

HISTORY SEMINAR ROOM

SEMINAR: 22 NOV. 1982
4.30 pm

THE IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE ON THE PEOPLE
OF MUTOKO, 1885-1906

By

R.C. Mutwira

In the winter of 1895 the people of Mutoko were shocked to realize that they had in fact not avoided colonial subjugation by signing the 1891 agreement with "Shamwari a Mtoko", (1) Fredrick Courtney Selous, the treaty seeking representative of the British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.) to many African Chiefs. They realized they had tied themselves to a colonial power very similar to the Portuguese they had been fighting for the past decade. The promises of protection against foreign aggression of supply of basic economic necessities and possibly guns in substantial numbers in return for the surrender of all mineral rights in fact turned out to be a measure to enable the B.S.A.C. to recruit for labour and to enforce hut tax. Hut tax in theory was supposed to be collected from adults owning huts. In practice, however, every man from the age of fifteen had to pay tax. (2) The problem was that most of these people did not have the money. They either had to offer themselves for labour or pay in kind. Unfortunately the only form of acceptable alternative was items at the centre of the Shona economy: cattle, sheep and goats. The main problem with using beasts was that they had different sizes and ages. Therefore it was not easy to fix value. The decision most probably lay with the "native messengers", but since these men aimed to please their masters, Africans must have paid a tax much higher in value than 10/-. The figures below show the tax collected in the Mazoe South area (which included Mutoko in 1894) and Mutoko in 1895.

	<u>Cattle</u> <u>Collected</u>	<u>Sheep</u> <u>Collected</u>	<u>Goats</u> <u>Collected</u>	<u>Grain</u> <u>Collected</u>	<u>Huts</u> <u>Counted</u>	<u>Huts</u> <u>Paid</u>
Mazoe South 1894	231	5	456	3	1641	1217
Mutoko 1895	310	215	1615	-	2447	366 (3)

The 1894 figures show that of the huts counted 74,16% of them paid hut tax. This is a very high percentage for those initial days. This percentage shows a high degree of co-operation from the people counted. The only problem here is that the area involved was very big, covering Marondera, Mrewa and Mutoko. So the people who paid tax must have been a very small percentage of the total population, and if 74% of them responded what happened to the rest, as well as those whose huts were not yet counted? This was another reason for dissatisfaction.

The figures for tax collected in Mutoko District in 1895 are more interesting. Of the 2447 huts counted only 366 hut owners paid tax; only 14,95%. From these people 310 heads of cattle, 215 sheep and 1615 goats

were collected, a total of 2140 beasts.(4) It is not surprising therefore that the people of Gurupira (Chief Mutoko) fired on the messengers, killed one and recaptured their animals.(5) This marked the beginning of a resistance against BSAC rule which continued in different parts of the district until the turn of the century. Between the winter of 1895 and that of 1896, Chigi Mukota, Gozi, Goronga, Chikwizo, Zindi, Doro, Nyakuchena, Muhomba, Mapundu, Kamsori, Nyam'koho and Charehwa had taken up arms against hut tax.(6) The first groups to be subdued were those closest to the Native Commissioner's camp but those further away, particularly those favoured by adverse climatic conditions, lasted much longer. Total control was not achieved until as late as 1903, but up to 1906 there were still many individuals who avoided hut tax by escaping to the mountains until the tax collectors had returned to camp.(7)

This paper aims to show that resistance in Mutoko District started much earlier than 1896 and lasted longer than in many districts in the country, mainly because of geographical factors. The paper will explain why Gurupira had to collaborate with BSAC Forces despite the disapproval of the Medium of Nehoreka. On the whole, the paper aims to show the impact of Colonial rule on the people of Mutoko up to 1906.

PRECOLONIAL HISTORY:

The main group of people to settle in this district were the Budya tribe and Shumba Nyamzehwa Mutupo.(8) These people claim to have originated from the lands between Tete and the Lower Luangwa Valley in Zambia. The people were ruled by their Chief Mutoko.(9) The father of Mutoko was Dzivaguru(10) who lived at Mangere, a remote place in Mozambique in the Valley described above. Under the leadership of Nehoreka (Nzou Samanvanga)(11) they travelled to their present home. Nehoreka was assisted by Napahwe (Mapaxwe, Mapakwe) Shumba Nyamuzihwa to defeat the original occupants of Mutoko area, Makati, who lived near Mount Mtemwa [Makati was probably the builder of the Zimbabwean type of stone buildings now known as Mutoko Ruins].(12) Nehoreka himself settled in the territory between the Nyadire and Chitora rivers, now known as the Charehwa and Napahwe took the area between the Chitora and Mudzi rivers known as Mutoko. Some Charehwa traditions say that Nehoreka was not perpetuated through a son so his chieftainship fell into the female line who ruled under the supervision of Mutoko and is to vacate her office at the death of Mutoko and re-appointed only at the discretion of the new Mutoko. She was to be the Mutupo Tembo and was supposed to be an elderly and unmarried woman. One thing is true of these people. They have great respect for elders, so in practice the woman ruler did not vacate her office but usually got the approval of the next Mutoko since she had the approval of the Medium of Nehoreka.(13)

However, Nehoreka remained very powerful among the Budya. No Chief in Mutoko could rule without the approval of the medium of Nehoreka. Even Courtney Selous was able to notice this: "Before coming here I have had no difficulty with any of the other chiefs, but here I have had a lot of worry and trouble. My great difficulty is that the whole country is really ruled, not by the Chief (Mutoko) but by one whom they call the 'Lion God'. This appears to be a hereditary office and the holder of it lives away by himself in the mountains, and is looked upon with superstitious dread and reverence by the Chief and his people".(14)

The Budya people settled on the best land in Mutoko, though the soil is not as rich as that of the Makaha area, the land is at an altitude of 3300 feet (1005,84m) above sea level and has a rainfall much higher than anywhere else. The land is free of tsetse-flies and is suitable for cattle breeding. A portion of this land was later taken and converted into European farms.

Big groups of Tonga people of Ngarwe (Nyamkoho) of the Nzou Samanyanga Mutopo also claim to have come from Mozambique. These claim their origin from Mutota. Another group that claims to have come from Mutota is the Chikwizo people of Rupire.

Smaller groups claim to have come from Mbire. Mkota (soko) say they immigrated together with Nyangure of Chief Makombe of the Portuguese East Africa. Nyachuma of Doro, who has also a claim to the Nyakuchena Chieftainship, claims also to have come from Mbire. Only Goronga (Nzou Samanyanga) is the only chief who claims to have come directly from the Darwin region, but a close consultation with his people will reveal a close connection with the rest of the others. This is interesting because it seems none of these people claim direct relationship with the Zezuru of Murewa, the Maungwa and Manyika peoples. This aspect of their origin and relationship was exploited by the Native Commissioners in the 1896-7 wars. People of one district were recruited to fight those of another.

