

rhodesian history

The Journal of The Central Africa Historical Association

Volume 9

1978

N. M. N. RALUSHAI

Traditions concerning Luvhimbi and
the Mbedzi

I. C. LAMBA

British commerce as an anti-slavery
device in Malawi

J. M. MACKENZIE

Responsible Government

I. R. HANCOCK

Capricorn Africa Society

H. H. PATEL

Asian political activity in
Rhodesia

Notes, Documents and Revisions

Essay Review

Reviews

Bibliography



RHODESIAN HISTORY

The Journal of the Central Africa Historical Association

Edited by R. S. Roberts and P. R. Warhurst

VOLUME 9

1978

Further traditions concerning Luvhimbi and the Mbedzi. N. M. N. RALUSHAI	1
British commerce as an anti-slavery device in Malawi in the 1870s and 1880s: A study in miscalculated strategy. I. C. LAMBA	13
Southern Rhodesia and Responsible Government. J. M. MACKENZIE	23
The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia. I. R. HANCOCK	41
Asian political activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to 1972. H. H. PATEL	63
NOTES, DOCUMENTS AND REVISIONS	
Cecil Rhodes: Some documents and reflections. G. SHEPPERSON	83
Firearms as a factor in Manyika politics from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century. H. H. K. BHILA	91
A difference of opinion in the Colonial Office, 1893. S. B. STEVENSON	99
ESSAY REVIEW	
The Tonga and the anthropologists. T. I. MATTHEWS	115
REVIEWS	123
R. BLAKE, <i>A History of Rhodesia</i> by P. R. Warhurst; A. F. ISAAC-MAN, <i>The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique</i> by P. R. Warhurst; M. GELFAND, <i>A Non-Racial Island of Learning: A History of the University College of Rhodesia</i> by T. O. Ranger; J. P. L. WALLIS and F. R. BRADLOW, <i>Thomas Baines</i> by R. S. Roberts; C. BLACK, <i>The Legend of Lomagundi</i> by R. S. Roberts; E. WASON, <i>Banned</i> by R. E. M. Songore.	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	128
NEWS	131

SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

J. M. MACKENZIE
University of Lancaster

THE GRANTING OF Responsible Government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 was perhaps one of the most extraordinary acts of the Imperial Government in the twentieth century. Winston Churchill, who had been Secretary of State for the Colonies at the crucial point in the negotiations, remarked in 1927 to a future Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Godfrey Huggins, 'You had — how many did you say? — only 30 000 Europeans when I gave you your constitution; I still don't know why I did it.'¹ If Churchill was retrospectively surprised, the Colonial Office had been even more doubtful at the prospect of handing over almost a million Blacks to thirty thousand Whites. As Sir Henry Lambert had minuted in 1919: 'To give responsible government to 30 000 whites ruling a million blacks is not only without precedent, but the example of Natal . . . right up to 1910 shows how great the difficulties would be.'² The question why the Colonial Office, on the eve of the Devonshire Declaration, was prepared to abdicate its responsibilities in this way is one that has never been adequately answered.

The Colonial Office had of course never had direct responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia. This had been delegated to the British South Africa Company (B.S.A. Co.) whose charter, so nearly lost after the Jameson Raid and the risings in Southern Rhodesia in 1896-97, had survived longer than any of the African charters. Although the Rhodesian settlers had been represented in the negotiations leading to Union in South Africa in 1910, the Company's charter had been renewed for a further ten years in 1914 with the concurrence of the settlers' Legislative Council. The possibility of Responsible Government was specifically mentioned in the renewal of the charter, but nevertheless it was clear that the succeeding years were to be a period of jockeying for Southern Rhodesia. Imperial policy was for ultimate union of the territory with South Africa, and Botha and Smuts prepared to harvest what Cecil Rhodes had sown. The B.S.A. Co., however, concerned

¹ H. C. Hummel, 'Sir Charles Coghlan: The Issues and Influences of the Constitutional Struggle for Responsible Government, 1904-1924' (Univ. of Rhodesia, Dep. of History, Henderson Seminar Paper No. 11, 1969), 47.

² Public Record Office, London, C.O. 417/616 (Colonial Office, Africa South, Original Correspondence), 7749, minute of Lambert, 17 Feb. 1919 on Buxton to Long, 14 Nov. 1918, quoted in R. Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1900-1948* (London, Macmillan, 1972), 49.

with current expediency, appeared to equivocate. During the First World War, it sought the amalgamation of its territories straddling the Zambezi; yet pronouncements in favour of Union had frequently been made by its directors.

The whole issue ceased to be academic with the Privy Council judgment of 1918 on the protracted land case. The Privy Council ruled that the Company had administered the land of Rhodesia only as an agent of the Crown, and did not therefore possess, as it claimed, ownership of all unalienated land by right of conquest. The Privy Council added, however, that the Company had a right to claim compensation for its administrative deficits up to 31 March 1918. This was significant in two ways. First, the Company administration in Southern Rhodesia would no longer be prepared to incur administrative expenditure that would create further deficits after that date, and the 'development' of the country would be seriously retarded. Second, it meant that Southern Rhodesia had a price: whoever inherited the administration would have to pay the Company for its deficits. The amount of these deficits was decided by the Cave Commission, appointed in July 1919, which gave its award in January 1921. The manner of the disposal of the Southern Rhodesia inheritance was decided more quickly. The Buxton Committee which sat between March and April of 1921 recommended that the future should be decided by the settlers themselves by a device that has been rare and unpopular in British politics: the referendum.

The settlers, led by Charles Coghlan, secured Responsible Government via this referendum despite a considerable barrage of powers ranged against them. Successive Secretaries of State, Bonar Law, Walter Long, Alfred Milner, and most of their permanent officials had regarded Responsible Government as unlikely and undesirable. Even Harcourt had been doubtful, and Churchill, having wavered in the direction of Responsible Government at the crucial moment in 1921, subsequently espoused the cause of Union. The B.S.A. Co. sought Union as the best way in which it could secure a good price for its recalcitrant offspring, and set about achieving its end by wielding its considerable power through financial interests in Johannesburg and London. Directors of the Company, and the Company Administrator in Rhodesia, had close personal relationships with Long, Milner, Churchill, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries Amery, Wood, and Ormsby-Gore,³ and

³ Long and Milner were both correspondents of Drummond Chaplin, the Company's Administrator in Southern Rhodesia; Milner was a friend 'of fifty years standing of P. Lyttelton Gell, Director of the Company and later Acting President (they had been at Balliol together and later shared rooms in London); D. O. Malcolm, another Company Director and later President rejoiced when Wood became Parliamentary Under-Secretary because Wood had been Malcolm's 'fag' at Eton; Malcolm was also related by marriage to Ormsby-Gore; references to cosy after-dinner conversations with the politicians about the future of Rhodesia abound in the Directors' correspondence.

