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PENDULUM POLITICS

Reform, Resistance, Repression

SANCTIONS

Towards a Siege Economy?

INKATHA'S UWUSA

The New Worker Politics

A MANAGERIAL PROFILE

Attitudes and Anxieties

PRIVATISATION

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
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Note: In keeping with current academic practice, the following words are used to denote membership of the respective racial groups: African; white; coloured; Indian. The term 'black' is used to collectively denote those people referred to by the government as 'non-white'.

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The Indicator Project South Africa (IPSA) is a publication unit which falls under the auspices of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, Durban. It was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change.

The Project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decisionmakers, through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' —namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban and industrial — as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

Financially, the Project relies on donor subscriptions from companies and foundations in South Africa and abroad who consider it part of their social responsibility programme to support the independent investigation and analysis of issues in all areas of South African society. A broad spectrum of individuals and institutes in the public and private sectors also subscribe to the Indicator SA journal and information service. Interested subscribers should contact the liaison officer directly at the IPSA offices.


Indicator SA draws on university-based research findings and commissions reports from prominent academics and practitioners in the field, besides maintaining a project research team who monitor issues, undertake special studies and make regular contributions. The main thrust of the IPSA information service is to provide objective, practical, policy-directed research. We strive to quantify published commentary and findings, through providing hard data, survey results and comparative research. Simultaneously, IPSA initiates debate on controversial issues by inviting a wide range of partisan perspectives, including government, labour, community, corporate executives, and spokespeople representing other key participants in the change process.

In this new edition of Indicator SA, the five 'monitors' that make up our unique publication package have been bound together in one volume, with separators indicating each new section. With paper and printing costs constantly rising, it became prohibitively expensive to publish five mini-reports under separate covers along the lines of the old Indicator SA format. Also, as the journal now enters a new and fourth volume, the project team felt the time had come to ring in a few changes — we hope our readership finds the new design and other innovations worthwhile and an improvement!

SOUTH AFRICA

POLITICAL

M O N I T O R



DOMESTIC & FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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Today, Elizabeth Nkumane will most likely discover Australia.

She will also learn to add and subtract, and find out that there's a lot more to books than just pictures.

She is still a child, her youthful dreams and future before her. Thirsting for knowledge, achievement and pride.

In a word, Education. Sound Education.

Each year the craving to learn gathers momentum. Yet each year in relative terms we invest less. There is a grave danger that tutorial undernourishment will starve our nation.

Our schools are overcrowded. Many of our teachers improperly trained. Politically set curricula warp minds and alienate students.

Children must be taught the truth in order to live by it. With dignity. In happiness.

Many, like us, see these problems, and are helping to find solutions. In a small, yet we like to think significant way. A small team of people in g J1 ^ ^ g ^ l has the task of studying the needs of schools, colleges and teachers. And helping. Financially and intelligently. With humility. For we, like many others, know that education for all is the genesis of our future.

We know we all are The Family
of Africa.
We all belong.

SOUTH AFRICA IN MID-1986

Stress & Stalemate

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

The declaration of the general state of emergency on 12 June was not unexpected in the light of the build-up of events in the townships. While its human dimensions are deeply tragic it is part of a pattern of reaction and counter-reaction which has played itself out before in our history and many hundreds of times elsewhere in the world. Its speedy termination, however, is something to which all responsible South Africans must be fervently committed.

Inevitably, recent events raise major questions about where South Africa is going. The issues are enormously complex since they must take account of an interplay of external pressures, governmental policies, economic trends and socio-political tendencies in both black and white communities. Only the very major factors and interactions can be addressed in this brief review.

The Safe Centre

It is hazardous to make assessments as the build-up to major by-elections begins but some useful evidence is to hand. For well over a decade, Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd have run polls among a nationwide panel of some 2 000 white voters which have correctly anticipated overall trends in voting behaviour. Their latest poll, conducted in June both just before and immediately after the emergency was declared, shows a surge of support for the National Party (NP), up from 47 percent in April to 52 percent of all white voters. Support for all opposition parties showed a decline, with the PFP and the CP/HNP combination at some 16 percent apiece.

In a previous analysis in Indicator SA (Political Monitor Vol1/No2 1983) it was shown that white voters, and English-speaking voters in particular, have a tendency to rally to support the NP when it appears to be under pressure and when it seems to be maintaining a course of reform. English-speaking support rose steadily before and during the 1976/77 Soweto crisis; a tendency repeated after Zimbabwean independence and at the time of the NP split and the establishment of the Conservative Party in 1982.

Hence the recent poll shows that as many English-speakers back the NP as support the PFP — some 37



Billy Paddock

percent. A similar resurgence of support among Afrikaners suggests that the combination of pressure on the government and the overly demonstrative right-wing politics of recent times has strengthened the appeal of what is probably perceived as the 'safe' centre.

What makes these trends more significant is that the resurgence of support comes at a time of the deepest economic recession since the 1930s, when all opposition parties should be reaping the benefits of protests over depressed living standards. A separate item in the above poll shows that general satisfaction with government policy is only some 10 percent down on what it was in late 1980 — a time of economic prosperity and generally positive expectations for the future — and that even dissatisfied voters are maintaining their support for the NP today.

The overall implication from these trends and other indications is that white politics is dominated by political security concerns more than by economics. In short, the NP seems to represent an anchor for this in constituency times of stress and uncertainty.

The Reform Process

The popular debate frequently links security action directly to reform, leading to the easy conclusion that tough security action contradicts political reform initiatives. Some years ago the author Merle Lipton argued the opposite and instead used the analogy of brakes being applied on a heavy vehicle gathering momentum. In other words, tight security controls are not by definition a move away from reform; they could conceivably facilitate the process by reassuring conservative government supporters and by increasing the obligation within government to demonstrate positive intentions.

Yet the present situation is more difficult to read than either of these two opposing arguments would suggest. There has certainly been movement since the beginning of 1986 (see box). Some of the developments may be highly controversial but the way in which the South African governmental system operates is undergoing a change, as illustrated by the accompanying synopsis of recent reforms.

Although not strictly state policy, a further major development could be in progress, in the form of formal negotiations in the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba, convened by the Natal Provincial Council and the KwaZulu government. The central issue under debate is the unification of the two areas under a multiracial regional legislative assembly, as a self-governing province of the RSA.

These developments, taken together, and seen in the light of nearly 40 years of highly institutionalised apartheid and over three centuries of racial segregation, point to a meaningful process of political mutation in South Africa. This view is valid, but must be placed in the context of the following equally salient political realities:

- there is as yet little or no sign of the government intending to deviate from a central principle of its policy — namely the preservation of a separate white political powerbase. The central foci of apartheid remain — the constitutional distinction between 'own' or (racial) community affairs and general affairs, each with distinct and separate administrations, based on separate voters' rolls drawn up on the basis of the Population Registration Act.

THE REFORMS OF 1986

A Select Guide to Government Moves 1

INFLUX CONTROLS

The abolition of the pass laws

The introduction of full ownership rights for Africans
The introduction of uniform identity documents without racial coding

Legislation confirming a common South African citizenry for all inhabitants of the common area. However, it does not apply to citizens of independent homelands unless they are permanently resident in SA, although a ministerial exemption to enter and obtain work in SA still applies to these 'aliens'.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The acceptance by the government of a proposal that a joint Executive Committee for Natal and KwaZulu be established

The inclusion on the new nominated Provincial Executive of coloured, Indian and African members

The establishment of a National Council (as a statutory body) into which Africans and other groups will be incorporated. It is to provide a forum for discussion and negotiation on the participation of Africans in government and to serve as a channel for interim African participation in government.

DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE

The provision of substantial sums of money for black housing and job-creation

A commitment to black community development is manifest, most recently seen in the promised provision of R750 million for black urban residential development.

DESEGREGATION STEPS

The abandonment of proposals to link private school subsidies to a racial admissions policy

The investigation by the President's Council of the Group Areas and Separate Amenities Acts

The opening of over forty central business areas to occupation for trading and occupational purposes of all groups

The desegregation of social amenities like cinemas, and the de facto emergence of mixed areas near the centres of major cities, e.g. in Hillbrow and Berea in Johannesburg.


- It has also become quite evident through the constitutional provisions for the regional services councils and the new nominated Provincial Executives, that an effective centralisation of final authority has taken place. There is considerable delegation of authority to lower tiers but no evidence of a devolution of powers.

Majority Opposition Politics

There are several noticeable keynote features in majority opposition politics or extra-parliamentary politics over the past 12 months.

Firstly, there are clear indications that with the exception of Inkatha in Natal-KwaZulu and informal vigilante-type groups elsewhere, less radical township movements have increasingly had to yield to the pressure politics and superior mobilisation of dissident youth and young adult formations. The result has been

HA MBA K



UDF president Archie Gumede addresses a funeral service in Pietermaritzburg for SACP chairman Moses Mabhida, March 1986.

the breakdown of local administration in some areas and a meaningful spread of politically motivated or organised rent defaulting to some 28 townships. The cohesiveness of dissident political movements has been marred but not yet undermined by considerable interactional violence of what is known as 'black-on-black' conflict in the townships.

Secondly, where organisations with non-revolutionary concerns, like groupings within the National Education Crisis Committee, have prevailed upon boycotting pupils to return to school, these efforts have taken place within the broader idiom of liberation politics, e.g.

'People's education'. Rapidly rising black political aspirations are such that no single shift in government Policy hitherto has been publicly acclaimed as 'real change' by black spokespeople (once again with the exception of Inkatha, the Urban Councils' Association of South Africa and certain homeland governments).

There has been a persisting refusal by any major black political interest group to openly and formally through the process of negotiation with the government to join or on the statutory National Council. Even the

middle-class National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc) has very recently refused to be associated with the Council. Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha have indicated that they perceive the council as a serious attempt by government to establish negotiations, but due to the surrounding configurations of pressures in black politics, they feel unable to participate if other movements represented by Nelson Mandela and the ANC are not free to do so as well.

Negotiation Factors

The reactions of black groups to attempts by the government to involve them in negotiations appear to be influenced by, inter alia, a combination of the following factors:

- a deep sense of estrangement from and hostility towards the present government;
- a suspicion that the government, as it is at present oriented, will not agree to relinquishing over-riding powers in any co-operative system of powersharing;
- political expectations — encouraged by the movements in exile, radical intellectuals, the OAU and the model of the frontline states — in terms of which 'liberation' is defined as a capitulation and elimination of white power (as opposed to a compromise 'settlement');
- an absence of cohesive organisation underpinning much of black leadership in South Africa, which means that difficulties exist in obtaining mandates to negotiate and/or to accept compromises;
- the fact that more realistically or pragmatically oriented organisations are either:
 - 1 under sharp and sustained attack from the left (Inkatha)
 - 2 very localised in scope (certain UDF-linked groups which have explored negotiation politics at local level in the Eastern Cape)
 - 3 very vulnerable to retribution from radical groupings (Nafcoc, Ucas, moderate civic associations); or
 - 4 defined out of direct and formal involvement in the political process, either by government or their own strategies (the emergent trade unions);
- a reluctance among some groups to forgo the proven potency and leverage of tactics of disruption, boycott and militant protest in favour of the uncertain advantages of negotiation.

Assessment

The current situation, then, appears to be one of political stalemate accompanied by relatively poor prospects for a strong economic recovery — a situation in which no one is winning. On the one hand the government cannot feed the flames of unrest by making concessions under pressure. It has to attempt to restore stability before proceeding with reforms; something it was able to achieve in the post-Soweto 1976/77 period. Yet, with a relatively low level of net domestic investment — lower in real terms for 1985 than a decade previously (see Sanlam Economic Survey, June 1986: p9-10) — the prospects for substantially reducing black unemployment, and with it the basic propensity for unrest in the townships, are poor. A period lies ahead of sustained coercion and repression of extra-institutional political activity in the townships.

On the side of extra-parliamentary black politics, the situation seems equally grim. The extent and demonstration effects of township unrest, and the

disruption of schools, are likely to be contained and subdued by security surveillance. Even if the government lifts the state of emergency, it has new powers and has instituted new systems (like local police forces, security systems at schools, etc.) which will continue to inhibit open mobilisation and dissidence. The most recent action — a planned nationwide protest stayaway by workers on 14 July was most undramatic in its effect, with very mixed success in some areas and abandonment in others.

The external mission of the ANC is having to resort more and more to sabotage and much of it is directed at civilian targets. This will not only injure the image of the organisation, possibly even among local black rank-and-file (as opposed to the more militant 'intelligentsia'), but also reduce the possibilities of the government agreeing to seek ways of negotiating with it.

Sanctions and Concessions

External sanctions which are promoted abroad, generally with much more moral conviction than national calculation, have very limited scope for inducing movement in the South African situation.

While the consequences of sanctions and of state responses to them are extremely difficult to predict, it is certainly true that the effects of a shrinking economy on blacks are far more dramatic than for whites. In the recessionary period between 1982 and 1985, in manufacturing industry, for example, only 14 percent of 127 400 jobs lost were occupied by whites, compared with their 22 percent share of total employment. Hence the government is not under the most extreme, direct pressure to avoid sanctions at all costs. Already the cabinet has started to prepare the country for increased sanctions: restocking of strategic oil reserves, the establishment of a government unit to assist exporters in evading sanctions, instructions to government departments to limit their purchases to South African products, and other measures.

The raid on ANC bases in neighbouring states in May precisely at the time of the investigation by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was a clear indication of government putting internal security before the risk of increased sanctions. There is also awareness of the last-ditch resort of retaliatory measures. In a nutshell, the real effectiveness of the sanctions campaign probably lay in its threat and that threat appears to be passing its zenith. Given the moral fervour of the sanctions campaign, it is quite clear to government that any concession will be met with renewed and more ambitious demands.

There is an assumption frequently expressed by private sector spokespeople that a series of systematic reforms will deflect the trend of events out of the mire of the stalemate. The attitude is shared in a limited sense by government, which has intensified its commitment to a programme of expenditure on the socio-economic upliftment of disadvantaged communities. More and more blacks may thus perceive themselves to be beneficiaries rather than victims of the 'system'.

In the short term, however, socio-economic reforms will have little effect. Black aspirations are too clearly focused on major political change for piecemeal reform to be effective. In a situation in which even relatively moderate blacks are withdrawing from participation in the system, almost all kinds of interim concessions to black demands will probably fail to secure co-operation.

If reform were to work, to reverse the trend it will have to be presented as a complete package which includes⁶ negotiated entry into political decision making.

Breaking the Stalemate

To conclude, there appear to be three possibilities of movement, which must be promoted and encouraged at every opportunity. Firstly, if South Africa's conflict cannot be resolved at the centre it can perhaps be addressed through contact, dialogue and negotiation at local or regional level. The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba, although viewed highly cautiously by government and rejected by the extra-parliamentary left (with one or two possible indications of interest), is virtually 'the only game in town' at the moment. It deserves more attention at national level as a model which can possibly be applied with different actors in other regions, e.g. in the Eastern and Western Cape.


Another hope lies in a responsible facilitating role by realistic European or US politicians in the mould of the most recent political 'missionary', Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Minister (Howe's mission may well have failed but others are bound to follow). This is provided that such facilitators do not actually undermine the basis of their effectiveness in South Africa by setting demands or deadlines. What is perhaps possible is for such facilitators to embark on an open-ended process of meeting with the different political actors, including constituency-based black leaders like trade unionists, with a view to drawing them closer together or at least into an alignment which will make direct negotiation possible.

The third hope lies precisely in the effects of the present 'no win' situation on all sides. It is conceivable that the stalemate will incline government to widen its own framework for potential negotiations and some black groupings to think in terms of (genuine) powersharing and compromise, rather than a pure and uncompromising struggle for total power. If a spirit of equitable compromise is to emerge, however, it will need far more encouragement than it is presently getting from black and white church leaders, community spokespeople and the national intelligentsia generally. The situation on all sides is far too grim and dangerous for apocalyptic prophecy and eloquent resignation to violence to be constructive.

Mutual Concessions

A reasonable ideal would be a situation in which the government gives an unambiguous assurance that it is prepared to negotiate about a universal franchise constitution in which safeguards for minority rights and participation are secured on a basis which is not explicitly racial (examples of which can be found). Further, the government might agree to negotiate with all majority leaders subject only to the understanding that the former group must maintain order during the process. On the other side, majority group leaders might reasonably be expected to concede that South Africa's economic, social and ethnic situation is sufficiently complex to warrant convincing safeguards for minority participation and against one-party rule in the future.

Neither side has yet offered such assurances, and South Africa's violent stalemate is likely to drag on until they do so. External facilitators and internal spokespeople would do well to encourage such undertakings as even-handedly and as hard as they can at the present time.



TIGHTENING THE SANCTIONS SCREW

SOUTH AFRICA VS THE WEST

*By Prof Hermann Giliomee, Department of Political Studies,
University of Cape Town*

In rapid succession the Nassau Accord of 1985, London's stormy commonwealth summit, and the EEC Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 15 September form the backdrop for the shift from a relatively unproblematic to substantial economic sanctions on South Africa. In assessing the likelihood of a continued hold-out on sanctions by 'the Big Three' - the US, West Germany and France — Professor Giliomee focuses on the steady deterioration of Pretoria's diplomatic relations with her major trading partners over the last decade. His evaluation of western governments' remaining foreign policy options on Southern Africa, and the political and economic developments in the region are based on extensive interviews conducted for Indicator SA with senior spokespeople from foreign ministries and embassies.

South Africa's uneasy relationship with the West has deteriorated to a state of acute tension. With the violence in South Africa having continued unabated for two years now, anti-apartheid sentiment among the general public in Europe and North America has been raised to a new pitch, forcing policy makers to modify their policies towards South Africa. The sanctions screw is being tightened on the symbolic level, while the commonwealth sanctions package could well presage a slide towards comprehensive economic sanctions.

South Africa has stated unambiguously that it considers the stamping out of black resistance a top priority. To this end it is prepared even to risk the threat of sanctions. After South Africa's raids into Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia earlier this year, Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha stated that South Africa 'cannot be held at ransom' by the threat of sanctions (Time 9/6/1986). Indeed, it seems that the government has already discounted sanctions in weighing up its strategic options.

Mistaken Assumptions

Behind the change in Pretoria's thinking lies its fundamental conviction that financial considerations dominate the West's relationship with South Africa. From this point of view, the main task is to quell

investor fears about stability through tough action and to try to remove the factors constraining economic growth. The government's equation is a simple one: once the economic fundamentals improve, so will the diplomatic relationships.

This appears to be a mistaken assumption. The time is long gone when diplomatic and economic ties were purely a matter concerning different governments, investors and traders. In the West, the anti-apartheid lobby has greatly increased its capacity to pressurise those in government and business who deal with South Africa. During the past seven years the African National Congress has established itself as a co-player in the international corridors of power. And at home, black workers and demonstrators have developed an uncanny capacity to thwart the ruling group's finely-laid plans.

Above all, the gradual severing of western diplomatic ties with South Africa has been influenced by developments inside western countries rather than changes in South Africa itself. In other words, South Africa has become a pariah state because western governments, on international forums and in their domestic policies, have been compelled to renounce all forms of racial discrimination. Apartheid has certainly aggravated matters but the main cause of the marked deterioration of relations with South Africa over the last thirty years must be sought primarily in the change of western

The government sees its main task as quelling investor fears about stability, through tough action and removing constraints on economic growth

Developments inside western countries rather than changes in South Africa itself have influenced the gradual severing of western diplomatic ties

From 1978 to early 1984, intensified Super Power rivalry strengthened the 'globalist' perspective on South Africa and temporarily arrested the drift towards economic sanctions

Pretoria's inability to achieve sufficient reforms and the embarrassment of close ties now outweigh South Africa's strategic importance, however

Events of the past decade have refuted the assumption that Russia was doggedly pursuing a long-term goal of overthrowing the South African state

The Soviets do, however, want to use Angola to improve their somewhat battered image in the third world as an efficient military ally of revolutionary regimes

attitudes (Bull 1986).

Western foreign policy towards South Africa is the product of a whole array of competing perceptions, conflicting interests and choices between different alternatives. Superficially, the right and the left are at loggerheads over the contentious issue of South Africa. There is, however, a need to distinguish between the rhetorical flourishes of opposition politicians and the main thrust of foreign policy towards South Africa.

Western Considerations

The distinct cooling of the West's relationship with South Africa over the past two years is the result of some important shifts in their governments' perceptions:

International Context

• *The easing of Super Power tensions over the past eighteen months*

The period from 1978 to early 1984 witnessed a sharp increase in Super Power rivalry between the USA and Russia. The substantial nuclear arms build-up and their aggressive expansion in many parts of the Third World - including Angola, Afghanistan and Central America - gave rise to widespread western fears that Russia was bent on world domination. The reality, however, was somewhat different - over the past 15 years Russia has been staking its claim as a co-equal Super Power along with the US, with comparable interests and entitlements in world affairs.

This intensified Super Power rivalry strengthened the 'globalist' perspective on South Africa. The globalists in the western security establishments saw South Africa as an ally in the East-West conflict, as opposed to the 'regionalists' who regarded apartheid as a major source of instability and a threat to western interests. The globalist perspective, together with the economic recession in the West, temporarily arrested the drift towards economic sanctions against South Africa.

During 1984 Washington, London and Bonn began to change their minds about the way South Africa fitted into the global powergame. Having put the recession behind it, the West again gained confidence in its ability to cope with Russian threats and to out-perform it economically. Pretoria's inability to achieve sufficient reform and the embarrassment of close ties now outweigh the strategic importance globalists attach to South Africa. In June 1986, Secretary of State George Schultz sounded the retreat when he observed that: 'Obviously, Southern Africa, not just South Africa, is a region with great resources - but let us not think of this as

somehow another version of the East-type confrontation. This is about a racially unacceptable system - and that system has to go' (USIS 2/6/86).

• *Diminished western fears of Soviet involvement in Southern Africa*

The West was greatly shocked in 1975/76 to the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, an area traditionally seen as a western sphere of influence. Heightened US involvement in Southern Africa since 1975 has been driven by the perceived urgency of attaining a settlement of the crises in Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa, in order to forestall further Soviet or Cuban moves in the region (Jaster 1982: p5). Yet, as with its global obsessions, the West's regional fears for Southern Africa are turning out to be rather overblown.

The events of the past decade have refuted the assumption that Russia was doggedly pursuing a long-term goal of overthrowing South Africa and winning the global war for mineral resources. It is true that they have greatly stepped up arms deliveries to sub-Saharan governments since 1975, but the Soviets have insisted on being paid in cash where possible. In any case, experience elsewhere in the Third World has shown that arms deliveries by themselves have rarely secured permanent diplomatic and ideological gains for Russia (Legvold 1984: p37). Furthermore, economic aid has been paltry and Soviet credits to sub-Saharan governments fell from \$492m in 1961/71 to \$335m in 1975/79.

Soviet policy on Namibia and Mozambique has also demonstrated a surprising degree of timidity. In the case of Namibia, Russia went along with Security Council Resolution 435 and the role of the Contact Group, on the ground that the African states favoured these moves (Ibid: p36). Their behaviour towards Mozambique has been even more telling. Despite vigorous Mozambican lobbying, the East Bloc refused to admit the country into its economic association, the CMEA. Also, although South Africa greatly stepped up its support for Renamo, Russia refused to respond in military terms despite the fact that an unstable situation existed which could have been easily exploited. Subsequent to the Nkomati Accord, Mozambique has considerably strengthened its economic and military ties with the West (Kuhne 1986).

This does not mean that Russia will easily back down in Angola. Like the United States, it fears appearing to be weak. An undignified retreat will constitute a major diplomatic reversal. The Soviets clearly want to use Angola to improve their somewhat battered image in the Third World as an efficient military ally of revolutionary regimes. Moreover, the Angolan oil deposits make their involvement a quite attractive proposition.



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The Domestic Context

• *A changed perception of South Africa and apartheid as the root of regional instability*

The first Reagan administration approached the volatile Southern African region with two assumptions. Firstly, it believed that through patient negotiation it could bring about a Cuban retreat and an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. Secondly, it hoped that normalised relations between South Africa and its neighbours would give Pretoria a greater sense of security and a stronger platform for internal reform. If the Reagan administration could secure these objectives, it would have scored a major diplomatic victory by demonstrating to the world its capacity to roll back the Soviet threat. While western European governments shared these sentiments, they were particularly hopeful that normal relations would pave the way for a fuller integration of the region into the capitalist world economy.

Early in 1984, western governments were Pleasantly surprised by the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and

Mozambique and the Lusaka Accord, which provided for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. However, in a mere two years both accords have turned sour. Pretoria has continued to give support to the Renamo insurgents in Mozambique and ANC activities across South Africa's borders have increased. In Angola the mutual trust created by the withdrawal of South African troops and of Swapo was destroyed by renewed incursions. In Namibia, a recent authoritative analysis concludes that 'South Africa has yet to establish an ultimate objective in the negotiations over Namibia - no coherent plan for a settlement or for a post-independence political structure has yet emerged from the Botha leadership' (Jaster 1985: p75). The failure of western regional initiatives has produced a distinct cooling of relations with South Africa. There still exists a pressure group of globalists who see the Botha administration as a contribution to western strength against communism. It continues to urge support for Botha and his limited reforms. On the other hand, there is a substantial body of opinion, even within conservative governments, which now holds that there can be no regional breakthroughs until apartheid has been eliminated and a

Had the Reagan administration secured its Southern African objectives, it would have demonstrated its capacity to roll back the Soviet threat

A substantial body of opinion now holds that there can be no regional breakthroughs until a democratically elected government is installed in Pretoria

SOUTH AFRICA & THREE MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS

Trade & Foreign Investment 1983/85

Value of Exports to SA	1983		Dm 4 928m	\$2 129m
	1984	£1 205m	Dm 6 649m	\$2 265m
	1985	£1 011m	Dm 4 997m	\$1 205m
Value of Imports from SA	1983		Dm 2 742m	\$2 027m
	1984	£727m	Dm 2 974m	\$2 577m
	1985	£976m	Dm 3 163m	\$2 168m
Value of Direct Investment in SA	1983			\$2,6bn
	1984			¹ \$1,8bn
	1985	£5,7bn	Dm 1 368m	\$1,3bn
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FACTS AND TRENDS ON TIES

Britain

- Britain is the largest single foreign investor in SA, which is among its top ten investment markets.
- Direct and indirect investment in SA accounts for 8 percent of British global investment.
- About 120 000 jobs in Britain depend directly on British exports to SA.
- Up to 750 000 residents of South Africa hold, or could claim, a British passport.

West Germany

- In 1983 new West German investment in SA amounted to Dm260m, dropping in 1984 to Dm171m and in 1985 to Dm140m.
- In 1983 SA debtors owed West German banks Dm1 687m; and in 1984, Dm1 644m.

USA

- Over the past five years, only one ('small') US company has established operations in SA, while in the past three years 40 have left.
- US investment in SA has declined by 50 percent since 1983.
- At least 40 cities and 15 states have implemented disinvestment measures since 1982.
- The drop in US exports to SA between 1984/85 is due partly to a decline in wheat exports which fell from \$366m to \$29m, and the poor performance of the SA economy.
- US imports from SA have also declined — the gold coin trade fell from \$485m in 1984 to \$102m in 1985.

democratically elected government installed in Pretoria (IISS 1985). A spokesman for the German foreign ministry, interviewed for Indicator SA comments:

'It is now clear that Pretoria's prime objective has been to impose its will upon its neighbours. We see South Africa as not having honoured Nkomati and other regional commitments. South Africa has unleashed insurgents in order to control the land-locked frontline states. By cutting off roads and railway lines it has greatly increased the frontline states' dependence on South Africa.'

A Diplomatic Vacuum

At a recent conference in Wilton Park, England (attended by the author), a senior American diplomat who had played an active role in 'constructive engagement' exercises expressed his government's disillusionment. In his view, western attempts between 1980/84 to remove the trouble spots in the region have had little success - neither curbing South African aggression nor inducing the Botha administration to tackle the key issue of power-sharing. Western governments now seriously question whether their diplomacy has any role to play in solving the problems of South Africa and of the region. This diplomat expressed the fear that Southern Africa would move towards the kind of diplomatic vacuum in which the Middle East currently finds itself.

At present western policy options appear to be distinctly limited. The radical alternatives of giving substantial aid to the frontline states or to support the military struggle against South Africa are not seriously considered. Consequently, the West has fallen back on face-saving exercises. To spread the embarrassment more evenly, there are renewed efforts to co-ordinate approaches towards Pretoria. Whereas previous US policy was to deal directly with governments in the region and have little involvement with non-governmental groups, there will undoubtedly be increasing consultations by western governments with the ANC, SWAPO and UNITA.

- *The continued violence and the state of emergency make it difficult to deflect demands for economic sanctions*

The collapse of western hopes for sufficient reform in South Africa has produced a distinct shift in their political positions. Statements in interviews conducted for Indicator SA reflect the new mood in western capitals. For instance, the spokesman for the German foreign ministry also said:

'We no longer accept the proposal that Botha is taking the only possible route, namely reform at a suitable speed to

preserve his party base. We have been disappointed by the extent and rate of his party's

of Botha is now seen as high on the list of measures to be taken. Botha's role expectations' (IPSA

Interview).

'It is self-evident from current developments in conservative governments in Bonn, London and Washington are wilting under the sanctions pressure.

A British Embassy official pointed out that:

'A major change has occurred in Britain's relationship with Pretoria. For the first time Britain has to take into account worldwide pressures to change its policy in all of its decisions. If world pressure on the apartheid issue increases, Britain may have to curb its ties with South Africa substantially even if that would damage us badly' (IPSA Interview).

President Reagan, who, much against his will, had to issue an executive order in late 1985 containing some mild sanctions, said in March 1986 that these sanctions should remain in force. In his view, apartheid posed 'an unusual and extraordinary threat' to the foreign policy and economy of the United States (Orkin 1986: p25).

Nevertheless, Reagan expressed support for Botha's reform efforts in mid-1986. The US ambassador in South Africa, Herman Nickel, comments further:

'International market judgement about investment climate and the long-term stability of your country could come to coincide with the political judgement of those who would want to impose sanctions as a punitive measure. Sanctions that run counter to market judgements normally do not work. Where sanctions and market judgement run parallel, they could reinforce each other (IPSA Interview).

Watershed Period

However, the conservative governments in Britain, West Germany and America are not yet prepared to embark on more substantial economic sanctions that would have a serious effect on the South African economy. While Britain and Germany are primarily moved by their extensive economic ties with South Africa, the American policy is rather the product of Reagan's revulsion of sanctions against a Pro-American government.

Reagan's administration has found it necessary to support continued economic relations with a strong political stand. In March 1986, Dr

admitted that the Reagan administration favours black majority

rule in Africa rather than the protection of minority rights. According

to congressman Harold Wolpe, this was the first time any high-ranking Reagan official has publicly endorsed majority rule in five years of testimony before the House of Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on Africa.

The West's relations with South Africa are undoubtedly approaching a fundamental watershed. Economic diplomatic ties are already being curtailed by western states such as Australia and Canada as part of a trend which can only increase in the immediate future. There is also a small but significant change in the global power-game. Russia appears overextended, particularly in Poland and Afghanistan, and does not seem to have major ambitions in the Southern African region. As a result the West is considerably less concerned about a possible global Soviet threat and does not think it necessary to support the Botha administration in order to ensure a continued supply of South Africa's minerals.

The way in which the West looks at Southern Africa has changed. The apartheid order is now seen as the main cause of instability in the region. On top of it all has come the prolonged violence in South Africa, which makes diplomatic and economic ties with Pretoria embarrassing; and the depressed state of the economy, which has prompted many companies to reassess their stake in the country. Unless there is a dramatic up-turn in the economy, this will mean further disinvestment subsequent to the commonwealth conference. South African exports such as coal, steel, uranium, fruit and vegetables are distinctly vulnerable to sanctions or boycotts.

On the political front, South Africa's diplomatic isolation looks set to increase. Instead of tireless efforts to nudge Pretoria in the direction of a more democratic society, western governments will probably shift their attention to the ANC and try to persuade it to soften their stand on key issues. While the military struggle will continue, the political and diplomatic battle between the South African government and the ANC has begun in earnest. For the time being, much of this battle will be waged overseas, with western governments moving into the new role of mediator. (WJF)

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Western governments now seriously question whether their diplomacy has any role to play in solving the problems of Southern Africa

The American policy is the product of Reagan's revulsion of sanctions against a pro-American government

Recently, Dr Chester Crocker declared that the Reagan administration favours black majority rule and the protection of minority rights in South Africa

Western governments will probably shift their attention to the ANC and try to persuade it to soften their stand on key issues

On Formal, Informal & Hidden Negotiations

By Prof Heribert Adam, Department of Sociology, Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada.

The Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group initiative marked another unsuccessful attempt to bring together the major antagonists in the South African conflict. In their recent book, 'South Africa without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination', Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley examine existing power configurations in South Africa and analyse the process of change towards a post-apartheid society. The following essay summarises some of the main themes of their study, focusing particularly on the necessary political ingredients for a successful negotiation procedure.

Both the South African government and its extra-parliamentary opposition fail to recognise the reality of the political stalemate that grips the country

The ANC's pragmatic moves to win the support of the liberal establishment contrast markedly with the uncompromising stance of the internal black opposition

Analysts of radical opposition politics in South Africa have noted an almost 'fundamentalist' feature — the uncompromising rejection of potential reforms perceived as dangerous co-optive domination. With little organisational clout to challenge the entrenched establishment effectively on its own ground, media politics and fantasies of government collapse take the place of real power.

In other words, rhetoric can create a revolutionary political culture in South Africa without the prospect of a revolutionary takeover. At the same time, however, the state is unable to normalise the situation, because it cannot unleash its full force without alienating the black labour force on which the economy depends.

Costly Stalemate

In South Africa today, both antagonists deny the reality of a stalemate. Government pretends that a temporary aberration from normality will soon correct itself; extra-parliamentary opposition presumes that uncompromising confrontation will soon deliver the promised results. The mutual denial of reality is self-perpetuating. Negotiations about cutting losses and costs cannot start in the absence of a shared perception of the situation.

If the discourse of violence had coincided with objective possibilities, talks would have started long ago in South Africa. The Lancaster House settlement in Zimbabwe was possible because all parties finally shared the perception of a costly

stalemate as against the real prospect of a democratic transition. A similar type of settlement is still far off in South Africa, because the major antagonists are not yet even in strength. The apparent weakness of the opposition — as long as it remains untested through prior free political activity — is as much a stumbling block to a negotiated solution as the government's false belief in its waning monopoly of force.

An indication of its recent symbolic success and strengthened self-confidence is the fact that South Africa's exiled nationalist movement has shown a far greater flexibility in engaging itself with potential allies than the internal opposition. By discussing the domestic crisis with concerned businessmen, church delegations, liberal students or disillusioned white nationalists, the African National Congress is shrewdly eroding official definitions. Accordingly, without embracing gradualism explicitly, the organisation enlists the liberal establishment as allies. The onus is on the reformists to deliver, without the revolutionaries having to concede anything in return.

The ANC now prudently distinguishes between 'revolutionaries' and what is called the 'forces of change' that can be mobilised and used for weakening minority cohesion. This realistic political manoeuvring stands in sharp contrast to the apolitical purity of internal boycott politics, which refuses to recognise the leverage at its disposal. Pretoria in turn reinforces the moral fervour of an 'all-or-nothing' stance by also treating each legal concession or material improvement as a substitute for central political rights.

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leadership legitimacy.

An Open Agenda

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A two-stage negotiation procedure, first bringing together major antagonists, and then centre parties, would be necessary to preserve the legitimacy of all groups

Although success* in some respects protagonists of boycott tactics remain blind to the unintended results of their non-collaborationist politics of withdrawal.



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BOYCOTT'S SHOWING BENEFITS FOR US BLACKS ALREADY!"

Negotiating parties would have to be able to guarantee the compliance of their individual constituencies with any agreed upon compromise solution

Increasing polarisation at grassroots level has largely destroyed any prospects for the formation of a grand elite coalition in South Africa

Political freedom within a democratic system is essential in order to establish the size and nature of the support for each organisation

The ANC's statements of intent are remarkably non-racial, non-ideological and undogmatic in the best sense of pragmatic western traditions

the government can secure right-wing adherence to the new rules will those rules acquire meaning. Similarly, only if the opposition movements are able to discipline their followers can a new order achieve stability. Informal contacts of elites in non-governmental institutions further facilitate successful accommodation. If elite accommodation is confined to the political realm, without social contact to forge mutual trust between crucial support groups (universities, professional and business organisations, unions, churches, etc.), a deeply politicised distrust is the likely consequence. The dialogue process favours the dominant group, which deals individually with those who speak for blacks and can exploit cleavages and different strategies. In short, the greatest danger of secret elites and alliances is that an illusionary consensus may emerge whose acceptability has not been tested in open discussion.

In such a situation, few prospects exist for a traditional consociational elite-cartel. Formation of a grand elite coalition of divided segments depends on a grassroots acceptance of controversial alliances and disappointing compromises. However, politicised resentment generally favours the group advocates who demand the unobtainable ultimate. Extreme demands for sacrifices and the promise of further struggle, with the promised psychological rewards of purity and self-esteem, appeal to the disenchanted. The promises of meagre spoils by reformers seldom match the excitement of anticipating Utopia. Besides, the South African government has repeatedly discredited moderate counter-elites by ignoring their requests.

Legitimate Role

The chaos of leaderless and frustrated resistance can only prove counter-productive to peaceful conflict regulation. It is essential that all leaders be permitted political freedom even if they refuse to profess a humiliating allegiance to the constitutional rules in whose making they had no part. Only if all persons who claim a following can participate freely in the democratic competition can their representativeness be established and the disruption they threaten be contained by mutually binding rules.