By mid-nineteenth century the settlement pattern was like this.(15) To the south — on the better watered and higher altitude part of the country was, from south to north, Chimoyo, Mutoko, Charehwa, Chisengwe (Muhomba), with sub-chiefs Makoni, Marongedza and Chingwi settled a little further east with Doro to the north of them and Kadiki and Nyamkoho further north.

The central region of the district was occupied from south to north by Chikwizo, Nyakuchena (Doro), Zindi, Mapundu and parts of Nyam'koho (Ngarwe). This area is drier than the one described above, but the land is fairly flat although it is much lower in the Ngarwe area. The result is that most villages were situated along the river valleys. The people of Mapundu who lived far away from a major source of water built their huts around a spring.

To the extreme east and bordering with Mozambique were from south to north, Goronga, Gozi, Nyanguo and Chigi Mukora. The area is very dry and people live in river valleys. Though the area has a higher altitude than the central region and has richer soils, the area is very hot and has tsetse-flies.

Economically, these people were not poor. The Budyia had more cattle than the Tonga but when it came to goats the reverse was the case. Basing our estimations on figures collected in 1905 the people of Mutoko on the whole had large herds of livestock. The totals were :

Cattle	2181
Sheep	1504
Goats	4746

These were most probably conservative estimates. In addition, these people had regular trade with Portuguese. So, despite crop failure, and problems of locusts, people of Mutoko were fairly well off. They no longer depended entirely on skins for clothes as this report shows. "The wearing of skin aprons is not so common as in other parts of Mashonaland. They wear to a large extent, common or coloured limbo or calico, and are greatly addicted to ornamenting their heads with beads. The women all wear a cloth which is made from fibre in patterns, a good number wearing limbo and in a good many cases the faces and breasts all tattooed, or I should say cut and marked by scars in a variety of patterns."(17)

The people were well-armed as well. Nearly all visitors to Mutoko went back talking of how well armed these people were. F.C. Selous described them "..... a nation, and what is more, a warlike nation, capable of putting several thousands of warriors into the field".(18) Later he wrote "It is difficult

to estimate numbers but I am sure that at this interview Mutoko was surrounded by far over a thousand men, all fully armed, and a large number of them with guns".(19) That the people of Mutoko had large quantities of fire-arms is not surprising when one reads the report by the Native Commissioner of Northern Mazoe. "This trading of firearms was carried on to such an extent during the recent rebellion (1896-7) that at the end of it the natives had 50 per cent more guns than they had previously to the rebellion to take the Lomagundi, Mangwende and this District I can say the Mashonas have 200 per cent more. The three above districts are all bounded to Portuguese territory from where this trading is carried out. I suppose we have collected two thousand guns in Mashonaland up to the present. I don't consider this one third of the arms the Mashonas had during the rebellion. I put the amount of arms traded during the rebellion down to about 40,000 at least. This is taking the whole of the districts; putting this district down to about three thousand as having been traded since May, 1896. It is very important that something should be done to stop this trading as for instance we have taken about six to eight months to collect about two thousand or even three thousand and it would take the Mashonas to recover this amount or more less than a month."(20) In addition to a fairly reasonable economic structure the people of Mutoko worked hand in hand with two of the most powerful rulers in the Zambezi Valley, Antonio Vicente da Cruz (Bonga)(21) and Makombe of Barwe.(22) The strength of Bonga's forces is best described by Axelson "The most notorious of these rebels was the Lord of Massangano, Antonio Vicents da Cruz nicknamed Bonga (the wild cat) who had massacred a force sent to take him prisoner, among the victims being the Governor of Tete himself. A punitive expedition failed to take Bonga's stockades but a third expedition, well equipped with artillery got as far as besieging it. The defenders sallied out and butchered half the attacking troops. A fourth expedition largely composed of volunteers from Portugal met with no success, the rebels attacked it while it was returning and turned the withdrawal into a rout.(23) Even after signing the agreement of co-operation with the Portuguese "The Governor of Tete found it expedient to continue to send presents to Bonga(24)". There are rumours that the Portuguese had him poisoned. Of Makombe, Axelson described him as "an independent potentate to whom the Portuguese used to give presents in the hope of maintaining friendly relations. Whenever gifts fell into arrears the Chief expressed his contempt for authorities of Sena, and disrespect even for Manoel Antonio da Sousa. His support was essential for the reoccupation of the fairs of Manica and Quiteve.(25)"

The people of Mutoko therefore had very strong neighbours. Though both Makombe and Bonga raided in all directions there is no report I came across which shows they raided into Mutoko. On the contrary there are several reports of co-operation and alliances against enemies. In fact da Sousa complains often of the large numbers of Mutoko people he found among the Makombe soldiers.(26)

PORTUGUESE PRESSURE.

The most serious threat to the stability of the life of the people of Mutoko came from Manoel Antonio da Sousa (Gouveia), a prazo holder of Indian origin, who bought the prazo Gorongosa. Later he was favoured by Government and made Capitao-mor of Manica and Quiteve. He worked with Government to fight Bonga because Bonga was a major rival. He was said to be able to raise at any time an army as large as twelve thousand men.(27) For a long time the major advantage Mutoko had was that whenever Gouveia planned to attack Mutoko he had to do it either through Barwe or Manyika. Therefore Mutoko was often informed well ahead of time.

The decision by Colonel J.C. Paiva de Andrada to use Gouveia's forces to stabilize Portuguese authority in Manica and Zambezia provinces could be said to have been a turning point in the history of Mutoko. Four years after the decision, Portugal was challenged at the Conference of Berlin to provide proof of effective occupation of the vast territory she claimed in Africa. Andrada decided to put to full use the forces of Gouveia.

In March 1885 Augusto de Castilho, Governor of Lourenço Marques, who had visited Gouveia, heard that Captain Andrada had been robbed in the lands of Rupire and a European killed. He sent Gouveia with a force of 2,300 men. Gouveia was accompanied by F.I. Gorjao Moura, Governor of Manica. The expedition was a great success for Gouveia. They were able to take the "lands between rivers Inhamessanzara, Arucanha and Muze and lands of Massana and Chiunnye ---Caterere --- lands of Chidima, lands of Beza --- of Gosi --- of Inhamaringa" This account shows that Gouveia's expedition was able to capture the gold producing areas of Makaha, lands stretching fromKaterere in the Nyanga district, across the Ruenya, taking Kaunye, Chikwizo, down to Nyakuchena, Goronga, Katsande, Nyanguo and probably parts of Mukota. All the Tonga speaking people were subdued. It is, however, unlikely Gouveia's forces disturbed Muhomba, Doro, Zindi and Mapundu. After this expedition it is not surprising that Moura claimed to have killed 1800 Africans.(29)

The most probable reason behind this 1885 expedition was to forestall the British in the Makaha area. Following Carl Mauch's 1870 trip to Makaha and the description of a possibility of large deposits of gold there, European people visited the place in larger numbers than before. The aim of the Portuguese therefore was to control the area before any of these powers claimed it. Stockades were therefore built from Rupire up to the Mazoe River. But perhaps the capture of Rupire and the rest of the Tonga country would not have been possible had it not been for the fact that Gouveia and Makombe had had a dispute over trade arrangements. Gouveia, during the argument, produced a revolver shot and killed Makombe, took thirty-two of his Chief Officers and killed them. Then he chose one of the collaborators as a successor to the Makombe. This new Makombe had to pay an annual tribute of ten tusks, ten herds of cattle, fifteen goats et cetera.(30) each year.