frequently imagined that they could influence the Colonial Office in consequence. They had no illusions, however, about the antipathy the Company aroused among the permanent officials or about the power these officials exerted over their Secretaries of State.⁴ Coghlan recognized the power of capital when he described the enemies of Responsible Government as being 'the reptile press, the influence of the Chartered Company, the machinations of the non-Rhodesian capitalists and politicians with their local satellites'.⁵

So much is well known, but students of the Responsible Government issue have never fully expained how Coghlan and his supporters won the principle of the referendum, and then that referendum itself, against such a formidable array of opponents. The crucial aspect which has been missed by all previous commentators is the influence of the Imperial 'man on the spot'. The influence of the 'man on the spot' is an abiding theme of the historiography of nineteenth-century imperialism. But if the activities of the 'man on the spot' were crucial in the expansion of Empire, they were no less crucial — in the case of Southern Rhodesia at least — in constitutional change leading to its contraction in the twentieth century. Those who have written on Responsible Government — and much of their work has remained unpublished — have taken either a metropolitan approach or a peripheral approach. Those in the former category, like Fage, Chanock, and Hyam, have examined mainly Imperial policy;⁶ those in the latter, like Gann, Davies, and Hummel, primarily local politics.⁷ To a large extent this reflects whether the Imperial or Southern Rhodesian archives were used. Only Warhurst⁸ used both, but his work is limited by a touch of Responsible Government nationalism, in which the Responsible Government party are doughty fighters who succeeded in bamboozling a weak and vacillating Colonial Office, an utterly unscrupulous Company, and 'slim

⁴ National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury [unless otherwise indicated all documentary references are to these Archives], Hist[orical] M[anu]s[c]ript[s] Coll[ectio]n, GH8/2 [Papers of Sir Francis Percy Drummond Chaplin: Correspondence], 2/2 (By Correspondent: Sir Henry Birchenough, 26 June 1951-21 Mar. 1929), Birchenough to Chaplin, 10 Nov. 1921: 'the successive secretaries of state, Milner excepted, seemed usually content to leave matters to their officials', *ibid.*, GH8/2/1 [General, 9 Feb. 1896-18 Nov. 1933], Chaplin to Sir John Chancellor, 1 Nov. 1923.

⁵ M. A. G. Davies, 'Incorporation in the Union of South Africa or Self-Government: Southern Rhodesia's Choice, 1922' (Univ. of South Africa, unpubl. M.A. thesis, 1963).

⁶ J. D. Fage, 'The Achievement of Self-Government in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1929' (Univ. of Cambridge, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1949); M. L. Chanock, 'British Policy in Central Africa, 1908-1926' (Univ. of Cambridge, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1968), since published in a considerably amended form as *Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-45* (Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press, 1977), which he describes as 'an "official mind" study of the period' (p.6); R. Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion*, ch. 3.

⁷ L. H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1965), 231-50; Davies, 'Incorporation in the Union'; Hummel, 'Sir Charles Coghlan'.
⁸ P. R. Warhurst, 'Rhodesia and Her Neighbours, 1900-1923' (Univ. of Oxford, unpubl. D.Phil. thesis, 1970).

Jannie' Smuts, incidentally saving Southern Rhodesia for the Empire. None of these, except Warhurst, adequately examine the role of the Company, and all have missed the significance of the 'man on the spot'.⁹ Moreover, there have been some significant misconceptions about the voting patterns in 1922. Arrighi described the victory of Responsible Government as the victory of 'domestic capital'.¹⁰ Chanock has seen it as the victory of 'petit-bourgeois nationalism'.¹¹ In fact, one of the most significant Responsible Government elements was White labour, and domestic capital was seriously divided.

This paper will argue that the Colonial Office in its dealings with the Company was activated by a long tradition of hostility, and by a desire to avoid offence to the elected members in the Legislative Council which it had called into being to control that Company. It was this which encouraged the local official of the Colonial Office — the Resident Commissioner, established as an Imperial watchdog under the Order-in-Council of 1898 — to enter into an alliance with the Responsible Government Association and discover the constitutional formula which would salve the Colonial Office's conscience. Moreover, Responsible Government became the liberal solution to the problem of Rhodesia, largely because Exeter Hall lent its support owing to its implacable hostility to the Company and its distrust of Union 'native policy'. Finally, no less than in South Africa, Smuts was thwarted by the fatal division of the English-speaking Whites into capital and labour.

The Colonial Office's attitudes towards the settlers were conditioned by the peculiarities of Company rule. From the Risings onwards, senior Colonial Office officials like Just, Anderson, Lambert, and to a lesser extent Fiddes, had led a chorus of hostile opinion to the Company.¹² In the absence of the revocation of the Charter in 1898, the Order-in-Council of that year set up a Legislative Council which was specifically designed to keep the Company in check, as well as answer the local demand for representation. This Legislative Council had subsequently pursued the classic pattern of development, from elected minority to elected majority. In 1898 there had been 4 elected and 5 nominated members. In 1903 parity was achieved with 7 of each. In 1907 an elected majority was produced by the curious device of the Company's voluntarily reducing the nominated element to 5. In 1913 and 1917 the elected members were increased to 12 and 13 respectively.

* More recently, both Lord Blake and Chanock have noted the influence of Stanley, though only in passing, Chanock relegating his remark to an appendix: R. Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (London, Eyre Methuen, 1977), 180; Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 267.

¹⁰ G. Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (The Hague, Mouton, 1967), 29-30.

¹¹ Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 51.

¹² Just was Assistant Under-Secretary from 1907 to 1916; Anderson was Permanent Under-Secretary from 1916 to 1921; Lambert was Assistant Under-Secretary from 1916 to 1921; Fiddes was Assistant Under-Secretary from 1909 to 1916 and Permanent Under-Secretary from 1916 to 1921.

In the face of this development of the elected element, the Colonial Office had found itself forced to adopt an anti-Company line whenever the Administration and the elected members came into conflict. As early as 1902 one Colonial Office official had minuted: 'It would not do for H.M.G. to take up a hostile attitude to a movement for increasing popular control as against that of the Company in Southern Rhodesia'.¹³ Sir Lewis Harcourt had written that H.M.G. had 'felt throughout that their decision must be largely influenced by the opinions of the electors of Southern Rhodesia, who are the persons primarily interested in the form of administration insofar as that part of the Company's territories is concerned'.¹⁴ Again in 1917 Lambert had commented that the difficult situation of Company rule facing an elected majority was only workable through the presence of the Crown, and that in consequence the Crown should never side with the Company against the elected members as it would make the position impossible should chartered rule end.¹⁵ Even Walter Long, in a private letter to Chaplin, the Company Administrator in Southern Rhodesia, apologized for the refusal of the Company's amalgamation schemes on the grounds that the Colonial Office could not act against 'popular' opinion.¹⁶ In this way, the Colonial Office had itself created, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, a force it could no longer control.