The imprisoned ANC nationalists are probably the last black leaders with a wide enough legitimacy to negotiate with Pretoria without being compromised. For the Rivonia trialists of 1964 — Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and others — the only way to maintain dignity after heroically sacrificing their lives for a cause is probably to maintain purity. So far, Pretoria has not indicated any willingness to

recognise publicly the principled i_{Ust} J of their opponent's cause. Few face.!) proposals have been made to allow negotiations to begin; but the longer. wait, the greater the likelihood that J restrained militancy of the ANC wiH^L overtaken by the unrestrained rage injfl townships. Yet another generation of ii? leaders will then have to follow rather r than lead.

The external ANC leadership can therefore not reject the idea of serious negotiation either. If Pretoria would grant recognition of the ANC's legit_mJ role, the exiled faction would gain a platform from which to perhaps assert its hegemony over internal competitors — I particularly Inkatha and the independent I unions. However, it is difficult to p envisage the exact role of the ANC (banna. since 1960) as an identifiable organisation if it were demilitarised as demanded.

In the official Pretoria view, the ANC is a self-proclaimed Marxist organisation wiⁿ half its executive being members of the South African Communist Party'. Against I all evidence, Mandela is constantly denounced as 'a self-confessed communist' i On the contrary, even if the Marxist influence in the ANC is as strong as its detractors make it out to be, its essentially conservative constituency, once unbanned within South Africa, would make it a reformist, nationalist movement, provided it were democratically organised.

Therefore, the relevant question is not the degree of socialism in the ANC, but its commitment to internal democracy versus authoritarian centralism. Does the ANC programme envision a multi-party system in post-apartheid South Africa? How would individual rights and rights of self-chosen cultural groups be guaranteed? On all these questions, the statements of intent by the Congress movement are remarkably moderate, I non-racial, non-ideological and undogmatic in the best sense of pragmatic western traditions.

When even US Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, describes ANC guerillas as 'freedom fighters in the generic sense', a more sophisticated conservatism belatedly realises what liberal academic analysts pointed out long ago. Above all, the growing recognition of the ANC reflects its demonstrated internal mass support, though by no means monopoly, of organised apartheid opposition. A reconciliation, or at least a loose alliance, of Inkatha and the UDF/ANC forces is not only demanded by their similar goals but is clearly in the interest of future stability. iM/i\

For further elaboration of the arguments of this essay, see Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *South Africa Without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.



CHALLENGING INJUSTICE

The Role of the Judiciary

*By Gilbert Marcus, Senior Research Officer,
Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand*

During the ongoing political crisis of 1984/86, several major legal actions have been mounted through the courts to challenge government security decisions and activities. In mid-July 1986, the Natal Supreme Court reaffirmed the judiciary's prerogative to intervene and declared void sections of the Emergency regulations, including several definitions of 'subversive statements' and the ban on lawyers' access to detainees. Focusing on human rights in South Africa, legal expert Gilbert Marcus outlines the democratic judicial tradition of protecting the individual against executive and legislative abuse. Although he acknowledges recent landmark court decisions, he demonstrates how our judicial process is overshadowed by non-democratic constraints exerted by the larger political system.

In a country with an unenviable record of human rights violations, it remains paradoxical that those in power insist that South Africa identifies itself with the western democratic tradition. This insistence has created a conundrum. An indispensable ingredient of any democracy is an independent and fearless judiciary with the ability and willingness to curb the abuse of power. Yet, the notion of an independent judiciary, with the power to strike down legislation which violates the fundamental freedoms enshrined in a bill of rights, is anathema to an authoritarian regime.

In South Africa, an institution such as the US Supreme Court would be a positive hindrance to the legislative programme of

the National Party. That is why in 1948, when the present government came to power, South Africa was one of eight countries which declined to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Other countries which refused to sign included the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. The repressive policies and enactments of these governments were simply incompatible with any notion of the protection of human rights.

Contempt for Legality

The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty empowers the legislature to enact any measure it chooses, no matter

One of the last 'pass raids' in central Jhb, March 1986. Although influx controls have since been abolished, many black people have little faith in South Africa's judicial system because of mass prosecutions under the pass laws.

(AFRAPIX: Santu Mofakeng.)

Despite government claims, the South African judiciary is far from independent and has been constrained in many ways by the legislature

Many traditional judicial powers concerning security matters have been transferred to bureaucrats and politicians, effectively placing these officials above the law

Judges are still able to play an important role in protecting the individual from the abuse of official power

The interpretation of ambiguous statutes is another area where the Supreme Court can play a significant role in correcting injustices

how evil, arbitrary or unreasonable. In such a system, the role of the judiciary is severely constrained. Although politicians and sometimes even judges seldom lose the opportunity to proclaim the excellence and independence of the judiciary, their rhetoric obscures the reality. In truth, government actions display a fear of true judicial independence and a contempt for legality. In South Africa this attitude has manifested itself in a number of ways:

- It is no longer denied that in the past, political factors rather than merit have influenced judicial appointments.
- Research conducted in the Transvaal suggests that there have been attempts in the past to ensure that only certain judges preside over 'political' trials.
- Judicial decisions which have advanced the cause of human rights have all too often been neutralised by a change in legislation.

Furthermore, in crucial areas of law, the legislature has stripped the courts of their traditional powers and transferred them to partisan administrative officials. This is particularly evident in the realm of South Africa's security legislation, where administrative officials and politicians have been vested with sweeping powers which are largely beyond judicial scrutiny (Dugard, 1982).

Black Experience

Not everyone has shared the government's enthusiasm for the excellence of the judiciary. Nearly twenty years ago the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) observed that 'in spite of a number of courageous decisions, the overall impression is of a judiciary as "establishment-minded" as the executive, prepared to adopt an interpretation that will facilitate the executive's task rather than defend the liberty of the subject and uphold the Rule of Law' (1968, iv).

For the majority of South Africans, the courts of law have been perceived as the instruments of oppression. The common black experience of the administration of justice arises out of daily arrests in the past for failing to produce passes, brief and humiliating appearances in the 'pass' courts and imprisonment in overcrowded jails. It is hardly surprising that blacks have little faith in a judicial system which appears in practice to entrench white privilege.

The courts thus find themselves facing a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis which should not, however, be viewed in isolation, because the courts form but one section of the general administration of justice. The law enforcement agencies which include the police, defence force, and the prison service are also part and parcel of the wider administration of justice. South Africa faces the potentially

catastrophic scenario of a discredited system of justice, where law enforcement agencies are perceived to be ivpressil and undisciplined, and the courts of l-not resorted to because they are perceived to be biased and impotent

Breaking the Silence

Although the function of the judiciary i .1 repressive legal order is limited, it does i not follow that the courts are **impotent ft** the contrary, despite constraints, judges are undoubtedly able to play an important role in protecting the individual from th® abuse of power. This may be achieved ins number of crucial areas of law.

Firstly, South Africa has in many respects I become the epitome of the **Bureaucratic j** State. For black people, the **most crucial f** decisions affecting their lives **arc taken f** by administrative officials. Yet **the Supreme I** Court retains the power to ensure **that** these officials do not exercise **their** discretion in an arbitrary or **capricious** { manner and if they do so, their **decisions** % may be set aside. Secondly, in **the field** | of statutory interpretation, **where there is** | any ambiguity, judges are entii **led to** s adopt an interpretation which **avoids** t harshness and injustice.

In a number of recent decisions, some judges have set their faces against injustice. Mention may be made of the ! judgments in the Pietermaritzburg treason trial, where four judges spoke out \ forcefully against a provision of the Internal Security Act (ISA) which entitled the Attorney-General to prevent the release of accused persons on bail (S v Ramgobin, 1985). In another landmark decision, Mr Justice Leon ordered the release of an ISA detainee on the basis that the security police had been unable to justify his detention (Hurley v Minister of Law and Order, 1985).

There are other cases but they are few in number. They also represent the exception to the rule. By and large the courts have preferred to retain a judicial silence in the face of iniquity. While these decisions are obviously welcomed by all concerned with the protection of human rights, it is a sad reflection on our judicial s\stem that they should be highlighted as unusual. After all, one expects the judiciary to dispense justice and this is precisely what was done. Nevertheless, these decisions do stand out in sharp contrast to many other cases where justice was denied.

A unique case in South African legal history involved an application by six people for an order allowing them to search a police station for implements ol toriurc which they alleged had been used on them. One of the applicants described how Ik was taken to an office where he was ordered to strip and was made to sit in a chair which 'had an unusual design'. He

was secured to this chair by means of handcuffs and straps and a hood was placed over his head. Two cold objects were placed high on his inner thighs. He was electrically shocked. When the shock stopped, he falsely implicated two people whom he said had burnt down houses. The evidence of the other applicants was equally gruesome and horrific.

The court found this evidence to be reliable. Yet, an order to search the police station in question was refused. It was found that while the implements of torture would strongly corroborate the allegations made, 'the evidence in question is neither essential to their case nor can it be said that its non-availability would lead to a denial of justice' (Case No 100/1985).

The Judicial Personality

These above decisions illustrate the importance of the judicial personality in the legal process. There may be some who find the idea that legal decisions are dependent on the personality of the presiding officer disconcerting. After all, surely the same set of facts will give rise to the same decision regardless of which judge hears the matter? However, practitioners, and indeed all those with any experience of the operation of law in practice, know that the judicial personality can be decisive. An eminent American judge, Jerome Frank, observed that 'a judge's decisions are the outcome of his entire life history' (1949: p115).

Many factors will have a bearing upon a judicial decision: background, education, political persuasion and race. These are examples of human behaviour which cannot be wished away. In the legal sphere they need to be acknowledged and reckoned with. To quote Judge Frank once again: 'The honest, well-trained judge with the completest possible knowledge of the character of his powers and of his own prejudices and weakness is the best guarantee of justice' (ibid: 138).

In South Africa, research into the judicial process is not lightly undertaken for fear of prosecution for contempt of court. This was the fate of the late Barend van Niekerk who was prosecuted after publication of research which indicated that there was a judicial bias against blacks in the imposition of the death penalty (S v Van Niekerk, 1970). In the result, judges enjoy an unacceptable degree of anonymity and their performance does not attract the strident and robust criticism it often deserves.

It may be thought unfair to highlight a particular case as indicative of the courts' general reluctance to champion the cause of liberty. Regrettably, there are many

more. Furthermore, this discussion has been concerned only with the role of the Supreme Court. The majority of South Africans who have had any experience of courts of law have not encountered the wood-panelled splendour of our highest courts. Their experience has been the austerity of the lower courts presided over by magistrates who do not have the same degree of independence as Supreme Court judges. The vast majority of those who appear in the lower courts do not have the luxury of legal representation. In these courts, the fear of racial factors in the imposition of sentences loom large (see generally Dugard, 1985).

For lawyers, the crucial question is whether the courts have any meaningful role in the protection of human rights. A number of possibilities present themselves, but all ultimately depend upon fundamental political and social restructuring. The courts simply cannot be expected to advance the cause of human rights while there are laws which preclude them from doing so. At best, the courts can perform an ameliorative function only.

Bill of Rights

The call for an entrenched bill of rights appears to be currently in vogue. The incorporation of a bill of rights in the new constitution was considered and rejected by the President's Council. This was not surprising. A bill of rights is simply incompatible with the present political realities of South Africa.

Even if South Africa had a bill of rights it would not be a panacea for our ills. The effectiveness of a bill of rights is dependent on a number of factors, not the least of which a judiciary inspired by libertarian values. With a few notable exceptions the performance of our judiciary in the human rights field over the past twenty-five years has been disappointing.

More important, however, is the fact that the effectiveness of a bill of rights is ultimately dependent on the political will to respect the values embodied therein. Many countries which are regarded as repressive have impressive constitutions and bills of rights. Above all else South Africa needs a political system in which people are treated with equal respect and dignity. Only then will it be possible to talk in any meaningful way about the protection of fundamental human rights. (IPA)

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The effect of the judicial personality – the judge's background, experiences, politics and race – on legal decisions is often not appreciated

The stringent application of the contempt of court rule protects the country's judicial process from rigorous criticism

As long as repressive laws continue to violate human rights in South Africa, the courts can only perform an ameliorative function

The effectiveness of a bill of rights is dependent on the degree of democracy of the political system within which it is to operate

The Shifting Alliances of Reform & Resistance

By Prof Clifford D Shearing, Centre of Criminology,
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The strategic responses to South Africa's crisis by both government and opponents, on the left and right of the political spectrum, have yet to produce concrete results, whether in terms of electoral support, negotiation successes or sustained confrontation. A longer view of the possible outcomes of the ongoing trials of strength is offered by South African sociologist Clifford Shearing, who records his impressions after a recent eight-month return visit to the country.

In evaluating the twin reformist and hardline security strategy adopted by government in the 1980s, Prof Shearing concludes that black resistance groups are unlikely to be able to sustain the momentum of their challenge. Nevertheless, he warns that further, more devastating contests for power are inevitable unless new and lasting white/black alliances are built on firmer foundations than transient concessions or challenges.

The extra-parliamentary campaign has been remarkably successful in undermining support for reforms

Many Afrikaners see the abandonment of Verwoerdian apartheid as a blow to Afrikanerdom rather than a source of ultimate survival

The events of the last couple of years have made it clear that President Botha's well-laid plans for reform have not produced their intended consequences. What, it seems, was not anticipated was that the prospect of change was in the offing — would mobilise political opposition both within and outside South Africa's borders. Extra-parliamentary opposition has sought to shape and radicalise reform by challenging Botha's public construction of his reforms. This has been done through defining them as strategies for continued Afrikaner and, more generally, white dominance, thereby undermining attempts to create a new white/black alliance.

The extra-parliamentary campaign, co-ordinated under the banner of the United Democratic Front and given momentum by flamboyant black leaders like Bishop Tutu, has been remarkably successful in undermining support for reforms in both the black community and the international forum. Simultaneously, in urban black communities there have been violent attacks on blacks who in the past co-operated with the government. This in turn has seriously affected existing structures of co-optation of black policemen and petty bureaucrats.

The extent of this black reaction has hurt

Botha within the Afrikaans community, where it has created considerable scepticism with respect to reform. Within this context, the abandonment of Verwoerdian apartheid has been seen by many as a blow to Afrikanerdom rather than a source of ultimate survival. It has also deeply divided the Afrikaner community. A militant right-wing has emerged which argues not merely for a return to Verwoerdian policies, but for a reformation of them so as to bring them into closer accord with traditional Afrikaner ideals.

Botha's Response

How is Botha responding to this crisis? Two critical themes have emerged. Firstly, and most importantly, Botha has insisted that he is, in the final analysis, an Afrikaner leader who will not jeopardise Afrikaner autonomy. Secondly, he has sought to demonstrate, both in words and through his actions, that power in South Africa lies securely within the government's hands.

This second tack is designed to convince the opposition — black or white, domestic or international — that the only realistic option open is to accept Afrikaner nationalist ground rules for reform and to work within those to negotiate the best possible deal for blacks. No external

...pressure can, Botha insists, alter the power relations that exist within South Africa. The government's military superiority, as well as its demonstrated economic muscle, is quite simply too formidable.

Whether Botha will remain committed to the reforms depends primarily on the activities of two groups located at opposite ends of the economic spectrum: young black radicals and the white business community, especially multinational corporations.

The black youth is important because they have spearheaded urban black resistance. They have been remarkably successful in disrupting order in black townships and, in responding, the government has had to dig more deeply than ever before into white reserves. Its use of young white conscripts to exert direct control over black resistance in the heart of South Africa's cities has raised serious questions about the cost of white dominance. Among the visible signs of this in the white community are the growing anti-conscription campaign, renewed emigration among whites and the re-emergence of resistance on white university campuses. On the white 'right', there is open conflict with government and growing support for a revitalisation of the idea of an Afrikaner state.

The business community is important as it has much to lose in a destabilised South Africa, and because its international sector has little, if any, ideological commitment to Afrikaner autonomy. Its concern is the maintenance of a stable, profitable economic order, not the preservation of Afrikanerdom. The major corporate players in the South African economy are also major players in Zimbabwe, who have had first-hand experience negotiating with a black socialist government in the 1980s.

The fact that an avowed Marxist government has maintained a remarkably stable economic climate in which business has been able to continue to prosper has not gone unnoticed by South African business. For them, if Botha fails to quell resistance to his policies, a popular black government may well be not only inevitable, but preferable to a hardline white government braced against international and domestic opposition.

Business Divisions

The recent visits by business leaders to meet with the ANC leadership in Zambia suggests that big business may be beginning to anticipate and prepare for black rule. Yet, in considering the role business will play in the future of the reform process, a distinction needs to be made between the interests of small and big business. While both have benefited

from apartheid, small business has a greater stake in continued white rule than its multinational counterpart. Small business, whether within the English or Afrikaans community, has a very real stake in the success of Botha's reform strategy. Neither black rule, with its prospect of an Africanisation of small business — which the Zimbabwean experience portends — nor a retreat into a repartitioned South Africa, without black labour, is attractive to it.

Accordingly, the thrust of the small business lobby has been to encourage Botha to abandon his right wing and to seek accommodation with more moderate blacks who accept the notion of white safeguards. As the Buthelezi Commission indicates, big business has played an important role in initiating and maintaining this policy direction. However, unlike small business, it is not as bound to this option and is far more willing to consider moving its allegiance to a black majority government — provided it is likely to maintain a friendly stance to international capital. Thus the political alliance between big and small business is a fragile one.

It is in this context that the black union movement has significance. While still very small in comparison to the total black workforce and located mostly within big business, it has become an important influence in shaping corporate responses. It is in this capacity that black unions are most likely to have an impact on developments in the immediate future. In the longer term the impact of unions will depend largely on the extent to which they participate directly in the political arena. A united front involving unions and those who are directly disrupting order is likely to push the government even further into a hardline position. This development, in turn, could encourage big business to move closer to negotiations with the ANC, which stands at present as the only black organisation with legitimacy among urban blacks throughout the country.

What does the response of white business in South Africa mean for reform? Botha is likely to have considerable difficulty responding positively to business, without further alienating his Afrikaner constituency. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, the ultimate interests of these two groups are fundamentally different. From the point of view of Afrikaner traditionalists, it has been the tendency of successive governments to support business interests that has produced the massive black influx into 'white' areas — the very root of the present crisis. For Afrikanerdom the prospect of greater power sharing with moderate black leaders in a multi-racial South Africa is as detrimental to their aspirations as black majority rule.

Botha's commitment to reform depends on the activities of young black radicals and the white business community, especially the multinationals

The business community's concern is the maintenance of a stable, profitable economic order, not the preservation of Afrikanerdom

Small business has a very real stake in Botha's reforms — neither black rule nor a retreat into a repartitioned South Africa is attractive to it

Botha is likely to have considerable difficulty responding positively to business, without further alienating his Afrikaner constituency



The use of young white conscripts to exert direct control over black resistance has raised serious questions about the cost of white dominance.

Secondly, while Botha's 'tough-it-out' stand is attractive to many Afrikaners it is having serious economic repercussions for business, especially small business, in the form of internal black and international consumer boycotts. Small business does not find attractive the argument that in the long term this policy will produce stability because 'in the long run we will all be bankrupt'. To them it will be of small consolation that the economy has survived; especially if they happen to be English-speaking business persons with no cultural stake in Afrikanerdom.

Apartheid's Dramatic Irony

What about black youth and the urban resistance it has mounted? There is a profound irony in this resistance, for it is rooted firmly in apartheid. The system of African education has sought to provide compliant, semi-skilled black labour. It has produced, however, a profoundly disaffected and alienated youth with the will to resist apartheid. The very institution that has in the past been acclaimed as a jewel in the Verwoerdian crown, 'Bantu Education' has become the source of, and organisational base for, the most successful black resistance to apartheid to date.

Another aspect to the irony of urban black resistance has to do with its tactics and targets. Verwoerdian apartheid, in recognition of white dominance, sought to protect whites from blacks by segregating blacks in townships that were easy to

cordon off and contain. The apartheid strategy of co-optation subsequently created a stratum of blacks who support white dominance by participating in the machinery of control. For years this 'collaborationist' stratum was protected from blacks by the very ideology of apartheid, which set whites and blacks apart while encouraging in-group solidarity. Black opposition strategists have finally shed this apartheid-induced racist view, and co-opted blacks, a group critical to the maintenance of white dominance, have come under vicious and sustained attack. This irony more than any other single factor accounts for the success of the present round of black resistance.

The future of both international protest and internal black resistance will be critical in determining Botha's success. It is this that has precipitated the crisis in confidence in Botha's government. If it is not sustained, or Botha is seen to cope with it successfully, the alliance of Afrikanerdom, business and co-opted blacks now in jeopardy is very likely to be re-established.

If Botha's hardline strategy restores economic confidence and domestic order, the right wing within Afrikanerdom is likely to lose influence. Afrikaners (and more generally whites) will once again be united by the alternative of white survival via a multi-racial South Africa, in association with its satellite black homelands. Botha will then have the levers necessary to develop and introduce some form of limited self-government to urban Africans. If he has the power to

Bantu education has become the source of, and organisational base for, the most successful black resistance to apartheid to date

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' S S m v ' a social level (separate a c H e S l areas and facilities such as education), or white political dominance in 'general affairs'.

Moreover, if black compliance is restored, and subsequently extended, this will provide the economic stability both big and small business have been seeking. It will thus serve to unify business behind apartheid once more.

Centrality of Resistance

There are many 'ifs' in the above analysis. Each one rests on an implicit query about the future of urban black resistance. What makes a continuation of effective resistance unlikely is that it does not have a firm base of material support. Rather, it has been sustained on the basis of the sense of potency blacks have experienced as they discovered the chinks in what had hitherto appeared to be the impregnable armour of apartheid.

This sense of potency derives, in large measure, from the international support black resistance has enjoyed. The courage of blacks who have resisted apartheid, the possibility of change after so long, and the blatant injustice South Africa institutionalises, have caught the imagination of the world. This international sympathy has fuelled the disinvestment campaign of established anti-apartheid groups. Yet, while such r e * m e n t has undoubtedly hurt the ; , o T . t A f n c a n economy it has by no means sertnrc 3 c r ' P P l i n g blow, as its major

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f r i l i S b l a c k S t a n c e has discovered apartheid h n \ the Protection that support ? ! h i l s p r O V l d e d to those who arm our ; ; £ S I are merely chinks in the South African t i T 30 Achilles heel. The military k r P o l l C e , with the aid of the without area? n ' f r W i t h the black challenge b e e n m a s d i f f i c u l t y . While there havl many n ^ L T M ^ l incidents of violence, and man L p , o p i e k i l l e d , the government has its mnro u . V O U T O I S w u n o u i r e s o r t i n time new n n i i ? a t i a l , f i r e p o w e r l . In , h e c h i n k s w » V a c t l e s w i U b e developed, will b e c S r i disappear, and resistance

A further factor is that black resistance forces have not received sufficient support from the frontline black states and are unlikely to do so in the future. South Africa has a vice-like stranglehold on their economies and with its superior military capacity, it is able to back its insistence on neutrality through military incursions against guerilla bases in these states.

The New Alliances

The conclusion this analysis suggests is that outside support for black resistance, whether material or ideological, will not develop further, and indeed is likely to diminish, while at the same time internal controls strengthen. The almost euphoric optimism that has given such strength, courage and tenacity to black people in their struggle is likely to give way to more pragmatic concerns of individual and group advantage. Once this happens stability will have returned. This will provide Botha with the opportunity he needs to put in place the new alliances and structures of power that will provide the basis for continued white survival and dominance under 'Botharian' apartheid.

Even if Botha does struggle through this round against black resistance, however, there will be no tranquility; only the ever present threat of war. Black resentment will burn deep and hot within black consciousness and flare up in renewed resistance the next time a chink in the government's armour is detected. If this combative potential is not reduced, the noose will continue to tighten until there is an all-out confrontation.

After such a conflict the possibility of a relatively affluent African country emerging with a viable and independent economy will be very slim indeed. The economic base that black and white have built together over so many years will be devastated. There will be no pie left to share in a more equitable fashion and the conditions will be ripe for replacement of the present dictatorial regime with another.

Can this catastrophe be averted? Yes, but only if a genuine intersection of interest can be forged between the two groups who lie at the heart of the antagonism that drives the South African conflict: working-class Afrikaners, especially those who work within the civil service, and ordinary black people. In this unlikely alliance lies the hope of a peaceful solution to the South African conflict.

The challenge to the leadership of South Africa, black and white, is to find a mechanism to meet black aspirations for political autonomy that does not promise to impoverish ordinary Afrikaners. Their children find work with the police and the military just as the children of ordinary blacks find their work at the frontline of black resistance. The noose can only be loosened if this is accomplished. QIP3A

If Botha's hardline strategy restores economic confidence and domestic order, whites will be united by the alternative of white survival via a multiracial South Africa

Black resistance has been sustained on the sense of potency blacks have experienced as they discovered chinks in apartheid's impregnable armour

Black nationalist forces have, however, not received sufficient support from the frontline states and are unlikely to do so in future

Hope for a peaceful solution lies in the forging of a genuine intersection of interest between working-class Afrikaners and ordinary black people

Chronology

FROM ONE EMERGENCY TO ANOTHER

A Brief 'Interlude' March-11 June 1986

By Indicator SA and Deborah Quin

	NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS <i>Community Boycotts & Stayaways</i>	GENERAL CIVIL UNREST <i>Vigilante/Activist Clashes, Faction Fighting</i>	GOVERNMENT RESPONSE <i>Continued Crackdown & Court Challenge</i>	BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY <i>The External & Domestic Fronts</i>	
MARCH 2nd week	<p>7 March DET suspends classes at 5 schools in Tvl Highveld region due to renewed unrest since start of first term. In Pmb (Natal), 7 schools closed; and in E Cape, pupils at 25 schools in PE boycott to protest suspension of classes at 5 schools.</p> <p>11 March At Kabokweni (White River/KaNgwane), schoolchildren gather outside magistrate's court in support of 8 pupils on charges of public violence; police shoot on crowd, with 5 fatalities and 80 injuries.</p>	<p>Since Sept 1984, about 1 000 schools damaged or destroyed, 10 000 buses and private vehicles damaged. Transport losses since Sept 1984 estimated at R28m, incl R24m in damages. Drivers killed and 230 injured during unrest. Bus services suspended for nearly a year.</p> <p>7/8 March In Bela Bela (Warmbaths), security forces suspend 40, incl civic leaders. Near Umbumbulu (Natal) SACTU renewed faction fighting. In Motetema (Lebowa) security forces suspend 40, incl civic leaders, and E Cape UDF vice-president, Henry Fazzie.</p>	<p>1787 deaths recorded during first state of emergency from 20/7/85 to 1/8/86, incl 371 in police shootings and remainder in radical/moderate violence and other incidents of political violence. 31 Policemen killed since 1984. Minister of Law and Order Le Grange announces 18 569 suspended for nearly a year.</p> <p>7/8 March In Bela Bela (Warmbaths), security forces suspend 40, incl civic leaders. Near Umbumbulu (Natal) SACTU renewed faction fighting. In Motetema (Lebowa) security forces suspend 40, incl civic leaders, and E Cape UDF vice-president, Henry Fazzie.</p>	<p>7/9 March Limpet mine explodes in toilet of Hillbrow police station (Jhb). Moses Mabhida, general secretary of SACP, exec member of ANC and vice-president of SACTU, dies in Maputo, Mozambique.</p> <p>10 March Former SA journalist Marion Sparg arrested after series of ANC-linked bomb blasts in police stations.</p>	MARCH 2nd week
MARCH 3rd & 4th weeks	<p>17/20 March In Mamelodi residents stage 2-day stayaway to protest police action. In Guguletu (CT) pupils protest inferior quality of free books; media ordered out of township.</p> <p>21 March Commemoration of Sharpeville/Langa shootings. Protesters clash with police in Langa township, WITS and UWC campuses. Dbn city centre and elsewhere.</p> <p>24/25 March Stayaway in Ratanda to protest detention of 2 community leaders; 4 fatalities. Consumer boycotts launched in Pretoria's 4 main townships, GaRankuwa (Lebowa), and Odi and Moretele districts (Bop). Medunsa students boycott to protest reinstatement of 2 white students.</p> <p>29/30 March NECC conference in Dbn — 1 000 delegates decide that pupils will return to school but set new demands. Two Inkatha supporters die in attempt to disrupt meeting. Annual National Forum conference calls for a 10-day stayaway from June 16, and for a national rent boycott. Fort Hare university closes 1 week early after 3-week boycott. In Zwide (PE), 20 000 attend memorial service for SACP's Mabhida.</p>	<p>15 March In Guguletu 30 000 mourners attend funeral of 16-year-old activist killed in police shootings on 3 March. In Johannesburg children at Kabokweni on 11 March.</p> <p>16 March Mourning and police clash, with 4 fatalities. Atteridgeville, 15 die and 66 injured in Sotho/Xhosa faction fighting. In future, 18/21 March In Soweto, 8 die in clashes between schoolchildren and police. In Atteridgeville, 4 activists' houses are petrol-bombed. Women from Crossroads march on police station over 'widoekes' (vigilantes) — 9 die in 2-day battle with commuters also killed.</p> <p>24/26 March In PE townships, police shoot dead 13 people at liquor outlets. In Crossroads feud, 2 policemen and 2 youths killed. In Winterveld (Bop), police open fire on meeting of 5 100 people, killing 11 people, injuring 70, and arrest 2 500.</p> <p>31 March 300 Crossroads women demonstrate against Nqxbongwana and detention of 2 women. In nearby squatter leader Yamilie is detained.</p>	<p>High-ranking police official appointed to investigate shooting of 16-year-old child at Kabokweni on 11 March.</p> <p>16 March Appeal Court finds banning and detention orders served on 16 Orkney, mourners and police clash, with 4 fatalities. Atteridgeville, 15 die and 66 injured in Sotho/Xhosa faction fighting. In future, 18/21 March In Soweto, 8 die in clashes between schoolchildren and police. In Atteridgeville, 4 activists' houses are petrol-bombed. Women from Crossroads march on police station over 'widoekes' (vigilantes) — 9 die in 2-day battle with commuters also killed.</p> <p>24/26 March In PE townships, police shoot dead 13 people at liquor outlets. In Crossroads feud, 2 policemen and 2 youths killed. In Winterveld (Bop), police open fire on meeting of 5 100 people, killing 11 people, injuring 70, and arrest 2 500.</p> <p>31 March 300 Crossroads women demonstrate against Nqxbongwana and detention of 2 women. In nearby squatter leader Yamilie is detained.</p>	<p>15/19 March In central Springs, a limpet mine explodes damaging shops and injuring 1 person. In nearby Elsburg a limpet mine is defused. In Geduld (Springs) a church is damaged by explosives.</p> <p>22/23 March In Alberton a bomb explodes, causing minor damage. On Durban Bluff, 4 limpet mines go off at sub-station.</p> <p>25 March In Katlehong township an ANC insurgent is killed by police.</p> <p>29/30 March NUSAS/ANC meeting takes place in Harare. Mabhida buried in Maputo after funeral arrangements outside Pmb threatened with disruption.</p>	MARCH 3rd & 4th weeks
APRIL 1st & 2nd weeks	<p>1/2 April Stayaway in White River and Nelspruit, as Pretoria businessmen discuss 2-week-old consumer boycott with government. In Zwide, thousands attend NECC follow-up meeting and call for pupils to return to school, 'people's education' and for 3-day stayaway on 16/18 June.</p> <p>4/6 April In Atteridgeville 5 activists' houses burnt, totals 45 in past few days, also 4 burnt in Winterveld (incl Natcoc president's). Severe restrictions and security presence for unrest funerals in Alexandra and Guguletu. In New Brighton 2 men are killed in clash with police at unrest funeral. In Brandfort, Winnie Mandela addresses mourners who defy funeral restrictions; after disrupted Kagiso funeral, residents decide to continue bus and start consumer boycotts.</p> <p>7 April PE consumer boycott resumed after 5-month break; in Nelspruit 6-day stayaway ends. In Cape Town, 100 Nyanga camp women protest detentions outside court.</p> <p>12/14 April In Soweto, Regina Mundi meeting resolves to stamp out thuggery among youth. All 1 076 Medunsa students sent home after riots erupt over reinstatement of 2 white students.</p>	<p>2/4 April In Bop's Odi district, 51 people arrested after 50 burnt houses. In Zolani (Ashton) 250 detained during protest march to board. In Vosloorus stayaway 5 people die and several arrested. In Nelspruit march on offices after bar on funeral of ANC guerrillas in Nelspruit (nr Nelspruit) at least 3 die in inter-cine violence, and 2 arrested.</p> <p>5/9 April In Motherwell (PE) 3 charred bodies found after funeral. In Kanana (Orkney) 3 people die in clashes nationwide at least 13 die over weekend. In Hammarsburg employees are killed by unknown assassins. Six die in clashes with police in Natal.</p> <p>12/14 April In Mooiplaas (nr East London) 9 people die in incorporation into Ciskei; in Sekhukhune/Lebowa 3 'necklace' victims found — 87 later detained. In New Brighton 1 killed by activists for secretly burying 5 unrest victims. In clashes in Daveyton (Benoni), Tantie (Grahamstown) and Cradock.</p>	<p>Chief Minister Mabuza of KaNgwane appoints 1-man commission to investigate police shootings. In Mabopane a CCAWUSA member in custody, hours after arrest. Banning orders on Winnie Mandela after 23 years but she remains a 'listed' person. In Lawaakamp municipal bulldozes 150 shacks after unrest. CT Supreme Court dismisses application to have restrictions on Kynsa unrest funeral lifted. In Mahwelereng (Potgietersrus) a journalist dies in custody after being arrested with 3 Azapo members, who are later released.</p> <p>April George municipality fires 215 workers who heed stayaway and township residents 1 week to pay rent arrears or face court action. In Winterveld, mass funeral for 11 people called off as police refuse to allow bodies, in clashes 3 more fatalities occur.</p> <p>12 April Crossroads Sacta clinic claims it treated more than 500 people with gunshot wounds in past 10 months, with at least 13 fatalities. In Lawa, lawyers file suits for R2.8m against police on behalf of 494 people. In Ciskei application on behalf of detained Rev Stofile. Fort Hare lecturer, granted by Supreme Court — state undertakes not to act lawfully in Lebowa. N Tvl president of UDF Peter Nchabeleng dies after being detained. In Mahushu Trust (KaNgwane) pupil dies in detention.</p>	<p>Le Grange says ANC responsible for 197 sabotage and other incidents in past 12 months.</p> <p>1 April ANC exec member Joe Slovo becomes new SACP chairperson.</p> <p>2 April 19-year-old Andrew Zondo sentenced to death for Amanzimtoti bomb blast of Dec 1985.</p> <p>8 April In Wentworth (Dbn) handgrenade attack on ex-Labour Party secretary's house. Death in Lusaka of exiled paramount chief Sabata Dalimebo, hereditary leader of Transkei's Thembu tribe.</p> <p>9 April In Vrededorp (Jhb) 1 killed and 4 injured in bomb explosion in public toilet.</p>	APRIL 1st & 2nd weeks
APRIL 3rd & 4th weeks	<p>38 African community councils and 3 local authorities nationwide inoperable due to resignations under community pressure; in Ratanda, development board appoints 5 members to local council after all resign.</p> <p>19/20 April In Potgietersrus, workers stay away and begin bus boycott. In Lawaakamp mass meeting dispersed by police; in Soweto 800 Tshiwawello residents decide to continue 2-month boycott until rents reduced.</p> <p>21 April In Dundee and Eisties River pupils are dispersed outside magistrates' courts where detainees appear on charges of public violence. In Alexandra indefinite consumer boycott begins. 13th township to recently announce renewal — others incl Kagiso, Munsieville, Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Soshanguve, Mabopane, King Williamstown, and 6 townships in PE and Nelspruit.</p> <p>22/23 April Alexandra town council collapses as mayor Sam Buti and 4</p>	<p>President PW Botha announces that between Sept 1984 to 1986, 508 dead in 'black on black' violence (205 in 1986), many more injured. 731 people killed by security forces (149 in 1986), many more injured (not related to unrest).</p> <p>15/20 April In Bongweni (nr Adelaide) consumer boycott of shops and services in Lamontville and Chesterville. 5-day security 'lockdown' in New Brighton, police shoot dead 1 and arrest 100. In Umbumbulu 8 more die in faction fighting and another mine another dies. In Soweto a policeman and 1 civilian killed. In Middelburg 5 people die in clashes incl a councillor. In 'widoekes' die in clash with 'comrades'.</p> <p>22/23 April In Lawaakamp 200 are arrested in 'crime clean-up' operation. In Alexandra 10 activists' houses are damaged and violence erupts.</p>	<p>16 April In Mabopane (Bop) a 25-year-old man dies in detention. Bop Minister of Law and Order ordered to show why 26 arrested at Winterveld were not brought to court. In Durban a final court order, granted to prevent police from assaulting a 16-year-old detainee. Pretoria Supreme Court grants interdict restraining Atteridgeville police from attacking a house.</p> <p>20 April Under Wait commission of inquiry into Vaal unrest of 1984 is established. In Grahamstown a conference on alternative forms of government is banned. In Cradock all meetings except bona fide meetings are banned. In the Transkei ex-president Matanzima issues court order — removes and buries body of Chief Sabata to prevent funeral.</p> <p>23 April In Middelburg 4 church leaders and 3 teachers detained. The</p>	<p>15 April Transkei police kill suspected ANC insurgent. The SACBC meets with ANC in Lusaka. 11 ANC members detained in Swaziland in security preparations for coronation of new Swazi king.</p> <p>17/18 April In Umtata, prime minister's office and defence headquarters are bombed as Sabata's body arrives from Lusaka for burial. At Wild Coast Casino, bomb blast kills 2 people and injures 6.</p> <p>21/22 April Near Breyten (E Tvl), 2 landmines explode injuring 3 people. Large arms cache found in white area of Roodepoot.</p> <p>26/27 April In Edendale (Pmb) police kill one insurgent and injure one. Le Grange says 51 arms caches uncovered over past year.</p>	APRIL 3rd & 4th weeks

NON-COLLABORATION POLITICS
Community Boycotts & Stayaways

remaining councillors resign. Middelburg students boycott until 3 of their teachers are released. In Hambanathi (Tonga), pupils continue class boycott after transfer of 2 teachers — several pupils injured in clashes with amabutho (Zulu vigilantes).

