

THE ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND EDUCATION, 1980-1982

BY

Griff Foley

In this paper an attempt will be made to sketch major political, economic and educational developments in Zimbabwe since independence. Although the conclusions and the recommendations here are stated definitely they are offered tentatively for a number of reasons. First, Zimbabwe has been independent for only two years. In analysing such a short period it is only possible to try to detect trends. Secondly, the material reproduced here is part of a study of the political economy of Zimbabwean education from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial period. Because of the scope of that study (both in terms of the length of the period covered and the range of issues analysed) it has not been possible to examine the post-colonial period in adequate detail. A third problem with the data in this paper is that they are freshly collected and have not been properly digested. Finally, and most importantly, it is difficult for an outsider, particularly a transient one, to insert him- or herself into another people's political and economic debate. For, however much sympathy one has for the Zimbabwean liberation movement, and however much effort one has put into studying the situation here, Zimbabwean struggles can only be waged by Zimbabweans.

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I

At Independence the inheritance of a war-ravaged dependent economy lacking capital and skilled manpower gave the new government two choices. It could move quickly to give control of the economy to state and people, or it could adopt a gradualist approach. The former strategy would bring economic reprisal from foreign investors, would probably lead to an exodus of remaining white labour and possibly bring South African military intervention. The second strategy would mean continued foreign control of the economy, reliance on foreign aid that would probably not be forthcoming in the amounts required, and accelerated class formation and its accompanying inequalities. It was an unpleasant choice to have to make.

The new government took the gradualist road. In his post-election broadcast the Prime Minister said there would be no early nationalisation of business and that the property and pension rights of whites would be respected. 'I recognise' he said, 'that the economic structure of this country is based on capitalism, and that whatever ideas we have, we must build on that. Modifications can only take place in a gradual way.'

to further reassure the whites two Europeans were appointed to the first cabinet. At the same time as he tried to reassure capital, Mugabe made some attempt to meet the expectations of the people. The twin election pledges of equal wages for blacks and whites, and the expropriation and redistribution of land owned by absentee proprietors would, he said, be honoured.(1)

A week later Mugabe stated that the government's economic priorities were the redistribution of land to those displaced by civil war and the restructuring of the civil service. Unused white farming land would be immediately acquired for resettlement. Peasant farmers who had been driven off the land by the war would be allowed to return to their villages. They would be provided with loans, extension services and marketing facilities. People with no land to return to would be encouraged, but not forced, to settle in state collectives based on family units. In these units marketing would be cooperative but family units could retain the profits.(2)

A government economic survey published in May said that all available foreign aid would be injected into peasant agriculture and predicted a 30 per cent rise in output for this sector in 1980-1.(3) But during 1980 the pace of resettlement was slow. By the end of January, 1981, 1,400 families (8,500 people) had been resettled on 130,000 hectares, 38,926 hectares of which had been acquired from white farmers. The government announced its intention of resettling 4,000 to 6,000 families on 340,000 hectares during 1981.(4)

The resettlement policy had obvious flaws. Small numbers of people were being resettled. A government commissioned UCTAC report released in May warned that the strategy laid down by the Lancaster House agreement of using external borrowings to buy land from white farmers and redistribute it to blacks would simply put off the solution of the land problem, since loans would ultimately have to be repaid by the people.(5) In January 1981 Mugabe pointed out in an interview that Britain and the US had not provided funds for acquisition promised at Lancaster House.(6) Criticism of the resettlement policy during 1980 had earlier led the state to defend it (7) and draw up the 'accelerated' program outlined above. The Zimbabwean government continued to put pressure on the West for aid, and much of the funds pledged at the March, 1981 foreign aid donors conference (see below) were for land distribution. A more fundamental problem with the land resettlement policy, as we shall see, was that it did nothing to alter existing production relations. Underlying the state's unwillingness to move quickly on land reform was its desire to preserve the white farming sector which produced the bulk of Zimbabwe's food and cash crops (gross output worth 1437.8 million in 1979, as against 102.3 million from African agriculture, only 216.9 million of which was marketed).(8) To reassure the white farming sector, Mugabe appointed the head of the white farmers' association as his first Minister of agriculture, thus assuring the farmers that they still, as they had throughout the colonial period, had direct access to cabinet.(9)

Although the new government did not fulfil its pledge of equalizing black and white wages it did introduce minimum wage legislation in July 1980. The new law set minimum wages in industry, mining, agriculture and domestic service. Although these wages were still far removed from white salary levels, and well beneath the poverty line, they were a great advance for the majority of black workers who had never enjoyed any guaranteed working conditions.

In its first year of office the government's other policy priorities (excluding education, which will be considered in detail below) were: extending its influence over the state bureaucracy, establishing regional economic links, and preventing a flight of capital. The problem of transforming bureaucracies that have served colonial and capitalist ruling classes has long plagued post-independence governments in the third world and reformist governments in the West. The capture of the state does not mean that the administrative machine automatically serves the interests of the new rulers. The reverse is usually the case: state bureaucracies tend to continue to serve the interests of ruling groups recently ejected from state power (who often, in reality, continue to wield power through their control of the economy)(10). In Zimbabwe the reorganisation of the civil service had two strands: bringing state apparatuses under black control, and creating new job opportunities for blacks.

White control of the state bureaucracy presented three immediate problems. One was the gigantic Department of Internal Affairs, the 'state within the state' that had had a monopoly of state power over blacks throughout the colonial period. The functions of this department were split between the Ministries of Local Government, which was given responsibility for legal administration, and Home Affairs, which took charge of security.(11) The government also moved quickly to reorganise the Ministry of Information, which, during the previous fifteen years, had been turned into the propaganda arm of the Rhodesian Front. Some of the functions of the Ministry of Information were redistributed to other ministries, BBC consultants were brought in to revamp radio and television and an institute of media studies was set up in Salisbury.(12) As we have seen in the colonial period the civil service was responsible for the formation of much government policy, and identified its interests closely with those of settler capital. Control of the civil service rested in the Public Service Board. One of the first steps of the ZANU-PF government on coming to power was to reorganise the Public Service Commission into a Ministry.(13) The Commission was retained, and a black chairman appointed to lead it.(14) In May 1980, the Commission was instructed to give preferential advancement to suitably qualified Africans in appointments and promotions to senior posts.(15) Each ministry was required to produce an organisational chart indicating how it was going to organise its middle and upper levels of staffing.(16) This set off a rush of applications from Zimbabweans at home and abroad.(17) By the end of August 15000 applications had been received and they were still coming at the rate of 150 per day.(18) By mid-1981, 10,000 more civil servants had been employed, most of them in education, health, agriculture and natural resources.(19)