Yet it cannot be argued that Responsible Government was in consequence inevitable. Although the Supplemental Charter of 1914 had alluded to it as the alternative to Chartered rule, this was seen purely as a prelude to Union in the same way that Responsible Government in the Transvaal from 1907 had been. Moreover, Harcourt had himself qualified this on several occasions; in a much-quoted letter of 1911 he had written that in any deadlock between the Company and the settlers, Southern Rhodesia must enter the Union.¹⁷ In 1913 he had written that 'one would imagine that Union is their proper ultimate objective'.¹⁸ Moreover, his Tory successors had regarded Responsible Government as 'totally out of the question'.¹⁹ In July 1919, Milner in a telegram to Buxton pointed out that the Supplemental Charter allowed for Responsible Government if conditions warranted it, but that

¹³ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/345, 48597, minute of Grindle, 24 Nov. 1902.

¹⁴ Harcourt to Gladstone, 3 Oct. 1914, quoted in C. Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), 205.

¹⁵ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/589, 46457, minute of Lambert, 17 Oct. 1917 on Buxton to Long (confidential), 13 Aug. 1917.

¹⁶ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/8 [By Correspondent: W. H. Long, 22 Mar. 1909-10 Mar. 1918], Long to Chaplin, 28 Dec. 1917.

¹⁷ [The Rhodesia Herald], 24 Dec. 1913, a report of a speech of Jameson, quoting Harcourt. See also J. P. R. Wallis, *One Man's Hand* (London, Longmans Green, 1950), 129.

¹⁸ Hyam *The Failure of South African Expansion*, 49.

¹⁹ The phrase is Milner's: Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/616, 7749, minute 22 April 1919 on Buxton to Long, 14 Nov. 1918.

Milner felt that they did not.²⁰ One of the principal Rhodesian Unionists, Sir Bouchier Wrey (a cousin of Walter Long) was assured by Lambert in August 1919 that the Colonial Office favoured the junction of Southern Rhodesia with the Union, and Wrey returned to Rhodesia convinced that 'responsible government is I am glad to see doomed'.²¹

In that same month of August, however, Sir Henry Lambert indulged in a vital *volte face*. Minuting upon a telegram from Buxton to Milner which indicated that the Rhodesian public would not accept Union, Lambert reviewed the alternatives and came to the conclusion that Responsible Government carried fewer difficulties than the other possible courses.²² This conversion of Lambert was to be crucial, for he was to become the greatest protagonist of Responsible Government within the Colonial Office. He prepared and sat on the first Buxton Committee, whose terms of reference assumed Responsible Government from the outset. When Churchill powerfully espoused Union, he recognized that Lambert was the greatest stumbling block in the Colonial Office, wrote to him twice in September 1921²³ to make it clear that Union was now the policy, and transferred him to the Crown Agents later in the same year. The even more crucial conversion of Milner took place in the following year, September 1920, when he wrote: 'I am beginning to come round to the idea, that we shall have to give Rhodesia some form of self-government sooner than I at one time contemplated or at all like.'²⁴ Milner's conversion had come after the Rhodesian elections of April 1920, when the Responsible Government party had shown its strength, but it is significant that he wrote the above as comment upon a despatch of the High Commissioner, Buxton, enclosing a memorandum from the ex-Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia, now Imperial Secretary at the Cape, Herbert Stanley.²⁵ The very considerable influence of Stanley, for whom Buxton was little more than a stalking horse, has been largely ignored in studies of the Responsible Government issue.

Lord Buxton, High Commissioner in South Africa, was not highly regarded in the Colonial Office, mainly because he had more than once caused the Office considerable embarrassment. In 1916 during the debate on the

²⁰ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/619, 39043, telegram Milner to Buxton, 1 July 1919.

²¹ Ibid., C.O. 417/620, 47156, Wrey to Lambert, 19 Aug. 1919.

²² Ibid., C.O. 417/620, 45008, minute of Lambert, 6 Aug. 1919 on telegram Buxton to Milner, 1 Aug. 1919.

²³ Warhurst, 'Rhodesia and Her Neighbours', 358.

²⁴ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/640, 41929, minute of Milner, 18 Aug. 1920, on Buxton to Milner, 6 Aug. 1920.

²⁵ Ibid., C.O. 417/640, 41929, Buxton to Milner, 6 Aug. 1920, enclosing a memorandum in which Stanley had argued that Representative Government or Responsible Government would be preparation for union, that Responsible Government would be preferable, and suggested for the first time the idea that the High Commissioner could still reserve 'native affairs'. Leopold Amery in a minute of 4 Aug. 1919 (C.O. 417/619, 41726, on Buxton to Milner, 24 June 1919) had suggested Representative Government or 'some variant on diarchic lines'.

Company's plans to amalgamate Northern and Southern Rhodesia, he had announced in Salisbury that the Company could have amalgamation provided the settlers approved, as no Imperial interest was involved.²⁶ The Colonial Office felt that he had not only been indiscreet, but had failed to recognize the reality of Imperial interest, and in consequence he was rebuked by Bonar Law.²⁷ In 1919 he had produced an uproar when he privately encouraged the Responsible Government leaders, after Milner's despatch in August, which set out to discourage hopes of Responsible Government, by informing them that this despatch represented Milner's personal view and not that of H.M.G.²⁸ He had thus shown a degree of partisanship, and it was largely under the influence of Herbert Stanley.

After several indolent Resident Commissioners in Salisbury, Stanley had annoyed the Company by his activities,²⁹ and had impressed the Colonial Office by his very full despatches on, *inter alia*, Northern Rhodesian labour, the amalgamation issue, and, later, Responsible Government. Unknown to the Colonial Office, however, he had become firmly convinced of the need for Responsible Government, and from 1917 had been closely associated with the Responsible Government party. He was regarded by one Company director as 'our sinister friend Stanley'.³⁰ He was related by marriage to Newton, ex-colonial official, the Treasurer in the Company's Administration, and later a leading Responsible Government politician; he had frequent secret meetings with Coghlan and Newton;³¹ and probably precipitated

²⁶ *Ibid.*, C.O. 417/576, 37180, Buxton to Bonar Law, 19 July 1916, and minute of Lambert, 23 Aug. 1916, on the same, commenting that Buxton seemed to ignore the Black population. Buxton thought that amalgamation and union were not incompatible.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, in answer to the above, Lambert was still remembering Buxton's mistake in November, C.O. 417/590, 53496, minute of Lambert, 14 Nov. 1917 on Buxton to Long, 21 Sept. 1917.

