

B.3 Witness Seminar 3: Peace and Security

B.3.1 Overview

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WS3 took place at in the Hoare Room, Church House, Westminster, on 13 January 2016 to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the first preparatory meeting of the UN Security Council, which took place in the same room on 17 January 1946. Organised by the United Nations Association-UK (UNA-UK), with support from the British Association of Former United Nations Civil Servants (BAFUNCS), King's College London and the Bodleian Library, Oxford, with funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), it sought to collect testimony from current and former British professionals who have worked in or with the UN System throughout the organisation's lifespan.

The anniversary provided an opportunity for those involved in or with the UN System to reflect how the organisation had stood up to the fluid and diverse political, economic and social challenges of the latter half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. Specifically, the seminar considered the UK's record on the UN Security Council and the council's activities to prevent and resolve conflict, as well as to keep peace.

It proceeded in four sessions that were designed to draw on participants' insights and provide lessons and recommendations for the future:

- Session 1: The UK on the Security Council: assessing the record after 70 years
- Session 2: Prevention and early action
- Session 3: Peacekeeping and peace-building
- Session 4: Lessons and recommendations from seven decades in international peace and security.

Organised in the form of panel discussions led by a chair, one or two panellists and two respondents, the seminar provided an opportunity for participants to share a wide variety of experiences, insights and views, which were recorded and of which transcripts are envisaged.³ A draft report on the seminar has been prepared.⁴

The seminar was attended by 140 participants drawn from former UN staff, and representatives from academia, UNA-UK, the FCO, the Department for International Development and UK Ministry of Defence, non-governmental organisations, and interested individuals. It included one present and five former UK Permanent Representatives to the UN. A series of 15 Witness Briefs were prepared, as well as transcripts of two oral interviews. Some of these have been used as the basis for articles for the present IDS Evidence Report.

Adam Roberts assesses the record of 'The UK and the UN Security Council: 70 Years and Counting' (B.3.2) and describes the UK's involvement in the creation and operations of the UN Security Council from 1941 to 1945. He highlights salient features of the UK's involvement in the UN since then, including where the UN has been vital for British interests, and how it has played key roles in its development, and as one of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Roberts identifies issues relating to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the need for choice between 'selective security' and 'collective security'. In conclusion, he suggests areas where the UN's role could be improved: in the functioning of the Security Council, in changes in the Secretariat, in strengthening press coverage of the UN, in tackling climate change, and in maintaining a perspective of realism and selectivity in UN and Security Council affairs.

Margaret Anstee, in 'Experiences in Development and Peacekeeping, and UK Support' (B.3.3), describes her early UN career in Asia and Latin America, mainly focusing on development issues, and her experience in senior positions in United Nations Development Programme, the UN Department of Technical Cooperation for Development and the UN Office in Vienna. She relates her experience as head of the UN Angola Verification Mission, the first woman to head a UN peacekeeping mission. She also highlights opportunities that she considers the UK could have taken in relation to the implementation of the Brahimi Report on peacekeeping.⁵

Lastly, Jeremy Greenstock draws out 'Lessons and Recommendations from Seven Decades: International Peace and Security' (B.3.4). He highlights key aspects of the UK's role in facilitating the UN's work in peace and security and gives examples of his own personal experience in dealing with UN matters. He underlines the UK's key, and often unique skills, and urges greater recognition of the UK's soft power capacity in diplomacy and the promotion of a stronger rules-based international order. Greenstock offers a passionate plea for stronger recognition in London of the UN's unique convening role in bringing together a wide diversity of nation states and in building consensus around issues of security and international action in many fields.

Notes

¹ The opinions expressed here represent the views of the author and participants in the Witness Seminars, and not necessarily those of the IDS, the UNA or BAFUNCS.

² Based on WS3 on 'The UN and International Peace and Security: Navigating a Divided World? British Perspectives', Church House, Westminster, 13 January 2016.

³ WS3 recordings are available online at www.dropbox.com/s/e80t4latqlojrb/2016.01.13%20United%20Nations%20HMH.MP3?dl=0 and Lord Malloch-Brown's reception remarks are in a separate file, available at www.dropbox.com/s/uudhw4rkfwddnjc/Malloch%20Brown%20reception%20address%20recording.m4a?dl=0.

⁴ BAFUNCS/UNA-UK (2016) The United Nations at 70. Report of Witness Seminar 3 on the UN at 70 and the UK in Peace and Security: Navigating a Divided World: the UK and the UN Security Council, draft, May.

⁵ UN (2000) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305 S/2000/809)*, 21 August.

B.3.2 The UK and the UN Security Council: 70 Years and Counting

*Adam Roberts*¹

Abstract

This article draws on the author's wide experience observing and researching UN affairs, and summarises his views on the history of the UN, and of the UK's involvement in it, particularly of the Security Council. He highlights moral and practical arguments for respecting the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. He indicates that the UN has proved unable to provide anything approaching a system of collective security, and is better understood as embodying a system of selective security. He also notes with satisfaction the decline of international war between sovereign states, even though this has coincided with continuing high levels of conflict in many post-colonial states. In conclusion he highlights areas where the UN's role could be improved: in the functioning of the Security Council, in changes in the Secretariat, strengthening press coverage of the UN, tackling climate change, and in maintaining a perspective of realism and selectivity in UN and Security Council affairs.

Keywords: UN, Security Council, UK, collective security.

1 Background

What is special about the UK's involvement in the creation and operations of the UN Security Council? In the extended negotiations in 1941–45 for the future world organisation, the UK played a leading part that has not always been accorded proper recognition in the histories of those years. The British had one considerable advantage over the US and Soviet negotiators: the UK had been part of the League of Nations throughout its existence, and had clear ideas about the hazards to be avoided. In the long and drawn-out process of creating a UN that might have a chance of being effective, Winston Churchill, the prime minister, manifested a peculiarly British combination of enthusiasm for international organisation and a deep-seated realist belief that, for states as for individuals, interest is the most fundamental guide to action. The combination of hard-headed realism and a strand of idealism has been detectable in British attitudes to, and roles in, the UN Security Council over a period of more than 70 years.

