



THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION | FONDATION POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES EN AFRIQUE

# THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICAN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

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THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION

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This Occasional Paper submits that Africa's youth unemployment requires long-term, deliberate, well-targeted, and coordinated interventions. Addressing it requires integrated, comprehensive, and long-term approaches to rural development that provide an enabling legal framework, stem rural-urban migration, and ensure that educational systems provide marketable skills.

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# THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICAN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT



## PREFACE

The future of Africa is in the hands of its young people, but integrating them in the labor market with decent and productive jobs remains a huge challenge that cannot be solved at country level alone. The bulk of the unemployed population in Africa is below the age of 25. Poverty, insecurity, the brain drain, and social and political unrest—and more specifically the 2011 Arab Spring and the many Africans risking their lives to reach Europe—all stem from youth unemployment, which must be analyzed in detail, as must good practices for addressing the challenge.

The continental Agenda 2063 calls for action to support young people as drivers of Africa's renaissance. This is to be achieved through investment in their health, education, and access to technology, capital, and opportunities. Concerted strategies to combat youth unemployment and underemployment are needed at national and continental levels.

Against this background, the African Capacity Building Foundation has produced this Occasional Paper under its Strategic Studies Group. The objective is to initiate evidence-based discussion and encourage further investigation into some of the critical capacity challenges of youth unemployment in Africa.

The paper shows that government programs on youth unemployment face funding issues, lack clear target population definitions, and are frequently haphazard and poorly coordinated. And they are rarely evaluated systematically, and thus present no good data for improving them. There is therefore a need to inculcate a culture of and capacity for monitoring and evaluating programs for sustainable youth employment on the continent.

While the ILO, World Bank, and African Union identify purportedly effective strategies, a comprehensive review of best practices and effective capacity development approaches for addressing youth unemployment in a multisectoral and multistakeholder framework is still lacking. This is the gap the paper seeks to fill. Using a broad-based literature review, the paper begins by examining the complexities of African youth unemployment including its history, causes, national and regional dimensions, and local and international responses. It is clear that Africa's youth unemployment needs to be treated as a universal concern that requires well-coordinated efforts of different actors (public, private, domestic, and foreign), economic sectors (formal and informal), the use of new technologies, and the development of solutions grounded in African history and culture. Accordingly, the paper uses case studies to evaluate selected national and regional youth-employment efforts and recommends innovative policies.

African youth employment requires both a short-term approach that immediately seeks to gainfully engage qualified but unemployed youth (creating jobs) and a long-term one that addresses systemic and structural causes (improving the quality of labor supply). Both approaches require the development of human capacity to effectively exploit the continent's vast natural resources to meet the continent's needs through a careful blend of modern technology and indigenous knowledge systems. In particular, they must use Africa's existing natural resources; develop and use local human skills and talents, regardless of age and gender; develop soft skills (especially leadership); and exhaust local skill-building resources towards retaining, harmonizing and utilizing local capacity before seeking external assistance. It is also clear that efforts by individual countries to tackle the youth unemployment challenge are inadequate given that the challenges transcend national boundaries. Regional collaboration in building the capacity to address this challenge is thus indispensable.

Professor Emmanuel Nnadozie  
Executive Secretary  
The African Capacity Building Foundation



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### **About the African Capacity Building Foundation**

The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is Africa's premier institution in capacity building. Established in February 1991, ACBF builds human and institutional capacity for good governance and economic development in Africa. The Foundation has empowered governments, parliaments, civil society, private sector, and higher education institutions in more than 45 countries and six regional economic communities. It supports capacity development by way of grants, technical assistance, and knowledge generation across the continent. ACBF's vision is that of an Africa capable of achieving its own development.

### **About the Strategic Studies Group**

The Strategic Studies Group (SSG) is an ACBF network of global development experts and practitioners made up of the ACBF Policy Institutes Committee, selected development partners, international development specialists, and the ACBF-supported training programs and university partners. The SSG assists the Foundation in identifying key policy and emerging issues requiring the attention of the Foundation and its stakeholders.

The SSG works with the ACBF to identify research themes and advises the Foundation on strategic and pertinent issues that need special attention. It also serves as a "review panel" that shapes, examines, and evaluates the high-level studies undertaken by the Foundation.





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## ABBREVIATIONS

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| ACBF     | The African Capacity Building Foundation                             |
| AfDB     | African Development Bank   |
| ALMP     | Active labor market program  |
| AU       | African Union  |
| BPO      | Business processing outsourcing                                      |
| BTVET    | Business, technical, vocational education and training               |
| CEMAC    | Central African Economic and Monetary Community                      |
| GDP      | Gross domestic product   |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| ICT      | Information and Communications Technology                            |
| IITA     | International Institute of Tropical Agriculture                      |
| ILO      | International Labour Organization                                    |
| IMF      | International Monetary Fund  |
| ITES     | Information technology enabled service                               |
| NEET     | Not in employment, education, or training                            |
| OECD     | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development               |
| SAP      | Structural adjustment program  |
| SME      | Small and medium-sized enterprise                                    |
| STEM     | Sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics                   |
| TVET     | Technical and vocational education and training                      |
| UAE      | United Arab Emirates   |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Programme                                 |
| UNECA    | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa                        |
| UNESCO   | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization    |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children's Fund                                       |
| USAID    | United States Agency for International Development                   |
| VETA     | Vocational Education and Training Act                                |
| YALI     | Young African Leaders Initiative                                     |





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many African youth face high unemployment or employment in low-wage temporary jobs that compound their poverty, especially in northern and southern Africa. Urban areas have much higher rates of unemployment than rural areas—as do women than men—and, it seems, higher income countries.

The reasons are similar across the continent—relatively rapid economic growth with inadequate job creation, and a youth population bulge with few skills relevant to the labor market reflecting an educational system that fails to prepare youth for existing jobs. For female youth, early marriage associated with withdrawal from the labor force is exacerbated by greater discrimination because employers believe that they will soon get married and leave their job.

In addition to the direct costs of lost income and tax revenue and wasted or underused human capacity and potential, Africa's widespread youth unemployment threatens social and political stability. Unemployed youth are easily attracted to crime and are more likely to foment social unrest. The International Labour Organization, the World Bank, and the African Union (AU) identify purportedly effective strategies. But a comprehensive review of best practices and effective approaches for addressing youth unemployment in a multisectoral and multistakeholder framework is still lacking.

Youth unemployment in Africa has worsened over time. In precolonial Africa, the traditional educational systems used local technologies and resources and a wide network of adult role models to socialize youth into the main economic activity, agriculture, which required total family participation from little children until the time that they were old enough to have their own farms or herd. European colonialism undermined Africa's traditional socioeconomic systems to better serve European economic needs and introduced a cash economy, production of export crops, and exploitation of minerals and forestry products. That created demand for wage employment. The more stable and higher wages became the basis for migrant labor, as young men left their homes to look for work in distant places in cocoa, coffee, and tea plantations or copper, cobalt, diamond, and gold mines. The imposed arrangements also created a disdain for agriculture and other traditional economic activities alongside a craving for western-based wage employment in the formal modern system. As rural-to-urban migration grew, employers sought to raise productivity by replacing labor with machinery, thereby adding to unemployment.

The expansion of primary, secondary, and tertiary education, without much consideration of the content's relevance to labor markets, produced educated individuals who became detached or looked down on tradition and indigenous knowledge systems and activities. Further, the role of the state in many economies as the leading employer made a future government job the main objective of youth. So when many state-owned operations became crippled by mismanagement and corruption, which checked their capacity to absorb newly educated youth, the outcome was a continually growing “waiting” pool of unemployed youth. Concurrently, the youth bulge became larger as African countries experienced fast population growth in the 1970s and 1980s. In the latter decade, structural adjustment programs raised African youth unemployment when unrelenting economic hardships forced many African countries to follow austerity and divestiture measures, leading to economic retrenchment.

Through all this, Africa's private sector received no formal support, and elements of it were denigrated as the informal or even underground economy, where the majority of Africa's youth try to eke out a living.

Alarmed by the potentially explosive consequences of youth unemployment, as in the Arab Spring or Kenyan post-election crisis, governments have responded, but with poorly targeted interventions that were neither coordinated nor sustainable. Many programs have been tainted by corruption or other poor governance practices. Similarly, assistance programs of foreign governments and international foundations have been piecemeal, short term, and insufficiently comprehensive to produce long-term impacts.

Government responses can be classified into two broad categories. One is labor supply improvement programs aimed at building skills and capabilities through post-school programs of skill building and entrepreneurship. The other "second-chance" programs such as adult literacy, support for marginalized groups, and public works; and job creation programs that seek to broaden opportunities for employment by boosting demand for labor. But many government programs have been haphazard, lacking continuity and adequate funding. Further, programs have usually lacked systematic evaluation, and thus generate very few data to improve programs. In a few cases, such as the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency, programs have been crippled by corruption or political ineptitude.

Among the key lessons for addressing youth unemployment are that it requires integrated, comprehensive, and long-term approaches that ensure rural development; educational systems that provide marketable skills; and legislation that incentivizes business to hire youth. The formal sector is incapable of creating enough jobs for the many new youth entrants to the labor market. So the informal sector must be recognized as an opportunity, not a nuisance, and be empowered to do even more by youth employment policy.

Wage subsidy programs should be linked to structured workplace training, and targeted to industries where employment will be responsive to changes in labor costs. Programs that reward youth whether they show up for work or not and ignore performance are not helpful. Much can be done to bridge the divide of misunderstanding between employers and young jobseekers, and the involvement and support of employers can help make youth employment-ready, enabling them to know what opportunities exist and to pursue those that match their expectations and profiles and that meet employers' needs. By playing this vital role at an early stage, from schools to universities, employers can provide invaluable insights into the worlds of work, and how the young can better prepare for and secure employment. They can provide high-quality first-hand experience of working through apprenticeships and internships.

The better—more workable—youth employment programs improve the chances of young entrepreneurs to engage in self-employment and to create jobs for other youth. Measures include business mentoring, procurement quotas for youth enterprises, youth enterprise funds, and market access programs. Youth-led information and communications technology (ICT) incubation programs have promise to release the potential of Africa's digital opportunities. The success of M-pesa in Kenya indicates ICT's huge potential to transform Africa's youth population from a time bomb to a driver of economic transformation.

While second-chance and equivalency programs are necessary, they cannot substitute for the long-term restructuring of the educational system. Curricula and pedagogies need to be revamped to foster creativity, innovative thinking, and other skills required in the job market. Such initiatives should be part of a national and even a pan-African strategy. And vocational or other routes to learning and skill acquisition should receive comparable esteem to standard



academic attainments. Combining school and work-based training, as is common in Sweden, is the right approach.

Labor exports, a reality in a globalized world, must be seen as part of the solution to Africa's youth unemployment. African countries must formalize and regulate overseas employment of young people, and export some of their surplus labor (including many youth) to other parts of the globe, in mutually beneficial arrangements. Such programs can boost public and private demand for youth labor and ensure a dynamic inclusive labor market, with skills flowing freely across Africa and globally. It is thus critical for African countries to ease the cross-border constraints that obstruct trade and labor flows.

Finally, any youth unemployment program must ensure built-in sustainability and offer clear detail on expectations for graduates, on job placement at the end of the training, and on the continuity of employment. Short-term programs established with seed funding must be supported and embraced by African governments and integrated into a comprehensive framework, not neglected as "orphans" when the funding dries up. The efforts of the International Labour Organization, World Bank, Rockefeller Foundation, and other entities should be welcomed, but cannot be a substitute for African governments' ownership and responsibility. African countries must stop waiting for external intervention and begin to actively engage the challenge with African resources and solutions. Better socioeconomic convergence and an Africa-wide coordinated strategy are fundamental enabling factors.

Africa's youth unemployment problem was not created overnight, and so cannot be solved in a day. That requires long-term, well-targeted, and coordinated capacity interventions. Foreign seed funding may be helpful, but not as the primary instrument. If African countries take these lessons to heart and ensure that their youth employment programs conform to them, they will be on their way to taming youth unemployment and turning their youth bulge into a blessing rather than a curse. Youth—Africa's future—must not be wasted; they must be nourished and empowered to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all Africans.

## PART 1. YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN AFRICA

African countries have experienced rapid gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the last decade. It averaged 5.3 percent in 2012, for example, well above the world average of 3.3 percent. But their youth unemployment (age 15–24) remains much higher than in the rest of the world (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a). And according to the *African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2012*, the continent has the world’s youngest population, with almost 200 million people age 15–24.

Africa’s youth population is getting better educated. An estimated 59 percent of 20–24 year olds will have had secondary education in 2030, up from 42 percent today (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a). Still, although the percentage of African youth with secondary and tertiary education is increasing, many are unemployed or underemployed in the informal economy. Part of the problem is a mismatch between the skills that young jobseekers have to offer and those that employers need.

Notwithstanding recent progress in reducing poverty, 71 percent of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa live on less than US\$2 a day (Kararach, Hanson, and Léautier, 2011:4). The situation is no better in North Africa, where in 2012 the employment-to-population ratio was only 43.0 percent, far below the global average of 59.6 percent (ILO, 2014). In 2011, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated youth unemployment in North Africa as the highest in the world—about 29.5 percent of the labor force (ILO, 2014). Particularly important is the number of youth in vulnerable employment—youth presumably working but not making enough to live by themselves and still living with their parents.

Set against population growth, private and public employment capacity is simply too small. Over 2000–2007 the ILO (2012b) estimates that Africa’s working-age population grew by 21 percent. Even if job growth over the period was stronger at 23 percent, in absolute numbers the working-age population grew by 96 million, but the number of jobs by only 63 million. With about 12 million young people entering the African labor market every year, much stronger job growth is required to reduce youth unemployment.

The informal sector is the chief source of jobs in Africa. The World Bank (2007) estimates that the informal sector accounts for 80–97 percent of jobs created. Commerce is the main activity in the sector and the principal source of employment in peri-urban areas, with many street vendors. USAID (2011) shows that the great majority of young Senegalese, for example, take temporary and informal work while waiting for a formal job.

African youth unemployment is universally high and worse for women, with small regional variations. For example, in 2009 youth unemployment across North Africa averaged 23.4 percent, against 48 percent in South Africa (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a). In Egypt, 45.7 percent of young women are unemployed but only 17.9 percent of young men. Similarly, in Southern Africa, 51 percent of young women but 43 percent of young men are unemployed (Population Reference Bureau, 2013a). Youth with higher educational attainment suffered from higher unemployment in North Africa than in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Barriers to youth employment include lack of job creation, vulnerability of young workers to layoffs when economic growth falters, high labor costs or unrealistic wage expectations on the part of youth, discrimination (negative attitudes toward inexperienced young workers), poor access to fundamental education (including lack of skills from limited job

experience and thus little access to on-the-job training), and government policies that discourage work (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a).


## CHAPTER 1. THE LANDSCAPE OF AFRICAN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Demography is an important contributor to Africa’s youth unemployment (box 1.1). In 2013, the 10 countries with the highest total fertility rates worldwide—Niger 7.6, Chad 7.0, Somalia 6.8, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 6.3, Angola 6.3, Burundi 6.2, Uganda 6.2, Central African Republic 6.2, and Mali 6.1—were African; the continent as a whole averaged 4.8 (Population Reference Bureau, 2013b). Due to the rapidly improving child survival rates and persistent high fertility, Africa will continue to have the highest population growth through 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2013b).

### Box 1.1. Distinguishing between *unemployment* and *underemployment*

Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force age 15–24 without work but available for and seeking employment (ILO, 2014). In contrast, underemployed youth are those whose hours of work are insufficient compared with an alternative employment for which they were willing and available to work better or more adequately (ILO, 2014). Thus the underemployed have jobs, but their productive potential is underused. Another important measure is the proportion of young people not in employment, education, or training (NEET) (ILO, 2014). The NEET rate measures the untapped potential of youth—that is, the population that is neither improving future employability through investing in skills nor gaining experience through employment. Due to the nature of informal sector employment—lacking social protection, health benefits, legal status, rights, and freedom of association—and given the fluidity of the distinction between unemployment and underemployment, reported youth unemployment figures must be seen as underestimates (box figure 1).

Box figure 1 Youth unemployment in Africa, 2013



Source: World Bank 2014a.

Africa’s youth unemployment is also structurally, geographically, and socially complex. Structurally, most youth are in jobs with low wages, long hours, little personal and job security, and no social protection. Many unemployed youth are either in transition (Garcia and Fares, 2010) or “waithood” (Honwana, 2012)—they have completed their education or dropped out

of school and are waiting to enter the market. Not finding anything decent, they take menial or low-wage jobs. Thus unemployed youth comprise both the skilled and unskilled in disguised unemployment.

Geographically, youth unemployment varies between urban and rural areas. Lack of basic amenities and job opportunities in rural areas drives high rural–urban migration and increases youth unemployment in urban areas. So while open or disguised unemployment is the norm in urban areas, underemployment is more common in rural areas due to the seasonality of farming activities. Underemployment and poor working conditions in the informal economy are key features of youth employment in Africa given insufficient quantity and quality of jobs in the formal economy (ILO, 2012a). Desperate for work, many youth resort to precarious, underpaid, and seasonal work, mainly in the informal economy (ILO, 2012a), often in unpaid family work (ILO, 2015a).

Socially, African youth unemployment also differs by educational attainment and gender, being higher for the least educated and for women (ILO, 2012a). An estimated 133 million young people (more than 50 percent of the youth population) are illiterate, and have a very low chance of any employment outside subsistence activity. Their access to formal technical and vocational education and training (TVET) is similarly severely limited.

Youth unemployment is higher among females (Garcia and Fares, 2010; ILO, 2012a; Honwana, 2012) (Table 1.1). Globally, young women suffer higher unemployment rates than young men in the majority of economies (UN, 2002), but female unemployment is usually hidden because of cultural expectations of marriage, care-giving, and domestic work. Throughout Africa, the labor force participation rate was 33.8 percent for women versus 49.7 percent for men in 2000. Yet official labor statistics do not adequately reflect women’s activities, especially in rural areas where production systems are still predominantly household or family based (ILO, 1997).

In addition, in rural and urban areas, female youth are usually relegated to the less lucrative informal sector. In a study of eight African countries (Benin, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia), Elder and Kone (2014) reported that young women had a more difficult time finding work in all countries except Benin: the average female youth unemployment rate was 25.3 percent, against 20.2 percent for men. In urban areas, most women are self-employed in the informal sector, particularly in retail trade (ILO, 1997; Okojie, 2000). A survey conducted by the World Bank found that over 95 percent of female workers in Ghana and 90 percent in Zambia were employed in the informal sector (Katepa-Kalala, 1999). In rural areas, women are heavily concentrated in agriculture, and within agriculture, particularly in the less lucrative food production subsector. Women are mainly at the lower echelons in the formal sector (African Centre for Gender and Development, 2002).

**Table 1.1 Unemployment rates for youth and adult populations, by sex, 2008-2013 (%)**

| Year | World Youth | Male | Female | Sub-Saharan African Youth | Male | Female |
|------|-------------|------|--------|---------------------------|------|--------|
| 2008 | 11.7        | 11.5 | 11.9   | 11.8                      | 11.1 | 12.6   |
| 2009 | 12.7        | 12.5 | 12.8   | 11.8                      | 11.1 | 12.6   |
| 2010 | 12.5        | 12.3 | 12.7   | 11.8                      | 11.1 | 12.6   |
| 2011 | 12.3        | 12.1 | 12.6   | 11.7                      | 11.1 | 12.5   |
| 2012 | 12.4        | 12.2 | 12.7   | 11.8                      | 11.1 | 12.5   |
| 2013 | 12.6        | 12.4 | 12.9   | 11.7                      | 11.0 | 12.5   |

Source: ILO 2013, p. 80.

In many African countries, the lack of qualifications represents a critical barrier for women's employment, especially in good jobs. Western, Eastern, and Central African countries have the lowest participation rates in primary and secondary education, as well as the largest gender gaps in education (OECD, 2012). For rural youth and rural women, unemployment is especially high because jobs in the urban-dominated monetary economies require specialized educational, technological, and language skills seldom available in rural areas, and so these subgroups face the double disadvantage of being geographically and socioeconomically detached from the modern economy.

Early marriage is a major cause of unemployment for female youth (UNICEF, 2005). Often, marriage leads to withdrawal from the labor force as married youth consider themselves housewives rather than unemployed (Okojie, 2003). Married young girls are more likely to look for more flexible jobs, usually in the informal sector, and become engaged in informal employment with lower earnings (OECD, 2012). In addition to marriage, many young women drop out of school because of teenage pregnancy, financial difficulties, or the parental cultural decision to educate boys (ILO, 2009; Okojie, 2003). Across Africa, married women are more likely to be NEETs than unmarried women.

Female youth face greater discrimination in the labor market and poorer career trajectories because of societal and familial expectations that they will leave their job or be less productive after marriage or after the birth of their first child (ILO, 2015a). Okojie (2003) cites the example of employers in Nigeria requiring young female graduates to sign agreements not to marry, get pregnant, or go on maternity leave for an agreed number of years after recruitment. Failure to comply leads to job termination or denial of promotion. Among young women, lack of employment opportunities has accelerated the feminization of poverty and encouraged sex work as a coping strategy (Okojie, 2003).

Girls face special difficulties in entering and remaining in school due to the demands of domestic responsibilities and cultural expectations (ILO, 2015b). Time on domestic work means less time for study and they are therefore more likely to perform poorly and withdraw from school. In countries with high HIV/AIDS rates, many young women and girls are often the primary care givers, in a role that keeps them out of school and of the more productive and lucrative employment (Okojie, 2003), ensuring that girls end up with less education and fewer skills than boys in aggregate, and fewer job options.

Due to the particular challenges of female youth unemployment, the gender dimension must be addressed with special emphasis in all job creation programs. Three important elements identified by UNDP/ILO (1999) are to apply a gender perspective in assessing and reforming macroeconomic policy frameworks; to develop regional and national capacities to assess, design, and advocate for investment and employment policies that are sensitive to gender; and to include strategies to ensure women's equal participation in projects.

Youth unemployment has far-reaching economic, social, and political consequences for African countries, especially as youth are a substantial proportion of Africa's labor force. Long spells of unemployment or underemployment in informal work impairs future productive potential, employment opportunities, and lifetime earnings (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA 2012a; OECD, 2010; Guarcello et al., 2007). It also delays the transition of youth into adulthood because, without jobs, youth cannot really take care of themselves, marry, or own property (Gyimah-Brempong and Kimenyi, 2013). Moreover, they will not be able to contribute to Africa's old-age social safety net system because they will not be able to take care of their parents and other extended family members. Suffice it to say that the sense of frustration and hopelessness

that accompanies youth unemployment is often what drives many youth into all manner of crime and illicit activity, with devastating socioeconomic impacts. According to the World Bank (2011), half of young people who join a rebel movement cite unemployment as the main reason for doing so. Social unrest is particularly acute in countries and regions where youth unemployment is high or rising rapidly (ILO, 2015a).

