

Post Independence Land Reform In Zimbabwe

CONTROVERSIES AND IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

Medicine Masiwa

**FRIEDRICH
EBERT**

STIFTUNG

POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE:

Controversies and Impact on the Economy

Edited by

Medicine Masiwa

Published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of Development Studies,
University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 2004

© This collection: Medicine Masiwa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of
Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe

© Contribution: the author

Cover design: Danes Design, Harare

Printed by: G. M & S. Printers, Harare

ISBN: 0-7974-2786-4

Contents

	Page
Contributors	i
Foreword	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Introduction	v
Chapter One Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe: Disparity between Policy Design and Implementation; Medicine Masiwa & Lovemore Chipungu	1
Chapter Two Socio-economic Conflicts of the Fast Track Resettlement Programme; Nelson Marongwe	25
Chapter Three The Impact of Land Redistribution on Commercial Farm Workers; Godfrey Magaramombe,	35
Chapter Four The Impact of Land Redistribution on Large Scale Commercial Agriculture; Maxwell Mudhara	57
Chapter Five The Impact of Land Redistribution on the Environment; Takawira Mubvami	71
Chapter Six Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP): Precursor to the Fast Track Resettlement?; Godfrey Kanyenze	90
Chapter Seven Law, Politics and the Land Reform Process in Zimbabwe; Lovemore Madhuku	124
Chapter Eight Land Reform and Gender in Zimbabwe; Abby Mgugu & Rindayi Chimonyo	147

Chapter Nine Land Reform and the Challenge of HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe; Philemeon Kwaramba	161
Chapter Ten Land Movements and the Democratisation Process in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-Liberalism; Sam Moyo	193
Conclusions and the Way Forward; Medicine Masiwa	216
Abbreviations	220

Chapter Ten

Land Movements and the Democratisation Process in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-Liberalism

Sam Moyo

Introduction

The high profile land occupations in Zimbabwe from 1998 onwards are a manifestation of a much larger phenomenon currently underway across the South. In Latin America and Asia, as well as in other African countries, there has been a resurgence of mass land occupations in the 1990s (James Petras, 1997, Saturnino M. Borrás, 1998, Sam Moyo et al). While local and national differences may be observed, these movements share common grievances arising from unresolved land questions (agrarian questions more broadly). They share also a common location in the development dialogue as 'rural poor' and as subject to welfarist 'rural development' programmes. And they share their effective exclusion from a 'civil society' that conforms to the 'proper' procedure and content of 'oppositional' politics in accordance with the liberal formula. This formula values 'independent' civic organisation, where 'independent' means dissociation from the state, not donors; 'multi-party democracy', at a time when political parties can no longer differ in their substantive (neoliberal) politics; and respect for the 'rule of law', defined by private property, 'independent' judiciary (meaning bourgeois), and 'free' press (meaning private). The liberal formula has been deployed world-wide in the 1990s throughout the liberalising world, has gained ready adherence by national bourgeoisies and has co-opted organised working class politics. It should come as no surprise therefore that, along with deepening poverty and proliferating rural violence over the last two decades, there have emerged both organised and spontaneous rural movements, outside the 'civil' framework, seeking to transform inherited property regimes, as well as national policy-making processes (Christobal Kay, 2000, Mats Berdal and David Keen, 1997).

The 'democratisation' debate in academic circles has itself been complicit in the exclusion of rural movements. In the 1980s, the liberal mainstream was preoccupied

with demonstrating the 'urban biased', 'captured', and 'corrupt' nature of the indebted post-colonial state in order to justify the authoritarian implementation of economic liberalisation (Robert Bates, 1981, Deepak Lal, 1997, Larry Diamond, 1987). Rural politics, and especially land politics, were thereby submerged (Sam Moyo, 1995, Paris Yeros, forthcoming monograph). In the 1990s, the liberal mainstream repositioned itself to the realities of 'the lost decade', seeking to accommodate the rise of popular protest by fitting the latter into the mold of liberal democratic civility. Yet, rural politics continued to be brushed aside, for the new theory of 'democratisation' became synonymous with 'regime transition', defined as the replacement of the one-party system with competitive multi-party elections (Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, 1997). Indeed, throughout the quarter-century, a negligible amount of liberal ink was spent on the diversity of rural politics, organised and unorganised, low or high profile, armed or unarmed. And where it was, gravitated to the 'civil' type, Michael Bratton, (1994) or tended to espouse the economic/welfare functions of the organisations that emerged to supplement the withdrawal of the state (Sam Moyo, in Henock Kilfe et al, 1999).

Meanwhile, social movement theory proliferated, but under the banner of 'identity politics' it managed to displace class-based movements, especially rural ones, from national and global politics, at best treating them as local cultural manifestations, subject to no 'grand theory', analytically unconnected, and politically unconnectable. Thus, James Scott, in one of the most important contributions to rural politics, suggested that rural movements are destined to be localised and dispersed, exhibiting 'everyday forms of resistance', and avoiding open confrontations with wealthier classes and the state (James Scott, 1985, Tom Brass, 1991). Social movement theory at the 'global' level has not fared better; so far it has been oblivious to the political import of rural movements, even when it has set out to theorise working class politics (Mark Rupert, 1995, Robert Cox, 1999, Ronaldo Munck and Peter Wateman, 1999, Robert O'Brien et al, 2000). The few and notable exceptions have generally been penned by students of agrarian relations who engage with global issues (Henry Bernstein in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, 2000, Philip McMichael, 1997). It is therefore necessary to recover the significance of the land question and to explain the 'sudden' emergence and import of extra-legal rural politics as represented by land occupations. This paper will do so by reference to the Zimbabwean case.

Zimbabwe has not, historically, had an organised civil society that has made radical demands for land reform or land redistribution. Under colonial rule, the land cause was led by the liberation movement, and in the 1970s, was pursued by means of armed struggle (Knox Chitiyo, 2000). In the post-colonial period, the civil society groupings that have existed have been predominantly middle class and with strong international aid linkages that have militated against radical land reform, while formal grassroots organisations have tended to be appendages of middle class driven civil society organisations (Sam Moyo, 1994). The rural operation of civil society within a neoliberal framework has been characterised by demands for funds for small-project 'development' aimed at a few selected beneficiaries (Moyo, undated NGO). This state of affairs is evident throughout rural Africa, and in Zimbabwe in particular it has left a political and social vacuum in the leadership of the land reform agenda (Sam Moyo in Sam Moyo and Ben Rhomadhane, forthcoming).

It is within this strategic vacuum that the élite in the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), first engineered the early land occupation movements around 1980, then engineered its gradual demobilisation since 1984, only to remobilise the movement in the late 1990s through the agency of the liberation struggle and veterans.¹¹³ Historically, the government instigated or controlled the resurgence of the land occupation movement by insisting that ZANU-PF, as the people's government, would address the land question 'once and for all' on their behalf (Sam Moyo, 1999). It was, however, in 1997 when a shift in power occurred within the ruling party, when the war veterans took centre stage, that the land redistribution initiative was brought back to the centre of the development debate, now couched in the more popular discourses of nationalism and liberation.¹¹⁴

The above leadership vacuum in civil society, together with the neoliberal policy framework, which failed to deliver either land or economic development, has generated centralist and commandist models of land redistribution. On the one hand, the salient land demands of the black elite within both the ruling and opposition parties, made within a liberal electoral and human rights framework, have avoided the fundamental issues of economic restructuring and redistribution of resources. On the other hand, the stagnation of the economy has enabled ZANU-PF to maintain an emphasis on the historical injustice over land redistribution and through this continued to dominate the rural vote. The adoption of a centralised method of compulsory land acquisition on a massive scale was instigated in 1997 by war veterans, who are few in number and in terms of their political base, but whose cause has a broad rural social basis and potential for mobilisation. In this sense, the land occupation movement that has emerged is politically organised but socially grounded. It might be instigated centrally but it is differentiated by the many different pulses driving it, including varied local interests of war veterans, traditional and other leaders, and informal community organisations. It is this broad social base, constituted by the existing economic hardships and marginalised political grievances, that has made it possible for the war veterans and ruling party to mobilise rural people.