MAY
1st & 2nd weeks
MAY DAY About 1.5m workers stay away on International Labour Day, the largest national strike in SA history; in Durban 60 000 attend launch of Uvusa, a pro-inkatha union.
1/4 May In Bongoletshu (Oudtshoorn) residents begin bus boycott to protest high fares and suspended township service; in Zwelentemba (Worcester) a year-long bus boycott is called off after demands are met. In Bela Bela (White River) all councillors resign except the mayor and his deputy.
5/9 May In Port Alfred African women stage stayaway to protest detention of 5 women at Mayday rally. In Pretoria, a 7-week consumer boycott is called off to enable residents to buy winter clothing. In CT a church delegation is prevented from meeting the commissioner of police to discuss welfare of detainees. In Vondokhaya 3 detainees go on hunger strike, demanding to be charged or released. In Vosloorus 2 councillors resign.
10/12 May At rally in Zwijdam, Mkhoseli Jack calls for consumer boycott to be extended throughout E Cape; indefinite boycott also launched in N Tvl, incl 9 white towns, to protest detentions, attacks on activists' homes, high bus fares and troops in townships; calls for resignations of councillors and homeland MPs.
14/15 May In Tembisa residents stay away for restricted funeral of 3 unrest victims, police halt procession. In Atteridgeville 2 people appointed to town council to fill vacancies.

MAY
3rd & 4th weeks
17/19 May In the Transkei more than 500 Unitra students detained after boycott to protest deportation of 2 students. Mbekweni (Paarl) residents stage stayaway as violence erupts in township. Two councillors from KwaCuga (Witbank) and Vosloorus quit their posts.
20/23 May Police act against student protests at Wits and UCT protesting SADF raids into frontline states. Vaal Crisis Committee investigates school crisis and looting, in attempt to curb township violence. In Alexandra, an administrator is appointed to replace defunct town council, while residents appoint their own committees — community leaders claim death toll of 80 in 1986 so far.
26/29 May Duduza residents start bus and consumer boycott to support demands for township upgrading; in King Williamstown boycott is lifted. In Soweto, SCA calls on residents to form street and defence committees to oppose vigilantes. In Tumahole (Parys), partial stayaway to protest police action against 'people's parks' — 6 people injured on march to police station. In Lekoa, 7th councillor resigns.
31 May In Soweto rent boycott begins; and 2 more councillors resign in Thokoza and Vosloorus. Third day of police/student clashes on Wits campus; students at UWC decide to postpone mid-year exams, and students on Vista's Soweto and Zwijdam campuses boycott exams. In Jhb, NECC calls on pupils at private schools to observe June 16 stayaway. Boycotts and schools closures now affecting 80 000 pupils at more than 100 schools nationwide.

JUNE
1st & 2nd weeks
1/4 June DET suspends classes at 24 schools in Highveld region incl Tembisa, Vosloorus, Thokoza and Kaitshong; lifts suspension on 6 schools in Atteridgeville. Schools in Soweto close 2 days early before mid-year break, due to growing violence. In Bop, classes in 20 schools disrupted by pupils protesting security force actions; in Pietersburg pupils and students boycott protesting detention of colleagues.
Rent boycott begins in Soweto, and consumer boycotts begin in Potchefstroom, Boksburg, Springs, Nigel and Vosloorus. More councillors resign in Thokoza, Vosloorus and Tembisa. Three-day stayaway begins in KwaNdebele in protest at forthcoming 'independence', and in Thokoza residents stay away to attend unrest funeral.
9/12 June 2 Protests outside parliament by Crossroads women demanding help for devastated camp. In Welkom 22 arrested at protest against new security bills. Bonteheuwel and Mannenburg pupils protest detentions in central CT. Stayaway in Brits to attend funeral of Mawu organiser's wife killed in house attack, in Alexandra, 2-month consumer boycott is called off but rent boycott continues.
Several major firms grant June 16, 10th anniversary of 1976 Soweto rebellion, as paid public holiday — though employer associations adopt 'no work, no pay' policy.

GENERAL CIVIL UNREST
Vigilante/Activist Clashes, Faction Fighting

stayaway — between 3-9 fatalities reported, with at least 45 000 attend rally and resolve to form street committees. In Witbank, 26/29 April Unrest funeral in Cradock is banned — severe person dead. In KwaMashu another fatality and riots after student leader. In Soweto 3 more activists' homes petrol-bombed and reported dead and many injured after night vigil. In Umhlanga deaths. In Tembisa, 5 beerhalls burnt and 5 people die. In KwaNdebele 18 people killed after police use handgrenade. In Sharpville 20 activists attacked.

1/5 May In Bonteheuwel police whip protesting pupils — nearly 15-year olds held responsible for murder of 12-year-old girl and youth activists. Several people are burnt to death in Khutsong and KwaNobuhle in intercommunal township violence. Handgrenades on houses kill 2 people in Mabopane (Bop) and injure 2. where vigilantes force clinic to close.
6/8 May 34 Mbokotho vigilantes are arrested in KwaNdebele and 3 people are injured by unidentified gunmen, and in Roddepoort 3 youths are found. Severe clashes in Soweto between vigilantes, also attacks on activists' houses in Tembisa, Alberton and Witbank townships. In Gelvendale a man is shot dead in 'coloured' MP's house.
9/14 May In Mankweng (Kroonstad) a youth is shot dead at funeral. Police conduct search in Walmer (PE) where UDF/ANC by development board members. Alexandra closes off by 100 forces in 'clean-up operation'. In Zolani (Ashton), 4 activists burnt.
In Khutsong several shacks destroyed in 'comrades' vigilantes. Tembisa 4 youths allegedly killed at night vigil for unrest victim. Vlaklaagte (KwaNdebele) youths go on rampage after funeral victim. Attacks on activists' homes in Tumahole and Mamelodi child is injured. In Nkundza royal kraal (KwaNdebele) 2 000 anti-independence meeting are dispersed — 7 die and many businesses and 9 houses are burnt.

16/18 May In Soweto 4 youths shot dead after being killed by 'Kabasa' gang. In Sekhukhune (Lebowa) 150 charged for murder of 26 women. In KwaNdebele 2 die in clashes. Mbokotho vigilantes and youths. In Zandela (Sasolburg) member dies and 5 injured as police disperse fundraising fatalities in police action in Chesterville (Dbn) and Vosloorus. Bodies found in Tanga (Nelspruit) and one in Soweto — violence. Humansdorp with its first necklace murder.
19/22 May Crossroads official death toll now 27, with over 2 destroyed, leaving 20 000 homeless — several calls made inquiry into alleged police support for 'widoekes'. In Mamelodi between UDF, Azanyu and police leave 2 dead. In Kagiso (Wit) unrest witness injured and 5 of his family die in attack on house people die near Ulundi (KwaZulu) in faction fighting. In KwaNdebele pitched battles between youths and amabutho who attack school boycott, 6 vigilantes die.
23/25 May In CT man accused of being informer is murdered by UDF meeting in Mitchell's Plain, and a man in Mannenburg death in KwaMashu, death toll rises to 14 in 5 days, when 10 dead by 2 000 attacking amabutho. In Chesterville, 2 'comrade' clashes with 'A-team' vigilantes; in Zolani (Ashton) 14 people 120 arrested after similar clashes. In Soweto, 5 people die in feud at funeral of unionist. In E Cape, 7 die in security force action. 26/30 May Crossroads death toll rises to 45 in 10 days, thousands Khayelitsha. In Soweto, Azapo member is killed on way to end Azapo/Soyco feud. In Kwanobuhle, 2 die and 3 injured shooting; in Kaitshong and Thokoza 8 activists' houses attacked weeks 7 fatalities. In Brits, a Mawu organiser's wife killed in grenade attack on house. In Tumahole (Parys) a policeman is stayaway. In Soweto 2 people killed at roadblock, and in PE youths burnt to death — 67 necklace killings in E Cape since 1984.

1/3 June Police action at funerals of unrest victims in Gugulethu and KwaMashu; in Chesterville, 'comrades' and vigilantes funeral. In upsurge of violence in Soweto, 9 bollie-stones, 50 and several houses damaged — 22 vehicles hijacked by Alexandra in past few days, totals 250 since March. In KwaNdebele people die in clashes.
4/6 June In Soweto, 35 fatalities in violence over preceding weeks loses R600 000 in attacks on its bottlestores.
7/8 June In Kempton Park centre, youths go on rampage causing damage to shops. At Hobane mine (Vryheid) clashes between NUM/Uvusa unions leave 11 dead and 115 injured. In PE people burnt in intercommunal feud. In Mamelodi, leader of opposition is assassinated. Two policemen die in Pretoria and 9/11 June After days of sporadic violence near Crossroads, invade KTC and Zolani clinic relief centres. Bishop Tutu holds peace with 'widoekes' as latest death toll rises to 21, with thousands in Alexandra, leader of youth organisation killed in clash with police in KwaNdebele. 5 people die incl 3 security guards killed by other police in police action, a further 379 people killed by other persons, policemen. IPSA/SARMI monitoring shows 815 total deaths, necklace killings over 12-month period to 20/6/86. Total deaths Sept 1984 reaches 1 843.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Sustained Crackdown & Court challenge

Police Times is temporarily barred from police press liaison because of coverage of ambush of ANC cadres in Gugulethu. Bop government passes legislation to prevent 11 Winterville victims from being buried in funeral. Public Safety Amendment bill read for first time, to increase security powers. In Dbn 2 security police found guilty of assaulting Billy Vanda 4 detainees hospitalised. In KwaNdebele political violence is 145, bringing total count since Sept 1984 to 1 561.

Police death toll in 1986 stands at 10, with 122 police houses damaged in attacks. Minister of Defence says that 5 temporary military bases have been set up in black townships since start of unrest; 76 civil cases and 33 complaints made last year against SADF in townships, with at least 20 members found guilty.
May A 6-week ban on the Cape Times receiving police information is lifted for UDF leader Nchabaleng, after magistrate allows funeral to go ahead with restrictions.
May A 6-week ban on the Cape Times receiving police information is lifted. The CT Supreme Court grants temporary interdict restraining police from assaulting detainee, Cassiem.
May Rand Supreme Court dismisses application by 3 residents of Athlone to set aside restrictions on unrest funerals. In Alexandra mass funeral is banned.

Orange states 18 966 people arrested for unrest-related offences in 1986, of whom 16 094 were charged — incl 13 556 under-20 year olds and 175 trade unionists. 522 lawsuits were brought against him for police action in unrest. In Soshanguve, SACBC head, Father Smangaliso, is detained.
19/22 May In rural E Cape, compulsory military call-up for all men between 18 and 64. PE removal court finds 2 policemen guilty of setting black man against last year. Bloemfontein Appeal Court dismisses Le Grange's appeal against judgment ordering Diakonia's Paddy Kearney release from prison on 10 Sept 1985.
28 May Development boards owed nearly R200m in debts, incl an estimated R100m in rent/service arrears. CT Supreme Court grants urgent temporary interdict restraining security forces and 'widoekes' from violent actions at Crossroads. A Dbn judge grants interim interdict restraining Shabalala, Inkatha exec member, from assaulting activist.
27/30 May Giskei Supreme Court grants temporary interdict restraining police from further assaults on students at College of Education. PE Supreme Court sentences 2 security policemen to 11 and 4 years respectively for murder of 2 schoolchildren in July 1985. New Brighton magistrate's court drops charges against 60 youths for public violence. In Port Elizabeth magistrate's court drops charges of public violence against John Bishop, hours before Bishop Tutu was to lead march in protest. In Pretoria, Lebowa's Chief Minister applies to have cessation of Moutse to end KwaNdebele declared null and void.
KwaNdebele death toll of 213 for May is highest in 21 months of civil unrest in South Africa.

2 June In KwaMashu, woman granted interdict restraining councillor from assault after her husband was killed in raid by amabutho.
4 June Houses of Delegates and Representatives refer new security bill and severals back to standing committee. Minister of Law and Order bans gatherings until 30 June, to commemorate 1976 Soweto rebellion.
8 June Government reaffirms that KTC squatter refugees must move to townships. Rand Supreme Court grants order to allow UDF to go ahead with meetings to launch 'urban the ANC' campaign. In London, Commonwealth EPO reports for sanctions after 6-month investigation into SA apartheid.
10 June Transkei police instructed by Prime Minister Matanzima to 'blacklist' people found necklacing others. In Winterville, promotion of 2 commanding officers after March shootings — community's lawyers withdraw from official inquiry.
12 June President Botha declares national STATE OF EMERGENCY, with wide-ranging powers given to security forces to detain, enter, search and seize property with immunity from prosecution. Tight controls placed on media political reporting and freedoms of expression and organisation, with all unrest reports coming from state-run Bureau for Information.

BLACK NATIONALIST ACTIVITY
The External & Domestic Fronts

Police figures show 75 guerilla attacks so far in 1986 compared with 20 for same period in 1985.
1/2 May In Wentworth, ex-Labour Party secretary and his wife are injured in handgrenade attack on house. In Jhb a man is given 18-year prison sentence for bomb attack on Nedbank last year.
3/5 May Bystander dies as ANC guerilla is freed from police guard in Edendale hospital (Pmb). 8 People arrested in connection with arms find in CT.
14/15 May Policeman's house damaged in grenade attack. Landmine explosion near Hectorpruit kills 3.

16/19 May In Rustenburg an ANC member is sentenced to 20 years jail; and in Rand Supreme Court, Dutch citizen Helene Pastoors is sentenced to 10 years for high treason. In Krugersdorp, the largest arms cache so far is uncovered.
19 May SADF raids ANC targets in Gaberone, Lusaka and Harare, 2 people die and 13 injured. Swaziland deports 17 ANC members.
21/23 May Rand Supreme Court sentences 4 ANC members for treason; and in Bethal 11 Witbank youths are acquitted on terrorism charges. A landmine blast in Davel (E Tvl) kills 3 people and injures 8. A bomb explodes in Umlazi supermarket and in central Dbn a bomb is defused in a parkade.
26/30 May Another landmine explodes in Davel, and in Dbn 10 people appear in court in connection with 13 bomb blasts. In Lusaka, Natfoc and ANC officials meet for 3 days.


ACRONYMS
SADF SA Defence Force
UWUSA United Workers Union of South Africa

3 June In Mbabane (Swaziland), 2 ANC members assassinated in alleged cross border raid. In Ficksburg (OFS) 1 ANC guerilla shot dead by security forces.
5 June Lesotho expels 63 more SA refugees and ANC members.
10 June In Volksrust, 3 people injured in 2 landmine blasts.

ACRONYMS
EPG Eminent Persons Group
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
WRDB West Rand Development Board

SELECT IN POLITICAL

CATEGORY BREAKDOWN OF FATALITIES IN CIVIL UNREST
Four Comparative Phases, Sept 1984 - 12 June 1986



NOTES

1 Figures on fatalities in police action are taken from a combination of daily press/police reports and government estimates for major periods. Dual sources are necessitated by the fact that official records supplied in parliament and at press conferences tend to differ from independent monitors; and further cover interim periods that differ from the breakdown used in this table.

2 This category (often described as 'black on black' violence) covers fatalities in several distinct types of political conflict that are statistically inseparable in most media and police reports. These sub-categories include:

- left-wing activist attacks on 'collaborators' (black town councillors, policemen, etc) and criminals
- right-wing township and homeland vigilante attacks on opposition groups
- feuding between extra-parliamentary opposition and labour groups, e.g. UDF and Azapo
- the 'necklacing' and burning of opponents by conflicting parties.

3 This and the other categories used here exclude victims politically unrelated tribal faction-fighting, whether in rural or urban (e.g. mine compounds) areas. Official figures show 439 Africans were killed in such clashes between Sept 1984 and 22 April 1986, mostly in Natal/KwaZulu areas.

4 During this period, in April, 36 rural black women were 'necklaced' in Lebowa by youths who accused them of 'witchcraft' and of being behind the poor political situation. These fatalities have been included here because of the surrounding political circumstances.


5 The unrest deathtoll in this category includes the official count of 65 shackdwellers at Crossroads and nearby camps between May-June 1986. No breakdown of separate responsibility for the fatalities is available - i.e. whether in the hands of the 'witdoeke' (vigilantes), 'comrades', other activists or security forces.

6 Since the declaration of the second state of emergency, the government's Bureau for Information has been established as the only legal source for unrest data/incidents, or for confirmation thereof. Their 'catch-all' fatality count cannot consistently be broken down into the above categories.

INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE

MONTHLY UNREST DEATHTOLL, WITH MAJOR INCIDENTS


January 1985/June 1986



Date	Place	Fatalities	Details	1986	Date	Place	Fatalities	Details
1984				L	1/2 Jan	Moutse (KwaNdebele)	20	anti-independence clashes
(A)	3/4 Sept	26	outbreak of riots during rent boycott	M	18 Feb	Alexandra	13	police and resident clashes
1985				N	3 Mar	Guguletu	7	alleged ANC guerillas killed in police ambush
B	21 March	19	police open fire on marchers	O	20 Mar	New Crossroads	7	'fathers/comrades' clashes
C	26 June	10	booby trapped hand-grenade incident	P	26 Mar	KwaZakele	9	in bottle store attack
D	5/14 Aug	70	police, amabutho and activist clashes	Q	26 Mar	Winterveld	11	Bop police shootings at residents' meeting
E	12/14 Aug	19	police actions	R	14 April	Sekukhuleni (Lebowa)	36	women necklaced by youths
F	22 Aug	7	police actions	S	23 April	Alexandra	9	police and resident clashes
G	28/31 Aug	31	riots erupt after Mandela march	T	17/26 May	CT Squatter Area	44	police, 'witdoeke' and comrades' clashes
H	15 Oct	3	Thornton road, trojan horse ambush	U	20/25 May	KwaMashu	11	youth and amabutho clashes
I	18 Nov	14	police shootings at meeting	V	9/11 June	CT Squatter Area	21	police, 'witdoeke' and comrades' clashes
J	21 Nov	17	police shootings at meeting	W	14 June	Durban	3	bomb-blast on beach front
K	30 Dec	11	'fathers/comrades' clash					

SOURCES Bureau for Information Indicator SA Press Clippings Hansards

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ECONOMIC

M O N R



The unemployed scour the job columns in Grahamstown, part of the depressed Eastern Cape economy. The linkage between high unemployment and civil unrest, and the need for a resilient growth strategy, are debated in several articles inside.

AFRAPH, Steve Hilton-Barber

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⁴³ *Economic Outlook*



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
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MANAGEMENT ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE

By Prof Jill Nattrass, Head of the Development Studies Unit, University of Natal

Earlier editions of *Indicator SA* have published the findings of several surveys conducted on the attitudes of black communities and workers on a range of critical political issues, from disinvestment to socialism. On the other side of the coin, the results of a recently undertaken survey concerning the opinions of management personnel are presented in the following article. Here, over 700 managers speak out on government economic and political mismanagement, rank the multiple causes of socio-economic disorders, and express their levels of confidence in future performances.

In her commentary on the survey findings, Prof Nattrass provides insights into management's 'change' orientation when their party-political affiliations are correlated firstly with age group, and secondly with perceptions of social issues. A major outcome of the survey is that over 75 percent of the managers who responded believe that the Land Act, Group Areas Act and Separate Amenities Act should be repealed; and that around 60 percent believe that the tricameral parliament, Population Registration Act and segregated primary/high schools should also go.

The Development Studies Unit was asked recently to undertake an opinion survey among management in South Africa, with a view to establishing their attitudes to future social, economic and political change. In view of the shortage of time available for the completion of the project, the survey was conducted by means of a postal questionnaire sent to a sample of 2 500 managers, who were selected from a personnel consultant's mailing list.

Although returns from most postal surveys are usually poor, after no follow-up procedure in this survey, 718 returns were received in time for

processing. This constitutes a 29 percent return, which is virtually unprecedented and, in itself, provides some evidence of management's concern over the country's future.

Spectrum of Sample

Managers from all levels were included in the survey and were drawn from a wide variety of enterprises including public corporations and government institutions. However, the manner of selection has most probably imparted a bias to the returns from middle and lower management, who are

numerically the larger groups.

Furthermore, over half of the survey respondents (58 percent) worked for organisations employing more than 500 people. In general, the managements of firms with large workforces are more likely to be aware of the wider (collective) problems facing their workers, and less likely to be aware of the employee's personal (individual) problems. Therefore, the over-representation of large firms may well mean that from the broader viewpoint of social and political change, the survey results have a further bias towards the more enlightened segments of the management cadre.

Management Profiles

Only about five percent of the respondents did not give data relating to their personal characteristics. Thus a detailed profile of white management emerges from the survey. Predictably, the results show that the management cadre is dominated by men. The mean age of the respondents who did provide personal information was 38 years, and 50 percent were aged 40 years or more. The age distribution is younger overall than one would intuitively expect, which supports the view that there are greater numbers of middle and lower management represented in the survey than of top management.

As regards formal education, it is interesting that less than half of the management respondents (49 percent) are graduates and 31 percent have a professional qualification. Sixteen percent have no (formal) school educational qualification and 15 percent have a technical diploma. Nearly one third of the respondents had a qualification from another country. In fact, one third of the respondents (out of 95 percent of total sample) were born outside the Republic, and 49 percent have had work experience in other countries.

Political Affiliations

As an important aspect of a profile of white management, the respondents were asked who they thought they would vote for if an election were to be called. The results are presented in table 1.1 (see box 1), showing predominant and almost equal support for the National Party (NP) and the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). A very interesting finding from the viewpoint of change is that there are significant differences in terms of age group when correlated with support for the two major political groupings represented in the 'white' parliament.

The swing to the PFP in the younger age groups, reflected in table 1.2, is a positive sign of a changing environment. It is probable that members of these groups will have to adapt to very significant changes within their lifespans and their support for a party favouring change is to be welcomed. More specifically, a correlation of age and party reflects that:

- Sixty-eight percent of the managers who support the NP are aged over 40; and 30 percent over 50.
- Fifty-two percent of the managers who support the PFP are aged over 40; and 20 percent over 50.

From the survey results, it is very difficult to see

any relationship between the major **political** affiliations of the respondents (**if broken down** sectoral background) and the economic condition prevailing in an industry — e.g. **whether it is** labour or capital intensive.

Attitudes on Change

Broadly speaking, the survey refers to **attitudes** change as it relates to:

- personal life styles
- general attitudes to the future

A POLITICAL PROFILE OF WHITE MANAGEMENT

Table 1.1
POLITICAL AFFILIATION BY PARTY

The party that would be supported	No. of respondents
National Party	296
Progressive Federal Party	317
Conservative Party	15
New Republic Party	10
Other	24

(Total No. →)

Table 1.2
POLITICAL AFFILIATION BY AGE GROUP

AGE	Percentage of age supporting party		
	Under 30	31-40	41-50
National Party	35	36	48
Progressive Federal Party	65	56	44
Number of respondents	29	234	

(Total No. : • 5201)

**situation
and family aspects.**

It is inherited that this is an attitude reflects the attitudes prevailing at the time. In some instances, attitudes (perhaps) are very volatile and subject to rapid change; whereas in other, attitudes ('prejudices', perhaps) are very to change. To make the link between and likely action requires an assessment of of volatility, e.g. attitudes relating to which tend to be volatile whereas action with social issues are often less so.

Africa's Future

surveyed were asked to mark, in order of priority, the number of economic, political and social factors they felt were most likely to cause concern over the next five years. A factor was counted as being of concern if ranked in the top five factors marked by the respondent.

In the first period given (up to 1990), the top concern was expressed about political unrest, followed by the obviously

of little political reform, which ranked next, and subsequently family security.

- in general did not appear to be worried about personal financial or work situations.

priority ranking by respondents for a five year period — to the year 2000 —

; interesting changes and some surprising

. Too rapid reform, personal progress at work and the possibility of redundancy continued to be factors of very little concern.

» Increased political unrest dropped in ranking from first to second place, with only 46 percent marking it as a factor to 2000 (as against 80 percent to 1990).

® There was a significant increase in the degree of concern expressed over family security to the year 2000, as its ranking rose from fifth place to first.

® The importance of black nationalism as a cause for concern was also seen as very much higher — 25 percent marked it to 1990, increasing to 41 percent to the year 2000.

The Economic Climate

Managers were asked whether they thought conditions in their industry were better or worse than those in the country as a whole; and whether they considered conditions in their firm worse than those in the industry. Of a total of 673 respondents who answered the first question, 53 percent said that they felt conditions were better in the industry than they were in the wider economy, and 36 percent that they were worse. On the second question, respondents were far more optimistic. Many managers (74 percent) thought conditions in their firm were better than in the industry and only 13 percent believed them to be worse.

Respondents were then asked to select the two factors they felt were the major reasons for the present poor economic climate, from eight alternatives. Table 2.1 (see box 2) shows that management places the

responsibility for the present economic climate largely on the shoulders of government. The largest group (53 percent) stated that poor management of the economy was one of the two most important factors underlying the recession, and another 42 percent stressed too slow a pace of political reform.

Respondents were also asked to give their opinions as to whether broad economic conditions in 1986 would be better or worse than 1985, with respect to their particular industry and their personal financial situation. This question was then repeated relating the outlook in 1990 to 1986. In general, the results show that management remains optimistic but their uncertainty increases as the time horizon lengthens, even if only from one to five years.

In this section, there was some variation by age correlation, with younger groups tending to be more optimistic than older age groups, particularly with respect to their personal financial status and income levels. More importantly, the link between economic growth and political change was most clearly perceived by managers when 82 percent stated that political reform was a prerequisite for a sustainable economic recovery.



THE ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT

Table 2

CAUSES OF THE POOR ECONOMIC SITUATION

Reason	Percentage marking it as factor	Priority ranking 1-5
Poor World Conditions	11	
Internal Unrest	32	3
Too Slow Reform	42	2
Too Fast Reform	1	
Poor Management of the Economy	53	1
Border Conflict	17	
The Withdrawal of Foreign Capital	21	5
International Pressure	25	4
(Total No 620)		



Many segregated recreational facilities exist even though forms of 'petty apartheid' have been removed. The investigation investigated managerial perceptions of the apartheid institutions, black grievances, the

Political Situation

diminished economic optimism, the
 of management attitudes to the short-term
 was **pessimistic**. Overall, 44
 that the level of social unrest would
 be 86 percent in 1985, and 39 percent that
on the Border would also deteriorate.
 1, stood against 38 percent and 25
 respondents respectively who thought these
 ...! improve.
 i outlook was much more optimistic,
 u of all the respondents, 53 percent
 the social unrest situation will have
 , 1990, and 35 percent that the Border
 also be better.
 s were also asked to state which of a
 natives the thought was the most
 • contributing to the present unrest,
 managers replied to this section. The
 in table 3 (see box 3) are
 in that they show that the management
 fallen victim to the conspiracy theory
 instead, 46 percent of the respondents

attribute the biggest single cause to black
 dissatisfaction with the government, and only 14
 percent to agitation (10 percent blame the ANC,
 and 4 percent the UDF). A further 23 percent picked
 on economic conditions as the primary cause (12
 percent the general economic climate; and 11 percent
 unemployment).

Attitudes to Government

Managers were also asked to give their opinion of
 the present government's performance. In general
 terms, management attitudes are in line with its
 above views on the causes of unrest, though
 respondents seem more ready to give government
 the benefit of the doubt in this section.

The factors that emerged in this section of the
 survey are firstly, the high proportion of management
 (36 percent) that believes the government has no
 plan of action to proceed with reform; secondly, both
 NP and PFP supporters hold this view in more or
 less equal proportion; and, thirdly, another 19 percent
 of respondents see the government as being

THE POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT

USES OF SOCIAL UNREST

Uses of Social Unrest	Managers marking it as most important contribution			
	None	Little	Breakdown by major party'	
NP			PFP	
Parliament	5	1	1	1
Economic Climate	49	12	14	10
Government	191	46	29	57
My of Black	42	10	15	4
	8	2	1	2
ns in Townships	15	4	6	2
	3	1	1	1
on to White	47	11	11	10
	41	10	9	11
	10	3	3	2

CSS as minority political affiliations, i.e.
 7-ofa/Wo 413)

Table 4

ATTITUDES TO SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS OF APARTHEID

Institution	Percentage of Management stating institution should		With no opinion
	Remain	Go	
Influx Control	5	93	2
Separate Amenities Act	6	89	5
Tricameral Parliament	21	58	21
Separate Universities	11	87	2
High Schools	33	58	9
Primary Schools	36	55	9
Transport	5	93	2
Beaches	10	87	3
Entertainment	4	94	2
The Land Act	4	75	21
Group Areas Act	12	82	6
Population Registration Act	24	58	18
Imprisonment of Black Leaders	15	61	24

committed to undertaking reform within the apartheid system.

Looking into the future, 56 percent (385 managers) believed that black people would dominate the government within their lifetime; 27 percent (185 managers) said no, and 17 percent (118) did not know. There were differences by political affiliation—44 percent of NP supporters believed that blacks would dominate, 40 percent of Conservative Party supporters, and 70 percent of PFP supporters.

Judging from these answers, management seems to have a very pragmatic view of the political future—in the sense that it sees significant and inevitable political change on the horizon. However, what is worrying is that it also believes the government to have no real plan for progress. Does this signify a policy-making vacuum which a co-ordinated business effort could perhaps help to fill?

Apartheid Institutions

In the hope of being able to make a possible contribution to the development of a path of change, management were asked to give their opinions on a number of aspects of the existing framework of legislation. Specifically, they were asked to say whether a particular institutional aspect of South African life should remain or go. Their answers are given in table 4.

From survey responses, it seems that, at least as far as the management cadre is concerned, South Africa no longer has any racial 'sacred cows'. More than 75 percent of respondents felt that laws governing influx control; separate amenities, universities, transport and entertainment; and the Group Areas and Land Acts, should be abolished. Indeed, the only instances in which more than one fifth of the respondents felt that the institution should be retained concerned separate schools, the Population Registration Act and the tricameral parliament.


Economic Growth and Change

There are a number of major conclusions that come out of this study. The overall impression gleaned from an overview of survey responses is that management remains fully committed to South Africa, although this is tempered by a realistic view of the possible deterioration of conditions over the next 15 years. Management appears to be fully aware of the economic necessity for political change and maintains a clear commitment to the removal of apartheid in all its forms.

At the same time, there is evidence of a lack of clarity of thought with respect to the relationship between economic and political developments. For instance, some 82 percent of the respondents said political reform was a prerequisite for an economic recovery. However, there was some confusion in relation to what exact areas require political reform as distinct from social and economic priorities.

To conclude, managers need to forge ahead in order to better understand the relationship between economic growth and socio-political change. They would then be able to incorporate this understanding into forward planning, thereby co-ordinating actions on the political front with a view to improving the economic conditions in which business operates.

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By Dr Zac de Beer,
Chairman of Southern Life
and other
Anglo-American Companies

The inextricable linkage between South Africa's severe economic and social problems, and therefore solutions, is clearly illustrated by Dr de Beer in the course of outlining alternative scenarios that will stem from change, stalemate or stagnation. There are no easy solutions to the cumulative pressures of high unemployment, incremental sanctions, constant capital outflow, rising inflation, and the related aspects of the country's political crisis. Nevertheless, Dr de Beer believes there are still potential ways out of these dilemmas - if certain socio-economic imperatives are met, and a government adopts a realistic approach to the politics of negotiation.

Economic imperatives

South Africa needs jobs by the hundred thousand if it were to overcome present troubles and a reasonable measure of stability and prosperity. This objective implies non-inflationary, real growth of 10 percent or more for at least a decade. Present evidence exists that such growth can be achieved only on the basis of a net inflow sufficient to finance about ten percent of gross domestic investment. An inflow on this scale was available until about 1974, but has since disappeared.

although the free market system probably remains the preferable option for most observers.

Consumer expenditure simply must be curbed, both from the standpoint of controlling inflation and for balance of payments reasons. Again, the question is how to do so without causing even greater recession and unemployment. The answer must lie, to a large extent, in export promotion and export substitution. For both of these, a reasonably low rand exchange value is required.

The threat of economic boycotts and sanctions, to which the response has to be political, is a further matter of concern. All this adds up to a fairly grim, belt-tightening scenario - high taxes, high interest rates, high savings and very expensive imports. Given the uncomfortably wide wealth gap between affluent South Africans and poor ones, the biggest share of the belt-tightening burden will of necessity fall on the white community. The political responses of the white electorate will undoubtedly worry the ruling Nationalist Party. A more serious consequence would be the loss of the country's valuable skilled manpower through emigration, while it is becoming difficult indeed to recruit workers of this kind abroad.


A solution to South Africa's economic ills must lie mainly in export promotion and import substitution, based on a low rand exchange value

The white community in particular will have to tighten belts through curbing consumer expenditure, high savings, and interest rates, and expensive imports

Countering Inflation

Financial authorities maintain, with some justification, that "in" inflation is cost-push rather than demand-pull. However, it seems clear that monetary and fiscal policy will also have to be deployed in order to counter "in" inflation. Whether this strategy can succeed without aggravating the prevailing severe unemployment is a matter of debate. This dilemma has given rise to spallation in certain quarters about a controlled economy.

Advocates of change are encountering major hurdles on the unfolding road to reform, and will have to fend off many antagonists.



The economy must be relieved of the two great, related burdens of apartheid - the huge bureaucracy and the excessive police/defence

In the longer term, of course, the South African economy simply must be relieved of two great, related burdens that flow from the apartheid policy - the huge number of civil servants engaged in the maintenance of apartheid, and the excessive police and defence budgets. Of course these expenditures could not be eliminated altogether in a post-apartheid society, but it ought to be possible to cut them very considerably.

least in the fields of health and education, must be a top priority if to be social stability. Education in particular has become the major battleground in the present conflict situation and it will be difficult to stability while state schools remain segregated. However, short of desegregation, the establishment of a single education authority and a political equal per capita expenditure is essential with affirmative action to close the gap between black and white standards

The critical areas where social progress must be made to improve black people's quality of life include improved education, housing and

So

If the economic picture is a difficult one, the social one is no less so. It is fashionable and, in one sense, valid to protest that South Africa is a third world country and the living conditions of our poor should be judged by third world rather than first world standards. But of course the difference between South Africa and other third world countries is that South Africa remains a discriminatory pigmentocracy, in spite of recent reforms.

For a very long time to come, South Africa will be unable to provide social welfare expenditures on anything like a first world scale. What we can and must do in the short term is to make it possible and attractive for our poor to improve their own lives.

In the interests of individual satisfaction and economic efficiency, black people must be given their freedoms - freedom to move; freedom to sell their labour at the best price they can obtain; freedom to buy, sell and hold property, fixed or movable; freedom to live where they please.

Perhaps more important than any other area of social progress is the matter of urban housing. Black urbanisation has been extremely rapid in recent years and the repeal of pass laws will bring this trend out into the open. The housing shortage, already acute, will be intensified. Yet, most of those in need of housing will be unable to pay for even the cheapest contractor-built structure. Self-help housing may offer a solution, but this will be feasible only if the state provides large amounts of serviced land on a freehold basis. A massive housing drive on this basis should also provide a good deal of formal and informal employment.

The next major social need is for the abolition of the Group Areas Act. Government talks of apartheid as being obsolete, and expresses its support of the free enterprise system, yet South Africans who have accumulated some wealth are denied the right to purchase homes in areas of their choosing. It is hard to imagine any policy better calculated to promote revolution.

The provision of good basic facilities, at

Inevitably, one starts with economics and sociology and ends up with politics. Clearly the primary task of restoring a positive balance on the capital account of the balance of payments is a political one. If the economic imperative is capital inflow, the social imperative housing and educational equality, then the political imperative to make all these possible is constitutional reform. Without widespread support and a reasonable measure of government by consent, a bleak, limited, unprofitable future faces the white community in South Africa and the victors in any revolution will receive little.

So there has to be constitutional reform. It has to be negotiated between leaders having sufficient credibility to make it solid. And before negotiations begin, substantial reform, or at least an unambiguous commitment to that reform, must have taken place. The time when credible black leaders would come to a conference with an open agenda has passed. Before the white nationalists can even get people of true standing and authority to talk to them, they will have to give far-reaching guarantees.

Assuming that this formidable hurdle can be surmounted, what sort of constitution can be hoped for? Again, there was a time when expedients such as qualified franchise or a multiple vote could have gained wide acceptance; but it is all gone now. After years and decades of frustration, no black leader is going to settle for anything less than universal suffrage. No peace or stability will be achieved without that. In short, non-black negotiators should concentrate on obtaining an entrenched constitution, bill of rights, an independent judicial, proportional representation and a genuine geographical federation.

No-one in his right mind will see there are dangers in adopting this democratic approach. But to move boldly forward now is the certain disaster of perpetual capital outflow, perpetual unrest, poverty, massive skills emigration ultimately, destructive

If the economic imperative for South Africa's recovery is capital inflow, the political imperative remains constitutional reform

The most that white negotiators can hope to obtain are a bill of rights, an independent judiciary, proportional representation and a genuine federation

TOWARDS ECONOMIC RESTORATION

By Dr Jan Lombard,
Deputy-Governor of the
South African Reserve Bank

An alternative view on corrective economic measures is presented by Dr Lombard, who analyses the investment equation and eschews further manipulation of interest rates or tighter exchange controls. Instead, he proposes a policy of increased domestic investment to promote economic growth, while emphasising that an accompanying political breakthrough is required to ensure local entrepreneur confidence in the country's future.

