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VIR VOLK EN VADERLAND

A Guide to the White Right

INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA

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
**VIR VOLK
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VADERLAND**

A Guide to the White Right

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INTRODUCTION

Defining the White Right

In May 1987, three in ten white South Africans voted for one of the two white rightwing parties - the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party - which contested the national election for the House of Assembly. By any count, this represents a large portion of white opinion in the country.

Whites living in South Africa in the late 1980s have much cause for anxiety and fear: compared with a decade or two ago, they find themselves materially poorer, less secure in their middle-class homes and their manager's offices at work, rejected by the outside world, and increasingly without a clear, positive vision of their future.

It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that these two trends are linked to one another in any simple causal way. In South Africa, whites do not simply vote on the right because of their very South African fears and anxieties. Nor, in fact, does the Conservative Party merely whip up and exploit such fears and anxieties (though these do play a significant role in that party's strategy). Rather, support for the CP emerges from a complex background which has a long history and a changing composition.

Support for the CP, moreover, is assembled from diverse sources: convinced Afrikaner Nationalist followers of the party form the core; supporters who wish to lodge a protest against their traditional parties, a significant section; and a mixed bag of white supremacists and white colonials, another

section. Support for any political party, in fact, particularly when established by way of the vote, is an illusive matter, often fickle and never wholly rational. The case of the CP is no exception.

Our purpose in this *Indicator SA* Issue Focus is threefold:

- to identify and analyse CP policies and strategies in the run-up to the second national white election it will contest;
- to show how and why the CP forms part of a wider social movement we will call Afrikaner nationalism, a movement within which the CP is but one - albeit important - element;
- to show how white conservatism in South Africa receives moral support and justification from Afrikaner nationalism which, in turn, directs and adapts itself to different conservative groups in the country.

The authors do not intend, moreover, to enter into the world of electoral forecasting and try our hand at predicting the results of the forthcoming September 1989 election. Rather, we will describe the world of organisation and the world of ideas which has given rise to the CP and to the wider white rightwing movement. By so doing, we hope to demonstrate that this movement should be neither disregarded nor underestimated.

Nor do the authors intend to malign or ridicule the white rightwing by calling them 'rabid racists', for example, or relegating them to the 'lunatic fringe'. That there are racist

White conservatism in South Africa receives moral support and justification from Afrikaner nationalism, in the form of a new social movement

The term 'white ultraright' can be used to describe the rightwing movement when it is placed on the entire spectrum of white/black politics

elements within the movement is irrefutable. These dimensions are discussed in this study. We believe, however, that the label, racist captures neither the fundamental nature nor the underlying intention of the rightwing movement. As for the phrase, lunatic fringe, the movement is anything but fringe if this implies insignificance, and it is anything but lunatic if the implication here is that the ideas of the movement should not be taken seriously. Finally, the authors will use the term, white rightwing, in the text. This use implies that the predominantly white Democratic Party is on the 'left' and the governing white National Party in the 'centre' of the political spectrum. On the narrow platform of white South African politics, these defined positions do

ring true. When the platform is broadened to include all significant political parties and movements within the country, on the other hand, the term, white ultraright would be more fitting. We recognise and accept this dilemma, and do not wish to underrate the importance of these other political forces by using the more common first term.

To assist the reader, separate summaries are provided of the lengthier chapters in this study, covering Part One (The Conservative Party), Part Four (The Wider White Right), and Part Five (Rightwing Violence). These reader summaries, which identify the main trends and offer commentary, follow in boxes at the end of each of these chapters.

PART ONE

The Conservative Party

**Waiting
in the
Right Wing**

Data Base

PROVINCIAL BREAKDOWN OF 1981 & 1987 ELECTION RESULTS

IPSA Research

I Transvaal

| | 1981 | 1987 | 1981 | | 1987 | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|----|
| Total no of registered voters | 1 164 564 | 1 617 747 | | | | | |
| Provincial percentage poll | 63,94 | 67,45 | | | | | |
| Total votes & seats per party | | | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | |
| | | | NP | 396 425 | 67 | 526 919 | 47 |
| | | | PFP | 120 954 | 9 | 123 657 | 6 |
| | | | NRP | 24 316 | — | 4 895 | — |
| | | | HNP | 119 379 | — | 32 499 | — |
| | | | CP | — | — | 383 176 | 22 |
| | | | Independent | — | — | 11 201 | 1 |

II Cape

| | 1981 | 1987 | 1981 | | 1987 | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|----|
| Total no of registered voters | 687 361 | 811 970 | | | | | |
| Provincial percentage poll | 68,10 | 68,71 | | | | | |
| Total votes & seats per party | | | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | |
| | | | NP | 229 033 | 43 | 335 793 | 48 |
| | | | PFP | 98 112 | 11 | 95 420 | 8 |
| | | | NRP | 22 889 | 1 | 12 272 | — |
| | | | HNP | 35 386 | — | 14 006 | — |
| | | | CP | — | — | 82 366 | — |
| | | | Independent | 2 143 | — | 13 417 | — |

III Natal

| | 1981 | 1987 | 1981 | | 1987 | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|-------------|--------|-------|---------|----|
| Total no of registered voters | 262 174 | 360 332 | | | | | |
| Provincial percentage poll | 69,63 | 66,35 | | | | | |
| Total votes & seats per party | | | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | |
| | | | NP | 67 282 | 7 | 119 299 | 14 |
| | | | PFP | 46 231 | 6 | 66 885 | 5 |
| | | | NRP | 57 451 | 7 | 23 327 | 1 |
| | | | HNP | 8 206 | — | 4 446 | — |
| | | | CP | — | — | 21 059 | — |
| | | | Independent | 520 | — | 2 531 | — |

IV OFS

| | 1981 | 1987 | 1981 | | 1987 | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|-------------|--------|-------|--------|----|
| Total no of registered voters | 178 180 | 229 558 | | | | | |
| Provincial percentage poll | 66,70 | 73,4 | | | | | |
| Total votes & seats per party | | | Votes | Seats | Votes | Seats | |
| | | | NP | 84 818 | 14 | 93 497 | 14 |
| | | | PFP | — | — | 2 612 | — |
| | | | NRP | 2 108 | — | — | — |
| | | | HNP | 29 333 | — | 10 505 | — |
| | | | CP | — | — | 60 958 | — |
| | | | Independent | — | — | — | — |

Notes

- Data excludes registered voters in unopposed seats. There were only two unopposed seats (both PFP) in the 1987 election, after 12 candidates stood unopposed (10 NP, 2 PFP) in the 1981 elections.
- Out of a total of 3,04m registered white voters, 2,12m votes were cast in the 1987 election, producing a 67,97% poll (1981: 66,02%).
- The national distribution of (directly elected) parliamentary seats after the 6 May election is NP (123), CP (22), PFP (19), NRP (1), Independent (1). On 11 March 1987 the pre-election division of seats was NP (117 — included 7 vacant NP seats), PFP (25), CP (16), NRP (5), Independent (2), HNP (1). Both sets of data exclude 12 indirectly elected, nominated seats.
- The party share of total votes cast in the 1987 election was NP (52,45%), CP (26,37%), PFP (14,44%), HNP (3,14%), NRP (2%), Independent (1,3%).

Overview Setting the Stage

The September 1989 national election directly involves white, 'coloured' and Indian voters. African South Africans will not cast a vote. The outcome of the election will directly define the composition of the Houses of Assembly (white), of Representatives ('coloured') and of Delegates (Indian). African representation in the tricameral parliament with its State President and cabinet - the institution which governs the Republic of South Africa - will remain totally absent; the African voice will not and, under the present constitution, may not be heard. In short, the election is, in the first place, an 'own affairs' election, and an election which excludes the majority of the population. The election, moreover, takes place under a continuing nation-wide State of Emergency.

The issues which are being raised by 'own affairs' politicians on public platforms immediately before election day, however, are anything but 'own affairs' issues. Mainly, the issues revolve around:

- the distribution of national wealth among all South Africans;
- the relationship between 'own affairs' political parties (representing minority groups) and extra-parliamentary anti-apartheid movements;
- the South African state, its social services and the security role it should play in the country;
- the outside world's deprecatory view of apartheid, the country and its government; and
- each party's proposed vision of the country's future.

What is also increasingly being discussed, especially since the momentous public meeting in July 1989 between State President Botha and ANC President Mandela, is the form of the national negotiations which need to take place. It is widely accepted that such negotiations will culminate in a constitutionally-defined contest between all South African political groups, a contest for power under conditions of free association (rather than within statutory race groups).

Although an African voice may not be heard in the three Houses constituting the tricameral parliament, other types of political institutions involving mass African participation are not silent. The historical view that African participation in the South African political process has taken the form of passive participation is a patently false view. The present situation is no exception.

The *Mass Democratic Movement* (MDM), a coalition of anti-apartheid bodies (which includes trade union together with voluntary associational membership), which has recently been formed, makes a legitimate claim to widespread support throughout the country. The MDM has launched a defiance campaign designed to coincide with pre-election 'own affairs', party-political campaigns. This defiance campaign is designed to highlight the discrimination and inefficiency caused by 'own affairs' policies and institutions in the provision of social services.

In the international sphere, moreover, South Africa's apartheid system is unanimously accepted as criminal and vicious. This has led to a continuing series of boycotts and disinvestment strategies, and to international recognition of the exiled African National Congress (ANC) as a primary and legitimate political actor within the country.

It is within this broader political context that we shall analyse the Conservative Party together with its electoral record to date, its policies, its strategies and tactics in the run-up to the September election.

1.1 CP Emergence and Electoral Gains

The Conservative Party (CP) became the official opposition in the House of Assembly following the 1987 general election, the first which it contested. The party was formed in 1982. Under the leadership of Dr Andrius Treurnicht, a former minister of religion and Afrikaans daily newspaper editor, seventeen parliamentarians seceded from the National Party (NP) government.

It is widely accepted that national negotiations will culminate in a contest for power on the basis of free association rather than statutory race group

The CP won over 26% of total votes cast in May 1987, rising to 30% if HNP votes are included as part of a combined rightwing vote - 3 out of 10 white voters

The cause of the CP breakaway hinged on the creation by the government of the tricameral parliament, which provided for representation in separate chambers for Indian and 'coloured' South Africans. This policy shift - ostensibly in the direction of 'power-sharing' - was too much for the inward- and backward-looking (*behoudende*) group in the NP: the principle of white (and essentially Afrikaner) exclusivity in the political domain had been fundamentally compromised. At a deeper level, this compromise, so they believed, would deeply and negatively affect white group interests and their very survival.

Andries Treurnicht had long been linked to the *behoudende* group within the NP. As editor of *Die Hoofstad* during the sixties, he had supported a position close to that of the earlier breakaway Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). Instead of joining that party, as many observers expected at the time, he remained in the NP, was later elected its Transvaal leader, and was invited to serve in the cabinet.

The CP break from the NP in 1982 came on the heels of the information scandal which had rocked the government to its core. Senior members of the government - apparently hailing mainly from the Transvaal - were shown to have illegally used state funds for the purpose of improving the image of the NP and of the country as a whole. This major government embarrassment contributed to the rise of the more *verligte* (enlightened) Cape faction in the cabinet and the party. Provincial loyalties, as expressed through provincial Congresses, have always been important in the NP. This shift of power and influence probably contributed to the breakaway of a number of Transvaal parliamentarians and to growing dissatisfaction among many party members.

The scope of dissatisfaction with the NP was broader, however, than that reflected by the 17 breakaway MPs. Many branch organisations had become disaffected and party discipline and routine had suffered as a consequence. A number, in fact, switched organisational allegiance by joining the CP as complete branches. The Prime Minister of the time, PW Botha, was unwilling or unable to call a general election in the early eighties -

the strategy which his predecessor, John Vorster, had used in the late sixties to contain the earlier HNP breakaway. The result was that the so-called 'dissidents' were able to organise themselves into a coherent political force (Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987).

The successes of the CP in gaining parliamentary constituencies (and in becoming the official opposition) in the House of Assembly are summarised in the accompanying table (see data base:8). The 22 seats the party won in 1987 (out of the 166 in the House of Assembly) represents 13% of the total seats contested. This percentage is misleading, however, for it reflects a significant under-estimation of the party's strength among the white electorate at that time.

The reason that CP strength was greater than that which the percentage suggests is two-fold:

- The CP was opposed in 75 of the 126 seats it contested in May 1987 by the HNP, a fellow white rightwing party which differed from the CP for largely historical and personality reasons rather than on essential ideological grounds (see next chapter). The HNP did not succeed in winning a single seat. It did split the rightwing vote, however. This led to eight seats being won by the National Party (NP), even though combined rightwing votes exceeded those for the NP in these constituencies.
- The CP received over 26% of total white votes cast, a proportion which rises to an effective 30% if HNP votes are included with those cast for the CP (see data base:22). In short, nationally, three votes out of ten were cast for the white rightwing parties (a proportion which, if directly translated into constituencies, points to no less than 50 out of a total number of 166 seats).

Subsequent by-election results have confirmed the strength of CP support, especially in the Transvaal. Two by-elections held for the House of Assembly in small-town and rural Transvaal constituencies in early March 1988 were decisively won by the CP. Although the two wins did not increase CP parliamentary representation - for both seats

had been won by the party in May 1987 - voter majorities were significantly increased. Against the full force of the governing NP electoral machine and the extensive pro-government press in the run-up to the by-elections (the 'war of words', as one newspaper called it), the CP seemed stronger and more confident than ever. The new party convincingly created the public impression that it was successfully consolidating its support.

