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EAST AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
CONFERENCE PAPERS - JANUARY 1966

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
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A SURVEY OF LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN EAST AFRICA

(Presented to the first conference of the University of East Africa Social Science Research Council held at EAISR, Makerere College, Kampala, January 3-8, 1966).

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This paper presents some impressions of land settlement and rural development resulting from a tour of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, on short term assignment with one of the UN Special Agencies (for which a fuller report has been prepared) during the first half of 1964. These impressions have the merit, despite the brevity of the interviews and periods of observation on which they are based, of pertaining to a wider, and more diverse, socio-political area than is customarily the case with 'rapid surveys'. Planning interest in land settlement is topical at the present time. I refer, for example, to the recent Stamp Commission in Kenya of which the broad outline of its findings - the Report itself is classified and I have not seen it - has been indicated in recent press releases.⁽¹⁾ Presumably the recent British Government Planning Mission to Tanzania inquired into various aspects of pilot village settlement schemes in that country. In Uganda, current planning interest in the subject is by no means confined to refugee zones, if we include 'group farming' within the scope of our definition.

Various doctrinal and other statements on land settlement have been made by the Governments concerned, and a lengthy, perceptive evaluation of some aspects of the Highlands land settlement schemes in Kenya is just about to be published.⁽³⁾

A pioneer social anthropological case study of a scheme in Tanzania, near Dodoma, was carried out in 1963 by Dr. Peter Rigby,⁽⁴⁾ currently my colleague in the Department of Sociology, Makerere, and a number of various other sociological studies are now in progress.⁽⁵⁾

Definition:

Land settlement, which is sometimes land re-settlement, can conveniently be defined in rough and ready terms, distinct from other forms of rural development projects, if first we distinguish between:

- a) planned social change that necessarily does entail population movement, population selection, and most probably population control subsequently, and
- b) planned social change that does not necessarily that is, as conceived by the 'planners' entail these population aspects of redistribution and control.

* Discussed subsequently with M. Balshaw, of the Department of Agriculture, and H. Langlands, of the Department of Geography, subsequently to my joining Makerere.

At least the following sub-categories of (a) can be distinguished, as follows:-

- (i) sedentarization of nomadic or pastoral populations;
- (ii) villagization of cultivators;
- (iii) land settlement, sometimes called land re-settlement, under which head at least some forms of "group farming" should be included.

It is, then, with projects of the type (a, iii) that we are concerned in this survey particularly, provided it is understood:

that grazing control schemes or cattle ranching projects and the opening up of new land by irrigation may involve population control, but not necessarily so:

that the distinctions between our first major category and the more usual approach to rural development in terms of agricultural consolidation varies from country to country in East Africa, being greatest in Tanzania, least in Uganda, and somewhere between these two regional extremes in Kenya:

that the distinctions between the three sub-types defined above also vary as between country and country - for example, land settlement and villagization in Tanzania are closely interrelated, in Kenya bear no relation one to the other, in Uganda differ widely from scheme to scheme according to type and phasing:

that the forms of socio-agrarian organization in the new settlements vary all the way from extremes of individualist, to extremes of collectivist, types, and these forms do not correlate with either the extent of government assistance to the settlers, or the scope of overall planning - e.g. whether or not planning for social amenities is integrated with that for economic production.

Further, no rural population has an entirely static distribution, and even so-called 'indigenous' or 'traditional' settlement patterns are not fixed but have changed, and no doubt will continue to change, according to health, security, administrative, socio-political and economic factors which influence the pattern of settlement to different extents, and in different combinations, in different situations. Unplanned and unassisted migration of individuals or families from one rural area to another, is a common feature, in Buganda, for example. In some areas, e.g. West Nile, "villages" constantly divide then fuse together again, following social processes of conflict then conflict resolution. Possibly the rural population of East Africa generally (but I have no figures) is mobile to a particularly high degree in the sense that people travel frequently, over large areas, visiting relatives or in search of work.

In Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya alike, development planners have explicitly taken one of the Israeli forms of land settlement, the moshav ovdim, as a model to be followed, and have in general terms adopted also the Israeli paradigm (Yaffe, in 1919) of national land, self help, mutual aid and joint buying and selling, except that a trend towards greater collectivization is increasingly apparent in Tanzania, as contrasted with Uganda and Kenya.

P. Apthorp

To date there seems to have been little if any recourse to Soviet or Sino models. On inspection, however, any analogy between forms of settlement in Israel and in East Africa breaks down in matters of detail. In Israel, according to an officially distributed handbook (6), hired labour on settlement schemes is to be avoided because of the "unbearable strain on social relations" that would be caused, yet socialist planning theory in East Africa nowhere goes this far. And in respect of the "back to the land" ideology in Israel (that was supposed "to redeem and to exalt the human spirit by physical work in the lap of mother nature", to cite from the same government source, there is scarcely any parallel to be found in East Africa (unless something vaguely of the sort was more or less behind some early Tanzanian and Kenyan schemes for rural resettlement of urban unemployed, except of course that professional classes in East Africa were not involved they were in Israel)

Above all, whatever similarities there may be in limited, specific, or isolated agrarian, social or physical planning aspects, the socio-political national contexts of land settlement schemes in Israel and in East Africa differ irreducibly.

Further, tending by their very nature to be geographically remote, it happens that land settlement schemes come to develop in comparative isolation one from the other. To the physical (and financial) problems of communication posed by spatial distance, other types of obstacles to communication are added when the agents or agencies responsible for different types of settlement (found in each of the three countries in East Africa) are disposed to quasi-ideological dispute about the merits even of the physical basis of the planning of their respective schemes. Yet common at any rate to the planning of all types - I believe without exception - of settlement scheme in East Africa, is an emphasis on the part to be played by co-operatives. As originally planned, each Highlands Scheme in Kenya for example, after two and a half years of tutelage under a central government Settlement Officer, was to be managed entirely by a co-operative. Settlers, immediately after arrival, were (and are) expected to form themselves "voluntarily" into a co-operative, this despite the fact that, due to the method of selection, though all settlers on one scheme may be of the same "tribal" classification, they will have come from different locations and probably will not have been known to one another previously. One farmer is expected to serve voluntarily as a secretary, foregoing the monthly salary of £20 - £25 that he could otherwise earn in paid employment, commercially. And he will have his own farming operations to attend to at the same time. The Settlement Department in Kenya does not give subsidies to individual primary co-operatives. Its 10/- shillings grant per plot-holder is taken up by the office of Department's Assistant Commissioner for Co-operatives which follows the policy of giving only advisory assistance to the primary societies, not taking any part in their internal affairs, even in respect of book-keeping.

At the present time some co-operatives are already charged with responsibility for loan retrieval. Possibly other

The co-operative principle generally in East Africa, tends to be identified with the total form of 'African traditional society' (as construed by 'African Socialism') rather than seen as a particular component part of it. Tanzania's doctrine of Ujamaa, for instance, is a theory of organicism in social relations that underplays the competitive and conflicting elements that undoubtedly we find even in small, hierarchically organized, "family" societies. A jamaa, in a traditionally organized rural community in Tanzania, while it co-operated well for some purposes (e.g. the rituals of kinship at life crises, births, marriages and deaths), did not co-operate at all for other purposes (e.g. food production). And in the context of the local political community at any rate, it had too limited, too ascribed a membership for it to take any collective action that was not necessarily, even inherently, factional and disruptive in that local political community.

The present-day ranching 'co-operatives' in the Machakos district, notably at Lukenia and Koma Rock, would appear to be closer rather to companies than to co-operatives in the usual senses of these words. And in any event, experience gained in cattle ranching does not necessarily give much clue as to how co-operative farming on mixed arable land might work out, especially in an area fairly intensively developed before settlement where a mixed participation, of displaced farm labour and new settlers, would be the basis of any co-operative organization. Case studies in applied rural sociology are most urgently needed to evaluate successes and failures 'in co-operatives' obtained thus far. The Githioro scheme on the Kinangop would appear to come closest to co-operative farming on mixed arable land operated by the Settlement Department in Kenya. How does this compare say with co-operative farming (of various kinds) in southern Tanzania and this with certain group farming ventures in Uganda? And what sociological analysis/one to make of the rise and fall of theories of communal farming (e.g. in Kenya) in the colonial interlude, as compared with the place of the same approach in nationalist contexts?

Tanzania

The comparative sociological study of land settlement schemes in Tanzania should begin with evaluation of the sleeping sickness settlements in the Western Province, where, according to Apted (1) by 1955 "some sixty two settlements containing a quarter of million people" were established, some dating from the 1924-1930 outbreak. In the Lake Province, the previously largely unpopulated and tsetse infected Geita District has been settled by people from the neighbouring and over-populated Sukumaland. The wheatlands schemes (Fuggles-Couchman) in the Arusha District (in the 1940s?) afford another early example of a rural development involving resettlement. But, turning to the new forms of land settlement in Tanzania at the present time, the pilot village settlements are the most prominent in government planning. It is intended that, during the five year period 1964-69, sixty eight of these will be established, and a start has been made now on, I think, five or six. A further five are to be based on sisal. However, seven tenths of the financing required for this total of seventy three village settlements would become available only in the final year of the above

Perhaps two kinds of pilot village settlements can be distinguished. The Ramkoma settlement, south-east of Musoma in the Mara Region, consists mainly of farmers who already had a claim mainly in the form of grazing rights on the land (some 7,000 to 8,000 acres) now set aside for the new villages. Ramkoma is, therefore, more in the nature of farming consolidation rather than a pioneer settlement.

The scheme at Mlale-Litenga, west of Songea in Ruvuma District, may be regarded as a pilot village proper. There is a small indigenous "village" in existence bordering the proposed new farming lands, but it is outside the scheme. Farmers for the new village will be recruited from anywhere in the Ruvuma Region or elsewhere.

Crops for these new villages vary from area to area. The pilot village settlement at Upper Kitete near Mbulu is to be based on wheat. Wheat production requires a large scale method of organisation of production, and mechanisation to a great extent. Technologically, therefore, some form of large-scale (rather than small-holders') cultivation of wheat may be expected at Kitete. After his visit to Upper Kitete in March 1964, President Nyerere is understood to have expressed himself in favour of a communal approach to farming methods as sound social as well as technological (in the case of wheat) policy.

I gather that it is the experience thus far at Upper Kitete that while communal cultivation of communal land has proved socially feasible, communal labour undertaken on behalf of individuals, e.g. in wood cutting, has not. Will communal herding of individually owned cattle be socially acceptable?

Financial and ^{other} details of the model type of pilot village settlement are set out in the Government pamphlet Rural Settlement Planning.⁽⁸⁾ Each village is to consist of about 250 families (about 1,000 persons). It is envisaged that, after supplying his subsistence needs, each farmer will have an income of from £100 to £150 per annum. The Extraordinarily high cost of each village is in the region of £200,000, of which three-quarters should be paid back to the government by the settlers over 25 years. Costs breakdown as follows: Surveys, access roads, etc., £5,000; land clearing (but there are plans for National Service manpower to clear trees at no cost to the settlement) £30,000; machinery £25,000; buildings £40,000; livestock purchases £15,000; recurring costs for two years, including farmers' subsistence £85,000.

Planners recognise that, as a high birth rate may be anticipated, the control of population in the villages will present a real problem. Present policy is to insist that only direct dependents live with the farmer, and that his holding is not subdivided on inheritance. Criticism on both these points was voiced to me by settlers at Mlale-Litenga for example.

In the first instance long-term Rights of Occupancy over the whole area of each scheme will be taken out by the Rural Settlement Commission. During the training period, homestead plots of one to three acres will be allocated provisionally to the farmers. As the production fields around the village nucleus are cleared and brought under cultivation so strips or blocks in these fields will also be provisionally allocated to farmers. During this period eviction from the holding and the scheme will be relatively simple in cases of persistent bad husbandry.

When the schemes reach maturity the Right of Occupancy will be transferred to a co-operative society, which will retain the rights over the land on which public and farm buildings are constructed but will issue titles over homestead and production plots to the individual farmers. These titles will provide security of tenure and will be inheritable (subject to strict provisions against fragmentation into uneconomic units). However, provision will still exist for the (compensated) expulsion of a farmer in certain cases.

The aim of the scheme being equality of potential income, not equality of land holding, large differences are expected in the size of individual production plots (though the size of the homestead plot will be in all cases approximately one acre). Thus to achieve the net income level of approximately £100 per annum, three acres may be sufficient in an irrigated scheme and, indeed, all that a family could handle, whilst on other schemes 20 to 30 acres may be necessary.

Other novel forms of rural social organisation appearing in Tanzania, which depart from traditional modes, include tenantries and rural resettlements for urban unemployed

The tenant farmers' scheme at Nachingwea (mixed arable) seemed to me to be a clear case of social and economic failure.⁽⁵⁾ Social services are not provided to any very significant extent, one reason being that the tenant farmers are dispersed in some 14 nuclei, each of from 3 to 20 farmers, some with families through a seven mile extent of territory. The 42 junior staff employed on the scheme at the time of my visit are somewhat better off, probably because they are less dispersed.

Each farmer's holding is of some 22 acres of which about 12 are farmed, the rest lying fallow, groundnuts, maize and soya being the principal crops. Land use is so arranged that the patches of groundnuts, for instance, cultivated by different individuals, are adjacent to each other to permit a degree of mechanisation of cultivation. The individual farmers pay a fee for ploughing, etc., to the Corporation. In 1962-63 period, only 43 of the 142 farmers on the scheme were recruited locally, either from nearby villages or the old Overseas Food Corporation scheme. The rest were mainly urban unemployed formerly settled at Sonjo. Of the 142 farmers, 80 made a loss at an average of 535 shillings per farmer; 62 made a profit, averaging 535 shillings per farmer. The highest gain was made by a family cultivating four and half acres of soya (yielding 1,325 lbs. per acre) and four and three-quarter acres of groundnuts (yielding 1,350 lbs. per acre).

The highest loss was made by a single man cultivating nine and a half acres of soya, obtaining a 300 lbs. yield per acre, and six and three-quarter acres of groundnuts, at 185 lbs. per acre, clearly a management fiasco. Of the 80 farmers who made a loss, 69 were "immigrant" and in the opinion of the settlement officer these farmers failed mainly because they did not apply themselves seriously enough to the work of cultivating, and partly because they lacked agricultural experience. Individual farmers tended markedly to have higher rates of failure than farmers with families to assist them.

The history of tenant farming at Kongwa since the end of the groundnuts scheme of the Overseas Food Corporation is one of progressive subdividing of farms. The last large commercial farm closed in 1956 - a drought year. The decision to abandon production cultivation of groundnut on a mechanised scale was finally taken in December 1963, it having been eventually realised by the T.A.C. that this region, socially as well as ecologically, was more suitable for cattle than crops. In the vicinity of Kongwa there are some six to seven million acres of country which could be developed into cattle country, given water supplies by means of bore holes (correct pasture management would result in no run-off of water occurring, so dams would not be feasible and water sources). This acreage is in addition to that which is at present occupied by the Tanzanian Agricultural Corporation cattle ranch at Kongwa (35,000 acres of open grazing for 13,000 cattle).

The farmers' settlement scheme at Kongwa comprises some 150 tenants grouped in six villages. A maximum of 30 head of cattle is permitted per tenant, some of whom will reach this target this year. With more clearing and stocking the 3,000 acres of the scheme will carry 4,500 head of cattle.

A particularly interesting feature of the settlement at Kongwa is that the authorised Welfare Committee, which, among its other functions, runs a shop very profitably, hears cases between tenants on occasions which are not confined to disputes arising on the job. For instance, the guilty party in an adultery case may be required to compensate with a yearling or a weaner, say from 100 to 130 shillings in value, provided the decision of the committee (which in this respect acts as a kind of popular court) is accepted by the parties concerned.

According to Rigby's analysis (10) the disadvantage of the Kongwa tenant farmers' settlement as seen by the farmers themselves is precisely its character as a tenantry scheme. The Chairman of the T.A.C. in his 1957 Report claimed that such schemes converted "the African peasant farmer" into "a successful yeoman farmer". But whatever other factors may be involved, that could scarcely be the case in the absence of secure tenure rights. The Kongwa system for the settling of disputes is seen by the farmers as an advantage. It saves disputes having to be taken to the primary courts. Present arrangements at Kongwa would appear to accord well with the scale, organisation and ideology of life in the settlement, and they have the further advantage of speed, economy and geographical convenience besides.

Several schemes for the rural settlement of urban unemployed were started in different parts of the country, especially in 1962, generally on the initiative of TANU. Such settlements near Mwanza, at Buyombe, and near Tabora, differed from others in being financed by the Mwanza and Tabora Region Resettlement Assistance Boards, which relied on voluntary contributions from local business men and others.

Buyombe comprises four schemes of 2,000 acres each, with planned provision for 50 farmers, cultivating 20 acres, on each. The remaining 1,000 acres are for communal cultivation. At the time of visiting Buyombe, the population comprised some 114, men 46 women, and 48 children, an ethnically very mixed population, but with no record of any "tribal" conflict. The settlement officer and his assistant ventured the opinion that a less mixed population, for instance one comprising simply two groups - say Sukuma and Zinza - might have experienced such conflict.

37 acres were under communal cultivation and 61 acres individually cultivated (30 for cash and 23 for subsistence). An "official" income of £54 from the previous season's cultivation had been obtained, but some cotton had been sold privately. From charcoal very profitably sold in Geita and Mwanza, the income was probably in the region of £225. At the time of visiting, two agricultural field assistants were allocated to the village, but there had previously been only one and no demonstration plot had been made. In as much as there had never been any emphasis on for instance threats of expulsion for failure to cultivate, and no mechanisation had been provided for removing tree stumps (so ploughing was impossible) Buyombe differs for instance from pilot village settlements. It may, indeed, be due to lack of mechanisation, rather than any lack of agricultural experience, that little progress is being made. Only chain saws had been loaned for cutting down tree trunks. But another contributing reason undoubtedly was lack of transport facilities for such market vegetables as had been grown.

In addition in Tanzania there are Tanu Youth League Communal Farms and Tanu Farmers' Training Settlements.

Concerning the former, the term "yough" here may be misleading. Tanu Youth League farms are not confined to youth, although young unmarried men and women are particularly encouraged to join and do join. In this respect as well as others, this form of settlement contrasts with the pilot village settlements planned by the Village Settlement Commission.

The "model" Youth League communal farm is at Litowa, Ruvuma Region, where cultivation is communal and there are no small-holdings at all. This is not the case at all Yough League farms. For example, at Ligoma farm in Tunduru District, some members have small private plots. Some 40 communal farms were started in Tunduru District in 1963 in already existing "villages" or "village sections", on which two days' work from each villager each week is required. The profits from these communal farms are used to meet school fees, to buy corrugated iron roofs, etc.

In Litowa a number of different tribal groups are represented (e.g. Ngoni, Ndendeule, Bena, Matengo, Fangwe, Safwa) and there are very few people even distantly related to each other. The scheme was started from the Peramiho Mission branch of the Tanu Youth League, where the workers are drawn from all the sub-missions over a wide area. In fact the five who might be termed the leaders of the scheme are from five different tribes. This arrangement appears to be acceptable in Litowa and there is no pressure group attempting to change it. Other settlement schemes in the area, however, like Liweta and Ligera, are not ethnically mixed - they are made up from people in the area, who still live in their old villages and work only a few days of the week on the scheme.

The Mara Tanu Youth Farms are designed to provide an apprenticeship in Agriculture under a manager (whose salary is equivalent to that of Pilot Village Settlement Managers). Farmers will be required to live and work communally and on completion of training, to form the nuclei of planned settlement schemes elsewhere. The project will consist of an arable farm of 300 acres, a poultry farm, and a cattle ranch of 10,000 acres. The farmers will be selected from the (unmarried) youth of the Mara Region, the selection procedure placing emphasis on loyalty and enthusiasm. The first intake will work on the project for three years. Subsequent intakes will work for two years only. During their stay they will be required to work on all three sites, receiving food, pocket money, and uniforms, but no wages. The Community Development Department will provide recreational facilities.

Uganda

The resettlement policy in Uganda 1945-1963⁽¹¹⁾ differs from that in Tanzania earlier, even as regards tsetse settlements, as the object of such resettlement in Uganda was more to create "consolidation barriers" against tse tse reinvasions, than settlements within tse tse zones. It was difficult then, with regard to earlier schemes to distinguish between population resettlement and agricultural consolidation, at the present time some group farming resembles rather consolidation measures than a settlement programme. Planners anticipate, however, that settlement will follow eventually (where thus far it has not started) in response to the inducement simply according to physical layout) in Uganda, which is based on the mechanization of existing holdings, following a 1964 (April) policy decision (which affects particularly eastern Uganda) is not to be developed further in group farm fashion, but is to remain in its present stage of participation in tractor hire schemes. The other two types are evolving still. One, known as the "ladder type" because the dwellings are spaced along a straight road, with holdings in strips at right angles to the road, and cultivation in bands across the holdings, parallel to the road, to permit ease of mechanisation, is exemplified in Bunyoro, at Akumulikire. Serere farm (2,500 acres) in Acholi, illustrates the block cultivation being started in areas in the north of Uganda. Dwellings are not spaced out along a straight road, but are clustered in a hamlet that may predate the group farming (so this form of group farm does not always come within our category of land settlement schemes).

Akumulikire group farm is based on cotton. At the time of my visit (April 1964) there were about 65 farmers (eventually it is hoped there will be twice as many), each with $15\frac{1}{2}$ acre plots, three acres of which were then under cotton and $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres being given over to the farmer's dwelling and homestead plot. The highest yield per acre in 1963 was 1,800 lbs. to the acre, the average yield about 1,200 lbs. The selling price per lb. was 51 cents. Members paid, in addition to their 5/- entrance fee to the group (not repeated) and their annual 10/- share, a sum of 165/- per acre to cover mechanized services - first and second ploughings, harrowing, planting, first weeding, and four sprayings.

The group farm originated with a group of members from a nearby primary co-operative society who decided for themselves to open up new land for cultivation. The land had already been cleared, in a U.S.A.I.D. campaign against tse tse, and trees stumped and piled in contour rows. The duties of the Government salaried manager appeared to be mainly concerned with the tractors. The services of the adviser, Mr. Kamese, were without fee. Some 20 group farms were in operation in 1964 (including one in Acholi, another in West Nile, another in Madi two in Lango (of which one, Inomo, is fully planned); one in Bunyoro, two (?) in Buganda, five in Busoga, three in Teso, one in Bukedi), a further 20 being expected by the first rains of 1965. Each has - or is to have a farm manager's house, a co-operative supervisor's house, a tractor park and work-shop, tractor drivers' and machinery houses, a co-operative society building, and a consumers' co-operative store. But group farming faces different problems in different areas, and presumably, therefore, they will develop rather differently in different areas. In Busoga, unlike Acholi, there is considerable individual land tenure which is obstructing large scale group farm development.

(12)

The B.A.T. Company has the monopoly of tobacco buying in West Nile (and until recently in Acholi also). Obtaining loans from the former Uganda Credit and Savings Bank at the rate of £80 per farmer, at 7% interest, farmers sign agreements guaranteeing that part of the price they obtain for their tobacco is paid directly to the Bank to discharge their loan. Some growing is by co-operatives, which obtain an average yield of 500 lbs. per acre, but more by master farmers (who average 736 lbs. per acre).

Master growers operate in groups of up to four per barn - four are required by the company to begin with, but one or more may drop out later. Barns collaborate in buying seedlings, and in baling, etc. One of the four growers per barn is the group leader - and it is in his name that the one bank account per barn is kept. It seems that the bank is reluctant to operate one (in fact two) accounts per grower, because of expenses (but one would have thought that at 7 per cent. such would be possible). Under present arrangements there are many disputes - which often reach the courts - between group members over the division of the proceeds of the crop.

Cultivation is not communal - each member cultivates his own crop, and the company in fact keeps figures for each individual grower. Groups tend to consist of a father and his sons, but there are cases even of a single farmer using hired labour, running a barn by himself.

Bweranyangi settlement scheme ⁽¹³⁾ is an Inter Church Aid (Geneva) project. The first settlers started at the beginning of 1964, some 30 having been selected from some 60 applicants. Farmers should be above the age of 21 and with education up to J.S. 2 standard. Selection is on the basis of such considerations as general physical fitness but as the project is one of the C.M.S. presumably religious affiliation is a most important factor.

A feature of the tea resettlement scheme is that, while there are farm plans, there is no village plan - farmers are permitted to build on whatever part of their land they choose. It is considered essential for the success of the scheme that the farmer makes a profit as soon as possible. Labour from the surrounding area is employed. Market vegetables and poultry are supplied on contract to the Kilembe mine nearby. Each farmer is to have six acres, of which three are to be planted with tea, with the aid of hired labour if necessary, immediately. Two more acres will be planted with tea after the first year of tenancy either by hired labour or by bringing in friends and relatives. There is to be no insistence on a nuclear family structure (but religious considerations dictate monogamy). The remaining one of the six acres is for poultry and market vegetables. This whole scheme of farming is conceived commercially. Farmers are expected to buy sorghum, banana and millet for their own needs from existing surrounding farmers, outside the scheme.

Some 3,000 acres have been allotted (by the Ankole Land Board) to Bweranyangi. It is not certain yet how much land will be able to be given over to tea, but 170-200 farmers are expected to be established on the scheme, and, including outgrowers, eventually a population of 1,000 will be immediately involved in tea. It is intended that after two years or so selected people will be invited to the scheme to receive training so as to enable them to start similar schemes elsewhere. But the farmers presently and expected on the site, are and will be there to stay. The manager will have powers of eviction during the first year of a farmer's tenancy. For the following two, he will be able to recommend to the Land Board that he is not granted the 99 year leasehold for which otherwise he would be entitled to apply in his third year.

Production will be organised through a co-operative society, in the conventional manner. Farmers have been recruited locally.

Re-settlement of Chiga from Kigezi into Ankole dated from an agreement between the two Kingdom governments in the 1940's (but the movement was administered by the central government).

The Ankole gombololas, where there was empty land, mainly affected were Ibanda (Bisheshe), Igara (Bitereko), Kaashari (Rubaya) and Rwampara (Mwezi). Like other relocations from over-populated Kigezi, these schemes were more in the nature of rescue operations, than development, and not associated with cash crops. The IBRD Study of Chiga re-settlement and the sociological studies now in progress will provide case studies.

Mention is made in the 1958 Development Plan for Karamoja of the need to resettle certain mountain dwellers, not only to bring them into the orbit of Government but also for reasons of forest conservation. The mountain groups concerned include the Teuso high in the Turkana escarpment and the Tepeth on the Moroto, Kakam and Napak mountains. The Tepeth today are cultivators and collectors, but keep some cattle in imitation of Karamojong practice. Some attempts have already been made at resettlement, but little inducement was offered and little administrative effort was made to consolidate what little success was achieved at one stage and people wandered back into the mountain again. According to Turnbull the Teuso numbering between 1,500 and 3,000, are possibly connected with the Nyangea and Tepes (vocabulary similarities, but as yet there is no grammatical study of the other two to judge from: economic and political structures seem comparable, as are the general ecologies). They live high up along the top of the escarpment being in some density around the Timur forest, and stretching westwards from there to the next densely (relatively speaking of course) populated area around Pirre. The suggested area for relocation is Lemej, or perhaps the Morungole foothills. It is possible that the Department of Sociology will mount a small study under the supervision of one of its Guest Lecturers, Dr. Colin Turnbull.

The Mubuku Sebwe irrigation scheme in Toro exemplifies an irrigation project which will entail resettlement, of Bakonjo. Ultimately some 12,000 acres will be irrigated, on the plains of Kasese, Karusandara to Kibuga. It was proposed last year that 1,000 acres would be available to tenant farmers this year. Probably 15 acre plots will be leased by tenant farmers - six for cultivation in any one year, six fallowing and three taken up by housing, roads, etc. Since 1961 there have been five pilot tenant farmers (four Batoro, one Ruanda). Opinions differ about the ethnic policies to be adopted for this scheme - which does not lie in the Toro counties of the Toro Kingdom. The scheme is to be heavily capitalised. I gathered that no final decision had been taken (mid 1964) on the nature of the social organisation envisaged for the scheme except that clearly it is neither group farming nor a co-operative in the usual sense of these terms.

Kenya

After the 1960 Lancaster House Conference on Kenya and the opening-up of the then called "White Highlands" for all wishing to purchase land - which previously Africans could not purchase - settlement schemes came to be envisaged on a large scale for Kenya, originally intended mainly to provide a solution for problems of great land pressure in some areas, also to enable those European farmers who wished to sell out to the Land Settlement Board if they wished to.

After a farmer has agreed to sell, responsibility to take over the farms lies with the Department of Settlement, on a date laid down by the Central Land Board. A settlement officer inspects the farm with the farmer, checking that the permanent improvements, etc. are all in place. A certificate is signed, and that is the end of the farmer's responsibility. At some future date, settlers begin to arrive to take up holdings which have been planned in the interim. Meanwhile, during this time lag, the settlement officer perforce must be engaged in farming operations on the site. Settlement officers tend to be Europeans with farming experience (in contrast with Tanzania, where a recent advertisement for managers of pilot village settlements stated that they do not need necessarily to have farming experience.) Loose assets, e.g. cattle and machinery which have been taken over, are dealt with under the authority of the Area Settlement Controller.

In the majority of cases the time lag is between six and twelve months. However essential it is for the national economy that production be maintained during this time, almost unavoidably, production decreases may result in this interim, and the departing European farmers about to sell out frequently allow crops like pyrethrum to fall below top condition. During this interim, the paid labour on the farm is maintained, but seldom can it be supervised adequately. For instance, the Sabatia settlement near Nakuru formerly consisted of nine European farms. All these had to be managed by one settlement officer under the new development.

The planners at Sabatia planned for farms which, after yielding living expenses and loan repayment, would produce a profit of £40 per year. The average acreage of plots at Sabatia - excluding coffee - works out at about 50 acres - there is no land pressure in the neighbouring Tugen areas whence the settlers are drawn, comparable to that for instance in Kakamega or Kikuyu. All permanent improvements like buildings, dams, etc. have been demarcated out of the schemes - they remain Central Land Board property. Survey teams from the Agricultural Department translate the farm planners' map into access roads on the ground, demarcations, etc. and establish whatever soil conservation measures are necessary. The costs to the Ministry of Agriculture for this are paid by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. At Sabatia, the planning cost per acre was about 7/- and the soil conservation costs about 10/- (a maximum of 15/- for this is permitted). It worked out, after a government land purchase subsidy of 33%, that each plot at Sabatia would cost 6,000/- at a cash payment, but in fact a 30 year loan scheme (at 6½% interest) operates. On the nail, the settler has to put down only a deposit for the conveyance fee, etc. to enable the transfer of land to him from the previous owner by the Commissioner of Lands, which amounts to 160/-, to which must be added 45/- to join the co-operative, plus 1/- for a stamp, making 206/- in all. A loan per farm of £100 is made available for farmers in high density schemes (see below) like Sabatia.

The selection of settlers begins as soon as demarcation of the farms is done, and the costs of farms is known, the selection process being set in action by the Regional Government Agent in the District concerned, who advertises the details of the scheme for distribution to the locations, and calls for applications. From population censuses, it is worked out how many applicants are permissible from each location (roughly on the basis of one applicant per 100 families), according to population density. Locational selection committees set up by the Regional Government Agent make the initial selections - usually too many. A final selection is made by the Regional Government Agent's committee consisting of himself and locational chairmen. The prospective settlers then fore-gather at the Headquarters of the Regional Government Agent and draw lots for plot numbers, settlers having a choice between pyrethrum or coffee plots or cattle plots, etc. Plots are then visited, and under the aegis of the Regional Government Agent some further changes in allocation may be made at the wish of the prospective settlers. Then, the Department of Settlement stipulates a date for settlers to sign papers and make their deposits. Any defaulters are replaced at this time from a reserve list of applicants supplied by the Regional Government Agent. Note that even at this stage, no selection is made by the department of settlement (the process being entirely by the regional government authorities).

There is the problem of displaced labour, the paid labourers of the departed European farmer who may not come from the area but from elsewhere, and those from the requisite ethnic group but who have spent less than four years on the farm. Paid labourers have first claim on plots, but labour from elsewhere has no claim except upon the good offices of the settlement officer (who, I understand, in most cases is anxious to do what he can as he tends to expect this category of settler farmer to be the best). Also, in addition to the conditions of tenure signed by the settler, the Department of Settlement has certain means to deal with absentee settlers, or settlers who do not farm, by withholding loans. For instance cattle will not be released to settlers until they have constructed a night paddock, a shelter for milking, etc. Loans may be used to purchase cattle either from the Department or from outside. Despite the high quality of the cattle with the former contrasted with the latter, some 10% of farmers (at Sabatia at any rate) purchase from this second source. Ploughing, etc. is a service obtained by the settlers from contractors, with part of their loan finance. From breaking to planting this works out at about 140/- per acre. A settler spends more or less all his loan during his first year (including some on labour for cleaning maize, etc.) but, of course, he enjoys immediate returns.

The impression I gained of the Sabatia scheme is that, of its present settlers, approximately only about one third were formerly truly poor and landless in Tugen reserve, and this category of farmer has relatively a poor performance.

Apthorpe

One third were formerly employed on European farms (which means probably that there were landless too); this category has a moderately good performance. The remaining one third of the plot holders are school teachers or other government employees, or traders, who are often absentee landlords, leaving farming operations on the spot to "managers". Production from this category of plot is low. The best performances would appear to be those of widows and married women with family responsibilities. But these are all impressions, only, not research findings.

Although small holdings on settlement schemes in Kenya are planned with the labour force of only a nuclear family in view, already there is recourse to hired labour. At Sabatia, this is at the rate of about 1.5 men per plot, not including "managers".

Broadly speaking these smallholdings settlements are divisible into three types (but it would appear that present policy tends to place emphasis on only the second two). (a) The International Bank/Colonial Development Corporation yeoman scheme planned to give a subsistence and £250 net per annum. (b) The International Bank/Colonial Development Corporation peasant scheme planned to give a subsistence and £100 net per annum, and (c) High density schemes planned to give subsistence and £25-40 per annum.

The estimated finance involved in each of these schemes is roughly as follows:-

	<u>Land</u>	<u>Development</u>	<u>Cash to be provided by settler</u>
Yeoman scheme	£660	£1,160	£500
Peasant scheme	£220	£ 430	£100
High density	£140	£ 100	£ 6

Land purchase is subsidised by 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ %, and administration costs are grants - while the balance of the money is taken up by the settlers as loan. The land loans are repayable over 30 years, and the development loans over an average of 10 years.

The selection of settlers varies in obvious manner with the different schemes - for the first two types mentioned above the individual can qualify only if he has the requisite capital and farming experience. For the high density schemes the qualifications are either four year's residence as paid labour (and appropriate ethnic classification) on the farm taken over, or by lot selected from the landless and unemployed. The schemes are intended primarily for the rural, not the urban, unemployed. For administrative purposes the scheduled areas are divided into areas East and West of the Rift Valley. An area controller is in charge of each, with four settlement officers under him. Each senior settlement officer is responsible for roughly 70,000 acres. Each settlement unit itself, which may previously have comprised any number of European farms, amounts roughly to 10,000 acres or 500 settlers (5,000 acres only in the case of International Bank schemes). Extension staff are in addition.

Near the end of 1962, the Member for Buret (M. Towett) encouraged some 30 squatters on a 900 acre farm which was for sale in the Fort Ternan area each to contribute a sum of about £60, and then obtained a land bank loan for the amount outstanding. Each member of the new co-operative then received a four acre homestead and garden plot, and was permitted up to 10 cows. By 1964 the society cultivated, communally (each member working six hours daily), some nine acres of coffee and owned some 200 cows. Each evening everyone obtained a quota of free milk. The 115 children received free primary education. These and other benefits were provided by the society, and in addition, 20 shillings monthly to each member as a living allowance. After making the yearly loan payments and paying for the new cows, a profit in the region of £1,750 was made. Last year (but I am not informed of the present position) expansion plans were under consideration for sugarcane plantation on 540 acres nearby.

By 1964 it was proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture that, on as many new settlement schemes as possible, farming operations should be large-scale. The farms of departing European farmers were to be worked as units, by co-operatives. Especially in the Ol Kalou area, technological considerations dictated this, since due to waterlogging it is not possible for all the farmland to be worked all of the year. But then the Ministry of Lands and Settlements had technical assistance funds for small-holdings settlements schemes only, following from an Israeli adviser's report to Government in 1962 that settlement schemes in general in Kenya should be guided essentially by (a) the landmindedness of the potential settlers and (b) that collective farming schemes present certain management needs which, in conditions of manpower scarcities, were considered to be more difficult to meet than marketing (and later servicing) facilities which were to be provided by co-operatives geared to smallholdings.

At the time of writing (December 1965) Senate has passed a motion urging Government to establish State Farms, using an organised force similar to the National Yough Service. The debate, however, raised the doctrinal criticism that National Farms were not in keeping with African traditional socio-agrarian organization.

In 1947 the agricultural officers of colonial Kenya had declared themselves as being in favour of group farming, because they presumed the individual farmer was unable to provide good management. I think the first group farm in Kenya started in 1947. By the end of 1948 there were 27 group farms with 420 members and 8,700 acres.

Planned group farming was put into practice in Nyanza Province as a means for dealing with problems posed by the difficulty of consolidating scattered strips, and the economic shortcomings of demonstration smallholdings. The free service provided by the Agricultural Department during the first two years made for great popularity of the scheme, but when these were withdrawn in 1949, the scheme folded up. Another shortlived attempt was made at Makueni, in Machakos, by Aldev,⁽¹⁴⁾ for landless Akamba, the groups comprising about 20 families each.

By 1953 only three group farms in Kenya survived. Their failure was not due to lack of agricultural education or of close supervision. At least one was operated under the aegis of the Bukura Farm Institute. It seems rather that from the beginning little or no emphasis was given in planning on self-government or self-regulation in the group farm. It was expected merely that the common economic production bonds linking the members would be sufficient to provide a social stability. Another factor undermining the group farming principle was the progressive diminution in official thinking in the views of the experts, in the size of the minimum economic holding. For example, "when the Lambwe Valley settlement was started a figure of 100 acres was mooted (as minimum economic unit). By 1954 for most high rainfall areas the figure was under 10."

The background of settlement policy in general in Kenya against which such group farming developments should be seen is that from 1945 to 1955, there was emphasis on settlement in new areas (like the present emphasis in Uganda and Tanzania). Next, reconditioning and reclaiming the resettlement of existing areas had priority. After soil conservation measures had been established, these areas were to be developed further by intensive farming. The Swynnerton Plan, aiming to multiply by 10 times the average cash incomes of 600,000 African families in high rainfall areas, and to increase cattle exports, started officially in April 1954.

At the present time group farming settlement schemes are in being at Narosurra, near Nakuru, at the East African Headquarters of M.R.A. A large farm is worked by a co-operative as a single unit, farming that part of a previous European owned farm that was not bought by seven former paid labourers. This scheme started in 1961, and was officially recognised by Government two years later. At Muhoroni a start has been made on a type of settlement not hitherto attempted in East Africa. It will ultimately comprise some 800 - 1,000 settlers, living on their own three acre homestead plots, which encircle the plateau area on which the cash crop, sugar, will be grown. Preparation of the land, planting and harvesting of sugar, will be carried out collectively by means of a co-operative organisation. The sugar will be grown, however, on seven acre smallholdings on which weeding and tending will be done by the farm family concerned. Separate farm family accounts will be kept at the sugar factory. Obviously this type of settlement is transitional between individual and group extremes. At Bibirioni a group farm was started in 1962 by 12 members of the Dini ya Roho religious group, with its own capital of £3,500. £30,000 was loaned to the group (by the Settlement Department) for land purchase and loose assets, permanent crops and development loans. All 12 members were given individual land tenure to provide for any eventuality which would require group interests to be liquidated, and farming to be done individually. There were signs in 1964 that such a breaking-up process may have started. There are 1,394 acres - maize, coffee, pyrethrum. The former owner stayed on for six months or so to advise the group, which included one of his former paid labourers. They are all Kikuyu, led by Holy Ghost Elijah.

The group is actively religious - business meetings start with prayers, etc. Two members of the original twelve have been discarded. The present economy consists mainly of cattle (whole milk), strawberries for export to U.K., cereals and coffee. The scheme certainly has been - and may still be - a great success. In 1962 the net profit after drawings was £2,500 and in 1963 £5,000.

Settlement schemes in the coastal part of the Coast Region (as distinct from the hinterland) do not come under the aegis of the Ministry of Lands and Settlements, therefore the coast squatter settlers do not qualify for loans, etc.

There are broadly three categories of squatters:

(a) those living on non-alienated crown land who have planted permanent trees, now mature (e.g. cashew). The prescriptive right of these settlers to their land - and the prescriptive right of settlers who have planted now mature trees even on private land - is recognised by government. The task here as seen by government is merely to legitimise or legalise the situation, by means of title deeds, etc. and to introduce land use planning where necessary.

(b) Another category of squatters comprises those who cultivate annual crops but live elsewhere - these squatters are not recognised by government as having any rights to the land by settlement.

(c) Very many more settlers than those of category (a) - who are long-time residents - have moved on to the land in the last three years or so, to plant permanent tree crops, to establish their claims vis-a-vis the Asian or Arab owners. Much of this land is Arab-owned. Some owners agree to voluntary forfeit of small excisions from their land. Excluding category (b) there were in 1964 probably 20,000 squatters in the coastal strip, for whom some form of settlement programme must be devised. Generally speaking these migrants to the coast have not left their natal areas inland due to land pressure, as in fact some areas 10 - 15 miles inland (e.g. Kikoneni) have good rainfall and soils.

The first settlement scheme on the coastal strip was at Gedi in the late 1930's, when new plots were carved from the bush, but settlers were not attracted due, it is said, to the rigour of the administrative rules that were to be imposed on them. The effective model for the present endeavours to deal with the squatter problem is the Roka Settlement, formerly known as the Kelife Crown Land Settlement. This was started by the Administration (Gedi scheme has been planned by the Department of Agriculture), after initial surveys in 1961, without reference to the Agricultural Department or agricultural policy, in an area of heavy (if secondary) bush, practically uninhabited except for probably a few fishermen. Agricultural interest in Roka started in 1963 and present agricultural policy for the coastal strip (after some years of uncertain policy) is that where bush trees are taken out, cash crop trees (e.g. cashew, mango, coco-nut) should be planted; the soil is too sandy to permit of annual crop (e.g. cotton, maize) cultivation except as a temporary measure. There are some 800 - 900 plots of Roka - title deeds, possibly with a 33 years' lease) will be granted once mapping, etc. is done.

