

The Human Factor Approach to Development in Africa



Edited by

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The Human Factor: Foundation for Development and Democracy

Senyo Adjibolosoo

Introduction

Since gaining their independence, many African countries (ACs) have tried almost everything possible to achieve democracy and human-centred development. Numerous plans, policies, programmes and projects have been pursued with zeal and zest in the past. Today, after all is accounted for, it seems as if ACs have lost their bid to sail with the democratic winds that drive the ships of democratization and development. The processes of democratization and development on the continent seem either to be stalled completely or to be creeping at a snail's pace (Ellis, 1993: 133-143). It is clear that the region is at the crossroads where it must pause to review critically all it has done in the past in its pursuit of constitutional democracy and development. From the colonial era to today, Africans have tried many plans, policies, programmes and projects aimed at economic growth and development. In many cases, resources channelled into education are used to focus on human capital development. Educational policies and programmes have, therefore, focused on acquisition of knowledge and skills, to the total neglect of critical human qualities. ACs have produced intellectual elites who possess knowledge and skills which they are unable to use to deal with Africa's social, economic, political and cultural problems. The reason for this failure is that current mechanisms ignore the central significance of the Human Factor (HF). They have neglected the HF as:

the spectrum of personality characteristics and other dimensions of human performance that enable social, economic and political institutions to function and remain functional over time. Such dimensions sustain the workings and application of the rule of law, political harmony, a disciplined labour force, just legal systems, respect for human dignity and the sanctity of life, social welfare, and so on. As is often the case, no social, economic or political institutions can function effectively without being upheld by a network of committed persons who stand firmly by them. Such persons must strongly believe in and continually affirm the ideals of society (Adjibolosoo, 1993: 142 and 1994: 26).

The primary objective is, therefore, that until the HF is developed in ACs, their desire to achieve and maintain constitutional democracy will always remain unattainable. Similarly, a sustainable human-centred development cannot be forthcoming if ACs continue to fail to educate and train their citizens properly for them to acquire the necessary human qualities and/or characteristics, that is the HF that make both constitutional democracy and development happen in societies. The constitution of a country is nothing more than a blueprint. It cannot plan, organize,

institute, implement or operate itself. Its effective and successful implementation are critical functions of the HF. It is the HF, rather than a perfect constitutional blueprint, which wields the power to mobilize both internal and external resources for successful democratic rule and sustained human-centred development.

Democracy and development

The literature on democracy and democratic rule is voluminous. Even today, scholars are still writing pages upon pages of books, notes and journal articles, on the various forms of democracy known to humanity and their functionality. Our objective is not to reproduce this literature. It is to discuss briefly what democracy is, explain its relevance to development and examine the necessary factors that make it workable in societies.

The concept of democracy is very slippery to grasp and define precisely. Its conceptualizations and meanings have changed throughout the centuries. Moreover, no two countries understand and practise democracy in identical ways. As pointed out by Cnudde and Neubauer (1969: 17), the people's understanding and perception of democracy as practised in Athens are different from democracy as understood and practised in Britain and America. The concept of democracy has so many connotations that it has become difficult to pin down or know what people exactly mean when they use the term. To some, democracy simply means majority rule, political liberty and equality (Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969: 18).

Ranney and Kendall (1969: 41-63), maintain that a government is democratic if (1) those who hold public office are usually ready and willing to do what the public desires and make sure that they do not engage in activities that are not approved by the public; (2) each individual citizen has equal opportunities to engage in making decisions regarding the community's goals and objectives; and (3) in the case of disagreement, the voices and desires of the majority must carry the day.

Using these characteristics, Ranney and Kendall (1969) developed four principles of democracy—popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation and majority rule (see also Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969: 19). In the views of Ranney and Kendall (1969), it is only when these four principles are closely adhered to simultaneously that democracy can be said to exist in society. Thus, according to these authors, when even one of these principles is violated, no government can claim to be democratic.

Sartori (1962), maintained that 'the difference between democracy and its opposite (autocracy) lies in the fact that in a democracy, power is scattered, limited, controlled, and exercised in rotation; whereas in an autocracy power is concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite and unlimited. What democracy is not is, in one word, autocracy,' (quoted in Cnudde and Neubauer 1969: 36. See also Sartori, 1962: 135-157). To Sartori (1962), therefore:

democracy, viewed as a non-autocracy, denotes a political system characterised by the absence of personal power, and more particularly a system that hinges on the principle that no one can proclaim himself a ruler, that no one can hold power irrevocably in his own name. Precisely because the autocratic principle

is repudiated, the democratic axiom is that man's power over man can only be granted by others. Furthermore, if the designation of leaders does not come from consensus, there is no democracy. Nor is there democracy when consensus is counterfeit and extorted, for there is no consensus if those who are to give it are not free to dissent and if it does not result from choice among a number of alternatives.

Democracy can, therefore, be viewed as a socio-political system where the majority of the population rule through the use of ballots to select representatives who are then empowered to administer rule on behalf of the whole nation. It is a system designed by the people themselves to be used to foster and sustain the interests of every member of society. Democratic institutions are expected to seek and pursue liberty, equity and justice in society.

Lipset (1959), noted that democracy is a political system which gives people the chance to select and/or change officials who govern. Democracy also provides the mechanism for people to resolve problems in a peaceful manner. Lipset (1959), contended further that the existence of political parties, a free press/speech and such like, is critical for the successful working of a democracy. A democratic political system that lacks a well-developed and organized value system to encourage and enforce the principled use of power and authority, will crumble. There will not exist any stable democratic process and/or procedure for organizing and running society. Similarly, if no procedures exist for the assignment of power and authority to a group of people to oversee the proper running of society, democracy will not prevail. In cases where powerful oppositions are not allowed to co-exist alongside the ruling group (party), the rulers may arrogate all powers to themselves and there will be little or no popular participation. Lipset (1959: 69-105) put forward the proposition that a high level of economic development is necessary to sustain and maintain democratic regimes. In his view, democratic countries experience higher levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education.

