

1 To Appendix in ACR 80-81) Background

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION: THE STRUGGLE
CONTINUES

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Liberation versus Constellation

As 1980 opened there were two major contending thrusts toward economic coordination in Southern Africa - the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) launched at the July 1979 Arusha Conference of the Front Line States and the South African "Constellation of States" endeavour highlighted by Prime Minister Botha's November 1979 Carleton Center Address.¹

At that point the future of both was problematic. SADCC still lacked a formal interstate agreement and the participation of the independent states of the region outside the Front Line grouping. The critical role of Zimbabwe in the struggle for regional coordination was clear. The timing and auspices of Zimbabwe's independence appeared to all but the most convinced supporters of ZANU (PF) and Robert Mugabe to be uncertain. While the distaste of all the independent Southern African states for a formalisation and solidification of South Africa's economic hegemony through the "constellation" was clear, their ability to resist it was less so.

Early in 1980 ZANU(PF) won the Zimbabwe elections. On April 1, Prime Minister designate Robert Mugabe initialled "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation",² the SADCC Charter endorsed by Heads of State or Government (or in two cases their representatives) of the nine independent states of the region. In November SADCC-2 was held in Maputo with detailed programmes in transport, communications and food security and attracted pledges of about \$650 million from over thirty states and institutions.³ Meanwhile a "competing" London constellation revival conference collapsed.

Parallel to the main thrusts were negotiations toward an Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area and

toward outlining steps for effective sanctions against South Africa and toward limiting their harmful impact on neighbouring states. As 1980 opened, the first - under ECA auspices - seemed likely to produce a treaty within the year while the latter - under OAU auspices - appeared to be making little headway. As of early 1981, the PTA was still in official level consultation and negotiation. The sanctions/support work, however, had acquired a new momentum with the much greater OAU/Non-Aligned pressure for sanctions following South Africa's sabotage of the January 1981 Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference.⁴

"Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation"

The heads of state or government of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Swaziland, the prime minister designate of Zimbabwe, and representatives of Lesotho and Malawi met in Lusaka on April 1st 1980⁵ to consider ways and means to reduce regional dependence - especially on South Africa, to forge links toward genuine and equitable regional integration, to mobilize resources in support of these goals and to secure international cooperation for economic liberation. On April 1 they adopted the Lusaka Declaration - "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation" - to form the basis for Southern African Development Coordination.

The Declaration, accompanying speeches and background papers,⁶ suggest commitment to several main themes: development of concrete joint programmes among two or more states, flexibility, openness for SADCC members to participate in other bilateral or regional cooperation groups, identification of key areas for initial action, involvement of Liberation Movements in manpower development and pre-independence economic planning.

SADCC is quite overtly concerned with the liberation of Southern Africa. However, unlike the Front Line states, it does not focus on political, diplomatic and military issues. Rather it is concerned with increasing national and regional economic strength and self reliance and with reducing concentrated external dependence, especially on South Africa. In that sense it is - as the late President Khama of Botswana who convened the Arusha and Lusaka meetings stressed - not directed against anyone but toward positive achievements by its members.

SADCC does not - in standard terms - have a political economic ideology. Its concentration on common concerns, issues and interests rules that out at the present time. At least four of its members are following basically capitalist strategies with varying degrees of state intervention and participation, two pursue interim mixed economy strategies with a long term commitment to transition to socialism and three are engaged in implementing transition to socialism strategies. To debate overall issues of political economic strategy at the present time would be divisive and divert attention from concrete common concerns. A commitment to reduction of economic dependence on South Africa, a willingness to act jointly to achieve this and acceptance of an important role for state economic intervention are perceived as the necessary common characteristics for SADCC membership.