British diplomats involved in drawing up the charter did not see their contribution, or indeed the resulting UN Charter, as exclusively idealistic. Charles Webster, a distinguished historian who was part of the British team, said in a moment of exasperation that the plans were drawn up among those to whom 'it is no use appealing to principle. The Office is all on the other side and opportunistic as usual' (Webster 1945 [1976]: diary entry, 25 October 1944: 52). The UN Security Council veto was accepted by the British not because of optimism, but because of a realistic (and not unwilling) recognition that neither the USSR nor the USA would enter the organisation on any other basis. There was no assumption that relations between the great powers would necessarily be harmonious, or that the new machinery being created would work. Gladwyn Jebb, the British diplomat who during the latter part of the war was head of the economic and reconstruction department of the Foreign Office, later stated that 'even a cursory look at the memoranda shows that we were not utopians or even internationalists. Throughout hard-headed British self-interest was paramount.'²

UK negotiators have often said how important it is to avoid claiming too much credit even when the UK has had a successful part in negotiations at the UN. That principle has not always been followed perfectly. On the day the Charter was signed, Webster wrote in his diary this private and not altogether modest appraisal:

It is an Alliance of the Great Powers embedded in a universal organisation as the Covenant also was. But this fact is more clearly denoted because of the fact that sanctions cannot even theoretically be put on a Great Power as it could in the Covenant. This is a great blot and I wish it were not there. Otherwise there is little I would do to alter the Charter, except of course clear away some of the verbiage which has accumulated round it during these 9 weeks. Its new ideas come mainly from me, if I may so record without undue egoism. The Purpose & Principles, the promise to settle all disputes, the acceptance of primary responsibility by the Security Council, the promise of the other states to obey it – all come from my original paper before it was even submitted to the Law Committee. Some of the phraseology has come right through.

(Webster 1945 [1976]: diary entry, 26 June: 69–70)

2 The UK and the UN

Throughout its participation in the UN the UK has been highly selective about which issues it takes to the UN and which issues it prefers to address through other means – whether essentially internal, or else involving allies and coalition frameworks separate from the UN. In the long struggle in Northern Ireland, between 1969 and 2005, the UK chose (in my view, rightly) to treat it as essentially an internal UK issue, albeit one with many international ramifications. In the Anglo-French Suez imbroglio in 1956, the British government resented several of the attempts to raise the matter at the UN. In the short Kuwait crisis of 1961, the UK preferred to act on its own, and then through regional instruments. In 1963–72, on the subject of minority white rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the UK wielded the veto on its own – that is, without any support from other members of the Council – no less than five times. And in deciding to join in the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, the UK invaded a sovereign state without an explicit authorisation from the Security Council. As with Suez, the Iraq invasion has left a legacy of suspicion of the UK: repairing that particular damage remains hard work to this day.

At other times, support from the UN has been vital for the UK. Key instances include:

- Following the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982, UN Security Council resolution (SCR) 502 of 3 April 1982, calling on Argentinian forces to withdraw, contributed to the legal and political basis for the subsequent UK military operations to recover these territories.
- Following the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, UN SCR 678 of 29 November 1990 went so far as to explicitly authorise states (including the UK) to liberate Kuwait.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1995 the UN Security Council helped to provide the framework for, and thus legitimise certain key UN and NATO military actions. These included the positioning and use of the UN rapid reaction force just outside Sarajevo. This helped to end the siege of Sarajevo and prepared the way for the end of the war.
- UN SCR 2249 of 20 November 2015, calling on member states to take action against Islamic State/Da'esh – also known as ISIS – paved the way for the UK House of Commons vote on 2 December to authorise British participation in the bombing of ISIS targets in Syria.

The UK pattern, of sometimes acting outside the UN framework and sometimes inside it, would be easy to criticise. Yet there is a possible rationale for it. Other countries exhibit similar patterns of selective involvement. Each crisis really is different, as is each country. There is a serious case for tailoring responses – and the procedures for reaching decisions on action – to the particular circumstances of each case. The vast increase since 1945 in the number of UN member states (from 51 in 1945 to 193 today), and the significant role regional organisations play, reinforces an already strong case for careful discrimination in how issues are handled.

That the UK felt generally comfortable with the structure of the UN – notwithstanding early differences on certain colonial matters – has not meant that the UK always performed well in a UN context. Margaret Anstee describes examples of UK performance in (a) promoting UK representation in the Secretariat and (b) supporting projects or missions in which UK nationals in the Secretariat have a lead role. She concludes: ‘In both cases UK performance has been chequered... sometimes brilliant, sometimes disappointing.’³ On the strength of the evidence she presents, one can only agree.

Indeed, there are some respects in which the UK is in danger of selling itself short in regard to the skills needed in UN work. Here I will mention just one: the serious decline in language competence in the UK is undermining our capacity to relate to other societies. In his Witness Brief, David Stephen rightly observes that, while English is certainly the *lingua franca* of the UN, ‘there is a less attractive side to anglophonism, when it becomes synonymous with monoglottism.’ He is right to conclude that the UK should ‘work to ensure that its officials, both nationally and in the UN Secretariat, do not become cocooned in a monoglot Anglophone world.’⁴

On many issues that the UN has addressed – including disarmament, and the perennial demands for enlargement of the Security Council – the UK has a long record of willingness to support reform proposals in principle, combined with nervousness about rushing headlong into their implementation because they might in the end prove to be dysfunctional. In 1961 the UK’s policy towards the idea of a permanent UN force was to support it, but to point out the practical difficulties.⁵ Some might view that as emblematic of British policy more generally. It might even be seen as hypocritical. However, conservative caution about attractive radical proposals can be a perfectly respectable position to take.