Lipset's study showed that there is a significant relationship between democracy and economic development. Lipset's hypothesis has been verified and validated by Cutright (1963: 253-264). Other scholars who wrote on this issue include McCrone and Cnudde (1967: 72-79), Neubauer (1967: 1002-1009), Prothro and Grigg (1960: 276-294), Dahl (1961: 311-325) and McClosky (1964: 361-382).

Cnudde and Neubauer (1969: 145-146), pointed out that the Lipset-Cutright developmental model and its various extensions by McCrone and Cnudde showed clearly that there exists a powerful linear relationship between democratic political development and economic and social development. In the views of Lipset (1959), the richer a nation is the greater the chances of its ability to support, uphold and/or maintain democracy. Neubauer (1967), however, found that the results of his study did not support the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis. He argued, therefore, that there exist other factors that are more critical and/or relevant to a society's democratic performance. Prothro and Grigg (1960) concluded that education is the most important variable that determines an individual's ability to commit oneself to a democratic regime and its principles.

Dahl (1961), argued that those who are mostly committed to the tenets of democracy are the professionals. These are the people, according to Dahl, who uphold democracy in its darkest hour and through times of controversy or other forms of hardship. McClosky (1964), maintained that the group of people who form the political strata of society are the custodians of the public conscience and protectors of the principles of democracy (see Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969: 148). Cnudde and Neubauer (1969: 149) observed that :

the concept of democracy is obviously predicated upon the assumption that the citizen will participate rather generally in the affairs of his [her] polity. The reality is that when he [or she] does decide to participate, he [or she] has very little of the "equipment" to do so as a democrat.

The individuals who have been voted into power are expected to see to it that society is run effectively and efficiently and that every citizen is treated as stipulated in the national constitution. Clark (1990: 14), observed that democracy transcends one's possession of the right to vote. It involves the right to free speech, association and independent press. According to Clark (1990: 14-15), when defined in much broader terms, the cause and course of democracy have both been affected and advanced by different groups in society. Such groups include women's movements, voluntary organizations, the green movement, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and many others. These groups have always pursued programmes aimed at the attainment of equity, fairness, justice and many others in society. Above all, many of these groups fight for the eradication of poverty in all societies.

Table 1.1 contains points representing a bird's eye view of the general ingredients of true constitutional democracy from the orthodox classical perspective. Any society that is able to make these ingredients prevail is deemed to have achieved democracy. The bill of rights is expected to assure all citizens their rights and privileges in society. In a democratic society, everyone is supposedly 'guaranteed' equality before the law, personal freedom and free speech and above all, the right to engage in one's choice of vocation, the ability to own property and enjoy fruits from one's labour and property.

Table 1.1. The traditional view regarding the general ingredients of a democratic society.

-
- * Selection of people into office through systematic and meaningful elections
 - * Degree of freedom of association existing in a nation
 - * Freedom of press and free speech
 - * Fair and competitive elections through the ballot
 - * Popular participation
 - * Political liberty
 - * Modernization
 - * Efficiency in bureaucratic decision-making
 - * Rationality
 - * National unity
 - * Civic culture
 - * Social consensus
 - * Viable and highly effective conflict resolution mechanisms
-

The relationship between democracy and development has been debated in the literature for many decades. Although there are no conclusive results (Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F., 1993:51-69), regarding whether democracy leads or trails development, it has been the view of many scholars from the developed countries that democracy is a *sine qua non* to development (see, for example, Lipset, 1959 and 1960; Dahl, 1971; Scully, 1988; Helliwell, 1994: 225-248.) It is often argued that any ACs that desire to develop must first facilitate the democratization process. However, as correctly pointed out by Healey and Robinson (1992: 94-95), while one group of scholars believes that democratic, social and economic systems reinforce each other, an opposing view maintains that 'democratic politics and procedures hinder economic development.' For example, according to Almond and Coleman (1971), the functional prerequisites for democratic development include (1) high levels of urbanization, (2) widespread literacy, (3) relatively high per capita incomes, (4) geographical and social mobility, (5) a high degree of commercialization and industrialization, (6) an extensive mass communications network and (7) widespread participation in modern social and economic processes. While Lipset (1959), believed that social consensus and the existence of a civic culture are necessary for the successful promotion of democracy, Huntington (1965), argued that better education, increasing urbanization, growing literacy, enhanced communications and many other factors are critical for workable democracy in heterogeneous societies. In the views of Geertz (1963), 'primordial loyalties' predicated on religion, language, kinship, culture and so on, will destroy the basic foundation of democracy in societies. The literature on democracy is full of pronouncements about what makes democracy happen in societies.

A successfully accomplished democratization process is expected to lead to the establishment of a strong and powerful state, civil order, political stability, financial prudence, effective law and order, the rule of law, efficient and effective public administration, a powerful, authoritative constitution and constitutional government, the institutionalization of a democratic political life, and so on. The existence of these factors in a democratic society is expected to guarantee every citizen equality before the law (that is liberty, justice, fairness and equity).

As is often argued, many developing countries have not experienced these positive results because they have failed to achieve successful democracies. Lumumba-Kasongo (1994: 89-90), for example, argued that liberal democracy has failed in Africa for many reasons. In his view, the major reasons for the failure of liberal democracy include the following:

1. The elites hijacked democracy in its infancy.
2. It was too full of bureaucratic procedures and expensive for the common person.
3. Its concepts and practices were alien to local practices.
4. Due to the intrusions of many external forces, democracy could not have the necessary environment within which to flourish in Africa.
5. It failed to give critical consideration to the people's way of life in Africa.

