

32)

RECEIVED

DISCUSSION PAPER

*Preliminary material and interim research results circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment*

INSTITUTIONAL
- 4 AUG 1983
DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

Law and Order Statistics in the Third World
by R. E. S. Tanner

DP 189 July 1983



JUNE 2 3086

255048

THE LIBRARY, INSTITUTE OF
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

PLEASE RETURN NOT LATER THAN

~~IP11
29884
28/4/89~~

PUBLIC POLICY

Law and Order Statistics in the Third World

by


R.E.S.Tanner

DP 189

July 1983

This paper is about the unreliability of crime statistics in developing countries. There are many operational, technical, institutional, social and cultural reasons for these inaccuracies. What the police do when an offence is reported and whether they treat it as a crime is the most critical factor determining the nature and extent of law and order records. Much crime goes unreported because of distance, environmental conditions, diffidence, fear of retribution and distrust or lack of confidence in the police. Many other offences, though reported, are never recorded because of incompetence, corruption and an unwillingness on the part of the police to become embroiled in domestic conflicts. And many crimes are not considered as crimes because the offences relate to traditional customs that form part of long accepted tribal and religious codes of behaviour. At the same time minor infringements of the law and petty contraventions are actively pursued by the police. The resulting crime statistics thus provide a dubious and inadequate basis for the formulation of policies of social development and reform.

IDS



053584

CONTENTS	Page
Foreword	1
Introduction	5
The Structure of Third World Law and Order	8
Administration	
A The rational good model	8
B The organic model	10
C The bureaucratic imperative	13
Third World Conditions Influencing Criminality	14
The Producers of Law and Order	15
A The primary recorders	15
B The collators of information	18
C The receivers of statistics	19
Unrecorded Data	19
A unrecorded crime - unknown and not recorded	20
B unrecorded crime - known but not recorded	20
False Recorded Data	28
A Falsified by the police	28
B Falsified by the victims	30
C Falsified by witnesses	31
Inaccurate Recorded Data	32
Recorded Data	35
A Primary data	35
Statistical Procedures	40
Statistical Predictions	42
Conclusion	44
References	46

FOREWORD by MICHAEL WARD

The following IDS Discussion Paper has been prepared by Dr Ralph Tanner, a regular contributor to the Institute's annual course in Development Statistics. The paper is based on the series of lectures on the problems of interpreting law and order statistics that Dr Tanner presents to this course. Dr Tanner has had lengthy and extensive experience as an administrator, magistrate and member of official commission of enquiry into police, prison and judicial procedures in many developing countries. In these various capacities he himself has frequently encountered serious difficulties in trying to use and interpret official statistics on crime and police operations. Because this paper distills much of Dr Tanner's experience and his specific research in this area, it was felt to be useful and worthwhile to have his views more widely disseminated. No new theory or data are presented in the field of law and order but it is believed this paper will undoubtedly stimulate renewed interest, comment and discussion on this topic. The field of law and order statistics is an area of statistical activity that has received scant attention in both official circles and the literature in developing countries.

Dr Tanner highlights how difficult it is to make head or tail of published data relating to law and order. It seems almost impossible to determine the real trends in crime. He clearly demonstrates that a multiplicity of social, institutional and technical factors underlie what data are presented and influence how they are produced. He contends that, implicitly and explicitly, the data reflect only those features which, over time, the authorities charged with the duty to maintain law and order in the community, decide to record officially as 'crime'. He suggests, too, that the amount of reported crime is not independent of the number of people actually involved in its attempted suppression.

The problems identified by Dr Tanner are widespread. But many have a special significance in developing countries where physical and logistical difficulties create additional obstacles that have to be overcome. A multiplicity of potential social conflicts can also arise. It is evident that customary and cultural factors have a considerable bearing on what does or does not constitute a crime and affect what actions in practice are regarded as essentially 'criminal'. The area of 'contraventions' is equally vague and arbitrary and subject to substantial variations over time. Furthermore, and possibly even more important, much crime goes undetected, although whether more so than in advanced industrial countries it is impossible to say.

It must be recognised that there is often an inherent conflict between customary and cultural codes of conduct observed by a community and those formally prescribed criminal laws subsequently introduced by the state but originally devised and developed in the context of literate urban industrial societies. What in different societies would be considered as callous acts of barbarism inflicted by one section of the community on others who are either too young or too weak to object or to have any formal redress against the perpetrators, may often be performed in the name of culture and tradition. Criminal acts of assault - such as infanticide, ritual murder, child abuse, the traditional religious or tribal circumcision of young children - may still be regarded as socially acceptable in some societies even if they are no longer regarded as legal. Sadly, such acts of personal offence, ritual mutilation and violence are often condoned rather than condemned by the community, despite the fact that laws have now been introduced in most countries to halt these practices. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, in the same countries and at the same time, minor trading and vagrancy transgressions involving hawkers and pedlars are sometimes harshly punished. The severe treatment which petty stealing receives from both the courts and police compares unfavourably with the unofficial blind eye that is turned to the huge rake-offs made by some politicians and senior civil servants handling large public service contracts. The 'backsheesh', 'dash', and personal cuts commonly associated with official deals are discreetly ignored because certain senior, executive and decision-making people or their friends are themselves involved. Whilst this particular issue is not the main concern of Dr Tanner's treatise, it does reflect the basic question as to what action - across countries - is or is not considered as a crime and how such perceptions change over time. Whether an act is merely a contravention (of perhaps some arbitrary local bye-law) that is easy to enforce - like speeding or parking offences - or a 'basic' crime is another factor complicating the situation. The problem is compounded when, as implied earlier, it is tacitly acknowledged that many serious offences relating to traditional customs are considered socially acceptable and may even be practised by the leading dignitaries and families in the land. Even if such acts are considered crimes it is difficult to ensure they are reported and even more difficult to secure any convictions on these counts. The covert and even overt social pressures for the suppression of such investigations are strong.

For a variety of complex and often unrelated reasons, the basic crime statistics are frequently at fault and invariably inconsistent over time. It follows that the associated crime detection, solution and indictment rates will be similarly difficult to interpret. The interrelationships between law and order data are confusing and subject to bias and error to an

unknown extent. What is a crime, what is regarded legally as a crime, what is reported or is detected as a crime and what is eventually recorded as a crime, are all different aspects of the law and order statistics problem and make analysis all the more difficult. The nature of police evidence, type of prosecution witnesses and methods of court proceedings are also important in assessing statistics on convictions.

Dr Tanner describes in some detail how, in practice, those incidents that the authorities choose to regard and define as 'crimes' are actually recorded. There is little spatial or temporal consistency in such procedures. Attitudes differ significantly depending upon the time of day, week, month or year; the place of the incident; location and proximity of the police unit; the persons involved; and who records the incident.

Changes both in the law and how the law is enforced at the institutional level also affect the statistics on crime. It is perhaps less evident, however, that changes in economic conditions can also exert a direct influence on the data. For instance, the inexorable march of inflation can turn 'petty' crimes into 'serious' crimes as the value of stolen property rises above a certain pre-defined and arbitrary financial limit regarded as 'petty'. Furthermore, economic conditions can exert other influences on the nature of offences committed. They may also have a direct bearing on how many resources are allocated and applied to law and order and its maintenance. In the ultimate analysis, the data - whether referring to identification or detection - relate only to contact. The greater the resources put into this field and the greater the access to problem areas, the more information will become available. In that sense, at least, it can be argued that, indirectly (and superficially), 'the police create the crime'. The desire of the police to detect more illegal acts, to achieve a higher level of success in solving crimes and, in the final result, to secure a larger number of convictions inevitably leads to a greater volume of criminal statistics. Their success in obtaining the confidence and cooperation of the public in both reporting crime and assisting the authorities in its detection is equally important.

All these features are discussed in some detail by Dr Tanner who illustrates what can and does happen using actual examples drawn both from his own experience and that recorded by others. The problems are clearly as much 'institutional' as real and a careful description of the procedures adopted in recording events related to questions of law and order maintenance is a necessary prerequisite. Before anything can be done to rectify a statistical situation that is widely recognised as being inconsistent, unstandardised and unsatisfactory, some semblance of order must be introduced into crime reporting methods. It is

only when policy-makers can have greater confidence in the official data on crime that the law and order authorities make available to them that they will be able to understand better the actual situation of 'lawlessness' prevailing in their society. Only then can they consider taking more appropriate and effective action to deal with the problems identified.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this discussion paper is not just to criticise the law and order statistics of developing countries. It is intended to show as widely as possible the ways in which such statistics are likely to be unreliable in any country and how these circumstances are likely to be particularly influential in causing inaccurate data in developing countries.

The law and order statistics are the results of certain social behaviours being recorded by law and order institutions and their personnel. Since human behaviour at any time is difficult to record accurately and numerically, records are dominated by uncertainties as to what is recorded. In addition there is a large 'dark' area covering what is not recorded relating to crimes which have been committed but which are not reported to the police.

It is generally agreed that this 'dark area' constitutes the main difficulty in using law and order statistics for social planning. Furthermore, the statistics actually generated are the product of particular institutional processes which modify them for a wide variety of social, economic and religious purposes. In the developed world considerable work has been done by criminologists to improve the value of the statistics and to produce additional data so that the whole material gathered can be of greater value for diagnostic and planning purposes. To a very large extent these improvements have been made by professional researchers not directly involved in law and order organisations and their processes.

Much progress towards achieving higher standards of accuracy in law and order statistics has been made in recent years. This has required not only the interest of many professional criminologists but also the money to support their research. It has necessitated the consent and interest of the institutions themselves. More importantly the researchers have worked mainly in countries of some social and political stability. Unfortunately, in situations of active or passive civil unrest, it is difficult to implement improvements in law and order statistics and such data must be regarded as being extremely unreliable.

A much more difficult area to research has always been actual police practices. What the police do when a crime is reported to them and how they use their discretion on whether to proceed with a case (and under what circumstances) is vague and undefined. The extent of legal, quasi-legal and illegal practices in the law enforcement system in any country is rarely known and their effect on law and order statistics can only be guessed at.

In the first instance any consideration of crime and case rates must depend on knowing the relevant population for that area. An accurate and comprehensive census requires both a prolonged period of social and political stability and a widespread bureaucratic detachment from the social, economic and political implication of the results that are obtained. Some developing countries do not have effective control over their whole territories and it is doubtful whether a proper population census could be carried out in many disputed and unsettled areas of Africa and Asia.

Population totals provide the basic evidence in political struggles for various forms of regional autonomy and community representation. Consequently, much data from the past population censuses of certain countries, eg Lebanon and Nigeria have been very suspect. Where government servants' pay is related to the number of people they represent, there must always be a human tendency to inflate local population figures. The data collected may also be at fault because in some developing countries the enumerators are local people who are themselves subject to pressures over what they should record. They may be unable to list the population because in being regarded as government they are considered to represent a particular political party. There is thus widespread suspicion as to the uses that may subsequently be made of these records. Data may also be inconsistent because many developing countries have geographically mobile 'nomadic' populations which have a traditional disregard for 'artificial' political or national boundaries.

Lastly, much depends on the timing of a census if it is to be used for the assessment of rates of criminality. The population may vary with the time of the year. Large numbers of migratory male workers may return home for the month around Christmas or Ramadan. A census taken at any other time would disclose a disproportionate number of adult women and children. Criminality as expressed in crime rates will vary substantially between these two situations. Similarly, if a census only covers those who sleep in the areas to be counted and not where they spend their days, the criminality ratios for cities will be inaccurate since they will exclude 'commuters' and tourists who must certainly include some criminals and victims who fall within the proportion of all crimes committed. (Skogan, 1975).

This paper considers, in particular, the problematical issues and questions surrounding these statistics in the developing world where law and order data may not exist at all or only in an irregular and summary form. In such countries special conditions prevail which may make the data even more unreliable. These circumstances include, inter alia:-

- Periodic and prolonged civil unrest in which a civil

structure of law and order institutions ceases to function effectively, eg National wars, civil wars, guerrilla insurgencies, coup d'etats, etc.

- Revolutionary reorganisation in which a reforming social structure is imposed on a country from the top without an adequate administrative infrastructure to support any radical social, political and economic change.
- Situations of rapid social change with unequally distributed benefits resulting in adverse social consequences and an uncontrolled impact on different population groups.
- Famine and national disasters, eg flooding, earthquakes, etc.
- Disturbances in neighbouring countries causing, for example, a massive and uncontrolled influx of refugees. In these situations it is unlikely that the public will view the institution of government as particularly useful for maintaining law and order or that the institutions themselves will perform any regular law and order functions, much less record their activities in any regular and controlled way. There are thus long periods of social instability in which it is difficult to conduct any enquiry in comparative safety. In such situations the question of accuracy becomes irrelevant.

