

**Strategic approaches to
post-war economic reconstruction and
livelihood rehabilitation
in sub-Saharan Africa**

**Project Proposal
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Summary

Economic reconstruction after war is a critical step in the transition from relief to development in sub-Saharan Africa. As with natural calamities (such as drought), man-made catastrophes are not best served by a dichotomy between survival relief and development assistance with no linking elements. In many cases, e.g. Mozambique and the Horn, calamities and catastrophes interact, creating complex emergencies. Since the initial post World War II era in Western Europe and Japan, post-war reconstruction is a little researched area.

The post World War II experience suggests that, if addressed strategically, the process allows quite rapid recovery and establishment of a forward dynamic - e.g., Federal Germany, Japan - but, if not addressed, leads to very slow recovery and even failure to regain pre-war production levels in key sectors - e.g., Burmese rice and petroleum. This would appear to be particularly true in respect to the livelihoods of displaced persons and to small farming family sectors, which are not automatically re-empowered by rebuilding infrastructure.

In sub-Saharan Africa, at least fourteen countries with a combined population of 175 million people currently face the challenge of post-war reconstruction. They vary in the nature of conflict they have experienced, in the extent of decapitalisation, and in their approaches to reconstruction. However, common issues arise in each case, to do with the macro-economic management of reconstruction, alternative routes to livelihood rehabilitation and the role of different aid instruments, including food and financial aid.

The proposal is to conduct a literature survey, to visit each of five case study countries in SSA, to commission country papers from citizens based in the countries, and to prepare a conceptual and programmatic comparative paper including specific attention to policy and programming issues and priorities. If justified, a second phase would involve more in-depth country studies and an international conference.

The project will be implemented by the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK in collaboration with colleagues in Europe. The total cost is estimated at 190,000 ecu.

I. PURPOSE

Background and Justification

1. The immediate objective of the research is to examine the process of post-war reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation in five Sub-Saharan African countries - two in Southern Africa and three in the Horn. From this, it is intended to identify applied strategy and policy guidelines relevant to these countries and to other SSA countries facing similar problems; and to explore the implications for more effective donor/country interaction..
2. If the study is successful a second stage is envisaged, concentrating on one or two countries in greater depth.
3. The number of SSA economies which face or will - hopefully soon - face post-war reconstruction challenges is at least 14, with a total population in excess of 175,000,000 (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Western Sahara, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia/Somaliland, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi). Therefore, the question of how best to conceptualise and to programme post-war economic strategy is of substantial concern to a significant proportion of the world's population and to agencies involved in providing resources in support of economic survival, adjustment, transformation and development.
4. Reconstruction and rehabilitation rarely, if ever, mean literal replication of the pre-war position. Neither practicability nor desirability point in that direction. This is at least as true of household income rehabilitation to levels sustainably above absolute poverty lines as of patterns of infrastructure or service provision. Nevertheless, substantial elements of physical and social infrastructure, of commercial systems, of market access and of public service delivery of services (including law and order) often do need to be repaired or rebuilt on lines broadly similar to what existed before. That is not uniquely a top-down view - Mozambican displaced persons/refugees and local government personnel tend to express it very forcefully.
5. Poverty alleviation - beyond repairing increases caused by war - is a specific strategic priority in several countries, e.g. Mozambique, Namibia, Ethiopia, and probably at least implicitly in Somaliland and Eritrea. This fact has implications for the importance of decentralised rural livelihood rehabilitation related to market access, physical infrastructure and basic service rehabilitation. The extent to which rural recovery - via provision of food, production inputs and markets - would also substantially reduce urban poverty is an issue to be researched.
6. Appropriate public service/governance issues arise. Without a strategic framework, rehabilitation does not appear (in SSA or elsewhere) to generate critical momentum. Negligible technical capacity below Provincial/Regional level, inadequate numbers of inadequately trained basic cadres (in social sector as well as governance institutions), and low public sector pay exacerbate both design and implementation problems. Experience - especially in Mozambique and Ethiopia - with massive direct action by external agencies (including NGOs) suggest that these may increase short term delivery capacity, but at the price of cumulative fragmentation and decapitation of domestic governance and social sector institutions; and that they are not usually cost efficient per unit of service delivered when contrasted with domestic governmental or social sector channels. Examining potential routes away from the present limited public service/domestic social sector capacity and absence of a

coherent articulated strategic framework with at best limited user input pattern will be a significant element in the project.