The farmers' committee there had decided that such deeds should be granted only after plots have been planted with permanent trees.

Mtwapa Bridge Settlement exemplifies category (c). Space has been allotted in the demarcations for the eventual provision of social amenities, which the county council will be asked by the settlers to provide - the county council has already assumed responsibility for the two boreholes. At present the social organisation of the settlers consists principally of an elected farmers' committee of about six farmers. Eventually this committee, will have powers to reject bad settlers. At present its duties are mainly to allocate plots, to oversee cultivation, to organise self-help, etc. But the duties of a committee member are practically full time, four or five days a week, and unremunerated in any way financially. Without some form of reward for his services, a committee member says he cannot make a sufficient living from cultivation to pay school fees, etc. The present settlers came from the hinterland starting about 1960, and are completely without capital, etc; they are landless, except insofar as "back in the reserves" there may be land, of a sort, available to them. The problem of most settlement schemes - that of initial land clearing and tree felling - happens to be lighter at Mtwapa Bridge due to the local vegetation, yet some problem remains, and no mechanised assistance has been provided.

The squatter problem in the Coast Region was aggravated of late with increased migration to the coast brought about by the pre-independence movement. A year ago it was reported as particularly pressing in the Kilifi District. Clearly the squatters in the coastal strip, who have certainly come to stay, must be counted as landless. Surely the whole problem merits the attention and normal facilities made available for the landless elsewhere in Kenya by the Settlement Department.

In the hinterland of the Coast Region, the Shimba hills settlement scheme enjoys great success measured, for instance, in the high stability rate of its Kamba farmers. In consequence of Kamba individualist attitudes towards land there has been no attempt at collective or group settlement. There is a co-operative, but in contrast with the highlands' schemes, membership of this is not compulsory.

It is clear that there is not enough land in Kenya to provide every family with an economic plot, and some of the best agricultural land for peasant cultivation is on the already populated slopes of Mount Kenya, the Aberdare Mountains and Mount Elgon, where at present there is little progressive farming. If settlement is to solve the two problems (a) landlessness and rural under-employment, and (b) increased production, then conflicting economic and political pressures make it difficult to steer settlement policy either in one direction or the other. The latter requires larger units, the former smaller units.

Generally speaking land settlement in Kenya is not meant as a panacea for urban unemployment, although of course it is expected to have some effect on this (mainly by way of stemming migration to the towns), and there have been some cases of urban recruitment of settlers.

Concluding remarks.

In the absence of sociological case studies from which one might generalize, my concluding remarks cannot be other than superficial. And in any event, this hastily prepared survey of land settlement schemes in East Africa is intended to serve, at this Conference, as a background paper, preliminary to the presentation of detailed studies.

The direct advantages in the general field of rural development offered by land settlement schemes based on integrated social as well as economic planning, are closely similar to those which may result from sedentarization of nomadic or pastoral populations. Social services can be provided effectively and economically. Marketing and distribution facilities can be provided more directly than is practicable, in many cases, for a scattered population. Economies of economic scale can result in higher production; mechanization is an infusion into whole process of socio-economic change of one source of miranda and credenda. Government generally can be provided more immediately. Given a suitable selection process, settlers have a greater opportunity to break with tradition where necessary, and to reverse the traditional priorities of subsistence before cash crops, than have farmers who are more traditionally grouped. Furthermore, pilot village settlements for example have the effect of localizing, or decentralizing, development. This makes good sense when, due to manpower scarcities, a national gridwork of extension services, effectively centrally administered and with an adequate number of field officers and assistants at the other end of the process, simply is not a feasible proposition. But, characteristically, planners expect the success of a settlements scheme to depend either on instant co-operatives or else on the maintenance of a strict control (which they tend to call "discipline") in as many sectors of life in the new society as possible. Also, in practice, neither the selection of settlers nor their subsequent "management" may be in keeping with the planning principles of land settlement schemes that are supposed to distinguish them from alternative means of rural development.

It may be that where peasant farming has thus far been unresponsive to improvement this may be due, where new crops are introduced from outside the local area and "from above" administratively, to planning errors - e.g., agricultural field assistants being expected to supervise too large an area, and demonstration plots being cultivated at research stations instead of immediately in the socio-economic contexts of the farmer's plots themselves. The sociological dimension of "demonstration effects" (as well as "economies of scale" and "voluntary associations") has not yet attracted the empirical sociological, social anthropological and social psychological attention it deserves. But, even in the absence of any corpus of detailed studies, it is not difficult to envisage how an individual's achievement within a community can be put down by his neighbours to personal aggrandizement by sorcerous means, or how the achievement of one community may be seen by another as due to means-capital, privilege, opportunity etc. etc.) denied to that other community, with the result that the second community is driven into a traditionalism, that perhaps was not present before, as a form of self-defence.

And something similar can happen when an innovation, accepted by one faction within a local community, for that reason has to be rejected by an opposing faction in 'the same' community.

While settlement schemes are, explicitly, innovatory, the paradox is that of all forms of rural development in East Africa settlement schemes are supposed to be more in keeping with African tradition- called, especially with regard to planning theory, African socialism - than are others. In some respects, even, this tradition is conceived as a model to be followed. But what are the characteristics of this rural society and tradition?

It has been remarked that the "social institutions described by the anthropologists as 'feudal' in East Africa resemble most nearly those mistakenly described by historians as 'tribal' in Europe". (15) A wide range of freedom of individual action may not have been possible in the rural societies in question, yet it would be incorrect to think say of their customary land (or cattle) tenure simply as "collective" or "communal". Strictly speaking, in Tanzania, except for formerly so-called Native Authority holdings, collective tenure was more or less confined to tree plantations (Hehe, Luguru), cassava gardens (Usigwa), and finger millet gardens for beer making (Usafwa). (16) "Traditionally", the forms of control over the land varied widely. Where land locally assumed political importance, it was controlled by political authorities. Where a particular tract was ritually or religiously important it would be controlled by the religious authorities who were not necessarily the same as the political leaders (and in fact more in the religious than the political case did control come closer to "ownership" in the Western sense). For other than especially political or religious purposes, and particularly where the indigenous settlement pattern was basically made up of individual homesteads rather than villages (as traditionally was and is the case in much of eastern Africa), land rights were exerted essentially by the individuals concerned, in their kinship capacities. There may in some societies have been a theory of a hierarchy of authorities with reversionary rights, but in practice, except perhaps in times of crisis or conflict or rapid change in land values, etc., probably it was seldom implemented.

"Traditional African society" then was not organizationally uniformly homogeneous, small-scale, etc, even with regard to societies based on cultivation. Different authorities and organizations, with differing scales of operations and types of leadership, were distinguished in different sectors. And, most probably, seldom was any African rural society culturally homogenous to the extent that the Western stereotypes of Africa would lead us to believe. Not everyone in a village necessarily believed in sorcery, or participated in ancestor cults, to the same degree, and some farmers were progressive, some chiefs innovators.

Especially in times of socio-political emphasis on 'nation building' at the centre in new nations we may expect the planners of these new nations, and the nature of their planning agency, to be predisposed to planning settlement schemes mainly for other than economic, or technocratic, reasons. Particularly with regard to Tanzania, we have seen the high financial cost of the pilot village settlement type of programme of settlement. This must, at least to some extent, represent a utopian disregard for economics in the narrower and more dismal sense of the term. And, for example, there is the doctrine enunciated by President Nyerere in his FAO lecture that consideration of social policy must be put before technological factors in all cases of 'development schemes', not only land settlement.⁽¹⁹⁾ There is also another utopian aspect of settlement planning theory - it became clear to me, on my tour, that planners had not provided in their design for settlement schemes neither for failure of the social system, nor for mechanical repairs. For example, one noticed that, where some mechanization was to be introduced in remote settlements, little if any thought had been given to the need for artisans and mechanics to repair machinery when broken. In the socio-legal field, little if any consideration had been given to institutionalizing social processes for the settlement of disputes off the job (even, in some cases, on the job) arising between settlers. Experience at Kongwa, the emergence of a form of popular court, deserves detailed study in this regard. Experience in tractor hire services in Uganda, for example, deserves study in respect of mechanical breakdown.

There is one further feature of planning to which I would draw some speculative attention before concluding. In the acutely nationalist phase of planning that we have witnessed in East Africa for example, much of the planning process is very largely left to specialist economists - the employment of sociologists, for example, in the planning process is slight (there is some sign that this situation is improving; fortunately the teaching of the social sciences in the University has anticipated this). Planning, development planning, is over-identified with economic planning. The 'economics' brought to bear is that which has been nurtured in what have been called over, rather than under, developed societies. 'Economies of scale' are, in real life, at least partly determined by social conditions and surely the 'socio-economies of scale' vary widely as between different social structures. The question arises, then, of the extent to which the economic planning that has taken place has been relevant to the social context in which the new developments are supposed to occur. As for the commodities that are to be produced, the economist's knowledge of the world market for cotton, coffee, tea etc. needs to be implemented by study of local markets and local resources that is often carried out by social anthropologists in the course of their intensive community studies.

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FOOTNOTES

- (1) Statement by the U.K. Minister of Overseas Development, 19 November 1965, House of Commons, observes that "although the settlement programme has done much to alleviate a difficult social problem of landlessness, the high density schemes have not so far produced the levels of cash incomes for farmers which are necessary for the progress of the Kenya economy. A pause in settlement for at least two years should be made to enable past results to be analysed and present and future practice to be improved."
- (2) Eg. for Kenya cf. Sessional Paper No. 10, 1965.
- (3) Ruthenberg forthcoming 'Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya 1952-1965' IFO Institut.
- (4) To be published in Eastern Africa 1967, Apthorpe, Desai, Mosha, Rigby, editors.
- (5) Sociological - social anthropological field studies of land settlement in Uganda are at present being carried out by Mlle. Yeld (Nigezi) and Hutton (Ankole), and M. Charsley (Bunyoro). Currently in Tanzania a study of pilot village settlements is being carried out by a social science team, from Syracuse University, directed by Prof. Burke. A number of other types of study (agricultural economics, geography) have been, or are still being, carried out by Mlle Illingworth and Messrs Belshaw, Bridger, Etherington, Ruthenburg, MacArthur, Lord, Katarikawe et al. The special problems of a socio-political order posed by the resettlement of refugees have been analysed, sociologically by Mlle. Yeld and, administratively, by M. Davies.
- (6) E. Orni 1967, Forms of settlement (Jewish National Fund, Jerusalem)
- (7) cited in Clyde, History of the Medical Services in Tanganyika
I am indebted to M. Langlands, of the Department of Geography, Makerere, for drawing my attention to this.
- (8) Rural settlement planning (?1962) issued by the Rural Settlement Commission, Vice-President's Office, Dar-es-Salaam.
- (9) A published analysis of the scheme is announced as coming to a different conclusion from mine, but I have not yet consulted this study.
- (10) See f.n. 4.
- (11) D.G. Belshaw, 1965 'An outline of resettlement policy in Uganda' E.A.I.S.R. Conference proceedings, Makerere College.
- (12) Fieldwork into this aspect of rural development is to be carried out by Miss C.R. Hutton, EAISR, Makerere College. Land settlement is little if at all involved.
- (13) A sociological field study is to be undertaken by Miss C.R. Hutton, EAISR, Makerere College.

Footnotes contd...

- (14) See African Land Development in Kenya 1946-1962, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi
- (15) E.M.Chilver "'Feudalism' in the interlacustrine Kingdoms" in A.I.Richards (editor) 1960, East African Chiefs (Faber + Faber Ltd.)
- (16) A.A.Oldaker, 1957 Interim report on tribal customary land tenure in Tanganyika (Government Printer)
- (17) J.L.Soy 'Mechanical cultivation in Acholi' in J.L.Joy (ed), 1960 Symposium on mechanical cultivation in Uganda (Uganda Arugs Printer)
- (18) ! Cf. Joseph Nye 1963 "Tanganyika's Self Help" Transition No. 11, Nov. 1963 (Kampala)
- (19) Mwalimu J.K.Nyerere 1963 MacDougall Memorial Lecture on F.A.O. 15 November, 1963.

TRENDS IN RHODESIAN POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT AND THE INDEPENDENCE QUESTION.

By

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In this paper I hope to put into perspective recent developments in Rhodesian politics. The period encompassed will be from the disposition of Garfield Todd as Prime Minister in February 1958 to the unlawful seizure of independence by the Rhodesian Front government on November 11, 1965. My intention will be to make a fair assessment of the forces shaping the pattern of political change, or perhaps more properly the lack of change, that characterizes Rhodesian political life.

In doing this I have included a lengthy study of the 1965 general election. I have a dual reason for emphasizing this election. In the first place the election, as a case study, clearly reveals European intentions in Rhodesia. Only if we see how the Europeans view themselves, their leaders, the Africans, and the outside world can we understand the choices that they make. Secondly, this election was mounted under the provisions contained in the 1961 Rhodesian constitution. For a constitution that has been so maligned and defended (often by the same people), very little is known of its operation. I know of no detailed study of the 1962 election in Rhodesia. Therefore I have brought in material from this election, as well as that of 1965, in an attempt to show the complicated electoral workings of this constitution. In this regard I have found the study of the B-roll particularly engrossing. All European hopes for the emergence of "middle-class and responsible Africans" were bound up in these fifteen B-roll seats. For numerous reasons this idealized 'moderate' did not emerge and when the African nationalist refused to participate, this most important area of an intended interim constitution became, at best, an anomaly. Nevertheless, as I will show, this constitutional backwater has retained a special and fascinating life of its own.

If the B-roll is interesting for who does not vote, the European dominated A-roll is important for the shifting nature of its loyalties. The first part of this paper draws connecting lines between Rhodesian elections and referendums from 1958 to 1964. These lines, I will suggest, show a consistent European resolve to prevent African advancement a resolve which has been underrated in the past. Seen in this historical perspective the coming together of European voters in 1965 should not surprise us; neither should it give comfort to those observers of the Rhodesian scene who serenely wait for "moderate" Europeans to emerge and take power from the "extremists." This paper is designed to show that when it comes to African advancement, there are no moderates in Rhodesia.

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Finally, in attempting to keep pace with the kaleido - scope of events in Rhodesia, I have set into perspective the emergence of the independence issue. This, as we shall see, was not something started by Ian Douglas Smith. It was part and parcel of the manysided European effort to stifle African political advancement. It is my view that the independence question is intelligible except in this context. More than a demand for national sovereignty, it was a demand for European supremacy. The irony of the independence quest of course is that carried to its logical conclusion on November 11th, the Rhodesian Front may well have unleashed the forces which can bring their policy to ruin. Though the book "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia since Colin Leys" has yet to be written, I would hope that this paper would suggest important guidelines to be pursued.

I. BACKGROUND.

Political Developments Under the UFP 1958-1962.

We must look briefly at this period in an attempt to show the forces and events which led to the emergence of the Rhodesian Front government in December 1962. Our interest will be to try to assess the central issues and concerns of the European electorate during this period. With this information at hand we will be better prepared to understand the nature of the RF's appeal and to suggest how it varied from the preceding government.

There are essentially two ways of viewing Rhodesian politics since the disposition of Garfield Todd in 1958. One is to view subsequent developments and leadership changes as a steady succession of shifts to the right. This procession takes us from the liberal Todd, to the vacillating Sir Edgar Whitehead, to Winston Field, a sincere but too cautious paternalist, and now, finally, to Ian Smith, an unyielding reactionary. Implicit in this view is the notion that each successive Prime Minister has properly reflected the increasingly right-wing attitudes of the Rhodesian European electorate.

The second view would be to the effect that the centre in Rhodesian politics has remained basically unchanged over the years. This centre position holds as an undeviating tenet that political control, and therefore social and economic privilege, is to remain for the foreseeable future in the hands of Europeans. This view sees the changes in Prime Ministers, not as a series of shifts to the right, but as a continual reassertion of the centre position against those Prime Ministers who have temporized on racial issues and therefore fallen out of step with their public. This view implies that once in power the Prime Minister tends to become 'moderate'; thus it was suggested (at least before UDI) that the Harper block was waiting in the wings, ready at any moment to engineer a coup against a faltering or insufficiently resolute Smith.

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The immediate difficulty which we find with the first interpretation is the problem of defining what is right or left in Rhodesia. In probing social and economic policy pertaining to Europeans, we quickly discover that these terms have little or no relevance. The European population is remarkably homogeneous; since the demise of the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party after the Second World War, no European party has been formed in defense of a specific class interest. On many issues of European social and economic concern, each succeeding Prime Minister had stood to the left of his predecessor. (The paradox should also be noted that in a very real sense the more stringent /i.e. right/ a government is in impeding African advancement, the more left he is in terms of preserving a high, but basically uniform, standard of living for Europeans.) European unity is a central factor in Rhodesian politics. As Colin Leys has noted:

"The only effective rallying-point ... is fear of African economic and political competition. This is stronger in some sections of the European community than others; it is strongest in those whose economic position is most closely threatened by African competition. But very few are immune, because full African competition would threaten the terms on which European settlement as a whole have been established."^{1/}

This writer fully subscribes to Leys' view that only one issue - that of the pace of African advancement -- in all its ramifications can meaningfully divide the European electorate. Only in reference to this issue can a left or right in Rhodesia possibly be discerned.

Therefore the case for interpretation one, whether there has been a steady eroding of politics to the right, stands, or falls on whether one can (at any time in the past) substantiate a liberal or left case for Rhodesian politics. In other words, has there been, at any time in the past nine years, a serious undertaking made, by a governing Rhodesian party, to the effect that African advancement and African government was possible in the discernable future? If this case could be shown, then interpretation one would be valid. The strongest arguments for this first case are (1) Garfield Todd's position in 1958; (2) the writing and ratifying of the 1961 Constitution; and (3) the 1962 United Federal Party platform.

The party Huggins built, the United Party cum United Rhodesia Party, was always a white man's party.^{2/} This

^{1/} Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 174.

^{2/} It is interesting to note in this connection that three future Rhodesian Front Ministers - J. Wrathall, D. Lardner-Burke, and H. Reedman - stood for the URP in 1954 while no future RF members or parliament stood for the very reactionary Confederate Party which received 22.3% of the vote in this election.

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was true whether the slogan was the "two-pyramid policy" of the straightforward 1930's or "partnership" in the more subtle 1950's. When Huggins became the first Federal Prime Minister, his mantle in Southern Rhodesia fell to Todd. The story of Todd's ouster in February 1958 and the subsequent URP split has been told in a number of places.^{1/} What comes through most clearly is that the URP cabinet felt that Todd's liberal statements were endangering "their" chances at the polls. One must emphasize however that it was statements, not policies let alone legislation, against which his cabinet revolted.^{2/} The subsequent election bore out their fears.

First preference votes in the 1958 general election were roughly allocated as follows: Dominion Party 46%, United Federal Party 42%, and United Rhodesia Party 12%. Because second preference votes were of critical importance in this election it is necessary to understand how each party approached this unusual electoral device. It will also provide us with added insight into the beliefs and fears of each party.

Both the DP and UFP were at pains to dissociate themselves from any involvement with, or similarities to, the URP which was now taking a somewhat more liberal line. For the UFP this attempt at disassociation bordered on obsession because of their recent links. Neither the DP or the UFP took a stand on the preferential voting system. The UFP could not take a chance on endorsing a second candidate.

^{1/} The name changes of Rhodesian parties are confusing. The United Rhodesia Party was the governing party in 1958. When it split the Todd rump retained the URP name. The rest of the party reconstituted itself as the United Federal Party. After the 1958 election the URP disbanded and reformed as the Central Africa Party. This party disbanded after the 1962 election. The UFP remained in power until 1962. In opposition thereafter they first became the Rhodesian National Party and then the Rhodesia Party. After the 1965 election they too disbanded. In 1958 both the Dominion Party and the United Federal Party had territorial and Federal wings. It was largely an amalgamation of the two DP wings (plus a section of the federal UFP) which led to the formation of the Rhodesian Front in 1962.

^{2/} This is not being unfair to Todd. The only remotely liberal legislation passed from 1954 - 1958 was a rise in the minimum wage. The much condemned Industrial Conciliation Act was later passed by the UFP and its nominal multi-racialism has not prevented solid European control of trade unions.

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To support the URP against the DP would have been electoral suicide because of the URP's liberalism. On the other hand to support the DP would be potentially helpful to their most potent challenger. Silence was the expedient, and sensible, way out. By the same token the DP did not want to aid the UFP in any way while voting for the URP was unthinkable. Only the URP urged their followers to use their second preference vote - for the UFP. Because of the close nature of the election, a redistribution of URP second preference votes gave the UFP four additional seats and a narrow victory over the DP (seventeen seats to thirteen). The 11.7% of the vote polled by the URP represents the high-water mark in Rhodesian liberal politics. This group of Todd followers would have considered a gradual transition to majority rule. The choice has not been offered to Rhodesian voters in a meaningful sense since.

The second argument for a liberal choice in Rhodesia concerns the framing and ultimate acceptance of the 1961 Constitution. Even Joshua Nkomo was convinced of its liberalism for a few days. But there are several weaknesses in this interpretation, not least of which is the way in which the Constitution was presented for ratification. It is most instructive to carefully view the breakdown of forces supporting and opposing this constitution for it provides insight into the real intentions of most Europeans.

The Dominion Party opposed acceptance of the Constitution because of the speed which it allowed African advancement.^{1/} Many of Rhodesia's few liberals also opposed the constitution, though for opposite reasons - its narrow scope for African advancement, its various outlets for perversion of intent. But it is the attitude of the UFP, the negotiators of this constitution, which is most interesting to note. For the most part their campaign for acceptance was stated in purely racial terms. Fifteen Africans in Parliament were seen as the price Rhodesia had to pay to get rid of the reserve clauses which heretofore, nominally but legally, had allowed Britain to interfere with internal legislation on certain matters. Through convention Britain had not used these powers but with the increasing pressure of African nationalism, both at home and abroad, it was considered essential to be rid of these clauses. The campaign document, Breakthrough to Nationhood, issued by the UFP during the referendum campaign asserted this point:

^{1/} Fifteen of sixty-five seats in the new parliament were to be allocated to electoral districts. Registered B-roll voters, predominately Africans, could control which candidates would be elected. The loophole in this advancement was that the representation ratio of 50:15 was not entrenched. Thus two-thirds of parliament (i.e. a united A-roll) could decrease B-roll or increase A-roll seats at will.

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"To sum up, under the new proposals, the ultimate control of Parliament will always remain with the voters of the upper roll, since they will elect 50 of the 65 Mp's. With the present system, once it is conceded that the 20 percent limitation will be impossible to maintain, the entire roll will eventually be swamped by voters of lower qualifications.^{1/}

Thus the UFP urged support of this constitution, not because it offered an orderly, if not very rapid, transition to majority rule, but because it gave white Rhodesians the opportunity to thwart this very transition.

The referendum passed ^{by} nearly a 2 to 1 margin.^{2/} In view of the voting patterns which both preceded and followed this referendum, there seems to be only one adequate explanation for this breakdown. Dominion Party supporters divided on this issue. It would be my view that a sizeable number of DP supporters accepted the UFP argument that this limited African advancement was a permissible price to pay to prevent any further British interference in Rhodesian internal affairs. Table 1, including all types of electoral constituencies, suggests this swing in DP voting.

The third argument for a liberal choice in Rhodesian politics is the UFP campaign in 1962. This is more difficult to come to grips with because, on the surface, some consideration of political change seems evident. The UFP in office had legislated against discrimination in a few public places. If returned their 1962 platform promised to legislate against the Land Apportionment Act, suggested a possible 15-year timetable to an African majority, and refused to promise that the franchise would not be widened during the life of the new parliament. The UFP ads gave flavour to this platform by asking with reference to the Rhodesian Front: "Are you a man or a dinosaur? Adjust yourself to environment - find solution, don't deny problems." or "This man is a menace - he won't face facts, the future, or world opinion. He's going to vote for privilege and prejudice with his head firmly in the sand."

If we turn to the legislative program of the UFP in the years 1958-1962 in an attempt to discover these 'solutions' or 'adjustments to environment' the scoreboard

^{1/} Quoted in the Central African Examiner (Salisbury), December 1962, page 7. It is impossible to refute this UFP claim. Dr. Claire Palley, the leading Rhodesian constitutional expert, has estimated that an African majority could be put off for 50 years without even juggling the 50:15 seat ration. The income and educational controls which the Rhodesian government holds over African advancement would be sufficient. The wide ranging declaration of rights was a dead letter when viewed against the battery of controls and discriminatory legislation already on the books.

TABLE 1

Swing in DP/RF Voting Support to Indicate Acceptance
of 1961 Constitution (in percentages).^{a/}

Constituency	DP Voters, 1958 Gen.El.	1961 Ref.'No' Aga.the Const.	RF Votes 1962 G.E.
Avondale	34.9	19.1	43.7
Bulawayo District	44.9	37.4	55.7
Bulawayo East	21.7	12.6	29.7
Bulawayo North	56.1	28.7	52.6
Bulawayo South	42.6	30.0	56.0
Eastern	44.5	41.7	57.1
Lomagundi	45.8	40.4	64.6
Mazoe	37.3	27.4	59.1
Salisbury Central	56.2	23.0	51.9
Salisbury City	30.5	23.7	44.5
Salisbury North	28.3	19.6	41.3
Victoria	74.3	44.4	65.3

is pretty one-sided - the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act, the Vagreny Act, the banning of nationalist parties in 1959, 1961, and 1962, repeated states of emergency, repeated restrictions. In view of this record, how can we explain the tentative liberalism which their platform seems to suggest?

The answer lies in two areas - the UFP's African policy and the UFP's relations with the British government, particularly regarding Federation. The UFP's African policy was two-pronged: African nationalism was to be ruthlessly suppressed while at the same time limited social, economic, and political advancement was to be offered to a few 'civilised' Africans. Thus, after the constitutional referendum, the UFP launched a vigorous "Build-a-Nation" campaign designed to register potential B-roll voters. This campaign was heavily backed by largesse from government coffers and the UFP's hope was to enroll at least 35,000

^{a/} These figures are usefully compiled in the Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1898 - 1962. Edited by F.M.G. Willson, written and compiled by Gloria C. Passmore and Margaret T. Mitchell. Department of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 1963.

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Africans on the B-roll. The proposed slow phasing out of the Land Apportionment Act, the opening of public places, and the widening of the franchise (while still keeping seats allocated in the 50:15 ratio) were policies designed to appeal to these new voters. Unfortunately for the UFP, the "Build-a-Nation" campaign succeeded in enrolling barely 10,000 Africans and unusual pressure (against African civil servants for instance) was needed to enlist even this many. The dismal failure of the UFP African policy was laid bare in the 1962 general election when a grand total of 1870 B-roll voters supported the UFP.

If on the one hand this platform was thought necessary to entice the 'moderate' African, it was also seen as necessary to beguile the British government. Liberal sounding statements for foreign consumption combined with stringent legislation at home have long been a central feature of Rhodesian political life and 1962 was no exception.

The UFP's major desire at this time was to preserve Federation. Though many in the Southern Rhodesia territorial UFP camp shared the RF's belief that Federation was dead,^{1/} this belief had not been accepted by the party leadership. Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister and most powerful UFP figure in Central Africa, knew well the successes of liberalism abroad and reaction at home. Liberal campaign statements and "partnership", as typified by the 1962 UFP platform, were still seen as a small price to pay for Rhodesia's disproportionate share of Federal revenue.

If the UFP had really contemplated significant changes, the striking thing about the 1962 election, indeed the phenomenal thing, would be that they did receive 28,522 or 42.5% of the A-roll vote. I would suggest that for most UFP voters the security legislation, not the 1962 platform, spoke for them on African advancement. (One month earlier the UFP campaign in the 1962 Northern Rhodesia general election had blatantly exploited racial fears).^{2/} Only a slight shift, caused perhaps by outside events, perhaps by the RF's more realistic policy on Federation, perhaps by the RF's skillful exploitation of racial fears regarding land apportionment repeal, allowed the Front to form a government in 1962.^{3/}

This last possibility deserves brief amplification for it was over Land Apportionment that the UFP struck the wrong balance between liberal statements and proposed legislation and thus lost support. The UFP's policy in Land

^{1/} The Front did not contest the April 1962 Federal election and saved its candidates for the Rhodesian election.

^{2/} See David Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia Election

^{3/} The Front won 35 of the 50 A-roll seats. The UFP won 15 A-roll seats and 14 of 15 B-roll seats. An independent won the remaining B-roll seat.

Apportionment had been drawn from two Parliamentary Select Committee reports presented in 1959 and 1960.^{1/} The Committee's problem had been to assess the cost and value of resettling African farmers who were occupying non-African land. The unanimous conclusion of the Committee was that to move Africans for ideological and not productive purposes^{2/} was entirely wasteful of Rhodesia's short capital resources.^{2/} It was the considered opinion of the committee that "land in general, whether urban or agricultural, should be purchasable by anyone, anywhere, irrespective of race or colour."^{3/} It was thus an economic, and not a political, argument which guided UFP thinking on Land Apportionment. The RF, however, read this policy as school integration and the mass-circulated RF poster of white and black legs ("We are not ready for this!") turned many townsmen against the UFP.

I have carefully discussed these three cases so as to present the best possible argument for a left to right swing in Rhodesian politics. As is evident, I do not think such an approach can be substantiated. The DP could not have possibly repressed the African nationalists from 1958-1962 any more swiftly or strictly than did the UFP. And even if the UFP had won in 1962, one can scarcely imagine new successes with their African policy or a reapproachment with the nationalists. I would say that since Todd's defeat in 1958 the liberal choice in Rhodesia has just not existed.

Because both major Rhodesian parties were committed to stemming African advance, I accept the second view of Rhodesian political development, viz. that the centre position in Rhodesian politics, which encompasses the vast majority of the Rhodesian European electorate, does not and has not envisaged anything more than the most gradual, and undefined in terms of time, approach to the question of African advancement. Inasmuch as this question alone makes up 'politics' in Rhodesia it would be my contention that in 1958 or in 1962 either the DP/RF or the UFP could equally well have represented the European electorate. Voting statistics bear out this claim.

I put forward this argument because I think it is necessary to dispell the notion that Rhodesian politics swung irretrievably to the right with the formation of the Front government in December 1962. While the pressures from the outside world and the increasing candour of the RF have more conspicuously drawn the lines of

1/ Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly. First/and second Reports of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives, 1959 and 1960. UFP members were H.J. Quinton, chairman, B. Goldstein, J.D. Burrows, and B.V. Ewing, P.H. Grey and S.E. Aitken-Cade represented the DP. 2/ unanimity is most interesting. When the DP refused to accept these recommendations both Grey and Aitken-Cade, the DP members, left the party. Aitken-Cade stood as an independent in 1962 and Grey moved over to the UFP. 3/ Par. 229 of the Second Report, 1960

conflict, there is little reason to believe that any other situation was likely.^{1/} African pressures both inside and outside Rhodesia have increased, the eyes of the world have ever more intently focused on Rhodesia, but the response of Rhodesian Europeans, now as in the past, has been a remarkably uniform, constant and unflinching "no".

The Rhodesian Front and the Emergence of the Independence Question.

The Rhodesian Front assumed control of the Rhodesian government on December 15, 1962. The new Prime Minister was Winston Field, a wealthy tobacco farmer from Marandellas. Field's political views closely corresponded with those of the former UFP leaders. The big difference, and that which put him in the RF camp, was an early disillusionment with Federation and an active desire to break it up. After the RF coup on April 13, 1964, when Field was replaced by Ian Smith, Field perhaps defined his political inclinations as well as anyone could, "I am not a white settler reactionary I am a somewhat conservative individual who does not like rapid change for the worse." This could have equally well been said by any UFP leader.

If we suggest that Field represented a logical link with the past, the reasons for his dismissal as Prime Minister must concern us. Was it, as with Todd and Whitehead before, a verbal moderation on racial questions, or was it something else? To answer this question we must briefly touch on the emergence of the Front as a governing party.

There is little doubt that the RF was surprised to find itself in power. In terms of ministerial experience it was not well equipped to assume the reins of power. Therefore it is not surprising that in its first year in office, the Front cautiously felt its way, adjusting to new responsibilities, adjusting to UFP-conditioned civil servants, and for the most part continuing with UFP policies. One lecturer and two journalists were deported; the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was amended and strengthened; the African nationalist leaders were first released and then re-restricted. All this has a very familiar ring. The only significant change was that with the dismantling of Federation (and the movement toward independence in Zambia and Malawi), new urgency was given to Rhodesia's own quest for independence.

^{1/} The factor that most possibly could have altered the shape of Rhodesian politics would have been nationalist participation under the 1961 Constitution. I do not however feel it would have changed the shape of European politics. Nationalist participation in 1962 would probably have increased the RF vote and thus hastened the ultimate coming together of most European citizens. It could have made a difference, however, by giving Britain a lever in the situation. This she lacked with UFP Africans, and not nationalists, holding the B-roll seats.

Inasmuch as a good part of this paper deals with the tactics and emotions arising from Rhodesia's desire for independence, two points should be immediately brought out. First of all, independence for Rhodesia, even by illegal seizure, was not an idea introduced by the RF. Talk of this type was current in Rhodesia from the first years of Sir Edgar Whitehead's rule and Sir Roy had often used this threat with regard to the Federal demand for Dominion status. The notion of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was born with the UFP and it was only after the RF had taken it to heart and made it a real possibility that UFP support became to drift away. Secondly, and this is the crux of the whole independence question, the RF's and the UFP's demand for independence under the 1961 Constitution was a demand for long-term European domination as much as it was a demand for political sovereignty. Independence for Rhodesia under this Constitution did not mean gradual and orderly progress to majority rule but white government indefinitely.¹ The split between the RF and the UFP (now called the Rhodesia Party) over the tactic of a unilateral declaration of independence came not because the end was in question but because the RP saw the tactic itself as unnecessary and potentially dangerous to the end they both desired.

Field first held talks with the British Government in May-June 1963. Again in January 1964, Field made an extended trip to London to sound out Conservative Party feeling on conditions for Rhodesian independence. When Field returned from this trip emptyhanded, the Front attitude from the branch level upwards began to harden. Because Field did not want to put a time limit on negotiations and was hesitant over the possibility of taking a UDI, he was compelled to resign on April 13, 1965.² Ian Smith became the new Prime Minister.

Smith's first actions as Prime Minister were to reassign cabinet positions to correspond more accurately with power positions within the Front. William Harper and Clifford Dupont assumed the key portfolios of Internal Affairs, and Justice, Law and Order, respectively. Then he banned ZAPU and re-restricted Nkomo. But most significantly he toured the country defining, more clearly than ever before, the policy of the RF toward African advancement.

^{2/} Other reasons also given for his removal were that he was aloof from the party organization and too hesitant in restricting or detaining Nkomo. The significant thing is, however, that these points, as well as the central one over UDI, all indicate a reluctance on the part of Field, to move as quickly on racial questions as the party and the public demanded. His hesitancy on all these questions was read as 'moderation', a dangerous position for Rhodesian Prime Ministers.

^{1/} Perhaps the most conclusive proof of this assertion is the each with which the RF's vitriolic opposition to the Constitution first mellowed and then turned into passionate and active support.

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I believe that if in my lifetime we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in: this is, the policy of trying to bring two main races together, on amicable grounds, so that we can live happily side by side ... It will not be in the interests of the European and the civilisation that they have brought to this vast mass of Africans - the decent African who simply want to get on with their business and earn a living for themselves and their family - it certainly will not be in their interests if we are faced with an African nationalist Government in this country in my lifetime.^{1/}

After thus consolidating his position within the party and in the country, Smith quickly began to step up the pressure on two fronts - on the one hand against the African nationalists and on the other against the British government. On August 26, 1964, a state of emergency was declared in the African township of Highfield and the African paper, the Daily News, was banned. By the end of August over 600 people had been detained as the Government swiftly cracked down on the rival nationalist organizations, ZANU and ZAPU. This split had occurred a year previously.

With these firm measures restoring order at home, Smith flew to London for crucial talks on independence with Sir Alec Douglas Home. The taking of final decisions was hampered by the impending British general election but in a final communique (Command Paper 2464 issued on September 11, 1964) both countries agreed that independence was desirable. The British Prime Minister noted Smith's assertion that independence under the 1961 Constitution was supported by the majority of the population but he added that the British government as yet had no evidence of this. Smith, for his part, recognized that the British government was entitled to be satisfied about this claimed support. Home acknowledged that the British government would take account of any views which might be freely expressed by the population on the issues involved, but he made it clear that the British government reserved its position.

From Smith's return to Rhodesia in mid-September until the middle of November, Rhodesian politics burned at a white-hot temperature. There were several major events: the October 1st by-elections, the October indaba of chiefs and headmen, the Wilson statement on Rhodesian independence, and the November 5th referendum.^{2/}

^{1/} Rhodesia Herald, May 11, 1964. This talk was given on the African Service of the Southern Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation on May 10th.

^{2/} There was also time for a new state of emergency in the African township of Harare and for the removal of Major General John Anderson as head of the Rhodesian army. At age 51 Anderson was removed "on grounds of age." Anderson was necessarily expendable because "he had accepted the job on condition that there was no question of unconstitutional action", conditions acceptable to Field, who appointed him, but not to Smith.

The indaba, referendum, and Wilson statement were all closely linked together in reference to the independence question and sprang directly from the September talks. However, the importance of the by-election emerged from different circumstances - the decision of Sir Roy Welensky to attempt a return to territorial politics.

Sir Roy stood in Arundel, an upper class suburb on Salisbury's northern outskirts. His opponent was Clifford Dupont, a powerful Front leader, who resigned a safe seat to take on Sir Roy. Sir Roy potentially posed a serious threat to RF leadership. In Parliament he could have given added heart and strength to the Rhodesia Party. There was only one mentionable difference between the two candidates - Sir Roy's hesitancy over the question of UDI. Because of the deepening racial overtones of this issue, the campaign degenerated into the most vicious and bitter battle in Rhodesian history. At one particularly large meeting on September 21st Welensky was jeered as a "Bloody Jew, a communist, a traitor and a coward." This could almost be dismissed as funny if it did not so graphically reveal the political acumen of many Rhodesian voters.

Sir Roy was soundly defeated by Dupont, 1079-633, in an extremely high poll, 75.9%.^{1/} In an accompanying by-election in adjacent Avondal, the RF candidate was defeated by his RF rival, 1042-416. The losses were devastating blows to the RF in their traditional strongholds and gave the RF an added shot of confidence and fearlessness which they had previously lacked.

Taken together the Domboshawa indaba, the Wilson warning, and the referendum comprised the first major UDI scare in Rhodesia. Many of the implications of a UDI were now widely discussed for the first time though Sir Robert Tredgold, ex-Chief Justice, had touched on many key issues in a public speech earlier in the year.

Both the indaba and the referendum were designed by Smith, shortly after his return from London, to demonstrate to the British government that independence under the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to all the country's population. African opinion was to be ascertained by means of an indaba, a meeting of chiefs and headmen, featuring "decision-making according to tribal custom and immemorial tradition." Forgetting that traditional indabas were held in the open, this indaba was held from October 21-26 under conditions of strict military security. All meetings except the last

^{1/} The Rhodesian electoral rolls are so out of date that only in relatively stable upper income neighbourhoods could the percentage poll even reach 70%. During the 1965 election campaign both parties estimated that 20-30% of the names on the rolls were incorrect.

were closed to the public, the press, radio, and even to Members of Parliament. Presenting their decision at an open meeting on October 26th, the chiefs and headmen revealed that they unanimously supported the government's demand for immediate independence.^{1/}

Into this heady atmosphere of chiefly support and certain European backing in the upcoming referendum, the British government felt compelled to remind the Rhodesian government that their position on the acceptance of evidence supporting Rhodesian independence claim had been reserved. The British government, for the first time, warned the Rhodesian government of the possible effects of illegal action. In this October 27th statement from 10 Downing Street the British government concluded:

In short an illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relationships between her and Britain; would cut her off from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign Governments and from international organisations; would inflict disastrous economic damage upon her; and would leave her isolated and virtually friendless in a largely hostile continent.^{2/}

Due to this warning and anti-UDI pressure in Parliament, Smith gave a public assurance that a "Yes" vote in the referendum (indicating support for independence under the 1961 Constitution) would not be considered an acceptance of UDI. With this assurance there was really nothing at stake for both parties supported this position. As such, the referendum was an overwhelming success. In a poll of 61.6% of the registered voters, 58,091 voted "Yes", 6,096 voted "No", with 944 spoilt papers. Of those voting, 89.1% voted "Yes". Much was made in the British press that only 55% of the total electorate had voted "Yes". However, again taking into account the state of the voters rolls, at least 80% "Yes" would be a closer estimate.^{2/}

1/ The transcript of this final meeting plus a sociological defense of this method of consulting Africans have been combined in a Rhodesian government White Paper, The Domboshawa Indaba, Government Printing Office, Salisbury, 1964. Domboshawa is where the indaba was held.

2/ Rhodesia Herald, October 28, 1964.

3/ The campaign was featured as are all Rhodesian elections by racial appeals. The RF noted: "The African Chiefs have shown the way. They have braved the extremists, ignored intimidation, and even risked their lives in giving the Government an unanimous "Yes" vote. YOU CANNOT LET DOWN THESE HONEST AND COURAGEOUS MEN! A 'No' vote can only mean a vote for a racist Black Government." Smith, in a letter to all voters, saw the referendum basically in cosmic terms, "between the forces of good and evil. A struggle in which our established standards of politics, public and private morality, and integrity are pitted against expediency and selfishness. Unless we Rhodesians can unite to sever the strings which tie us to Britain and which render us a pawn at the disposal of British Govt., we have no hope of survival. I hope you will realise how absolutely essential the YES vote is. Without it, Rhodesia is surely lost; with it we will surely survive."

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Smith used the impetus gained from this vote of confidence to step up the tempo of negotiations with the British government. This international pressure was paralleled at home by large scale efforts, particularly in December, to rebuild the prestige of the chiefs. Throughout the tribal trust lands a campaign was launched suggesting that the chiefs would be allowed into Parliament after independence. This added recognition was often backed by guns which were issued to many chiefs so they could protect themselves against their people.

The first tangible outgrowth of this new wave of negotiation was the visit to Rhodesia from February 21 to March 3, 1965, of Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, and Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor. During their lengthy stay in Rhodesia they spoke with all segments of Rhodesian society and also extensively toured the country. It is widely believed that fairly concrete terms for independence were offered during these meetings. These terms probably included an expansion of the B-roll seats to allow for at least a 'blocking third' which Africans presumably could control, a broad expansion of the B-roll franchise to perhaps bring all African taxpayers onto the rolls, and the beginning of a phasing out of the Land Apportionment Act. No decisions were revealed though it is clear that Smith refused these terms.