In many developing countries there is an almost total absence of background data on which to build research. Only a few countries such as India have detailed records and some like Uganda have gaps existing for several years. Others publish no records at all. In Iran, neither the present nor previous government appears to know how many people it has executed or imprisoned in a year or whether these official actions have followed any legal process whatsoever. There is, unfortunately, very little published research by impartial and trained researchers on the functions of law and order institutions in the developing world in comparison with the large amount published in professional journals of the developed world.

The whole consideration of law and order statistics is pervaded by the view that the law can be regarded as a panacea for social evils. It seems that the very passage of a law will have a quasi-magical effect; but the mere passage of a law cannot be expected to solve problems without the support of adequate enforcing institutions and public opinion. The written law alone does not differentiate illegal from legal acts. People make this distinction, so that anything recorded in law and order statistics has a situational perspective (Daudistel et al 1979). In developing countries the statistics recorded on law and order reflect a dialectic conflict between modern and traditional

jurisdictions. It has been suggested that, to a limited extent, the data can be viewed more as indices of acculturation to the urban industrial society and its legal institutions than of lawlessness per se. (Brillon, 1980).

The conclusions of this work are designed to have an overall application to any consideration of law and order statistics. An enormous amount of crime goes unrecorded. When this is combined with the processing of information designed only to accord with the official wishes and unofficial needs of the institutions and personnel involved, it leads to published figures which have no necessary or inevitable relationships to the events to which they purport to relate. It is doubtful whether such data have any use as basic social evidence.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIRD WORLD LAW AND ORDER ADMINISTRATION

A priori, in the examination of law and order statistics it is essential to consider the whole framework within which they are produced. An understanding of the relationship between the 'rational goal model' of legal administration and the 'organic model' in which the administration responds to the local situation is important in this respect. The quasi-dominance of the bureaucratic imperative influences the particular manner in which administrations exercise their authority.

A The Rational Goal Model

In this approach the government develops institutions to deal with law and order problems as a result of studying the problem. It reaches a decision as to the best possible means of attaining its objectives with a Weberian rationality in much the same way as a shoe company sets out to mass-produce low priced footwear. This is perhaps the way in which the government of a developing country would present its law and order structure to an outsider's enquiries. Such an ideal form is rarely, if ever, achieved for a wide range of reasons:

- Any decision maker is faced with an existing institutional structure, a de facto heritage, about which he can do very little. This provides the building blocks with which any law and order institution has to be constructed or reconstructed. eg the colonial heritage, cultural tradition, language, communications and the environment generally. Particular developing countries have often grafted the people, habits and institutions left by colonial rule on top of their own indigenous practices.

- Any decision maker is faced with a multitude of known alternatives in law and order administration. There are also perhaps just as many of which he is unaware - either from the exigencies of the situation or because of the behaviour of the organisation in which he is working. The political decision to concentrate Tanzanians in villages led to the deliberate misinforming of government officials about the progress of this movement (Samoff, 1981) and within it a further restraint on relationships with the police can be inferred (Mwapachu, 1976)
- There are barriers to collecting adequate information about the variety of 'acceptable' goals and policies and to obtaining the basic data generally. Situations in which the actual number of cattle thefts was probably nine times higher than the official figure (Tanner, 1966) make rational planning of anti-rustling by the police impossible.
- The personal needs, commitments, inhibitions and inadequacies of decision-makers sometimes interfere with rational assessments (Lindblom, 1959). No public office-holders involved in law and order decisions can ignore the possible effects on their own political futures of government policies which may involve their own imprisonment, exile or execution.
- There may be structural difficulties within law and order institutions as well as between them and the legislative and executive branches of government. These may involve limits on the administrators' control over subordinates, standard operating procedures which have become ritualised, conflicts between those in the field and those in administration, competitive behaviour between different branches of government, fear of alienating those in power and so on.
- Also to be considered is the deviant behaviour of individual administrators and the extent to which this deviance has become institutionalised in widespread corruption (Scott 1969; Wraith and Simkins 1963; Greenstone 1966). The alleged widespread corruption in the Nigerian customs service (Economist, 17 July 1952) makes their statistics relating to that period questionable. In practice law and order is a political process and no political system even approximates the ideal rational policymaking process.

Law and order statistics produced according to the rational goal

model, can be assessed relatively easily only in terms of unattained accuracy.

B The organic model

In this situation law and order organisations are assumed to develop, change, and even decline over time. They are shaped by the varied exigencies and contingencies of their effective internal and external environment. This is an incremental process in which a developing nation may be subject to pressure over which it has little or no control. These factors will affect not only the nature of law and order in general but also have an impact, in particular, on the institutions concerned. They will influence how their policies function and especially how their activities are ultimately recorded in their statistics.

- **Economic factors** Most countries have the law and order systems they can afford which are not necessarily the most effective. Exchange rates and foreign currency reserves govern the availability of transport and its use; the mobility of police affects both their proactive and reactive relationship to crime, criminals and the general public. When the whole area is impoverished by civil strife, official duties are dropped as individual personalities take over and their needs take precedence over official role performance (Southall, 1980). Again, the statistics coming from a court run by a well-paid and experienced judge will be very different from that coming from another court in which the judge is markedly less well paid and of lesser experience.

- **Environmental factors** Such phenomena as deserts and jungles have a significant effect on the policing of constituent territories. Famines and floods, islands and straight-line international borders each in their way predetermine law and order priorities. Operational action therefore requires the division of limited funds to deal with crises when geographical anomalies or environmental difficulties involve considerable expenditures before the police can be usefully deployed on the ground. Any great dependence on international aid in itself raises further issues of control, quite apart from the reactions of personnel to what they may see as the loss of their dependence and personal status.

- **Political factors** No statistics are produced by a government which de facto has ceased to exist as in the case of Lebanon and Chad. In such circumstances law and order means the supremacy of the locally powerful for which there may be more information (Spear, 1951). On the more analytical level a crisis of confidence in politics becomes a crisis in law and order (Wilkins, 1970) which means the absence of information on which

law and order decisions are based.

The extent to which the government uses the police as an instrument for its own stability and support and for political coercion will affect law and order decisions. The public may be unable or unwilling to make the proper distinctions between the respective roles of the police. The Republic of South Africa is a case in point. Perhaps a more extreme case would be contemporary Iran in which law and order, de facto, seems to be in the hands of young revolutionary guards who impose their own interpretation of Islamic values on society without prior court hearings or much less any recording of details (Economist, 17 July 1982).

Any government faced with an external political situation which threatens its own internal security will give high priority to this threat and accord a much lower priority to its internal public relations. Many developing countries have to contend with civil unrest in neighbouring territories and they find themselves either ideological havens or unwilling hosts to counter-revolutionaries and freedom fighters' trying to gain power in their own countries as in Lebanon, Sudan, Cuba, Thailand and Angola.

A further important factor is the extent to which a state - because of geographical or economic weakness - is under the political influences of another sovereign state. Subservience to the 'superior' country's ideology must influence the form of the law and order policies pursued in the dominated country, eg Lesotho, Namibia and Vietnam.

- Social Factors The legal systems of the advanced Western nations have developed over a long period as a response to the urbanisation and industrialisation that has occurred. Consequently, the use of alternative or parallel legal systems and policing procedures is severely limited. In the developing countries these changes have been rapid and they have led to the traditional system surviving in a form both convenient to and highly adaptive to the needs of large numbers of their citizens who live in the rural areas and in the more densely populated poorer parts of the cities. But parallel to this will be the official law and order system of the state.

Thus law and order statistics will reflect the needs of a minority who have either fully adapted, culturally, to the modernised state or who have specialised needs for using its legal system. By contrast, the needs of those using the parallel traditional system - who probably constitute the majority - will not be recorded. This parallel system will contend with many specialised social needs involving magic, religion, polygamy, matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance and land use. In such a

situation it can be seen that, both de facto and de jure, enormous gaps will exist in the available law and order statistics.

- Religious factors While a specifically Christian legal code is not administered by any state, an Islamic code has become dominant in Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This religious code, formulated either before urbanisation had become widespread or industrialisation had occurred, deals mostly with family affairs and to a lesser extent with trading relationships. While non-religious, non-sectarian law has developed in response to the particular needs of industrialisation, because religious codes like the Koranic law cannot handle issues involving the pursuit of individual self-interest, urban anonymity and the development of technology, effectively. The actual application of the Koranic code, by analogy, to essentially modern issues is apt to turn litigants towards methods of informal arbitration and away from the formal state system. Even if law and order statistics were produced on the basis of such a system, it is difficult to see what would be their immediate value since there would be no comparable material to use in analysis and no available datum line from which to measure trends.

Developmental factors In developing countries the state is often the only institution that is openly coercive in a wide range of areas including law and order. In such situations it is sometimes the case that the government adapts its law and order statutes in response to modernising issues as it alone conceives them according to its particular philosophy or ideology. Consequently, the majority of its citizens feel more inclined to distance themselves from an institution which is both socially detached from them, mechanical in its operations and outside their personal influences (Bayley, 1969).

Another important factor is the nature of the legal system which has contributed greatly to the gap between the law and order wishes of most citizens and what their governments provide. In this, the influence of the legal profession has been particularly dominant in all questions of non-traditional law. The members of the profession have been trained to the legal standards of developed nations and they have an in-built need to extend the range of this legal system which they see not only as the best way of dealing with matters in dispute but as providing their own livelihood. They promote their own profession and industry in proposing the introduction of particular laws that they regard as necessary. They construct the laws themselves in their capacities as legal draftsmen and they encourage the use of the formal legal process wherever possible as it is in their interests to do so. The courts provide prestige for all those involved as judges and lawyers as well as for anyone who uses them (Dodd, 1979).

In theory, in respect of the rational-goal model it is possible

to evaluate law and order statistics in terms of the overall aims and objectives defined. In the case of the organic model, however, it is not known (or rather it can only be guessed) what are the premises on which the policies are based. This makes it much more difficult to assess the value of the law and order statistics produced under this approach.

C The bureaucratic imperative

Weber conceived of bureaucracy as being the most rational and the most efficient form of administration. He based his ideas on the administrative machines of modern governments and large-scale business organisations. Perhaps it may even be considered one of the evolutionary universals, with its division of labour and hierarchical structure of officials (Parsons, 1964). In the developing nations, however, several deviations from the ideal type can be seen. These have their effect on the quality and quantity of law and order statistics since such an organisational structure can only be the most efficient way of organising large-scale operations when all the necessary parts have some equivalent competence. The Kenya Prisons' administrative machinery was designed for a complex penological policy, admirable in theory but impossible to implement effectively in practice because of circumstances beyond the control of those involved. The educational and administrative standards of a developing country do not allow for too much bureaucratic sophistication in their prisons (Tanner 1970 (d) 108).

An Indian district administrator once commented:

'There were, of course, precise rules on paper for the disposal and inspection of work, but the meticulous following of the rules never got one very far, since one could easily lose oneself in the jungle, and all the more so since one's subordinates were adept at putting up charts and statements for the edification of the unwary which were impeccable on the surface but not so innocuous underneath' (Hunt and Harrison 1980: 86).

There has been an acceleration of the bureaucratic process in response to the developed world's ideas of what is the necessary basis for planning. It forms a part of the legitimisation of the authority of the new nation state that is established without the social, economic and political uniformities which, to a certain extent, have helped to create such authority elsewhere. There are general problems involved in skipping certain stages in a process of unilineal development in which only some parts of a country conform to this pattern of accelerated modern development. It is manifested in, eg, highly trained official statisticians collating the figures produced by untrained clerks in distant offices who are often unaware of the aims of an

enquiry and who have little interest in such ritualistic clerical exercises.

Most developing nations evidence the ever-widening scope of governments' bureaucratic activities as possibly an obstacle to further evolutionary advance, simply because recording takes up such a high proportion of government officials' time. Much of this paper work is defensive and protective in the way it is produced. It is rarely compiled to further a particular administrative need. And, sadly, the routine completion of records is not seen as any way forward for ambitious young officials. The police may be continually distracted from more important work by bureaucratic demands made worse by varying standards of educational competence and the admixture of languages (Bayley 1969).