Aspects of rehabilitation

7. Aspects of reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation after war include:

- a. rebuilding of a climate of law and order and of governance generally accepted as legitimate (a result closely linked to delivery of b and c);
- b. reconstruction of physical infrastructure;
- c. restoration of basic human social and economic services (including human investment) and of public service and social sector capacity to deliver them;
- d. rehabilitation of market systems and directly productive enterprises;
- e. recreation of functioning local level social and community systems;
- f. rehabilitation (not replication) of livelihoods, including in particular those of small farm rural households (including reintegration into production of persons who have been refugees, internally displaced or pauperised in place amid devastation).

8. It is unlikely that any element would be totally irrelevant to any reconstruction programme. However, their relative importance may vary sharply. In general, the second - physical infrastructure - has received the most emphasis (especially as to large scale projects) and the fourth (market systems) and the last (livelihood rehabilitation) the least. This may be highly inefficient. For example, certain aspects of the present use of food aid impede restoration of market access and commercial enterprise recovery. Similarly, failure to coordinate the phasing out of support to refugees and displaced persons with support to resume production has negative poverty, food security and macroeconomic implications.

9. These aspects interact, although how and how uniformly are among the issues to be explored.

Relevant Diversities

10. The nature of reconstruction challenges and opportunities depends in part on the nature of the previous war period. Relevant aspects include:

- a. duration;
- b. geographic coverage;
- c. numbers of households driven into external or domestic places of refuge or pauperised in home areas;
- d. physical decapitalisation through war damage;

- e. physical decapitalisation through non-maintenance,
- f. disintegration/deterioration of basic economic, human and social services through destruction, war related financial constraints or lack of access;
- g. degree of damage to economic sectors crucial to exports, investible surplus and government revenue.

11 There are extreme variations on these. Namibia, for example had very little physical decapitalisation related either to destruction or to non-maintenance; Ugandan decapitalisation was severe but related much more to non-maintenance than to direct war damage; Mozambique has been severely affected on both heads. Angola's key sector - petroleum - has been to a significant degree protected from war impact, as have Namibia's fishing-mining-ranching sectors, whereas the core agricultural export/domestic urban food supply sectors of Mozambique have been devastated. Rwanda's physical destruction, outside Kigali, is limited, but the social, human and institutional devastation is equalled only by parts of Somalia.

12. An additional set of diversities relates to post-war approaches:

- a. has reconstruction been identified as a strategic focus and related explicitly to core macroeconomic strategy?
- b. was an early start made toward implementation of physical reconstruction and (or) livelihood rehabilitation?
- c. has substantial funding (relative to estimated requirements) been available?

13. Again there appear to be significant differences. For example, the answers for Mozambique would appear to be 'yes, yes, no' while for Uganda they appear to be 'physical reconstruction yes', 'livelihood rehabilitation no' and 'yes on finance' subject to the limitation that no serious overall livelihood restoration strategy has been programmed.

Cross-country Issues - Common Questions

14. Given the sparseness of readily available, systematic data, a set of case studies on post-war reconstruction would constitute a substantial addition to knowledge in and of themselves. That contribution - and the set's value as a base for comparative study and conceptual analysis - can be enhanced by securing data answering a set of common questions on general and crucial issues:

- 1. How important quantitatively is potential livelihood rehabilitation (especially in small farm agriculture) to Gross Domestic Product recovery?
- 2. And what is its order of magnitude relevance to other key macroeconomic elements, e.g. exports, government revenue, sustainable household demand for urban goods?
- 3. What is its potential relevance to increasing food security (for producers and for urban consumers)? To reduction of the proportion of households in absolute poverty?

4. Can labour intensive public works be a cost efficient means to combine infrastructure rehabilitation, cash income generation (including supplementary income for rural households and survival)? Are they likely to be more or less costly to carry out than a combination of capital intensive works plus poverty alleviation (or social support) transfers? What obstacles impede their broader use?
5. Which gender issues (e.g. divisions of labour, income and expenditure within households, land tenure systems, timely access to ploughing) are important to rehabilitation design and implementation?
6. Does rural and peri urban livelihood rehabilitation prioritisation provide opportunities for ecological sustainability enhancement/damage reduction. How?
7. How can food aid be used in ways not impeding market access for surplus producers and recovery of rural commercial networks?
8. To what extent do private enterprises (in commerce and manufacturing) respond to improved infrastructure and higher (potential) consumer incomes? Is the frequently sluggish response because of unfriendly state policy? Inadequately supportive state policy? Other? Or all three?
9. What would be the costs and benefits of a full scale rehabilitation/reconstruction programme over 5 years? What would the resultant total expenditure/additional GDP (direct plus multiplier) be? The cost per household directly benefiting? Would the additional recurrent expenses and imports for sustaining these results be financeable out of taxes (including indirect taxes) and exports gained from them? If so, when?
10. How resilient are local communities? Local governance institutions? What government initiatives are more likely to facilitate rather than to stifle their recovery?