²⁸ *Rhod. Her.*, 27 Apr. 1920. Newton informed Chaplin that he had been told that Buxton had given a great deal of encouragement to the Responsible Government members in Bulawayo, and had told them to return to the attack, Hist. Mss. Colln, CH8/2/2/14 [By Correspondent: F. J. Newton, 19 Mar. 1916-30 May 1920], Newton to Chaplin, 31 Oct. 1919. Chaplin suggested that if Milner's August despatch had been allowed to stand without Buxton's gloss, Responsible Government would never have been a live issue, *ibid.*, CH8/2/2/13 [By Correspondent: Viscount Milner, 22 Apr. 1906-28 May 1921], Chaplin to Milner, 6 May 1920.

²⁹ Hist. Mss. Colln, CH8/2/2/12 [By Correspondent: Sir Lewis Michell, 4 Apr. 1914-5 June 1923], Chaplin to Michell, 21 Jan. and 7 Mar. 1918. Malcolm had once referred to 'James Fair's method, complete indolence', *ibid.*, CH8/2/2/1/11 [By Correspondent: D. O. Malcolm, 16 Sept. 1910-9 Apr. 1929], Malcolm to Chaplin, 6 Feb. 1915. A crucial moment for the reactivation of the Resident Commissionership, and as it turned out for the path to Responsible Government, was when the offices of Resident Commissioner and Commandant General of the British South Africa Police were separated in 1913. This opened the way to civilian Resident Commissioners, of whom Stanley was the first.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 6 Sept. 1921.

³¹ Hist. Mss. Colln, CO8/1/3 [Papers of Sir Charles Patrick John Coghlan: Correspondence: Personal], Coghlan to Lady Coghlan, 13 Oct. 1921: 'Stanley says it must not be known he had seen me'. Hist. Mss. Colln, NE1/1/1 [Papers of Sir Francis James Newton: Correspondence: Sir Charles Coghlan, 13 Nov. 1922-24 Aug. 1927], Newton to Coghlan, 16 Nov. 1922.

Newton's entry into the Responsible Government party by showing him a copy of the Buxton Report before it was published.³² His influence upon Buxton is incontrovertible, and when Buxton was succeeded by Prince Arthur of Connaught in 1920, Stanley became the effective power in Cape Town and Pretoria, Prince Arthur being Smuts's ideal of a figurehead and non-interfering High Commissioner. Finally, it was Stanley who solved the problem of the Colonial Office's conscience about handing over one million Blacks to 30 000 Whites by suggesting that Responsible Government be limited by vesting 'native affairs' in the High Commissioner.³³ It was a cunning device, for it could be all things to all men. To the Unionists in Rhodesia it was seen as rendering Responsible Government nugatory, while there were those, including Churchill and Devonshire's Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ormsby-Gore,³⁴ who recognized that it would be a dead letter. But Buxton accepted all of Stanley's recommendations and embodied them in his important despatch of 6 August 1920 and later in the first Buxton Report, which the Company rightly saw as having been heavily influenced by Stanley despite the fact that he was not a member of the Committee.³⁵

When Smuts, following his tour of Rhodesia in 1922, requested that the Imperial Government give a lead in favour of Union to the Southern Rhodesian electorate, it was Stanley, in the absence of Prince Arthur, who counselled against such a move.³⁶ Meanwhile, Stanley's successor as Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia was Douglas-Jones, who had been secretary to all the Resident Commissioners since 1898 and was rewarded with the Resident Commissionership itself in 1918. As a long-standing Salisbury resident, whose brother was a Responsible Government member of the Legislative Council from 1920, Douglas-Jones was also inclined to the Responsible Government interest, and was considerably influenced by Stanley, his former chief. The Company may well have been right in suspecting that Stanley's motivation was to pull the plum of the governorship out the Responsible Government pie.³⁷ It would have been a just reward for Stanley's close and secret relationship with the Responsible Government leaders and his considerable efforts on their behalf. It is interesting to note that when the Colonial Office informally offered him the governorship of Northern Rhodesia, he informed

³² Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 7 June 1921.

³³ See above, n.25. I can find no earlier reference in the official papers to the idea of limited Responsible Government than Stanley's constitutional memorandum.

³⁴ Ormsby-Gore questioning Wood in the Commons on 21 July 1921 said that experience in Natal showed that safeguards on native affairs were nugatory, 144 *H. C. Debates*, 5th ser., 2386.

³⁵ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 31 Mar., 28 Apr. and 7 June 1921. 'Both reports . . . are due to our sinister friend Stanley, who seems to be the villain of the piece', *ibid.*, CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 6 Sept. 1921.

³⁶ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/681, 44403, Stanley to Masterton-Smith, 14 Aug. 1922.

³⁷ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 7 June 1921.

them that his ambition did not lie in Livingstone.³⁸ When the Southern Rhodesian governorship had gone elsewhere, however, he did indeed go to Livingstone as the beginning of a distinguished gubernatorial career that would eventually take him back to Salisbury.³⁹

While the 'men on the spot' were thus assiduously working for Responsible Government, it was Churchill, who succeeded Milner in February 1921, who vacillated at the crucial moment and virtually ensured success for Responsible Government. In appointing the Buxton Committee,⁴⁰ with Buxton and Lambert as its leading members, he could have been in little doubt as to the recommendations of that committee, particularly as the terms of reference assumed that Responsible Government would be the likely outcome. Later, under the influence of Smuts, Churchill was to become an eager supporter of Union for Southern Rhodesia. Whereas Milner had been cautious and anxious to avoid extra expenditure for the Imperial taxpayer, Churchill was mercurial, so mercurial in fact that he thoroughly confused the Company directors.⁴¹ He seemed to have sold the pass to Responsible Government in a moment of haste before his departure for Egypt; yet later he became the fiercest supporter of Union.⁴² Churchill had in fact speeded up the whole process. Whereas Milner had thought in terms of waiting for fresh immigration to Rhodesia, waiting for the next general election due in Southern Rhodesia in 1924, and then testing the outcome, Churchill accepted the idea of a referendum,⁴³ pressed for a Rhodesian all-party delegation to meet Smuts, for Smuts's Union terms to be considered in Rhodesia and for both the Responsible Government and the Union terms to appear on the referendum ballot paper. But while the Colonial Office abdicated responsibility to Southern Rhodesian 'popular' opinion, which of course meant White settler opinion, the Cabinet was deluded into imagining that Imperial policy for Union, which was also the cheapest policy of course, could be successfully achieved. In June 1920 Milner had suppressed a Colonial Office memorandum for the

³⁸ C.O. 417/694, 40787, Stanley to Masterton-Smith, 15 Aug. 1923.

³⁹ Herbert J. Stanley was Resident Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia, 1915-18; Imperial Secretary, South Africa, 1918-24; knighted in 1924; Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 1924-7; Governor, Ceylon, 1927-31; High Commissioner in South Africa, 1931-5; and Governor, Southern Rhodesia, 1935-42.