Regionally, support has emerged mainly in the north of the country. At present all 22 elected CP parliamentary seats are located in the Transvaal, as are six of the eight seats in which the combined CP/HNP vote exceeded that of the NP in May 1987. The other two seats are located in the northern Orange Free State (OFS), a province in which the combined CP/HNP vote was over 40% of total votes cast. Most of these seats are rural, though the CP does hold a number of constituencies in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging (PWV) region.

The regional character of CP support was underlined by the outcome of the municipal elections of October 1988. The CP gained significant and in a number of cases, overwhelming support in Transvaal towns and on the Reef, together with some support in the OFS. In Natal and the Cape Province, on the other hand, support was very limited. It is interesting to note that the CP believes that local government elections had become far more politicised in the Transvaal (in Johannesburg, for instance) before the October 1988 elections than elsewhere. Party leaders also believe that the tradition of non-party political elections in the other Provinces significantly limited CP support at local polls in those Provinces, particularly in the OFS where the party had enjoyed widespread support in the general election.

1.2 CP Election Campaign 1989

Four political parties will be contesting the 1989 election for seats in the (white) House of Assembly. Two of the four, the CP and the

HNP (both belonging to the white rightwing) will once again compete against one another. Attempts some two years ago at forming an election alliance before the May 1987 election failed and the HNP, which showed poorly at the polls during that election, has been diminishing in strength and influence ever since. Nonetheless, as a result of the perseverance of its tenacious and controversial leader, Jaap Marais, the HNP intends to contest over twenty seats in September, all but two in constituencies also contested by the CP. The waning fortunes and ambitions of the HNP are discussed in Part Two, a case study of the party (see data base:22). In addition, a comprehensive explanation for these waning fortunes and for continuing CP-HNP disunity is given in Part Three.

The three major parties participating in the white national election are the NP, the CP, and the Democratic Party (DP). The CP will field candidates in 129 of the 166 parliamentary constituencies, all contesting NP candidates. In 68 of these 129 constituencies, the Democratic Party will also field a candidate. This will result in a series of three-cornered (and in some cases, four-cornered) contests, leaving the NP the difficult task of fighting to maintain a position in the centre of the South African white political spectrum in these 68 constituencies, most of which it now holds.

1.2.1 Security and Economic Issues

One major plank in the CP electoral strategy to date has been to accuse the governing NP of having 'sold out' the white voter to a future black majority government - *die verloening van die volk*. This stance is closely bound to attacking the government for its mismanagement of the economy, and the resultant falling living standards of white South Africans in general and of civil servants in particular. In this way, the CP hopes not only to retain support in its own ranks but to gather an increasing number of protest votes from more conservative NP groups.

It is in the context of these two issues that the issue of the Namibian settlement is being used

Of the 129 seats that the CP is contesting in September 1989, the HNP will be contesting about 20 and the DP 68 in three - and four-cornered contests with the ruling NP

The CP election approach is borrowed from earlier NP strategy, comprising grassroots participation in civic associations and voluntary bodies

by the CP in whatever aspects the settlement may be seen to be inimical to 'white interests' in that territory. Thus, white security as regards both the establishment of Namibia and the continuation of the state of emergency in South Africa itself, remains a focus point and may become, particularly in light of the Botha-Mandela meeting, one of the primary pre-election issues.

A second strategy of attack is to accuse the NP of moving in the direction of the liberal, 'sell-out' DP. The CP charges that if the combined CP and DP seats were to exceed 83, the NP would be induced to form a coalition government with the DP (rather than with the CP), thereby showing its true emergent colours.

Finally, there is the strategy of blaming the NP for the continuing impoverishment of the 'ordinary' white man. In the CP election newsletter of July 1989, the accusation is carefully spelled out:

- South Africa faces increasingly difficult economic circumstances and therefore, greater white poverty in its near future;
- the economic downturn is largely due to reckless government spending;
- a substantial part of this expenditure is found in the irresponsibly large allocations to black groups in the country; with the result that
- it is the ordinary white man who is at the receiving end, for he must pay for this state expenditure.

1.2.2 Back to Grassroots

The CP has developed a widespread grassroots approach to its supporters and potential supporters. This approach was tested and validated - mainly in the Transvaal - in the run-up to the May 1987 election and has since been further extended in the OFS, Northern Natal, and North-Western Cape. It is an approach borrowed from NP strategy in the thirties and forties, comprising aggressive participation in local civic associations and voluntary bodies (such as local councils, school boards and agricultural co-operatives) together with the maintenance of continuous personal contact with voters in their homes

and their neighbourhoods. Because of party workers' backgrounds and party branch locations, it is an approach which is particularly effective in Afrikaans communities; even though the CP does claim a growing English-speaking support base and goes to considerable lengths to woo English-speakers into the fold.

As the governing NP has become more elitist and more distanced from its traditional Afrikaans supporters, this CP approach has gained in grassroots support and recognition. Symbolically, the two competing Ox Wagon Memorial Treks in December 1988 epitomised the battle for Afrikaner nationalist support. It is interesting to note that, whilst the official *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuur Organisasies* (FAK) Memorial Trek enjoyed wide mass-media coverage, that of the white rightwing (under sponsorship of the *Afrikaner Volkswag*) achieved significantly wider participation and support, particularly in Donkerhoek (Pretoria) where the final celebrations took place.

1.2.3 Financing the Campaign Trail

The CP has set for itself a target of R50 000 to be raised for each constituency it will contest in September 1989. The party intends transferring a substantial amount of these funds to its central administration, largely to finance constituencies (like Mayfair and Hercules) where such large amounts will be extremely difficult to raise.

The CP obtains the largest portion of its finances from individuals rather than corporations: it uses the phrase, a 'hearts-and-minds' campaign to recruit donors either for a once-off contribution or to raise more permanent support by way of stop-orders. Party workers regularly approach supporters in their neighbourhoods to recruit and register in these ways. Party officials claim to have raised recently, in two adjoining constituencies, R120 000 in a two-month period through the work of a single party fundraiser.

The party's financial base is therefore individual rather than corporate. The CP

plans, nonetheless, to approach corporations for larger donations than those it regularly receives from individual supporters. Party spokesmen argue that some larger concerns in the Transvaal *platteland* will probably be willing to donate to the CP, particularly now that the party has become the official opposition and thereby gained a great deal of legitimacy. Spokesmen also argue that some of their supporters, particularly farmers, will be able to exert influence on suppliers of farming equipment and materials to make donations to party coffers.

The party, in fact, found it difficult to secure financial loans when they were first formed, but this position has been reversed since 1987. Relations with large banks (*Volksskas*, for instance) are said to be much improved. Even without coffers which are bursting at the seams, however, party finances are not perceived by party leaders to be a major problem in the run-up to the elections of 6 September 1989.

1.3 CP/NP Policy Distinctions

What basic differences divide the CP from their erstwhile colleagues in the NP? The CP adheres to two fundamental principles. The first is white racial exclusivity in all important domains of life. The second is geographical partition, enabling each group to obtain its own homeland or, at minimum, enabling the Afrikaner *volk* to do so, leaving the rest of South Africa to go its own way. The party argues that the South African government has irreversibly compromised itself in relation to both principles. Thus the NP is no longer able to offer Afrikaners (and all whites) what the CP promises: *vryheid met geregtigheid* (freedom with justice).

The vision of South Africa which the CP offers is not simplistic. It is the vision which was carefully nurtured and developed over 25 years - from 1950 to the late 1970s - by the present NP government. It is what may be called the Verwoerdian ideal. Most of today's white voters have grown up with this vision and with no other. It has been deeply

inculcated; and its inherent inconsistencies and contradictions - so evident to those outside the ranks of Afrikaner nationalism - have long been laid to rest in the minds of members of the *volk* and in the minds of white supremacists (those who support the CP for instrumental reasons rather than out of nationalist conviction).

Pleas from the government and others that the Verwoerdian vision cannot succeed in modern-day South Africa are often rejected with anger, with accusations of deception or with plain disbelief. It is to a large extent this repudiation of present NP government policies - policies widely interpreted as equivalent to betrayal of past NP promises - which motivates CP supporters.

What are the policies which the CP advocates today to give effect to its two principles? We shall consider four areas, the four policy dimensions that form the heart of the CP's vision for the country: its racial policy; its economic policy; its policy at local town and city level; and its policy of geo-political partition.

1.3.1 Racial Policy

The core beliefs underpinning this policy are that South Africans are divided into different *volkere* (peoples), each of which is culturally and ethnically distinct, and that whites (and Afrikaners in particular) have the right to place the interests of their white *volk* first. This right they believe is inalienable, historically justified and God-given in the sense that the diversity of peoples in South Africa is a diversity created by God. Members of the CP thus deny that they are racists in the sense of negative discrimination regarding others. Rather, they argue, all groups discriminate 'positively' regarding their own members: this form of discrimination is both natural and self-evident.

Furthermore, the CP claims that all Africans belong to one of the ethnic groups defined by their ancestral mother tongues: Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, North Sotho, Tswana, and so on. Indians and 'coloureds' also form separate and distinct 'peoples'.

Supporters of the white right believe that the NP government has betrayed the Verwoerdian ideals of white racial exclusivity and self-determination

In its 1989 election manifesto, the CP rejects what it sees as NP 'socialist' redistribution and state intervention in the economy for the benefit of black people

From this point of view, the notion of separate development (or partition) for whites, 'coloureds', Indians, and the different African 'ethnic' groups (accompanied by separate political freedoms in separate homelands), logically follows. As expressed in their 1989 election manifesto:

'The Conservative Party believes that the only way in which a people can effectively be protected against domination and can unhindered exercise their right to self-determination is in their own states under their own governments.'

The fact that members of all these different 'peoples' presently live in 'white' South Africa blurs the clarity of this vision. The CP recognises this reality and claims to recognise the rights of these other 'peoples' to remain as sojourners in 'white' South Africa and, in particular, to share to some extent in the country's wealth. They argue, however, that white interests in 'white' South Africa must be given priority. They point to the existence of white poverty, of white unemployment, and to the fact that whites pay the lion's share of taxes in the country. As further justification, they argue that a vision of the country as a community of individuals in a unitary state will inevitably lead, as they allege has been the experience of white communities elsewhere in Africa, to the destruction of the Afrikaner *volk*, its culture and its industry.

It is for these reasons that the CP broadcasts as central party policy the right of all white communities to racially exclusive access to the important domains of life: to home, to neighbourhood, to school, to church and to hospital. In terminology also used by the NP, the CP stresses that the Group Areas Act, and 'own affairs' within schools, hospitals and churches must be strictly safeguarded. In the language of the CP 1989 election manifesto, this is essential to 'ensure that the white's exclusive and separate community life (is) not ... overwhelmed and disrupted by other communities'.

1.3.2 Economic Policy

The CP subscribes to a 'mixed' economy, in two separate senses. In the first place, the

party accepts that the South African economy will have to involve persons from all racial and ethnic backgrounds, and will be open to all residents within the country. Access to the labour market in 'white' South Africa will, however, be regulated by influx control (the system whereby the state controlled access by African persons to that market in the fifties, sixties and seventies). This regulation will operate so as to guarantee preference to white work-seekers.

The South African economy will also involve persons who will be living (and exercising their political rights) beyond the borders of 'white' South Africa. There is, thus, underpinning this policy, the notion of a common market of states in Southern Africa (including independent and self-governing homelands as members).

In a second (and more conventional) sense, the party recognises and even promotes the idea of a market economy in modern South Africa. In the words of their 1989 manifesto: 'the free market system will be promoted and the socialist redistribution of wealth will be ended'. The inference here clearly is that state intervention in the functioning of the economy should be restricted.

A closer analysis of policy, however, suggests that the free market dimension relates largely to the issue of redistribution, and to the issue of redistribution 'between white and non-white' (1989 manifesto), in particular. This core CP concern is captured in the racialist warning sounded in the party's newsletter of July 1989: 'The basic problem of the economy is simply that the white horse cannot carry the enormously large black rider' (*'Die groot probleem met die ekonomie is dat die wit perd eenvoudig nie die enorme groot swart ruiter kan dra nie.'* CP Election News: 1 July 1989). It is here that the total rejection of the 'socialist' policies of the present government on redistribution and revenue sharing are most clearly visible.

With regard to a number of other critical economic issues, however, the nature and extent of envisaged state intervention appears ambiguous. The party stresses that large monopolies in the private sector are an evil

which must be stamped out by government action. At the same time, however, the CP subscribes to a free trading policy, and supports (within limits) a policy of privatisation.

It is also envisaged that state intervention in the economy will be needed to promote regional development. Industrial decentralisation incentives will be offered, so as to move as many of the employment opportunities for Africans (and others) to the border regions close to or within the proposed ethnically homogeneous homelands of these 'peoples' in Southern Africa.

State intervention in the economy, in addition, will be aimed at developing a geographic labour preference policy based on workers' ethnic backgrounds. Thus, 'for example, Natal will be a labour preference area for Zulus, the Eastern Cape for Xhosas and the Western Cape for Coloureds' (1989 manifesto); and white employers will be rewarded for adhering to these distinctions.