In principle membership is open to expansion. In practice the only clear case is Namibia on the attainment of genuine independence (President Nujuma of SWAPO was officially present at the Lusaka Summit). Other states are viewed as too far removed from the dominant theme of regional disentanglement from dependence on South Africa and the development of a coherent regional transport and communications network for membership to be appropriate. Ultimately Zaire may be seen as a plausible member and

has evinced some interest in joining but, at present, SADCC members see closer bilateral relations (by Angola, Zambia, Tanzania) and ad hoc sectoral discussions (e.g. with Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and perhaps the SADCC Transport and Communications Commission) as more appropriate and productive.

At Lusaka, as at Arusha,⁷ transport and communications was identified as the first priority area. A Transport and Communications Commission, based in Maputo, was constituted by the Lusaka Declaration "to coordinate the use of existing systems and the planning and financing of additional regional facilities." Other priority areas were semi-arid area agricultural research, food security, industrial coordination, manpower development, energy coordination, financial mechanisms for regional projects and the provision of an interim secretariat together with evolution of proposals as to a more permanent institutional form. These were assigned to Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland, Angola, Zambia and Botswana respectively to act as coordinating countries, draw up proposals and convene official level meetings to report back to the SADCC ministerial meetings.⁸

Dimming of a Constellation

At the end of 1979 the dominant theme in "constellation" strategy was "wider still and wider." From the Republic of South Africa - Bantustan - Namibia - Zimbabwe - BLS core the economic and security grouping would rapidly draw in Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Gabon, the Central African Republic and Mauritius and - perhaps less rapidly or fully - Mozambique and Angola. South Africa would have achieved economic and security lebensraum and the Nationalist Party would have reincorporated the doubting business community through liberalisation at home and outreach regionally.

Basically supportive writers⁹ warned of problems - including

the lack of acceptance by any independent African state - and well disposed but more independent ones¹⁰ queried whether the overt security/political comradeship aspects were practical. What neither took adequate account of was the reality of the SADCC challenge or the vital role of Zimbabwe in either "constellation" or SADCC.

Early 1980 brought two disasters for "constellation" strategies - the ZANU(PF) victory in Zimbabwe and the Lusaka Declaration (with Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi added to the initial Frontline 5). Not merely had a key star fallen from the "constellation" but the initiative had clearly switched and the routes to reducing transport and petroleum dependence on South Africa were suddenly open.

Thus the objectively greater economic strength of South Africa in 1980, its loans to several SADCC states and its emergence as a maize granary for a majority not only failed to lock the "constellation" in place but did not even suffice to keep it as a serious contender for regional organizing leadership. The external events were compounded by the failure of liberalisation domestically leading to the premature 1980 election - blacks were not bought off, business and professionals did not abandon the PFP, but a right wing Afrikaaner backlash threatened to topple Botha.

A 1980 effort to refloat the constellation under the auspices of conservative Euro-MP's, the British South African lobby, South African big business, Andreas Shipanga, with the attempted addition, Commissioner Cheysson of EEC and David Steel of the Liberal Party backfired badly. Upon discovering that the proposed conference had not only no backing from the independent states but their firm opposition and hearing a sharp denunciation of it by Botswana President and SADCC Chairman Quett Mosire in his address to the European

Parliament,¹¹ Cheysson and Steel totally disassociated themselves from the venture and with neither acceptable names nor African state participation it quietly expired.

In December 1980 an overtly business (but including several semi official consultancy body and academic speakers) was held at the Royal Swazi Spa.¹² Its theme of how to do business both in South Africa and the independent states appeared to be an attempt to preserve the economic outreach element of the "constellation" under business auspices. While held, the conference was apparently not notably successful and failed in its goal of attracting a major ECA speaker (Baq Nomvete who was listed in that capacity angrily denounced the sponsors at the Maputo SADCC for having used his name when he had categorically refused to participate).

A further blow to the "constellation" was the April 1981 Swaziland - Lesotho - Mozambique - Botswana summit on economic security in Mbabane. It suggested further erosion of even the unwilling acceptance of South African economic dominance which had characterized Lesotho, Swaziland and - to a lesser degree - Botswana.