⁴⁰ Great Britain, *First Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider Certain Questions Relating to Rhodesia* [Cmd 1273; Chairman: Lord Buxton], (H.C. 1921, xiv, 719). The Buxton Committee, consisting of Sir Henry Lambert, R. N. Greenwood, Sir Edward Grigg, and W. Waring, M.P., must hold the record as the most expeditious of all Government Commissions. Appointed by Churchill within two weeks of his coming to office, on 7 March 1921, just before he departed for Egypt, it presented its report on 12 April 1921.

⁴¹ 'Churchill's attitude is puzzling'; and 'Winston is so mercurial we don't know what he is going to do next'; Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 1 Dec. 1921, and Michell to Chaplin, 18 Dec. 1921.

⁴² Hist. Mss Colln, GO8/1/3, Coghlan to Lady Coghlan, 17 Nov. 1921.

⁴³ The idea of the referendum was first suggested by the Colonial Office official, Davis, Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/620, 7927, minute of Davis, 17 Feb. 1921.

Cabinet because it was in favour of Responsible Government. By October 1921, Churchill was explicitly working for Union in the Cabinet.⁴⁴

But if Churchill appeared inconsistent, the Company had been no less so. Like the Colonial Office, it had exhibited indecision as to whether South Africa should end at the Limpopo or the Zambezi. In 1914, during the agitation regarding the renewal of the Charter, the Company, and in particular Jameson, had used the possibility of Union as a bogey with which to frighten the Southern Rhodesian electors.⁴⁵ In 1916, the Company had again appeared to set its face against Union when it had sought the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. At that time, Jameson had specifically said that amalgamation would postpone Union, but by 1917 he was telling the Company shareholders that Union would produce the best settlement for the Company.⁴⁶ When this produced a storm of protest among the settlers, he suggested that there might be an interim period of Responsible Government.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, events of the War had led the Company at times to espouse the notion of a great Central African territory. It was Company forces which seized the Caprivi Strip, and the High Commissioner dangled before the Company the possibility of involvement in the post-war settlement. With the Germans defeated in South West Africa and in German East Africa, there was the possibility of a redistribution of territory, and Charter hoped to secure some of the pickings. Drummond Chaplin, the Administrator in Rhodesia, as scornful of the Portuguese as many other Southern African politicians had been, wrote that the Portuguese had been so inefficient in permitting the Germans to reach Portuguese supply dumps, thereby prolonging the campaign against von Lettow Vorbeck, that they could only expect to lose some of their territory after the War.⁴⁸ Lourenço Marques could go to South Africa; Beira, the Zambezi Valley and the Shire Highlands to Rhodesia; and Portugal could receive some compensation in German East Africa. The Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, expressed not a little interest

⁴⁴ 'Mr. Churchill having pointed out that we could not well compete with the inducements which were being offered by General Smuts, proposed to continue the discussion with bias a little in favour of joining Union.. This was the conclusion at a Cabinet held in October 1921, quoted in Warhurst, 'Rhodesia and Her Neighbours', 363.

⁴⁵ *Rhod. Her.*, 24 Dec. 1913.

⁴⁶ The British South Africa Company, *Report of the Twenty-First Ordinary General Meeting... 5 July, 1917* (London, The Company, 1917), 6.

⁴⁷ *Rhod. Her.*, 20 July 1917, quoted in Warhurst, 'Rhodesia and her Neighbours', 288. Warhurst suggests that the Company had plotted Union from the time of discussions between Botha and the Company in 1910 and the secret memorandum of 1911 compiled by Wilson Fox, the Company's Manager, and that they even saw amalgamation as strengthening their hand for union. A reading of the Company correspondence makes it difficult to believe that the Company was so consistent as to have such a 'plot'. Jameson argued for amalgamation on the grounds that it would prevent Union, Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 11 Feb. 1915; Malcolm had also indicated that amalgamation would make entry to Union more difficult, and that it would in consequence be opposed by the 'Union element' in Southern Rhodesia; *ibid.*, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 12 Oct. 1915.

⁴⁸ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/8, Chaplin to Long, 11 Feb. 1917; Long to Chaplin, 4 Sept. 1917; and Chaplin to Long, 10 Mar. 1918.

in these proposals.. Yet they only served to make the Colonial Office's dilemma, and the pivotal position of Rhodesia, more apparent.

The significance of amalgamation and the wild schemes associated with it is that during the War the Company was clearly looking northwards. In the Colonial Office, the Company's amalgamation plans of 1916 were regarded as essentially anti-Union and therefore unacceptable. Sir John Anderson minuted with great prescience that German South West Africa would almost certainly be added to the Union after the War, providing strength for those opposed to Botha and Smuts, and making it essential that Southern Rhodesia be used as a counterpoise.⁴⁹ So the Company's amalgamation plans were thwarted, both by the Colonial Office ruling in the tradition of Lord Salisbury that Southern Africa — and symbolically Roman Dutch law — ended at the Zambezi, and by Colonial Office support for the elected members who feared dilution of their tiny White minority by the overwhelmingly Black north. In 1917 the Company attempted to achieve amalgamation 'through the back door' by uniting the administratorships of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This again was refused. Until 1918 at least, elements in the Company remained anti-Union. In that year Newton, then Acting Administrator (who alone of all the Company officials remained consistent⁵⁰) warned against Union, much to the annoyance of the Colonial Office, who thought that he had spoken under Company orders.⁵¹

The Company had ironically already become turbulent for Union by the time that they succeeded in achieving their diluted version of amalgamation, the joining of the administratorships of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under Chaplin, in 1921. While the Union had in the past been a convenient bogey for the continuation of the Charter, the Union now became the most eager buyer with the fattest purse. The Cave Commission had asserted the Company's right to be reimbursed for its administrative deficits to the tune of almost £5 million, a figure with which the Company was not displeased, 'knowing how arbitrators work in these matters'.⁵² Moreover, the Company felt that it was an amount which Smuts could afford to pay. But the Buxton Committee suggested that this amount could be paid out of land sales, a prospect which convinced the Company that it would have to wait a hundred years to be paid off. In the event the Company was of course right in assuming that South Africa would be the most liberal buyer, for Smuts was prepared

⁴⁹ Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/574, 7706, minute of Anderson on Buxton to Bonar Law, 25 Jan. 1916.

⁵⁰ Sir Francis Newton had been Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland at the time of the Jameson Raid, and had been piqued not to succeed Milton as Administrator of Southern Rhodesia. In 1916 Newton wrote to Chaplin that he found that the Nationalists and Labour reduced the dignity of the South African House — 'My only prayer is that we may be kept out of it as long as possible', Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/14, Newton to Chaplin, 22 June 1916.

⁵¹ *Rhod. Her.*, 9 Mar. 1918; Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/602, 21516, minutes on Buxton to Long, 26 Mar. 1918.