In short, the CP claims to have developed a more pragmatic policy of state intervention in the economy than that of the NP in the sixties and seventies. While this may well be the case, what is evident is that CP economic policy is rigid in its determination to promote a spatially decentralised economy geared towards the development of ethnic nation-states. The aim of *die volkerebeleid* (the policy of partition) is primary; and the slogan, *politie onafhanklik - ekonomie interafhanklik* (politically independent whilst economically interdependent), captures the policy guideline derived from this goal.

CP economic policy is strongly reminiscent of those NP policies of the sixties and seventies which were designed to encourage industrial decentralisation and to channel recruitment of African workers to the homeland areas. These policies give priority to political aims over employment creation strategies, even though it is generally acknowledged that South Africa has pressing problems of unemployment and that the decentralisation policies of the past have exacerbated these problems whilst failing to achieve the political goal of separate development.

Two further dimensions of CP economic policy deserve attention. These are the policy stances regarding international boycotts and disinvestment, on the one hand, and those regarding the flourishing black trade union movements in the country, on the other.

On international economic and financial pressures, the CP asserts the need to be given a chance to demonstrate to the West that CP policy is morally defensible and hence acceptable. The CP argues that its policy has been wrongly interpreted as being racist and exploitative whilst, in fact, it accords with the rule of international law that 'people have the fundamental right to rule themselves in their own countries' (1989 Manifesto).

Underlying this need to convince the West of the legitimacy of its policy is the CP goal of reversing disinvestment measures and of enabling the country to trade without artificial restrictions, always provided that 'no interference in domestic policy' takes place. The party thus makes clear that it 'will not let itself be dictated to by threats of sanctions'. It also emphasises that sanctions need not be feared, pointing out that 'sanctions have not been successful anywhere, precisely because they are contrary to the dictates of economic laws'.

In line with its principles, CP formal policy on trade unions proposes that they should be located in each peoples' homeland. Thus, 'only white trade unions will be allowed in South Africa and all other trade unions will be disbanded' (1989 Manifesto). The CP is aware of the potentially provocative - if not rash - nature of this formal policy statement. Why then has the party embarked on such a policy?

Leading members within the CP participated, in the fifties, in white trade union movements which successfully realised political and financial goals. Party leaders, therefore, are well aware of the power and influence which a trade union movement is able to generate. They regard the development in 'white' South Africa of the muscle of the black union movements of the 1980s with growing concern (if not outright fear).

One CP reaction to this concern has been an

CP economic policy is reminiscent of earlier NP policy which encouraged industrial decentralisation and black worker recruitment in homeland areas

NP 'own affairs' policy at local level on group areas and petty apartheid coincides in large measure with CP policy on racial exclusivity

attempt to resuscitate a white trade union federation (involving, *inter alia*, the white Mine Workers Union). These attempts to return to the days of successful white trade unionism have borne little fruit, since white union membership is steadily decreasing and white labour leadership - with some outstanding exceptions such as the late Mr Gert Beetge and Mr Arrie Paulus - remains closely linked to the state and its bureaucracies.

Accordingly, black trade unions are to be barred from 'white' South Africa. The CP recognises, however, the need for some alternative mechanism to settle black-white labour disputes within 'white' South Africa and is prepared to provide for this.

In the light of the party's unsuccessful attempts at union counter-action, and a history of failed attempts by the state at regulating industrial relations by means other than unionisation, it seems probable that this CP policy is one around which severe criticism, resistance and rejection will emerge. Labour/management relations in South Africa have become highly sophisticated over the last decade, and certainly the most sophisticated on the African continent.

1.3.3 Local Urban Policy

CP policy on local issues has come to prominence following its successes in the October 1988 municipal elections (see data base:34). These successes have placed the CP at the helm of a large number of (mainly Transvaal) towns and in effective control of sections of the PWV region. This has enabled the party to put into practice at local level those party policies which had remained untested earlier.

In keeping with its principles, the CP subscribes to a local government policy of total racial exclusivity, as attested to by recent events in Boksburg and Carletonville. The party believes that each group should develop its own separate and distinct local government, responsible for its own area of jurisdiction. Amenities and facilities should remain racially separate, though the need for

a measure of 'bilateral' exchange should be acknowledged by, for example, allowing a limited number of international (i.e. multi-racial) hotels.

Although the enforcement of separate amenities in Boksburg and Carletonville have created something of a storm, CP policy at local government level is not that different, in fact, from official NP policy. In a number of CP-controlled urban areas, there has been no need to reintroduce petty apartheid measures since these were already in force at the time of takeover. NP 'own affairs' policy at local level coincides in large measure with CP policy. Differences are evident where the NP has allowed exceptions to its 'own' affairs policy, for example, the opening of central business districts to all races.

In one sense, therefore, CP policy at local level may be viewed as a 'purer version' of government policy. According to the CP, there can be no compromise: racial exclusivity of facilities and amenities must be absolute. In like measure, it believes that education should also remain strictly racially exclusive. (This is illustrated by the CP-controlled Menlo Park school board, which refused to allow racially mixed sport on school grounds.)

Thus, policy differences at local level between CP local councils and the NP revolve around (often ambiguous) NP promises to move away from racially discriminatory practices. These promises, moreover, are virtually always made by higher authorities, at provincial and national levels, rather than by NP-controlled local governments. CP-controlled councils have consistently acted to block or slow down the elimination of racial exclusivity in the use of public facilities, in the opening of trading areas, and in the desegregation of residential areas. Some of these blocking and slowing tactics have been symbolic rather than binding - scapegoating the government - since NP provincial and central governments have threatened to override local government decisions of this nature.

It is not only white town councils ('own affairs' bodies, in government language) which have been affected: The government's strategy to extend representation at third tier to all

population groups also has a 'general affairs' component. ('General' affairs is in principle unacceptable to the CP.) Thus, multiracial local bodies known as Regional Services Councils (RSCs) have been introduced by the NP and are most developed in the Transvaal (where 12 are operational). Representation on RSCs is by way of nomination by participating local authorities and, since voting is based on the proportion of RSC services consumed by each participating authority, representatives from white councils hold the upper hand. A critical function of these RSCs is to raise levies from businesses in their areas and to use these monies for infrastructural improvement in areas of 'greatest need'.

At the time of RSC establishment in the mid-eighties, official CP policy was that it would abolish those which came within its control. This is because RSCs operate on the principle of power-sharing (joint decision-making and decision-taking) by whites, 'coloureds', Indians, and Africans. As such, they are anathema to the CP, which fundamentally rejects all forms of inter-racial power-sharing.

Although this CP principle remains intact, its policy on RSCs has been adjusted recently. In the first place, the CP agrees on the need for additional funds to be generated at local level and used for infrastructural development. In the second place, the CP finds itself serving on a number of RSCs but exerting strong influence (rather than control) over decisions taken. (A two-thirds majority is required for binding decisions within an RSC, and all the chairmen are appointed by central government rather than elected by RSC members). In fact, CP influence on nine of the twelve Transvaal RSCs is substantial.

As a result, in participating in RSC activities the CP has argued for the maximum use of levy funds (which are largely raised, the CP argues, from white businesses) in white areas. Further, it will consistently block, in regions where it has substantial representation, any RSC attempts at local-level reform initiatives aimed at introducing some form of multi-racial or non-racial local or metropolitan government. The party will also

block redistribution of RSC funds to black areas if these are deemed to be to the detriment of participating white local governments and the white interests it represents.

Participation should not be confused with party approval of the institution. The principle of separate decision-making remains intact; and CP participation in RSCs should be seen as a reflection of its belief that its supporters' interests are best served through the CP engaging political opponents in the country's public institutions, with a view to promoting its policy of partition.

1.3.4 Geo-Political Partition

The party's guiding principle states that each *volk* (people) has the right to a *vaderland* (fatherland) within which it will, as a separate group, pursue its political destiny. Others who choose to live in that nation-state are expected to recognise and accept the fact that the interests of the dominant *volk* come first. They are also expected to accept the fact that they will not be able to enjoy 'direct' political rights in that area. As a principal architect of this vision, Hendrik Verwoerd enjoys a position within the ranks of the CP of one of the revered leaders and thinkers of Afrikaner nationalism. Members of his family remain key members within the white rightwing movement to this day.

In translating this partition principle into policy and relevant action, the CP is bound to experience the same fundamental difficulty as that experienced by the NP in the sixties and the seventies. Quite simply, the present geographic distribution of the different 'peoples' the CP claims belong to the different South African nations, drastically distorts the vision of a Southern African confederation of 'ethnically' consolidated, homogeneous nation-states.

Party leaders argue, nonetheless, that historically rooted 'ethnic' and racial *vestigingspatrone* (settlement patterns) are such that their policy on partition is viable, despite the difficulties. It is on the basis of these settlement patterns that they justify and

CP participation in racially mixed RSCs is intended to promote development in white areas and is consistent with its policy of geo-political partition

The CP's 1989 election manifesto discusses coupling black city-states in 'white' South Africa with ethnic homelands for coloureds, Indians and Africans

develop CP policies of 'ethnic' labour preference and of regional development.

The CP holds that both 'coloured' and Indian South Africans should be assigned *hartlande* (homelands) within which most members of their 'peoples' should seek their common destinies. Treurnicht, for instance, in a recent lecture to the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), pointed to both rural and urban areas in the Western, Eastern, and Northern Cape which are settled by members of the 'coloured' people. Although not a consolidated region, these areas could, on the basis of historical patterns of community settlement, form the basis of a viable 'coloured' homeland.

Regarding African homelands, moreover, the CP is aware of, and concerned about, the issue of their economic viability. Accordingly, it acknowledges the need for further land consolidation. The party states that additional land - over and above that envisaged under the 1936 Land and Trust Act - will have to be obtained. Simultaneously, the party proposes that efforts should be made to develop a viable market in land within these homelands. In effect, the party proposes that the consolidation of land for homelands should take place in a new and more market-related context.

The most intractable difficulty in implementing this policy stems from urbanisation. Party leaders recognise that this process leads directly to the increased mixing of the 'peoples' of the country in metropolitan areas and towns. It attempts to counter this - since it accepts the inevitability and irreversibility of the urbanisation process - by envisaging the future development of

all-African cities within 'ethnic' homelands. At the same time, black urbanisation is to be minimised in 'white' South Africa by a variety of strategies. (*Die KP gaan perke stel aan die uitbreiding van swart besetting in blanke gebied.* CP Election News, 1 July 1989:2).

In the shorter-term, the party plans to create 'city-states' in urban areas such as Soweto. Within these city-states, local governments will be constituted to represent the interests of residents grouped together, in so far as possible, on an 'ethnic' basis. Africans will thus commute to work from these city-states and will maintain links with their 'ethnic' homeland through the offices of local homeland representatives residing within these city-states.

This idea of 'coupling' city-states with 'ethnic' homelands is dealt with at length in the CP's 1989 manifesto:

'(City-state/homeland coupling) can be done by several means, of which voting rights are the most important. The government of a national state can, for example, be put in a position to provide certain services to its citizens in black suburbs in white South Africa. Examples of such services could be education, law and order, registration of vehicles, registration of births, marriages, deaths and so on. All black civil servants should be in the service of their own governments and can be seconded to South Africa for the provision of services to their countrymen.'

Once again, it should be noted that this emergent CP policy rests heavily on the thinking and strategy of the NP during the sixties and seventies.

READER SUMMARY OF PART ONE

Parting of the Ways

In short, the substance of most CP policies is drawn directly from those of the National Party during the sixties (the high tide of Verwoerdian separate development), the seventies, and the eighties (the 'own' and 'general' affairs reform period). This is true both with regard to mainstream CP policy as well as in areas where deep ambiguities appear in CP attempts to translate principles into policy. What reasons can be found for these striking similarities in policy positions between the 'old' National Party and the 'new' Conservative Party, parties which today are locked in conflict over the future of the country?

Let us first consider the differing visions of the future which each party holds out to its supporters. As reflected in its 1989 five-year plan, the NP paints a picture of a common future for all South Africans in one country under a single flag, a common future within which minority group rights are protected. The common future will emerge in the course of a transition period during which the government of the day will remain effectively controlled by the NP.

The picture painted by the CP, on the other hand, is that of a separate and wholly white fatherland for Afrikaners and those other whites who would follow Afrikaner leaders into such a future. Other 'ethnic' homelands are seen as taking their place within the Southern African subcontinent as neighbours to this fatherland. The government of this white homeland will effectively remain controlled by the CP or an equivalent Afrikaner nationalist party. This government and this vision, moreover, will be indisputably nationalistic and separatist.

It will be argued in Part Three that these two visions may be taken to indicate the waning of the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism within the NP and the waxing of these same ideals within the CP. In fact, these changing loyalties toward nationalistic values within the two parties offers one explanation for the dilemma identified above: the existence, simultaneously, of striking similarities in CP and NP policies, together with deep CP and NP conflict over the country's future.

In short, it will be argued in Part Three that an understanding of the process of Afrikaner nationalism is essential for an understanding of both the CP and of the NP. Furthermore, the NP is rapidly being displaced by the CP as the self-proclaimed bearer of the torch of Afrikaner nationalism.