Many positive aspects of the UK’s approach to the UN may spring partly from a healthy recognition that, if the UK is to justify its continued membership of the ‘Permanent Five’ members of the Security Council – and, one could add, if it is to overcome the widespread criticism of the UK’s participation in the 2003 intervention in Iraq – it must be seen to perform effectively. At the meeting at Church House on 13 January 2016, especially in the impressive presentations of the three UK Permanent Representatives to the UN – Matthew Rycroft (2015–), Jeremy Greenstock (1998–2003) and Mark Lyall Grant (2009–15) – there were at least three pieces of evidence of the results of such an approach:

1. The emphasis that has fairly consistently been placed on ensuring that UK personnel chosen to occupy key positions at the UN – whether in the UK Mission or as members of the Secretariat – are qualified and prepared for the work they will be doing.
2. The UK’s avoidance of the use of the veto. In the period since 1989 the UK has not cast a veto on the Security Council. The Permanent Representatives have, rightly, regarded this as a positive achievement.
3. The UK’s commitment to the UN’s Official Development Assistance target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP). The degree of commitment shown is unusual, and is widely appreciated at the UN.

3 Sovereignty

It is a paradox that the UN has presided over the vast expansion in the number of sovereign states at the same time as political ideas (such as human rights and democracy) and certain countries (mainly but not exclusively 'Western') have in various ways challenged the supposedly absolute principle of sovereignty. The tension between human rights and sovereignty is built into the UN Charter, and is itself part of an age-old debate about the fundamental principles governing international relations. There is certainly no way that this debate can be resolved by a neat verbal formula. What is clear, however, is that Western visions since the end of the Cold War have been too optimistic – both about the consequences of even well-intentioned military interventions, and about the chances of achieving democratic change in authoritarian and/or fragile states. Elections are not quite the magic means of bringing conflicts to an end that many hoped they would be 20 years ago.⁶ Today, sadder and wiser, we know that interventions tend to arouse strong nationalist or separatist responses, and that democratisation is an extremely difficult and hazard-strewn process.

There is a larger question: have the Western powers sometimes gone too far in challenging the rights of sovereign states? I am not suggesting here that they should for one moment accept that dictators have the right to slaughter their own people; nor am I denying that there can be circumstances in which the Security Council, and even member states acting outside the its procedures, are fully entitled to act against a particular state that is violating fundamental norms. However, there is a serious moral and practical argument for respecting the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Those principles embody a decent respect for civilizations and cultures different from our own, and they may save us from rushing into unwise military adventures. Showing that we understand and respect that argument may allay some of the suspicion about Western interventionism – suspicion that Russia and China have been able to exploit in today's equivalent of the Soviet and Chinese liaisons with the non-aligned states in the last decades of the Cold War.

4 Selective security

The history of the Security Council, and the presentations we heard in WS3, amply confirm the view that it is always and necessarily selective. It is not the only body at the UN that is selective. All UN member states are selective as regards which issues they take to the UN and which peacekeeping or other operations they choose to support through actual participation. We do not yet have anything like a full system of collective security, in which the security of every state in the system is the concern of all. The prospect of completely unanimous military action against deviant states is as remote as it has ever been. What has been created is a partially effective system of international cooperation overlaid on an existing, and continuing, system of states and alliances. It is important that this should be recognised frankly: exaggerated claims for what the UN has achieved, or might achieve, invite damaging levels of scepticism about the organisation.

Yet the fact that there is a great deal of common action in the security sphere – in the form of peacekeeping, coalition military actions with Security Council approval, and continuous discussion of security issues between major powers – is an indication that some progress has been made. 'Selective security' is not a slogan or even a goal, but it is a sober description of what actually exists. Moreover, in almost all spheres of life selectivity can be a positive virtue. The UN Security Council could not possibly address on equal terms every single conflict, whether internal or international, and its selectivity is part of the explanation for the UN's unique record. No other international organisation of general competence can even begin to rival the UN's record of surviving 70 years.⁷

5 The decline of international war

In that period of 70 years, war between sovereign states has been in decline. The causes of the decline are numerous, but at the very least one can say that the UN's roles and actions have not been incompatible with that decline.⁸ At a time of numerous armed conflicts, and renewed power-political rivalry between Russia and Western states, it is important to recall that the UN era has seen significant achievements – in the field of development as well as security.

The decline of international war has coincided with a continuing high level of conflict, but mostly in the post-colonial world. There is a pattern of instability and civil war in many post-colonial states, and in many cases other states and movements are drawn in. Syria is a great stain on the UN, and we see daily how our inability to stop this war has consequences for our own societies. Essentially, in such post-colonial conflicts the UN has been asked, ever since 1946, to tackle a type of problem that it was not set up to address. It has gained much valuable experience of dealing with this type of problem, but Syria shows how difficult it can be to end such wars, especially when major powers have conflicting policies on the issue and at least one of them is willing to use the veto.

6 Where to now?

The many areas of difficulty and failure confirm that it is important to think about the areas in which the UN's roles could be improved.

6.1 Improvement in the functioning of the UN Security Council

Firstly, if we accept that structural reform of the Security Council is impossible to achieve for as long as major powers (especially China) oppose it, there is an urgent need for continued practical improvement in how the Council operates.⁹ The improvements in consultation with states that are not members of the Council have been significant and need to be further developed. The consideration of thematic issues, direct reports by experts on specific conflicts and visits to conflict areas have shown seriousness and have brought the Security Council into contact with realities. At WS3, Rycroft gave a vivid picture of actual and potential progress in these areas. He also pointed to the practical challenge that we all face: if Charter revision on this matter is impossible, what is the maximum change that can be achieved short of actual Charter revision?

6.2 Changes in the UN Secretariat

Secondly, the Secretariat needs to be more open to the world. At WS3, Michael Williams, who has held several important UN posts in matters relating to peace and security, argued persuasively that the performance of the Secretariat could be improved if changes in ethos and procedure could be initiated, with the aim of encouraging staff to go on field missions. And he may well be right that the Department of Political Affairs and Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to merge. I have personally seen just how absurd is the rigid division between these two departments, which have closely related (though certainly not identical) mandates.

6.3 Press reporting on the UN

Thirdly, some matters not under the UN's direct control need improvement. For example, I have often been struck by the variable quality of media reporting on the UN. In the UN's 70 years, only a handful of correspondents have developed real expertise in, and an appropriate feel for, the organisation. This is not a plea for the media to be kinder to the UN: indeed, a lively media might have exposed certain UN scandals earlier – whether about the wartime military record of former Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim (1972–81), corruption in the UN oil-for-food programme in Iraq in 1995–2010, or sex crimes by UN personnel that were the subject of a report by the SG in 2013 (UN General Assembly 2013).