In March 1887 Mutoko recaptured the lands of Rupire.(31) Gouveia who now had a headquarters in the Barwe area decided on a recapture of the rich area. His army moved into the Rupire area where they claimed to have defeated a force of five thousand men but on the night of the decisive battle, his men fled except for only three hundred who then raided the Rupire area as they retreated.(32) To re-establish authority over the area a joint effort was planned against Mutoko. This expedition was to involve Captain Andrada himself, Ferreira Simois, Governor of Manica and Gouveia. The fact that such a big army was to go against Mutoko shows how strong Mutoko was. Mutoko having been warned of the forces coming to attack him sought the assistance of Bonga's successor, Chatara. Mutoko wanted Gouveia's forces away from his neighbourhood, so he asked Chatara to attack Portuguese stockades on the Mazoe River. Gouveia, knowing the strength of Massangano decided to subdue him first. But this was not easy. For the next three years Portuguese struggled to subdue Massangano. In the first attack of September, 1887, four columns — one from Tete (advancing towards Chatara's stockades on the Mazoe), a second from Sena (advancing upon stockades on the Muira), a third from Chicou (also advancing on stockades on the Mazoe) and a fourth from Manica composed of four thousand armed men. Chatara was forced to withdraw from Massangano and go into hiding, but he was betrayed by his brother, Motontora, and surrendered to Portuguese at Tete.(33) But by July 1888 the Portuguese taxation on Motontora was so heavy that he organised an uprising. The people of Rupire joined Motontora's forces but in the ensuing war Massangano was eventually captured and a stockade built there. But this defeat of Massangano was not the end of war in the area because there are reports of several uprisings and disturbances in the area.(34)

During these days of disturbances Mutoko helped Makombe to take up arms against Gouveia. In the battle which followed Makombe was killed. He was replaced by one named Kanga.(35)

When BSAC representatives moved into the border areas promising Chiefs protection from attack by other foreign powers, many chiefs cooperated from fear of Gouveia more than anything else. When Gouveia was arrested over the Mutasa controversy, news of the capture spread fast and BSAC became popular in border areas. Some chiefs in Portuguese sphere sent representatives to the Company asking to be made British subjects.(36)

One wonders if the trip of Courtney Selous was not timed to coincide with the arrival of the news of the capture of the greatest enemy of Mutoko. Selous had failed to conclude a treaty with Mutoko before(37) but knew very well that the arrest of Gouveia would have an impression on Mutoko. Indeed, when Selous got to Mutoko Mutasa's envoys had just left and after sharing with Mutoko the joyful news.(38) Selous' report does not explain what he did to persuade Mutoko to sign that paper. Judging from what other chiefs had been promised, Mutoko must have been promised large supplies of arms and ammunition, a big sum of money each year, total freedom, et cetera. Mutasa had been promised similar things. Besides promises he had been given only a revolver and thirteen rifles and ammunition.(39) However, it is very likely that Mutoko was given more guns. He was not as desperate for arms as Mutasa. A treaty with Mutoko had necessitated a fresh supply of gifts, since Mutoko was not desperate for support both militarily and economically. Selous observed that Mutoko's people "are wonderfully well supplied with all kinds of vegetable food and in no part of the country have I seen such fine rice as is here grown, of even, large grain and beautifully white".(40) Militarily as explained above, Mutoko was very strong. Selous observed that Mutoko controlled the Makaha gold mines.(41) This shows us that Mutoko had driven out Portuguese power from the Rupire area.

The news of the capture of Gouveia prompted punitive expeditions from Makombe, Mutoko and the rather weak Motondoro of Massaganho. Makombe being closest to Gorongosa gained the greater share of exploits. Later Gouveia described how these Chiefs revenged. They "pillaged my stores, killed a lot of my people and burnt my huts. They took one thousand five hundred guns, gunpowder, limbo, food, gold and ivory which I had collected as tribute for fifteen years.(42) Whether Mutoko and Makombe had a joint expedition or they went separately is difficult to establish but both raided into Gorongosa.

On Gouveia's return he found that his people had returned to their homes. (43) Captain Castinho had taken six thousand of his men to fight Bonga and Gouveia claims to have been greatly impoverished. He was, however, able to raise an army which fought and defeated Makombe and re-establish his authority there. He was never again strong enough to bother Mutoko. It was now Mutasa, Makoni and Mutoko who raided into his area. Several times Gouveia complained to the BSAC, especially in the year 1892.(44)

By the end of 1892 the areas of British and Portuguese influence were fairly well defined. There was, of course, the question in some areas of exactly where the boundary lay, but generally there was an understanding of which and which not was British territory. However, this was not the case in mineral rich areas; there was often a struggle to acquire from the other colonial power as much valuable land as possible wherever possible. As late

as 1894 there was still a struggle for Makaha gold rich area. N.C. of Umtali, W.W. Taylor, made several journeys to Barwe to persuade Makombe to do something in order to rid himself of Portuguese authority and to accept BSAC protection.(45) On the other hand, Portuguese also sent representatives to persuade people of Makaha to accept Portuguese rule. As late as November, 1893, "a Portuguese commandant came into the Country and sent a message to him [Makombe] to say he had come to live in the Country and that he would make his headquarters at Ruperia [Rupire]. Makombe immediately sent a message to him to leave the Country, which he disregarded.

"Karima and Ruperia (subsidy Chiefs) sent to me immediately on my arrival here to ask me what they had to do with this man who called himself commander. They had already warned him to leave the Country and that he had offered him presents to remain which they refused."(46) Later, after the man had been forced to leave, Taylor recommended that a "Native Commissioner be appointed for this district making his headquarters at Rupire which is about the centre of the gold belt and alluvial districts."(47) This is probably why Armstrong was appointed at the end of that year.

COMPANY RULE.

The period following the signing of the Treaty with Mutoko was marked by a steady stampede by whites to make claims of mining areas in the Makaha area. J.T. Bent led an official delegation at the beginning of 1892, and he was followed by many private individuals and companies. By June, 1894, when claims were officially recorded, these companies made corresponding claims.

