Aid, rents and the politics of the budget process
Download
Date
2008Author
Mejía Acosta, Andrés
De Renzio, Paolo
Metadata
Show full item recordImpact
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of political institutions and budgetary procedures
on budget governance in aid- and resource-dependent countries. The notion of
budget governance refers to the quality of budget outcomes, such as the
governments’ ability to produce sustainable public finances over time, make
efficient use of government spending, and represent the preferences of citizens.
While the paper discusses some of the challenges of measuring budget
governance in aid and resource dependent countries, the empirical analysis
focuses on one aspect of budget governance: the extent to which countries can
produce sustainable fiscal balances over time. For this purpose, we have produced
a new dataset of 47 low and lower middle income countries whose economies
depend on aid or natural resource inflows between 1995 and 2006. The analysis
builds on indicators of party competition and democracy, good governance,
budgetary processes and institutions, and aid and resource dependency.
Preliminary findings suggest that greater executive power is positively associated
with improved fiscal performance in resource dependent countries, but this is also
associated with lower levels of party competition and democracy. Conversely,
greater levels of aid dependency are inversely associated with both executive
power and fiscal performance.
Keywords: budget process; fiscal outcomes; political institutions; aid effectiveness;
resource dependency; low income countries.
Citation
Mejía Acosta, A. & P. de Renzio (2008) Aid, rents and the politics of the budget process. Working paper series, 311. Brighton: IDS.Is part of series
IDS working papers;311Library catalogue entry
http://bldscat.ids.ac.uk/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=178811Rights holder
Institute of Development StudiesCollections
- IDS Research [1661]