The defensive use of bureaucracy can be an adaptation to stress (Merton 1964) in which the completion of records in some form or other is regarded as a process of abstracting some sort of order out of what is actually experienced as disorder - in the sense of officials being 'out of their depth' in particular situations and being unable to cope with them.

THIRD WORLD CONDITIONS INFLUENCING CRIMINALITY

Certain factors, rather more specific to developing countries, have a particular bearing on crime statistics. First, there is the prevalence of violence as a background to the social experience of many Third World citizens, eg the regularity of large scale riots in India, civil war as in Nigeria and Cambodia, and political and interpersonal violence in Central America, Columbia and Mexico (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). These features are possibly initiated or made worse by the habit of agitational politics. This possibility of widespread public disorder as the background to the police establishment (Bayley 1969: 252) means that such forces have to be prepared for serious disturbances as an every day part of their working lives.

Secondly, there is the total vulnerability of the peasant who makes up the vast majority of the Third World population. These low income rural dwellers often live in isolated areas in poor housing with flimsy security and they work alone in fields away from villages. Their principal wealth, their livestock, is equally vulnerable. Such other tangible values will be kept somewhere in the house or on the persons of wives and daughters, which makes them particularly liable to victimisation. Law and order for them is usually a purely local affair. He feels that he has no duty to assist the state in criminal matters and no

obligation to report crimes or co-operate in investigations; he shows a profound reluctance to get involved in unpleasant situations over which he has little control (Bayley 1969).

In situations of poverty or when the standard of living is low, even articles of little value which in the developed world can usually be left unguarded such as railway keys, coal and telegraph wire become objects of crime. Under such conditions it is not surprising that a high proportion of thefts appear to be of personal or public property which it was not reasonably possible to guard. In these conditions there are even difficulties of identification should the goods concerned be recovered.

THE PRODUCERS OF LAW AND ORDER

A The Primary Recorders

The basic details of the information that subsequently appears in the official statistics are usually recorded by the lowest levels of the civil servants or officials involved, such as police constables and court clerks, and much must depend on their competence to do this accurately. In some countries the medical checks on police or civil service recruits are cursory (Bayley 1969) or non-existent. In Nigeria there are no tests of visual acuity, hearing and mental soundness (Igbovina 1981) and such biological factors must have an influence on performance.

Those who record the information are very often of low education. In some cases they may even be virtually illiterate taking employment with the police as the last resort. Because the pay is too low and there is little chance of promotion, the job does not attract the better qualified (Bayley 1969). Rapid expansion of the police forces of developing countries must mean the rapid promotion of large numbers of junior officers who have not undergone any lengthy period of adjustment to new responsibilities. The number of police available is no indication of their ability to solve and prevent crimes. The results of any shortage of men and experience is likely to be the concentration of the better police in the capital cities and important commercial areas (Tanner 1970 b).

The general training of the police may be of a low standard and the writing of reports never taught. The result then is that the basic records of crimes may be very poor just because the clerks concerned are incapable of being either accurate or consistent. The maintenance of records and the recording of evidence is a skilled occupation requiring training, practice and supervision, all of which is often inadequate. For such persons there is very little incentive to keep good records, which is regarded as

a purposeless activity pursued only with the aim to demonstrate to their superiors that they have honoured routine or occupational obligations. In the Kenyan prison study 'every type of record keeping was found to be unreliable, sometimes inaccurate and very frequently unsystematic... This was occasioned not by any lack of effort on the part of the officers and warder clerks but by elements in the system itself. The majority of records were kept in longhand....Much detail was written in large cumbersome ledgers, each prisoner's records were kept in an open file, held together by string at the corner and stacked in a cupboard' (Tanner 1970 (d)).

Not only is there the important issue of literacy and education but the more complex issues of recording information when the language of family origin, the language of the area in which events occur and the language of the record are very different. In Tanzania, for example, a Sukuma policeman learning Swahili is acquiring another language within the same linguistic group in which the grammar is very similar but a Massai or Sandawe recruit would have to learn a language totally different in grammatical structure to his own; and both, at times, would have to report information in English.

There is not only the general problem encountered by countries which have a multiplicity of primary languages and a lingua franca of limited acceptability but a further problem of 'internal' expatriates. This arises from the common policy of posting officials to outlying provinces beyond the areas to which they belong or grew up on. This may complicate the ordinary processes of transferring central government civil servants to where they are needed to fill posts because of their doubtful reliability as perceived by the dominant political group. These government servants may be seen at best as strangers, at worst hostile intruders. They in turn may regard those whom they serve as both savage and backward so that bond of unity between the servers and those they serve may not be much more than shared political suzerainty (Callaghy 1980).

For these recorders of information there is a great difference between situations in which the data are reported by a third person to the recorder (as with road accidents and reported crime) and those where the recorder initiates his own investigations and then writes down the results.

Reactive primary recorders In this situation, the police officer receives a report from a civilian that requires him either to investigate the incident or to react to a public demand to deal with an offender who has already been identified. This is often the case with domestic assaults, shoplifting and employee theft (McClintock and Avison 1968: 109). There may be very little real investigative police work to do and records will tend to be kept

to a minimum consistent with the legal work required. It is difficult to get any sense of achievement out of this type of work. The police play a relatively minor role in the discovery of incidents in which the other groups and companies are in fact the generators of these official statistics (Bottomley and Coleman 1976).

Police Officers dislike making any formal report when there is a close relational distance between the victim and the offenders since he knows from experience that whatever he does is likely to complicate a quarrel between relatives or between spouses. He knows that many reports to the police are not intended to initiate prosecutions but to warn or threaten another party (Skogan 1975). He is also likely to defer if he possibly can to the dispositional preferences of the complainant who may be a parent, wife or someone politically important.

In these sensitive areas the goodwill created and maintained by individual officers or police stations will be best reflected. The more popular the police, the more they will be used and consulted on a wide range of issues above and beyond the minimal necessities of reporting serious crimes.

Proactive primary recorders There is a wide range of recorded data initiated by the police themselves of which most are both legally and socially trivial such as traffic offences and disorderly conduct (Black 1971). If the policeman wishes to achieve notice, he can create his own cases in which the recording of the crime committed, its detection and associated conviction rates coincide. He can create a personal score which shows him to be active and energetic.

There is a stronger tendency to be proactive in public places rather than on private premises where, in the latter situation, there are legal restrictions which may react on the police officer who invades the privacy of citizens. The police are likely in practice to take proportionately more action against the poorer people who tend to spend a greater part of their time in public places. As a result the police seem likely to be more obviously biased in proactive than in reactive behaviour (Bottomley and Coleman 1981: 53).

From colonial times and on through independence, a high proportion of police activity has been to support and keep in power a particular dominant group, eg the Republic of South Africa where over 60 per cent of all recorded crimes constitute law infringements rather than criminal offences and where 98 per cent of the former go for trial as against 61 per cent of the latter (Midgley 1971). The implied racial bias is also self-evident in this situation. Even the court clerks recording and processing cases may be an important element in statistical terms to a certain extent because they usually control the flow

of cases. They may get so hopelessly behind that the police have to stop prosecuting and the courts stop processing for a time.

The police may also have a proactive role in enforcing government policies in places where patrolling on a regular basis is rare and there are periodic raids to catch a range of offenders (Callaghy 1980; Washikongo 1976; Bamisaiye 1974). In 1960 the Bombay police filed 96,000 prosecutions against the Prohibition laws and in 1962-63 Indian police prosecuted 8 million persons for travelling on the railways without a ticket (Bayley 1969). Departments may be set given target figures so as to beat last years' total of traffic prosecutions. Likewise, individual policemen may be given specific targets for traffic offences eg the completion of a book of traffic summonses for the day which, if they succeed in completing, they can be relieved of duty for the rest of the day. In one particular year, however, the Mombasa Criminal Courts handled 644 traffic cases in October, 1732 in November and 565 in December, whereas the flow of reactive cases remained steady throughout the year with little fluctuation (Tanner 1970 (b)). The ability of the courts to handle more than a fixed number of cases in a certain number of working days must impose some restraint on police prosecutions. The possible hostility of the judiciary may also be another factor considered by the police (Tanner 1970 (b)).

It must be concluded that proactive cases form a significant and growing part of police activity. The initiators of such actions are not usually influenced by any question of creating or maintaining the goodwill of those citizens in whose areas the police serve.

B The Collators Of Information

These secondary stage producers of statistics, usually junior clerks, make up returns at regular intervals marking off months, quarters and the completion of the year. For them it is part of the process of running an office, producing statistics in an orderly way, often (if not always) on a prescribed form. They may indeed have little interest in what these figures represent or they may be produced as part of a particular programme desired by the dominant political group. In Tanzania some wildly inflated figures of the villagisation programme were gathered at each level of government and passed on to the next (Samoff 1981). A mere junior collator of information is not going to make his position uncomfortable by making critical evaluations of statistics of which he is no more than the passive recipient. Police officers are instructed to make up their data to conform to certain required norms of completeness, clarity and credibility so as to produce a document which has a reasonable chance of being useful to the person to whom it is passed, provided that this "doctoring" does not remove a defensible correspondence between the transformed and original account

(Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1968).

C The Receivers Of Statistics

Administrators and politicians instinctively see the statistics they receive as tools for use in self-protection, political in-fighting and for furthering a political cause. They may believe the data represent facts and form part of a process of ratifying their views (Green 1975).

Since this data can be misused there is often excessive secrecy and non-disclosure so that the information may not be shared between departments unless specifically authorised. Even if the users of statistics wanted to check, it is often extremely difficult - by reason of poor communication and distance - to do so. Furthermore, nothing in particular is usually to be gained by initiating any correspondence about the accuracy of such records.

UNRECORDED DATA

In any situation the primary data recorded by the police will simply comprise varying proportions of all the actual events that have occurred. The universe of crime can never be known as it varies with a wide range of personal and institutional factors. Any assessment of these must be largely guesswork. Almost no work has been done on unrecorded crime in the developing world so that this remains one of the major difficulties in assessing levels of true criminality.

The amount of unrecorded crime will tend to increase when:

- There is civil unrest and riots
- social change is occurring at a rate which does not permit the building up of a compensatory and balancing social equilibrium;
- large numbers of strangers enter into a hitherto socially homogeneous area;
- immigration into an urban-industrial area occurs at a rate at which government cannot provide adequate supporting social services;
- the population in any area is demographically unbalanced in terms of its age and sex structure.

The amount of unrecorded crime will tend to decrease when:

- law and order agencies form part of the community and are representative of the community in which they are operating;
- the community has enjoyed a long period of social stability in which the rate of social change has been sufficiently slow to allow continuous and even adjustment.

The general conditions of the developing world make it very possible that the 'dark area' of unknown crime is likely to be at least as high as in the developed world and very probably much higher for reasons which will now be analysed.

A Unrecorded Crime - Unknown And Not Recorded

Victims may not know that they have been victimised as with young children who are sexually abused by relatives and mentally sub-normal individuals who are maltreated. With a wide range of property crimes, victims may not know immediately that they have lost goods. Peasants who have been defrauded by traders or confidence men, or who return home after a visit to a distant relative or a pilgrimage to find that they have been burgled (Maltz 1975) have little chance of discovering when the incident occurred. Crops, small livestock and building materials may be stolen without the owner knowing that he has lost anything.

It is widely known that companies may not know that they have been victimised by shoplifters or employees (Dodge and Turner 1971), and government departments, farmers and co-operatives may also suffer stock "shrinkage" without ever knowing it. Crops stores at depots, firewood and coal on the railways, as well as livestock, fish, crops etc. on state farms may disappear. In situations where there is poor security or no security at all and where records are poorly kept and stock checks infrequent, loss is likely to account for a considerable amount of unrecorded crime. In such cases either the time of the crime or its nature or the amounts involved are unknown. Sometimes the crime itself is unknown - a theft is not discovered or a murder is considered an accident or simply a missing person.

B Unrecorded Crime - Known But Not Recorded

In any consideration of unrecorded crime there is a basic analytical framework which suggests there are considerable restraints on informing the police. Firstly, who did it? - Someone with whom there was a known social relationship or strangers? Secondly, was it done for economic reasons or passion? Thirdly, what was the extent of the damage to person,

property or propriety? Lastly, what were the participants', or potential informer's assessments of the burdens and benefits of reporting to the police?

Cultural factors There is always a social distance factor between the social institutions and ideas of the individual and his immediate relatives, friends, fellow tribesmen, caste members and local community; and the institutions, practices and ideas of the government of the country in which he lives. This difference is likely to be wider in situations where the central government is a new and largely alien institution than in countries where it has developed into its present form over centuries.