In their departing public communique Bottomley and Gardiner noted a "hardening of attitudes" in Rhodesia but expressed the hope that negotiations would continue in "a sober search for ways by which present uncertainties can be removed, by which current dilemmas can be resolved constitutionally and honourably and by which the common goal of independence can be achieved."^{1/} Negotiations were to continue on a Prime Minister to Prime Minister basis.

^{1/} Rhodesia Herald, March 4, 1965.

II. THE 1965 GENERAL ELECTION

The timing of the election and the chain of events immediately preceding the dissolution of Parliament were a subject of some controversy. March had been filled with speculation about the arrival of the "Wilson Letter" which was to be the first correspondence between the two governments following the Bottomley-Gardiner visit.

A letter from Wilson, via the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, was transmitted to Smith on March 30th. Later the same day, after cabinet and RF caucus meetings, dissolution was announced. Did the arrival of the British communique lead directly to the decision to go to the country? Probably not though it would be too much to fully accept Smith's statement that the arrival of the letter and dissolution on the same day were purely coincidental. But other factors must be taken into account.

First and foremost was the RF's desire to take advantage of the present mood of the electorate. The opposition Rhodesia Party was in complete disarray following the Welensky defeat and had just changed leaders. The time could not have been more propitious for decimating the white opposition. Secondly it is likely that Smith saw a general election as a way of consolidating his position within the RF and also, if victorious, as a means for making certain cabinet changes. Post-election adjustments seem to bear this theory out. Finally, statements from both governments concurred that there were no new proposals in the March 30th letter. In light of growing impatience on the part of RF constituency organizations for action on independence, the election was clearly a response to their demands and a tactical move to step up the tempo of pressure upon the British government.

The timing itself was dictated by more mundane considerations and again mediates against the idea of a spur-of-the-moment decision. Parliament had sat in special session until late March and the annual budget session was to reconvene in mid-June. This would run until October. In agriculturally conscious Rhodesia, October and November are planting months and December is the month of school holidays and South African vocations. If the RF was to seek a new mandate in 1965, May was the most convenient month in which to do so. The election was set for May 7th, a Friday.

We have cited the objectives of the Front, as a political party, for calling the election. In turning their attention toward the country, political objectives were transformed into national concerns. And this, in a word, meant independence. In his opening campaign speech in Fort Victoria April 14th, Smith underlined this point:

The main issue of this election IS Independence. Anyone who believes that Independence is not vital, and our first priority, is out of touch with reality and the considered views of Rhodesians I think I have made it quite clear that Government believes that Independence for Rhodesia is imperative, and this decision has been made because evidence has satisfied us that, without independence, we cannot achieve the economic expansion or political stability which is so essential for the survival of civilised government in this country. -/

1/ Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury), April 15, 1965. References are given to the Herald because it is the most convenient source. Many speeches were duplicated by the parties and handed out; this observer was present at most meetings as well.

Victory in the general election, hopefully with an overwhelming mandate, was seen by the RF as another phase in their battle for independence; to this end they made their one clear request to the electorate. They asked for a two-thirds majority in the new parliament. This majority was desired for two expressed reasons: to put added pressure on Britain and to give the RF all possible legislative means to forward their position².

The election was contested under very complicated provisions. In Rhodesia there are two classes of voters (A-roll and B-roll) and two types of seats—50 electoral constituencies and 15 electoral districts. The qualifications for each roll are based upon a combination of income, property and educational requirements. The result is that the A-roll is almost wholly European, the B-roll predominantly African¹.

Voters on each roll vote for both a constituency and a district candidate. It was originally hoped that this cross-voting procedure would force candidates to be acceptable to voters of both major racial groups. Because of the B-roll boycott and one-sided A-roll voting, this objective has never been fully realized. Nevertheless, under the scheme, A-roll voters are to have an influence of up to 25% of the B-roll vote in electoral districts and B-roll voters are to have a similar influence of up to 25% in electoral constituencies. In any instance where the cross-voting exceeds 25% of the predominant roll's vote, the results are devalued proportionately².

The Campaign: Electoral Constituencies.

There are fifty A-roll constituencies in Southern Rhodesia. All fifty were contested by the Rhodesian Front: twenty-five were contested by the Rhodesia Party. In three other constituencies the RF was opposed by independent candidates making twenty-eight seats in all where the RF was opposed.

2 This last point refers to the government's ability to make constitutional amendments. Many amendments necessitate only a two-thirds majority in Parliament. However, entrenched clauses (dealing with controversial matters like the franchise, cross-voting, and the delegation of human rights) require a two-thirds majority plus either the concurrence of the British government or the approval of all four races voting in separate referenda. Without this two-thirds majority the RF could not even begin the amendment process.

1. The racial breakdown of registered voters for the 1965 general election was as follows:

	African	European	Coloured	Asian	Total
A-roll	2,330	92,405	1,307	1,242	97,284
B-roll	10,689	587	181	120	11,577

2. The following example will illustrate this procedure:

Gokwe Electoral District, 1965 General Election.

Candidates	B-roll votes	A-roll votes	A devalued to	Total
Chigogo	74	122	1	75
Nkiwane	34	3,085	29	63
Ndimande	28	356	3	31

Roundoff prevents the devaluation from reaching its proper total of 34. However, a simple check of the final returns show that in no district were the returning officers able to devalue properly.

The Rhodesia Party presented the primary electoral opposition to the RF. However, following the wounds inflicted by the Avondale and Arundel by-elections, the RP's campaign was more of a death throes than a battle. That the old guard had thrown in the towel was apparent when only five of the thirteen RP constituency incumbents chose to seek re-election. Standing down were such figures as Sir Edgar Whitehead, former Prime Minister, and A.E. Abrahamson, winner by a 616 vote majority in 1962 and holder of one of the RP's safest seats-Bulawayo East. The change was further marked by the fact that former Prime Ministers Whitehead of Rhodesia and Sir Roy Welensky of the Federation, took no active part in the campaign, and indeed were out of the country more often than not. Sir Roy was on a North American lecture tour and Whitehead, two weeks before the election, emigrated back to Britain after 37 years in Rhodesia. Former Front Prime Minister, Winston Field, also did not stand for re-election. (All this is not to forget Garfield Todd who quietly ranches near Shabani but whose present views are a light year way from the main stream of white Rhodesian thinking).

The writing was on the wall for the RP and they made no attempt to deny this basic reality. In what surely must go on record as being one of the least dynamic and most candid opening campaign statements, the new leader of the RP, David Butler, acknowledged that there was "no ready belief in the country that it would be likely for us to form a government". He also added prophetically that the greatest danger to the RP was being wiped out on the A-roll and thus losing its multi-racial support. The decision to contest only 25 A-roll seats however, was ample proof of the RP's dwindling support not only electorally, but among potential candidates, and most significantly, from financial circles. The maximum hope of the RP was to win the 15 B-roll seats and seven A-roll seats, thereby preventing the RF from attaining their desired two-thirds majority.

The campaign seemed to fall into two parts. The first, lasting most of April, was most notable for its lack of cohesion and structure. The second part, from April 28 to polling day, was much more intensive and wholly centered on the possible consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as raised in a number of economic reports.

The Search for an Issue

The first stage of the campaign was marked by a desperate effort on the part of the RP to find a significant issue. Resting upon their uncertain base, the RP proceeded to offer the Rhodesian electorate "The Third Choice."¹ Five central points were embodied in the RP platform: (1) independence by negotiation; (2) the maintenance of standards; (3) responsible government; (4) economic prosperity; and (5) racial harmony.

1. The Third Choice was not (1) a UDI or (2) a nationalist handover, but (3) independence by negotiation. The RF was blatantly racial in its rejoinder. "The 'Third Choice' means a Black future for all. A COUNTRY CANNOT STAND STILL! It either progresses or declines. Look what happened to the Kenya farmers... the B.S.A. company millions...the massacre of White and Blacks in Stanleyville. THIS IS WHAT THE 'THIRD CHOICE' MEANS". Rhodesia Herald, May 5 1965.

A perusal of this platform makes it clear why the RP was rejected. Quite simply, everything that the RP stood for was accepted by the RF only more so. To the Rhodesian electorate, maintenance of standards, responsible government, and economic prosperity mean only one thing-- white government for the indefinite future. Because they refused to endorse the possibility of taking a UDI, the RP was subject to unrelenting attacks on point one-- independence by negotiation. As much as it tried, the RP was never able to escape the taint that it would be amenable to a "Phased Handover." This was the most bitter taunt in the RF book.

For the most part the RP was opposing a mood, a general feeling of intolerance, rather than a specific program. That they could not see this fact, or chose not to, was understandable for they and their predecessors had had much to do with engendering this harsh political attitude. Because in the end the two parties held so many shared assumptions, the RP could never (1) challenge this mood, or (2) understand the vituperative nature of the RF attack. The RP's wildly flung charges--no useless bluffing, no censorship, no one-party state, no blank cheque--could not hope to hit the mark within the prevailing political atmosphere.

On the other hand the RF, perhaps because of overconfidence, perhaps because of poor organization, perhaps even by choice, did not take advantage of the flaying helplessness of the RP campaign. Instead of working as a coordinated unit systematically laying a policy before the country, each candidate seemed to go his own way, reflecting his own views. To be sure all RF candidates hit hard on the need for independence and the maintenance of strong, responsible government, but beyond this the campaign was most discursive.

The most glaring example of RF indecision came on the broad question of proposed constitutional amendments. This was a key area of concern in that any attempts to alter the specially entrenched clauses could possibly force a showdown with Britain.¹ Furthermore, the Front had clearly indicated that if they received a two-thirds majority they would seek to make certain changes.

On April 23 the Minister of Law and Order, D. Lardner-Burke, released a list of six proposed amendments to the constitution--"the only amendments that the government was contemplating." Two proposals dealt with non-entrenched clauses: one was to expand the size of the House; the other sought to amend the clause that holders of public office could not be members of the Assembly. (This would enable Chiefs to become MPs if the government so decided).

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1. The government had frequently stated that they would not use the procedure of referendum within each racial group. The only alternative was to attain the consent of the British Parliament. If this consent was not forthcoming, it was widely believed that the Rhodesian government would claim interference in its internal affairs and use this interference as a justification for UDI.

The other four proposed amendments dealt with entrenched clauses: (1) the abolition of cross-voting; (2) a change in the definition of tribesman to cover only indigenous Africans; (3) a re-definition of citizen to mean a citizen of Rhodesia (so as to restrict voting to Rhodesian citizens); and (4) a provision which would enable Tribal Courts to administer tribal law and African customary law to all Africans, non-indigenous as well as indigenous.

None of these proposed changes were overly contentious within Rhodesia. What sparked controversy was the absence of expected proposals. Most noticeable by its absence was an amendment to the declaration of rights to allow for a preventive detention (without trial).¹ Smith, in Wedza the day before the amendment list was released, said that if the RF was returned with a two-thirds majority it planned to alter the constitution regarding the country's security position. Furthermore, John Gaunt, Minister of Local Government, said in Johannesburg the night the list was released, that "we find security is sadly handicapped by the existing Declaration of Rights...."

It is to be noted that the RF's proposed amendment on chiefs only sought to make it possible for chiefs to enter the House; it did not propose that they be brought in. This distinction needs to be made for RF candidates during the campaign enunciated at least three distinct views on the position of the chiefs. On April 22, W.J. Harper, Minister of Internal Affairs, strong man of the Smith cabinet, and producer-director of the October indaba, said that the RF recognised the chiefs as leaders of the African people and that the chiefs were not now satisfied with the system of parliamentary representation. Without directly promising that the chiefs would be brought into Parliament, Harper said that without a two-thirds majority to alter the constitution, the Government had been unable to give the chiefs more power --- which they wanted and which the Government wanted to give them. The question of chiefly power was not illuminated when the following day Smith declared it had not been decided whether the chiefs would sit in Parliament and J.H. Howman, Minister of Internal Affairs in the Field cabinet, said that he did not favour bringing chiefs into the political arena because of potential conflict between political and tribal leadership.

The RP reacted to these various and conflicting RF statements by publishing a list of proposed constitutional changes which the RP said Smith had revealed to David Butler, as leader of the opposition, in a private meeting on March 25. The approach

1. D. Lardner-Burke, Minister of Law and Order, "I would love to have preventive detention!" Second reading of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill. Debates of the Rhodesia Legislative Assembly, March 18, 1965. No. 12, V. 60., Col. 1021.

had been made in an attempt to ascertain whether the two-thirds majority would be forthcoming on the proposed amendments. Before the RP replied, the Assembly was dissolved.

The proposed amendments cited by the RP were as follows:

(1) elimination of cross-voting; (2) extension of the B-roll franchise--probably to include all tax-paying Africans; (3) the addition of 10 A-roll seats and 3 B-roll seats, the latter, plus one existing b-roll seat, to be filled by chiefs nominated by the Council of Chiefs; (4) the removal of restrictions on the number of cabinet ministers; (5) a fade-out clause on B-roll seats; (6) the amendment of the Declaration of Rights to allow for preventive detention; and (7) an alteration of the procedure for amending the specially entrenched clauses so that these could be amended simply by two-thirds, or perhaps a three-quarters, vote in Parliament.¹

The Government at no time refuted the veracity of the RP statement. But they did stand by Lardner-Burke's statement as to their final position on proposed amendments. The next day the controversy was swept aside, and became virtually forgotten, when the Government's White Paper on the economic consequence of UDI was released. This was a much meatier issue for the RP to concentrate upon.²

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1. Only two proposed amendments the elimination of cross-voting (entrenched) and the expansion of A and B-roll seats (not-entrenched) were on both the RF and RP lists. Until the RF makes their proposed changes known we can only conjecture on their intentions. However it is possible that the published list of six was for respectable consumption and that the many variations suggested by numerous ministers merely laid the groundwork to give the Government a free hand for anything.
 2. Only one major statement came from the RF on the RP list. In perhaps the most convoluted speech of the campaign, Clifford Dupont, Deputy Prime Minister, accused the RP of disclosing top secret exchanges with the Prime Minister. He asserted that the talks of March 25th had been called to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand in negotiations with the United Kingdom and in no way were a disclosure of the Government's proposed constitutional changes. From this Mr. Dupont surmised that "if negotiations with the British Government are prejudiced then the responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Rhodesia Party".
Rhodesia Herald, April 28, 1965.

The Economics and Politics of UDI.

As we have seen, the RP had been unable to make political headway on any issue. But there was still one point upon which the RP hoped to gain ground--the general apprehension within the community of the economic effects of a UDI. The RP strategy was to (1) get the facts on the economic consequences of a UDI, and (2) link the probability of a UDI to an RF victory.

The facts in question were found in special reports, prepared by major Rhodesian economic groups, estimating the consequences to Rhodesia should Britain implement her threatened sanctions following a UDI. The Government (perhaps unwittingly) had commissioned these reports following Wilson's statement of October 27, 1964. By mid-January eight major reports had been submitted.¹

As time passed it became increasingly clear that the Government was not pleased with the contents of the reports and was in no hurry to divulge their findings, despite repeated promises to do so. By the middle of the campaign only the Rhodesian Tobacco Association's report had been made public. This report had been released to its members and the press months earlier, on January 25, 1965, and the Government had then made no secret of its displeasure.² This report, confining its analysis to the tobacco industry alone, said that without Commonwealth Preference the London Agreement between British manufacturers and Rhodesian producers would be endangered and that if embargoes were applied, the Agreement would be destroyed. The probable result would be that only about one-half of tobacco produced could be sold, even at minimum prices, that the auction system would break down, and that Rhodesia would lose her place in the world market.

1. Reports were submitted by the Rhodesia Tobacco Association (RTA), the Tobacco Trade Association, the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU), the Rhodesian Institute of Directors, the Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARNI), the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia (ACCOR), the National Commercial Distribution Office Workers' Association, and the Tobacco Export Promotion Council of Rhodesia (TEPCOR).
2. Heralding the line which was to flower in May, the Minister of Agriculture, Lord Graham, said that to raise such "bogeymen" was a disservice to Rhodesia and that Rhodesians would not take kindly to attempts to "blackmail them into deserting their aim that government here will remain in responsible hands." The publication of the report was a manoeuvre to create unease and fear. Because of its repeated use of the word "might", the report was nothing more than speculation and crystal gazing. Rhodesia Herald, January 28, 1965.

The RF silence on the question of the reports was understandable. But the pressure was building and on April 20th Smith said that the Government would issue its evaluation of the reports "in a matter of days", after which the organizations could issue their reports if they chose to do so.¹

With publication on Monday, April 26th of the Government's White Paper the controversy broke open. The statement was remarkable. Short, just over 1200 words, it made no mention whatsoever of the contents of any of the commissioned economic reports. It alluded to their existence only in noting that they had been based upon the assumption that Britain would carry out her threatened sanctions.

Instead of remarking upon possible economic effects within Rhodesia if UDI were declared, the White Paper chose to discuss (1) Rhodesian preparations in case of a UDI and (2) "whether, in fact, Britain could or would implement in full the sanctions suggested as consequential upon a unilateral declaration of independence and to consider the likelihood of Commonwealth countries falling in with the British Government's suggested action. If these proposals were not implemented then of course these reports would be of little relevance."²

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1. The Government's sensitivity over the contents of the reports was monumental. John Parker, chief sub-editor of the Sunday Mail (Salisbury) and president of the Rhodesian Guild of Journalists appeared in court on April 27th in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act to be questioned about a "supposed offence revolving around the Official Secrets Act." The inquiry, held in camera attempted to determine who had shown Mr. Parker copies of the ARNI and ACCOR reports in January. If it was a civil servant, prosecution was planned. Mr. Parker refused to divulge his source as the source was confidential and to tell, Mr. Parker felt, would be a breach of journalistic ethics. He assured the court that his informant was not a civil servant. The court sentenced him to jail for two days and sentence was suspended pending appeal. On July 26th the appeal was turned down and Mr. Parker went to jail for two days. On July 28th, still refusing to divulge his source, Parker was jailed for seven more days but sentence was suspended pending a further appeal. Rhodesia Herald April 28, July 27, and July 29, 1965.
 2. Para. 2 of the White Paper. See Rhodesia Herald, April 29, 1965.

The Rhodesian Government's position was that Britain would not fully impose her threatened sanctions and even if she did, Rhodesia was sufficiently prepared to withstand them. In support of these dual contentions, the White Paper observed that:

- (1) Economics in countries to the north could be crippled;
- (2) Withdrawal of preference and trade was a two-edged sword;
- (3) Rhodesia could redirect her trade for there is "no sentiment attached to money";
- (4) Britain would not attempt the destruction of the Rhodesian economy, and stable government when certain countries to the north of Rhodesia already give every indication of submitting to Communist influences.
- (5) An embargo on Rhodesian tobacco would give America a virtual monopoly;
- (6) Rhodesia could repatriate foreign workers to Zambia and Malawi;
- (7) Economic sanctions would be detrimental to all races;
- (8) Counter-measures (unnamed) had been decided upon and the government is "quite satisfied that these measures will be effective in protecting Rhodesia's national interests, economic and otherwise".
- (9) History has shown that sanctions will not prove successful; and
- (10) "There can be no doubt whatsoever that in the long term Rhodesians have nothing to lose but all to gain by accepting their responsibilities and becoming completely independent as a sovereign nation."

The publication of the White Paper was coupled with a statement by Smith on April 28th to the Bulawayo National Affairs Association in which he suggested that publication of the economic memoranda on the economic consequences of a UDI "would be a disservice to the people and economy of Rhodesia." His justification was that "UDI is not an issue in this election."

By attempting to prevent the publication of the memoranda, by shifting the basis of argument from economic consequences to potential retaliation, and by criticising the reports for basing their conclusions on the most severe economic sanctions (as had been asked) instead of on possible non-implementation (which the front now chose to take as likely), the Government brought a wave of criticism upon itself, and most importantly, brought forth the publication of the memoranda themselves.

In addition to the RFA report, the following organisations

published before election day: The Rhodesian Institute of Directors, the Association of Rhodesian Industries, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, and the National Commercial Distribution and Office Workers' Association.¹

Of the four newly published reports only the NCDOWA's assessment matched the optimism of the Government. Drawing on many of the same points (Rhodesian retaliation, Communism to the North, the universality of the profit motive, historical failure of sanctions), the NCDOWA firmly associated itself with the quest for independence and suggested that Britain could not and would not implement her threats.

Taken together the Institute of Directors, ARNI, and ACCOR represent virtually all segments of Rhodesian commerce and industry. In assessing the possible economic consequences of a UDI their findings were largely complementary.² Trade and financial difficulties which were foreseen included: (1) withdrawal from the sterling area; (2) diminishing foreign investment; (3) the freezing of Rhodesian assets abroad; (4) loss of entry to the London money market; (5) withdrawal of Commonwealth Preferences; (6) loss of access to raw materials; and (7) loss of Rhodesian export markets. Within Rhodesia a combination of these effects could lead to a credit squeeze, import and exchange controls, and probably to devaluation of the Rhodesian pound as well. A serious fall in both external and internal sales of Rhodesian produce and manufacture could also be expected. This would inevitably lead to rising costs

1. The Tobacco Trade Association issued a statement on April 27th that it "is unable to accept the Government's White Paper on the economic aspects of a declaration of independence in so far as it relates to Rhodesia's tobacco industry. However, the association has no intention of entering the political arena on this or any other issue and will not, therefore, publish a statement until the general election." The Rhodesia National Farmer's Association made its assessment available to members on a confidential basis. Though fearing a tobacco and sugar loss, it was widely believed to be more optimistic than the RTA report, drawing largely on the belief the exports could be diversified to cattle and pigs if sanctions were imposed. The Tobacco Export Promotion Council of Rhodesia (TEPCOR), a statutory body advising the Government on tobacco exports, prepared three papers, each presupposing a different set of circumstances. They were not released to the public.

2. The full text of the Institute of Directors report is in the Rhodesia Herald, April 28, 1965, and the ARNI and ACCOR texts are in the Sunday Mail (Salisbury), May 2, 1965.

of production and higher costs of living. Large scale unemployment, for all races, also was envisaged.

The Institute of Directors (because of the chain reaction of economic hardship) was skeptical of belt-tightening as a solution and ruled out "any practical possibility of sitting out a period of pressure by mere cutting of standards." It noted the frequent RF statement that capital was waiting to flow into Rhodesia as soon as independence was declared and commented, "It seems to us that their weakness is that they convince nobody outside this country."

ARNI expressed its conclusions in a similar manner:

Sanctions could be imposed against Rhodesia to an extent which:--(i) in the short term, could cripple the economy to a considerable extent, creating unemployment and imperiling the security of Europeans in particular; (ii) could cause long-term loss of markets of certain products; (iii) could render some industries non-viable and pose serious operating problems for others.

The export trade to Rhodesia of the more important countries which would be likely to support the imposition of embargoes or restrictions is a relatively insignificant item in the external trade of such countries, and such limited retaliatory economic weapons as Rhodesia possesses could therefore be used only at the risk of intensifying Rhodesia's own economic problems. It is unlikely that economic sanctions could be effectively circumvented by Rhodesia's making special arrangements with countries likely to remain on friendly terms in the event of independence being declared unilaterally.

Although we will attempt, in a later section, to analyze the effect of the publication of the White Paper and the economic memoranda on the election itself, it can be remarked here that their publication was the high water mark of the RF campaign. The RF had nothing new to add. Publication was what they had demanded and waited for and now their course until election day was to re-iterate endlessly the economic consequences of UDI.¹

In the final days of the campaign the RF did not attempt to seriously deal with the questions raised by the economic reports. Instead they launched a two pronged counter-attack intended firstly to impune the motives of the business community and belittle the relevance of the memoranda to the situation at hand and secondly to sharply down the question of a UDI by disassociating its possibility from a RF victory.

The first tactic was largely that of P.K.F.V. van der Byl, Parliamentary Secretary for Information, and second only to Smith as the most prominent RF campaigner. In dealing with the Institute of Directors report he would first note that the Institute has 479 members. (Two hundred and seventy-five had indicated they opposed UDI; nineteen favoured UDI; the rest had abstained). But, van der Byl continued, there were 11,000 companies in Rhodesia, surely averaging two directors each.

1/ A typical RF advertisement stated: STOP THIS MADNESS. UDI has been condemned by the Institute of Directors, the Chambers of Commerce, industrialists, RTA and the Tobacco trade. These are not political organisations; they are the people who run the Rhodesian Economy. Individually their members have widely differing political views, but they are all agreed on one thing...a UDI would be economic suicide for Rhodesia. This is also the view of the RF. We have been saying this for more than a year. Twice already the RF has gone to the brink and then pulled back. THIS TIME IT IS NO BLUFF. If they get enough encouragement on Friday, there will be a UDI. You may have been content to go along with the bluff. But the bluff has failed... YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO GO ALONG WITH THE REALITY. Sunday Mail, May 2, 1965.

Thus those opposing UDI represent but a small fragment of Rhodesian businessmen. (This argument discounts the fact that if van der Byl's figure were correct, nearly half the total male adult European population of Rhodesia would be directors.) The ARNI and ACCOR reports were dismissed for dealing in possibilities not probabilities. Van der Byl did not think the worst would ever happen because, "he who wishes to destroy Rhodesia, absolutely destroys Zambia." The clincher in his argument was an historical treatment of the mistakes made by businessmen when they attempted to influence politics. Financial mining interests in Johannesburg had always financed the Progressive Party--clearly a lost cause; great business names had supported Hitler--a clear political error; and finally, the Bolshevik Revolution was largely financed by American big business.¹

The RF issued a press statement that "whilst not questioning the validity of the arguments raised it should not, of course, be forgotten that it was ARNI and other kindred bodies that foretold disaster and doom:-- (a) if the Federation was destroyed; and (b) if the RF was returned to power in 1962. Their assessment can therefore, be treated with a modicum of reserve!" In attempting to dispell UDI fears, UDI became in the last week of the campaign a "United Drive /or Demand/ for Independence" and Smith repeatedly said that "not one of the RF candidates is for a UDI."

Regardless of what words were used, UDI was an issue and the only one with now meaningfully divided the European electorate. The RP's policy statement was clear: "UDI is an unnecessary and disastrous step which would do irreversible harm to our national and personal pockets. Rhodesia is virtually independent already and derives great strength from the legality of her constitutional position. The RP will not declare independence unilaterally and will resist any attempt by others to do so."

Despite their last minute attempts to obscure the issue, the Front's position on UDI was equally clear:

If, in the future, we find ourselves heading for by extreme racialists in our midst, aided and abetted by Communist forces operating for our destruction, then we will not advise you to plan for phased hand-over of your country, as you were advised three years ago by the then government. On the contrary we will advise that there should be no handover and that the time has come, if we wish to preserve our country and the Christian civilisation we have built here, that we have no option but to take matters into our own hands. Should such an eventuality arise, you will find your Government will have taken the necessary precautions and will be well prepared for what may follow.¹

This basic position had been echoed time and time again by Front candidates; no Rhodesian citizen could fail to take cognizance of the possible outcome of a RF victory.²

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- 1/ All these arguments were used by van der Byl numerous times. When pursued by a questioner at Borrowdale on May 3rd about the Russian revolution, he admitted he could not cite his source. Later in the meeting he remembered Oswald Spengler but this observer has been unable to find the relevant passage.
 - 1/ Speech given by Ian Douglas Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, on Rhodesia radio and television on election eve, May 6, 1965.
 - 2/ Smith most succinctly summed up this position on April 20th when he said that if negotiations failed Rhodesia would be forced "to take it, seize it, assume it. ...call it what you will, the end result is exactly the same." Rhodesia Herald, April 21, 1965.

What was the general tone of the campaign? Much of the bitterness and rancor which had so completely marred and dominated the Welensky by-election bid in Arundel had subsided. To a great extent this can be attributed to the new found confidence of the RF and the profound lack of hope within the RP. Still, the air was heavy with RF heckling. RP meetings often consisted of 50% RF supporters who were very disruptive; three cheers from the back of the hall for "good old Smithy" invariably closed the RP meetings. Only one RF meeting was disrupted, that on election eve, when a group of University students prevented Smith from speaking for about 45 minutes. Eventually four people were ejected by the police and two arrests were made. No arrests were ever made, nor were police visibly present, at any RP meeting.

Question time, an important part of all meetings, generally ran smoothly with both sides anxious to show that all views could be heard. At RP meetings questioners were usually very hostile; the few brave questioners who attempted provocative questions at RF meetings were politely received from the chair but the profound incredulity with which critical statements about the RF were received by the crowd marked their basic disinterest in argument, their willing desire to accept the RF view unquestionably.

II. The Campaign: Electoral Districts.

Unlike the A-roll campaign with its frequent meetings and intense feelings, the B-roll campaign was largely a phantom affair. There was a nearly uniform disinterest in all candidates. But just because the campaign was unexciting does not mean that it lacked interest. It could well be argued that the implications of B-roll politics (or lack thereof) are far more noteworthy than their A-roll counterpart.

Who then participated in the B-roll campaign? For both African nationalist parties banned in Rhodesia, Joshua Mzomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Reverend N. Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union, the election "did not exist." No nationalist 'independents' stood in any electoral district though it is likely that Dr. Ahrn Palley, Highfield incumbent, received some nationalist support. In light of the many reasoned suggestions that the nationalists should have participated in this election it is well to remember three factors: (1) that all significant, and many insignificant, nationalist leaders have been restricted, detained, imprisoned, or have fled; (2) that anyone coming forward as a nationalist would almost surely have been restricted; and (3) that the day the election was called it was also announced that the voting rolls were closed as of January 31, 1965. Thus nationalists could not have registered their supporters even if they had chosen to.

At the other end of the African spectrum, the chiefs urged full participation. Throughout the campaign, "prominent members of the Chiefs Council" (invariably unnamed) made strong appeals to African voters not to ignore the coming election. In the chiefs' indaba vi w, "half a loaf is better than none." As the Domboshawa showed, the chiefs firmly believe in independence under the present constitution.¹

1/ The chiefs' loyalty does not go unrewarded. On July 9, 1965, the government announced a pay increase for chiefs retroactive to October 1964. Chiefs with over 500 followers may be paid £420 a year while those with fewer followers may be paid £240 annually. Further allowances were also made available. The new maximums more than trebled previous limits.

The two major parties took opposing positions on the question of contesting the B-roll seats--the RP participated, the RF did not. Superficially this no more than reflected their relative strength in the electoral districts; at dissolution the RP had 12 incumbants, the RF none. But the situation was in fact considerably more complex.

For the RP, contesting the B-roll seats was an obvious corollary to their desire for 'moderate' African support for their essentially European party. This may seem an unfair judgment but a perusal of the RP's eight page published policy statement finds only one paragraph devoted to "the African people." This paragraph did little more than note that urbanisation and detribalisation was taken place and then assured the Europeans that "the Party's realistic policies will guard against the real danger that such people will continue to become embittered nationalists." The RP contested all fifteen electoral district seats; it was their hope achieving a two-thirds majority.

The RF repeatedly disclaimed any interest in the B-roll seats. (In the more competitive days of 1962 the RF had fought all fifteen B-roll seats, received 12% of the B-roll vote, and returned no one.) Smith in his opening campaign address carefully laid out the RF policy:

I wish to reiterate once more the stand we have taken on "B" roll Candidates. It is quite obvious that the "B" roll was primarily designed for the representation of Africans and African interests by Africans, and therefore, their representatives should be elected by them without any "A" roll influence. Accordingly, as I stated at the time the Election was declared, it is not the intention of the Rhodesian Front to submit any Party Candidates for the electoral districts. I believe that these members should be independent and free from any Party ties to express the wishes of their constituents. It is quite apparent during the last Parliament that the system then operating was a failure. Through being tied to a European dominated Party they were placed in a invidious position of having divided loyalties between the principles which brought them into Parliament and their belief in the true interests of the African people. Further, for the same reasons they were subjected to assaults, intimidation and being branded as "stooges". By standing as independents they would be free from all those difficulties and able to fulfill their Parliamentary responsibilities completely unfettered.¹

As can be seen, this position closely tied in with previously mentioned RF objectives. The RF hoped to abolish cross-voting. Thus Smith's inaccurate suggestion that the separate Rolls were designed as blocks for racial representation. Indeed, cross-voting had been intended a vehicle to facilitate multi-racial support for all candidates. As for the effort to make the B-roll members non-party independents, this would open the way for the chiefs to be brought forward as African representatives.

In fact, however, the RF position was by no means so clear cut. Nomination day gave the first clue to RF tactics. In addition to the 15 RP candidates, 21 independents took the field. Some of these 21 were identifiable. Seven stood as members of the so-called "Chanetsa Group." R.H.J. Chanetsa and P.E. Chigogo, independent MP'S who had defected from the UFP/RP since 1962, headed this group.²

1/ Speech given in Fort Victoria, April 14, 1965. Full text is reprinted in the Rhodesia Herald, April 15, 1965.

2/ The political aims of this group defies description and for want of a better term we can call them left-wing RP's. They are constitutionalist Africans who basically eschew the possibility of a moderate multi-racial party. They are by no means nationalists and one of the group even stood against Palley in Highfield.

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A few other candidates were true independents but this still left mysterious "third man" candidates in most constituencies.

These candidates aroused suspicion because many of them had been closely associated with the RF and because very few Africans in Rhodesia have £50 for electoral deposits. P.M. Clyde-Wiggins, one of three Europeans standing in electoral districts, resigned as an RF branch chairman just before nomination day. I.H. Samuriwo had been a Dominion Party MP and had stood for the RF in 1962. L. Dembetembe had also previously stood for the RF.

Many suspicions would have gone unanswered if it had not been for an inexplicable slip on the part of F.A. Alexander, RF chairman and a candidate in Highlands North. At an April 27th meeting Alexander stated that RF campaign offices were prepared to advise voters on the most desirable B-roll candidates. The shocked look on Clifford Dupont's face indicated that the cat had been let out of the bag. An immediate denial by a "RF spokesman" regarding any B-roll directive only confirmed the obvious. In point of fact, the RF supported candidates in all thirteen contested districts. A memo, issued in the RF office, April 20, 1965 said the following:

THE RHODESIAN FRONT. GENERAL ELECTION: "B" ROLL CANDIDATES IN ELECTORAL DISTRICTS.

The Party, as is well known, is not putting up any candidates for the "B" Roll seats. However, amongst the Independent Candidates nominated, the following are thought to be the more responsible and responsive:--
/Nine candidates were listed./ Of the remaining contested seats, the reference is thought to go to:--
/Four additional candidates were listed./

With this information available, the following positioning of B-roll candidates can be suggested. (See Table 2).

Two questions must be answered: (1) Why did the RF bother to support candidates on the B-roll at all and (2) having chosen to do so, why was it done sub rosa?

Part of the answer to the first question lies in the total uncertainty concerning B-roll results. Other than the fact that the poll would be low, no one could possibly anticipate the nature of the B-roll response. The RF's hope was to split RP B-roll support so that the mass A-roll support for the "responsible" candidate would prove decisive.¹ Another factor encouraging RF support was that they had little to lose by doing so. Money was no problem and any extra B-roll seats would be added insurance against unexpected RP constituency strength. Also, any successful B-roll candidates supporting RF policies would be useful in independence negotiations for the Front could then show both electoral district and chiefly support for their policies.

As for the second question, the most obvious answer is that it would have been politically unwise, particularly internationally, to have been openly defeated in the electoral districts. With the 1962 results as a background and no subsequent claim to further African support, the RF's decision not to openly contest B-roll seats was its only wise choice. By not openly contesting the seats, any defeat could not be clearly tied to Front policies. (Inexplicably, the RP did not pick up the cited statement by Alexander and throughout the campaign only toyed with the issue of RF supported candidates.)

1/ The RF attempts to split the B-roll vote may even have been more extensive. It was widely rumoured in Salisbury that the Chanetsa Group was financed by the RF as well. Though I have been unable to confirm this, the known financial difficulties of this group, plus the RF objective of a split and confused B-roll vote, make this theory at least plausible.

TABLE 2

1965 General Election: Candidates in
Electoral Districts.

DISTRICT	CANDIDATES NAME	RP	--AFFILIATION--		Chanetsa Group	Indpt.
			RF(1)	RF(2)		
Belingwe.	Hove	x				
	Mazibisa		x			
Bindura.	Chanetsa				x	
	Chipunza	x		x		
Gokwe.	Chigogo				x	
	Ndimande	x				
	Nkiwane		x			
Highfield.	Chaza				x	
	Molife		x			
	Palley					x
	Tladi	x				
Hunyani.	Kandengwa	x		x		
	Kaneunyenyene				x	
Inyazura.	Majongwe	x				
	Mazinisa		x			
	Wagoneka				x	
Makabusi.	Horrell					x
	Makohliso	x				
	Rubatika		x			
Magondi.	Chirenda		x			
	Govan				x	
	Kawara					x
	Savanhu	x				
Mangweni.	Jacha	x				
	Mano				x	
	Samuriwo		x			
Manicaland.	Clyde-Wiggins Mkudu	x		x		
Matabeleland North.	Behane	x				
Matabeleland South.	Kumalo Mhlanga	x		x		x
Mpopoma.	Hlabangana	x				
Narira.	Kwenda		x			
	Makaya	x				
Ndanga.	Dembetembe		x			
	Gondo	x				
TOTALS		15	9	4	7	4

Note: Two seats (Matabeleland North and Mpopoma) were uncontested and won by the RP. Also, three RP candidates were endorsed by the RP as well in their contests with Chanetsa Groupers or Independents. The RF endorsements are divided into two classes as their memo suggested.

Another reason was surely the unresolved RF position on the whole question of African representation. If chiefs were to be solely backed as African representatives, or if the discussed fade-out clause for B-roll seats was enacted, the RF could not afford to be tied to elected MPs. Finally, the RF approach to the B-roll was clearly designed to appeal to its European supporters. The RP surely lost more support than it gained by its timid multi-racialism and B-roll policy. For the RF to openly ask their supporters to vote for Africans (of any persuasion) would have had potentially divisive effects within the party. In allowing a laissez-faire approach to exist regarding the B-roll, the RF had the best of all possible worlds. Voting statistics indicate that RF supporters freely exercised their option not to vote on the B-roll.

Despite the many candidates the campaign was desultory at best. Even the RP, who needed the seats, did not have the physical resources to wage an active campaign. Occasionally small meetings were held around the country and signs were posted in the Bindura district, but the only candidate known to have checked the voter rolls and canvassed his district was Falley. And since Highfield was under a state of emergency, his efforts were severely curtailed. No meetings could be held and only Falley, his wife, and one assistant were allowed to enter Highfield for canvassing. Aside from election day, when four drivers were allowed in, all other applications for entry permits were refused.

III. The Results: Electoral Constituencies.

The morning papers on election day, May 7th, were filled with news about the disruption of Smith's election-eve rally and of the Indian government's decision to close its consulate in Salisbury. It is doubtful if either occurrence effected the poll; if they did it surely would have been to the Front's benefit.

The RP on election day was a party left without a public. Nothing else could be more obvious from the voting returns. The RF won all 50 seats--22 unopposed, 3 against independents, and 25 against the RP. The four seats which the RP were considered to have a reasonable chance to win--Bulawayo East, Highlands North, Salisbury City, and Willowvale--all fell to the RF by considerable margins. In Highlands North, a fashionable European suburb of Salisbury, David Butler, leader of the RP, was defeated 985 to 440 by F.A. Alexander, chairman of RF. In Salisbury city where 250-300 Assians were expected to help the RP incumbent, J.R. Nicholson, the vote was 718 to 242. In Bulawayo East, considered the safest RP seat, the RF swept to victory by 856 to 489. The swing here to the RF was 34%. Willowvale, the only predominantly non-white constituency in Rhodesia, returned Bernard Ponter, the Salisbury mayor, over G.J. Raftopoulos, the Coloured incumbent by a 318 vote majority in the most closely contested A-roll race. The percentage poll, 36.2%, was by far the lowest.¹

1/ The RF candidate was aided by the B-roll boycott. Only 118 of 1345 registered on the Willowvale B-roll voted. On the other hand, 1030 of 1991 A-roll voters participated. All shades of non-white political attitudes are mirrored in this constituency. The Africans on the B-roll boycott the election. The Assians and Coloureds who predominate on the A-roll split every way. Some support the boycott but many see their choice as between economic security and societal discrimination under the RF or economic uncertainty and theoretical non-discrimination under an African government. As this vote shows, many prefer the former.

Similar results came in from constituencies all over the country, whether urban, suburban, or rural. RP majorities ran from 318 in Willowvale to 1200 in rural Lomagundi. Six seats were taken by over 900 votes; nine by a 700-899 margin; ten by 500-699; and only three by under 500 votes. In the same 28 constituencies in 1962, the margin in only three was more than 400 votes and in fifteen contests the majority had been under 200 votes. The average swing to the RF was 28.9%. Constituency results are summarized below and given in full in Appendix 1.

TABLE 3

1965 General Election: Summary of Constituency Results.							
	A-roll	%	B-roll	%	Total	%	Seats
eg. Voters.	97,284		11,577		108,861		
eg. Voters in 28 Constituencies	55,025		5,656		60,681		
voting and %age of participation.	35,506	(64.5)	719	(12.7)	36,225	(59.7)	
RF votes.	28,165	79.2	206	28.6	28,371	78.3	50
RP votes.	6,377	18.1	509	70.8	6,886	19.0	0
Indpt.	964	2.7	4	6	968	2.7	0
		100.0		100.0		100.0	50

If anything, the RP vote, 19.0%, is over-valued in relation to its strength in the country. The 25 seats they fought included all seats in which they had incumbents. In Hartley and Lomagundi, where the RP tried to fight rural constituencies, the RF received 88% and 86.5% of the vote respectively. By the same token, however, if the RP had stood in all constituencies, the overall swing to the RF would have been less than 28.9%. The RF had won all the uncontested seats handily in 1962 and there would have been less room for a swing to the RF.

Excessive racial fears and complete hostility to any African advancement permeate every aspect of Rhodesian life. This is the only way to fully explain the crushing defeat of the RP--a party pledged to a restricted franchise, school segregation, the maintenance of law and order in the Rhodesian manner (i.e. long-term restrictions without trial or charge), and substantial land apportionment.

Where in all of this lay the RP's weakness? The answer of course is on the all important independence question. The objective itself was not in question--only the methods by which it was to be achieved. The RP was firmly committed to the maintenance of Rhodesia's constitutional position and independence by negotiation only. For Smith and the RF the "finalisation of this thing" (as they so often put it) was of paramount importance, no matter how it was achieved.