6.4 Implications of climate change for the UN

Fourthly, it is self-evident that climate change has immense implications for the UN. The essence of the CO₂ problem – what makes it so intellectually and diplomatically challenging – is that action within any individual state to reduce CO₂ output only benefits that state and its inhabitants marginally, and only to the same extent as it benefits the rest of the world. To devise technologies, accounting mechanisms and diplomatic procedures to overcome this problem by providing incentives to decarbonise demands high levels of skill, ingenuity and commitment. It is natural that the UN should continue to address the issue, as it did at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015.

6.5 Maintenance of perspectives of realism and selectivity in UN and Security Council affairs

Finally, we need to continue and further develop the strong UK tradition of viewing the UN in general, and the Security Council in particular, in a perspective that, while recognising and applauding the purposes and principles of the UN as enunciated in 1945, also encompasses that strong element of realism and selectivity that has been an important part of the UN's history and has contributed to such modest success as it has enjoyed.

Notes

¹ The opinions expressed here represent the views of the authors and participants in the Witness Seminars, and not necessarily those of the IDS, the UNA or BAFUNCS.

² Lord Gladwyn (1990: 25). See also the unashamed assertion that his proposals for dealing with the US representatives 'had a certain flavour of Niccolò Machiavelli, for which I was no doubt responsible' (Gladwyn 1972: 117).

³ Brief for WS3 at Church House, London, 13 January 2016, in file of pre-submitted Witness Briefs, p. 6.

⁴ David Stephen, brief for WS3, in file of pre-submitted Witness Briefs, p. 14.

⁵ Edward Hale of the Foreign Office's UN Department, 'A Military Force for the United Nations', 7 April 1961, in the Public Record Office as FO-371/160957, UN-2284/8, cited in Briscoe (2003: 133).

⁶ At WS3, Jonathan Prentice was right to state that, in the process of ending conflicts, the contribution of elections is often over-estimated.

⁷ For a fuller discussion of the concept and practice of selective security, see Roberts and Zaum (2008).

⁸ For a brief discussion of the evidence of the decline of international war, and the possible causes, see *ibid.*, pp. 31–5.

⁹ A point made by Francesc Vendrell and others at WS3.

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B.3.3 Experiences in Development and Peacekeeping, and UK Support

Margaret Anstee^{1,2}

Abstract

In her contribution to WS3, Margaret Anstee describes her early career in Asia and Latin America with the UN, mainly focusing on development issues, and her experience with respect to UK government support to later senior positions she held as Assistant Secretary-General with UNDP and UNDTCD (the first woman to reach ASG level), and then Under-Secretary-General in charge of the United Nations Office in Vienna. She then relates her experience as head of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, the first woman to head a UN peacekeeping mission, including experience of British support to her. Finally, she highlights opportunities which she considers the UK could have taken in relation to the implementation of the 'Brahimi Report' on peacekeeping.

Keywords: UN, EPTA/TAB, UNDP, DTCD, UNOV, Peacekeeping, UNAVEM, Brahimi Report.

1 Background

Most of my 41 years as a UN civil servant (1952–93) were spent in the field on operational programmes and, when at Headquarters – New York (1974–87) and Vienna (1987–92) – I was directing operational programmes all over the world. Initially, therefore, I had little knowledge of the UK's performance or policies in the Security Council. My contribution is predominantly from the field perspective of a British national working in different parts of the secretariat, without the political support of the UK government, except on rare occasions. Beginning as a local staff member in a tiny new office in the Philippines, I was very remote from Headquarters and the political and policymaking bodies in New York. This changed in 1956 when I went to Latin America as the first woman field officer of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of the UN Technical Assistance Board (EPTA/TAB) and the then UN Special Fund, which merged in 1965 to form the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As a Resident Representative I found myself for the first time in an intensely political environment. Resistance to American dominance of Latin America in pursuit of the anachronistic Monroe Doctrine (1823)³ was growing, fuelled by several acts of aggression by the US. The Cold War was escalating and any signs of non-conformity or liberal policies were construed as Communist sympathies.

In 1965, the US intervened to unseat the democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, in a manner reminiscent of the overthrow of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala a decade earlier, in 1954. On one of my rare visits to New York en route to home leave and, invited to lunch by the UK Permanent Representative, I expressed my dismay and surprise about the UK's support of the intervention. The Representative explained that the special relationship with the US and the need for Western solidarity was behind the decision. I cannot help suspecting that similar considerations would have guided UK positions at the UN.

2 Career progression from local staff member to ASG/USG with UNDP and UNDTCD

Early on I discovered that, while many member states were assiduous in promoting the careers of their nationals already in the secretariat, the UK was averse to doing so. This 'hands off' approach was, of course, the morally correct policy, though I said at the time 'The UK is playing cricket while everyone else is playing American football!'

I rose gradually in the ranks of EPTA/TAB and then UNDP field staff under my own steam. I only began to be noticed with my transfer to UNDP Headquarters in 1974, and then my promotion to UNDP Assistant Administrator (Assistant Secretary-General (ASG)-level) in 1977, and then UN ASG on transfer to the main UN Secretariat in 1978. I was the first woman to reach the ASG level. The UN post came about because the Secretary-General rejected two UK nationals proposed by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) for the newly created United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDTCD) as insufficiently qualified and decided to appoint me instead. Thus the UK assisted my appointment but without meaning to do so!

Then I stagnated for eight years and became the longest serving ASG at that time. There was still no woman Under-Secretary-General (USG). Opportunities did arise and I was considered by many to be the most qualified candidate within the Secretariat, but I was constantly passed over. I consider this to be because of my British nationality and my gender. Such posts included United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) twice, and director of the World Food Programme. Initially the UK government supported me for both of these roles but this support crumpled in favour of male candidates proposed by other states – a Swiss candidate proposed by the US in the case of UNHCR (he left before completing his term and I was proposed again but by then it was too late) and an Australian presented by his government at the last moment. In all the cases HMG did not seem prepared to mount a strong campaign or stay the course in the face of alternative candidates presented by political allies.