During 1980 the new government adopted a cautious approach to South Africa, accepting the fact of South Africa's existence and of Zimbabwe's economic links with it. Mugabe spoke against apartheid but said that Zimbabwe would not provide bases for Zanzanian freedom fighters. Instead of confronting South Africa Zimbabwe began to try to disengage itself from South Africa's economic dominance. A series of conferences in 1980 and 1981 began to set up the machinery for regional economic cooperation between nine black central and southern African countries. The priority task was the development of alternate transport routes, as much of the trade of Zimbabwe and other countries went through South Africa. The cooperating nations sought \$2 billion in foreign aid to help them restructure communications but only received one-third of this. This was enough to enable a start to be made on upgrading the railway lines between Beira and Kaputo in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It was announced in August that the rail links to Kaputo made inoperative by the war would be opened by October, three months earlier than expected. Roads were also made longer. Other forms of cooperation. Zimbabwe was asked to draw up a regional food security plan. An international

agency was asked to open a research centre for semi-arid agriculture in Botswana and Swaziland was requested to carry out a review of training facilities in the region and make recommendations for their cooperative use.(20) In 1980 Zimbabwe also entered into separate economic cooperation agreements with Zambia and Tanzania.(21) During 1980 Zimbabwe was at pains to reassure foreign investors and local capital that their businesses would not be precipitately nationalised. In May Mugabe 'categorically denied' reports that the government intended to take a 35 per cent share in mines and to install workers' committees to run them. The Prime Minister said that the government 'at this stage' had no intention of legislating to control the mining industry. The government, Mugabe said, encouraged companies to have a majority of local shareholders and to reinvest their profits in Zimbabwe. But its policy on these matters was one of persuasion, not compulsion.(22) The Zimbabwean government sought to further assure foreign investors of the country's 'stability', and to improve its capacity to raise finance in international markets, by negotiating long term agreements to pay off debts incurred by the settler regime.(23)

The government's first budget reflected its cautious approach. Introducing it the Minister for Finance said that the government's philosophy was socialist in that it aimed to achieve greater social equality by raising the living standards of the poorer sectors of the community. But, he said, Zimbabwe had learnt from the mistakes of other countries and so the government would put its principles into practice in a 'pragmatic, wily' way. For that reason the government intended to encourage the continued cooperation of state and private enterprise and to leave it with participation by Zimbabwean capital and enterprise.(24)

The budget was a fairly typical social democratic one, with government expenditure rising overall (by 16.4 per cent) and rising fastest in the welfare areas — education, health and rural development. These increases were to be paid for by slightly tougher rules on remitting company profits overseas, increased sales taxes on items likely to be used by high income earners, and foreign aid. Income tax was not raised, and 50 per cent of after-tax profits could be remitted to non-resident shareholders.(25)

At the end of Zimbabwe's first year of independence the gradualist strategy appeared to be succeeding. Calculations of the overall growth rate of gross domestic product varied from seven to ten per cent, or three and a half to five times the 1979 rate.(26) Growth was particularly strong in the manufacturing sector, where the overall volume of production rose by fourteen to fifteen per cent during 1980(27), and the work force grew by 8.2 per cent.(28) Fewer skilled workers emigrated than had been expected, and the ending of the call-up and employment of qualified blacks led an influential local economist to conclude that the work force was adequate for current needs.(29) The Limbore foreign aid donors' conference, held in Salisbury in March, 1981, was very successful, gaining slightly more/plus than the government had asked for. Donors promised to provide grants of £67,483,000 in soft loans of £74,178,000. About one-third of this amount was earmarked for refugee and reconstruction programs, land resettlement and rural development, training and technical assistance (£11.9 million) and infra-structural development. The remainder was unspecified.(30)

Despite its pleasing economic performance, signs of political and economic stress had begun to appear. Labour unrest began even before the ZANU-IF government could take office. From March to May, 1980, thousands of workers staged lightning strikes in shops, factories or farms. Their demands included higher wages (increases of up to 400 per cent were called for) and shorter working hours and return of pension contributions(31) The reasons for the strikes were clear. They were a direct result of the presence of white

wages. Workers had been waiting for wage justice for decades. Now, having finally gained a black government they demanded their due. The state responded by urging workers to be patient, by introducing minimum wages and by breaking strikes. The Minister of Labour said he saw minimum wage increases as an interim measure, but that the government did not wish to push wages too high for fear of hampering economic recovery. A full scale investigation of prices and incomes would be conducted and new wage levels set. The interim increases would, the Minister said, improve minimum wages in 55 out of 68 urban industries, as well as raising wages of domestic and farm workers.(32) Some workers, however, particularly in mining and manufacturing, were already getting more than the new minimum and were consequently disappointed by the government action. Some employers tried to avoid paying the rises by dismissing workers before the new levels took effect. After July 1st the state had the power to fine employers for taking such action.(33)

In November there was another rash of strikes in the mining industry. These stoppages were stimulated as much by industrial relations problems as by the desire for higher wages.

The underlying industrial problem was that the legal framework of industrial relations was still the 1959 Industrial Conciliation Act, with its cumbersome system of labour boards and its no-strike provisions.(34) The trade union movement, repressed for so long by the settler regime, was still weak. Only 80,000 workers, 10 per cent of the workforce, were members of registered trade unions. The new government established a congress of trade unions and launched two major inquiries into labour conditions. It announced that industrial legislation would not be changed until these inquiries were complete, and there would be a time lag of at least nine months between the issuing of these reports and the passing of the new legislation. (35) In the meantime pressure for better wages and conditions and particularly for an end to disparities between black and white wages, continued to build up. In October, 1981, discontent over these disparities led to a four day teachers' strike. Government responded by arresting hundreds of teachers under emergency 'illegal assembly regulations' and by blaming the strikes on Australian and British teachers. In the same month a nurses' strike was brutally crushed.(36)

Pension also appeared within the ruling coalition soon after Independence. In June, 1980, the Prime Minister alleged that organised bands of ZIPA followers were refusing to recognise the authority of the government. Joshua Nkomo, ZANU leader and Minister for Home Affairs, denied the charge and said that on his orders ZIPA dissidents from Tjiclotjo had been detained.(37) Two weeks later a ZANU Minister, Enos Nkala, accused Nkomo of being a tribalist and said he would 'crush' him.(38) Another ZANU Minister Edgar Fekere, pointed to the long history of struggle between ZANU and ZAPU when he said he had been trying to depose Nkomo from leadership positions since 1961.(39) Nkomo responded by accusing ZANU of not dealing with ZANLA dissidents in the east and then went on a series of trips to England, Libya and Iraq.(40) On his return he denied that he had gone overseas to raise support to try to bolster his political position.(41) The next month Nkomo toured the regions where he had the greatest support — Undebele, the Midlands and the Lowveld — to wage what he described as a national campaign for peace, stability and unity'(42) He continued the tours, and the line, in September and October.(43) In October Nkomo called for the postponement of local government elections until conditions were more peaceful and proper electoral machinery had been established.(44)

During August and September, 1980, there were persistent reports of banditry by former combatants, of tension in guerrilla assembly points and of violent clashes between ZANU and ZAPU supporters.(45) In mid-September

Nkomo and Mugabe discussed the violence.(46) Early in October, after a stormy parliamentary debate on security, the Prime Minister ordered the employment of integrated units of army and police to deal with 'armed dissidents and undisciplined party members'(47). In mid October shots were exchanged by an army patrol and ZANLA combatants at Chitungwiza, near Salisbury.(48) During the rest of the month there were numerous violent incidents in townships and rural areas.(49)

In the second week of November, at Entumbane township in Bulawayo, ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas fought a four hour gun battle which seemed to have been provoked by a ZANU-PF rally in the city at which three Ministers and five Deputy Ministers spoke.(50) The rally was held after the clashes, but its scheduling may have been deliberately provocative. One of the Ministers at the rally, Mkalala, said that in the face of 'provocation' by the Patriotic Front the time had come for ZANU to 'flex its muscles'. He called for party supporters to form 'vigilante groups' 'to challenge the Patriotic Front on its home ground.'(51)

