


MEMORANDUM

SECRET

To: Bill
From: Reg

Date: 20-XII-83
Re: Namibia

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1. We spoke of a possible scenario and how pressure might be applied to help it along. This is to recapitulate.
 2. As of mid 1984 Executive President P.W. ('Piet Wappen') Botha - Prime Minister Botha as he now is - may wish to negotiate seriously to get out of Namibia on terms approximating 435. I rate this as 50-50.
 - a. Namibia is an international nuisance. It could become worse (especially if 1985 sees President Mondale).
 - b. Tying up 100,000 troops in Namibia risks having too few for non-sanguinary control if multiple strikes and riots throughout RSA all at once. A series of Sharpsvilles, Botha does not need.
 - c. Militarily the Orange River is a better defense line than the Kunene and the Northern Cape a worse area for guerillas than Northern Namibia (and the ANC less competent to date than SWAPO).
 - d. As Executive President with (white) Parliamentary Election behind him, PW has five years before having to face public. Further, given makeup of President's Council, he has a built in majority even if white Parliamentary component is at odds with him.
 - e. PW saw lesson of Portuguese revolution as being that empires which hang on to peripheral colonies like grim death die by being overthrown at centre.
 - f. Business community wants Namibia settled. Reasons are complex:
 - i. Anglo wants to do business in independent Namibia and sees longer more bitter war as endangering that;
 - ii. rest of big business (including Afrikaaner magnates) see N as hampering their overseas business especially with independent Africa;
 - iii. the war is seen by them as costing \$/ 1,000 million or more a year.
 - g. The best advice - including from Gerritt Viljoen who went from head of Broederbund to AG SWA/Namibia to Minister of Education - is that no viable anti-SWAPO electoral front can ever be formed unless it can have two years of peace to get a platform.

- h. The advice of 2 of 3 top military men (Defense Minister Malan, Chief of Staff Geldenhuys - the ex Officer Commanding Namibia/Angola) is that:
- i. Namibian war cannot be won;
 - ii. SWAPO has a firm base which war strengthens;
 - iii. forward policy in Angola ultimately cannot resolve problem;
 - iv. the war will slowly (5 or 10 years) worsen, i.e. RSA position will erode;
 - v. a deal as soon as timing right for domestic RSA political purposes should be struck.

However, the head of army (Constand Viljoen) is a "forward" advocate. He believes in military action to instal a UNITA junta in Luanda and an RSA force to protect it against its neighbours. (And so to Cairo as English language press puts it in satirizing this approach.) Lloyd, the current OC/SWA-Namibia is of the same kidney.

- i. PW would need to sell the 435 acceptance:
- i. international breathing space (will get that whether we like it or not);
 - ii. stop the boys dying in the bush (automatic);
 - iii. preserve opportunities for RSA business in Namibia (for Anglo probably will - Barclays and Standard banks will shift the Namibia subsidiaries from Jo'burg to London);
 - iv. Cubans out of Angola (not impossible if in a package that makes deal attractive to Angola - they'd like to be able to have Cubans out).

3. USA (President reagan and all) want a settlement before November:

- a. considerable publicized investment of diplomatic prestige and personnel in seeking a Namibia settlement;
- b. general problem of Namibia deadlock not helping black African standing or policy;
- c. growing doubts of moderate Republicans (e.g. Senator Percy, Senator Kassenbaum) that "constructive engagement" works with RSA or that Chester Crocker's claims it does not really alienate African leaders are credible;
- d. advantage of saying "we got Cubans out of Angola" as a propoganda ploy (even if USA public not quite as obsessed with the 'superpower of the Caribbean' and its 'global reach' as this administration is, there is a lode of public response to be tapped).