15. There is no reason to expect wholly uniform answers - indeed quite the contrary. For Mozambique, rural livelihood rehabilitation (or its absence) will dominate 1995-2000 GDP performance. For Namibia, the additional GDP (albeit not necessarily the poverty and food security) results appear certain to be relatively small. The export gains impact depends on the nature of exports - Mozambique, whose goods exports used to be dominated by annual crops grown by small farming households is in a very different position from Angola, with an export base dominated by petroleum.

16. One interesting question is whether emphasis on reconstruction/rehabilitation does correlate with potential macroeconomic importance or is largely determined by other factors (e.g. political commitment to poverty reduction, degree of contextual innovativeness of policy analysis - either of which could explain the Mozambican emphasis as much as the central macroeconomic significance of small farming family income rehabilitation).

Where?

17. The proposed countries for study are: Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland (NW Somalia) and Namibia. If initial exploration indicates one is unsuitable or impracticable, alternates are Angola (if peace is achieved), Rwanda and Uganda.

18. The first three countries have focused on reconstruction with a substantial livelihood rehabilitation component as a major economic policy cluster. In Mozambique, this is directly linked to macroeconomic strategy as perceived by the government. Somaliland illustrates reconstruction in one zone of a territory the rest of which is still afflicted by war. Namibia is a case at a longer distance from the end of widespread conflict and one in which reconstruction from war has been concentrated in one zone and related more to rural livelihood enhancement than to post-war physical reconstruction as such.

II. METHOD

19. The initial phase would consist of a literature review, conceptualisation and articulation of issues, themes, hypotheses and data requirements. In part this would draw on a decade of work with cost of conflict, emergency/development links and post-war reconstruction by the researcher. This includes a body of published work (see end of this section) and other less formal materials.

20. During this phase, individual and institutional contacts would be built up in each country to be covered. Many would be persons or institutions with which the researcher or other IDS Fellows have worked previously. In each case preliminary identification of an associate to write a country paper would be attempted. Should any country (e.g. Somaliland) prove impracticable, a substitution would be made. Angola and Rwanda would be leading candidates if it has become reasonably clear that they have emerged from a war to a lasting post-war stage.

21. The second phase would include field visits by the researcher. These would collect statistical and other published/semi-published as well as interview data. They would also be the occasion for definite selection of the five country study associates.

22. Preliminary examination, revision of conceptualisation and synthesis would begin on the basis of the field visits but be intensified on the basis of the country papers. A workshop on the synthetic chapters, applied policy conclusions and country papers would be held at IDS involving the researcher, paper authors, other IDS Fellows working on related topics and selected other researchers on post-conflict situations.

23. A discussion paper, a monograph, a briefing paper and possibly an *IDS Bulletin* would conclude this research project. A workshop in Brussels is also proposed. However, it is envisaged as an initial phase if its results justify a longer, more in-depth study of one or two countries.

III. PROGRAMME

24. The timing, personnel and inputs required for the three stages of the project are summarised in Figure 1. A bar chart is in Figure 2.

Figure 1

Summary of programme

Phase	Description	Activities	Inputs required
I	Conceptualisation phase	Literature review Preparation of overview paper Preliminary work on country cases Visit to Brussels Planning workshop	Principal researcher (30 days) Research Officer (2 months) Other professional inputs (10 days) Support costs Visit to Brussels (2 x air ticket + 2 x 3 days' subsistence)
II	Field work phase	Visit to five countries Recruitment of national consultants Preparation of country case studies	Principal researcher (70 days) Research Officer (3 months) Travel and subsistence Communications etc . . National consultants (5 x 2 person months)
III	Synthesis phase	Workshop at IDS Finalisation of country case studies Drafting of final synthesis report	Principal researcher (20 days) Research Officer (2 months) Other professional inputs (20 days) Participation in workshop! 5 x SSA (travel + subsistence + fee for 1 week) 5 x UK (travel + subsistence + fee for 3 days) 5 x EU (travel + subsistence + fee for 3 days) Workshop costs (photocopying, communications, tea/coffee/lunch etc.... research assistance)
IV	Dissemination phase	Preparation of IDS Bulletin and Briefing Paper Workshop in Brussels	Principal researcher (10 days) Research Officer (2 months) Publication costs Workshop in Brussels (2 x air ticket + 2 x 3 days' subsistence)

