

CASS.16/82

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THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSION

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SYNOPSIS OF REPORT ON ATTITUDE SURVEYS

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THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSIONSYNOPSIS OF REPORT ON ATTITUDE SURVEYS

1. There is very little agreement among politicians and observers as to what degree of social, racial and constitutional reform Whites are prepared to accept. Similarly, observers disagree widely among each other as to the compatibility of Black and White values, political sentiments and current expectations. Only through focused attitude research can one resolve the differing possibilities.

Accordingly, the Buthelezi Commission contracted out research in order to:

- determine the extent of support among Blacks and Whites for current policies ;
- establish the extent to which Blacks and Whites would be prepared to compromise on their ideal demands on political accommodation in the region;
- assess the extent to which the basic political, social and economic outlooks of the different groups in the region are compatible;
- and to establish in the light of current political and social consciousness among Black South Africans, the degree of urgency with which a new dispensation should be sought.

The attitude surveys covered 525 Whites, 200 Indians and 100 Coloureds in Natal and 2 629 Black people in KwaZulu, Natal and the Witwatersrand. The results compliment the other evidence collected by the Commission in that they:

- reflect attitudes among representative cross-sections of communities surveyed;
- covered many of the topics in the terms of reference of the Commission systematically and with standardised approaches allowing comparability;
- collected responses in an atmosphere of neutrality in people's homes away from the atmosphere of the Commission proceedings.

The main research was conducted by a well-known commercial organisation with a sound reputation for high quality fieldwork. People were interviewed at length by well-trained permanent staff who had no particular interest in the Commission's findings. A check on White responses was run through a second well-known polling organisation with a reputation for accurate voting forecasts. The Commission accepts the results as sufficiently objective and unbiased. If the results err, they would tend to be more *conservative* than

2.2 DEMONSTRATION EFFECT OF MUGABE VICTORY IN ZIMBABWE.

"Mugabe could not have won against South African White army"

KwaZulu/Natal cities	13%
	%%%
Witwatersrand	15%
	%%%

"Mugabe's men won because of own strength and courage"

KwaZulu/Natal cities	83%
	%%%%%%%%%
Witwatersrand	83%
	%%%%%%%%%

2.3 POLITICAL CAUTION VS. ACTIVISM.

"It is best for Black South Africans to be careful in Politics and not get into trouble"

KwaZulu/Natal cities:	
Agree	49%
	%%%%%%%%%
Disagree	51%
	%%%%%%%%%
Witwatersrand:	
Agree	45%
	%%%%%%%%%
Disagree	54%
	%%%%%%%%%

2.4 APPROPRIATE REACTION TO INEQUALITY UNDER RULE BY PEOPLE OF ANOTHER GROUP IN HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY.

"Nothing works - only bloodshed"

KwaZulu/Natal cities	37%
	%%%%%%%%%
Witwatersrand	31%
	%%%%%%%%%

2.5 PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF NO CHANGE IN TEN YEARS.

"Definitely expect"

KwaZulu/Natal cities:

Too frightened by army/police to act	9%
	%%%

Many more leaving country for military training 56%

Mass strikes by Black workers 65%

Bloodshed/war/revolution (spontaneous addition) 98%

Witwatersrand:

Too frightened by army/police to act 17%

Many more leaving country for military training 51%

Mass strikes by Black workers 64%

Bloodshed/war/revolution (spontaneous addition) 99%

Rural:

Too frightened by army/police to act 21%

Many more leaving country for military training 44%

Mass strikes by Black workers 60%

Bloodshed/war/revolution (spontaneous addition) 100%

2.6 POTENTIAL FELT SUPPORT FOR CONFRONTATION.

"Would Black workers strike for two weeks in response to a call by well-respected Black leader"

All KwaZulu/Natal:

Almost all 20%

Many 49%

Only few 29%

"If ANC were to come in secretly asking people to help it and work with it ..."

All Natal/KwaZulu:

Most would try to help	19%	#####
Many	29%	#####
A few	29%	#####
Nobody/almost nobody	8%	####

"Most or many would help ANC"

All KwaZulu/Natal	48%	#####
Rural	46%	#####
16 - 24	56%	#####
White collar workers	56%	#####
Semi-skilled workers	55%	#####

"Of people who would not help ANC, would it be because of fear of Police or because they disagreed with ANC?"

All KwaZulu/Natal:

Fear of police	60%	#####
Disagree with ANC	27%	#####

2.7 RECOGNITION OF LEADERSHIP.

In KwaZulu-Natal Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha are dominantly recognised as the legitimate political leadership although the ANC is in a strong second place. On the Witwatersrand, the ANC has greatest recognition, followed by Black Consciousness organisations and figures and then by Inkatha and the Committee of Ten. As an individual leader, Chief Buthelezi is ahead of any other figures except "absent" ANC leadership on the Witwatersrand.

2.8 These results show a growing verbal militancy, mounting political consciousness and increasing discontent at the political level. Other results show that this growing consciousness has not yet permeated labour or trade-union issues for the tank-and-file, however, although this could develop quite easily from now on.

The sharpening of the political consciousness is due in part to the fact that by now a large majority of Black people actively compare their condition with that of Whites, making for strong feelings of *relative deprivation*. The goal of *equality* is supplanting the goal of *reform and progress*.

We do not suggest that there is a pre-revolutionary situation. Most of the radical sentiment derives from the symbolic effect of events elsewhere in Africa. Nevertheless, there is a substantial minority of people which appears to be militant with intentions to act. Even if this is no more than 10 percent, and it could be as high as roughly 20 percent, it represents large numbers of people in absolute terms. It is not to be taken lightly.