⁵² Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 20 Jan. 1921.

not only to pay out the Company for its administrative deficits and its assets at once, but was also willing to take over the Company's railway rights and negotiate for the mineral rights. It is perhaps not surprising that the Company discovered that Imperial interests lay not in the creation of a great Central African territory — as they had appeared to argue in the past — but in a greater South Africa. The Company and its related financial interests therefore encouraged the Rhodesian Union Association by financing it with amounts far in excess of the Responsible Government Association's finances.⁵³

After the referendum of October 1922, in which the Responsible Government Association won a victory of 8 774 votes to Union's 5 989, the Responsible Government party were convinced that Ormsby-Gore, who was virtually running the Colonial Office for Devonshire, was holding up the final settlement because he was 'hand in glove' with the Company.⁵⁴ Coghlan wrote that Ormsby-Gore had told Harris (the Responsible Government representative in London) that the situation was 'obscure and difficult' when the Responsible Government people knew that it was 'simplicity itself'.⁵⁵ Coghlan was of course exaggerating, for in the absence of Smuts's down-payment to the Company, the Company had decided to proceed by Petition of Right to secure an immediate cash settlement of its administrative deficits under the Cave Award. The final irony in the Company's fortunes was that in early 1923 Rochfort Maguire became President of the Company: he was pro-Responsible Government and anti-Union, perhaps echoing his Irish nationalist past.⁵⁶ The 'obscure and difficult' situation was solved when the Colonial Office came to an agreement with the Company by which the Company received £3.75 million (£2 million from Southern Rhodesia and £1.75 million from the long-suffering Imperial taxpayer) in exchange for the waiving of the Imperial Government's claims for war expenses against the Company. The way was now cleared for the issue of the Letters Patent containing the Southern Rhodesian constitution. Despite all its fears, the Company came out of the settlement extremely well. It retained all its mineral rights in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, several million acres of land in both countries, a half-share in land sales in North-Western Rhodesia for forty years, and an 86 per cent share of Rhodesia Railways. Between 1924 and 1939 the Company paid out £8 million in dividends at the rate of 8 per cent per annum.⁵⁷

The success of the Responsible Government party was the more remarkable for being based on a very brief history. A Responsible Government

⁵³ Hummel, 'Sir Charles Coghlan', 43. E. Tawse-Jollie, *The Real Rhodesia* (London, Hutchinson, 1924), 87.

⁵⁴ Hist. Mss Colln, NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 13 Feb. 1923.

⁵⁵ Ibid, Coghlan to Newton, 17 Apr. 1923.

⁵⁶ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/6 (By Correspondent: P. L. Gell, 24 Oct. 1918-6 Jan. 1923), Gell to Chaplin, 30 Nov. 1922: 'of course Maguire has always opposed Union.'

⁵⁷ Chanock, 'British Policy in Central Africa', 248; *Unconsummated Union*, 172.

movement had first been formed in 1912 before the review of the Charter due in 1914. Based on farming discontent with Company policy and the favouring of mineral interests, it failed to attract a more widespread support among the settler community. Re-formed in 1917 to oppose the Company's amalgamation proposals, it received the greatest fillip from the Privy Council judgment in the land case. From now on Responsible Government was a viable proposition and the movement began to attract the support of local politicians like Coghlan and of important interest groups like commerce and labour.

Mrs Tawse-Jollie, the widow of the Company's first Chief Magistrate (i.e. effectively Administrator) in Mashonaland, was a leading Responsible Government protagonist and ensured that almost the entire female vote went to Responsible Government, and stated as her reason for avoiding Union the fact that the English-speakers in South Africa had become fatally divided into Capital and Labour.⁵⁸ Yet in Rhodesia they were no less divided: If any single influence was vital in the shift of opinion from 1914 to 1922 it was that of labour. It was the artisan class combined with women and some of the professional classes which ensured the success of Responsible Government. In the past, workers on the mines had been sufficiently under the influence of their employers to vote for mining representatives. With the labour turbulence of the War and the inflation and strikes which followed it, it was no longer possible for mine-workers to see their interests as coinciding with those of the mining interest. Moreover, as comparisons of the 1911 and 1921 censuses show, the workers in the 'industrial' category were rapidly growing in numbers.⁵⁹ An analysis of the voters rolls of 1922 by profession reveals that it was in those constituencies where mining and industrial workers were most highly concentrated that Responsible Government received its biggest majorities.⁶⁰ Other high majorities were in urban constituencies inhabited by civil servants, professional people and women.⁶¹ The workers

⁵⁸ Tawse-Jollie, *The Real Rhodesia*, 59.

⁵⁹ The census report of 1921 gave the following occupation breakdown: public services, 4 892; professions, 1 490; mining, 4 316; agriculture, 8 250; industries 3 395; commerce, 5 645; commercial services, 1 684; railways, 3 725. The 1911 census report had given only 2 255 in mining and 2 067 in agriculture. The artisan element in mining and industries taken together constitute in 1921 about 24 per cent of the population, almost as large a single group as agriculture. See Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Director of Census regarding the Census Taken on 7th May, 1911* (Sessional Papers, A.7, 1912); *Report of the Director of Census regarding the European Census Taken on 3rd May, 1921* (Sessional Papers, A.13, 1922).

⁶⁰ Hartley, the most important mining area, had a Responsible Government majority of 66.52 per cent, while Bulawayo South and Bulawayo District, both with high artisan populations, had 63.97 and 64.98 per cent respectively. For much more detailed figures and extensive analysis of voting patterns, see M. Elaine Lee, 'An analysis of the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922', *Rhodesian History* (1977), VIII, 77-98; 'Politics and Pressure Groups in S. Rhodesia, 1898-1923' (Univ. of London, unpubl. Ph.D., 1974); and 'The origins of the Responsible Government Movement', *Rhodesian History* (1975), VI, 33-52.

⁶¹ Bulawayo North and Salisbury Town had Responsible Government majorities of 67.93 and 63.81 per cent.

were influenced by the fact that they earned wages 10 per cent higher than their counterparts in South Africa (which contrasted notably with the lower wages prevailing for Africans in Rhodesia), by their view of Smuts after the February-March 1922 'revolution' on the Rand as the Bloody Jeffreys of South Africa, his 'feet dripping with blood',⁶² and by anxieties that their privileged position would deteriorate if there was an influx of Poor Whites from the South.⁶³ After the brutal suppression of the Rand strikes, Chaplin himself wrote that 'the Rand troubles have made responsible government in Rhodesia almost a certainty'.⁶⁴

Civil servants were concerned mainly about bilingualism and about Union taxation of which Responsible Government propaganda made much play.⁶⁵ Women had been enfranchised in Rhodesia in 1919 much to the distaste of the Company which even then had recognized that this 'monstrous regiment of women' (adding no less than 3 467 voters to the rolls) would be solidly for Responsible Government. The women were near-unanimous because women did not have the vote in the Union, because of their disgust for Poor Whites,⁶⁶ and fears of Dutch and English languages mixing promiscuously in the schools. When Smuts referred to Rhodesians as 'little Jingoos'⁶⁷ he was perhaps thinking principally of the women. The other group which supported Responsible Government was the smaller element in the commercial sector, which was concerned about Union taxation which would have borne heavily upon them, about the abolition of the 'Rhodes clause' (which gave preference to British goods imported into Southern Rhodesia), and about the possibility of being swamped by large South African concerns.