Unemployment among youth and the attendant financial insecurity and poverty also present a major political threat, as youth-led protests against economic injustice across the world have shown (ILO 2012a; Gyimah-Brempong and Kimenyi, 2013). In September 2010, for instance, angry young protesters took to the streets in Mozambique against price increases in basic staples such as bread, leading to 12 deaths and more than 400 injuries (The Economist, 2010). In the Arab Spring, youth-led uprisings toppled governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In Senegal, youth unemployment was a major reason for the political and civil unrest and electoral violence that ultimately drove Abdoulaye Wade from power (Ighobor, 2013). Pervasive youth unemployment in northern Nigeria is also a reason for the success of Boko Haram—recruiting jobless young people is easy (Ighobor, 2013).

## CHAPTER 2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Youth unemployment in Africa neither appeared overnight nor emerged from a single source, but evolved over a long period from a mix of factors. In this section we offer a contextual grounding, because without one, it will be difficult to solve the issue. In the first part, we provide an overview of how the problem evolved; in the second, we tease out the contributory factors.

### **Evolution**

#### *Precolonial era*

Precolonial Africa had little unemployment because most societies socialized children into productive members by teaching them skills and behaviors relevant to local needs. Unlike the modern school system, traditional educational systems used local technologies and resources and a wide network of adult role models to ensure that the vast majority of youth grew into productive members of society (Otiso, 2013: 160-162). Agriculture, which was the main economic activity, was a family activity in which youth participated fully from the time they were physically able and certainly before they were old enough to have their own farms or livestock herds. Although agriculture offered only seasonal employment, there were other activities such as fishing, trading, and handicrafts or small-scale manufacturing that filled in some of the off-season time, while the rest was for leisure.

Youth were also part of the social and political system of precolonial African societies. They served as the reserve army; they participated in community development projects and, among some ethnic groups such as the Ibos of southeast Nigeria, they were an essential part of a governance system based on age groups (Webster, Boahen, and Idowu, 1967).

The arrival of Europeans and the subsequent development of the Atlantic slave trade made youth unemployment even rarer because the trade depopulated Africa of its most able-bodied young men and women. The institution of this illegitimate trade in Africa and increasing trading activities in the interior of the continent created additional opportunities and alternatives to agriculture for youth, including working for mining companies and European trading firms or as middlemen in Afro–European trade (Pedlar, 1974).

#### *Colonial period*

European colonialism either changed or undermined Africa's traditional socioeconomic systems to serve European economic needs. The introduction of a cash economy—through cultivation of export crops, exploitation of minerals, and forestry activities—created demand for wage employment, which provided a basis for migrant labor and, for the first time in Africa's recorded history, young men left their homes to look for work. This migrant labor was broadly based, in agriculture, mining, forestry, and fisheries, and in both colonial and non-colonial territories. In western and eastern Africa, migrant labor worked on cocoa, coffee, and tea plantations. In central and southern Africa, the main attractions were the copper, cobalt, diamond, and gold mines.

During the late colonial period, investment in formal education created a new African youth with higher expectations than working on the farm or in the mines. Higher wages in the nonfarm sector in the towns lured many of the educated into higher-paying jobs (Kitching, 1980; Iliffe, 1987; Burton, 2010). But as rural–urban migration grew, employers were simultaneously seeking to raise productivity by replacing labor with machinery, adding to the



already growing problem of youth unemployment. Modern medicine and other health care gains also made the late colonial period the start of Africa's demographic transition from high birth and death rates to high birth and low death rates, which would eventually lead to today's youth bulge.

#### *Postcolonial period*

By the end of the colonial period, Africa not only possessed a dependent economy that “produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce” but also bore the signs of a young, growing population that needed jobs. Independence came with freedom of movement, particularly in southern and eastern Africa, where movement of Africans to the cities had been restricted during the colonial period. Some of the colonial cities such as Algiers were hollowed out soon after independence because of the departure of large numbers of Europeans (Freund, 2007). This paved the way for Africans to move into the cities. As early migrants settled there, a process of chain migration ensued as news of “bright city lights” reached the countryside (Gugler, 2002; Adepoju, 1992; Byerlee, 1974).

Economic development policies to some extent added to the luster of the cities. In particular, early postcolonial policies emphasized industrialization. Import substitution—adopted to achieve industrialization—directed the location of factories and provision of amenities to the few urban centers, while very little attention was paid to rural areas. With rural livelihoods deteriorating due to declining agriculture and lack of amenities, young people left rural areas in droves, accelerating the rural–urban migration that had begun in the colonial era (Igbozurike, 1976; Todaro, 1969; Caldwell, 1969; Pots, 2008).

The expansion of primary, secondary, and tertiary education without much consideration of the content of education produced educated individuals who became detached or looked down on tradition and indigenous knowledge. The prominent role of the government in the economy, in particular as the leading employer, made a job in government the main objective of youth. The combined impact, when many of the state-owned operations became crippled by mismanagement, corruption, and slow economic growth, and could not absorb the newly educated youth, was to create a continually growing pool of unemployed youth who were biding their time. Around this time the youth bulge became larger, as African countries experienced fast population growth from the 1970s through the 1980s. During the 1980s and 1990s, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) accelerated youth unemployment when unrelenting economic hardships forced many African countries to follow World Bank–International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity and divestiture measures, which led to economic retrenchment.

The greater portion of Africa's private sector, which could have helped absorb the unemployed, never received formal support. With no jobs in the formal sector, it is in the informal sector where the majority of Africa's youth eke out a living, especially the less educated (Shehu and Nilsson, 2014; Elder and Kone, 2014). Yet as Ncube (2013) points out in an AfDB blog, “Little attention has been paid to the role of the informal sector in fostering growth and creating jobs. In fact, the informal sector contributes about 55 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP and absorbs 80 per cent of the labor force.”


#### **Causes**

Africa's youth unemployment has demographic, political, economic, and sociocultural roots, which we now explore briefly.

*Demographic*

According UN population estimates, Africa’s population grew from 227,270,000 in 1950 to 1,033,043,000 in 2010—a cumulative gain of 354 percent or an annual average of 5.9 percent (Figure 2.1). The largest percentage changes per period were in 1975–1980 and in 1980–1985, at 2.8 percent a year (Table 2.1). In 1975–1980 it was the world’s highest—versus Latin America and the Caribbean’s 2.29 percent, Asia’s 1.95 percent, and Oceania’s 1.33 percent—with wide variation among countries. In 1975–1980 only three countries—Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea—saw an annual population growth rate of less than 1 percent.

**Figure 2.1 Africa’s total population and population growth rate 1950–2010**



Source: United Nations Population Division.

These high growth rates reflect high fertility and declining mortality. Africa’s total fertility rate in 1975–1980 was 6.57, but by 2005–2010 it was down to 4.64. The highest rate during 2005–10 was 7.19 in Niger, the lowest 1.67 in Mauritius. Most African countries—36 of them—had total fertility rates of 4 and above. Indeed, eight of these countries, including Malawi, DRC, Chad, Zambia, Somalia, Mali, and Niger, had total fertility rates of 6 or more (see Table 2.1). These high population growth rates that culminated in the continent’s youth bulge would not have been a problem had African economies possessed commensurate absorption capacities. Unfortunately, they did not because of the policies most of them followed.

*Political and economic*

At independence, African governments followed a nationalist philosophy of development in which they envisioned their role to be not only the maintenance of law and order but also as active participants in the economic production of goods and services. They felt the obligation to provide for their citizens who had long been suppressed by colonial rule in one form or another. So strong was this philosophy that even in countries that followed a form of capitalism such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, nationalistic governments became the leading employers in their countries. They offered jobs through large, state-owned industrial and agricultural establishments, distribution activities, and civil services. The ticket to these jobs was usually a college or university degree, and many young

people with one opted for a public rather than private job. In South Africa, apartheid policies ensured that public sector jobs were only open to well-educated white minority youth, while the majority less-educated—and for the most part unskilled—non-white youth were left with mining and other menial jobs.

These policies had carrot-and-stick elements: the carrot was many youth getting access to highly subsidized tertiary education and training and high-paying government jobs, and the stick was an authoritarian and repressive regime. But initial “guarantees” of well-paid public sector jobs after university soon became unsustainable as a result of saturation, mismanagement, cronyism, corruption, and nepotism. The World Bank–IMF SAPs that many African countries implemented in the 1980s and 1990s swung the pendulum to the other extreme by encouraging privatization of many public companies and the retrenchment of many public workers. Some countries such as Egypt tried to address the plight of youth during the SAP era through laws, but initiatives were compromised by the fact that a large section of the formal sector jobs were not open to competition to first-time job seekers (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; Wahba, 2009).

Government economic policies have also long been unsupportive of small firms, yet these are important job creators. For example, the structures and mechanisms needed to energize the private sector, such as easy registration and access to credit for (especially) smaller firms, remained very difficult (Akande, 2014). One upshot? Over 2000–2008, only 16 million (22 percent) of the 73 million jobs created in Africa were for youth (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a).

#### *Sociocultural*

These roots lie deep in the areas of education and training and of societal perceptions of the expected returns to education.

*Education and training.* African governments foresaw the youth bulge in the 1970s and 1980s and sought to expand education and training not only at primary and secondary levels, but also at tertiary level. Nigeria for example in 1972–1985 built 30 new universities, adding to the five it already had. Ethiopia built eight in 1976–1985, while Egypt and Tunisia added six each (Lulat, 2005). These efforts aimed at increasing educational participation in all segments, including across the rural–urban divide. However, the rapid expansion of universities failed to keep up with demand, and was often of dubious quality.

Despite the continent’s massive expansion of its education system, the illiterate (or functionally illiterate) share of its youth population remains substantial. For instance, Jones et al. (2014) shows that the majority of children in Standard 3 (those who have completed at least two years of schooling) in the East Africa region cannot recognize a word in the language of assessment used at the end of primary school. Moreover, in Tanzania and Uganda, more than 25 percent of children enrolled in Standard 5 are unable to recognize a written word. In Nigeria, Akande (2014) wrote of schools that lacked facilities and teachers. In North Africa, Mulderig (2013) reports on serious pedagogical problems, and writes that “students spend hours copying numbers and words off [...] blackboards, with eyes buried in textbooks or focused on a sole teacher addressing the entire class in oral repetitions of lists of facts” (Mulderig, 2013: 10). She laments that school curricula offer very little originality, group work, debate, or expression of opinion.

A mismatch between education and training and the job market is apparent. In particular, colleges and universities are turning out young people who do not have the skills needed for employment, whether to be competitive in today’s job market or to employ themselves

through business (Mcauliffe, 2013). Yet few African countries have undertaken the curriculum reviews required as the first step in correcting matters, and so the education system keeps producing graduates with academic degrees and qualifications but few productive skills (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012). At the same time, nepotism and corruption make it hard for public sector managers to either hire or fire employees or to improve their productivity, stifling the sector's capacity to create jobs.

Another feature of the education system is that, as demographic pressure has increased demand for education, admission into the top universities—where employers recruit for the best formal jobs—has become far more competitive, rendering matters more inequitable: the chances of getting into a top school now depend more on social status and geography, not ability. Students from rich, urban families have an advantage over other students, especially as they can afford to hire private tutors (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012). And these families can use their social, political, and business connections, nudging out many young people from poorer backgrounds.

A further weak link is the small share of TVET in secondary education. In North Africa, for example, we see 27 percent in Egypt and Libya, 12 percent in Algeria, 8 percent in Tunisia, and 6 percent in Morocco. These low shares reflect the low quality of the training and social preferences (Schmidt and Hassanien, 2011; and see just below). It appears that people in North Africa with TVET skills are more likely to parlay their skills into self-employment—and indeed in South Africa and Kenya, which have a shortage of such artisans as plumbers and masons (SABC, 2014; Otuki, 2014).

*Societal perceptions.* Closely related to the crisis in education is the poor social image and prestige of TVET and trades (Mulderig, 2013). The historical prominence and prestige of public sector jobs and their requirement for university degrees have created a long-standing perception throughout Africa that TVET is inferior to a university education, relegating TVET in society's eyes to be the preserve of students who cannot get into university.

Given that most public jobs require degrees in arts, humanities, or social sciences, these disciplines have long been popular with students (and their parents) who, in any case, have a poor grasp of the need for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields because there are insufficient laboratories and teachers. Many students also grow up fearing these fields, which even at university are restricted because of the lack of adequate facilities and qualified professors. The result is continuing overproduction of graduates trained to work for governments that can no longer employ them, who join the pool of waiting youth labor, or what Salehi-Isfahani (2012) calls the “credentialist equilibrium.”

Many college graduates (and their families) have unreasonable expectations of where they should work and in what type of job, as exemplified by Tunisia: in 2010, non-public sectors recruiting university graduates—banking, electricity production and distribution, and real estate—accounted for only 6.7 percent of total employment in the country; sectors such as construction, textiles, and hotel and restaurants, which accounted respectively for 14.8 percent, 11.7 percent, and 4.1 percent of total employment, had the fewest employees with university education (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012a).

**Table 2.1 Estimated population growth rates of African countries, 1970–2010 (annual average per period, %)**

| Country/Region           | 1970–1975  | 1975–1980  | 1980–1985  | 1985–1990  | 1990–1995  | 1995–2000  | 2000–2005  | 2005–2010  |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Africa</b>            | <b>2.7</b> | <b>2.8</b> | <b>2.8</b> | <b>2.7</b> | <b>2.5</b> | <b>2.4</b> | <b>2.3</b> | <b>2.3</b> |
| Algeria                  | 3.1        | 3.2        | 3.2        | 2.7        | 2.2        | 1.5        | 1.5        | 1.5        |
| Angola                   | 2.3        | 2.8        | 3.4        | 2.6        | 3.2        | 2.8        | 3.4        | 2.9        |
| Benin                    | 2.2        | 2.5        | 2.7        | 2.8        | 3.4        | 2.9        | 3.2        | 3.0        |
| Botswana                 | 3.4        | 3.8        | 3.4        | 3.1        | 2.7        | 2.1        | 1.3        | 1.4        |
| Burkina Faso             | 2.1        | 2.3        | 2.5        | 2.6        | 2.7        | 2.8        | 2.9        | 3.0        |
| Burundi                  | 0.9        | 2.3        | 3.2        | 2.9        | 1.7        | 0.9        | 2.6        | 2.9        |
| Cameroon                 | 2.7        | 3.0        | 2.9        | 2.9        | 2.7        | 2.4        | 2.3        | 2.2        |
| Cape Verde               | 2.5        | -0.7       | 1.8        | 1.2        | 2.5        | 2.0        | 1.6        | 1.0        |
| Central African Republic | 2.0        | 2.4        | 2.9        | 2.2        | 2.5        | 2.1        | 1.6        | 1.8        |
| Chad                     | 2.4        | 2.0        | 2.5        | 3.1        | 3.0        | 3.2        | 3.5        | 2.7        |
| Comoros                  | 2.6        | 3.9        | 3.2        | 2.5        | 2.4        | 2.6        | 2.7        | 2.7        |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. of      | 2.8        | 2.9        | 2.8        | 3.2        | 3.8        | 2.4        | 2.9        | 2.8        |
| Congo, Rep. of           | 3.0        | 2.9        | 2.9        | 2.8        | 2.7        | 2.8        | 2.4        | 2.7        |
| Côte d'Ivoire            | 4.5        | 4.6        | 4.2        | 3.5        | 3.2        | 2.4        | 1.7        | 1.8        |
| Djibouti                 | 6.5        | 8.4        | 3.4        | 6.7        | 2.2        | 3.1        | 2.0        | 1.9        |
| Egypt                    | 2.2        | 2.3        | 2.4        | 2.3        | 1.8        | 1.7        | 1.9        | 1.8        |
| Equatorial Guinea        | -4.0       | -1.5       | 7.0        | 3.6        | 3.4        | 3.2        | 3.1        | 2.8        |
| Eritrea                  | 2.7        | 3.1        | 2.6        | 2.4        | 0.3        | 2.7        | 4.0        | 3.2        |
| Ethiopia                 | 2.6        | 1.4        | 3.0        | 3.3        | 3.3        | 2.8        | 2.5        | 2.2        |
| Gabon                    | 2.3        | 2.7        | 3.0        | 3.1        | 3.1        | 2.6        | 2.1        | 1.9        |
| Gambia                   | 3.2        | 3.1        | 4.0        | 4.6        | 3.1        | 2.8        | 3.0        | 2.8        |
| Ghana                    | 2.7        | 1.9        | 3.3        | 2.8        | 2.8        | 2.4        | 2.4        | 2.4        |
| Guinea                   | 0.6        | 0.6        | 2.2        | 3.1        | 5.5        | 2.0        | 1.6        | 2.0        |
| Guinea-Bissau            | 2.8        | 3.7        | 2.0        | 2.0        | 2.0        | 2.0        | 2.0        | 2.0        |
| Kenya                    | 3.6        | 3.8        | 3.8        | 3.5        | 3.1        | 2.6        | 2.6        | 2.6        |
| Lesotho                  | 2.1        | 2.6        | 2.5        | 1.9        | 1.8        | 1.8        | 1.0        | 1.0        |
| Liberia                  | 2.8        | 3.0        | 2.8        | -0.8       | -0.3       | 6.1        | 2.2        | 4.5        |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya   | 4.2        | 4.3        | 4.6        | 2.4        | 1.9        | 1.8        | 2.0        | 1.9        |
| Madagascar               | 2.7        | 2.8        | 2.6        | 2.8        | 3.0        | 3.1        | 3.0        | 2.9        |
| Malawi                   | 3.1        | 3.3        | 3.1        | 5.1        | 1.0        | 2.6        | 2.7        | 3.0        |
| Mali                     | 1.8        | 1.9        | 2.0        | 1.6        | 2.5        | 2.8        | 3.1        | 3.1        |
| Mauritania               | 2.9        | 2.9        | 2.8        | 2.7        | 2.8        | 2.8        | 2.8        | 2.5        |
| Mauritius                | 1.5        | 1.5        | 1.0        | 0.9        | 1.4        | 1.0        | 1.0        | 0.7        |
| Morocco                  | 2.5        | 2.5        | 2.6        | 2.1        | 1.7        | 1.3        | 1.1        | 1.0        |
| Mozambique               | 2.3        | 2.7        | 1.9        | 0.3        | 3.2        | 2.7        | 2.6        | 2.4        |
| Namibia                  | 3.0        | 2.2        | 2.5        | 4.1        | 3.1        | 2.8        | 1.9        | 1.9        |
| Niger                    | 3.0        | 2.9        | 2.8        | 2.9        | 3.3        | 3.5        | 3.5        | 3.5        |
| Nigeria                  | 2.5        | 3.0        | 2.6        | 2.6        | 2.4        | 2.3        | 2.5        | 2.5        |
| Rwanda                   | 3.2        | 3.3        | 3.2        | 3.1        | -4.9       | 7.5        | 2.6        | 2.9        |
| São Tomé and Príncipe    | 2.2        | 2.8        | 1.8        | 2.2        | 1.9        | 1.9        | 1.6        | 1.6        |
| Senegal                  | 3.1        | 2.5        | 2.8        | 3.0        | 2.9        | 2.5        | 2.7        | 2.7        |
| Seychelles               | 2.2        | 1.7        | 1.3        | 1.2        | 1.0        | 1.0        | 1.2        | 0.7        |
| Sierra Leone             | 1.9        | 2.1        | 2.3        | 2.3        | -0.4       | 1.2        | 4.4        | 2.6        |
| Somalia                  | 2.7        | 8.9        | -0.2       | 0.7        | -0.2       | 2.5        | 2.4        | 2.2        |
| South Africa             | 2.7        | 2.5        | 2.5        | 2.2        | 2.4        | 1.6        | 1.3        | 1.0        |
| Sudan                    | 3.0        | 3.2        | 3.2        | 2.4        | 2.6        | 2.5        | 2.3        | 2.5        |
| South Sudan (no data)    |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Swaziland                | 3.0        | 3.1        | 3.1        | 4.0        | 2.2        | 2.0        | 0.8        | 1.4        |
| Tanzania                 | 3.2        | 3.1        | 3.1        | 3.1        | 3.2        | 2.6        | 2.6        | 2.9        |
| Togo                     | 2.5        | 2.3        | 3.4        | 3.0        | 2.2        | 3.2        | 2.4        | 2.2        |
| Tunisia                  | 2.0        | 2.6        | 2.5        | 2.3        | 1.7        | 1.1        | 0.9        | 1.1        |

|                |      |      |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|----------------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Uganda         | 2.9  | 3.0  | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Western Sahara | -0.5 | 14.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 6.7 | 3.7 |
| Zambia         | 3.4  | 3.3  | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.7 |
| Zimbabwe       | 3.4  | 3.3  | 3.9 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 |

Source: United Nations Population Division.

## CHAPTER 3. THE LESSONS

At the beginning of our review, we had hoped that we would be able to identify the programs that had worked and those that had not, so as to draw some lessons. However, because none of the programs we reviewed had a clear evaluation process, this was not possible. Most simply indicate the number of people served over a certain period of time and the amount spent, without any clear indication of what has happened to those participants after the program or after they had finished with the program. However, we have identified programs that have high potential for success, and otherwise—“workable” and “potentially flawed” programs.

### **Features of workable youth employment programs**

*A workable program is rooted in a comprehensive and supportive legal and policy framework*

This framework is critical as it provides the basis for successful public, private, and voluntary sector youth employment interventions. Such frameworks can take many forms including standalone laws, national youth policies and their supportive laws, and can even be embedded in constitutions. Many African countries have national youth policies, but they must ensure that they are mainstreamed and fully implemented for the benefit of their youth. African countries should pursue proven job-creation, preparation, and sustaining strategies, including those in Table 3.1 and discussed below. Many of these strategies are in line with the best practices in youth entrepreneurship and employment policies of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2011: 47-55).

*A workable program needs the support of good governance and macroeconomic management*

While not specifically focused on meeting the needs of youth, good national macroeconomic management provides a good economic environment for youth to find and maximize their career potential within the economy. Poor economic management and stagnation negatively affects everyone including youth. Conversely, a growing economy has the potential to benefit everyone, including youth, if inclusive economic measures are also in place. Thus African countries should aspire to create growing and effectively managed inclusive economies as these are best placed to address youth unemployment.

*A workable program makes the labor market work better for young people*

The labor market for young people can be made more efficient by providing youth with career counseling and job search skills, wage subsidies, public works programs, and anti-discrimination legislation. While *career counseling* has long been provided through the formal school systems of many countries, these services, along with many African countries' school systems, are seldom in tune with their countries' labor market needs. Thus many school systems continue to produce unemployable graduates while employers continue to decry the shortage of suitably qualified workers and are often forced to import them (Wokabi, 2014). Moreover, after graduation, many young people struggle to find jobs because they lack basic *job search skills* including resume or curriculum vitae preparation. The many African countries contemplating revising their school curricula to better match their market needs should also revamp their training in career counseling and job search skills, as Tunisia's AMAL, Algeria's ANSEJ, and Morocco's ANAPEC programs have already done.

Although wage *subsidy* programs are rare in Africa because of financial constraints, they can be used to create jobs for youth. But to be effective, “they should preferably be linked to structured workplace training, be targeted to industries where employment will be responsive

to changes in labor costs, and be focused on the youth” (Burns, Edwards and Pauw, 2010: v) because youth can gain experience from such programs, increase their future employability, and raise their contribution to the economy through higher labor productivity. Moreover, evidence from South Africa has shown that wage subsidy programs can help reduce poverty and inequality. While wage subsidy programs can cost as much as targeted income grant schemes or welfare programs, they are more beneficial to individuals and society in the long term (Burns, Edwards and Pauw, 2010). For wage subsidies to work, African governments must carefully weigh the negative impact of their economic subsidies and tax incentives on job creation since these can make such factors of production (as capital, skilled labour, and technology) relatively cheaper, and these substitute often for low-skilled labour (Rankin, 2013). One example of such programs is Algeria’s Subsidized Work Contract Social Development Fund.