Whether a serious attempt can be made to relaunch a more limited "constellation" of South Africa, the Bantustans, a "moderate" recognized government in Namibia and BLS remains to be seen. South Africa has good reason to try and some to believe the USA would under the present administration be supportive.¹³ However, there are daunting obstacles. BLS would strongly oppose any such linkage especially with Bantustans and a Namibistan. No viable Namibian "settlement" excluding SWAPO can be

envisaged. EEC support - diplomatically or financially - would almost certainly not be forthcoming. On balance it would appear that the "constellation" reached its zenith in 1979 and while not yet buried is unlikely to rise again.

Salisbury: Toward Programme Implementation¹⁴

SADCC's first ministerial meeting was held in Salisbury, Zimbabwe in September 1980. Its main topics were preparations for SADCC-2 - the Maputo pledging conference - and progress in the priority work was set out at the Lusaka Summit. The official and ministerial meetings were chaired by Botswana in its role as SADCC coordinating state.

The Transport and Communications Commission had held two official and a ministerial meeting. These had prepared a draft convention and set out both priorities and a preliminary list of projects to be submitted to the Maputo donors conference which were approved by the Ministers.

A preliminary study on food security had been carried out by Zimbabwe and a meeting of experts from partner states was scheduled to prepare a final version for submission to the Maputo Conference. Botswana had contacted the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in respect to the creation of an INCRISAT sub-regional centre for Southern Africa and a team was coming. Discussions on veterinary issues led to the decision to convene a specialists meeting - in the event held jointly with the food security conference. Zimbabwe announced its decision to withdraw from the South African based Southern African regional soil conservation and land utilisation body (SARCCUS).

Manpower development work had included a regional meeting and a consultancy survey of existing institutions. Steps

toward broadening use of other national institutions - including publishing a regional directory - were discussed. Tanzania's preliminary paper on industrial coordination identifying possibilities in short term production and trade expansion from existing capacity, medium term exchange of data on projects under construction and longer term planning coordination of production development was taken as the basis for a subsequent officials meeting.

Further work was requested in respect to the financial institution, energy and secretariat development questions.

Conferencia do Maputo: Proposals and Pledges

The Second SADCC was held in Maputo, Mozambique in November 1980 and attended by all SADCC states and over 30 governments and international development agencies.¹⁵ It was preceded by official and ministerial meetings which continued to receive reports on and supervise the work programme.

The Conference centred on three SADCC papers on Transport and Communications, Regional Food Security, and Strategy.¹⁶ The first laid out a multi year, phased programme covering rail, road, harbour, air, lake and sea transport and telecommunications. The initial phase included over a hundred multi-country projects with probable costs of over \$1.6 billion. A substantial portion related to rehabilitation of the Angolan, Zambian, Mozambican, Tanzanian and Zimbabwean rail systems which had suffered grievously from Rhodesian and South African backed insurgent raids and the impact of financial and import constraints on maintenance during the post 1974 economic crisis and the final phases of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

to commit resources to that cooperation than at Arusha sixteen months earlier and provided a base from which to launch actual project implementation especially in transport and communications and in studies relating to food security and energy.

Beyond Maputo: Toward Implementation

The Maputo SADCC has been followed by a series of technical working meetings. The Transport and Communications Commission had met twice more by mid 1981 to work out coordination of implementation of the earlier projects. The ICRISAT mission had recommended establishment of a sub-regional centre and discussions on its location and programme were beginning.

An initial Industrial Coordination meeting in Dar es Salaam concentrated on identifying areas for expansion of production through regional trade in the short run and some of the practical means toward such action.²⁷ A second meeting on longer term planning coordination was scheduled for the second half of 1981. The first meeting of officials on regional energy policy coordination was held in Luanda.

Additional meetings scheduled for 1981 were a Summit^{probably in Salisbury} and a Ministerial meeting, probably in Mbabane and a 3rd SADCC with external participation probably in Lilongwe. Decisions on the site and structure of a small permanent secretariat were also expected to be taken for 1982 implementation.

Sanctions: Divisive or Cohesive?