PART TWO

**The Herstigte Nationale
Party**


**Dissension
over the
Holy Grail**

Data Base

PERCENTAGES OF VOTES CAST FOR RIGHTWING PARTIES IN 1981 AND 1987 GENERAL ELECTIONS



1981



1987

Footnote

The HNP has never won a seat at a general election. It did win (with CP support) the constituency of Sasolberg in a by-election in 1985 but lost the seat (to the NP in a three-cornered contest with the CP) in 1987.

SEATS CONTESTED AND TO BE CONTESTED BY THE CP AND THE HNP

| | TOTAL SEATS | CP | | HNP | |
|--------------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | | 1987 | 1989 | 1987 | 1989 |
| CAPE | 56 | 35 | 33 | 28 | 4 |
| OFS | 14 | 14 | 14 | 9 | 4 |
| NATAL | 20 | 10 | 15 | 7 | 1 |
| TVL | 76 | 67 | 67 | 42 | 13 |
| TOTAL | | 126 | 129 | 86 | 22 |

Footnotes

1. In all but nine of these eighty-six seats, candidates of the two rightwing parties campaigned against each other.
2. Candidates of the two rightwing parties will campaign against each other in all but two of the twenty-two seats.

Overview Breaking with Tradition

The *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (Re-established National Party) was formed in 1969, when sitting National Party members of the House of Assembly were forced to leave that party. In the language of the time, the split came about as a result of disagreements on how *verlig* ('outward-looking' and enlightened) the policy of the NP should become. Those who left the party argued that government policy of the time which had been tried and tested, should continue and should remain more *verkramp* ('conservative' and inward-looking'). No compromise on the primary goal of achieving Verwoerdian separate development should be permitted.

The debate revolved, at a deeper level, around strategies aimed at sustaining the nationalist identity, the material interests, and, ultimately, the survival of the white Afrikaner *volk*. Thus, a primary argument which has become a *leitmotif* of the white rightwing movement today, emphasised that the strength and success of Afrikaner nationalism lay with the *volk*, within the racial and ethnic boundaries of this social entity.

The *verkramp*te view was essentially inward- and *behoudend* (backward-looking), and largely aimed at maintaining the status quo. The *verlig*te alternative, though clearly targeted at securing the continued dominance of white, especially Afrikaner, power and its interests in the country, was more assimilative and open in approach. It enabled the NP as governing party, so the *verlig*tes argued, to deal more effectively with the challenges - especially the economic challenges - of a rapidly modernising and technologically advancing society.

The particular incident that precipitated the break in 1969 was the NP government's willingness to accept the inclusion of a Maori in a New Zealand rugby team that was to tour South Africa. The HNP viewed this incident as an example of government surrender to outside dictates, thereby violating the autonomy of Afrikaner state power and Afrikaner interests. Simultaneously, the

principle of absolute racial segregation - which had become a corner-stone of the apartheid policy and the means of attaining Afrikaner Nationalist ideals - was deeply compromised by this event.

As a result, so argued the new HNP at the time, the system of apartheid as devised by successive NP Prime Ministers from Malan to Verwoerd was fundamentally compromised and 'short-circuited'. The Prime Minister of the time, John Vorster, was seen as symbolising the liberalisation and eventual betrayal of Afrikaner nationalism and, thereby, as having started the dismantling of the Afrikaner *volk* and the concomitant impoverishment of its people. Its very survival was at stake.

2.1 Limited Support Base

The NP under Vorster's leadership reacted rapidly to counter the dissidents and their contention. A general election was called in which all four HNP members of parliament lost their seats. The new party was thus almost immediately denied a parliamentary platform. In addition, HNP members were dismissed - or forced through social and other pressures to withdraw - from all influential positions in Afrikaner voluntary organisations, and from the *Broederbond* in particular.

This effectively withheld from the new party's members most forms of Afrikaner nationalist patronage - reflected in material and other advantages (in state and Afrikaner business) which, by the late sixties, had become wide-ranging as well as substantial. Party members were thus effectively excluded from the institutionalised activities of the *volk*, and were thereby relegated to the fringes of the white Afrikaner's social entity. Such, so it is alleged, was the Prime Minister's determination to crush the fledgling party that he used state departments and civil servants to victimise its members (Schoeman, 1974).

A further factor limiting potential HNP support was the economic advance of the Afrikaners in the seventies. During this

The HNP/NP split in 1969 centered on debate over strategies to sustain the nationalist identity, materialist interests and survival of the Afrikaner volk

In the 1970s the HNP failed to attract significant rightwing support as a new materialism and middle-class began appearing within Afrikaner society

decade, Afrikaners were reaping the fruits of rapid economic development and upward mobility into the ranks of the middle-classes. This, moreover, was clearly perceived as the reward for continued loyalty and allegiance to the ruling party, as well as membership in the many Afrikaner socio-cultural and economic organisations. There was little material reason or incentive for defection to the HNP. On the contrary, loss of membership within this institutional network would probably have resulted in fewer chances for career promotion, and possible direct material losses for the persons concerned.

Failing to grasp the significance of these new social and economic forces, the HNP persisted in adopting the slogans of a bygone era. The party failed fully to understand the changed material and structural conditions of the country: especially the new materialism and middle-class ethic appearing within Afrikanerdom. HNP rhetoric was rooted in the image of the thirties and the forties. It had a working-class flavour that was unacceptable to the newly fashionable and respectable Afrikaner middle-class. It also reminded them of an era during which they had not enjoyed political dominance.

As a result, HNP membership was largely restricted to the remnants of the white working-class (and to groups of farmers) from which the NP - as the political vehicle of Afrikaner nationalism - had drawn its support in earlier decades. Trade union support, for example, included Gert Beetge of the white *Blanke Bouwerkers Unie* (White Building Workers Union) who joined the HNP, and Arrie Paulus of the white Mineworkers Union who supported the party on a number of occasions from its political platforms.

During the seventies, accordingly, the party developed a 'loser' and 'lower-class' stigma that left it, its leaders and its message with little support among an upwardly mobile white Afrikaner people. Quite simply, the *volk* was no longer what it had been. This, in turn, fatally undermined its chances at the polls. No member of the party was elected to parliament in the course of the 1970s.

2.2 CP/HNP Policy Distinctions

Since becoming the official opposition in 1984, the Conservative Party has consistently refused to consider any pact or formal agreement with the HNP. Recent attempts in 1989 - highly visible on South African television networks - by three white rightwing groupings (including the HNP) aimed and failed to reach some agreement with the CP on the consolidation of a 'rightwing front'.

Reasons for this refusal to enter into an agreement with the HNP need to be sought in the run-up to the May 1987 election. There was (and still is) little difference between the two parties in the general policies broadcast by each to the voters. In 1987, both parties approached the election in the context of 'Armageddon': the Afrikaner *volk* would be destroyed if P W Botha was not stopped. Partition was the one and only plausible policy. It would:

- re-establish order in the country;
- contain the African nationalist and communist onslaught;
- adequately protect the interests of whites; and
- regain the economic prosperity of earlier decades.

Both parties emphasised (then as now) the drop in standards of living, which was directly linked by spokesmen to increased levels of state spending on the new constitution and on black development.

This wide-ranging coincidence in views requires some qualification. The HNP has consistently acted in a more unyielding manner regarding its view of Afrikaner nationalism than has the CP. It has argued that Afrikaans should become the only official language in the country and, after adopting a less rigid stand on the matter, still retains the hope that things will eventually turn out this way in a future white South Africa. The party also holds that South Africans of Indian descent should be repatriated to the Indian subcontinent.

With regard to economic affairs, moreover, the HNP subscribes to a socialist economic policy which has been called *volkskapitalisme*. It proposes that wealth created within the market economy by Afrikaner nationalists should remain within the *volk* and should be redistributed for the benefit of the *volk*. This form of 'restricted' exchange will be regulated by a series of parastatals controlled by the Afrikaner nationalist government (O'Meara, 1983).

These differences between the two parties' positions have never been of major concern to rank-and-file supporters, however. In fact, policy issues were not the major cause of the failure to reach agreement on a pact between the two parties. We need to seek elsewhere to identify this cause.

2.3 Competing with the CP

From the time of the formation of the CP in 1982, throughout the four to five years leading up to the 1987 election, the HNP leader, Jaap Marais, had steadfastly rejected amalgamation with the CP. Instead, he proposed *samewerking* (cooperation) which would culminate in the allocation of 50 % of winnable seats to his party. Notwithstanding the unequal parliamentary representation of the two parties before the 1987 election (one HNP seat to seventeen CP seats), Marais justified this demand by calling for 'blood-money': the HNP recognised the 'wrong turn' taken by the NP thirteen years before the CP did and had had to bear alone the torch of true Afrikaner nationalism under severely trying circumstances throughout the period. The HNP, he argued, had remained *reg* (right) during the period when CP

members were still serving in Vorster's dishonoured cabinet and caucus.

The CP, after serious negotiations on the issue broke down, and fearing that continued bargaining by the smaller and weaker party over seats and candidates would harm the larger party's electoral chances even more, opted to go it alone in 1987. In the light of its success then and continued growth over the past two years, the CP's decision seems to have been the correct strategic one.

Mr Marais declared early in 1989 that the HNP would continue to compete with the CP at the polls. This threat is in all probability a hollow one. Although the HNP will be contesting 22 seats (see data base:22), defections from the HNP to the CP - including a large number of senior HNP office-bearers - have been widespread. The party has few funds and little organisational infrastructure left, even in its Pretoria stronghold.

The HNP leader has been forced to use his own name, rather than that of his party, to advertise recent public political meetings he addressed. The spectacle of Marais sharing a political platform with Terre'Blanche, the leader of a movement (the AWB) he had for years shunned and criticised, attests to this loss of prestige. Although Marais personally continues to enjoy a noteworthy position within the white rightwing, his party's fortunes are at an all-time low.

To conclude, the Conservative Party, to all intents and purposes, can today rightly claim to be the political torch-bearer of Afrikaner nationalism and of white rightwing beliefs in South Africa.

The HNP subscribes to a socialist economic policy, volkskapitalisme, which involves a series of parastatals controlled by an Afrikaner nationalist state

PART THREE

The Social Movement

**Torch-Bearers
of
Afrikaner Nationalism**

POST-WAR WHITE POLITICS

| Election Year | Total number of seats in parliament | Communist Party of SA 1 | South African Communist Party 1 (MP prevented from taking seat) | SA Labour Party 6 ^a | Dominion Party 0 | United Party 65 | Afrikaner Party 9 ^a (1957 AP and HNP merge and form National Party) | Heidelberg National Party 7 ^b | Independents 2 ^c |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--|---|--------------------------------|
| 1948 | 153 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | |
| 1953 | 159 | | | 4 ^a | | 57 | 9 ^a | | 2 |
| 1958 | 159 | | | | | 53 | 10 ^a | | 1 |
| 1961 | 159 | | | | | 49 | 10 ^a | | 4 |
| 1966 | 166 | | | | | 39 | 12 ^a | | — |
| 1970 | 166 | | | | | 47 | 11 ^a | | — |
| 1974 | 171 | | | | | 41 | 12 ^a | | — |
| 1977 | 165 ^a | | | | | 10 | 13 ^a | | — |
| 1981 | 165 | | | | | 8 | 13 ^a | | — |
| 1987 | 166 | | | | | 1 | 123 | | 22 |

Key

- ¹ Elected under Representation of Nations Act, 1958.
- ² Elected under Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1955.
- ^a Party politicians in government.
- ^b Non-white MPs; no longer sat in SA parliament (ending White Sup.

Diagram:

- Electoral alliance: 1953-1961 (SA Labour Party, Dominion Party, United Party, Afrikaner Party, Heidelberg National Party)
- Split in party, party merger or deletion of sitting MPs: 1961-1966 (SA Labour Party, Dominion Party, United Party, Afrikaner Party, Heidelberg National Party)
- 1966-1970: Party dissolution, 1968 (Party dissolution, 1968 and Prevention of Political Interference Act)
- 1970-1974: Formed 1975 with 4 UP MPs; Reform Party
- 1974-1977: (July 1975 PP and RP merge) SA Progressive Reform Party
- 1977-1981: (11 UP seats 1977) Progressive Federal Party
- 1981-1987: (8 UP MPs expelled 1977) Democratic Party; (formed 1977) New Republic Party; (1980 SAP MPs join NP) South African Party; (4 NP MPs expelled 1969) Herstigte Nasionale Party; (13 NP MPs expelled 1982) Conservative Party; (HNP wins by-election 1986)

Sources:

- Davies K, O'Meara D & Durrheim S, *The Struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to movements, organisations & institutions*, Vols 1 & 2, Zed Press, London, 1984.
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Overview Nation-building

Neither the Herstigte Nasionale Party nor the Conservative Party can be fully understood if analysed as separate and discrete phenomena: they form part of a wider social movement, commonly termed the 'white rightwing'. This movement and the ideology that underpins it can, in turn, be fully understood only in the wider historical context of politics in South Africa, particularly white Afrikaner politics. The rise and spread of Afrikaner nationalism over the past century is the key process in this context.