The Mayor of Bulawayo (Mike Constandinos) attributed the outbreak of violence to electioneering by the ZANU-PF Ministers, who had come to Bulawayo because 'it looked as if their party was lagging behind and that the PF could win'.(52)

Shooting broke out again the following day and only ended after airforce jets buzzed the township.(53) 55 people were officially reported to have died in the violence although other estimates put the death toll at 'just below' 500.(54)

A few days after the Entumbane violence police searched two of Nkomo's properties for arms, but found none.(55) Nkomo countercharged that hundreds of armed ZANU cadres were stationed in camps near Salisbury.(56) A week after the Entumbane battle five people were killed when grenades were thrown in Chitungwiza township, Salisbury, allegedly by ZIPRA combatants stationed there.(57) Several days later nine police officials were detained by police 'for investigation'(58). In mid-December large numbers of people left Bulawayo's western suburbs for the countryside, in anticipation of further violence.(59) Four days later street fighting broke out again in Entumbane.(60)

In January Nkomo was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs to become Minister of The Public Service, thus ending any ZANU control over the security forces. After a fortnight of intense bargaining Nkomo was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Prime Minister's Office, with responsibility for defence and the public service.(61)

In the New Year factional violence continued in army bases and guerilla camps outside Salisbury and Bulawayo and in the Midlands.(62) The army moved into Entumbane when serious fighting erupted there again, in which more than 150 people died.(63) The airforce was used to prevent an armoured column moving into Entumbane to relieve the ZIPRA forces.(64) The government controlled radio and television did not report the fighting and overseas news film of it was confiscated.(65) ZIPRA and ZANLA fighters were moved out of Entumbane to separate camps. But many guerillas refused to be disarmed, moved out of the camps and allegedly engaged in banditry and terrorism in Matabeleland and the Midlands.(66) In March there was a wave of armed robberies in Matabeleland and Mankwato and Fort Victoria.(67) A curfew was imposed in Bulawayo and the municipal elections suspended there.(68) The government, with the help of ZIPRA and ZANLA high commands, started to systematically disarm all 42,000 guerillas.(69) In the second week of April the curfew on Bulawayo was lifted.(70)

Zimbabwe's first year of independence ended with Mugabe saying violence by dissident guerrillas would be brutally crushed, and Moyo saying that the way to end this violence was to end former combatants' sense of insecurity by providing jobs for them.(71)

By early 1981 aspects of Zimbabwe's heritage of economic dependence were causing concern. Despite the lifting of sanctions, a record maize harvest and rapidly growing mineral exports in 1980-1, Zimbabwe's balance of payments position fell from a surplus of £100 million in 1979 to a deficit of £182,3 million in 1980.(72) This radical change was due to three factors: first, a large increase in imports (up in value 47 per cent in 1980), particularly of capital goods depleted by the fifteen years of partial economic isolation; second, a significantly higher deficit on invisible transactions; and third, the halving of capital inflows despite a doubling of private sector borrowing abroad.(73) In 1981 gross domestic product grew at a slightly lower rate than 1980-1 (7%) but there was a strong growth in all sectors, and a substantial increase in manufacturing employment.(74) But the balance of payments deficit continued to be serious in 1981 (a trade deficit of £105 million from October 1980 - October 1981) and began to eat into the country's foreign exchange reserves, which fell by £25 million in the first nine months of 1981.(75)

To try to stem the outflow, the government cut industry's foreign exchange allocations in the late 1981 and early 1982 quota periods, and borrowed money on the international capital market.(76) The former measure was criticised by industry as being likely to lead to shortages and inflation, while the latter was seen by a liberal economist to be an 'easy option' which usually involved governments in agreeing to changes in their domestic economic policies.(77)

During 1981 local and foreign capital began to mount an ideological offensive against government economic policy. The theme of this attack was that government decisions were causing a loss of confidence among investors. Specific government policies singled out for criticism were the promotion of worker participation (concern being expressed that workers would take over decision-making from management), the extension of government ownership of industry, inadequate foreign exchange allocations for industry, financial controls on foreign investors and restrictions on the importation of skilled manpower.(78)

In 1982 the ideological offensive accelerated. In February 'several' industries reported falls in production of from ten to seventy per cent. The falls were attributed to cuts in foreign exchange allocations, loss of skilled workers and worker indiscipline following a no-sacking rule imposed by the Minister of Labour in December, 1981. In the same month the head of a parastatal said local and foreign investment in Zimbabwe had 'virtually stopped' due to the 'total mistrust' of the government by business. In the early months of 1982 there were frequent calls from capital for the government to issue an investment code which would offer clear guidelines — and favourable terms — to foreign investors. The rates of company tax (30 per cent), retention in Zimbabwe of net profit (50 per cent) and the dividends tax on remittances (20 per cent) were also criticised.(79) The state responded to these criticisms by first announcing that an investment code would soon be issued.(80) and then by saying that an investment code was unnecessary because the Lancaster House Constitution provided all the safeguards that capital needed.(81) But foreign capital was reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe. In February, 1982, only £7 million in direct private investment allocations to Zimbabwe since independence.(82) In this atmosphere of uncertainty and gloom whites continued to emigrate, arguing the economy of badly needed skills. From April, 1980, to January 1982, from 1200 to 2200 people emigrated each month.(83) Net emigration was 10,833 in 1980 and 12,737 in 1981, and it was

calculated that by mid-1981 the European population had fallen to less than 200,000. Skilled Zimbabweans continued to return from exile but immigration fell to one quarter of emigration (1,501 from January to April 1981, compared with 2,666 in the first four months of 1980). The white exodus exacerbated the shortage of technical and administrative personnel. The public sector was heavily hit, with several departments short of vital staff. Rapid Africanisation of the Civil Service after independence generated widespread insecurity among white employees who believed that the infusion of blacks would block promotions or lead to redundancies. Many white civil servants moved into the private sector or left the country.(84) In the first two and a half years of independence the outflow of white artisans from Zimbabwe outstripped the country's capacity to train new apprentices. Between 1980 and June 1982, 2319 skilled workers emigrated, and 2009 apprentices completed their training. To stem the outflow the Ministry of Manpower Planning announced in June, 1982, that apprentices would henceforth be bonded to the state. Apprentices would pay 10 per cent of their salary into an interest-bearing fund which would be non-refundable if they left the country before the bond expired.(85)

II

Post-Independence Zimbabwean politics has been characterised by the struggle of a new ruling class to establish itself. This struggle has been waged at both the political and the economic level. In politics the conflict has been waged on two fronts - among black nationalists, and between the state and whites. We saw in Section I that Zimbabwe's first year of independence saw a continuation of the ZANU-ZAPU struggle. The conflict extended into the second year of independence. Banditry continued, much of it involving ex-guerillas who refused to be disarmed.(86) A Commission of Inquiry ^{into} disturbances at Arras Tachemonts appointed in May 1981, was told that the violence in Antubane was a recurrence of ZANU/ZAPU clashes in camps in Tanzania and Mozambique during the liberation war(87), and that the February battle had begun with 'a carefully planned ... pre-emptive attack' by ZANU on ZIPRA.(88) Numerous witnesses to the Commission claimed that the biased broadcasting of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Commission had contributed to the disturbances by creating resentment and insecurity among ZAPU supporters.(89) A ZIPRA commander said that the ZIFA soldiers had felt especially insecure because 'ever since the return there had been reports of our people dying in different parts of the country'. He also blamed politicians for making inflammatory speeches which portrayed the ZIPRA, ZAPU and national security forces as 'separate and private armies of one group or another'.(90) Another commander said that he had warned President Mugabe in December 1980 that politicians' speeches were inciting one faction and infuriating the other at Antubane.(91) Senator Kele testified to the Commission that Keone had suggested joint ZANU/ZAPU political rallies. No action had been taken on this proposal. A proposal for joint meetings of the ZANU and ZAPU central committees had also been rejected by ZANU.(92)