Another innovative way of dealing with making the labor market work better for young people is to provide tax incentives for employers who employ target populations. Examples are South Africa’s Employment Incentive Act and Tunisia’s Professional Initiation Stage (SIVP). Many countries have programs specifically targeted at special youth populations such as disadvantaged and the poorest youth and women, often in rural areas. Examples include Benin’s PADE for rural youth, Burkina Faso’s PSCE/JF for youth and women, and Ghana’s ITES for the poorest.

While labor intensive *public works* can be used to productively absorb large numbers of youth, such programs are rarely used in Africa largely because of cost and management hurdles, as evidenced in Kenya’s recent Kazi Kwa Vijana (Jobs for Youth) program. Nevertheless, if such programs are well conceived and executed, they make can be part of the solution as Egypt’s PEP, South Africa’s EPWP and CWP, and Ethiopia’s Cobblestone Project have shown.

*Anti-discrimination legislation* benefits youth because it protects them from discriminatory hiring and labor practices. *Affirmative action hiring* can also be used to provide youth and other marginalized groups with access to governance structures, educational and economic fields, and employment opportunities. Across Africa youth employment legislation usually has exclusions. One example is Algeria’s programs under the Social Development Fund.

*A workable program improves the chances of young entrepreneurs*

Interventions that enable youth to engage in self-employment and create jobs for other youth are important. These outcomes can be accomplished through the following features.

Business mentoring can be achieved in many ways including the youth enterprise funds in operation in many African countries. Examples include South Africa’s Harambee, Zambia’s My Job+1 Program, Uganda’s Youth Venture Capital Fund, and ILO’s YEF in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Uganda’s Mara Mentor program is also notable for being online and having operations in many African countries. Other examples that provide mentoring, leadership training, business planning, credit, and encouragement to become job creators are Morocco’s Moukawalati, the program of the Algeria’s National Agency for the Management of Micro-credit, DRC’s PRO-YEN-YEN, and Nigeria’s Young Agripreneurs program.

*Procurement quotas for youth enterprises* are necessary because these enterprises often find it difficult to compete with their more established and better networked and resourced counterparts owned by older people. Youth and women are often underrepresented in most African countries’ power and economic structures and are, therefore, often underinformed about business opportunities. An example of a program that deals with this is Algeria’s ANGEM, which provides loans to small firms to buy raw materials to create an economic activity, and Kenya’s AGPO, which sets aside 30 percent of government contracts for firms owned by youth,



women, and persons with disability without competition from established firms (AGPO, 2015). While the effectiveness of these programs is yet to be gauged, they provide youth with more economic opportunities.

As lack of business finance and expertise are common obstacles to youth entrepreneurship in many African countries, Youth Enterprise Funds are increasingly being used. Examples include Algeria's ANSEJ, Kenya's YEDF and Uwezo Fund, DRC's Program for Creating Jobs and Revenues (PROCER), Tanzania's YEDF, Lesotho's YEP, Morocco's Moukawalati, and Uganda's Youth Venture Capital Fund (TYVF). Just as these funds have many shared objectives, they also have many common weaknesses, including stringent lending criteria that often exclude the very youth they are trying to help.

Like funding, *provision of market access programs for youth enterprises* is critical to their development and contribution to youth employment. Measures for success include aiding their product improvement and marketing efforts, sponsoring them for trade expos, and granting them quotas—more so on government contracts. The last measure is, for example, the focus of Tunisia's ANAL, Benin's PAPJME, and Kenya's AGPO.

*Increasing the productivity of the informal sector* is important because it is a major employer of youth. While debate continues on whether to boost or shrink it, the sector is “heterogeneous and policy should be differentiated accordingly” (Mbaye, 2014:3). Thus while efforts to increase its productivity are bound to be complicated, positive changes can occur in the sector if improvements to all levels of the informal sector continuum are implemented to assist small informal firms to improve productivity while fiscal and regulatory obligations for large informal actors are enforced; governance and public–private partnerships are developed for mutually beneficial reforms that can enhance the public performance and private contributions of the sector to public finances; measures are taken to equip the sector with better skills and business services; policy reforms are made to reduce cross-border smuggling and make trade a tool for regional integration and development; and action is taken to reduce barriers to investment in unskilled, labor-intensive sectors and technologies in agriculture and industry (Mbaye, 2014). Examples include Burkina Faso's FASI, Senegal's Informal Sector Training Program, and Algeria's ANGEM.

*A workable program provides skills training for young people through vocational training including apprenticeship systems, young adult literacy and numeracy programs, and second chance and equivalency programs*

These programs are important because they can improve the employability of youth by equipping them with skills actually required by the job market. Many African educational systems need to be revamped because they produce graduates with skills not required by the market; have high dropout rates; and produce marginally literate and numerate graduates with dim career and higher education prospects<sup>1</sup> unless they get a second chance to strengthen their academic skills.

Africa's vocational education systems also need to be restructured to better meet the continent's growing need for workers in areas such as masonry and carpentry. Egypt's MKI, Morocco's Workplace Success and Job Placement Program, and its women's agriculture and TVET programs are solid examples.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, six out of every 10 Tanzanian students who sat the 2012 Ordinary Secondary Level national examination failed (*The Citizen*, 2013).

Many African countries lack or underuse internships and apprenticeships, depriving youth of a major avenue for acquiring marketable job skills. African countries and their development partners have recently started to expand these systems—Kenya’s KYEP is one example.

*A workable program makes training systems work better for young people*

Good access to information, credit (to individuals or enterprises), and financial incentives (subsidies, vouchers) is fundamental. Throughout Africa, cellphone access has risen to an all-time high and, with it, is growing access to the internet. Youth are increasingly accessing useful information as many public and private agencies make it increasingly accessible. Cellphones will continue to be a central means of communication and source of information.

Readily available educational credit makes it easier for youth, especially those from poor backgrounds, to advance their training. In much of Africa, the state has long been the main financier of education, but since the 1990s many countries have struggled to finance their citizens’ educational needs, particularly for vocational and tertiary education. Consequently, revolving loan programs have started to spread, even though they seem to focus primarily on tertiary education. An excellent example of credit support for TVET education is Egypt’s MKI. In Kenya, the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) provides TVET loans and bursaries for diploma and certificate courses in public universities, university colleges, public national polytechnics and institutes of technology and technical training institutes countrywide. However, these loans are mainly targeted at orphans, single parents, and others from poor backgrounds (HELB, 2015).

Educational financial incentives such as subsidies and vouchers are often used to encourage youth, especially disadvantaged ones, to enroll. Financial incentives have also been used by some countries (Gambia, Uganda) to increase teacher attendance or encourage teachers to serve in remote parts (UNESCO, 2012). We have not been able to find African examples of students being paid directly to attend school, and suspect the main reason is lack of finance.

*A workable program creates programs to counteract residential segregation of disadvantaged young people*

Around the world, residential segregation can create a spatial or geographic mismatch between youth and opportunity, leading to pockets of poverty and marginalization (Onatu, 2010). In much of Africa, residential segregation is the product of European colonialism and South Africa’s pre-independence apartheid policies. At the time, such segregation was racial and, while banned by independent African countries, it transformed into an equally potent socioeconomic variety that still disadvantages many African youth (Otiso, 2005; K’Akumu and Olima, 2007). Among the common solutions to residential segregation is mixed-income housing, transportation (“bussing”), and anti-discriminatory residential legislation.

Theoretically, well designed *mixed-income housing* environments can “improve *social networks* whereby poor people expand their job-search and acquisition networks; improve *social control*, where the presence of higher-income people leads to higher levels of accountability to established norms and rules followed by increased order and safety; offer *behavioral effects* in which higher-income residents model alternate lifestyles and norms, which in turn promote behavioral change and increased self-efficacy among low-income residents; and improve the *political economy of place*, where the presence of higher-income residents will create new market demand and effective political pressure that will lead to higher-quality goods and services for all residents” (Levy, McDade and Dumlao, 2010: 8). How much these benefits are obtainable elsewhere in Africa is unclear, but mixed-income housing has helped tackle poverty,

marginalization, and criminalization of the poor and make decent housing affordable in South Africa and Kenya (Onatu, 2010; Noppen, 2012).

Much more common and, perhaps, more effective in the short term for dealing with youth unemployment in areas with residential segregation is the use of affordable public or private transportation to bridge this geographically induced opportunity gap. Like a poor blood circulatory system, bad transportation can easily constrict the economy and hamper the efforts and creativity of youth and all other members of society. But because of their limited financial resources, youth can be especially hard hit.

*Anti-discriminatory residential legislation* is also a good solution, if enforced, but that can be complicated by many factors, including ethnicity. For example, section 39 (3) of Kenya's constitution states: "Every citizen has the right to enter, remain in and reside anywhere in Kenya."

*A workable program improves and makes labor market regulations beneficial to young people*

National and international labor laws need to be enforced, e.g. ILO and UN Conventions 138 and 199 and relevant national constitutional clauses. Together, these conventions set a general minimum age for employment at 15 years (18 years for hazardous work) and protect children from economic exploitation and work. Specifically, they seek to prevent the worst forms of child labor such as slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, and other illicit activities (ILO, 2015b).

*A workable program creates programs for labor migration and employment of young people abroad*

In today's global economy, labor exports are part of the solution to Africa's youth unemployment, allowing the continent to export some of its surplus labor (including many youth) to other parts of the globe. For instance, Morocco's Infitah program supplies rural women as farm laborers to France and Spain. Similarly, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have recently announced a similar initiative for unskilled and professional jobs (Mutambo, 2015).

To be mutually beneficial and minimize human trafficking, however, regulation is necessary, and African countries must negotiate and sign bilateral labor agreements with host countries; strengthen the regulatory framework for employment agencies that take their nationals abroad; conduct predeparture training for migrant workers and students going abroad for further studies; use travel advisories to enhance the safety of nationals going abroad; and encourage nationals working abroad to register with their embassy to facilitate their access to home-country aid (Matara and Mbatiah, 2014).

*A workable program exploits the advantages and potential of modern technology, particularly mobile phones, for Africa's digital natives*

Global technological advances and economic and market forces will bring disruptive changes to the nature of work in ways that are not yet clear. Global internet connectivity and distance working (from home or in virtual offices) are already a force to be reckoned with and present huge opportunities for employment and wealth creation. Across Africa, mobile technology has become a game changer, particularly for youth who are using mobile phones for communicating, listening to the radio, transferring money, shopping, and mingling on social media. The technology has transcended some divides between urban and rural, rich and poor (Sambira, 2013).

The potential of mobile phone technology for addressing African youth unemployment remains unclear. Obstacles to youth employment include poor awareness of jobs, few personal contacts, and limited means to travel to find work (Dawes, GSMA, Marom, and Alcatel-Lucent, 2013). Because informal ways (word-of-mouth) are the most common job search tool, mobile phones can be used to link employees with prospective employers. In Tunisia, for example, Ooredoo Tunisia is a mobile service program that provides career guidance, financial literacy, career search strategies, links to local training opportunities, and tips on how to start a business. In Kenya, M-Kazi links up unemployed youth with employers via SMS and voice technology throughout Africa. It allows jobseekers to register their details and qualifications via SMS and receive SMS job alerts and employers can target candidates on the m-Kazi database who meet their requirements. Similarly in South Africa, Ummeli connects recruiters with jobseekers, through a community network. The user can build a CV by answering 12 basic questions on their mobile phones, which is then sent to potential employers.

Nevertheless, mobile job support has its challenges. Jobless youth in many countries may be unable to afford high-speed mobile services and some users may also be wary or uncomfortable with new technology. According to a 2009 study on the links between ICT skills and employability in the United States by the Technology and Social Change group (Garrido, Sullivan, and Godorn, 2012), ICT skills cannot solely transform the employability of the individual. Other factors including social and personal contexts, such as gendered access to mobile phones and education, must be addressed. The prospects in this area require a thorough scoping, and all practical measures taken to enable job-creation for the young with the drive, right attitudes, and aptitudes.

### **Features of potentially flawed youth employment programs**

Any youth unemployment program that misses out on the above features is unlikely to succeed. The following are hallmarks of ineffective programs:

- *A poor legal basis (or a good legal basis not implemented).* Just because an idea is enshrined in a country's constitution does not mean that it will be implemented. This has been Africa's common experience. So while we advocate for the passage of legislation to address youth issues, we emphasize even more the need for the state to hold itself accountable and do what the law or constitution says.
- *No reasonable objectives.* African development plans and programs often overestimate their objectives and fail to adjust them to match changing realities. While it is normal for programs to miss the objective, continuous evaluation can help to keep programs on track.
- *Not based in reality.* For example, an agricultural program designed for university graduates who have been taught that agriculture is not for university graduates is unrealistic. An example is the Egyptian National Project that expected young university graduates to go and turn a desolate desert into a "granary."
- *Devoid of long-term goals.* Many of the programs in North Africa either had a short termination date or provided only short-term employment relief with no thought for what happens if a graduate fails to get a job after training or internship. The hope that young people will find something after their internship is only realistic if the private sector is robust enough to absorb the youth, which is usually not the case.
- *Unsustainability—a dream killer.* It was impossible to tell whether many of the programs were sustainable as they did not have a positive and consistent evaluation procedure.

While many of them indicated the number of people trained, there was no way of finding out what happened to those people subsequently. Many programs were launched with short-term external funds that ensured that the programs, some of them good, died when funding ended. We advocate for programs that are locally and sustainably funded over long periods, to the extent possible.

**Table 3.1 Efficient youth employment policies**

| Strategy  | Methods  | National examples  |
|---|--|--|
| Make the labor market work better for young people  | Provide career counseling and job search skills                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Algeria: ANSEJ</li> <li>Tunisia: AMAL</li> <li>Morocco: ANAPEC Programs</li> </ul>  |
|   | Provide wage subsidies   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South Africa: Employment Tax Incentive (since 2013)</li> <li>Tunisia: SIVP</li> <li>Burkina Faso: PSCE/JF</li> </ul>  |
|   | Provide public works programs  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ethiopia: Cobblestone Project</li> <li>Egypt: PEP</li> <li>South Africa: Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP)</li> <li>Nigeria: Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES)</li> </ul>   |
|   | Create anti-discrimination legislation and affirmative action hiring | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2010 Kenya Constitution's bill of rights and anti-discrimination clauses</li> <li>Algeria: Social Development Fund Program</li> </ul>   |
| Improve chances for young entrepreneurs             | Provide business mentoring   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Uganda: Youth Venture Capital Fund, ILO's Youth Entrepreneurship Facility (YEF)</li> <li>Tanzania: YEF</li> <li>Morocco: Moukawalati</li> <li>DRC: PRO YEN-YEN</li> </ul>   |
|   | Create procurement quotas for youth                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kenya: Government's youth and women contract quotas and Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO)</li> <li>Algeria: ANGEM for small firms</li> </ul>  |
|   | Launch Youth Enterprise Funds  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Algeria: ANSEJ Program</li> <li>Kenya: Youth Enterprise Development Fund, Uwezo</li> <li>Uganda: Youth Venture Capital Fund</li> <li>Nigeria: Youth Employment in Agriculture Program (YEAP), Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P), Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOU-WIN)</li> </ul>                                     |
| Improve chances for young entrepreneurs (continued) | Launch Youth Enterprise Funds (Continued)                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ghana: Youth Enterprise Support (YES)</li> <li>DRC: PROCER</li> </ul>   |
|   | Provide Market Access Programs                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tunisia: ANAL program</li> <li>Benin: PAPJME Program</li> </ul>   |
|   | Increase the productivity of the informal sector                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Burkina Faso: FASI Program</li> <li>Senegal: Informal Sector Training Program</li> <li>Algeria: ANGEM</li> </ul>  |
| Provide skills training for young people            | Vocational training including apprenticeship systems                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Egypt: MKI (The Mubarak-Kohl Initiative)</li> <li>Benin: Songhai Centre</li> <li>Morocco: Women's Vocational; Agricultural Vocational; ANAPEC Programs; Workplace Success and Job Placement Program</li> <li>Nigeria: International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (ITTA) Youth Agripreneurs—A youth agripreneurs scheme, Auchi Polytechnic</li> </ul> |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
|   |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uganda: Mandatory tertiary education internship program, introduction of entrepreneurship as a subject in all levels of education</li> <li>• Senegal: Recognition of skills acquired in informal training</li> <li>• Tanzania: Tanzania Youth Scholars (TYS) program for orphans and vulnerable children and youth</li> <li>• South Africa: Learnerships—a partnership between government, training service providers, and the private sector</li> </ul>  |
|   | Literacy & numeracy—<br>young adult literacy programs   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Burkina Faso: Bilingual Education Program</li> <li>• Niger: Alphabétisation de Base par Cellulaire (ABC): Mobiles 4 Literacy</li> <li>• South Africa: Adult Literacy and Skills Training Program (ALSTP), Bridges to the Future Initiative</li> </ul>   |
| Provide skills training for young people (continued)                                | Second chance & equivalency programs  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Burkina Faso: Youth Employment and Skills Development Project (PEJDC)</li> <li>• Ghana: GILLBT Literacy Program</li> <li>• Kenya: National Youth Service's rehabilitation of street youth program</li> <li>• Tanzania: Opportunities for Youth Employment (OYE)</li> </ul>  |
| Make training systems work better for young people                                  | Information   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Much of Africa: Internet Cafes, mobile phone-based access</li> </ul>  |
|   | Credit (to individuals or enterprises)  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various countries</li> </ul>  |
| Create programs to counteract residential segregation of disadvantaged young people | Transportation  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National and city-wide transport systems that ensure youth overcome the spatial mismatch and access jobs in wealthier sections of the nation and city.</li> </ul>   |
|   | Anti-discriminatory residential legislation   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya: Constitution section 39 (3): "Every citizen has the right to enter, remain in and reside anywhere in Kenya"</li> </ul>   |
| Improve and make labor market regulations beneficial to young people                | Enforce national and international labor laws e.g. ILO Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 1973 and UN Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 1999, both of which include youth age 12–18 years | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya constitution Section 30 (1–2): "A person shall not be held in slavery or servitude. A person shall not be required to perform forced labor."</li> <li>• Kenya constitution section 41: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Every person has the right to fair labor practices</li> <li>(2) Every worker has the right—(a) to fair remuneration; (b) to reasonable working conditions; (c) to form, join or participate in the activities and programs of a trade union; and (d) to go on strike.</li> <li>(3) Every employer has the right—(a) to form and join an employer's organization; and (b) to participate in the activities and programs of an employers' organization.</li> <li>(4) Every trade union and every employer's organization has the right—(a) to determine its own administration, programs and activities; (b) to organize; and (c) to form and join a federation.</li> </ol> </li> </ul> |
| Improve and make labor market regulations beneficial to                             |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya constitution section 41 (continued): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(5) Every trade union, employers' organization and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>  |

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| young people (continued)  |   |   |
| Create programs for overseas employment of young people             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiate and sign bilateral labor agreements with host countries;</li> <li>• Strengthen regulatory framework for employment agencies that take nationals abroad;</li> <li>• Conduct predeparture training for migrant workers and students going abroad for further studies;</li> <li>• Use travel advisories enhance the safety of nationals going abroad and</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Morocco: Infitah Program</li> <li>• Kenya: Kenya's 2014 Diaspora Policy contains these provisions</li> </ul>   |
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage nationals working abroad to register with your country's embassies abroad</li> </ul>   |   |
| Pursue a comprehensive approach for dealing with youth unemployment |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tanzania: Youth Policy</li> <li>• Uganda: Youth Policy</li> <li>• South Africa: Youth Policy</li> <li>• Côte d'Ivoire: The Youth Employability and Insertion Support Program (PAAEIJ)</li> </ul> |
| Other (e.g. voluntary national service programs)                    |   |   |

Source: This table is adapted from Rother, F. 2006. *Interventions to Support Young Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Regional Report for the Youth Employment Inventory*. World Bank: Washington, DC, page 4. The original drew on multiple sources, including many of those in the references below.

## Conclusions

Addressing the youth unemployment problem in Africa requires an integrated, holistic approach. Shortcuts will not work. Africa's youth unemployment problem was not created overnight, and thus cannot be solved in a day. It requires comprehensive, long-term, deliberate, well-targeted, and coordinated interventions. Foreign seed funding is helpful, but should not be regarded as the primary instrument for resolving the immediate crisis or a long-term solution.

Good governance is crucial. This includes supportive legislation for youth unemployment (not just on paper) that eliminates discrimination against youth. Maintaining law and order and adequate security in a regulatory environment that facilitates investment and business, particularly of small enterprises, is vital. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) must ensure that regional economic integration policies do not just remain a theory but are implemented in real terms, across borders. Free movement of people and goods should be

encouraged, within the limits of regional and international trade treaties. International youth labor movement must be streamlined and regulated to be mutually beneficial.

Any youth unemployment program must ensure built-in sustainability, offering details on expectations for graduates, job placement at the end of the training, and continuity of employment. Short-term programs established with seed funding must be supported and embraced by African governments and integrated into their comprehensive youth employment framework; they should not be neglected as orphans when the seed funding dries up. The efforts of the ILO, World Bank, Rockefeller Foundation, and other entities are important, but cannot be a substitute for African governments' ownership of and responsibility for the youth unemployment crisis. African countries must stop waiting for external intervention as helpless victims of a crisis and begin to own and actively engage the challenge with African resources and solutions.

If African countries take these lessons to heart and ensure that their youth employment programs conform to them, they will be well on their way to taming their youth unemployment beast and, thereby, turn their youth bulge into a blessing rather than a curse. The youth are Africa's future and must not be wasted: they should be nourished and empowered to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all Africans.



## PART 2. RESPONSES TO YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

The overwhelming majority of Africa’s responses are active labor market programs (ALMPs), defined as programs that require beneficiaries to engage in job search or training in return for benefits and services (Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano, 2013). (They exclude passive activities like unemployment insurance.)

ALMPs may be classified in multiple ways. Garcia and Fares (2010), for example, identified 68 measures in three main policy areas: broadening opportunities for employment through programs that boost demand for labor; building skills and capabilities through post-school programs of skill building and entrepreneurship; and investing in “second chance” programs such as adult literacy, support for marginalized groups, and public works. Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano (2013) spot five types: training and retraining; intermediation services; wage subsidies; public works programs; and self-employment.

In selecting the case studies, we were guided by nine measures known to be effective in tackling youth unemployment (Rother, 2006:4): making the labor market work better for young people by providing them with counseling and job-search skills, wage subsidies, and public works programs; improving the chances for young entrepreneurs; providing skills training for young people through vocational training and apprenticeship systems, literacy and numeracy training, and second chance and equivalency educational programs; making training systems work better for young people by providing them with information, credit, and financial incentives; providing programs to counteract residential segregation of disadvantaged young people; improving labor market regulations to benefit young people; providing programs for employing young people abroad; ensuring a comprehensive approach to youth employment creation; and undertaking other youth engagement initiatives, e.g. voluntary national service programs.