A social movement encompasses more than one or more political parties. It binds its followers together by way of a number of general beliefs and pervasive social bonds. It may be seen, in fact, as a form of collective behaviour in which people are mobilised on the basis of these beliefs and bonds either to support or to resist a proposed form of socio-economic change. As will be shown later in this study, these bonds and beliefs comprise, in the case of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, both religious and intellectual doctrines, as well as social and civic ties at neighbourhood and community levels.

A social movement may, in addition, be called a nationalist movement when the primary belief binding together its adherents is the conviction of belonging to a distinct nation. Afrikaner nationalists see themselves as a separate nation, and accordingly insist on their own right to self-determination, a principle defined by one of the movement's leading intellectuals - Professor Booysen - as, 'the right to determine your own future, to govern yourself and to enjoy the fruits of your own labour and technical abilities, and to have your own country and fatherland' (Zille, 1988).

Is a movement of this nature inherently racist? Giliomee, a noted South African historian, thinks not. Racial attitudes were developed in the eighteenth century, during which early colonial and 'trekker' communities bred a strong sense of white superiority within master-slave relationships. It was within this

historical context that British-Boer conflict led to the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism: 'Whereas slavery and settlement stimulated a racial consciousness, the Afrikaners' clash with British imperialism brought the concept of a distinct white political entity to the fore' (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:100).

3.1 Political History

After the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the century, British imperialism was imposed on the two former Boer republics and, in due course, on the newly formed Union of South Africa. The (often unstable) political alliances and government policies which resulted were widely perceived to set Afrikaner against Afrikaner. Thus, the South African Party (SAP) of Prime Minister Botha split the Afrikaner community in the north of the country; whilst the decision to enter the First World War on behalf of Great Britain against Germany led to bitter internecine clashes between pro-British Afrikaners and the 1914-15 rebels. It was partially in reaction to these developments that Hertzog's National Party, in the 1920s, identified three main thrusts in its battle against British imperialism:

- the pursuit of 'sovereign independence';
- the achievement of English and Afrikaans language equality; and,
- a 'South Africa First' economic policy.

However, Hertzog himself undermined this emergent nationalist current when he declared in 1926 that the objectives of republicanism had been realised. Hertzog's National Party fell into further disarray thereafter, when 'fusion' with the SAP was proposed and accepted in 1933.

A small group of mainly Cape Nationalists led by DF Malan voted against 'fusion', declaring their resolve to address 'the economic problems of our (Afrikaner) people and ensure full sovereign independence' (Die Burger: 22/6/34). This group formed the core of the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party), while the rest of the provincial NP groups (with few significant exceptions) followed Hertzog into 'fusion' and

As a social movement, Afrikaner nationalists see themselves as comprising a separate nation, and insist on their own right to self-determination

A network of Afrikaner voluntary associations from church to welfare groups, played a vital role on the road to white nationalist political dominance

the formation of the United Party.

In each of the provinces a small *gestuwerde* (purified) NP group emerged. In the OFS Dr NJ Van der Merwe declared the new party to be the 'champion of the worker and the farmer' (*Die Volksblad*: 24/11/34), determined to 'develop a clear policy for the advancement of the white population' (*Die Burger*: 7/12/34). In the Transvaal, JG Strydom found support amongst those pressured by commercial agriculture, although the main support for the *Gestuwerde NP* developed amongst Afrikaner academics, clergy and the professionals. It was from these political roots that the National Party of Malan, Verwoerd and Vorster emerged.

This party (in alliance with the Afrikaner Party) won a surprise victory in the national election of 1948 and for the first time became the governing party. It has remained so ever since. Although this victory has been explained in terms of structural factors following the Second World War which favoured a change of government, the result was, in reality, a surprise to the leaders of the Afrikaner Nationalist movement (both politicians and others). Accordingly, the 1948 NP victory can only be explained in the light of an ongoing process of white Afrikaner mobilisation: a process which had been gathering momentum for many years prior to the 1948 election.

3.2 Ethnic Mobilisation

This process of 'ethnic mobilisation' (Adam & Giliomec, 1979) took root during the second decade of this century, and expanded yet further during the thirties and forties. Through it, increasing numbers of white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans were mobilised around a set of loosely linked, informal voluntary associations. The pattern of mobilisation was exclusivist - restricted to the emergent *volk* - and Afrikaans-speaking ministers of religion, teachers, and academics were in the forefront of the process.

The 'poor white' problem of the thirties, resulting from the trek to the cities, raised

pressing welfare issues and gave further impetus to the process of mobilisation. This was especially so since Afrikaner leaders were astute in recognising the potential support-base of this alienated Afrikaner community. Welfare organisations were established to combat the problems experienced by the 'poor whites'. These rapidly took firm root and - together with a number of allied organisations - soon formed an interlinking network of Afrikaner voluntary organisations, a network which was to play a vital role in the development of Afrikaner nationalism.

At the heart of this network lay the Afrikaner churches, which took a leading role in the process of mobilisation and thereby contributed to the legitimisation and institutionalisation of the concept of white Afrikaner exclusivity (Stals: 1978, 1986). The establishment of Afrikaner supremacy - or hegemony, as some call it - owes much to the legitimisation thus founded on religious belief. One major result of this process which was also accompanied by the mobilisation of capital from within their own ranks (O'Meara, 1978), was to prevent the formation of a large Afrikaner urban working class or proletariat during the thirties and the forties. This, in turn, placed the Afrikaner on the road to middle-class respectability, increased wealth, and political dominance across the country.

The significance of the interlinking welfare organisations lies also in the men responsible for their establishment. They were formed by men like William Nicol, a minister of religion in the Dutch Reformed Church. Worker organisations and, later, trade unions were formed by men like Albert Hertzog, the son of a South African Prime Minister, a cabinet minister in the governments of Verwoerd and Vorster, and a lawyer educated in Europe. (Albert Hertzog was later to become first leader of the HNP when the break with the National Party came in 1969.)

A highly successful and widely broadcast ceremony - *Die Ossewagedenktrek* (the oxwagon memorial trek) - was organised in 1938 to commemorate the *Voortrekkers'* Great Trek from the Cape to the north one hundred years earlier. This ceremony was organised

under the auspices of the Afrikaans Language and Cultural Association (ATKV), by Henning Klopper, a former railway clerk, later Speaker in the House of Assembly, and founder member of the influential and secretive Afrikaner Broederbond ('Brotherhood') (*Gedenkboek van die Osewatrek (1838-1938)* 1940; Keyter et al: 1940).

The oxwagon memorial trek of 1938 paved the way for an *Ekonomiese Volkskongres* (Economic People's Congress), where Afrikaners were mobilised on the basis of their *Voortrekker* heritage and induced to contribute to a *Reddingsdaadfonds* (salvation fund). This was aimed at establishing Afrikaner-controlled businesses which would rescue Afrikaners to a better economic position, which - compared with that of their 'English' compatriots - was parlous indeed. In

fact, the congress succeeded in mobilising capital for the formation of large Afrikaner financial institutions, (e.g. *Federale Volksbeleggings*), and in rallying Afrikaans business in the cause of *volkseenheid* (unity).

The significance of these organisations was even more far-reaching for they were used by the NP with great success to recruit voters for the party and the cause. The 1948 election victory can be explained in large part by the influence they had by then attained over white Afrikaner thinking. After 1948, the governing party encouraged the entrenchment of these organisations in Afrikaner life and built upon them to create a virtually monolithic institutional base. It was on this base that exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism was to grow and flourish.

The mobilisation of Afrikaner capital in the thirties and forties rallied Afrikaner business to the cause of the volk and built a new middle-class with political power

PART FOUR

The Wider White Right

**Actors
and
Benefactors
in the 1980s**

Data Base

Summary of Municipal Election Results October 1988

| PROVINCE | Party | % Control of Local Authorities |
|-----------|----------------|-----------------------------------|
| TRANSVAAL | NP | 38,5 |
| | CP | 53,3 |
| | NP/CP doubtful | 6,1 |
| | Other | 2,1 |
| OFS | NP | 78,0 |
| | CP | 18,1 |
| | NP/CP doubtful | 3,9 |
| | Other | - |
| CAPE | NP | 90,7 |
| | CP | 3,0 |
| | NP/CP doubtful | 4,6 |
| | Other | 1,7 |
| NATAL | NP | 87,3 |
| | CP | - |
| | NP/CP doubtful | 1,7 |
| | Other | 11,0 |
| TOTAL | NP | 71,0 |
| | CP | 22,0 |
| | NP/CP doubtful | 4,0 |
| | Other | 3,0 |

Overview Grassroots Revival

The Conservative Party is an all-white political party representing conservative and ultra-conservative white South Africans. In this chapter the authors intend to show that a proper understanding of this party is possible only if its links with other conservative bodies are identified, and only if each of those bodies (including the CP itself) are shown to be constituent parts of the social movement referred to earlier as Afrikaner Nationalism. In short, we intend to show that white conservatism in South Africa is closely related to, and supported by, the Afrikaner nationalist movement.

The proposition that the CP is (only) the political arm of Afrikaner Nationalism does not imply that rightwing politics is somehow less important than the 'whole' white rightwing. On the contrary (as shown in the previous chapter), it was this very political arm during the forties, fifties and sixties - in the shape of the NP - that fashioned and sustained the movement and eventually rewarded its loyal supporters. In the eighties, it is the CP which claims to play this same role of political torch-bearer.

In fact, it is through the beliefs and actions of the leaders of the CP (together with those of the wider Afrikaner Nationalist elite) that the resurgence of nationalism has occurred. The links forged over the last few years between, for example, church, farmer's cooperative, party, and school committee - links that form the crucial organisational foundation of the movement in white towns and suburbs - are the products of these beliefs and of these actions. They are the products, moreover, of a strategy which was successfully implemented by some of the same leaders under another party during an earlier period of South Africa's history.

What explains this nationalist resurgence? The answer is found in the one central guiding idea underpinning this nationalism: white Afrikaners are a separate people, they belong to a distinct nation, and have a legitimate and God-given task to maintain this separate

identity. After periods of trial and tribulation, once the decades of the sixties arrived, Afrikaner leaders found that this guiding idea had borne fruit (particularly for the children of the *volk*) only for (some of) these same leaders to find, in the eighties, that the *volk* was once again centrally threatened.

As in the past, these threats are perceived to be emanating from three main sources:

- in the first place, from within the ranks of their own people, from erstwhile leaders who have lost direction, who are 'betraying their history', and in so doing, who are financially ruining and endangering the very survival of the *volk*.
- secondly, the threats also come from *vreemde* (alien) people who share the *volk's* land with them, and who are receiving, the CP contends, an ever-increasing share of its wealth.
- thirdly, the threats come from 'traditional' enemies of the *volk* - from the international community - who are exerting tremendous economic and political pressures on the *volk*.

As was the case earlier in the twentieth century, accordingly, Afrikaner leaders have come to the conclusion that this climate of mounting threat to Afrikanerdom calls for action by the *volk*, action directed at the renewal of the nationalist movement which had become moribund during the seventies and early eighties.

The leaders of the rightwing movement do not believe that the NP intends voluntarily to 'give up' white Afrikaner power and privilege. They do believe, however, that the NP's 'new' strategy will lead to unintended consequences, and fatal consequences at that.

'Power-sharing', a key NP policy guideline, is a prime example. In the words of Andries Treurnicht, the CP leader, to share power is to lose power. It is as simple as that.

Betrayal from within became unavoidable once the NP started to undermine the 'grassroots' democratic tradition of the Afrikaner. Traditionally, ordinary Afrikaners were able to express their views and state their criticisms freely within their Afrikaner nationalist organisations - or so at least claim

Grassroots links forged between the church, party, school committee and farmer's cooperative form the crucial organisational foundations of the new white right

The NP has undermined democratic Afrikaner traditions by centralising decision-making, bureaucratising the civil service and militarising society

today's Afrikaner nationalist leaders. What is indisputably true, however, is that the NP has, over the past ten years, willingly or under duress, centralised decision-making within the party, bureaucratised the civil service, and militarised large parts of white South African society. To rank-and-file Afrikaners, this is tantamount to riding roughshod over their valued *volksdemokrasie*, their democratic political culture. The NP has broken down the solidarity so painstakingly built up by the *volk*.

The split within Afrikanerdom thus seems irrevocable. As a consequence, the white rightwing movement has (in resuscitating Afrikaner Nationalism) been required to take over - or where necessary, create anew - religious, cultural, intellectual and other institutions so as to forge a new and equivalent organisational foundation for this new phase of nationalism. It is these institutions, renewed or refashioned as they have been during the eighties, which we shall discuss below. In so doing, we will show how they interlink and cut across one another to form the foundation upon which the movement will be able to sustain itself, in the authors' view, into the foreseeable future.

4.1 Religion: Apartheid as Sin or Salvation?

Afrikaans Reformed churches locate themselves squarely within a Calvinist reform tradition. As a result of theological-based schisms and other differences (which most often originated in the Netherlands), three distinct churches, known as the *susterkerke* (sister churches), developed on South African soil:

- the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK), the largest and most influential of the three churches which includes a missionary 'outreach' arm, and is thus often known as the *Moederkerk* (mother church);
- the smaller *Gereformeerde Kerk* which is colloquially known as the '*Dopper*' church and is based in Potchefstroom; and
- the smallest of the three, the *Hervormde Kerk*.