The Dumbutshena Commission adjourned at the end of May, and was to resume hearings in July.(93) It resumed for one day in the first week of June(94), and there was no further report of any public hearings by the Commission. At the end of October it was announced that the Commission's draft would be ready three weeks.(95)

At the end of November the Commission's Chairman said that the report was being typed and the Prime Minister would decide whether it would be published. (96) It never was.

From July the incidence of banditry declined (97), and in August the police claimed that the Highlands were free of banditry. (98) Towards the end of the year there was a new wave of armed robberies in Bulawayo, leading the police to reinforce their strength and to institute body searches. (99) A police appeal for information on a recent robbery met with little public response (100) and banditry accelerated in the new year. (101)

In February huge arms caches were discovered on properties owned by ZAPU across the country. ZANU-PA ministers, including the Prime Minister, accused ZAPU of using the arms to foment armed robbery and of having planned to use the arms to overthrow the Government. (102) Mkombozi and three ZAPU ministers said to be implicated in the plot were dismissed from the Cabinet. (103) Two top ZAPU commanders, both Russian trained, and many middle ranking ZAPU officials were detained. (104) ZAPU ministers were invited to stay in the government if they wished. Two stayed and one declined to. (105) Armed robberies and other bandit activities accelerated again in Matabeleland and the Highlands, apparently in response to the movement against ZANU. (106)

Early in March 32 people were arrested after a clash between ZAPU and ZANU supporters in Bulawayo. (107) In the same month the Officer Commanding the Bulawayo police said he was convinced that the rural people were giving shelter and food to the bandits. The pattern was for bandits to operate in the city for a couple of days, where their weapons were kept for them in people's homes, and then to return to the rural areas and lie low for some time. (108) Bandit activity became more open and intense in April. (109) ZANU soldiers in the national army were reported to be deserting their bases and taking to banditry. (110) Arms caches continued to be unearthed in March, April and May (111) and factional fighting between ZANU and ZAPU elements of the national army continued. (112) In May gangs damaged the Salisbury to Untuli electricity line and the railway line and water and electricity installations in Bulweridge. (113) In mid-May the Prime Minister announced that youths would be armed so that rural communities could be defended against 'bandits and dissidents'. (114)

With the removal of whites from state power the Rhodesian Front (renamed the Republican Front in 1981) was no longer able to hold together the coalition of white classes it had built up in the early 1960's and maintained throughout the UDI period. Emigration and the recognition by the whites ^{who} remained that white political parties could yield little influence through conventional parliamentary opposition tactics, turned a series of by-elections in white seats into a farce, with tiny turnouts returning RF members. (115) With the obvious end of white electoral politics a struggle took place within the RF between the old guard UDI politicians who would not be reconciled to black rule and younger politicians who sought to develop new ways of maintaining white influence within the state. In August, 1979, this struggle culminated in the resignation of eight RF members from the party and their declaration that they would represent their electorates as independents. (116)

Mugabe used the arms caches and the discovery of a 114 as a pretext to form a two-stage cabinet. In the first cabinet a number of key ministers were promoted to ministerial level and some were dismissed. Muzarandwa, dismissed in the previous cabinet for a similar offence, was brought back into the cabinet to take over the sensitive portfolio of land matters. A new Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was created, headed by Muzarandwa.

was created to facilitate the reform of colonial laws and, most probably to help pave the way to the creation of a one party state.(117) The second stage of the Cabinet reshuffle, on the eve of the second anniversary of Independence, involved the incorporation of some ZANU elements (five ZANU MP's were appointed Ministers and Deputy Ministers) and two Whites who had broken away from the Republican Front, as well as the appointment of thirteen new Deputy Ministers. All but one of the new ZANU Ministers were given posts which had no bearing on state security (Construction, Water Resources, Man-power Planning, Community Development and Women's Affairs). The fifth Minister, John Nkomo, was appointed Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office, with special responsibility to the Deputy Prime Minister. It appears likely that this appointment was designed to help the government to keep an eye on political development in Matabeleland, where banditry and political unrest in the wake of the discovery of arms caches and the removal of Joshua Nkomo from the government continued to fester. The two whites brought into the Cabinet were appointed to areas where whites still wielded great influence: the Public Service and Trade and Commerce.(118) The extended Cabinet reshuffle was clearly designed to consolidate power in the hands of Mugabe, and his closest advisers. The appointment of the additional Ministers and Deputy Ministers brought the size of the Cabinet to 50, greatly extending the possibility of developing patron-client networks from the Prime Minister downwards. (119) The addition of two further Ministers of State to the Prime Minister's Office, making a total of three, was also indicative of a desire to concentrate power at the centre, a process that had been going on some time. In 1981 sixty administrators were trained by the central government and appointed as Chief Executives in districts in place of the old colonial District Commissioners. The District Administrators were to be the local heads of all government departments, and were to chair District Councils. They were responsible to the Prime Minister.(120)

The concentration of power at the centre, the discovery of the arms caches and the splitting of ZAPU into those who would cooperate with the ZANU-PP government and those who would not, needs to be seen in the context of the continuing struggle between the two parties for dominance within the nationalist movement, and, after Independence, for control of the State. From the early 1970's, ZANU-ZAPU differences became increasingly based on tribe and region(121) and the struggle between the parties became increasingly unequal, simply because of the numerical superiority of the Shona. The struggle became even more one-sided after Independence, once ZANU had a majority of parliamentary seats and could invite ZAPU into the government as a junior partner. As the actions and words of some ZANU Ministers after Independence, and particularly during the 1980-1 ZANU-ZAPU clashes demonstrate, distrust of ZAPU, and particularly of Nkomo, ran deep.(122)

People like Tsekere and Nkala were early advocates of a one-party state for Zimbabwe. But it wasn't until the middle of 1981 that ZANU began to move systematically towards establishing a one party state. Mugabe conducted a comprehensive tour of the country aimed at stimulating the reorganisation and expansion of ZANU. He announced in August that a referendum would eventually be held to decide whether a one-party state should be set up. In the same month a statement by Minison Zwedlo, then Minister for Local Government, made it clear that ZANU saw its alliance with the Patriotic Front, and the twenty white parliamentary seats, as temporary expedients.(123)

In March, 1982, a new party structure, worked out by ZANU's central committee, was announced. The basic organisational unit would be a 'grass-roots cell' consisting of 100 people with an executive committee of seven, including a security officer and a political commissar. Five of these cells would constitute a Branch, five branches a District, and a number of Districts would make a Province, in a hierarchical structure stretching up to the National Executive. The cells would also have men's, women's and youth wings. (124)