In the light of these, one may ask the question: Will democracy happen in Africa when all these factors become available in any society?

Some myths about constitutional democracy

The discussion so far illustrates clearly the orthodox views about what is necessary to make democracy happen in societies. As is obvious, the general sentiment is that those societies that fail to make available the necessary conditions will never achieve constitutional democracy. In case this happens, the orthodox view maintains that economic growth and development will not have the chance of occurring in societies where democracy fails to take root. In a detailed review of the literature on democracy and development, Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 51-69) showed clearly that social scientists not only know very little about the true relationship between democracy and development, but also that the existing evidence gleaned through econometric (regression) analysis is highly inconclusive. Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 52), pointed out that the view that democracy shelters private property rights is not only a recent invention, but also naive.

In their literature review, Przeworski and Limongi, found out that some earlier conservative writers/scholars were in agreement with the socialists and the view that the freedom to form and be part of unions and the subscription to the concept of universal suffrage could spell the doom of private property. Thomas Macauley (1900: 263), believed that universal suffrage could destroy both private property and civilization. In the views of Karl Marx (1934, 1952 and 1971), universal suffrage and private property are unable to coexist harmoniously together.

Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 53), noted that most people who claim that democracy promotes private property ownership, economic growth and development fail to explain how democratic institutions are able to achieve these laudable goals. Olson (1991: 153), for example, fails to offer clear examples to illustrate how democratic institutions provide the necessary leadership commitment through which the intended objectives can be successfully achieved. One great mistake made by the property rights literature is to maintain that the state is the sole threat to private property. In response to this unbalanced view, Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 53), noted that:

property rights are threatened by private actors: capitalist property is threatened by organized workers, landlords' property by landless peasants. It is by no means clear the villain is necessarily 'the ruler.' Indeed, one liberal dilemma is that a strong state is required to protect property from private encroachments but a strong state is a potential threat itself . . . The widespread usage of democracy as a 'proxy' for guarantees of property rights in econometric studies is thus unjustifiable: democracy may promote growth but not via this particular mechanism.

Gallenson, (1959: 388); Huntington, (1968) and Huntington and Dominguez, (1975: 60), believed that democracy hinders economic growth through its negative impact on investment (see details in Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988 and Przeworski and Limongi, 1993: 54).

On the other hand, those who advance the view that the role of the state causes economic growth and development, focus among other things, on institution building, learning and capacity development, human capital acquisition, and the pursuit of

allocative efficiency. Yet, unfortunately, scholars of this persuasion do not tell us how the state is able to achieve these goals successfully. What is it that allows the states in South East Asia to achieve the observed significant levels of economic growth and development? To answer this question, many scholars who propound this view maintain that state autonomy is crucial. For example, Haggard (1990: 262), argues that 'since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy from distributionist pressures, they increase the government's ability to extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with efficient economic adjustment,' (quoted in Przeworski and Limongi, 1993: 57). According to Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 57), proponents of how state autonomy promotes the effectiveness and success of authoritarian political arrangements fail to provide the actual reasons to explain why autonomous states will take into account both the short term and the long term interests of everyone in the nation. It is important to explain how governments are able to achieve the law and order crucial for providing the necessary environment within which economic growth and development can occur.

In view of these observations, Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 60-66), concluded that statistical evidence provided by econometric analyses regarding the relationship between democracy and economic development and growth is inconclusive and/or mixed. Their results are presented in Table 1.2. A careful study of the data in Table 1.2 reveals that studies of democracy, autocracy, bureaucracy and growth do not provide clearcut results. While some studies concluded that democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy are fertile ground for economic development and growth, others rejected this result and concluded otherwise and vice versa. In summarizing the results of their study, Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 63), pointed out that:

the pitfalls involved in the studies summarized . . . can be demonstrated as follows. Averaging the rates of growth of ten South American countries between 1946 and 1988, one discovers that authoritarian regimes grew at the average of 2.15 per cent per annum while democratic regimes grew at 1.31 per cent. Hence, one is inclined to conclude that authoritarianism is better for growth than democracy. But suppose that in fact regimes have no effect on growth. However, regimes do differ in their probabilities of surviving various economic conditions: authoritarian regimes are less likely than democracies to survive when they perform badly. . . As one would expect, authoritarian regimes grew faster than democracies—indeed, we reproduced exactly the observed differences in growth rates—despite the fact that these data were generated under the assumption that regimes have no effect on growth. It is the difference in the way regimes are selected—the probabilities of survival conditional on growth—that generate the observed difference in growth rates. Hence, this difference is due to selection bias.

The application of ordinary squares will, in most cases, fail to provide efficient results. The literature review undertaken by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990: 126-157), reveals three different perspectives, that is conflict, compatibility and skeptical, regarding the relationship between democracy and economic growth and development (see Helliwell, 1994: 235). While three of the research papers they reviewed concluded a negative relationship between democracy and economic growth, six concluded the