At first glance one might surmise that the difference between independence by negotiation or by UDI was merely a tactical difference. But in the super-charged atmosphere of Rhodesian politics the difference was contentious because of its racial overtones. The simple fact was that the RP had no answer to the question, "what will you do if negotiations fail? Because of this their attitude toward Africans was seen as equivocal, as weak-willed, as susceptible to the notion of a "phased handover". As Todd, Whitehead, Field and Welensky previously, Butler and the 1965 RP were rejected because they were seen as soft on the question of race.¹

1/ In terms of African political advancement, the RP's differences with the RF are more of subtlety than of substance. They showed their real colours after the election when they chose to disband the RP rather than continue under African Parliamentary leadership.

Against this prevailing belief and the RP's acknowledged commitment to constitutional action, nothing else in the campaign really mattered. The economic reports on the possible consequences of UDI had no effect at all on the election. No censorship, no blank cheque, the amendment controversy; none of these would-be issues got off the ground. The answer again lies at the doorstep of racial fear. In the simplistic view of the RF, and therefore of most Europeans, the choice was between firm unyielding white government or nationalist handover. A UDI, come what may, was definitely preferable to either a gradual transition to African rule or to a maintenance of the status quo. Lord Graham, Minister of Agriculture in the Smith Cabinet, verbalised the culinary aspects of this policy when he commented, "I am confident they (any post-UDI sanctions) will be overcome by Rhodesians--who will live on mealie meal for a year if necessary before they see their country destroyed.

The only tactical error on the part of the RP was to contest the election at all. Several incumbents who chose not to stand apparently favoured this choice. The mass defeat did not help their cause, and the RF mandate would have been less certain had there been no opposition. The Dominion Party boycott of the 1962 Federal elections set a precedent for taking this line.

In completing this assessment of the constituency results, two further points should be touched upon: 1) the nature of the RF appeal and of Smith in particular; and 2) the character of those who continue to vote for the RP.

For white Rhodesians there can be no doubt that the RF is a party of hope. As unrealistic as this may seem to the outside world, Smith has consolidated the country behind him to an extent unmatched by former Rhodesian Prime Ministers. The party is determined to attain its goals and is self-righteous in justifying its policies. Smith is the first Rhodesian Prime Minister born in Rhodesia; he has a broad Rhodesian accent, a splendid war record--he is, as the ads say, "a man you can trust." The RP could not hope to cope. Their new leader, David Butler, was British born, an Etonian, monied, an Olympic yachtsman. In addition to supporting a policy which was unsaleable, Butler was personally suspect for a trip he had taken to the United Nations in 1962. Before the Fourth Committee of the UN he had defended Rhodesia's 1961 Constitution and had argued that its non-racial qualitative approach had the support of all races. During the Committee's interrogations, he had suggested that there could be an African Prime Minister within two years if the electorate wanted it. During the campaign Butler was repeatedly accused of favouring this himself--a sure instance of extending credit where it was not due.

For the most part the middle class, the upper middle class and the civil servants had their last fling with Welensky. When he was so soundly defeated, nearly everyone dutifully moved over to the RF. With the writing so clearly on the wall, very few groups or institutions were willing to be left behind. White disunity was constantly attacked by the RF and the electorate was assured that "one nation is not one party". Interestingly enough, the major Rhodesian newspapers did not jump on the bandwagon and remained in rather timid opposition. This made them targets for endless RF scorn.

In Arundel and Milton Park, fashionable Salisbury suburbs which encompass a significant portion of the Jewish community (and the University is in Arundel as well), the swing to the RF was 38 and 35.8% respectively. The remaining RP faithful consisted of a few hundred Rhodesian liberals (voting in protest against the RF), the educated top professionals who are employable anywhere and do not fear African employment pressure, big business (especially those with international interests) who feared UDI for financial reasons, and a small cross-section of the population who opposed unconstitutional action.

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The Afrikaners (estimated to be between 15-20% of the European population), the farmers who would be without political influence under an African government, clerks and semi-skilled workers--potential poor whites, small business men, and the managerial and professional classes nearly all supported the RP. Special mention should finally be given to the civil service, a major group in Rhodesian society which has largely swung to the RF. This is not surprising for the RF, quietly and efficiently, is making political loyalty the sine qua non for advancement, and in some cases, for retention on one's job.

IV. The Results: Electoral Districts.

Three important questions must be answered regarding the B-roll results: (1) what was the nature of B-roll (i.e. African) participation in electoral district polling; (2) what was the success of RF supported candidates; and (3) why was the RP able to repeat its 1962 success in the electoral districts?

Surely the most singularly impressive fact, when analyzing electoral district voting patterns, is the almost uniform success of the B-roll boycott. Only 14.4% of the registered voters in contested districts participated - a drop of nearly 10% from the low poll of 1962. To what can we attribute this low poll? Nationalist intimidation, which the government would suggest, is not an adequate explanation. No matter how many voted or who won, the nationalist had nothing at stake in this election, nothing to gain by coercing people not to vote. To the nationalists the difference between 10% or 50% B-roll participation was nearly irrelevant when under 1% of the African population was enfranchised at all. Beyond this total disinterest, potential intimidators have been sharply curbed. Between January 1, 1964 and July 31, 1965, 1005 Africans were restricted without trial for periods up to five years and 1791 Africans were served with arbitrary detention orders.¹ Several thousand more are in jail for essentially political crimes. Because justice is swift and harsh on this type of crime, most overt intimidation has ceased.

A more appropriate explanation than intimidation for the minimal B-roll participation is the disillusionment and non-acceptance on the part of most Africans with the present Constitution. They need not accept the nationalist brief to see that their present representatives can do very little for them. B-roll voting is summarized in Table 4.

TABLE 4.

Electoral District B-roll Voting

District	Regis. B-roll	Number voting	Percent	Regis. B-roll	Number voting	Percent
Belingwe	649	143	22.0	782	41	5.2
Bindura	644	214	33.2	698	127	18.2
Gokwe	726	197	27.1	782	136	17.4
Highfield	651	88	13.2	674	190	27.7
Hunyani	619	145	23.4	646	60	9.3
Inyazura	757	212	28.0	752	101	13.4
Magondi	808	212	26.2	855	111	13.0
Makabusi	652	150	22.0	688	117	17.0
Mangwendi	665	159	23.9	738	109	14.8
Manicaland	638	182	28.7	728	103	14.1
Matebeleland N.	743	226	30.4	811	Uncontested	
Matebeleland S.	803	130	16.2	946	96	10.1
Mpopoma	707	146	20.7	734	Uncontested	
Narira	717	115	16.0	824	114	13.5
Ndanga	808	260	32.2	901	138	15.3
TOTAL	10,632	2,577	24.2	11,577	1,443	14.4 (of contested)

1/ Rhodesia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, No. 25, Vol. 61, Wednesday, August 4, 1965. In answer to written questions by Dr. Palley the Minister of Law and Order summarized action taken since 1962 under the following acts: the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Emergency Powers Act, the African (Registration and Identification) Act, the African Labour Regulations Act, the Master and Servants Act, and the Unlawful Organisations Act.

2/ (next page)

Footnote Continued.

2/ e.g., Prime Minister Wilson arrived in Salisbury on the evening of October 25, 1965. The next morning an African was jailed for nine years hard labour for intimidating three women into going to the airport. In Salisbury this was considered lenient treatment for the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act provides for a maximum 10 years' jail on each count. Three years is only the minimum.

A glimpse at this table shows one particularly remarkable feature. In twelve of the thirteen contested seats the percentage of B-roll voters participating declined in 1965. Only in Highfield where Dr. Palley stood, did participation increase. His majority rose from 4 to 174 and his personal vote more than trebled. This can perhaps partially be attributed to his active campaign but his outspoken and relentless criticism of the government also played a part. It would be hard to suggest from Table 4 that African voters are not cognizant of their own self-interest.

The RF clearly made an accurate judgement in regard to the B-roll seats. Polls were very low and the splintering of votes between victorious with less than a majority vote. In addition, the three RF candidates who the RF "preferred" also won. In no contest, however, were A-roll votes, after devaluation, sufficient to swing victory to an RF supported candidate, though in Magondi they came within one vote of succeeding. A complete compilation of electoral district results is found in Appendix 2.

The effect of the RF endorsement was apparent in many districts even if it was not decisive. Samuriwo, Rubatika, Clyde-Wiggins, Nkiwane, and Dembetembe all received three to ten times the A-roll support of their opponents. A-roll support for the RF endorsed candidates was not uniform, but overall, RF candidates received 70.4% of the A-roll vote. This is summarized below.

A-roll registration in 13 contested electoral districts	75,855
A-roll votes cast in 13 electoral districts	31,036
%age of registered A-roll voting in electoral districts	41.2%
Number of A-roll voting for 13 RF supported candidates	21,859
%age of A-roll voting for 13 RF supported candidates	70.3%

The relatively low percentage of A-roll participation in the electoral districts can be explained by a number of factors. (you will note by reference to Table 3 that the A-roll vote in electoral districts was 23.3% less than in constituencies.) One is that some Europeans did not want to vote for African candidates of any political persuasion. This is confirmed in a secondary manner by the high number of deliberately spoiled ballots in electoral districts - 4485. (Only 568 ballots were spoiled in the 28 constituencies.) A second reason is that in 22 constituencies there was no contest. Few Europeans were interested enough in the district elections alone to bother to go vote for an African candidate who, he did not really consider his representative. In districts where no constituency contests were being fought the A-roll vote fell as low as 20% while in Manicaland, where all constituencies were contested, the A-roll vote was highest at 60.3%.

In three electoral districts (Belingwe, Highfield, and Matebeleland South) the RF endorsed candidate did not get a majority of the A-roll vote. Each case can be explained in a

different way. In Belingwe no constituencies were fought so few Europeans voted. Furthermore the RF candidate, Hove, was both unobtrusive in Parliament and much better known in the district than his opponent. In Highfield there are no European voters who could be expected to back the RF candidate. What is interesting in the Highfield result is the uniformly high percentage of support given Palley from voters on both rolls. In Matebelcand South where K. Kumalo received slightly more A-roll support than Mhlanga, the explanation may well be mistaken identity. J. Kumalo ran for the RF in 1962 and the 1965 Kumalo was thought by many Europeans to be a close relative of J. Kumalo, if not, even possibly the same man.

The RP success can largely be explained by the fact that now, as in 1962, the B-roll voters are those who were registered by the UFP in 1961. This dwindling group of school teachers, government employees, nurses, and native purchase area farmers continue to support the nominal multi-racialism of the RP. Table 5 shows the similarity of results between 1962 and 1965.

TABLE 5

B-roll Votes in Electoral Districts

	1962 Election			1965 Election		
	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
RF	306	11.9	0	252 ^a	16.1	2
UFP/RP	1870	72.6	14	754	52.3	10
Indpt.	42	1.6	1	234	15.5	1
CAP	359	13.9	0	---	---	-
Chan. Grp.	---	---	-	233	16.1	2
TOTALS	2577	100.0	15	1443	100.0	15

a/ The three RP candidates "preferred" by the RF have been included in the RP total.

Finally, lest we are tempted to read anything into these figures regarding either parties African policy, it would be worthwhile to remember this. In 1965 the RP received 754 African votes; the RF received 232 African votes. In a country of 3½ million Africans, the difference seems hardly significant.

III. CONCLUSION.

There is really very little to say about the six months between the general election and UDI. The positions of both the British and Rhodesian governments remained deadlocked. The coming and going of Prime Ministers, special representatives, and interested bystanders did little, if anything, to alter the situation. Negotiations (the term is used in the broadest possible sense) were long on drama but short on content.¹

How did the election results effect the general direction of Rhodesian policy? The overwhelming victory in May surely hardened the RF in its relentless determination to achieve "independence without strings." The election results gave the RF a mandate to get independence, by UDI if not by negotiations.

1/ The comic opera scheduling of Wilson's October 25-30, 1965, trip to Salisbury illustrates this assertion. Mr. Wilson (uninvited), "I am coming to Salisbury." Mr. Smith (surprised), "I will reserve the weekend for our talks." Mr. Wilson (unhurried), "I will arrive on Monday." Mr. Smith (in a hurry), "Discussions will only last two days." Mr. Wilson (unruffled), "I will stay the week."

I would suggest that the election is best seen as a way-station-a place where the past intentions of both parties were consolidated into the solitary hands of Mr. Smith! This did not represent an abrupt departure from the past; on the contrary, independence under the 1961 Constitution, responsible government, even UDI, had initially been UFP policies.

It has been my fundamental thesis that the possibility of African political advancement, under either the UFP or the RF, was proscribed except under the stringent and limited terms acceptable to the European community. There has been no lack of evidence to support this view. Since 1959, African nationalist parties have not been given a chance to breathe. Political expression has only been tolerated by "civilized" Africans who have trod the narrow path set by the government. The interlocking and re-inforcing set of wage, educational, and political controls which the government possesses gives them an unbeatable hand. Faced with these obstacles the Africans have had no choice but to become nationalists, accept the European line, or withdraw from politics. The result has been the battery of security legislation necessary to crush African political activity and the essential sterility of B-roll politics.

If further proof of the unity of Europeans is needed, one must only ask the question, "what would have happened if the other party had won?" A DP victory in 1958 would not have served the cause of African advancement any more than the UFP's policy did. Even the 1961 Constitution in its present form would then have been unlikely.¹ In 1962 a victory for the UFP offered little promise for European-African reconciliation. Bitterness and distrust was the legacy of the UFP's African policy. There are only two possible differences which a UFP government in 1962 or a RP government in 1965 could have made. They might have negotiated independence under a minority government or they would have maintained the status quo.

It is impossible to see how either of these possibilities would have aided the cause of African advancement. In fact, it would be my argument, that the British dilemma in Rhodesia has been considerably eased by the RF's assumption of independence. Now at least Britain has the constitutional right to intervene. Previously, save for an invasion, there was nothing that Britain could do to alter the situation in Rhodesia. The RP saw the British dilemma, hence their hesitancy over the tactic of UDI.

What were the obstacles to negotiating independence for Rhodesia? Basically there was only one obstacle and that was the unwillingness of the Rhodesian government to compromise. This was to be expected. Therefore the talks were spun out only so long as Britain was prepared to concede to Rhodesian demands. When Britain finally stopped giving way, negotiations broke down and UDI became a certainty.

The British conditions for the granting of independence centered on five points:

- (1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

1/ This argument suggests the possibility that total European intransigence in 1960-61 could have moved Britain to come to the aid of the Africans. This she could have done under powers entrusted to her in the 1923 Constitution. However, convention, plus Britain's commitment to Federation, mediate against this possibility.

- (2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
- (3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.¹

The Rhodesian government answered these five points as follows:-

- (1) The 1961 Constitution provides, in the qualifications governing the franchise, for an increasing number of Africans to be entitled to vote and the question of guarantees against retrogression is essentially a matter of providing suitable mechanisms.
- (2) The Government of Rhodesia proposed the addition of a Senate (to be composed of 12 chiefs elected by the Chiefs' Council) which would vote with the Assembly at third readings on any question affecting the revision of the entrenched clauses. This would replace the referendum procedure under the 1961 Constitution.
- (3) The Government of Rhodesia states that their proposal for a Senate to be composed of 12 African chiefs represented a major advance for Africans. They could not contemplate any increased representation for Africans in the Assembly while so many Africans rejected the opportunities offered under the present Constitution, but they were prepared to consider an extension of the B-roll franchise, for example, by admitting to it all taxpayers.
- (4) The Government of Rhodesia states that they wished to see an end to racial discrimination by an evolutionary process, but they could not agree to the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.
- (5) The Government of Rhodesia claimed that they had already demonstrated that the majority of the people of Rhodesia desired independence on the basis of the present Constitution. This had been shown by their consultation of tribal opinion and the referendum of the electorate.²

With British skepticism of both the chief's representativeness and the Rhodesian government's good faith now obvious, there was little chance of a mutually acceptable agreement. The quibbling over the five points really obscured the central issue at hand - the Rhodesian government's desire for an indefinite perpetuation of its racial dictatorship. Nothing less would suit the RF government. Only with complete independence could this "last Christian civilization in Central Africa" be preserved. Only with complete independence could Rhodesia counter her five enemies: (1) the attitude of the British government; (2) the Afro-Asian bloc; (3) the United Nations; (4) Communism and (5) world-wide liberalism.³ The British government was prepared to go part of

1/ Statement issued by the Commonwealth Relations Office on behalf of the British Government on October 9, 1965, after the breakdown of talks in London with Mr. Smith. Reprinted in The Observer (London, October 10, 1965).

2/ Ibid.

3/ As enumerated by the Parliamentary Secretary for Information, P.K.F.V. van der Byl, to the Rhodesia National Affairs Association April 2, 1965. It is a measure of both the Rhodesian's contempt for, and control of, the African nationalists that they do not make van der Byl's list.

the way to accommodate these demands but both Commonwealth and internal Labour Party pressure prevented a total capitulation.

Talks finally broke down when it was clear Britain would not grant independence under the 1961 Constitution "without strings." The Front then felt compelled to take a UDI. In this action, I would suggest that the Front was at least partially a prisoner of its own rhetoric. At every point in this period when a choice had to be made, the decision was seen as between "civilized standards" and a "racialist Black dictatorship." In fact, the chance of either resulting was minimal. There is no civilization worthy of the name in Rhodesia, but by the same token, there has never been an opening for Black government, let alone a Black dictatorship. The paradox of UDI is that by "taking things into our own hands", Rhodesia, instead of dispelling the hated uncertainty, has actually let control of the situation slide from their hands and into those over which they have no control.

I do not want to suggest, however, that this decision was taken blindly by the Front government. Even if they disliked and deprecated the economic reports on the economic consequences of UDI, they did have the information at hand. Even if they are disdainful of world opinion and world pressure, they did know that it would be overwhelming hostile. The fact which must emerge is that the Front was (and is) immensely confident that they can weather sanctions and ride out the storm. It would be a grave misreading of the Rhodesia situation to suggest that Smith represents an extreme element of the society and that "moderates" would come forward if given half a chance. Smith is firmly in the centre of the European political spectrum. He embodies their desires and their hopes-- all summed up in the word preservation. Only time will tell if their strategy was correct or if UDI has finally opened the door to meaningful change in Rhodesia.

Paper read at a conference held at the East African Institute of Social Research. January 1966.

APPENDIX 1.

Swing to Rhodesian Front in the 28 Electoral Constituencies
Contested at both the 1962 and 1965 General Elections,¹

Constituency	1962				1965		Percentage Swing to RF
	UFP	RF	RF%	RP	RF	RF%	
Arundel	930	613	39.7	389 ^d	1354	77.7	38.0
Avondale	315	652	43.7	230 ^d	1251	81.7	38.0
Belvedere	744	659	47.0	259	1119	82.4	35.4
Borrowdale	986	533	35.1	402	1031	71.9	36.8
Bulawayo Central	650	630	49.2	211	829	79.7	50.5
Bulawayo District	575	702	50.8 ^a	301	836	73.5	22.7
Bulawayo East	1064	483	29.6	493	860	65.6	34.0
Bulawayo South	564	709	55.7	164	917	84.8	29.1
Charter	459	832	64.5	250	1002	80.0	15.5
Eastern	661	786	54.3	298	983	76.7	22.4
Greendale	627	782	55.5	219	1121	83.6	28.1
Greenwood	717	532	39.6 ^b	283	904	76.2	36.6
Hartley	476	821	63.3	138	1043	83.3	25.0
Highlands North	856	577	40.3	440	985	59.1	28.8
Highlands South	677	648	48.9	232	1032	81.6	32.7
Hillcrest	648	880	57.6	131	1171	86.6	29.0
Hillside	822	653	44.3	404	973	70.7	26.4
Lomagundi	622	1003	61.7	234	1434	86.5	24.8
Marlborough	536	938	63.6	299 ^d	1085	78.4	14.3
Milton Park	873	592	40.4	305	975	76.2	35.3
Mtoko	653	628	49.0	281	896	76.1	27.1
Raylton	586	852	59.3	226	1121	83.8	24.5
Salisbury Central	586	625	51.6	169	877	83.4	31.8
Salisbury City	631	501	44.3	242	718	74.8	30.5
Salisbury North	902	614	40.5	328	997	75.3	34.7
Umtali East	530	811	60.5	167	1047	86.2	25.7
Umtali West	539	752	58.3	264	1073	80.3	23.0
Willowvale	573	464 ^c	53.9	415	733	63.9	25.0
TOTALS	19,302	19,217	49.4	7854	28,371	78.3	23.9

a/ A third candidate received 104 votes (7.5%).

b/ A third candidate received 94 votes (7.0%).

c/ On the first count an Independent candidate received 164 votes (13.7%).
On the second count necessitated because no candidate had a majority the RF received 466 votes (44.9%). This was the only case in which second preference votes came into play. Preference voting was subsequently abolished by the Rhodesian Front government.

d/ There three candidates were independent and not members of the RF.

Note: All the computations are mine. The raw data for the 1962 election (and all previous Rhodesian elections) is usefully compiled in the Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1893-1962. Edited by F.M.G. Willson, written and compiled by Gloria C. Passmore and Margaret T. Mitchell. Department of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury 1963. For 1965 data is available in the May 10, 1965, Rhodesia Herald (with several errors) and in the July 21, 1965 Rhodesian Hansard (without breakdowns by party).

1/ The 22 other constituencies were won by the Rhodesian Front in both elections. In 1962 they were contested; in 1965 the Front was returned unopposed.

APPENDIX 2.

Bowman

1965 General Election: Electoral District Results.

District	Candidate	Affil.	B-roll #	Votes %	A-roll #	Votes %	A-roll deval.	Total B + A
Belingwe	Hove	RP	37	90.2	353	75.9	7	44
	Mazibisa	RF(1)	4	9.8	112	24.1	2	6
Bindura	Chipunza	RP/RF(2)	71	55.9	6558	72.6	22	93
	Chanetsa	CG	56	44.1	2472	27.4	8	64
Gokwe	Chigogo	CG	74	54.4	122	5.4	1	75
	Nkiwane	RF(1)	34	25.0	3085	86.6	29	63
	Ndimande	RP	28	20.6	356	19.0	3	31
Highfield	Palley	Ind.	161	84.7	56		34	195
	Chadza	CG	15	7.9	11		6	21
	Tladi	RP	11	5.8	8		4	15
	Molife	RF(1)	3	1.6	1		0	3
Hunyani	Kandengwa	RP/RF(2)	57	95.0	1937	73.0	10	67
	Kaneunye- nye	CG	3	5.0	717	27.0	4	7
Inyazura	Majongwe	RP	79	78.2	162	26.7	6	85
	Mazinisa	RF(1)	11	10.9	429	70.4	18	29
	Wagoneka	CG	11	10.9	18	2.9	0	11
Magondi	Govan	CG	41	36.9	106	4.8	1	42
	Chirenda	RF(1)	22	19.8	1574	71.8	19	41
	Savenhu	RP	32	28.9	379	17.3	4	36
	Kawara	Ind.	16	14.4	133	6.1	1	17
Makubusi	Rubatika	RF(1)	54	46.2	2786	54.4	15	69
	Makohliso	RP	52	44.4	1302	25.4	7	59
	Horrell	Ind.	11	9.4	1034	20.2	5	16
Mangwendi	Samuriwo	RF(1)	45	39.4	1109	74.8	20	63
	Jacha	RP	33	30.3	345	23.3	6	39
	Mano	CG	33	30.3	29	1.9	0	33
Manicaland	Mkudu	RP	76	73.8	844	23.8	5	81
	Clyde- Waggins	RF(2)	27	26.2	2709	76.2	19	46
Matabele- land North	Behane	RP	Won Uncontested.					
Matabele- land South	Mhlanga	RP/RF(2)	60	62.5	379	44.8	10	70
	Kunalo	Ind. 1	36	37.5	467	55.2	13	49
Mpopoma	Hlabangana	RP	Won Uncontested.					
Narira	Makaya	RP	94	82.5	129	23.0	6	100
	Kwenda	RF(1)	20	17.5	431	77.0	211	41
Ndanga	Gondo	RP	124	89.9	134	15.2	5	129
	Dembetembe	RF(1)	14	10.1	749	84.8	28	42

Note: Sources are the same as those given for Appendix 1.

ROLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

by Brack Brown

Introduction One of the apparent tasks of this conference is to question if and how the political science scholar can make more meaningful contributions to development processes in the new nations. Explicit in this undertaking is the assumption that there are means by which this branch of the social sciences can be better utilized to help enable relevant personnel make better decisions about political aspects of development on the basis of thorough and skilled observations, analyses and evaluations of relevant political data. These terms of reference require us to face squarely what could be a very revealing and possibly even embarrassing set of questions.

This paper is designed to put forward a few ideas about the possibilities and difficulties raised by this question. A useful starting point is to ask why it is that the political scientist is not already more deeply involved in development activities to the extent, let us say, of the economists. In presenting some ideas about this question it is intended to overstate some views on the economists' role for the sake of contrast. Secondly, we will examine the advantages and disadvantages of closer political science involvement in development both in terms of the discipline and in terms of the practitioners of politics and administration in developing countries. If we can determine that there are positive and mutual benefits to be gained from such a relationship, we can further examine what attitude changes might be required as well as what specific forms of contacts or arrangements might be made to facilitate participation. Finally, there are several important ideas concerning the possible approaches which the discipline can follow in relation to development with special regard to the nationality of the scholars upon whom such tasks might fall.

Politics and Development--Prevailing Interpretations In the developing states the role of the politicians is to determine, allocate and balance values, day to day as well as over long periods. They have chosen, from among the academic professions economists as one of their chief aides in this process. This relationship has had consequences to interpretations of the word "development". The term is seldom used in practical affairs without the assumed or explicit adjective, "economic". It is the economic component of the state system that has tended to dominate discussions of development at the national level. Other dimensions of the state system are sometimes viewed in this context as the result of spontaneous, accidental, whimsical and unpredictable events and forms of behavior. Academic specialists who deal with non-economic (and technical) components of society and the state are often considered to be irrelevant, impractical or, at worst, meddlesome speculators who either waste the time of busy officials or who bring persons and programs into criticism without taking responsibility for their charges.

Politicians, civil servants, technicians and economic advisors in developing states profess to aim at the rapid but controlled evolution of modern, prosperous and peaceful states. Their apparent need and appreciation for those of us who examine such phenomena as interest groups, parties, legislatures, administration, elections, ideology, revolution, reform and political mobilization is low indeed. Only on such dramatic and highly public occasions as constitutional change, elections and revolutions does the political scientist become conspicuous as an analyst worth listening to. The implications are that the political scientist's expertise lies only in hindsight. Yet

the field of political action in developing countries is littered with what many political scientists agree are unavoidable embarrassments, delays and expensive insights. Let us look at this problem of the general relevance of political science information and activity from two broad aspects of politics in developing countries, namely, decolonization and nation building.

Decolonization, politically, administratively, socially and economically is one of the first steps towards development. It is a process amenable to planned change. The emotional word for what it is that is being decolonized is "colonial mentality". Colonial mentality is simply the perpetration after independence of attitudes, patterns of action and standards of judgement that were designed for or emerged as part of the effort to establish and maintain colonial states. It is only fair to add that much of the colonial legacy has structural and functional relevance to the process of development after independence, but much of it has not. There is no question that political and administrative styles and objectives have been radically altered by the advent of independence. Developing countries must, however, move carefully away from the framework of old modes and forms as they cannot directly substitute the modes and forms of the relatively well developed countries. This leaves them with the difficult task of creative adaptation and modification of existing machinery and puts a high priority on the design and application of many entirely new assumptions, techniques, institutions and goals appropriate to development.

Obstructing this process of progressive adaptation and change are myriad factors characterized at one end by conservative counselling ("don't rock the boat") to radicals who demand that we rebuild the boat while it is in the water. Younger, educated persons in the developing countries who never developed the habits of colonial thinking and who desire the most rapid rate of change consistent with stability rail against the conservatives as short-sighted obstructionists and against the radicals as selfish of idealistic hot heads. These philosophical and generational conflicts are at the core of the difficulties confronting enthusiasts of rational but rapid development in all corners of the society.

Some of the needs in rational decolonization and nation-building are the perception and manipulation of new trends, the discovery of conditioning factors and the passing of viable alternatives to guide the developing countries through the twin dangers of clinging conservatism and overzealous radicalism. For the political sphere, if assistance is being sought, it is the political scientist who is most competent intellectually to deal with the detection of general social trends, conditioning factors and alternative choices of action and organization which are consistent with development and stability. This does not mean, however, that the services of political scientists are indispensable to the developing nations which have so far been developing without them. It does mean though, that the discipline can deal with matters of vital importance to development and that a properly structured relationship between action men and academics might aid in effective and efficient development.

Before continuing with these considerations of the general relevance of political science to development we might take a moment to get a different slant and some contrast by examining the present role of the economists in developing countries vis a vis the political scientists. What accounts, for instance, for the apparent entrenchment and acceptability of the economist in development planning? On the other hand, what factors account for the apparent ignoring of the political scientist and the tendency towards non-employment of his services? The two questions are related.

One reason for the routine inclusion of the economists in planning is that bread and butter aspects of all politics are a

highly conspicuous and specialised responsibility of governments. They are also the most tangible measures of the progress of the leadership towards promised goals. The nearly universal recognition of what economic planning can and has accomplished in both Eastern and Western development is readily grasped even by unsophisticated politicians. Nearly all the leaders in developing countries thus long to identify themselves as the advocates, and even initiators, of the use of economists in similar activities in their own countries. Under such conditions the economist finds a natural and receptive framework within which he can combine research, advice and even prescription. Since his science is relatively explicit and normative, the economist can defend his conclusions about what can be done by accepted standards of quantitative calculation. In performing this exercise, however, he must trust that certain potential combinations of physical resources and social factors can be taken as given. If his calculations do not lead to the desired results he can always claim that it was due to variables beyond his detection or control.

The politician finds this line of reasoning highly useful to his own purposes and employs these technical and logical arguments as legitimizing devices in his consultations and speeches, however little he understands the arguments themselves. This facile, naive and overdependent approach to economic information and advice often leads the national official into being sold a bill of goods by the economist. As one participant at this conference has said, it is difficult to believe that certain programs in East Africa have in fact had economic assistance in their design. From my own knowledge about these same programs I can assure the questioner that economists had a great deal to do with the design and changes in these programs since their inception. From another angle, however, there are grounds for the defense of some of the programs in question albeit not economic defense.

A View of the Obstacles. A safe exaggeration we might make in this affair is that politicians tend to be politically wise and pounds foolish while the economists tend to be pounds wise and politically foolish. The combination would appear to make a sensible and mutually acceptable balance if it were not for the chronic gap in real communications and intelligence between the two types. It is at this point we reintroduce the political scientist into this discussion. We have already suggested, superficially at least, that the political scientist has the competence to identify and analyze wants, conditioning factors and policy alternatives relative to the development process. In some ways he appears to be a logical choice in helping to fill the gap between political intentions and economic directions. Why is he not more deeply involved and avidly sought?

The basic reasons for the "outsider" role of the political scientist in development are traceable to two sources: first, the research and presentation style of the political scientist and second, the limiting views or beliefs held by the politicians and officials both of themselves and of the "academic types" save the economist. In the nature of his interests and competence the political scientist stimulates an understandable caution from the politician and official in developing countries. As few cabinet ministers, parliamentarians and top civil servants are university degree holders it is logical that they might anticipate embarrassing confrontations with the intellectuals if they were thrown together in a continuous fashion. This, of course, assumes that there is a basic familiarity with the interests and even the existence of the political scientist as a specialist. But even if we see this as a small barrier there are further reasons for distrust, namely in the tradition in political science, as in journalism, of free, direct and public criticisms of political

extent professional. local, national and international conferences serves as a useful means of bringing academic political scientists into meaningful interaction with politicians, administrators and other officers. A healthy initiative of this kind has been the establishment of an Institute for Development Studies in Nairobi where academic and non-academic men concerned with development regularly exchange provocative ideas oriented towards practical local problems. The funneling of potential expatriate research projects through the University at Dar-es-Salaam as a central clearing agency of such projects is another healthy tendency.

I have not included the impact of scholarly articles and books in the above discussion as they are so insignificant an influence on practitioners but for exceptional cases. One index of this, at a fairly low level can be given, but our observations at higher levels confirms the view. When over 116 students at the Kenya Institute of Administration were questioned over a period of several months it was established that only 3 to 4 percent of them had read Kenya's Sessional Paper Number 10, let alone the Bennett and Rosberg study of the Kenyatta Elections. Among twenty settlement officers interviewed in Kenya's land settlement program, only two had read the last annual report of their own department. For a wide variety of reasons politicians and civil servants in developing countries make practically no effort to keep abreast of their fields through "outside" reading.

There are, however, a number of indirect approaches which have not so far been employed to bring practitioners of development into regular touch with students of development. One of these unexplored avenues is the popular press. In France, Duverger's political series in the press has been followed avidly for years by members of government. In East Africa, at least, the academics have left this job to the journalists. Another indirect device, one of great interest to some of us here this year, is the preparation of appropriate political science teaching materials for secondary schools, institutes of administration, universities and the general public. The potential impact of an imaginative effort in this field could go along way towards giving our profession a sense of positive contribution to development. There are many more unexploited techniques that could be mentioned.

Finally I want to consider briefly one more special problem of the political scientist's contribution to development. For many already indicated reasons, the political scientists are seldom sought after by development decision makers. One so far unmentioned reason for this is the fact that the vast majority of such scholars are expatriate and their time in the developing countries is usually short. From the point of view of nationality and familiarity it is difficult to expect these people to be able to fully identify with the full range of aspirations and the conditions of the people they seek to help. Furthermore, there are disturbing and confusing differences of academic orientation on the part of the various expatriate groups. English, American, Scandinavian and other social scientists do not operate from a fixed base of interests and assumptions. These factors may cause confusion among decision makers even if they desire to seek out the academics. Certainly when indigenous academics appear they are quickly deluged with requests to undertake research and become participants in active development. We are all fairly well aware of this tendency and in it we right find the best answer to our original problem. Our professional role may be to seek out every possible means of encouraging and working on a program which will result in the fastest possible growth of indigenous political science scholarship in the developing countries.

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GROUP FARMING IN BUNYORO (UGANDA)

By

SIMON CHARLESLEY

The present Group Farming Scheme in Uganda is formally an extension into the direct organization of farming of the primarily marketing co-operatives which are the main form of co-operative activity in this country. The extension runs via the Co-operative Credit Scheme. It is this present Group Farming with which I am concerned in this paper, though it is perhaps worth noting that such schemes are not new in Uganda, or even in Bunyoro. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies wrote in his Annual Report for 1948 of a certain Society in Teso, that "the members of their own initiative, started farming co-operatively on a small scale. The idea may be capable of extension on a large scale amongst the population in the northern part of the Protectorate and it also has possibilities as regards the development of mechanical cultivation."^{1/} Even the expression "Group Farming" has been appearing in Agricultural Department reports at least since 1953, describing a variety of schemes which has appeared, and disappeared, over the years.

My present purpose is not to go over this history, instructive as it might be. It is to provide a preliminary report of a study in progress of one particular Group Farm in Bunyoro. I lightly disguise both the Farm and its parent Society ^{2/} under the name "Ekyotakaliire". The report is based in the main on the first five months of observation. This is far from long enough to be able to say anything reliable about present social development in general, and I therefore in this paper confine myself to a number of essentially simpler topics which nevertheless have some interest and practical relevance for the evaluation of the Scheme as a whole.

I set my particular case against a more general background of description derived from the standard agreements and by-laws which a person draws upon himself in becoming a member of a Group Farm. This provides what may be termed the idea of a Group Farm. It is important, first because in many aspects idea and reality are close; secondly because it is very often the idea which is presented to visitors and enquirers where there is a divergence between the two; and lastly because it is precisely the points of divergence which are likely to be the most revealing and fruitful for the analyst, and of greatest practical interest to the planner.

^{1/} Report, page 13.

^{2/} I use "Society" rather than "Co-operative" according to the local usage.

The fundamental agreement for the setting up of a Group Farm is between the Society involved and the Director of Agriculture. This is known as Agreement "A". It has a companion, Agreement "B", which the individual members of the Farm must sign. "A" has no term set to it, but "B" is for one year only, though renewable. These two agreements explain what the Department will provide and do, and lay down what the Society and its members must do in return. The tone and content of these agreements suggest that what is involved is a surrender of freedoms on the part of the member in return for blessings to be received from the Department, which guards itself as far as possible from all responsibility to members. There is from the beginning no suggestion of any "partnership for development". Significantly, one copy only of each agreement is signed, at least in the case under study, and this is kept by the Department. There has not yet been available any Ruyoro language version of the agreements. But though revealing, these features are not of much direct importance at present, since in the first place the members are not in general keen to quarrel with the goose, except hesitantly when promised golden eggs are delayed beyond reason; and secondly because a number of the more drastic provisions have never yet, as will be discussed, been applied. Many members of course remember little or nothing of what they have signed.

Agreement "A" binds the Society to the adoption of a special set of by-laws. These also the member of the Farm brings upon himself. And by Agreement "B" he has to sign a loan agreement with the Society. He is thus involved finally with the special by-laws relating to loans. It is from all these collectively that the idea of a Group Farm is derived.

I must immediately however, stress two points. Firstly, Ekyotakaliire is one of the first generation of Farms and these did not receive the same care in selection or the same degree of planning as the later Farms. This might invalidate its use for a case study of the Scheme as a whole, but in fact it does not. Even without these added benefits, Ekyotakaliire is currently considered to be among the most successful Farms; it was indeed selected for study as such.

Secondly, I must stress that, although my analysis is directly relevant to the evaluation both of the Scheme and of the particular case, my discussion here is not in terms of success or failure. Such a discussion, whether in social or economic terms, could only be successfully carried on in reference to specific ends which it is hoped to achieve by means of the Scheme, and these I do not discuss here. In particular I should not be understood as saying that Ekyotakaliire is failing in so far as it is departing from the idea of a Group Farm; it might even, though I do not say this either, be a success because it is departing from features of the idea which, in this case or generally, have proved unworkable. Nor *a fortiori* should I be understood as saying anything about the economic costs and benefits involved. The Scheme or a Farm might be highly successful in achieving certain social ends but at a cost which would have to be judged prohibitive.

How a Farm begins: the idea

Farms are born of thriving "Growers'" Societies which are already within the Co-operative Credit Scheme. Such a Society requests consideration for the setting up of a Group Farm within its area of available land, suitable for annual cropping, within its area.

If the application is successful, the Society is required to sign Agreement "A". I quote only the salient points of this. It is agreed that a land usage plan shall be drawn up by the Department, that this will then be agreed with the Society and will become binding upon it. A fixed feature of whatever plan is adopted is that the District Agricultural Officer is to mark out the land in strips according to the requirements of tractor cultivation. He is then to arrange for the clearing of this land, but here the Society must put itself into his hands by agreeing that "its members will carry out as much as possible or practical or necessary to do by hand of this clearing".

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Such work is to be organized by the Committee of the Society without any payment to the members who carry it out. In sharp contrast however, if the Director of Agriculture has the work done mechanically, no charge will be made to the Society for this.

Case:

Ekyotakaliire Society was started in 1956 as a break-away from a neighbouring Society. Its period of expansion dates only, however, from early 1962, when a retired Co-operative Officer, Mr. C. who had settled in its area, began to interest himself in its organization. The headquarters of the Society was moved to a new site by the road to his home, and with his help it began to build substantial stores and offices. In 1963 the Society entered the Credit Scheme, having about 200 members at the time.

Group Farming activities also began through the same man. Also in 1963 he persuaded some twenty or so people to come together to clear land for cotton on the next and more or less uninhabited ridge to the one on which he himself was beginning to farm on a fairly large scale. These people were to clear as many acres of fairly thick bush as was needed to give each of them one acre of cotton land. The immediate attractions were first that the effort of taking new land into cultivation was eased by working together; secondly that the simultaneous opening up of a fairly large area would lessen the risks of animal damage, always an important consideration in this as in most parts of Bunyoro; and thirdly that the land so opened would be ploughed on credit, either through the Credit Scheme, or for those who could not obtain this, from Mr. C. who would do the work with his own tractor. A less immediate but important attraction was that a successful effort in the first year was likely to bring direct help from the Central Government; this was the year in which the present Group Farming Scheme began.

There was nevertheless a good deal of opposition to the plan, and those who joined were in the end few. This opposition seems to have been based partly on distrust of the intentions of Mr. C., the big man behind the scheme, and partly on previous experience. This experience consisted, as far as co-operative farming was concerned, of the Farming Societies for which there had been a vogue in Bunyoro for a time in the 1950s, but which never, on the whole, had much success. As far as the prospect of large-scale schemes was concerned, there was the experience of the ill-fated tenant-farmer scheme of the Bunyoro Agricultural Company at Kigumba in 1954/6. Those who joined the new scheme, it was said locally, if they did not become the dupes of Mr. C., would certainly become the slaves of the Government, without benefit to themselves. The whole affair was taken up as material for political dispute; UPC supporting against DP attacks.

Nevertheless the scheme did get started, was reasonably successful, and the Central Government did step in to convert it into a fully fledged Group Farm. The land was obtained on a lease for an initial 5 years from the Bunyoro Kingdom Land Board. Bulldozers arrived early in 1964. They cleared and windrowed some 880 acres on two ridges (migongo), which are the basic land form in most of Bunyoro. This was only about 100 acres less than the total of land immediately available for use, and the whole Farm is thus considerably smaller than the minimum size now laid down.

In the event, as has been general in Bunyoro at least, the members were not called upon to do any of the clearing by hand, though they were required to work on the access road and on a bridge which was needed.

Of the three other Group Farms now operating in Bunyoro, one started very similarly, following a small hand-clearing scheme; in a second case there was such a scheme but it did not have the same direct relation to the development of the Group Farm as in the other two cases^{1/}; and the third Group Farm is a partly converted agricultural settlement scheme originated by the Kingdom Government.


The Figure shows the layout design for one of the ridges of Ekyotakaliire Farm^{2/}. The basic feature is that each member of the Farm has a more or less square plot of about 15 acres. This is allocated to him for as long as he remains a member. The plan clearly assumes that members will be resident, since each plot includes a 2 acre strip, not to be included in the general cropping plan for the Farm but earmarked for a house site and for the growing of food crops according to the inclinations of the particular farmer. The Farm crops, typically cotton, maize and ground-nuts, with beans now coming in, are to be grown in strips which run continuously across successive plots. This enables mechanical operations to be carried out continuously from one end of the ridge to the other, at its maximum a distance of nearly two miles.