In April the Minister for Home Affairs criticised the 'conspicuously apathetic attitude in Bulawayo towards the independence celebrations.(125) And the Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, expressing his anger over the presence of a UANC choir at the independence celebrations, suggested that local authorities should close shops belonging to UANC members by refusing to grant members of that party trading licences.(126) At the same time the ZANU provincial executive for Matabeleland North announced that the Minister for Home Affairs had been appointed (not elected) provincial chairman.(127) The slanging and the appointment were part of a coordinated campaign against rival political parties, especially ZAFU, by local(128) and national ZANU politicians, including the Prime Minister, who said that ZAFU had won four Midlands seats in the 1980 election through intimidation but 'now people were realizing that ZANU(PF) was the party worth supporting' and that ZANU(PF) 'would rule for ever'(129)

Parliamentary reform was also foreshadowed. Early in May, on consecutive days, the Speaker in the House of Assembly (lower house) and the President of the Senate (upper house) said they foresaw an end to Westminster style parliamentary democracy and the development of a system of representation more appropriate to the needs of a one party state.(130) The President of the Senate, claiming widespread popular support for a one party state, said there was a need to change the electoral system to enable more than one candidate from a party to stand in a single constituency.(131)

Perhaps the clearest indication of the direction of politics in Zimbabwe came from two stories related to the army which appeared at the end of the second year of independence. In February, 1982, Mugabe, addressing the first group of British trained graduating officers at the Zimbabwe Staff College, said that the course that the officer had just completed had been designed to help each officer to make 'a mental and emotional transformation from a one-time party officer to a National Army officer who is truly apolitical. Combine these two trends and you become a true national soldier prepared to serve the Government and through the government the people'(132) At the second Independence Day celebrations at Rufaro Stadium, Harare, men from the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, gave 'a thrilling display, carried out/split-second timing' of weapons drill, skirmishing technique and unarmed combat.

In two squads, the men doubled into the arena. The first squad, in track suits, chanted in cadence as they ran 'Long live, long live, long live' The men marched off bearing a banner reading 'Let us lay down our lives for Comrade R.G. Mugabe'(133)

These two vignettes capture the essence of the post-independence political style: constitutionalist rhetoric, identification of the interests of state (and hence ruling class) and people, concentration of power at the centre. This political style is, of course, the product of history. As we saw in earlier chapters, the severe repression of the settler state created a black nationalist political style which concentrated power in the hands of petty bourgeois leaders who maintained their positions through power-broking, patron-client ties and violent removal of opponents.

After independence the objective of petty bourgeois political leaders was no longer the mobilization of popular support for the capture of state power. The struggle was now between factions of political leadership, to determine which faction would be dominant in the state. The style of work remained the same: power-centred, authoritarian, and violent. And, as we will see below, once state power had been captured, the authoritarian style of work was turned on the people, as well as political opponents.

In the first two years of Independence the new ruling class also sought to establish itself economically. Three main tactics were pursued. First, the role of the state in the economy was expanded; second, the state attempted to forge an alliance with local and foreign capital; third, the emergence of a local black petty bourgeoisie was encouraged.

As we have seen, the role of the state in the Rhodesian economy expanded greatly after World War II, and particularly during the UDI period. State participation in the economy concentrated mainly on the provision of investment capital and infrastructure, but there was also some direct ownership, notably of the iron and steel industry, motor vehicle assembly and food processing.(134) While direct public sector involvement in agricultural production and mining was negligible, it was estimated that in March, 1982, the public sector's share of total manufactured value was about 15 percent.(135)

Since Independence the state has, through the parastatal Industrial Development Corporation, bought a 42 per cent share in the country's largest pharmaceutical manufacturer, a 61 per cent share in Zimbank and a 47 per cent share in a new bank of Credit and Commerce, Zimbabwe. The state is also currently negotiating with a West German firm for the establishment of an electronics joint venture (136), and is in the process of setting up a Minerals Marketing Corporation which will become the sole marketing agent for all minerals produced in Zimbabwe.(137) Public sector investment in electricity and water has accelerated since Independence, as has government involvement in the search for alternative energy sources.(138) The state also owns nearly a third of the assets of the banking and finance sector, and state activity accounts for 50 per cent of the value added of construction, 19 per cent in distribution, and 72 per cent in transport and communications.(139) The state, through its statutory authorities, controls 61 percent of exports and provides more than one third of short term farming credit. Almost half of annual capital investment (gross fixed capital formation) is supplied by the state, which also pays around 40 percent of all wages and salaries.(140) Although the activity of state-owned enterprises makes up only a small proportion of the total production of goods, the total outlays of the public sector amounted to 40 percent of the gross domestic product in 1980(141)

A new ruling class now has some control over these resources, and is seeking to extend its control, in partnership with private capital. The idea of such a partnership is central to the new state's development strategy. As the Minister of Finance put it in September, 1980:

We have a mixed economy with State enterprise and private enterprise co-existing in harmony It is not Government's intention to change this co-existence, but naturally we look forward to seeing a greater participation of Zimbabwean capital and enterprise, both in the private and public sectors, in new development in our country.(142)

In April, 1982, the same Minister 'emphasised the need for private initiative and said it was not Government policy to nationalise or expropriate'. (143)

The state envisaged the private sector contributing about 4 percent of capital investment in the planning period 1982-1985, which would involve an almost doubling of private sector investment above 1980 levels.(144) ZIMCORD documentation projected an annual inflow of \$148 million in foreign investment. The state has also encouraged the emergence of a black petty bourgeoisie, particularly through the granting of import allocations.(145)

Apart from winning praise in the west for its moderation, the State's economic strategy has met with limited success.(146) Although generous amounts of aid were pledged at ZIMCORD, little has yet reached Zimbabwe.(147)

We have already seen that only a small proportion of the foreign capital the state requires is flowing in, and that local capital is becoming increasingly vocal about its dissatisfaction. The attempt to create a black petty bourgeois has also run into difficulties. There is a high failure rate among new businesses, due in part to lack of expertise but more especially because of lack of capital and a credit and marketing system that is oriented to white enterprise.(148) The use of foreign currency allocations to stimulate black enterprise has encouraged illegal trading in these allocations. Even if the state's strategy does work in the long run, the petty bourgeois class fraction that emerges will be commercial rather than productive and so will do little to bring ownership of the means of production into the hands of blacks.