In 1986, when Brian Urquhart retired, the then Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, told me he wished to promote me to Under-Secretary-General and appoint me to head all peacekeeping operations. This time the UK actively opposed my advancement, having a candidate of their own, a senior British diplomat. The UK Permanent Representative to the UN told me that I could not aspire to this post as no woman could ever command the military. 'What about Mrs Thatcher?' I enquired, in vain! It appeared to me that they wanted their own man and I did not qualify, despite having been a member of the senior branch of the UK Foreign Service at the beginning of my career.

In 1987, Pérez de Cuéllar at last succeeded in making me Under-Secretary-General when, under his own authority, he reorganised the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV) (the third UN headquarters), strengthening the authority of the Director-General and extending it to cover, *inter alia*, all UN drug-related activities.

I do not think the UK was involved or consulted, but the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher wrote me a personal letter of congratulations, offering all support, saying she was happy that the senior woman in the UN was British and occupying a post to which they attributed much importance. She was as good as her word. When she came to the General Assembly the Secretary-General invited me to his meeting with her.

She took the lead and, fixing me with a steely blue gaze, said 'Since Miss Anstee is here, let's discuss drugs', launching into a claim that, being a trained chemist, she knew that modern herbicides could provide a quick solution. Taking a deep breath I mentioned a few other factors such as poverty and the need to reduce demand as well as production, and a lively exchange ensued until she noticed that the Secretary-General's eyes were beginning to glaze over, and I to fear for my career prospect.

The prime minister suggested we continue the discussion in her office in 10 Downing Street the next time I was in London. This we duly did. I managed to persuade her to modify her position and the result was the highly successful first and only global conference on the reduction of the consumption of narcotic drugs, held under the joint auspices of HMG and the UN Office in Vienna, at which the UK provided funds and the venue, and my office provided technical support. It was an excellent example of member state and Secretariat cooperation.

A crisis at the beginning of my period in Vienna led to a high-level intervention by the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey (later Lord) Howe. The head of one of the drug programmes that was to come under my authority according to the new arrangements took the unethical step of circulating a draft resolution to member states attending a drugs conference rescinding the Secretary-General's decision to appoint me. This flagrant act, contrary to the oath of obedience that we each swore on joining the UN, should have been severely sanctioned immediately, but the official in question was a protégé of the then Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, and no Secretary-General would risk such a confrontation. It was Geoffrey Howe who took the matter up with Andreotti. An uneasy compromise was achieved but when new problems arose later on the UK Foreign Office was not as supportive as the prime minister.

True to its tradition, the UK has been much less blatant than other member states in pushing for candidates from its own national government services to occupy senior political posts in the secretariat who are not always fully qualified for that particular function.

There have been cases when a UK candidate well suited for one particular post, but who has been unsuccessful, has been switched to another for which they are less well suited, in order to maintain a seat at the political high table in the UN secretariat.

3 Peacekeeping and peace-building

3.1 UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) (1992–93)

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed me to my last official field posting as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Angola and head of UNAVEM II.

UNAVEM II was one of the first batch of peacekeeping missions emerging after the end of the Cold War that were designed to embrace elements other than those of a purely military nature. In the case of UNAVEM II the mission was to end in free and fair multi-party elections and the installation of a new, democratic government. Based on negotiations in which the UN had had no part, the Security Council mandate limited its role to monitoring the execution of the Bicesse Accords⁴ and provided an inadequate mandate and resources. The UK presumably took part in the Council's discussions but does not seem to have argued against the 'small and manageable operation' favoured by the Council. By that time, the UK had abandoned its earlier practice of contributing military contingents to UN peacekeeping forces on the ground. The UK Ambassador to Angola was, however, extremely helpful in supporting my difficult mission and in feeding information and requests back to London, especially during the battle for Luanda in which he played a key role as the UK was president of the European Union.

I held regular meetings with all UN Ambassadors in Angola, especially those with seats on the Security Council so as to keep them informed of developments and needs. The irony was that those of us on the ground usually found ourselves in agreement, but found that our views were not shared by the policymakers in our respective Headquarters who had no direct experience of field activities but seemed rather to act on collective thinking at a different level.

It was a combination of all these factors that led to the tragic culmination of the mission in failure, with an incalculable loss of Angolan lives. Behind it all I felt there was general international indifference to the plight of an African country, a forgotten tragedy in contrast to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, which was perceived (wrongly I believe, in a global geopolitical context) as greater. This was a general failure in international strategic thinking but I could have wished that the UK, with its vast international experience, would have taken the initiative in broaching an alternative approach.

Another fundamental flaw in UNAVEM II was the lack of any provision in the mandate or the resources for peace-building, a concept still in its infancy then, or the assurance of sustainable peace. The mission was to hold the elections and then leave the country to its fate. I had to canvas individual member states for voluntary funding of such obvious immediate follow-up measures as vocational training of demobilised soldiers (Germany did this) or the provision of barracks to house the new army (the UK did this).

The UN was not supposed to gather military intelligence but only 'information' of a less sensitive nature. SRSGs were thus dependent on major powers with sophisticated intelligence services to provide secret data that might be relevant in a conflict situation. The US and UK occasionally did this but not always. Coming back through London from New York to Luanda in June 1992, about halfway through the electoral registration period in Angola, I was invited to attend a meeting in the Foreign Office to discuss the situation.

Throughout the meeting there was an undercurrent of expectation as if something of importance was about to be imparted but it was never divulged (even though I had myself been a member of the UK Foreign Service, had also worked in the Prime Minister's Office and had sworn the Official Secrets Act). It was only months later that I learned that an act was being planned by one of the parties to the conflict that would have disrupted the electoral process. By then, preventive action had been taken but it would have affected some of my decisions had I known what was going on at the time.

3.2 Security Council resolutions on UNAVEM II

By rejecting the election results of September 1992, withdrawing his generals from the newly formed joint army and resuming the war, Jonas Savimbi (founder and leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola – UNITA) was in flagrant breach of the commitments that UNITA and he had undertaken under the Bicesse Accords and with the Security Council. This rank disobedience should have been punished immediately with the strongest sanctions. Instead, the Council adopted a series of half-hearted resolutions, wringing its hands over the turn of events and timidly increasing the strength of the verbs but still stopping short of any form of sanctions until September 1993, and even then applying only a limited regime. The reason for this was US insistence that they still had influence with Savimbi, did not want to alienate him and could persuade him to cooperate.