<u>June 1894:</u>	Physmomsma	10	claims
	Egyem	10	"
	Yantsitsi	10	"
	Talisman	10	"
	Capital	10	"
	Liaden	10	"
	£. s. d.	10	"
<u>September 1894:</u>	Mtokia	20	"
	Carl Mauch	70	"
<u>November 1894:</u>	Kaiser Wildehaim	23	"
	Carl Mauch	20	"
	Leo Grand Phix	20	"

These early miners faced many problems. There was excessive heat and shortage of water. There was a critical shortage of labour.(49) The Africans were not willing to work for the little money they were being offered. The problem of labour was only solved when the hut tax became enforceable. But the main problem was that the mines were not as rich as they were expected to be. African miners had removed all the top layers of gold(50) and to work the gold at lower levels often turned out to be uneconomic. In fact, at the Kaiser Wildehaim all work was stopped at the end of March, 1903.(51) It was only resumed in February, 1907, but with only a staff of 50 men.(52) In many cases Africans who agreed to work there were often ill-treated and poorly paid.

In January, 1895, the first Native Commissioner, Armstrong, who had initially come to the place with C. Selous and witnessed the signing of the Mutoke Treaty, arrived at Mutoke. His work was similar to the work given to other Native Commissioners: to recruit for native labour and collect hut tax. He brought with him Zulu soldiers who became the men responsible for passing the messages to the Chiefs and enforcing the collection of the Hut tax. The first done was unbearable because it was excessive and deprived the Africans of their only form of wealth. The Africans, as is shown in the first paragraph, then killed one of the messengers, drove off the rest and recaptured their animals. They then threatened Armstrong so much that he wrote to the Chief Native Commissioner for a punitive patrol. J. Brabant(53) who had been recently appointed to this office as the first Chief Native Commissioner, felt this his chance to demonstrate to his superiors his ability to put down such uprisings. He invited Weale, the Native Commissioner for Marandellas (he covered Mangwende and Mutoke regions as well) to come with him and asked him to collect a strong army. At Kirewa they collected five hundred men to form a well-armed small army.

On crossing the Nyadira they were met by four messengers sent by Armstrong to direct the Chief Native Commissioner. Armstrong had taken pains to dress them properly -- "in cricket blazers and second-hand boots"(54). Brabant was angry to see these people well dressed. Weale described his reaction, "Now if there was one thing about a native more than another that annoyed Brabant it was to see a raw native wearing boots"(55). He had the men stripped of their clothes and flogged, "for letting one of their men to be killed" and failing to collect hut tax. He marched on leaving them wailing behind. On arriving at Mutoke he asked Armstrong to send his men to collect Chief Gurupira but none of the Armstrong men were willing to go because they knew that Mutoke's men were all over the hills ready to attack. Brabant then ordered Weale to send his own men. These were anxious for adventure. They marched towards the Chief's camp late in the afternoon and the next morning brought the Chief and his Councillors. Everybody, including Brabant, knew that Gurupira himself had not instigated the shooting and was not behind the uprising. He was blamed because "he was the principal chief of the district and it seems these people had killed a coloured trader named Gouveia some years before and that they were bold and that they had objected to paying hut tax"(56). This was unfair, because according to Armstrong's reports it was the house of Gurupira alone that had paid hut tax. (57)

"Brabant then went up to Wagurupila and started interrogating him and asked what is the reason for his military display, now that he had come himself he found the country all armed, pointing to the surrounding hills. One of the Councillors said something to which Brabant evidently took exception and on continuing to be insolent Brabant took a jambok out of a police boy's hand and struck him with it. Immediately Gurupila and his Councillors made a dash for liberty but most of them were stopped. Wagurupila then opened a box he had brought with him and displayed a helmet and a breast-plate of brass together as peace offering but Brabant spurned it with his foot and called upon everybody to go raiding the country He explained to Gurupila that he could either go in person or send his Councillors to tell his people that we were going to burn and shoot and destroy everything we saw until he sent to stop us and ask for mercy, but that before we would cease he would have to fill the valley with cattle for us to pick from for hut tax and that

he was also to furnish with 200 of his picked men to go and work in the mines.

"We then proceeded down the valley in search of something to destroy. The police boys and messengers and camp followers scattered over the hills and burnt down all the kraals they came across until the whole valley was dense with smoke of burning rapoko and other corn and grass".(59) "while the five hundred strong force went about destroying property, Brabant and his fellow men engaged themselves in a game on horse-back. When Gurupira came to accept Brabant's conditions the warriors were called back. "We returned to camp to find the valley literally full of cattle lowing and bellowing." The next day the party collected the hut tax in cattle, goats and sheep. In addition, 500 of Gurupira's men were collected for work in the gold mines.(60) This was a typical example of the way African Chiefs were treated in those days. W. Edwards reports that he raised an army of "fifty Wazezuru, armed with old muzzle loading guns" to enforce the people of Fungwe to pay hut tax.(61)

But this unexpected humiliation of Mutoko needs some comment. First Brabant brought with him an armed force of 500 men to a Chief who expected friendly negotiations. Secondly, Gurupira did not want punishment similar to that given Gouveia. After all there had been agreement of friendship which had been confirmed the following year by J.T. Bent who brought a letter and presents from the British "Crown"(62). But I think the crux of the problem lay in the personality of Gurupira. He was not like the Old Mutoko but perhaps the opposite. He had this unusual faith in the whites that he did everything they told him. He would be described as very afraid of them, as this experience with Bent shows. "His Majesty came forthwith, but he refused to shake hands, nay, even look at the white lady, and during the whole of the interview he trembled so violently, and looked so nervous that we felt sorry for him"(63). It appears he was so afraid of BSA Company men that he was willing to do anything he was ordered to do, such as being ordered by Bent, a visitor to his state, to come out to meet him, or for that matter to be ordered by Brabant to travel so early in the morning from his own headquarters to the N.C's Camp or offering presents to a man who was obviously contemptuous of his office. His only effort was towards collaboration. He had never followed a different course in the past and all this maltreatment was unfair. After this humiliation he ordered his people to bring gifts and prepared a party. On the other side Brabant and his party "walked around inspecting the cattle and small stock and besides there were rows of women kneeling down behind their loads which consisted of their people comprising grain of every description that they grew and meal ground from such grain and different kinds of roots (sensa) and vegetables, beans, monkey nuts dried, melon slices, etc. etc"(64). Gurupira then ordered his people to dance the whole night. Gurupira never again took a different course. Armstrong had great faith in him. "Gurupira the son of Mtoko", he wrote, "the most powerful and respected of all sub-chiefs is a really clever native and I would fearlessly go and talk with him alone either in the open or in a case when a party goes down"(65). His eldest son died in an ambush of a police patrol in the Charehwe area. He was part of the

force that fought and defeated the Zezuru at Zhombwe in 1897. He was later killed fighting in the white man's forces. What is, however, important is the fact that it was only a small part of Mutoko that approved of the actions of Gurupira, perhaps only members of his own clan.