SADCC is quite overtly part of the Southern African liberation struggle. On the other hand, it is not the Front Line States and is committed to coordination of material economic action for development rather than to economic action against South Africa. To date, therefore,

South Africa - while hardly concealing its dislike for SADCC - has not threatened its neighbours with ending Customs Union, migrant labour, sales of food or petroleum products or more active destabilisation if they adhere to SADCC.²⁸ Thus the increasing likelihood of meaningful sanctions in respect to petroleum against the Republic could be seen as a threat to SADCC despite its commitment to economic liberation.

The strategy of the OAU and Non-Aligned States to secure an Emergency Special of the General Assembly under the "uniting for peace" procedure, if a Security Council Resolution is - as expected - vetoed, suggests that sanctions to which the majority (probably 100 odd) states voting for such a resolution would be obliged to pay at least some heed are likely. Both the March 1981 joint meeting of the OAU Sanctions Committee and Committee of 19 (on support for front line states)²⁹ and recent technical studies³⁰ suggest that more thought has now gone into what type of sanctions would be practicable and potentially effective and what could be done to lessen their adverse impact on South Africa's neighbours.

The Arusha Meeting concentrated on oil sanctions centred on OAU - Third World oil exporting state cooperations in sanctions against tankers calling at South African (or occupied Namibian) ports and against companies selling petroleum or products to South Africa.³¹ At the same time it stressed the need to achieve a coordinated plan to limit damage to neighbouring states and to ensure adequate petroleum supplies to these (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi) non dependent on South African sources. It seems probable that it will seek to contact SADCC as a regional focus for these cost reducing operations.

The immediate problems of the neighbouring states turn primarily on South Africa's reaction to sanctions. Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe (as well as Malawi) have quite clearly stated that they could not themselves enforce sanctions. However, a South Africa facing damage from sanctions would be likely to cut off their supplies of oil and possibly of other imports and of transport.

The most critical problems would be in respect to petroleum, maize, transport, commercial infrastructure and Lesotho with migrant labour only slightly less critical in the case of Botswana.³² Of these the first and third can only be solved regionally while the second and fourth could be alleviated regionally.

Repair of the pipeline from Beira to Umtali (scheduled for late 1981)³³ would allow importation of petroleum products for Zimbabwe and Botswana. Reactivation of the Feruka refinery (incredibly posited as requiring until late 1982 by Shell/BP) would allow Zimbabwe to refine for both. Swaziland can be supplied from the Maputo refinery and Malawi either by Maputo or by direct imports via Ncala and Beira. There is little doubt that Mozambique and Zimbabwe either directly or through the good offices of the OAU could secure access to OPEC state crude shipments at contract prices to meet the additional demand.

Similarly completion of repairs to the rail lines from Zimbabwe and Zambia to Maputo and Beira and the dredging of Beira's channel would allow Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, and - less conveniently - Botswana to divert their traffic from South African routes. For Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho a major problem would be their present lack of genuine import/export houses (as opposed to branches of

South African wholesalers and small firms who have no knowledge beyond Republic firm catalogues and quotations). While this gap can only be closed nationally,³⁴ in the short run import/export houses in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania could handle some of the business on behalf of their landlocked partners.

Over 1980-81 South African maize exports to seven SADCC states (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique - as well as Kenya to the north) seem likely to exceed 750,000 tonnes. In a year of even moderately bad harvests there is a regional deficit. However, in such a year three states Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania might have surpluses equal to Swaziland, Botswana and Swaziland deficits while Zambia and Mozambique might be in approximate balance. Certainly regional food security coordination as planned by SADCC could help overcome the initial impact of any abrupt cessation of South African maize sales and reduce the need for massive purchases on the North American market.

Lesotho's problems in the event of sanctions appear beyond effective regional action. Because it is landlocked in the Republic with five sixths of Basotho employment in South Africa, over two thirds of government revenue from the Customs Union and about 80% of imports paid for by remittances and Customs Union payments, a massive financial injection and an airlift would seem necessary. Regional states can help present Lesotho's case and, especially, seek aid from less poor African states (e.g. Nigeria, Algeria) but the basic response would have to be international.