The UNITA lobby in Washington continued very strong; the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that their priorities lay elsewhere and so the US was taking the lead.⁵ By January 1993, UNITA had occupied huge swathes of Angola and a humanitarian crisis of vast dimensions was overwhelming the civilian population. At about that time the Security Council called upon me as SRSG to mount a large programme of humanitarian relief with the resources at my disposal (these were rapidly diminishing and this anodyne phrase meant

that no additional money would be forthcoming). I believe that it might have been helpful if the UK had insisted that UNITA's transgressions were summarily dealt with and resourced. As the conflict and UNITA threats against me escalated after the elections in September 1992, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions and presidential statements calling on UNITA to withdraw the death threats against me. The UK was part of these supportive measures. When my mission in Angola ended in July 1993, I had a farewell session with the Council, at which the president, the then UK Ambassador, David (later Lord) Hannay, was particularly generous in his tribute to me.

4 Follow-up to the 'Brahimi Report' on peacekeeping

The 'Brahimi Report' (UN 2000), commissioned to recommend measures to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peace-building operations, contained a paragraph recommending that the Secretary-General should prepare a UN plan for peace-building. This plan would ensure the effective participation and cohesion of all the relevant agencies and organisations of the UN System, through all stages of dealing with a particular conflict, from the initial ceasefire to a long-term development programme designed to address the causes of conflict and establish the conditions for sustainable peace. Now retired, I was asked to undertake this work as a consultant attached to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), assisted by a small team from the Secretariat.

We produced an articulated plan which envisaged a versatile system adaptable to each individual situation. It comprised a multi-agency body at Headquarters, centred on DPA, to establish the overall policy and the respective roles of the various entities at the start of the operation. Once the overall plan had been devised for a country, responsibility for its implementation would be delegated to a similarly composed multi-agency body at the field level, led by the SRSG. The central policy board at Headquarters would receive regular reports from the field and monitor progress, intervening *only* in the event of emergencies or deviations from the original policy blueprint. In short, there was to be maximum centralisation of policy between the various UN bodies concerned to ensure cohesion of overall approach combined with maximum decentralisation of execution to the field level, to ensure rapid and efficient implementation, reduce bureaucracy and increase accountability.

The snag was that my remit required the final draft to be cleared with no less than 17 UN agencies. This took an inordinate amount of time and when the comments (mostly self-serving) were included, the proposal resembled a 'dog's dinner' rather than the original coherent and integrated plan. I had suggested that a pilot project be tried in one or two countries where the conditions were not too adverse. To my dismay the Administrative Committee on Coordination decided on Afghanistan, where the Taliban were just tightening their hold! An integrated strategy was prepared there but predictably could never be implemented. The plan was discussed by governments in various fora but in the absence of a powerful backer and amid clamour for a Peacebuilding Commission it lost its way. After some previous dispiriting experiences I had foreseen that something like this would happen and at an early stage sought to interest the UK Mission to the UN. I saw the Ambassador, and a member of the UK mission came from time to time for briefing but there was no real support. I had thought that this could be a worthy cause for the UK to support, which, if successful, would also lay the foundations for solving other problems of coherence and efficiency latent in the UN System, but it appeared that the UK's priorities lay elsewhere. Another great chance of reform was lost. I do not know what the Secretariat did with the ill-fated plan. I have a copy!

5 Conclusions

This article has described some examples of two kinds of UK performance:

1. in promoting UK representation in the staff of the secretariat;
2. in supporting specific projects or missions in which UK nationals in the secretariat are playing a lead role.

Of the two I consider the second the more important. In both cases the UK performance has been chequered in my experience: sometimes brilliant, sometimes disappointing. It is thus impossible to reach an overall assessment.

One general impression I do have is that the UK could have been more adventurous in taking the lead in strengthening Security Council resolutions establishing mandates and resource levels for peacekeeping and peace-building. There has perhaps been excessive readiness in following the position of the US rather than ploughing a more independent furrow.

Notes

¹ The opinions expressed here represent the views of the authors and participants in the Witness Seminars, and not necessarily those of the IDS, the UNA or BAFUNCS.

² Margaret Anstee's article was submitted to WS3.

³ The policy, established by President Monroe in 1823, that the US opposed further European colonization of and interference with independent nations in the Western hemisphere.

⁴ The Bicesse Accords, also known as the Estoril Accords, laid out a transition to multi-party democracy in Angola under the supervision of the United Nations' UNAVEM II mission. President José Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] signed the accord in Lisbon, Portugal on May 31, 1991' (*Source*: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bicesse_Accords).

⁵ Both UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, and the MPLA led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos, hired US public relations or lobbying firms to promote their respective causes through influencing the US Congress and government into providing military, diplomatic and other support.

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B.3.4 Lessons and Recommendations from Seven Decades: International Peace and Security

Jeremy Greenstock^{1,2}

Abstract

In the concluding session, Jeremy Greenstock summarised the discussions and drew out key principles relating to the UK's role in facilitating the UN's work in peace and security as the bedrock for effective development work. He highlighted examples of his own personal experience in dealing with UN matters; underlined the UK's key, and often unique, skills; and urged greater recognition of the UK's soft power capacity in diplomacy and the promotion of a stronger rules-based international order. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the UN's unique role in bringing together and protecting a wide diversity of nation states, the need for a strong unity of purpose and strategy between London and New York, the importance of good communications between all types of actors and, finally, the importance of the UK's diplomatic and facilitation role in brokering selective issues affecting the UN and member states.

Keywords: UN, Witness Seminars, peace and security, UK diplomacy.

1 Introductory remarks

These comments draw on my experience as chairman of United Nations Association (UNA)-UK as well as of being the UK Permanent Representative at the UN in New York. In this final session we need to move from analysis to prescription, to prescribe where we think the UN should be going, and what lessons this set of Witness Seminars should bring to the UN, to the UK at the UN, and to the UK in the context of its national interest.