The danger of the government's economic strategy is that it will lead to little change in existing social relations of production. The composition of capital may alter slightly -- in a few years there will probably be less local white, more foreign, more local black, and more state capital. But there will have been little genuine socialisation of the productive forces: the mass of Zimbabweans will still be excluded from their ownership and control. A further danger is that the strategy will lead to economic stagnation. The experience of other Third World countries shows that to promote economic growth it is either necessary to throw open the doors to foreign capital by providing cheap labour and investment incentives (as, for example, in Singapore, the Ivory Coast, and South Korea) or to engage in a full-scale socialisation of the means of production (as in the USSR and China)

Zimbabwe's development strategy is a mixture of these two models. The problem with middle of the road strategies is that they tend to take on the worst features of both systems. This was certainly the case with another African country which attempted to pursue a gradual, conflict-free road to socialism, Tanzania.(149) There are clear signs of similar problems emerging in Zimbabwe. Not only is capital not forthcoming in amounts required, but reliance on administrative action (for example, wage and price controls) to regulate the economy tends to be destructive of entrepreneurial activity. So, for example, strict allocation of foreign exchange prevents production expanding to meet demand, and the introduction of a comprehensive system of price control, in April, 1982, is likely to bankrupt some black rural businessmen.(150)

A long discussion of industrial strategy at the inaugural seminar of the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, a government sponsored research organisation set up to facilitate the transition to socialism, revealed the conceptual problem that lies at the heart of the inadequacy of the gradualist strategy. The Minister of Industry and Energy Development, Simba Makoni, conceded that there could be no transformation of the Zimbabwean economy without altering the relationship of capital and state, and capital and labour. On the question of how these relationships might be transformed the Minister was vague, indicating only that the government was not rushing towards socialism: 'We're talking about a period of transition -- we're not yet in the socialist period and I doubt if we will be for some time'. The Minister spoke generally of the phases of transition to socialism, and the need for different tactics in different phases, and of the need to identify areas of priority in state participation. The government would want 'to involve itself as much as possible' in industry, giving leadership and direction'. By identifying priority areas and involving itself, leading in them, the Minister said, the state would move the economy towards socialism. But the phases of transition were not identified, and the priority areas of state intervention were spelt out in only the most conventional and abstract terms. Socialism of industry would, the minister said, proceed along the lines laid down in the settler period, with 'planned joint participation' of public and private capital which would lead to strategic industries being brought under

state control 'in time'. Institutions such as the Zimbabwe Industrial Development Corporation, a para-statal investment authority established during the Federal period(151) would carry through these joint ventures. The rest of the government's industrial strategy, as presented by the Minister, was unexceptional — and not necessarily socialist. Government policy, the Minister said, would seek to bring about

- decentralisation of industry,
- greater use of local raw material to promote import substitution,
- greater use of labour without abandoning the use of 'efficient' high level technology,
- greater use of appropriate technology.(152)

From the way the Minister spoke at this seminar, and from other statements of Ministers and government officials, it is clear that the rationale underpinning the state's vague and cautious approach to development strategy is the desire not to frighten away local and foreign private capital. Makoni, at ZIDS, was at pains to point out that the government did not believe it was a prerequisite of socialist development to destroy what capitalism has made. The government's intention was to transform and build on what private capital had established, and would continue to establish.(153)

This approach was consistent with ZANU's 1980 election manifesto, which stated that while the party's aim was 'socialist transformation', it is recognised that private enterprise will have to continue until circumstances are ripe for socialist change'(154).

Integral to the state's gradualist approach to socialist transformation was distaste for the notions of class and class struggle. On the day before the Minister for Industry spoke to the ZIDS seminar, the Vice-President of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, the industrialists' umbrella organisation, had categorically (and understandably) stated the private sector's unequivocal commitment to capitalism and opposition to socialism.(155) asked to respond to this, Makoni admitted that the private sector's opposition to socialism presented 'difficulties'. But, the Minister said, the government did not want the state and the private sector 'to be at each others' throats'. Transformation would hopefully come about without a struggle, but if the private sector was 'hard' on its position confrontation was inevitable. But in his discussions with the private sector the minister had not heard the position stated so harshly — the government had been led to believe that the private sector accepted the eventual transition to socialism.(156)

The absence of class struggle and class strategy is itself a function of class formation. The new ruling class has no material interest in promoting a transforming and mobilizing style of development. The new ruling class and the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie which serves it have adopted a technicist, diffusionist and authoritarian style of work, which takes power away from the people and helps to maintain capitalist production relations.

III

In this final section of the paper the argument of the first two sections will be reviewed and extended, and an attempt made to situate post-independence developments in education within a political-economic framework. The assertions relating to education will necessarily be stated baldly: they are elaborated upon in the dissertation on which this paper is based.

Since Independence there has been no movement in the social relations of production in Zimbabwe away from capitalism and towards socialism. The labour of workers and peasants continues to be super-exploited, i.e. their surplus labour is extracted at less than the cost of reproducing it. This is made possible by the continuation of ties of dependence between urban and rural areas which enable workers and peasants, when they pool the product of their labour, to subsist. A general review of post-independence development policy shows that current development analysis and policy contributes to the maintenance of capitalist production relations.(157) The conception and strategy of development that have been pursued in Zimbabwe since Independence can be summed up as follows: Development is seen as a technical matter, as a means of matching means and ends in the most efficient manner. Policy makers wish to effect a gradual, harmonious transition to socialism, one which avoids class struggle and does not disturb existing economic and political structures. The final feature of the dominant conception of development is that those in power believe they know what is good for the masses. The fundamental flaw in this conception of development is the absence of class analysis. The crudest class analysis shows that a technicist, gradualist development strategy must lead to formation of a new ruling class and petty bourgeois in alliance with international capital, and further demobilization and impoverishment of the working class and peasantry.

The most significant political development in Zimbabwe since Independence has been the emergence of a new ruling class. The boundaries of this class have not yet been finally established, but the contours of its formation can be drawn. The power of a ruling class in a newly independent Third World country is initially purely political. The ruling class comes to power because it is seen by the people as the representative of its interests. At the moment of Independence the personnel of the ruling class is simply the majority of those who have been elected to political office — in the case of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PP and Patriotic Front parliamentarians — and the party power brokers and guerrilla leaders who act as mediators in the hierarchy of patron-client relationships which link people and political leaders. The old political rulers either leave the country, as in the case of metropolitan colonialism, or become a minority exercising little influence, as in the case of settler colonialism. But the disappearing or weakening of its political representatives does not mean that the old ruling class simply vanishes. In the absence of a clear class analysis and strategy on the part of the new ruling class, the old ruling class always manages to accommodate itself to the new order. In Zimbabwe since Independence the agricultural, commercial and industrial fractions of the settler and international bourgeois, as well as considerable numbers of the commercial and administrative white petty bourgeois, have attempted to adjust to the new political order. The new ruling class has also sought to establish itself, and its petty bourgeois allies, within existing political and economic structures. The result has been an uneasy alliance between state and capital and continued demobilization and impoverishment of the proletariat and peasantry. The situation has been complicated by a continuing power struggle within the state.

After two years of independence Zimbabwe was following the educational route of other newly independent African countries. (158) Its education system was expanding rapidly, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels. Inherited educational structures and processes had hardly changed. The well-established hierarchical and authoritarian educational administration had absorbed and reoriented nationalist staff. In the schools, curricula and styles of teaching and learning remained very much as they had been in colonial times. The dominant characteristic of the education system — its expansion — was a reflection of the post-independence class struggle. The perceived interests of the parties in that struggle — on the one hand the new ruling class, on the other peasants and workers — were both served by expansion.

Peasants and workers, having been denied educational opportunity for so long, pressed the state for more facilities, and themselves made a tremendous contribution to the reconstruction and expansion of schooling. The ruling class responded to and encouraged this expansion as one of the ways of establishing itself in power. But even as it did this it was aware of the trap it was making for itself. For the expansion was costly, and created problems that would have to be dealt with in the future, chief among which was the question of what was to be done with the products of the schools. (159) But by 1982 concern about expansion was only being publicly expressed by professional educators. (160) There was no public debate about educational expansion and its consequences. The conventional view was that the reconstruction and growth of schools was a triumph. Politicians continued to urge education for production, to assert that Zimbabwe's education system was assisting the transition to socialism, and to exhort students, teachers, and parents to make sacrifices for education and development. (161)

Basic questions like: when is secondary school going to end? and what is going to happen to the products of secondary schools? — were not being publicly argued. The longer decisions on these issues were left the more likely it was policy would be made in the arbitrary way and that the outcome for most students would be ejection from the school system a couple of rungs higher up the ladder than in colonial days. There was no evidence that school leavers would have any better chance of getting a job than students had two or five years before. (162) or that they were any better prepared for a life of 'self-employment' on the land or in towns.