South Africa has regularly threatened its neighbours with economic reprisals if they cooperated in sanctions or in

discussing their impact. It has backed these threats with various destabilizing actions even against the states which have been extremely correct in not providing facilities for liberation movement activities. Most observers had believed this strategy would work - so far as even verbal backing for sanctions and overt assistance to liberation movements went - at least in respect to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. However, in April 1981 Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland held a summit conference in Mbabane on coordinating security, including economic security, in the face of South African threats and destabilisation actions. This summit marked another shift toward regional solidarity on a defensive basis and another indication that impending sanctions could well hasten, not retard, the building of SADCC coordination.

The Broader Scene

Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area negotiations continued³⁵ during 1980 under Economic Commission for Africa auspices. Contrary to initial expectations, however, no agreed text was initialled much less submitted for ratification. In the context of increased interest in regionalism, this delay was on the face of it, surprising. At least five factors seem to have played a part.

First, the states oriented toward a transition to socialism - notably Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania - raised objections to the classical laissez faire format of the draft proposals and pressed for greater incorporation of regional, and protection of national, planning as well as tighter controls over participation by extra regional firms in PTA benefits.

Second, the SADCC states - while fully disposed to join the PTA as an addition to SADCC -wished to safeguard the position of their own venture. On the one hand this made certain PTA proposals requiring all preferences to one state being opened to all unacceptable. This is especially true to Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi each of which has significant special relations with at least one other SADCC member which could not, in practice, be generalized to all PTA members. On the other hand, the attention and effort required to create and begin building a programme for SADCC left limited time or personnel to devote to PTA.

Third, because the proposed PTA is basically a fairly conventional customs union plus clearing union, special problems arose in respect to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. None saw itself as in a position to leave the South African Customs Union nor could the latter two contemplate leaving the Rand Monetary Area. As a result their accession to the PTA would either require special protocols rendering the nature of their membership ambiguous or formal South African assent. This problem had not arisen in SADCC because of its wider spectrum of coordination and more flexible pattern of operation.

Fourth, the proposed membership of the PTA is in some senses almost too wide but in others clearly too narrow. The coherent concerns which activate SADCC simply do not involve either the states north of Tanzania or the island economies. On the other hand three states in ECA's maribund Central African sub-region are clearly linked to Eastern and Southern Africa. Two-Rwanda and Burundi - use Kenyan and Tanzanian ports and have substantial trade with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania but not (with the tenuous exception of Zaire) with other African economies. The third-Zaire-has significant transport and trade links

with Angola, Zambia and Tanzania (and historically with Rwanda and Burundi).

It is now proposed that Rwanda and Burundi - who have been observers at the PTA negotiations - should become members of the Eastern and Southern African sub-region. The case of Zaire is less clear, but its clear desire to affiliate to SADCC suggests the logic of its accession to the PTA grouping.

Fifth, so long as Tanzania has a closed land border with Kenya and Kenya bars air traffic to Tanzania (albeit both allow trade by sea), severe problems exist for bringing the PTA into being. As there seems little likelihood of the East African Community asset and liability settlement, which Tanzania holds to be a precondition for restoring normal trade and transport links with Kenya, in the immediate future this issue seems likely to continue to embrangle PTA talks in 1981.

On the East African front three pieces of progress more than offset two negative developments. The Kagera Basin grouping of Tanzania-Rwanda-Burundi and - in principle from 1980 with formal accession in 1981 - Uganda completed a set of feasibility studies and mapped out a medium term plan covering transport, hydroelectric power and irrigation. Progress was made on construction of Rwanda-Tanzania road links.