In many developing countries, traditional ideas and practices survive strongly as the preferred way of settling criminal and civil disputes. It is not surprising that these communal modes of regulation and codes of conduct are often not recognised by the state because, for the most part, they are in tacit opposition to the state system. In some cases they are seen as being actually criminal as attempts to run a parallel state (Sumner, 1982). The event and the police seem to belong to different cultures (Hoebel, 1965; Cohn 1965). Much depends on the extent to which each community is organised both to prevent and to deal with crime amongst its members. It also depends on the extent to which the community or social group is organised to commit crimes (Bayley, 1969).

Usually these customary legal norms have a universal application. They are universally understood; they have an obligatory character and operate principally in the area of primary relationships, matters in which outsiders are not involved. The individual, family or group may not welcome the intrusion of outsiders who will isolate the criminal act from the wider surroundings which they do not recognise, especially where neither victim nor witness feels any criminal wrong has been committed. Many small community crimes are part of a loose network of incidents often going back for years, even centuries: The author was involved in a violent land-tenure dispute in the Kodaung Hill Tracts in northern Burma which was probably two hundred years old; and the 1953 Lari massacre during the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya was a stage in a land tenure dispute dating from the early years of the British occupation (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966).

Many crimes occur within the intimacy of village life. Those involved are tied by numerous strings not only to each other but to all possible witnesses so that to give evidence to the police is choosing sides. In such circumstances it would be unrealistic to expect litigants to use the courts widely (Tanner, 1964). Those concerned see little point in making another person suffer in a mechanical legal process that is outside the control of the community. To them it would be clearly better to

apease the victim by some form of compensation, which would leave the village social fabric intact.

Some offences and disputes involve incidents not recognised by modern law such as witchcraft (Brillon, 1980; Winans and Edgerton, 1965), or matters which the community regard as justified like the killing of illegitimate children (Minturn and Hitchcock, 1963), adulterous wives, and daughters who have lost their virginity outside marriage (Nordenstam, 1968, 96). These are concerns which, traditionally, the community feels the criminal justice process does not treat seriously enough.

While there is often this clear distinction between the traditional culture and the administrative culture of the government there are also situations in which minorities do not integrate into the dominant culture either as individuals or groups. These may be sub-cultures within a traditional culture or minority groups in urban-industrial environments, all sustained by their own sense of cultural identity (Barbour, 1980). There may indeed be a factor of ethnicity which affects their willingness to request police assistance (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969). In such circumstances there will be a general undercurrent of resistance to the state with reactions varying from active to passive non-cooperation accompanied by a feeling that their existence is dominated by foreigners whose police make them feel the reverse of safe (Callaghy, 1980). Many citizens of developing countries are well aware that their modern judicial system was not constituted and is not maintained to coincide with the wishes and practices of the majority. For them it is part of a deliberate move towards political centralisation and control and a further step towards imposing cultural uniformity.

Individual factors It is difficult to separate the individual from the social environment in which he lives and works. It may well be, however, that as he becomes more detached from a traditional society and becomes a part of the urban-industrial society he will be increasingly influenced in his behaviour by more personal and purely individual considerations. He will usually weigh in his mind the extent to which the availability of government legal institutions provides a more or less convenient and more or less effective way of settling disputes than existing traditional or quasi-traditional institutions and methods.

Reporting to the police is a time consuming business and for someone paid by the hour and likely to lose his job if he takes time off, there is not much incentive unless the return will outweigh the losses. This is unlikely to be the case in the majority of instances of criminality. The same is equally true for the rural household dweller. Fields have to be guarded from wild animals and birds, stock tended, plots hoed and the grain harvested so that a day away might make a serious change in a

family's well-being for the coming months. For the rural household family, distance from the reporting centre or telecommunications point is another deterrent factor especially if the intervening terrain to be covered is difficult or inhospitable.

Few will report criminal acts in which they have been willing participants such as prostitution, illegal drinking or drug use, and much less when they have been victimised by the prostitutes through theft or blackmail or robbed by the owners or frequenters of illegal bars (Maltz, 1975). Neither are they likely to report where they have been unwilling accessories. Victims of sexual offences are particularly unlikely to report to the police because of the embarrassment and shame involved in the legal process - particularly as there are usually counter assertions of the victim's own contributory immorality. Such offences are also not reported when children and relatives are involved both as victim and offender. It has been shown that victims are several times more likely to recall offences by strangers than by relatives (Turner, 1972). Where complaints are made the police sometimes view them as domestic incidences in which they dislike interfering; a further discouragement to reporting offences (Pollak, 1950).

Well-to-do citizens may fail to report insured losses for fear that the policy may be cancelled, not renewed or the premiums increased (Reiss, 1974). No one will report a theft that might provide evidence of his own criminal activities such as the theft of a previously stolen article or an assault relating to a dispute between criminals.

If the victims have had a previous unsatisfactory experience of the police or where an unhelpful response is expected, crimes will tend to go unreported. This is not easy to assess as the quality of the relationship between the police and the prospective witness is a very subjective matter and will probably vary from day to day and from matter to matter. It is a function of what one party thinks the other is capable of doing (Bayley, 1969). There is no such thing as a person's single attitude to the police and few generalise from a particular experience. The individual in a developing country has a choice as to which type of legal procedure he will use (Nader, 1967; Tanner, 1970 (b)). Where there are these alternatives, the decision given in any one system will be taken as only one stage in the total process of settlement. Many will not bother to report their victimisation to the police because they do not regard them as effective (Center and Smith, 1973). At best they feel nothing will be done; at worst, they suspect the police as untrustworthy or even implicated themselves.

It has been shown in West Africa (Oloruntimehin, 1973) that the lower classes, the old and women are much less likely to report

to the police than the young, the men and the upper classes who have some sense of identity with government processes.

Political factors relating to criminality by officials A serious feature of law and order in developing countries is the extent to which the state and its employees are the criminals and their citizens are the victims who, furthermore, are deprived of any possible recourse to the legal system for justice and protection (Lopez-Rey, 1970), Callaghy, 1980; Mushanga, 1976). The Uganda police in 1964 would take no action in cases involving the military. They also did not record deaths attributable to civil disturbances as either murder or manslaughter (Tanner, 1970(a)). During the Amin regime many of the deaths, even in custody, went unrecorded - and Uganda (or indeed Africa) is not an isolated example as recent revelations about "missing persons" in Argentina have shown.

That these offences are numerous and widespread is not in doubt as the work of Amnesty International regularly discloses. Official complaints of military abuse against Philippine civilians are reported to be at the rate of 54,000 a year (National Secretariat of Social Action, Justice and Peace, 1979) Examples are offences against the person; beatings, torture and killing for which there is often photographic evidence, as in Gabon, Liberia and Cambodia, and the disappearance of large numbers of persons (as reported in Chile and Argentina). There are also internal illegal deportations and illegal detentions in many countries. There are offences against property such as the theft of private property by officials. Corruption at all levels of government is widespread. Where both the briber and the bribed are pleased with the transaction the crime is not reported. Where others may be afraid to complain or distrust the police or feel that nothing can be done about it, the offence will similarly go unreported. Indeed corruption may be so widespread due to the inability of the state apparatus to function (as in post-Amin Uganda) that it becomes the main theme in the political economy of the state (Green, 1981). The forms of corruption are almost infinite; doing, not doing, misdoing, doing speedily and maintaining goodwill (Bayley, 1969). Corruption is considered to be most prevalent during rapid modernisation (Huntington, 1970) and after, rather than before, independence (Monteiro, 1966; Dumont, 1966), but little is revealed in the statistics. Newly formed governments often initiate drives against corruption but this sometimes involves summary justice which again may not be recorded.

There have been numerous occasions on which the civil government has not been able to control their own military forces, as in the 1964 East African army mutinies. The same situation applies when the military governments keep their own forces out of effective control, as with the police in Brazil who have allegedly executed suspected criminals. In Ghana the armed forces have ill-treated

people appearing before the courts in cases involving the courts and forcibly released some prisoners (Economist, 13 March 1962. 64). In August 1982 the Bombay Police mutinied over a pay and union dispute and the police themselves were widely involved in criminal acts of looting, arson and assault.

Finally, it must be mentioned that there are offences against the state. Rebellions and riots instigated by employees of the state which are retrospectively legalised in successful coups d'etat but are harshly condemned if they fail inevitably involve widespread offences against both people and property. In such situations the police may well cease to function to protect the public because they are unable to discern who are the criminals and who are their present or future political masters.

Political factors relating to criminality in general Civil unrest will always reduce the ability of the police to function. Little crime will be reported and even less recorded in these circumstances. There is, for example, a complete absence of law and order statistics throughout the period of the Nigerian civil war (Milner, 1972). During any situations of widespread disorder in which organised civil government ceases to operate there is no intensification of criminality generally. In the 1948 India-Pakistan Partition civil violence erupted during which there were innumerable killings by both sides and widespread abduction of Hindu women by Moslems (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak, 1957).

The recent troubles in Uganda have resulted in large tracts of the country becoming effectively out of government control. In such areas criminal gangs are too well-armed and organised for the police to provide any protection to the citizens there (Southall, 1980). In Burma the line between gang criminality and political insurrection has often been difficult to distinguish.

There is always a social distance factor between the law as constituted by the state, with or without the agreement of the community and its representatives, and the attitudes of that community to the law. Indeed, many may not even know about the imposition of such formal and complex laws or be aware of their impact (Thompson, 1977). There is less likelihood, therefore, of crime being reported to the police. Where laws are few and simple to understand more offences will be reported. The developing countries have experienced a law explosion and few citizens are likely to know their rights, or the extent of the law covering their own occupations and living conditions.

Without any consideration of the rightness or justification for the mass imposition of new laws to the population, the expanded legal code will affect a far wider range of attitudes than any particular matter taken in isolation. The movement of several million Tanzanian peasants in the 1974 villagisation campaign may

have had just such an effect (Samoff, 1981) especially as there would have been additional reactions brought on by the use of force and the burning of villages (Mwapachu, 1976).

In many situations the new laws run counter to traditional rights and beliefs and no assistance at all can be expected from the people. Some examples would be the National Park legislation in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia which overrode traditional hunting rights; customs and excise laws relating to communities artificially split by an international border, eg as between Ruanda and Urundi with Uganda and Tanzania; and state forest laws affecting the local use of timber as in Burma. In addition there will be a whole range of totally new laws for which most communities will have no need, at least initially.

In this wide range of situations the police become the lightning conductors for many of the grievances and frustrations over the enactment of new social policies in which they may not themselves even be involved (Clinard and Abbott, 1973). Most developing countries use the police as the striking force for social revolution. In such circumstances any respect for the traditional police function as servants of the public is under threat and it is doubtful if favourable public attitudes can be developed (Bayley, 1969; Potholm, 1969). Modern law has been institutionalised out of the control of those for whom it operates. But both customary and religious (particularly Islamic) legal systems operate by consensus and the arbitrators attain their role by the agreement and respect of the community and the parties involved.

Situational factors It is well recognised that urban and rural situations are different with respect to crime. In the urban environment many more contacts with the police are possible without having to go to seek them out. They are an obvious part of the landscape and the degree of contact rises with income, education and proximity. City people are more likely to have an unpleasant experience of police coercion. Many more will have seen policemen strike people than in the rural areas (Bayley, 1969) where the impersonality of the police may be greater.

As indicated earlier, in rural areas reporting a crime may involve walking twenty miles on bad roads subject to the vagaries of the weather with floods and storms. There are likely to be very few telephone connections to rural police stations or to the villages. More use is likely to be made of local courts in a country like Tanzania where there was one court per 1041 square kilometres. There will always be a relationship between the number of police stations and courts and the number of infractions. This is also correlated with the density of policemen. In Uganda in 1969 there was one policeman per 1300 population but in the Ivory Coast in 1975 only one per 3652 population. The ratios are even lower for the capitals with

Kampala having one in 642 and Dakar one in 535 (Brillon, 1980).

In the Musoma area of Tanzania failure to report to the police cases of cattle theft came about for several reasons (Tanner, 1966). Cattle owners knew that the police would only send a constable who would probably be able to do even less than they had already done themselves on discovering the theft. In any case, making an official report to the police would have prevented the owners from taking popular retaliatory measures themselves; swift retaliation was a matter of pride and accounted for infrequent thefts in some areas. In the Ikoma and Issenye areas of Tanzania some crimes occurred in places which were sixty miles from the nearest police station over roads which were often impassable for long periods during the rains.