Nor was there, in the immediate post-independence period, any sign of an alternative to the formal education system emerging. Given the continuation of academic, examination-oriented curricula and teaching styles, revolutionary and liberating forms of education were not going to emerge in the mainstream school system. The supposed site of educational transformation — the ZIPRA schools — had a small number of students, were starved of funds and were isolated from the educational mainstream. Technical education which, being under the control of a new Ministry, could have become the vanguard of educational change, was allocated few resources. The proposed 1982 adult literacy 'campaign' was nationalist and technicist rather than socialist and mobilizing in conception and by mid-year had become an adjunct of other development programs. The class nature of the Zimbabwean education system was seen in the continued existence of schools with widely varying student populations and resource levels. The maintenance of exclusive private and government 'A' schools signalled the emergence of an alliance between the white bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and the emerging black ruling class and petty-bourgeois. The refusal of the new government to either end the distinction between various grades of school or to confront continued racism in 'A' schools, and signs that in these schools the production of race was giving way to the production of class, were all manifestations of this emerging alliance. (163)

Post-Independence educational developments reflected and fed a complex class struggle between three groupings: whites, black ruling class and petty bourgeois, and black proletariat and poor peasantry. The most significant political development of the first two years of Independence was the single-minded and successful pursuit of power by a new ruling class and petty bourgeois. The centralisation of political power in ZANU-PP and the Prime Minister; the attempted demobilisation of the working class through the setting up of party-controlled trade unions, the strategy of 'worker participation', the use of colonial labour legislation and of coercion; the articulation of a economic strategy which involves the maintenance and Africanisation of domestic private capital, the deepening of transnational involvement in the economy, the extension of state participation in the economy in partnership

with private capital, and a minor redistribution of income from capital to labour -- these political and economic developments were manifestations of the efforts of a ruling class to establish itself, and the struggles that arose from the opposition to these efforts by other classes. (164)

An understanding of the new ruling class and the forces that have shaped it is central to an understanding of Zimbabwe's trajectory of development. As we saw in the previous chapter, a combination of factors prevented the Zimbabwean nationalist movement from developing into a movement of national liberation. Despite fifteen years of armed struggle the nationalist movement remained in the control of petty bourgeois leaders, whose commitment to socialism was rhetorical, and whose style of work was centred on accumulation of personal power. The rhetorical commitment to socialism and the authoritarian power-broking style of work, have, understandably, carried over into Independence. While saying it is going to build socialism the new ruling class has concentrated its energies on taking control of the state, developing an alliance with local and foreign private capital, and demobilising the workers and peasants. (165)

In this situation education both reflects and contributes to the domination of the new ruling class and its allies -- the local and foreign bourgeois, and the black and white petty bourgeois. There are numerous manifestations of this dominance in post-independence education -- the continued privileged position of exclusive private and 'A' schools, the expansion and then the cutting off of secondary education for the masses, the continued material and intellectual underdevelopment of the schooling received by the bulk of the people, the continued dominance of authoritarian, 'telling' pedagogies and hierarchical forms of administration in all spheres of education, the failure to either construct a meaningful alternate system or to mount mass education campaigns -- all these developments reflect and serve the interests of the ruling class. (166)

But as always, these developments do not serve the ruling class in unambiguous and uncontested ways. Resistance continues, at all levels of education and society. This resistance is generally confused and disorganized. The classes and class fractions with a material or ideological interest in building socialism and democracy -- the working class, the poor peasantry, progressive sections of the petty bourgeois -- have been largely demobilized since Independence. State-created or controlled trade unions, the repressive domesticating industrial relations strategy, the absence of a mobilising strategy of land reform and communal production, the incorporation and/or intimidation of the progressive petty bourgeois, the ruling class's domination of the party -- all these processes have prevented a progressive class alliance emerging that might challenge the political-economic strategy being articulated by the new ruling class and its allies. (167)

In Zimbabwe, as is the case in much of the capitalist world, democrats and socialists have no chance of capturing state power in the short run. The left needs to accept this fact, without despairing. There is much for committed socialists and democrats to do in Zimbabwe. Numerous arenas of struggle are available to them: schools, work places, trade unions, the party, the media, the civil service, parliament, the family, male-female relationships. The working class and the peasantry were demobilized easily after Independence because they have had little experience of running their own lives. They will only become mobilized again through struggle.

At the most basic level what we all need is practice in participation: we need to identify our dissatisfactions, act on them, analyse the actions and their results, and act again, and so on, in a spiral of praxis. In this

way a dialectic of action-analysis, a truly activist and democratic praxis can be developed. To speak in this way is not to slip into abstract idealism, academic theorizing. As analysis of the 1981 teachers' strike shows (168) the struggles Zimbabweans live in are real, and difficult. They are also amenable to analysis. People can learn from their experiences, and develop more effective forms of struggle. This may sound like petty bourgeois individualism, but ultimately effective struggle rests on individual will. Each of us has to choose to despair and give up, or to have heart and struggle on. This decision is a difficult one to take, but it is ^{an} unavoidable one -- like it or not, we make this decision every day. And socialists and democrats who work in education in a capitalist society are subjected to particular pressures, most importantly, the knowledge of having to struggle alone, or with very few comrades for much of the time, and the constant temptation to stop struggling and enjoy their position. Part of the reality of working in education in a capitalist society is the knowledge that at this stage of our history most people in education -- because of their privileged material position, because of the pressures to which they are subjected -- will give up the struggle for socialism and democracy.

So the choice is there for each of us. We will make the choice many times, inevitably. Sometimes we will show courage, sometimes we won't. Our struggle will -- again inevitably, because of our class position and our place in history -- be ambiguous and confused. All that we can do if we are serious about contributing to the building of democracy and socialism is to self-consciously continue to struggle, to work alone and together to develop more human and effective styles of work. And when we most feel like despairing we should remember two related things: there are no easy struggles, and we are never alone. ^{As this paper is being} The thesis on / ^{was} tried to show, the history of education in Zimbabwe has been one of struggle; and political and economic struggles have also been educational. These educational, political and economic struggles have been difficult, and have yielded ambiguous results. These struggles continue, and they continue to be difficult, and ambiguous. But if we choose to participate in them on the side of socialism and democracy, on the side of the oppressed and the exploited, we can be assured that we will not be alone. Apart from those who will struggle with us (although often physically separate from us), there will be those who have gone before us, and our knowledge, our sustaining knowledge, that we are part of a great tradition of struggle.

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- P.S.C. = Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series.
- H.D.S. = Monthly Digest of Statistics, Zimbabwe.
- S.M.H. = Sydney Morning Herald.