We will attempt to draw out where the UN stands against its geopolitical background and where human society is going in the twenty-first century, because we have to look forwards instead of backwards to learn the true nature of the lessons that all of us in our professional lives, as practitioners in the UN and as observers, have gathered through our great interest in a working global institution.

Inevitably, we must be more political in this session. Politics rules in the end, as it rules at the UN. One central theme is sovereignty and the role of the nation state. After 70 years of peace, in a history of human affairs which has never, ever known more than 100 years of quasi-peace between human societies, we are reaching the fourth quarter of this maximum span of a period of peace – *unless* we do something about the natural tendencies of human beings to be violent.

2 Purpose

In this session, we home in on three issues:

(1) *The potential for UN service for peace and security.* The UN's continuing potential to offer a global service for peace and security against a changing geopolitical background. The health of the UN is a vital UK national interest – and, by the way, a vital national interest also for all those member states who place such a premium on their sovereignty being protected by the UN.

(2) *The capacity of the UK to continue to play its traditional roles:* The capacity of the UK to continue to play the role at the UN that it has played for 70 years. Whether it will continue to do so as relative power structures and relationships change, and whether its image is right to play that role, is something we need to comment on.

(3) *Recommendations for UK policymaking:* UNA-UK, British Association of Former United Nations Civil Servants (BAFUNCS) and King's College, but particularly UNA-UK, want to take to the UK government, as well as to the UN, some recommendations on the requirements for UK policymaking and resource allocation, in the context of finding global solutions to global problems through collective diplomacy.

3 Personal experience and lessons learned

I've been asked to use this moment to offer a witness account, in terms of my five years at the UN from 1998 to 2003, and I shall do so very briefly. I've given a succinct witness statement, nothing like as anecdotal, as interesting and as amusing as Margaret Anstee's, but a succinct statement about what the lessons are for somebody who has worked at the Security Council. I think the most important lessons relate to:

3.1 The relevance of the UN: The UN remains highly relevant for the maintenance of global peace and a stable and increasingly prosperous world – much more relevant than most nation states, including the UK, give it the credit for 70 years on. Why? It's about the need to avoid big power conflict which, much more than the impacts of climate change, or a lack of security in certain regions, or the absence of growth in the global economy, is the immediate threat to continuing successful human existence. The potential for big power conflict does not attract enough attention, while all these other things are going on – that is, the potential for a relapse into real conflict amongst great powers in competition with each other. We need to have a sense of where power really lies, that's what politics is all about. The UN cannot be successful if it just dabbles in the bureaucratic interstices of its charter, mandates and discussions, and its formals and informals, and informal informals. It has to analyse where power lies and where power and human instincts are dragging human affairs in the next generation.

3.2 The UK's strong skill sets: Secondly, the UK is as skilled as any member state in its capacity to operate in a complex, political, multilateral environment. Perhaps it is losing some influence and impact due to the changes in relative power around the world. Perhaps it is losing a touch of political will at the highest political levels, to play the role that it can play, and has played, as will no doubt be illustrated with further anecdotes during this session. And perhaps, I sense, it is not focusing on the real potential of highly qualified personal diplomacy by Permanent Representatives in New York and elsewhere in the multilateral system. There is scope – as Matthew Rycroft has indicated and as I'm sure Mark Malloch-Brown will indicate, as Crispin Tickell and David Hannay can show in their stories, and as I can testify to – for personal diplomacy to make a difference in that inspiring and frustrating atmosphere of New York, where the courtesy of relationships can sometimes, with intellectual skill, trump the competition between national interests and produce answers where you didn't think that answers could be produced. In my experience there are no two better countries at doing that than the UK and France at the UN.

In that context, the UK does retain a certain amount of respect. Yes, it gets vilified for being a permanent member. Yes, it gets vilified for our role in Iraq and for the damage that Iraq has done to the image of the UN, to the image of the US, to the image of the UK, and to the image of multilateral diplomacy, when you contrast it with the April 1999 Chicago speech of Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Yes, the UK's relative power is diminishing, but it is constantly contributing to collective diplomacy, looking for the best outcomes for the Security Council, being a penholder (i.e. a

lead drafter) for good reason – in that we're better at it than most others, and others recognise that and want us to do it. That active role can be brought out as a matter of criticism and resentment, but it is also respected. As Danilo Türk, the Slovenian Permanent Representative, said to me when we were both serving on the Security Council: 'It's only you two countries [France and the UK] that can produce resolutions in industrial quantities.' And the work of the UN Security Council on peace and security is an industry.

3.3 The under-valuation of UK diplomacy: Are we still prepared from the top political level downwards to make concessions, to put our energy and effort into all of this? I feel at this moment that diplomacy is being undervalued in London. It has been said during the course of today, but I want to underline this very particular policy point: we are one of only two countries in the world that devotes 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to our overseas assistance budget and 2 per cent or more of GDP to our defence budget.

But where is the third leg of the stool of a balanced hard–soft power capability? Diplomacy is the professional skill which brings together development and military intervention; that has to deal with the politics of global issues going wrong. It appears, however, that it is not being given the priority it deserves. I am not just talking about budget cuts to my old department; I am talking about my interest as an elector in the United Kingdom who wants a peaceful world for a more prosperous UK. You cannot do without diplomacy; and you cannot do without the high skills of British diplomacy at the UN being resourced to have representatives around the world who feed into the teamwork that is the hallmark of British operations in multilateral diplomacy. And if that is not a lesson that gets through to the British government out of this series of witness statements, I won't have been doing my job as the corrector of the draft that eventually goes to the British government.

3.4 The need to invest in a rules-based international order: We also fail to invest sufficiently in a rules-based international order. We want it, we talk about it, but we do not invest in it in the way that this session will try to recommend. Yes, there was damage from Iraq. Yes, we are draining power. But are we also, as the UK, withdrawing a bit into our shell because we have too many domestic concerns – 'domestic' to include the European Union environment – to look at a global situation which, against the background of the polarisation of identity politics in the world, is going wrong on us as the fourth quarter of that 100 years begins to trouble us? That is what we need to discuss in this session.