In wild and remote areas many crimes would go undetected, especially when they occurred within a community but also when outsiders were involved because they would not have seen any point in reporting crimes. Murders particularly could always be attributed to accidents and wild animals. It can be assumed that the remoter the district, the less chance there is of crimes being reported or properly investigated.

Institutional factors In most developing countries the organisation and functions of the police represent a continuation from their colonial past and with this has usually come their paramilitary and politically supportive nature (Sumner, 1982). In many cases the latter are isolated from the general public by living in barracks or civil service suburbs. This reflects official thinking that the lower ranks need to be shielded from civilian social contacts (Bayley, 1969). It is compounded by the centralising, inward-looking characteristics of any police organisation which discourage outside contacts (Wasikhongo, 1976 Okonkwo, 1966). Whether they feel they are popular or not police officers will tend to spend most of their off-duty time with other police officers in their own 'club' or in such activities as organised sport. In some politically unsettled independent states the police have a wide variety of duties thrust upon them. Previously these did not take up so many officers, so much time and so much equipment. On any one day, large numbers of police may be involved in state visits, public celebrations, political meetings, presidential tours, security and special guard duties for ministers and diplomats. Similarly, their distribution on the ground will account in part for the level of known criminality. Low density residential areas containing senior civil servants, government ministers, diplomats and expatriate business managers and experts will be relatively well provided with police and telephones (Tanner 1970(b)).

There is, however, a more important factor affecting the amount of unrecorded crime which occurs in many cities and industrial

areas. In some cases, criminal offenders are processed and punished by institutions which have their own private police or security force to protect their personnel and property. They deal privately with employees who steal money, goods and tools; and they deal similarly with a high proportion of outsider thieves (Cameron 1964) by private administrative justice (Robin 1967), ie either the agent himself or the group that employs him 'takes the law into its own hands'.

Private security organisations and their employees initially have the same range of discretion as ordinary policemen when they come across crime; the developing world has these organisations in addition to private armed and uniformed police. In the Philippines the suburban estates of the well-to-do around Manila are well guarded; in other countries and cities it is the same. Thus it is likely that a substantial amount of unreported crime has been dealt with privately and in an 'ad hoc' way (involving often beating-up and/or dismissal) and is not recorded in any statistics. Another type of crime which goes unrecorded is inter and intra business crime (fraud, etc.) which may be common among the richer and more well-established groups in developing countries who are seldom prosecuted. It more often goes undetected because of the inefficiency of external controls, like auditing, direct tax system, etc. Whether this group are businessmen, civil servants or the military, they comprise the power elite which is often beyond the law (Heidenheimer 1970) or informally involved in it in some form of dubious complicity.

Finally there is a widespread attitude that legitimates much theft and fraud upon large private and governmental bureaucracies. Extensive pilfering and minor theft is condoned and so goes unreported. The social distance is too great for moral constraints to be operative particularly in developing countries (Smigell and Ross 1970). This applies whatever the political complexion of the government; colonialist, capitalist, socialist and communist. Socialist Tanzania's Minimum Sentences Act 1963 was in part a response to theft of government property, theft by public servants and petty corruption. Cuba has experienced a serious growth in economic crimes against the state (Salas, 1979) while the frequency of reported violence has been reduced (Brady 1982). It is perhaps inevitable that as the institutions and functions of governments in developing countries become more widespread, they should become increasingly the victims of crime.

FALSE RECORDED DATA

a) Falsified by the police

Given the frailties of human nature, it must be expected that the

police may wish to record more or less of the crimes which are known to or reported to them. It cannot always be assumed that the recorder of information wants to provide accurate data or that he is capable of doing so. An ambitious police commander may consistently produce low crime totals to give the impression that he is well in control of his district's crime situation (Bohrnstedt 1970; Maltz 1975). There have been cases of substantial under-recording of crime although incidents were initially recorded (Wolfgang 1968). The crime rate can be significantly lowered by attributing criminal damage to under-age children and reducing the scale of serious theft by systematically undervaluing the property stolen (Seidman and Couzens 1974). This situation can often be detected where declining crime rates are associated with population increase, eg India (Bayley 1969).

In a rural police station the police officer has a vested interest in stability and good relations with the communities in his area and he would not want to record crimes for which police action would be counter-productive and have no communal support. Even in urban areas, cases may be settled out of court by a small payment made direct to the police and the files of proactive cases can mysteriously vanish (Southall 1980).

There is a range of cases where the police will not proceed with the investigation of an incident because of their estimate of the investigation time required to produce adequate evidence, how long it would take to get a court hearing and the chances of getting a conviction (Manning 1977). If crimes are unlikely to be detected such as the burglary of mud and wattle houses or the theft of home produced articles, they may not be recorded at all and the 'clean-up' rate will look more respectable (Bottomley and Coleman 198). Conversely, there may be increases in recorded crime and low detection rates related to police wage claims implying a competitive move for an increased share of total public expenditure.

Data may be held 'back' in a policeman's or detective's notebooks to be recorded when it could be used against a particular criminal. Without any question of corruption, there may be a downgrading of crime to make it less serious so that there can be a better likelihood of getting pleas of guilty. This could also arise when the police feel that the full charge would cause a defendant undue harm or when attempting to avoid collateral harm in sexually oriented cases (Daudistel et al 1979). Policemen, who are frequently aware of the difficulties of getting a case through the courts on the basis of what is first recorded, may record either as little factual information as possible - filling in the relevant details as the investigation proceeds - or record as much as possible even asking informants to go away and obtain

more detail before the investigation is yet in motion (Bayley 1969).

Apart from the obvious cases of corruption in which the police receive material benefits for falsifying their records, they may do this where they feel so certain of their suspect's guilt that it makes the facts unimportant. They then produce false evidence, rig identification parades and even hire witnesses, particularly when trying to lodge cases against ex-convicts who do not have convincing alibis. They may also falsify and fabricate evidence as much to defend themselves against over-critical judges as to ensure the conviction of a suspect on too little evidence (Bayley 1969).

Police may also alter information under social pressure or to show favouritism. As individuals the police remain members of their own extended families, clans, tribes and castes. They are subject to political and cultural influence, conniving at false information and the padding of cases. Above all, the police will alter their information to make it conform exactly to legal requirements. Any offence will have its various constituent elements to which the information contained in police notebooks and crime reports must conform (Bottomley and Coleman 1976). At a higher level, there may be political reasons for altering the data in particular cases, and also for raising and lowering the apparent crime rate generally. Falsification of statistics can take place at any or all administrative levels but it may be more difficult to implement such alterations above the primary level when there is a computerised command and control system (Chatterton 1979). Finally a crime may not be reported because of simple human failing or weakness on the part of the policeman on duty.

b) Falsified by the victims

People reporting that they have been victims of crimes may be making the accusation for a connected motive. The court case may only be a stage in an extra-legal traditional process in which the report to the police is an additional pressure for settlement. It may have the direct private purposes of revenge and punishment, rivalry or establishing an alibi for another matter. Evidence abounds of offences reported to have occurred at non-existent addresses or in which victims give false names and never appear again, or where an inflated loss or a bogus loss is reported in order to claim higher compensation or the insurance (Seidman and Couzens 1974). In this group there will be those who report to the police just to be reassured that police are available (Maltz 1975) as well as the mentally disturbed and senile of which every large town has its examples

(Rubinstein 1973; Skogan 1975).

Finally, in all police forces there exist numerous reports of crimes that are classified as 'unfounded'. Many such cases are unfounded but others would probably be recorded in victimization surveys, even though the police might not have established that a crime had been committed.

c) Falsified by witnesses

Providing a signed statement to the police in good faith and making the same statement on oath in court where one is liable to cross-examination are two quite widely separate events. In the passion of the moment when the crime is in the forefront of his mind, the witness may freely make a report to the police. Later on he will see this crime in the context of the community in which it occurred and in which he still lives. He will be subject to the very personal pressures of those involved so that by the time the case comes to trial, not only will many of the details have become vague or blurred but the complainant or witness will see his evidence as necessary to support a particular viewpoint for which he will receive continuing social support. The prevalence of intrigue in these small tightly knit communities will always make it difficult to hold tightly to bare facts. In India the repudiation by a witness of his earlier statements to the police may account for half of the cases in which the police fail to get a court conviction (Bayley 1969). Even if the prospective witness is prepared to hold to his story, he may quite simply fear retaliation either against his person or his stock or his land and property.

While within the traditional system the oath to tell the truth may have power to prevent lies, it will not be used in situations in which lies are inevitable since the witness has no other role but that of being partisan to one party or another (Bohannon 1957). The oath in court has no such power and it is rarely a strong enough factor to force a witness to override his partisan commitments. The difficulties of being a witness and the reasons for agreeing to be a witness are common to all. It can be an embarrassing process because no one likes to have their veracity publically questioned and it is almost certainly a costly process in terms of the time and money lost. In general there are few if any inducements for a witness to appear and the low or non-existent reimbursement of his expenses are unlikely to offset his losses at critical times of the year. Perhaps only the well-to-do and the totally unemployed may be able to come to court without some economic suffering. Trials drag on and memories fade so that most witnesses become progressively less reliable particularly if the defence lawyers can get repeated

adjournments. Witnesses also feel nervous when facing lawyers known by reputation to make insulting suggestions about their statements or characters and the reasons for coming to the court. They feel threatened when lawyers cast doubt on the evidence itself and sometimes retract certain statements under such personalised pressure. Others feel flustered by the formal procedures (Bayley 1969).

Some will not consider the government court system to be as responsive to justice as the community in which they live or as they themselves conceive it and, whilst not revealing it, they could be regarded as hostile witnesses. Individuals may give tip-offs to the police because they have grudges against the offender. Others stand to gain by helping the police because it affords them a supply of goodwill which may prevent the police from making further enquiries into matters in which they have been involved (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). In addition there are witnesses recruited and tutored by the police. In Kenya convicts often talked about joining the police on their release; this meant being regular informants for which they might receive some minor benefits (Tanner 1970d).

INACCURATE RECORDED DATA

While at each end of the scale there are completely accurate and completely false statistics, in between there is much data which is inaccurate or incomplete for incidental reasons. The recorders do not mean to be inaccurate but they have neither the means nor the will to be accurate; there is a 'grey area' between what is reported by the public and what is officially recorded.

Data may be absent from police and court records for a variety of reasons (Wasikhongo 1976) including oversight, laziness, incompetence and pressure of other work which has to take priority. In an examination of some court data it was found that the courts did not ask from where litigants came, nor if they were Moslems, before applying Moslem law to them. This meant in practice that the court officials were unable to comply with the requirements of the law as they did not have the relevant basic information (Bohmer 1978).

Local differences in training and lack of supervision may be revealed in the variations in recorded data between adjacent police jurisdictions with similar social environments (Skogan 1975). In Nigeria the sentences for corporal punishment passed by northern local courts were apparently added in error to the figures for magistrates courts so that for 1962 the totals of corporal punishment sentences rose from 93 to 3806. Similarly the reported rise in crime in Western Nigeria from 1812 in 1955

to 27,488 in 1964 was so dramatic that some error must be assumed (Milner 1972). Indian crime statistics have also produced some surprising totals. In 1963 only 4000 more serious crimes were recorded than in 1949 although the population had grown by 107 millions. At that time the serious crime rate was reported as only 115.6 per 100,000 with the equivalent rates for England and Wales being 2382.7 and the United States 1,226.2. Less than 2.5 per cent of all recorded crime was committed by persons under 21, whereas in England and Wales it was 23.7 per cent (Bayley 1969).

At a lower level errors can often be found where, for example, police districts have no cases awaiting trial at the end of the year (Tanner 1970b). Some cases are investigated by police of low rank and minimal education. In other cases there may be only 'armchair' investigations with junior policemen being sent out to do perfunctory investigations. Sometimes the scene of the crime is never visited—as with petty, bicycle and car thefts (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). There are other well-known difficulties concerning incidents which occur near the end of a duty shift when the police involved avoid starting any new paper work or do not react to a call that would delay them going off duty (Manning 1977;). Overall there is the basic factor that even when everyone involved is telling the truth to the best of their ability, the victim's, witnesses' and police officer's perceptions of the same event are very likely to be different in important respects: suspects are always ready to offer counter-charges and alternative explanations. In situations where the offence is dyadic with both sides contribution to the offence, the police may split the blame, releasing or charging both parties, or apportion the blame to one party simply for legal reasons (Curtis 1974; Skogan 1975). Thus what is recorded and the social realities of the event are quite different. The traditional range of contributory guilt is likely to be very much wider than any legal limitation as occurs, for example, over contributory negligence in the loss of personal effects (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). Parents may make complaints to the police about the injuries of their children which they assume to be from criminal assaults which the police attribute to fair fights (Conklin and Bittner 1973).