The issues of race and segregation emerged well over two centuries ago as major difficulties within churches and the practice of religion in South Africa. During the early eighteenth century, for example, children of 'mixed' couples were not baptised in 'white' churches. Thus, the Afrikaans Reformed theologians developed and refined doctrines which served to legitimate, in the minds of their members, racially segregated practices in their churches and within their congregations.

Throughout the twentieth century (until very recently), in fact, the three churches have been united on the principle (they claimed biblically-justified) of racially separate worship and hence of separate churches and of separate congregations distinguished on racial lines. The NGK, in accordance with this doctrine, established a number of separate mission churches which have become known as the *dogterkerke* (daughter churches). These were formed on (purported) racially distinct lines: one for 'coloured', one for Indian, and one for African South Africans (though these churches and their ministers have shed this form of 'racial' exclusivity some time ago). The NGK also has a number of missionary initiatives in Southern and Central Africa originally run on purported ethnic lines.

Afrikaner nationalists took over the reins of government in 1948 and introduced policies aimed at concretising apartheid in the country and at instituting separate development along homeland lines. These Afrikaans Reformed church doctrines of separateness became powerful allies in the government's search for moral justification, both for its Afrikaner nationalist ideology and for its apartheid policies. These churches, in fact, saw Afrikaners as a distinct people created and elected by God, a people with a divine calling to maintain their identity and separateness (at least on earth) as well as to bring to other *vreemde volke* (foreign races) the word of God.

Thus, the ideas and practices of these churches coincided in crucial areas with the ideas and practices of the NP government, a state of affairs which led one writer to call the ideas and doctrines of these churches a 'civil religion' (Moodie, 1975).

It is important to underline, that white Afrikaners - with their rural roots and largely isolated history - were, and have remained, a deeply religious people. They traditionally have been attached to, and deferential toward, the ministers of their churches and the doctrines these ministers broadcast. As was shown in the preceding chapter, moreover, these Reformed ministers formed part of the Afrikaner leadership who mobilised the rank-and-file in the thirties and the forties. Through congregational activities, they promoted Afrikaner nationalist values and established a whole spectrum of church-related voluntary and welfare associations. In short, religious justification and social practice continually interacted with one another.

Let us take a contemporary example of religious justification for Afrikaner nationalism from the writings of the present leader of the CP, Andries Treurnicht. This example will serve to illustrate the close relationship which developed between church doctrines and government ideology. It is drawn from a book entitled *Credo van 'n Afrikaner* (Credo of an Afrikaner) which was written in 1975, some eight years before the author broke from the NP to form the CP. The excerpt is chosen to highlight the moral justifications given for the policy of separate development:

- 'The whole of creation forms a unit. God is the author of this. Christians do not conceive of the dualistic principle of two or more sorts of power. 'For all things were created by Him, and all things exist through Him and for Him' (Romans 11:36) ... Humanity therefore forms a unit. The command of neighbourly love ... applies to all people ... My neighbour is anyone who needs my help, even if he is from another race or culture.
- The variation and 'pluriformity' within the unity of creation and within human gender was present before the Fall of Man. After the Fall came further development, a further emphasis of variation. This differentiation resulted in racial differences, which Jeremiah implied when he asked 'Can a black man change the colour of his skin, or a leopard remove its spots?' (Jeremiah 13:23).

- The Bible also takes the fact of the existence of nations and peoples seriously. 'The fortunes of nations and peoples fall under the will and the intervention of God.'
- Thus God directed each people to their own area, and it can be deduced that this process continues under His guidance through history to the end' (Treurnicht, 1975:14).

Church and state in this excerpt - written a short while before the NP found itself forced to introduce reforms to its policy of separate development - emerge as close and intimate allies in this quest for justifiable geo-political separation.

Once the split in Afrikanerdom was institutionalised by the breakaway of the CP in 1982, how have the three Afrikaans Reformed churches reacted to the new and divisive political context within which they and the members of their different congregations have had to live and act? We shall consider this question by discussing each church separately.

4.1.1 The Hervormde Kerk

Of the three *susterkerke*, the *Hervormde Kerk* has formally opted to maintain racial exclusivity within its ranks. The church has agreed (once again) to uphold Article Ten of its Law, an article which precludes black membership and disallows common worship with Christians of other races in its churches. There is a measure of (minority) dissent within the church, however, which is led by an academic at the University of South Africa.

Although the *Hervormde Kerk* is the smallest of the three Afrikaans Reformed churches and has not played as important a role in Afrikaner politics as its *susterkerke*, its legitimising role should not be underestimated, a role which now is played to the benefit of the white rightwing.

4.1.2 The Gereformeerde Kerk

This Potchefstroom-based *Dopper* church is currently wracked by division over these racial and political issues. Although it is difficult to make a clear assessment, it would seem that

The Afrikaans Reformed church doctrines have provided moral justification for nationalist ideology and apartheid policy in the past

Escalating tensions over the relationship between church and state have led to rightwing breakaways from the NGK in the late 1980s

conservative interests are succeeding in gaining the upper hand:

- the Church's widely-known and respected journal, *Woord en Daad* (Word and Deed), has lost the clear liberal stance it held in earlier years;
- the Potchefstroom theological seminary (*kweekskool*) is said to be dominated by rightwing conservative Nationalists; and
- Tjaart van der Walt, a prominent liberal theologian in the church, has recently resigned as principal of the University of Potchefstroom for Christian Higher Education, a move widely interpreted to imply a significant loss of liberal support within the church.

4.1.3 The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)

The primary battleground over the issues of church and state is located within the ranks of the NGK, the mother church and the largest and most influential of the three sister churches. Pressure for the church to reconsider its racial policies and its biblically-founded justification for apartheid have been mounting over the past decade, particularly from within church circles in the Western Cape (as well as from without).

As a result, church theologians formed a Commission which compiled in 1986 a report, *Kerk en Samelewing* (Church and Society), in which the biblical foundations supporting apartheid were refuted. The report, however, is couched in terms which have allowed certain NGK ministers to argue that the practice of segregated worship and segregated church membership may in principle continue. Controversy has continued ever since though the report was approved, in 1988, by all the regional synods of the mother church.

The NGK daughter churches, have been rallying for some time to exert pressure on the mother church to declare apartheid (in policy as well as in practice) a sin - and to accept that any church supporting this policy be declared heretical. The role of the *NG Sendingkerk* (NG Missionary church) and in particular, its moderator Alan Boesak, has

been particularly important in this regard.

As a result of these escalating tensions within the church, an informal group of rightwing members led by a number of traditionalist theologians was formed. This group which called itself the *Beswaardes* (Objectors) led to the formation by a number of its members of a separate church in 1987 (the APK - see below). Other members have remained within the NGK and have formed a conservative grouping, the *NG Bond*. Dr Andries Treunicht and Professor Carel Boshoff have remained within the NG Kerk, in fact, and are (presumably) members of this informal *Bond*.

Tensions rose even further during a recent 1989 federal synodal meeting in Vereeniging which was attended by representatives from all the missionary daughter churches. Demands from these representatives to declare apartheid a sin could only be partially met - by way of a confessional - by the mother church.

It is probable that continuing escalation of tension within the NGK will lead to further breakaways in the future. The church today does not act as theological and moral foundation for either the NP or the CP. Rather, dissension within its ranks reflects the continuing battle between the white rightwing and the NP over how churches should provide spiritual security to white Afrikaners. Resolution of this battle, moreover, will be taken to indicate which group can legitimately claim to be the true representative of the white Afrikaner people and of its nationalist traditions.

4.1.4 The Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk (APK)

This church best exemplifies contemporary rightwing religious sentiment. Formed in 1987 by a group of NGK *beswaardes*, the church holds that racially exclusive worship is biblically defensible and socially necessary. Its theologians argue that the arguments contained in the NGK *Kerk en Samelewing* document comprise a serious deviation from the Articles of Faith of that church and from the reformed basis of the Afrikaans Reformed

churches as a whole. In its response to this document, entitled *Geloof en Protest* (Belief and Protest), the church finds in favour of a biblical justification for segregated worship.

APK members claim that membership is increasing apace, particularly since the Vereeniging meeting alluded to above. For example, in Carolina, a rural town in the Eastern Transvaal, the church has recently established a congregation which comprised 300 people by the middle of 1989. A number of CP members of parliament (including the MPs for Bethal and for Barberton) joined the church in the same year. Although the APK argues that its establishment arose for exclusively biblical reasons, its membership is probably overwhelmingly supportive of the white rightwing movement.

4.1.5 Sectarian Gospel

There are a number of small religious movements which unequivocally endorse the ideology of white racial exclusivity. For the most, support for these movements is limited to ultra-right fringe groupings, amongst whom arguments are found, for example, that only white people are able to 'go to heaven', or that white South Africans represent the last 'pure' group of God's chosen people. These beliefs are most often drawn together into a doctrine known as '*die Kinders van Israel*' (The children of Israel). Although small in membership and in direct influence, the movements which subscribe to this doctrine are significant in that they lend credibility to religious beliefs rooted in racist and separatist principles.

4.2 Political Parties: Parliament to Boerestaat

The CP (see Part One) and the HNP (see Part Two) represent the most visible political currents of the white rightwing movement. Both are political parties within the traditions of white South African politics. Both, moreover, believe that their path to power involves following the procedures laid down for constitutionally-defined electoral contests within the white electorate. With regard to

their primary policy objective of partition, both also contend (as does, in fact, the NP) that geo-political separation should be guided by the basis of land allocation defined within the 1936 Trust and Land Act, though the CP does propose, as we have seen, an increase in land consolidation under clearly defined market conditions.

Two other smaller political parties belonging to the white right view these related issues of partition and of land in a different light, however.

4.2.1 The Boerestaat Party (BSP)

This small party was launched in Pretoria in 1988 by Randburg's former mayor, Robert van Tonder. It does not yet enjoy formal political party status since such legal recognition requires a defined extent of initial support the party has yet to demonstrate. Its leader, nonetheless, insists that the party intends to raise support for the party among rank-and-file conservative whites in the country as a whole.

The significance of the party is found in the policies its leader proposes. Partition - the primary objective of the party - will result in the establishment of a *boerestaat* ('boere' nation-state). This state will comprise the areas covered by the (historically-defined) Transvaal, Free State and Vryheid Republics of the nineteenth century. Inspiration for this nation-state is found in the works of Israel's Ben Gurion, from which van Tonder also borrows the notion of *boere-kibbutzim* - mini-states which will develop a large measure of economic self-sufficiency.

A *boer* is defined as any direct descendant of the Voortrekkers, or of combatants in the two Afrikaner *vryheidsoorloë* (wars of liberation) or of inmates of the British concentration camps established during those wars. The Boerestaat Party is critical of the *Afrikaner Volkswag's* (AV) plans for an Afrikaner *volkstaat* (an equivalent nation-state for Afrikaners), since van Tonder claims that 'the Afrikaners have never possessed an own state - only us boere have'. Members of the party argue that 'boere' have a clear right in

Although the CP and HNP believe the path to power lies in contesting national elections, other fringe parties focus their activities outside of parliament

The primary objective of these parties is geo-political partition and the creation of a white boerestaat like the old Afrikaner Republics

international law to this claim to a separate nation-state.

In the white rightwing movement, Van Tonder is viewed as a maverick, though the basis of his (and his party's) ideas - as expressed through books written by van Tonder himself - are given consideration. Their significance lies in the fact that secession is couched in terms other than those proposed by Verwoerd in the fifties and sixties: van Tonder's *boerestaat* is significantly smaller and will therefore be, he claims, more culturally homogeneous than Verwoerdian 'white' South Africa ever could have become.

4.2.2 The Blanke Volkstaat Party (BVP)

Although legally registered, this party, which is the formal political arm of the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB), has yet to be launched in an organisational sense. It has been used, however, by AWB leaders and by Eugene Terre'Blanche in particular, to broadcast a vision of a *boerestaat* very similar to that of van Tonder's party.

The BVP has also been used for strategic purposes. Thus, its existence was recently used, unsuccessfully, by the AWB, the BSP, and the JINP to draw the CP into a pre-election front. Nonetheless, its significance lies, as with the BSP, in broadcasting among rightwing supporters, the idea of a smaller and more culturally appealing Afrikaner nation-state which would, its proponents claim, be established in accordance with international law.

4.3 The Paramilitary Option: the AWB & Others

Founded in 1974 by Eugene Terre'Blanche (an ex-policeman and ex-bodyguard to John Vorster), the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB) (literally, Afrikaans Resistance Movement) is a militant extra-parliamentary organisation which has remained highly visible during the eighties. Led by Terre'Blanche, who is a charismatic orator, the organisation

used to clash with government ministers at public meetings. Propelled by what it sees as the urgency of the NP threat, moreover, the movement has made sustained, albeit unsuccessful attempts, before both the 1987 and 1989 white national elections, to mediate between the CP and the HNP.

Romantic, racist and sensational as it is, the militant rhetoric of Terre'Blanche has had widespread appeal for Afrikaners in both the Transvaal and the OFS. After an NP campaign against the movement (which began in earnest in 1987), the nature of the organisation began to change. It remained militant and extra-parliamentary whilst the widespread media coverage it has enjoyed in 1987 and 1988 helped to build a more effective organisational body - with a head-office in a prestige Pretoria suburb, new literature and a video on sale, plus a new softened and more sophisticated message to supporters. Terre'Blanche's language remained as honed and polished in Afrikaans oratory as ever, but was substantially less prone to racist and violent metaphor than earlier. In addition, the AWB developed a defined welfare programme (run in large part by women) and appointed women to its *Grootraad* (Advisory Council).