Land occupations have been an ongoing social phenomenon in both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe, before and after the country's independence. They represent an unofficial or underground social pressure used to force land redistribution to be taken seriously. The 2000-2001 occupations mark the climax of a longer, less public, and dispersed struggle over land, under adverse economic conditions that have been exacerbated by the onset of liberal economic and political reform.

Zimbabwe's Neo-liberal Experience in Perspective

The prospects for democratisation and egalitarian land reform in Zimbabwe diminished as a result of the change in policy thrust from socialism to neoliberalism.

113 At independence and most of the 1980s, the government of Zimbabwe had neutralised war veterans. Some observers note that it had lured the war veterans constituency without meaningfully addressing the issue of demobilisation. The power of war veterans was further delegitimised through instruments such as the War Veterans Act and War Victims Compensation Act.

114 They demanded to be paid Z\$ 50 000.00 pensions immediately and that the 5 million hectares targeted by the government be acquired at once. This power play forced a realignment within ZANU (PF). It also created a policy-making vacuum throughout 1998.

The latter was formalised in the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1990, though the shift occurred gradually over the period 1987 to 1996 (Sam Moyo, 2000). The external imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by means of policy-based lending reinforced broadly undemocratic policy making practices, and they influenced also the evolution of land policy towards an élitist agenda.

The imposition of structural adjustment programmes throughout Africa in the 1980s was rationalised on the grounds of a perceived political and economic 'crisis' in Africa. Various neo-classical economic and liberal political assumptions about the nature of African policy making processes were used to justify SAPs. Moreover, the policy shift was adopted *without* consultations with the majority of the populace, especially labour, small farmers and small business (Thandika Mkandawire in Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi, 1995). However, large business, white far, and a nascent black bourgeoisie, represented by the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC), supported the resultant ESAP, based upon their active consultation the World Bank. While the IBDC sought affirmative action for its members, little was offered by towards far reaching land redistribution programme. Neoliberal economic reform therefore entailed a balancing of various capitalist interests: external, local white, and aspiring indigenous.

For some time, the struggles between local white and black capital for public policy attention in the context of macro-economic reforms overshadowed issues of redistribution and state intervention in land markets. But black capital sought its place in a predominantly white elite business system, not least in commercial farming, where the 'indigenisation' project soon turned. Indeed, the first victim of the liberal policy shift was the land question itself. The indigenisation lobby appealed for the de-racialisation of the ownership base of commercial farmland. This intervention by black capital towards commercialising land reform, which was in fact supported by large white farmer organisations, technocrats, and many NGOs who together altered the eligibility criteria for access to land from 'landlessness' to those of 'capability' and 'productivity', the neoliberal global development paradigm (A. A. Ashworth, 1990, World Bank, 1995, Mandivamba Rukuni and Carl K. Eicher eds., 1994). Meanwhile, the economic reforms implemented benefited mainly the current white large scale landowners, as offered little new investment to the black smallholder and did nothing to redistribute land, water, and infrastructures (Sam Moyo, 2000).

The re-emergence of land reform on the developing world agenda in the mid-1990s and the relaunching of the resettlement programme in Zimbabwe mark the current phase of a dialectic relationship between peasants, government and global institutions. After the failure of structural adjustment to live up to its rural development promises, the land question has resurfaced as a legitimate item on the poverty reduction agenda of the World Bank while, at the national level, the same failure has made demands on the ruling party to redeem its liberation promise.

The years 1997 to 2000 were characterised by economic collapse that ushered in a new period for land reform defined by political and economic crisis. A series of confrontations between organised civil society and the were witnessed throughout the 1990s. These were led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), but also independently of it, by middle class workers, in particular doctors and nurses

(Paris Yeros, undated, monograph). The latter were quite distinct from a whole range of other labour confrontations, for they spelled a break in the social contract between middle class workers and the ruling party. Capital flight and the withholding of foreign funds as well as the cost of the intervention in the Congo conflict, which exasperated the economic crisis, the central government retreated in 1998-1999 from its neoliberal policy thrust.

The land designations and pension disbursements were answered by capital flight and the withholding of funds on the part of donors, bringing about an economic freefall, as well as new economic policy issues. The costs of Zimbabwe's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict exacerbated the economic crisis, and generated broader political criticism locally and more critically internationally. The years 1998 and 1999 saw the retreat of the GoZ from its neoliberal policy thrust.

Given Zimbabwe's colonial legacy, the long-standing conflicts over the land question translate into intense electoral political competition, which in turn is marked by polarisation between land reform radicalism and conservative land transfer strategies. Before the June 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF leaders were calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the 'whites', and instigated as well as supported the land occupations, while the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leaders called for a transparent but not concretely defined market process of land acquisition. The parliamentary election campaign of 2000 was the most highly contested and violence-ridden in the elections history of Zimbabwe. The campaign focused on the land question, the economy and governance issues. The ruling ZANU (PF) party campaigned on the basis of land through their campaign slogan of 'Land is the Economy, the Economy is land'. The MDC focused on economic management and governance reforms. The ruling party argued that the opposition intended to reverse land reform, and were sell-outs to the former colonial masters, given their alleged receipt of financial assistance from white farmers and business, and from civil society organisations linked to donor funding. The MDC accused the ruling party of giving land to its cronies, and of making the land issue a monopoly of ZANU (PF) in spite of their alleged failure to resolve the issue in twenty years. The pressure for land reform must, as usual and of necessity given Zimbabwe's history, build up around elections, making it trite to say that the issue of land reform was being politicised. Rather, the point is that every party must look for a vantage point on land reform so that their political agenda is adequate.¹¹⁵

The problem of the MDC alliances and their motives in relation to its campaign for 'change' ('*chinja*'), and how substantive and durable it is in relation to the ZANU (PF) challenges, needs careful analysis. The opposition movements that have emerged since the late 1980s in Zimbabwe have had very narrow political interests.¹¹⁶ All of

¹¹⁵ The land issue was alleged to be merely a campaign strategy for ZANU (PF) used in every election since 1980. It can be argued that the land issue in Zimbabwe will always be an electoral issue, until it is adequately resolved, and that opposition parties must keep land reform on the national agenda. The ruling party's present compulsory land acquisition programme or 'Fast Track' land and agrarian reform plan are considered by some critics as part of ZANU (PF)'s campaign strategy for the 2002 presidential elections.