The policy elements of a strategy to return South Africa to economic prosperity (at least outside the future) fall into three broad categories: financial, non-financial and political reform policies. The South African Reserve Bank's area of influence is, of course, confined to some aspects of financial policy. The Bank is able to influence only the level of the money supply, price inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. Even in this narrow



AFRAPHIX: Paul Weinberg

field, we are obviously constrained in our power to do things by the close functional interrelationships that exist among these variables. In economics, it is said, 'everything depends upon everything else'.

On the financial side, the monetary authorities have now done more or less all they can to promote domestic growth. It cannot be said that present interest and exchange rate levels represent serious constraints on growth. If supply and

Domestic investors should look to the burgeoning consumer market that inevitably will follow rapid black urbanisation over the next five to ten years.

imm

Contrary to one conventional wisdom, the availability of foreign finance is not a vital precondition for domestic economic growth in South Africa

A policy strategy must be on the active side of the economic equation - local investment in productive capacity to meet future demands for goods and services

South Africa has actually been saving more than it has been investing domestically, while exporting capital abroad in five of the past eight years

A political solution will determine the success of any economic policies and also restore entrepreneur confidence in the country's future

demand conditions on the money and foreign exchange markets call for further manipulation of the rates, this need will be addressed. But apart from the reform of rates of taxation, the answer must now be sought on the other side of the investment equation, namely in the real demand for productive capacity. In this respect the process of economic growth is as self-generating as stagnation is self-fulfilling. The greater the size of investment, the greater the demand for the goods and services produced by the new productive capacity. It is a well-known principle in economics that when investment decisions become geared to watching indices of existing surplus capacity instead of anticipating expected future demand for output, stagnation sets in. The missing element in the investment equation is indeed a willingness among production entrepreneurs to broaden their horizons to satisfy the needs of society - especially the effective demands which must inevitably emerge from the rapidly urbanising black population. It is from this active side of the economic equation that the revival of growth must come, rather than the passive side of finance.

What policy strategy is required in this regard? How can economic expectations and a clear conception of the country's economic strengths and weaknesses be restored?

One widely propagated argument states that the main obstacles to rapid domestic economic growth in South Africa is its balance of payments problem - therefore, rigid controls should be introduced over both the current and capital accounts. Policy-makers will then be free to stimulate domestic growth by expanding domestic demand without fear that the exchange rate of the rand will fall apart.

This approach is largely fallacious; however sound, real domestic investment for economic growth does not produce balance of payments problems. Firstly, the drastic decline in the external value of the rand, particularly since 1980, was not caused by too rapid investment and economic growth over the period. Secondly, economic growth from sound domestic investments is associated with deficits on the current account of the country's balance of payments, not with the surpluses it has run up during five of the past eight years.

Furthermore, sound and rapid domestic investment usually exceeds domestic savings and automatically draws capital inflow from abroad. But South Africa has actually been saving more than it had been investing, and has been exporting capital abroad for five out of the past eight years. The level of South Africa's foreign

debt has actually been reduced rather than increased, as it would have if the domestic economy enjoyed a high rate of economic growth. Any attempt to stop that outflow by means of better systems of exchange controls will get us nowhere.

The availability of foreign finance is by no means a vital precondition for domestic economic growth. The link of cause and effect is rather the other way around. Where funds have to chase up opportunities, problems are just around the corner. This process was clearly illustrated in the 1970s by the problems following upon the recycling of billions of petrodollars throughout the world. The substantial potential rate of growth in this country, financed entirely by its own savings, is still close to four percent per annum. Even in 1984, the year of high growth, capital inflow made no more than a useful marginal contribution to the funding of domestic investment. In short, opportunities will seek out funds, and will usually succeed in doing so.

Strategy

The restoration of capital inflow is not a precondition for the revival of domestic growth. I would similarly reject strategies which require the deliberate planning of reduction in imports or the subsidisation of exports in order to produce a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. The fundamental base from which to design a strategy for domestic economic growth seems to lie elsewhere. The point of departure is the question, why do South African industrialists and other entrepreneurs prefer to devote their skills and energies to playing musical chairs on the ship deck (through mergers and take-overs, etc.), instead of getting vessel itself out of the doldrums and on its way to real prosperity?

An important part of the answer can probably be found in a drastic improvement of the prevailing perceptions of political and social stability in South Africa. Together with the overseas disinvestors, we are also to blame for selling the country, short in our inability to perceive of a peaceful road towards the re-establishment of constitutional certainty and legitimacy. Although the effect is unintentional, every corporation or company which decides to go short on real productive capacity and to go along on money market is, in a very real sense, disinvesting domestic economic growth, and contributing to an outflow of capital.

Central bankers are not usually upon to produce solutions for problems. But even bankers can see that the missing link in the economic policies and strategies for economic growth in South Africa lie in the political area.

Women in Soweto anticipate in one of the casual job schemes created by government to alleviate the plight of the nation's unemployed.

By Or Merle Holden and Prof Mike McGrath
of the Department of Economics, University of Natal

Retrospect

In spite of many indications that the economy had turned around in late 1985 and was on the first (1986) economic results for the justed GNP, were disappointing. Overall, output increased two percent with real mine output only in the non-gold sector. Culture and industry, gas and water

Expenditure on GDP are to recover. Firstly, the economy

by approximately 2% shown strong signs of a feline in spending in all attributed to a number lack of

of consumers as a decline in disposable income (due to high inflation and fiscal drag); and

consumer expectations that the appreciating rand in early 1986 would eventually lead to decreases in the price of imported goods.

Secondly, real fixed investment in the private and public sectors also continued to decline in 1986 despite moderate decreases in long-term interest rates. In particular, public real fixed investment declined substantially, probably due to the existence of surplus capacity and the exclusion of South Africa from foreign capital markets.

The lower rate of inventory depletion and the increase in real consumption expenditure by government contributed to a sharp increase in real gross domestic expenditure. This increase was not reflected in real GDP because real exports declined by R1,7 billion while real imports increased by R1 billion, resulting in the two percent overall decline in real GDP. The sharp increase in imports of oil for strategic stockpiling certainly could not have been forecast.



Other Indicators

The renewed slackness in the economy was also reflected in a levelling off in the demand for labour and a concomitant rise in the numbers of unemployed. The special training and job programmes initiated in 1985 were unable to stem rising unemployment levels nor were they sufficient to stimulate the demand for labour.

Inflation still remains at high levels despite the weakened economy. The increase in consumer prices accelerated to 20,7 percent in January 1986, slowed to 18,6 percent in April and decreased to a rate of 17,5 percent in May. This moderation in the rate of inflation partly reflects the lower rates of increase in the prices of imported goods and food. The reduction in the price of fuel in April and the inclusion of third party insurance therein contributed to the lower rate of increase of the consumer price index in May.

The current account surplus on the Balance of Payments was lower in the first quarter of 1986 when compared with the last quarter of 1985, or with the quarterly averages for 1985. Fortunately, the capital account, on the other hand, improved slightly during the first quarter of 1986. The net capital outflow diminished from a high of R5 billion in the fourth quarter of 1985, to R831 million in the first quarter of 1986.

During the first quarter of 1986, the developments in the Balance of Payments were reflected in movements in the exchange rate. The rand continued to strengthen until the middle of March when the foreign debt repayment triggered fears of depreciation, which were realised through an outflow of capital. By the middle of April, however, improved expectations in the foreign exchange market led to a recovery in the rand. This improvement was shortlived and the rand gradually depreciated to reach lows, before June 16, which reflected a lack of investor confidence in the ability of government to maintain political and social stability in the country.

Pressing Economic Priorities

For free enterprise to survive in South Africa, major changes will have to occur in the distribution of employment opportunities and of economic rewards. The present levels of economic disparities between racial groups, and even within African and coloured groups, are far too high for economic stability.

High levels of racial income inequality and wide urban/rural differentials in income indicate that poverty is widespread among the African population, and that it will be particularly prevalent in the non-

metropolitan regions.

The magnitude of the problem of economic inequality is clear from:

9 A Gini-coefficient for South Africa with a v i of 0,68 (1975), which gives South Africa the unenviable distinction of having the most unequal distribution of income for any economy for which a is available. In comparison, Gini-coefficients in the developed Western economies vary between n ic 0,41.

• The skewed distribution of income by race gm 1980 the disparity ratios of white per capita income^{UP} to coloured, Indian and African per capita income[^] were respectively 5,3; 3,9 and 12,9. The white/ African disparity ratio is greater than it was in 1946/47.

• Influx controls, the racial distribution of land and other factors have given rise to very marked inequalities between African household incomes in the urban and rural areas.

Low levels of income earning occupations in rural areas, and substantial levels of open and disguised unemployment among Africans raise the dependency burden on African households and depress per capita incomes. The Current Population Survey showed that 8,4 percent of the African population was unemployed in February 1986. This official estimate undoubtedly understates the magnitude of the problem by failing to measure the number of people engaged in low productivity employment levels for low income occupations in subsistence agriculture, domestic service and in the informal sector. In 1985 some two million African people were engaged in these occupations, representing over 30 percent of the economically active African population.

The conventional wisdom regarding economic growth and income distribution envisages a process in which income inequality widens in the early phases of growth, and narrows only when a relatively high level of industrialisation has been achieved, and when the labour surplus has been absorbed into employment in the high wage industrial sector. The narrowing of income inequality in the final stage of this 'trickle-down' process requires the attainment of a growth path in which labour is absorbed rapidly, labour's bargaining power rises, and the benefits from growth are shared with labour.

However, there is nothing inevitable about the attainment of such a growth path. In fact, the growth rates of employment which might have caused trickle-down have not occurred in South Africa since 1975. Between 1980 and 1985 the index of manufacturing sector employment (excluding agriculture) has grown by less than one percent per annum — falling far short of the rate needed to create a scarcity of unskilled labour.

Constraints

The growth of demand in the world economy is a major determinant of the South African economy's export growth. The fall in oil prices, falling rates of

inflation, and falling nominal interest rates have led to an upward revision of the growth predictions for most of the industrial economies' levels for the p

"P¹⁰ 1988, investment and a high growth rate of exports
 Foreign investment to an acceleration of the growth
 as, ultimately, both in Africa's GDP. Yet, if comprehensive
 rate sanctions are applied against South Africa,
 trade disruptions, the effects on economic growth could be
 the substantial. In 1985 exports (including gold)
 very substantial. The growth of GDP and it is clear that it
 accounted for a very dramatic reduction in employment
 reduction in employment and economic growth
 reduced level that sanctions would be
 "The impact against exports such as gold, wool, chrome,
 ineffective against South Africa's
 platinum etc. -> under sanctions may drop by as little

1. T/Jrrent However, the resultant reduction in
 2. M > after the multiple effects would be
 Approximately ten percent of the absolute level.
 plher imports (excluding oil) consist mainly of
 , rhinery transport equipment and industrial
 1. n cals Efforts to expand the domestic production
 of these commodities will involve considerable
 increases in domestic unit costs of production because
 of the small scale of domestic production runs. The
 capital equipment required to produce these import
 substitutes would still have to be imported, and
 embargoes would either aggravate the Balance of
 Payments problems or prevent import substitution.
 Import substitution will therefore be unlikely to
 compensate for the loss of real income that would
 flow from comprehensive sanctions.

Capital Outflows and Inflows

Disinvestment pressures and the 1985 standstill on
 short-term banking debt have unquestionably
 severed South Africa's access to foreign capital

markets. Furthermore, multinational companies
 operating here are faced with disinvestment pressures
 at home, threats of consumer boycotts of their
 products in home markets and reduced levels of
 profitability within South Africa itself. Under such
 circumstances, these companies are unlikely to expand
 their investments, and may increase the proportion
 of profits paid abroad.

The retained earnings of foreign firms constitute a
 very substantial share of gross private investment and
 their annual repatriation would lower the economy's
 propensity to save and the growth rate, and would
 cause additional problems on the Balance of
 Payments. However, a move to sanctions would
 probably result in the termination of most capital
 outflows, including the repatriation of dividends.

A simple multiplier can be used to give estimates of
 the effects of a reduction in the inflows of foreign
 capital on the growth rate of real income. Table 1
 shows the reduction in the growth of real GDP which
 would result from two possible types of
 disinvestment: either the termination of foreign direct
 investment, or an embargo on all long term capital
 inflows. In both cases it is assumed that domestic
 South African capital formation falls by an equal
 amount, although there are other possibilities.

The results illustrate the importance of long term
 capital inflows. Over the decade 1974/1983, the
 average real economic growth of the South African
 economy would have been lowered by 24 percent per
 annum if foreign direct investment had ceased. The
 decrease would have been much greater if all long-
 term inflows had ceased. Domestic investment or
 government expenditures could have been increased in
 order to stimulate the economy, but responses of
 this sort would soon cause deficits on the current
 account of the Balance of Payments.

Table 1

CONSEQUENCES FOR GROWTH OF HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTIONS IN LONG-TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS IN EACH YEAR FROM 1974-1983

Year	Annual Real Growth Rate	Percentage Reduction in Annual Growth Rate Terminating:	
		Direct Private Investment	All Long-Term Capital inflows
1974	8,2%	17%	56%
1975	2,6%	50%	239%
1976	1,9%	53%	368%
1977	0,4%	*	425%
1978	2,8%	*	Neg
1979	3,9%	3%	*
1980	7,3%	5%	*
1981	4,7%	21%	38%
1982	-1,1%	73%	600%
1983	-3,1%	16%	*

1983
 1982
 1981
 1980
 1979
 1978
 1977
 1976
 1975
 1974

4 backyard panelbeater at work in one of Durban's shack settlements. One aspect of any economic growth strategy stimulate the informal sector through

Interim Solutions

A Redistribution Strategy

The slowing down in the growth rate of the economy in the 1980s has made trickle-down ineffective as the primary means of redressing income inequalities, the prospect of sanctions and the reality of disinvestment further reduce the prospects for economic growth. Furthermore, increases in real per capita incomes are not at all auspicious until a political system is instituted in South Africa which is both able to end internal strife and acceptable to international opinion.

Redistribution of income to poor households has been shown to be a powerful tool for alleviating poverty and increasing employment. The consumption patterns of poor people centre around necessities. These goods are produced using both local capital and less capital-intensive production techniques. As a result the second round spin-offs for further growth are high.

Transfer payments to the poor, or policies which create employment in the informal sector can have an impact on growth, poverty and income distribution. They will place less strain on the Balance of Payments than will growth originating in the industrialised sector. To achieve the full benefits of growth policies aimed at the informal sector, restraints in the form of health and housing legislation, licensing laws,

agricultural marketing and transport policies i be removed.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy

During the first quarter of 1986 the rate of growth of the newly defined broad money supply (M¹) fluctuated around low levels of 10.6 percent to 12.9 percent, despite the decrease in short-term interest rates. In fact, in January and March the seasonally adjusted values of M³ were less than the lower end of the target range set for M³. By the middle of the year M³ was approximately in the middle of the target range. Increases in bank credit mirrored these trends with increases of 12.9 percent in March. By March the low prime overdraft rate of 14.5 percent was maintained with the current economic policy of keeping interest rates low.

Certainly, lower interest rates will reduce costs to business, but there is no evidence that interest rates are so high as to reduce economic activity. In fact, interest rates are now negative in real terms, and demand for bank credit is still low and a negative real interest rate of 1.5 percent has not stimulated the housing market, nor has a negative real rate of return on government securities. The effect of keeping interest rates low is being tax da

debentures encouraged private
 icorpo'f
 Smith Mjrea, has shown that high
 t rates at U) date to show that low
 I stimulate demand in the face of low
 W" before to mvs that further easing of
 the [ace of present levels of
 economic activits will not lift the economy
 of the doldrums
 offer the economy? On 17 June
 I-nmmed its growth
 to the economic problems
 included:
 immediate repayment of the loan levy at a cost of
 Of the ten percent import surcharge on
 mainly imported inputs, costing
 K180 million
 of the perks tax on
 company cars
 a rebate on the excise duty on motor cars

- costing R70 million
- privatisation of toll roads
 - an additional R5 million for the transfer and development of technology
 - a further R100 million as drought relief to farmers
 - an additional R750 million for low cost housing
 - another R50 million for job creation and training, and
 - a further R50 million to the Small Business Development Corporation.

The total cost of the package amounts to R1,5 billion, of which R1,2 billion is additional to that expenditure which was budgeted for in March. (The loan levy was due to be repaid in the next few months and had been included in the March appropriations.) Even if the R1,5 billion could be injected into the economy in the coming financial year, this would amount to only two percent of total government spending. As it has been estimated that only R992 million of the R1,5 billion is likely to enter the spending stream this year, few observers share the Minister of Finance's view that his strategy will achieve the hoped for three percent growth in GDP this year.

Prospect

In the present inhi.\ of political, social and economic uncertainly, it i- n-u -uprising that most forecasters have revised downwards their estimates of the rate of iwmmnii ittowl n u r 1986 imm the moderate three pccient lirst pte-iv.ted.

It is doubtful whether eithet investment or private loIMimptmii will t ecover sul'icciently, and furthermore, given (he puv-ihih. of economic sanctions on exports, an export-led revival in the economy is unlikely Although traditional exporters expanded Rair volumes ,i ' -S5. merchandise export volumes labi tsed over the year and declined in the first

despite the low uncertainty surrounding the ICKS" (combined with the deterred non-traditional .in.ring the export market.


change rue have also been A 38C/42C range, lion have accordingly approximately 18 iued decline in the economic malaise in ne, Assocom's Business first small increase "VP" has been largely interest rates, the new age .uul perceptions that the and unrest has abated.

onslaught on the economy, there is a growing and influential move to retreat into a siege economy characterised by import controls, foreign exchange rationing, dividend restrictions and price controls. The influence of this lobby should be strongly resisted as the long-term costs of such a strategy are all too well known. The lower exchange rate will in the longer term encourage import replacement without the use of direct controls over the market. Furthermore, even though future growth in exports may be curtailed, the present level of the exchange rate gives exporters a strong competitive edge in the face of possible sanctions.

Instead of committing the economy to a strategy either of export-led growth or old style import substitution, a third option exists: This strategy has been termed 'inward industrialisation' and involves the efficient utilisation of resources for domestic usage. It is characterised by small-scale firms producing consumer goods for the growing numbers of urban blacks, coupled with the provision of low cost housing using more labour intensive methods of production.

If this policy strategy were to be adopted, the role of government would be to deregulate the economy, thereby encouraging informal sector growth. At the same time, greater funding would have to be provided for the Small Business Development Corporation in order to allow the market to operate efficiently in the financing of infant firms. The success of this option does not necessitate closing the economy to the outside world, but it does depend on a stable political and social environment as a precursor to its viability.

^ Sie Economy
 with the possibility of a hostile international



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URJUSf EGIONAI

O N I T O R



Old-age pensioners wait for their bimonthly payments at Mamba Store, a pay-out point in the Amouti shack settlement on the outskirts of Durban.

WELFARE POLICY

⁵¹ *Privatised Welfare: Who will pay the Fare?*

⁵⁶ *Pension Pay-outs: Streamlining KwaZulu's System*

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

^j KaMgwane - 'Pretoria's Unwanted Stepson'

^^Hr Struggling with Resettlement

F Poverty & Unemployment

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IMIJONDOLO,
 Badsha's photographs of a Durban shack community.
 Johannesburg: Afrapix/Ravan Press. 1985

SOUTH AFRICA—
 THE CORDONED HEART,
 the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty, Photographic Exhibition,
 (ed) Badsha.
 Cape Town: Gallery Press. 1986

PRIVATISED WELFARE

Who will pay the fare?

By Francie Lund, Research Fellow,
Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal

The new terminology of privatisation, differentiation and devolution lies an unfolding, innovative by government in many spheres of policy and expenditure. CASS researcher Francie Lund outlines the likely impact of these current moves on the provision of social welfare, especially the practical implications for the welfare profession — both for the providers and the recipients. Her analysis is based on an evaluation of a working policy document being circulated by government, which aims to transfer responsibility for administering and financing segregated services to the understandably unwilling welfare private sectors.

The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning has been especially busy recently in its traditional role as architect of social policy. This expanding influence has been seen in health services, in the population and community development programmes, and in the regional services councils.

In the last few months a working paper on social and proposed welfare policy has been developed by its Directorate of Social Welfare. It has been sent for comment to various national welfare councils and other organisations. If it is accepted, the revised welfare policy implemented, there will be profound implications for the providers and recipients of welfare services, for the state authorities, and for the private

The report's central themes are:
1. Differentiation — the further racial differentiation of welfare services
2. Devolution — a reduction in state responsibility for welfare spending
3. Implementing welfare as an 'own affair' of the new tricameral constitutional arrangements.

The main thrusts of the report is to shift the onus for financing and providing welfare services from government to the community and the private sector. This and other proposals have created controversy in welfare circles, and many organisations, community and university social work groups have submitted memoranda expressing their criticisms. A growing number of organisations are working together to explore ways of opposing the proposed new policy.

Welfare Trends

The report and its implications need to be considered in terms of past trends in the



An independently run clinic at the Gandhi settlement outside Durban. Official welfare services are racially segregated, which affects both recipients (unequal grants) and providers (differential salaries).

AFFAPIX Omar Badstra

Welfare, now an 'own affair' in South Africa, has been the joint responsibility of government, voluntary welfare agencies and church organisations

The new welfare policy report proposes to offer financial incentives to councils and organisations who 'differentiate' (segregate) speedily and effectively

No matter how effective the envisaged 'employee assistance programmes' are, they will certainly not benefit the masses of unemployed or rural communities

The proposed new structures appear to replicate and expand the welfare bureaucracy and to retain strong central power over policy matters

development of welfare services in South Africa. Social policy here has followed the residual model, whereby the state takes responsibility for the welfare needs of its citizens only when they themselves are unable to do so. This is in opposition to the institutional model, or welfare statism. In other words, welfare has been the joint responsibility of government on the one hand, and voluntary welfare and church organisations on the other. Services have also been racially segregated, with differential provision for each group (see box). Racially based inequalities affect both recipients (e.g. unequal pensions for different races) and the providers of welfare services (e.g. differential subsidies of social workers' salaries). These practices have led to a fragmentation of services, and no centrally co-ordinated policy has existed. Welfare is now an 'own affair' in terms of the constitution, and the revised policy aims to further entrench racial separation. The report proposes to offer financial incentives to councils and organisations who 'differentiate' speedily and effectively, and to initiate a publicity campaign to promote the policy.

Privatisation

Over the years, the government has taken on increased financial responsibility for welfare needs, and expanded the areas where it provided direct services. In contrast, historically there has been relatively little emphasis on private sector provision of social services for its own employees. Accordingly, the new objective of privatisation is 'in line with declared government policy that the state's active part in the national economy in general should be reduced and that responsibilities, where possible, should be transferred to the private sector' (Report: p64).

What does privatisation actually mean in the welfare field? It can mean that:

- social workers charge a fee for services rendered, and private practice is encouraged
- employers develop increased in-house social service and social security provision
- the private sector takes more responsibility for supporting existing or new welfare organisations.

The policy pays particular attention to the first two of these possibilities. It accepts that there are people who would be unable to pay for the service of social workers, and the state would then continue its responsibility for free services.

As far as the private sector is concerned, the report envisages two main areas of development. Firstly, for agricultural, mining, industrial and commercial

enterprises, employee assistance programmes will be encouraged it is proposed that employers should invest in services for early detection and assistance with social problems such as alcoholism. The report does not however, spell out in detail what it by employee assistance programmes. Furthermore, no matter how effective it may be, they will certainly not benefit the masses of unemployed. Secondly, the report cites the Urban Foundation and the Foundation for Rural Development encouraging examples of agencies which have played an important role in establishing housing, educational and community facilities. It sees their role as having mobilised the private sector effectively and then recommends that 'the privatisation of welfare services should be promoted by foundations'. Yet the report says also that social welfare 'is not concerned with the broader social field and is not concerned with such aspects as education, health, housing...' (Report:p5)

Lastly, it is recognised that services and structures have been unco-ordinated and duplicated in the past. In order to implement the new objectives, however, the report proposes a new (and no less complex) set of structures which appear, paradoxically, to argue for:

- simplification and trimming of the welfare bureaucracy, while replicating and expanding it
- devolving some decision making to local and regional level, while retaining strong central power
- a change in orientation away from curative to preventive services, without making it at all clear how this will occur.

A Civic Issue

The South African welfare sector has traditionally been a conservative group, passively implementing national policy. There have been occasional protests about particular legislation or policies, in 1976, for example, the Theron Commission recommended that all government welfare services should fall under one department - this was not accepted. Various organisations have attempted to deracialise, and some have made their own arrangements to pay equal salaries to their social workers. In any case, by and large the welfare sector has become an unassertive force.

This is the result of a combination of factors, important among them being state subsidy of private welfare organisations, which has led financial dependent management committees to pressure their social workers to stay in the public sector. Also, fragmented professional associations have until recently been concerned with improving professional

QUALITIES IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BUDGETS

Table 1 RACIAL 'pp SELECTED WELFARE CATEGORIES 1984/85






Table 2

SELECTED MONTHLY WELFARE PAYMENTS 1986/87

(1) Foster Care Grants



(2) Disability Grants



CHILDREN'S HOMES' SUBSIDIES


• While Pretoria controlled welfare budgets for Indian and coloured people, the per capita subsidy per month per child in children's homes was the same — R158,00

Under the tricameral parliament, the Coloured Risen has seen fit to increase the above subsidy to Mm^{U,00}, while the Indian House has increased the sum to R168,00

INSTITUTIONS FOR DISABLED PEOPLE

Whites
Govt Subsidised for Africans
Gazankulu
KwaZulu
Qwa Qwa
Lebowa

• The Government's rationale for not providing such institutions for Africans in the common area is that physically disabled Africans should be taken care of in the 'homelands'.



AT O'APFSI

The report proposes that employers should institute services for the early detection of and assistance with social problems such as alcoholism or drug addiction.

Many doubt the practicability of privatisation - how does one charge poor clients fees for some services, which show little tangible benefit?

status than lobbying on policy issues which affect their clients. And academic training departments have emphasised clinical case work rather than mobilisation of communities around welfare issues.

Much is changing, however. The welfare arena, along with health, housing and education, has been identified as part of the 'civic issues' domain of the many community organisations that have sprung up in the 1980s. Social workers in the cities have become more politicised and professional associations are responding increasingly to such issues as children in detention and the detention of social workers themselves.

Now, in 1986, the welfare sector is being told to implement apartheid policy even further via 'differentiation' — this at a time when there has been awareness of the need for unitary, equitable and just

social service provision. At a meeting in Durban during March, about 400 professional workers were united in their opposition to being used as agents for further segregation in welfare.

As regards privatisation, opinions are divided. Some social workers feel that payment for service might promote standards by introducing competition, so long as there is some kind of safety net whereby all who cannot afford to pay **would** still have access to services.

Many, however, doubt the principle and the practicability of privatisation. How does one charge fees for services which show little tangible benefit, in the short term at least? The vast majority of client problems related to poverty. There may well be a case for private practice in some fields - for example marital **counselling** for those who can afford it. But for most

their welfare needs are likely to

itself." Pick up the tab?

Central Responsibility

Private sector involvement in welfare has increased direct grants by the state to non-profit organisations, such as churches, universities, trusts and foundations. Employers have also increased benefits to their own workers in fields of housing, education and social security. In the mid-1980s the first solid foundation of 'corporate social responsibility' in South Africa. During the 1980s this gained impetus through the adoption of employer codes — the Sullivan Code, European Economic Community Code, etc. — as a result of international pressure on companies to promote equality and dismantle apartheid on their own terms. The corporate social responsibility budget is now estimated to be around 10% of turnover (Management April 1985: p25).

What's in it for business? The easily presumed and manifestly stated intentions are to create a stable black middle class; to protect future profit maximisation by training and educating future workers; and to ensure continuing investment in South Africa. This means that the emphasis in private sector spending tends towards secondary and tertiary education (particularly scientific manpower training and housing).

There are certain common principles or guidelines used by enterprises when processing applications for funds from welfare or development projects. Some of these are:

- replicability: can this project be used as a model which can be copied elsewhere?
- sustainability: does it encourage self-help skills transfer such that it could eventually become independent?
- credibility: will it find broad acceptance as a priority need in the community, where it will be located?

These guidelines are sound and would be supported by most in the community in welfare and housing fields.

Problems and Priorities

Problems for welfare are specifically differentiated in the urban and rural areas. In both communities themselves list of needs to be low on their priority list. In a South African study (Ibid: R27) of the perceived lack of communities in three

urban areas, welfare services came a poor fourth (5,2%), following housing (41,2%), education (37,5%) and employment (28,7%). In other words, in terms of the 'credibility' guideline, companies are correct in allocating by far the largest portion of the social responsibility budget to housing, education and manpower training — and not to welfare.

In undeveloped rural areas, on the other hand, the report also sheds no light on the possible meaning of privatisation. Where a rural family finds it hard to pay a R2,00 hospital fee to save a chronically ill child, it is hard to see the poor paying fees for consulting with a social worker (if one were available). Where there is very little independent business or commercial development, it is hard to imagine private sector resources supporting local welfare needs. And foundations and companies know how difficult it is to reach out to rural development projects, there being so few formally constituted organisations to work through.

If government is to persuade the private sector to co-operate with its new policy, it will have to do so on mutual terms. It is quite possible to see joint benefits in privatising some parts of the health services. Health is a saleable commodity which can bring profits, even though a result of privatisation will be improved (or at least as good) services to elites, while not guaranteeing more adequate services for the poor. But it is difficult to see the attraction to the private sector of supporting, for example, the needs of the (unproductive) aged and handicapped.

Foundations and the private sector at large are being asked to promote privatisation — but this is linked to 'differentiation' or the active furtherance of racial segregation. The activities of companies in how they deploy their social responsibility budgets, and how effectively they are adhering to code principles, are being carefully monitored, both nationally and internationally. What is suggested here is that the private sector cannot afford to associate itself with a policy which enshrines apartheid.

This new policy ultimately highlights the enormous distance between its architects, and the sponsors, on-the-ground service providers and recipients. It cannot be attractive or feasible for the private sector; it runs counter to the ethics of the welfare sector. And what will the likely response of the recipients of welfare services be? As a participant at a public meeting put it: 'Who will have the courage to go into black communities and tell them about this policy?' P3&

Private sector involvement in welfare, or 'corporate social responsibility', has gained impetus in the 1980s through the adoption of employer codes

In underdeveloped rural areas, with little commercial development, it is hard to imagine how private sector resources can support local welfare needs

Although benefits exist in privatising some health services, only government can meet the primary needs of the aged and handicapped

The private sector cannot afford to associate itself with a policy linked to 'differentiation' and the active furtherance of racial segregation

* Report on an investigation into the present welfare policy in the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Directorate of Social Planning, March 1985. (Circulated for comment early 1986.)



Pension Pay-outs

Streamlining KwaZulu's System

By Dr Valerie Moller, Senior Research Fellow,
Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal

Homeland pensions are becoming a critical issue as the number of elderly Africans in rural areas soars, growing rural poverty reduces extended family support, and many pensioners are left with almost no alternative sources of income. In many cases, the notorious inefficiency of the pensions pay-out systems transferred to homeland administrations exacerbates the plight of this dependent group.

Recognising this fact, the KwaZulu government appointed a Committee of Inquiry in 1984 to investigate the homeland's pensions pay-out procedures, and to make recommendations for their improvement. In May 1986 the Committee finally presented its report. In this article, the second part of an Indicator SA focus on pension issues, Dr Valerie Moller examines the existing system in KwaZulu, and comments on how far the proposed reforms might go to resolve current inadequacies.

Caption: Fellow pensioners help carry an elderly woman into a pay-out station to collect her bimonthly payment. A shanty shack settlement outside Durban.

Growing levels of rural poverty and the past application of harsh influx controls have effectively shifted the main thrust of the pensions issue from urban to rural areas. The rural African elderly have become increasingly dependent on welfare payments as a source of income. Most often formerly employed in low-paying jobs, rural Africans are unlikely to have been able to save for their old age, or to have had the benefit of private pensions.

At the same time, the migrant labour system has to a large extent broken down traditional family support systems for the African elderly, who can no longer rely on contributions from their children.

Research conducted among contract workers in KwaZulu (Moiier 1985) showed that less than 20% received any substantial support for their children. The recent abolition of the pass law system and the introduction of 'planned urbanisation' is unlikely to result in any immediate and significant demographic changes. In fact, the number of rural pensioners continues to rise rapidly.

Soaring Growth Rate?

The transfer of welfare responsibility from the central government to homeland administrations may

hated the plight of many rural
 'pre KwaZulu, which emerges as
 having relatively good track records (see
 then provides a useful illustration of
 'the pension system.

z KwaZulu government assumed
 the capability for pension payments in
 between 1979/85 the number of
 pensioners registered in KwaZulu
 is the growth rate of the
 resident population. The
 of eligible for old age
 is in KwaZulu is estimated to rise
 some 2.6 percent per annum, and it
 conservatively estimated that by the year
 some 274 000 men and women
 under its administration will be eligible for
 social pensions.

A growth rate of such magnitude is
 sufficient to cause serious problems for
 administration, especially a newly
 established one. Although KwaZulu's
 welfare coverage of the elderly is better
 than that of all the other homelands,
 the Black Sash claims that one in five
 eligible persons in the homeland may
 not be receiving old age pensions.

Furthermore, for many Africans in rural
 and urban areas, the process of applying

for a pension is experienced as an
 ordeal with uncertain rewards. Pensioners
 cannot always be sure of receiving
 regular payments, and for some, the
 difficulties in obtaining their pensions
 are so great that they forego this right
 altogether.

KwaZulu's Pay-out System

The present pensions system in
 KwaZulu is complicated and cumbersome.
 Applications for pensions are made at
 the local pensions office and then
 forwarded to Ulundi. An Induna from
 the local community usually accompanies
 the applicant, who must pay for his
 expenses and services. After a certain
 period applicants then report to any
 paypoint in their district, to see if
 pension vouchers have been made out in
 his/her name. If no satisfaction is gained
 on a number of pay-days, they may inquire
 about the delay at the district pension
 office.

Yet applicants receive no receipt of
 application and thus have no proof that
 their cases are being considered. The
 average waiting time is some six to eight

*Although reforms
 are needed,
 KwaZulu has a
 relatively good
 track record in
 administering
 pension
 payments
 compared with
 other homelands*

*Between 1979-85
 the number of
 pensioners in
 KwaZulu has
 risen at twice the
 growth rate of
 the homeland's
 resident
 population*

Administering Rural Pensions: Amounts Allocated to Social Pensions in Homeland Budgets, 1983/85

Homeland	1983/84		1984/85	
	Amount	%	Amount	%
Bophuthatswana	R35 070 000	4,8%	R40 000 000	4,9%
Ciskei	R20 586 000	5,7%	R23 200 000	5,3%
Gazankulu	R9 944 000	7,6%	R11 361 500	6,8%
aNgwane	R7 180 000	14,7%	R8 426 440	12,4%
KwaNdebele	R3 983 200	10,5%	R4 698 700	8,3%
KwaZulu	R88 699 000	14,7%	R129 220 712	18,9%
Lebowa	R46 374 430	14,4%	R50 838 530	15%
QwaQwa	R7 209 000	11,4%	R8 064 000	8,5%
Transkei	R72 489 000	11,6%	R80 296 000	10%
Venda	R8 934 200	5,6%	not available	-



Libby Ardington

Claim procedures are too complex for many rural pensioners and the application process is arduous.

Some 100 000 elderly Africans who qualified for pensions in KwaZulu were not paid out in 1984 because the administration's welfare funds were exhausted

Pension reforms have aimed to streamline KwaZulu's system, to protect the pensioner and to eliminate opportunities for fraud after scandals were exposed

months, but applicants have been known to wait years before winning approval. Furthermore, pension payments commence only from the date of acceptance and no backpay is made. In recent years the KwaZulu government has been forced to delay processing new applications because pension funds were exhausted. Nicholson (1984) quotes Chief Buthelezi's comment that in 1984, some 100 000 elderly Africans who qualified for pensions in KwaZulu did not receive payment because the administration lacked the necessary funds.

Current Procedures

The pay-out system currently operates as follows:

- Bimonthly payments are made at 982 paypoints in 30 pension districts in KwaZulu. The uncertain schedule of the pay team - only the day, not the time of arrival, is specified - means that pensioners often have to queue for hours and if the team runs out of cash, they have to return at a later date, which causes many of them considerable inconvenience.
- The pay team also works under difficult conditions. The pay counter often has to be improvised and there is little protection from the elements.
- Once the pension is paid, the pay voucher is kept by the pay team and the payee receives no record of payment. In the case of non-payment, the pensioner can expect to collect arrears on a later pay-day.
- Theoretically, payment should be made in the presence of a third person, usually the Induna - who may assist the illiterate and innumerate elderly to count their money - but this does not always happen.
- Pensioners who do not collect their pension on three consecutive pay-days - or whose arrears exceed three times their current pension payment - will automatically have it suspended for six pay periods and will have to apply for reinstatement.
- Pensioners who are incapable of collecting their pensions themselves, may appoint a procurator. To avoid suspension, however, the pensioner must appear in person twice annually for a review.

Problems and Pitfalls

Research into pension issues in KwaZulu (KwaZulu Government, UJ) shows that the single most common concern was the long delay between making an application and receiving first payment. Further major problems arise from delays in the payment of arrears where pensions have been suspended. Nicholson (1984) reports that over 70 percent of pension cases dealt with by the Black Sash advice office in Durban concerned the non-payment of arrears.

Since coming into operation seven years ago, several reforms have been introduced to streamline the KwaZulu pension system, to protect the pensioner and to eliminate opportunities for fraud. Most notably, the sliding scale of the means test has been removed (See IPSA Rural and Regional Monitor Vol 4 No 2), so that all pensioners now receive a full pension. However, an income of over R480 per month disqualifies the applicant from receiving any pension at all.