No matter how they are classified, all ALMPs have two broad objectives—to improve labor supply (skills training and improvement) and to create employment—which we adopted in selecting the case studies, and which form the structure of each country’s analysis. The studies give examples of best practices of youth employment programs, and are presented regionally: North Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Each region has a summary unemployment table followed by the case studies. The appendix has summary tables of the programs discussed.

## CHAPTER 4. NORTH AFRICA

North Africa has attracted the most attention, in part due to the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a 24-year-old Tunisian, which triggered the Arab Spring, and in part because the region has the highest youth unemployment rate in Africa (Table 4.1)—at 31.4 percent, almost twice Africa’s rate. Like other countries in Africa, this region’s countries have implemented many policies and programs, some of which go back to the early post-independence period.

**Table 4.1 Unemployment rates for youth (age 15–24) in North Africa, 2013 (%)**

| Country                | Total       | Male        | Female      |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Algeria                | 24.0        | 21.0        | 38.7        |
| Egypt                  | 38.9        | 25.8        | 71.1        |
| Libya                  | 51.2        | 38.5        | 77.2        |
| Morocco                | 18.5        | 19.0        | 16.9        |
| Sudan                  | 24.5        | 22.6        | 27.5        |
| Tunisia                | 31.2        | 32.0        | 29.3        |
| <b>North Africa</b>    | <b>31.4</b> | <b>26.5</b> | <b>43.5</b> |
| <b>African average</b> | <b>16.7</b> | <b>15.2</b> | <b>19.3</b> |

Source: World Bank 2014a.

### Algeria

The attempt to deal with youth unemployment is embodied in its National Employment Policy (NEP), adopted in 2008. Among its 11 targets were to fight unemployment through an economic approach; strengthen the promotion of youth employment and improve recruitment rates after an induction period; and to reduce unemployment to less than 10 percent in 2009–2010 and to less than 9 percent in 2011–2013 (Musette, 2013). Implementation is through the National Employment Agency (ANEM), National Agency for Youth Employment Support (ANSEJ), National Unemployment Insurance Fund (CNAC), Social Development Agency (ADS), and National Agency for the Management of Micro-Loans (ANGEM). CNAC is for unemployed adults age 30–50 (Abdellatif and Mohammed, 2014).

CNAC is under the Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Security, while ADS and ANGEM are under the Ministry of National Solidarity. These agencies have implemented two broad programs—job placement services for the unemployed and support services for creating microenterprises (Musette, 2013).

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET program.* The program was implemented between 2007 and 2009 with funding from BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) and implemented by the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ). The objective was to increase the value of vocational education through stronger cooperation between the private and public sector; and to improve the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The program was mainly intended to advise policymakers and the private sector on how to restructure the apprenticeship program for people under 25. About 60,000 students attended the training over two years. Reports on the program show that the trainees were better prepared for the job market than students from regular vocational institutes. A 2009 review reported that Algerian partners were going to set up 14 such programs (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010).

*Job placement services for the unemployed.* Two programs come under this initiative.

*National Employment Agency (ANEM) Programs—Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Security.* This agency was created in 1990 and was reorganized in 2006 with a staff of 3,097 and charged with the task of job intermediation for the young unemployed. All employers—public and private—must inform the ANEM of any vacancies or they will face a fine (except public services). ANEM then places the unemployed into the vacancies. In 2006 there were 132,000 vacancies and 96,000 jobseekers. In 2010, the number of vacancies reached 234,000 while the number of jobseekers was 181,000. In 2006 the placement rate was 73 percent, in 2010, 77 percent, meaning that not all vacancies could be filled, for several reasons (Musette, 2013)

Since 2008, the agency has adopted another program for youth: The Professional Insertion of Youth Program (DAIP), which has four components:

- Graduate Integration Contract (CID)—one-year graduate integration contract for university graduates
- Professional Integration Contract (CIP)—one-year vocational integration contract for secondary-technical graduates
- Training Insertion Contract (CFI)—one-year training insertion contract for jobseekers with no qualifications
- Subsidized Work Contract (CTA)—three-year subsidized work contract after the end of one of the above contracts.

For CID and CIP, the state pays the salary while the employer contributes to social security. For the CFI, the state pays the bursary during training and pays for the salaries if the student is placed. The state pays the salary. The CIP and CFI benefited 278,000 people in 2009 and 273,000 in 2010. Similarly, 8,000 benefited from the CTA in 2009, and in 2011, 24,000 people gained permanent employment. In 2012 the CID, CIP, and CFI placed 240,000 beneficiaries, while the CTA had 41,000 (Musette, 2013).

*Social Development Agency (ADS) Programs—Ministry of National Solidarity.* The ADS was created in 1996 to fight poverty, support unemployment, manage pro-poor employment programs, and fight social exclusion. These programs' main targets are poor and rural families of working age (16–65) and young graduates. The agency's programs can be broadly categorized into two. The first encompasses pro-poor programs or program for social inclusion, such as the Public Works for Social Inclusion (DAIS) Allowance for Activity for Community Service (AIG), Job Employees Local Initiative (ESIL) Allowance of Activity of General Interest (IAIG), and Work for Public Utility-High Intensity (TUP-HIMO). The second is the Insertion Program for Graduates (PID).

The DAIS places unemployed people age 18–59 who have no qualifications into temporary jobs or in public works, lasting for two years but renewable twice. Participants receive wages and state-supported social insurance. In 2012 the ESIL and IAIG were folded into DAIS. AIG targets disadvantaged people in the labor force and places them in jobs for one year, renewable once. In return people receive a state-supported wage and social insurance.

The PID program targets young unemployed or disabled university graduates and technicians age 19–34. They are placed with a company for one year, renewable once. They receive a state-supported wage and social insurance.

Musette (2013) reports that the number of beneficiaries of all these programs, except IAIG, has fallen. For example, DAIS served 90,000 people in 2010, a few more in 2011, but fewer than 37,000 in 2012. TUP-HIMO generated an estimated 33,000 jobs in 2010 but only 24,000 in 2011

and 19,000 in 2012. For the PID programs, the numbers were 48,000 in 2010, 42,000 in 2011, and 13,000 in 2012. In contrast, the IAIG continued to serve around 252,000 beneficiaries in 2012 (Musette, 2013).

#### *Job creation*

*Support services for creating microenterprises.* The second set of programs supports creation of microenterprises. There are three programs, but that targeting people age 30–50 is not included here.

*The National Agency for Employment Support of Youth (ANSEJ) Program—Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Security.* This agency was created in 1996 to support youth (19–35 years) and those under 40 through the creation and expansion of microenterprises. It has 1,942 staff, including 526 women. The program offers business advice, training, credits and grants, tax exemptions, and monitoring. It offers two types of funding: bilateral funding requires 70 percent of personal funds, and the program funds 30 percent of the project, interest free; multilateral funding requires a 1–2 percent personal contribution, a 70 percent bank loan, and a 28–29 percent agency grant. The number of funded projects was in 2010, 30,000; in 2011, 42,621; and in 2012, 62,812 (Musette, 2013).

*National Agency for the Management of Microcredits (ANGEM)—Ministry of National Solidarity.* This agency was created in 2004 with the aim of alleviating poverty through granting microcredit loans to the poor and reducing social exclusion, the informal economy, and unemployment. Before the Arab Spring, the main activity was to grant loans to small firms to buy raw materials to create economic activity. After the Arab Spring, it adopted a funding model similar to the ANSEJ's. It provides funds of US\$1,000–10,000. In 2005–2012 it funded 451,608 projects, of which almost 423,000 were for purchasing raw materials for home-based activities (Musette, 2013).

### **Egypt**

Egypt has enacted several employment policy and governance measures, including establishment of the Supreme Council for Human Resources Development (SCHR), a National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE), and the National Skills Standard Project (NSSP). These have provided the framework for employment programs that address labor supply improvements and job creation (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002).

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*The Mubarak-Kohl Initiative.* Egypt's signature human resource development was embedded in what came to be referred to as the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative (MKI) of the 1990s. This program, an experiment to adapt the German system of technical training into the Egyptian context, was a combined effort of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002). It was based on the philosophy that joint public-private responsibility of training programs would better equip young people with the skills they need for the job market. The private sector was to be responsible for providing internships, monitoring the internship, and making sure the students got proper training; the curriculum and examinations were jointly designed by the Ministry of Education and the private sector. The Ministry of Education also provided partial payment for the program. Entry into the program was based on passing an aptitude test, and after the three years of training, students would be placed in the firms they did internships with, or if the firms were unable to hire them, the students would work elsewhere.

In 1995 the first such training institute opened in the 10th of Ramadan City. The first students were selected by the industries themselves. Each week for three years, the students received two days of general and technical education and three days of practical training. Problems were immediately identified in that some of the companies began using their students as a form of cheap labor. This caused the program to recruit students the “Egyptian Way”—that is, recruiting students from relatives who worked in the same factory, for example. Still, in 1999 the program was evaluated, found successful, and extended (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002).

Other problems included overcoming the concept of public–private partnership in a culture where the government was historically responsible for everything; the lack of sophistication and inability of most industries or factories to provide training over long periods; and the overall potential for solving unemployment was limited by the scope of the economy. The program also suffered from gender inequality, shortage of qualified teachers, and graduates often wanting to pursue university degrees rather than to become skilled workers.

German support, which covered teacher training, curriculum updating, and developing instructional materials and financing of school infrastructure, officially ended in 2009, and the program is running now without any external funding. At that time there were 1,900 companies participating, out of 25,000 potential enterprises that could take part in the initiative. Over 80 percent of the companies were in manufacturing, about 8 percent were in services, and the rest were in agriculture. Only 13 percent of the 24,000 graduates were women. Of the graduates, 85 percent were employed in the companies where they had received training. Although 22 of Egypt’s 27 governorates offer the system as an option, the number of students in the program remains small—just about 1.59 percent of the total number of all students (Amin, 2014).

*Community youth mapping.* This program was implemented in 2004–2008 by the Academy for Educational Development with funding from United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was meant to provide a basic life skills education that would provide jobs for the economically disadvantaged youth. The target group was age 13–18 years but training was also open to teachers of vocational schools, local government personnel, social workers, and local business enterprises. The program was concentrated in a mix of six rural and urban governorates. More than 4,000 students attended, while over 120 trainers were certified. A new nongovernmental organization (NGO) for youth was also established as a result of the program (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010).

#### *Job creation*

*Public works programs (PWPs).* Egypt’s direct job creation strategy has been through infrastructure projects, which use local resources, a large number of temporary workers, and labor-intensive construction techniques. In 1991, as a way to cushion the side effects of Egypt’s structural adjustment program, the government established the Social Fund for Development (SFD). This was a large fund of about US\$700 million and was initially for a few years. However, its mandate was extended in 1996 and again in 2001 to tackle structural social problems through development of communities, enterprises, and human resources (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002). The target groups were unemployed youth, retrenched workers, poor female-headed households, and unskilled or semi-skilled workers. The fund sought to create jobs directly or indirectly through PWPs and enterprise development (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002).

PWP projects covered a wide range of infrastructure: productive (irrigation), economic (roads); social (building restoration); complementary (health). Projects are identified through the PWP network of regional offices and local populations. Projects are selected on the basis that they do not contradict planning policy; depend on contributors outside PWP; meet urgent needs of the local population; are environmentally sound; and use labor-intensive techniques. Projects also require local contractors, NGOs, and laborers before approval. Salaries paid to unemployed youth are no higher than those in the local area so as to prevent a flock of unemployed youth from elsewhere.

In the short term the PWP appeared to have created jobs—it is estimated that about 42,000 jobs were created up to 1997, but of these 90 percent were temporary (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002). The workers were all men. PWP's insistence of local resources and inputs also made maintenance costs very high and, with no local tax base and given that donors were not interested in funding infrastructure maintenance, it was difficult to see how sustainable those projects would be. And without data collection and transparency, it is hard to determine its long-term impact, especially where all the temporary workers ended up once the temporary jobs are over. Did workers go on to more permanent jobs as the program had hoped or did they go back to being unemployed?

*Support in self-employment and enterprise creation.* There have been two programs in this area.

*The National Project.* With an area of almost 1 million sq. km., of which only 6 percent is cultivable, and a growing population, habitable land is a rare commodity in Egypt. As a result, land reclamation was part of Egypt's history until the 1970s. During the 1980s interest in it began to grow again and projections were made to expand arable land by about 33,000 sq. km. over the next 20 years. The objective of these projects was to reduce unemployment, alleviate population pressure in the major cities, and increase agricultural production. The project was launched in 1988 in the hope that young university graduates would move into a new kind of environment and apply their skills to develop and use the land.

Several problems emerged. First, land fragmentation impeded use of modern agricultural techniques. Second, it was difficult convincing young people used to urban life and expecting to get white-collar jobs to move to agricultural lands that were formerly deserts. Third, one provision of the program was that new settlers would use the land but not own it until they had cultivated it for 30 years, which many felt too long. Other problems included bureaucratic delays in releasing land, and the high cost to the government because settlers had to be supported until they could stand on their two own feet. From the mid-1990s the government decided to sell land to large investors, which had very little employment potential (van Eekelen, de Luca, and Ismail, 2002).

*Support for Small Enterprises and Micro-Finance.* This program was started in 2006 for five years with World Bank funding. The goal was to create 18,000 SMEs that would create 60,720 jobs and 50,000 micro-businesses that would generate 60,000 jobs. The loans came from different sources—banks, NGOs, and nonfinancial business development services (Amin, 2014).

## **Morocco**

Morocco has one of the most extensive youth programs and services on the African continent. Indeed, until Abdelwahab Zeidoun set himself on fire on January 18, 2012 in Rabat, Morocco was held as a model for youth employment programs in Africa. Since then their effectiveness has been questioned. Almost all the programs reviewed relate more to labor supply improvement than job creation.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET programs.* Morocco has a number of vocational training programs for youth beyond the formal school system, some of which do not have direct bearing on youth. Those specifically for employment include the following.

Women's Vocational Training seeks to offer labor market entry through rapid qualification training to young women age 15–22 who have no formal education, or have dropped out or finished school without any degree (World Bank, 2012). The training is at women's centers, the first of which was established in 1957. Initially the training focused on literacy, health education, cooking, sewing, embroidery, and child care. Today, sewing and computer training are the most popular courses. A review of the program in 2011 indicated that while the number of centers grew from 282 in 2005 to 295 in 2009, the total number of beneficiaries increased only slightly, to 38,574 in 2006, after which it started falling. In 2009 the beneficiaries numbered only 17,423 (World Bank, 2012).

The National Assistance Agency's Vocational Training offers two vocational training programs through the Centers for Education and Training (CEFs) and Apprenticeship Training Centers (CFAs). Established in 1957, CEFs are similar to women's centers and offer programs in recognized vocational training certificates. The World Bank (2012) reported that there were 1,079 CEFs providing free training for 106,673 beneficiaries. It also indicated that, while it was very popular with young women, instructor shortage was a major constraint. The CFAs were introduced in 1990 given poverty concerns among socially and economically vulnerable youth. The training targets high school dropouts age 16–30. The training includes 20 percent theoretical foundation and 80 percent hands-on production using course content usually set by the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training.

Agricultural Vocational Training—from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries—offers three types of training to young agricultural workers:

- The two-year technical program strikes a balance between classes in a vocational training center and practical experience in a workplace. Training is provided through Agricultural Institutes for Specialized Technical Studies (ITSAs), Agricultural Technology Institutes (ITAs), and Certified Agricultural Training Centers (CQAs). The ITSA provides training in agricultural management and trade technician certificates to students under 25 with baccalaureate degrees. The ITAs provide training to students under 25 who have finished secondary education, while the CQAs target students under 25 who have completed the ninth grade (World Bank, 2012). Both programs aim at helping students acquire practical knowledge through work experience, to enable them to enter the workforce.
- A one-year apprenticeship training, offered through the CFA program, was introduced in 2000. CFAs are in agricultural training institutes. The greater portion of the training (80 percent) occurs on farms with only 20 percent at institutes. The main target of this program is the rural youth who have not gone onto higher education.
- A three-year training course is offered through the Rural Family Houses (MFRs). This program, created to meet the needs of rural youth who do not have access to formal education due to location and distance, targets 15–20 year olds, most of whom have only secondary school education. Evaluation of these programs shows mixed results (World Bank, 2012). Students' success in finding employment varied across regions, and often graduates had to move to other regions to find a job. Evaluation of the ITSA concluded that the training was too general. The one-year apprenticeship training was

inadequate for employment on most farms in Morocco, and the three-year program was facing staff and funding difficulties (World Bank, 2012).

#### *Programs of the National Agency for Employment and Skills Promotion*

ANAPEC is Morocco's principal agency for implementing the following programs. The agency was created in 2001 to act as an intermediary of the labor market to youth and employers, providing information to both (Belghazi, 2013). It collects information on the labor market and matches jobseekers with vacancies. It has a network of offices throughout the country and in remote areas, and partners with NGOs to provide information to unemployed youth.

Belghazi (2013) finds that in 2009, ANAPEC collected information on 27,678 vacancies and placed about 4,355 jobseekers. By end-2009 about 517,000 people (41 percent female, 18 percent under 24, 33 percent university graduates, 33 percent graduates of professional training, and 30 percent with only a high school diploma) had registered with the agency. ANAPEC offers four youth employment programs—the *Idmaj*, *Taehil*, *Infatih*, and *Moukawalati*, which were all created in 2006–2008. The first three are labor supply improvement programs and *Moukawalati* is a job creation program.

*Idmaj*. This targets first time jobseekers and matches them with employers through internships. It seeks to make jobseekers, mostly higher education graduates, more attractive to employers by reducing the total wage bill. Employers do not pay taxes on trainees' salaries during training and, if they are hired, the tax-free status extends for another year. Evaluation of the program showed that about 52 percent of the trainees did not complete their training before they were terminated by their employers. Employers cite lack of skills as the main reason for termination (Belghazi, 2013).

*Taehil*. This program seeks to provide training for labor market integration for high school graduates. After completing a regional needs assessment study, it provides employer-specific customized training. Employers commit to employ the trainee for six months after the training (Belghazi, 2013). The program is successful as demand exceeds supply. It is reported that 70 percent of those receiving training find short- to medium-term jobs within the firm they trained. Evaluation of the program shows that 37 percent of the firms interviewed hired their trainees at the end of the contract, 58 percent hired half of their trainees, but 17 percent did not hire any (Belghazi, 2013).

*Infatih*. Launched in 2008, the objective of this program is to place jobseekers in the international market as well as in seasonal and circular labor migration. The program targets people age 18–40, mostly women, from rural areas with children under 14 years old. The women are sent to France and Spain as farm laborers, leaving the children behind to guarantee their return after completing their contract. In 2009, the program had 10,853 beneficiaries. In 2010 only 6,222 went through the program. The beneficiaries saw the program as good for them but they thought the long separation from their families was difficult. In addition, because most of the women were uneducated, they were more vulnerable to exploitation in host countries (Belghazi, 2013).

Among the problems in these programs are a cultural gap between government ideals and entrepreneurial skills; self-employment is still not seen as appropriate for university graduates; youth still lack the skills to put together and present a good business plan; expectations from the private sector by university graduates seem unreasonably high; and evaluation is inconsistent.



### *E-equality ICT and Entrepreneurship Program*

This program was initiated in 2004 with funding from USAID, to help “the education and vocational training sectors prepare graduates better to meet Morocco’s current and future workforce needs” through “creating bridges between formal schooling, vocational training and employment” (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010). The program adopted the approach of making curricula relevant, developing communication, decision-making, and leadership skills of young people and enabling schools to carry out their own quality improvement plans.

Among the main activities is to work with public and private institutions to develop relevant curricula; provide job opportunities; train over 1,500 vocational school students and instructors every year; connect youth with job counseling and placement services; and provide skills needed by youth in today’s job market. The target group is below 25 years, male and female, in rural and urban areas. As of December 2015, the program has cost US\$26.7 million. During school year 2007/08, 275,000 students and 10,000 teachers from 485 schools took part. At the time of the review no graduates had finished yet, although preliminary evaluation considered it as adding value to education (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010).

### *Workplace Success and Job Placement Program*

This ongoing program was initiated in 2007 with funding from the International Youth Foundation. The objectives include improving the overall quality of training and job placement for youth; increasing public–private partnerships; and improving economic conditions for youth so that they can support their families.

Employers identify skills gaps and local solutions are devised through education, training, and job placement. The program primarily targets male and female youth in the 20–30 age group. Employers’ positive feedback led to additional courses launched in 2008 and 2009. The total cost of the program for 2009 was US\$256,584. By 2010, 222 people had attended the program, of whom 182 had graduated, out of whom 86 percent had been placed in an internship (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010). That year, the Education for Employment Foundation (EFE) and Hassan II University were to team up to integrate the program into the broader curriculum (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010).

### *Job creation*

#### *Moukawalati*

This program aims at long-term support for young entrepreneurs. It provides microcredit to young entrepreneurs, who must register with ANAPEC to apply for a loan. If the project passes the feasibility test, the loan is granted interest free to be paid back within six years. The entrepreneurs are monitored for the first two years of their project (Belghazi, 2013). At inception, the program aimed to create 30,000 new small enterprises and 90,000 new jobs by 2008. However, after the program had been criticized for poor planning, the target was reduced to 10,000 enterprises. By 2013 only 3,315 enterprises and 10,000 jobs had been created (Mitchel, 2013).

## **Tunisia**

Tunisia has two government agencies for youth unemployment: The Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment oversees the labor market, and the National Agency for Employment and Independent Work (ANETI) employment intermediation. These agencies run several programs, six of which are now highlighted.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*The Professional Initiation Stage (SIVP)*. SIVP was introduced in 1987 as a wage subsidy for graduates to work with a firm or organization for one year. The wages offered depended on their qualifications. Entities receiving the graduates were given tax exemptions and national insurance contributions. Graduates had to register with ANETI and to be looking for work to be eligible, and organizations had to be part of the social security system and have a ratio of interns to permanent staff of not more than 40 percent. From 2004 to 2011 over 45,000 went through the system (Broecke, 2012). An evaluation in 2012 found that the program improved the likelihood of graduates finding employment by 8 percent (from a base of the average employment rate of a graduate who did not participate in the program of 60 percent). The review recommended that if the program is to be kept, its funding must be redirected (Broecke, 2012).

*Contracts of Insertion of Graduates of Higher Education (CIDES)*. This program targets university graduates who have been unemployed for three years, a period reduced to two years in 2011. It operates through an internship with private firms and up to 400 hours of training. Most of the beneficiaries are women. The majority of the firms are in the services sector. But only 11 percent of eligible graduates are placed due to lack of internship opportunities (Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano, 2013).

*Contract for Adaptation and Professional Insertion (CAIP)*. This internship program is for non-graduates. It provides a small stipend and social security coverage. Most of the firms participating are in manufacturing or services. In 2011, 40,000 people participated, but job placement after the program is rather low—in 2010 only 18 percent (Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano, 2013).

*AMAL*. This program, which means hope in Arabic, was established after the Jasmine Revolution. It provides services to unemployed university graduates for up to 12 months. Services include career coaching, training in hard and soft skills, on-the-job training and a monthly stipend small enough to encourage graduates to search for a job. In 2011 the program benefited 155,000 more people than the 30,000 originally projected, which has serious budget implications as the project has essentially become a source of unemployment benefit for graduates (Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano, 2013).