¹¹⁶ A series of black élite, middle class movements, the opposition parties and movements, including ZUM, ZUD and the Forum Democratic Party in the 1990s, have failed to capture or fill the void for social democratic demand for redistribution of resources, especially during the period when the land reform agenda

them have made some valid demands for democratisation, within a liberal electoral and human rights framework, but no wider demands for redistribution of resources or economic restructuring. It was only PF ZAPU in the 1980s, which along with ZANU (PF) was a player in the liberation struggle, that had an underground radical land reform agenda. The collapse of the economy and the resultant opposition to ZANU (PF) has not as yet yielded a truly social democratic movement for political and redistributive social rights based on a more complex understanding of movements such as the land occupations. Rather, what has emerged is a protest movement focused on the urban areas, seeking to overthrow the President, and demanding less corruption and reversal of short term economic problems, such as high prices for basic commodities. As such, ZANU (PF) has been able to continue to hold sway over the rural vote by maintaining an emphasis on correcting the colonial imbalances.

It is important, finally, to identify briefly the present state of the land debate with reference to its evolution in the post-colonial period. In the 1980s, the emphasis of land reform was on redressing past land alienation by promoting equal access to land the majority of the indigenous people with the hope of creating political stability in land property rights. At the same time, land reform was also aimed at achieving economic growth by reducing the size of land holdings per individual and allocating land to diverse beneficiaries that included the landless, former refugees, war veterans, the poor and former commercial farm workers (Sam Moyo in Ibbo Mandaza, 1987, Bill H. Kinsey, 1983). Land reform, therefore, was implemented for the objective of promoting national self-sufficiency, focusing on food security and general agricultural development. It was also intended to enhance labour intensive, small farmer production so as to optimise land productivity and returns on capital invested.¹¹⁷

After an initial accelerated process of land reform in the 1980s, when three million hectares of the targeted eight million hectares were redistributed to almost seventy thousand families, the pace slowed down, targets were not met and the problems of equity and racial bias in capital and resource ownership markets once again became starkly obvious. By 1997, about eight hundred black commercial farmers holding about ten percent of the large scale commercial farmlands had emerged, against four thousand whites holding about ten million hectares. The government had expected to redistribute fifty percent of the white controlled land, but five million hectares of this remained to be transferred. Over the last twenty years, it has become clear that land reform is not an event, but a process that depends on the policy framework in use. As shown below three distinct phases in Zimbabwe's land reform, which reflect both shift in government policy and resources allocations, and changing economic and political processes have influenced land reform in the country.

Britain's promise to pay for land acquisition at Lancaster house was barely 55 % of expectations. In 1997, the newly elected British Labour government proposed that the new DFID poverty oriented, development aid policy be used to guide support to Zimbabwe's land reform. The British government also denied that it had any historic

had been dropped by the government (1986—96), and even during the crisis period from 1997 to 2000 in the case of the MDC.

117 Ibid.

responsibility for land expropriation in Zimbabwe on the grounds that its members were not of land owning stock. The responded to this with mass compulsory acquisitions. The differences over financing land transfers and the prescribed poverty reduction approach vis-à-vis the 'capable' beneficiaries one, which emerged in 1996 between the British and the Zimbabwe, had contributed towards the hardening of the land reform strategy. Internal pressure applied on government by farmers unions, technocrats, and even academics had always encouraged conservative position, until demands by war veterans in 1997 for the compulsory acquisition of 1 471 farms created new momentum for radical land reform (Land Tenure Commission, 1994).

The temporary reprieve, from the radical demand for massive land transfers, had arisen from the Donors' Conference in 1998 by calling for a gradualist approach called the Inception Phase Framework Plan, which was shaky as it had no guarantees (GoZ, 1999). The opposition movement did not back the radical land reform agenda but instead reiterated donor calls for transparency, poverty reduction, rule of law and macro-economic stabilisation as the basis for land reform. This had the effect of further radicalising ZANU (PF) and the government of Zimbabwe, leading to some rural communities taking direct action through farm occupations by 1998.

Informal Politics and the Evolution of Land Occupations

The rejection of the draft constitution that the GoZ of Zimbabwe embarked upon in 2000 was a precursor to the current land occupations in Zimbabwe. Before the draft constitution was put to a referendum, the government introduced a number of changes to it, including clauses that reinforced the right to compulsory acquisition, and qualified the existing market criteria for compensation of the land, permitting it to pay only for any improvements to it.¹¹⁸ The National Constitutional Assembly formed to push for constitutional reform, the MDC,¹¹⁹ and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), campaigned heavily against the draft constitution, contributing to its defeat in the referendum. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA) came in full support of the occupations and called for further occupations as a way of demonstrating the need for land. When leaders of the war veterans association and the ruling party realised by the end of March that white farmers were actively campaigning for the MDC, and encouraging farm workers to do the same, farm occupations became violent, and were intertwined with the political campaign for the June parliamentary elections.

Before analysing the occupations in more detail it is important to comment on formal politics of rural people, for informal politics are not in any way 'essential' peasant politics, but interact dynamically with the formal and its exclusions. The representation of small farmers, the rural poor and the landless in land policy formulation is assumed to be organised mainly through constituency politics, which are dominated by the ruling party and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) (Sam

118 It was only in Mashonaland Central where the ruling party was supported heavily in the referendum. There was a clean sweep in the 'YES' vote. The former governor of Mashonaland central come in full support of the actions of the veterans.

119 A new labour backed political party launched in September 1999 formed within the confines of the NCA that was anchored by many civil society organisations.

Moyo, undated. (land and democracy) Michael Bratton, undated). The ZFU claims to represent all black farmers, particularly small and emerging farmers who have historically been discriminated against by the state and continue to suffer from the deliberate policy biases and market distortions organic to Zimbabwe's bi-modal agrarian structure. Given that over 50 percent of ZFU's membership are poor, while a further 40 percent can barely break even from farming, land policy demands could be expected to be central to the agenda of the ZFU. However, the membership is also widely differentiated and policy is dominated by an élite of 'capable' farmers whose demands are for freehold land for productive purposes and are far from representing the majoritarian black farmer demand for land, which seems to be more realistically reflected in 'informal' land occupations (Sam Moyo, 1995).

At the same time, most NGOs grew out of the social welfare and emergency relief traditions and so did not address structural issues (Ben Cousins, 2001). Some address human rights issues. Middle class and racial minorities lead them, and focus on political and civil rights, not social and economic rights and social justice based upon redistribution. here is a common middle class belief in the myth that the poor degrade land and that the large scale commercial sectors use land efficiently, their excessive focus on schemes to 'protect' land and to 'educate' the peasantry on sustainable land use, than land redistribution.¹²⁰ Generally, rural based NGOs and the wider society structures have been and remain a reactionary force rather than an agenda setting one.

Until a few years ago when the Women's Coalition and Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG) emerged, there was no local NGO, besides ZERO, which had argued for land reform in Zimbabwe. Some NGOs had argued that it is complicated to be involved in land reform, given the state interest in it and its politics. Yet they could easily involve themselves in mobilising resources for settlers on government acquired farms or even to negotiate land transfers with landowners at reasonable prices if they chose a conservative line or mobilised for land expropriation, land restitution and reparations for the rural poor if they were radical. However, at an ideological level, many local NGOs seem to be against land reform. For instance, only six project proposals to support land reform were produced by NGOs during the Inception Phase (1998-1999). These include proposals by Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ), Danish Aid People to People (DAPP), Zimbabwe Environmental Research Organisation (ZERO), Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG) and CREATE, which is a group of five mainly foreign NGOs. The few truly Zimbabwean NGO proposals merely sought to train the resettled but hardly any sought to lead the demand for greater land transfers. Only recently have NGOs, such as Inyika Trust and National Development Assembly, agitated for land redistribution.¹²¹ The cutting edge of any involvement in land reform by civil society organisations at this stage must be in expanding the access and rights to land of the poor landless and disadvantaged sections of society such as women and farm workers.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ These organisations do have close links to groups of ZANU (PF) leaders.