Paradoxically, certain reforms introduced after the exposure of numerous fraud scandals may have contributed inadvertently to the hardship of KwaZulu pensioners by tightening up the pay-out system and suspending payments. It is clear that the revised system prejudices pensioners who are unable to attend on pay-days. Not only is the pensioner denied immediate access to cash, but he/she is not certain when it will be received, if at all. Furthermore, they run the risk of their pension being suspended altogether.

Also, the transfer of a pension may cause further hardship, as the pensioner will not receive any money until the transfer is processed, and this may take two or three pay periods.

Streamlining Procedures

One of the greatest problems facing pensioners and the support organisations attempting to assist them, is ignorance. Pensioners are often ill-informed as to what their rights are, and the procedures that must be followed in order to obtain such rights. For example, a recent survey undertaken in KwaZulu (KwaZulu Government, 1986) discovered that only two of several pensioners whose pensions had been suspended knew what to do; this had happened, and none knew to go about getting their pensions reinstated.

The lack of receipts for applications* payments cause further problems and misunderstandings. One of the first steps that must be taken to improve the efficiency of the pay-out system - is an educational campaign, directed at

and administrative staff involved processing and payment of

the KwaZulu government set up a committee to investigate the present system of social pensions in the province. The committee reported in May 1984 and proposed many practical ways to streamline the pay-out system. Some of the major recommendations were:

• set paypoints and timetables so that pensioners should be able to collect their pensions from only one paypoint in their area, based on a strict timetable which should be publicised and advertised a year in advance.
• Once a known and limited number of pensioners are reporting to each paypoint, queries and other procedures should be dealt with on the spot. This should also eliminate problems such as long queues, queuing, and pay teams running out of money due to unpredictable demand. The controversial monthly pay-day was retained for practical reasons - a change would require the computerisation of the system - because pensioners preferred it.

• Pensioner voucher receipts issued through proper channels of communication will serve to eliminate opportunities for fraud and enable pensioners to understand more clearly how the system works.

• Computerisation of the system is inappropriate to the stage of development of KwaZulu and its elderly population, which is largely illiterate. Therefore, very few computer measures were recommended by the pensions committee:

• Applicants for pensions or for increases should receive a date-stamped copy of their original form as a receipt, with specific details indicated.
• Every person who joins the pension system must be issued with a voucher, and all vouchers (payment, inquiry, etc.) must be clearly recognisable.
• Vouchers are to be thumbprinted and date-stamped on two portions so that officials and pensioners have a permanent record of all transactions.

Equality with South African Pensioners

A major recommendation made by the committee was the alignment of the KwaZulu pension system with that administered by the Department of Community and Development. Underlying the proposal is the declared principle that all South African pensioners of all races should enjoy similar privileges, including pension parity. This would require further reforms to the KwaZulu system, including:

• requesting for sufficient funds from central



Lobby Ardington

government to ensure that all valid pension applications can be approved without delay

- reviews should be made annually rather than biannually
- pensions should be paid out from the date of application rather than the date of approval
- residence in a border area within Natal should not disqualify an eligible person from collecting a pension at a more convenient paypoint in KwaZulu. However, a refund should then be claimed from central government.

The pension pay teams have uncertain schedules, limited cash amounts and have to improvise pay counters - the pensioners, in long queues, are exposed to the elements.

Conclusion

The existing pensions pay-out system in KwaZulu is both cumbersome and expensive, and has been unable to meet satisfactorily the needs of pensioners and the community. Ardington (1984a) suggests that at a minimally increased expense, rural people could perform a wide range of administrative procedures at paypoints e.g. they could register births and deaths, apply for identity documents, and even basic health services could be provided. The location of paypoints at growth points could also promote development. Even excluding these additional suggestions, the proposals for pensions reform should improve considerably the efficiency of KwaZulu's system, thus releasing the latent development potential which has so far remained untapped. Similarly, in the other homelands, regular and extensive pension payments could provide a significant cash inflow into rural areas, thereby promoting growth in these poor and underdeveloped areas. *UPA*

* Report of the committee of inquiry into the payment of social pensions in KwaZulu, KwaZulu Department of Health and Welfare, 1986.

SOURCES

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In tightening up the pay-out system, there is a danger that ill-informed pensioners will be further penalised through the suspension or transfer of payments

Underlying the new proposals is the universal principle that pensioners of all races should enjoy similar privileges and payment parity


KANGWANE

'Pretoria's Unwanted Stepson'

Mr Enos Mabuza, Chief Minister of KaNgwane, speaks to Indicator SA Researcher, Vicki Cadman

When Enos Mabuza met with the ANC in Lusaka in March 1986, he was the first ruling homeland leader to talk to the nationalist movement since Chief Buthelezi's breakthrough meeting with the exiled leadership in 1979. In an interview conducted before a national state of emergency was declared (covering the self-governing homelands also), Mabuza comments on his talks with the ANC and his own role in internal opposition. He says he intends to use his position as chief minister of KaNgwane as a platform from which to obstruct apartheid policies and oppose homeland-style independence. In this interview, Chief Minister Mabuza discusses a wide range of issues, focusing on the regional implications of the national unrest and on development factors in KaNgwane. Examining the problems facing the homeland's economy, Mabuza concludes that despite some agricultural and industrial development, KaNgwane is locked into a dependent relationship with the core economy, and cannot hope to provide sufficient jobs for its inhabitants.

The following data base, the second in an ongoing Indicator SA series on the homelands, examines demographic, agricultural, employment and other developmental trends in KaNgwane.



[What was the cause of the recent unrest in

The initial unrest arose because children
(Mabuza: ^ wjtj1 ^g way examination scripts
ked They boycotted classes and the
*l'rt' ""ris that education officials promised to look
matter and the trouble subsided. When
in't' hot dead two pupils, we were faced with
BKnerals. So again we tried to speak to
moe . (jers) to persuade them to go back to
I and not to resort to violence. But a lot
ds on what happens in the surrounding areas'.
Su re told the situation is much more serious in
ikulu and Lebowa.

...cA. Until recently, most of the worst violence was
Medio urban centres. It now appears to be
prrn'ling 10 some quite isolated rural areas. To what
In,Id you attribute this?

Mabuza: This is partly the result of increased political
Rareness among the youth all over the country.
The rural youth are fully aware of what is going on
in the urban areas and this influences their actions.
They uphold the ANC - their freedom songs contain
references to the (military) 'stampede' when
marching to freedom. One wonders who teaches
them - when they are taught?

Chiel Minister
Enos Mabuza

The leaders, whoever they are, fear that they might
be promoting the aims and objectives of a banned
organisation. So they must remain faceless, and
politically motivated youth unfortunately cannot
have the advantage of an identifiable leader who will
give them direction. Their aspirations are not
wrong - far from it - but I think their methods are
counter-productive to their objectives.

IPSA: What are the aims of the Inyandza National
Movement (INM), and what role do you see for it?

Mabuza: Our movement is a progressive movement
working for peaceful change, believing in a free,
non-racial and democratic South Africa. We are
prepared to co-operate with other democratic
forces in the country, including the UDF, Azapo and
Inkatha. In a way the INM is also a cultural
movement, with a Women's League and Youth
Congress. The latter has roots outside of our
territory, and is strongly supported in Soweto ...

IPSA: You have frequently stated that your political
ideal would be one man/one vote in a unitary state,
but in meetings with other homeland leaders you
appear to consider a federation.

Mabuza: This will have to be determined at the
conference table. I certainly would not go to
negotiations with a federal formula in my pocket. I
would go there demanding one man/one vote in a
unitary state.

IPSA: But what about the leaders of the other
homelands, especially those who have accepted
'independence'? For example, President Sebe is
unlikely to relinquish the independence of his
territory.

Mabuza: I personally believe in the dismantling of
the entire bantustan edifice because I think its
foundation is faulty and shaky. With all due
respect to the President of Ciskei, I do not think in
his heart of hearts he believes that he is president
of a state, when he still has to be financed by
another independent country.

I do not see the present young generation supporting
the homelands. So we have to start preparing for
the changes now. In my view the homeland leaders
will have to accept as a fait accompli that this
thing will have to go. And then they would have to
bargain for their constituencies, in a sort of free
market political system.

IPSA: What would you see as the ideal economic
model for a future South Africa?

Mabuza: I would support a free market system,
but we must take into account the fact that it has not
been as free as it should be in South Africa. There
are glaring disparities between the 'haves' and the
'have-nots' - between black and white.

There would have to be a transitional period where
the 'have-nots' - who are 'have-nots' because of
government policies, not because of their lack of
ability - would have to be given the chance to
make up for the ground they have lost. This would
occur through the relaxation of existing constraints
on the free market system and the opening up of
opportunities, such as the recent opening of central
business districts in cities. The extension of education
would also play a very important role because
blacks have been subject to a very inequitable
system.



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INDICATOR SA

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IPSA: Would you envisage any government participation in key industries such as mining or banking?

Mabuza: I am a supporter of privatisation, but at the moment it is for whites only. If a situation existed where privatisation would mean equal competition by all population groups, then one would prefer that.

IPSA: What do you see as being your particular role in achieving these changes?

Mabuza: I regard my role as limited. I see my primary role as one of trying to bring together people of opposite views, so that they can talk, and map out the future of the country. I am not thinking of a role beyond the end of the present system others can take over.

IPSA: After returning from your meeting in Lusaka with the ANC on 2 March 1986, a joint ANC/INM statement was released, expressing opposition to the bantustan system. How do you reconcile this statement with your present position as chief minister of KaNgwane?

Mabuza: The homeland system is a reality.; If I were to resign today it would not remove the acts which constitute it, and possibly somebody else might come in and carry it to its logical conclusion. So I regard my role as being that of applying brakes and reversing it as far as I can, no matter how slow the process might be, and using it to bargain for a new South Africa.

One of the problems is that the young people, especially, see us as being in the camp of the oppressor. Instead, it must be seen that even people who are operating within the system can play a role, and that even the ANC are prepared to talk to you.

IPSA: How do you plan to do this? Through public statements, through communicating with the youth?

Mabuza: Yes. One would also have to take time to speak to the chief ministers of the other self-governing homelands to express these views; and urge that we should combine forces and face a common enemy. If you look at the ANC/INM statement, you will realise it condemns the structure of the system, but not the people. We believe that people can still change sides, and work together as one force to change the system.

IPSA: What do you see as the biggest obstacle in the way of change in South Africa?

Mabuza: Apartheid is an obstacle, but black disunity is the most serious obstacle. However, if the government were to change, and say 'come let us negotiate', and 50 black leaders were to participate, there would be a realignment of political groupings and the disunity would be reduced. But as long as the present policies exist, there will be infighting among blacks.

IPSA: Your relationship with the ANC - what do you feel came out of your meeting in Lusaka?

Mabuza: I believe very strongly that the ANC is a key actor, perhaps the most important actor In our communique, the two delegations agreed to work separately and implement their own decisions. In other words we recognised that we (the INM)

are an internal movement which works within the legal terrain prescribed by the country, but that we share a common vision with the ANC.

IPSA: There has been tremendous tension between the ANC and Inkatha. You have had KwaZulu Natal in the middle. How does this affect your role?

Mabuza: I do not intend to intervene in a way which I have never been involved in. I do not want to be part of it. This is a tragedy, as I believe in fostering unity and peace in this country.

IPSA: The State President is forming a National Statutory Council (NSC), comprising representatives of the South African government, the homeland governments and other 'representative' black leaders. What are your views on such a body?

Mabuza: We do not know what its actual statutory powers will be, but we believe it will be a form of preliminary discussion for an actual negotiation forum. If the State President did not realise the need to negotiate, to talk to them about the future of the country, he would not have announced it. But I do not see blacks participating in the absence of leaders who are imprisoned or in exile.

IPSA: Are you going to participate on the NSC?

Mabuza: Yes, provided the government looks seriously at the matter of releasing political prisoners and unbanning political organisations. I do not want to be accused tomorrow in my own constituents of having negotiated behind the backs of others.

IPSA: You once said KaNgwane fell like Pretoria's unwanted stepson. KaNgwane battled to get self-governing status, and in 1982 the homeland was nearly ceded to Swaziland.

Mabuza: It was the intention of Pretoria to have all the homelands become independent, and from the moment I took office, I expressed my opposition to independence. So government had to find ways and means of pressuring us - and we have not yet heard the last word. What they did do is just cut off the supply lines so that die people can turn against me and say 'Look, you've been to Lusaka and now we are without'.

IPSA: Do you think they would do that?

Mabuza: I cannot say they would do that, but they are certainly capable of doing that. The consolidation of our territory is a question and there are question marks as to whether there is any self-governing territory into which has been such massive resettlement. People have been resettled without social amenities, or a basic infrastructure creating a typical situation of social unrest.

IPSA: Resettlement from 'white' South Africa has resulted in the emergence of rural communities particularly in the south-west of KaNgwane. What measures has your government taken to improve conditions for these communities?

Mabuza: We have not been able to do this. This is a problem we cannot solve. We have tried to upgrade agriculture in the



A woman from the rural Fernie community decorates her house. There has been massive resettlement of people from South Africa to this part of KaNgwane.

In terms of economic development, what are the major problems KaNgwane faces, and how do you intend to tackle them?

Mabuza: Our key problem is our large population. We cannot create enough local job opportunities and are forced to continue to rely heavily on migrant and commuter workers. The KaNgwane economy is not viable as a separate entity. But we do plan to create as many job opportunities as possible, and to promote agricultural development - there are many areas with considerable agricultural potential in KaNgwane. We hope to develop agri-related primary industries, and to exploit the anthracite and coal deposits in the territory.

An industrial decentralisation point (IDP) in the homeland has been established at Kabokweni. How has so far created employment for 750 people at a cost of R4 900 per job. The area qualifies for decentralisation incentives, but is situated close to the established White River/Nelspruit IDP. Does this likely attract investors away from Kabokweni?

Mabuza: I do not think so. Many investors have moved to Kabokweni. My concern is the incentives and its possible abuse by unprofitable firms who rely wholly on incentives to make a profit. However, we are carefully monitoring the use of incentives in KaNgwane to prevent such abuse.

IPSA: KaNgwane's National Development Plan suggested land tenure reform to promote small commercial farmers and agribusiness. Do you intend to pursue these proposals?

Mabuza: We would like to promote more of the first, where you have individual commercial farmers, than the second, which tends to be owned by a company and all the benefits go to bureaucrats instead of the people. We have quite a number of successful farmers in our area who are doing pretty well, but we also have smallholdings and agribusiness farming which we would like to see transformed into individual farming enterprises or co-operatives.

IPSA: The consolidation of land into viable commercial plots may push people off the land, leaving them landless and unemployed. How will you tackle this?

Mabuza: With proper planning, alternative employment opportunities can be created for those people. It is good to have one, two or three successful farmers who in their farming ventures will employ people, rather than have 20 subsistence farmers who will barely live off the land. But then in doing so, we should also plan as to how to absorb the others who may be left without subsistence at all. So the whole question would hinge around proper planning. 1983

KaNgwane - Struggling with Resettlement

IPSA Researcher Vicki Cadman



On 31 August 1984 the South African government conferred self-governing status on the KaNgwane homeland. Appointed as Chief Executive Councillor in 1977, Mr Enos Mabuza, president of the Inyanga Movement, became Chief Minister of the homeland. His supporters hold 43 out of the 45 KaNgwane's legislative assembly. Although there have been no elections so far, a tentative date is set for 1988.

POPULATION

Population	1970	1980	
Urban areas	5 313	52 053	
Rural areas	114 781	259 740	126
Total	120 094	311 793	159

Analysis

- The dramatic population increase is the result of resettlement from white South African farms, 'black spots' and urban African townships previously situated on the South African side of the homeland border (urban relocation), as well as betterment planning.
- By mid-1980 Mabuza claimed that 150 000 people had been moved into KaNgwane from white farms and 'black spots'. This figure constituted almost half of the population in the territory at that time.
- The significant increase in urban population between 1970/80 is the result of rural poverty and overcrowding, as well as urban relocation from 'white' South Africa to KaNgwane.
- KaNgwane appears to be something of a 'makeshift' homeland. Although well over half the population are Swazi-speaking, Shangané, Zulu, Ndebele, Northern Sotho and other tribal groups constitute a fairly significant proportion of KaNgwane's inhabitants.

LAND

- KaNgwane currently comprises three separate geographic areas, covering 382 268 ha (see map). Negotiations concerning consolidation proposals are still under way.
- In 1980, the homeland had a population density of 77 people per km². This is lower than the average for the 'self-governing' homelands, which is 98 people per km².
- In 1982, in terms of a bilateral deal between South Africa and Swaziland, KaNgwane and the Ingwavuma area of KwaZulu were to be ceded to Swaziland. This move was bitterly opposed by both homeland administrations and the intended incorporation was dropped after the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry failed to report and was dissolved in 1984.


AGRICULTURE

- About 29 percent of KaNgwane's total area is potentially arable land. In 1984 there were about 11 000 subsistence farmers in the homeland, each using approximately 3 ha of land.
- There are 18 agricultural projects run by KaNgwane government, the KaNgwane Agriculture Company and the KaNgwane Development Corporation. These projects include four community gardens, several large agribusiness schemes, and others aimed at establishing small groups of commercial farmers.

Workers harvest rice at a major rice project in the Mofokeng area. Sixty percent of KaNgwane's arable land is



INDICATORS



Sisal dries at the longa sisal project, a major agri-business scheme managed by the South African firm 'Measured Farming'.

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

Area	Salaries & Wages	Agriculture	Domestic Production	Own Business	Pensions	Contributions received*	Income from boarders & lodgers	Imputed rent	Other
Urban	74,7%		31,1%	6,1%	2,1%	0,5%	6,3%	0,0%	1,4%
Rural	38,5%	9,7%	4,7%	9,3%	4,0%	26,3%	2,5%	3,4%	1,6%
	45,6%	7,8%	4,4%	8,7%	3,6%	22,1%	3,3%	2,8%	1,4%


* Includes migrant remittances

	1978	1982	% increase
Migrants	37 000	67 000	81
Commuters	28 500	44 000	54

» s y s r n e i s population was
 A t t h e S o S r p S q (from Gross National Product) of the homeland, the dependent and the local equivalent figure
 K a E n T e r P P O r t u n i t i e s mean that
 C o n o r , A w a n e w o r k e r s are employed in the
 A h i g h t h e r e c o m m u t e r s - where
 , T h i s e x S a i n s f h i h a n t h e y w o u l d i n t h e
 the relatively high per capita

- Per capita income in the urban areas is almost a third more than that in the rural areas.
- Salaries and wages constitute the major source of household income in all areas. 'Contributions received' which includes migrant remittances, constituted a further 26,3 percent of total rural household income.
- The high dependence of rural households on the former two sources of income, indicates the increasing inability of the agricultural sector to provide a living for rural inhabitants. Agriculture constitutes only 9,7 percent of rural household income.

Winter 1986




Workers at Tonga Sisal. This project has provided much needed employment for 363 Kahl...

REVENUE

Table 4


Contribution of Migrant and Commuter Income to GNP



Analysis

- GDP as a percentage of GNP, has fallen by 5,6 percent from 1978-82. This highlights the homelands' growing dependence on migrant and commuter labour.

Composition of KaNgwane's Total National Revenue



• The above table clearly illustrates KaNgwane's continued economic dependence on direct financial aid from South Africa.

HEALTH

• In 1982 KaNgwane had 308 people per hospital bed. This figure is a little better than the ratio of 337: 1 for Africans in 'white' South Africa, but significantly lower than the 61 people per hospital bed for whites.

EDUCATION

• In 1980, 55,9 percent of the KaNgwane population either had no education, or their level of education was unknown, while a further 34,8 percent had less than std 6. Only 0,5 percent had a matric.



Barbara James

have been cultivated in KaNgwane with the help of Taiwanese experts.

Southern Africa, KaNgwane Development Information, 1986.
 Relations, 1978-84, Johannesburg.
 Forced Removals in South Africa, Vol 5, Cape Town, 1983.

*By Zamakhosi Mpanza, former Researcher;
Development Studies Unit, University of Natal*

Official statistics documenting unemployment and poverty in rural South Africa are notoriously inaccurate and frequently reflect unrealistically low levels. If these are not correctly quantified and identified, it becomes almost impossible for development planners to formulate appropriate strategies to overcome them successfully. In this case study of the Dumisa area, situated south of Durban in KwaZulu, Zamakhosi Mpanza uses expanded concepts and definitions to examine the widespread unemployment and poverty that plague this typical rural community. Her analysis clearly reveals inadequacies of existing terminology and the practical need for their revision.

Caption: The high migration rate of males from rural communities places great pressure on the women and children who remain to seek employment.

Rural poverty and unemployment are critical issues in Southern Africa that constitute a formidable challenge to development strategists. This is not only because these socio-economic problems in themselves are widespread and severe. The very terms and concepts used by analysts to identify and quantify poverty and unemployment are often inadequate, which in turn produces a seriously distorted picture of the real crisis

experienced in many rural

To formulate strategies for efficient labour utilisation and poverty, one must firstly detailed examination of the problems encountered, in southern KwaZulu is in many typical underdeveloped rural Southern Africa. As a case illustrates the pervasive levels of poverty and unemployment

Features

characterised by several typical of similar, underdeveloped communities:

• a preponderance of females

• very low levels of education are a serious obstacle for those seeking formal employment, who can only secure lower income jobs, and are vulnerable to unemployment in times of recession

• large numbers of people (mostly women and children) are dependent on the small number of adults who earn a regular income

• a high rate of migration among members of the community, especially males. The resultant absence of young adults tends to have an adverse effect on rural development, and places greater pressure on the remaining women and children to seek employment.

• households are characterised by a high proportion of proxy heads, in most cases who are largely over 50 years

• land supply is inadequate for the agricultural needs of the resident population. Although most Dumisa households have access to land, it is unevenly distributed, with plot sizes ranging from two to ten acres.

• factors hindering small-scale rural development in Dumisa include the dependence on climatic conditions (the area has been severely affected by the drought), lack of access to basic agricultural equipment like ploughs and harrows, and traditional institutional constraints.

Income and Employment

In Africa's rural areas, the monetisation of the economy has been experienced at household level as a need for cash income. This has resulted in an increase in market-oriented activities which can be divided into several categories. Firstly, there is a migration to wage

employment outside rural areas, including contract migrants. Contract migrants from the Dumisa area tend to send money back to their rural homes fairly regularly. Their remittances are not high but make much difference to the standard of living of the average household.

Also, in real terms, migrants' incomes decline over time because of inflation.

Casual and wage labour opportunities are obtained locally. Casual labour is particularly important to women, who are excluded from the formal labour market. As children, the unskilled and uneducated people without legal permits to



The monetisation of the rural economy has increased market activities.

Libby Ardington

INDICATORS OF POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

A Survey of Dumisa, KwaZulu

• HOUSEHOLD SIZE •

7,76 Persons

• SEX RATIO •

54% Female

46% Male

• DEPENDENCY RATIO •

Each adult receiving a regular income has 4 dependants

• INCOME •

20% Earn a regular income

6% Receive pensions

Average migrant remittance is R37, received monthly

• EMPLOYMENT •

60% of men and 11% of women work as migrants

4% of resident adults are involved in casual labour

14% of adults are unemployed

• AGRICULTURE •

90% of households have access to land

Average size of plot is 1,92 acres

Land is primarily used for cultivation, but after harvest serves as a common area for grazing

Maize and beans are the most popular crops

Mean average harvest is 2,6 bags of maize and 1,25 bags of beans

4% sell part of what they produce

Mean income from sales is R128 per family per season

44,5% of households have no livestock



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The limited local production of commodities such as handcrafts is declining in the face of competition with factory produced goods.

The majority of casual labourers at Dumisa are female, which illustrates the demands made on rural women to bring home wages for the survival of their household

seek employment in urban areas, and women with household and childbearing responsibilities. At Dumisa, however, only four percent of resident adults were involved in casual labour. The majority in this category are female (60,7 percent), which illustrates the latent demands made on rural women for the survival of their households. It seems such labour output is increasingly perceived by many to be of little value, as it provides limited employment opportunities for low wages.

Lastly, there is domestic labour within the household for the production of goods (e.g. handcrafts) for sale on the market, and other activities aimed at income generation such as hut building and trading. Local production of commodities is limited, and declining further as a result of an inability to compete with factory produced goods.

General Trends

The Dumisa case study shows that many more men than women are formally employed. In general, the ability of

rural women to earn an income is severely constrained. They have limited access to land and other identified resources, they often have limited control over their own labour and they are hampered by family/household responsibilities and socio-cultural restrictions. In other words, the family decides where they will work and at which income level.

Nevertheless, in rural areas the wives and daughters of male migrants are becoming increasingly important in providing subsistence for the rest of the family. It is evident that growing rural poverty leads to an increased dependence on formal employment for women, which in turn boosts the number of women seeking such employment.

In the Dumisa area, agriculture provides very little income. It is largely subsistence-based and the land has a very low agricultural potential, which is exacerbated in the lack of modern technological and agricultural inputs (see data base). The rising cost of farming and diminishing returns from subsistence farming means that state pensions, particularly old age pensions, have become an important source of

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i. s'ime time, underemployment -

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no younger community members (in

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replemment is probably largely the

It of the area's apparent declining

tv to provide residents with effective

omic alternatives, in conjunction

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unities.

further afield. Yet another condition mitigating against active job seeking is the fact that people become committed to other tasks they set themselves in the course of unemployment.

At Dumisa, despite the apparent apathy displayed by some people supposedly looking for employment, 68 percent of workseekers declared that they were 'desperate' for employment and would start a job 'immediately' if it were available. Most were also prepared to work anywhere in South Africa. Yet, because of material circumstances preventing them from actually seeking out such 'long-distance' opportunities, these people are not officially counted among the ranks of the unemployed.

Growing rural poverty leads to an increased community acceptance of formal employment for women, in turn boosting the number of women seeking such jobs

-Dynamics of Labour

overruling characteristic of labour in

rural areas can be described as

erty-in-employment', a term which

to those who combine low average

es with a considerable instability

income and employment. The rural

ur force, through its composition

"organisation, defies most tried and

pioven analytical approaches. The most

problematic areas for the analyst are:

- The distinction between 'active' and 'inactive' economic activity

According to the current population survey

(CPS), a person must have worked

least » liouis m market-oriented

viies in the week preceding the survey

be regarded as 'economically active'.

Dumisa, only 12 percent of the total

labour force qualifies as economically

Wive in terms of this definition.

Restricting the definitions of 'economic

activity* conceptually shifts large numbers

potentially productive labour into the

' appropriate categories of 'economically

inactive or idle". Instead, they should at

be viewed as 'structural, additional

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- The concept of unemployment

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"King for prospective work

Narrow Definitions

The effect of narrower definitions of unemployment is to artificially reduce the number of unemployed. These definitions do not take cognisance of the situation as it confronts rural communities and 'real' unemployment levels thus remain far higher than is likely to appear in official statistics. As Moll (1984) points out, without adequate indices, labour statistics are likely to give a distorted picture of the local demand for work and labour resources that are available for development.

To complicate the picture further, there are certain special features of rural labour. Firstly, in rural areas where jobs are scarce and the labour market fragmented, people tend to engage in more than one form of economic activity, and half-day work and piece jobs form an integral part of labour utilisation patterns.

Secondly, there are often large numbers of people in these areas who could be expected to become available for formal employment, and even development schemes, if certain enabling conditions were met, such as the creation of jobs near their homes.

To conclude, the definitions discussed here are dangerously restrictive and seriously distort the analyst's view of unemployment levels and labour trends in South Africa's rural areas. The case study of Dumisa clearly reveals the inadequacies of current official definitions of unemployment and economic activity, and gives some idea of the complexity of the issues facing development strategists. It is clear that until these terms are redefined to facilitate accurate identification of problems, strategies formulated to combat rural poverty and unemployment are unlikely to succeed.05>3Ei

Dumisa's declining capacity to provide alternative sources of income and the lack of new local employment opportunities have led to widespread poverty


The current population survey has narrowed the definitions of unemployment, underestimating the extent of the crisis experienced in rural communities

Unrealistic and restrictive definitions seriously distort the analyst's view of unemployment levels and labour trends in South Africa

SOURCE

Moll T. Planning with South African Labour Statistics: The Politics of Ignorance. M.Soc.Sc. thesis. Development Studies Unit, UNO. 1984.

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URBAN MONITOR



The daily exodus of 2,1 million Africans from distant residential areas to their places of work in 'white' cities costs both commuters and the state, which subsidises bus and rail fares, more than R1,6 million a year.

COMMUTER TRANSPORT

A Dependence on Subsidised Transport: The Influx Control Hangover

^ *Transport Policy After Welgemoed: Taking a New Route*

centralising the Transport Crisis: The Role of RSCs

& EDUCATION

hangover on the Sportsfield

* *Political Football*

95 *AmSA* **STRATEGY**

1 *mise* *of the Dompas: From Influx Control to Orderly Urbanisation*

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A TICKET TO RIDE

THE POLITICS OF (RE)PUBLIC TRANSPORT

•ement and settlement patterns of black people in South Africa have been rigidly
jd by racial group areas and influx control, resettlement and homeland policies,
of living closer to the city with easy and cheap transport access, black workers
e from their residential to work places across the great apartheid divide that has been
Hy created between town and township. Today, both urban residents and homeland
iters are forced to spend a substantial part of their income and a great deal of their
•elling long distances to work in 'white' cities, on transport services that are often
'ed, poorly maintained, unpunctual and crime-ridden,
surprising that many black communities perceive close links between government
d the actions of state-supported transport monopolies, leading to the politicisation of
over fare increases and the quality of commuter services. Since the 1950s, these
issues have been a major site of political conflict, reflected in the many localised
al bus boycotts and in the rallying cry 'Azikhwela' (We will not ride). Over time
t and provision of public transport has become a heavy burden for the government,
•d-pressed exchequer is increasingly unable to afford the many costs involved,
• in providing substantial fare subsidies.

of three commentaries in this Indicator SA focus, transport consultants Bill
and Andries Naude examine the imbalance between distant African settlement in
wnships and the location of most employment opportunities in 'white' urban areas,
nment has to provide an average annual subsidy per African bus passenger of
year in order to maintain extensive commuter networks and make transport costs
to workers. The authors doubt whether the government's new urbanisation
ill enable some of the 2,1 million long distance commuters to actually settle closer
areas and thus reduce subsidy costs.

~>nd article, Naude looks closely at transport policies that might complement the
ift towards 'privatisation' and devolution. The government, he reveals, is now set to
'any of the recommendations of the Welgemoed Inquiry into Transport (1983),
"ured consolidating the monopolistic position of transport companies, increasing
• on black kombi-taxis, and totally phasing out all transport subsidies. Instead, in
ing white paper on transport the government is expected to devolve control over
transport to the regional services councils (RSCs) and deregulate black kombi-
"ns, so as to promote open competition between transport carriers.

>an geographer Jeff McCarthy reviews the preceding transport-based policies. He
devolution of the control and financing of public transport to RSCs will not
traⁿnsport issues, because the RSCs have limited powers and remain bound by
M p^{lcr}o-P^olicy^on African settlement patterns, which lies at the very heart of the
icyCarthy is also sceptical as to whether the deregulation of commuter transport
c^ent to break the power of the private and state transport monopolies.

A DEPENDENCE ON SUBSIDISED TRANSPORT

The Influx Control Hangover

By JWM Cameron and A H Naude



Each day the South African railways transport more than 800 000 African workers to and from their places of work.

* The authors are writing in their personal capacities and their views cannot therefore, be attributed to the National Institute for Transport and Road Research (NITRR) of the CSIR, where they are currently employed.

A significant milestone in the reform process in South Africa has been the recently announced strategy on urbanisation, which will particularly affect settlement and, therefore, urban and regional transport patterns. The anticipated white paper on transport policy is expected to incorporate many aspects of current economic and constitutional policy, especially deregulation, the promotion of competition, and devolution to regional and local levels of government.

However, the effects of past settlement policies which, inter alia, have made commuters increasingly dependent on transport subsidies, are not likely to disappear overnight. The urbanisation strategy has not dealt adequately with this issue, nor is it expected that the forthcoming transport policy will address all its ramifications. With specific data on long distance migrant and commuter movements, and on the transport expenditures resulting from the present imbalance in African settlement and employment patterns, one may highlight the possible rate and directions of future urbanisation. Also, the magnitude of the transport subsidy problems that are likely to remain for the foreseeable future then become clearly evident.

African Settlement Imbalances

For various reasons it is difficult to establish a generally agreed upon rate of urbanisation for the African population¹¹

Data Base

of South Africa. Estimates vary from a low of 39 percent to a high of 57 percent, depending on where the line between urban and rural settlement is drawn. African settlement and urbanisation patterns can be more constructively analysed if divided into seven regions (see table 1), which highlights:

- interregional differences in settlement types
- population densities and development prospects
- interregional labour circulation and likely future migration flows.

There are about 8 million Africans living in the homelands, in settlements which are distant from centres of employment, while a further 3 million Africans live in closer settlements or commuting areas adjacent to 'white' border areas. The settlement patterns shown in table 1 reveal a serious imbalance in the distribution of the African population vis-a-vis employment opportunities. The most obvious manifestations of this imbalance are the pattern of labour migration that occurs, the concentration of jobs in 'white' areas, the relative absence of employment in the homelands, and extensive rural over-population.

A further result of settlement imbalances is that about 1,6 million interregional oscillatory migrant labour movements occur (see table 2). The contract migrants - 1 000 000 from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique; and 600 000 homeland commuters - together comprise a significant proportion of the economically active population in South Africa. With high unemployment in the homelands, however, South African migrants are increasingly reluctant to take leave for long periods and risk losing their jobs. The traditional revolving labour force on the mines is thus increasingly becoming stabilised. This is also a consequence of higher levels of mechanisation in industry and the attendant need for a settled, skilled and trained labour force.

Following restrictions hitherto imposed by influx controls, the stabilisation of migrants as a temporary urban residential group has not been accompanied by the urbanisation of their dependants. Most of these migrants still stay in single-sex accommodation and thus a pattern of fragmented family life prevails, with its associated human and social costs.

It remains to be seen whether the recent abolition of influx controls will result in the families of migrants choosing to move to urban areas, particularly in view of the deteriorating security situation in many African townships in 'white' areas. If this is to be the case, then there will be an immediate need for more than a million housing units.

SPATIAL APARTHEID & BLACK COMMUTERS

African Settlement & Migration Patterns

Table 1

Resident African Population in Seven Regions of South Africa





Table 2

Destination of Migrants in 'White' South Africa



NOTES

- The analysis areas are:
- Witwatersrand-Vaal Employment Area: Includes Johannesburg East Rand and the Vaal Triangle.
 - Highveld Mining Region: Includes mining areas of Northern Orange Free State (OFS) and gold and coal fields in Western and Eastern Transvaal.
 - Southern OFS and Cape Province: Includes remainder of the OFS and Cape Province.
 - Border Employment Areas: Encompasses 'white' areas in Northern Transvaal, including Pretoria, Pietersburg and other towns and corridors between the homelands, and 'white' areas in Eastern Cape and Natal including East London and Durban.

SOURCE

Naudé A. *Die Ontwikkelingsproblematiek rondom Plaas- en Mynwerkers op die Hoëveld*. M.Com Thesis. UNISA 1985.

The Great Trek to Work

Costs & Distances of African Commuter Transport




Table 3
Daily One-Way Trips per Mode and Distance (1982)





Table 4
Total Annual Costs of African Commuting (1982) by Distance Category



Notes
The distance categories are:
• Short: an average of 10 km, less than 15 km.
• Medium: an average of 23 km, ranging between 16 km and 30 km.
• Long: an average of 53 km, covers between 30 km to 120 km.

Unaffordable commuter

The urban passenger transport mt.B associated with South Africa's sk., ?S system of settlement and developS h been quantified by the M'l rfj K , "avc 1984) and are preIntecl ' data reveals that past settlement iJ transport policies have been encourTM disturbing trend towards medium mI long distance daily commuting for 2 1 million African workers. Thi's^in turn has led to an increased dependence umn,, transport subsidies in order to make transport affordable for the commuters These trends arc alamiinn because the national cost of the transport subsidy is simultaneously unaffordable for government, even in the medium term.

Overall costs

For 1982, the total annual cost of the home-to-work movement pattern of the 2,1 million African commuters in South Africa was estimated at R1 600 million (Naude 1984). Table 3 shows the number of commuters per day, which may be compared with table 4 depicting the total costs per annum by mode of travel and by distance. The vast majority of total commuter transport costs arc attributable to medium and long distance travellers (71 percent), which are about evenly distributed between rail and bus transport. The total costs can be broken down into:

- direct transport costs of 51 percent
- time costs, conservatively estimated at 34 percent, and
- accident, crime, crowding, road space and congestion costs of 15 percent.

These costs are considerable. The total transport cost per commuter was about R700 per annum in 1984. It is hoped that the recent abolition of influx controls and the 'spatial' reforms (urban ntilling, higher urban population densities, etc.) announced by government will reverse uw trend towards longer distance commuting and higher travel costs. This seems unlikely in the near future, however, particularly if the independent homelands are excluded and where^urn-status is dependent upon 'obtaining-' accommodation/site approved by a government authority (White i ap^ . ^ Urbanisation 1985: Section 5.3.1—J approved group area.

Subsidy costs

Transport subsidies, which h.a|Vn caused by necessary to ameliorate harusmi the high cost of long distance commuting, are plainly ' j, -v long run. Between S creak " passenger subsidies tor Atnta" ^ by 13 percent per annum, subsidies for commuters of an #

The average annual subsidy per bus commuter is a staggering 1.5 percent per annum. The variations in urban bus fares are highlighted in table 6. This indicates that cities with higher population density such as Port Elizabeth and Cape Town incur much lower transport costs than Durban and Bloemfontein, where a majority of the African population lives in dispersed satellite towns.