^{1/} A number of such small schemes have recently been started in the more or less vague hope of Central Government intervention; a slightly odd example is a cotton-growing "group farm" among the fishermen of Butiaba.

^{2/} The rest of the Farms of Bunyoro are probably to follow a slightly different system based on the Northern Region pattern. None of these Farms yet have Farmers resident, so that direct empirical comparison is not yet possible. But I do not think that the differences will be so great as to make Ekyotakaliire experience irrelevant elsewhere. I therefore omit all discussion of the topic from this already over-long paper.

FIGURE PLAN FOR ONE RIDGE
 ERYOTAKALIRE GROUP FARM.

□ PLOT BOUNDARIES
 EACH PLOT APPROX 300 × 50.
 = ROADS. □ HOUSES
 ← → ALIGNMENT OF CROPPING STRIPS.



This overall pattern has remained, but it has become rather less regular in the Farm's second year. Although Ekyotakaliire's ridges are of unusual regularity, this has turned out still to be less than the regularity of the plan; fitting the two together therefore resulted in plots of varying sizes. This was resented by the members and the boundaries had to be re-drawn this year to give greater equality. Notably, there are now few places at which four plots make a neat corner. Though no full groups of four houses have yet appeared, they have tended to be clustered, since it was explained that this would be more convenient if water could one day be taken to them.^{1/}

One plot by the access road on one of the ridges has been set aside as a Village Centre. The Manager's office, the houses and sheds of the Tractor Hire Service, of which the Farm is a base, the Lint Marketing Board cotton store, and somewhat apart the Manager's house, distinct in its "European" style and construction, are the main features here. There is also a continuing but so far unsuccessful attempt to prepare a football pitch, but even this is on the whole of interest mainly to the tractor staff. Though Farm Meetings are, it is true, held at the Village Centre, in one of the tractor sheds, it contains nothing of direct or permanent interest to the Farmers. There has thus been little concern with the provision of amenities or with the "social" side of Farm life. A Young Farmers Club for the younger Group Farmers and for the children of others is only a partial exception, since its main and virtually only activity has been the growing of cabbages and carrots. It has, hardly surprisingly, failed to interest, and it remains in being only because the Agricultural Assistant in charge does the gardening.

Farming the Farm: the idea

By Agreement "A" it is agreed that once the clearing is accomplished, further tractor work will be arranged for "as many subsequent cultivation operations as possible". These are to be agreed with the Committee of the Society at the beginning of the cultivation season (see under Management below), and the Director of Agriculture undertakes to make available the tractors and equipment necessary for the work.

All remaining farming operations are agreed to be the responsibility of the members to whom plots are allocated. This means that it is their responsibility to perform them when this is required by the overall Farm plan for crops, and in a manner satisfactory from the point of view of this plan. If a member fails to carry out the operation satisfactorily and at the proper time, the Committee of the Society is charged with arranging for it to be carried out, but at the expense of the member concerned.

^{1/} Water supplies at present are limited to two very slow bore holes by the swamps on the edges of the Farm.

This degree of regimentation is required most immediately by the place of mechanical cultivation in the plan; if cultivation is to be possible by strips or blocks rather than by individual plots, then all plots in the strip must be ready for the operation at the same, and correct, time. The Society's interest is harnessed to this end through the loan which each member has from it. Unless the Society can ensure that members collectively and each member individually get a reasonable harvest by keeping up with the plan, it will have difficulty in securing the repayment of the loan. This in turn will endanger the whole Society.

Agreement "B", which the member signs, makes clear that the allocation of land is for one year only, though renewable, and is by the Committee of the Society. The individual accepts that he will sign a loan agreement with the Society for the full cost of mechanical operations (however much this may eventually amount to); that he will sell through the Society all crops grown within the Scheme; and that if he fails to keep the agreement, or withdraws from the Scheme, he will pay all damages and costs arising from his actions. This last clause demonstrates a determination to be thoroughly hard-headed about the Scheme, and is indeed perhaps mainly intended to show to the individual the seriousness of his undertaking, since all major contingencies are in fact taken care of elsewhere within the web of agreements in which the member of the Farm is at least potentially entangled.

Management: the idea

Formal authority over the Scheme is vested in the District Agricultural and Co-operative Officers. They are charged with explaining the farming operations which they have planned for each approaching season discussing them with the General Meeting of the Society. They have to advise the Society on agricultural and co-operative principles; indeed this is only a manner of speaking since their "advice" is binding on the Committee. After this, the day-to-day running of the Farm, except for the mechanical side, belongs to the Committee of the Society.

For the mechanical operations of the Farm the Department of Agriculture undertakes to provide a Manager, while explicitly refusing any responsibility to the Society or its members for his, or any of its other employees', proper performance of their duty.

Case:

The Manager is thus given no general authority or responsibility for the running of the Farm, but his position is necessarily potentially strong and of wider significance since the mechanical cultivation is at the heart of the whole operation. Not only this, but the

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Manager in practice also represents the Agricultural Officer, and indeed the Co-operative Officer, who are rarely able to attend Farm Meetings or to have any great part in the detailed planning. The more Farms there are, the truer this is bound to become. Even if this were not so the Manager would still necessarily be the resident representative of the Government and thus clearly in a position of considerable authority.

That he is, as on most of the Group Farms throughout the country, a European undoubtedly is here an additional support for his authority, though it is at the same time a factor exacerbating the communication difficulties which are potential in this rather complex management situation. In practice it is the Manager who has to ensure that members are completing their farming operations successfully and to bring those who are not to the notice of the Committee. If additional labour is then needed, it is he who has access to this through contact with people who have previously been employed by the Department. He is also able to hire labour as the Society sometimes is not, as it is not trusted as a ready payer.

As regards the crops of the Farm, it is he who studies the possibilities of new crops; who secures the necessary seed; and who, if other crops besides cotton are to be sold through the Society, as the Agreement lays down, has to find a market for these. It is he who calls most Farm Meetings, and indeed when a real subject of complaint existed over a serious delay in the selling of the minor crops - it had been he rather than the Committee who had been keen to sell these collectively at all - it was he, with the support of Mr. C., who avoided the holding of meetings altogether.

These meetings are usually attended by half to three-quarters of the members. They are held irregularly, whenever there is something to discuss, but usually not more than twice a month at the most. The Manager uses them to explain plans to the members, to answer queries and objections from them, and to exhort them to greater labour. The members on their side bring up, besides strictly agricultural matters to do with the running of the Farm, the kinds of thing which are put to chiefs and all other visiting representatives of authority, namely the shortage of water, the need for schools and for medical aid, damage to crops by animals, trouble with thieves, and so on.

As far as the Committee is concerned, the first thing to note is that it is not in fact the Committee of the Society as such which is in this case relevant.^{1/} Since the first year there has been in effect a separate Committee for the Group Farm, sharing, however, a Chairman and Treasurer with the Society. It might be and sometimes is

^{1/} The exact arrangements in this respect vary among the Farms of Bunyoro.

termed a "sub-committee", and on occasion it and the Society Committee meet as one, but it is in fact separately elected by the Group Farmers only. Only one member of the Society Committee, besides the Chairman and Treasurer, is also a member of the Farm, and none of these three are actually resident there. In the first year the Farm Committee had three other members, one being Mr. C., the retired Co-operative Officer, not in fact a member of the Farm, and the other two his ex- and present foremen on his farm. In April of this year, at the beginning of the new season, a new committee was elected. Mr. C. was declared the Adviser to it, and he and the two others were replaced by people who had emerged as leaders of opinion on the Farm itself. The Hire Service Mechanic, who had also secured land as a Group Farmer, became the Secretary, an office the Farm Committee had not had before.^{1/}

But these developments have not led to any strong collective role for the Committee. Even if formally charged with running the Farm, in practice its competence for decision is highly restricted. It is so, first, by the role of the Farm Manager, and second, by the presence of Mr. C.; matters of policy and planning which might conceivably in very different circumstances be the prerogative of the Committee, seem inclined to be settled by the Manager and Mr. C. together, the latter then "advising" the Committee on the matter. Its main importance would seem to be in the allocation of land to new members, discussed below, and in ensuring that plots, particularly those of non-resident members, are maintained. A likely development, already beginning, would bring the Committee more into relation to the actual structure of Management - as against the theoretical structure - than it is at present. Previously the Committee has been autonomous as far as meetings were concerned, but the Manager has now begun to call meetings of a slightly expanded Committee to act as a channel for communication and information between himself and the Farmers.

The loan: the idea

By Agreement "A" the Society agrees to pay the Department of Agriculture for each tractor operation more or less as it is undertaken. This sum becomes, in a series of purely paper transactions, first a loan to the Society from the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank, and secondly a loan from the Society to each individual member of the Farm, divided according to the amount of each person's land on which the particular operation has been carried out. This may of course be actually or notionally the same for each member.

^{1/} There is also a further sub-committee appointed to look into the status of the Farm Committee in relation to the Society. This has never met.

This principle, of the Society first spending the money and then converting it into a loan to the members, so that the members neither handle the money nor have any initiative in its use, runs throughout operations connected with the Group Farm. It extends even to the provision of extra labour for farmers who request it or for whom the Committee considers it necessary, as for example for picking or sorting cotton. This is not actually provided for in the rules but is the necessary consequence of making it essential to the Society that no individual member should fail. All these loans come under the normal rules of the Credit Scheme, except necessarily, though this is not explicitly stated, where these are incompatible with the way in which Group Farming loans are created. They are to be recovered at the next harvest out of the proceeds which the Society obtains from the sale of the particular member's crops.

Thus credit, on the Co-operative Department side, together with mechanical cultivation on the agricultural side, are the twin elements around which the whole Scheme is arranged. In fact, far more than being a scheme for Group farming, it is a scheme for the extension of credit-based farming with mechanical aid, so designed as to eliminate the possibility of the improper use of the credit by the recipient, and to minimize the risk that it will not be repaid. It also of course minimizes the educational value of loans on which some stress is laid in the Credit Scheme itself, and does not allow for the development of any initiative in their use. In this as in other respects the Scheme tends to be highly cautious and conservative, and to be as nearly as possible independent of, and hence unconcerned with, the people who are working it. It is therefore not an accident that my account so far has, for a social report, been rather short of people.

The members: the idea

It is indicative of ~~the same approach~~ that no criteria for membership are registered explicitly in Agreement "A". Nevertheless there are criteria to be gleaned, particularly from the Society's by-laws relating to loans. As these criteria are often invoked in answer to the question: who are the members?, to bring them forward here is not merely a logical exercise.

It is nowhere explicitly stated but it is assumed throughout that to be a member of the Farm a person must be a member of the parent Society, and there are criteria laid down in the by-laws of the Society for this. The member must be a person who is "ordinarily resident within or farms land within the Society's (defined) area of operation"; he must be over 18 years of age; and he must be "a good farmer of good character". In addition he must not be a member of any other Society. To be eligible for a loan, three years must have passed since his election. The meaning and purpose of this limitation are seen in the clause

which follows it, though this is necessarily waived in the case of a Group Farmer. It limits the amount of loan which is to be granted to two thirds of the total annual value of produce which the member has delivered to the Society in the three previous years (or to ten times the value of the members's shares in the Society, whichever is the less). Although this cannot apply directly, the idea behind it nevertheless remains and is often cited, namely that members of the Scheme are to be drawn from among those members of the Society who have been marketing their crops successfully through it for the three years before they enter the Scheme. There is a second and minor implication that the member of the Society is bound to be at least 21 years of age before he is eligible as a Group Farmer. I have no evidence that this is not a purely accidental implication; at least it has no relevance in practice. There are no other criteria.

The Scheme is thus not much concerned with who become its members; there is even little need to worry about securing people who are likely to repay loans. But on the basis of the preceding paragraph, what intentions there are can be summarized by saying that a Group Farm is intended for established local farmers. It would indeed be surprising if there were not some intentions, since the Scheme is certainly not completely without social and educational aspirations. I refer to some of these in the final section of this paper.

Case

It is useful to divide those who have in fact got into Ekyotakaliire Farm for analysis according to their year of entry. The 1963 and 1964 intakes are the most important and these I contrast below.

The 1963 group were, as might be expected from the circumstances of their recruitment, practically all local people living within a five mile radius of the present Farm Centre. They were members of Ekyotakaliire Society, and indeed more than half were eligible for membership of the Farm even under a three year rule. About half had obtained normal Credit Scheme loans in 1963, these ranging from Shs.100/- to Shs.240/- They included about 1/3 of Society members receiving these loans, though they were only about 1/10 of the total membership.

Their age seems on average high for joining such a Scheme; the median and modal values fall in the 45-9 year bracket, and about 65% were over 45 years of age. Over half of them had never been at school, which is very near the normal rate for Bunyoro shown by the 1959 Census, and none had more than 6 years of schooling. About 1/3 claim no religious affiliation, and this again is normal for Bunyoro.

The mean number of their present wives is less than one.

In general it is clear that the 1963 group was composed predominantly of local farmers including, from the number who received loans, a fairly high proportion of the more active. The only 'notable' among them was a local headmaster who is also the Treasurer of the Society.

The 1964 intake, who were 37 in number, are in considerable contrast. Over half were not local people at all and only 3 were eligible for membership under a three year rule; most in fact joined the Society on or immediately before being allocated a plot.

In age they show a very wide range, from 17 years - infringing even the rules for Society membership - to about 70 years, but with a much lower average than their predecessors: median and mode in the 30-4 bracket, and 70% under 45 years.

They were also better educated: only one in four was never at school and this is less than those who reached Junior Secondary standard or better (at least 7 school years). Only three do not claim some religious affiliation, and by far the largest number of those who do (70%) are, as with the 1963 intake, Protestants. The predominance is far greater than is shown for Bunyoro as a whole by the 1959 Census, but whether it is to be connected with DP opposition to the Scheme and UPC support is, in the absence of other evidence, impossible to say.

They have also on average appreciably more wives than their predecessors (mean:1.4), in spite of the presence of a number of very young men.

About 1/3 of them are in regular employment, and a number of others have recently retired. There is a senior official of the Co-operative Union, a Local Government officer, and an official of E.A.R. & H., two teachers, two mechanics, a junior assistant in the Agricultural Department, and a mutongole chief. There is also a self-employed driver and a boy still at school.

A feature of the Farm connected with the 1964 influx of these 'notables' was the effective allocation in some cases of more than one plot to a single person. In a few cases plots were allocated to names, the owners of the names being completely unknown to the Society or the Committee. It was obvious to all concerned that multiple holding was infringing some principle, since a separate name was attached to each plot. Thus one man secured four plots, registering one for himself, one each for two of his wives, and a fourth for a son in employment. Three other people obtained two plots each: one registered them for himself and a son, also in 1/ though I have found no definite rule on the subject.

employment; one for himself and a servant of his; and the third for two of his sons, one in employment and one at school. The people concerned were the Union official, the Local Government officer, an Agricultural Assistant, and a retired sub-county chief. These notables were able to register names of people whom the Committee, in some cases, had never seen, and in one case, even without revealing that a relationship existed at all between himself and the person named, his son.

The character of the 1964 intake has two aspects, the fewness of the local people, and the prevalence of outsiders. The first of these can be attributed, though they are of course obverse and reverse of the same coin, to the considerable degree of local distrust there was of the Farm, referred to above; and the second to its close connection with Mr. C., one of the leading public men of Bunyoro, through whose wide contacts a number of the notables were induced to join. A more or less superficial acquaintance with the other Farms of Bunyoro suggests that, although there is something of the same variety of members to be found elsewhere, there is a higher proportion of local farmers.

But the character of Ekyotakaliire, once given, seems likely to stick. Of 12 new allocations which have been made in 1965, only one was to a local person, and he a carpenter rather than, previously, a farmer. Eight allocations were to close relations or friends of established members, in three cases of Committee members. Four of the intake are in full-time employment, there being County and Sub-county chiefs, another officer of E.A.R. & H. and an Agricultural Department driver. In addition one other had just given up being the senior clerk at a Uganda Hotel.

If the Scheme is intended for local farmers, how is it that so many people who are neither local nor farmers get into it? In the first place it must be remembered that there is no distinction here between farming and gardening, and that there are few people in Bunyoro who do not undertake this activity, whatever you may call it, at all. Almost everybody is, has been, or expects to become to some extent at least, a farmer. Farming is not one job amongst others, but the basic way of life on which the fortunate may for a time superimpose jobs. If it is intended that Group Farming should be a full-time activity incompatible with other employment, this is not something which is immediately self-evident in Bunyoro or, I should guess, elsewhere in Uganda. It is rather something which must be learnt, either from being consciously taught or, over time, from experience. In the absence of specific instructions therefore, it is not seen as obviously wrong to allocate land to an employed man.

Neither is there any procedure for allocation laid down, nor explicit criteria for choosing members provided. The Committee allocates and it may or may not bring the General Meeting of Farmers into the process. On one recent occasion the Committee seems to have decided privately; on another it presented names to the General Meeting, but only as many as there were vacancies; and on a third it seems to have offered the Meeting more names than vacancies, so that the Meeting had a real choice. There are now always more people wanting land than vacancies available. In general, being the candidate of an influential member of the Farm, still more of the Committee, seems the most important factor.

In the absence of explicit criteria for choosing, it is difficult to see how this could be otherwise; and it might well happen in any case. Implicit criteria are, as I have shown, ignored. It is said that the Committee require a candidate to be able to, and to agree to, put a house on his plot and keep someone there to look after the land if he is not himself intending to come. In some cases the Committee have indeed done this, in spite of the fact that the Treasurer and one of the members are themselves offenders against this rule. In one recent case however, a man living at a distance heard that he had been allocated land through a friend on the Committee even before he had decided, as he has still not yet done, whether he could find anybody to look after the land and indeed whether he even wanted it.

Settlement: case

As we have seen, it was both assumed and desired that Group Farmers should be resident on the Farm. I give below figures for those Group Farmers participating in cotton growing for the present 1965/6 season^{1/}. In relation to the period before picking began, I divide the Farmers into those who were fully resident, those who were resident for a part of the time, and those who were not then resident at all. These are not of course categories with rigid boundaries. The third I then divide again into those who had a resident representative in charge of their plot, those who had a representative who was resident part of the time, and those who had no resident representative at all. At any one time over the last three months of the year about half of the Registered Holders have actually been sleeping on the Farm. The exact figure has been tending to rise, as has the total of residents, as the cotton and other harvests have approached.

^{1/} Planting took place from the end of May and picking the end of November.

Table:

Holder resident	22	39%	}	59%
Representative resident	11	20%		
Holder part-resident	12	21%	}	30%
Representative part-resident	5	9%		
No resident	6	11%		11%
<hr/>				
Plots	56	100%		100%

Total where Holder not resident: 22 (39%)

14 (63%) of these non-resident holders are people in full-time employment. This contrasts with about 30% of the Farmers as a whole employed. But the interesting fact is that all six cases with no resident concern local people. This is not of course surprising, since such a person is much more likely to be in a position to look after his land himself without being resident than is somebody from outside the immediate area. Putting the fact the other way round, all non-local people are either at least resident some of the time or have a representative. Thus, if it is desired to have somebody resident, without worrying much about whether that person is the one in whose name the plot is registered, then non-local people are quite as desirable as locals. But in fact the matter is not quite as simple as this, since the various representatives have varying degrees of control. These range from virtually complete autonomy to simply checking on the work of labourers to whom the holder himself has given instructions. Thus some can, but some cannot, be regarded as adequate substitutes for the Holder.

About $\frac{2}{3}$ of the representatives are women, being sisters or wives, "mothers" or father's sisters. This has no direct bearing on their adequacy as substitutes.

Of those holders and representatives who were at least partly resident, between half and $\frac{2}{3}$ of the men are continuing to maintain another home elsewhere; the position of the women is more complicated and I omit them here. These people at least have clearly not committed themselves wholly to the Farm.

Another indicator of the same situation is worth considering. This is the building of houses, so obvious an indicator that it is often asked about. It is, however, frequently answered misleadingly, being a rather less simple matter than it looks at first sight. By the beginning of cotton picking this year, four out of every five plots had a "house". But "houses" are not just for living in, or necessarily primarily so; cotton and other crops,

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once picked, have to be stored. With this in mind it is indeed remarkable that one in five still had no building on their plot.

It is necessary also to look at the type of house which has been built. Nyoro have fairly fixed notions about what constitutes a proper house, the main feature being a roof with at least four surfaces, so that the end walls are not exposed up to the crest of the roof. Where there is not this kind of roof the house will be called a "store"; if it is used to live in, there will be some implication of impermanence. In addition, today most people will not regard a house as permanent unless it is roofed with corrugated iron.

By these standards only five of the plots, one in nine of those with buildings at all, had, in mid-November proper, permanent houses. These five all belong to notables, the Local Government Officer, a Co-operative Union official, a teacher, an Agricultural Assistant, and the retired sub-county chief. Slightly more people have roofs of the proper form, but thatched. But by far the largest number of houses, about $\frac{3}{4}$, are of the "store" type, $\frac{2}{3}$ of these with iron roofing. In addition, only half the houses yet had their original grass walls replaced with the usual permanent material, mud, although the wet season, the only time when the mud can fairly easily be prepared on the Farm with its scarcity of water, was by then over.

The "store" type of house is cheaper, quicker and easier to build; and simpler to dismantle. Many were certainly constructed in a hurry when the need for a cotton store was realized in the first season. They have nevertheless been allowed to remain. This reflects either an underlying doubt about the permanency of the Farm, or the realized possibility of building much better houses later, either when the Government provides help for this, or when the individual himself has more money available. But the former possibility seems the more important; under a third of the Farmers included building or improvements to houses on the Farm among their immediate or more distant plans. A few indeed who were intending to apply Farm profits for such purposes were thinking rather of their homes elsewhere. Only one in six mentioned as desirable the possibility of Government help for housing, though this had been discussed more than once at Farm Meetings. Building and improvements seem likely to proceed, but slowly.

There is obviously no rush to settle on the Farm, but then there is no basic reason why there should be. The people of the immediate area and of Bunyoro as a whole suffer no land shortage. On the other hand land once cleared and cultivated is not to be lightly abandoned, since the virgin or thoroughly regenerated bush of these parts is thick and troublesome to clear. This does mean though, that there is a demand for cleared land, as on the Group Farm, if it is offered. There is also of course the cost in money and in labour of setting up a new home, and this is unlikely to be lightly incurred.

There are however, also more specific reasons (a) for not leaving a previous home, and (b) for not transferring oneself irrevocably to the Farm. In the first place, though, it is worth noting that there are no fundamental ideological ties between a person and his home; Nyoro do not have any kinship-based residential groupings, nor do they have any firm ritual connexion to their home site. But what people do have very frequently are banana plantations, sometimes coffee trees, and often a few fruit trees, usually oranges and mangoes. Well over half the Farmers do in fact have banana plantations, and a third of them have coffee. In a few cases the fruit trees are so numerous as to be of comparable importance to the other two crops. These are all crops which take several years to mature, and though established plantations are saleable, as in law the land itself is not, there has simply not yet been time to develop these on the Farm. Bananas particularly are important, for eating - they are valued as a staple food second only to millet - and for brewing. This year a few people have begun tentative experiments with them on the Farm, but there is no great confidence that they will in any case grow well there. The area in general is marginal for bananas.

Reasons for not committing oneself completely to the Farm are two. In the first place there is no confidence in the Scheme's permanency. For one thing the Government is felt to be somewhat inscrutable as far as its intentions are concerned; and for another many people know that the land has been obtained on a 5-year lease, and are worried about what will happen at the end of this period. But the more radical impermanency does not seem yet to have been realized. Five people have now had their membership of the Group Farm ended, but in no case has this been simply for inefficiency, and it does not seem to have threatened other members or to have brought home to them that their membership depends on annual renewal by the Committee. If expulsions or threats were much more common, then they might have a more radical effect on felt security and the willingness to invest in settlement. This would bring out a potential conflict which exists within the design of the Scheme.

The second factor is only at present, as far as I have been able to observe, potential. There is no provision in the Scheme for illness or for old age. This has not been felt because there has so far been no need, unless the individual has so desired, to abandon previous homes and interests; and because no very obvious cases have yet occurred to bring the situation to people's attention. By their own account, two members who left last year were forced to do so by illness, but others view their situation differently; it is either said that they simply lost interest when they saw how much work was required, or their going is viewed in terms of their having been dangerous sorcerers whose removal was necessary for

their neighbours's safety. This is thus not yet an issue, but it does deserve some thought for the future. A sensible immediate move though, and not only in this connexion, would be to impose an upper age limit for joining the Group Farm Scheme: three members of Ekyotakaliire are already over 60.

Settlement on the Farm is progressing; as long as it maintains its present promise in regard to income, the people will come in time. They can be encouraged, but an attempt to force the pace might be dangerous. After all, the Scheme does not want to rid itself of its more prudent members.

Conclusion

The Group Farm Scheme as a whole and Ekyotakaliire in particular have been seen in this paper as remarkably conservative and far from radical. At Ekyotakaliire it is in process of creating a new Nyoro village out of a cross-section of the Bunyoro population. Even the older immigrants are not neglected in its representativeness; among the mainly Nyoro¹ members are two "Nubi" of Alur origin and a Lango. This new village will, as things are at present arranged, lack any distinctive features except in so far as the plan of mechanical cultivation demands a special layout and the curtailment of various freedoms anybody not a Group Farmer would have.

¹/ This includes Kuli, Gungu and (Palmo) (Chope).

In conclusion I consider briefly what it does for, or to, the Farmer in return.

There is little doubt that the Farm will raise his income and provide the possibility of acquiring a small amount of capital. Some individuals will indeed acquire capital in this way and will use it for development. At Ekyotakaliire, a part of last year's profits were used by about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Farmers, according to their own claims, to cultivate more crops off the Farm, and about the same proportion are planning to use this year's profits in the same way. A few have more ambitious plans; digging a fish dam is one example from Ekyotakaliire. But it must be noted that individual development can only take place off the Farm; within it the pattern is fairly firmly set and basically egalitarian. Such projects are in any case not at all common among the Farmers. Indeed they cannot be expected to be since, as has been shown, there has been no attempt to get any particular kind of person into the Scheme, let alone people who are likely to have further ambitions.

There is then the parallel possibility of the Farm widening its members' experience and introducing them to a larger scale of farming than they have hitherto been used to, though this rather assumes that it is the ordinary local farmers who come onto the Farm. What has in practice happened however, was summed up to me by Mr. C. when he remarked that the Farm was now nearly two years old, but all the people had so far learnt was that tractor cultivation was superior to cultivation by hand. He might have added that even this is not a highly novel lesson; the Tractor Hire Service has operated in Bunyoro since 1953 with only one year's interruption. The Farmers ought, he thought, to have learnt more than that. He proposed to remedy this by appointing someone to encourage and to teach: agriculture, hygiene, even general knowledge. But the basic fact is that, as has been seen, the Scheme is designed neither for teaching nor for learning. In relation to loans I noted the retreat from Credit Scheme educational ideas, and the plan of cultivation takes the organization of farming out of the individual's hands. Nor has there been any effort to affect the agriculture practised in the private food-crop area, or in any positive way to further group working.

Finally from the point of view of the population as a whole, what is the Scheme's significance? I can consider this in one limited and simple aspect only. I take Bunyoro as the example, but I have little doubt that the same situation is general. There are now some 300 Group members in Bunyoro, and some 33,000 tax-payers in its four northern counties. Thus at present the Group Farm members are less than 1% of tax-payers. It is thought that the District is not likely in future to acquire more than one new Farm a year. With increases in established Farms this might amount to 200 new Group Farmers per year, which is certainly less than the present rate of population increase. The Scheme is not therefore going to have any direct effect on a significant proportion of the population. Indeed it might even be argued that the more successful the Group Farms become, the more there is a danger of creating a small class of relatively wealthy farmers who have not even the virtue, in the main, of having acquired their wealth through their own effort and initiative.

These concluding paragraphs show that there is needed, first, some serious thought about just what kind of indirect effects are to be secured by means of the Scheme, and then a realistic assessment through detailed policy-directed research of the possibilities of securing these effects, and of the adjustments required to do so.

At present the Scheme appears to be suffering fairly widely from difficulties centred round the role of the Manager, briefly analysed here, and the problems of communication in management. These can undoubtedly be resolved, but unless the Scheme can become more ambitious, and at the same time thoroughly realistically so, than it is suggested in this paper that it is at present, it must remain doubtful, even without economic analysis, whether the best use is being made of the considerable resources the Scheme absorbs.

SYMPOSIUM ON TANZANIA ELECTION
 E.A.I.S.R. CONFERENCE
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TANZANIA ELECTION : ITS RESULTS & THEIR SIGNIFICANCE (1)

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There are several questions which could be asked about any election. The one everyone asks is, "What was the result - who won?". The more perceptive might also want to know why the result went the way it did. In recent years, Political Scientists have taken the questioning one stage further and have asked why people vote the way they do. Some of the answers they came up with showed that the voting decision was not always the rational, considered choice between two alternative sets of policies and leaders the democratic theorists had assumed. This in turn led one to a further set of questions - "What does an election actually achieve?. How does this contrast with the voters' view of what they are doing?" This paper attempts to pose some of these questions in the context of the September, 1965 elections in Tanzania.(2)

The aim will be to see what is involved in trying to formulate answers rather than to state definite conclusions, at this stage - a task which has to be approached diffidently given the unique character of the Tanzanian system.

Tanzania's One-Party System.

In previous elections in East Africa the answer to the question who won, could be put simply in one word - "TANU," "U.P.C." or "KANU" - the name of the party concerned. And to those of us familiar with elections between competing parties within a parliamentary system, such an answer would imply a great deal. It would imply that a certain leader was now Head of the Government, and that a certain set of individuals now formed the Government. It would convey that certain types of policies were likely to be pursued. Or to put it the other way round, the election's function would have been to provide an opportunity for the people to have a say in choosing the decision - making leadership and to decide in very general terms the kinds of policies to be pursued. But what can we say about the results of Tanzania's election, which was not one conducted between competing parties within a parliamentary system?

In order to answer this question, it will be necessary first of all to see what changes have been effected in Tanzania's political system by the enactment of a new interim Constitution in May, 1965 which(3) provided for elections within the framework of a single party system. The last elections in Tanzania in 1960 had been conducted along the true Westminster pattern with parties selecting official candidates to contest for Parliamentary seats. The candidates were from TANU and the remnants of two groups - the United Tanganyika Party and the African National Congress - plus a few independents. But in so far as there was a contest, in the minds of many it was a fight between the nationalist forces (TANU) and its opponent - the Colonial Administration. The result was that of the 81 M.P.s who represented Tanganyika at the beginning of 1965, only 12 had actually fought an election. The rest had been returned unopposed, and even those who had faced a contest had succeeded as TANU representatives. In addition, the members of Parliament, all of them members of TANU, behaved as they were expected

to behave under the Westminster system; they formed a TANU Parliamentary Party (T.P.P), imposed "whips" on members, and decided the "Party line" before debates. In other words they behaved as though there was an opposition.

President Nyerere was aware of these problems. "Because we have been operating in the context of a multi-party system the people have no choice as to which (TANU) candidate. Most candidates, he said, in effect, are elected by a Party Committee. He also complained that, "if we can encourage this freedom of expression at National Executive meetings (of TANU), why do we discourage it in Parliament?". The Democratic One-Party State proposals were designed to remedy these shortcomings of the earlier system. The question of whether these aims were realised we will return to. These proposals contained recommendations for the unique system of election. As this system has been outlined in another paper presented as part of this symposium, I will merely dwell on one or two of the contrasts with earlier elections.

Firstly, we should note that these were the first real elections in the sense of having most of the seats contested, as well as the fact that this was the first time most people had had a chance to vote in a Parliamentary election. Secondly, it was not an election between organised groups or parties, but between individuals. Some ethnocentric commentators could not rid themselves of the habit of interpreting the results for or against the Government or ruling party, but any such attempts at generalisation should be viewed very cautiously. Further, because this was the first, real, contested election, one can only draw the conclusion from the fact that few incumbents were returned that they were unrepresentative. - which is merely a tautology. To be sure the candidates were not merely judged as individuals, most of them were representative of some group or interest in the eyes of the voter. But certainly there is no evidence to support any contention that any candidates were representative of a party, or opposed to a party or faction, or any national grouping. A candidate might, however, be regarded as representative of a certain clan, or of local people as opposed to outsiders, of a religious group, of a certain family or interest group. Or, as we have seen from the case-studies presented in this symposium, local factors such as the desire for some service, such as a road or school, or attitudes towards local officials may have decided some contests. Alternatively the education, personal record behaviour or style of the candidate might have been the decisive factor. Certainly, the case-studies examined show the completely different character of the elections in different constituencies.

One must also remember that there were two distinct parts of this election as well as the actual voting, there was a fairly rigorous selection process by the party. This second aspect also deserves careful study as it was very significant, weeding the field down in some cases from 20 to two.

In assessing the elections one is therefore faced with the problem of summarising 101 separate elections in which local factors were all important, and where character and record of the candidates and the local factors with which they were identified were different in every case. To the question, "What was the result?", the answer is 101 separate names; and to the second one, "Why was the result so?", the answer is 101 times the numerous factors which might have influenced any one particular case. It is for this reason that the title refers to the "results of the election".

What one can try to do, however, is to try to make general propositions from a study of the individual cases about the kinds of candidates tended to be selected and then to win and about the factors and issues were in the minds of the party and the voters when they made their choices.

The Candidates. The questions that come to mind about the candidates how far did personal characteristics affect voting and selection as compared with the candidate's record, or local issues or factors? And, in so far as personal characteristics mattered at all, what weight was given to such things as sex, age, traditional or socio-economic/education political style and so on? Until the results of a computer analysis of the biographies of the 713 candidates is complete, we can at this stage hazard some impressionistic guesses about such questions.

It was probably true that sex was a barrier if a candidate was a woman, although one that could be overcome by a good woman candidate, as witness the fact that of 8 women selected, 4 of them won. Some have suggested that it was the prejudice in a Moslem, Coastal area against her sex, which helps explain the defeat of the national woman's leader, Bibi Titi Mohamed, but if this is true, there is a paradox with the case of Lindi East constituency, also on the coast, where a woman not anything like so experienced, who was a Christian and from another district beat her male opponent. As far as Tanu selection was concerned, there was no indication of sex being an influence, as one would expect, given the important role women have always played in party affairs. In fact most of the women nominated were selected as final candidates.

One might expect that older men would be at an advantage given the tradition of respect for age common to most East African societies, but provisional figures show in only 34 and of the 101 contests did the older man win. This probably means not that age is no longer respected, but that youth usually implies better education - obviously an important criterion in choosing some-one to represent you, as the following table shows :-

<u>CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH:-</u>		<u>CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH</u>	
Older candidate won	34	Less educated candidate won	19
Younger " "	64	Better educated " "	53
Candidates were of same age	1	Candidates had roughly same education	22
No information	2	No information	7

In fact of the 34 older candidates who won 20 had the same or better education than their opponents.

Traditional status was probably a mixed blessing. We have seen from the case-studies how traditional leaders were ousted at the primary stage in Kilimanjaro and Buhaya, the same also occurred in Sukumaland. This was largely a hang-over from colonial days, when most chiefs were associated, in TANU eyes, with the colonial regime. But this antipathy is not general for in several areas, e.g. Biharamulo, Kilosa, Muheza, Mbulu South, members of chiefly families had also identified with TANU in the past, and in each of these cases they were returned. In other areas such as Dodoma, Iringa, Mbozi and Tabora, prevailing attitudes favoured those candidates who could be identified with the ex-chiefs. In other cases, even though members of former ruling families survived the TANU selection process, they were defeated. For instance, in Ufipa, the royal family had in the past been identified with TANU but their representatives were beaten by commoners who in the past have been somewhat anti-TANU. Indeed the winning candidate in Ujipa North, had opposed the official TANU candidate in 1960. (8)

As the details about incomes are not available, and as there is little evidence as to how Tanzanians rank people socially, it is hard to say anything precise about significance of socio-economic status, job, wealth etc. Most observers seem to share the impression that mere wealth was not in itself important, although someone, perhaps while in government, who had obviously done well for himself at the expense of others, or without sharing his good fortune did tend to suffer. (The case, mentioned by Goran Hyden in Kianja-Bukara, where the winning candidate had used his wealth for good works, is a good example of the converse of this). There was limited opportunity too, for the use of money in private campaigns, as these were restricted. That some money did pass, here and there, is widely agreed, but there is the same agreement that it did not significantly alter any result.

The personal record of the candidate - both in politics and more generally - was certainly an important element in many constituencies. Naturally, a candidate's political record was key in the TANU selection. Some popular candidates who had an anti-TANU record were weeded out, especially by the National Executive. TANU was obviously not going to tolerate the old sweets; incumbents who had not had good records as M.P.'s were in several instances not selected by the party - these included three Junior Ministers. A good party record was still not the only criteria for the party's ranking, for there are several instances where candidates, acceptable by virtue of their education or some other quality, were preferred to party stalwarts even at the TANU District Conference. A good party record was, understandably, not valued so highly by the general public, although the non-African candidates all seemed to feel that their records of support for TANU in the past were important factors in their success. The voters were very much concerned about the records of incumbents, and where there was a former member standing questions about what he had done for the area, and whether he had kept in touch with the people were crucial issues. The fates of the former elected and nominated members are shown in the table below:- (a)

	Ministers	Junior Ministers	M.P.'s	Total
Did not stand	-	1	20	21
Ex-Officiomembers (Regional Commissioners) -	-	-	10	10
Not selected	-	3	9	12
Lost	2	6	9	17
Won	8	3	4	15
Unopposed	5	1	4	6
Totals	15	14	52	81

Some Ministers especially tried to stand in part on the overall record of the Government of which they had been members. But at one campaign meeting in Arusha when the former Planning Minister argued that if people were going to vote for President Nyerere, they should also vote for him as a member of the same team, he was declared out of order by the Regional Chairman of TANU who chaired the meeting. There is evidence that some Ministers might have suffered by catching the blame for Government -- often the expression of a local grievance rather than considered criticism of Government policy. This was the case in Mwansa East, where former Finance Minister, Paul Bomani, was in a sense the scapegoat for resentments, especially against the fall in the price farmers were getting for their cotton.

Those Members, even if they had been Ministers or Junior Ministers, who had not "mended their fences", certainly suffered. And perhaps in some measure the results of former Members represent a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the old Parliament -- hardly surprising as it was

fairly ineffectual as a body through which local demands could be channelled. The records of new candidates were also weighed in the balance -- particularly as regards the contribution they had made and their performance in various public bodies, such as cooperatives or local government. Cases where co-operative officials had been associated with bad times -- a fall in price, or some inefficiency were remembered. In some areas, especially where local government institutions are more developed, such as Bukoba and Kilimanjaro, many candidates had been members of District Councils. Candidates' records in such bodies as missions, the Tanganyika African Parents' Association (which runs self-help schools), trade unions were also taken into account.

Factors & Issues Affecting the Voting Decision

In addition to the personal characteristics and record of the candidates themselves many other considerations swayed the voters. K.W.J. Post in his work on the Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959(10) uses the concept of the "voting decision".

The "voting decision" in Tanzania was based on countless things with which different candidates were identified. Those elements which arose spontaneously and inevitably from the nature of the constituency, and attitudes within it, we have called "factors" -- in contradistinction to the "issues", those elements which the candidates themselves introduced into the campaign.

One general factor which was everywhere important was the candidate's local standing. All the evidence bears out that what Post said in respect of Nigeria, that "the character and local standing of the candidate mattered far more than in the United Kingdom"(11) was certainly true of Tanganyika. This "local standing" was compounded of many different elements. One of which is the personal record which we have just discussed; although it was not just a question of what a candidate had done but how well he was known locally. This often meant it was essential to have local roots of some kind. These roots might be ethnic, coming from the same tribe, clan, chiefdom and so on. Alternatively, there were resentments against the "person from the city" -- a candidate who had become identified with Dar es Salaam, even though ethnically or by birth he might have had some ties with the constituency. This preference for the "local boy" over the "city gent" was probably significant in Bagamoyo, Songea North, Rufiji -- and also in Mafie, where an Asian candidate was regarded as the "local boy" so defeated Abdul Faraji, a prominent, former M.P. who lives, works and had grown up in the capital. So strong was the desire for a local representative in some areas that it was almost unthinkable for a candidate to stand outside his own division (which coincide usually with the old chiefdoms). Thus in Bukoba all of the candidates came from the constituency for which they were standing. The situation was similar in Kilimanjaro, and in the Vunjo constituency the association of the woman candidate with her husband's home division next door was probably a decisive blow. In other areas this tendency was not so marked, the extent of this parochialism seemingly depending on how cohesive, inward-looking and hierarchical the particular society is.

Much of this local feeling is obviously based on attitudes that spring from ethnic considerations, although it is hard to disassociate this from purely geographical loyalties. In the Arusha Rural constituency, for example, where there are two tribal groups, the Waarusha and Wameru, with one candidate from each, most said they would vote for their tribe's candidate, but many when asked why, replied, "because we know him, and don't know the other man."(12) Can such an attitude be called "tribalism"?

The various constituencies fall into two main categories in their ethnic composition. Most of the constituencies were fairly homogeneous with one dominant tribe, or at least one group in a majority. In almost

half the total number of constituencies the situation was one where both candidates belonged to the main tribal group. In about 30 cases only one of the contestants was from the major indigenous group. In the other set of constituencies, there was more than one distinct ethnic society, and in many of these cases the candidates each came from different ethnic backgrounds. We can then look at the ethnic factor as it related to three main categories.

1. Constituencies in which both candidates belonged to one main indigenous group. ---- e.g. All the Bukoba and Kilimanjaro constituencies. There the ethnic factor does not operate, and other considerations are decisive.
2. Constituencies in which one of the candidates does not belong to any indigenous group. ---- e.g. Dodoma North, where only one candidate was Mgogo, or Kondoa South where a Junior Minister an Ngoni from the South was heavily defeated by an opponent from one of the local tribes. In a handful (literally) of cases the non-indigenous candidate beat his local opponent -- two of these were where Asians beat local Africans. Again it was among the more segmented, egalitarian societies that non-indigenous people stood.
3. Constituencies where candidates represented different ethnic groups both present in the area. ---- e.g. the North Mara constituencies, and also Arusha Rural (the breakdown of results in this constituency shows that roughly 90% of the Waarusha and Wameru voted for their tribal candidate). Similar evidence is not available for most of the other 20 odd constituencies in this category. By and large, the impression is that the candidate from the bigger group won in most cases.

In addition there are a few constituencies which don't fall easily in any of these categories -- Mafia, and Mbeya where neither candidate was indigenous, and the urban constituencies whose populations are very mixed.