In short, the AWB gained ground. In late 1988, however, the AWB was split by a series of events, beginning with Terre'Blanche being arrested on charges of malicious damage to property and *crimen injuria*. Although he was acquitted of the charges in the subsequent trial, it brought about the resignation of several high-ranking members of the AWB. In January 1989, several more members were dismissed after calling for Terre'Blanche's resignation in light of the incident involving him and *Sunday Times* columnist Jani Allen. Four of these members went on to form a rival organisation called the *Boere Vryheidsbeweging* (Boer Freedom Movement).

The *Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging* (BBB) (White Emancipatory Movement) was formed in 1987 under the leadership of Professor Johan Schabert, until recently attached to the Rand Afrikaans University. Though without a comparable charismatic leader, the movement, which has a small membership,

shares paramilitary characteristics with the AWB. Its leader, for instance, claims that it operated, through military-style commandos, in secret for two years before its public appearance. It has been involved in several instances of public disturbance, particularly in connection with the issue of residential racial segregation in Mayfair (Johannesburg). The BBB propagates the extraordinary idea that South Africa and 'South West Africa' belong exclusively to white South Africans.

The South African government restricted the activities of the movement and its leader in November 1988. The same measures were applied some two months later against the *Blanke Nasionale Beweging* (White National Movement), a new organisation with similar aims and membership which emerged immediately after the first set of restrictions were implemented.

The AWB (and other comparable bodies) thus find themselves at a low ebb in mid-1989. Standing as they do in the paramilitary tradition of Afrikaner resistance, however, the present state of affairs may well be temporary. In the traditions of the 1914-15 Afrikaner rebellion and the *Osewabrandwag* (Oxwagon Sentinel) of the Second World War, the implicit message that these organisations will organise Afrikaners - once 'all else has failed' - and lead them into a justified civil war will remain a potent one for many white South Africans (See Part Five on Rightwing Violence).

4.4 Afrikaner Culture: The Afrikaner Volkswag (AV)

The *Afrikaner Volkswag* (literally, Guardian of the Afrikaner People) (AV) is a cultural organisation drawing together people and families active in the area of Afrikaner traditional culture. At its helm are Professor Carel Boshoff and his wife Anna, daughter of the late Dr HF Verwoerd. It was formed in 1984, the year after Boshoff resigned as chairman of the *Broederbond* (the NP-dominated Association of Brothers). The origins of the AV are found in the widespread dissension and tensions in Afrikaner cultural

and civic organisations which were brought to a head by the crisis surrounding the 1982 breakaway of the CP.

The AV provides a forum for communal activities, fostered through a programme designed to promote Afrikaner Nationalism. Thus, activities of symbolic significance are encouraged: parades in Voortrekker dress, the occasional use of oxwagons in such parades, and the singing of traditional anthems. The values of family life, membership of the Afrikaner *volk*, and belief in God are emphasised.

The organisation publishes a monthly newsletter for its estimated 50 000 members. It also distributes rightwing literature, including copies of the speeches of Afrikaner leaders, relevant novels, and childrens' books deemed appropriate by the organisation's leadership.

The AV counts among its members Jaap Marais, Andries Treurnicht and Eugene Terre'Blanche, all three of whom have spoken on AV platforms. Most prominent of this organisation's activities was their recent participation in the white right's 'alternative' Groot Trek memorial celebrations, which culminated in a *volksfees* (festival of the people) on the farm Donkerhoek outside Pretoria. These celebrations drew an estimated 25 000 participants, far more than those of the official government celebrations organised by the NP-linked *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurorganisasies* (FAK) (Federation of Afrikaans Culture Organisations).

4.5 Rightwing 'Think-Tanks'

In the tradition of Afrikaner nationalism as it took shape under the political banner of the NP, three primary institutions which propose and refine the rightwing movement's ideological and policy proposals have developed. These institutions are not directly linked to the political parties of this movement - so as to ensure freedom of discussion and criticism - and are able to broadcast their

The militant traditions of the Osewabrandwag remain alive among small paramilitary elements found within the white rightwing movement

Three primary research institutions have emerged to refine the ideological and policy proposals of the rightwing, formulating specific plans for a white homeland

ideas and proposals widely through books, journals and other documents which are regularly published and distributed. Two of the three organisations, *Die Vereeniging van Oranjewerkers* (Association of Orange Workers) and *Stigting Afrikanervryheid* (Afrikaner Freedom Foundation) were established after the white rightwing movement had been launched. The third, *Die Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede* (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs) (SABRA), had been the primary NP 'think tank' and research organisation on 'race policy' throughout the NP period of rule. Since the NP found it impossible, in the early eighties, to convince senior members of SABRA (who included Carel Boshoff) of the correctness of their new constitution and 'race policy', government members reluctantly broke ties with the organisation.

Today, SABRA stands squarely within the framework of the rightwing movement, draws on the expertise of well-known rightwing intellectuals such as Professors Boshoff and Hercules Booyesen, and conducts research, for example, into the financial implications of different models of partition in South Africa. This research is conducted within the ideological guideline that 'the new Afrikaner territory would have to be sovereign, unified, have a first-world economy, and be based on Afrikaner Calvinistic principles and traditions. It ... should not be so big that Afrikaners could not manage it on their own or it would eventually culminate in a multiracial state'.

The *Oranjewerkers* organisation is led by Professor Hercules Booyesen and by HF Verwoerd, son of the late prime minister HF Verwoerd. Members hold to the principle of *beset en besit* (occupy and possess), implying that white South Africans while having the right to some form of partition, are morally obliged to occupy on their own a defined geographical area if they wish to realise that right. Accordingly, they emphasise self-sufficiency and encourage the use of white labour. The first of these white 'growth-points' is located at Morgenzon on the Eastern Highveld and includes a factory and a number of shops, together with the twenty to thirty families of *Oranjewerker* members.

With financial support from sympathisers - the recently established *Genootskap van Oranje-Sakekringe* (Society of Orange Business Circles) is a case in point - *Oranjewerkers* succeed in publishing a quarterly journal aimed at stimulating debates regarding partition. They also provide a publishing service and have produced over 20 works in the last few years. The organisation counted some 2 500 members in 1986.

The *Stigting Afrikanervryheid* (Institute for Afrikaner Liberation) was established in 1988 by Carel Boshoff specifically to develop the outlines of a physical plan for the *volkstaat* ideal of the white rightwing. The organisation also offers to rightwing intellectuals a non-party political platform from which new ideas may be broadcast. The outlines of the *volkstaat* envisaged by the organisation were finalised and broadcast during 1989. The large area proposed comprises regions in northern and central Cape Province, as well as a southern region of Namibia.

The primary criterion used to delineate this area, moreover, was that a majority of the residents should be white. Boshoff argues that self-determination in a new Afrikaner nation-state would only be meaningful if Afrikaners (and other whites) formed a majority of the population resident in that nation-state.

Boshoff believes that these and similar arguments need continually to take place within the broader rightwing movement to sustain 'creative tension', in his phrase, to ensure ideological development. In so far as the *Stigting Afrikanervryheid* continues with this task, it will, in all probability, grow in stature and in importance.

4.6 Wider Civil Society

Churches and political parties, together with cultural, intellectual and paramilitary organisations represent but a few of the numerous voluntary associations which make up modern life in South Africa. In many white (mainly Afrikaner) towns and suburbs, a

series of often grim battles have been waged between NP supporters and white rightwing groups over control of town councils (see data base:34), agricultural cooperatives, school committees and the like.

One group which engages in these battles is a women's organisation called *Afrikanervroue Kenkrag* (AVK) (literally, Afrikaner women: strength in knowledge). Formed in 1983 by a group of women who 'felt that the government's integration attempts should be actively countered', the organisation is directed by a powerful and charismatic leader. Established in Pretoria, the AVK has expanded rapidly in the north of the country and now counts a paid-up membership of 1 200. Bi-annual congresses are held and members receive a monthly newsletter.

The organisation aims at involving women in warding off 'attacks' on the *Afrikanervolk* and the Afrikaner way of life. Its fundamental objective is to protect those institutions which safeguard Afrikaner nationalist beliefs and values.

In 1987 controversy surrounded the decision by the CP-controlled Menlo Park High school committee to bar an African scholar from an athletics meeting to be held there. More recently, much publicity has been given to the re-implementation of separate amenities by the CP-controlled Boksburg and Carletonville municipalities.

In the Eastern Transvaal, the largest agricultural cooperative in the country is effectively controlled by the rightwing, whilst the CP member for Bethal estimates that three out of four white school committees in his constituency are run by *regdenkendes* (people with right views).

Overall, there is evidence that the white right is making increasing inroads into Afrikaner civil society. In fact, the mounting influence of the white right, as we have shown above, in Afrikaner churches, over Afrikaner culture, and in the realm of secessionist ideas may be taken to be a reflection of equal influence over Afrikaner mores and attitudes at town, suburb, and village levels.

The white right has made major inroads into Afrikaner civil society, waging grim battles with NP supporters in agricultural cooperatives, school committees, etc

READER SUMMARY OF PART FOUR

Flocking to the Faith

The white rightwing in South Africa today should be recognised as a social movement. Followers of the movement share a wide range of beliefs with one another, beliefs in particular regarding their right to racially exclusive life-domains - suburb, school, hospital and church, for example - and their right to a separate nation-state. They also share deep-seated fears, fears relating to loss of wealth and material well-being, loss of privilege as well as fears of betrayal.

Supporters of the movement, moreover, are bound together through common membership in wide range of voluntary bodies, all which subscribe to these beliefs. These membership bonds often cut across and mutually support one another: a follower typically belongs simultaneously to a rightwing town council, a rightwing church congregation and a rightwing political party.

Leaders of these rightwing organisations mobilise their followers to express support for the movement through a range of activities: voting for rightwing candidates at local and national level, making donations to rightwing organisations, participating in the local branches of cultural and other rightwing bodies, recruiting new supporters for the movement, and so on. Mobilisation is advanced by the judicious broadcasting of new rightwing ideas and strategies identified by the movement's intellectuals and their 'think-tank' organisations, and often morally justified by rightwing ministers and theologians.

The movement is fundamentally Afrikaner nationalist in orientation. Its ideal is the creation of an Afrikaner-dominated nation-state in which Afrikaner values and culture may flourish in safety and security, a state in which the principle of Afrikaner self-determination may be unequivocally applied by Afrikaners, and unambiguously recognised as legitimate by other people.

The Conservative Party, therefore, should be recognised as the political torch-bearer of Afrikaner nationalism. The party's electoral strategy in 1989 may not fully accord with all the ideas of the movement's 'think-tanks' and intellectuals, but the recognition by all rightwing supporters of the CP's role as political torch-bearer is effectively total. On 6 September 1989 at the polls, the CP will stand, and will be seen by many to stand, as the legitimate representative of the white rightwing and Afrikaner nationalist movement.

PART FIVE

Rightwing Violence

**Potential
&
Responsibility**

Is the rightwing likely to resort to violence against the state and, if so, under what circumstances? Is it responsible for attacks on leftwing groups?

Overview Speculation after Strydom

In November 1988, 23 African people were gunned down on the streets of Pretoria. Six of them were killed, the remainder wounded. These random shootings brought the issue of political violence and the white rightwing sharply to centre-stage.

The so-called Strydom *Wit Wolf* (white wolf) incident - raises three questions:

- To what extent has the rightwing already been responsible for attacks on targets to the 'left' of the National Party?
- Is the rightwing likely to use violence against the state itself and, if so, under what circumstances?
- Were the rightwing to come to power in South Africa, what would be the effect on the incidence of political violence across the country?

Analysis of these questions is inevitably speculative: either because of a lack of information or because the questions relate to events yet in the future. Subject to this disclaimer, each of these three issues will be dealt with as best as possible.

5.1 Attacks on the Left

Proven instances of organised white rightwing involvement in political violence are relatively few. They include in the seventies the fire-bombing of Colin Eglin's home, and in the eighties, the tarring and feathering, by the AWB, of a Pretoria academic seen as having betrayed the *Afrikaner volk*, and the fire-bombing of the office of a UNISA academic who gave evidence in mitigation of the accused in the Silverton siege trial.

More recently, there is no proof of rightwing political violence: only a growing number of unexplained incidents. Thus, for example, since the upheavals of 1984-86, 'there have been 17 assassinations of radical and prominent opponents of the government'. In addition, 'there have been more than a dozen acts of sabotage against buildings owned

by ... (opposition) groups' (*Sunday Times*: 20/11/88), the most notable of these being the bombings of the headquarters of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and of the South African Council of Churches (Khotso House). The murder of a prominent Wits academic and civil rights activist, David Webster, in front of his house in Johannesburg earlier this year is another recent case.

Those on the left widely believe the rightwing (possibly in collaboration with the state) to be the perpetrators of this violence or at least to be responsible for some of it. In the absence of further evidence, this claim is hard to test.

Why, however, the sudden increase in these unexplained incidents? What are the factors, in other words, which contribute to violence against the left and what is likely to happen, in this context, in the short-term future?