Figure 2

Bar chart

Phase	Item	1996											
		March	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec		
Conceptualisation phase	Literature review	x	x	x									
	Visit to Brussels	x											
	Planning workshop		x										
Field work phase	Visit to five countries		x	x									
	Preparation of country cases		x	x	x	x							
Synthesis phase	Workshop at IDS							x					
	Drafting of final report							x	x				
Dissemination phase	IDS Bulletin and Briefing Paper									x	x		
	Workshop in Brussels											x	

25. In the first phase, the Researcher would spend 30 days in UK on literature review and refining/articulating conceptualisation from his existing body of related work. The Research Officer would spend up to two months on literature review/summarisation. A semi-formal seminar would be held with other IDS staff (e.g. Simon Maxwell, Jeremy Swift, Susanna Davies) with experience in the field. Selected other European researchers will be consulted as well as EU personnel involved in interacting relief/development work. The researcher would use his own and IDS contacts to arrange for field visits. The bulk of this work would be completed in March and April 1996.

26. The Researcher would then travel to each of the five countries for one and a half to two weeks. During this time he would conduct interviews with officials, researchers and social sector leaders and collect empirical and other published data. In parallel, an associate would be identified to produce a longer country paper and participate in a workshop at IDS. This first part of the second phase would be completed in April and May 1996. The national consultants would complete their papers by July 1996.

27. The Researcher would review data collected and papers (due July 1996) for Workshop (September 1996) and prepare final paper/monograph and report. IDS Publications Department would edit an issue of *IDS Bulletin* and a special briefing paper based on the papers by December 1996. A workshop would be held in Brussels at around this time.

IV. DISSEMINATION

28. Draft materials will be used in IDS (Sussex) - IDS (Dar es Salaam) - CEPA (Accra) Study Seminar on Structural Adjustment and Transformation in SSA. This will both reach 30 to 40 senior African practitioners and researchers each year and provide feedback from intended basic audience/users.

28. An *IDS Discussion Paper* will be produced immediately after the Workshop summarising papers - discussion - conclusions. On IDS publications list.

29. A monograph including an overall synthesis and conclusion by researcher, edited country papers by associates and the conference summary will be produced and sent to selected contacts in countries covered and other potential users.

30. An *IDS Bulletin* will be built around Workshop papers and potentially contributions by other researchers pursuing related topics, e.g. M. Duffield, J. Macrae. It would have an enhanced distribution to selected policy makers in the case study and similarly placed SSA countries and to selected international and bilateral agencies involved in reconstruction and development.

31. Finally, an IDS Briefing paper will be produced to make the results of the project widely available to policy-makers.

V. BUDGET

32. The budget for the project is 190,000 ECU, made up as follows:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Unit cost (ecu)</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Total (ecu)</u>
1.	<u>Personnel</u>			
	i. Principal researcher	519/day	130	67470
	ii. Research Officer	2380/month	9	21420
	iii. National consultants	1900/ month	11.5	21850
	iv. Other researchers	417	60	25020
	Sub-total			135760
2.	<u>Travel and subsistence</u>			
	i. Int'l air fares			
	London - Brussels/Europe	360	9	3240
	SSA Round trip	6000	1	6000
	SSA - UK	1500	5	7500
	ii. Domestic travel			300
	iii. Subsistence - SSA	140/day	70	9800
	iv. Subsistence - UK	60/day	50	3000
	v. Subsistence - Brussels	226/day	12	2712
	Sub-total			32552
3.	<u>Other direct costs</u>			
	i. Computer services			2976
	ii. Communications			2000
	iii. Workshop costs			4500
	iv. Dissemination			5000
	Sub-total			14476
4.	<u>Contingencies</u>			7212
	Grand total			190000

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Relevant papers by Professor R.H. Green:

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11. (Report for UNICEF), 1995, *That They May Be Whole Again: Offsetting Refugee Influx Burdens on Ngara and Karagwe Districts*, Dar es Salaam.
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File

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

MEMORANDUM

To: Simon Maxwell

Date: 2 November, 1995

From: Reg Green

Ref: sh

Complex Emergencies: Before-During-After

1. Herewith some questions re 'bid'
2. Herewith also my old ESCOR do revised for EU
3. What next on # 1?
4. What next on # 2 re EU, i.e., more changes? To whom? How channelled?

