

EARLY WARNINGS, EARLY WARNERS, EARLY RESPONSE

Reflections on Tete (1989) and Southern Africa (1992)

INTRODUCTION

I. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

A. Satellite Photo Interpretation/Weather Interpretation (Availability and Adequacy)

B. Bottom Up Data Aggregation (Zonal, National)

- Crop Projections/Outcomes
- Market Surveys (Quantity Price)
- Health - Morbidity, Underweight (Malnutrition)

II. DEMAND, SUPPLY, LOGISTICS BALANCES

A. Domestic Production

- Total
- Producer Consumed
- Marketed

Imports

- Commercial - Known Channels
- - 'Border Traffic'
- Committed Food Aid

Stocks

BALANCE (National-Zonal-Urban-Rural)

B. Response To Imbalance

- Commercial Purchases (Finance)
- Emergency Appeal

III. WATER - THE FORGOTTEN FACTOR

- Sporadic Inclusion (e.g. UNICEF Southern Africa 1992)
- Can cause more dislocation than food production fall if logistics for food aid OK

TETE PROVINCE 1989

A. Road to Dearth

- 1997/98 Crop Failure (Rainfall/Civil War)
- Blockage Urban Food Aid (bureaucratic)

B. Early Warning

- Provincial Calamities Commission

C. Early Non-Response

- FAO - no drought/'normal' rainfall
- UN Provincial Food Aid Coordinator - annual leave as warning given
- Confusion

D. Rapid Reassessment

- Finance Ministry exploration team
- Horrified Report
- Finance to PM to President
- UNICEF to UNDP to New York

E. Results

- 6 months 600 tonnes/6 weeks 6,000
- Bureaucratic Snag, with EU cleared
- Vehicles 'found'
- 'Compulsory Unloading' food to Malawi (official or unofficial averted)
- 20,000 do **not** die

**SOUTHERN AFRICA (1992): The Great Drought (91-92), The Great Dearth (92-93),
Averting The Great Death (92-93)**

A. THE GREAT DROUGHT 1991/92

- Precursor Years
- Reserve Movements
- 1991/92 Rains
- Course of War
- Limited Commercial Import Capacity

B. EARLY WARNINGS - THE FOUR HORSEMEN MOUNT TO RIDE

- National - Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique
- Regional - SADC Food Security Unit
- Concerned - UNICEF/WFP (Maputo), NGO's, Jan Pronk, Others

E. THE TOXIN SOUNDS

- EU (Brussels) with Pledges
- NGO/UNICEF/SADCC

- “It may indeed be too late... if we do not even try history will not forgive us nor should it”.
- 3,000,000 lives at risk

F. BELATED EARLY RESPONSE

- FAO/WFP (plus UNICEF) assessment moved June to March
- Accept National/SADCC Data (April)
- Detailed Regional/National Need Analysis
- UN-SADCC Pledging Conference (June)
- SADC/SA Logistics Coordination

G. RESULTS

- Food Flows
- Reaches Mozambique Ports and Zimbabwe Field Distribution Centres 5 to 10 days before stocks and other flows would have run out
- Only one arterial port route clogs (Durban - and why)
- Rural Water Dislocated Higher than Food 2 cities/municipal zones of 1 million each within fortnight of evacuation before new rain flows arrive
- Varied *ad hoc* Distribution Systems
- 2,800,000 do not die - 200,000 almost all where war impeded delivery

H. BUILDING ON SUCCESS

- Donors pat selves on back as sole authors of success
- Near deadly lay in response overlooked
- Future water strategy and basic vulnerability reduction the 2 cities not achieved (much less implemented)
- River Basin Water Allocation Conventions Begun (SADCC)
- Systematic Work For Food Standby and National Interim Stock Build-up Not Financed
- 1997 Lesser Dearth Response Only Slightly More Timeous Than 1992 and Possibly Less Adequate In Scope.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

- A. Early Warning
- B. Analysis
- C. Outcry
- D. Joint (Regional Action) - Analysis, Outcry, Negotiation, Logistic
- E. National System Preparation
 - Works Programmes (Standby)
 - Food Sales To Finance Emergency Works Jobs
 - Focus National and Domestic Social Sector Institutions
 - Phasing Northwestern NGO's Out of Major Roles
- F.
 - Include Water
 - Include Future Vulnerability Reduction (in Works Done, in Interim Stock Building)

- R H Green

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