Land Occupation Movement

Turning now to the latter, it is evident that land occupations in the Zimbabwean debate have been conceptualised in several ways. 'Land invasions' is the generic term used to denote a negative view of politically organised 'trespass' of farms led by war veterans. Invasions involve temporary visits of a few days and sporadic repeat visits and do not entail extended stays (Knox Chitiyo, 2000). Land occupations by those a benign view of them. In the past land occupations were referred in Zimbabwean jargon as 'squatting'. The term land 'seizures' is generally used, especially in the media, to cover a variety of phenomena including outright repossession of land through armed liberation struggle and conquest. The terms 'land nationalisation' or 'expropriation without compensation' have not been commonly used in national debates, except in occasional international media reports with reference to compulsory land acquisition rather than land occupations. The various dimensions of the land occupations characteristics are shown in table 1.

Table 1: Dimensions of Land Occupations in Zimbabwe

Dimension	Method	Scale	Facilitators	Publicity Method
Symbolism.	Demonstrative	Small/ Scattered	Communities, Traditional Leaders, War Veterans. Peasants.	Government.
Intimidatory.	Perceived violence. Prompting land occupants.	Localised. Intense in some areas	War veterans	Attracts media. Landowners Opposition.
Physical seizures.	Invasion. Land grabbing.	Wide spread (2000).	War veterans. Ruling party.	Media. Human Rights organisations, donors.
Social mobilisation.	Instigate people to occupy land. Electoral campaign.	Widesprea d, intense in some parts.	Communities Political party War veterans.	Human Rights organisations, farm unions?
Political campaign.	Political re- education, Intimidation, propaganda war.	Intense during election (by- elections).	War veterans, opposition parties.	Media Opposition.
Legitimate, compulsory acquisitions.	Pre-empt aimed at formalising occupations.	Widesprea d.	Government technocrats.	Government.

Source: Author's Conceptual Matrix from Interviews and Empirical Evidence

Land seizures or even land 'grab' however, tend to be used mainly by the independent media to emphasise the negative political action of the ZANU (PF) and

the war veterans. The concepts of 'land demonstrations' has been used by the government and/or the ZANU (PF) to emphasise the symbolic aspect of the transgressions and to underline that it is only the which has the legal right to acquire land.¹²² There are also occupations by 'opportunists' noted by CFU leaders, which are not formally sanctioned. These are at times used to refer to isolated occupations by middle class and urban dwellers as well as criminal elements who seek personal access in the guise of the 'land revolution'. It is reported that some local politicians, businessmen and intellectuals may be cashing in on the land occupations, and even gaining access to land targeted for the poorer¹²³.

These broadening forms of participation and conceptualisations of land occupations also reflect the emergence during the late 2000 of a certain level of political alliance between the state and various national and local level social forces spanning various class in opposition to what is seen as international conditionalities against land redistribution in defence of narrow racial interests in land. The intensive land occupations that Zimbabwe is experiencing today are not generically new since they have consistently accompanied or influenced government efforts to acquire land in the past whether this be on the market or through compulsory procedures. There are important similarities and a few differences between various phases of land occupations which need thorough analysis. However, there is a need to analyse them in relation to the two other instruments of land acquisition – market acquisitions and compulsory acquisitions - which interact with occupations in a politically determined manner. The amendment of the Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act on this matter reflected major formal effort to challenge the imposed rules on colonial land property rights, in response to the organic or popular pressures that land occupations have brought to the debate. Over the last years land occupations have traversed various land tenure categories: white owned commercial land, state land and communal lands (Sam Moyo, 2000, Sam Moyo et al, forthcoming). Research by Murombedzi shows that land occupations grew extensively during the late 1980s in the Zambezi valley frontier zones (James Murombedzi, 1994). State lands have remained a soft target for occupations for years especially in Matebeleland and in Manicaland where forest and parks are predominant.

Thus although land occupations are still on the national development and rights agenda, civil society organisations, formal opposition political parties and the private sector have paid scant attention to them. The character of the occupations have changed slightly but their essence has remained the same. The first phase of land occupations can be termed one of 'low profile, high intensity' occupations. These occurred throughout the country, from 1980 to 1985, while a parallel process of 'accelerated' land resettlement f mainly by British funds was initiated to formalise some of the occupations, and to assuage parallel land pressures. These early land occupations were led by landless communities inspired by war veterans, the ZANU (PF), 'dissidents' in Matebeleland, and by other leaders, such as the spirit mediums. They were tacitly supported by ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU structures albeit without

122 This perspective is usually repeated in the Herald, and has been formally stated by vice president Msika in various press statements.

123 These 'opportunists', however, are to be distinguished from those urbanites applying for land under the now broadened Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme which has been intended to build elite black commercial farmers at various scales of farm operations.

the public flaming of the political basis of the mobilisation. While government distanced itself from the occupations its leading rights financed them.

The period between 1985 and 1996 witnessed what we can call in relative terms 'normal low intensity occupations'. They took place in the context of dwindling resources for continued land resettlement and economic liberalisation which resulted in many people losing their jobs in urban areas and the mines. During the 1990s landless communities increased 'illegal' occupations of land and poaching of natural resources in private, state and 'communally' owned lands, and in urban areas (Sam Moyo, 1995, 2000, Sam Moyo et al forthcoming). Local 'squatter' communities made themselves beneficiaries by occupying mainly abandoned and under-utilised land, most of which was in the liberation war frontier zone of the Eastern Highlands. This 'community led' occupation approached land identification central government came into purchase such lands at market prices, thereby formalising the occupations in what came to be known as then an 'normal intensive land reform'.

Thus the occupations cannot be claimed to have been spontaneous. Zimbabwe hosts a facile debate, which oversimplifies the question of spontaneity of land occupations vis-à-vis politically mobilised occupants. In my analysis rarely in the years have occupations been spontaneous, since they were mostly planned through either the liberation movement, local MPs and party structures. While the intensity of political support to the occupants may differ in form between the 1980's and 1997/2000 period, the substance has been similar. Even when the state practised extensive evictions of 'squatters' during the 1985—1993 period, they turned a blind eye and used kid gloves on the many other squatter cases. This led landowners to attempt their own evictions of which were even more brutal than the state's.

However, the government has used forced evictions to restrain land occupations, especially during the transition to the liberalised economic policy framework. The brutality with which these evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, were reminiscent of colonial era evictions carried out in the decades prior to independence (Paris Yeros, undated (Shamva)). This was coupled with increasing violence by property owners, particularly white farmers, against illegal occupants, often with implicit or explicit state approval.

Land 'self-provisioning' or popular struggles for land have been circumscribed by the central government through its 'squatter policy', regular promises of land redistribution and other agricultural support schemes intended to improve the intensity of communal area land use and returns *in situ*. However, 'squattling' as a concept is problematic and manipulable because the term gains meaning within a particular moral framework that is codified as 'law' by the state. Shiku points out that Rhodesian law defined a squatter as 'an African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set apart for some other reason' (Emmanuel Shiku, 2001). In any case, the squatter policy failed to stem squatting, mainly because of legitimacy problems at the local level. Instead demands for land redistribution grew among the poor due to growing poverty and the retrenchment of workers, as well as among the wealthier due to their expanding focus on accumulating capital through emerging markets based on land and natural resource uses.