Table 1.2 Studies of Democracy, Autocracy, Bureaucracy and Growth

Author	Sample	Time Frame	Finding
Przeworski (1966)	57 countries	1949-1963	dictatorship at medium development level grew fastest
Adelman and Morris (1967)	74 underdeveloped countries (including communist bloc)	1959-1964	Authoritarianism helped less and medium developed countries
Dick (1974)	59 underdeveloped countries	1959-1968	Democracies develop slightly faster
Huntington and Dominguez (1975)	35 poor countries	the 1950s	Authoritarian grew faster
Marsh (1979)	98 countries	1955-1970	Authoritarian grew faster
Weede (1983)	124 countries	1960-1974	Authoritarian grew faster
Kormendi and Meguire (1985)	47 countries	1950-1977	Democracies grew faster
Kohli (1986)	10 underdeveloped countries	1960-1982	No difference in 1960; Authoritarian slightly better in 1970s
Landau (1986)	65 countries	1960-1980	Authoritarian grew faster
Sloan and Tedin (1987)	20 Latin American countries	1960-1979	Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes do better than Democracy; traditional dictatorship do worse
Marsh (1988)	47 countries	1956-1984	No difference between regimes
Pourgerami (1988)	92 countries	1965-1984	Democracies grew faster
Scully (1988, 1992)	115 countries	1960-1980	Democracies grew faster
Barrow (1989)	72 countries	1960-1985	Democracies grew faster
Grier & Tullock (1989)	59 countries	1961-1980	Democracies grew faster
Remmer (1990)	11 Latin American countries	1982-1988	Democracy faster, but result statistically insignificant
		1982 and 1988	
Pourgerami (1991)	106 countries	1986	Democracies grew faster
Helliwell (1992)	90 countries	1960-1985	Democracy has negative, but statistically insignificant, effect on growth

Source: Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic growth" *Journal of Economic Perspective*, 7 (3): 61.

existence of no relationship and four discovered mixed results. The studies of Pourgerami (1988: 123-141), Kormendi and Meeguire (1985: 141-163) and Grier and Tullock (1989: 259-272), concluded that democracy exerts a positive impact on economic growth. While selection models might be very sensitive, simple modifications can affect the signs of regression coefficients. In view of these difficulties, standard regression models fail to provide convincing and definitive results. This is one main reason why they cannot be relied on for policy purposes (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993: 64).

Although the extensive literature review and analyses of Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 51-69) are both revealing and insightful, they fail to provide definitive answers regarding the actual relationship between democracy and economic growth and development. What they also fail to perceive is the primary role of the HF in both democratic and economic growth development processes. This is the main reason why they concluded that 'it does not seem to be democracy or authoritarianism *per se* that makes the difference but something else. What that something else might be is far from clear.'

According to Lewis (1955: 78), economic freedom has brought about increased incomes in North America and Western Europe. Yet, when properly pursued, collective action under authoritarian leadership can also lead to growth. Lewis observed that:

collective action and cohesive sentiments are not merely necessary to growth, they may also in certain circumstances achieve results superior to those achieved by individualism. A cohesive group, organized on authoritarian lines is probably better able to attain given objectives than is a group more individualistically inclined. It is superior, presumably, for anything which has to be done according to a plan, where keeping together is of the essence of success. . . . The cohesive, authoritarian group will also have superior economic growth, if the chief knows better than the individuals the measurements which growth requires. . . . Hence it is not true to say that growth depends on the individual having freedom to manoeuvre, if the alternative is that the individual will be compelled to do things which lead to growth. The case for the superiority of individual freedom in economic matters rests on the belief that the chief has no superior source of knowledge, and that individuals seeking in many directions are more likely to discover open doors than a chief with a monopoly of manoeuvre.

In view of this, Lewis (1955: 80), argued that under authoritarianism, a government that possesses a clear understanding of what causes growth is potentially more able to promote economic growth than a government which pursues growth on an individualistic basis. However, he cautioned that the possibility of having authoritarian governments that are intelligent and have people's interests at heart may be exceptions rather than the rule.

The superiority of a centrally planned economy to an unplanned economy has been discussed by Lewis (1955: 82-84). To Lewis, planned economies with well-carved objectives and well designed programmes might be better able to achieve their objectives than unplanned economies. A planned economy might be more successful than an unplanned one in achieving higher levels of capital formation,

industrialization, and so on. One of the primary reasons why a planned economy may perform impotently may be the lack of a purposeful objective towards which to work. In this case, the activities of private entrepreneurs might be superior to those of central planners. Since the central planners, in this case, may not be able to achieve the best in the absence of efficient knowledge and/or information, it is best to encourage private individuals to do their own things—working for the best of society. Lewis (1955: 83), pointed out that trying to plan well-established *laissez faire* systems may prove to be as futile as pulling teeth out of chicken. The process may not lead to economic growth.

The traditional arguments presented above create several myths about the true relationship between democracy and economic growth and development. The ‘something else’ which Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 51-69), could not decipher very successfully and which is crucial is the HF. The failure of orthodox scholarship to determine the true impact of democracy on economic growth and development has become the *primary reason* for the creation and promotion of the most commonly advanced myths regarding the perceived relationship between democracy and economic growth and development. Some of these myths include:

- Myth 1:* Democracy is a *sine qua non* to economic growth and development.
- Myth 2:* Any societies that are keen to pursue the democratisation process need to place emphasis on high literacy rates and continuing widespread participation in the social, economic and political processes of change and emancipation.
- Myth 3:* It is critical to maintain continuing press freedom, free speech and the rule of law if a society wishes to cultivate and enjoy the fruits of the democratisation process.
- Myth 4:* Well-crafted principles of civic culture and permanently established procedures for the attainment of social consensus and conflict resolution are good requisites for successful democracy.
- Myth 5:* A powerfully authoritative bill of (human) rights has the capability to guarantee all citizens the right to life, justice, equity, fairness and freedom to enjoy the rights and privileges conferred on each individual by the national constitution.
- Myth 6:* Effective and efficient institutions and institutional structures facilitate and promote the progress of democratic societies.

Truly, although the successful running of a democracy requires legal (law), social and political institutions, sound and workable cultural norms, ethos and efficient police and military forces, these may not perform their duties efficiently as expected without the HF. Similarly, the transformation of ideas into practice (that is, plans, policies, programmes and projects) requires people who have acquired the HF to do so. All institutions of social transformation and popular movements cannot achieve their intended goals without a group of people who are readily available and willing to be responsible, accountable, committed, honest and trustworthy (Adjibolosoo, 1995b).