### *Job creation*

*PC-50 Program*. This program encourages private companies to hire first-time jobseekers with a university degree. The program pays half the wage for 12 months of the contract, but the program exists in only regional development zones. It is very small and in 2011 served only 500 graduates (Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano, 2013).

*Small Enterprise Promotion Program (PAPPE)*. This provides coaching, support, and development of business plans for potential entrepreneurs. It provides a two-day training course and start-up funds of up to US\$62,000. A total of 17,000 projects were funded in 2011 (Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano, 2013).

## CHAPTER 5. WESTERN AFRICA

This region has the second lowest youth unemployment rate on the continent after Eastern Africa: 10.2 percent (Table 5.1). However, it has extremes, based on World Bank (2014) data. At one end Mauritania has a 42.9 percent youth employment rate, but Benin a mere 1.7 percent and Guinea 1.5 percent. These low rates may be due to these economies' large subsistence agriculture and informal sectors. While youth unemployment is less severe than in Northern or Southern Africa, it remains a challenge. In addition to regional differences (see Figure 5.1), rural areas have much lower rates. National responses have been similar, ranging from outstanding successes such as the Songhai Center of Benin, which has been replicated in Nigeria and other countries, to the corruption-fueled failure of the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency.

**Table 5.1 Unemployment rates for youth (age 15–24) in Western Africa, 2013 (%)**

| Country                | Total       | Male        | Female      |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Benin                  | 1.7         | 1.5         | 1.8         |
| Burkina Faso           | 4.9         | 6.0         | 3.7         |
| Cabo Verde             | 10.8        | 10.4        | 11.4        |
| Côte d'Ivoire          | 5.7         | 6.1         | 5.1         |
| Gambia, The            | 10.7        | 10.2        | 11.2        |
| Ghana                  | 8.7         | 7.4         | 10.0        |
| Guinea                 | 1.5         | 2.0         | 0.8         |
| Guinea-Bissau          | 11.3        | 10.9        | 11.7        |
| Liberia                | 4.5         | 3.4         | 5.6         |
| Mali                   | 10.7        | 8.3         | 14.4        |
| Mauritania             | 42.9        | 44.5        | 38.7        |
| Niger                  | 6.7         | 7.2         | 5.7         |
| Nigeria                | 13.6        | 14.0        | 13.2        |
| Senegal                | 14.6        | 11.4        | 19.4        |
| Sierra Leone           | 4.7         | 6.6         | 3.0         |
| Togo                   | 10.7        | 10.2        | 11.2        |
| <b>Western Africa</b>  | <b>10.2</b> | <b>10.0</b> | <b>10.4</b> |
| <b>African average</b> | <b>16.7</b> | <b>15.2</b> | <b>19.3</b> |

Source: World Bank 2014a.

### Benin

Responses to youth unemployment have included labor supply improvement and job creation programs.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms.* TVET reforms are similar to those in other African countries. They seek to strengthen young people's employability by creating a more relevant curriculum that consists of 60 percent practical training and 40 percent theory; extending training after vocational certification; restructuring the curricula to retain only those materials in line with the country's economic needs; and creating a professional training and learning center for every community. Training emphasizes professional training which includes 15 months in institutions and a seven-month internship. Training is in two places—a training center and a craft business, and involves master craftsmen in the traditional and informal sector. All these are overseen by the National Council of TVET and its subcommittees (Benin, 2014).

*Songhai Center in Benin.* Songhai is a continuing project that began in 1985 with one acre of land provided by the government. It seeks to develop young people with entrepreneurial culture and prepared morally and technically with organizational skills, which will make them successful. The center aims to develop local resources efficiently. The idea is to restore dignity to farming by engaging and rewarding youth in farm activities. The center provides technologies and methods that will improve local production and the environment.

Training seeks to produce young entrepreneurs capable of reproducing the Songhai model in their own community (and elsewhere). The model can be found in other countries and with more than 200 partners, the center helps participants achieve their entrepreneurial dreams. For about 30 years, Songhai has helped many young men and women start business that have not only improved their personal lives but that of their family and community as well (UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in Africa, 2014).

*Partnership for Decentralized Employment (PADE).* This was established in 2009 to support the country's 77 municipalities in human resources development. The program offers paid training to rural groups and the trainee must be eventually hired. There were about 238 beneficiaries in 2011–2013, but few trainees were actually retained after initial training (Benin, 2014).

*Support Program for Youth and SMEs (PAJPME).* This program aims to promote young people to be self-employed and support SMEs that need funds for business expansion. In 2008–2009, the program financed 574 projects and created 662 jobs directly, but due to the high delinquency rate, the program had to be restructured (Benin, 2014).

*Microcredit Program for the Poorest.* This is a group of related projects aiming to strengthen self-employment for females and other disadvantaged groups. The program provides training in accounting, microcredit management, and business management. The female component helped 29,278 women, while the component targeted at farmers helped 38,941 people. By 2014, the project had created 51,622 jobs (Benin, 2014).

## **Burkina Faso**

The legal and institutional framework of the youth employment efforts is provided by national youth legislation, the National Employment Policy (NEP), the National Youth Policy (MPC) of 2008, the National Policy of Education and Training and Technical Professionals, and the National Council of Employment and Vocational Training (CNEFP). Within this framework the government, through the Ministry of Employment, promotes youth employment on three levels: strengthening the means for establishment of small and micro-scale enterprises; improving youth employability; and providing information and intermediation on the labor market.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*The Support Fund for Youth Initiatives (FAIJ).* This fund aims to provide finance for youth projects and entrepreneurship training, and to support job creation. It seeks to improve young people's access to finance for micro-projects and strengthen their professional integration into society. In 2008–2013 it funded 3,875 projects and created 13,485 jobs—3,875 direct and 9,610 indirect. Of the 3,875 youths who received funding, 1,319 were women. The funding rate was about 43.5 percent. One feature is that because the funds are directed at productive sectors, the program allows youth to contribute directly to wealth creation. In 2008–2012, about 45.6 percent of the funds went to agriculture and livestock and 32 percent to crafts (Darankoum, 2013).

The interest rate for all these programs ranges between 5 percent and 13 percent, depending on the sector. However, FASI (see just below) and the Employment Promotion Support Fund (FAPE) give a preferential rate of 4 percent to the disabled, while FAJI gives a preferential rate of 2 percent for disabled youth and 3.5 percent for young women. Over 2008–2012 these programs sponsored 72,150 jobs a year, of which only 11 percent were new jobs. However, the jobs do not take beneficiaries out of poverty. Only about 5 percent of the jobs became secure, 35 percent remained precarious, and the remaining 60 percent failed after three years (Darankoum, 2013). This has been attributed to small loan sizes, and lack of continuing monitoring and skills development.

*Special Job Creation Program for Youth and Women (PSCE/JF)*. This program was launched in 2012 to combat persistent unemployment and underemployment among youth and women, in urban and rural areas. Its objectives include promoting access to employment for young graduates, facilitating access of students and non-students to employment, strengthening productive capacity of rural youth, and strengthening women's access to technology and production transformation. The program created 26,500 jobs and 18,300 internship and volunteer positions in 2012, but only 5 percent of the jobs were directly created for young people who were neither in school nor employed. For the internship positions, there was no proper follow-up with beneficiaries to assure the results expected from the investments. This is the missing link in the program (Darankoum, 2013).

#### *Job creation*

*The Informal Sector Support Fund (FASI)*. This program was established in 1998 to support and finance the informal sector and create job opportunities there. During 2008–2012 FASI financed 5,929 projects. It acts primarily to consolidate existing jobs rather than creating new ones: in the period it funded 11,131 jobs of which only 1,080 (9.7 percent) were new. Most of FASI's support (about 65–75 percent) goes to the services sector (retail trade) and about 17 percent to farming (Darankoum, 2013).

*Youth Employment and Skills Development Project (PEJDC)*. PEJDC began in 2013, and aims to support broad-based economic growth and poverty alleviation by improving employment opportunities for young men and women through labor-intensive public works, skills development, and strengthened institutional capacity and project management (World Bank, 2013). Burkina Faso has recently announced that this project will involve 46,800 youth over five years (White House, 2014). According to the project implementation report, the project development's goal is to increase temporary employment and skills development for out-of-school youth (World Bank, 2013). Already, about 1,100 youth have started work in the labor-intensive public works component with varying specialties. In all, about 2,000 youth are expected to benefit from the initial launch (four regions) of this component. PEJDC is financed entirely by the World Bank and is estimated to cost US\$50 million.

### **Côte d'Ivoire**

The country has addressed youth unemployment by enacting youth policies and implementing labor supply improvement and job creation programs, though all the programs here are of the former type.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms*. A major reform of TVET was launched in 2009. A partnership agreement was signed between the Ministry of Vocational Training and chambers of commerce to develop a performance system that provides skills needed by the country over the next 10 years. The objective is to absorb about 30 percent of primary school leavers and 30 percent of college

graduates and train them. Strategic areas include meeting the demand for TVET, strengthening the links between schools and businesses, ensuring sustainable integration of jobseekers into the job market, and promoting effective and efficient governance of the education system. The implementation plan set out in the Medium-Term Operation Plan (2012–2015) (OTMPC) includes expanding access through rehabilitating existing schools and building new ones, improving the curriculum, launching competency-based certification programs, and establishing a National Certification Regulatory Framework. At the end of 2013 there were 470 vocational training institutions—393 private and 77 public, with 6,482 diploma students in the private institutions and 1,169 skills training students in the public schools. The objective was to have 4,920 diploma students a year and 9,700 skills training students a year at the end of the OTMPC (Côte d’Ivoire, 2014).

*Youth Employability and Insertion Support Program (PAAEIJ)*. About 772,000 youth (age 15–34) were unemployed in 2013 and half of them had no qualifications (AfDB, 2013). In 2012 unemployment was high among those with higher education (38.5 percent) and secondary graduates (23.8 percent), largely due to weak involvement of the productive private sector in education system governance (AfDB Human Development Department [OSHD], 2013). This is essentially a skills-mismatch: about 27 percent of local businesses believe that shortage of good labor limits their competitiveness, a rate higher than the average for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) zone, which is 20 percent (AfDB, 2013).

PAAEIJ supports improving the employability of those with qualifications from professional training and higher education, along with integrating unemployed young people. This is consistent with the goals in the National Development Plan 2012–2015. Financed by the African Development Bank (AfDB), PPAEIJ focuses on forging partnerships between the private sector and the education system to promote a culture of evaluating the external efficiency of training as well as of improving sector effectiveness and governance.

According to AfDB-OSHD (2013), PAAEIJ is expected to directly affect 59,000 vocational training students (48.8 percent female), 155,000 higher education students (37.1 percent female), 2,000 unemployed youths (at least 40 percent female), firms in the nine professional sectors to be restructured, as well as senior officials. It will also indirectly benefit formal and informal sector businesses, the 986,000 unemployed (56.2 percent of whom are female), and the entire population due to the development impact of human capital on growth and poverty reduction.

The program was to end in June 2015, but in March that year the World Bank approved US\$50 million in continuing support to promote employment opportunities and skills training programs for youth (World Bank, 2015). This additional funding will continue PAAEIJ activities because of its immense success in helping the underserved youth population find employment, improve their job skills, and contribute to the stability of the country. According to World Bank (2015), enormous challenges persist due to the high concentration of the labor force in self-employed informal and low-productivity occupations, particularly among the poor, female workers, and people in rural areas.

*Youth Employment and Skills Development Project (PEJEDEC)*. The objective is to improve access to jobs through developing professional skills. The target is jobless and underemployed young men and women age 14–30. The program began in 2012 with funding from the International Development Association for three years. Administered by the Employment Programs Coordination Unit (UCPE) of the Ministry of State, and Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Vocational Training, the program has two parts. The first provides temporary job

opportunities through labor-intensive public works activities such as construction. This part has served 12,500 young people age 14–30 who do not have any qualifications or are still in school.

The second part focuses on skills development including apprenticeship and direct internship, accelerated training, and self-employment. These projects aim at improving employability of young people in multiple skills either through first-work experience or professional courses that are tailored to the needs of the labor market. The program's goal is to help 27,500 young people. By March 2014, 17,508 young people had benefited. Among these were 3,000 unskilled young people who had received an apprenticeship, 2,250 graduates who had received an internship, 5,000 unskilled youth needing to update their skills who had gone through accelerated training, and 800 graduates who had received help for self-employment (Côte d'Ivoire, 2014).

## **Ghana**

To address the growing challenge of youth unemployment, Ghana launched the National Youth Employment Program (NYEP), seeking to employ about 500,000 youth age 15–35 years, over 2006–2009. Prior to rolling out this program, a survey conducted by Coulombe, Temourov, and Wodon (2012) in the country revealed that most of the high youth unemployment rates were in urban centers, especially in the Ashanti and Greater-Accra regions. Because the program only targeted youth who have completed junior secondary education or higher, its impact on poverty reduction was severely limited, particularly for the northern parts of the country with higher rates of illiteracy. Additionally, because of the wages paid and high administration costs, the program was very expensive compared with a public works program (Coulombe, Temourov, and Wodon, 2012).

### *Labor supply improvement*

*Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA)*. GYEEDA replaced the NYEP in October 2012 and was initially grouped into two phases. The first comprised 10 modules of short-term programs to create jobs for youth and consisted of programs such as youth in agriculture, phone repairs, health extension officers, a youth enterprise program, and youth in waste management. The second phase took a medium- to long-term view of employment issues within the context of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). Between 2009 and 2012, the Executive Director of GYEEDA stated that about 500,000 unemployed youth were recruited and trained under various modules, with over 2 million waiting to join the program (Agbenyega, 2012). For example, the waste and sanitation module, managed by Zoomlion Ghana Ltd, charged with improving environmental sanitation, had about 42,000 youth (Zoomlion, n.d.). RLG Communications also trained about 30,000 youth in mobile phone repairs and assembly, computer programming, and entrepreneurship (Cobbina, 2012; RLG, 2014). Additionally, the Youth Entrepreneur Project benefited from a grant of US\$65 million from the World Bank.

But due to corruption and other illegal activities, GYEEDA was frozen in March 2013. According to the GYEEDA investigative report, Zoomlion paid workers GHC 100 while it retained GHC 400 in management fees (Awuni, 2014). In addition, all service contracts between GYEEDA and its service providers including RLG Communications, Asongtaba Cottage Industry and Exchange Program, and the Better Ghana Management Services Limited were terminated in January 2014 after a huge public outcry over corrupt practices (Kale-Dery, 2014). Some leaders of GYEEDA have been indicted (Myjoyonline, 2013), and others are standing trial.

*ITES Ghana Readiness to Work Program.* This project, part of the e-Ghana program, was based on the assumption that, when relevant information technology-enabled services (ITES) and business processing outsourcing (BPO) skills are provided to a talented pool of young people at the base of the pyramid (in poverty), their opportunities for gainful employment in the growing ITES/BPO industry will be enhanced.

ITES has faced considerable challenges. Due to the skills mismatch, BPOs had to retrain some participants because they lacked critical skills needed for the jobs. Also, BPOs resented the direct payment method followed because it did not allow for performance monitoring. (A participant is paid regardless of work performance or whether they even show up.) Performance-based payment would have provided better incentive for trainees and produced better outcomes. Moreover, according to Rabiou and Doh (2013), while the average monthly income of respondents increased by 250 percent, from GHC 97 per month to GHC 340 during the project, participants on average spent GHC 150 on transport to work alone. Nevertheless, 97 percent of participants surveyed reported improved status in their localities after taking part in the program.

BPOs' willingness to retain some of the trainees after the six-month compulsory phase is not promising, however. Their capacity seems not to have expanded to allow them to engage more hands. Participating BPOs need to compete in the global outsourcing market, as a critical part of creating permanent employment to trainees. Because retention of staff depends on availability of jobs, the Information Technology Enabled Services of Ghana (ITESGH) and its sponsors/partners must explore sustainable options or project extensions.

#### *Job creation*

*Youth Enterprise Support (YES).* This is an ongoing youth employment program launched by President John Mahama with a GHC 10 million seed fund. YES seeks to give young Ghanaians (age 18–35) an opportunity to showcase their talents and entrepreneurial skills, challenge them to start new businesses, and employ other youth. This program is multisectoral and draws collaborative support from key agencies such as the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), National Youth Authority (NYA), the Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Finance. Beneficiaries for YES are selected from a pool of applicants with business ideas whose business plans or proposals are then considered for a presentation session. Unlike other programs, YES targets young Ghanaians who have business ideas and require financial support and mentorship. According to the Ghana News Agency (2015), the program had received 1,048 proposals from the 10 regions.

*Youth Employment Agency (YEA).* The agency was established on February 9, 2015 by the government to replace GYEEDA. Like GYEEDA (which replaced the NYEP), the goal of YEA is to develop, coordinate, supervise, and facilitate the creation of jobs for youth. This new agency also takes over the assets of the defunct NYEP and GYEEDA and is implemented by the government. According to the Employment Minister, YEA has an employment capacity of between 45,000 and 100,000 youth, out of whom about 30,000 are expected to be assigned to the sanitation sector (Myjoyonline, 2015). The agency will ensure that no one will be paid less than the minimum wage, which was common during the eras of GYEEDA and NYEP. Funding for the agency includes money approved by Parliament, 80 percent of the Communication Service Tax, 10 percent of the District Assemblies Common Fund, 5 percent of the Ghana Education Trust Fund, as well as donations, gifts, and grants.



## Nigeria

Nigeria has instituted policies and programs to address youth unemployment since independence, covering labor supply improvement and job creation.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) Youth Agripreneurs.* This program was initiated in 2012 and is ongoing. Its goal is to promote agriculture by serving as a model for other young people planning to venture into agribusiness and becoming trainers of trainers. This is achieved through training and demonstration of agricultural best practices. Activities of IITA encompass crops including cassava, plantain, soybean, and maize. “Agripreneurs” in the program seek to cooperate with investors and sponsors to expand their production, and ultimately, to become independent and self-employed, and create jobs for others.

*Auchi Polytechnic (Center for Entrepreneurship Development).* Auchi Polytechnic is ranked as the best in Nigeria and West Africa, and second best in Africa (UNESCO-BREDA, 2013). Its mission is to offer training in skills and knowledge in science. The institution facilitates integration into the formal sector of some 30,000 youth every year. The Center for Entrepreneurship Development (CEDAP) is particularly well known. Students are equipped with skills in areas such as fish farming; carpentry; and making soap, shoes, and pottery.

*Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P)—Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS).* This ongoing empowerment program is geared toward enhancing the employability of up to 50,000 unemployed graduates nationwide via internship programs in preselected institutions by 2015. GIS started in October 2012 and is being implemented by the Federal Ministry of Finance. The program aims to provide the unemployed and underemployed graduate youth with job opportunities that will allow them to develop skills relevant to the job market. Eligible youth will be placed as interns in public and private firms. Participants work in an organization for a year, receive a monthly stipend, and develop skills necessary for national development. According to the Office of the Federal Ministry of Finance, GIS has so far matched over 200 firms with about 1,000 interns from a total of about 85,000 graduates who have registered with it (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2015).

*Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES).* Launched in 2010, this seeks to reduce youth unemployment in Osun, Nigeria by equipping as many men and women with skills, a positive work ethic, and respect for the environment. Due to the skills learned and applied in OYES, participants become attractive in the job market and are often recruited by both government and private enterprises. Unfortunately, the scheme is only able to accept 8 percent of applicants (OYES, 2012).

### *Job creation*

*Youth Employment in Agriculture Program (YEAP)/Fund for Agricultural Finance in Nigeria (FAFIN).* This continuing program was announced to the public in September 2012. In 2014, a Youth Department under YEAP was established by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to support and coordinate all activities of YEAP. The aim of the program is to create more employment for Nigerian youth in agriculture. Additionally, the program will support youth with access to resources including technical, entrepreneurial, finance, business, and marketing skills. Over five years, YEAP seeks to develop a new cadre of 740,000 market-oriented young agricultural producers in rural areas, including school leavers and rural youth leaders (20,000 a state); and to develop 18,500 university graduates who will be formed into young agribusiness entrepreneurs, or “agropreneurs.” They will develop businesses along the entire agricultural value chain.

*Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOUWIN) Program.* This is an innovative business plan competition with the goal of generating jobs by encouraging and supporting aspiring entrepreneurial youth to develop and execute business ideas. This program, via collaboration between the Ministries of Finance, of Communication Technology, of Youth Development, and of Women Affairs and Social Development, seeks to create jobs for youth. The program expects to generate 80,000–110,000 jobs over three years (2012–15). In addition, YOUWIN seeks to provide business training for up to 6,000 aspiring youth entrepreneurs. The government has financially supported over 3,600 Nigerian youth to develop their business ideas through this program (YOUWIN, 2015). YOUWIN has several “editions,” including YOUWIN! Women, targeted at female entrepreneurs age 45 years or less.

## **Senegal**

Senegal’s efforts at tackling the youth unemployment problem has involved programs that improve the labor supply and create jobs, though we review only labor supply improvements and some combination of job creation incentives (Senegal, 2014).

### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms.* These reforms have focused on making vocational training relevant to the needs of the country, developing strong partnerships with private companies and professional organizations, involving the business community and professional organizations in developing curricula and validating practical skills, increasing access to more young women, and supporting integration of trainees into professional life. To implement these Senegal will develop new training institutions for various sectors; create mobile training units that will be flexible to meet the needs of companies; develop clusters of training networks that involve private businesses; and establish vocational schools that will develop a wide range of programs with the flexibility to adapt to the needs of the economy (Senegal, 2014).

*Recognition of Apprenticeship Skills Acquired in Informal Training.* This program provides a means to train and employ vulnerable young people and ensure that this training is recognized at the same level as formal training. Supported by government and private actors, it includes practical and theoretical training in areas such as car mechanics and tailoring. Participants who complete the training receive official certificates that are well respected.

### *Job creation*

*Integration and Agricultural Development Program.* The objective is to promote the development of modern agriculture for young people. The program is administered by the National Agency for Integration and Agricultural Development (ANIDA). It began in 2012 and has created 23 village farms that have created 2,000 jobs for young people. It is expanding to include training and coaching in agriculture and sustainability (Senegal, 2014).

*National Convention of State Employers for Youth Employment (NCEE).* The objective of this program, a collaboration between the government and the employers’ association, is to enhance employability of the youth and facilitate their entry into the job market. It has four components. The internship program and learning allows students to get a good job training match. Internship is usually from six months to two years but apprenticeships are up to four years. The Contract Solidarity Program allows the student to find an internship as a teacher. After training in the first two months participants spend the entire school year in the classroom. The spin-off contract program enables skilled workers interested in self-employment to create or take over a company through financial assistance from either the state or a business. The government covers 50 percent of the cost of course fees. Finally, the Human Resources SME Financing Program aims to increase the growth potential and

development of micro, small, and medium enterprises by improving access to quality human resources.

The agreement among the public authorities and the employers was renewed in 2013, with the goal of generating 39,000 jobs. At end-2013, the program had 306 partners, including 214 companies and 92 in private education. There were 17,405 trainees—16,910 in business and 495 in private schools—and 14,000 jobs had been created (Senegal, 2014).