A series of bilateral and trilateral and quadrilateral (with Zambia) meetings among Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania - some at head of state level - restored a degree of high level contact among the old East African Community states unknown since the middle 1970's (and since 1970 so far as heads of state meetings are concerned). While these did not lead to immediate direct Tanzania-Kenya economic link strengthening (as opposed to cooperation on border control,

smuggling and related frontier zone concerns), they did show a joint concern for assisting Uganda in overcoming its transit problems. Kenya, in particular, relaxed road restrictions and improved rail and port service. Like Tanzania it also deferred claims (including public corporation claims) for at least some arrears.

The old East African Development Bank's new charter was approved. This provides, in effect, for an Eastern and Southern African Development Bank to which any of the proposed PTA (and therefore any SADCC) members can adhere. At the same time the management was strengthened and a search begun for new funds to meet anticipated new loan applications.

However, another regional corporation foundered in early 1980. The East African National Shipping Line (Kenya - Uganda - Tanzania - Zambia) had faced increasing difficulties from 1978 with rising oil prices and less rapidly rising freight rates plus increased competition by non-conference scheduled services and tramp steamers. A proposed injection of new equity was not completed, its three remaining ships were seized by creditors (two in Europe and one by the Tanzania Investment Bank in Dar es Salaam) and liquidators were called in. While the early 1981 quadrilateral summit spoke of recreating the line, early action seemed unlikely given the serious foreign exchange problems and dubious external credit ratings of all four states.

The settlement of EAC assets³⁶ made no real progress over 1980-81. The Mediator's Report in early 1980 apparently proposed that somewhat under 20% of the net assets go to Uganda, 35% to Tanzania, and somewhat over 45% to Kenya. This would have entailed Kenya and Tanzania assuming all remaining external liabilities and making payments (substantial in the Kenya case) to Uganda.

Initially, Uganda was disposed to agree. Kenya contended that it was being asked to assume too many liabilities and rejected the payment to Uganda. Tanzania entered a procedural objection. Kenya had been unwilling or unable to give any meaningful data on Railways or Airways assets in Kenya (about half of total EAC and corporation assets) to the mediator. Tanzania contended that in the absence of such basic data it was impossible for a fair settlement to be recorded.

By early 1981 the situation had altered. Kenya was disposed to accept the mediator's proposals, offsetting its liability to Uganda against transit traffic charges. However, Uganda had shifted to claiming 33% of net assets on the basis that in life the EAC had always said that net worth was held equally among the partners - a theory the mediator had rejected as implausible although it certainly was the generally expressed position within the EAC. Tanzania apparently expressed some sympathy for the Uganda position and restated its demand that Kenya produce 1977 Railway and Airway asset lists and valuations. As no logical compromise between 18% and 33% exists on the Uganda asset share (the latter entailing a transfer from Kenya of over a billion shillings) and it is doubtful that four years after the event Kenya can any longer produce the initial asset data, resolution of the EAC assets question now appears to turn on a broader package agreement on East African economic relations being agreed by Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Obote.

Association: Cooperation, Influence or Manipulation?

By the Maputo Conference, SADCC had come to be viewed as a going concern of some significance by most Western European states and by the United States and Canada. On the whole,

they appeared to view its emergence as potentially desirable - albeit for somewhat less than clear or unanimous reasons.

The European Economic Community continued to take the lead. Commissioner Claude Cheysson³⁷ at the Maputo Conference stressed EEC's concern with development, with regional cooperation, with the reduction of dependence on South Africa and with mutually beneficial trade relations. On the face of it, this approach fitted well with President Machel's³⁸ stress on mutual economic interest and businesslike arrangements as the basis for SADCC and SADCC member state relationships with extra-regional states.

However, a distinct strain continued to exist in respect to the relations of Angola and Mozambique - SADCC's two non-ACP states - with EEC and, therefore, with EEC's support for much of the vital transport and communications programme. EEC clearly sought to use SADCC as an opportunity to press Angola and Mozambique to accede to the second Lome Convention and implied that it could not finance substantial projects in non-ACP states.