It seems then that any successful candidate must have a local base, usually but not without exception, this meaning his ethnic origins should be in the constituency concerned. This poses problems for the politician who for some reason has no such base, yet might be an important figure nationally. Nsilo Swai, a Minister, only won narrowly in Arusha town, where he had stood -- a ministerial colleague standing in his home area in Kilimanjaro. In every electoral system, efforts are made to ensure the return of certain key political leaders. A special problem occurs under the Tanzania system for those leaders without a local base, and in this category are four Ministers whose ethnic origins are in Malawi. In the event, all four of these were returned unopposed. That voting should still take/into account tribal loyalties is not surprising. It is the handful of exceptions that sets Tanzania apart from other African countries.

Religion is a potentially divisive factor in Tanzania -- a fact about which TANU has always been very anxious. Exploiting religious differences, along with racial or tribal divisions, was therefore made illegal. Perhaps the only place where it was in any sense overt was in the Arusha Urban contest between a Catholic and a Moslem "Swahili"(14). There, the candidates were warned about bringing religion into the campaign. In the West of the country, it seems to have affected a number of results; in Kibondo, Uripa and in Buhaya, Catholic candidates were returned against non-Catholic opponents. TANU tends to be identified with Islam in some of these areas. It is difficult to assess the precise significance of religion even in these cases, as Christianity often implies a good education, and it might be the latter which people vote for rather than a faith. In most parts of the country, however, especially the South, religion seems to have played no part -- candidates being returned for areas which were predominantly of

A number of economic issues influenced particular results. A reduction in the price being paid to farmers for their crop weighed against a number of candidates in the cotton-growing areas around Lake Victoria, most notably in the case of Paul Bomani, the present Minister of Finance, but also in Kwimba and Maswa. Other prices and the poor record of local co-operatives were factors in a number of places including Mbozi and Rungwe; while in Handeni the development brought to a poor district by a newly-formed co-operative was a boost to the Secretary who was standing. In Ihangiro (Bukoba), it has been shown how the former Junior Minister for Agriculture was held responsible for an unpopular policy of uprooting old coffee trees. The demand for, or resentment at not having, local services was also an important element. Basil Mramba has shown how the provision of a road was the most important single factor in Kilimanjaro Rombo. In Handeni, the closing of a secondary school told against the losing candidate, the former Junior Minister for Education.

In some of these cases an element of 'status consciousness' on the part of the community is discernible. At an earlier EAISR Conference, Bonow discussed 'status reversal' among the Masai. It seems that there was a general feeling that the incumbent (who was heavily defeated) had nothing to restore the Masai to their former position of influence(15). Equally in Rungwe, there was a general tendency to blame the deterioration in the formerly advanced district on the defeated Minister and former M.P. In Pare, the election turned on the feeling of the South of the area that they had been neglected, and that they should remedy this by replacing the M.P. with a man from the South.

The symbols(16) given to the candidates were also a factor - and also an issue, in the sense that sometimes skilful manipulation was necessary to bring out their latent importance. Although in a few cases an enterprising candidate was able to use the "house" to advantage, by and large there seems to have been an advantage attaching to the 'hoe' symbol, especially where there were no other important issues which could fire the interest of voters. Mostly, the hoe was associated with work and making a living. In Singida it was also regarded as "Nyerere's symbol", because people remembered a poster depicting him wielding a hoe(17). In fact, out of the 101 contested elections, 62 of the winners had the hoe(18). If we take the north-central areas of the country, i.e. Mwanza, Shinyanga, Tabora and Singida Regions, only 3 "nyumbas" won out of 31 constituencies.

The campaigns themselves, and the way they were waged, were one of the decisive issues. Perhaps 40%(19) of the electorate attended one campaign meeting, and many others would have heard them discussed. This would give people a real opportunity to assess both candidates together. The characteristics of political style that would impress would be the ability to relate to an audience of ordinary, simple people - without being "proud" (the favourite word in this context) - both by one's tone and by talking in terms which would be meaningful in terms of their own experience. Humour and sincerity would also be important.

Although by the letter of the law the campaigns were restricted to the official public meetings, other activity that went on below the surface was often crucial. Some candidates, like in Bukoba, had their own "machines", and many recognized the importance of winning over local "opinion leaders". One candidate explicitly told me that this was the whole key to the elections. These opinion leaders might be Party officials and cell leaders, members of Village Development Committees, church elders, traditional authorities, co-operative officials and generally the respected figures in a local community - those with authority, the old and the educated. Two other features of this unofficial campaign

which are not susceptible to precise measurement but which should be mentioned, are rumour and witchcraft. There were a number of successful whisper campaigns - for instance, the one against the lady candidate in Kilimanjaro Vunjo - some of them arising spontaneously, others being engineered, and all of them spreading through the buses, bars, markets and meetings. The use of witchcraft was even harder to track down, but such stories as the parading around of a goat to ensure that a supernatural power would enter the hands of voters so that they would all be forced to put their cross against one name, stories like this abounded. There is little evidence to suggest that this had any significant influence.

One final point to note is the virtual absence of any national issues from the election. The content of speeches and of discussions among voters centred round the record and character of the candidates and local factors and issues. But controversies over national policies were practically unknown. Indeed this was the stated intention, for all candidates were expected to accept the general party policy.

This attempt to sum up the kinds of influences which were at work is, of course, not exhaustive. The pattern of the various factors and issues is different for each constituency - and there were invariably a number of influences, often inextricably intertwined in practice. It was seldom easy to trace and identify all the factors, and always difficult to separate them, and virtually impossible to weight their individual importance.

The Impact of the Elections on the Political System.

It would be appropriate to see what the intended effects of the new One-Party System of election. The President instructed the One-Party Commission to observe (among others) the following principles:

(a) there shall be the maximum possible participation by the people in their own Government and ultimate control by them over all the organs of State on a basis of universal suffrage.

(b) there shall be complete freedom for the people to choose their own representatives on all Representative and Legislative bodies, within the context of the law(20).

To deal with the second and more specific point first, it is obvious that there was considerable freedom of choice probably more than in most competitive party systems, where people vote for who the party selects regardless. Perhaps the only important limiting factor arises if selection by the Party excluded candidates whom the public might have elected given a wider choice. The significance depends in part on the manner of TANU selection. The One-Party Commission certainly thought that it is important that the pre-selection be "worked in a spirit of tolerance and good faith, it would then not be inconsistent with the principles we have been enjoined to observe by the President". It would also be a serious limitation if the Party's choice was likely to be generally very different from that of the people, in other words if the Party was unrepresentative. In this context it is useful to remember how TANU selects - principally through the District Conference. This can be a fair-sized body of up to 100, with delegates drawn from largely branches and affiliated organizations. The National Executive which gives the final word is largely a representative body. Whether party selection is representative or not depends partly on how these organs have been chosen. The election of the Party organs is now a constitutional matter, requiring the same supervision as the normal elections. Selection by the Party is not self-selection by a small clique, but the stage-by-stage selection of representatives of a mass party from the cells of ten houses up to the National Executive. The number of incumbents among, say, Regional and District Chairman, who were replaced suggests along with other impressions that the new system is helping to make the Party organs more representative.

Implicit in the idea of freedom of choice is the need to make the choice meaningful to the voter. With a new system, and in a country like Tanganyika with great problems of communication, it is difficult to provide the ordinary person with enough knowledge of the candidates to make such a meaningful choice. While it is true that the campaigns in some areas could have been pursued more energetically, it is hard to think of an alternative system which would provide the opportunity for a more meaningful decision. The fact that the choice centred around the record and character of the candidate and local issues, rather than national policies and ideological issues probably helps to make the decision more meaningful at this stage of development. It is also probably inevitable at this time that the voting decision can only be made meaningful through the medium of opinion leaders who can interpret the issues.

As regards the criterion of "participation", an increase in registered voters by 2 million compared with the Presidential elections of 1962 suggests some improvement. The total of registered voters represents perhaps two-thirds of the adult population, of whom roughly two-thirds, again, voted (21). Here, again, more effort could be made in registration, as Miss Harris' paper points out, but these proportions are not particularly discouraging given the problems of communication and administration. In this context it is well to appreciate that the problem of registration was one of the administration trying to persuade a reluctant populace: there was no question of trying to inhibit participation. The extent of the participation can also be measured by the attendance at meetings, which, as was mentioned earlier, amounted to a significant proportion of the electorate.

But participation cannot be measured merely in terms of statistics of voters. It is also a matter of attitudes. The overwhelming impression is that most voters felt that they were participating in something important. A growing feeling of self-confidence on the part of the people was discernible. At campaign meetings, one could on occasions almost sense the thrill as the audience realised they were being given the chance to choose their own representative. The sensation was the greater as this was the first real opportunity most people had had to participate in the political system. The elections also helped to dispel some of the cynicism which some sections of the community, especially the educated, had about the regime, about the system, and about the sincerity of the intentions to maximise participation and to allow freedom of choice. The result of these attitudes was to increase loyalty to the political system as a whole. The reactions created were not, of course, universally favourable. In some areas where the candidate's return had been engineered either through being unopposed, or through official interference in the campaign, the effect was often to increase cynicism with the regime - and the voting figures show that some of this official partiality backfired.

The strength of any new loyalties created will depend on how far the record of the new Parliament encourages people to believe their M.P. is indeed their representative.

This in turn brings us to a consideration of the role of Parliament in the political system. The people have been given an opportunity to participate in elections to Parliament, but this does not necessarily imply that they "have ultimate control... over all organs of State". This depends in part on the power of Parliament in relation to other institutions. The One-Party Commission itself thought that "debates in the National Assembly have tended to be lifeless and superficial. Legislation of the

most complex and far-reaching kind has passed rapidly through all its stages without challenge to basic principles or careful examination of detailed provisions"(22). If Parliament continues to be a rubber-stamp then, despite free parliamentary elections, popular participation in decision-making, and in the recruitment of decision-making leadership is severely limited.

The intention is, of course, to enliven the National Assembly and make it "a public forum in which the Government explains its policies to the people and learns from their elected representatives about the problems facing the ordinary man". One would expect, too, that the pressures on the new Members of Parliament as a result of the kind of contests they have fought, would mean that they would have to be more responsive to their constituents. There are encouraging signs already that the new Parliament will have much livelier debates, that official attitudes will be more readily challenged, and that it will be a channel through which local demands filter to the top. The questions asked in Parliament, and the speeches in the general debate seem to reflect this concern with local problems. This effect of the elections may, however, raise the problem of too much concern with local as opposed to national considerations. It would be unfortunate if few Members looked at problems from the point of view of national interest. Such attitudes might also harm the national loyalties that have been successfully built up in Tanzania.

The decision-making capacity of Parliament may be limited by Party organs as well as by the Executive. Under the new system the Party will retain the final authority to make broad decisions about national policy. Despite the intention of removing "whips" and the TANU Parliamentary Party, it has already been found necessary to have a caucus meeting to discuss certain things in advance. In addition, the pre-selection of candidates by the National Executive allows further possibility of control. However, the very existence of an enlivened Parliament will naturally mean a shift in decision-making power. The new balance which is struck will depend on the attitudes adopted by the various institutions. It will depend on how much the Party and/or the Executive wish to control the legislature, and how detailed the National Executive Committee intends to be in giving policy directives.

The Committee has now been given authority to summon evidence and this should inform its discussions, but if it specifies in too much detail, it could pre-empt Parliament's role.

This discussion on the locus of power is modified by the realization that there is considerable common membership between the Party organs, the Executive and Parliament. The election of a large number of new Members of the National Assembly, many of whom were not in leadership positions in TANU, means an influx of new blood into the political system. And this recruitment is now extending to the Party and Government - one new M.P., formerly a civil servant, is now a member of the Cabinet. The new M.P's may well also play a vital role in the party structure at district level.

One final question remains in trying to assess the effect of the election on the decision-making process. That is in relation to one area of decision-making - planning. The present planning machinery in Tanzania requires Parliament to give final approval to the completed Plan. The very nature of Planning makes it very difficult to make any changes at this stage, or during the course of implementation - certainly to make changes in response to purely local demands. At the same time, the central importance of development and the detailed nature of planning in Tanzania, means

that almost all important decision-making is contained in, or implied by, the 5-Year Plan. In so far as the new Parliament is going to be responsive to local needs it will want to get more deeply involved in the planning process. Already the demands for local services through Parliament have proved so great that the Government has had to make it clear that the present 5-Year Plan cannot be changed to include any additional services(24). Government is now trying to divert Members' attention to the task of plan implementation, although this probably necessitates them being brought into the planning mechanism, perhaps as members of District and Regional Development Committees. In so far as they do this, they will be discharging the other dimension of their intended function as a communicating agent. But it will mean that often the new representative will not be able to "bring home the bacon". But in this he shares the dilemma of the Government and of all governments in Africa, of having to accommodate the demands and aspirations of the people which rapidly outpace what is possible given the limited resources at their disposal.

Notes

1. The conclusions of this paper and the responsibility for any shortcomings it contains are entirely mine. But much of the information on which it is based was collected through the efforts of a team of people. In addition to my colleagues offering papers in this symposium, staff and students of Makerere University College, of University College, Dar-es-Salaam, Kivukoni College, Dar-es-Salaam, and the Social Training Centre, Nyegezi, Mwanza have all assisted invaluablely. From these many people, I would like to single out especially, my colleagues at Makerere, Emory Bundy, Ken Prewitt, Bismarck Mwansasu and Ganja Geneya, Norman Miller, until recently of the Institute of Public Administration, Dar-es-Salaam and Daudi Mwakawago of Kivukoni College. Finally, I would like to thank the Government of Tanzania, especially the Second Vice-President, Hon. Rashid M. Kawawa for their co-operation - and Professor James S. Coleman for his enthusiastic support and inspiration.
2. This paper, and indeed the whole symposium, is chiefly concerned with the Parliamentary elections rather than the Presidential election which occurred simultaneously.
3. The new Constitution is 'interim' in the sense that most of the new provisions relate only to mainland Tanzania - formerly Tanganyika - so from here on I shall refer mainly to Tanganyika, where the Parliamentary elections took place. The name Tanzania will be used only when referring to the whole state.
4. President's Address to the National Assembly, June 8 1965.
5. "Democracy & the Party System", Julius K. Nyerere, 1963.
6. The new One-Party Constitution is substantially based on the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party system by law. (Govt. Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965).
7. There were 107 constituencies, but in six candidates were returned unopposed. there were therefore 101 contested seats.
8. I owe this point to Dr Roy G. Willis of the Dept of Anthropology, University College, London, who has done field work among the Wafipa.
9. The parliament of Tanzania included before its dissolution, representatives from Zanzibar, none of these are included. In addition, all Regional Commissioners had been made ex-officio members, only those who had previously been elected are included in the table. There were 8 of them and they automatically return

their seats as ex-officio Members. One Minister who lost has since been nominated, as was another M.P. who was not selected. A Junior Minister who lost has since been made Regional Commissioner, and another former back-bencher has been elected for one of the National Seats.

10. K.W. Post: Nigerian Federal Elections 1959. Oxford 1963, See Ch.X.

11. Post. op. cit. p.327-8.

12. This, and other valuable information from Arusha, were collected by Paul Puritt, an EASIR Associate.

13. See P.H. Gulliver: A Tribal Map of Tanganyika, Tanganyika Notes & Records, 1960. The numbers in these categories are imprecise because information on the origins of all candidates is not yet available, and also because of the difficulties of definition of a "tribe".

14. The term "Swahili" is used in the sense of a town-based detribalised African brought up in the Swahili culture although not necessarily from the Coast. In this case, it would be the term the individual would use of himself.

15. Howard Banow: "Status Reversal & Political Reaction" EASIR Conf. Dec. 1964. I am also obliged to Mr Banow for the above observation.

16. Each candidate was given either a "jembe" (hoe), or "nyumba" (house) as a symbol to aid illiterate voters.

17. From a private communication from Miss Marguerite Jellicoe, a Makerere M.A. student doing field work in Singida.

18. As the symbols were given out randomly, one would theoretically expect the winners to be divided equally if one takes a large number of cases. Using a χ^2 test, the probability of 62 winners having the jembe occurring by chance is only about 1%.

19. This estimate is based on an average of 30 meetings in a constituency, and an average audience of 400.

20. Contained in the terms of Reference to the Commission. See "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic one Party State". Govt. Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, p.2.

21. The statistically-conscious might like to remember that registered voters in six constituencies where candidates were unopposed did not have the chance to vote.

22. "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic one Party state. p.20.

23. Op. cit p.11.

24. Statement by Minister for Finance in the National Assembly, Dec. 20, 1965.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SUKUMALAND.

By

G.G. Geneya.

INTRODUCTION.

Today, Sukumaland covers an area of about 20,000 sq.miles with a population of more than one million people situated mostly to the South of Lake Victoria. Sukumaland is comprised of five districts: Mwanza, Kwimba, Maswa, Shinyanga and Geita, the latter only recently formed.

As early as 1940's the Sukumaland Development Scheme was established so as to enable population movements from densely populated mainland districts to Geita. In addition, the Scheme was designed to restore soil fertility of the overpopulated areas using whenever possible a rural resource team with the help of local authorities. It was also assumed that the Scheme would rehabilitate Central Sukumaland, an area of 10,000 sq.miles and to open extra 8,000 sq. miles of unoccupied land in Geita and Maswa Districts. The Staff consisted of a team at Malya where the heads of Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary and Water Development of the Province worked in conjunction with the Deputy Provincial Commissioner who acted as a co-ordinating officer.

The cost of the Scheme was estimated at £520,000. The basis of the Scheme was self-help in which people were approached by their local authorities. By 1955 the Scheme was described to have achieved most of its objectives and Geita quickly became the leading cotton produce for the whole of Sukumaland. In 1957 the Scheme was left in the hand of local bodies and it was assumed that the rehabilitation programme in special areas of the five districts would continue.

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS.

This is a report on the circumstances affecting the recent Tanzania Elections in Sukumaland. This area can be viewed as a microcosm illustrating many of the forces that affected the electoral processes throughout the country. Here we can witness the effect on the voter of the "Hoe" and the "House", the election symbols; we review the criteria used in the candidate's selection process; we can examine the degree to which the campaign made choice a realistic option for the voter, and we can analyse the manner in which the election as a whole has potential for reshaping the relationship between the represented and his political leaders, between traditional and modern.

THE ELECTIONS AND THE BASUKUMA.

In the first General Elections an electoral law was enacted purely on the basis of qualified franchise. Each constituency had to return three candidates to the Legislative Council, an African, European and an Asian on a common roll. A triple vote was compulsory for the ballot to be varied. These elections took place in February 1959 for the Lake Province. Very few people participated in voting as all TANU supported candidates were returned unopposed.

In 1960 all TANU sponsored candidates were returned unopposed. Since there were no campaigns there was no electoral experience.

Geneva.

For the 1962 Presidential Elections, total registration figures for the Lake Region were 305,507. The people had to choose between Nyerere (TANU) and Mtemvu (ANC). These elections were the quickest ever held. There was virtually no electioneering. Neither of the candidates issued any form of printed manifesto. Nyerere made it clear that he usually disliked the idea of campaigning which he considered to be both undignified and unnecessary.

After nomination, 3,000,000 voting slips were printed on which appeared the names of the two candidates only who stood for the Presidential Elections. Polling took place on 1.11.62 throughout the country.

The most important issue throughout the elections was the size of the winner's majority. The absence of electioneering had made people apathetic about the election. The issue was for the first President of Tanganyika to procure the mandate needed from the people. There was no electoral experience.

Results of the Presidential Elections of 1962.

<u>District</u>	<u>Total Registered Voters.</u>	<u>Nyerere</u>	<u>Mtemvu</u>
Maswa	51,647	28,296	412
Mwanza	24,372	9,658	224
Shinyanga	-	-	-
Kwimba	42,810	24,832	229
Geita	-	9,730	246

Geita District had the lowest poll, 33% of those registered.

From the results of the elections, it clearly appeared that the people of Sukumaland firmly believed in TANU. The low poll was largely influenced by the incapacity of the election machinery which was required to meet the new demands made on it within the framework of the time allowed for polling. Three conclusions emerged as a result of the elections:-

- (1) Mtemvu's vote showed that there were very few opposition supporters in Sukumaland.
- (2) In spite of the lack of previous electoral experience, the registration figures were substantial in the whole area. If campaigning had been organised, the Mtemvu supporters might have shrunk further.
- (3) The anti-TANU support was not ignored although it tended to centre on a small group of disgruntled persons who resented the government's policy more for personal reasons - especially Chief Francis C. Masanja and Samson Masalu, both of Kwimba District.

TANU viewed the anti-TANU vote however as a useful indicator of public opinion in Sukumaland. Attempts were made to ascertain the root causes of dissatisfaction and try to remedy them. After the results Mtemvu claimed, "ANC and PDP should either join forces to form a strong opposition or else the members of these two Parties should join TANU" (Tag.Std.8.11.62).

Geneya.

The General Election of 1965 under the One-Party System.

My research was mainly conducted in the two districts of Maswa and Shinyanga.

<u>District</u>	<u>Area (Sq. miles)</u>	<u>Population (157)</u>
Maswa	8,918	350,000
Shinyanga	3,580	270,000

Comparative Registration figures* according to Constituencies.

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Adult Population ('65)</u>	<u>Registered Total.**</u>	<u>%</u>
Maswa North	56,400	36,224	64.2%
Maswa South	57,000	42,087	73.8%
Maswa West	54,600	35,583	70.7%
Shinyanga Central	45,700	34,275	75.0%
Shinyanga East	42,800	22,033	51.5%
Shinyanga West	56,600	33,567	59.4%
		<u>303,751</u>	

Registration: In all the six constituencies registration was relatively high. The area secretary for Maswa spoke of certain difficulties among the Masai in the South but the percentage of registered voters was the highest in the district, 73.8% compared with 64.2% and 70.7% for Maswa North and Maswa West respectively.

Nomination: The electoral law arrangement provided that any person who is a member of TANU qualified to seek nomination once he obtained twenty-five signatures of registered voters. In order to fit in with the idea of the One-Party System, it was an offence for any person acting in his official capacity to discourage persons seeking nominations in accordance with the law. Nomination papers provided the Candidate's particulars, especially his membership in TANU, qualification and his service to the community.

In Shinyanga District, there were no reported problems regarding nominations, but in Maswa District the Area Secretary said that some candidates came late for the District nomination and were turned away. He did not mention any specific names, but Emmanuel Bomani was one of them. Emmanuel Bomani who is the manager of the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions Ltd. (V.F.C.U.) and brother of a Minister lives in Mwanza District but wanted to stand in Maswa District. There were all sorts of stories

* based on estimates of 1965 adult population.

** Tanganyika Standard 1965

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as to why he came late for nomination. Some people told me that he first went to Bukoba to persuade A.S. Kuilasa now M.P. for Maswa West not to stand but he found Kuilasa had left for Maswa and he was already late; so he gave up the idea. Other people say that Emmanuel Bomani came late on the very day of nomination and he was turned away in accordance with the electoral regulations.

TANU SELECTION.

The District Conference.

It is very difficult to ascertain what the District Conference regarded as the ideal criteria for selecting a candidate. Judged by the number of the Candidates who went through at the District Conference in Maswa and Shinyanga age was not a factor. Here is a table of the Candidates by Constituency and the number of votes they obtained at the District Conference.

<u>Constituency.</u>	<u>Candidate.</u>	<u>Age.</u>	<u>Education.</u>	<u>Votes Received.</u>
Maswa North	1. S. Lubala	40	VI	36
	2. E.K. Mvanga*	38	VIII	5
Maswa South	1. S.S. Ngwanangwalu*	28	Koran	46
	2. J. Mbutu	33	X	11
Maswa West	1. A.S. Kwilasa*	28	VIII	58
	2. L.L. Ndimila	39	VIII	17
Shinyanga Central	1. J. Rupia	61	Literate	61
	2. S.B. Msonde*	33	VIII	17
Shinyanga East	1. E.E. Nzinzula*	47	Literate	30
	2. K.A.N. Emmanuel	27	VI	11
Shinyanga West	1. S.K. Ngwanamakundi	51	Literate	42
	2. K. Philipo*	48	VI	15

Education was not an important criteria, anybody who could read and write was regarded as educated. John Rupia (Shinyanga Central) and S.S. Ngwanangwalu (Maswa South) hardly went beyond Class IV. On the other hand those with traditional status based on a major obstacle in the two Districts. All the members of the Chiefly families save one (Maswa North) who attempted to stand were dropped out by the District Conference. But in Kwimba District, Chief Francis C. Masanja, the sitting member who had resigned from TANU in 1962 and joined ANC and later PDP came second at the District Conference but the NEC threw him out. Another member of ruling family was selected and went through in the other constituency in the district.

In certain areas the origins of candidates was very important for Maswa District. All the Candidates were born there and stood in their own constituencies. In Shinyanga District all candidates but one (K. Philipo Shinyanga West) stood in areas other than their own. With one exception (S.B. Msonde**) candidates were not born in Shinyanga

* Candidates who won the elections.

** S.B. Msonde is not a Msukuma - parents came from Bagamoyo.

District. Tanu support automatically qualified a person to stand anywhere rather than look for a local base. In Shinyanga District all traditional elements were eliminated at the District Conference.

Ali Makani Nyanga* a member of the Chiefly family was asked the following list of questions, most of them antagonising, at the District Conference:-

1. Do you pay party subscriptions?
2. Do you participate fully in TANU meetings?
3. Do you attend TANU meetings?
4. How often are you in conflict with TANU principles?
5. How often have you done self-help work?
6. How many Chiefs associated themselves with ANC?
7. What is the foundation of the Government's Constitution?
8. Do you have your TANU card here?
9. How many doors has the TANU District Office?
10. Whom will you elect as President?

Francis Nangale, a candidate in Maswa West Constituency criticised the District Conference selection. He argued that the conference selected only those candidates who pleased TANU officials. I see no reason why Mr. Nangale should not please local TANU officials. Probably Mr. Nangale's opinion points up the difference between TANU and the people in the area.

The National Executive Selection.

The preference of the District Conference was not altered in the six constituencies. In Kwimba, too, Chief Masanja who came second at the District Conference was thrown out by the NEC. In Mwanza Madila who was fourth at the District Conference was selected by NEC to fight the former Finance Minister, Paul Romani.

The Campaign Stage:

The Role of Supervisory Committee:

In every constituency an ad hoc electoral supervisory committee was charged with the responsibility of supervising and reporting the progress of all meetings. In order to eliminate local bias, members of the committee were recruited from other Regions (those for Shinyanga Central came from Kigoma Region).

On the procedural level their role differed from place to place. This was a matter of interpreting the electoral laws. The electoral supervisory Committee attempted to interpret written legal processes which they themselves did not understand in most cases. Their role can be seen not so much as one of reporting or punishing offenders, but of reconciling those who were in dispute.

The area Secretary for Maswa spoke of illegal campaigning in certain Constituencies. Although there was no evidence to substantiate the allegation, he decided to post supervisors out in the constituencies to keep watch after all the official campaigning was over.

* Obtained from Ali Nyanga himself. Interview took place in Swahili, author's translation.

Geneva.

Throughout the election campaigns any appeal to racial, tribal or religious sentiment was made illegal. In the One Party System idea it was a law that the only medium of communication was Kiswahili, which presented problems in some parts of Sukumaland. Furthermore, in accord with the idea of the One Party System the Chairman of each Campaign meeting made it clear that both candidates were TANU members. They were equally good and had to be given fair play.

I. Maswa North Constituency:

Campaigns were described as fairly quiet. Ex Area Commissioner S. Lubala whose symbol was the House was heavily defeated by his opponent, E.K. Mvanga. In his Election Manifesto Sylvester Lubala did not mention that he was once Area Commissioner for Maswa. During the Campaign rumours began to circulate in the constituency that when Lubala was Area Commissioner for Maswa he refused to issue licenses to traders who had thatched houses. His symbol of a tin-roofed house was described by many people as representing his old policy. Those who had obtained trading licenses but had thatched houses feared that if Lubala was elected they would lose their licenses.

II. Maswa South Constituency:

This constituency is vast with great transport difficulties so little information was obtained. The two candidates were:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Votes Received at the District Conference.</u>
S.S. Ngwanangwalu	46
J. Mbutu	11

Both candidates are fairly popular and known in their areas. Ngwanangwalu has been a Maswa District Councillor from 1960-5. In 1965 he became Chairman of Maswa District Council and he is a TANU National Executive Committee Member.

J. Mbutu has almost a similar record as that of his opponent. 1959 - 60 he was Secretary of a local TANU branch. In 1960-61 he became District Treasurer of TANU (Maswa). In 1961-63 he was chosen as Hon. District Secretary of TAPA. In 1960-64 he was a member of Maswa District Council and from 1962-64 he was Chairman of Maswa District Council.

Among other things the "Hoe" was a great asset to S.S. Ngwanangwalu, a person of Arab origin. The support of TANU officials was also a factor.

III. Maswa West Constituency.

Both candidates are popular in the area.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Votes Received at the District Conference.</u>
A.S. Kwilasa	58
L.L. Ndimila	17

Elections were a fierce political battle here. This is the only constituency out of eight in the Region where a candidate with a House

Geneya

symbol was successful. This brought a turning point in the popularity of the Hoe.

As a TANU member Kwilasa has held several posts in the Party in Maswa District. In 1960 he was TANU's District Secretary as well as Branch Secretary of TANU in one chiefdom. In 1964 - he went to Kivukoni College for further training. Early in 1965 he became Deputy District Secretary of TANU in Bukoba. In July 1965 he became Acting Regional Executive Secretary of TANU in West Lake Region.

Ndimila worked for various Cotton Co-operative Societies in Maswa District from 1955. In 1957 he became Inspector of the local Co-operative Union and in 1960 - he became Manager of the Union.

Kwilasa felt convinced that his opponent was using the co-operative organisation for his campaigns. But he further felt that the use of co-operatives was ineffective because of the constant fall of cotton prices. Throughout Sukumaland people seem to be unaware as to who decides the price level of their cotton. A fall in prices is often blamed on those who administer the Societies, but even Kwilasa had the support of Co-operative officials. One divisional executive officer who was also a Kwilasa supporter claimed that the support of Local TANU officials and other opinion leaders was the key to success. Kwilasa claimed to have the support of key local figures as well as the support of women. His claims to popularity obviously had substance - enough to overcome the disadvantage which was felt to attach to the hoe.

IV. Shinyanga Central Constituency.

Four Candidates had attempted to stand. Two of them who got one vote each at the District Conference are members of the Chiefly family. The two candidates who fought the Elections are:-

<u>Name</u>	<u>Votes received at the District Conference.</u>
J. Rupia	61
S.B. Msonde	10

John Rupia has been M.P. for Shinyanga District from 1960-1965. Msonde has held several posts in various organisations. Neither are well known to the ordinary men in the area.

Rupia is one of the founder members of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and is also a founder member of TANU. He was the first Vice-President of TANU. He is a member of both the Party's Central and Executive Committees as well as the Party's Annual Conference.

In 1963 Msonde became one of the Assistant Divisional Executive Officers in Shinyanga District. (Shinyanga East Constituency).

In certain parts of the Constituency it was rumoured that earlier in the year a cattle census had taken place and those who had 40 head of cattle or more would have to sell at least a number of them so that they could qualify for corrugated iron sheet loans for the construction of modern houses. But the Chief Executive Officer for Shinyanga told me that he knew absolutely nothing of such a cattle census. It was, however, a "successful" rumour.

Geneva.

To many people, Rupia's symbol, the "House" represented 'destocking' or forced selling of cattle - important, as people still remember the forced destocking campaign which occurred in many parts of Sukumaland during the 1950's. Some people spoke of "Punguja Ya Shokile" or "Destocking has come". With the existing famine situation in certain parts of the district at the time of the elections, the "Hoe" the symbol of plenty was an advantage. The impression I got from many voters was that the model of the House as it appeared on the Candidate's Election Manifesto was too big for the people to afford to build. But the Hoe as it appeared on the Election Manifesto of the candidates represented the most popular hoes in Sukumaland today; the type which has superseded the traditionally made hoes. Many people told me "Biswe tulibigembe duhu," "Datogelilwe higembe" or "We are for the Hoe", "We like the Hoe".

Rupia with his long political career was one of the most effective speakers in Shinyanga District. He knew exactly what he was supposed to say in a rural or an urban centre. In urban areas he made references to the problems of housing. He promised the town residents that the programme started at Magomeni in Dar es Salaam of demolishing thatched houses was on its way to Shinyanga. During an election campaign meeting in Shinyanga Urban he received loud applause from women when he spoke of this project. Furthermore, Rupia listed what he had achieved for the people of Shinyanga as an M.P. and he mentioned things which the people could see at the time of the elections. He claimed that his efforts had brought:

- (a) Electricity to Shinyanga town. This was a very strong point because at the time of the election campaign electricity posts had just reached the township.
- (b) A Modern Higher School Certificate Secondary School. This was another strong point, for during the election time the construction of the school was well under way.
- (c) A modern hospital for the people of Shinyanga although there were no signs of this at the time of the election.

If elected, he promised a tractor for the Umoja wa Wanawake farm (The Women's Union). He accused his opponent of being one who never stayed in a job for a long time. He claimed, "I have been in the nationalist movements since the creation of TAA".

Rupia also spoke about the elections in general. He claimed that the name "Rupia" was known all over Shinyanga and he could even have stayed in Dar es Salaam and whistled, "Put your votes in the House for Rupia".

Unfortunately John Rupia spoke of things which affected the town rather than the rural areas. His claimed achievements as M.P. for Shinyanga were in respect of town services and they were not significant local services for the rural areas.

Msonde warned his audience not to elect a person who would be away in Dar es Salaam for the next five years. He claimed, "The only qualification I have, which I am proud of is, TANU has selected me to fight the elections". Msonde claimed that since he was a farmer like themselves, he knew what sort of problems people had, and if elected he would keep his door open day and night for those who wanted to see him. He did not commit himself to major promises to the people, but Rupia's absence from the area, together with Msonde's appeal that he was a farmer like themselves gave hope of the provision of local services in the rural areas,

Geneya

not just in urban centres. Again Msonde was clever in his tactics because he made no specific promises even if he was elected. The only thing he could do, he said, was to get everyone to sit together and discuss the ways and means of solving their problems. He explicitly made it clear that there is no single person who could bring the things his opponent claimed to have done.

Generally speaking Msonde appealed more to rural dwellers rather than Urban dwellers. Many people told me, "Msonde ali nini gitibiswe". Msonde is a farmer like ourselves".

In spite of his record, Rupia lost badly in the election. It is probable that his symbol was a further factor that led to his downfall.

V. Shinyanga East Constituency.

Both candidates were born in Kwimba District and have no real connection with the area. Nzingula is more connected with Shinyanga Central than Shinyanga East. Kapaya Emmanuel is only known in Williamson Diamonds Mine, an area exclusively reserved for those who work there. The District Conference preference was as follows:

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Votes received at the District Conference.</u>
E.E. Nzingula	30
K.A.N. Emmanuel	11

Nzingula is known better in many parts of Shinyanga than Kapaya Emmanuel. For many years he had run a private hospital in Ussiha Chiefdom (Shinyanga Central). In 1953 he worked very effectively in establishing a Cotton Co-operative Society in Ussiha Chiefdom (Shinyanga Central). In 1954 he was a member of the Sukuma Council (for the Sukumaland Federation of Chiefs) and he was also a member of the multi-racial East Lake County Council at Mwanza representing Ussiha Chiefdom. In 1958 he became branch Chairman of TANU Ussiha Chiefdom and in 1960-65 he became member of the District Council for Kiloleli Division (Ussiha Chiefdom).

In 1965 K.A.N. Emmanuel became Tanu branch Secretary at Mwadui Mine.

Nzingula had massive TANU support at the District Conference. In the election, among other things, the Hoe was a great asset for him. Even one person who works in Mwadui Mine told me, "I have voted for Nzingula because he is a farmer like myself". Some voters were trying to identify themselves with the candidate's occupation.

VI. Shinyanga West Constituency.

Both candidates were not born here - but one of them is a resident of the area, the other lives in Shinyanga East. But both candidates have very good party records. District Conference preferences stand as follows:-

<u>Name</u>	<u>Votes obtained at the District Conference.</u>
Sittak N'gwanamalundi	42
K. Philipo	15

N'gwanamalundi has been a member of Shinyanga District Council from 1960 - 65. From 1962 - 65 he has been branch chairman of TANU,

and in 1963 - 64 a member of the Annual District Conference of TANU. Today he is District Chairman of TANU.

Philipo has been member of Shinyanga District Council from 1960 -. He is at present Chairman of Shinyanga District Council, Regional TANU Executive Committee member and District TANU Executive Committee Member.

The name "N'gwanamalundi" is known all over Sukumaland because "N'gwanamalundi" the candidate's father, was a famous magician who was deported by the Germans to an Island in Dar es Salaam where Sitta was born. It is argued that it is probable that Sitta lost largely because of his symbol.

SOME GENERALISATIONS ABOUT THE INFLUENCES AT WORK.

The elections were dominated by rumours throughout. These rumours included the coming of "destocking" mainly in Shinyanga Central. The return of old policies such as no trading licenses to traders with thatched houses in Maswa North. The fall of cotton prices was a factor in Maswa West, Kwimba District and Mwanza East where the former Finance Minister, Paul Bomani was heavily defeated. There was a tendency for many Candidates in Sukumaland to manipulate their symbols during the campaigns. Such statements as, "I am a farmer like yourselves". "Put your votes in the House" misled many voters who thought they were voting for symbols rather than personalities. The whole issue of symbols came to be viewed by many voters as if they were representing specific policies. Rather than make the choice of candidates easy for the illiterate voters, the symbols confused the issue.

The District Conference did not emphasize education as a criteria for selecting among the 47 candidates who stood in Maswa and Shinyanga Districts. Many local TANU officials even today tend to regard educated men as persons who must be resocialised before they entered political life. This process of resocialisation would only be complete when there is no opposition to what is said by officials.

In Shinyanga District cotton prices were not an issue, simply because there were no co-operative officials who stood. In Maswa West, Kwimba and Mwanza, cotton prices were very much an issue. Co-operative officials were identified with the sharp economic reversals. People tend to translate their personal problems as national problems and their economic problems tend to be attributed to Government policies. Where people still believe that the traditional rulers (Batemi) have the power of making rain they still argue that their removal has caused famine. Many people have forgotten that even when there were traditional rulers there were recurrent periods of drought which created serious famine situations. When this occurred people did not blame the Chiefs directly - they simply asked him to investigate the cause of the calamity and do something about it. Today the Government seems to be very unpopular in times of plenty.

The "we" feeling is one of the crises of new nations. There is a lack of collective identification. The various levels of the

population see politics in various ways. Others think that the political system is the answer to all their problems, while the politician thinks that the people should expect nothing from the State, they must help themselves first.

It was argued that in certain areas people feared that registration meant they were going to be taxed. But I think that the most important single factor is the lack of training of the electorate. They did not have to register as voters for local elections and there was lack of national publicity about the elections.

However, in all the three Districts of Shinyanga Region, Maswa, Shinyanga and Kahama, registration was relatively high. The lowest being Shinyanga East 51% of the adult population.

THE 1965 ELECTIONS IN GENERAL FOR SHINYANGA REGION. MASWA, SHINYANGA AND KAHAMA DISTRICTS.

Constituency & Adult Pop. (Estimated)	Regd. Voters.	Candidates		Votes		Majority	Total No.	Votes as % of adult	
		Name	Symbol	No.	%			Pop.	Regd.
Kahama East 31,300	26,591 85%*	L.A. Sazia	J	14007	84.5 ^x	11430	16584	53.0	62.4
		A.S. Sango	N	2577	15.5 ^x				
Kahama West 30,700	17,600 57.3%*	F.M. Lukinga	J	6583	50.1 ^x	10	13146	42.8	74.7
		A.M. Lumelezi	N	6563	49.9 ^x				
Maswa North 56,400	36,224 64.2%*	E.K. Mvanga	J	20914	90.4 ^x	18688	23140	41.0	63.9
		S. Lubala	N	2226	9.6 ^x				
Maswa South 57,000	42,087 73.8%*	S.S. Ngwanangwalu	J	18024	55.7 ^x	3676	32372	56.8	76.9
		J. Mbutu	N	14348	44.3 ^x				
Maswa West 54,600	38,583 70.7%*	A.S. Kwilasa	N	12868	55.5 ^x	2543	23189	42.5	60.1
		L.L. Ndimila	J	10321	44.5 ^x				
Shinyanga Central 45,700	34,257 75.0%*	S.B. Msonde	J	22761	78.8 ^x	15928	28894	63.2	84.3
		J. Rupia	N	6133	21.2 ^x				
Shinyanga East 42,800	22,033 51.5%*	E.E.B. Nzingula	J	1441	86.4 ^x	12177	16705	39.0	75.8
		A.N.E. Kapaya	N	2264	13.6 ^x				
Shinyanga West 56,600	33,567 59.4%*	I.K. Philipo	J	15019	70.1 ^x	8926	21412	37.8	63.8
		S.K. Ngwanamalundi	N	6393	29.9 ^x				
TOTAL 375,100	250,942 66.9%*						175,442	46.8	69.9

^x % of registered voters.

* Registered voters as % of population.

In the three Regions containing the Sukuma Nyanwezi*area the statistical advantage of the "Hoe" was 23 constituencies to 3. By vote the margin was 69% to 31%. This is much higher than the national level and clearly significant.

Having a local base was not very important in Sukumaland. It was very easy for candidates to stand in constituencies other than their own. The Basukuma tend to accept the "rule" of the "Wageni". In this case I use the "Rule" judiciously because in the past some Batemi had employed Swahili speaking administrators and these were lingually respected by the people. The late Chief, Chief Makwaia Mwandu of Ussika Chiefdom employed a Mnyanyembe from Tabora, Ali kipanya as his assistant (Ngwambilija). People are used to "rule" by "foreigners" (I use the word foreigners here to refer to those non-indigenous to the area).

In Sukumaland many former Chiefs and members of the royal families who attempted to stand as candidates got few votes at the District Conference, one exception being Chief F.C. Masanja of Kwimba who came second at the District Conference. Since the advent of nationalism in Sukumaland there has been a clear dichotomy between the traditional elites and the new political elites.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

At every campaign meeting the first thing to be explained was the Presidential Elections. Since many people were mesmerised by the two symbols, Hoe and House, the Presidential Elections got less attention. The importance of these elections as the Area Commissioner for Shinyanga put it, "is to prove to the world that the people of Tanzania really love their President".

THE 1965 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY FOR SHINYANGA REGION (KAHAMA, MASWA & SHINYANGA).