The Responsible Government Association has often been seen as a farmers' party, particularly as most of its early leaders were farmers, and as the principal beneficiaries of Responsible Government seemed ultimately to be farmers. But in fact the farming interest was very divided by 1922 with

⁶² J. W. Keller, in *Rhodesia Railway Review* (Apr. 1922).

⁶³ Responsible Government Association propaganda made great play of the Poor White problem: for example 'Sui Juris', *The Terms of Union: An Examination of their Provisions*, reprinted from the *Rhodesia Railway Review* (Sept. 1922): 'The idea of a swarm of these poor unfortunate creatures coming into Rhodesia and multiplying here with frightful rapidity . . . is dreadful to contemplate.'

⁶⁴ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/12/1, Crewe to Chaplin, 20 Mar. 1922.

⁶⁵ An R.G.A. poster gave figures showing that there were 855 individual income tax payers in Southern Rhodesia, but that under Union there would be over 4 000. Examples of the benefits to companies were revealed in *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 7 Oct. 1922: Shamva Mine paid £78 433 in tax and royalties in 1921; under Union it would pay £48 725. Falcon Mine paid £30 591 in tax and royalties in 1921; under Union it would pay nothing. These figures cannot have carried much weight with Coghlan's 'man in the street'.

⁶⁶ Mrs Boddington, speaking at an R.G.A. meeting at Selukwe because Mrs Tawse-Jollie was indisposed, said that the Poor Whites in the Free State were 'neither black nor white, but really worse than animals, and in addition they were mentally deficient', *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 10 Oct. 1922.

⁶⁷ Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion*, 67.

the majority probably taking the Union side. In the 1920 election Afrikaner farmers had been instructed by the South African nationalists to vote for Responsible Government specifically to frustrate Smuts's aims. But the trojan horse in the Responsible Government movement had been turned aside by the powerful anti-Afrikaner sentiments within the party. Maize farmers alone continued to support Responsible Government because they feared the swamping of Rhodesia with South African maize, made competitive by cheap railway rates from the south, and therefore stealing the lucrative Matabeleland market from the Mashonaland grower.⁶⁸ Both the other two sectors of Rhodesian farming, beef and tobacco, were for Union, hoping for markets there in a time of depression in both commodities.⁶⁹ One of the principal items of Nationalist anti-Smuts propaganda was that South African cattle farmers, predominantly Afrikaners of course, would have to compete with cheap Rhodesian beef.⁷⁰ The tobacco interest hoped for the removal of a tariff designed to protect the nascent South African tobacco industry.

The other group which has erroneously been seen as supporting Responsible Government, and which constituted a significant proportion of the population, is the railway men.⁷¹ In fact analysis of the voting at Bulawayo polling stations in the 'railway suburbs' reveals that the railwaymen were split, but that a majority voted for Union.⁷² Propaganda regarding the advantages of working for a larger operation, and improved opportunities for promotion seem to have outweighed fears of bilingualism and of compulsory movement to any part of the Union.⁷³ Apart from the railwaymen, then, Coghlan was not too far wide of the mark when he remarked that in the face of all the powerful forces ranged against him all he could muster was the 'man in the street',⁷⁴ meaning of course the White man. Another contemporary judgment seems to have been more accurate than later commentaries — the analysis of the referendum by Chaplin in a letter to Smuts. The most recent historian of Rhodesia, Blake, wrongly contradicts Chaplin on the question of the farmer vote.⁷⁵

Coghlan did however have one other area of support, and it was a most

⁶⁸ An important maize-growing area like Mazoe was heavily pro-Responsible Government, Lee, 'An analysis of the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922', 88-90.

⁶⁹ Marandellas, an important tobacco area, was the only constituency to vote for Union. Cattle-ranching districts of the Victoria and Western constituencies were heavily for Union.

⁷⁰ Davies, 'Incorporation in the Union', 43.

⁷¹ See above, n.59.

⁷² In the two 'railway suburbs' of Bulawayo, Raylton and Bulawayo South, there were pro-Union majorities.

⁷³ J. H. Eakin, *A Few Words to Railwaymen* (Bulawayo, Rhodesia Union Association, 1922). The R.U.A. was the only association to produce a pamphlet in Afrikaans with a long section on railways and a page showing how to vote, since the ballot paper would of course be in English.

⁷⁴ Davies, 'Incorporation in the Union', 16.

⁷⁵ Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 188.

curious one. This was Exeter Hall. The role of the Aborigines Protection and Anti-Slavery Society, and of missionaries, even as radical as A. S. Cripps,⁷⁶ was important in giving Responsible Government an air of respectability in liberal circles. To a far greater degree than the Colonial Office, they were activated by hostility to the Company: it seemed that those who were enemies of the Company, like Coghlan and his supporters, must necessarily be their friends. They were impressed that a missionary, Hadfield, was a member of the Responsible Government party, and that he had suggested in an electoral address that the one million acres net removed from the Reserves by the Coryndon Reserves Commission of 1915 should be returned.⁷⁷ Two other Responsible Government men, J. McChlery and H. U. Moffat, a future Southern Rhodesia Premier, had close relations with the Society. The Society had apparently forgotten that Coghlan had been a prime mover in racially discriminatory legislation before the War; that his interest in Union in 1909 had been to escape Imperial 'native policy', that he had attacked the High Commissioner Gladstone's 'negrophilism' in the 'black peril' case of 1911, that he had associated himself with Chartered 'native policy' and had disassociated himself from J. H. Harris's *Chartered Millions*, in the preface of which he had received laudatory reference.⁷⁸ Exeter Hall's policy arose from the knowledge that Crown Colony rule, which they would have preferred was impracticable, and from their antipathy to both the Company and Union 'native policy'.

Another aspect of Responsible Government's 'liberalism' was the fashion in which it set out to court the Indian and Coloured vote. The Responsible Government Association assiduously held meetings for these sectors of the population,⁷⁹ and it is interesting to note that far more Indian voters, giving their professions as 'traders' and even 'hawkers' appear on the voters rolls for 1922 than had appeared at any time before. It has even been suggested that registering officers, themselves almost certainly for Responsible

⁷⁶ The more radical Rhodesian missionaries favoured direct Imperial control, but they were convinced by J. H. Harris that Responsible Government was the only practicable policy, T. O. Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia* (London, Heinemann, 1970), 89.