The Mhondoro, Nehoreka totally disapproved of his actions. Armstrong recorded the disapproval. "... as Gurupira who was a man of great power and determination had for some years repeatedly disregarded and disobeyed orders given him by the witch doctor of Mutoko Country and I was afraid the death of the King fighting for the white men would once give the witch doctor great power as Gurupira's sons were only youths. — more especially Gurupira's eldest son who had been in Government employ for ten months was also shot through the lungs about a year ago, also on the side of white men."(66)

After Brabant returned to Salisbury, Armstrong set out to enforce hut tax. Basing our assessment of success or failure on the figures of tax collected in 1895, he must have had initial success, but soon received resistance. Not surprising because even before Gurupira died there were groups of individuals who disapproved of his personality. Moreover, the rest of the Tanga Country had not been approached about hut tax. The rest of the country was full of guns. The people now had a fair knowledge of how to make gun-powder.(67) Guns were being sold by Portuguese quite liberally to Africans who could afford them. Kunzwi-Nyandoro got over 700 guns from Gouveia.(68) Over 1500 had been captured from the same man by peoples of Rupire and Barwe when he was arrested by the BSA Police.(69) Any man with cattle could afford a gun because at the border they were being sold by the Portuguese at a price of 30/- each.(70) So when Armstrong sent messengers to collect a man said to have killed another in the area of Shegu-Mtoko and to ask the Chief to come and receive instructions on hut tax, they were fired on. Armstrong then "at once went down with ten police and eight friendliers and one of [his] party was fired upon". "I was confronted with an impi" he wrote, "of over 600 men, and the chief absolutely declined to pay any tax to us, and threatened to attack me if I did not at once return.(71)" He made a camp on a hill where he remained for four days but was forced to retreat, escorted by a force shouting abuse at him. He wrote to Salisbury for another punitive force.

Chigi Mukota's influence spread like wild fire before the end of 1896. The chiefdoms of Mapundu, Mazarura, Doro and others took up arms. Armstrong at this time went on leave. He was replaced by Acting Native Commissioner Ruping. He soon learnt that Chigi Mukota had extended his power to very near his camp. There was support not only from within Mutoko district but also from outside. Chiefs "Cattarari". (Katerere) and Chiquera (Chikwira) of Rupire sent kegs of powder as presents to the Chief of Chisaire(?). Muhomba and Charewa only 16 miles (about 26 Km) also joined in the war.(72)

Then Ruping went with 8 men to inform Muhomba of hut tax collections and to talk of recruitment of labour. He found the Chief and his men drinking and sharing ideas. When he tried to inform them of the tax he was fired at. (73) He had to retreat to his camp. Except for the 700 Gurupira's subjects who had offered themselves to fight for the white men most chiefs in Mutoko who had been approached on the hut tax issue took up arms. Those mentioned in BSA reports were "Mahomba, Chombo, Katerere, Niri (Rupiri), Macaha, Massahua and Doro.(74) These included Gurupira's subjects who remained at home when Gurupira went with the whites to Mrewa. These surrounded Ruping's camp to capture and kill him, as Armstrong reports. "That very night, the men who lived within half a mile of my camp and the very men who for eighteen months had helped me as volunteers against their own people and witch doctors and who had all paid hut tax, surrounded my camp"(75) fired on Ruping. Ruping

was assisted by Smith, one of the four white men in the whole of Mutoko at that time, to escape. He was killed in the Mrewa area by one of his supporters.

The other three whites were lucky. Two, Messrs Jensen and Horne, who had been prospecting separately were able to meet and build a temporary stockade at Dora. Soon they ran out of water but before long they were found by Smith and the three of them managed to escape through Barwe.

The importance of the quotation above is the proof it provides that although a large number of Mutoko people under Gurupira fought on the side of whites until the death of Gurupira, at home there was disapproval from some members of his chiefdom. There were the people who organized the war against Ruping in Gurupira's absence.

For almost a year the people of Mutoko knew no white authority above them. Until the appointment of Byron as Native Commissioner, these people managed their own affairs.

Exactly a year after the death of Ruping Armstrong's leave expired. He joined the force that was in the Murewa area, and started his return journey. But the force was no longer the same. It had suffered humiliating defeat near the Nyague River; their chief and motivating force was dead (there is no mention of the normal burial arrangements of a chief) and the majority of them had been routed in action.

On crossing the Nyadire, Africans must have met their fellow men and were informed of their image before Nchoreka, now that Gurupira was no more. They therefore joined hands with others and planned to murder Armstrong unaware. He had a few white men there; there would be no point starting a war. Armstrong was informed of the plan and he sent out for help. [It is said the young man sent went to see his girl friend first]. "All day I watched and listened carefully and by the time camp was reached I was quite sure treachery was intended but could not be sure exactly how and when, so I camped on an open patch, commanding water and had one outfit piled at the same place, the Budya Camp line being in the bush 80 yards (about 73 metres) away.(76)

Armstrong was surprised at this form of reception. He, however, did not put the blame on the people themselves but the leadership. He blamed Mhondoro for the uprising. "... the witch doctor had told the frantic people that Gurupira had been bewitched by the whites and his death was due to his refusal to obey the orders of the witch doctor, and that although a warning had been given to Gurupira and the Nation a year ago when Gurupira's son had been shot dead when doing the white man's work no notice was taken and Gurupira had now been killed for taking the impi to fight with whites against the wish of the witch doctor."

The Budya themselves had a well worked out strategy. "The main body was to go ahead with our outfit and Muchenedya, the son of Dowa was to guide the party and bring up the rear. Should the whites come and bother them after the affair they would go to the Mountains around Uzumba and with their stores of corn would fight for five years"(77). Armstrong, however, was able to escape before the Budya implemented their plan.

By this time the reports of the death of Chief Makoni reached the people

of Mutoko, the impact of which was found in the degree of cooperation which began to creep into the people of Mutoko. The BSA Company was aware of this and took advantage of it. A Major Harding, one of those responsible for the death of Makoni, sent messages to Dawa explaining the consequences of continuing with the resistance, and informing Dawa that he would be allowed to keep his guns if he opted for peace.(78) Dawa accepted peace terms. When the new Native Commissioner, Byron, arrived at Mutoko, Dawa and other Chiefs were waiting for him.(79) Once Dawa had shown he had changed sides he met opposition from fellow Budya claimants of the Chieftainship: he was most probably associated with rebel Gurupira. Early in 1898, Dawa was attacked by Zindi and defeated. He was driven off the district and "all his cattle, women and guns taken." He fled the district to that of Gurupira where he lived as a refugee.(80) He was later reinstated with the help of the Native Commissioner.(81) By the end of 1898 most of the Budya people had decided to cooperate. Hut tax was collected from Dawa, Muhomba, Rundu, Gwati and Zindi. In fact most chiefs within the radius of 30 miles (about 48 kilometres) from the N.C's Camp paid tax.