The severe drought during the 1991-92 farming season led to extensive commercial farm retrenchments adding to the pressure on communal area land resources (Sam Moyo, 2000. Knox Chitiyo, 2000). During this period the state had a legal framework to resolve the land question through compulsory land acquisition but did not succeed in using the instrument. The grounds for severe conflicts were created during this time, as captured in recent research on new land uses in the Mashonaland provinces (Sam Moyo, 2000).

The last phase of high intensity and high profile land occupations began in 1997, although many scholars, political analysts and some of the media, seem to conveniently forget it by focusing on the analysis of the Zimbabwe land conflict from the occupations that followed the constitutional referendum. In September 1997, the more high profile community-led land occupation approach seemed to emerge and isolated land occupations started to occur, with the explicit aim of redistributing land from white farmers to landless villagers and war veterans. These occupations augmented existing low profile land occupations, which had remained throughout the country. They came in waves, starting with just about thirty cases in 1997, mostly on farms, which had been identified for compulsory acquisition (Moyo, land acquisition process). The squatters later 'agreed' to 'wait' for their orderly resettlement and in some cases were evicted by the government in 1998. Then a new wave of high profile and high intensity land occupations arose, from a handful in February to just below a thousand cases by 2000. The scale and form of land occupations in Zimbabwe has been the subject of a propaganda war in the media and on the Internet. The key thrust of the CFU on land occupation is to exaggerate the scale of such invasions. Police records and field evidence suggest that when all the invasions were counted including 're-visits' or repeat invasions following withdrawal by occupants, the maximum number has been about 800. However CFU data has placed pre-election occupations at about 1 700 while its post election figures in December 2000 stood at about 685 occupations and declined to 450 farms by April 2001. About 250 of the latter cases involve formal allocations of land to settlers by government on land which is being processed for compulsory acquisition.¹²⁴ Data from the war veterans' list do not go beyond 1 000 farms occupied. Available information bulletins suggest that about 300 farm occupations have been marked by violence, and serious human rights abuses, including rape and torture. This covers the period both before and after the June elections (see CFU internet reports). Interestingly neither the war veterans and the ruling party, nor the government have refuted this public image, which literally multiplied by two the scale of land occupations.

The origins of the land occupations and their control is contested. The first few occupations of February begun in Masvingo under the local leadership of a few war veterans and local communities, only to be followed in late February by a controlled and orchestrated country-wide land occupation movement led by the ZNLWA. It appears that the ZNLWA and ZANU (PF) only gained full control of the occupations

124 I have referred to these rising cases as 'prematurely' resettled land because one school of thought in the government argues that once the it has began processing land acquisition orders in the administrative courts, it is only a matter of time for such a farm to become its property, notwithstanding the bottlenecking that farmer litigations bring.

around May 2000 as numerous localised and contradictory waves of them emerged between February and then.¹²⁵

The current round of land occupations can be analysed in terms of various dimensions of their intended effects, which are pursued either individually or. These varied intentions also reflect the perspectives and goals of different 'wings' of the ruling party from the extremists seeking outright 'repossession' of the land by physical seizure to the more 'liberal' middle of the road leaders seeking merely to demonstrate the right of Zimbabweans to compulsorily acquire the land. Nonetheless these basic dimensions show the complexity of the process, which has firstly a political (partisan and non-partisan, electoral and non-election orientated) framework and objectives, and which is then socially grounded by invoking existing sentiments in favour of land repossession based upon grievances over historic injustices.

At another level, the land occupations can be viewed as a mobilisation process of expanding the social constituency of land occupiers, through this campaigning for electoral support and creating the political legitimacy for the formalisation of massive legal compulsory land acquisition. Indeed the purely political character of the land occupations have been transient.

However, after the elections the government and the war veterans shifted the basis of targeting farms to include productively used land subject to other policy criteria of multiple farm ownership, foreign ownership and contiguity to communal areas. In some cases, farms owned by black politicians or high profile were occupied contrary to the radical ZANU (PF) indigenisation perspective. There also seemed to be some class alliance emerging either for or against the occupations. In some cases war veterans linked up with peasants and farm workers yet, in others, peasants refused to be cajoled into the occupations. Depending on the 'behaviour' of the farm owner, some farm workers and war veterans teamed up to remove the owners. Members of the urban petty bourgeoisie also joined in the land occupations. The majority of the urbanites were opposed to anarchy on the farms, rather than to the occupations *per se*.

The question of who is involved in the current occupations has been a subject of cynical debate in which the prime focus has been to minimise the importance of both the war veterans' leadership and their level of capacity to hold widespread occupations. Thus the army and the government are attributed leadership on the one hand, while children, youth and women are said to have been cajoled, paid or even forced, to join occupations. As a result, the occupations have been characterised as either contrived or farcical or narrowly instrumental for electioneering. However, the fact the farm workers and people from communal areas, including those on resettlement waiting lists, have joined the occupations to enhance their chances for resettlement has not been properly analysed. Thus the organic and deep-seated local pressures for land reform, and even anger from past injustices and deprivation, are underestimated in this critique.

125 Interviews show cases where local chapters of war veterans led occupiers and/or some community led occupations exhibited different forms of discipline with regard to: focusing on unused land; local coherence or linkages to district level or provincial structures of ZNLWA; absence of violence; defiance of government officials and ministers; land use or production strategies; formation of local associations for development; urban participation etc.

One of the major contestations in the Zimbabwe land occupations debate is the degree to which they have been led by an homogenous command structure under a single ZANU(PF) leadership linked to military chiefs and the head of state. Empirical observations show that parallel to the many high profile centrally orchestrated war veterans led occupations of the 2000 there were numerous occupations, which can be differentiated at provincial and local level which either preceded or copied the former, which emerged from more diverse organisational formations and interests. Such interests would include some Provincial Governors who are seen to be more militant in terms of land reform (Mashonaland North, Mashonaland Central and Manicaland), specific independent branches of the ZNLWA, individual MPs and other traditional leaders. In many cases it would appear that the ZNLWA came to hegemonise locally initiated occupations.

There are other locally driven and differentiated occupations led by war veterans within their own districts (Wedza, Mazowe, Marondera), in which members of war veterans associations have taken a leading role which can be seen as antagonistic to a central command in terms of which land and how it should be occupied.¹²⁶ This led to the formation of numerous semi-autonomous farmer associations comprising war veterans, community members and urbanites who originate from those regions. Thirdly, there is a variety of locally differentiated land occupations that were community instigated and led, which were then 'formalised' or 'legitimated' by the procurement of war veterans to nominally lead the occupations. Different varieties of such occupations included those led by traditional leaders or notable persons and those driven by the desire for restitution of land with spiritual value (Mazowe District) and based on specific claims.