Above all, these people must exercise a significant degree of personal knowledge, understanding, wisdom, judgment and integrity, courage, conscience and good character. It is when people fail to comprehend these critical principles that the myths isolated above become the dominant paradigms for planning, policy making, programming, project development and implementation. In this case, where the said myths undergird all forms of plans, policies, programmes and projects, constitutional democracy will have no chance of success in ACs.

In a society where there is HF decay and/or underdevelopment, existing liberal democratic institutions cannot function as originally intended. Similarly, in such a society, no precautions can be taken to sustain and protect the democratic ways of doing things. Those who are thirsty for power will do everything possible to acquire, use and enjoy it to the detriment and/or enslavement of others. It will not be easy to replace them because, having ushered themselves into power and authority, no one can tell them about what their term limit should be. These types of individuals usually nominate, vote, elect and install themselves into public office either through force or trickery. In many cases, the only ways they leave office are either through a military *coup d'etat* or death.

Education and HF development

One of the questions that arises from the literature review on the meaning, definition and conditions that make democracy happen in societies is: 'Is it true that the higher a person's educational attainment, the more likely he or she is to believe in democratic values and also support democratic practices?' (See Smith, 1948: 65-82; Trow, 1957: 17; Kido and Suyi, 1954: 74-100; Helliwell, 1994: 226-231 for the view that the answer to this question is in the affirmative). Yet, from the HF perspective, this statement is a sweeping generalization that cannot be true. Many people have been academically brainwashed to believe and accept this view. I argue, therefore, that most scholars who have examined this question have all operated within education systems that did foster HF development in some ways, and they are all, therefore, failing to make a distinction between *kinds* of education, focusing instead on *levels* of education. Although education is a vital key to HF development, many societies often fail to establish viable educational and training systems that will facilitate HF development in societies. Regardless of how much education an individual possesses in the modern world, as long as that education does not foster HF development, it is unlikely that it will produce men and women who will believe in democratic values and also support democratic practices. Bryce (1921: 80-81) observed that:

Some of us remember among the English rustics of sixty years ago shrewd men unable to read, but with plenty of mother wit, and by their strong sense and solid judgment quite as well qualified to vote as are their grand children today who read a newspaper and revel in the cinema. The first people who ever worked popular government, working it by machinery more complicated than ours, had no printed page to learn from. Athenian voters who sat all through a scorching summer day listening to the tragedies of Euripides, and Syracusan voters who gave good treatment to those of their Athenian captives who could

recite passages from those tragedies, whereof Syracuse possessed no copies, were better fitted for civic functions than most of the voters in modern democracies.

As is obvious from Bryce's view about education and democracy in his days, I cannot understand why, although we claim to be probably more enlightened than these people, we still fail to comprehend that mere academic or technical training cannot produce people with the relevant HF necessary for the working of democracies. In our ignorance, supported by flimsy research in education, which is primarily aimed at academic publication and merely boosting the egos of academicians who accomplish it, we fail to devise proper educational and training programmes that will have the capability to develop the calibre of people modern Africa is in dire need of. We always assume, in our ignorance, that more education will be the relevant tool for accomplishing the tasks and programmes of humanity. From the HF perspective, if the world continues in this manner, it will one day destroy the effectiveness and efficiency of the human enterprise, and by so doing annihilate itself in the long run. Truly, any society that craves for the organization and operation of democratic institutions must be ready and willing to pursue purposeful education that is based on values drawn from human factor development principles. A recipe for disaster is to focus on short-term 'quick fix' training programmes, which ignore these qualities in their zeal to teach 'skills' and 'techniques.'

Every record relating to education and human performance has to be set straight. The HF, rather than mere academic education, is the critical factor for the development of successful constitutional democracies and growing economies. Examples abound in the real world to substantiate the view that many people earn higher degrees like, PhDs, MAs and MBAs and yet fail in performing their civic duties as expected. For example, although the French and the Germans have in the past attained very high educational levels, their higher educational attainments neither sustained nor stabilized their democracies (see Lipset, 1959: 69-105). Dewey (1916), is correct when he notes that German education was more focused on 'disciplinary training rather than . . . personal [HF] development.' It is, therefore, obvious that the acquisition of extensive disciplinary knowledge does not necessarily lead to the knowledge, understanding, wisdom and critical judgment necessary for building and operating workable democratic institutions. Heraclitus was right when he said 'much knowledge does not teach wisdom' (see Bryce, 1921: 84). It is sad to note that even at the close of the twentieth century, modern men and women are still failing to differentiate between wisdom and mere academic disciplinary knowledge. Truly, there is more to education and training than is being pursued today in academic institutions all over the world.

Bryce (1921: 84-89), reminds humanity that philosophers of ancient times were particularly concerned with character building because they knew that without it no society could achieve the best of democratic arrangements. Bryce (1921: 87-89) discusses the underlying factors that led to the success of democracy in Switzerland. He observed that:

Not merely the high level of intelligence among the people and attention paid to the teaching of civic duty, but the traditional sense of that duty in all classes

and, even more distinctly, the long practice in local self-government. Knowledge and practice have gone hand in hand. Swiss conditions cannot be reproduced elsewhere, but the example indicates the direction which the efforts of other democracies may take.

The view that the attainment of higher educational levels by citizens is sufficient condition for successful democracy is neither acceptable nor tenable from the HF perspective. If ACs are really thinking about how to pursue successful constitutional democracies, they must be careful how they pursue the democratization process. If they make the mistake of following western views and perceptions about democracy and what factors make it happen, they will force themselves into traps that will mislead them and create other sets of hindrances to development on the continent. Africa should wake up to the truth about what kind of education, training and mentoring programmes will be required to provide people who can work their own forms of democracy. There is no magic in western democratic procedures. Western democratic processes do not have automatic switches to be pressed by Africans so that they can easily achieve their intended goals. The primary key to the successful attainment of constitutional democracy and sustained human-centered development is the HF. Those who wish to experience the peace, tranquility and 'good life' that a democratic way of life can bring, need to make HF development an ongoing national task and top priority.