4. UK wants a settlement to avoid increased Commonwealth pressures (New Delhi Heads of Government meeting was uncomfortable) and to avoid frictions with USA. Basically it believes Cubans are a mares nest and RSA would be wise to get out (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe exercise by UK is still viewed as a success).
5. France certainly wants a settlement. (Ditto Canada but they are not very significant.)
6. Federal Germany wants a settlement and thinks 435 a good basis so long as Genscher's Foreign Minister (things would change were Strauss to bulldoze his way in - he is a hard line South African backer):
 - i. Germany's #1 interest is future of German origin settlers. Since 1981 it (and their representatives) are reasonably happy with SWAPO on this;
 - ii. #2 interest is to continue to be able to buy Rossing "yellowcake" (uranium oxide) for power companies. Sees no problem since 1981 (the one useful result of Geneva 'Nonimplementation' Conference was side talks SWAPO/FRG).
7. Netherlands wants a settlement. It has a guilty conscience about Afrikaners. The Centre Right government wants some action on some issue to make centre left happy. The latter is true in particular in respect to left wing of Christian Democrats (not the exact title) which is very restive on economic cutbacks, missiles, etc.
8. Scandinavians want a settlement - they are increasingly concentrating attention on Southern Africa including independent states, Namibia, RSA.
9. SWAPO evidently wants a settlement subject to:
 - i. a reasonably free election (à la Zimbabwe) - it is confident that any such election it can win hands down;
 - ii. a UN military presence of - say - 6 to 7,500 with RSA limited to 1,500 during campaign plus UN supervision of police and electoral (counting, voter registration) practices;
 - iii. the package being acceptable to Angola.
10. The Front Line States want a settlement about on the same lines as SWAPO. They are fairly flexible on how (not on whether) Angola's security is to be protected. On the whole the FLS other than Angola are probably not best pleased with Angola's lack of interest in exploring the Nigerian proposal of substituting Nigerians for Cubans.

11. Angola wants a settlement. Nobody is as hurt by the war as it is. But it must meet following conditions:

- i. be acceptable to SWAPO;
- ii. protect Angola from risk of major RSA invasion going beyond South;
- iii. be in a context rendering RSA operations via UNITA much less effective;
- iv. avoid massive loss of face to Angola or to Cuba.

12. The above suggest that a settlement is possible (assuming PW decides to move to cut losses and negotiate his way out of Namibia soon after he becomes Executive President). It would need to include:

- i. 435 package of UNTAG military presence, police and electoral supervision;
- ii. a parallel protection force for Angola made up from countries acceptable to Angola and not likely to infuriate Reagan, e.g. Nigeria-India-Yugoslavia-Netherlands-Finland;
- iii. parallel implementation of UNTAG force and Angola Protection force.

NB: when RSA is down to 1,500 men in Namibia and UNTAG is running DMZ in Northern Namibia then Angola's security worries will be much less. RSA cannot attack directly (except by fast marine vessel and even that is risky as en route it would be in Namibian waters by day both up and back) as DMZ would cut off land and Walvis Bay/Rooscamp airfield is out of operational range for fighter or ground support planes. Further, UNITA can hardly be kept going across DMZ without logistical air support since a) unlike Mozambique there is no common border but several hundred miles of gaps and b) on its own UNITA has never fought well. Thus Angola Protection Force needs far less than 15,000 men (the present Cuban force).

13. What could increase likelihood of this scenario happening:

- i. pressure kept up on RSA to maximise international nuisance of Namibia reason for negotiating out;
- ii. selling idea to USA as a way to achieve an international success that will play in Peoria, Paris and Harare (no African capital with a P!);
- iii. getting some European backing for Angola Protection Force (preferably including Netherlands) and broadening Nigeria idea to include India (e.g. getting Commonwealth Secretariat into the act);

- iv. having credible joint offer of Angola Protection Unit and UNTAG/435 on Namibia. They need to happen in parallel but probably should on formal face of it be separate;
- v. get Security Council to provide funds for both halves of iv.