For many African communities, the evidence exists of the human costs associated with commuting daily to work over long distances. In surveys of African commuters in Durban and Port Elizabeth, the main problem areas listed were overcrowding, frequency, costs, total travel time, punctuality for work and crime (Mortimer 1986: p5). In all cases, the level of commuter dissatisfaction with journeys increased with distance.

The variation in travel times and the long distances travelled by many workers are also a problem. In north-eastern Bophuthatswana, the average travel time to work in a township of 100 Pretoria commuters was 75 minutes, which is longer than the average time they spent sleeping!


The white paper on urbanisation instructs the Department of Transport to 'investigate methods of reducing travel times, shortening bus routes, improving the co-ordination of transport modes', etc. (Fourie and Morris 1985). However, a limited transport sector response is not likely to address effectively the problem unless it is linked to more extensive urban influx and other overarching reforms.

For instance, one of the envisaged functions of the new RSCs will be to finance commuter transport out of regional services levies. Yet subsidy costs are considerable and devolution will not resolve the problem as some regions do not have the financial resources to respond to the ideals of 'the user pays', self-help and 'own affairs' community development. At the same time, the 'principle of consumers paying for services', another key recommendation in the white paper (ibid: Section 4.4.3.13), is also impractical unless the costs of commuting can be significantly reduced for the commuter. Because of the low incomes of most Africans in South Africa, it is simply not possible to apply 'the consumer pays' principle to public transport. In short, the effects of the escalating costs of current policies and settlement patterns will not disappear overnight.

The alarming trend towards long distance commuting has meant that African workers depend on transport subsidies to cover uneconomic fares

Although the removal of pass laws allows Africans easier access to cities, transport costs might not decrease as other restrictive laws still regulate settlement

Kombi-taxis are becoming a popular and reliable form of transport for African commuters.




The Subsidy Shuttle

The Effect of Urbanisation on Transport Costs

Table 5

Breakdown of Passenger & Economic Fare (1985)



SOURCE
 Department of Transport. "Transport Information". Vol.2. April 1986

Table 6

Breakdown of Bus Subsidy Costs in Major Centres (1983)

Metropolitan area	Total subsidy	Average ticket distance	Annual subsidy per commuter
Pretoria	R35,8m	45km	R440
Bloemfontein	R 6,9m	55km	R315
Durban	R24,6m	20km	R200
Cape Town	R 2,3m	15km	R160
Witwatersrand	R32,1m	20km	R150
Port Elizabeth	R 2,9m	15km	R 60
<i>National</i>	<i>R183,3m</i>	<i>26km</i>	<i>R240</i>

Urbanisation Policy Scenarios

Government appears to have » the system of strictly regulated settlement in larger urban to be replaced b? a m o r e W ^ urbanisation strategy' For the however, there can be little effeS "1' change regarding African migration , L urban areas as long as: »

- the Group Areas Act is retained
- land available for African settlement in or near the major urban areas rem! scarce; and
- urban status rests upon the Occupation of an approved accommodation/site

The strategy might amount to a statement of good intentions, but with no time frame provided, there will continue to be , damming-up of people in the homelands which in turn increases the disequilibrium between people and resources.

A notable key element of government policy appears to be a greater reliance on free market mechanisms for guiding settlement patterns. There is also a trend towards the deregulation of urban settlement and public transport policy (see following article). The key questions which remain are, where will future urbanisation take place and, who is likely to urbanise? The following section depicts four alternative scenarios that might result from the relaxation of influx controls.

1 Minimal change

Although influx control is removed, the low supply rate of approved accommodation sites restricts the increase in the urban population (resulting from rural migration) to only 2 million, between 1980 and 2000. This is in addition to the natural population increase of urban Africans, estimated at 4,5 million over the same period (President's Council Report No 1985: p49).

As indicated in the white paper on urbanisation, the government wjk«j»« to place emphasis on sate h e ho ^ and deconcentrated industrial deveio. The implication for commut.e.r transp is a continued high level of transpo' subsidy, imposing a severedrain t RSC levies and requiring incasca government support, particularly border commuting areas.

2 Permanent settlement o f j «

This scenario envisages ' ^ X m - ^ used to channel growth to n in urban centres, with t h e . permanently settling theoscu re?10 migrants in the H i g ^ f TM ! ^ ' » and other **under**-urbanised | s,11f The result would be an u r w

growth of between 2,5 to 3 million people, apart from the natural increase (see above). There would then be a relative reduction of average commuting distances and passenger transport costs.

3 Positive urbanisation

The supply rate of serviced land would be stepped up to provide places for the estimated 3,5 to 4 million migrants and their offspring who would be added to the urban population before the year 2000. This strategy would accept and selectively promote the informal sector, relying upon property ownership and market prices as mechanisms for guiding settlement.

In this scenario average travel costs will decrease in some urban areas, through the location of more accessible settlement areas for newly urbanised Africans. In other areas, transport costs will escalate as a result of increasing city sizes and congestion levels. However, commuting patterns will also be dependent upon patterns of urban employment - e.g. if the informal sector is predominant, commuting costs are unlikely to increase.

4 Laissez-faire

The abolition of all controls on migration to the cities is unlikely if the white paper is taken at face value. Nevertheless, without adequate enforcement of 'orderly urbanisation' controls, a situation approximating laissez-faire settlement will eventuate. In such a scenario the 1980 African urban population could be swelled with between 4,5 and 7 million migrants and their offspring - apart from the predicted 4,5 million natural population increase of those who were already urbanised in 1980. The geographical focus will then be on existing metropolitan areas, particularly the PWV area.

The public transport implications would be that both distances and costs would increase, coupled with the need for considerable expenditure on transport infrastructure for corridors linking African residential areas with employment centres.

Conclusion

From the four alternatives it is clear that apart from the last two scenarios, most of the growth in urban African settlements will in future stem from a natural increase of the already urbanised African population. This could even be true in the case of the latter scenarios, because many surveys (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1985: p340) have indicated that as many as three quarters of oscillating migrants would prefer not to settle permanently with their families in the areas where they work at present.

Obviously, there is an urgent need for a



Between 1981 and 1984, state subsidies for each bus commuter rose to R285 - a staggering increase of 25 percent per annum.

revision of current land use and public transport strategies because of the inefficient spatial structures and high transport costs of large urban areas such as Pretoria and Bloemfontein. There is also a need to change current settlement trends in other areas such as Durban and Cape Town, which threaten to destroy the relatively efficient spatial structures found there and thus overtax transport networks.

Even with the recently announced reform initiatives, it is likely that a subsidy policy will have to be retained in order to ameliorate the hardships caused by long distance travel and associated apartheid policies. At the central level, the National Transport Commission and the Department of Transport need to identify a subsidy policy and formula which will be both sensitive to the needs of those affected by apartheid structures, while also linked to the envisaged spatial development reforms. *IPDA*

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The further development of satellite townships that necessitate transport networks will drain both RSC levies and central government revenues

If Africans were allowed to settle in urban areas closer to their work places, the subsidy and hidden costs of commuting would be dramatically reduced

Transport Policy After Welgemoed

By Andries Naude

The past eighteen months have seen intense debate on the necessity for reform of existing government policy on financing and regulating black passenger transport. Since the findings of the earlier Welgemoed Commission (1981/3) there have been a number of significant changes in outlook, which have been largely influenced by the National Transport Policy Study (NTPS).

The NTPS: Departure from Welgemoed

Commissioned in 1982 by the National Transport Commission (NTC), the NTPS consists of a consortium of transport engineers and legal and economic consultants, operating under a steering committee. In 1984 an NTPS advisory committee on passenger transport policy was formed, with representatives from the bus industry, the kombi-taxi association, South African Transport Services, organised commerce and industry, the NITRR and the Department of Transport. This committee became a forum for intense debate, albeit conducted largely behind closed doors. As a basic point of departure, the NTPS accepted the need:

- for a market-oriented transport system with more effective competition
- to devolve decision-making and financial responsibilities, where possible, to regional and local levels of government.

The basic approach of the NTPS thus differs substantially from that of the Welgemoed Commission, which favoured:

- quasi-monopolistic rights for bus companies
- phasing out kombi-taxis carrying more than four passengers
- tightened regulations and stricter action against unauthorised taxis
- re-routing rail and bus services to avoid parallel running routes.

The NTPS has adopted a cautious approach to subsidising bus transportation - an issue that may have to be resolved at local/regional level. The Welgemoed Commission had to endure scepticism and criticism because it recommended that in the long term:

- bus subsidisation should be phased out
- employers should pay enough to enable employees to bear their own transport costs
- each passenger should be responsible for payment of a full economic fare.

Interim Proposals

At the annual transportation convention in August • NTPS representatives presented the following basic proposals:

- devolution of regulatory decision making and responsibility for transport subsidies to regional services councils (RSCs), excluding 'technical regulations' (vehicle and driver fitness, etc.), which should be handled at national level;
- 'on-the-road' competition (on the same route) to be allowed only between kombi-taxis (vehicles with a seating capacity of fewer than 16 persons), and buses;
- 'minimum necessary' passenger, rural and bus services to be identified by RSCs. Franchises or contracts to run such services on a fee-for-service basis negotiated with SATS and private bus companies. Bus contracts to be allocated preferably through a competitive tendering process, for exclusive rights of operation on specified sets of routes;
- RSCs to set restrictions on number of kombi-taxis allowed in a given area, determined by availability of approved parking facilities and congestion levels, on routes where buses enjoy preference;
- disputes to be resolved by an independent transport tribunal.

Forthcoming White Paper

A white paper stating the government's views on the NTPS and the Welgemoed Commission proposals is expected to be tabled in parliament soon. Although specific details were made public during this year's transport budget debate, the Minister of Transport, H W Schoeman, did confirm that policy changes at devolving public transport matters to RSCs. In addition, local road transportation has been asked to treat applications for 16-seater taxi permits with greater leniency. However, giving effect to these proposals is not expected in 1987, and new policies will be phased in over three year period between 1988/91

Implications for the Bus Industry

Of late, the bus industry has been hard hit by number of factors: the recession and its associated passenger numbers since 1982 (see foreign exchange losses on future orders with over-expansion




Many black commuters prefer to use kombi-taxis as they are more frequent, quicker, not so crowded and operate off mainstream bus routes also

Increased kombi-taxi competition, reducing the market share of conventional buses

- transport boycotts and general unrest - losses from stranded and burnt-out buses, and forced withdrawals or reduction of services.

INDEX OF BLACK PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED BY PRIVATE BUS COMPANIES, 10/9/85



- since the 16-seater kombi-taxi is a more efficient vehicle than the 10-seater, the real costs of kombi-taxi travel could decrease over time
- the service-level qualities that currently attract commuters to the 10-seater kombi-taxi would remain almost undiminished, i.e. generally higher frequencies, higher speeds, better penetration of inner-city areas and less crowding than buses.

The shift to kombi-taxis is likely to be relatively more pronounced over shorter distances because the kombi-taxi is not subsidised, whereas buses travelling for further than 25 km are generally subsidised to between 50 and 75 percent. In other words, a significant proportion of the black public transport market is captive to subsidised modes such as rail and bus transport. Even with complete deregulation of kombi-taxis, the present bus industry and SATS can rest assured of continued commuter usage of their services for the next three to five years.

The Politics of Public Transport

Viewed from a more holistic perspective, black communities are justified in expressing genuine grievances about travel costs and in desiring compensation for discriminatory racial zoning, which often means that they must travel long distances to work. Bus companies that provide public transport to black people are seen to be highly visible beneficiaries of restrictive racial regulations. It will simply not be acceptable, either politically or to black commuters, to continue protecting the quasi-monopolistic rights of the present (largely white-owned) bus industry; or to maintain the present subsidy system.

Further conflict will result if present operators in the low-income and longer distance public transport markets are entrenched through continued subsidy over three to five years, while restrictions on rival (especially black-owned) bus operators who offer alternative services remain. Also, at the same time, if subsidies were to be reduced, considerable user dissatisfaction as well as wider socio-political problems could emerge.

It is not publicly known and nor has it been indicated here what the latest NTPS proposals on public transport policy contain, or how the white paper will respond to these and the Welgemoed Commission's recommendations. It can only be hoped that the fears expressed here about the lengthy phasing-in period of new policies and the phasing-out of passenger transport subsidies will prove to be unfounded. Q3A

Efficiency in implementation should mean that the exclusive route-permit and bus subsidy system will continue in some form for another three to four years, which would be good news for the bus industry - a winning time to recoup present losses and expand fleet would place it in a strong position in a competitive tendering system of competition.

JJN Commuter Expectations

Research on commuter attitudes and bus boycotts reveal that commuters

standard of seat availability and fares

alternative transport modes and/or

dissatisfaction expressed by commuters if greater numbers used

market entry from the consumer's perspective, the following:

Decentralising the Transport Crisis /

THE ROLE OF RSCs

By Dr Jeff McCarthy,
Department of Geography, University of Natal

Perhaps regional services councils (RSCs) are partly intended to extricate the state from the budgetary and political dilemma of public transport

Since bus subsidies cost the government more than R500 million a year, it is not surprising that it seeks ways to rid itself of this burden

The 1980s have seen a rise in the politicisation of bus commuter transportation on a scale that makes the bus boycotts of the 1950s appear a modest contribution to South Africa's urban and regional politics. In the current pattern of unrest, bus boycotts, together with rent boycotts, have been a fundamental tactic of worker politics outside the factories, just as education boycotts have been crucial for the township youth.

For the state, commuter transport has been identified as an economic and political liability that has not been easy to offload, though it now appears to be settling upon a strategy to at last accomplish this. The Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry into Bus Passenger Transportation (1983), emphasised the geometric rise in government subsidy to bus companies on the one hand, and the increasing politicisation of transport issues on the other. It argued for the privatisation of bus transport and proposed the placing of restrictions upon 'unfair' competition from kombi-taxi operators, as key components of future transportation policy.

After Welgemoed

Since the Welgemoed reports, bus boycott have intensified with significant political repercussions in areas such as East London/Ciskei, Empangeni/KwaZulu and Pretoria/Bophuthatswana. Invariably, the trigger factors in these boycotts were fare increases imposed upon black commuters who were forced, largely by the peculiarities of South Africa's Verwoerdian political geography (ine group areas and homeland system), to commute long distances from peripheralised locations and homeian residential areas to work centres in 'white' cities (see Cameron and Nau tables 1 & 2). Indeed a familiar configuration of long distance commuter transport patterns has developed since the 1980s involving escalating bus fares and, to a lesser extent, kombi-taxi fares. It has become clear that the new regional services councils (RSCs) were intended to assist government itself from the jaws of mere transport politicisation and rising demands. The state now subsidises bus companies to the tune of R140 million annually. In the context of a tor

demands for central government
 neency, it is perhaps not
 that it should have sought ways
 "I" transport subsidies as a
 J n. budgetary item.
 ' ,,,nst to the Welgemoed
 sion, therefore, the current
 ,, nf government policy influence
 "That not only should the
 Ifcation of bus services be
 leed, but that unsubsidised kombi-
 and small scale 'midi-bus' services
 ;j also be supported. Moreover, it is
 | L e d that the forthcoming RSCs
 !j oversee route regulation and attend
 ding policies.

^Influences

paper presented at the Annual
 M Sport Convention last year is typical of
 kind of reform thinking on transport
 that is now gaining influence with
 emment (Vermeulen et al 1985).
 it was argued that 'A basic point of
 jiture (is) the need for a more
 ikt orientated transport system with
 -reeffective competition Quality
 jirements such as vehicle standards,
 -er licensing and safety of operations

will be administered on a national basis,
 while economic regulation and other
 service requirements will be administered
 at a local, metropolitan or regional
 level. It is important to notice that the
 focus here will fall on the proposed
 regional services councils their areas
 will need a minimum public transport
 system and they will have to be prepared
 to pay for this service if it cannot cover
 its own cost through fares.'

This type of thinking, which is in line
 with what the Minister of Transport said in
 his budget debate (1985), could cause
 alarm among local chambers of commerce
 and industry, who are already concerned
 with the new payroll and turnover taxes
 associated with the implementation of

Once RSCs take control of public transport, they will have to foot the subsidy bill with revenues raised from payroll, turnover taxes and other sources

More importantly, perhaps, proposals
 such as these should be a source of worry
 to those who aspire to holding office
 within RSCs. The escalating cost of rents
 and transport, after all, have been
 central to the politics of popular resistance
 in South Africa, and the RSCs are to be



New government transport policy may allow individual kombi-taxi operators to compete with the large bus companies on the same commuter routes.

Government intentions to privatise public transport will not necessarily increase the economic efficiency of services or reduce fare costs

It is unlikely that RSC control of public transport will make commuter issues less politically sensitive for African communities

As laws affecting African settlement patterns and urban land use are still determined by government, how can RSCs resolve related transport problems?

At the root of South Africa's transport crisis are the poverty of African workers and the restrictions imposed on their residential and mobility rights

demonstrably related to the political process of determining price structures for housing and transport. Are these new local authorities now being set up as decentralised targets for popular grievances?

Free Market Solutions

It could be argued that to the extent that RSC authority over transport coincides with privatisation initiatives, the goal of depoliticising commuter transport may be achieved through a highly decentralised and competitive system of transport price determination. In addition, it is often alleged that privatisation is an initiative aimed at enhanced efficiency, which should therefore decrease fares. Often, however, the effect, if not the purpose of privatisation, is to cause regressive shifts in wealth distribution and it has little impact upon economic efficiency per se.

Township rents in South Africa, for example, have been rising partly because government believes it is important to create incentives for people to participate in its 'grand housing sale' (Mabin and Parnell 1983). This laissez-faire effort has flopped largely because of the emergence of new bureaucracies associated with the sale process, and the inability of most South Africans to accumulate sufficient capital reserves on their meagre incomes to meet the transaction costs of ownership. In those Durban townships administered by the Port Natal Administration Board, for example, only two percent of the state-owned housing stock had actually been sold by late 1985, despite all the publicity.

Rhetoric about laissez-faire development is often far removed from reality when situated within a particular national political context. There is little evidence to suggest too that regional bureaucracies, as opposed to national ones, are less prone to encourage cartelisation and barriers to free trade. After all, the RSCs will inherit the local public transportation status quo which is often supported by powerful lobbying influences. Will they be able to resist their appeals?

Of course, much of the problem of transport costs in South Africa derives from the great separation between the residential and work places of Africans in particular. Hence, another important problem is that whereas influx control is now to be relaxed, the process of settlement control and the management of journey-to-work relationships will only partly be within the ambit of RSC control. Land-use zoning controls and building code restrictions will continue to allow individual municipalities to include or exclude whatever types of development suit their purposes, whatever RSC opinion may be.

planning framework of n,li '8, areas. The RSC s, thj, fh_r ' 1 be able onh to int l S c t K ' 1 ^ pattern of settlement, l a n ? J development at the margins TV?

ultimately from the oleral"patw urban and regional land use the could become the 'sucker" HP,If 15 gôvernment that is expected to consequences of crises created maintained by tlv d^i, , , ,) (^ ^

Appropriate Policies

What kind of iirhank.uon piIHx-Ss urban transport policy, then act appropriate to the circumstances South Africa? The legacy of plar irrationalities created in the era of"6 Verwoerdian apartheid, together with the general difficulties posed by rapid world-type urbanisation, means that there can be no quick and easy • 1 1 transportation solutions. Furthermore, shallow attempts to proselytise 'free markets' and 'decentralisation' by an authoritarian state will s:mp\ not dn as basic framework within which to resolve the transport crisis.

At the root of the tr.i'ispoit **am'**- is poverty of South African **workers** barrage oi restrictions at local, and national levels on people's **freedoms** residence and mobility. **If the b** of workers' housing and **job cen** experienced much exp,iiuled **lieedoms** locational choice, and **! an i_-onomic** policy was developer :kil emphasised growth throuuh incoru. udismbutiuii job creation."there could be **an efficient** State transport s\sk-m. It would **not require** subsidisation, nor pose a significant everyday crisis for workers. Subsidy-dependent transport **monopolies** such as **PI** TCO which transport **workers** from far-flung shacks in homelands to jobs (where They arc available) **in** centralised pockets of increasingly capital-intensive urban industries,**areiiim**. scene out ol Orwell's -1984'. **The** majority ol South Africans appear to **wc** understand that the new 'free marKei talk is often but a facade **for featherings** few new middle class entrepreneurial nests, with no real spinolfs **for the m j** . (Van der Ross and Thomas I n -

To conclude, much jhifges -- when the RSCs and associated **P'** " rscs initiatives are brought in'o eiieu- seem certain to provoke mass ippoafiMj but if the balance of political yce* ^Sfli jrtheless be **remains such that they can** " forced into operation, a_nuul ^e iikel)10 important local political issues **are** emerge, on the agenda. I our exd g



R.R.R.

"THE LOGICAL GYMNASTICS ARE VERY TESTING — INSTEAD OF A FARE INCREASE YOU'RE NOW EXPECTED TO AGREE TO PAY THEM 1/2 TIME FOR THE 4 HOURS A DAY THEY SPEND SITTING ON THE BUSES."

...the possible questions of the
 ...are the possibilities that the
 ...small (usually black) transport
 ...ers will become separated from
 ...opposition politics, especially in
 ...over transport fares? Will some
 ...administrators be able to co-opt these
 ...entrepreneurs into a position of
 ...ion and privilege from which they
 ...ell previously excluded?
 ...will local chambers of commerce
 ...industry deal with the fact that
 ...is now a transparent, direct
 ...ship between the new taxes their
 ...es must pay, and the bus fares that
 ...es must pay? Given that transport
 ...ave risen more rapidly than wages,
 ...will trade unions react?
 ...local business groups' perceptions
 ...new and direct implication in
 ...ts of inefficient urban land use and
 ...ment lead them to pressure
 ...y for further policy reforms, but
 ...matters such as Group Areas
 ...strictive land use controls? Will they
 ...ed in this by organised labour?
 ...if at all, will the South African

Transport Services' (SATS) rail and bus routes be integrated into the new proclaimed pattern of privatisation and decentralisation of mass transit operations? Perhaps government is at last ready to sacrifice this once sacred cow of economic inefficiency and white working class privilege.
 It is possible, of course, that these specific issues will not emerge if the RSCs themselves are abandoned or substantially modified in the future. It would nevertheless seem fair to say that until black poverty and the massive geographical separation of workplace and residence are redressed, public transport will remain high on the list of South Africa's many politicised issues of urban and regional planning. JPA

Both employers and unions are put under pressure given the fact that transport cost are rising more rapidly than wages

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THE TWO SIDES OF POLITICS IN SPORT

With the furore over South African participation in international sport still making front-page news sustained by the Commonwealth Games controversy the underlying facts and socio-political linkages are often obscured Indicator SA initiated an in-depth debate in the last edition of the Urban Monitor (13/No4), by publishing a foreign sportsman's account of racial inequalities in South African sport. Drawing on his own experiences here, Douglas Booth criticised moves towards multiracial sport as token and limited, especially as they occur in isolation from a still segregated society. In response, the government's Bureau for Information submitted two critiques from the (central) Department of National Education and the (African) Department of Education and Training, respectively. These are reproduced here, with brief introductory comment from the Bureau on reforming sport and society. Both departments dispute Mr Booth's comparative statistics on government sport expenditure per white and African schoolchild, and cite progress in administrative and legislative reform, as well as multiracial school sports events. In a rejoinder Mr Booth defends his earlier analysis, using the updated figures provided by the education departments

CHANGE ON THE SPORTSFIELD

Submitted by the Bureau for Information

The statistics quoted by Mr Booth in his article, 'Sport and Society', relate to 1982/83. In these times of rapid change, these statistics are already totally out of date. Using data which is three to four years old, specifically ignores just those radical changes that have taken place on the sports fields of South Africa.

Nobody can or will deny that change is needed, nor that change is taking place — maybe not as rapidly as some would

hope, but there are certain constraints caused by the present economic and socio-political structures. There is a disparity in numbers and differences in birth rates which cause different age weighting between the various population groups. There is a particular skewing towards blacks of school-going age. The differences in expenditure in sport can and will be eliminated, but this is time-dependent on the amount of taxation that the taxpayer can carry.

.Comment

Department of National
•cation(DNE)
HAdvancement

, cnuth African Sport and the
• Lent have always admitted that
rl are still many disparities that have to
'li right. The fact that numerous
Knees have been corrected and that
has been a leader in the attempts
ring about equal opportunities for all
Liation groups in South Africa was
5ygnored in Mr Booth s article. Sport
Lbeefl responsible for breakthroughs
•j number of fields. For example, since
"i the 'Rapport' cycle tour has had a
nt influence on the opening of hotels for
Evarious population groups.

Every country in the world tries to
«prove its image through sport, and covets
:mpic medals. However, if South Africa
braves its sports standards, it is seen
government propaganda. Many countries
penly control the movements of their
rtspersons. Very few countries can boast
M m control by their governments
sis the case in this country. In South
'nea, sport is totally autonomous and
anises affairs in its own fashion.

Unwarranted Selectivity

iptersrus and Middelburg, both situated
me most conservative part of South
jr.³ were used as the norm by Mr
F®. The hundreds of town councils
to encourage mixed golf were not
; ned. The facts are that the SA
n8 Union immediately applied strict
;;» we measures against Middelburg,
ne tape Provincial Administration has
Regulations whereby legal
^ainings could be instituted against any
..juncil which unreasonably barred
Pede i public sport>ng facilities.
^velopments and the existence of
W, II open sports clubs have been
r^fully ignored.

of sport which
sated ami sport,ng structures have
£ plem s e o file co b d ool au rr (sic), has
K^dent h has caused an
lies n, 3nd unex pected shortage of
i" illv sonHi 0 a nu mber of other high
r d s such as housing,
? and health services, these
the government^ eliminated overni g ht

r^rtmem of Education
V<'4A/o) Winter 1986

Training, however, has already spent
approximately R60 million over the past
five years in an attempt to shrink this
backlog. Yet the author conveniently did
not mention this figure — on the other
hand he mentions only the approximately
R250 000 spent on upgrading mixed
sporting facilities in the 'platteland' (rural
interior).

Legislating Mixed Sport

Certain legislation has been amended to
provide for mixed sport. The Group Areas
Act was amended in 1982 to allow
persons of colour (sic) to enter white areas
to participate in sport. The Black Urban
Areas Consolidation Act was amended in
1983 so that whites may now enter any
black area for the purpose of sport.
Furthermore, the amendment to the
Liquor Act in 1981 implies that blacks may
join any sports club as full members. In
short, no direct legislation currently exists
which could possibly inhibit any sport.

Mr Booth's statement that the majority of
blacks do not get the opportunity to
meet whites on the sports fields is also
misleading. Only some ten percent of the
total South African population actively
takes part in sport, anyhow. The article
further misjudges the universal role of sport
to allow people to mix and meet socially,
whether as spectators during sports events,
or on the training fields.

The School Level

There is an incorrect reference to sport
after school hours being compulsory for
white schoolchildren only: all after-school
participation in sport is optional. The
1984 Declaration of Commitment, by which
90 percent of all South African
sporting bodies committed themselves to
the promotion of sport from school level to
international level, and to the integration
and mixing of such sport, was not referred
to at all.

The author makes reference to the SA
Council on Sport (SACOS). The facts
are that 249 schools have already broken
away from SACOS because they obtain
better services from the so-called 'racial
sports bodies'. During the Human
Sciences Research Council's (HSRC's)
investigation into sport (1982), SACOS
was repeatedly asked to co-operate. The
organisation showed no interest in
participating, however — not even for a
scientific research project.

Acknowledged sporting groups participate
in 127 different codes of sport in South
Africa. SACOS has interest in only 24
codes, of which just two enjoy
international recognition, i.e. darts and
table tennis. The former sporting bodies
play more than 60 sports which have
international recognition.

*The elimination
of differences in
sport expenditure
is time-
dependent on the
amount of
taxation that the
taxpayer can
carry*

*Sport has been a
leader in
attempts to bring
about equal
opportunities in
South Africa,
such as the
opening of hotels
for all race
groups*

*Since certain
amendments
have been made
to provide for
mixed sport, no
direct legislation
exists anymore
which could
inhibit sport
freedoms*

*Over 200 schools
have already
broken away
from SACOS
because they
obtain better
services from the
so-called 'racial
sports bodies'*

Booth's earlier article conveniently omitted up-to-date figures, and honed in on only the negative aspects of sport in South Africa

One cannot compare the sports expenditure of only one of eleven departments for African education to the total spent by five white education departments

Real Progress

The figures tabulated in this publication have the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as its source. The article conveniently omitted more recent, up to date figures. In any case, the amount spent on African school sports facilities for the 1982/83 financial year exceeded R950 300 and was in fact not R14 700 as indicated. In the 1985/86 financial year, an amount of R8 936 000 was spent on school sports facilities and equipment for Africans.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, it is rather unfortunate that Mr Booth saw fit to hone in on only certain negative aspects of sport in South Africa. The real progress has been completely ignored. The progress of change can only maintain its momentum by contact and communication. The author should therefore obtain the correct facts before he publishes such articles.

Comment

The Department of Education and Training (DET)

In the 1986/87 budget, DET has set aside R30,775 million for the provision of recreational facilities and equipment in black schools.

The table of comparative statistics on government expenditure that accompanied Mr Booth's article reflects statistics for 1982 and 1983. Why did the author not use more recent and readily available

statistics? If he did, he would have found that in the 1986/87 budget the Department of Education and Training set aside R30,775 million for the provision of recreational facilities and equipment. To this must be added the amount earmarked by the ten white education departments catering for African schoolchildren. The present capita figures are vastly different from those quoted for 1982/83.

The R14 700 reportedly spent for sport on African schoolchildren, which compared with the R9.9 million spent on white children, is also grossly in error. Expenditure of one of eleven departments for African education compared with the total spent by five white education departments.

Total DET expenditure for sport and recreational facilities for the 1982/83 financial year exceeded R950 300 and in 1983/84 the figure is in excess of R1 042 800. The amounts increased to R3 810 600 and R6 250 500 respectively. The budget for sport allocation by the Department of Development Aid (with the same ministerial portfolio) is included.

It should also be borne in mind that a considerable percentage of the amount budgeted for by the Department of National Education was spent on black sportsmen and sports facilities for clubs. By omitting this fact, Mr Booth clearly sought to create the impression that these amounts were spent only on white

Concealing the Facts

In the article, it was stated that white schoolchildren 'are exposed to a wide



of competitive sports and...
...in compulsory extra-
...not true. Insidiously, the author tries
...impression that black
Children are not exposed to a variety
...or that they do not have physical
...The latter part of this
...ment in particular, is simply not true,
...state school has compulsory extra-
...ocular activities.

Physical education is a compulsory
...in every black school as it is in
...The schools. Colleges of education
...specialisation courses for physical
...teachers who are sent there on
...with bursaries. Furthermore,
...training courses are
...for physical education teachers and
...Department has many specialist
...advisors.

It is true that the majority of white
...schools have excellent facilities and
...equipment. What Mr Booth conveniently
...conceals, however, is the fact that these
...facilities have not been provided by the
...state but through the efforts and fund-
...ing of parent organisations.
...the statement that 'African
...children are denied these resources and
...opportunities' is malicious innuendo, which
...implies that the state provides such
...facilities at white schools but deliberately
...withholds such privileges from black
...children.

Refuting the Bias

Restatement that there is 'a prevalent bias
...against sport in African schools' is
...Willed by the following:

...considers school sport to be an
...Part of the child's development and
...maturation because the physical maturation
...is just as important as his
...physical and mental development.

- ...and, including 1982, the South
...ii Mudcets Athletics Union
...V) exercised overall control of all
...concerning blacks. This
...schools under the control of
...yn and I raining as well as
...n the self-governing and
...Millent states.

...department decided to co-
...schools and to
...aid do? ... Official policy
...constitution was drawn
...council was instituted - in
...name of Us.

...promm an effective structure
...ipals, n, CS sport at school level.
...arrangements or other
...matches and
...RSA ... level teachers from a

particular zone are elected to a circuit
...committee, and at regional level, the
...regional committee is elected from
...representatives of the circuit committees.
At national level, we have the Sports
Council which comprises 28 members and is
responsible for arranging national
championships and liaises with other
departments concerning sport.

Other Efforts

In 1985 athletics, soccer, netball and
mini-marathon competitions took place at
national level. A triangular meeting took
place on 25 May 1985 in which children
from various population groups
participated. This event was organised by
the Sports Council and is generally
considered to constitute a notable
breakthrough and a historical milestone
in school sport. The finals of the mini-
marathon took place on 12 October
1985. From commencement of the heats,
more than 200 000 pupils participated.

A national school soccer league
competition was held in October 1985 in
which more than 350 000 pupils
participated. The national netball
championships were played in August
1985. More than 140 000 schoolgirls took
part in this major event.

Furthermore, a variety of courses for sports
administrators and coaches are offered in
various centres from time to time.
Exceptional efforts have been made to
eliminate the backlog with respect to sports
facilities. Adequate facilities are being
planned for new schools and, wherever
possible, new multi-purpose 'combi-
sportsfields are being built at older schools.

Taking the Lead

The HSRC report on 'the provision of
services by the various education
departments' (1982) clearly pointed out
inadequacies in coaching, training of
officials and research in sport. It
emphasised the desirability of appointing
full-time personnel with the necessary
qualifications and enthusiasm. In
response, DET has taken the lead by
creating the post of Assistant Director
for Sport (the first such appointment by any
education department). In doing so, it
has emphasised the importance the
Department attaches to this matter.

It should be patently clear that we consider
sport to be both a significant socialising
mechanism and a bridge over which
children of differing cultural and
population groups can cross, reach out and
find one another. All the information
quoted is readily available and if Mr
Douglas Booth were in any way serious
about an objective report, a mere telephone
call would have been sufficient to provide
the correct facts he was looking for. Mi\

*Good facilities at
white schools
have been
provided through
the efforts and
fundraising
activities of
parent
organisations,
not by the state*

*In 1982, DET
decided to co-
ordinate all sport
in its schools,
and there is now
an effective
structure
promoting sport
in black schools*

*Adequate
facilities are
being planned for
new schools and,
wherever
possible, new
multi-purpose
'combi'
sportsfields are
built at older
schools*

*Sport provides a
bridge over
which children of
differing cultural
and racial
backgrounds can
cross, and reach
out to one
another*

A POLITICAL FOOTBALL

By Douglas G Booth, Development Studies Unit,
University of Natal

The debate on government expenditure only serves to illustrate the deteriorating state of township sporting and recreational facilities

According to state revenue accounts, DET did not allocate one cent of its own vote to the promotion of sport among African schoolchildren

My article stressed not only the gross inequality in expenditure on sport between black and white sportspersons but, more importantly, that apartheid channels blacks away from sport. Written by an educator who has worked in both white and African schools, and who remains an active sportsman and sports administrator, this account of sport in South Africa today was accurate in both its data and analysis and attempted to counter government selectivity and media disinformation campaigns.

In broad response, legislation such as the Laws on Co-operation and Development Amendment Act, which removed controls placed on the entry of white sportspersons into black townships, and the Liquor Amendment Act, which opened up hotels to people of all races, are merely concessions and should not be confused with fundamental change or 'breakthroughs' in reforming society. Secondly, this debate on government sports expenditure only serves to further substantiate what Professor Scholtz of the Institute for Leisure Studies, (University of Potchefstroom) describes as the deteriorating state of township sporting and recreational facilities (1985, 1986).

Sources of Information

In the last debate on sport in the House of

Assembly (1983), Mr D. J. Dalling (PFP) quoted that R14 700 had been spent on the promotion of sport in Dti'i schools which accommodate approximately 30 percent of African pupils in South Africa. DNE and DL'I reject his figure on two grounds. Firstly, that the correct expenditure for 1982-83 was R950 300 in DET schools and not R14 700, and that R3 810 600 was spent on African pupils throughout South Africa. This is strange because the original source for this figure was the Minister of Education and Training (Hansard, Col 6117.1983) and not the PFP as claimed by DNE. Secondly, the Departments claim that 1982/83 expenditure figures are out of date and that recent statistics on government expenditure on sport are readily available.

The latter claim needs closer scrutiny as it is not supported by searches of Hanwi or departmental annual reports, the suggestion that 'a mere telephone call sufficient to provide the correct facts preposterous. On 6 June 1986, for wary telephone calls and requests to the v (Advancement of Sport) offices in M Durban and Pretoria, Hie Durban office informed me that these were 'unverified information', while the Pretoria office that they were published in the weekly

(i.e. the annual Estimate of the 'ethnic to be Defrayed State Account, RP2). It is not to the 'white books' prior to 1981 that I did not allocate one cent of my own vote towards the promotion of African schoolchildren, much more than the R60 million over the years. (Note that this claim is not by DNL not DET.) The paltry amount spent on sport for African schoolchildren by DET came from the (former) Department of Co-operation and Development's vote (see table). The claim that recent statistics on government expenditure on sport are readily available is clearly refuted.

Revised Expenditure Figures

DET and DNE offer a set of new expenditure figures on sport for African schoolchildren (see table). Those who unquestionably accept these amounts as the true expenditure should be aware that these sums are not in fact verified in the 'white books' (ibid). The justification for these new figures is that it is erroneous to compare the expenditure of eleven departments for African education (DET plus ten homeland ministries) with the total spent by five white education departments. Artificially boosting expenditure on African school sport by including expenditure in the

homelands is pure connivance given the government's 'constitutional' detachment from the homelands and its insistence that four of them are 'independent'.

It should be noted that, calculating expenditure per African pupil according to DET rules and using their expenditure figures only, expenditure increases to the princely sum of R0,75 in 1982/83 (i.e. R3 810 600 divided by 5 059 332 pupils in DET and homeland schools). This compares with R10,14 for white schoolchildren in the same year.