Constituency	Adult Pop. (1)	Adult Regd. Pop. (2)	Votes for	Votes Against	TOTAL VOTES		
					No.	As% of (1)	As % of (2)
Kahama East	31,300	26,591	15,115 94.3%	915 5.71%	16030	51.2	60.3
Kahama West	30,700	17,600	12,586 95.7%	567 4.31%	13153	42.8	74.7
Maswa North	56,400	36,224	22,121 95.7%	1006 4.35%	23127	41.0	63.8
Maswa South	57,00	42,087	31,334 97.7%	729 2.27%	36063	53.3	76.2
Maswa West	54,600	38383	22585 78.0%	468 2.03%	23053	42.2	59.7
Shinyanga Central	45,700	34,257	30,070 97.7%	720 2.3%	30790	67.4	89.8
Shinyanga East	42,800	22,033	17,061 97.0%	519 2.95%	17580	41.1	79.8
Shinyanga West	56,600	33,567	20,113 96.9%	635 3.06%	20748	36.7	61.8
	375,100	250,942	170985 96.9%	5,559 3.15%	176544	47.1	

* i.e. Mwanza, Shinyanga, Tabora Regions.

N.B. Maswa South was reported to have had difficulties for the people to register. But in spite of all this Maswa South had the highest registration figure 53.3% of the adult population registered and the highest poll in Maswa District 76.2% compared with 63.8% and 59.7% for Maswa North and West.

Kahama District had the highest Anti-~~Presidential~~ vote 5.71% and 4.31% for East and West Constituencies. But the average Anti-President vote was also relatively high - in eight constituencies average was 3.15%

SECTION FIVE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTIONS ON BASUKAMA SOCIETY.

The Traditional Elites:

The elections clearly demonstrated that the role of the traditional elites was not welcome. Four former Chiefs attempted to stand in the six constituencies, but they never succeeded, even at the District Conference. Furthermore there is no record of Chiefs in Sukumaland as being very effective supporters of TANU. Although only a few opposed TANU openly, they provided the ammunition to those who opposed* the Government's policy of removing the traditional rulers from the political role.

The New Elites:

The elections have proved that the balance of power has been tilted in favour of the new elites. The traditional elites were blocked at the District Conferences and those who survived the process of political distillation like Chief Francis C. Masanja of Kwimba were redistilled by the N.E.C.

Political mobility for the new elites in Tanzania is very rapid today. Many candidates who had little previous political experience have gained the rank of an M.P. very quickly. All the new M.P.s in Sukumaland have never been M.P.'s before.

The new elites are characterised by their great aspiration to modernity. Their main concern is to modernise their own social structure, their culture and their political life. Their aspiration to modernity entails the total dethronement of the traditional power holders from their positions. Those who survived after the repeal of the African Chiefs Ordinance in 1963 were employed either as Divisional or Assistant Divisional Executive Officers and were transferred to areas other than their own. This was further achieved when former chiefs and some members of the royal families were dropped at the District Conference level.

The new type of Nationalism in Sukumaland appears to be against traditional authorities even though it draws deeply on indigenous traditions and values. Traditionally, Chiefs were not opposed openly. The only opposition had to be expressed in magic rather than in words and any person who disagreed with the policy of his Chief had two choices: either to shut up and stay in the Chiefdom or move out of the Chiefdom to another one. The new elites are appealing to this spirit. They think whatever they say in their official capacity must not be opposed under any circumstances.

At the same time the elections have clearly demonstrated the new "rulers" are answerable to the people for what they do although they claim to be answerable to the collective will of the nation. In Sukumaland,

* African National Congress, Peoples Democratic Party and

peasant group antagonism is not very strong and the new elites look at them as subjects for modernisation. Their preferences and responses to the new political structures are of much concern to the new elites. Since most of the "Basukuma" tend to have very little conception of their rights as citizens, the new elites are gaining power very rapidly. Furthermore, the intellectual elites in Sukumaland are very reluctant to take active part in politics. There was no Msukuma graduate or high Government official who attempted to stand as a Candidate. The past District Conference selection may increase their reluctance simply because education did not seem to be an important criteria. Party record was very important irrespective of education.

CONCLUSION.

Throughout my research I tried to look at the elections from the point of view of political sociology. My attempt was to analyse the people's attitudes on matters of local and national importance. I also tried to relate these attitudes to such factors as reference "group categories"*, politico - Social change, party allegiance and occupations of both candidates and voters. The influence of such factors in the elections were often only marginal, however, the impression I got from the people seemed to support the idea that there was widespread ignorance about the elections and there was only a limited interest in them. Campaign meetings were very short. Some lasted for ten to fifteen minutes. In the rural areas most people did not follow the language (Swahili).

But inspite of all this ignorance the elections have had a great impact on the attitudes and values of the people as a whole. In Tanzania politics there has been an attempt to develop a "national ethic"*** from which other political values can be built. Such an ethic is growing very rapidly because of the charismatic role of President Nyerere. As far as political life is concerned, Tanzania seems to have depended more on the personality of its leaders. Political concern appears to be centred at the top leadership level. The safeguarding of the people's rights has become partly constitutional and partly in the hands of one man, President Nyerere.

Statements on the rules and regulations about the elections as a whole tend to show that there were specific values intended to be fostered as a result of the elections. Throughout the elections racial, tribal or religious differences were explicitly made illegal. President Nyerere strongly believes that Tanzania can be built without these attitudes. The electoral law simply confirmed these official attitudes. The illegality of any efforts to inflame racial, religious or tribal sentiments was time and again referred to by those administering the elections and in some cases by the candidates themselves. Further evidence of successful socialisation was the non-African Candidates who stood, such as in Maswa South, and won. Their success has publicly confirmed that Tanzania is a non-racial society. In Shinyanga Central, candidates from non-indigeneous tribes managed to beat the indigeneous candidates in the elections and at the District Conference stage. This also was a further vindication of the fact that in Tanzania tribal considerations are no longer crucial. The fact that candidates can win despite race, tribal or religious differences suggests that attitudes can be developed and national rather than the local loyalties fostered. A sense of confidence about the non-racial concept of Tanzanian Society has been built. Deliberate rules and regulations have assisted in eradicating the racial ideas that existed during the Colonial era and these attitudes have been enforced by

* I have used group categories rather than "Social classes", a confusing term in Africa.

** Nyerere's own innovation

deliberate rules such as the prohibition of tribal or racial organisations throughout the country. Even the politicians themselves when speaking to the people rarely refer to specific tribes such as "You Wakamba", "Wachagga". They normally say "wanainchi, watanzania" (Countrymen, Tanzanians) "Let us do this"

National unity and political integration have become very important in the Tanzanian political perspective. The elections were used to further a national outlook by the compulsory use of Swahili by all candidates. This had a great impact on the development of a national political consciousness. The fact that the candidates shared a common platform during the elections and the same party umbrella was an educating experience to the masses. Those who administered the elections told the people clearly that both candidates have been selected by TANU and were equally good. Whoever was chosen was fit.

It was the first time in Sukumaland that many people had become involved on a large scale in anything to do with national politics. The majority of the people in the area were given the impression they were actually part of the national political system. For the first time many people took part in choosing their own representatives. The ballot paper which they dropped in the ballot box gave them the impression that they were actually participating in political decisions. It was the first time that many people in Sukumaland got the opportunity of making or hearing explicit political speeches at election campaigns. The elections further demonstrated that all politicians were visibly dependent on the people's decision in voting. People became aware of the fact that power to recall undesirable politicians lay in their hands. This was explicitly made clear to the entire nation, ordinary citizen and political leader alike.

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created a certain amount of hostility and was certainly viewed as being undemocratic by a large number of people. What is probably needed is the setting up of a committee to examine this whole question.

It can be argued that this kind of problem is peculiar to Tanzania's one party system but moving from this it might be interesting to raise one or two questions concerning features peculiar to the competitive one-party election system.

In the first place there is the obvious absence of the self-correcting mechanisms of opposing organisations which prevail in the more conventional competitive party systems. In systems where more than one party is engaged in the electoral struggle all have an interest in performing the watch-dog functions both upon each other and upon the administrators themselves. This vacuum could be partly filled by allowing candidates rather than the party to choose their own polling station agents in order to scrutinise voting procedure. However, there is at least one inherent danger in this, and that is that the candidates may well then be in a position to build up a strong local private organisation outside that of the Party. A compromise between the individual candidates' needs and the well-being of the Party needs to be struck.

An equally obvious facet of one-party elections is the absence of both the need for, and the existence of, a de facto, non-political civil service. In Tanzania civil servants are allowed to become members of TANU although they are still discouraged from being really active in the movement. However, they often have to work very closely with the local politicians and consequently they can find themselves in an invidious position, subjected to subtle political pressures. These pressures will be working against one ideal aim which is to so instil the codes of impartiality into the administrative personnel that it becomes a self-correcting mechanism.

This whole question of impartiality is further complicated by doubts as to whether in some areas it is a viable concept, particularly in the area of the election campaign. It may well be that too much is being demanded from both the local party personnel (including the Area Commissioners) and the Supervisory Committees (who are also political activists) in their function of scrutinizing the arrangements of both the conduct of the campaign and the content of the electoral speeches.

Much of the responsibility for carrying out the directives fell upon Area Commissioners, the political-administrative heads of the various districts within which the constituencies were located. Although he is not an elected official directly responsible to the local population nevertheless the measure of his success is his ability to control and direct his district. For him, as for other officials, the election is merely part of a continuing political process and must be calculated accordingly. On the one hand, his knowledge of local life puts him in an advantageous position to supervise and carry out the "watchdog" function. The reverse of this is that for certain purposes his hands may be tied by local arrangements and commitments made to groups and individuals. Under these circumstances, can the two candidates, almost inevitably linked to that network of groups, ever be viewed neutrally and equally and should they be so viewed?

For given the parochial emphasis of the elections the two candidates would as a necessary condition of acceptance be closely connected to a local power-base, such as the District Council, Party or co-operatives. Both candidates would be well known to all local interest groups. Is it not too much to expect these same local groups to remain passive during the campaign period? Is it not more natural to expect that the Area Commissioners and other officials will have strong ideas as to the politician they feel would be most beneficial to the constituency?¹

However, having said this, one comes back to a central dichotomy of contested elections in a one-party system either the State must legislate to equalise the campaign contest and use its legal expertise to ensure that existing loopholes concerning private campaigning are blocked or so modify the system to allow for a modicum of private campaigning but in so doing take the risk of individuals forming miniature party organisations. The success of this first election was largely due to ignorance of the scope for effective private campaigning, but it may prove to be a hard task to maintain this "gentlemanly" agreement in the future.

It may be argued that the existence of Supervisory Committees is sufficient to inhibit electoral malpractices pertaining to the present system. Because they are not locally involved they are no doubt in a better position to apply "fearlessly" the electoral rules (however they may interpret them). But equally they will clearly be limited by their

1. In some cases, the name of the Area Commissioner and other important constituency names on the candidates' nomination forms.

lack of knowledge of the local political interest groups and the political channels potentially open to either of the candidates. Moreover, the members of the supervisory committees were, in the main, drawn from TANU District Executive Committee members who were often politically and occupationally subordinate to the people they had to deal with.¹

The Returning Officers are in a slightly different position; in so far as they are local Civil Servants they will have the advantage of security of occupation and be more knowledgeable but again if they wish to continue working in the same area they may be loathe to create a hostile atmosphere by pointing out electoral irregularities, particularly if they subjectively regard them as minor.

Another difficult sphere for precise legislation, in addition to that of supervising the conduct of campaigning, has to do with the enforcement of the legitimate content of debate. Informally the limits on debate are the broad outlines of TANU policy. Clearly there are things a candidate is not permitted to say.² But the decision to interpret the content of particular speeches as stepping away from the TANU line or involving the use of illegitimate appeals is again a discretionary one. There were instances of both Regional and District party officials intervening, but on the whole there was a relative absence of such concern. Again, this was not a particularly pressing problem in this election but it may well be in the second single party elections.

An existence of a highly organised party all the way to the grass roots with a clearly defined political role would find judgment of political speeches a natural extension of its political roles. Also, we have indicated that such a party would have no difficulty in continuing to carry out the vital functions of selecting and vetting candidates without being susceptible to the various personal and economic pressures which will be put upon them. Unfortunately, the party organization (with the possible exception of the N.E.C.) has tended to lag behind that of government administration, both in terms of salary, training, and status, and it is not at all certain that it will be in a position to discharge its new political role effectively unless changes are made..

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1. It is interesting to note that in the one reported case (Goran Hyden) of a member of the Supervisory Committee publically intervening on a question of TANU policy, he was himself a national figure and a member of the N.E.C.
 2. Although even the introduction of tribalism was not sacrosanct. It was observed at a Dar es Salaam meeting that one of the candidates introduced tribalism through the back door when giving advantageous tribal information about himself in answer, as he said, "to the rumours which were put out by friends of the opponent."

Finally, we may conclude with a few general observations on the significance of these elections judged against accepted democratic criteria. This criteria is primarily concerned with the conventional democratic objectives of freedom of choice and participation by the electorate and their control over their own officers. Using this criteria there is no doubt that these values were at play in both the adoption of the system and its fulfilment. It is not difficult to see that the government made a deliberate choice to democratize the existing de facto one-party system aware that risks might be involved and limited financial resources would have to be used.¹ (By contrast, the recent Ghanaian elections cost nothing and in no way disturbed the existing order.)

Success, in terms of the markedly high degree of participation through attendance at meetings, registration and the selection procedure was achieved. Choice of a representative could be made subject to the very real limitations of the indirect pre-selection of candidates that exists in all contemporary political systems. And the parochial emphasis has ensured, albeit unwittingly, a direct influence on national policy, as in effect the system has produced 107 local pressure groups each conscious that the continued support of their constituencies is dependent upon them, so to speak, delivering the promised "goods". This must have a profound effect upon future government policy; the changed composition of the new parliament and a more informed electorate will ensure this.

The new composition of Parliament was not achieved without some shocks. The words of the President that "those forming the Government will, of course, be replaced from time to time, this is what elections are for..." turned out to be more than prophetic (see appendix). However, it was the quick acceptance of these results, coupled with the high degree of public participation which has illustrated that the democratic spirit has prevailed.

By concentrating in this paper on the administrative aspects, we have perhaps tended to over-emphasize the weakest links in the new system, but in the opinion of the authors, these administrative problems do no more than suggest areas for modification rather than for a radical change in the present system. There is no doubt that forces for change will arise as changes occur in the Tanzanian society, as perhaps the society becomes less homogeneous and organised elites and classes make themselves felt. It is how Tanzania is able or willing to adapt its electoral system to the new society that will ultimately decide whether the new concept of 'One Party Democracy' will find a permanent place in political theory.

1. The cost of the election is estimated at £160,000, not insignificant compared to a total national budget of £37 millions.

APPENDIX
Relevant Statistics

Constituencies:	107 (of which all but 15 were drawn up by the 1962 Boundaries Commission).		
Population:	Estimated at approximately 10½ million (based on revised 1957 population census figures).		
Registration:	3,175,617.		
Polling Stations:	7,417.		
District Selection Conferences:	60.		
Nominees called before D.S.C.s:	803.		
Unopposed Candidates:	6 constituencies.		
Two Candidates Only:	5 constituencies.		
N.E.C. Selection:	96 nominees who came 1st in the D.S.C. 85 " " " 2nd " " " 5 " " tied 2nd and 3rd in the D.S.C. 14 " " came 3rd in the D.S.C. 2 " " tied 4th and 5th in the D.S.C.		
	202 candidates for 101 constituencies		
Election Dates:	72 constituencies on 22nd September. 35 constituencies on 26th September		
Presidential Results:	Votes cast in favour..... 2,303,678 (Figures do not include spoiled papers, approx. 2% of total) Votes cast against..... <u>90,885</u> Total Votes 2,394,563 Total Abstentions 781,054		
National Assembly Results:	Total Votes cast..... 2,269,024 Abstentions..... 906,593		
Occupational Results: (up to 31st July)	<u>Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>	
Ministers (including 5 unopposed)	13	2	
Junior Ministers (including 1 unopposed)	4	6	
Other M.P.s	4	8	
TANU District Chairmen	1	13	
Other TANU officials	8	9	
Cooperative officials	7	6	
NUTA (trade union) officials	3	0	
Local Gov't Chairmen (elected)	6	9 1	
Other Local Gov't Officials	12	7	
Area Commissioners	3	2	
Civil Servants	13	4	
Teachers	11	9	
Farmers (without other occupations)	8	13	
Business and Misc.	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	
1. including 3 Deputy Chairmen and mayor of Dar es Salaam.	107	101	

SYMPOSIUM ON TANZANIA ELECTION
E.A.I.S.R. CONFERENCE, JANUARY 1966

By

Belle Harris¹

in collaboration with

John S. Saul

The Tanzanian General Election of 1965 demands consideration for a number of reasons, not the least amongst them being the experiment of contested elections within the context of a single national political movement which it represents. This has in the authors' opinion added a new dimension to modern democratic theory.

In this brief background paper,² however, we are not so much concerned with the political as with the administrative aspects of the election, although it should be clearly recognised that there is even less formal separation between party politics and administration in the one-party system than in a competitive-party system. Any discussion of administration naturally leads into a discussion of the whole political system. First, we shall present^{in Part One} the formal requirements of the new electoral procedure and then^{in Part Two} pass on to examine two major considerations: the technical administrative problems common to elections in most new states and, perhaps more significantly, the administrative aspects peculiar to contested elections within a one-party state. In doing so we are aware that we shall be raising fundamental questions concerning the viability of this new political system and possibilities of its continuance, in its present form, or with modifications, in future elections.

The legal and administrative framework of Tanzania's General Election of 1965 is to be found in the following documents: the Interim One Party Constitution of 1965, the National Assembly (Elections) Act, 1964, and its Amendment Act of 1965. These legal requirements were based upon the political recommendations put forward in the report of the Presidential Commission on "The Establishment of a Democratic One Party State,"³ which in turn based its findings on an exhaustive survey

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 2. This paper was presented by Belle Harris at the E.A.I.S.R. Conference in the Symposium on the election and was designed to provide the administrative framework of the elections as an introduction to the subsequent case study papers. A more comprehensive, factual report by Belle Harris is to be found in Mbioni, the Kivukoni College magazine, Vol. II, No. V.
 3. This excellent report (drafted in the main by the Secretary, A.J. Nsekela and the (then) Attorney General, Roland Brown) provides the theoretical framework of the new electoral system, incorporating the detailed concept of the National Ethic, as put forward as a guiding line by President Nyerere.

of all levels of public opinion and an examination of other, selected, political systems. A Government White Paper (No. 1, 1965) accepted "in general" the recommendations of the Presidential Commission and included (minor) modifications and additions proposed by a joint meeting of the National Executive Committees of the Afro-Shirazi Party (Zanzibar) and the Tanganyika African National Union (hereafter TANU), on May 5th, 1965.

The fundamental aim of the new electoral system was to democratize an existing de facto one-party system. The overwhelming success of TANU in the previous General Election of 1960 and the Presidential Election of 1962 had so demoralised any organised opposition that it had, so to speak, gone into voluntary limbo. The lack of popular support for an official opposition can be seen in the following voting figures for these previous elections:¹

(a) General Election 1960

<u>Party</u>	<u>Official Candidates</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Unopposed Seats</u>	<u>Total Seats</u>
T.A.N.U.	71	100,581	82.8%	58	70
A.N.C.	3	337	0.3%	-	0
INDS.	10	20,527	16.9%	-	1

Sources: Tanganyika Gazette and M. Lowenkopf, "Tanganyika Responsible Government" Parliamentary Affairs, Spring 1961.

(b) Presidential Election 1962

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Votes</u>
Dr. J. K. Nyerere	1,127,978
Z.M.M. Mtemvu	21,276

The Presidential Commission's report pointed out the irony of these results which had in effect disenfranchised the electorate:

"By a paradox the more support the people have given to T.A.N.U. as a party the more they have reduced their participation in the process of government."

In the same section they observed:

"So long as the law permits the establishment of alternative parties TANU must continue to fight elections, both national and local, on a party basis. In Tanganyika, in most cases such candidates have been unopposed and the people have in consequence, the right to vote but no opportunity to do so."

The most important implication arising from these quotations is that the right of the people to vote could only be reinstated if TANU were not circumscribed by the need for a single list of candidates. In turn, this could only take place if the de facto one-party state were to be made into a de jure one-party state. The provisions of the new constitution were designed to meet this felt need.

1. These figures have been extracted from notes on the election, produced by Prof. Colin Leys and to be found in the East African Study Materials of the Dept. of Political Science, Makerere College, University of East Africa.

PART ONE

The new regulations included a constitutional division of the electoral process into two separate parts: the pre-selection of candidates which became the special responsibility of the official party organisation and the general election based upon universal franchise. The costs and administrative responsibility were also divided on a two-tier basis between party and government, although in practice the lines were often blurred. As a result a heavy burden was placed upon the administrative organising centre, the Speaker of the Assembly, and particularly on Mr. Msekwa¹ (a 29 years old graduate of Makerere College), the chief-clerk to the National Assembly, and his assistant. These three with one other representative, constituted the Electoral Commission with special responsibility for administering the election.

Previous to this, the country had been divided into 107 constituencies following proposals put forward by the 1962 Boundaries Commission's Report. The Commission adopted the procedure of making the 60 Districts the principal electoral unit, the number of constituencies being dependent upon the total population. They accepted, in all but a few cases, the advice given to them by the District Councils. An indirect effect of drawing up the boundaries before M.P.s were aware that there would be contested elections was to take the boundary question outside of the arena of political controversy. Also indirectly it led to an absence of the premeditated creation of the "safe" seat common to many countries. Excluding the two smallest constituencies of Arusha Urban (population 10,038), and the island of Mafia (population 12,199), the population of the largest constituency, around 120,000, was three times that of the smallest, but these estimates are very hazy as they are based upon 1957 population census figures. In any case it is unlikely that the process of boundary creation had any determinative effect on the results, though this may become a source of controversy in the future.

It should also be kept in mind that the elected constituency member contributes to only one part of the composition of Parliament. In addition to the 107 elected members there can exist up to 97 additional members whose position is based upon being either nominated by the President (up to 10 from Tanganyika, 20 from Zanzibar) or indirectly elected (up to 15) or, in the case of other individuals, upon their status as Regional Commissioners (20 ex officio members) and representatives of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (up to 32). (It is expected that the "over representation" of Zanzibar--estimated population, 300,000--will be a transitional phenomena.)

At present the system can be said to constitute a bi-cameral arrange-

1. I would like to take this opportunity to record our sincere appreciation to Mr. Msekwa and his Assistant, who however busy always found time to give courteous consideration to any enquiry made at their office.

ment within a single legislative chamber.

Registration

Before going on to examine the innovations concerning the pre-selection of candidates it might be as well to look at the first stage in the election process, that of registration, which is not an automatic process in Tanzania. During May it was announced that registration would begin on 1st June and close on 31st July; only those citizens who received a registration card during this period would be eligible to vote.

The work of registration was carried out by Civil Servants and Local Government staff under the supervision of the head of administration in each of the 60 Districts--the Area Secretary.¹ Arrangements were made for these officers to travel out to the people. Polling/Registration stations were set up to cover each Village Development Committee area. Later a circular from the Electoral Commission suggested that a polling station should be sub-divided, one for every 400 registered voters, the estimated number of polling stations being 7,417. This number posed a tremendous administrative task for Tanzania's limited resources. Each polling station had to be manned by a minimum of three personnel (or more, according to the number of polling booths) and equipped with two ballot boxes, one for the presidential, the other for the parliamentary candidates' ballot papers. 10,000 ballot boxes had been ordered but the subsequent short-fall of over 4,000 made it necessary to hold the election on two separate days, the 22nd and 26th September.

It was hoped that the registration figure would reach the four million mark, estimated as 80% of those who were eligible (based on revised 1957 population census figures). All citizens (those born in Tanzania, or having at least one Tanzanian parent) over twenty-one were eligible to register.

The actual registration of 3,175,617 was excellent compared to any previous election; yet, it still fell short of expectations. The response throughout the country was uneven and in some constituencies poor.

Several reasons were put forward for the nature of this response, one concerns the border areas. Here many who thought they were eligible found they had no claim to citizenship: petitions were sent to the 2nd Vice-President. As a result on June 25th the ruling was amended to enable people from the bordering countries to be eligible on a residential qualification of five or more years.

More universal limitations lay in insufficient publicity and poor communication; to many, registration was a new experience. At least one village received its first contact with the election at the

1. No constituency elections took place in Zanzibar; therefore, voting and campaigning were confined to the Presidential election. The Zanzibari elections are not covered in this paper.

campaign meetings. At this period most would-be electors were unaware of the new electoral provisions, and, of course, the names of the candidates. Many might have registered had they known the full significance of their choice.

However, within the limits imposed by communications difficulties, the next most important reason for lack of registration was undoubtedly the spectre of taxation. The tax which caused the trouble was the local poll-tax, which is levied in the majority of the Districts on males over the age of eighteen. The efficiency of collecting this tax leaves much to be admired; as a result many citizens were in arrears. It is understandable that these tax evaders would be reluctant to have themselves registered by officials who have arrived at their village in government landrovers. What is clearly indicated is, on the one hand, the need for tightening the existing loopholes in tax collection, but perhaps, on the other hand, it might be worthwhile experimenting with using non-government personnel, e.g. local TANU officials, if suspicion is to be overcome and maximum registration obtained.

Pre-Selection Process

From June 1965 the constitution of the Party had become an integral part of the National Constitution. Its prestige and status had further been enhanced by a decision to place the powers and the salary of the members of the Party's National Executive Committee on a par with those of the National Assembly. Its new powers were to include the final selection of candidates. This strengthening of party participation and party control was not seen as a restrictive measure; TANU was to remain a mass party open to all citizens who accepted its principles and these were couched in extremely broad terms. There is, to date, no evidence of TANU's having closed the door on the aspirations of any would-be candidate by refusing party membership. On the other hand, the new system did have the effect of revitalising party morale by giving it, for perhaps the first time since independence, a clear-cut political role.

The pre-selection process was to be carried out in two stages, first at the party level and secondly at the national level (see diagramme, appendix one). The requirements concerning candidates were, in brief, that they be members of TANU, they obtain not less than twenty-five signatures from persons registered in the constituency and, their nomination forms being in order, they submit themselves for questioning at a specially convened TANU District Conference at which time a preference vote would take place. The question procedure was not institutionalised, there being merely a recommendation that speeches should not be allowed.

Approximately 1,000 nomination forms were asked for and given out; in the event 803 nominees went forward to the selection conference.

A small part of the difference in numbers was due to procedural irregularities; the phones of both the Attorney General and the Secretary to the Electoral Commission were kept busy with enquiries concerning the adequacy of specific nomination papers on technical grounds. Whenever possible in such cases, the benefit of doubt was given to the nominee. Other contributing factors to the "fall out" process were a variety of non-administrative personal and political factors.

The TANU District Conference ranged in size from just under 20 to just over 100 delegates. The delegates included all TANU District Officers, Regional Officers resident in the District, Constituency M.P.s, Branch Chairman, two Branch delegates and delegates from affiliated associations. It was the task of each of the delegates to indicate a preference, by secret ballot, for one of the nominees presenting himself to the conference.

There is evidence that the usual forms of lobbying for delegate support took place, which intensified in the days immediately prior to the conference as delegates arrived at the District Centres from the surrounding villages. Private lobbying and even campaigning was not classified as illegal at this stage in the nomination process, although one could interpret it as not being strictly within the "spirit" of the law. In this election, private lobbying does not seem to have introduced a corrupting element; how much this was due, in the first instance, to the nominees' ignorance of their potential for exerting political and even economic pressure, is hard to say! Certainly this area of political activity is likely to be considerably intensified in future elections.

All the names of the nominees, together with the list of votes received were then submitted to the Party N.E.C. (National Executive Committee), which was required to select two candidates to contest each seat.¹ The N.E.C. was not legally bound to accept the preference votes of the District Conference, although in fact they did so in just over 90% of the cases. Unexpectedly, the full list of names and the votes received were made public. The published figures revealed that two Junior Ministers, nine M.P.s, one Ambassador, and the Chairman of the Agricultural Marketing Board failed to secure either first or second place. No attempt was made to secure places for these well known personalities. Sixteen changes were made, however, and although the reasons were kept secret, it can be ascertained that in the main the dropping of one of the two leading nominees took place where either a

1. The original proposal put forward by the Presidential Commission was for three candidates. The joint party Executive Meeting amended this to two candidates in order to avoid any "member being elected on a minority vote."

candidate's honesty or his loyalty to TANU was in question. The TANU record had to be blemished rather than non-existent as grounds for rejection. Interestingly, of the sixteen names that moved up the list to fill the gaps created, eleven were successful and in at least one constituency; the change was a distinct advantage to an incumbent. In addition to these eleven cases another 37 candidates who topped the preference list at the TANU District level were subsequently defeated at the polls. Part of the reason for these reversals lies in the manner in which TANU is at present structured. It should be noted here that the present structure is based upon the 60 Districts and not the 107 constituency units. Hence in some cases of multiple constituencies within a single district the initial selection of candidates tended to have a district rather than a constituency basis.

In any constituency where less than three candidates were standing, nominees were automatically accepted at both District and National level. In six constituencies the candidates were unopposed and consequently no election contest took place. Thus, the 2nd Vice-President, four Ministers and one Junior Minister were automatically elected. In five other constituencies the names of only two candidates were submitted. Therefore, the N.E.C. found that regardless of the qualities of these candidates they had no alternative but to accept the names given. At the present time no provision exists under which the N.E.C. can reject such candidates unless irregularities have occurred in the procedures by which they were elected. Of course there was much speculation as to the reasons why the "six" were unopposed; however, again, it is more likely that it will be the manipulative possibilities open to the informed nominees of future elections which will, no doubt, give rise to the necessity of independent investigations.

The pre-selection of the Presidential candidate followed a different procedure from that prescribed for the National Assembly candidates. This procedure was laid down in a Government White Paper (No. 1, 1965).¹ In section 3 of the appendix, the White Paper amends the proposal of the Presidential Commission to read as follows:

"Until the merger between the Afro-Shirazi Party and TANU, the nomination of the candidate for Presidency should be made by a joint meeting of the new Annual Conference of the two parties and not by their National Executive Committees."

The Presidential election was to run concurrently with the general election and would be by a direct affirmation vote for a single candidate. That is, if more than 50% voted against, then the joint N.E.C.s would have to submit a different candidate to the electorate. Both the

1. The Government White Paper incorporated the decisions reached by the joint executive meeting of the N.E.C.s of the Afro-Shirazi Party and TANU on 3rd/5th May to consider the Presidential Commission's Report.

joint executive committees meeting and the electorate gave their support, in the first case unanimously and in the second overwhelmingly to the candidature of Dr. Julius K. Nyerere.¹

Campaigning

The most novel of the new electoral rules² were those governing the proceedings of the campaigns. These rules were designed to ensure "fair play between the candidates" and thereby designed to eliminate the "exploitation of tribal, racial or religious issues." The official language was to be Swahili. The assumption underlying the rules was that as both candidates had been chosen by the Party, both would be equally acceptable to become members of the National Assembly; therefore in organising the confrontation between candidates and electorate the two should be treated as "one person" homogeneous as to transport, campaigning techniques and electoral expenses. By any yardstick this is a pretty difficult assumption to square with what is often regarded as the "norm" in electoral campaigning. It certainly imposed a hard task upon the party administrators and it says something for the law-abiding spirit prevailing in Tanzania that in this election, in the great majority of cases the "impossible" was adhered to.

The details of the campaigning regulations were laid out in the Election (Amendment) Act; it was stated that:

"The District Executive Committee of the Party....shall organise the election campaign on behalf of both the candidates.... shall specify in such programme the time and place of each meeting, the person who shall take the chair and the order of speaking (alternating at successive meetings)....shall accord a fair and equal opportunity to each of the candidates....No candidate shall expend any sum in the furtherance of his campaign for election."

The Act also required each candidate to associate himself with an approved symbol allotted to him by the N.E.C. for the purpose of identification. The task of choosing these fell upon the Central Committee of the Party. It took them over five hours to select two symbols, the Jembe (Hoe) and Nyumba (House), which were felt to be of equal value, neither giving an unfair advantage to the holder. Distribution of these symbols was done in alphabetical order by constituencies, the first candidate in each being given alternately Nyumba and Jembe. Only in the case of Ministers and Junior Ministers was

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1. The national average vote against was less than 5%, but the spread was not even. Dr. Peter Rigby, in his case study paper of Dodoma Region, points to the complexity of reasons for that Region's above average "hapana" vote in which three constituencies contributed to 17% of the votes against.
 2. These rules were drawn up by an ad-hoc committee appointed by the joint Party executive meeting to "Report on Rules for the Nomination Process and Conduct of Election Campaigns for the National Assembly."

care taken to ensure an exact distribution, every other man receiving the House.

Finally, the Act stipulated that each constituency election would be supervised by an ad-hoc committee composed of TANU officials from outside the constituency. A circular (No. E.C.1/4/21) was sent out to all those selected by the Electoral Commission from a list of names submitted to them by TANU Regional Officials, to be members of the three-men Supervisory Committees. As far as possible the aim was to get delegates sent to a different region from their own. The circular explained in a comprehensive manner the delegates duties in ensuring that both candidates were indeed treated fairly.

The N.E.C. completed their final selection of candidates on 9th August, on the 15th August the campaign was due to begin. This left exactly six days in which to print all electioneering material. As it happened this was one of the areas where there existed some ambiguity as to who was really responsible for publication of the material used by the candidates, the Party or Administration. The ad-hoc committee had proposed that: "each candidate should be entitled to write an election address which would, free of charge, be printed and distributed in the constituency by the local TANU organisation, under the supervision of the ad-hoc supervisory committee." And at one time there was talk that TANU would produce a national statement which would appear in the individual election manifestos. This excellent idea would have provided a golden opportunity for publishing existing TANU aims and policies. Unfortunately nothing came of these suggestions, no doubt owing to the lack of staff at TANU H.Q.s. Once again the burden of providing this political material fell upon the (non-political) shoulders of Mr. Msekwa. The material at his disposal consisted of the information put down by the candidates on their nomination forms; as they were unaware that this information was to be used for this purpose it was understandable why it was that some of the details were bazaarre as well as revealing. Given these circumstances the results were impressive. In only three cases did photographs not arrive on time and in two other cases the candidates found they had been allotted the wrong symbols.¹

In addition to approximately 3 million electoral manifestos for the 101 constituencies which were given out, albeit rather unsystematically, at the campaign meetings, the Electoral Commission was also responsible for printing the same number of leaflets explaining the voting procedure for (a) the candidates and (b) the President. These

1. A candidate in one of the constituencies, Mwanza East, has since given this error as one of the grounds for filing a petition.

leaflets were most effective in giving a clear explanation of how to put one's mark. Their pattern was reproduced on the 7 million ballot papers. Other publicity material included many thousands of strikingly produced posters giving a multi-coloured visual explanation of the procedure, which was put out by the Tanzanian Information Services. Also TANU produced its own poster in support of the Party's choice of Julius Nyerere as their Presidential candidate.

But by no means did the overall effect of the printed material produce the election atmosphere of the "West" where the electorate can expect to be assailed by a rising bombardment of party advertisement material. In Tanzania the printed word was probably of minor significance as also was the radio and newspapers which gave comparatively little coverage to the election. Here, publicity rested on two pillars: the campaign meeting supplemented by the local "bush" tele-communication network; it was a campaign of the direct impact of the spoken word.

The average number of meetings held in each constituency was thirty-five. At the two ends of the scale were the 103 "whistle stop" meetings held in Mpwapa District and the 10 or so held in the Urban areas of Arusha and Tanga. If one assumes an average attendance of 350 (based on personal observation) it means that over one million people travelled to see their candidates, a very large percentage of the total number of those who voted. When one considers that for thousands of the electorate this entailed many miles of walking, one is amazed at the efforts made by the voters to participate in the Election.

The pattern of the meetings became fairly standardised. The campaign chairmen, drawn in the main from local political leaders including Area Commissioners, or from local government staff, would start the meetings (invariably held under the central mango tree) with various "Uhuru" rallying calls and the supervisory committee would be introduced. Then in turn the candidates would be invited to speak and the Presidential voting arrangements explained. In a few constituencies microphones or transmitters were used. This facility (a most useful one) was for the most part lacking, sometimes to the detriment of a candidate. The instructions concerning the Presidential procedure were particularly effective and fair although often the chairman would receive a humorous, even bewildered response when trying to explain the optional right of voting "hapana" against the incumbent.

However, variations did exist, particularly in the supervisory process. For example, the supervisors' interpretation of their duty to ensure fair treatment was not always consistent. In Kilimanjaro Vunjo, to give an ^{exceptional} example, the audience was asked not to applaud or laugh, and

not to give the traditional women's cry, as this would be showing favour. Also some imposed a strict time limit on speeches. Others left it up to each candidate. Sometimes a Committee would even admonish lack of punctuality. Other committees took a more passive role. Even in the investigation of charges of malpractice and of similar personal recriminations between the candidates these variations in the styles adopted by the committees were evident.¹

In the pre-campaign period it was not clear as to what the candidates would find to speak about, since one implied effect of elections in a one-party system is to do away with open conflict over National Policy statements. Both candidates are members of TANU, both theoretically accept the agreed party policy; both will presumably work through the party hierarchy if they disagree with that policy. However, this implication did not have too inhibiting an effect. The "real" politician was quick to realise that what the electorate responded to, and what they understood were local "shauris" or issues,² (as well as personal humour). Thus, great emphasis (excluding the time spent on the symbols) was placed on attitudes expressing demand/promises on which there would be complete consensus. The choice was framed in terms of picking the most "effective" individual on the basis of the candidate's local performance. One could conjecture that this kind of choice might well have been identical at this stage, even if two-parties had been competing! That is, given the prevailing culture, politics is the politics of the locality rather than the Nation.

The regulations concerning the content of speeches remained open-ended, it being taken for granted that no anti-TANU line would be launched; on the other hand, the regulations concerning private campaigning were very strict indeed. As already noted elsewhere, it was expected that the two candidates would be treated as if they were one person, as if there were one campaign. Any private action which could be interpreted as an action to solicit votes, including the buying of Pombe (the local brew), was deemed to be illegal. Although this perhaps represents an "ideal" which it is impossible to maintain in toto, nevertheless, a vigorous attempt was made to ensure observance of the spirit of the law. The second Vice-President, Hon. Rashidi Kawawa, personally toured many constituencies to ensure the neutrality and impartiality of TANU and during the campaign Dr. Klerruu, Acting Asst.

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1. This aspect is dealt with more fully in Goran Hyden's case-study of the Bukoba Region and Lionel Cliffe's political summary.
 2. Basil Mrambo gives interesting examples of this parochial emphasis in his paper on the Kilimanjaro Region.

Secretary General of TANU issued a stern directive to all officials on this same point.

But, as is to be expected, in many constituencies there was evidence of private campaigning. The form it took varied from the use of family, TANU, or local government connections to the use of rumours, superstition and in rare cases religious influence. However the evidence also illustrates that the unofficial private campaigning, as with the official public ones, were remarkably free from violence and corruption. In one constituency three or four people (including at least one person rejected by the N.E.C. and one other defeated at the district level) were detained for running a campaign against the incumbent; also there were rumours of at least three TANU branch officials being detained and the suspension of a Returning Officer on the day of the election.

Concurrently, in the few constituencies where candidates felt they were being intimidated,¹ most quickly found they could obtain on-the-spot redress following complaints made to the Supervisory Committee or Regional Commissioner. Alternatively, if the Commissioners felt that candidates were exerting undue influence they also, in some cases, placed restrictions on the candidates. To give just one example, in Korogwe a candidate (the TANU District Chairman) was requested by the Area Commissioner to leave his village and join the other candidate in town whereupon both were then barred from using bars and from extending private hospitality.

Mention of these areas where informal influence can be exerted serve to illustrate the difficulties of legislating to ensure the "fair" treatment of one-party candidates on contested elections. We shall return to this point later.

But before going on to examine the administrative arrangements pertaining to voting and counting we might return briefly to the question of symbols, as these raised a further point of difficulty. It would seem that for cultural reasons it was much easier to use the Jembe (Hoe) to one's advantage than the Nyumba (House).² There is no doubt that the swing (59 Jembe were successful against 42 Nyumba) was marginally in favour of the Jembe, regarded as the "source of all wealth" in rural Tanzania. In at least eight constituencies the symbol was a decisive factor. In less marginal areas it probably influenced the total result without necessarily changing the predicted result. It certainly could have been one of the factors which led to the demise of so many Party District Chairmen; of the thirteen defeated ten had the House as their symbol (see appendix)

Indeed, for these reasons it seems already agreed that the present

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1. In one constituency, that of North Mara, intimidation provides one of the grounds for a petition.
 2. The data for this statement is to be found in Lionel Cliffe's political summary.

symbols will not be used again. Perhaps the new choice will look to abstract designs, although the discovery of any design which is free from all religious and cultural connotations will prove difficult, (and even then there is no guarantee that electors will associate it with the man.)

Voting and Counting Arrangements

The legal regulations for the voting and counting arrangements were precise and exact; the Returning Officer shall... "furnish each polling station with... compartments... in which the voters can, screened from observation, record their votes;... the Presiding Officer or his assistant shall mark some part of one hand with indelible ink... If a voter... is unable to read, he may call the presiding officer aside and shall tell him... the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote and the presiding officer shall mark the ballot paper accordingly... If at the hour of the closing of the poll... there are voters present who have not had an opportunity to vote the poll shall be open for sufficient time..." (National Assembly (Elections) Act 1965). An amendment allowed for an agent to be chosen by the TANU Executive Committee. It was also agreed that voting should take place in 72 constituencies on the 21st September, the remaining 35 on the 26th September.

These regulations describe the kind of administrative requirements deemed necessary to impartial implementation of the election. However, many of the arrangements were ad-hoc and did not come up to the standard envisaged.

Perhaps this was understandable as to all intents and purposes these were the first "mass" elections to be held in Tanzania: as already stated, in the last elections of 1960, only 121,445 votes were cast. The nearest equivalent to a mass turn-out had been for the presidential election held in 1962 in which just over one million votes were recorded.

Now the two elections for the National Assembly and for the President were combined in one process more complicated than before. Queues formed at dawn and lasted until dusk, when many families had still not been attended to, although they might have been waiting for anything up to eight hours. Some polling stations remained open until late at night using the light of flares. Others seem to have been unaware of the extended time clause and closed at six in spite of queues. As usual the urban areas had a speedier turnover than the predominantly rural areas (although Kivukoni students had to queue for six hours in Kigamboni across the ferry from Dar es Salaam).