Another variant of such occupations includes those led by communities with grievances against farmers. Such grievances include those in which the landowner may or may not have a history of being the liberation movement in the sense of undermining the war effort or a workers in the sense of their maltreatment, poor wages and racism (Nelson Marongwe, 2001). Some farmers were identified necessarily if at all for being aligned with opposition politics during the 2000 elections. Moreover, there are a number of community led land occupations within provinces and districts of predominantly MDC vote, such as Matebeleland, in which it has been suspected that some alliance between opposition interests and war veterans has been struck in the interests of securing land through occupations. In addition, there are those occupations that are very much led by urban-based people mobilising some elements of their communities, including war veterans and local bureaucrats, thus seeking the formalisation of occupations by war veterans. When these locally based veterans are pitted against those who are centrally organised, one finds there are important contradictions, contestations and negotiations in the occupation process and movement.

In some locations, we see land occupations through their associations plan land uses, allocation, cropping regimes and beneficiaries that are different those presented to them by local government. In many cases, we see the absorption of farm workers into the land reform process. Despite the perception of a largely non-

126 During April and May 2000, there were fear of a 3-way split among the war veterans occupying land, while the extent to which specific local grievances instigated independent 'copy-cat' occupations has not been fully documented.

citizen farm workforce, eighty percent are Zimbabwean and have frequently joined the land occupation movement, contrary to suggestions that they are not involved and are always in confrontation with war veterans and marginalised by the state (Sarah Musungwa in Prisca Mandimika, 2001, Prisca Mandimika, 2001).

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the fear by GAPWUZ that many farm workers have been rendered unemployed and homeless by the occupations. The problem is that much of the debate on this relates to the expectation of job losses on compulsory land acquisitions which have so far not been completed. The data tends to be speculative more than actual.

In many ways, apart from the period February to April 2000, in which the central war veterans' leadership played a leading role in the occupation movement, evidence across the country suggests a large scale response to the movement by various community and interest groups that have tried to co-opt the war veterans' movement. The war veterans have, in turn, tried to claim hegemony over the spread and growth of the occupation movement.

We need to add to this complex evolution of the land occupation movement the pervasive criminal and opportunistic aspect, in which individuals, claiming to be war veterans or members of the ruling party leaders used the occupation movement to intimidate farmers to extort money, poach wildlife and firewood or assume sharecropping rights on farmers' crops or even used pieces of land for their own cropping activities. This suggests that once ridden the land occupation 'movement' is less easily managed than might be expected by both ZANU (PF) leaders and their opponents who expect them to control it. Within this context, the 'radical' elements of ZANU(PF), who have pro-actively supported land occupations, have the burden of justifying the land occupation movement in the context of sporadic and wanton violence and lawlessness, which undermines the growing social base that had been mobilised around land occupations after the early 2000 period when occupations had been dominated by war veterans.

We have seen in this context that both ZANU(PF) and the state have followed behind the land occupations movement and tried to co-opt and contain it as in the past within the framework of the evolving land acquisition programme. Indeed, the post-election July 2000 act of gazetting over three thousand farms for compulsory acquisition reflects not only a response to the perception of the aggression of farmers, in collusion with the MDC, but also, and importantly, an attempt to create physical space to accommodate the mushrooming land occupations movement generated so far, while negotiating international community support for Zimbabwe's land reform.

Implications for Democratisation

What can be learnt from Zimbabwe's recent experience concerning the importance of social movements that are differentiated and adopt different strategies is that, while their roles and actions might be contradictory, they can also provide some progressive movement on issues such as democratisation and land reform. However, this can also produce negative feedback in the form of violence and abrogation of civil rights. In Zimbabwe, it can be expected that the negative

consequences will be relatively short term, as against the long term benefits of assuaging historical grievances and addressing a problem that has been neglected for twenty years by a model of reconciliation which did not include justice or reparation.

One general lesson concerns how a formal policy can evolve and be refined over a very short period after having been static over the longer term (twenty years in this case). There have been great shifts in Zimbabwe's land policy in the past five years, particularly the last two, which have seen the policy debate moving to more radical options because of the failure of negotiations and indeed, even shifts within this more radical policy movement. The major implication is that most of the players are pushed to attempt land transfer within a legal framework of compulsory acquisition, even if this is done under threat of non-legal action. Such transfer is now being discussed in terms of a much larger scale and a far greater pace.

There are a number of positive implications of the current land occupations. Firstly, the delivery of land will increase the possibilities for a wider range of rural and urban poor and the middle classes participating in the economy. This reinforces the social and economic basis for democratic growth, by the interests of a larger segment of the population wanting to defend the new regime. The economic benefits will form the basis for more positive and participatory rural and agrarian policy formation.

Secondly, land transfer will weaken the hegemony and segregation of the current advantaged white minority. It challenges the current conditions and inadequate rights of farm labourers, questions the injustices perpetrated against them by landowners and raises the issue of their rights to land (Sam Moyo et al, 2000, Dede Amonor-Wilks, 1995). The recognition of the need to address what happens to farm workers has brought to the fore the bogus defence of farm workers' rights by commercial farmers and some NGOs favouring the status quo, and exposed this form of enclave politics.

Thirdly, land transfer will make the agricultural sector more efficient by having many more people engaged in producing for the economy. Used concurrently with the downsizing of land holdings, land acquisition and resettlement will increase the current four thousand five hundred commercial farmers and involve more indigenous blacks on more smaller sized commercial farms. If all these commercial farmers adopt more efficient methods, they could produce more than in the past on the land available to them (Sam Moyo, 1995, Michael Roth, 1992, World Bank, 1990, Dan Weiner et al, 1985, Peter Von Blackenburg, 1994)

Fourthly, the Zimbabwean experience echoes that of the Chiapas in Latin America, in which informal and new types of movements have captured and maintained space for themselves in which they are recognised and able to undertake direct negotiations with farmers and the state (James Petras, 1997, Neil Harvey, undated). In Zimbabwe, such associations, which include the Nharira Association of traditional cultural leaders and the Nyabire Association, may have been mobilised by the war veterans but they have now taken on their own forms and are difficult for government to ignore. Such associations involve urban and rural people including the poor, elites and traditional leaders, from given districts where land has been designated for compulsory acquisition and/or is already occupied. They are numerous but informal.

They have developed rules such as focus their activities on unused land, not stealing farmer's property and limiting violence. But their ideology is commonly anti-colonial, against white racism, redistribute and based on combining self-reliance with surplus production and sales. They seem gradually circumscribe traditional authorities as war veterans and urban workers hold key positions in such associations.

Fifth, the occupations have confronted bad past and present race relations by forcing intensive interaction and discussion between whites and blacks in different roles. It has also raised the issue of the different values placed on the deaths of blacks and whites, particularly as reflected in international media coverage, and challenged the notion of reconciliation without truth, justice and reparation.

Sixthly, there has been broad participation in the call for restitution, by traditional leaders, spirit mediums and others who are beginning to reclaim their historical rights to land and resources on the basis of its sacred or cultural value in addition to its productive potential (Nelson Marongwe, 2001). For example, in the Mazowe District, three out of the fifteen land occupations have been for the return of sacred places.

Seventh, the demand for land of the Zimbabwean population has been brought to the attention of the international community including neoliberal NGOs. The media has been both a recipient and a source of such information, although their heightened interest at the moment has tended to increase the impression that this is a situation that has only just arisen. The confrontation has brought the role of the British into the spotlight and shifted the perception of land reform from that of a development issue to that of a restitution and justice issue.