Another consequence of the current political consciousness among Blacks is the fact that popular sentiments increasingly justify, legitimate and encourage militant strategies and undermine internal leadership. The conclusion is reached that socio-political reform of such a kind as to increase faith in the possibility of change is urgent. A situation has to be avoided in which only subversion and coercion are recognised as useful strategies by a majority.

3. ATTITUDES TO THE SEPARATION AND INDEPENDENCE OF KWAZULU AMONG BLACKS AND WHITES.

3.1 INTERDEPENDENCE OF KWAZULU AND NATAL.

Both Blacks and Whites recognise the essential interdependence of races and regions in KwaZulu-Natal.

Among Whites:

"All races depend on and need each other"

All Whites 68%

Afrikaans-speakers 61%

Separation of KwaZulu and Natal predicted to last indefinitely:

All Whites 36%

Afrikaans-speakers 52%

3.2 INDEPENDENCE FOR KWAZULU.

After stating the fact that "KwaZulu has territory in Natal from Mozambique and Swaziland to Transkei ...", the following proportions considered that KwaZulu should become an *independent* country:

All Whites	32%
Afrikaners	49%
Afrikaans NP	59%
English NP	39%
NRP	20%
Businessmen	25%
Indians	22%
Coloureds	15%

Hence it is only among one section of NP supporters that independence is endorsed. Those supporting independence, however, are generally *least* inclined to wish to see additional territory or concessions for KwaZulu. While conservative Whites value the segregation implied by Separate Development, the full implications of government policy are not accepted.

Among Zulu-speaking Blacks, the notion of independence for KwaZulu along lines already granted to other National States has support from *less than one-third*. Hence, majorities in all official groups reject the concept of independence as normally envisaged for National States.

4. ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT POLICIES.

4.1 MODIFIED INDEPENDENCE.

Between 50 percent and 70 percent of Blacks are prepared to accept the notion of independence but with either more farming land/towns and cities added to KwaZulu/the right to live and work outside KwaZulu. This cannot be taken as support for modified independence, since the modifications are such as to defeat the political goals of independence as conceived by the present government. The real reaction to a separate and autonomous KwaZulu is seen in the following result for Blacks:

"KwaZulu should not exist - it should be part of Natal and South Africa"

Natal-KwaZulu cities	82%
KwaZulu rural	72%
Soweto Zulu	73%
Zulu migrants in Transvaal	65%

The factors which encourage Black people to endorse a modified "independence" are not the independence but the opportunities suggested—access to farming land, towns, cities and the right to work in South Africa.

Among Whites, the prospect of independence with the kinds of benefits which might persuade Blacks to accept it, is unacceptable to majorities:

"If political problems became severe with pressure to grant concessions ... would you accept homelands like KwaZulu encouraged into independence with more land, towns and industries"

Percentage acceptance:

All Natal Whites	44%
Afrikaans NP	44%
English-speaking NP	47%
Businessmen	38%

Indian and Coloured people are more accepting of independence with concessions: 58% and 52% respectively.

Broadly, however, what Blacks desire to make independence acceptable is the negation of reasons for separation in the first place, and these desires are rejected by slight to substantial minorities of Whites.

4.2 "CONSENSUS" ALTERNATIVES.

Our results indicate that there is a very real prospect of sufficient agreement at grass-roots level being achieved on constitutional options for the region to make a devolution of power to a conjoint Natal/KwaZulu an achievable political goal for any party, excluding the right-wing oppositions. The schedule of 'Consensus-Dissent' overleaf illustrates this. Among some party-supporters - mainly NP supporting Afrikaners, considerable leadership will be required but the majority agreement among Whites generally will encourage movement in these groups. Majority

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS AND DISSENT

PERCENTAGE LEVEL OF ACCEPTANCE BY GROUPS
 B=Black(Zulu), C=Coloureds, I=Indians, W=Whites


10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80 90 100

Natal and KwaZulu as they are but cooperating more in planning development



CONSENSUS REJECTION

KwaZulu independent along lines of Transkei/Bophuthatswana etc.



Leaving KwaZulu as it is.




Natal and KwaZulu one Government under Pretoria - Black Representatives increasing over years until equal in number



Bringing together KwaZulu/Natal round large cities - multiracial - equal rights for all



Natal and KwaZulu unified - full movement for all - multiracial Govt. under Pretoria - Local Power




Natal and KwaZulu allowed by Government to unite - power-sharing on 50/50 basis to make many laws for the region.




KwaZulu and Natal joining with powers to make some laws - central government retaining some power.




Elected Homeland leaders and White Government sharing decisions on a 50/50 Basis on Governing Council.



Qualified franchise for Blacks.




KwaZulu Government, Pretoria and Natal coming together to make decisions for big towns, cities and surrounding areas



Black Homeland leaders, Black Urban Representatives on a governing council with White Cabinet



Universal franchise for South Africa with White/Minority veto rights



One-man-one Vote in a single system for South Africa.



* Note: Mark on Meningopnames results are used since they had more realistic acceptance categories - "If government supports proposals"

Note: Where figures are estimated (est.) a closely comparable item is taken as a basis.

agreement on a KwaZulu-Natal devolution may not be immediately forthcoming from NP supporters but we foresee the possibility of considerable movement with adequate leadership over the next few years.

4.3 COMPATIBILITY OF POLITICAL CULTURES.

Our report on the results indicates that despite much popular wisdom suggesting that Black and White political cultures are incompatible, no matter how the Black respondents were questioned, their basic political values appear to be remarkably close to those of Whites, given the distorting effect of great inequality in circumstances.



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