Bryce, once again, (1921: 88-89), pointed out that:

though the education of the citizens is indispensable to a democratic government, the extent to which a merely elementary instruction fits them to work such a government has been overestimated. Reading is merely a gate leading into the field of knowledge. Or we may call it an implement which the hand can use for evil, or for good, or leave unused. Knowledge is one only among the things which go to making a good citizen. Public spirit and honesty are even more needful. . . . Attainments in learning and science do little to make men [and women] wise in politics. Some eminent scientific men have been in this respect no wiser than their undergraduate pupils. There have been countries in which the chiefs of public services and the professors in Universities were prominent in the advocacy of policies which proved disastrous. The habit of local self-government is the best training for democratic government in a nation. Practice is needed to verify knowledge.

The mere promotion of some forms of primary, secondary and university education in ACs will not be sufficient in preparing Africans to develop, implement and operate their own democracies, regardless of what form it takes in each country. Such an education and training programme, if it fails to focus on HF development, will end up creating more problems for the democratization process than it was originally intended to accomplish. In the light of this, Africans have to pause, reconsider and re-evaluate everything they have learned about western democracies and ask themselves the question, 'What must we do to develop the necessary HF that makes the democratization and development processes attainable?' Sincere answers to this

question may put ACs on the route towards the attainment of successful constitutional democracy through continuing grassroots popular participation. Bryce was correct when he said that 'the seed of education will ultimately yield a harvest in the field of politics, though the grain may be slow in ripening.' ACs must stop looking for quick-fixes and tackle their pertinent problems of undemocratic and underdevelopment through continuing HF development programmes. Only then can they bring intended goals within attainable reach.

The HF and the effectiveness of the national constitution

A nation's constitution is the political blue print that outlines clearly the various rules, regulations and principles that are relevant to the organization, operation and governance of the state. Regardless of its stipulations, it is a document crafted by statesmen and women to be used to guide the affairs, behaviour, action and all other kinds of activities (that is, business, economic and social contracts) in the country. Its contents are a reflection of the desires, hopes and aspirations of a people. It cries out loud the dreams and visions of both the leadership and all citizens in the society. It is, however, an inanimate document in itself because its functionality and effectiveness are determined by the desire and willingness of citizens to respect and adhere to its stipulations. The extent to which it is effective and productive is directly related to the level of HF development in the country. Its capability to foster genuine workable relationships and agreement among citizens is also a positive function of existing social ethos and personal character. Its availability in any society is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for establishing successful constitutional democracy and development.

The necessary and sufficient condition for a successful democracy and development is a well-developed HF that furnishes every citizen with the necessary human qualities, abilities and skills that are *sine qua non* for the continuing potency of the constitution and its stipulations. Adjibolosoo (1995b), observed that:

it is the cultivation of productive attitudes and positive HF in people rather than a *perfect* constitutional blueprint that has the power to mobilize internal and external resources for economic development in sub-Saharan African countries.

This truth is usually ignored by many scholars of both economics and political science when they discuss issues relating to democracy, economic growth and development. They focus their attention on how to prove that democracy leads and causes economic growth and development. They fall into intellectual traps of faulty reasoning, emphasizing myths presented earlier as true foundations for constitutional democracy.

The National Committee for Democracy (NCD) in Ghana was correct to observe that:

the constitution of any nation, as a document in itself does not confer a good government. It is essentially a guide to those who direct the affairs of the nation. Above all, it must be the ultimate repository of the people's will, and their

expression of faith in themselves as the main factor in determining the affairs and its destiny. It must therefore draw its strength from the political experiences of the nation which has been constructed from many events and experiences at times painful but necessary effort at harmonizing and channelling all the human energies of the citizenry towards proper, good and beneficent government (quoted in Adjibolosoo, 1995b: 188).

This view of the committee reveals that a nation's constitution is nothing more than an inanimate blueprint of regulations on which the organization and rule of a nation would be based. Its depth and effectiveness rest on the will and motivation of the people. This document outlines and explains the procedures of the democratic process and is also expected to help every citizen to know what constitutes his or her individual rights and privileges, and the accompanying responsibilities and duties. In effect, every citizen needs to become accountable, committed and dedicated to the successful implementation and functioning of the national constitution. Every institution and institutional structure that has been developed on the basis of a nation's constitution need to be managed by people with appropriate HF. Whether these institutions and institutional structures succeed or fail in performing their duties is dependent on the will and character of the people, the existing social ethos and principles they live by (Adjibolosoo, 1995b). Adjibolosoo (1995b: 188-189) has noted that:

by merely stipulating in the constitution how people must react to unpopular governments, sub-Saharan African countries may only be preparing the necessary but not sufficient conditions for effective democracy and economic development. Recall that this was the case for the Third Ghanaian Republic headed by Dr. Hilla Limann. When the constitution for the Third Republic was being drafted, much time and effort were expended to find appropriate clauses to enshrine in it to discourage military takeovers. Although the clause was successfully developed and woven into that constitution, the soldiers rose up one night, pulled the democratically elected government down, and suspended the constitution. This example points out that an excellent constitutional blueprint is only necessary but not sufficient for practising successful democracy and freedom of speech in a nation. Democratically elected governments in Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, Liberia and many others in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered similar plight.