## CHAPTER 6. EASTERN AFRICA

Youth unemployment for this region in 2013 was 8.9 percent, around half Africa’s average (Table 6.1). As with other regions, it was lower for males (8.0 percent) than for females (9.8 percent). Kenya had the highest rate—17.1 percent—while Rwanda had the lowest (0.7 percent). The highest rate for female unemployment was in Kenya, but the highest gap between male and female unemployment was in Ethiopia, where female unemployment was almost three times the male rate.

**Table 6.1 Unemployment rates for youth (age 15–24) in Eastern Africa, 2013 (%)**

| Country                | Total       | Male        | Female      |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Burundi                | 10.7        | 9.9         | 11.4        |
| Djibouti               | No data     |             |             |
| Eritrea                | 10.8        | 10.3        | 11.4        |
| Ethiopia               | 8.0         | 4.4         | 12.0        |
| Kenya                  | 17.1        | 16.8        | 17.3        |
| Rwanda                 | 0.7         | 0.9         | 0.5         |
| Seychelles             | No data     |             |             |
| Somalia                | 10.6        | 10.2        | 11.3        |
| South Sudan            | No data     |             |             |
| Tanzania               | 6.5         | 5.5         | 7.4         |
| Uganda                 | 6.6         | 6.1         | 7.0         |
| <b>Eastern Africa</b>  | <b>8.9</b>  | <b>8.0</b>  | <b>9.8</b>  |
| <b>African average</b> | <b>16.7</b> | <b>15.2</b> | <b>19.3</b> |

Source: World Bank 2014a.

Eastern African countries have faced up to youth unemployment through laws, policies, institutional frameworks, and labor supply improvement and job creation programs collectively designed to empower, educate, and employ youth (Hope, 2012). Due to differences in colonial experiences, in economic development, and in political commitment to tackling youth unemployment, Eastern African countries vary in the number of policies and programs they have introduced. In particular, we counted more programs in Kenya than any other country.

### **Ethiopia**

In 2012, urban youth unemployment was estimated at 23.3 percent; 28 percent of the employed were reported to be underemployed, 27 percent in rural areas and 34 percent in urban areas. For the youth in the 15–24 age bracket, only 19.9 were enrolled in TVET (Government of Ethiopia, 2014). Ethiopia’s National Employment Policy and Strategy of 2009 has a focus on youth employment through private sector labor-intensive construction activities. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of 2010–2015 gives priority to job creation and targets the creation of millions of jobs over the period.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms.* These have focused on a range of objectives, including developing a highly competent workforce, identifying future human resources, creating micro and small enterprises (MSEs), ensuring a competitive market and guaranteeing development, developing national occupational standards and industry-led assessment and certification processes, developing management information systems that will allow for tracking areas of concern and will facilitate decision-making, and integrating TVET into the informal sector through training and provision of services (Republic of Ethiopia, 2014).

### *Job creation*

No information is provided on the number of beneficiaries of the following two programs.

*Federal Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency (FeMSEDA)*. This agency provides assistance to youth for starting up a business. Assistance includes registration, assessment, guidance, and referrals to TVET institutions and microfinance institutions (MFIs) (Republic of Ethiopia, 2014).

*Innovation, Collaboration, and Entrepreneurship (ICEADDIS)*. This program, initiated with the collaboration of various partners, provides a business incubation environment including training, coaching, and prototyping facilities for small workshops and laboratories (Republic of Ethiopia, 2014).

*The Cobblestone Project*. This project was started in 2005 by the Construction Capacity Building Program, which includes labor-intensive activities such as quarrying, chiseling, transporting, and paving. The project targets millions of young people of different age groups and physical abilities. The program is based on the use of local resources, use of few basic tools, need for large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled labor, and beautification of cities. The project began with an invitation of an international cobblestone expert to train national trainers who then trained the trainees at TVET institutions. The project is funded by the World Bank (US\$50 million). It has increased geographic mobility of people and created new MSEs. Reports indicate that the program has been highly successful. It has constructed about 350 km of roads and pavements in 140 towns. It has also created more than 2,000 MSEs and more than 90,000 jobs (Republic of Ethiopia, 2014; World Bank, 2014b).

### **Kenya**

Since independence in 1963 the country has gone through three phases of employment policies—"Kenyanization" (1963–1979), ALMPs (1980–1989), and macroeconomic management (1990–2011) (Omolo, 2012: 1). The framework of Kenya's current youth employment efforts is provided by the Kenya National Youth Policy (KNYP) and its enabling laws (e.g. the National Youth Council Act of 2009) and the relevant sections of the 2010 constitution (e.g. Chapter 4, The Bill of Rights, and Section 55). These legislative instruments seek to ensure that youth can access education and training; have opportunities to associate, be represented, and participate in political, social, economic, and other spheres of life; can access employment; and are protected from harmful cultural practices and exploitation (Kenya, 2010b). Among Kenya's numerous programs, due to space limitations we review seven only.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*Skills training for young people through vocational training, internships, and apprenticeship programs*. These programs seek to equip Kenyan youth with the skills required by the job market. They have two key components.

*Vocational Education and Training Act (VETA)*. The first component seeks to equip youth with marketable vocational skills through formal training programs in the country's youth polytechnics and other agencies. This component is being revamped by the VETA of 2013 which seeks to establish a TVET system; provide the governance and management of TVET institutions; coordinate TVET assessment, examination, and certification; institute a mechanism for promoting access and equity in TVET training; and assure TVET standards, quality, and relevance. The VETA also created the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority to implement TVET by targeted investment in curriculum development,

internships, apprenticeships, on-the-job training, and the training of instructional staff (Kenya, 2013).

*World Bank Fund.* The second component is a World Bank–funded project (up to US\$145 million) that seeks to support the government’s efforts to improve youth employability. It is coordinated by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning and is implemented through two subcomponents including the Private Sector Internships and Training program that is managed by the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) (Coll-Black, 2014). Popularly known as the Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP), the program links youth interns with employer KEPSA members who have long decried the irrelevant skillsets obtainable through much of Kenya’s educational system. KYEP was initiated in 2010 and is set to end in 2016 (World Bank, 2015). By 2014, four cycles of the six-month internship program had been delivered in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu, with 5,121 young people completing the program and a further 4,408 enrolled. While a review of the program showed that it had yielded positive results because “77% (of which 45% were female) of the interns were employed or self-employed six-months after the completion of cycle 4 of the internship and an additional 8% had returned for further studies,” it nevertheless deemed it only moderately satisfactory in achieving project objectives and overall implementation (Coll-Black, 2014).

#### *Job creation*

*The National Youth Service (NYS).* The NYS is Kenya’s longest running youth job creation program. It was established in 1964 and focuses on admitting and equipping single, 18–22-year-old youth, with a minimum mean grade of D+ in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) exam with vocational, technical, and professional skills. It also admits, rehabilitates, and trains disadvantaged and orphaned youth. While it was for a long time limited to an annual intake of 3,500–4,500 male and female recruits who went on to take one-year artisan, two-year craft, or three-year diploma courses, its intake was expanded in September 2014 to more than 20,000 (Wokabi, 2014). Because the NYS also provides paramilitary training to its recruits, it also serves as a standby national defense force. As part of their training, recruits undertake public works (such as asphaltting roads and building bridges and clinics) and public service projects (Omolo, 2012; Vidija, 2015). The NYS is quite sustainable because it is generally well financed by its own income-generating activities, the government, and Kenya’s development partners.

For a short while in the 1980s NYS was a compulsory pre-university program designed to give pre-university students an appreciation of blue-collar work and a national culture and outlook. Funding shortages and other challenges led to its abandonment in 1990. However, the Kenyan Senate recently passed a law that would make the NYS mandatory for high school graduates and pre-university students (Bosire, 2013), in a component yet to be implemented.

*Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) Program.* The government implemented this public “Work for Youth” program between 2009 and 2011, which sought to employ an estimated 200,000–300,000 urban and rural youth age 18–35 who are vulnerable to hunger and starvation (OECD, 2015; Hope, 2012). KKV employees got a daily wage of between Ksh 150 (US\$1.68) and 250 (US\$2.80) in rural and urban areas, respectively. The World Bank and the government funded the program (US\$43 million) in FY 2008/09 and US\$84 million in FY 2009/10. “By the end of 2010 between 195,458 and 296,000 youths, aged 18–35 years” had benefited from employment in KKV projects (Hope, 2012:224).

The program faced many challenges including delayed release of central government funds, poor project status reporting to central government, and unrealistic expectations of

stakeholders, which caused its demise. Its many critics claimed that KKV was a political gimmick that was too ambitious, most effective in road construction projects that favored men, over controlled by government, and prioritizing politics over professionalism (Hope, 2012; OECD, 2015).

*Programs designed to improve the chances of young entrepreneurs.* Three programs are noteworthy.

*Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO).* This program was created following a 2013 government pledge that 30 percent of government contracts would be set aside for youth, women and persons with disability without competition from established firms (AGPO 2015). AGPO's objective is to register and prequalify such people with enterprises so that they can access government tenders and contracts. While the effectiveness of the program is yet to be gauged, it fulfils the Kenya constitutional requirement that "The State shall put in place affirmative action programs designed to ensure that minorities and marginalised groups ... are provided special opportunities in educational and economic fields" (Kenya, 2010b: Section 56).

*Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF).* This seeks to provide young people with access to finance for self-employment and to develop their entrepreneurial skills (OECD, 2015). Established in 2006, it had accumulated total allocations of US\$34 million by FY2009/10 and disbursed US\$36 million to 87,281 enterprises by June 2010. YEDF's objectives are to provide loans for youth-owned enterprises; attract and facilitate investment in MSEs and commercial infrastructure such as business or industrial parks, stalls, markets, or business incubators that will benefit youth-owned enterprises; support youth-oriented enterprises to develop linkages with large enterprises; facilitate marketing of products and services of youth-owned enterprises in domestic and international markets; provide funding and business development services to youth-owned enterprises; and facilitate employment of youth in the international labor market (Hope, 2012:223). In 2007, Kenya transformed YEDF into a state corporation (YEDF, 2015).

*Uwezo (Ability or Empower) Fund.* This came into being in 2014 for expanding access to finance in promoting youths' and women's businesses at constituency level in pursuit of Kenya Vision 2030; generating gainful self-employment for youth and women; and modeling an alternative framework in funding community-driven development (Uwezo Fund, 2015). The program issues loans only to institutions that are registered and have listed youth and women group members and to organized youth and women's groups that meet certain tight requirements. As of 2015, the program had disbursed roughly US\$57 million to all the country's 289 constituencies (Uwezo Fund, 2015). Political cronyism among Members of Parliament with influence at that level remains a challenge.

*Overseas job initiatives.* The government, through its 2014 Diaspora Policy, plans to pursue measures designed to protect its nationals, including youth, working abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, some of whom have suffered grievously (Connolly, 2012; Matara and Mbatiah, 2014).

## **Tanzania**

Tanzania was the first East African country with a national youth development policy (1996; revised 2007). The goal is to empower, facilitate, and guide youth and other stakeholders in resolving youth development issues. Tanzania has implemented many youth programs.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*Opportunities for Youth Employment (OYE)*. YE is funded by the Netherlands Development Organization and The MasterCard Foundation, and is implemented over 2013–2018. Its primary goal is to improve the livelihoods and prospects of 20,500 rural, out-of-school youth through skills training in a way that fuels their own aspirations as well as the needs of local agriculture and renewable energy markets; match skilled youth with labor market opportunities and contribute to the establishment of new youth-led enterprises; and harness the motivation, energy, and passion of rural youth to innovate and transform existing markets and to create new ones (MasterCard Foundation, 2015).

*Tanzania Youth Scholars (TYS)*. TYS is funded by USAID and run by the International Youth Foundation. The program seeks to help the nearly 10 percent of Tanzanian youth under 18 who are orphans or vulnerable children who lack the educational and job training that would aid their transition to adulthood. It was launched in 2011. At launch, it sought to provide quality employability training and secondary education opportunities for at least 1,800 orphans and vulnerable children age 14–24 through provision of scholarships and accompanying support and to strengthen the capacity of local organization to deliver employability and education programs for vulnerable youth (International Youth Foundation, 2015).

### *Job creation*

*Empowerment and Livelihoods for Adolescent Youth (ELA)*. ELA is an economic empowerment program focused on the social and financial empowerment of vulnerable teenage girls age 13–19. It is run by the international NGO Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC) with funding from the Nike Foundation. It seeks to empower girls to be self-reliant. Its services include entrepreneurship and financial literacy training; social empowerment through life skills-based education on overall health and reproductive health, family, and relationships; and microfinance for small enterprises to promote self-reliance (ILO, 2012).

## **Uganda**

The goal of Uganda’s National Youth Policy, the main policy vehicle for dealing with youth unemployment, is to provide an appropriate framework for enabling youth to develop social, economic, cultural, and political skills. Uganda has launched several programs in part motivated by its postcolonial but troubled history, particularly the tumultuous 1970s–1990s. In more recent years, activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel movement have produced large numbers of displaced, disconnected, and uneducated youth, particularly in the north (Otiso, 2006).

Uganda’s youth unemployment programs seek to provide a supportive environment for private sector investment to create jobs; support enterprise development; and build skills and equip its labor with knowledge (Ahaibwe and Mbowa, 2014).

### *Labor supply improvement*

*Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training (BTVET)*. Uganda is using BTVET to build skills, which are especially important to youth who often lack employable skills or possess skills irrelevant in the job market (Ahaibwe and Mbowa, 2014). Beyond BTVET, Uganda also seeks to improve youth employment by introducing entrepreneurship as a subject at all levels of education; by promoting science by paying higher wages to science teachers, building science labs, and by dedicating more government-sponsorship (75 percent) to science students at universities; and by introducing mandatory internships and skills courses at tertiary level. But unemployment remains high and BTVET programs continue to flounder because they are



largely theoretical and lack the infrastructure to offer more practical courses. Poorly funded, most BTVET programs offer those skills required by the labor market. Enrollment in BTVET programs is low because of negative community attitudes to vocational education (Ahaibwe and Mbowa, 2014).

#### *Job creation*

*Youth Venture Capital Fund (TYVF)*. The TYVF is a government-supported entrepreneurship fund (Ahaibwe, 2014). Supported through a partnership between the government and the Development Finance Company of Uganda Bank, Stanbic Bank, and Centenary Bank, the fund seeks to support the growth of viable and sustainable SMEs by youth in the private sector by providing them with capital and mentoring services. It focuses on youth ventures in multiple areas. To be eligible, applicants must be youth entrepreneurs age 18–35, and their enterprises must have a history of three years, be able to employ four people by the end of the loan period, and their proprietors must be willing to receive advice and be ready to participate in financial skills training and mentoring for business management (Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development, 2015). Other recent and related youth entrepreneurship programs are the Graduate Venture Fund and the Youth Livelihood Program (Ahaibwe and Mbowa, 2014).

A recent evaluation of the TYVF by Ahaibwe (2014) concludes that the fund and similar programs are unlikely to solve youth unemployment because they are urban-based (whereas most youth are in rural areas); are regional rather than national; have stringent lending criteria (e.g. collateral requirements); and are less likely to be accessed by rural youth in agriculture, which provides the bulk of livelihoods for youth. Ahaibwe and Mbowa (2014) call for a comprehensive approach to entrepreneurship, noting that even though the enterprise scheme that was introduced in the 2011/12 had four complementary elements (the Youth Venture Capital Fund, entrepreneurship training, business development, and workspace/infrastructure development), only the TYVF has taken off. It is therefore unlikely to offer much by itself.

*Mara Mentor Program*. The online Mara Mentor program (<https://mentor.mara.com/>) is one of the most innovative business mentorship programs in Africa. It seeks to inspire young entrepreneurs by enabling them to access entrepreneurial and business-related advice from established, prominent, and successful entrepreneurs; expand their leadership skills; receive decision-making and business-planning advice; interact with other entrepreneurs in their country or industry; and become job creators for the next generation (Mara Mentor, 2014). As of May 2015, the program had a legal and operational presence in 17 African countries, was planning to expand to four more, had many diverse mentors from around the world, and hundreds of thousands of mentees who were business owners, entrepreneurs, employees, students, or people just passionate about business (Mara Mentor, 2014).

## 7. CENTRAL AFRICA

Regional youth unemployment at 14.8 percent is slightly below the continental rate (Table 7.1). The regional average is lifted by Gabon, with a whopping 35.2 percent. Still, the three countries reviewed here—Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Republic of Congo—consider youth unemployment a major problem. In the DRC, civil strife, which makes policy planning and implementation precarious, compounds the issue.

**Table 7.1 Unemployment rates for youth (age 15–24) in Central Africa, 2013 (%)**

| Country                  | Total       | Male        | Female      |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Cameroon                 | 7.4         | 7.0         | 7.9         |
| Central African Republic | 12.5        | 11.4        | 13.8        |
| Chad                     | 10.8        | 10.3        | 11.3        |
| Congo, Dem. Rep.         | 14.3        | 13.8        | 14.7        |
| Congo, Rep. of           | 10.7        | 10.2        | 11.2        |
| Equatorial Guinea        | 12.5        | 12.0        | 13.2        |
| Gabon                    | 35.2        | 30.6        | 40.6        |
| São Tomé and Príncipe    | No Data     |             |             |
| <b>Central Africa</b>    | <b>14.8</b> | <b>13.6</b> | <b>16.1</b> |
| <b>African average</b>   | <b>16.7</b> | <b>15.2</b> | <b>19.3</b> |

Source: World Bank 2014a.

### Cameroon

The majority of employed youth are either self-employed or in a family business, but most of them (about 68 percent) are unskilled (Ngathe Kom and Njimbon, 2014). Recognizing that this pattern is untenable for long-term development, Cameroon has enacted legislation that provide incentives for companies to hire young people, initiating other programs on labor supply improvement and job creation.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*Technical and vocational education and training (TVET).* The key National Employment Policy emphasizes increasing the supply of decent jobs, setting adequate demand for jobs, and improving efficiency of the labor market. TVET reforms include collaboration of government with civil society and other partners; joint coordination of government and external support by key stakeholders; emphasis on relevant curricula and adoption of the International Organization of Francophone Countries' standards for technical and vocational skills; special training in strategic sectors including agriculture, tourism, hospitality, and fisheries; and efforts at incorporating artisan capacity building targeted at the informal sector (Ngathe Kom and Njimbon, 2014).

*Integrated Program of Support to the Informal Sector Actors (PIAASI).* This program was established in 2005 to strengthen the productivity of the informal sector, design training programs tailored to technical, managerial, and entrepreneurial needs, and support self-employment through micro financing and profitable and stable projects. Since 2005, the program has created nearly 8,000 jobs (Ngathe Kom and Njimbon, 2014).

*Graduate Employment Program (PED).* This was initiated in 1993 by the National Employment Fund (FNE), with the objective to give work experience to young graduates through internships. Trainees' salaries are split equally between the FNE and the companies offering the internships. In addition, if trainees are hired by the company at the end of the probationary or internship period for a minimum of two years, FNE contributes to the first three months'

wages equal to three times the amount the company spent during training. This hiring incentive made the program very popular at launch. The program has been so successful that FNE has revised it to extend the training period to two years, though the hiring incentive has now become controversial for the FNE and government (Ngathe Kom and Njimbon, 2014).

#### *Job creation*

*Program to Improve the Competitiveness of Agro-pastoral Family Farmers (ACEFA) and the Support Program for Revitalization and Development of Vocational Training in Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (AFOP).* These two programs complement each other in integrating youth into agriculture. ACEFA aims at increasing the productivity of family farms by improving their technical and economic capacities and modernizing and strengthening family farms as production units. The targets include agro-pastoral producers, consumers, and other agricultural sector operators. AFOP provides the training for young people during post-primary education. The aim is to rejuvenate the agriculture workforce, reduce unemployment, and create jobs. More than 7,000 youths have been trained in this program (Ngathe Kom and Njimbon, 2014).

### **Democratic Republic of Congo**

The government identifies unemployment and poverty as the two most important problems facing the economy. Its efforts are encapsulated in policy documents including the National Youth Policy, National Action Plan for Youth Employment, National Policy of Employment and Vocational training (PNEFP), and in those of the National Institute of Professional Preparation (INPP).

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms.* These reforms have focused on a solid infrastructure in the form of facilities, equipment, and materials and legal framework for TVET; curricula and training programs to offer employable skills for the economy; training of more competent instructors through a National Resource Center for TVET; and a public–private partnership support mechanism (DRC, 2013).

#### *Job creation*

Several initiatives aim to integrate youth into the job market, but more needs to be done.

*The National Program for Youth Employment (PRO-YEN YEN).* This program promotes youth employment to fight poverty and misery. By providing direction for placement and mentoring and by improving the employability of rural youth, the program serves as the intermediary between the labor market and young jobseekers. The main targets are agriculture and rural development, infrastructure, service, and mining and hydrocarbons. It also supports youth initiatives in establishing SMEs. The program was launched in 2005 but a government report found that it has been impossible to assess its impact (DRC, 2013).

*Business and Employment Development in Strategic Economic Sectors.* This program is aimed at reinvigorating agriculture, which still contributes about 40 percent of GDP, compared with 15 percent for mining. The program is embedded in the National Agricultural Investment Program (NIPA) which has a twofold objective—to lift people out of food insecurity and to make agricultural development and agro-industries pillars of growth. The strategy of the Program ‘Business and Employment Development in Strategic Economic Sectors’ is to create 16 agro-industrial parks, define production, fund funding and bring together the state, landowners, cooperatives, local communities, and private sector operators. Each park will be given the status of a special economic zone (SEZ) and managed as a joint public–private venture with the

land leased for a minimum period of 10 years. The program will run during 2013–2020 at a cost of US\$5.7 billion. It is hoped that the program will mobilize a large workforce and training in trade related to agricultural products, cooperatives, multimodal transportation, conservation, and energy construction (DRC, 2013).

*Framework for Program for Creating Jobs and Revenues (PROCER)*. This framework was initiated in 2001 by the Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Welfare. Launched in 2005, the program seeks to ensure full employment, increase efficiency of investment in job creation and income redistribution, develop proposals to increase investment in promising sectors, and help draft a national employment policy. The program has supported several SME projects including a microphone business in Kinshasa, alley paving in Kinshasa, recovery and recycling of used bags, rehabilitation of extension workers, and incentive programs for farmers (DRC, 2013).

*Agricultural Project for the Promotion of Rural Employment on the Bateke Plateau*. People in the project site faced chronic underemployment and poverty due to low agricultural output. This in turn was due to use of traditional technologies, lack of funding, and lack of mentoring. An initial 30 hectares of land was acquired for 50 young men and women in the Bukana Village on the plateau, in Maluku commune. For two years farmers cultivated cassava, maize, groundnuts, vegetables, and beans, using semi-mechanized processes (grinders and shellers). The cultivated land was extended to 100 hectares and the beneficiaries grew to 300. The project is yet to be evaluated (DRC, 2013).

## **The Republic of Congo**

Government reports indicate that national youth unemployment is exacerbated by lack of professional qualification. The government has undertaken policy measures and TVET reforms, and has implemented some job creation programs. The policies include the creation of the National Agency for Integration and Rehabilitation of Young People in 2010, National Social Action Policy, National Craft Policy, and National Industrialization Policy (Republic of Congo, 2014).

### *Labor supply improvement*

*TVET reforms*. Reforms include development of qualified human resources competent and responsive to national needs; and establishment of more vocational and technical schools and alternative training institutions to train apprentices and skilled workers alongside the private sector (Republic of Congo, 2014).