P.S. Re Food Aid.

1. How does one approach cases in which nutrition *per se* is not basic objective - budget support or incentive to key workers is?
2. In principle pure case for monetisation. But in Ghana and Somalia selected 'high value', favoured foods (rice, cooking oil, tinned fish) distributed sectorally (export sector in one case and public service in the other) have worked. User preference key as had to get bulgar wheat **out** in Ghana and shift to sorghum in Somalia has bad impact (families can provide teachers/nurses **that** and spouses can grow).

Key Themes

(JT suggests we stress our 3-5 big ideas)

1. It is possible to do something useful even in worst periods -
2. What is done today strongly influences what can be done tomorrow (e.g. capacitating or - more usual - decapacitating emergency support and both prolonged crisis coping and recovery)
3. Domestic base and middle level professionals and their working structures are central to sustainability at all stages
4. Individual actions need to be within a macro frame to allow strategic prioritisation of scarce resource use and to identify both partner capacity and routes to sustainability
5. While survival and livelihood/basic services strengthening can support basically political (or political economic) strategies for averting, ending, reconciling ethnic and other civil conflicts they cannot, in general, either substitute for or constitute such strategies which are largely beyond aid agency management.

Micro - Macro

How can one incorporate strategic macro elements into survival-rehabilitation-prevention?

- a. consolidate proposed micro to get aggregated whole
- b. compare "a" with sectoral and macro structures
- c. revise "a" in light of "b" where war causing grave cumulative damage in ways initial "a" did not address
- d. identify key macro issues
 - avoiding mass population movement
 - avoiding mass refugee/displaced person camps
 - avoiding decapacitation central-provincial-local government.
 - identifying indirect damage/costs (e.g. Zimbabwe drought has serious value added/household wage income implications for manufacturing, commerce, transport, fiscal sectors and thus GDP and Govt. Budget -)

Continuums and Continuous Interactions

Can one assume war-rehabilitation-development is standard pattern?

- if not, what implications (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda)?
- even if yes, how build in calamity (natural disaster, e.g. drought) impact - calamities are made **worse** by conflict but don't not recur when it ends (e.g. 1994/5 Mozambique -)

If normal pattern includes shocks - even if not necessarily complex political ones - what type of continuum should be conceptualised and how can it both manage crisis and sustain some medium term strategic integrity?

When is survival oriented crisis coping (grab-jab-dab) the only feasible core response? What parallel planning can be done to be able to respond rapidly when circumstances change?

Is a basic services oriented programme beyond survival justified if uncertainty of conflict makes survival problematic - unit costs per unit of service high? (e.g. Central Somalia).

Prevention

How, and what kind of, prevention can be built into development support?

- a. against natural calamities (e.g. drought proof rural/urban water reserve stocks basic human and veterinary drugs -)
- b. against exacerbation sub-national tensions (e.g. user friendly nomadic education, health services; water supply reducing drought year risk; reserve drought year pastures to replace those encroached on by crops in **Mali**)
- c. providing livelihood rehabilitation for ex-combatants - (I do not see how ODA can deal with prevention in cases like Rwanda/Burundi or even Nigeria or Kenya - It **can** cut off aid but that is a political not a programming instrument -)

No Government

What survival/rehabilitation/development services can be maintained in the absence of functional national governments?

- via communities (which may have cash, food and personnel resources up to primary unit level)
- via professional committees (which may have staff, experience but no resources for salaries, mobility, linking up community based primary units)
- via local government bodies (slightly less undersourced than committees but focused on civil admin and civilian policing)
- via substantial zonal governance units with most characteristics of national governments **except** international recognition (e.g. former British Somaliland)

How widely do cases lumped as no government ('failed state') vary?

Successful Interim Recovery Oriented Survival

(Prolonged politico-military crisis with shifting possibilities)

1. Emergency Food Support When Needed

- dry rations to senior woman each affected household (all or almost all if drought or conflict prevention of planting-tending-harvesting has resulted in low or nil food -)
- food for work on displaced person facilities/local infrastructure-housing
- child feeding (preferably linked to clinics) focused on Unimix (adults do not like it so children get 99%)
- identified group (e.g. pastoralists who have lost entire herds, refugees with little or no land/water or kinship support access) feeding on longer term basis preferably by food for work
- to the extent commercial system works (very case specific) work for cash for food should be substituted for food for work