Despite their criticisms neither DNE nor DET are forthcoming with per capita expenditure per race group. The Institute for Leisure Studies has issued the most recent alternative statistics which estimate per capita expenditure on sport at R10,89 for whites and R0,82 for Africans (SAIRR, 1984 Survey: p924).

Furthermore, anyone who is impressed by the Departments' efforts seriously misjudges the gravity of the problem: The shortfall in sports facilities in South Africa has been calculated at R1 400 million by the Institute for Leisure Studies (SAIRR, ibid).

Bias Against Sport

In any case, the forces denying African communities their rights - or what DET refers to as 'privileges' - are far more subtle than the mere physical provision or

The claim that more recent statistics on government expenditure on sport are readily available is clearly refuted

Per capita expenditure for African pupils, using DET figures only, is R0,75 for 1982/83, compared with R10,14 for white children

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON SPORT

SOURCE		82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	86/87
DET DNE M.D.	Total Budget For African Schools	R3 810 600	R6 250 500	-	R8 936 000	R30 775 000
RP 2 by dept.	DET. Dev&Co-op ² Dev.Aid ³ DNE ⁴	R262 000	R189 000	R216 000	R270 000	R20 000 000 ¹ R1 865 000

Notes
1 According to the DET parliamentary liaison officer, R20 000 000 is the correct estimate and 'unlikely to be significantly different'.
2 Expenditure on administration grants and organising meetings only. No money was allocated for facilities and equipment.
3 According to DET, expenditure increases if amounts allocated by the Department of Development Aid are included. This is not verified in RP 2.
4 Expenditure on facilities and equipment for all race groups although resources are invariably built in white cities.
Sources: RP 2, 1982/83, 1983/84, 1984/85, 1985/86, 1986/87, and personal correspondence with PFP Research Department.

The forces denying African communities their rights retard their potential for self-advancement in all spheres of society, including sport

Conditions such as the housing shortage, unemployment and other social issues must be addressed before sport can be normalised

The myth that sport transcends racial barriers grossly exaggerates the function of competitive sport and passive recreation in a society

For a government which officially does not interfere in sport, South Africa has done more to politicise sport than any other state

withholding of resources. For Africans, the legislative rigidity of apartheid, the self-financing nature, peripheral location and deprivational nature of the township environment, and exclusion from most decision-making processes, retard their potential for self-advancement in all spheres of society including sport. It is not surprising, therefore, that while white parents concern themselves with raising money for more luxurious needs - to finance swimming pools, micro-buses, computers, video equipment and school rugby tours - many African pupils and parents are demanding free text books and stationery. Their more urgent campaigns have been for the release of detained pupils and teachers, and the withdrawal of security forces from schools and townships.

DET refers to its 'effective structure' of sports promotion and its 'successes' in sport administration since 1984, i.e. the School Sports Council (SSC) which excludes homelands from affiliation. The new structure rests on 'principals and teachers' and nothing is offered to suggest that attitudes towards sport among teachers in DET schools differ from those found in KwaZulu, described in my first article (see survey of ten African schools). Among the eleven DET schools in Lamontville (Durban) there is only one playing field, which happens to be shared by two schools. Rather than sharing the field on a time basis, the two principals constructed a permanent dividing fence across the middle of the field, rendering it useless for sport and games (Bush 1985). Is this an example of an 'effective structure which promotes sport at school level'?

Having earlier rejected my claim that 'black schoolchildren are not exposed to a wide variety of competitive sports', it is interesting to note that when DET refers to its 'successes' it invariably refers only to soccer, athletics and netball. DET argues that it has responded positively to the HSRC (1982) recommendations aimed at improving sporting facilities in black townships. Professor Scholtz, however, points out that the only responses have been on a 'fragmented and opportunistic basis' (op cit).

SACOS and Race Barriers

Attempts to discredit SACOS miss the point. For the majority of people in South Africa, sport is a minor facet of life - well behind issues such as the shortage of housing, unemployment, and the inadequate supply of electricity, water and transport. SACOS's argument that these conditions must be addressed before sport can be normalised makes a good deal of sense - so do criticisms of the fact that elitist international sporting tours are being sponsored with public money. For

example, the Durban C in- G,,1n

the New Zealand (avaliers. , ^ S subsidise housing rents for the poor,

The argument that sport transcends racial barriers is very popular in South Africa. However, it is a myth. The function of competitive and passive recreation in society is a research findings Stevenson concluded that 'there is no valid evidence that participation in sport causes any verifiable socialisation effects' (1975: 100). Sargeant concluded that 'mutual participation in sport did little to foster interracial relationships' (1975: 100).

I am accused of unwarranted selectivity in citing pro-segregation attitudes in towns such as Potgietersrus and Middelburs. However, such attitudes are no less prevalent in 'liberal' areas. Further instances, following the desegregation of beach toilets and shoners at Amanzimtoti 1000 people petitioned condemning the Town Council's enforced integration as improper (Daily News, 8/2/86): in IVieim.iiit/hmg the Town Clerk reissued a by-law restricting entrance to swimming pools of race remain in force (I own C lick's files, 1975/1 VPJ: JB): and Ill Durban, a spokesman for the Mayor's Beach Amenities Sub-committee reassured residents and the beleaguered hotel industry that the 'vi hiles-i.n|\ South U-iiih will not be desegregated' (1 hiistinias 1987 (Natal Mercury. 12/6/86).

Politics and Sport

As documented in my article, for a government which officially does not interfere in sport, this government has done more to politicise sport than any other. Despite proposals by the Minister of National Education in September 1980 to remove its political influence on sport administration, the South African Sports Federation, which has liaised with the government in the coordination of SJJOMS policy since 1951, refused to disband in favour of a non-aligned umbrella organisation at its general meeting in this year.

If segregated sport in South Africa has frayed at the edge, concrete changes have not materialised. Simply reforming apartheid in sport is no longer an issue - the issue is government policy.

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B

DEMISE OF THE DOMPAS

from Influx Control to Orderly Urbanisation

- By Prof S P Cilliers, Department of Sociology,
University of Stellenbosch

Earlier this year the government responded to the President's Council report (1985) on guidelines for a policy of orderly urbanisation by tabling a White Paper in parliament. While it may be regarded as a statement of government on urbanisation and a strategy for dealing with the consequences of increased urbanisation, four acts have subsequently been passed for the implementation of this policy and they address most of the elements of the White Paper that have legal implications. and are titled:

- the Identification Act
- the Abolition of Influx Control Act
- the Black Community Development Act, and
- the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act.

The White Paper

The White Paper tabled on 23 April 1986 was accepted by the government. It recognises the inevitability of urbanisation and the principle that freedom of movement to urban areas should be extended to all citizens of the Republic, on a non-discriminatory basis. Influx control has therefore since been abolished and replaced by the issuing of uniform documents to members of all groups.

Enabling legislation came into effect from 1 July 1986 but excludes all Africans from the townships and homelands across commonwealth South Africa. This term is used to refer to influx control is administered with these provisions at least for as long as the 'citizens' are regarded as 'South African'.

• C S the White Paper

It is noted that the status of permanent residents in Bophuthatswana, the Transkei (TBVC), who lost their citizenship when the territories became independent, is being discussed in the following talks, 'if at the end of the year'.

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African citizenship should be granted to the citizens of the TBVC states, the existing agreements with the TBVC states on migration of their citizens across the common borders will be influenced' (WP:p18).

Other measures envisaged by the White Paper aim at the maintenance of standards or general civilized norms, such as that people cannot be permitted to settle indiscriminately in any place in a city. Mechanisms to ensure orderly urbanisation relate to:

- the early identification of adequate land for urban settlement
- the promotion of home ownership, with realistic building standards
- control over indiscriminate settlement in urban areas
- effective control over illegal squatting, and
- the use of the Slums Act and other measures to maintain health standards.

The government accepts as policy property rights and possession of a dwelling (within their means) for members of all communities, and specific guidelines to promote these aims are formulated. The role of finance for the acquisition of land for urban growth, and the role of local authorities in township development are also emphasised.

Multifaceted Plan

Attention is given to the economic and spatial ordering of urbanisation, which is to be structured in terms of the National Regional Development Plan (NRDP).

The NRDP, at present being drafted by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, is to replace the National Physical Development Plan of 1975. It is to take into account the social, economic, physical, spatial and constitutional considerations that have an influence on the development of the country. In specific principles and guidelines for the proposed NRDP, the role of metropolitan areas as core generators of growth is duly

Mechanisms to implement the government's new urbanisation strategy are provided by four main acts passed just before parliament closed in June 1986

Many aspects of influx control were abolished as of 1 July, but the movement of about 5 million resident 'citizens' of the independent homelands is still restricted

However, the new citizenship act could restore the rights of 1,75 million or more Africans out of the other 4 million TBVC 'citizens', who are resident within 'white' South Africa

The search for jobs in Grahamstown in the recession-hit Eastern Cape. With most influx controls gone, more black workers can now participate in a freer labour market.



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BV' 1 ... --MM

The White Paper states that the future status of Africans who lost their SA citizenship on TBVC 'independence' is being negotiated with the homelands

acknowledged, and a range of specific prescriptions for further metropolitan, regional and rural development are specified.

The White Paper also makes reference to community development, social welfare services, health and manpower as elements of social development which are seen as important facets of sound urbanisation. Negotiations are envisaged to promote a greater alignment of the labour legislation of the self-governing and TBVC homelands with the South African dispensation. The overall responsibility for implementing the urbanisation strategy is put in the hands of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning.

NRDP which will aim at comprehensive national socio-economic development.

Evaluation

Critics of government policy had in general assumed that influx control would be retained in some form or other. A close scrutiny of the White Paper and of the forthcoming legislation (see box) shows that they do not contain alternative forms of influx control. It is also clear that the shortcomings in the proposals of the Riekert and President's Council reports have been effectively addressed. In short, instead of extending the system of influx control to all citizens on a non-discriminatory basis, influx control is being abolished in toto - even the proposed requirement of approved accommodation or a plot of land as a basis for influx control is discarded.

Government has approved a three-pronged urbanisation strategy - to control settlement, maintain standards and provide land/housing

Interpretation

The White Paper and its accompanying schedule (Annexure A) on legislative aspects of urbanisation policy (see box) appear to reflect a genuine extension of the new direction initiated by the earlier Wiehahn (1979/81) and Riekert (1977/79) Reports. Cumulatively, government reaction to these proposals reflects a systematic process of eliminating statutory differentiation and discrimination on the basis of colour/race. The general policy framework within which the White Paper is formulated (par 4.2) spells out a commitment to fundamental human values and to an enhancement of the quality of life of all communities, as part of the process of dismantling apartheid.

It seems reasonable to conclude that for the time being, the Squatting, Slums and Black Community acts, all in amended form, are to serve as the main instruments through which to promote orderly urbanisation. In essence, this means that the government has approved a three-pronged strategy of controlling settlement patterns, maintaining standards, and expanding mechanisms for the provision of urban land and housing. In the medium to long term this is to form part of the

The ills associated with the migrant labour system, which had not been addressed by either of the reports, can now be tackled effectively. Since freedom of movement is instituted, it now becomes possible (at least in principle) for families and dependants to follow and settle with wage earners. Migrant worker and commuters, still excluded from participation in a free labour market according to earlier proposals, now have equal access with all other workers to economic opportunities.

Furthermore, the distinction between insiders and rural outsiders is totally relinquished and subject to a qualification concerning South African citizenship status of these homelands. The fact that increased urbanisation is concomitant of economic development - and it also contradicted the view that the whole of South Africa should be treated as an integrated system.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMME

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The Repeal of Influx Control

The identification Act No. 72 of 1986

This makes provision for the scrapping of the reference book system for Africans through the repeal of the Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, No 67 of 1952; for the compilation and maintenance of a population register for the Republic; and for the issuing of uniform identity documents to all - to provide a system simply for the identification of individuals.

The Abolition of Influx Control Act No 68 of 1986

It removes all racial distinctions with regard to squatting, places restrictions on owners who allow squatting on their land, and repeals the restrictions placed on employers who introduce employees into an urban area. The act also makes provision for the extension of the Slums Act, No 76 of 1979, to black local authorities; repeals section 5 of the Black Administration Act, No 38 of 1972 (which had provided for the removal of African communities or persons from land occupied by them); and increases the fines provided for in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No 52 of 1951.

Comment

The latter act is structured around the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, which is taken as the principal act for the purposes of the proposed amendments. The central thrust of this act is therefore to provide a vehicle for the scrapping of influx control through the repeal of legislation that had effected such control, and to deal with the possible consequences of rapid urbanisation that may result from such institution of freedom of movement.

The Schedule of Acts and Proclamations

These are repealed in terms of the second act above and include all the laws listed in the White Paper on Urbanisation for repeal, with the exception of (a) laws dealing with identity documents which had already been listed for repeal in the motion Act and (b) those black labour laws which deal with the position of TBVC citizens and tot i⁹land inhabitants working in the Republic. A total of 34 laws and proclamations are repealed in terms of section 18 including:

White Paper on the Development Trust and Land Act, No 18 of 1963, which dealt with unlawful acquisition of land by Africans, labour quotas for control boards; (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No 25 of 1963, in terms of which control over the movement of Africans into and between urban areas was exercised. The distinction between a 'Sfeoert' of urban insiders and rural 'ELfer' was wished; Proclamation No 174 of 1968, which regulated the flow of

African workers from self-governing territories to South Africa. The repeal of this proclamation is valid only in the Republic, and it will be negotiated with all homeland administrations in so far as this provision is applicable in these areas;

- Contributions in respect of Black Labour Act, No 29 of 1972, which, in view of the abolition of the acts listed above, has no practical application and is therefore also repealed;

- Proclamation 270 of 1966, in terms of which a member of the SA Police or an authorised officer of an urban local authority could at any reasonable time, without warrant, enter and search any premise in a prescribed area - if he suspected that an African person was resident, employed or accommodated there against the regulations of Act 25 of 1945;

- Blacks (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act, No 64 of 1956, which prohibited the granting of interdicts or other delaying court orders.

The Black Communities Development Amendment Act No 74 of 1986

This makes provision for the designation of development areas and the acquisition and vesting of land therein; for the establishment and development of townships by development boards, local authorities and township developers; for the conversion of rights of leasehold in respect of immovable property by Africans into ownership; and the registration of such ownership and the alienation of leasehold and ownership. It therefore creates mechanisms by means of which urban development for utilisation by African people can be facilitated, particularly through the involvement of the private sector.

The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act No 73 of 1986

It restores South African citizenship to three categories of people, their spouses and minor children:

- those born in the Republic prior to TBVC independence but who have been permanently resident in South Africa since;

- those who are citizens of the TBVC homelands by birth or descent but who have been permanently resident in South Africa for at least five years since the independence of the homelands;

- those who are citizens of homelands by birth or descent, who legally entered the Republic after the enactment of the act and who may apply for naturalisation after five years.

Comment

The granting of South African citizenship does not affect homeland citizenship status. Such individuals will therefore have dual citizenship'. TBVC citizens to whom South African citizenship is thus restored will therefore enjoy the same freedom of movement now extended to other black citizens of the Republic.



Houses go up at Khayelitsha outside Cape Town. This site of controlled informal settlement has been most controversial, especially after the recent efflux from Crossroads.

The squatting and slums acts are not alternative forms of influx control, but rather mechanisms to ensure a process of 'orderly' urbanisation

Although a major policy shift has occurred, punitive and unrealistic measures remain that aim to closely control and direct urban settlement

*All additional statistics (in margin) from S Duncan 1986, Weekly Mail Vol2/No75

Informal Settlement

Apart from the increased penalties provided for, the amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act do not represent an alternative form of influx control and do not tighten up further its generally punitive tone. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the existing Act does reflect a negative approach to the phenomenon of informal settlement - its general thrust has been that squatting is undesirable and that it should therefore be prevented. Humans, however, are not fairies, but are bound by the dimensions of time and space. People have to locate somewhere, and if no formal accommodation can be obtained or afforded, they have no alternative but to squat on open land.

In developing societies such as South Africa, the emergence of informal settlements under circumstances of rapid urbanisation is inevitable. If this occurs in an uncontrolled way, resulting in distorted forms of spatial arrangement, problems will arise. Controlled informal settlement provides a constructive way of accommodating such problems. The fact that Section 13 of the Abolition of Influx Control Act provides for the designation of land by the Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning for controlled squatting, represents a major policy shift towards such realism. It is particularly significant that such powers are granted to central government rather than to local authorities, who are generally loathe to provide land for settlement by the very poor.

The implications of the extension of the Slums Act to black local authorities are also of interest. A positive outcome may be that local authorities are now required to take pro-active steps to prevent the development of slums. The fact that African and largely coloured housing stock too are overwhelmingly under the public control of local authorities is relevant here. Through being entrusted with the responsibility to maintain civilised standards, local authorities will perforce have to come to grips with the

implications of rapid urban contributing to the provision of urban settlement and housing positive urbanisation processes facilitated.

Remaining Issues

The legal status of TBVC citizens in the Republic is now a matter of concern. The implications of the new citizenship legislation (see box) those TBVC citizens, the implementation of the new dispensation, were in possession of rights to remain permanently in South Africa's urban areas, will now, as South African citizens, have exactly the same rights as other African 'insiders'. This presumably will also apply to permanently employed farm workers who had formerly been classified as TBVC citizens.

Less clear is the position of former 'section tenners' who, having lost their urban rights through homeland consolidation (township incorporation) or relocation, had such rights restored to them through amendments to the Black Consolidation Act of 1985. Those living in non-independent homelands will obviously, as South African citizens, share fully in the deal. However, the citizenship act does not make specific provision for former 'section tenners' now located in the TBVC states. Excluding these persons from such privileges, on the basis of decisions regarding incorporation of land or relocations in which they certainly did not share, would appear to be less than fair.

Finally, significant numbers of African residents of South Africa did not, at the time of the institution of the new dispensation, qualify to be legally present in such areas. While for some the distinction between 'legal' and 'illegal' presence has now lapsed, this does not apply to many TBVC citizens. For instance the legal position of a large proportion of the inhabitants of squatter areas in Crossroads and Khayelitsha in the Western Cape has not changed at all. The chaos and conflict there and the scrapping of the pass laws will, in fact, complicate the task of identifying the status of such individuals. This will be even more difficult to monitor in areas where illegitimate commuting across the border from TBVC states occurs on a large scale, except by means of pass law night raids.

Logically, we appear to be but one step removed from the inevitable insurrection of total freedom of movement and settlement as between all parts of 'Greater' South Africa. A system of citizenship would seem to be on cards.

INDUSTRIAL

J O N I T O R



the leader of Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Butheiezi, arrives to officiate at the launch of the United Workers Union of South Africa in Durban on May 1, 1986. In Natal intense rivalry has since broken out between the new labour faction and the established black labour movement.

CIAL RESPONSIBILITY

¹⁰¹ Sullivan: A New Thrust

^ The Darker Side of Black Advancement: Myths & Realities

WON ISSUES & ACTIONS

J⁸ Contenders for Labour in 'KwaNatal': The UWUSA Initiative

² Stayaway Strikes in the 1980s

Jjjj^conco on UWUSA & Inkatha

, Trade Unions Sector by Sector: A Directory

And what if the fish
don't bite?



An extremely wise and very old Chinese gentleman once said: "If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish, and you feed him forever."
AECI has to do a lot more than just hand out the fish and pay for the fishing lessons. We have to tackle our social responsibilities square on, for the community and all our employees.
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We support primary, secondary and tertiary education and award scholarships and bursaries.
We back an internal manpower development programme, and provide housing and pension schemes.

In our sea, there are many schools of fish!




UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF SOUTH AFRICA

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SULLIVAN: New Thrust

Clark, President of the Sullivan Signatory Association, speaks to SA Researcher, Berkowitz



Increased pressure for disinvestment and sanctions has led to a new initiative for those US companies still doing business in South Africa. The new, streamlined Sullivan Signatory Association requires members not only to continue with their fair employment practices and community-based projects, but to develop meaningful programmes to promote social justice and to actively challenge the environment in order to assist in removing the apartheid laws.

Clark who, with IBM sponsorship, has helped to guide this new phase in the Sullivan initiative, discusses ways in which US companies are trying to overcome their credibility crisis at home and in South Africa. He talks at length on the ways in which Sullivan Signatories intend to act as partners with all South African communities in efforts to facilitate the reform process and to build a new post-apartheid society.

Q: US companies doing business in South Africa now have to fulfil extra conditions to qualify for export aid. Has President Reagan's 'executive order' of September 1985 concerning US business in South Africa also increased the number of companies who are members of the Sullivan Signatory Association?

CLARK: Yes, he has kept the voluntary nature of the Sullivan principles but unless you are a willing participant or do reasonably well in the Sullivan effort, you will have to report to the Department of State. This is likely to be a more taxing exercise than before. It will be in the public domain, so more US companies in fact have voluntarily opted to be signatories to the Sullivan principles. There were an additional 75 companies last year since the announcement of the executive order.

Q: Have any companies pulled out as a result of the further requirement?

CLARK: I don't think companies have pulled out because of this requirement. About 20 have left South Africa in the last year because of the state of the South African economy and the general hassle that is involved in doing business in South Africa these days — the hassles associated with pressure groups, the divestment,

disinvestment and product boycotts. These make business difficult down here and less profitable, bearing in mind the currency problems also. Further, since 1978 US regulations have not permitted sales to the South African military, police and certain government agencies.

IPSA: Is the heightened drive to impose sanctions likely to change the general stance of the Sullivan Signatory Association? What are the implications of the current state of emergency?

CLARK: It is election year in the US and South Africa is being used as a political football to some extent. The latest sanctions bill before congress would certainly make the position of US companies here more difficult. The immediate crisis and any specific events that occur in South Africa will also play a major role in any further sanctions that President Reagan will be asked to approve.

IPSA: Do you have similar codes in other countries?

CLARK: I am not aware of any code in any other country, in the way that the Sullivan principles have been implemented. There are one or two examples of bans on trade or embargoes of one kind or another but nothing like the voluntary, cohesive effort that we do have in South Africa. I think the uniqueness

about South Africa is that we have a legal structure that is abhorrent to the rest of the world.

IPSA: Do you think that companies that have pulled out, have done so with a genuine repugnance for the system and for racism?

CLARK: In the main, the primary reason for leaving was that their operations were not economically viable.

IPSA: Is there a problem of negotiating business with other countries? In other words, placating third world pressures by pulling out of South Africa.

CLARK: You could have an instance where there is a trade-off between business in black Africa and business in South Africa. There is also a balance between business in the United States and business in South Africa. It is this aspect that probably is the most serious. A small percentage of product boycott in the United States could well be more than the total output in South Africa for a particular company.

IPSA: Yet many companies still stay in South Africa, with all its problems?

CLARK: I think companies don't tend automatically to go with pressure groups; they tend to take a long-term and balanced view of the situation. Companies which pull out of South Africa may find other pressure points in their international operations. With this 'multiplier effect', eventually there may not be any international operations left at all!

IPSA: Is staying in South Africa based on a longer term assumption of being able to do their business with whoever is going to be in power in the future?

CLARK: South Africa is a potential growth market and I would suspect that most companies would like to have a presence in the future to take advantage of this opportunity. To do that, one has to take certain stances and certain positions. However, I think what some of the pressure groups do misjudge is the fact that if companies were to pull out of South Africa, as soon as the situation changes, it is most unlikely that business would come rushing back. The costs involved would be tremendous - in re-setting up an operation, re-tooling, re-fitting and so on. Of course the business may also have already been absorbed by someone else.

IPSA: Recently, Sullivan signatories have put aside enormous amounts of money for educational grants, bursaries and social responsibility programmes. Is there an element of competitiveness within the companies over this expenditure?

CLARK: One of the regrettable things about Sullivan is that we have been unable in the past to work together as closely as we ought to have done, and the critical impact of what we are doing is, therefore, diluted. What we are trying to focus on at the moment is the development and funding of national programmes so that all companies can participate in our operations.

To do well in the Sullivan report, you have to spread your activity between four areas. These are education for non-employees, employee advancement, social justice and community support programmes. Within each of these four categories there is a subdivision between the amount of money you give to these initiatives and the amount of personal effort or 'sweat' equity that you are prepared to give.

IPSA: Recently, a South African company with US minority shareholder became the first company to become a member of the Sullivan Signatory Association. The US minority shareholder, achieving top ranking in the annual Sullivan award, is this kind of pattern or militancy going to become more prevalent?

CLARK: I hope the word is **not** militancy, but I think the real purpose of the Sullivan award is to create a society of which we can all be proud. We help provide the infrastructure to remunerate some of the inequalities in this society. We do have many South African companies working together with black on projects and this, we find, is of mutual benefit. However, I do understand why some black people would be unwilling to go the whole way on the measurement side of the process.

IPSA: Since October 1985 there has been a major change in streamlining of the Sullivan Code, which has now become known as the Signum Awoua. Can you expand on the new direction?

CLARK: Last October we evaluated where we were. We felt we had ignored for too long the communities we are trying to serve, so now our priority is to work very closely in partnership with black communities.

IPSA: Is this then your answer to criticisms of the Sullivan Code was a top-down package, inspired by whites for black people?

CLARK: Yes, I think it is also the reason why Sullivan programme is criticised as being a public affairs exercise for consumption in the United States rather than an exercise for the development of Africa.

IPSA: Are you finding it easy to get "put Iurn communication with the actual recipients of your programmes in the black community"?

CLARK: Not easy, no. In fact, had we started this trail a few years ago, it would have been much more easy. Obviously, there is a far greater polarisation in the townships at this time than before.

IPSA: Are black people worried about losing credibility if they get involved in your program?

CLARK: By nature the business world would be the middle group, and it is being pressured. So, the people we are talking to are rather hesitant to acknowledge publicly the good things that are being done with the Sullivan effort, in order to be able to maintain their own posture and constituency. Yet I think more and more of the communities are hearing what we are trying to achieve. Some executive committees are dedicated to relationships and involving black employees managers in the process.

IPSA: To get back to the actual Sullivan programmes - the expression 'liberation education' must provide an enormous frustration for Sullivan companies who are black education.

CLARK: There have been two or three recent where some radical students have been helping our employees who have been helping our 'school' activities There is an increasing

appropriate education, or what some people term 'people's education'. It seems to me the current concept of the 'own affairs' education is completely unacceptable to black people.

I think that working together with community on some form of acceptable, alternative education programme would be in the communities' interests and the country's interests. Foreign companies should, in fact, be able to play a catalytic role and encourage these moves.

Community projects and problems are being raised in the work place through unions. Sullivan companies have some sort of relationship with unions?

We are beginning to engage in dialogue with representatives in an informal way. There is a very negative feeling by the unions about the Sullivan effort. One of the reasons, possibly, is that the philosophy of a trade union is that they look after the welfare of employees. The Sullivan effort is to look at both internal benefit programmes and external community relationships. Some unions feel that this is their territory and not that of black companies.

In criticising Sullivan, some unions have said 'you deal with the soft issues but not with the industrial relations problems.'

I would not call the ending of apartheid social justice a soft issue. In fact, I would think this is the fundamental cause of any problems - if I do think trade unions have a vital role to play in

the industrial relations scene in South Africa.


IPSA: Another emphasis in the Sullivan programme is dealing with black advancement programmes.

CLARK: This has been one of our key objectives since the Sullivan principles were introduced. However, it is the most difficult of the principles and it is one of the areas where we have the least achievement. The reason for this is probably an inferior education system and a different background that does not prepare black people adequately for a first world type of business structure. The bridging programmes that have been tried, the academic support programmes, and so on, have not yet produced equivalence.

IPSA: Is there a problem in finding the appropriate people?

CLARK: One of the major thrusts is to move people into the managerial area, but companies have found it easier to give money away to community programmes than to really give over the running of their business to people that they do not yet feel have appropriate knowledge, background and attitudes. The Sullivan Association believes it is of paramount importance to assist the movement of black people into management positions and to accelerate further the development of first line managers into positions of higher responsibility, right up to board level.

I see the future along the lines of the development of the small business sector, where people can participate without having the exposure and



experience of the corporate world. With an entrepreneurial spirit, they can run their own business very successfully. American companies are actively trying to assist in the development of small business and the informal sector.

IPSA: The 'fourth amplification' of the Sullivan Code was introduced in late 1984. It is the obligation placed on signatories to support the removal of all apartheid laws and to promote social justice. What does it mean exactly?

CLARK: At the end of 1984, Reverend Sullivan called on US companies in South Africa to assist in the ending of all laws associated with discrimination. For a few months we really did not know how to tackle this problem because several people questioned whether companies based in the United States had a right to give assistance to another country in changing their political structure.

By December 1985, there was some agreement between the United States and South African task forces on what actions could be taken to help work towards a new society. We call this general activity 'social justice'. This varies, in fact, from speaking out in the press or placing advertisements arguing that it is imperative to have a new society as quickly as possible, through to lobbying civil servants and ministers for appropriate changes; also, to support legal organisations that either help to redress the balance or to analyse the legal situation, then recommend a new system.

IPSA: Let's take some of those individually - 'lobbying' is a very efficient way of changing laws in America. Do you find that in lobbying in South Africa the Sullivan signatories have access to the powers that be?

CLARK: Yes, the term 'lobbying' is different in the United States and it is a well developed business over there. However, I do believe that in South Africa there is regular and easy access to people at the highest level, including cabinet ministers.

IPSA: The Institute of Race Relations recently published a study where they analysed whether in fact foreign pressure brought about change in South Africa. They found some pressure effective but that the only time it really worked well was when it was in alliance with local pressure. Do you agree with that?

CLARK: American business tends to be a small part of the business scene in South Africa and, obviously, with local companies putting their weight behind something, it will have a much greater impact. US companies are unlikely to be the major force for change but they have been a great, catalytic force in the change process.

IPSA: Recently, General Motors took an initiative where they offered to pay the legal costs of their black employees who had been charged with using the 'white' beaches in Port Elizabeth. This is part of your fourth amplification, I understand. Was this a planned initiative or was it something that they just stumbled upon?

CLARK: I don't know the planning that went on there; I was told it was spontaneous. General Motors have a fairly high percentage of employment in the Port Elizabeth area. The general manager, Bob White, felt, I understand, that he wanted to make this gesture. The gesture was extremely well received. I think more and more companies are

speaking out. Recently we supported the education thrust by some of the leading firms down in the Western Cape. Collectively and individually, US companies will speak out where they sense an opportunity to redress the imbalance.

IPSA: What sort of initiative would you undertake black housing - another central conflict issue?

CLARK: Most US companies would like relaxation of the Group Areas Act to enable their employees to have a choice of where they want to live.

IPSA: Would they take it upon themselves to buy housing for their employees in areas that were not allocated to them?

CLARK: I think that a certain amount of this has happened already and not just with American business. If one looks at the central business districts (CBDs), there are many black people already living there in any case.

IPSA: With help from their employers?

CLARK: With help from their employers or friends.

IPSA: Are there 'fringe' political groups outside that you are not going to be able to get to?


CLARK: This may appear a little illogical but there are some people who call for disinvestment when their real objective is a threat of disinvestment to accelerate the change process. It is important to work together with as many groups as we can, particularly to promote the free enterprise system. I don't think we will get very far with some of the extreme groups, but in the main, most people can sense that in a post-apartheid society the economy is going to be largely based on free enterprise.

IPSA: Is the success of Sullivan to get more people within a capitalist environment, i. e. able to share in the fruits of the business environment in South Africa?

CLARK: I think the success in the longer term will be to measure what impact American companies have had in developing the new South Africa in all its aspects - in housing, in education, in training and in developing the new legal system and so on. We need to do this urgently because whatever political scenario emerges for the future, we are going to need and have local people who are trained to run business, industry and the administration. It is imperative to find avenues of increased employment.

IPSA: Reverend Sullivan has given May 1987 as the date by which grand apartheid must be dismantled, or for American companies to pull out and economic sanctions be imposed. Is this a feasible time limit?

CLARK: He has said this for about a year now and he will have to develop some form of measurement criterion to see whether sufficient progress has been made to be able to assess this. There has been a significant amount of change and I do hope that Reverend Sullivan would support companies continuing to do business down here. Some measure of the change that he is looking for. After all, his objectives are really no different from most people in South Africa: how to develop a fair and just society - one in which each individual is able to develop to the limit of his/her potential and obtain rewards accordingly.



It is not
 a series
 of
 in a
 manner
 could
 be

In the 1970s witnessed the full entry
 of black advancement programmes
 into a part of managerial strategies in
 South African industry. Yet, despite
 statements of commitment from
 management to advance and promote black
 employees, the number of Africans as a
 percentage of total skilled and managerial
 personnel still remains extremely low.
 This lack of progress is usually blamed on
 the government and even on African
 workers themselves.

Some of the most common problems
 identified in management to account for
 the slow rate of black advancement
 within companies include the education
 backlog, inappropriate experience,
 cultural upbringing, racially discriminatory
 tests, etc. Although some of these
 external factors are genuine obstacles, the
 problem, inherent in the programmes
 is rarely emphasised. While they could
 create genuine space for real progress,
 the actual practice of black advancement
 creates conditions for co-optation, and
 a form of permanent training the
 programmes often defeat the very goals
 they set to achieve.

African Perceptions

Research indicates that it is
 mainly white managers who plan
 to implement these programmes. It is
 the African management

candidates rarely participate in the
 development and implementation of
 programmes claimed to be developing
 African leadership in business. In
 practice this has resulted in candidates
 being caught up in these programmes
 almost permanently and never graduating
 as real 'leaders' or independent
 managers.

The reproduction of paternal attitudes
 and practices also creates a major
 credibility problem for black
 advancement programmes. For, once an
 institution is perceived as something
 exclusively designed by whites for Africans,
 it is immediately suspect, as has been
 the case with 'Bantu' Education. This point
 need not be stressed as we are at
 present witnessing horrifying examples of
 what happens to local government
 institutions designed by white politicians
 for African communities.

Some of the trends that emerged from a
 confidential survey (1984) conducted
 among a group of shop stewards and
 management representatives further
 illustrate the extent and dangers of white
 paternalism. In a nutshell, the shop
 stewards conceptualised advancement in
 broader, holistic terms, to encapsulate
 total social, political and economic
 progress. For them, black advancement
 meant an improved quality of life - a living
 wage, decent housing, educational
 assistance, community development, and

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Designers of programmes appear to believe that one should produce fewer but better qualified African managers - they stress quality not quantity

Many black workers interpret advancement in broad terms that will produce social, political and economic improvement beyond the shop floor

The majority of African production workers do not benefit from job advancement programmes as these schemes are directed towards skilled and managerial personnel.

direct interventions by their companies on political issues affecting their lives.

The survey showed an important discrepancy in perceptions: Unlike management, workers believed that job advancement alone would not automatically lead to an improved quality of life. The shop stewards expressed the following views:

® Salaries and wages of African workers are so low that job advancement makes very little difference to their standard of living.

® Because programmes are directed towards skilled and managerial levels, most workers are excluded.

9 There are many politico-legal constraints that undermine the prospects of black advancement and undercut such programmes.

Management Perceptions

In contrast, management seems to have adopted the American model of job advancement which places heavy emphasis on promotion, based on the capitalist ethic of 'each person for him/herself'. Secondly, there is a relatively new tendency to explain industrial problems in South Africa in terms of the alleged conflict between First World ('white' society) and Third World ('black' society) standards. Such explanations are racist in the sense that they imply Africans are what they are because of the poverty, illiteracy, ignorance and superstition that are held to be characteristic of Third World peoples.

In other words, in using the 'North/South' dichotomy in this way, the South African and western First Worlds are absolved from the responsibility of

having brought about these underdeveloped, neo-colonial situations. In South Africa this conceptualisation leads to an assumption that Africans have to be trained through special advancement programmes because of their 'inferior' status. Yet how on earth can racism be eliminated through packages that legitimise racial divisions? From this perspective, the very concept of black advancement logically appears to be founded on the broader premises of apartheid.

There is also a strong tendency, particularly among managers, to emphasise quality in the training of African managers, almost to "the total exclusion of quantity. They argue that they would rather produce fewer but better qualified numbers of African managers. The practical dangers of this approach are the provision of a rationalisation for permanent training and a limited increase in the number of black managers, from constituting 5.8 percent of this occupational category in 1977 to (a projected) 7.7 percent by 1987 (see table).

Class Enemies and Allies

One, often unexplored, reason for the exclusion of Africans from management power structures is the genuine fear among white managers that Africans with the same skills will eventually take over their jobs. Although business leaders' calls for black advancement are sometimes rhetorical and mainly intended to give legitimacy to the 'fruits' of a free market economy, white middle management also blocks some initiatives.

The advancement of black employees is



STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF BLACK ADVANCEMENT 1977-1987

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES	BLACKS		WHITES	
	1977	1987	1977	1987
Executives, managers and other professionals and semi-professionals	46 370 <i>(Percentage Growth: 76%)</i>	82 005	799 530 <i>(Percentage Growth: 33%)</i>	1 068 207
Workers (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour)	2547 688 <i>(Percentage Growth: 25%)</i>	3 203 834	414 030 <i>(Percentage Growth: -1,8%)</i>	406 292

¹Excludes teachers and nurses, and workers in the non-agricultural sector.

²SSIC 'Class Formation: Skill Shortages and Black Advancement' in *South African Review One*, (ed) South African Research Services. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.

viewed as a threat to the extended reproduction of the white middle classes in South Africa, largely due to the limited vacancies that exist at managerial level. Hence, pseudo-scientific explanations are often used to counter the upward mobility of many black employees. For example, Africans are perceived to:

- have a low need for achievement
- have no knowledge of business principles
- be alienated from western civilisation, etc.

A further constraint inherent in managerial practices and strategies stems from what is usually seen as the ultimate objective of advancement programmes. While business organisations are grappling with black advancement, there is at the same time a growing concern in African working class communities as to what is perceived as the real intention of such efforts - the co-optation of skilled and professional workers onto the side of the ruling white power bloc.