In other circumstances the data may not be available; the prison files of long-term Kenyan convicts contain a space for psychiatric observations in which it is rare to find any statements recorded. Certainly a common feature of these long-term prisoners' records was the very high proportion of uncompleted details and this vitiated the usefulness of this particular system of record keeping (Tanner 1970d): a murder case file recording the cause of an incident might state 'trivial quarrel of unknown origin' and, in the absence of post mortem facilities, many reasons for suspicious deaths amount to no more than guesswork. Most police stations do not possess even the

simplest forensic equipment. In rural areas with few police, it will often prove impossible to keep onlookers away from the scene of the crime so that much evidence could be destroyed. It is rare that physical clues can be speedily examined or that they can be examined at a convenient distance from the scene of the crime. A country may only have one forensic laboratory located in its capital, and in some small countries there may be no laboratory at all. The police then have to rely on the laboratories of neighbouring but not necessarily friendly countries. Police officers sometimes do not have maps or they are unable to read them. Furthermore, in the absence of any formal system of house addresses, locations may be inaccurately recorded. Times of crimes may not be related to watches and vary with the sun and cloud cover. Data may just disappear through flood, fire, white ants and even pilfering. The case file in Tanzania of an American Peace Corps volunteer accused of murdering his wife was missing from the Mwanza High Court registry.

Any federal state or country with large numbers of police and court jurisdictions having distinctive social characteristics automatically faces a serious problem over the reliability and consistency of its statistics. There may be variations in terminology and interpretations between jurisdictions; robbery and rape in one may be theft and indecent assault in another (Chappell 1976). A very thin line can separate specific classifications which may vary with the police officers on duty as occurs, for example, between stealing a car and the unauthorised use of a vehicle, between theft and robbery, and between the various gradations of assault. In Uganda there were variations in assault charges at some police stations which appeared to relate to whether there was a doctor available to make the necessary examinations and testify to the degree of seriousness of the injuries received (Tanner 1970b). Police may make errors in crime classifications according to their own sub-cultural and individual values (Ferracuti et al 1962) that may reflect linguistic and religious differences. Observed variations between various jurisdictions may be official, conventional or habitual.

From time to time there are differences between state, departmental and central government statistics supposed to be recording the same data. The examination of Nigerian law and order statistics (Milner 1972) shows some of these variations: the totals of regional crime returns do not always tally with published federal annual returns; annual reports of crime differ on average to the extent of 30,000 cases either way and, in the past, some states even failed to produce any published figures, eg in the years following regionalisation. The police sometimes record a crime in a specific category which should be amended when the charge is changed after further investigation or court verdict. If they fail to amend their returns the courts and

police will, in good faith, produce two sets of irreconcilable statistics.

In any long catalogue of human failings in the recording of accurate law and order statistics there are three stages. First, there is the presence or absence of instructions from the Chief Justice's office and Police Headquarters as to how the data is to be recorded. In the absence of handbooks for criminal statistics, it can only be guessed as to what is included under the headings of 'no crimes', 'refused charges', 'cautions' and 'informal solutions' and how standard entries such as the value of stolen property are decided upon (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). Secondly, there is the failure to be accurate for a wide range of personal, social, economic and political factors. Thirdly, the absence of adequate supervision to check and correct records perpetuates and even perpetrates distortions. Occasionally the inaccuracy is politically motivated when the government wants lower crime rates to be recorded as evidence of the success of their policies (Center and Smith 1973; Morrisey 1972).

Even when the accused and the crime are known to the police, the data may not be ultimately recorded, because each case is sifted through a variable mesh of interest, influence and bribery (Bamisiaye 1974). The existence of records, may merely reflect the fulfilment of a bureaucratic requirement (Skogan 1975).

RECORDED DATA

a) Primary data

In these situations, as earlier indicated, the recorder is in direct contact with the information that is being recorded. The scene of the crime or of the traffic accident is visited and statements by the victims and witnesses are taken down. Victims also approach the police directly. The more cordial the relationship between the police and the people and the greater the trust and confidence in the law maintenance authorities, the greater will probably be the amount of reported crime.

The recording of data is in many cases a deductive process which often depends upon being aware of the available alternatives or having a specialist available to define them. The absence of a psychiatrist may well mean the underrecording of accused persons who were mentally ill (Bienen 1976) or alternatively, to insanity being recorded as a fact when it can only be an opinion.

Discretion factors Once an event is reported to the police, they exercise their discretion in whether to recognise it as a possible crime. At every stage of the criminal justice process thereafter the police and the courts have discretion as to whether or not to proceed. The most important use of discretion is that used by lower-ranks of the police force; in many cases a

relatively untrained policeman, the nature of whose work is not open to supervision, decides whether there is a probable crime or not. This discretion is a necessary part of the legal system but how it is used is largely unknown. In many developing countries, mainly because of the isolation of police stations and poor supervision, the police have an enormous amount of discretion (Bayley 1969).

Thus the law provides those empowered to administer it with endless options. The more law that is provided by the state, the wider becomes the range of discretion given to each and every policeman (Pepinsky 1975). Much of this discretion in criminal matters depends upon how the police are mobilised for it, the priorities they observe and the extent of their specialised knowledge. If they do not send traffic police to patrol a particular road or to test possible defective vehicles there will be no possible offences over which they need to exercise their discretion (Reiss 1974).

There are also uses of discretion which are of questionable legality. However independent the police and courts may be in constitutional theory, ultimately any important law and order decision is a political one (Davis 1969). Senior government officials are not prosecuted for criminal offences either in Uganda (Southall 1980) or in Ghana (Economist 3 July 1982). Yet, in trying to withstand such pressures, three High Court judges were murdered in Ghana (Economist, 10 July 1982) and when Amin came to power, the Chief Justice of Uganda was killed.

Any criminal case should stand on its own merits in law, but the deference which suspects show to the police and their demeanour then and in court later, influence police and judicial discretion to enforce the law (Reiss 1974). Deference to those of higher status with whom suspects have contact also affects subsequent legal decisions (Skogan 1975; Black and Reiss 1970). Uncooperative juveniles tend to increase their chances of being arrested and are many times more likely in court to receive a severe rather than a lenient disposition (Piliavin and Briar 1964).

The illegal use of discretion occurs when the police impose their own sense of justice by beating and releasing suspects or even by murdering them. Such cases are known to have taken place in the Republic of South Africa, Brazil and Uganda but rarely will there be any record of them in the official statistics.

Legal factors Generally, the developing nations have considerably expanded the scope of their laws. Potentially, there are now criminals whose fathers and grandfathers could not have been accused if they had committed the same acts. In Singapore the use and possession of cannabis was made a criminal offence which raised the numbers of committed drug offenders

although it is doubtful whether this increase faithfully mirrored any actual increase in drug use (Koh 1974). Decriminalisation of certain offences would have had the reverse effect. There are also important factors in the specificity of the law; to convict needs the fulfilment of the intent legally establishing each offence (Lloyd 1977) whereas in traditional justice a wider range of more social factors is involved.

In traditional justice much of the processes of social life are public and privacy as a restraint on this process does not exist. With government law there is a clear distinction between what the law can do with actions taken in public and those occurring in private. The data recorded will always record a very high proportion of crimes in public over which the police require no preorganised legal justification. Since it is mainly the poor who spend a high proportion of their time in public, the data will reflect this feature in most urban areas. There are constraints on the police in matters regarding the legal protection of privacy. The police have to be invited to participate in 'private' incidents or they have to go through legal procedures in order to gain access (Reiss and Bordua 1967).

Although crimes are reported to the police by victims, the law enforcement social structure filters the data to produce a final product (Littrell 1973). This information can be organised differently with equal correctness but it is orchestrated to meet the demands of statutes and judicial practices and it is presented so as to withstand legal scrutiny. Crime as defined is a legal box (Rose 1969). Court statistics may better reflect comparative workloads than features of crime.

Institutional factors The organisation of the police force affects the amount of crime that is recorded. More crime is recorded in towns than in the country, not necessarily because more crime is committed there but because there are more police stations which are thus more convenient to visit (Brillon 1980). When a new police station is constructed it becomes convenient to report a range of offences which previously were not sufficiently important to justify the time and effort involved in reporting to a more distant station (Tanner 1970 (b)).

The reorganisation of the police force may also result in large numbers of crimes being reported. The introduction of a central communications centre receiving all emergency calls previously only made to individual police stations will increase the number of crimes (Wolfgang 1968). In Uttar Pradesh, India, a campaign to ensure the complete recording of all crimes raised the figures for gang robbery by 78 per cent, ordinary robberies by 98 per cent and murders by 23 per cent (Uttar Pradesh 1960).

When the enforcement of a particular group of crimes is concentrated in a single department rather than dispersed among

several departments this is likely to increase reported crime because this department will have a vested interest in justifying its existence with a larger figure of known crime. Singapore created a new Central Narcotics Bureau to deal with drug offences and this led to an increase in drug prosecutions (Koh 1974).

In urban areas the police, by their very numbers, will be much more involved with non-criminal violators and particularly traffic offenders. Law enforcement statistics will reflect this, not necessarily because the police are more active but because the offences become more obvious where there are large numbers of buses, cars, lorries and bicycles. If the discretion of policemen on the beat is reduced so that they cannot deal with minor incidents unofficially, the crime rate is bound to rise; only because the number of reports has grown (Center and Smith 1973).

As the value and amount of insured property increases, not only will there be more crimes reported by victims but also more enquiries from insurance companies which leads to a greater number of crimes being recorded (Reiss 1974).

Policy factors Public opinion and political climate may affect not only what the police act upon and thus record (Bayley 1969) but how the courts deal with the cases brought before them. In Singapore when the authorities launched an offensive against the drug user (who had become the symbol of the counter culture which the government regarded as a threat) the police started to arrest opium addicts over 50 years of age who had previously been exempt (Koh 1974). Other policies may affect police priorities in dealing with incidents such as wife-beating or rape. If the police assign high priority to any class of offences this will be reflected in a high proportion of cases being taken up as well as cleared up. If the same priority was given to burglary as to murder in terms of police resources, it is probable that the clean up-rate for burglary would rise dramatically.

The police may have a policy to refuse to accept charges by victims in which the lost property is of little value or the offence is difficult to define. Petty theft or deception and unlawful sexual intercourse with girls just below the legal age of consent - where age is difficult to prove - are particularly likely to be refused (Bottomley and Coleman 1981).

Where it is a government policy for the police to deal only with crime and to serve public law and order needs as the public of their own free-will define them, then the statistics will obviously reflect this. If, on the other hand, the police are used as one of the principal agents for social renovation and reform, then the statistics will reflect this policy in both their character and quantity. There is little doubt that the police in developing countries have increasingly been used in

this way. Such processes bring the police into contact with those segments of society which were not previously thought of as criminal. The activities of these groups create new classes of offenders outside traditionally accepted criminality and often place the police beyond the range of traditional support and goodwill. The prohibition of alcohol, land redistribution, compulsory villagisation, border interests, interstate movements, 'pass' laws, profiteering, blackmarket activities - the list is virtually endless. In Delhi, March 1964, the police deflated the tyres of 4000 bicycles in one evening as part of a traffic safety campaign and its effect on goodwill must have been negative (Bayley 1969).

Cultural factors The police and courts, just as any other long-standing social group or institution, have distinctive sub-cultures in which viewpoints are pre-determined. (Daudistel et al 1979). This stereotyping affects their attitudes not only towards suspects but also to victims and witnesses. Police and court reaction to prostitutes, vagabonds, drug-users, the very old and the very young is probably unsympathetic (Bottomley and Coleman 1981).

Once there is real or imagined information that a specific minority group, particularly one with easily visible or identifiable ethnic, tribal or caste characteristics, commits more crime than other groups (Mays 1963) it will lead to greater police saturation of their locality. This will turn up more crime and more arrests than would otherwise occur (Geis 1965). Furthermore, as there are widespread cultural differences, this will affect the character of recorded crime (Sparks et al 1977: 189). The police may not bother to record intra-communal violence since they see it as part of the group's normal behaviour.