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7. E.F.T., 17/8, 1980, 5553-4.
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9. Herald, 13/3/80. For a statement of government policy towards agriculture see Zimbabwe, Presidential Directive for the Development of Zimbabwe, May 14, 1980. Salisbury Ministry of Information and Tourism, Policy Statement No. 5, May, 1981), p 3
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	1979-80	1980-1
Army	-	\$117.6 million
Health	-	\$45.6 million
Education	\$66.4 million	\$60.8 million
Total	\$331.5 million	\$438.7 million

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48. Ibid., 17/10/80.
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56. Sunday Mail, 16/11/80.
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- 88. Herald, 14/5/81.
- 89. Herald, 16/5/81.
- 90. Herald, 30/5/81.
- 91. Herald, 28/5/81.
- 92. Herald, 15/6/81.
- 93. Herald, 30/5/81.
- 94. Herald, 5/6/81.
- 95. Herald, 27/10/81.
- 96. Herald, 1/12/81.
- 97. Herald, 5, 6, 8, 14, 20, 21, 27/7/81; Herald, 6, 8, 11, 17, 18, 21, 28/8/81; Sunday Mail, 3/9/81, 27/9/81; Herald, 22/9/81, Herald, 2, 16, 13, 15, 20/10/81; Herald 4, 24/1/81; 2, 5, 9, 12/12/81.
- 98. Herald, 4/6/81; 12/6/81.
- 99. Herald, 16/12/81; 14/1/82, 16/1/82, 6/2/82.
- 100. Sunday Mail 7/2/81.
- 101. Herald, 4, 9, 14; 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28/1/82; Herald, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10/2/82.
- 102. Sunday Mail, 7/2/82; Herald, 5, 13, 14, 16, 26/2/82.
- 103. Herald, 19/2/82.
- 104. Foto, o. 1, May, 1982, p 5; personal communications.
- 105. Herald, 20/2/82.
- 106. Foto, No. 1, May, 1982, p 5. Herald, 16, 20, 24, 25/2/82; Herald, 2, 7, 12, 13, 18, 24, 25, 26, 29/3/82; Herald, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 28, 29/4/82; Sunday Mail, 25/4/82; 16/5/82; Herald, 3, 5, 7, 12, 19, 19/5/82.
- 107. Herald, 10/3/82, 11/3/82.
- 108. Herald, 23/3/82.
- 109. See note 515.
- 110. Herald, 17/4/82, 4/5/82.
- 111. Herald, 26/5/82; 1/5/82.
- 112. Herald, 4/5/82.
- 113. Herald, 5/5/82.
- 114. Herald, 10/5/82.
- 115.
- 116.
- 117. Herald, 20/5/82.

References continued:

118. Herald, 17/4/82, 18/4/82.
119. As Africa Now, April, 1982, p 49, comments: 'With only 57 M.P's and a handful of Senators, that is a lot of political patronage'.
120. Herald, 7/7/81.
121. For a useful discussion of this development see Lionel Cliffe, 'Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance', in Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (London, Macmillan, 1981), pp 25-6
122. See Nkala quoted in Herald, 5/6/81.
123. FSC, 18/8, 1981, p6148-9.
124. Herald, 1/3/82.
125. Herald, 19/4/82.
126. Herald, 20/4/82.
127. Ibid.
128. For example, Herald, 12/5/82.
129. Herald, 10/3/82.
130. Herald, 4/5/82, 5/5/82.
131. Herald, 5/5/82.
132. Herald, 13/2/82. This ceremony, and Mugabe's statement, can be taken to mark the official end of the liberation army, whose loyalty is to party and people, and the emergence of a neo-colonial army, whose loyalty is to the ruling class, and later in some cases (Uganda, Ghana) simply to itself.
133. Herald, 1/4/82.
When the fifth Brigade was formed in August 1981, Nkomo complained he has not been consulted about this formation. At a rally soon afterwards Mugabe asked rhetorically, 'Who are you to be consulted?' (One answer was that Nkomo's responsibilities as a Minister in Mugabe's own office included security,. The Brigade, Mugabe said, had been formed to 'defend the country and deal with dissidents and other subversive elements' 27/8/81.
134. David Field, 'Manufacturing Industry', in Stoneman op.cit., p 157; Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 'The role of the private sector in Zimbabwe. Paper presented to the inaugural seminar of the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 31/3/82, p 4 (hereafter referred to as CZI/ZIDS)
135. CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., p 4.
136. Ibid., p 13
137. Herald, 12/2/82.
138. CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., p 13; ZIMCORD, op.cit., p 57; 1981 Economic Survey op.cit., paras. 4.19-4.28.
139. CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., pp 4-6
140. Ibid., pp 1-7. Although all the figures quoted in this paragraph are for the late colonial period, increased state participation in the economy after independence could only have increased these proportions.
141. Ibid., p 2
142. quoted in CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., p 10.
143. Herald, 29/4/82. Cf other statements by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Industry and Energy Development, quoted in CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., pp 10, 12, and the statement by the Deputy Minister of Economic Planning Herald, 12/2/82.
144. CZI/ZIDS, op.cit., pp 12-13.
145. Ibid., p 13.
146. See for example the statement by the British Foreign Secretary, Herald, 27/2/82.
147. Herald, 15/5/82. But see Chimzoro's claim in May-June European tour.
148. Herald, 12/5/82, 13/5/82.
149. See Von Greyhold, op.cit., particularly her conclusions, pp 116-122.
150. For the impact of price control on businessmen see 1/5/82, 14/5/82.
151. Field, op.cit., p 156.
152. Notes made by the author at the inaugural seminar of the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Harare.

References continued:

153. Ibid.
154. Cited in Alex Callinicos, Southern Africa after Zimbabwe, (London, Pluto Press, 1981) pp 57-1.
155. Notes by author, inaugural seminar of ZIPS, op.cit.
156. Ibid.
157. This point is developed in Foley, Education and Social Change, op.cit., Chapter 9.
158. For an analysis of this route see Griff Foley, 'Towards a Marxist Analysis of education and Underdevelopment in Africa', Paper presented to the sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand annual conference, LaTrobe University, Melbourne, June, 1976.
159. Interview with Dr. Dzingat Mutumbuka, Minister of education and Culture, Harare, 12/7/82; interview with Keith Yound, Principal, Belvedere Teachers' College, Harare, 22/4/82.
160. In April 1982 the Secretary for Education said that the country could not afford to continue building schools and providing education in the conventional way. Costs, the Secretary said, were so 'phenomonally high' that by 1984 the recurrent costs of education would be greater than the entire 1981 education vote of \$300 million. Alternative ways of educating people would have to be found. Sunday Mail, 25/4/82.
161. See Foley, Education and Social Changeop.cit., Chapter 10.
162. The situation of school leavers may be worse in the 1980's than it was in the 1970's. The three year transitional development plan envisages the creation of 80,000 new jobs a year. But each year over the next decade 150,000 - 400,000 school leavers will enter the labour market. Zimbabwe, review of education 1959-1979. Current problems and prospects for the next 20 years (Country paper prepared for Lineda
 [Conference of African Ministers of Education] Harare, 28 June - 3 July, 1982) p 23.
163. Foley, Education and Social Change.....op.cit., Chapter 10.
164. Ibid., Chapter 9.
165. Ibid., Chapter 9.
166. Ibid., Chapter 10.
167. Ibid., Chapter 9.
168. Ibid., Chapter 9, Sections VIII and IX.



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