It is the Tonga groups that proved quite resistant. They were aided by the environment. "The inaccessibility of the district, the absence during the greater part of the year of water and the exceedingly difficult nature of the country renders it almost impossible to frequently visit the district until May or June. The district is unsafe for horses owing to the horse sickness which is at the period of the year very prevalent in low lying parts of the district, so that unless a journey on foot is effected nothing can be done till May or June and later in the year the water on the road is not to be depended upon.(82)" In the winter of 1898 Byron decided to go on a tour of the Tonga Country to meet Chiefs and make them pay more tax and send in young men for labour. Aware of the possibility of a gun battle he took an army of one hundred and fifty armed men. At this particular time a number of Police patrols were stationed along the border to keep away the Portuguese from British claimed territory. These were used by Native Commissioners to enforce African obedience. To a fairly large extent there were elements of indiscipline in some of them. They sometimes raided African homes for food and women and were greatly feared by Africans.(83) In 1898 there were camps at Fort Haitland — north of Mazoe Tuitos Camp — 120 miles from Darwin and 70 miles from Tete; there was another at Makaha and then mobile camps such as those by Cunninghams and Meckerk.(84) Byron used these camps very much and in fact very heavily depended on their support.

Byron started with the Makaha area. He was well received by most of the Chiefs except for Rupire (Chikwize). The other Chiefs seemed to have decided to cooperate. But this was not true of Mukota. On arrival at Mukota village Byron occupied the well where the people got their water and forced Chigi Mukota to come for negotiations. Byron himself wrote "I arrived at a place near the kraal on the Mazoe River where Chigi Mukota's people came for water, the kraal being a mile or more off the river and the water in the immediate vicinity having dried up — necessitated the natives coming to the river for their supplies of water. The Chief, Chigi Mukota came down about midday with a few headmen. We had a long talk and I questioned him as to his not paying hut tax"(85). Chigi Mukota brought with him £3 and explained that he had sent his men to Salisbury to look for work and that he could not make his other people to pay. Byron then gave him a little more time. By January 1899 only £15 more had been paid. Byron then extended his deadline to July 1899, but again the response was poor. In his report to the Chief Native

Commissioner he observed that there was an alliance between Mukota and Chioko.(86) At the end of 1900 Byron wrote to the Chief Native Commissioner for a special patrol to handle Mukota. "I trust that the Government" he wrote, "will see their way to punish this Chief, as this state of affairs has now reached the third year and has a bad effect on neighbouring Chiefs."(87)

It would be inappropriate to limit this resistance to the people of Mukota only because we know that Byron's messengers could not travel freely in the whole of the North Eastern corner of the district. We know that up to 1902 Chigi Mukota also worked with Gozi and Nyanguo. It is therefore likely that Chigi Mukota, Chioko Gozi and Nyanguo collaborated their actions. In the report of December 1899 Byron reports having sent messengers to count people. These Chiefs were counted, Cherungoma and Mapundu and sub-chiefs there, Kadiki, Gwati, Chimoyo. In the Ngarwe area people were counted; so were those of Charehwa, Dawa, Rundu, Zindi and Nyakanyanga.(88) Katerere across the Ruenya was reported to be a difficult ruler as he crossed into Portuguese territory each time tax collectors arrived.(89) Earlier reports showed that the people of Chikwizo, Mubumba and Chimoyo areas paid tax. But throughout the reports there is no mention of Gozi, Nyanguo and Chigi Mukota. BSA Company patrols to the area probably never visited the people. It is not surprising Portuguese thought the area was within their sphere and came asking for hut tax in 1902.(90)

In April 1902 a special patrol to subdue these three chiefs was sent from Salisbury. Gozi was brought before the patrol and questioned on his failure to pay tax for four years.. Gozi's excuses were unacceptable and he had to suffer for the failure of his people to pay tax despite the unfavourable environmental problems. Byron wrote on the punishment he imposed on Gozi, "Ithere upon informed him that I would destroy a portion of his crops and his personal kraal and after he had moved his personal property I requested Lieutenant Myburg to destroy his kraal."(91) The message of the arrival of the special patrol and the destruction of Gozi's village spread very fast. When the patrol arrived at the next village, Nyamkateka, the village had been deserted. The patrol burned down the village and "some of the grain."(92) At Nyanguo the people had moved from the village and taken up defensive positions in the hills. Byron saw Nyanguo and his armed men but was afraid to start a shoot-out; he proceeded to Saramunda where he found the village deserted. One would not say Byron's mission was a success because though he succeeded in burning down several villages and destroying stores of grain, he failed to persuade these Chiefs to work with him and pay tax, which was his initial objective.

By 1903 Byron had increased his authority over the people of Mukota. He was able to count in this year the people in all the districts, including their cattle, sheep and goats.(93) He was also able to win the cooperation of the Chiefs of the Mukota area. The elders of Gozi, Nyanguo and Mapundu agreed to pay tax although the young men continued to resist taxation. "A large number of these unmarried men clear out of their kraals and remain in the bush or cross into the neighbouring districts when they hear that the native messengers are on their way to their kraals"(94. The main reason for this was probably the fact that these men were usually forced to travel away from home as labour once the messengers set their eyes on them. These young men continued to be very slippery until Byron got fed^{up} with the problem. He wrote the Chief Native Commissioner suggesting that all the people of Mukota be moved to a new site between Birewa and the Native Commissioner's

Camp(95). His reasons were that if he continued military expeditions into this part of the country he was going to involve Africans who had by then accepted Company rule; the move would break the bond of alliance between Mukota and Chioko; he would ensure that the people of Chigi Mkota would not continue to run away from their villages and live with bandits in the bush. The numbers of huts were decreasing fast. In the previous visit he had found 372 huts but in his later visit the number had dropped to 274 and his messengers had told him that some of these people had left and settled in Mozambique(96). The Resident Commissioner, however, had his own fears. He feared that the removal of Africans from the border area would leave the area open for occupation by Africans from Mozambique side of the territory. This would then encourage Portuguese to move into the area with the excuse of rightful authority over subjects. He added that although the area was unsuitable for European settlement the area was rich in gold; any removal of the peoples without providing border patrols would mean a rush for gold by Portuguese. He then suggested that Byron should provide border patrols as did the Portuguese on the other side. Perhaps the reason why Byron was worried was because these were the years when Mapondera was fighting Company forces. A number of Africans bearing arms(97) had been seen crossing into the Pfungwe Mountain strongholds and this bothered Byron.

However, through the years 1904, 5 and 6, Byron gradually got to solve the problem of escaping young men. While his reports continue to describe problems, more and more Africans offered themselves for labour, especially after the doubling of the hut tax in 1905.. He was now able to send to Salisbury cash collected from hut tax at the end of each month.(98) In addition, dog tax was introduced. Though Africans often hid their dogs in the bush(99) or killed them, gradually they found themselves with no choice but to comply. After this came registration (100) of guns and then prosecution for those who failed to register their guns. This was followed by the Pass laws (101) to make sure those employed would not escape and get away with it. At the end of 1905, 5024 Africans were registered for hut tax, 4000 of them were able to work and pay tax but "the remainder were unfit for heavy work but are able to pay tax owing to the possession of stock"(102). Those who failed to pay their tax were forced to go and work in the mines(103) and those who deserted before the expiry of their contracts were arrested and sent back to the mines.(104)

CONCLUSION.