4 Concluding remarks and recommendations

We've handled a huge amount today and we could go on for a long time if we didn't have other lives to lead. I now want to say one or two things about the substance we've covered over the past eight or nine hours.

4.1 The UN's role in bringing together and protecting nation states: Some of the things that have been said underline that the world has got a problem. The problem concerns the fragmentation of political objectives amongst 193 or more nation states. The central theme of what the UN is about, and of what we have been talking about today, is actually its role in bringing together as well as protecting nation states.

The UN is a member state-oriented institution, and the level of decision-making, for all the metaphors about collective diplomacy at the UN, in the European Union, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or wherever in multilateral diplomacy, still rests with the capital of member states. There is no higher level of political decision-making, where the buck stops, than the president or prime minister in the capital. The power–politics aspects of what we've been talking about today have to be taken seriously across the whole range of the complexity of geopolitical interaction. To play its role at the UN, the UK has to do more than just have a wonderful Permanent Representative at the UN, and serious people in Geneva – of which Julian Braithwaite is one at this moment, and his predecessor, Karen Pierce, who might have

been with us today. We do take the other UN centres seriously, but the Security Council and the politics of New York is what captures the world's headlines and what leads on the distribution of power decision-making in today's world.

4.2 The relationship between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London and UK Mission to the UN in New York: The relationship between New York and London has only been lightly touched upon. The Permanent Representative, for all the skills of his or her diplomacy, cannot operate without political direction – and that political direction has got to have objectives, it's got to have strategy, it's got to have will and it's got to have an interest in the power of the UN to continue solving global problems. And those of you in this seminar who are more political than others, or are in a position to affect the decision-making of politicians, must constantly bring them to realise that the UK is a marvellously skilled player in this complex arena of human interaction, internationally, if it is allowed and empowered to do so, which it isn't always.

4.3 The importance of good communications in promoting development, peace and security: What the UN is all about in its main work is the development of weaker states, including the peace and security aspects of development. As both Mark Lyall Grant and Matthew Rycroft will recall, I passed on my advice that you have to make it clear that your privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council recognises that the UN is all about development, and peace and security are an essential component of development. But that has to be managed through communication – that is the methodology of the UN. Communication includes being in a position to, and being prepared to and authorised to, speak to really nasty people, both at the UN, where the courtesies of the UN enable you to do so, but in capitals also, and in other groups around the world where things are going wrong.

The importance of good communications was underlined in the case of the travesty of Hamas being excluded from the Middle East peace process when it is a stakeholder. In my view, it was a method of Israel's to avoid the possibility of any meaningful discussion of a peace settlement – one of those tricks of political diplomacy to have a buffer zone that is protected so that the real zone never gets dealt with.

The UK should be above all of that and use its skills to get into difficult areas. Adam Roberts' point about selective security, not collective security, is absolutely fundamental. It is not in our interest at a particular moment to throw away the principles we stand up for in order to go for an urgent short-term objective. I believe that Iraq was all about that: principles were destroyed in the ambition to get rid of a political dictator who wasn't immediately troubling our national interests.

4.4 The importance of the UK's skills and facilitation role in brokering issues affecting the UN: We have to analyse these things better. We have to be intelligent at adapting to our modern circumstances. We have to have the team to operate within our own make-up as the UK, and at the UN, and with our international partners, to deal with the issues that actually confront us. The UK is, most of the time, in its operations, a more skilled player than people sometimes realise.

I will just give you a small anecdote in that respect, in relation to the peace-making process relating to East Timor, because it's been mentioned today and I like the history of it. I apologise for the small element of trumpet-blowing involved, but that Security Council mission to East Timor in the first few days of September 1999 was a marvellous reintroduction, under Kieran Prendergast's impulsion, of the idea of a Security Council mission. It wasn't all 15 members wanting to get on a jolly to go somewhere. It was five members of the Security Council – an immediate advantage in that it wasn't a crowded bus.

The mission was led by one of those really influential Permanent Representatives from an unassuming country, Martin Andjaba of Namibia, which often makes so much difference at the UN. It was Martin Andjaba who stood up to Senator Jesse Helms in the Security Council in 2001 in response to Senator Helms's statement that the Security Council should realise that the dominant force in the decision-making on international affairs is the voice of the American people. This statement elicited dead silence around the horseshoe table. We all sort of hummed around in responding to Jesse Helms. Martin Andjaba eventually spoke last and pointed out that while listening to Senator Helms' statement carefully, in his home country of Namibia the United States was of no use in delivering independence to a country where the majority of the people supported his political party and wanted freedom from the influence of South Africa. He expressed the opinion that the Senator should realise sometimes that the American people do not stand up for freedom. And that put him in his place.

On the East Timor mission Martin Andjaba was the leader; he had the moral authority of an unthreatening state and a charismatic personality, and it was behind his leadership that I was able, first of all, to bring the British press with me, to put real pressure on the Indonesian Minister of Defence, General Wiranto. And it was the use of the contact group in Jakarta – of the US, Germany, Australia, Japan, the UK and France, which actually worked behind the scenes without the mission knowing what I was doing to fix things with Indonesia's President Habibie – that would make sure that what Habibie wanted to do was going to work internationally. And it was that connection of moral authority and diplomatic skulduggery that actually produced results.

The British are always there playing that sort of role. When the Americans do it in that sort of way, they do it brilliantly, but it usually leaks before they get there. When the French do it in the French context, they do it brilliantly. And when the French and the British are working together in the UN Security Council (or the UN generally), nothing but a veto can defeat them because they both have wide and differing constituencies. And my relationship with the French Permanent Representative, Jean-David Levitte, where we both defied instructions from national capitals in order to work together on Africa, was an example of personal diplomacy being able to work on the opportunities that multilateral diplomacy gives you.

There is an enormous amount to be done, still, with a UN that stands for legitimacy, for communication and for the absence of big power conflict, which will be the death of this period of peace if we are not careful.

Notes

¹ The opinions expressed here represent the views of the authors and participants in the Witness Seminars, and not necessarily those of the IDS, the UNA or BAFUNCS.

² Edited transcript of Jeremy Greenstock's introductory and concluding remarks of Session Four of WS3: The UK on the Security Council – Lessons and Recommendations from Seven Decades.