In societies where there is continuing evidence of HF decay and/or underdevelopment, the national constitution can be suspended easily by an individual or a group of individuals who happen to possess the relevant ammunition to do so. This has been the plight of constitutions of many developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America. In these regions, continuing *coups d'etat* have become the order of the day. When soldiers, the police and some private individuals can no longer tolerate ruling governments, they band together, overthrow them through military *coups d'etat* and install themselves in power. They have little regard for national constitutions. The governments, themselves, that are usually subverted would also have failed to respect national constitutions. They would have acquired sordid human

rights records which become obvious to the rest of the world. It, therefore, can be argued that by disregarding stipulations of constitutional blueprints, governments create opportunities for others to subvert democratic processes. This phenomenon usually happens in the presence of severe HF decay and/or underdevelopment. It can be argued that military *coups d'etat* hardly ever happen in societies that have attained sufficient levels of HF development.

Those who desire to be national leaders must not only acquire personal integrity, but responsibility, accountability and commitment also, necessary for nation building. Leaders must learn not to abuse the trust and confidence invested in them by the whole society. This is the thrust of public programmes and/or activities through which high ranking civil servants are sworn into office. Society expects them to function as custodians of the constitution and principles on which its tenets are built. Unfortunately, public figures and leaders lack the necessary HF and betray the trust placed in them by those who installed them in office.

When there exists continued HF decay and/or underdevelopment in any society, the democratic process will always be subverted and derailed. After a successful subversion has been accomplished, new attempts are then made to restore it. This attempt may also be derailed by those who do not like it. Sooner or later, a continuing and self perpetuating vicious cycle is entrenched. Once this happens, the constitution will be denied the opportunity to achieve its intended goals. However, in a society where most people have acquired some level of the HF, it will be much easier to pursue liberty, justice, fairness, and equity for all, and sustained and successful human-centred development.

The pursuit of constitutional rule under democratic arrangements is based on the implicit assumption that every citizen will uphold the constitution to foster the rule of law and respect and protect the rights and freedom of others. Yet these goals cannot be achieved without having produced men and women who have acquired the relevant human qualities for the effective and efficient working of the national constitution. The failure of the constitution to achieve its desired goals and its significant attendant costs, that is social problems, economic decline and political failure is a direct result of lack of people who have developed the HF. Thus, any recommendations for social, economic and political progress must devise programmes aimed at HF development. When a nation is successful in HF development, its citizens enjoy true liberty, justice, equity and equal opportunities. Social, economic and political progress are the fruits of successful HF development programmes and education.

Constitutional democracy may be relevant to sustained human-centred development but it cannot become workable in societies that do not possess the HF. The programmes being pushed by developed countries (DCs) to force Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to pursue democratic processes are doomed to fail. By merely forcing ACs to pursue democratic rule by tying various bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, to the idea of popular participation and the democratic process, will not necessarily develop the required HF that is critical to the successful democratization, economic growth and development in societies. If, therefore, the DCs are truly concerned with the development and implementation of democratic rule and programmes of grassroots involvement in Africa, they must spend their resources facilitating HF development

on the continent. From the HF perspective, therefore, the DCs seem to be failing to identify correctly the critical role of the HF in both the democratization and development processes as far as ACs are concerned. Otherwise, they cannot be said to be really interested in helping ACs to stand on their own feet. In that case, as the late President Nkrumah said, ACs 'must unite.' There is no other way for them to play their role in the global political economy successfully.

The HF as the foundation for development and democratic processes

The debate about whether democracy causes economic growth and development or vice versa is misplaced. Its proponents fail to recognize the primary factor that makes democracy and development happen. Neither democracy nor development causes the other to occur. The extent to which a society is successful in its democratization process and development endeavours is determined by the state of the HF in that society. Those who pursue, diligently, HF development will, no doubt, experience both democracy and development, concurrently. The question to be asked is not 'whether democracy causes development to happen or vice versa.' The question should be, 'What makes both democracy and development happen in societies and to what extent does each reinforce the other?' Genuine attempts to answer this question will show the inescapable importance of the HF. The continuation of misplaced debates has led many scholars to design quantitative procedures for measuring levels of democracy and development. Other scholars have argued that there are necessary conditions that must prevail for democracy and development to occur in societies. They fail to perceive and acknowledge the HF role in democratization, economic growth and development processes.

The HF is the kingpin of every human endeavour. No human programme achieves its best results without it. No nation can achieve successful democratization without first developing its HF. Societies that try to pursue democratization without first developing the HF will be putting the cart before the horse. In no way can they achieve successful constitutional democracy without the necessary HF that makes it happen. In the presence of continuing HF decay and/or underdevelopment, these values, virtues and principles will not be forthcoming. There is no way constitutional democracy can occur in the decayed state of the HF.

The required human qualities usually serve as cement to glue together people interested in attaining constitutional democracy in their countries. The HF puts in place the necessary requisites for human progress, of which constitutional democracy is an integral part. When ACs become successful in HF development programmes, they will have created the relevant conditions for the successful pursuit of constitutional democracy. The African HF will serve as a pillar for national reconstruction programmes and democratization processes.

The visible characteristics of democratic institutions and structures are listed in Table 1.3. In a global sense, successful democracy exhibits these characteristics. Where they are absent, society cannot be deemed to have achieved democracy. These characteristics are not necessarily causes for successful democracies, but indications that society has achieved significant HF development.