The years 1885 to 1906 therefore were years when people of Mutoko fought at different times for political survival. But the impact of colonial pressure was like a strangling rope. Gradually, despite the beating and kicking, the colonial rope tightened round the peoples' necks until all energy was driven out of them. Their struggle lasted so long mainly because of their geographical position. Stationed at the far corner of BSA Company administered territory it took time for news from Mtkoko to reach the authorities. Secondly, the climate of this region was unsuitable for white settlement and the tsetse fly damaged the white man's means of transport. So the people of Mutoko were often left alone when other chiefs were pressurised. Because the area was so hot and water scanty, patrols containing large numbers of men were not possible at certain seasons of the year. Politically, the rulers had established an economic infrastructure that supported political

alliances which made it rather difficult for foreign powers to attack without having been involved in expensive preparations. Portuguese failed to establish authority in the area. The BSA Company could have equally failed had it not been for their treaty system which left rulers rather confused until too late. Often African rulers realized they had been colonized long after the BSAC had stationed armed men at strategic positions. People of Muteke realized what was going on when they were asked for hut tax. However, they fought the taxation issue with all the forces at their disposal. Though they lost they must be congratulated for the protracted wars they fought. Their Chimurenga was much longer than Chimurenga in other districts.

APPENDIX I

N15/1/1 February 7th, 1895. C.N.C. to Administrator

J. Brabant's estimates of Number of Huts in the Country. Brabant was Chief Native Commissioner.

Salisbury	65,000
Mazoe	75,000
Lomagundi	10,000
Hartley Hills	35,000
Victoria	15,000
Tuli	4,000
Untali	2,000
Wakoni	3,000
Marandellas	4,000
Matibi	6,000
Muteke	6,000
Chilimanzi	3,000

Brabant expected a total of over £114,000 in hut tax each year. He could not tolerate anyone who attempted to upset this budget. This is one reason why the trip to Muteke was necessary.

TAX FIGURES COLLECTED IN 1903. N9/4/5.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>			<u>LABOUR</u>
	£	s	d	
January	83.	8.	0.	47
February	381.	6.	0.	-
March	175.	0.	0.	-
April	-	-	-	-
May	195.	0.	0.	126
June	17.	10.	0.	240
July	153.	14.	0.	200
August	-	-	-	-
September	12.	0.	0.	-
October	1,684.	10.	0.	-
November	-	-	-	-
December	289.	4.	0.	-
Total	£2,992.	2.	0.	613

TAX FIGURES COLLECTED IN 1907. N9/4/5.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF HUT TAX</u>			<u>DOG REGISTRATION</u>			<u>LABOUR IND. ALIEN</u>		<u>REPLACEMENT OF LOST R.C.</u>		
	£	s	d	£	s	d			£	s	d
January	58.	10.	0.			6.	8	17	1.	7.	0.
February	84.	10.	0.	-	-	-	22	64	1.	3.	0.
March	38.	10.	0.	1.	6.		81	45	2.	7.	0.
April	35.	0.	0.	2.	6.		392	74	1.	13.	0.
May	76.	0.	0.	1.	0.		880	83	5.	0.	0.
June	17.	0.	0.	1.	0.		405	88	3.	7.	0.
July	18.	10.	0.	1.	6.		34	81	3.	18.	0.
August	-	-	-	1.	11.	6.	7	72	3.	9.	0.
September	898.	0.	0.	-	-	-	7	69	3.	3.	0.
October	2,060.	5.	0.	-	-	-	7	39	-	-	-
November	2,187.	0.	0.	-	-	-	15	30	-	-	-
December	755.	0.	0.	-	-	-	6	43	-	-	-

FOOTNOTES

1. SE1/1/1. Journey to Mtoko's Country, Nov., 16th, 1890. Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa. F.C. Selous, pp 403
2. NSJ1/1/3. N.C. Muteko to C.N.C. Salisbury, 18-9-1906.
3. A 15/1/1. Taylor Makombi. Correspondence March 26th., 1895.
4. Mathematical calculations give us interesting results. Taking 2 goats or 2 sheep to represent one herd of cattle the total of 1830 sheep and goats collected in 1895 would represent 915 cattle and these added to 310 would give us 1225 cattle. If we divide 1225 by 366, the number of people who paid tax, we come up with 3,3 cattle per hut which was certainly too heavy. But if we divide 1225 by 2447 (the number of counted huts) we come up with 0,50 which means that each cow could cost approximately £1. So what probably happened is that the messengers collected from 366 huts, the hut tax of 2447 counted huts. If that is what happened this was certainly a very unfair exercise.
5. N1/1/6. Armstrong's Report on Mtoko; Weale's Reminiscance, WE3/2/5. Armstrong to Taberer, 25th February, 1897, L05/4/2.
6. N1/1/6. Armstrong to Anderson: Report July 21, 1898.
7. NSJ1/1/3. Byron to C.N.C. 10th Nov., 1904. Also his Report of 18th September, 1906.
8. Ministry of Internal Affairs Delimitation Report, Mtoko, 1965.
9. Beach D.N.: Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850 stresses that after Mapahwe died power was shared between four houses "variously called Nyamakwere-Nyamukapa, Dawa-Nyakuna, Nyamakwere-Nyamukapa and Mhuzi-Kowo", pp 165. This assertion is quite true of most Shona Chieftainships. Succession struggles were often quite bloody and no succeeding Chief wanted to be called by anyone's name other than his own (usually his grandfather's name). What Beach did not explain is how Muteko came to power and why his name became so popular as to be accepted by the Eudya people as a whole.
10. Dzivaguru is the Chief Spirit Medium of the Korekore. M.F.C. Bourdillon: "The Cults of Dzivaguru and Farava amongst the North-Eastern Shona Peoples".
11. Nehoreka has now been accepted as the Chief Mhondoro of the Muteko area. Beach, op.cit., pp 165, says he had to change his totem to Shumba. It is possible that many people now confuse Shumba (lion) the animal in the form of which the Chief Spirit (Gombwe) appears in his physical form with Shumba, totem of the ruling class in the Muteko area.
12. Beach, D.N., Op.Cit., pp 159-160
13. Ministry of Internal Affairs Delimitation Reports records that Charewa Chieftainship is limited to the female line of the Tembo Totem. There is need for further proof of this assertion.
14. Millais, J.S., Life of Fredrick Courtenay Selous, p 1880
15. See Map.