Mozambique, in particular, did not welcome this exercise in persuasion. It argued that any project affecting several states, most of whom were ACP members, should logically be eligible for European Development Fund support even if part of it was in a non-ACP state. Further it objected to the form of the Lome Convention and to its wording in respect to achieve special, unique relationships both with EEC and CMEA. Angola took a somewhat similar position but seemed less concerned with the issues of acceding to Lome as contrasted to a specially negotiated association.

With Zimbabwe and Namibia (SWAPO) EEC's campaign for acceptance fared better. Zimbabwe acceded to Lome (with a beef and a sugar quota) within months of independence. The success of this exercise in pre and immediate post independence

the status of West Berlin, seeking to

diplomacy reinforced EEC's (or at least its aid Director Generalate's) efforts to treat SWAPO as a government in waiting and to achieve a broad consensus as to its accession to Lome. Talks at the Geneva Conference at a variety of levels appear to have cemented cordial relations and laid the basis for accession assuming EEC can deliver a satisfactory beef quota and Namibia (SWAPO) give EEC products treatment at least comparable to that accorded South African imports.

The United States, Canada, Federal Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom also set up a coordinating group in respect to assistance to independent Southern African states. With the partial exception of the Netherlands, each has very substantial trade and investment links with both the SADCC states and with South Africa. The committee, while clearly a step toward treating Southern Africa as a region in its own right and as separate from South Africa, has been variously interpreted in the region. On the one hand it is seen as concerned with reducing transport dependence on South Africa and with shifting Southern African trade and mineral development from a South African to a North Atlantic orientation - both aims at least substantially comparable with SADCC. On the other hand, some of its members are seen as wishing to use such aid as a lever to encourage less active Front Line State support for SWAPO and South African Liberation Movements - a suspicion enhanced by the early policy statements of the Reagan administration and the well known position of its Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker.⁴⁰

The Nordic States have also taken a special interest in SADCC. This seems to flow from three factors; their own experience with loose but meaningful joint interest coordination, the number of significant Nordic bilateral cooperation programmes with SADCC states and the sustained

Nordic state, party and public support for liberation efforts in Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic. One particular aspect has been the use of Swedish technical assistance personnel in the SADCC Transport and Communications Commission.

Prospects for Regional Cooperation

SADCC entered 1981 as a going concern with some momentum behind it. It had a number of programmes near operational stage and a priority position in the thinking of several governments. Internationally it had come to be recognised as at least potentially a meaningful channel for external assistance and for building up access to coal, metals and - in the case of Angola - petroleum.

On the other hand, the start of 1981 saw four SADCC states - Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique - facing severe economic crises turning on external payments imbalances and food supply problems from which no early exit could be discerned. Zimbabwe faced major challenges in maintaining reconstruction and a rapidly mounting trade deficit. Swaziland faced a recurrence of its slide toward structural external imbalance as sugar prices receded, while Lesotho (whose exports of goods cover only 5% of its imports) remained an economic captive of South Africa. Angola remained tied down by South African financed and manipulated UNITA insurgency and even more by increasingly savage and deep South African mercenary and regular unit assaults. Under the circumstances, the question of availability of resources and of attention to regional affairs necessarily remains problematic.

However, the crises push in two directions. The need to reduce extra-regional import dependence has been a factor in the rapid progress of Mozambique-Tanzania cooperation

(to be extended to a free trade area in 1982) and is clearly a goal at least Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia see as logically partially attainable within SADCC in the short run while Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland have expressed similar positions albeit more on a medium term basis.⁴¹ The growing probability of increased sanctions against South Africa also increases the objective need for coordination by making the dangers and costs of continued dependence higher.

The most likely outcome is continued serious attention to SADCC - probably with a greater lag in concrete results than was hoped for at Lusaka and Maputo but with a much greater perseverance and seriousness of purpose than sceptics suggest. Precisely because South Africa on the defensive is an even greater threat to those dependant on her and because the foreign exchange and food crises of several Southern African states require exploring all meaningful possible solutions, SADCC is likely to remain significant and to hold the momentum it has achieved.