The answer lies in a complex matrix of factors. One, however, seems to merit a special focus. This is the changing perception of the state's capacity to contain *swart gevaar* (black threat) and to maintain unquestioned white rule. After Sharpeville, in the mid-sixties and early seventies, there was little doubt as to either. African resistance, prior to Soweto 1976, appeared to have been thoroughly crushed. And the state (despite practical difficulties increasingly being experienced in the implementation of its ideology) remained committed to Verwoerdian separate development and thus to the maintenance of Afrikaner nationalist power and control over the country.

The Soweto unrest, coupled with a variety of other factors, changed these perceptions fundamentally. Black resistance was seen to be alive and well. And, at the same time, the NP government was seen as having betrayed the Verwoerdian ideal and, especially through the tricameral constitution, as having paved the way for ultimate African majority rule.

Both developments have undoubtedly played a crucial role in the rise of the rightwing. It is also likely, for rightwing supporters, that they have set the scene for categorical rejection of, (and, if necessary, political violence against)

the African 'left': its ultimate 'enemy'. Now that the NP government is perceived by the rightwing to be weak and vacillating, to the point of meeting with African National Congress president Mandela, and now that the NP appears to be unsure of its direction and unwilling to take decisive action against *swart gevaar*; it is not surprising (though hardly to be condoned) that the rightwing should be seeking to develop and assert its own form of control.

Is the implication that this trend is likely to continue and increase? An answer can be found by considering two separate issues:

- With regard to its opponents on the left, the NP government has used legal and security measures to curb activities while promising the development of healthy 'power-sharing'. It has used both the stick and the carrot of promised reform.
- With regard to its opponents on the right, the state is perceived to have vacillated: extending the hand of friendship while categorically rejecting the aims of the movement; threatening to act against groups on the ultraright while using its agencies of law, order and security almost exclusively against its other opponents. The state is thus perceived as inconsistent.

There are, in all probability, no more than a few hundred outright supporters of Barend Strydom (and of his deeds) in the country. On the far right, however, while there is general abhorrence for the deed, a number of rightwingers claim to understand why Strydom acted as he did. They argue that he alone should not be held accountable: the NP government should share that blame because of the fundamental way in which it has threatened the Afrikaner people.

AWB leader Terre'Blanche echoed these views when he labelled Strydom 'an unfortunate man' who had 'acted entirely of his own volition ... but I can understand the immense frustration someone like him feels when his security and all he holds dear are threatened.'

In the late eighties, rightwing supporters perceive themselves becoming poorer by the day. No longer do they receive the material

and symbolic benefits that they as Afrikaner nationalists received in the sixties and seventies. Insofar as this perception of increasing immiseration continues, it is probable that tacit support for home-grown forms of rightwing coercion and violent actions will develop simultaneously.

It is probable that tacit support for homegrown forms of rightwing coercion and violent actions will develop simultaneously

5.2 Anti-State Violence

This second question is closely related to the first. In order to address it, a reality often overlooked in analysis of South Africa must first and foremost be acknowledged. Thus, whilst most commentators have tended to focus exclusively on the challenge to the South African state from actors on its 'left', especially the Charterists and Africanists, the white rightwing must also be acknowledged as an equal source of challenge.

As yet, the white rightwing has not (in any consistent manner) resorted to violence against the NP-controlled state. Instead, it has accepted the rules of the game and sought to work within them to oust the present government from power. Hence, its main thrust (through the Conservative Party as its political arm) has been to challenge the NP at the electoral polls at national and local level. In addition, it has sought to mobilise the forces of Afrikaner Nationalism to its cause, by developing and welding into tight-knit unity a spectrum of social, economic and cultural organisations, ranging from school committees to the *Afrikaner Volkswag*. In doing so, the new white right is using precisely the same mobilising tactics employed originally - and highly successfully - by the NP to win and entrench political power.

In short, its main thrust to date has been to establish the CP as the new torch-bearer of Afrikaner Nationalism; and to rely on this powerful force to sweep it into political office and thus give it the capacity, by constitutional means, to re-institute Verwoerdian separate development.

This does not mean, however, that political violence against the ruling state does not also

The Afrikaner nationalist tradition of militant resistance, to protect the interests of the volk, will not fade away in the years ahead

have a place on the rightwing agenda. Critical among the constituent elements of the rightwing movement is the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging*: an organisation formed in the seventies specifically (as its name implies) to offer resistance to all it believes will 'sell out' the Afrikaner. Its charismatic leader, Eugene Terre'blanche, makes no secret of the organisation's commitment to force, if needs be. Its leadership and its membership, carry arms openly. The AWB boldly undertakes to Afrikanerdom that 'if all else fails' it will take action, by force if necessary, to safeguard Afrikaner interests. The form which such action will take is kept deliberately vague. But the threat of political violence against the state, if necessary, is open and apparent.

This threat, moreover, is also in keeping with Afrikaner history. As stressed by Terre'blanche, there have been bands of true Afrikaners at varying points in time: *die bittereinders* (the diehards) of the *Tweede Vryheids Oorlog* (Second Liberation War), the 1914-15 rebels, members of the *Ossewabrandwag* (Oxwagon Sentinel) - who have not hesitated to resort to force against the ruling order to protect the interests of the volk.

The Terre'Blanche and Jani Allan affair has undoubtedly resulted in the loss of respectability of the AWB in the eyes of the white rightwing leadership. With significant resignations at senior level, with resultant diminution of organisational coherence, the AWB has (for the moment at least) generally lost ground as an important organisation within the wider white rightwing movement.

This should not be taken, however, to imply that the paramilitary option has disappeared from the minds of many South Africans. In the first place, the split within the AWB is not over ideology. Rather, it was caused by personalities and by a disagreement over the importance in the movement of *suiwerheid* (purity): how purist in terms of Calvinist values leaders of rightwing Afrikaner movements should remain.

In the second place, the paramilitary option will be activated whenever the NP government (or any other future government, for that matter) is seen as going soft on law, order and security (which inevitably will happen in the years ahead). In fact, the defiance campaign of July 1989 launched by the *Mass Democratic Movement* (MDM) has already elicited racist statements and pamphlets, linked symbolically to the *Wit Wolf* slogan, threatening violent action against MDM leaders. It is difficult to see the strand of resistance within the tradition of Afrikaner nationalism fading away in the years ahead.

5.3 Rightwing Takeover & Violence

The likelihood of a rightwing takeover at national level is the subject of wide-ranging speculation before the September 1989 election. It needs no crystal ball to foresee greatly increased polarisation and tension in such circumstances. One immediate consequence would be a serious drop in South African business confidence, both nationally and abroad. Already, rightwing moves to reassert Verwoerdian apartheid at local level have created images of ghost towns, and seem to be generating resistance in local black communities, which have vowed to take their spending power elsewhere. Should the rightwing assume power at national level, no such option would, however, be open.

The likely result of a rightwing takeover - as recognised by some of the key intellectual leaders of the ultraright - would be a strengthened black resistance, manifested not only in non-violent boycott strategies but also in the flaring of violence and civil unrest. A victorious rightwing would be likely to clamp down with yet more force than has the state to date. And the result may well be a vicious cycle of repression and unrest in the context of a severe recessionary economic downturn, in which the chances of negotiating some form of peaceful settlement would be slim indeed.

**READER SUMMARY
OF
PART FIVE**

Increased Conflict

In short, the rise of the rightwing has fundamental implications for the incidence of political violence within the country. Rightwing violence against the left is already, it is submitted, a serious problem, particularly since there are sharply differing views regarding its incidence. Rightwing violence against the state is also a real possibility. And, should the rightwing come to power, there is little doubt that this would lead to increased polarisation, economic recession, and a general heightening of the level of political violence within society.

The prospect is deeply disturbing. It should also not lightly be dismissed. For, contrary to the views of many, the rise of the rightwing is no ephemeral phenomenon, nor is it simply an instance of *broedertwis* (fraternal discord) within the ranks of Afrikanerdom, of comparatively minor significance on the broader South African stage.

The rightwing is much more than the sum of its various parts. It is a growing movement, which reflects a re-awakening and re-channeling of the powerful force of Afrikaner Nationalism: the force which brought the NP to power in 1948 and has kept it there for forty years. Now, however, the NP has been displaced to a significant extent as the torchbearer of Afrikaner Nationalism. The rightwing, increasingly, has assumed this role. It is thus able to mobilise a commitment and support which far transcends the scope of 'ordinary' white political loyalties. This support, moreover, is buttressed by worsening financial circumstances for rightwing supporters.

CONCLUSION

Choosing Between Two Paths

It is in the nature of political parties to seek out support from diverse groups. The Conservative Party is no exception. It is anticipated that the CP will draw support from a diverse range of people, differing in both viewpoint and motivation. In general, however, it is expected that CP votes will derive from the following (not necessarily exclusive) groups:

- convinced Afrikaner nationalists;
- people who wish to lodge a protest against the ruling NP;
- conservatives and arch-conservatives who wish to maintain the privileges they have at present, or regain those enjoyed some decades back.

In South Africa today, white voters are profoundly influenced by anxieties about the future. Given the reality of a white minority and a black majority, political parties mainly concerned about white voters seek ways of proposing some form of black accommodation which will ameliorate these fears. It is with this in mind that the National Party and the Democratic Party have introduced the notion of national negotiations.

The Conservative Party's stand on this issue is clear: so long as all remain within one country, the reality of the mix of ethnic and racial groups in South Africa will inevitably cause continued conflict. In a country of this nature, to share power is to lose power to the largest group. The only accommodation possible, accordingly, is partition; partition aimed at offering each ethnic group its own homeland.

The promise implicit in this renewed call for 'separate development' is not a new one. It was repeatedly broadcast during the sixties and seventies, a period characterised by white (and particularly Afrikaner) prosperity and privilege. Support for the CP results in part from this history. By implication, once the party's supporters learn that the CP is not able to return them to prosperity and privilege, they are likely to seek other political alliances. Such CP support is thus likely to prove fickle.

Be that as it may, the authors have sought to show in this study that the CP is not simply a political party seeking support from conservative, racist and die-hard white South African voters. Rather, it forms part of a resurgent Afrikaner nationalist movement which accommodates (and even welcomes) broader white support on condition that Afrikaner ideals and Afrikaner leadership are accepted.

English-speaking supporters who form a small but significant rightwing following, are probably more than prepared to accept this form of leadership - leadership which has become traditional in white politics - on condition that they are assured that levels of white prosperity and privilege reached in the sixties will return. The white settler version of the process of political emancipation further north in the African continent probably also colours these voters' appreciative views of CP policy, and critical views of the policies of others.

As torch-bearer of the new white right, the CP plays a crucial role in a resurgent Afrikaner nationalist movement determined not to share power

Their choice is one between conservative Afrikaner opposition within South Africa or the creation of a volkstaat with a viable land mass and economy

The authors have also sought to demonstrate - despite the intrinsic weakness of this accommodative CP policy which may cost it support - that this movement is vigorous, historically grounded, organisationally rooted, and, at least in its own terms, sanctified by religion. It is for this reason that we believe the white rightwing movement will remain a significant factor in the process of political change in the country, irrespective of the outcome of the September 1989 election.

At the same time, the movement is also severely constrained on a number of fronts. A section of its support remains ultra-conservative, which complicates the already formidable task of identifying and broadcasting a morally defensible ideology and policy to South Africa and to the outside world.

Two other serious challenges face the leaders within the movement. In the first place, the contemporary Afrikaner nationalist movement has invested little serious thought or action in economic affairs. We have seen that the CP's economic policy is backward-looking rather than innovative, and designed to achieve political rather than economic goals. In the thirties and forties, during an earlier phase of ascendant Afrikaner nationalism, the rank-and-file within the *volk* were rural or working-class; and Afrikaner leaders, realising the need for economic action, mobilised capital and formed Afrikaner organisations to serve the *volk*. Today, rank-and-file Afrikaners are more often middle-class than working-class, and have become used to receiving benefits and privileges from the Afrikaner state over the last thirty years. As this state is forced to change, as it surely is and will continue to be, the new Afrikaner nationalists will

increasingly find themselves without their primary source of material wealth and privilege.

In the second place, there is the question of an Afrikaner-dominated white *volkstaat*. South Africa - under the impact of urbanisation and industrialisation - is moving further away from Afrikaner nationalist ideals of cultural exclusivity for the *volk* and racial exclusivity in church, school and hospital. In this context, the question of whether and how to define a smaller and more culturally acceptable *volkstaat* will increasingly predominate. The attempt to achieve such a white homeland will entail severe costs for many rightwing supporters. Those resident outside this proposed state, in particular, may well be less likely to support its creation. In addition, the question of how it is to obtain an adequate allocation of resources from the country as a whole will be a difficult and delicate issue.

In short, the white rightwing faces, in the near future, a fundamental choice between two paths. The first is one of continuing conservative Afrikaner opposition within South Africa, a path which can only hinder and scape-goat other political initiatives rather than lead to the implementation of its own.

The second path is to seek within present South Africa a *volkstaat* which may become culturally as well as economically viable. This path is one which requires cooperation, at least initially, from a range of South African interests so as to enable a successful launch.

The white rightwing has therefore - as do all other major political actors in South Africa today - to find answers to two key questions: its economic policy and its policy on land.

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