2. Support For Renewed Production Non-Conflict Periods

- seeds
- hand tools - hoes, cutlasses/machetes (bush clearing), pails, (water collection)
- creation basic veterinary drug stocks and pastoral community based para-veterinary delivery system on partially self-sustaining basis

3. Interim Health Services

- Standby basic drug stocking (if safe in area - otherwise nearest safest place)
- Clinics/health post combining mch/basic health care/supplementary child feeding and epi
- Campaign epi **especially** if and when substantial population dislocation
- Support for "district hospital" level care in towns

- Maximum interaction with community based groups and professional groups (whether public servants, official but unpaid committees or independent) seeking to maintain services

4 Interim Education Systems

- Restoration of Primary Schools - with parents/communities
- Creating *ad hoc* (with domestic professionals if possible) teacher training, school inspection, desk top publishing capacity
- Exploring possible links with existing 'non-formal' (e.g. Koranic) education

5. Water Access Restoration

- Restoration low cost elements urban services
- Supporting creation urban and (individual) borehole water 'authorities' to render post capital project maintenance/operation self-sustaining
- Well/borehole/pond/spring restoration
- Sanitation education
- Use domestic professional groups as link to user communities and authority operators (implying office-mobility-sustenance support)

6. General Incentives

- Public servants - primary and coordination/servicing levels (health, education, water, urban administration, veterinary/agriculture, civil police)
- Unless fiscally solvent state (unlikely):
 - a. community support (likely to be food or help with production)
 - b. high value (not locally produced/readily monetisable if necessary) food aid (e.g. rice, wheat flour, sugar, cooking oil, tinned fish)
 - c. cash 'supplements' - to add together with a/b to \$50 a month.

7. Focus

- a. present survival

- b. human investment services
- c. keeping service delivery/use capacities and habits alive
- d. strengthening people and production at household level so more able to survive next crisis period
- e. **but** also building in a way allowing (not obstructing) shift to full recovery programming if peace (or at least no war) breaks out.

Successful Recovery

1. Achievement largely self-sustaining household livelihoods for at least 90% of people and reduction sub-absolute poverty line of households below 25%
2. Sustainable restoration of basic services (health, education, extension, water, police/magistracy) at least to pre-crisis levels
3. Similar sustainable restoration of physical infrastructure at local (rural/urban) levels and of market access
4. Restoration of public service productivity/professionalism/pay to levels consistent 2-3 maintenance and further development
5. Re-achievement of macroeconomic patterns yielding manageable food, fiscal, market, external imbalance levels and trends (both in respect to macro impact of rehabilitation programme and more generally)
6. Avoidance of inequalities, inequities, poverty pressures massively exacerbating social-political-ethnic tensions and threatening law and order breakdown/renewed conflict
7. Reintegration into civilian livelihoods of bulk of ex-combatants to avert 'privatisation' of violence (brigandage) or/and renewal organised conflict).

R. H. G. 'expertise'

Mozambique

War/Post-war
(includes macro of war period and areas reachable with difficulty - • **NOT** no govt. access areas)

Rwanda

Post-war/Preventative (basic services on non-ethnic coverage expansion basis could help)

Ethiopia (limited)

Post-war/Near con-federal decentralisation public services as prevention and its snags -

Somalia

War (Survival - Basic Services - Hope)

Somaliland

Post-war ('non-recognition' problem)

Tanzania

'Post War' (Burden of spill-over via Rwanda refugee initial arrival damage and ongoing environmental destruction - wood/water -)

(Namibia/South Africa **but** these are not optimal as it is structural apartheid legacy not war *per se* which is problem and civil war as such quite unlikely -)

If we want SSA only:

- A. **Horn** (4) (excluding Djibouti - excluding Sudan - unless you or SCF or Leeds/B'ford feel strongly)
- B. **Rwanda** (Tanzania) (2) (and Tanzania spill-over from Rwanda)
- C. **Mozambique** (1)
- D. **Mali** (if Jeremy has relevant expertise/interest -)
- E/F. **Zimbabwe/Namibia** (historical as not **now** post-war in sense influencing programme -)
- G. **Angola** (only **if** clear path to non-war in time)

-
- H. **El Salvador** Candidates if largely but not exclusively SSA -
 - I. **Sri Lanka** We have no expertise except MM on Sri Lanka - don't know of relevant work.
 - J. **Kampuchea** No IDS expertise. SCF?
 - K. **Bosnia/Croatia/Macedonia** No IDS expertise

SCF probably operates in all - except Sri Lanka conflict zones
AA strong in Mozambique