⁷⁷ This is mentioned in a copy of a letter from the Aborigines Protection Society to Milner, July 1920 in Hist. Mss Colln, MA15/1/1 (Papers of John McChlery: Correspondence: 23 Nov. 1911-15 July 1929). See also *ibid.*, NE1/1/1, Newton to Coghlan, 14 Feb. 1923: 'Saw our friend J. H. Harris of the A.P.S. — who is heart and soul with us'.

⁷⁸ J. H. Harris, *The Chartered Millions* (London, Swarthmore Press, 1920). Newton at one point was induced to write to Coghlan to tell him to restrain Leggate, one of the R. G. members, at least until after the constitution was secured, from saying that the repeal of the High Commissioner's reservation of African affairs would have to be one of the first acts after Responsible Government, Hist. Mss Colln, NE1/1/1, Newton to Coghlan, 25 Jan. 1923.

⁷⁹ For example, one reported in *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 10 Oct. 1922, at which extraordinary promises were made.

Government, were less scrupulous about the exercise of the literacy qualification than they had been in the past.⁸⁰ Although the Responsible Government Association did not specifically court African support, educated Africans decided to adopt the line of J. H. Harris, that there was no chance of securing direct Imperial control, and that Responsible Government was far preferable to Union. The Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association was founded and sought the support of two Responsible Government members of the Legislative Council, too late (1923) to participate in the referendum. African voters had decided to combine on Cape lines to protect their interest, but few probably had any illusions about the effectiveness of the Imperial reservation of 'native affairs'.⁸¹ This, however, was purely educated opinion. If African labour had had a voice, the African labouring class may have recognized that Union could bring considerable economic advantages. Higher wages were offered in South Africa and might have pushed Rhodesian wages up — one of the greatest fears of the Responsible Government party was that Rhodesia might lose its cheap African labour force with Union. Certainly Rhodesian Africans had been voting for Union with their feet for decades by migrating to the Rand and other centres of employment in South Africa.⁸²

The policies of the Imperial Government and of Southern African capital coincided in Rhodesia just after the First World War as they had done so often in the past. But their enormous combined power was shattered by 'men on the spot' who ensured that the decision would be in the hands of White 'popular' opinion, and who found in the reservation of 'native policy' the solution to ease the Imperial conscience. The victory of Responsible Government was not, however, the victory of domestic capital, as it has sometimes been described; it was essentially the victory of a populist coalition such as was to be welded again at the break-up of the Federation. Smuts himself dug the grave of his 'United States of Southern Africa' in 1922, and the memories of his actions against the Rand strikers were of course fresh in the minds of the Southern Rhodesian electorate. The British South Africa Company got its price, but not such a good one as it would have obtained from Smuts, and the British taxpayer had to foot a large part of the bill.

Moreover, Responsible Government was secured at a moment of Imperial exhaustion. The intractable problems of Egypt, Kenya and Ireland

⁸⁰ Private information from B. A. Kosmin; see also his 'Ethnic groups and the qualified franchise in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1922', *Rhodesian History* (1977), VIII, 58-60.

⁸¹ Ranger, *The African Voice*, 91.

⁸² R. G. A. propaganda made much of the fact that 'voluntary' recruitment, which Smuts assured Rhodesia in his terms would be the only form of recruitment permitted, would be just as effective in draining the country's labour supply. In 1916 during the amalgamation controversy, Malcolm had written that 'one of our chief anti-Union arguments is that with Union our labour supply would be exploited for the Rand'. Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 16 Jan. 1916; see also above, n.47.

all bore in on the Colonial Office at the same time, producing a marked effect upon the efficiency and the health of its officials.⁸³ The Rhodesian analogy with Ireland was frequently made. When the Company was still in its anti-Union phase, Hawksley, the Company solicitor, had said in 1914, 'God forbid . . . that we should have to say "Rhodesia will fight and Rhodesia will be right" but if there is any attempt made to put this country under the heel of the Union of South Africa you will know what to do'.⁸⁴ George V, himself in favour of Union and a devotee of Smuts, remarked to Coghlan when the Responsible Government delegation met the King in 1921 that he understood that Rhodesia was the Ulster of South Africa. Coghlan replied that she was just as loyal — an ironical remark to come from a man of southern Irish Catholic origins.⁸⁵

But perhaps the greatest irony of the whole Responsible Government issue was the fact that many of the protagonists, even among the victors, regarded it as a purely temporary expedient. Smuts was convinced that Southern Rhodesia would still have to come in at a less favourable time;⁸⁶ Milner regarded eventual Union as still inevitable;⁸⁷ several people saw Coghlan as the first and last Premier of Southern Rhodesia. Even Mrs Tawse-Jollie considered that Southern Rhodesia might very well still go into Union, but that it would be at Rhodesia's own request rather than precipitated by the Chartered Company.⁸⁸ H. U. Moffat, later Premier, wrote in his notes for an interview with Ormsby-Gore that Responsible Government would produce a large British immigration and Union later. In his account of the interview itself he acceded to Ormsby-Gore's remark that once Smuts had a big majority, Rhodesia would be more willing to go in.⁸⁹ Newton also asserted that Rhodesia would go into Union, but that it would be in six years rather than six months.⁹⁰ But as we know from more recent history, prophecies of that nature are always dangerous in the case of Rhodesia. The break-up of the Federation, U.D.I., and the escalation of the guerrilla war on the Zambezi at last threw Rhodesia into the arms of a republican South Africa. And the latter has found it as embarrassing a baby as the Company and the Colonial Office once did, and no less eager to divest itself of responsibility for it.

⁸³ For example, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir James Masterton-Smith, underwent a prolonged period of ill-health which resulted in complete breakdown in 1924, burned out and retired at the age of 46.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Chanock, 'British Policy in Central Africa', 95.

⁸⁵ Tawse-Jollie, *The Real Rhodesia*, 85.

⁸⁶ Hist. Mss Colln, CH8/2/2/13, copy of Smuts to Bonar Law, 20 Nov. 1922.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Milner to Chaplin, 2 Feb. 1921.

⁸⁸ RC/3/1/61 (Resident Commissioner: Correspondence: General: 1918), 2063, Douglas-Jones to Buxton, 6 Dec. 1918. See also the *Rhodesian Advertiser*, 25 Mar. 1920.

⁸⁹ Hist. Mss Colln, MO13/1/1 (Papers of H. U. Moffat: Correspondence: Political, 21 May 1919-July 1933), Moffat to Coghlan, 14 Oct. 1920.

⁹⁰ Ibid., NE1/1/1, Newton to Coghlan, 25 Jan. 1923.



This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.

To view a copy of the license please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>

This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
<http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/>