*Graduate Jobs Internship Program (PED)*. This program offers training to college graduates, after which they are selected (or not) depending on their course performance. The incentive for businesses is that they get to use graduates as regular staff or employees without actually paying them.

### *Job creation*

*Project to Support Socioeconomic Reintegration of Disadvantaged Groups (PARSEGD)*. This promotes and supports job creation through public investments in labor-intensive activities. The emphasis is on infrastructure, and the target is disadvantaged people, including youth.

*Occupation for Young People in Public Works (DOJETIP)*. This program provides opportunities for young people interested in public works.

*Socioeconomic Reintegration of Unemployed Youth Fund (FORSEGD)*. This provides opportunities for unemployed youth (Republic of Congo, 2014).

*The New Villages Project.* A special project under these programs is the New Villages Project, begun in 2008. The project was to build 20 new villages that would produce food for urban areas. Each village was expected to have 50 dwellings, 40 poultry houses, social infrastructure—school and medical center—and storage facilities. Each village is to be located not far from a tarmac road. Two villages were completed in 2014. The first village specializes in table-egg production, which has been a source of direct jobs for the people of the village. People also engage in market gardening. The second village specializes in chickens sold live or slaughtered in the local abattoir. The target population is young married couples. Forty couples live in each village (Republic of Congo, 2014).

## 8. SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa has the second highest youth unemployment rate—23.8 percent—in Africa (Table 8.1), with a wide range of rates: 5.2 percent in Madagascar to 53.6 percent in South Africa. Male youth unemployment rate is lower in all countries, although the gap is much narrower in Madagascar and Zimbabwe.

With different historical backgrounds, strategies vary. For example, in countries such as Angola and Mozambique that gained independence late but had long civil wars, most efforts focus on building TVET institutes. In contrast, South Africa has a long history of independence and more advanced institutions, policies, and programs. Yet because of its apartheid policy, unemployment and unskilled labor remain huge problems.

Table 8.1 Unemployment rates for youth (age 15–24) in Southern Africa, 2013 (%)

| Country                | Total       | Male        | Female      |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Angola                 | 10.6        | 10.1        | 11.1        |
| Botswana               | 34.1        | 28.7        | 39.9        |
| Comoros                | 10.7        | 10.3        | 11.4        |
| Lesotho                | 33.2        | 27.6        | 41.2        |
| Madagascar             | 5.2         | 4.7         | 5.7         |
| Malawi                 | 13.5        | 12.5        | 14.4        |
| Mauritius              | 23.6        | 17.0        | 32.3        |
| Mozambique             | 14.3        | 13.9        | 14.6        |
| Namibia                | 34.1        | 29.9        | 39.1        |
| South Africa           | 53.6        | 48.9        | 59.2        |
| Swaziland              | 42.4        | 39.9        | 46.0        |
| Zambia                 | 24.6        | 26.6        | 22.5        |
| Zimbabwe               | 9.3         | 9.3         | 9.2         |
| <b>Southern Africa</b> | <b>23.8</b> | <b>21.5</b> | <b>26.7</b> |
| <b>African average</b> | <b>16.7</b> | <b>15.2</b> | <b>19.3</b> |

Source: World Bank 2014a.

### Angola

The 27-year civil war that followed independence in the 1970s devastated the economy and prevented development of educational infrastructure. Most teachers lacked basic training. The challenge has been how to deal with a large unemployed and unskilled youth population. Much investment has gone into building secondary and TVET schools, and tertiary education institutions since the late 1990s and early 2000s (Republic of Angola, 2014), focusing on improving the labor supply.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

From 2006 to 2009, 34 new TVET schools were opened. In 2010, 197,000 students enrolled in vocational/technical courses (Republic of Angola, 2014).

*Civil Construction Training Center.* This is a partnership between the government and construction companies. The companies train students at the center and hire them after training. The program has been deemed so successful that it is being expanded with the support of the Japanese government (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012b).

*Entrepreneurship Training.* This training takes place at a facility in Luanda, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Participants are offered an office space

and equipment for six months. This program is being expanded to other provinces (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012b).

The government reports that from 2009 to 2011, overall 600,000 jobs were created, in agriculture (191,074), commerce (121,037), construction (90,337), and public service (92,218). There are two job creation programs including civil construction training and entrepreneurship training.

## **Botswana**

Botswana has a growing labor force of young people who lack job-market skills, a situation exacerbated because the economy is dominated by capital-intensive mining. A 2013 government survey estimated unemployment for youth (15–24) at 41.7 percent (Government of Botswana, 2015). Programs focus more on job creation than labor supply.

### *Job creation*

*Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA)*. The agency was established in 2001 to provide financial and technical support for business development. The goal was to promote and sustain local businesses. The agency provides subsidized loans (Republic of Botswana, 2015).

*Young Farmers Fund (YFF)*. The objective of this fund is to improve youth participation in agriculture. The fund offers loans with lower interest rates and at longer terms than CEDA loans. The target group is 18–40 years old (Republic of Botswana, 2015).

*Local Enterprise Authority (LEA)*. The LEA was set up in 2004 to provide development and service support to MSEs. Services offered include business planning, training, mentoring, and advising. It also helps in business opportunities for enterprises, technology adoption and diffusion, and market access (Republic of Botswana, 2015).

*Ipelegeng*. The public works program, Ipelegeng seeks to provide employment and income opportunities for rural and urban dwellers. Previously intended as a drought-relief program that ran only during the dry period, it became permanent in 2008. It is a labor-intensive program that relies on simple technology and unskilled and semi-skilled labor (Republic of Botswana, 2015).

*Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES)*. YES was established in 2012 to oversee a wide range of efforts aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship and skills development among the population age 18–35, out of school, and unemployed. Participants receive a monthly salary (Republic of Botswana, 2015).

## **Lesotho**

Agriculture has been the largest employer of youth (60 percent) with manufacturing employing about 10 percent. In urban areas manufacturing accounted for about 31 percent of youth employment until the late 1980s. However, structural adjustment and privatization in the 1990s led to loss of manufacturing jobs. About 25,000 young people enter the labor force every year.

### *Job creation*

*Young People Employment Program (YEP)*. Created in 2006, the program comes under the Ministry of Gender, Youth, Sports and Recreation with support from UNDP, ILO, the Commonwealth Youth Initiative (CYI), and the Moliko Micro Finance Trust. A pilot in 2007–2009 trained 2,000 youths in entrepreneurship, which led to the creation of 500 small businesses in 2008–2009. More than 85 percent of participants who received credit from the Lesotho Youth Credit Initiative (LYCI) paid back their loans. The program has been successful according to one

evaluation, leading to more commitment from the government, UNDP, and Moliko to expand it (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012c).

Lesotho's Youth Volunteer Corp Project (LYVCP), developed with UNDP and United Nations Volunteers (UNV), provides unemployed tertiary school graduates with one year of work experience. After training in local governance, participants are placed in positions throughout government ministries and public organizations. The three-year project, funded by the government and UNDP, with some assistance from the European Union, started in 2010 with 153 volunteers.

### **Mozambique**

The prolonged colonial period followed by a long civil war that ended in 1992 devastated the two sectors that employ youth—agriculture and SMEs. Over the past decade the economy has been on a recovery path but most economic growth has been in capital-intensive sectors. The education system was so devastated that Mozambique was estimated to have the lowest formally educated population in the world. Thus companies often import skilled, vocationally educated labor (Danish Trade Union Council for International Cooperation, 2014). To maintain a balance between skilled expatriates and employment needs of locals, the government has had to institute quotas in some sectors. Employment programs were part of the government's National Five Year Plan (2010–2014) and the Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy (2010–2014) (IMF, 2011). However, these were not specifically focused on youth.

#### *Job creation*

*The Integrated Program for Professional Education (PIREP).* Focused on youth, PIREP is offered by the National Vocational Training Institute (IEFP) with support from the World Bank. An evaluation indicated that it needed expansion to meet the demands of the labor market (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, and UNECA, 2012d).

### **South Africa**

South Africa's youth unemployment (13–24) is horrific—50 percent using the government's definition and 59.5 percent when discouraged unemployed youth are included. Overall unemployment is higher for females (59.2 percent) than males (48.9 percent) (see Table 8.1). Unemployment is highest for those who have not completed secondary education and those who have only primary education. It is concentrated within the black majority and, geographically, within urban areas of four provinces—Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and Eastern Cape (Mayer et al., 2011).

South Africa has instituted policies such as the National Development Plan (NDP), Youth Accords, and employment legislation covering skills development, equity, and tax incentives.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

South Africa has been reforming its TVET system for a long time. Sometimes the speed and vast changes entailed in these reforms have been seen as a source of instability and uncertainty for colleges and students.

*National Artisan Development Center at a TVET college.* The center matches registered individuals interested in apprenticeships with employers who have apprenticeship positions.

*National Artisan Moderation Body (NAMB).* Established in 2010 under the Department of Higher Education and Training, the Board coordinates artisan development in the country. Thirty-five artisan trade occupations have been identified and prioritized for funding to register 20,000 young people in these trades for FY2014–15. To help young NEETs enter the program, an eight-



month immersion program in English communication, basic computer skills, life skills, and basic artisan knowledge—the Generic Trade Preparation Program—is offered at TVET colleges (Lolwana, 2014).

*Building the skills of informal sector entrepreneurs and apprenticeship managers.* For a long time, skills training for the informal sector was not considered important since it was assumed that the formal sector would eventually absorb the informal sector. But in recent years it has been realized that the informal sector is here to stay and needs to be incorporated into TVET (Lolwana, 2014).

*Harambee.* Harambee is a private job placement program started by Yellowwoods and its five investors (Hollard, Clientele, Telesure, Direct Axis, and Nando's)<sup>2</sup> in 2010. The goal is to help disadvantaged young people age 18–28 years, unemployed, and with no work experience make the transition from education to the labor market. It seeks to close the gap between employer needs and employee skills. The program contracts with employers about available jobs, identifies young people needing jobs, matching their skills to the job, and addresses skills gaps through training and guidance. Job candidates are placed into the precontracted jobs and job candidates and employers are monitored. In its first year Harambee placed more than 800 candidates and achieved a retention rate of 85 percent at the end of the 12 months. The program has secured 4,000 additional placement commitments for 2015. Although it is too early to evaluate it, employers seem to be satisfied but are learning about the need to modify their corporate culture to accommodate their first-time employees (Lolwana, 2014).

*Business Ventures Schools Program.* This program is supported by the South African Institute for Entrepreneurship (SAIE). SAIE's aim is to eradicate poverty by creating entrepreneurs through the program. Students learn about entrepreneurial skills by participating in games and activities as part of the curriculum. All course materials are developed by SAIE. SAIE works with identified schools to determine how to deliver the material. The program is implemented in selected schools for three years or less depending on funding. SAIE has to date worked with 460 schools and 69,820 student beneficiaries (Lolwana, 2014).

#### *Job creation*

*Public works programs.* In 1994 the National Public Works Program (NPWP) was launched, a two-part program that consists of the Community-Based Public Works Program (CBPWP) aimed at funding job creation in the short term; and reorienting expenditure to use more labor-intensive technology in the long term. The CBPWP was more successful than the long-term option of reorienting expenditure. However, in 2003 a review of the Special Poverty Relief Allocation (SPRA) that funds programs such as CBWP revealed some mismanagement and misuse of funds. The review recommended the closure of SPRA and CBPWP (National Treasury, 2003).

Also in 2003 the government announced an expansion of the Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP) with the intention of creating jobs for the unemployed. Quotas were applied to ensure that young people, women, and disabled all had an opportunity. Among the projects under EPWP are municipal infrastructure, provincial road maintenance, community-based home care, and community works program. It is also linked to environmental cleaning through which many young people are employed. EPWP aims to create 6 million jobs over 2014–2019; 419,758 work

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<sup>2</sup> Yellowwoods, owner of Nando's, is a primarily family-run holding company, which has other large investments in the restaurant and hospitality industry, as well as in financial services. The business, initially a single insurance company launched by Robert Enthoven, has been in the South African-based family for generations.

opportunities were created for youth during October–December 2013 in infrastructure (133,969), environment (97,258), social work (78,142), NGOs (26,459), and community works (83,930) (Lolwana, 2014). The participation rate in EPWP has been around 35–40 percent. While there are no supporting data, the program does not seem attractive to “younger” youth—it has attracted only 18–24 year olds (Mayer, 2011). Major problems include the fact that EPWP does not lead to any permanent future job or provide further education and training (as originally envisaged).

*Community Works Program (CWP)*. In 2009, the government revived the CWP, targeting the most marginalized individuals and communities, to provide a predictable eight-days’ of work a month in community projects. The target group is youth under 25, but some over 28 are also involved. The program employs 160,000 workers a year and plans to reach 1 million workers a year. The project sites, most of which are in rural areas, are usually identified by the Department of Cooperative Governance, which oversees the program, working with local government and communities. However, the planning and implementation is done by implementing agents and local communities. Training is provided to the recruits and, depending on the project, a high school diploma or higher may be required. The program runs a wide range of activities including environmental cleaning, cleaning rivers, training football coaches, helping school children with homework, providing home care for HIV/AIDS patients and orphans, and upgrading and maintenance of informal settlements.

Opportunities for youth after CWP are limited. Youth who have received training and worked in leadership positions seem to fare better. Also those who receive training in handy skills such as plumbing can undertake some jobs. Opportunities tend, however, to be a bit better in urban provinces such as the Gauteng. Monitoring and evaluation have been limited by difficulty in data collection, which depends on the organization running the program (Lolwana, 2014).

*Employment Tax Incentive Act of 2013*. This provides incentives for employers to hire young people. Employers reduce their hiring costs through a cost-sharing mechanism with the government. Registered employers who hire young people decrease their pay as you earn (PAYE) payable for hiring a qualifying employee. The program targets young people between age 19 and 29. The aim is to create 400,000 jobs over three years. Critics say that it does not address the structural problem in the labor market and that the program takes jobs from older workers.

*Youth Employment Development Strategy (YEDS)*. Created by a partnership between the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), this program aims to provide collateral to enable young entrepreneurs to access funds from financial institutions to start their own business. YEDS also provides market information and training in business plans. This program is supported by the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). While the government reported that the program created 309 new enterprises and supported 7,959 youth-owned enterprises during 2009 after its creation, a study conducted by FinScope for NYDA in 2010 showed that 5,600 out of the 7,959 enterprises had to start from own savings, while another 436 had to raise the initial capital from family and friends (Lolwana, 2014).

*Accelerated Artisan Development Program*. This program originated with the Arcelor-Mittal Corporation, a huge multinational steel manufacturer also operating in South Africa. To meet its needs, the company initiated an accelerated training program for its workers. The training involved a more structured approach to apprenticeship that allowed the trainees to complete 18–24 months training that includes six months in an institution followed by workplace training.

Other metal companies picked up the model. Success rates at passing trade tests have been reported higher among graduates of the program than those who do not go through the program—95 percent versus 60 percent (Lolwana, 2014).

## **Zambia**

Zambia produced a policy document—the National Labor Market and Employment Policy—in 2000. It seeks to provide equal access to employment to youth by reducing entry barriers to education and training, promoting literacy, and providing low cost training to out-of-school youth for self-sustenance (Nyimbili, 2012). But according to Chitala (2012), the policy exists only on paper. A 2011 survey of youth in the Copperbelt and Central Provinces revealed that only 16 percent of young people interviewed knew of its existence. More programs have been launched to either improve labor supply or create jobs.

### *Labor supply improvement*

*Technical Education, Vocational, and Entrepreneurial Training (TEVET).* A policy promoting self-employment and recognized training in the informal sector was put in place in 1996. The government committed to the idea that the training system would enhance the ability of graduates to start and run their own enterprises. With funding from Denmark, the World Bank, the Netherlands, and Germany, the program was implemented during 2002–2009. In 2014, TEVET was introduced into secondary schools (Government of Zambia, 2014; Nyimbili, 2012).

### *Job creation*

*Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP).* This plan aims to create decent jobs—1 million by 2016—and develop skills for young people (Government of Zambia, 2014). Youth Resource Centers were established, which trained 15,566 youths in various skills, and 79,043 in leadership skills.

*TEVET Fund.* This was established in 2005 to support development of occupations and jobs in strategic sectors of the economy. Funds are, however, limited and have been occasionally supported by external partners such as UNESCO.

*Youth Empowerment Fund (YEF) and the TEVET Graduate Tool Scheme—Ministry of Youth and Sports, and Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training, and Early Childhood.* Both YEF and TEVET seek to promote youth entrepreneurship. The TEVET graduate tool is open to graduates of selected public institutions who choose to follow the path of entrepreneurship. The government reports that the results of the TEVET graduate tool have been mixed and that full evaluation is yet to be done (Republic of Zambia, 2014).

*My Job +1 Business Challenge.* This initiative by the Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training, and Early Childhood is aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and job creation. The program works by way of an open competition which requires participants to create two jobs, one for themselves and one for another young person. The idea is to instill into youth the entrepreneurial and innovative skills that will eventually drive job creation in the economy. Successful participants will receive support to make their ideas sustainable. The program was launched in 2014 (Republic of Zambia, 2014).

## **Zimbabwe**

In 2012, people age 15–24 constituted 20 percent of the population, those age 15–34, 36 percent (Murinda, 2014). Unemployment hits these groups the hardest: official statistics indicate that the unemployment rate for those age 14–34 years in 2011 was 15 percent. The majority of the unemployed were in this age cohort.

Zimbabwe has developed policies and programs including the National Skills Development Policy (NSDP) and the National Youth Policy (NYP). The NSDP emphasizes provision of relevant skills to all Zimbabweans for sustainable development. The NYP emphasizes empowerment of youth, and the priorities and strategies to achieve those. Both policies serve as a framework for tackling youth unemployment.

#### *Labor supply improvement*

*Training for the Enterprise (TFE) Program.* The objective is to equip young people with the skills that will enable them start their own business. The target is those age 15–35 years who are unable to enter tertiary education for lack of funding or of post-primary qualifications. The curricula include basic skills such as HIV/AIDS prevention, business skills, developing business plans, and marketing. The program also offers remedial, alternative learning and informal apprenticeship programs. The program is offered by the Ministry of Youth, Indigenization, and Economic Empowerment (MYIEE) (Murinda, 2014).

*Integrated Skills Outreach Program (ISOP).* Adopted in 2006, this program provides skills through short-term training that lasts from one to three weeks. Examples of such training are how to make a coffee table, keep bees, mold bricks, mend vehicle tires, or repair domestic appliances. The program relies on skilled community members as instructors. Graduates receive certificates at the end of their training and a tool kit to start on their own in the community, which is the expectation. The MYIEE is in charge of the program but other government ministries involved include the Ministries of Higher and Tertiary Education, Local Government, Public Works, Women’s and Gender Affairs, Labor and Social Welfare, and Small and Medium Enterprises.

Evaluations of the program in 2009 and 2012 pointed to several positive aspects such as use of local resources, and the fact that graduates usually stayed in the area instead of out-migrating. However, lack of post-training support including start-up kit, funding, and marketing were major problems (Murinda, 2014).

*Skills for Youth Empowerment and Rural Development.* This is a joint venture between Zimbabwe and Denmark with technical advice from the ILO. The program aims to promote decent and productive employment and income-earning opportunities among unemployed young men and women. It has two main components: quality improvements in informal apprenticeship (QIA); and training for rural economic empowerment (TREE). The program is implemented by multiple actors—there is a National Steering Committee, a Technical Working Group, and Local Committees consisting of training institutions, banks, and NGOs. At the program’s launch in 2010 the target was to train over 10,000 beneficiaries. In 2014 it was reported that the program was being run in 40 communities, and 39 TREE courses had been offered to 4,454 participants. Also, 3,299 youths had completed the QFIA, while 120 officers had been trained. It was also reported that the government was to adopt the TREE and the QIFA programs as strategies for its youth empowerment program. Thus more funds from the National Youth Fund (discussed just below) were set to be diverted to the program (Murinda, 2014).

#### *Job creation*

*Zimbabwe Youth Employment Network (ZYEN).* This was created in 2006 as part of the worldwide Youth Employment Network established by the Millennium Summit framework in 2000. Its main purpose is to harmonize national policies across ministerial or department lines. This is the framework guiding the MYIEE programs.

*The National Youth Fund.* This fund was launched by the MYIEE in 2012 to promote entrepreneurship and facilitate job creation. It is administered through the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe and the Central African Building Society. Critics assert that the Fund will be more effective if concerns about equitable distribution and gender equity are addressed. The Fund needs more partners (Murinda, 2014).

## 9. INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

It is not only African governments that have been involved in tackling Africa's youth unemployment problem. Indeed, some of the above public programs have been jointly supported by NGOs or foreign governments, as now seen.

### *INJAZ Al-Maghrib—Morocco and Tunisia*

This program marks collaboration between the governments of Maghreb countries and the private sector to bridge the gap between education and the needs of the private sector. It focuses on curricular designs that equip young people for jobs in the private sector and encourages young people to form businesses. The target group is 16–18 year olds. Through collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the programs bring professionals from leading private companies to the classroom to share their experiences and teach students entrepreneurial skills and business ethics. The program began in 2007 (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, and Brodmann, 2010). In Morocco the program is funded by the private sector and in Tunisia by USAID.

### *ILO's Youth Entrepreneurship Facility*

YEF is active in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda and has a robust youth entrepreneurship program. Besides seeking to “contribute to the creation of decent work for young Africans both as means of self-employment and as job creation for others,” the program also seeks to nurture a national youth entrepreneurship culture; create an enabling policy environment for young entrepreneurs; strengthen service delivery of educational and training institutions for youth entrepreneurship; nurture business development; and provide youth-to-youth financing for youth-led entrepreneurial initiatives that create jobs for other youth (ILO 2012:11).

### *Digital Jobs for Africa*

The Rockefeller Foundation launched Digital Jobs Africa in 2013. This seven-year, US\$83 million initiative seeks to improve the lives of 1 million in six African countries through digital job opportunities and skills training. The six countries—Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, and South Africa—share high youth unemployment and have rapidly developing information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure.

### *US Initiatives for African Youth Unemployment*

Recognizing that the future success of African nations depends on the leadership, skills, and ingenuity of Africa's youth, the United States, through President Obama, launched the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) in 2010 to encourage African countries to invest in youth employment, leadership, and opportunity programs. Through YALI, the United States seeks to enhance leadership skills, bolster entrepreneurship, and connect young African leaders with one another and with the United States. New investments in YALI include four Regional Leadership Centers in Africa that offer online classes and resources, and seed funding, training, and networking opportunities for young entrepreneurs.