The positive outcomes outlined above are all necessary conditions for democratisation. However, they are not sufficient and there have also been some negative aspects. Past studies had all predicted that inadequate land delivery would precipitate violent confrontations in future (Jeffrey Herbst, 1990, Jocelyn Alexander, 1993). Policy makers and farmers did not take such predictions seriously as they continued their *laissez faire* attitude towards land reform. Notwithstanding this observation, the widespread occurrence of violence, including its impact on the 2000 parliamentary elections has been the most negative effect of the land confrontation, causing the abrogation of physical safety and threat to political participation.

There has been an instrumentalisation of violence although the scale of it has been exaggerated and it has been wrongly made the focus of the whole land reform issue. In fact, compared to rural and urban violence in South Africa,¹²⁷ Ireland or Brazil, the level in Zimbabwe has been quite low. Any level of violence is bad for democracy but there has not been any examination of the extent to which the violence in Zimbabwe is incidental to a broader anger and wider undemocratic culture. Violence has increased in response to economic decline and poverty, so that the land occupations cannot be seen as the main or only instigator. A more careful assessment of the exact scale and causality is needed.

¹²⁷ In South Africa land occupations in peri-urban areas involve over three million people over the last ten years, while over two hundred farmers have been killed.

One major offshoot has been opportunism, comprising criminal acts such as cattle rustling, extortion and pilfering of farm produce, work stoppages. This element is now recognised by the war veterans, the government and the farmers but the authorities have been unable to control it. Some argue that such cases are exaggerated by the CFU, while the latter allege that the government deliberately refuses to control this violence for its own political advantage.

The fact that the occupations have, in some cases, been violent needs to be understood in terms of the real animosity between the occupiers and those elements of government that are seen not to be serious about land reform. This is a longstanding and endemic grievance. There is no doubt that land occupations have generated, in certain localities, unwillingness to participate in the electoral process. There is also evidence that farmers and farm workers as well as opposition youth have been the source of some electoral violence in rural areas in which pitched battles have been waged sporadically.¹²⁸ Indeed, the death of two of the four commercial farmers and some farm workers killed in the context of land occupations resulted from prior attacks on ZANU(PF) youths, although the upper hand in such violence has belonged to the latter.

The land occupations movement also has to be seen in the context of deep division in ZANU(PF) over the strategy of land acquisition, with a growing segment rejecting not just market but also legalistic compulsory acquisition because of their history of failed implementation, in favour of land seizures and occupations as a strategy. In this vein, we have seen a different movement in which certain elements of the ruling party seek to halt occupations, preferring a focus on compulsory acquisition methods, in combination with negotiated land transfers based on dialogue with farm owners.¹²⁹ It is this divergence of views and split in the command structure that explains, to a large degree, some of the underground and uncontrolled violence and lawless aspects of the occupations which, as the evidence shows, have focused around half of the provinces including Mashonaland central, Mashonaland East and Matebeleland North.

The violence associated with the recent occupations and leading up to the 2000 election is suggested by some analysts and opposition leaders to have enabled the ruling party to maintain dominance over the rural electorate. This dominance has always existed anyway in some rural areas but the mobilisation for land reform tended to countervail any mobilisation by the opposition. It has been argued that opposition party structures were undermined but the degree to which these actually existed outside of small towns is yet to be fully demonstrated (Paris Yeros, forthcoming monograph). The few existing studies of this tend however, to underplay the strength of ZANU (PF) in most of the rural areas and appear to teleologically follow the post constitution referendum triumphalistic analysis which overestimated the growth of the rural MDC structures in communal and farm areas outside of the

128 It was alleged at one time that farmers were training defence militias, to which the state reacted by deploying military and paramilitary elements as a security measure against an alleged or expected armed resistance movement 'to the land occupations' by farmers in collaboration with opposition parties. Farmers and their workers armed themselves for confrontation with the war veterans and peasants.

129 For instance major movements were made by the Ministry of Home Affairs in April and by the Vice President Msika in May 2000, and by the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing for occupier to move off the land. These were contradicted by the President and challenged by his spokesmen.

larger rural and peri-urban centres where the MDC structures grew out of existing ZCTU structures. This is an area which calls for more rigorous research however.

The land occupations have so far failed to correct the inherited injustices of the justice system and property laws in an orderly fashion. By encouraging, rather than evicting, the occupiers and by premature resettlement of people on farms where the legal processes of compulsory land acquisitions were not complete, the government has overridden, instead of corrected the legal system. In one perspective the government has broken its own 'rule of law'. However, the land occupations and 'fast track' resettlement, including the litigation that took place in the Supreme, Constitutional and administrative courts have highlighted the debate on the relevance of the existing property rights structures and the laws that defend them. The Supreme Court's judgement of December 2000, giving the government six months to sort out the land issue represents a recognition of the need for change and the injustice of the current situation.

The changes to the Land Acquisition Act can be seen as signs of an attempt to find legal means of land reform, even though it is difficult for a neoliberal justice system to deal with such major problems of public interest. The introduction of the new Rural Occupiers Act of 2001, also shows the government effort to legalise the process of occupations, while the legal transfer of land proceeds. The rushed legislative changes, which might appear democratically facile, have brought to the fore the importance of an historical jurisprudence problem over property rights which requires special legal activism for it to be resolved.

Conclusion

In countries such as Zimbabwe, where the land question remains unresolved and where a large proportion of the mainly rural population depends on the land and natural resources for their livelihood, employment and accumulation, it is crucial to recognise that addressing the land question in terms of contemporary equity and historical social justice are essential parameters within which broader political reform and democratisation questions must be addressed. It would appear to be almost impossible to focus on liberal political rights in contemporary democratic movements without understanding the deep seated social and political enmity and contradictions with regard to the land question which undermine rural mobilisation for democratisation. It has been seen that most formal political organisation, be it among the ruling party or the opposition, has tended to neglect the deep rooted demand for land reform and pretend that the simmering land occupation movement is insignificant, even though this movement has been crucial both in the early 1980s and in the current crisis in forcing the land reform issue onto the political agenda.

It is self evident that the neoliberal, developmentalist model and structure of civil society organisation, dominated as it is both financially and technically by development and human rights NGOs, has been unable to address the pressing problem of land reform because of its general disconnection from the informal rural and urban social movements that have, over the years, pursued land occupations, resource poaching and all sorts of underground strategies to gain access to resources and other rights.

The result of this is that the land occupation movement has been hegemonised and controlled by war veterans and the ruling party, which has also demobilised it at various points in alliance with middle class interests within the state, opposition parties and NGOs, only to co-opt it as it re-emerged during the major post independence political and economic crisis which escalated in 1996 and 1997.

It is polarising and futile to simplify democratisation in such a way that the idea of changing government is privileged over and above the content of change. The idea of physically restructuring land and property relations is one example in which the historical unfolding of the process might seem to force change in what appear to be authoritarian ways but which might yield a framework for future democratisation. Moreover, it is too simplistic to pin the problem of achieving democratisation in Zimbabwe mainly on the tactics of the land occupation movement and the 2000 election. It is clear that the absence of the social and institutional infrastructure necessary for promoting true and widespread democratisation in rural Zimbabwe is a major bottleneck, which compounds the weak strategy of civil society and opposition movements. The lopsided racial access to information, education, physical resources and political experience in handling the contradictions of social democratic are yet to be redressed.

Therefore, much of the negative fallout from the occupations movement, including its use for short term political gain, has to be weighed more seriously against the longer term gains to the broader democratisation process, of creating space for awareness and participation in the basic social struggles hitherto dominated by formal state structures and urban dominated civil society organisations. Indeed, one of the major lessons and experiences is that the neoliberal policy framework of land reform can be challenged.