Management theoreticians have argued that this problem is beyond the organisational control of business and see it away as a broader problem. However, this problem is an organisational issue as it is political one. Perhaps one should rather analyse the ways in which organisations themselves are the very site and terrain on which co-optation and the formation of a middle class takes place. Most black advancement programmes are self-evidently limited to promoting Africans to managerial levels within organisational hierarchy.

escape Route

are any advancement efforts

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directed at lower level employees, these initiatives go only as far down as artisans, to the almost total exclusion of the bulk of the labour force. The result is that workers immediately believe that advancement really means the promotion of an African elite. As Human and Hofmeyer (1985) concur, hopefully this emergent class will dilute African anger with a dose of conservatism: 'Black advancement constitutes a personal solution to the problems associated with race, inequality and inferior status, and also weakens attempts for collective political and social action to improve the position of black people as a whole' (Human and Hofmeyer 1985: p27).

All of these managerial attitudes and practices are a reflection of the major dilemma in black advancement programmes. On the one hand, promotion of an African middle class is an attractive investment in political stability. On the other hand, there is a reluctance to accelerate the formation of a class whose growth may eventually pose a threat to established white middle class interests.

Until the business world starts reflecting critically on their own practices, black advancement will remain rhetoric and not a reality. Management willingness to examine their own strategies will be a measure of their commitment to real and meaningful advancement of black people.

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Do black advancement initiatives aim to create an African elite that can be co-opted as part of the ruling power bloc?

By 1987 there will be only 82 000 blacks in managerial positions in South Africa, while more than a million whites will occupy similar posts

Contenders for Labour in 'KwaNatal'

THE UWUSA INITIATIVE

By Mark Bennett and Graham Howe

Extra-parliamentary and worker movements are competing for popular support in the unfolding KwaZulu/Natal nexus as they play out dual roles in the political and labour arenas. The formation by Inkatha of the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) on May 1 this year, may be viewed as one such initiative, following the equally politicised launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in Durban five months earlier. IPSA researchers Bennett and Howe survey the events surrounding the emergence of UWUSA and conclude that conflicts between the two new labour groupings are likely to intensify in Natal, particularly on the shop-floor and also in the township community.

In the interview that follows, Simon Conco, senior Inkatha politician and UWUSA general secretary, discusses the political agenda of the new union. Conco highlights the problems UWUSA is likely to face in the future and reveals what strategy this newcomer to labour has devised in order to make itself a viable force on the shop-floor.

UWUSA supporters carry a coffin at the union's launch with the slogan 'COSATU is Dead' painted on it.

Between 1984 and 1986, the national rivalry for worker support and legitimacy among extra-parliamentary movements in search of a broader constituency has slowly spread from the township community to the shop-floor. In Natal, soon after the May Day launch of the new Inkatha-aligned union, UWUSA, the uneasy truce that had

existed between the black labour movement and Inkatha finally collapsed. Recent developments could well be the precursor to internecine worker conflicts in Natal as well as Witwatersrand industry, where COSATU affiliates are consolidating and UWUSA is actively recruiting workers.

The most serious clash of this kind so far occurred between the new labour (action and the giant COSATU affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). On June 6 at the Hlobane colliery in Northern Natal, eleven miners died when pro- and anti-striking faction¹ clashed violently, although UWUSA officials have denied that this was a direct confrontation with COSATU¹. Reports concerning the involvement of an outside group of armed Inkatha supporters, and the subsequent mass resignations of NI-M members from the mine, have heightened political tensions between the two movements (WM 13/6/86).

Other Disputes

The violent conflict at Hlobane was not an isolated event, however. Earlier, in May, workers at a Ladysmith furniture factory voted to leave COSATU's Paper Wood and Allied Workers Union and join UWUSA, after 200 amabutho appeared



Mark Bennett

I the factory gates to 'witness' the ballot NM 5/5/86). Then, in early June, a magistrate ordered members of COSATU's Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union to refrain from assaulting UWUSA 'u-innisers who were recruiting workers Ja dairy in Durban (NM 29/5/86). The Jis'putc between the rival unions has since been replicated at other branches of the company.

The related confrontations that have erupted in African residential areas have been equally dramatic. A mere month after UWL'SA's launch, COSATU released a detailed report alleging that Inkatha 'functionaries' were behind the harassment of COSATU officials and members in Northern Natal, Durban and Pietermaritzburg (COSATU 31/5/86). In a 45 page dossier compiled from affidavits, Inkatha officials - including KwaZulu's ministers of finance and health, youth and women's group leaders, as well as town councillors - are accused of being involved in petrol-bombing the homes of COSATU members and of other physical assaults.

Many COSATU leaders fear that their signed-up members may be coerced into joining UWUSA as a result of township pressures. Furthermore, through Inkatha's control over most of Natal's black local authorities, it has the power to prevent union meetings and wield its political clout in the labour arena. For instance, the Inkatha-controlled Esikawini town council 'banned' COSATU's May Day meeting in the township by denying them access to the township's stadium (WM

An Unknown Factor

Aside from its role as a political initiative (see following interview), what role is UWUSA likely to play as a trade union on the shop-floor? According to the union's general secretary, Simon Conco, UWUSA will initially be a general union trying to organise workers from as many industrial sectors as possible, as it plans to become an industrially based union in the long term. This transition is scheduled to take place if more than 5 000 workers, represented in each industrial sector, vote to twin a separate affiliate union, a process which will take place rather rapidly based on UWUSA's own account of its growth.

Conco has stated that the union already had 001 members before its May Day 'lunch and that the number swelled to 1000 two days afterwards (FM 9/5/86). However, UWUSA's head office refuses to provide figures clarifying whether these are paid-up or signed-up members, and will not comment on whether any recognition agreements are being negotiated. In the absence of verifiable information, the union's claimed strength remains an unknown factor

for the moment.

UWUSA appears to be pinning its hopes on attracting, as affiliates, other unions which share similar pro-foreign investment, anti-socialist and pro-Inkatha viewpoints. The union's leadership and some Inkatha officials have had meetings with the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) at regional level and the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), and claim to have scheduled further meetings with the Trade Union Council of South Africa (FM 4/4/86). BAWU has quickly dispelled speculation that it would affiliate to UWUSA, while CUSA's 'blacks only' philosophy (see interview) scuttled merger talks. The only unions which publicly announced support for UWUSA at its recent launch were the African Domestic Workers Union, the National Union of Brick and Allied Workers, and the Black Staff Association of the South African Transport Services (SATS).

It is estimated that the first two unions have fewer than 2 000 members each and consequently they are not a significant force in the labour movement today. The third group resembles a 'company' union and harks back to the pre-Wiehahn era of substitute forms of unionism for black workers. It was described by the General Workers Union in its 1982 recognition dispute with SATS as 'the SATS's personnel department dressed up as a staff association' (Van Niekerk 1986: p6). Although it seems highly unlikely, UWUSA might overcome its acute shortage of experienced unionists and take firmer shape as a labour initiative, should any of the established black unions affiliate to it.


Although UWUSA is at present a general union, once it has recruited 5 000 workers in each sector, it intends to form industrially based unions

Much of UWUSA's support will come from workers who owe political and cultural allegiance to the Inkatha movement

The contesting strengths of black unions in Natal were speculated on when UWUSA's launch drew more than 65 000 people, whereas COSATU's rival May Day rallies drew 10 000 in Durban and 5 000 in Northern Natal

The New Labour Politics

UWUSA will obviously get much of its support from workers who owe political and cultural allegiance to Inkatha. At one stage it was believed that Inkatha would have such difficulty in establishing an



Inkatha's supportive attitude towards black trade unions changed after some affiliated to federations with explicit political agendas

KwaZulu's labour legislation from South Africa's as it allows trade unions to affiliate to political parties

The majority of the large crowd that attended UWUSA's launch were workers from Durban's townships and hostels, industrial areas in Northern Natal and from rural areas

Little attention was paid at UWUSA's launch to union resolutions or measures to improve the conditions of service and wages of black workers

altogether new union that it would rely instead on worker loyalty to establish worker chapters of Inkatha in each factory. These branches 'would act as an alternative form of worker organisation which would exploit to the full any latent dissatisfaction with union strategy and tactics' (IR Data March 1986: p7). The immediate reason for Inkatha moving directly into the trade union arena can probably be attributed to the overt political rhetoric emanating from COSATU since its launch late last year. COSATU's perceived support for disinvestment and socialism and its attacks on homeland administrations drew Inkatha's wrath, which further intensified when the new federation's leaders travelled the familiar road to Lusaka to meet with representatives of the exiled African National Congress.

COSATU was born during the preceding (selective) state of emergency that covered some of the country's major industrial areas. Under these conditions, it was inevitable that it should develop into a political vehicle and strive to represent black workers on both the shop-floor and in the broader society. Support for the campaigns of popular national movements, combined with stinging attacks on Chief Buthelezi, brought the political sympathies of COSATU's leadership into the open. Their strong words and action appear to have galvanised Inkatha into belatedly attempting to counter COSATU as one of the few organisations with the potential to usurp the vital rural and urban worker constituencies established by Inkatha in Natal.

Inkatha in Labour

With an obvious awareness of the power and influence that solidly constructed worker organisations can wield, Inkatha has always had an active interest in the organised labour movement. Prior to Chief Buthelezi's revitalisation of Inkatha in 1975, he was elected as the first chancellor of the Durban-based Institute for Industrial Education, a forerunner of the emergent black labour movement. The institute was established and run by academics and trade unionists in order to provide black workers with rudimentary trade union skills. At UWUSA's launch, Chief Buthelezi stated that he had always encouraged Inkatha members to join trade unions.

In the 1980s Inkatha's supportive attitude towards black unions slowly changed, especially after their affiliation to mass federations whose political agendas were implicitly critical of Inkatha's goals and homeland platform. Although non-aligned, the former Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) tacitly supported 'progressive' community groups, while CUSA has developed links with both the

United Democratic Front and the National Forum Committee.

In 1983, Chief Buthelezi sent an aide, memoir spelling out his attitude toward South Africa's growing labour movement to Irvin Brown, who is head of the international section of the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO). It is alleged to be currently involved in the formation of UWUSA. Buthelezi indicated that he was keen to develop a type of formal interaction between unionised black workers and Inkatha and that he would like to see union interests represented on the Inkatha Central Committee. In turn, he suggested the trade unions might 'reciprocate and establish the possibilities for Inkatha's presence in their decision-making bodies' (SALB 1984: p80/81).

In late 1985, relations between Inkatha and the labour movement further deteriorated when a FOSATU affiliate, the Metal and Allied Workers Union, called a consumer boycott of all white-owned stores in Natal during a dismissal dispute with BTR Sarmcol. Inkatha argued that although it supported consumer boycotts, it was not prepared to endorse this particular call because it had not been consulted. After one and a half months, the boycott was called off, partly due to pressure from an Inkatha affiliate, the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce. The chamber's President, Mr P. Mtshede, claimed that Chief Buthelezi had made it clear that FOSATU's persistence with the boycott was considered a challenge to Inkatha and its leadership (Oherve et al 1985: p27).

An Earlier Initiative

The only trade union to have affiliated formally to Inkatha, in terms of KwaZulu's Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No 10 of 1981), is the National Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NSRAIEU). **Tik uriwi** was established in 1980, allegedly with the support of corporate sugar interests (SALDRU 1983: p131). An official of NSRAIEU explained the union's affiliation to Inkatha in terms of the union's admiration for the movement's anti-disinvestment stance (McCaul 1984: p34).

NSRAIEU initially attempted to recruit workers in Natal's sugar mills, but rapidly altered its scope of operation to recruit nationally in the construction, metal, food distribution and maize-milling industries. In 1985, some NSRAIEU officials exposed massive irregularities in the union's accounts and its general secretary, Selby Nsibandé, soon fell out of favour with Inkatha's leadership (see following interview). Nsibandé subsequently appeared in court where it was alleged that he had bought a R/1,000,000

•_{n1} motor vehicle, spent R25 000 on "nishings and improvements to his home, _{fj} more than R5 000 on traffic Ics—all with union funds (WM 14/2/86).

Political Directions

•₁ SA's May Day launch at the Kings >ark stadium in Durban was attended by _{tiorc} than 65 000 Inkatha supporters - _{na} local hostel dwellers and workers _{rom} smaller industrial areas in the Natal hinterland. Apart from providing a crude _{measure} of support for the union, the rally also gave an indication of what the future priorities of UWUSA might be.

firstly, the character of the launch resembled that of a political rally. Most speeches concentrated on the disinvestment issue which was encapsulated in the new union's slogan, 'Jobs Not Hunger'.

UWUSA's pleas for further foreign investment to halt increasing unemployment were in stark contrast to the strategies of other black unions, who argue for maintaining employment levels through overtime bans, reduced working hours and labour-intensive production methods. Secondly, unlike the many worker-specific resolutions focused on at COSATU's equally politicised launch, UWUSA's speakers paid no attention at all to issues such as demands for a minimum wage, maternity leave, the right to strike, worker health and safety, etc.

In KwaZulu/Natal, the close interconnections between UWUSA's leadership and Inkatha will mean that the union could get both extensive financial support from Inkatha (see following interview), the tacit political support of some managements and possibly even legislative support from the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). As the KLA has the right to design its own labour legislation (see Haysom 1985: p4/6), trade unions based in 'white' South Africa could conceivably be banned from operating in homeland industry as has occurred in Bophuthatswana.

UWIJSA's primarily political and managerial origins rather than labour orientation is further reflected in the collective composition of the union's leadership:

- general secretary Simon Conco is chief whip of KLA as well as a businessman;
- president Petrus Ndlovu works in the Personnel department of a sugar _{con}glomerate;
- vice-president Pepsi Msomi is a township superintendent at Tembisa;
- treasurer Peter Davidson is a Durban-_{re}gional entrepreneur.

Surprisingly, M P Gumede, a former _{re}gional secretary of COSATU's Paper _{work}ers and Allied Workers Union who _{crossed} over to UWUSA, did not make it _{into} the new unions's executive.

UWUSA's Problems

A problem which UWUSA will experience if it continues to identify closely with Inkatha, is that it will have difficulty in attracting the support of non-Zulu, unskilled and semi-skilled workers. At UWUSA's launch there was a complete absence of both Indian or coloured workers, despite the Labour Monitoring Group's estimate that 31 percent of all Indian workers observed the work stayaway in Natal on 1 May.

Also, because of Inkatha's obvious Natal bias, it will be difficult to see how UWUSA will transcend its regional orientation — particularly on the Witwatersrand. The union has, ambitiously, already established offices on the East Rand and hopes to establish another on the West Rand. Possibly, it aims to harness the support of thousands of Zulu migrants who work in the area.

It should be interesting to see whether organised industry and commerce will remain neutral in the impending competition for worker support and union recognition. Some employers might be drawn towards the reformist, anti-disinvestment, pro-free enterprise philosophy espoused by UWUSA (FM 4/4/86). On the other hand, some industrial relations officers have expressed concern that UWUSA could exacerbate union factionalism, a major headache for management in the heyday of general unionism. Intense union rivalry could well destabilise the sound relationships many employers have developed with the more established unions over the past seven years.

In the coming months, the real test of worker confidence in UWUSA will depend on the success the union has in organising members on the shop-floor, particularly if it manages to poach members from COSATU affiliates. COSATU, however, seems to be confident of their superior organisational ability in the long run. COSATU spokespersons argue that any loss of membership to UWUSA will be temporary, for workers are bound to realise that only trade unions with tested legitimacy will be able to improve worker's wages and conditions of employment.

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IR Data 1985-1986.

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Acronyms:

FM: Financial Mail
 NM: Natal Mercury
 WM: Weekly Mail

The close relationship between Inkatha and UWUSA could mean the union will receive financial support and assistance from the KwaZulu government

Because of Inkatha's obvious Natal bias, UWUSA will have difficulty in attracting support in other provinces and from non-Zulu workers

Tensions between UWUSA and COSATU affiliates could damage the sound relationships that have developed between some managements and established unions

Stayaway Stri in the 1980s

Indicator SA R^/ark Bennett

DATE & REGION

THE UNION STA YA WA Y

11 February 1982
Natal, W and E Cape; Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging (PWV)

THE OUTBREAK OF UNREST, 1984

September/October 1984
Regional stayaways in Vaal Triangle (1-2/9/84), Soweto (17-18/9/84) and KwaThema (22/10/84)

5/6 November 1984
Transvaal, centred mainly in PWV area

THE CIVIL UNREST OF 1985/86

18/22 March 1985
Port Elizabeth (PE)/Uitenhage

28 March 1985
Uitenhage

1 May 1985
National

14 May 1985
Transvaal, Natal, E and W Cape

July 1985
Localised stayaways in Ouduza (6/7/85), KwaThema (9/7/85 and 23/7/85) and Ratanda (23/7/85)

18 July 1985
Pietermaritzburg (PMB), Howick, and partly in Durban

August 1985
ToPm1^? townshPs (10-12/8/85), Witbank (15/8/85) and East London (21/8/85)

September 1985
PWV (1-3/9/85), Cape Peninsula (10-13/9/85), Queenstown (23-24/9/85) and East London (26/9/85)

October 1985
Dimbaza (1/10/85), Witbank (8/10/85) and national 'prayaway' (9/10/85)

November/December 1985:
Mamelodi, 21/11/85 and 3/12/85

February 1986
Soshanguve (4/2/86), Mhlakena (Randfontein 11/2/86)
Saulsvihe/Atteridgeville (13/2/86), GaRankuwa (17/2/86), Witbank (17-23/2/86), Atteridgeville (19/2/86) and Alexandra (21/2/86)

March 1986
Bela-Bela (Warmbaths, 3-10/3/86), Alexandra and Soshanguve (5/3/86)
Mamelodi (17/3/86), Seisoville (Kroonstad) and PE/Uitenhage (21/3/86) and Ratanda (24/3/86)

April 1986
Kabokweni (White River) and Nelspruit (1-7/4/86), Alexandra (23/4/86) and Cradock (28/4/86)

May 1986
National stayaway (1/5/86)
Port Alfred (5-11/5/86), Tembisa (14/5/86 and 29/5/86), Tumahole (Parys, 29/5/86)

16 June 1986
National

ORGANISERS

TEXT/DEMANDS

ASSESSMENT OF SUPPORT

Affiliates of emergent black union movement

in detention of Neil Aggett, Transvaal Secretary of the Food and
S Workers Union

More than 106 130 workers participate in some form of protest action, from
work stayaways to half-hour work stoppages.

Vaal Civic Organisation with support of Con
extra-parliamentary groups (Vaa?TralleTE W'S'tents and other... and service charge increases
(Soweto) and Wathema Barmt St S
supp...
Iwar nema Parent-Mud. n Act'on Committee with Trade Unions of detainees and police non-interference in unrest funerals

Mass support for two stayaways, but not Soweto.

t r X * n i o n W d &

yiuppb

from African townships
base of detainees and political prisoners
of African educational system
Saloon of 'unfair' taxes
went/service-charge and bus fare increases

Labour monitoring group (LMG) estimate between 300 000 workers (60% of
blacks employed in private commerce and service sectors) and 800 000 (60%
of total number of blacks employed in PWV — excluding miners) support call.
Both media and employers in PWV area estimate 60% support.

(rt^ederafor^o^

in region

LMG estimate that at least 120 000 workers stay away from work for at least
one day — 90% of Africans in PE and 36% in Uitenhage. Excludes about 50% of
PE/Uitenhage workers on short time.

iaoe unions (, uba IUI affiliates and other unions

V, loss of jobs due to mergers in automobile industry

8 000 Unionised workers halt work for 15 minutes to one hour.

Black labour movement, including FOSATU and GWU
Many black trade unions

ases in petrol price
shooting of 20 Africans in Langa township (Uitenhage) on 21 March

Unknown, but generally of limited regional effect.

FOSATU

to be paid holiday
-Jw/gwage and adequate support for unemployed
%our working week, maternity rights

14 000 Workers stay away from work to attend funeral in Tsakane. LMG
estimates that 107 500 workers participate in stayaways and temporary work
stoppages.

Various civic groups with support 1'ur nxl'a-parliamentary opposition
organisations

Jointly force action in the townships
it victims

Mass regional community support.

Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU)

lpressure employers in Natal Midlands to lobby BTR Sarmcol to re-
3650 workers, dismissed in recognition dispute

LMG and MAWU estimate from survey of 49 firms that 92% of all PMB African
workers participate — PMB Chamber of Industries estimate is 60%. Few
support call in Durban.

Same loose alliance

Sillar demands

Mass regional support: 100% in East London.

Same loose alliance, with trade union participation

ffirmation of first anniversary of Vaal Triangle uprising
"fid to Stalp of Emergency and unbanning of organisations
*payment of a living wage

Variable support of 20% to 60% for four-day stayaway in Peninsula, but
migrants do not participate; in East London and Queenstown 100% success.

Various community groups and 47 thinnus groups form the National Initiative
for Reconciliation (NIR) - not endorsed by trade unions

to attend funeral of ANC guerilla (Dimbaza)
of emergency and security force actions (NIR)

Massive stayaway in PE/Uitenhage in support of NIR — in rest of country
success is moderate to weak, some JHB firms experience 80% absenteeism.

Civic organisations, with support from other opposition groups

force presence in township, high rents and stringent restrictions
stayaway for funerals of twelve unrest victims killed in earlier

Mass regional stayaway - 3 of workers respond to second call.

Community and student groups

wo' dptamed community activists (Soshanguve and Witbank)
of unrest victims (Mohlakeng, GaRankuwa and Atteridgeville)

Unknown extent of support. In Alexandra more than 45 000 people attend
report-back after clergy meets with government.

Civic and student organisations, with support 1mm other opposition g P

to attend church-led meeting (Alexandra)

Variable support. More than 100 000 participate in Alexandra. 80% in
Seisoville and 100% in PE/Uitenhage.

Civic organisations, with support from other opposition groups

25]]Wiorate first anniversary of Langa shootings (PE/Uitenhage)
in Kabokweni and Nelspruit
unrest victims (Cradock) and mass meeting (Alexandra)

Between 75% and 100% effective in Kabokweni and Nelspruit; 100% successful
in Cradock and Alexandra.

Labour and extra-parliamentary movements (May Day) Regional civic,
student and women's groups

n? recognised as paid public holiday
Alfred women at May Day rally, and protest release of

LMG estimate more than 1 500 000 workers stay away on May 1. Regional
worker support is 90% in E Cape, 15% in W Cape, 80% in PWV, 70% in Natal;
and 80% of all miners participate. All women workers in Port Alfred; moderate
support in Tembisa and Tumahole.

Supported by broad range of black trade unions extra-parliamentary
opposition and student and civic groups

Funeral of unrest victims (Tembisa)
Siyismantle parks built by students
ration of 10th anniversary of outbreak of Soweto student rebellion

LMG estimate more than 1 500 000 workers support stayaway (Natal
excluded). Regional worker support is 90% in PWV, 35% in Cape Town, 100%
in PE/Uitenhage, but only 10% of miners participate.

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● THE OFFICIAL STRIKE COUNT 1975-1985 ●

Some Indicators of Industrial Conflict

NUMBER OF STRIKES/WORKSTOPPAGES	Year	Total number of workers involved		Total number of man days lost	Estimated wages lost
		African	Coloured Indian White		
274	1975	22 546	777	18 709	R 48 427
245	1976	26 291	1 722	59 861	R 85 710
90	1977	14 950	354	15 471	R 47 711
106	1978	13 578	582	10 558	R 44 354
101	1979	15 494	7 309	67 099	R 202 501
207	1980	56 286	5 499	174 614	R1 401 516
342	1981	84 706	8 136	226 554	R2 263 705
394	1982	122 481	19 090	365 337	R4 544 63
336	1983	61 331	3 138	124 596	R1 697 610
469	1984	174 897	7 045	379 712	R5 174 798
389	1985	224 947	14 869	678 273	Not available

● Not all incidents of industrial conflict — such as overtime bans, sympathy strikes, go-slows, etc — are officially recorded. Section 65A (1) of the Labour Relations Act requires employers to report to the Department of Manpower only a 'discontinuance of work' that occurs as a result of a dispute concerning the terms and conditions of employment.

● In addition, other forms of labour action not directly related to shop-floor issues — such as political strikes, black community stayaways and symbolic work stoppages — are not recorded in the official strike count (see preceding data base).

● For an elaboration of the problems encountered in the monitoring of labour conflict in South Africa see Levy A. 'The Limitations of Strike Statistics', in Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol3/No2: p9/12; 1985.

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1202

Conco on UWUSA & Inkatha

UWUSA General Secretary and Inkatha Chief Whip speaks to Indicator SA Researcher, Mark Bennett.

IPSA: Since UWUSA's launch on 1 May, I tensions between Inkatha and COSATU have I erupted into severe clashes between rival supporters on the shop-floor, e.g. at several Clover Dairies' plants, the Hlobane coalmine, etc. What steps are being taken to prevent further internecine worker conflict?

Conco: At Hlobane it was not a case of conflict between UWUSA and COSATU as such, but rather a battle between a group of shop-stewards intending to go on strike and those workers who did not want to. To be fair to COSATU, it is not the whole federation that is involved in these violent actions — it is mostly workers who belong to their Food and Allied Workers Union affiliate.

Management should not stand aloof when there is violence between workers but should try to bring together all affected unions to discuss the best ways to avoid conflict. In fact UWUSA is currently developing new methods of organising workers that will not result in direct confrontation with other unions. We are moving quietly and will only publicly reveal our support to management once we have obtained a majority.

IPSA: As a representative of Inkatha, what role do you think trade unions should have in South Africa Unlay?

Conco: We have always regarded trade unions as being very important for relations on the shop-floor to be put on an even keel. In the early 1970s, when the South African government wanted all workers to form works committees, we spoke very strongly against them and advocated a role for trade unions. We knew of course that the leadership of certain unions were opposed to Inkatha and that they had certain political affiliations, but were happy about our members belonging to trade unions - as long as they addressed themselves to shop-floor issues. In recognition of Chief Buthelezi's efforts, almost all inaugural meetings of Natal-based trade unions were addressed by him, the northern region of ftJSATU, BAWU, etc

4: What functions should trade unions perform? Should they confine themselves exclusively to 'bread and butter' issues, or should they get involved in "reader political issues?"

Conco: Well, a trade union should primarily concern itself with shop-floor issues, but then there is a very thin dividing line with politics - in fact the complements the other. We feel that it is right for trade unions to concern themselves with political "tatters - but not party political matters, not what is happening now, like the ANC visits.



Mark Bennett

IPSA: At its launch in Durban, COSATU issued a number of politically oriented statements on issues such as disinvestment, the homelands, a commitment to socialism. Why has Inkatha criticised these standpoints?

Conco: COSATU's members never gave anyone, any leader, a mandate to pronounce on political issues. Socialism has never been debated by the general membership of the unions - the 'charterists' have every right to advocate a socialist system, but then the leadership should put it to the people themselves on the shop-floor.

What we would like to see happen is that the benefits of the free enterprise system should be extended to all members of the South African community. As the Chief usually says, 'the free enterprise system is the only system we know that is capable of turning dust into a piece of bread'.

IPSA: Why does Inkatha oppose disinvestment?

Conco: Thousands and thousands of people are without jobs, and our people have not told us that they don't want the free enterprise system. As a matter of fact, they are voting with their feet, they are looking for jobs at the gates of every factory. In an effort to alleviate everyday suffering, Chief Buthelezi had to go out and canvass for foreign investment, to provide more jobs in this country. Now we are being criticised for having brought industry here that is supposedly exploiting cheap labour.

About the homelands - when Elijah Barayi spoke at COSATU's launch and started denouncing the bantustans, our people in the audience were not deceived - they knew to whom he was referring. That is why they came to Chief Buthelezi and said 'Look, you persuaded us to join that trade union and we think you have handed us over to the wolves.'

All the trade unions put together have unionised only 8 percent of the workers in South Africa and 92 percent are not unionised yet. Now that COSATU's leaders know that Inkatha is doing something about this situation, they have brought all their forces from outside to organise their unions in Natal. Our stand against COSATU is not conflict orientated. If their members come to us, well and good, but there are

people, including COSATU, think that we are not going to have any effect anywhere else other than in Natal, but they will be shocked. The battle will be won or lost on the Witwatersrand. We have one office on the East Rand which is going very well - in fact, it is beating us in Natal, and we have received invitations to the Vaal Triangle.

U'SA: Are those Inkatha members or are they workers who do not believe in disinvestment and socialism?

Conco: Workers! Some of those people are disappointed with the existing unions because they have not received a fair deal.

IPSA: As UWUSA is still very new I should imagine it has few experienced unionists, legal representatives and the like. What steps have been taken to overcome this lack of expertise?

Conco: In the first place we have retained the services of consultants to help us, both in the matter of industrial relations and public relations, and we are organising a legal team to train negotiators. We are also importing people from the United States and Europe to come here to organise our shop-stewards. Some shop-stewards will have to train on the job and a few will be sent out for training.

I think we are going to have teething problems, but they won't be as serious as many people are led to believe I think if people would give us a chance to get settled, we will come out with some novel ideas. As a marketing man would say, we think our product is good, the facilities are there and if we don't have the expertise we will have to buy the expertise.

IPSA: What type of long-term support will Inkatha offer UWUSA?

Conco: At the moment Inkatha is providing all the facilities and the KwaZulu government as such is playing a very small role. Inkatha has decided to throw everything into this because we believe it is a matter of life and death. You see there are two areas of concern to us - the schools and labour. As those are the two main thrusts of the ANC and their surrogates, Inkatha wants to counteract it.

IPSA: There have been reports that Inkatha or the KwaZulu administration has given UWUSA financial support. Is this a loan which will be repaid?

Conco: We have asked our regions to set themselves up into committees and are giving loans to these groups with the view of having the money refunded so it may be recycled. Where Inkatha gets its funds is not our concern in UWUSA, but it would be best for us to look up to one source of funding. We do not want extensive funding because we would like this thing to be self-motivating as soon as possible. To give us the kick-off, we will be satisfied with the funding we get from Inkatha.

IPSA: So in the long run you envisage UWUSA to be Worker-financed?

Conco: Yes. Most members of Inkatha will join in such big numbers that there will be no problem in getting finances.

IPSA: Would you encourage skilled workers to join UWUSA?

Conco: This brings me to the philosophy of Inkatha. We are not capitalists in the true sense, but we are using capitalism to adjust ourselves to

conditions in South Africa. What we are after is uplifting the lowly to the level where they can be self-sustaining. We are interested mainly in the people who cannot afford to exploit the capitalist system - the common working man who is exploited by other classes.

Some people have been encouraging us to get the teachers' union to join us, and we say teachers belong to a class that is capable of looking after itself. Consequently it would be a wrong policy to bring in teachers in order to swell numbers.

IPSA: KwaZulu has been allowed to develop its own labour legislation. What has it done so far and what further steps will it take in this regard?

Conco: KwaZulu has adopted that South African labour legislation which did not apply in the region. KwaZulu does not look at itself as a separate area of South Africa. We are looking to the day when there will be uniform labour legislation for one country. We are not encouraging different types of legislation for our community.

IPSA: Has the KwaZulu administration adopted the racial clauses in South African labour legislation?

Conco: We are in the process of doing away with them. In fact, sooner or later we will be in advance of the thinking embodied in the labour legislation in South Africa.

IPSA: If UWUSA workers felt that in a particular area, say health and safety, they needed some legislative protection

Conco: They can always lobby. In fact, I would not expect UWUSA to pander to all the dictates of Inkatha. I would expect UWUSA to oppose Inkatha if it were not doing its job.

IPSA: Will labour legislation be introduced, similar to Bophuthatswana, where unions who do not have their head offices situated in KwaZulu are outlawed from operating there?

Conco: We would never think of introducing legislation like that. People do not understand that we in KwaZulu have a totally different philosophy from that of the other so-called homelands. We are not looking upon ourselves as a KwaZulu territory. We look upon ourselves as South Africans, whereas Bophuthatswana looks upon itself as an independent authority.

IPSA: How will Inkatha deal with any companies in KwaZulu who refuse to deal with UWUSA?

Conco: Oh no, we can't enforce anyone, but I think it would be a very unwise company indeed who would refuse to recognise UWUSA in KwaZulu.

IPSA: Obviously the KwaZulu administration is concerned about the employment and living conditions of workers in KwaZulu. Does it envisage introducing a code of employment conduct for firms operating in KwaZulu?

Conco: Not only for KwaZulu; we are also concerned about the living conditions of labour in all of South Africa. We have always advocated the adoption of codes like the Sullivan code. KwaZulu has always encouraged trade unions, and that workers should join unions. This is because they should monitor the working conditions of labour within KwaZulu. Our complaint was that the existing unions had not given this service to the workers.

TRADE UNIONS SECTOR BY SECTOR

Part Two

• THE CHEMICAL AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY •



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A, though COSA TU hoped to unify its 33 affiliates into ten industrial unions

*mergers have taken place or, I, f, **
food and transport sectors

	Paid-up Membership
COSATU	
Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU)	20 700
CUSA	
SA Chemical Workers Union (SACWU)	23 500
TUCSA	
Chemical and Allied Workers Unions	475
Glass Workers Union	385
Unaffiliated	
Chemical Workers Union	577
Cape Explosives Industrial Workers Union	600

has negotiated a greater number of recognition agreements with employers. The absence of SACWU from the final stages of the unity talks was a bitter blow for COSATU. Prior to the formation of COSATU, informal discussions and tactical co-operation between the two chemical unions had broken down when SACWU claimed that CWIU was trying to dislodge it.

SACWU claims a much larger (paper) membership of over 45 000 workers, but it has been beset by constant upheavals within its upper leadership. Its stronghold is its stronghold in the conglomerate, African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI), where it has more than 8 000 members.

ANALYSIS

Equal Strengths

Approximately 103 000 people are employed in the South African chemical industry — more than two-thirds are black workers and the sector is obviously a strategic target for the new labour movement. Although COSATU's CWIU is numerically smaller than CUSA's chemical workers' affiliate, it appears to be better organised and

CWIU also has a presence at AECI but its strength seems to be located in the various SASOL plants and the coalmines that supply the oil-from-coal industry. During 1984 more than 6 000 SASOL employees and union members were dismissed for participating in the November 1984 work stayaway, but were reinstated after CWIU intervened on their behalf. CWIU also has an important foothold in the glass industry, due to the merger of the Glass and Allied Workers Union with U/viu when it was an affiliate of FOSATU.

• THE TRANSPORT AND SERVICE SECTOR •

	Paid-up Membership
TSATU	
Transport and General Workers Unions (TGWU)	24 000
SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU)	8 220
SA Scooter Transport and Allied Workers Union (SASTAWU)	4 700
Cleaning Services and Allied Workers Union (CSAWU)	850

TAWU	
Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU)	10 875
SA Laundry, Dry-Cleaning and Dyeing Workers Union /SALDCDWU)	3 000
Brushes, Cleaners and Allied Workers Union (BCAWU)	1 000
Ukani Black Guards and Allied Workers Union	1 000

UCSA	
Artisan Staff Association	24 297
Bay Bus Workers Union	220
East London Municipal Workers Union	309
Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers Union	1 000
Motor Transport Workers Union of SA	693
SA Transport Workers Union	810
Transport Workers Union of SA	13 417
Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers Union-Cape	1 116

Unaffiliated	
Laundry, Dry-Cleaning and Dyeing Employees Union-Natal	1 200
Tramway and Omnibus Workers Union — Cape	2 073
In-house staff associations for SA Railways and Harbours employees (many for whites only)	±50 000

ANALYSIS

Recruiting State Workers

The giant state-owned South African Transport Services (SATS) employs more than 300 000 black workers, who are almost entirely un-unionised. The SATS Conditions of Employment Act (1983) legally entrenches the group's refusal to deal with any newer black trade unions, and allows only staff associations recognised by the Minister of Transport to participate in SATS controlled conciliation mechanisms. Any transport unions on a recruiting drive will experience great difficulty in organising SATS workers. In 1982 SATS dismissed more than 500 black dockers in Port Elizabeth after the independent General Workers Union (GWU) fought a bitter struggle to negotiate a recognition agreement.

UCSA's presence in the transport industry remains substantial, albeit localised with most of its affiliates concentrated in municipal passenger and goods transportation. CUSA's TAWU operates on a national basis and has about 10 000 paid-up members, but claims to have organised up more than 20 000 workers.

COSATU Merger

The transport industry is most probably COSATU's weakest organised sector, as prior to their merger, both



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COSATU president, Elijah Barayi. COSATU's leadership has stressed that one priority of the federation will be to recruit unorganised workers in the agricultural, domestic service and transport sectors.

the former Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and GWU had only marginal bases in the country's massive transport infrastructure. However, they do offer the federation a base on which to now construct an integrated transport union.

In mid-May 1986, GWU and TGWU rationalised operations and merged to form the Transport and General Workers Union, as part of COSATU's drive to form one union within each industry. The total membership of the new union is about 24 000, of whom at least 10 000 are directly involved in the transport sector. The new union has the strong support of stevedores who work in the country's ports and it is organising in three main sectors — passenger, goods and municipal transportation (SALDRU, 1983: p257/258). The merger was not problem free, however, as COSATU general affiliate, the South African Allied Workers Union, which has organised some transport workers, unsuccessfully argued that railway employees should be organised within a separate union.

The reason why workers employed in the cleaning and security/protection services were included within COSATU's new transport union are not clear. The marginal nature of these two sectors and the fact that many COSATU affiliates have recruited small numbers of these workers, may account for the decision to tag them (possibly temporarily) onto TAWU.

Notes:

These synopses were compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett as part of an ongoing series on organised labour that now covers six sectors. For a complete list of sources, see Industrial Monitor Vol3/NoV P10.

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