2014 (Birr)</b>	420.7	432.4	403.9	393.8
<b>Monthly Real Household per capita consumption in 2018 (Birr)</b>	335.9	310.9	377.8	342.5
<b>Percentage change %</b>	-20	-28	-6	-13
<b>-N</b>	327	147	473	255

## Conclusion

Using a bespoke panel survey of approximately 1200 households in four regions of Ethiopia, carried out in 2014 and 2018, we explore patterns of migration and remittances. Our analysis suggests a number of important features of the dynamics of migration and remittances in rural Ethiopia.

The most significant finding is the scale of return migration between the two years. Over a third of our sample experienced the return of one or more migrants, from both internal and international destinations. We argue that this is driven by the escalation in recent years of intra-ethnic conflict, which has been violent at times, combined with restrictions on international migration to the Gulf States. These risks and uncertainties also shape the destinations of current migrants, with a shift towards more local internal migration.

One consequence of this changing pattern of migration is a decline in the proportion of households which receive remittances. Our data suggests that these declines are particularly stark for those households with internal migrants, presumably because intra- and inter-regional wage differentials within Ethiopia are low. Although amounts sent home have increased on average, fewer households are in receipt, which may in turn suggest an increase in inequality. We also observe a decline in average living standards, as measured by household consumption per capita: households report the main use of remittances is for food and clothing. We explore the impacts of migration on living standards in a second paper (Litchfield et al, forthcoming).

We also observe interesting gendered dimensions of migration and remittances. Women international migrants outnumber men considerably in 2018, showing a much less steep fall in numbers over time, whereas among internal migrants, women are the clear minority and show a similarly steep decline as to men. The households in our survey are asked about the process of migration decisions and the role of social networks. Women seem more likely than men to have migrated without a contact at the destination, and this seems to be related to destination choice. Internal migrants are more likely to know someone at the destination than international migrants. Our findings also suggest that women international migrants are more likely than men to use some form of agent to assist with the visa and employment process, so the risks arising from migrating without knowing anyone at the destination may be offset by the use of recruitment and immigration agencies.

Furthermore, despite the decline in remittance sending, this decline is much less for women migrants. Women migrants have higher probabilities of sending remittances home than men, and their average remittance amounts of both cash and in-kind remittances are higher. This is explained partly by the larger share of international migrants among women migrants, with higher wages at destination. But part may also be due to expectations families place on female migrants. Most women migrants are single, and on average under the age of 25. Their decisions to migrate more often involve other family members, they are less likely to have used personal

savings for their migration and they keep in closer contact than male migrants while away. These details point to greater involvement by families in the lives of their women migrants.



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## About Migrating out of Poverty

**Migrating out of Poverty** research programme consortium is funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). It focuses on the relationship between migration and poverty – especially migration within countries and regions – across Asia and Africa. The main goal of **Migrating out of Poverty** is to provide robust evidence on the drivers and impacts of migration in order to contribute to improving policies affecting the lives and well-being of impoverished migrants, their communities and their countries through a programme of innovative research, capacity building and policy engagement.

**Migrating out of Poverty** is coordinated by the University of Sussex and led by Research Director Dr Priya Deshingkar and Dr Robert Nurick as Executive Director. Core partners are the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana, and the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia and L'Université Assane Seck Ziguinchor (UASZ) in Senegal. Past partners included the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) in Bangladesh, the Asia Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore; and the African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC) in Kenya. Please visit the website for more information.

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