References

- Alexander J. (1993); 'The Unsettled Land: The Politics of Land Distribution in Matabeleland, 1980-1990', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17, no.4: pp. 581-610.
- Amonor-Wilks D. (1995); *In Search of Hope: Zimbabwe's Farm Workers*, Panos and Dateline Southern Africa
- Ashworth A. (1990); 'Agricultural Technology and the Communal Farm Sector', Background paper to the World Bank Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Memorandum, The World Bank, Harare
- Bates R. (1981); *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA
- Berdal M. and Keen D. (1997); 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Policy Implications', *Millennium* 26, no. 3. 795-818.
- Bernstein H. (2000); "'The Peasantry" in Global Capitalism: Who, Where and Why?', in Panitch L and Leys C *Socialist Register 2001: Working Classes, Global Realities*, eds. The Merlin Press: London, 25-51

Borras S. M. (1998); 'The Bibingka Strategy to Land Reform and Implementation: Autonomous Peasant Mobilisations and State Reformists in the Philippines', Working Paper Series no. 274, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Brass T. (1991); 'Moral Economists, Subalterns, New Social Movements, and the (Re-) emergence of a (Post)Modernised (Middle) Peasant', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18, no. 2: 173-205.

Bratton M (1994); 'Micro-Democracy? The Merger of Farmer Unions in Zimbabwe', *African Studies Review* 37, no. 1: 9-37.

Bratton M. and van de Walle N. (1997); *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bratton M() 'Farmer Organisation and Food Production in Zimbabwe' *World Development* 14, no. 3

Chitiyo K. T. (2000) 'Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans Debate', *Track Two* 9, no. 1.

Cousins B (2001) 'Why Land Invasions Will Happen Here Too...' Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of Western Cape, 1-4

Cox R (1999) 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order', *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1: 3-28;

Diamond L (1987). 'Class Formation in the Swollen African State', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4: 567-96.

Government of Zimbabwe (1999) *The Inception Phase Framework Plan of the Second Phase of Land Reform and Resettlement Programme*, Ministry of Land and Agriculture, Harare. International Donor Communiqué, September (to check reference)

Harvey N, *The Chiapas Rebellion*.

Herbst J (1990) *State and Politics in Zimbabwe*, University of Zimbabwe Press, Harare.

Kay C (2000) 'Conflict and Violence in Rural Latin America', Working Paper Series no. 312, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Kinsey B. H. (1983) 'Emerging Policy Issues in Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement Programmes', *Development Policy Review* 1, no. 2.

Lal D (1997) *The Poverty of 'Development Economics'* The Institute of Economic Affairs, London

Land Tenure Commission (1994) *Report of Enquiry into Agricultural and Land Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe*, Government Publications, Harare.

Marongwe N (2001) *A Case Study of Land Occupations in Zimbabwe*, ZERO, mimeo.

Mandimika P (2001) *The Indigenisation of the Large Scale Commercial Farming Sector: the Case of Corburn*, draft diss. Harare

- McMichael P (1997) 'Rethinking Globalisation: The Agrarian Question Revisited', *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 4, 630-62.
- Mkandawire T (1995) 'Home Grown Austerity Measures in Zimbabwe', in Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi (eds.), *Between Liberalisation and Oppression*, eds. Codesria: Dakar.
- Moyo S (1994) 'Conceptualising Land Tenure in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe', *SAPEM* 7, no. 8.
- Moyo Sam, Matondi Prosper. and Yeros Paris, eds. (forthcoming) *Land Occupations in Southern Africa*, SAPEM Books, Harare.
- Moyo S (1995) *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, SAPEM Books, Harare
- Moyo S (1999) 'Policy Dialogue, Improved Governance, and New Partnerships: Experiences from Southern Africa', in Kilfe H, Olukoshi A, and Wohlgemuth L (eds.), *New Partnerships for African Development: Issues and Parameters*, Nordiska Africainstitutet: Uppsala.
- Moyo S (1999) 'The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in the 1990s' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 1.
- Moyo S (2000) *Land Reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe*, Nordic Africa Institute: Uppsala.
- Moyo, *NGOs and Development*.
- Moyo S 'Peasant Organisations and Rural Civil Society in Africa: An Introduction', in Moyo S and Rhomadhane B (eds.) *Peasant Organisations and the Democratisation Process in Africa*. (Dakar: CODESRIA, forthcoming).
- Moyo S, (1987) 'The Land Question', in Ibbo Mandaza (ed) *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*, CODESRIA, Dakar.
- Moyo, *Land Reform under Structural Adjustment; 'The Socio-economic Impact'; 'The Interaction'*; and Sam Moyo, Paris Yeros and Prosper B. Matondi, eds., *The Land Occupations*. Pg 9 (revisit)
- Moyo S, Yeros P and Matondi P.B, eds., *The Land Occupations*.
- Moyo S, Rutherford B, and Amonr-Wilks D (2000) 'Farmworkers, Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers', *Review of African Political Economy* 27, no. 84
- Munck R and Wateman P (1999) *Labour World-wide in the Era of Globalisation: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order* Macmillan Press, Basingstoke
- Murombedzi J (1994), 'The Dynamics of Conflict in Environmental Management Policy in the Context of CAMPFIRE' CASS: University of Zimbabwe.
- Musungwa S (2001) *Beneficiary Selection in the Context of the Land Reform Programme*, draft diss. (Harare: Prisca Mandimika, 2001)

O'Brien R, Goetz A, Scholte J.A, and Williams M (2000) *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Petras James (1997) 'Latin America: The Resurgence of the Left', *New Left Review* 1, no. 223: 17-47;

Roth M (1992) *Analysis of Agrarian Structure and Land Use Patterns in Zimbabwe, Background Paper, Zimbabwe for the Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector: Memorandum for the World Bank*, MAD: Land Tenure Centre, Wisconsin.

Rukuni M and Eicher C.K (eds.) (1994) *Zimbabwe's Agricultural Revolution*, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare.

Rupert M.E. (1995) '(Re) Politicizing the Global Economy: Liberal Common Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTA Debate', *Review of International Political Economy* 2, no. 4: 658-92;

Scott J. C. (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT

Shiku E (2001) 'The Problem of Squatting in Zimbabwe: A Police Perspective' Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies, Harare.

Von Blackenburg P (1994) *Large Commercial Farmers and Land Reform in Africa*, Ashgate, London.

Yeros P (forthcoming) 'Labour Struggles for Alternative Economics in Zimbabwe: Trade Union Nationalism and Internationalism', *Monograph Series*, SAPES Trust, Harare.

Yeros P (undated), 'The Moral Economy of Squatting and Squatter Control in Shamva District', in *Land Occupations in Southern Africa*.

Yeros Paris (forthcoming) 'Peasant Struggles for Land and Security: A Global Moral Economy at the Close of the 20th Century', *Monograph Series*, SAPES Trust, Harare.

Weiner D, Moyo S, Manslow B and O'Keefe P (1985) 'Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23, no. 2.

World Bank, (1990) *Agriculture Sector Memorandum*, no. 9429, World Bank: Washington.

World Bank (1995) *Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Memorandum*, The World Bank, Washington, DC.



This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.

To view a copy of the license please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>

This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
<http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/>