Outside the SADCC care, the outlook for regional cooperation ventures is less uniform. The Kagera Basin grouping is likely to progress, but slowly given resource constraints. The recent attempts to involve Kenya and Tanzania in a Nile Basin water cooperation scheme (or a limitation on their use of Lake Nyanza waters to view it from the other end of the telescope) seem unlikely to lead to any early results. EADB expansion probably depends on a decision by SADCC on financial institutions and clarification of Rwanda and Burundi eligibility for membership.

PTA negotiations may well lead to a treaty in 1982 but do not seem to have high priority for most participants Kenya and ECA being the exceptions. Greater Kenya - Uganda - Tanzania economic cooperation turns on the ability of the Ugandan government to restore its economy to functioning,

order and its perception of Kenya's attitude toward and cooperation with that process. A stronger Uganda with genuinely good relations with Kenya might be able to serve as a catalyst for a Kenya-Tanzania rapprochement, but not a bankrupt one believing Kenya was at best indifferent to its problems and at worst aggravating and exploiting them.

Notes

1. See "Constellation, Association, Liberation", ACR, 1979-80.
2. SADCC, 1980.
3. Communique, SADCC-2 (Conferencia do Maputo), November 1980.
4. See "Namibia", this volume.
5. SADCC, Record of the Southern African Development Coordination Summit Conference, April 180.
6. Record, op cit; SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Rex Collings, London, 1981.
7. "Constellation, Association, Liberation", op cit; Record, op cit.
8. Record, op cit.
9. e.g. D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "Regional Cooperation In Southern Africa: A Constellation of States", International Affairs Bulletin (S.A. Institute of International Affairs), December 1979.
10. e.g. W.H. Thomas, "A Southern African 'Constellation of States': Challenge Or Myth", South Africa International, January 1980.
11. 21-X-80, paragraphs 16-17.
12. Conference brochure and programme.
13. See e.g. Southern Africa article by Chester Crocker (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980.
14. SADCC, Southern African Development Coordination Conference: Record of the Ministerial Meeting, September 1980.
15. Communique, November 28, 1980.

16. SADCC, 1980.
17. SADCC, Southern Africa: Regional Food Security.
18. SADCC, Southern Africa toward economic liberation: A Strategy Paper.
19. Maputo Conference, November 27, 1980.
20. Maputo Conference, November 27, 1980.
21. President Machel, Address, op cit.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
24. Chairman Mmusi, Statement, op cit.
25. Communique, op cit.
26. ibid.
27. Daily News, March 26-28, 1981
28. Its "offers" of non-aggression treaties linked to threats of destabilisation have been tied to actual or potential support for Liberation Movements and sanctions as have its raids into Zambia and Angola.
29. Press Briefings, Arusha, March 16-20, 1981.
30. e.g. Economic Sanctions against South Africa, 13 monographs published by International University Exchange Fund, Geneva in 1980. The two most directly relating to Southern Africa outside the Republic are: 2-Sanctions a basic choice in Southern Africa (A. Seidman) and 3-South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions on Southern African economies (R.H. Green)
31. See also "Namibia", this volume.
32. See 3-South Africa: The Impact..., op cit.
33. According to its co-owner and manager Lonrho as of March 1981.

34. Action is believed to be under consideration in Swaziland and Botswana on the basis of joint ventures with non-South African trading firms.
35. See "Constellation, Association, Liberation", ACR 1979-80.
36. See ibid and "The East African Community: The End of the Road", ACR 1977-78.
37. Statement, November 27, 1980.
38. In Lusaka Summit and SADCC-2 addresses.
39. Mozambique wishes the form of words Federal Germany has used in agreements with CMEA states not the form used in agreements with developing countries.
40. See "Dr. Crocker, and the safari that has Africa divided", Times, 15-IV-81 for a summary of Crocker's views.
41. At Salisbury SADCC Ministerial and Dar es Salaam Industrial Coordination Officials' meetings.