Total neighbourhood characteristics permit certain forms of behaviour to take place while inhibiting the occurrence of others (McBride and McCoy 1981), particularly with respect to them being reported to the police. Once outside the tight village community, the proportion of reported crime tends to rise. Generally, the more individualised the victim has become through urban living and involvement in industry and business, the more likely is a crime to be reported. The motives which lead non-victims to send or rather not send for the police are unknown (Skogan, 1975) but it is probable that it is not usually done for reasons of serving the public good. The reasons are much more likely to be those of jealousy, revenge, the furtherance of another dispute, financial or other gain, ingratiation, etc. (Cohn 1965).

Situational factors The decision to record a crime is the result of personal report and interaction. Distinct and observable offences form little part of the generality of crime as known to a community or the police (Black 1970).

There are many situational factors in urban living, with shops, houses, moveable property which make for higher crime rates. Crowds, such as at rush-hours, markets, football games, bus and train arrival and departure points etc., provide opportunities for crime and may in certain circumstances provoke criminogenic environments.

b) Secondary data

The information available to the collater of data has often already been filtered through a primary institution where it was originally recorded. Basic data may be excluded from the published court records (Bienen 1976; Bohmer 1978).

Local interpreters are a particular source of inaccuracy as they are often low-paid and non-specialist. Sometimes in the case of little known languages two local interpreters may be used to pass information from the language of the witness to the language of the court (Bienen 1976). To do such work requires considerable intercultural understanding and skill and unless someone in the court or police station is conversant with both languages, mistakes will be made. Furthermore, such 'interpreters' interpret rather than translate statements verbatim. If the collator finds errors in the primary data there is little that can be done to rectify them so the figures are altered to conform and make the totals consistent.

STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

Observers generally assume that the smaller the country and the smaller the number of reporting agencies, the greater the accuracy in the statistics of crime (Court 1976: 151). The sheer size of some countries and the areas of particular jurisdiction prevents the effective individual control of supervisors and clerks except irregularly because of the expense and the time involved in travel away from their headquarters. Checking by letter and comment requires a high level of literacy and interest if it is to be effective. In some cases, as in Angola, government statistics are not published because there is nobody to collect and analyse them (Economist, 24 July 1982: 65).

In developing countries, in the collation of law and order statistics, precise, alien categories are imposed upon highly variable social events (Sumner 1982: 10). The interpretation of the data therefore requires the extensive examination of primary

material if any sociological use is to be made of them. At best the categories used are shorthand reference terms (Sudnow 1965). This however means that the court statistics tend to be as exact as trained lawyers can make them. Cases are completed in set ways according to set categories. Even though only a minority of cases reach the courts, they have an accuracy of their own which can be used. The resulting records may also be more accurate because the court officials, particularly those in the higher courts, are more likely to be competent in the language in which the laws are written and the proceedings conducted (Tanner 1970 (b)).

Few of the clerks have any interest in the veracity of what they are recording and the procedures and methods in use are so scientifically crude as to have little value on their own except as indicators of certain forms of police and court activities. Perhaps such data could be referred to more properly as forming another part of the ritualisation of government. In almost all statistics criminal variables are measured imperfectly or not measured at all. Data concerning marital status, religion, employment status, age, geographical and ethnic origin are rarely recorded. Only where such information is clear and precise will the variables be recorded with any clarity; the employment status of a senior civil servant is unambiguous, someone who is married according to civil law, or who possesses a known address and whose parents are of the same tribal or caste origin can be 'defined' easily. But many others fall in between somewhere. Where the data are recorded on any scale it is likely to be modified by a wide range of influences, most of which can only be hinted at (Yunker 1982). The Singapore data for drug offences did not distinguish between criminal acts resulting from drug abuse - acting under the influence of drugs; and those related to the acquisition of drugs eg theft to get money to buy drugs; and offences with no apparent relation to drug use but concerning the manufacturers and sellers (Singh and Joe 1981). In a study of drug addiction in East Africa only Uganda recorded the occupations of persons prosecuted for drug offences (Tanner 1966 (b)).

Essentially law and order statistics are designed to be records of individuals committing separate and distinct crimes in the same way as an illness is individual and distinct. Once the records involve multiple offenders and multiple offences, the whole system no longer records anything of value beyond the basic facts of its multiplicity. Smashing a shop-window or burning a house are separate and distinct in every possible category of assessment. In India 1963 there were 28,114 cases of riot for which all the damage was lumped together. Although this was done partially for administrative convenience it was more a reflection of the fact that in a communal riot lasting several days, there were not enough police available to record each individual unit of damage or even the different events involving

damage. Even had there been, there was only possibility of making a charge against any known persons once the riot subsided. In August 1946, Calcutta officials collected and disposed of 3,173 bodies killed in communal rioting. In March 1964 at Jamshedpur, 164 bodies were found and in Uganda, after a cattle raid, 68 bodies were counted (Tanner 1970 (a)). In such cases there are not separate case files for every body found, even if the names of the dead were known. Legally they were all murdered and statistically they were not recorded as such or made the subject of individual murder enquiries. Similarly what is legally murder but which the communities involved regard as no more than simple justice occurs in the mob killings of thieves as with 179 known cases in Uganda in 1964 (Tanner 1970 (a): and witches (Tanner 1970(c)). In one Ugandan incident seven thieves were beaten to death (Clinard and Abbott 1973) and in a well known incident the President of the Central African Republic ordered the beating of imprisoned thieves of whom three were killed (Paris Match, 12 August 1972:) In the latter cases numbers of men were prepared to admit to participating in these killings but they would not be classified as murderers.

As the data are passed up the levels of the official hierarchy from policeman to Minister of Justice, they will have situational meanings integral to the various states in the assembly of official statistics (Cicourel 1968:) At each level they will have different uses so that the ex-post-facto readings and interpretations of statistical record may have little relationship to the original facts. Once the recording procedures have been evaluated, there must be extreme scepticism over any interpretation based on them alone (Mays 1963:)

If the work of the police and courts is largely assessed on the basis of statistical reports, then they will be compiled with this end in mind. Such archival data have an element of reactivity in their constitution and this may also reduce their primary value (Bayley 1969; Seidman and Couzens 1974). A further factor in this might be their belief in the value of deterrence in restraining further law breaking so that the police will pay great attention to a high rate of clearance and devote even more attention to this ratio when they have been alarmed by accusations of corruption and inefficiency (Box 1971:)

STATISTICAL PREDICTIONS

In general, it can be assumed that, to a large extent, crime is the result of a combination of social change, social contrast and poverty factors. But there are exceptions to the rule that, as developing countries become more urban and industrialised, the

profile of crime will roughly resemble the pattern of the developed countries. The various features are modified substantially by circumstances and this influences the overall pattern. The Japanese crime situation is markedly below that of other developed countries though it has had unprecedented urban and industrial development and has a criminal justice system modelled on that of the West (Clifford 1976).

Whatever the local and national problems, all available statistics show levels of reported crime that are unquestionably below any estimated levels of crime (Quinney 1970). In some cases the recorded levels of reported crime are far higher than those in some western countries. The murder rate in Uganda from 1960 to 1964 varied between 8.31 and 10.05 per 100,000. This was well before the civil disintegration of the Amin period for which no statistics are available. Nevertheless the data are not much different to the US rates for 1974. In 1977, Washington DC and the State of Colorado had the highest United States murder rates with 27.1 and 16.1 but in 1964 the Buganda county of Buruli had a murder rate of 194.9 and Karamajong 45.0 (Tanner 1970(a)).

Poverty is the principal experience of Third World populations but initially it was poverty in a society wide sense. Now it is poverty in contrast to the affluence which is seen in shop windows, the houses of diplomats, ministers and businessmen, cars, and expatriates (and perhaps particularly displayed by the women) which is now emphasised through the mass media of films and advertisements.

Many inhabitants, if not most, are on the knife-edge of survival and relatively minor changes in the political, social, economic and geographical environments can cause immediate deprivation and must lead to an increase in the rates of crime (Radzinowicz 1971). These increases in crime are not shown in official statistics, but it must be concluded that there has been - and continues to be - a substantial under-recording of crime and the underlying trend is upwards (Chester 1976).

In making any predictions about crime, there is a time-lag that has to be taken into account between when the crimes were committed and when the data appears on the record at a sufficiently high administrative level to be acted upon. It may be that a particular series of serious crimes may reach ministerial level very quickly but changes in the generality of crime may not reach this level until the annual statistics are prepared, which could be as much as two years later (Kleinman and Lukoff 1981). Even if a case were to be completed within three months of first being reported, it might be another year before the statistics were collated. Any official reaction to the data is thus likely to relate to a social situation which may have substantially changed (Yunker 1982).

Predictions of crime tend to be based on an assumed datum level but the rate of social change in developing countries tends to be so rapid that the time lag between crimes and assessment makes them out of date almost before the forecasts are made. For instance, it is assumed that the average age of criminals must decrease because of the changing age-sex distribution of the population. On the other hand, the exclusion of more young men from the normal adult existence once provided by traditional society (because of rising unemployment) will probably raise the average age of street gang members and provide such groups with more educated members (La Fontaine 1972). Similarly, unless the expansion of the police forces keeps pace with population growth, the ratio of police to people is going to become less and less favourable for the maintenance of law and order. This must inevitably result in a decline in reported crime as in Buganda (Tanner 1965). The prevalence of military training, the flood of arms, the desire for consumer goods, and the limitations of industrial development, all point to a rise in crime. Only when there is a wholesale restructuring of society that diverts criminality into new ideologies and political activity is there likely to be more stability. Even then there is likely to be a change of pattern rather than a Utopian reduction in crime and criminality.

Always insofar as the legal system is ethical, any crisis in political and social confidence tends to become a crisis in law and order operations because it operates as an integral part of the political system (Wilkins 1970).

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of law and order statistics in the developing world is the degree to which they are instinctively accepted at face value, as if they had the same probity as death and birth rates (Center and Smith 1973) which, in themselves, can be just as unreliable for a different set of individual and institutional reasons. Print alone, even for official documents, never confers probity on otherwise unreliable data. Nevertheless the conversion of weak and confused statistical evidence into 'hard' figures (as has occurred recently in the assessment of mugging in Britain and its identification as part of a dramatic rise in the rate of violent crime) still takes place even in developed countries. The press in any country, whether or not it is directly controlled by the government, can play a dangerous role in converting data from controversial impressions to incontrovertible statistics (Hall et al 1978). This type of transformation is all the easier in the

developing world since police activity tends to focus on the urban marginal migrant labourer (Sumner 1982).

As yet there is no widespread development of indigenous criminology in the developing countries, but what researchers and analysts there are, are likely to have been trained in the developed world. The bias inherent in any research may well be compounded by contemporary public opinion and the academic world outside their countries of origin. There is thus a process of internationalisation or expatriatisation of the researcher or senior official. Even when they are trained totally within their own cultural environment, they will be influenced by their own cultural interpretations of events whether these arise from traditional or contemporary political factors (Wadsworth 1981).