## APPENDIX:

**Table A1 Selected youth employment programs in North Africa**

| Country | Program   | Year/<br>duration          | Objective   | Actors   | Strengths  | Weaknesses   |
|---------|---|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Algeria | Graduate Integration Contract (CID)               | Created 1989, revised 2006 | To place first-time jobseekers with employers for 1 year in economic enterprises and 1 year and 6 months in administration      | National Employment Agency (ANEM) of the Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Security | Popular with people. Target is appropriate                       | Temporary nature of jobs                                   |
|         | Professional Integration Contract (CIP)           | Not indicated              | Aimed at young first-time jobseekers from secondary or vocation and technical education. Placement is for 1 year, non-renewable | ANEM   | Target is appropriate  | Temporary nature of jobs—just 1 year                       |
|         | Training Insertion Contract (CIT)                 | Not indicated              | Aimed at young jobseekers without any training or qualification. Program is for 1 year, non-renewable                           | ANEM   | Target is appropriate  | Job is temporary—just for 1 year                           |
|         | Subsidized Work Contract (CTA)                    | Not indicated              | Aims at extending anyone of the above ANEM contracts for up to 3 years  | ANEM   | A relatively longer period for job placement                     | Lack of proper follow-up and temporary nature of most jobs |
|         | Insertion Program for Graduates (PID)             | 1996–present               | Social inclusion of graduates from poor and rural families the main disadvantaged groups  | Social Development Agency of the Ministry of National Solidarity                           | Attempts to reach the most disadvantaged group of the population | Lack of proper evaluation and follow-up                    |
|         | Allowance for Activity or Community Service (AIG) | 1996–present               | Social inclusion of disadvantaged people of active and employable age, but with no income                                       | Social Development Agency of the Ministry of National Solidarity                           | Attempts to reach disadvantaged people                           | No proper evaluation                                       |
|         | Public Works for Social Integration (DAIS)        | 2006–present               | To place unemployed people (18–59) with no qualifications in  | Social Development Agency of the Ministry of National                                      | Program's target includes unemployed youth with no education—    | Target range is too wide (18–59 years); competition        |

|   |              |   |  |  |   |
|---|--------------|---|--|--|---|
|   |              | temporary work positions  | Solidarity   | inclusiveness  | with older adults   |
| Youth Employment Support  | 1996–present | To support youth employment through the creation and expansion of microenterprises by young entrepreneurs   | National Agency for Employment Support of Youth (ANSEJ) of the Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Security | Development of young people to be self-starters rather than dependent on government jobs   | Funding requires matching personal funds that may prove difficult for some  |
| Poor Persons Employment Support   | 2004–present | To alleviate poverty through provision of microcredit to the poor   | National Agency for the Management of Microcredits (ANGEM) of the Ministry of National Solidarity                | Encourages entrepreneurship; provides seed loans for purchase of raw materials   | Scope is limited—only purchase of raw materials   |
| <b>Egypt</b>  |              |   |  |  |   |
| Mubarak–Kohl Initiative Dual System (MKI–DS) Technical Training Program | 1995–present | To address the challenge of transition from education to work; to improve the relevance of technical-secondary education by linking students to industry; and to facilitate relevant skills and workplace training for students | Egyptian Ministry of Education, German government, Egyptian private companies                                    | Internship program; hands-on skills; participation of private enterprises; local funding source  | Small coverage  |
| Public Works Program (PWP)  | 1991–present | To cushion the side effects of structural adjustment programs through a wide range of public works. The program was initially for a few years but was extended 1996 and then in 2001  | Social Fund for Development (SFD)  | Employed retrenched workers in public works; well-selected projects; local participation salaries were streamlined to avoid flocking to particular regions | Mostly temporary jobs; mostly males; insistence on using local resources made projects expensive; long-term impact is hard to tell due to lack of proper evaluation |
| Desert Development—The National Project for Jobless Graduates           | 1988–present | To reduce unemployment, alleviate population pressure in  | Ministry of Agriculture  | Mobilization of large numbers of unemployed youth; increase in agricultural  | Underestimation of problems: land fragmentation   |



|                |  |               |   |  |  |   |
|----------------|--|---------------|---|--|--|---|
|                |  |               | cities, and increase agricultural production  |  | production   | n, bureaucratic red tape, convincing young people to take to farming, long period of tenancy before ownership |
|                | Support for Small Enterprises and Micro-Finance    | 2006–2011     | To create 18 million small and medium enterprises   | Egyptian government and World Bank, NGOs                                 | Focus on women and small enterprises                           | Not enough information to evaluate  |
| <b>Morocco</b> | Women Vocational Training                          | 1957–present  | To provide rapid training to women to enter the labor market  | Not indicated  | Targets women who have no formal education or little education | Competition with other programs has led to decline in beneficiaries   |
|                | National Assistance Agency–Vocational Training     | 1957–present  | To provide recognized vocational-certificate training to women  | Centers of Education Training (CEFs) of the National Assistance Agency   | Free training; very popular with young women                   | Shortage of instructors   |
|                | National Assistance Agency–Apprenticeship Training | 1990–present  | To provide training to high school dropouts age 16–30   | Apprenticeship Training Centers (CFAs) of the National Assistance Agency | Targets one of the most vulnerable youth segments              | Low funding affects quality of training   |
|                | Agricultural Vocational Training                   | Not indicated | To provide technical training and field experience in agriculture to university graduates, high school graduates, and ninth graders | ITSAs, ITAs, and CQAs of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries       | Training is additional to college education                    | Placement is difficult—depends on region  |

Sources: World Bank 2012; Angel-Urdinola, Hilger, and Leon-Solano 2013; AfDB 2011.

**Table A2 Selected youth employment programs in Western Africa**

| Country              | Program  | Year/<br>duration | Objective   | Actors   | Strengths   | Weaknesses  |
|----------------------|--|-------------------|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Benin</b>         | The Songhai Center in Benin                                | 1985–<br>present  | To foster the emergence of a new African society by developing: a sustainable socioeconomic entrepreneurship policy; the ability to effectively develop local resources (natural and human); and the ability to play a substantial role in the global economy | Private voluntary organizations  | Strong framework; sustainable development; provides alternative for rural youth | None  |
| <b>Burkina Faso</b>  | Youth Employment & Skills Development Project (PEJDC)      | 2013–2018         | To support broad-based economic growth and poverty alleviation by improving employment opportunities for young men and women through public works, skills development and promotion of self-employment  | Ministry of Youth, Professional Training, and Employment                         | Provides alternative to disadvantaged youth due to location and access          | Not enough information to evaluate  |
| <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b> | Youth Employability and Insertion Support Program (PAAEIJ) | 2013–<br>present  | To develop human capital to achieve strong and inclusive growth (long-term goal); to help diversify training supply and facilitate professional insertion of vocational-training and higher-education graduates   | Government (the goals of program are in the National Development Plan 2012–2015) | Provides mid- and long-term goals; training is additional to college education  | The program needs to find other funding source when the current funding ends. |

|                |  |                    |   |  |  |  |
|----------------|--|--------------------|---|--|--|--|
| <b>Ghana</b>   | NYEP/GYEEDA                                    | 2006–2013 (frozen) | To employ 500,000 youth (18–35) between 2006 and 2009 and provide youth with employable skills  | Under the Ministry of Youth and Sports   | Mobilizes large numbers of unemployed youth  | Corruption   |
|                | Youth Enterprise Support (YES)                 | 2014–present       | To give young Ghanaians an opportunity to showcase their talents and entrepreneurial skills, and challenge youth to start a new business and employ other youth         | Multisectoral initiative: Office of the President, National Board of Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), National Youth Authority (NYA), Ministry of Youth & Sports, Ministry of Trade & Industry, and Ministry of Finance | Strong collaboration/networking; supports youth initiatives to establish SMEs                              | Only candidates that pass through the final round are trained; no post evaluation and monitoring |
|                | Youth Employment Agency (YEA)                  | 2015–present       | To develop, coordinate, supervise, and facilitate the creation of jobs for youth; (replacement program for GYEEDA)  | A national program under the government  | Not enough information to evaluate   | Not enough information to evaluate   |
|                | RLG Foundation                                 | 2002–present       | To provide training that creates 1 million jobs by 2020   | Private corporation collaboration with Ghana's Ministry of Youth and Sports through GYEEDA   | Mobilizes large numbers of unemployed youth; offers graduate and internship programs                       | Not enough information to evaluate   |
| <b>Nigeria</b> | Youth Employment in Agriculture Program (YEAP) | 2014–present       | To support and coordinates all YEAP activities; To support youths with access to resources including technical, entrepreneurial, finance, business and marketing skills | The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD)  | Provision of support to potential entrepreneurs ; increase in agricultural production; hands-on experience | Not enough information to evaluate   |

|  |  |               |  |                           |  |   |
|--|--|---------------|--|---------------------------|--|---|
|  | The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (ITTA) Youth Agripreneurs  | 2012–present  | To promote agriculture among other young people through training and demonstration on agricultural best practices and the value chain  | International voluntary   | Increases agricultural production; coordinates with government; targets agriculture and rural development  | Limited training workshops  |
|  | Auchi Polytechnic (Centre for Entrepreneurship Development Edo State Nigeria)—best polytechnic in West Africa and 2nd best in Africa in 2012 | Not indicated | To offer training in skills and knowledge in science, technology, and the arts for the use of the brain, mind, and hands, and for promoting self-reliance, technological advancement, and sustainable national development   | Local private corporation | Well-managed project; sustainable development  | No post evaluation and monitoring   |
|  | The Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P)—Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS)   | 2012–present  | To enhance the employability of up to 50,000 unemployed graduates in the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory through internship programs in preselected institutions; to reduce vulnerability of unemployed graduates; and to build human resources base for attaining national development operations | Government                | Hands-on experience and training from being intern; firms and over 181,800 beneficiaries have been registered; mobilizes large numbers of unemployed youth | Only youths with degree equivalent certificate or higher qualification are eligible |

|                |   |               |  |  |   |                                    |
|----------------|---|---------------|--|--|---|------------------------------------|
|                | The Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOU-WIN) program | 2011–present  | To generate jobs by encouraging and supporting aspiring entrepreneurial youth to develop and execute business ideas that will lead to job creation                               | Collaboration of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Communication Technology (CT), Ministry of Youth Development and Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development in partnership with the private sector | Encourages youths to develop their entrepreneurial ideals and plans; enables young entrepreneurs to access a wide business professional network; encourages expansion, specialization, and spin-offs of existing businesses | Not enough information to evaluate |
|                | The Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES)                          | 2010–present  | To create a bridge to employment by equipping as many young men and women; to develop youths with characters and competence, infusing them with honor and integrity in life      | State and local government, University of Osun   | Coordinates with private sector employers; enables young entrepreneurs to access a wide business professional network   | Not enough information to evaluate |
| <b>Senegal</b> | The recognition of skills acquired in informal training           | 2007–present  | To train youth in the informal sector—car mechanics, tailors, etc. To put in place structures that allow for this training to be recognized at the same level as formal training | Ministry in charge of TVET   | Well-managed project; promotes entrepreneurship   | No post-evaluation and monitoring  |
|                | Sectoral centers  | Not indicated | To provide young people with specific training using the competency-based approach   | Private corporations   | Coordinates with government; hands-on experience; enables young entrepreneurs to access a wide business professional network  | Not enough information to evaluate |

**Table A3 Selected youth employment programs in Eastern Africa**

| Country | Program                                  | Year/<br>duration | Objective   | Actors   | Strengths   | Weaknesses   |
|---------|--|-------------------|---|--|---|--|
| Kenya   | The National Youth Service (NYS)         | 1964–present      | To admit and equip single youth (age 18–22) with vocational, technical, and professional skills as well as rehabilitate and train disadvantaged youth and orphans | Government of Kenya and Kenya’s development partners | Program recruits nationally and engages in numerous public service projects throughout the country.   | Number of beneficiaries unknown  |
|         | Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) Program            | 2009–2011         | To employ an estimated 200,000–300,000 urban and rural youth age 18–35 in labor-intensive public works projects   | Government of Kenya                                  | Target both urban and rural youth and offer many useful lessons for similar programs in Kenya   | Lack of timely allocation of finances from central government to project units on the ground |
|         | Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) | 2007              | To provide young people with access to finance for self-employment and entrepreneurial skills’ development  | Government of Kenya                                  | Encourage entrepreneurship; Provision of loans/credit to young entrepreneurs ; Respond to the long-term changing needs of the country’s youth | No proper external evaluation or assessment  |
|         | Uwezo Fund                               | 2014              | To expand access to finances in promotion of youth and women’s businesses   | Government of Kenya                                  | Targets women and persons with disabilities   | Only issues loans to institutions; political cronyism challenge by Members of Parliament     |
|         | Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP)   | 2010–2016         | To improve youth employability by equipping them with skills that is required by the job market   | Government of Kenya                                  | Coordinates with private sector employers; enables young entrepreneurs to access a wide business professional network                         | No information found on what the trained did   |
| Uganda  | The Youth Venture Capital Fund (TYVF)    | Not indicated     | To support the growth of viable and sustainable   | Government of Uganda                                 | Provision of subsidized loans for   | Small scope (urban-based; regional)  |

|                 |  |               |   |                            |   |   |
|-----------------|--|---------------|---|----------------------------|---|---|
|                 |  |               | SMEs by the youth in the private sector   |                            | business development and support to potential entrepreneurs   | rather than national)   |
|                 | Business, technical, vocational education and training (BTJET) | Not indicated | To build skills and equips its labor with requisite knowledge   | Not indicated              | Encourages entrepreneurs hip  | Lack the infrastructure to offer more practical courses; most offer skills below the needs of labor market demand |
|                 | Mara Mentor Program  | Not indicated | To empower and inspire young entrepreneurs in Uganda and throughout Africa  | Private companies          | Encourages entrepreneurs hip; provides support to potential entrepreneurs ; international programs (17 African countries); enables young entrepreneurs to access a wide business professional network | Not enough information to evaluate  |
| <b>Tanzania</b> | ILO's Youth Entrepreneurship Facility (YEF)                    | Not indicated | To contribute to the creation of decent work for young Africans both as means of self-employment and as job creation for others | Not indicated              | Encourages entrepreneurs hip; provides financial support for youth-led entrepreneurial initiatives  | Not enough information to assess  |
|                 | Empowerment and Livelihoods for Adolescent Youth (ELA)         | Not indicated | To empower girls to be self-reliant   | NGOs and private companies | Targets vulnerable teenage girls; provides entrepreneurs hip and financial literacy training  | Not enough information to evaluate  |
|                 | Kilimo Kwanza initiative (Agriculture First)                   | Not indicated | To promote youth involvement in agriculture   | Not indicated              | Not enough information to evaluate  | Not enough information to evaluate  |
|                 | Opportunities for Youth Employment (OYE)                       | 2013–2018     | To improve the youth livelihoods through skills   | Private companies          | Targets rural youth and out-of-school   | Not enough information to assess  |

|  |                               |               |  |  |  |                                  |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------|--|--|--|----------------------------------|
|  |                               |               | training and match skilled youth with labor market opportunities.  |  | unemployed youth.  |                                  |
|  | Tanzania Youth Scholars (TYS) | 2011– present | To help the nearly 10% of Tanzanian youth under the age of 18 who are orphans and/or vulnerable children who lack educational and job training opportunities | USAID and the International Youth Foundation | Appropriate targeting groups; provides training and secondary education opportunities to orphans and vulnerable children age 14–24 | Not enough information to assess |



**Table A4 Selected youth employment programs in Central Africa**

| Country           | Program   | Year/<br>duration | Objective  | Actors   | Strengths   | Weaknesses   |
|-------------------|---|-------------------|--|--|---|--|
| Cameroon          | Integrated Program for Informal Sector (PIAASI) | 2005–present      | To raise the productivity of the informal sector; design training programs tailored to the needs of the sector | Government   | Engages the informal sector; created 8,000 jobs   | Not enough information to assess; no data on beneficiaries   |
|                   | ACEFA / AFOA                                    | Not indicated     | To raise the productivity of family farms  | Government   | Focuses on appropriate sectors; more than 7,000 jobs created                            | No data on beneficiaries                                     |
|                   | Graduate Employment Program (PED)               | 1993              | To address the problem of inexperience of young graduates  | National Employment Fund   | Fills an appropriate need; employer incentives  | No data on beneficiaries                                     |
| Republic of Congo | Graduate Jobs Internship Program                | Not indicated     | To provide training and job placement opportunities to graduates   | Government and private sector  | Target is appropriate   | No data to assess how program has performed                  |
|                   | PARSEGD   | Not indicated     | To promote and support job creation through labor-intensive public investment                                  | Government   | Targets disadvantaged groups  | Not enough information                                       |
|                   | The New Villages Project                        | 2008–Present      | To build 20 new villages that would produce for urban areas  | Government and local communities   | Focus on agriculture; rural development   | Too early to assess  |
| DRC               | Youth Entrepreneurship and Training             | Not indicated     | To provide training and economic opportunities for transition from school to work                              | Ministry of Employment, Labor and Social Welfare, and International Organization for Migration (IOM) | Target is appropriate   | Not clear how this is accomplished                           |
|                   | Job Placement                                   | 2005-present      | To promote youth employment as a way of fighting poverty   | National Program for Youth Employment (PRO-YEN YEN)  | Targets agriculture and rural development; supports youth initiatives to establish SMEs | Program began in 2005 yet no impact assessment has been done |
|                   | Business and Employment Development             | 2013-present      | To revitalize agriculture; lift people out of  | National Agricultural  | Focuses on appropriate sectors; More  | No information   |

|  |   |               |   |   |  |                         |
|--|---|---------------|---|---|--|-------------------------|
|  |   |               | food insecurity; and make an agro-industrial pillar of the economy  | Investment Program                                | than 7,000 jobs created  | on beneficiaries        |
|  | Innovation Clusters / Center for Young People | Not indicated | To provide resources to jobseekers and reintegration of returning migrants  | IOM and DRC government                            | Focus is appropriate—jobseekers and returning migrants   | Program not started yet |
|  | PROCER  | 2005          | To ensure full employment; increased efficiency in job creation; income redistribution; and increased investment in strategic sectors | Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Social Welfare | Targets agriculture as a strategic sector; rural development focus; 300 beneficiaries in 2 years | No evaluation data yet  |

Source: Country reports presented at the 2014 Ministerial Conference on Youth Employment.

**Table A5 Selected youth employment programs in Southern Africa**

| Country           | Program   | Year/<br>duration | Objective  | Actors   | Strengths  | Weaknesses  |
|-------------------|---|-------------------|--|--|--|---|
| <b>Angola</b>     | Civil Construction Training                           | Not indicated     | Job training and placement training  | Angola government and construction companies   | Involvement of the private sector  | Number of beneficiaries unknown                             |
|                   | Entrepreneurship Training                             | Not Indicated     | To help young people to start their own businesses   | Government and UNDP  | Program combines training and start-up facility  | Number of beneficiaries unknown                             |
| <b>Botswana</b>   | Citizen Entrepreneurial Development (CEDA)            | 2001              | To provide financial and technical support for business development                                  | Government of Botswana   | Provision of subsidized loans for business development   | Program was upgraded in 2006 but no record on beneficiaries |
|                   | Young Farmer's Fund (YEF)                             | Not indicated     | To improve youth participation in agriculture as a way of addressing unemployment of 18–40 year olds | Government of Botswana   | Provision of lower-interest and longer-term loans  | Number of beneficiaries unknown                             |
|                   | Ipelegeng   | 2008              | To provide employment and income opportunities for rural and urban dwellers                          | Government of Botswana   | Requires semi-skilled and unskilled labor  | Temporary relief  |
|                   | Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES)                        | 2012              | To encourage entrepreneurship and skill development among youth                                      | Government of Botswana   | Targets out-of-school and unemployed youth age 18-35   | Not enough information to evaluate                          |
| <b>Lesotho</b>    | Young People Employment Program (YEP)                 | 2006              | To address youth unemployment  | Ministry of Gender, Youth, Sports and Recreation, UNDP, ILO, Commonwealth Youth Initiative, Moliko Micro Finance Trust | Training combined with provision of credit; pilot-trained 2,000 youths who created 500 small businesses; high rate of loan repayment | Demand exceeds supply                                       |
| <b>Mozambique</b> | Integrated Program for Professional Education (PIREP) | Not indicated     | Not clear  | National Vocational Training Institute (IEFP) and World Bank   | Not enough information to assess   | Not enough information to assess                            |

|                     |  |               |  |   |  |  |
|---------------------|--|---------------|--|---|--|--|
| <b>South Africa</b> | Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP)         | 2003–present  | To provide short-term job relief for the unemployed  | National Public Works Program   | Appropriate targeting of the unemployed; inclusivity; created 419,758 jobs in 2014   | Jobs are temporary and no exit strategy after program                                      |
|                     | Community Works Program (CWP)                | 2009–present  | To provide employment for the most marginalized individuals and communities  | Department of Cooperatives and Governance, Local Governments, NGOs  | Provides work opportunity for the most marginalized; communities benefit from projects   | Short-term/temporary jobs; life after CWP is difficult for many.                           |
|                     | National Youth Service Program (NYSP)        | 1996–present  | To engage unemployed youth in national development activities, and marketable skill development                                | All government departments  | 5,959 beneficiaries in 2013; emphasis on marketable skill  | Temporary job. Not much information on program aftermath                                   |
|                     | Employment Tax Incentive                     | 2013–present  | To provide tax incentives to employers who hire young people (ages 19–29)  | Government and private sector employers   | Good incentive and good employer response  | Critics see it as discrimination against older workers                                     |
|                     | Harambee                                     | 2010          | To help unemployed youth with no work experience transition from education to the labor market                                 | Private sector  | Addresses an important bottleneck  | Participating companies need to change culture   |
|                     | Youth Employment Development Strategy (YEDS) | Not indicated | To facilitate access to loans for start-up businesses by the youth and help with information and development of business plans | National Youth Development Agency (NYDA). Department of Trade and Industry; Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) | Takes care of an important obstacles to entrepreneurship and business creation; created 309 new jobs and supported 7,959 youth-owned enterprises | The program requires personal resources in most instances, which may be difficult for many |
|                     | Accelerated Artisan Development              | Not indicated | To provide the necessary skills needed for the labor market  | Private sector  | Quality; participants are more likely to pass state exams than others  | Limited in scope; competitive to get in  |

|                 |  |               |  |  |  |   |
|-----------------|--|---------------|--|--|--|---|
|                 | Business Ventures Schools Program        | Not indicated | To eradicate poverty by creating entrepreneurs through a Business ventures school              | South Africa Institute of Entrepreneurs hip (SAIE)                       | Good way to instill entrepreneurs hip into the youth                       | Many students have gone through program but not clear how that ties with entrepreneurial youths |
| <b>Zambia</b>   | Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP)   | Not indicated | To create decent jobs and skill development for young people. To create 1,000,000 jobs by 2016 | Government of Zambia   | A total of 15,566 youth in various skills, and 9,043 trained in leadership | No information found on what the trained did  |
|                 | Youth Employment Fund (YEF)              | Not indicated | To promote and support youth entrepreneurship  | Various government departments   | Youth entrepreneurship   | Mixed results. No detailed record.  |
|                 | My Job + 1 Business Challenge            | 2014          | To promote entrepreneurship and job creation   | Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational                               | Focuses on entrepreneurship and innovativeness                             | Too early to assess weakness  |
| <b>Zimbabwe</b> | Zimbabwe Youth Employment Network (ZYEN) | 2006          | To harmonize national policies across ministerial lines  | Ministry of Youth Indigenization, and Economic Empowerment (MYIEE)       | Streamlining all activities related to youth employment                    | No information on effectiveness   |
|                 | National Youth Fund                      | 2012          | To promote entrepreneurship and facilitate job creation  | MYIEE, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, and Central African Building Society | Promotion of youth entrepreneurship  | Limited fund and scope; gender inequity   |

Source: Country reports presented at the 2014 Ministerial Conference on Youth Employment.

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