14. Some nuts and bolts:

- i. In USA sell moderate Republicans like Senator Percy - Chairman Foreign Affairs and Senator Kassenbaum - Chairman Foreign S'Committee on Africa. Need to keep Senator Hatfield and Mac Mathias (who will back but are too "left" Republican to sell Reganauts) in picture as well as Democrats, e.g. Senator from Mass. and Rep. from New York (Solarz) who are African "specialists".
- ii. also sell foreign oriented big business e.g. Wayne Fredericks (VP, Ford Motor - formerly Ford Foundation), D. Rockefeller, Gulf Oil, etc. - they want an Angolan settlement and think USA official line is mad because it alienates a good customer and opens doors for Moscow. VP Ford Foundation Francis Xavier (Frank) Sutton is an intellectual establishment interaction point with them. AAI may be a useful conduit (to USA= Admin. not to Africa-).
- iii. the most likely groups to be able to run this are USA churches. Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian (whatever my comments on his autocracy as chairman at Vancouver, Bill Thompson is formidable and would, I think, be interested). Preferably people not already known as high profile SWAPO backers or at least not only such people. (You aren't high profile - Bill Johnston is.)
- iv. in Europe, Lutheran Church (via WLF) action is needed in Germany. The scenario would probably appeal to EKD (Lutheran - Reformed confederation) especially because of Angola end and approach to ending two wars at once. (EKD is very conservative and "reds under beds" ish at top levels albeit its delegation at Vancouver was in near revolt against the top - i.e. it was more progressive.) Netherlands leadership should be reformed church - who are involved to a degree and would be overjoyed (at top level) to have a success of quiet diplomacy to show their Christian Action groups who (sometimes unfairly) accuse them of being too cautious and "corridors of power" oriented. Approaches to Nordic countries would need to be Lutheran. France and Portugal would be, in principle, happy with this (or almost any) dual track approach including protection for Angola, as, I think, would Italy. Don't know what church channels there. The

Western Europe church centre for EEC might have leads. In UK presumably should go via Anglican Church, if possible, and if not Methodist. (International section of BCC is all anti-nuclear, Canon Osterreicher is an extreme case of failing to see how his peace line looks to be peace before justice and justice later and secondary seen from South. Cannot expect much BCC attention. After Anglican team visit Canterbury - represented by Primate's specialist lay roving ambassador - may be casting about for ways to bestir itself.)

- v. The people to convince Angola are Mozambique, Sweden, Portugal. I doubt use of direct church contacts, i.e. the offer of a credible force not goodwill is needed to convince Luanda. The most likely churchman to have any influence in Angola is the Methodist (UM diocese) Bishop Emilio de Carvalho. A (USA) UM person who might be useful is Dr. Jan Love (a re-elected WCC Central Committee member - 32 - professor - international concerns - 530 Deerwood C-1, Columbia, SC 29205. Friend of mine.) Another possible African Christian is the Most Reverend Walter Makhulu, Primate of the Church of the Province of Central Africa (Anglican - Zimbabwe/Botswana/perhaps Swaziland, Lesotho - I'm not sure whether last two yet disentangled from Province of SA), Moderator (President?) African Council of Churches, Co-President WCC. He is a South African, a diplomat, a 'moderate' liked by European establishmentarians.

vi. Re. South Africa I think the approach has to be indirect:

- a. USA official pressure if scenario is saleable to State and White House (I do not see any opposition from Schultz or Crocker if Congressional Republican pressure and White House acquiescence. In White House I'd suppose McFarlane - the National Security Adviser - and Baker would be attracted to approach.);
- b. South African business pressure. Here convincing USA business and having them talk to RSA counterparts is one way. Another is to sell somebody like Andrew Young who has good contacts with Anglo American and is a friend of Oppenheimer's.

- 15. As I did indicate the overall tactics and approach (but not the end result if they work) are quite conservative. The possible appeal to White House (a triumph for Reagan, a defeat for Cuba, an election campaign plus) and to South Africa (Botha as diplomatic master who removed Cuban/Angolan threat) are taking account of "thing things" (even if in some sense bad things - helping re-elect RR or solidify PW-Botha at home are unfortunate costs to me). But if it works this scenario gets a Namibian settlement in a frame which ensures a SWAPO electoral victory and gives Angola the security of moving RSA troops several hundred miles from its borders and making effective RSA operation of UNITA. almost ineffective.

My concerns are independence of Namibia, a chance to develop for Angola, stopping the killing.

16. I am not a good person to appear publicly in any such efforts. I am far too known as a hard core SWAPO person - and with some reason. (I should note that this memo is my own responsibility, it is not a SWAPO initiative.) I am happy to talk privately to key people on voluntary organisation side if this becomes useful. By same token I would not advise a high PCR (WCC) profile but would see them as sources of names, contacts, advice.
17. I've labelled this "Secret" for evident reasons. I have no objection to your showing it to a few people you trust or - if it would be useful - saying we talked through a possible scenario and what voluntary bodies - esp. Lutheran, Anglican, Reformed, Catholic churches - might do to nudge it along.

RHG
22-XII-83.