Table 1.3 Some Characteristics of a Democratic Society

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1. Political liberty for everyone
 2. The rule of law and its effectiveness
 3. Fair and competitive national democratic elections
 4. Rationality and national unity, regardless of race, creed, ideologies, etc.
 5. Free speech and continuing press freedom
 6. Ongoing respect for human life and human rights
 7. The ability to resolve conflicts amicably and to uphold the constitution
 8. The maintenance of trust, integrity, responsibility, accountability, commitment and so on
 9. The freedom to engage in business and economic activities of one's choice and the opportunity to enjoy one's property and the fruits of one's labour
 10. Understanding and the ability to co-exist
-

The partial list presented in Table 1.3 is not a list of factors that make constitutional democracy happen in societies. These are, rather, characteristics of societies that have attained some degree of HF development. Without the requisite HF, few societies exhibit these characteristics. The HF is a necessary and sufficient requirement for workable constitutional democracy in society. ACs that are interested in attaining continuing constitutional democracy and development must direct their energy and resources towards creating the environment and opportunities for their citizens to acquire the necessary HF. Any failures experienced in HF development programmes will also lead to the society's continuing inability to achieve both development and constitutional democracy. ACs need to keep this in mind as they struggle to achieve constitutional democracy and economic growth and development.

The problem with Africa and all others who wish to help ACs to achieve constitutional democracy and development is the rush to arrive where advanced countries are today, after having gone through many centuries of social, economic and political struggles. This behaviour has continuously and consistently denied most ACs the ability and opportunity to achieve intended goals. Africans have always been presented with end results of developed countries' plans, policies, programmes and projects and told how they could easily achieve the same results by following in the footsteps of the DCs. What they are not usually told is that it takes a well-developed HF to achieve the objectives of a national development programme. Africans need to know that the crafting of excellent constitutional blueprints, which they have done successfully in the past and would do again if required, is necessary but not sufficient for successful democratization and economic growth and development. ACs must strive to educate, train and prepare their citizens for the long-awaited and deeply desired constitutional democracy and economic viability through human factor development.

Making constitutional democracy work in Africa

Constitutional democracy is not a process that one country can accomplish on behalf of another. This is why both the United States and the United Nations have failed consistently in the past to install democracy in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America

and parts of Asia. Nations that fail to create their own HF will not attain constitutional democracy. As pointed out earlier, the development, implementation and running of successful democracies require more than the establishment of rules, regulations or institutions. Lake (1995: 23), observed that:

it is wonderful when a nation writes a democratic constitution and holds elections. But the real work of democracy comes in the next phase, when the leaders learn how to work with a parliament, how to sit down and debate differences with people who only briefly before they were trying to kill. And even more interesting ... is the importance of those who lost the elections learning how to be a loyal opposition. So we tried to send the message of the importance of this day-to-day work, of learning the habits of democracy that are so important.

Although this quote is interesting, it is also problematic. Lake seems to have failed to recognize that only a people with the necessary HF qualities are capable of sitting down and debate policy issues amicably and come out with reasonable conclusions based on social and/or group consensus. Those who lose elections might not work in peace and tranquility with the winners if they do not possess the necessary HF qualities. They would try to subvert the administration of the winners. In many cases, they would cry foul. Power-sharing and national reconciliation do require the development of critical HF qualities in our people. Above all, Lake seems to have no clue that democracy possesses no habits to learn by those who pursue it. It, however, needs the HF as its primary requisite.

The *Economist* also makes the same mistake when it says 'democracy is not just a matter of casting ballots, important though that is. It is also about free speech, religious tolerance and the rule of law.'

These conditions are all well and good, but they already pre-suppose the existence of other necessary pre-conditions, since these ideals cannot be achieved where there is HF decay and/or underdevelopment. The view of Bertsch, Clark and Wood (1991: 646) that governments in the LDCs are experiencing severe difficulties in accumulating and consolidating enough power to be used to foster modernization and industrialization, is wrong. The problem in the developing world is not insufficient power. Rather, it is too much power concentrated in the hands of a select few who lack the necessary HF and good judgment. Power and authority, like institutions, institutional structures, systems, technology are inanimate (Adjibolosoo, 1995b). The effective use of power and authority is dependent on the magnitude of the HF possessed by both the leadership and citizenry. When power and authority fall into the hands of individuals who lack the HF, social, economic and political disasters are inevitable. Without the relevant HF, absolute power and authority corrupt absolutely and, in the final analysis, lead to abuse of human rights and effective loss of the rule of law.

To achieve a workable constitutional democracy in Africa, it is crucial that the HF, the primary foundation of the human enterprise, be developed first. This will be achieved through an on-going political education (both formal and informal). When this objective has been achieved, the following results would accrue:

1. Limited office terms for political leaders, that is, Presidents, Prime Ministers, etc. will be defined, implemented and allowed to function as stipulated. No life terms will be allowed.
2. The democratization process will be promoted and utilized as expected.
3. Procedures will be designed, implemented and enforced to deal with any forms of military intervention.
4. Free speech, religious tolerance, the rule of law and press freedom will be upheld continuously.
5. Every citizen will always be assisted to possess adequate knowledge about his or her individual rights, privileges and responsibilities.

As is obvious, the above cannot happen without the available HF. This is why it is important to first develop the HF in every society. For many years, societies that have been struggling to attain constitutional democracy have failed to get involved in relevant HF development programmes that help provide the necessary conditions for progress. These countries are rather looking for formulas that can lead to the successful attainment of constitutional democracy. Unfortunately, there are no such automatic switches to press in order to establish democracy in ACs. This is a fact that has been ignored for many decades.

Conclusion

ACs as well as many other LDCs have gone about the democratization and development processes the wrong way for several decades. These countries have always looked for both quick-fix procedures and short-cuts. Yet, no such techniques exist. Both the development and democratization processes require the appropriate HF. As long as these countries continually fail to develop their HF, they will remain forever undemocratic and underdeveloped. They have to create opportunities to put both processes in motion. It is time to put the cart behind the horse for the carriage of democracy and economic growth and development to be drawn successfully towards envisioned goals of constitutional democracy and sustained human-centred development.

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