REFERENCES

AR	African Review
AA	American Anthropologist
ASR	American Sociological Review
CSSH	Comparative Studies in Society and History
CD	Crime and Delinquency
IJCP	International Journal of Criminology and Penology
JCJ	Journal of Criminal Justice
JMAS	Journal of Modern African Studies
SP	Social Problems

REFERENCES

- Bamisaiye, A., 1974, 'The Spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency and adult crime in the city of Ibadan', IJLP
- Barbour, K.M., 1980, 'Sudan since Independence' JMAS 18, pp 73-79
- Baterina, V.F., 1955, 'A study of money in elections in the Philippines', Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, pp 39-86 and 137-212
- Bayley, D.H., 1969, The police and political development in India Princeton University Press
- Bayley, D.H., and Mendelsohn, H. 1969, Minorities and the Police, Free Press
- Bienen, L., 1976, 'Criminal insanity in Western Nigeria', JMAS, 14, pp 219-45
- Black, D.J., 1970, 'The production of crime rates', ASR, 35, pp 733-48
- 1971, 'The social organisation of arrest', Stanford Law Review, 23, pp 1087-1111
- Bohannan, P., 1957, Justice and judgment among the Tiv, International African Institute, London
- Bohmer, C., 1978, 'Community values in Upper Volta', JMAS, 16, PP 295-310
- Bohrstedt, G.W., 1970, 'Reliability and validity assessment in attitude measurement' in Summers, G.F. (ed), Attitude Measurement, Rand-McNally, Chicago
- Bottomley, A.K., and Coleman C.A., 1976, 'Criminal Statistics: IJCP 4, PP 33-58
- 1981, Understanding crime rates, Gower Westmead
- Box, S., 1971, Deviance, reality and society, Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York
- Brady, J., 1982, 'The revolution comes of age: justice and social change in contemporary Cuba', in Sumner, C. (ed), Crime, justice and underdevelopment: beyond modernisation theory, Heinemann, London
- Brillon, Y., 1980, Ethnocriminologie de l'Afrique Noire, Vrin, Paris

- Callaghy, T.M., 1980, 'State-subject communication in Zaire', JMAS, 1Q8, PP 469-92
- Cameron, M.O., 1964, The booster and the snitch, Free Press, New York
- Center, L.J. and T.G. Smith, 1973, 'Crime Statistics - can they be trusted', American Criminal Law Review, II, pp 1045-86
- Chappell, D., 1976, Forcible rape and the criminal justice system, Columbia University Press, New York
- Chatterton, M.R., 1979, 'Review of 'Defining Crime'', British Journal of Criminology 19, pp 171-3
- Chester, C.R., 1976, 'Perceived relative deprivation as cause of property crime' CD, 22, pp 17-30
- Cicouirel, A.V., 1968, The social organisation of juvenile justice, John Wiley, New York
- Clifford, W., 1976, Crime control in Japan, Heath Lexington
- Clinard, M.B., and D.J. Abbott, Crime in developing countries: a comparative perspective, John Wiley, New York
- Cohn, B.S., 1965, 'Anthropological notes on disputes and law in India' AA 65, PP 82-122
- Conklin, J.E., and E. Bittner, 1973 'Burglary in a suburb', Criminology II, 226-32
- Court, J.H., 1976 'Pornography and sex-crimes' a reevaluation in the light of recent trends around the world' IJCP 5, PP 129-157
- Daudistel, H.C., W.B. Sanders and D.E.Luckenbill, 1979, Criminal justice: Situations and decisions, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York
- Davis, K.C., 1969, Discretionary justice; a preliminary enquiry, Baton Rouge
- Dodd, D., 1979, 'The role of law in plantation society', International Journal of Sociology of Law, 7, pp 275-96
- Dodge, R.W. and A. Turner, 1971, 'Methodological foundation for establishing a National Survey of Victimization' American Statistical Association Meeting

- Dumont, R., 1966, False start in Africa, Sphere, London
- Edelhertz, H., 1970, The nature, impact and prosecution of white-collar crime, Government Printing Office Washington
- Ferracuti, F., R.P. Hernandez and M.E. Wolfgang, 1962, 'A study of police errors in crime classification', Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police science 53, p 113-20
- Garfinkel, H., 1967, 'Good', organisational reasons for 'bad' clinical records, Prentice-Hall, New York
- Geis, G. 1965, 'Statistics concerning race and crime' CD II, PP 142-50
- Green, R.H., 1975 'Relevance, efficiency, romanticism and confusion in Tanzanian planning and management' AR 5, PP 209-234
- 1981 'Magendo in the political economy of Uganda: pathology, parallel system or dominant sub-mode of production', Discussion Paper No.164, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
- Greenstone, J.D., 1966, 'Corruption and self-interest in Kampala and Nairobi', CSSH 8, pp 199-210
- Hall, S., C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, 1978, Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order, Macmilan, London
- Heidenheimer, A.J., 1970, Political corruption: Readings in comparative analysis, Holt Rinehart Winston, New York
- Hoebel, E.A., 1965, 'Fundamental cultural postulates and judicial law-making in Pakistan', AA 67, p 43-56
- Holdaway, S., 1977, 'Changes in urban policing' British Journal of Sociology 28, pp 119-137
- Home Office, 1971, Instruction for the preparation of statistics relating to crime, HM Stationary Office, London
- Hunt, R. and J.Harrison, 1980, The District Officer in India, 1930-47, Scolar Press, London
- Huntington, S.P., 1970, 'Modernisation and corruption' in A.J. Heidenheimer (ed), Political corruption: Readings in comparative analysis, Holt Rinehart Winston, New York
- Igbovinia, P.E., 1981, 'A critical evaluation of personnel'

- selection requirements in the Nigeria Police', Police Studies 4, pp 44-66.
- Kirk, P.L., 1969, 'Criminalistics at the cross-roads', Criminology 4, pp 35-41
- Kleinman, P.H. and I.F.Lukoff, 1981, 'Official crime data: lag in recording as a threat to validity', Criminology 19, pp 49-54
- Koh, T.T.B., 1974, 'Drug abuse and community response in Singapore', IJCP 2, PP 512-64
- La Fontaine, J.S., 1970, 'Two types of youth group in Kinshasa', in P.Mayer (ed), Socialisation; the approach from Social Anthropology, Tavistock, London
- Lambert, J.R., 1967, Crimes, police and race relations, Oxford University Press
- Lindbloom, C.E., 1959, 'The science of 'muddling through'', Public Administration Review 19, pp 79-8
- Littrell, W.B., 1973, 'Vagueness, social structure and social research in law' SP21, PP 38-48
- Lopez-Rey, M., 1970, Crime; an analytic appraisal, Routledge, London
- Lloyd, J.W., 1977, 'The processing of misdemeanor drinking drivers; the bureaucratisation of the arrest, prosecution and plea bargaining situation. Social Forces 56, pp 385-407
- Maltz, M.D., 1975, 'Crime statistics; a mathematical perspective' JCJ 3, pp 177-94
- Manning, P.K., 1977, Police work; the social organisation of policing, Mass Institute of Technology, Cambridge
- Mays, J.B., 1963, Crime and social structure, Faber and Faber, London
- McBride, D.C. and C.B. McCoy 1981, 'Crime and drug-using behaviour: a real analysis, Criminology 19, pp 281-302
- McClintock, F.H. and N.H.Avison, 1968, Crime in England and Wales Heinemann, London
- Merton, R.K., 1964, Social theory and social structure, Free Press, Glencoe
- Midgley, R.K., 1971, 'Crime statistics in South Africa', International Journal of Offender Therapy 15, pp 226-9

- Milner, A., 1972, *The Nigerian Penal System*, Sweet and Maxwell, London
- Minturn, L. and J.T.Hitchcock, 1963, 'The Rajputs of Khalapur, India' in B.B.Whiting (ed) *Six-cultures-studies in child rearing*, Wiley, New York
- Monteiro, J.B., 1966, *Corruption and maladministration*, Manaktla, Bombay
- Morrisey, W.R., 1972, 'Nixon anti-crime plan undermines crime stats', *Justice* 16, pp 8-11
- Mushanga, T.M., 1976, *Crime and Deviance*, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi
- Mwapachu, J.V., 1976, 'Operation planned villages in rural Tanzania', *AR* pp 1-16
- Nader, L., 1967, 'Choices in legal procedure:Shia Moslem and exican Zapotec', *AA* 69, pp 394-99
- Nationala Secretariat of Social Action, Justice and Peace, 1979, *On Militarization*, Manila
- Nordenstam, T., 1968, *Sudanese Ethics*, Scandinavian Institute African Studies, Uppsala
- Okonkwo, C.O., 1966,*The Police and the Public in Nigeria*, African University Press, Lagos
- Oloruntimehin, O., 1973, *The Difference Between Real and Apparent Criminality*, University of Lagos, Lagos
- Parsons, T., 1964, 'Evolutionary universals in society' *ASR* 29, pp 339-57
- Pepinsky, H.E., 1975, 'Generation of discretion by specification of the criminal law' *IJCP* 3, pp 111-121
- 1976, 'Police patrolmen's offense-reporting behavior', *Journal of Research on Crime and Delinquency* 13, pp 33-47
- Piliavin, I and S. Briar, 1964, 'Police encounter with juveniles', *American Journal of Sociology* 70, pp 206-14
- Pollak, O., 1950, *The Criminality of Women*, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
- Potholm, C.P., 1969, 'Multiple roles of police as seen in the African context', *Journal of Developing Areas* 3, pp 141-52

- Quinney, R., 1970, *The Social Reality of Crime*, Little Brown, Boston
- Radzinowicz, L., 'Economic pressures' in L. Radzinowicz and M.E.Wolfgang (eds) *Crime and Justice*, vol I, Basic Books, New York
- Reiss, A.J., 1974, 'Discretionary justice in the United States', *IJCP* 2, pp 181-205
- and D.J.Bordua, 1967, *Environment and organisation; a perspective of the police*, John Wiley, New York
- Robin, G.D., 1967, 'The corporate and judicial disposition of employee thieves', *Wisconsin Law Review* 27, pp 685-702
- Rosberg, C.G. and J.Nottingham, 1966 *The Myth of Mau-Mau: Nationalism in Kenya*, Praegar, New York
- Rose, G.N.G. 1969, 'Crime statistics: Uses and abuses', *Criminology* 4, pp 96-105
- Salas, L., 1979, *Social control and deviance in Cuba*, Praegar, New York
- Samoff, J., 1981, 'Crises and socialism in Tanzania', *JMAS* 19, PP 279-306
- Scott J.C., 1969, 'The analysis of corruption in developing nations', *CSSH* II, PP 315-41
- Seidman, D. and M. Couzens, 1974, 'Getting the crime rate down: political pressure and crime reporting', *Law and Society* 8, pp 457-93
- Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak committee (1950), *Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab: 1947*, Amritsar
- Singh B.K. and G.W. Joe, 1981 'Substance abuse and arrests: variations in pretreatment arrests of clients in drug treatment programmes', *Criminology* pp 315-27
- Smigel, E.Q. and H.L. Ross, 1970, *Crimes against bureaucracy*, Van Nostrand, New York
- Smith, A.B. and H.Pollack, 1976 'Deviance as a method of coping', *CD* 22, pp 3-16
- Southall, A., 1980, 'Social disorganisation in Uganda: before, during and after Amin', *JMAS* 18, p 627-56

- Sparks, R.F. H. Glen and D.Dodd, 1977, *Surveying Victims*, John Wiley, London
- Spear, P., 1951, *The twilight of the Mughals*, Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge
- Sudnow, D., 1965, 'Normal crimes; sociological features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender office', *SP 12*, PP 255-76
- Sumner C., 1982, *Crime, justice and underdevelopment; beyond modernisation theory*, Heinemann, London
- Tanner, R.E.S., 1964, 'Cousin marriage in the Afro-Arab community of Mombasa, Kenya', *Africa 34*, pp 127-38
- 1965 A projection of expected crime in Buganda and Busoga for 1970', prepared for the Commissioner of Police, Uganda
 - 1966a, 'Cattle theft in Musoma: 1958-9' *Tanganyika Notes and Records 65*, pp 31-42
 - 1966b, 'Drug Addiction in East Africa', *International Journal of Addictions 1*, pp 9-29
 - 1970a, *Homicide in Uganda*, Scandinavian Institute African Studies, Uppsala
 - 1970b, *Three Studies in East African Criminology*, Scandinavian Institute African Studies, Uppsala
 - 1970c, *The witchmurders in Sukumaland - a sociological commentary*, Scandinavian Institute African Studies
 - 1970d, *An East African Prison*, Scandinavian Institute African Studies, Uppsala
- Thompson, E.P., 1977, *Whigs and Hunters*, Peregrine. Harmondsworth
- Turner, A.G., 1972, *The San Jose methods for known crime victims*, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington
- United States, Department of Jutice, 1966, *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook*, Washington
- Uttar Pradesh, Government of, 1966, *Report of the Police Commission 1960-1 Allahabad.*
- Wadsworth, M.E.J., 1981, 'Social change and the interpretation of research', *Criminology 19*, pp 53-75
- Wasikhongo, J.M.N., 1976a, 'Uniformities in aggravated assault in

St.Louis and Mombasa: a cross-cultural replication', IJCP 4,
PP 9-24

- 1976B, 'The role and character of police in Africa and Western countries: a comparative approach to police isolation', IJCP 4, PP 383-86

Wilkins, L.T., 1970, 'Crime in the world of 1990', Futures,
pp 203-14

Winans, E.V. and R. Edgerton, 1964, 'Hehe magical justice', AA
66, 584-92

Wolfgang, M.E., 1968, 'Urban crime', in J.Q. Wilson (ed), The
Metropolitan Enigma, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

- and F.Ferracuti 1967, The subculture of violence, Tavistock,
London

Wraith, R. and E. Simkins, 1963, Corruption in developing
nations, Allen and Unwin, London

Yunker, J.A., 1982, 'The relevance of the Identification problem
to statistical research on capital punishment CD 27, pp
96-124.

NOTES

For further information on IDS Publications and a free catalogue, contact:

**IDS Publications
Institute of Development Studies
at the University of Sussex
Brighton BN1 9RE
England**