Footnotes :

16. NSJ1/1/3. Description of Mtoke. A Report to Enable BSAC to Open Up Farms in the Region, 7th February, 1905.
17. N9/1/4. N.C. Annual Reports, 1898.
18. SEL/1/1. Nov. 16, 1890. Mtoke Expedition Selous F.C.: Travel and Adventure in South East Africa, pp 400
19. SEL/1/1. Nov. 16, 1890. Mtoke Expedition. Selous F.C., Travel and Adventure in South East Africa, pp 408.
20. N9/1/4. Annual Report, Northern Mazoe, April, 1898.
21. Axelson E., Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, 1875-1891, pp 5.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp 142
24. Ibid., pp 142
25. Ibid., pp 138
26. CT1/15/3. Capt. M.D. Graham to Local Managing Director of BSA Company, 19th Jan., 1892.
27. Axelson E., Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1875-1891, pp 140
28. Ibid., pp 127. Footnote 45.
29. Ibid., pp 127
30. CT1/15/3. Capt. M.D. Graham to Local Managing Director BSA Company. 19th Jan. 1892.
31. CT1/15/3. Board Minutes No. $\frac{9}{316}$ to Acting Secretary, Cape Town 20th Jan., 1892.
32. Axelson E., Op.Cit., pp 143.
33. Ibid., pp 144
34. Ibid., pp 145. O'Neil to Salisbury, 4th January, 1889. C.F5970, pp 20-1
35. CT1/15/3. Board Minutes No. $\frac{9}{316}$ to Acting Secretary, 20th Jan., 1892.
36. A15/1/1. Tayler Makombir Correspondence, March 26th, 1895.
37. Millais J.G., Op.Cit., 179.
Axelson E., Op.Cit., 265.
38. Selous F.C., Op.Cit., pp 403.
39. Axelson E., Op.Cit., pp 265.
T. Trevor, 9th October, 1890. C.F. 6086, pp 124-5
40. Selous F.C., Op.Cit., pp 404.
41. Ibid., pp 403
42. Ibid.
43. CT1/15/3. Capt. M.D. Graham to Local Managing Director of BSA Company. 19th Jan., 1892.

44. A1/9/1. Report of Capt. Graham, Jan., 1892.
CT1/15/2. Report of Capt. Graham, Jan., 1892.
CT1/15/1. Report of Capt. Lendy, 23rd June, 1892.
45. A15/1/1. Taylor Makombir Correspondence, March 26th, 1895.
46. A15/1/1. Ibid.
47. A15/1/1. Ibid.
48. A15/1/1. Ibid.
49. NSJ1/1/3. Description of Muteko: A Report to enable BSAC to Open Farms in the Region, 26th Jan., 1905. N9/4/1. N.C. to C.N.C. Nov., 1892.
N9/4/3. N.C. to C.N.C., April, 1899.
50. Mauch C: Journals of Carl Mauch, pp 291.
51. N1/1/7. Monthly Reports, 3rd September, 1903.
52. N9/4/20. N.C. to C.N.C., Feb., 1907.
53. M1/1/1. Secretary, Salisbury to Mining Commissioner, Lomagundi, 6th Sept., 1894. J. Brabant was a Victoria Province Interpreter. Early in 1892 he was appointed to go to Salisbury to become Native Commissioner responsible for the collection of hut tax from Mashonaland and for collection of "Native Labour." He was to appoint hut tax collectors to work in different Districts. By the end of 1894 the new Office was taking shape. Later he became Chief Native Commissioner while the Hut Tax Collectors became known as Native Commissioners.
54. WE3/2/5. Weale's Reminiscences. N.C. to C.N.C., N1/1/6.
Armstrong to Taberner, 25th Feb., 1897. L05/42.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. N1/1/7. A.N.C. to C.N.C., Nov. 29, 1897.
58. WE3/2/5. Weale's Reminiscences.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. ED6/1/1. Reminiscences of Wiri Edwards.
62. Bent J.T. The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland, pp 302.
63. Ibid., pp 324.
64. WE3/2/5. Weale's Reminiscence.
65. N9/1/6. Copy of Report on Muteko Country given to Colonel Alderson by Request. Rec. July 21, 1898. N9/1/1/7. May 26., 1897.
66. Ibid.
67. N1/1/6. Armstrong to Alderson "Report on Muteko's Country" July 21, 1898.
68. Edwards, op.cit. Report by N.C. Campbell 27th Dec., 1894, L05/2/40.
69. CT1/15/3. Capt. H.D. Graham to Local Managing Director of BSA Company, 19th January, 1892.

70. N9/1/4. Annual Reports. W. Edwards, Mrewa, April, 1898.
71. N1/1/6. Op.Cit.
72. N1/1/6. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. The '96 Rebellion. BSA Report on Native Disturbances in Rhodesia, pp 53.
75. N1/1/6. Op.Cit.
76. N9/1/1/7. Armstrong to C.N.C., May 26, 1897.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. N9/1/1/6. Copy of Report on Mtoko Country, July 21, 1898.
N1/1/7. Byron to C.N.C., Nov. 29, 1897.
80. N9/1/1/6. Ibid.
81. N9/4/5. N.C.'s Monthly Report, Nov. 28th, 1898.
82. N9/4/6-7. Armstrong to Alderson. Monthly Report, July 21st, 1898.
83. N9/4/1. N.C. Mutoko to C.N.C. Monthly Report, October 31st, 1898.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. N9/4/3. Monthly Report, May 31st, 1898.
87. N9/4/6-7. Op.Cit.
88. N9/4/5. N.C.'s Monthly Report, Jan. 1898.
89. Ibid.; N9/4/10. Report for the Month of November, 1901.
90. N3/1/16. N.C. Northern Maseo Monthly Report, 20th Feb. 1902.
91. N3/1/16. Special Report on the Patrol to Mtoko, 3rd May, 1902.
92. Ibid.
93. N9/1/8. Annual Report, 1903. See Figures on population and animals kept at the end of the paper.
94. Ibid.
95. N3/1/16. N.C. Mtoko to Chief Native Commissioner. Report on the Location of Chigi Mkota, 24th April, 1903.
96. N3/1/6. N.C. Monthly Report, 24th April, 1903.
97. A11/2/12/11. N.C. Mtoko Report on Attitude of Natives, 28th Nov. 1903.
98. NSJ1/1/2. N.C. to Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Feb. 1903. Also see figures for 1903 and 1907 attached.
99. Ibid. NSJ1/1/4 Monthly Report, 31st Sept. 1908, NSJ1/1/2. Report on Dogs Killed, Oct., 1902.
100. Ibid. NSJ1/1/4.
101. N9/4/19. Monthly Report, February, 1906.
102. NSJ1/1/4. Description of Mtoko, 7th February, 1905.
103. Ibid., 26th July, 1909.
104. N9/4/5. N.C. Monthly Report, 10th Jan. 1900.



This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.

To view a copy of the license please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>

This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
<http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/>