The snag was that each voter had to receive two explanations, one concerning the Presidential ballot paper, where the voter would have to be shown where he could place his tick or cross, either under the symbol of the black spot--indicating acceptance of Julius K. Nyerere--or alternatively under the shaded square--indicating non-acceptance. The other explanation concerned the elections to the National Assembly. In addition to this the voter's card would have to be checked and his

finger marked. If the voter was illiterate, another lengthy process would be involved. He would have to explain who his choice was and the paper would have to be marked by the Presiding Officer (who invariably was a teacher). It is estimated that it took on the average four to five minutes to deal with each voter. It is true that given a great deal of good-will the electoral machinery was able to cope with these problems. But no doubt some modifications could be made.

The decision to use either a cross or a tick led to ambiguity which could have been decisive. For example, in Arusha Rural, in one polling station 90% of the ballot papers (120 in all) were marked with both a tick and a cross. The attempt to use the tick to register a positive vote was clear, but the papers were spoilt. In yet another constituency, where the difference was less than 100, a Presiding Officer had failed to put the official stamp on the ballot forms and consequently the papers were void, and grounds were provided for another petition.

Another problem was language: many people were puzzled by the oral explanation, e.g. neither the word "rais" for "president" nor the word used for "tick" or "cross" were familiar to all. And in one or two areas the people did not trust the Presiding Officer and felt perhaps unjustly that he was not carrying out their instructions. In fact a TANU agent in Mwanza observed at least one clear case of an infringement.

In each constituency the Returning Officer also received comprehensive instructions (Form E.C.1/4/43) explaining how the votes should be counted. But as in the case of the voting arrangements one felt that the sheer weight of numbers of the electorate led again to minor and unintended irregularities. Often an Area Secretary would be responsible for up to three constituencies each one involving the counting of many thousands of ballots from the Presidential and Parliamentary voting.

It is not altogether surprising that the pressure of time and the use of relatively inexperienced staff led to some arrangements differing from the written instructions. To give just one example, section 12 of the instructions states clearly that the first step is to count the number of ballot papers in each box, writing them down on a form, and then to compare the totals on the Presiding Officer's forms. Yet, in many cases ballot boxes were being emptied straight on to a central pile; thus the opportunity was lost of making any double check.

To laymen, these technicalities may appear minor. However it is extremely important that the defeated candidate is given no opportunity to question the electoral administration. In marginal constituencies the candidate will only accept the defeat if he personally feels that

the administration has been efficient and fair. Otherwise he will merely feel defrauded and be encouraged to file unnecessary petitions.

PART TWO

Having given an outline of the administrative framework and a descriptive analysis of Tanzania's one-party election, it may now prove useful to introduce a few general considerations suggested by the analysis, concentrating in the main on administrative aspects followed by a brief consideration of some of the political aspects.

The election clearly gave rise to many of the problems which other writers¹ have found to characterise the early elections in countries emerging from pre-colonial tutelary Western-democracy. A characteristic of such elections is that whereas the written legalistic regulations may well be as precise and as comprehensive as one would find in the donor country, the implementors will be relatively inexperienced and operate within a technologically less developed territory.

The inherent communication difficulties arising out of this characteristic are of primary concern given the size and the scattered nature of the population of the country. These difficulties are compounded in so far as directions from the centre are important in outlining the procedures which the administrators are to follow. They had, as we have already observed, considerable impact on, for example, the efficacy of the work of both the Returning Officers and Supervisory Committees. In effect these officers possessed a wide area of discretionary power because of the lack of centralised training and opportunity to clear with the centre each administrative stage. The use of this power was a contributory factor to the lack of conformity in the voting and counting procedures mentioned earlier as also to the inconsistency of the supervisors' participation. What is needed to offset the poor communication network is a greater emphasis on centralised training of the personnel involved.

But perhaps it is not necessary to dwell too long on these problems as there is no doubt that a significant proportion of them are peculiar to this first election. One can expect, with each subsequent election, a reduction of that part of the discretionary power which arises out of technical inexperience. And as there already exist tentative proposals to use the same system for both the election of local councillors and party officials, sufficient experience may well be rapidly gained.

1. See works by T. E. Smith, MacKenzie, Robinson, and K. W. J. Post.

In addition, there is a further cluster of problems which relate specifically to this first election and will therefore/^{also} give rise to a reduction in the administrative difficulties in the future. The new system is imaginatively experimental, the devisors having almost no comparative material to draw upon¹ took pains to introduce a system organic to Tanzanian culture. But even then its novelty naturally posed problems. It quickly became apparent that insufficient time had been allowed between the acceptance of the new constitution and its implementation, and as a consequence the electorate and officials did not always possess a satisfactory understanding of the novel procedures involved. The lengthy queues on the election day, the variable registration, and, in some areas, the high degree of abstentions can be scored against this time factor.

However, this first election was not without its administrative advantages. Next time, there will exist at all stages, knowledgeable participants who may well exert pressures on the observable manipulative areas where discretionary power operates. For example, and given that no modifications are made, one can expect future aspiring candidates to do a great deal of private campaigning during the registration and nomination period not covered by existing legislation. Also attempts to influence selection delegates by perhaps more mercenary means may well develop; at present it is not certain that the party delegates are sufficiently ideologically disciplined to enable them to withstand these pressures. In addition a continuing relatively illiterate electorate provides further opportunities for the misuse of discretionary power, particularly by presiding officers who are instructing the people in the exercise of their choice. Although this particular kind of problem could be lessened by such mechanistic means as the use of a rubber stamp pre-marked with the cross, etc.

Other areas of pressure are more political in nature. This time only six candidates were unopposed and therefore did not have to submit themselves to the gruelling electoral contest. These examples must provide great temptation to other national figures in the future to use their influence to achieve the same position, particularly when the results have indicated the vulnerability of candidates whose reputation and occupation are based in Dar es Salaam rather than in the locality. Given the contemporary parochial nature of the elections, it can even be argued that the Ministers are at present being put into a less advantageous position than a local officeholder. The problem is further accentuated as Tanzania does not as yet possess the equivalent of the Party "safe seat" or the House of Lords, but merely possesses the retrospective presidential nominated seat. The use of this in the case of the defeated Minister of Finance

¹. Egypt, to date, seems to have been the only other country to have followed a similar experiment. (Source: E. Childers and P. Mansfield.)

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KILIMANJARO : CHAGGA READJUSTMENT TO
NATIONALISM.

By Basil P. Mramba.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO POLITICS.

A feature of post-independence Chagga politics has been the increasing recognition by local political leadership and the people at large, of the need for a readjustment towards nationalism under TANU leadership. Previously, close Colonial tutelage under indirect rule as well as rapid socio-economic change had by 1960 given rise to a form of tribal sub-nationalism, glorifying its achievements and desirous of making even more strides in this direction. Historically consisting of warring petty chiefdoms that were in themselves autonomous political units, the Wachagga had by 1951 united under a single Paramount Chief or "Mangi Mkuu" whose influence among other Chiefs in Tanganyika and in colonial administrative circles was considerable. It was under him that the symbols of Chagga sub-nationalism attained pride of place. The Chagga Council became a sort of tribal Parliament, while the Chagga flag, coat of arms and anthem, to say nothing of "Chagga Day", crowned it all.

Yet underneath this pomp lay the hangover of localist feelings owing as much to local history as to physical features, which also demarcated individual chiefdoms. These feelings as will be seen below, have always had an impact on local political decision-making, though other factors also count.

It was not until TANU made real headway in Kilimanjaro - after the abolition of tribal parties - that this readjustment really took a significant turn. But as will also be seen TANU has had its own difficulties in the area and it would be inaccurate to assume that even under this single party the people put as much emphasis on party record as does the party leadership in order that one might win an election. They do however accept the fact that any candidate ought to be a party member and normally like to work within the party machinery.

The Wachagga, who together with the Wapare are the main tribes in the Kilimanjaro Region, are only a fifth of Tanzania's main tribes. Progress in education was mainly the work of Christian missionaries who have worked in the area for seven decades and whose various institutions produced the earlier teachers and clerks, an influential group in local politics. It is through the influence of the educated elites that the local chiefly establishment came under strong fire, first in the late forties and decisively in the late 1950's, culminating in the 1960 plebiscite which rejected hereditary paramount chieftaincy in favour of an elective President and in the 1961

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Parliamentary abolition of the Chiefs which was regretted by very few people. Two former Chiefs who stood were rejected on the outset in the district selection.

The Wachagga are an agricultural people growing a variety of food crops on the mountain slopes. Coffee, the main cash crop, has been grown for over thirty years now under the auspices of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (K.N.C.U.) through which it is also marketed. Much of the socio-economic change in the area owes considerably to coffee growing. Through its annual elections at all levels, the K.N.C.U. had in a sense provided the first training ground for democratic practice. More significantly it has provided much of the local political leadership, having absorbed the more educated people from the early days. In this election the K.N.C.U. President, Mr. Lema, as well as a few local branch officials stood, though as it will be shown, none of them finally went through for various reasons.

2. TANU AND THE ELECTION:

I pointed out earlier that TANU's penetration in Kilimanjaro was from the start hampered by unco-operative traditional rulers. Further, TANU's period of intense anti-colonial struggle coincided with the period of anti-traditional and reformist tribal movements which diverted most of the Chagga people from the nationalist struggle. This was further aggravated by Chagga suspiciousness, somewhat justified by Youth Wing activities and poor relations with local incumbents and especially with the Kilimanjaro District Council in 1964. TANU's image has however improved considerably since, partly because of better relations with the people and especially because whatever may be the faults of local party officials the people believe that even Nyerere would not approve of it.

Kilimanjaro Region was for electoral purposes divided into five constituencies, one in Pare and four in the Kilimanjaro districts. These were from east to west - Rombo, Vunjo, Central and Hai west, the bulk of whose electorate is Chagga.

In all 44+ candidates registered. These included two women, (one Miss Lucy Lameck was and still is a Junior Minister) a Minister (Mr. Elinfoo) an unemployed Asian and Dr. L. Stirling, a European sitting M.P. for Nachingwea in Southern Tanzania but who had recently come in to take up employment in a Catholic hospital near Moshi. He was subsequently nominated by Parliament as a National Member, having lost at the district selection in Moshi. Most of the candidates were drawn from the teaching profession and the economic (especially co-operative) sector. A majority of them stated that they wanted to provide better leadership in their respective areas and to co-operate with the

+ Rombo: 12, Vunjo 11, Central 14 and Hai West 7.

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Government in implementing the Five Year Plan. Most of them had no difficulty in obtaining nomination signatures and did so indiscriminately, while a few were "choosy".

3. THE DISTRICT CONFERENCE.

Each candidate was quizzed for an average of 15 minutes by one or the other of the 114 delegates, though Mr. Eliufoo and one other candidate actually spent the longest time of 45 minutes there. Most questions were in reality asked by the Regional Commissioner as Regional Party Secretary who also was mainly responsible for those questions of a national or international nature. An average of 4 to 5 questions of varying depths and nature were asked each candidate. A few candidates like Mr. Eliufoo were questioned only on their fields.

Although complaints of lobbying beforehand are difficult to establish, they probably were not altogether absent though again it is difficult to say just how effective they were. Most if not all, candidates seem to have been taken unawares by the questioners, though as some of them later complained, it was doubtful whether considering the calibre of most of the delegates and the nature of the questions asked, voting would have been based mainly on the weight of candidates' answers.

4. REGISTRATION of voters was hampered by distance from the registration offices and in the town by its coincidence with working hours. In some areas there were those who, thinking this election would not be different from any other, saw no point in registering to rubber-stamp what they thought would have been the obvious. There was however a very high proportion of female voters, mainly urged on by local women's leaders. The figures were:-

<u>Estimated Adult Population.</u>	<u>Registered Voters</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Kilimanjaro Hai West 48,000	30,889	64.4%
Kilimanjaro Central 55,000	33,670	61.2%
Kilimanjaro Rombo 44,000	26,776	60.8%
Kilimanjaro Vunjo 53,000	28,982	54.7%

Lionel Cliffe has estimated that about two thirds of the country's adult population registered and about the same figure voted. It would appear therefore that the figures for Kilimanjaro are not on the whole far below the national average.

5. CAMPAIGNS.

Official campaigns began on the 23rd August and ended on the 17th September in the Kilimanjaro Central

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constituency. In all, upwards of one hundred meetings were held and the attendance was high. Interrogating candidates was at first not allowed and although it was later permissible not much use was made of it. The Supervisory committees appear to have been in control of their respective constituencies although in the Hai West constituency Mr. A.A. Mbowe, the defeated candidate, unsuccessfully complained in a high court suit against Mr. Eliufoo's election that the party's Youth League "organised a campaign" against him and that he was not accorded "an equal and fair opportunity in the organisation and conduct of the election campaign"+. There probably were isolated cases of such "unfair" and even more subtle campaigning, though it is difficult to establish them beyond doubt, or to say to what extent they contravened the exact letter of the campaign regulations.

6. CANDIDATES ISSUES AND RESULTS:

The TANU National Executive retained the first and second choices of the District Conference for all constituencies. In Hai West and Central the second choices eventually failed while in the remaining two constituencies they went through. In Rombo and Hai West the hoe (Nyumba) won while the hoe (jembe) won in Vunjo and Central. In all constituencies arguments on the symbols were rife but not decisive: more often than not they only helped to reinforce other factors: character, political record, education and local base, among others.

Thus Mr. S.N. Eliufoo (Nyumba, Hai West) was for example well-known throughout Kilimanjaro as the District's sitting M.P., former C.D.P. and Chagga President as well as holder of several ministerial posts especially that of education, always considered important in view of the people's sensitivity to education at all levels. Miss Lucy Lameck (Jembe, Central) was a Junior Minister; Mr. Hariel N. Kida (Jembe, Vunjo) has always been a veteran trade unionist who rose to become NUTA's ++ Deputy General Secretary. Of the winners only Mr. A.S. Maskini (Nyumba, Rombo) was not a national figure, having been mainly involved in local Government affairs and the running of several local organisations.

Opposing these were also people of outstanding records: Mr. Onesimo Lema (Nyumba, Central) was until just before the elections the Regional TANU Chairman, a former district chairman, K.N.C.U. President, former Chairman of Moshi Town Council and member of several bodies. Mrs. Kanasia T. Mtenga (Nyumba, Vunjo) a community worker, held several posts in TANU and the Town Council and has for long been Vice-President of the U.W.T. - the National Women's Organisation - as well as being its District Chairman. Mr. Mikael A. Mbowe (Jembe, Hai West) was a locally well-known owner of a hotel in town and other subsidiary busin-

+ The Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania,
Dar es Salaam 19th November 1965, p.867.

++ National Union of Tanganyika Workers.

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esses. Mr. Sabas M. Assenga (Jembe, Rombo) was, like Mr. Maskini, active in local government politics and organisations.

What one did while holding such positions was at times important. Mr. Elinfoo was renowned for his honesty, integrity and hard work, obvious advantages over his opponent, about whom there had been rumours of a bad past. Miss Laneck successfully exposed Mr. Lema's alleged misuse of office for self-aggrandisement, thus implying the opposite for herself, while Mr. Kida, although perhaps not as well known personally in his constituency, nevertheless scored over Mrs. Mtenga about whose character there had been rumours and whose marriage to a Catholic in Rombo discredited her before some Protestant voters. Only in Rombo was there little to choose between the two although again there were references to Assenga's "quietness", as opposed to Maskini's sociability and diplomatic loquacity which he probably earned over the years as a tailor and salesman. Honesty, integrity ability to get on with the people and to help them count in the Chagga assessment of character while "pride" (the opposite) is detested.

It is these considerations that were often balanced against other factors like education, effectiveness as an incumbent, local base, sex etc. Education is never altogether ignored in the choice of especially a public figure of this sort. The Colonial Administration partly encouraged this attitude by using educational arguments to install a chief of its choice. The people used the same argument to discredit some of the Chiefs in the late 1950's. Thus, Elinfoo, a graduate, was way above his ex-primary opponent, Mr. Mbowe. The latter's poor Swahili was sometimes attributed to his low education and added to his disadvantages: how would he even qualify to unseat Elinfoo in the Cabinet? In the remaining constituencies there was not much to choose between candidates in this respect though in Rombo it was greatly regretted that TANU had not chosen some of the more educated and popular candidates - including a graduate, a rarity in the area.

Classical localist arguments were manifest in the Vunjo and Rombo constituencies. Mrs. Mtenga who was born and brought up in Vunjo was considered an "outsider" by virtue of her marriage to a Rombo man, both of whom live in Moshi, Kilimanjaro Central. Would she really represent Vunjo with wholehearted devotion without taking heed of Rombo and or Central interests at Vunjo's expense? Yet she herself did not feel secure enough to stand in Rombo since she does not live there while her Vunjo background could have put her in similar difficulties. Maskini's victory in Rombo was almost exclusively attributed to his geographical base in the extreme east end of the Rombo road at Usseri. Assenga's home is at Mriti Mahida near the Vunjo border, west end of the road. The main controversy centred on the Rombo road which has in

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recent years been highly politicised. To have it wholly macadamised one needed a local boy (who knows where the shoe pinches) and one who lives at the extreme east end since he would not rest until he had a good road right to his home. In two other areas in Kilimanjaro influential incumbents had ensured that good roads reached their homes: Maskini would not be exceptional. Assenga might forget about it immediately his part was covered, which would have been negligible. Yet this rather sophisticated argument was advanced in spite of the general knowledge that the road had been provided for in the five year plan. For them, however, too many promises (even about the same road) had been given in the past and too little had in fact been done; Rombo must catch up with the rest of Kilimanjaro.

In at least two constituencies the campaigns were crucial: in Kilimanjaro Central this was probably the most important factor. Lucy's speeches and organisational techniques were probably unmatched in the whole country and drew hundreds of people. The Eliufoo-Mbowe mudslinging exercise amused many but exposed the latter's weakness especially in self-expression. Mrs. Mtenga made impressive speeches but she was too much at a disadvantage against her opponent.

Finally traditionalist arguments invoked sex and the symbols. Miss Laneck nipped sex appeals in the bud, but Mrs. Mtenga's position was difficult. Some (especially old) people would not flout tradition by "giving inheritance" to a woman when a man was available; others including fellow women, would just not vote for a woman: this was a man's job. In all constituencies there were arguments about the symbols. The "jembe" was associated with health and wealth, without which even houses cannot be built. In Rombo, perhaps to add to Maskini's weight, attempts were made to rationalise the significance of the house: exposed to the naked forces of nature one cannot live. Besides even the government has already recognised this by urging people to build better houses. In all, however, the jembe carried more weight but nowhere were symbols decisive.

Yet behind all these considerations lay the people's desire for local services - roads, water, clinics, schools, better land etc. The magnitude of these demands differed from place to place and from constituency to constituency but candidates were wise enough to relate them to the five year plan.

RESULTS:

Constituency Candidates	District Conference Votes	Conference %	Final Results	Majority
<u>Kilimanjaro Hai West</u>				
Mr. S.N. Eliufoo (N)	101	91%	20,213	<u>13,820</u>
Mr. A.A. Mbowe (J)	6	5%	6,393	

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RESULTS: Contd.

<u>Constituency</u> <u>Candidates</u>	<u>District</u> <u>Votes</u>	<u>Conference</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Final</u> <u>Results</u>	<u>Majority</u>
<u>Kilimanjaro Central</u> Miss L. Lameck (J) Mr. O.M.J. Lema (N)	68 17	60% 16%	26,902 1,616	<u>25,286</u>
<u>Kilimanjaro Vunjo</u> Mrs. K.T. Mtenga (N) Mr. H.N. Kida (J)	44 26	39% 23%	2,949 21,294	<u>18,345</u>
<u>Kilimanjaro Rombo</u> Mr. S.M. Assenga (J) Mr. A.S. Maskini (N)	45 21	40% 19%	4,318 18,120	<u>13,802</u>

Interest in the election was lively. Discussions and prognostications of results were common in bars, buses, households, "pombe" shops and other places. TANU's image considerably improved as a result of the election; defeated candidates had no grudge against the party as such. Only in Rombo was it felt that TANU had let them down by presenting them with a low calibre of candidates. Many people learnt about the Government through the speeches and those broadcast over the radio which also provided an interesting comparison and a feeling of participation in a national undertaking.

Yet in Kilimanjaro purely localist attitudes and aspirations, often rooted in the desire for local services, became the guidelines for this aspect of local adjustment to nationalism. Chiefs were rejected; more women participated and the presence of the government through TANU and the speeches was felt. In all probability this trend will be even more intensified, so long as the Central Government, rather than the local authority, continues to be regarded as the real giver of benefits. But the extent to which this will go will depend very much on the continued confidence in Government performance and effectiveness. Recent tension over the problem of ex-primary leavers points to possible areas of misunderstanding and even misgivings between voters and voted, rulers and ruled. Nevertheless whatever the case there is no doubt that for the people of Kilimanjaro their greatest challenge is whether they will accept to solve their problems in the national context, even if it might mean some amount of marking time. The election has shown that they are not very different in attitudes or degree of participation from the rest of the country.

APPLICATION OF CENTRAL PLACE THEORY IN MENGO AND BUSOGA DISTRICTS

by

Mario Ponzio
Peter Kamalamo

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I. INTRODUCTION

Like most newly independent countries, Uganda is still at an early stage of the process called urbanization. All over the world urban population is growing at faster rates than total population and this fact is also verified here when comparisons between the 1948 and 1959 population censuses are made. The trends will be accelerated as industrialization advances but technical and economic progress will also transform the countryside changing the relationship between urban and rural areas.

This paper is concerned not with the development of merely urban centres but with the relationships between them and their hinterlands. Geographers and economists have for more than 100 years dealt with these problems and the present paper is an attempt to apply some of their findings adjusting them to fit into the circumstances prevailing here.

It is hoped that this paper will be of both theoretical and practical value, theoretical in that it applies theories used mainly in the Western world to African conditions, practical in that it could form the basis from which economic and physical planners draw conclusions about future development.

II. THE THEORY OF CENTRAL PLACES

Since von Thunen¹⁾ in 1826 presented his work on cities with concentric circles of land use developing around them, an increasing number of geographers and economists have studied and developed theories concerning the relationships between urban centres and their surrounding hinterlands. It took until 1933 before a theoretical framework for the study of settlements was developed through the work of Christaller²⁾ in southern Germany.

A certain amount of productive land supports an urban centre and it exists because services have to be offered to the surrounding rural area. Thus locational factors such as access to waterways, road or rail junctions (communications) and administrative functions performed, mentioned by Christaller, are of minor importance, the productivity of land determines the siting of the centre. One normally assumes that the larger the city the larger its complimentary region, sphere of influence or service area. A hierarchical class-system of central places will develop, from the smallest performing only a few services up to the large city with a tributary area comprising many smaller service areas and providing services on a higher level. The hexagonal pattern of service areas presented by Christaller is wellknown. Each class offers specific groups of services and is characterized by a discrete population level of its centres. This model has not been substantiated by the empirical studies of Zipf³⁾ with his rank-size rule, where the largest city of say a nation, ranks number 1, the second largest number 2 etc. A regular continuous relationship becomes apparent when ranks are plotted against population size. A partial explanation of the contradiction is that, as centres raise their hierarchical positions, short term imperfections in the adjustment to their new classes will arise, allowing for variations in e.g. population of places of the same order.

Christaller's theories have been generalized by Losch⁴⁾ carried forward by Hottel⁵⁾ and criticized by others for being too abstract and lacking in adaptability except in rural, homogenous areas.

Services that are performed only for a surrounding area are called central functions by Christaller and the settlements performing them central places. Different central places have different central functions i.e. "supply of goods or availability of services coming from, going to or being localized to a centre" and because of this a classification of centres can be made according to their centrality i.e. "the degree of central functions the centre in question exercises over its hinterland", according to Godlund⁶⁾.

Measurements of the central importance of cities often start with population but this alone does not give a true measurement of the centrality. Thus in addition to population Christaller used an index based on number of telephones in proportion to the average number per thousand inhabitants. This measure is not very useful today as the telephone is such a common article as pointed out by Ullman⁷⁾ who mentions other indices more useful, such as number of out-of-town telephone calls and the amount or percentage of business drawn from outside the urban centre. More modern methods include bus services (Green⁸⁾ and local newspaper circulation areas. Reilly⁹⁾ one of the originators of studies on retail trade and urban hinterlands, worked out mathematical relationships between population of centres and their respective spheres of influence. A later development is Godlund¹⁰⁾ who uses a method where the number of employees in retail trade gives a measure of centrality. The following formula is used:

$$C = \frac{St \times 100}{Pt}$$

Where C = centrality,
St = number of employees in retail trade in the central place and
Pt = population in the central place.

This formula indicates that the more people employed in retail trade in relation to population of the central place the higher its centrality. A larger labour force is needed to serve both the urban place and its hinterland.

Other scholars have dealt with the problem by dividing production (Alexander¹¹⁾) or services in an urban centre into basic or city forming functions i.e. producing goods for distant markets or performing services of regional or national importance and non-basic or city serving functions i.e. producing goods or providing services for the centres and their immediate hinterlands only.

The various classification attempts mentioned above could be called, with Jacobson¹²⁾, the analytical methods, using more technical and complicated tools, while others, easier to deal with, add up centrality indicators and could be called the enumerative methods. Several of the authors critical to Christaller's method have adopted the enumeration principle.

Indicators, i.e. the various services available in the centres in question, are added together by different authors in various ways and the sums form the basis for the determining of the degree of centrality. The services are usually to be found among the following main functional groups: Administration, Communication, Social Services, Commerce and Local Industries.

Much work has been carried out in this field mainly among smaller trading centres in rural areas (see Ullman¹³), Berry and Garrison¹⁴) and only a few will be mentioned here. Bracey¹⁵) built an index on the occurrence of 36 selected services divided into six functional groups. Watanabe¹⁶) uses as many as 121 indicators. In USA studies have among others been carried out by Brush¹⁷).

Services of an urban centre can be described by their quality and quantity. Boesch¹⁸) states that "the quality of the services available in a locality defines its degree of centrality, while the quantity of the services available is in general only a function of people served". The quality of a service can be studied according to the variety i.e. the number of different services offered by an urban centre and according to the level i.e.

the population support needed by different establishments within one particular kind of service, a hospital being a higher level establishment than a health centre. The qualitative properties of services offered by different centres will often be different and by measuring their variety and level it will be possible to arrive at more distinctive estimates of centrality. The statement on quantity is applicable only to areas with high and even development where ratios of services per capita are more or less constant. In a developing country, however, to make services available to all inhabitants would at present involve costs that could not be borne. Measurements of the quantity of services could therefore be of importance in assessing the centrality of urban places in certain areas.

Several of the above mentioned studies show that the spatial patterns in widely different areas are alike, e.g. Brush and Bracey¹⁹) distinguished three orders of urban centres spaced apart at about 21, 8-10 and 4-6 miles. There thus seems to be certain spatial relationships in the hierarchy of settlements confirming Christaller's theories. On the other hand criticism has been raised against the hierarchical systems mainly because most studies use a priori methods. The class-system is perhaps only present in an arbitrary form and instead differentiation along a continuum is more appropriate (Vining²⁰). Berry and Garrison²¹) discuss this matter further but their findings go along with what Christaller postulated 25 years earlier.

More recent studies were discussed at the International Geographical Congress 1960²²) where many of the authors referred to above contributed to the theory of central places. Papers dealing with a more mathematical approach to the study of urban development were presented by, among others, Dacey²³). Berry and Mayer²⁴) introduced the concepts of threshold and range into the central place theory. By threshold is meant the

condition of entry of a business measured by the minimum sales volume needed to support the business and range or size of hinterland relates to the area occupied by this threshold sales volume. Many studies using enumerative methods have been criticised for being too static i.e. studying urban settlement patterns at one point in time only. More dynamic approaches have been introduced by Thomas²⁵⁾ who uses statistical methods for his trend analysis of the past and Merrill²⁶⁾ who tries to predict the development of urban place patterns over time using simulation methods. Such concepts and approaches are used to further sharpen the tools for the study of central places. There is scope for improvement of theories and for much further research into the development patterns of urban centres especially in areas, e.g. developing countries, where trends in urbanization indicate rapid changes in the rural-urban picture.

III Application of Central Place Theory to Mengo and Busoga Districts

The aim of this paper is to give an assessment, based on the principle of Central Place Theory, of the distribution of urban centres in Mengo and Busoga Districts, covering a land area of approximately 13100 sq. miles with a population, according to the latest Census (1959), of approximately 1,900,000 Africans and Non-Africans. Urban centres are taken as including even trading centres having only a few inhabitants. (see Appendix A) The very low degree of urbanization in Uganda, 5% at the Census in 1959, has prompted their inclusion as well, as they can be easily distinguished from their rural surroundings by the services they offer. Kampala, Jinja, Mengo Municipality, Nakawa, Kawempe and Njeru Townships have however been excluded from this study as they exert influence reaching all parts of Uganda. It is important to note that the study was handicapped by the absence of information and data required to give a more reliable classification of urban centres. Unlike studies in more developed countries mentioned in the chapter above, where data often is abundant, here much of the kind of information used is lacking. Especially the analytical methods all involve the gathering of statistics yet not available in Uganda.

It is however possible to collect information about quite a wide range of urban services. An enumerative method has thus been used in this study. In all a total of 12 basic services were studied and consist of Postal services, Petrol service stations, Telephone services, Bus Service, Railway Service, Electricity supply, Police, Medical services, Education, Road junction, Banks, Local Industry.

More services such as Churches and Mosques, Community Centres, Rest Camps and Hotels, Local Government Headquarters will be included, time did not allow this in the present paper, to give a fuller picture of the pattern of urban places. The distribution of those services conform to those whose data were recorded and tests made indicate that only small changes occur in the picture presented here. The services studied are to some extent arbitrarily selected as they had to be available from records held by government sources or private firms. They however include different kinds from the main functional groups mentioned earlier and include several examples of more than one level of establishment in the same kind of service e.g. Petrol Station - a) Full Service Station b) Filling Station.

One vital service had to be excluded from this study - that of markets. They are an important factor in the life of both rural and urban dwellers as they collect and distribute goods and also offer a range of other types of service such as hair cutting, bicycle repairs etc. Markets had to be left aside as no ready measure of their relative importance was available. It is possible to obtain data on the amount of revenue collected in tolls at each market but tolls are not uniform throughout the area studied and in fact some markets do not charge dues at all.

Temple²⁷⁾ has carried out a market survey in the Greater Kampala area based on tolls collected. The relative importance of markets is somewhat distorted by the factor of non-uniform dues in that area, where the larger markets like Nakasero are charged higher than the smaller ones. Information based on tolls reflects the volume of business, the centrality of a market is better measured if data on the variety and level of goods and services offered could be collected. Furthermore most of the markets often lie away from the urban centres in this study thus not contributing

to the centrality of the settlements.

This paper was initiated by the pioneering work by Grove and Huszar⁽²⁰⁾ in Ghana. The theoretical framework on centrality presented by them has been adopted here with one major exception. In Ghana the theory of central places has been strictly adhered to so far as quantitative data e.g. several establishments of the same level in the same kind of service have not been allowed to add to the centrality of a place. It is the variety and level, not the quantity of services offered that determines the centrality. This is one of the reasons why markets have not been included in the Ghana study as data is only available on the volume of business. Neither have industries, measured by number of employees, or health services, measured by number of beds, been included as they often serve a wider area than the complimentary regions of the central places to which they are located. In Chapters 5 and 7 of Grove and Huszar's study⁽²⁰⁾ however supplementary information of the kind mentioned above has been included in order to establish the functional types of central places as distinct from their centrality. This can be explained by the example of the mining town which is not necessarily in intimate contact with(its).... complimentary region - not withstanding its significance in the national economy. It is characteristic of this type of function that its significance is not related to centrality!⁽²⁰⁾

In this study however the very low degree of urbanization in Uganda, has prompted the authors to include indicators that do not strictly comply with the theory of central places. This is the case with employment in industry, local and those serving wider markets, a large labour force demands more and/or better services, both recorded ones here and those not recorded, than a smaller one thus enhancing the centrality of a place. It was also considered that e.g. a central place having more than one bank should have a higher degree of centrality because a larger contributory area is needed to support say, two banks instead of only one. Another point is that, as only two districts in Uganda have been studied so far, the impact on an urban centre of an industry with 100+ employees or of several banks is quite substantial but might however not be considered so great when looked upon in a national context. The discussion following Boesch's statement in Chapter II is also a factor to bear in mind.

When information about the selected urban services has been gathered the measuring of the quantity, size and quality (variety and level) consisted of attaching points to each service totalling them together for each central place, the sum being their respective degree of centrality. Certain objections to this approach and problems in attaching values to each individual service arise and are discussed in Appendix B where also the "scoring table" can be found.

Crucial to the interpretation of central place theory is the relationship between number of centres and degree of their centrality. In advanced countries where the theory has been applied, a curve with distinctive peaks of diminishing importance as centrality increases has been recorded on diagrams with scores on the X-axis and number of centres on the Y-axis. These peaks point to a clustering of central places which is the empirical evidence of Christaller's theoretical model that the settlements are arranged according to the grade of their centrality in a hierarchical pattern.

In this paper the diagram (App. C) does not give a clear picture of clustering around distinctive peaks. If the curve should indicate that a continuous relationship is prevailing no definite degrees of centrality can be extracted. But Grove and Huszar²⁸) have given the explanation that a developing country, having uneven population and income distributions as well as development levels, not mentioning historical factors having had their distorting effects, cannot expect a regular pattern in the distribution of urban centres.

This explanation might not be applicable here where the limited area studied is predominantly rural with fairly even population and income distributions indicating that a more regular pattern should have emerged. The small sizes of many of the urban centres included in this study might be the cause of the undetermined curve in the diagram. This has to be further investigated. Another attempt (App. C), using a diagram presented by Berry and Garrison²⁹) where the relationship between population and number of urban activities were studied, making the alteration of placing scores instead of activities, shows that the classes of urban places tend towards discrete levels of population as suggested by Christaller, implying a hierarchical pattern. The correlation coefficient is however weak, 0.69, which could be explained by the two variables not being comparable in time, population being recorded in 1959, scores in 1965. Bearing in mind the factors discussed above, the assumption of the hierarchy principle being operative here seems to be confirmed by the findings (see App. C) when disproportions of development are taken into consideration.

IV Geographical distribution of service centres

Chapter III gave an explanation of how central place theory has been applied to Mengo and Busoga Districts. Appendix D explains in map form the geographical distribution of the urban centres that have been classified into five grades by the scores given to them. The method of classification is described in appendix B.

From the map it can be seen that service centres are heavily scattered in Mengo District in an area covered by a radius of 50 miles around Kampala. Outside this area the settlements are spaced at much wider distances and occurring much more infrequent. To the North, centres are almost non-existent which can be accounted to the fact that this area is swampy. Westwards centres dwindle out as one approaches the dense forest reserves beyond Mityana. Similarly to the East, the area beyond Lugazi is occupied by the large Mabira Forest Reserve and hence few urban centres can be found. The whole hierarchy of settlements with few centres in the upper grades increasing with approximately a geometric progression, after Christaller, towards the lower grades is represented in Mengo District. Busoga District has a different distribution pattern of service centres, they are relatively few and spaced at wider distances than in Mengo District. The hierarchical pattern is not as apparent here as there are either too few centres of a higher order or too many in lower grades than a geometrical progression would allow (see Appendix C).

The difference in spatial patterns between the two Districts can be explained by the difference in population densities, the higher the densities the closer to each other or more frequent will the service centres occur, the 50 mile radius area around Kampala having 290 and Busoga 200 persons per square mile on the average (1959). To this can be further added that the road pattern is much more

developed in the more densely populated areas of Mengo than in Busoga. A good road network is, according to Christaller, an important locational factor for central places.

Another important feature noticeable in the distribution pattern of service centres is the tendency for centres to form a pattern of rings radiating out from Kampala and to a much lesser degree from Jinja in Busoga District, partly depending on the road network being better developed around Kampala. As one moves out of the periphery of the capital, a ring of low order centres emerge followed by centres of a somewhat higher order, after which small size centres occur again, before settlements of a higher degree of centrality arise, the highest since the Kampala urban complex. This pattern is then followed by new "waves" in the same way as described just now, the distance between the centres, however, becomes greater the further one moves away from the starting points. This feature is related to the decrease in population densities and shows the fact that the less the density the bigger will the hinterland of each centre have to be in order to support the services offered in the centre. Certain minimum population requirements exist for every service offered in order for it to operate efficiently or to operate according to established business laws. In areas with low income-levels the same effect as low population densities will be prevailing, a trader would need a larger hinterland in order to keep his business going. This pattern of concentric "waves" of settlements has also been empirically shown in a predominantly rural area in Southern Sweden (Godlund⁶).

When looking upon centres of the same grade another pattern emerges. The B-rating centres (see Appendix) are found to be 34 miles apart on the average, C-rating centres are about 13 miles apart while D- and E-centres are 6 and 3 miles apart on the average.

These distance figures resemble those presented by Brush and Bracey¹⁹). The spatial distribution of service centres observed in more developed countries seems to be applicable also to a developing country such as Uganda, with its young history of urbanization. One thing these studies have in common is that they all are dealing with predominantly homogenous rural area.

It should however be noticed that the patterns described above are not rigid ones. Physiographic and historical factors play their part in distorting a theoretical pattern. Factors such as the large plantations between Kampala and Jinja give rise to several large centres (high rating) close to each other. A centre such as Lugazi, with a population of over 8000, the highest recorded, does not, as could have been expected, have the highest score among the centres classified. This could be explained by the hinterland being dominated by sugar plantations so that the services offered cater mainly for the urban population, probably consisting to a very large extent of plantation workers. Mukono, on the other extreme, presents a picture of fairly low urban population combined with the highest score recorded. Here smaller plantations are located around Mukono using the centre for service purposes.

The above discussion leads to another aspect of hierarchical patterns, that of population of central places. Appendix A lists the centres for which population figures from the 1959 Census were available. This data is not strictly comparable with the material presented here but, since no more recent figures are available, has

been made use of. As can be seen from the table, in many instances the Non-African population exceeds that of the African, which raises the question of how centre boundaries were defined at the time of the Census as no maps seem to exist (the matter has been investigated). This factor might be existent as well in centres where no such easy measure can be used to detect any unreliability of the figures, Mukono might be a case, thus throwing doubts on the inclusion of population figures to this paper. Furthermore, to project urban population forwards to the present time of each of the centres studied could only lead to very rough estimates as very little information is available about relative growth between centres. Trends cannot be established as only one Census has been undertaken on urban population in smaller centres.

One might however venture to say, taking the above observations into consideration, that centres with high scores in 1965 and comparatively low figures for population in 1959 either have grown more rapidly than other centres or will become growth points in the future, Mukono and Mityana might be cases for such an assumption to be made. The reverse picture can be drawn for centres like Bugaya and Kabasanda having low scores and comparatively high number of inhabitants. A regression analysis on the material presented here (see Appendix C) shows that with an increase of 1 point in centrality there follows a population increase of approximately 75 persons, which could be used as a starting point for further investigations. Such studies cannot, however, be verified until another population census has been undertaken. Because of the above the population has been added to the paper as subsidiary information in that it assists in the evaluation of the distribution pattern of central places in Mungo and Busoga Districts.

One final aspect that has not been touched upon here is the matter of actually delimiting hinterlands or service areas for the urban centres studied. Spheres of influence of different magnitudes have been frequently mentioned throughout the paper but only in general terms. The lack of statistical information, necessary in order to apply indices of centrality discussed in Chapter II, has prevented the authors from using them.

The distance between centres figures could be used by simply drawing boundary lines at midpoint between any two adjacent centres of the same grade. This does however not take into account the size of centres which varies within a grade and would vary considerably more if centres of different levels were studied as can be seen from the scatter diagram in Appendix C.

A formula could be used taking both the distance factor and the level of centrality into account e.g. one that is used in Sweden to delimit administrative areas which recently were revised in order to adhere to the principles of central place hierarchy. The measure of centrality used is the one developed by Godlund⁶⁾ and it has still to be tested if the measure used here can be exchanged with the Godlund one. Only one Grade A centre is recorded in this study and has therefore to be excluded. Grade C, D, and E centres are too small and specialized to be considered. It might however be done for service areas at the Grade B level.

It was however considered unnecessary to apply formulas in the present study as the centres are of minor importance when looked upon in a national context. When the work is carried further on a wider scope such studies will prove valuable as an indicator for the determining of planning regions.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This study presents an application of central place theory to a part of a developing country. Only few studies exist in this field so far and the assumptions made, the problems encountered and discussed here could be of use for further studies into hierarchical patterns of settlements. The findings indicate that a hierarchical class-system of urban centres is prevailing in Mengo and Busoga Districts despite the influence the larger centres excluded in this study most certainly exert on their immediate interlands. This has encouraged the authors to continue the work in spite of the lack of data, which prevents the application of more advanced methods of study, some of which were presented in Chapter II, and others suggested by Grove and Huszar.

There is however still much scope for improvement using enumerative principles by which some of the anomalies found during the preparation of the paper will either be corrected or placed in their right context. Relatively few services have been recorded in this paper perhaps distorting the distribution pattern, the adopted grading system has to be improved upon and more subsidiary information, e.g. number of out-of-town calls, has to be brought into the picture in order to get a better understanding of the relationships between centres. Commercial activities are difficult to study, only banks have given an indication that business is conducted. It might however be possible to improve on the study in this respect by approaching large commercial chains who could supply lists of branches operating in the various centres studied.

It is hoped that studies of the kind presented here, when extended in number of centrality indicators of both quantitative and qualitative importance and extended in geographical area, will be of use in Uganda.

URBAN POPULATION AND CENTRALITY SCORE

Centre	Population				Centre	Population			
	Non-African	African	Total	Score		Non-African	African	Total	Score
Lugazi	801	7,744	8,545	22	Mukonjoru	110	57	167	7
Iganga	1,010	8,243	9,253	22	Kakira	153	-	153	18
Karuli	904	908	1,812	20	Kiriri	105	58	163	7
Bukenkotya	835	951	1,786	14	Bulo	33	33	66	7
Bugaya	88	803	891	2	Kibibi	50	100	150	10
Kaliro	337	547	884	15	Namrendwa	149	-	149	7
Kasswo	50	308	358	0	Igogwe	77	30	107	9
Bombo	482	488	970	21	Kakira	75	30	105	13
Kabasanda	14	333	347	4	Namutamba	113	-	113	6
Wobulenni	202	552	754	12	Kiboga	87	72	159	10
Mityano	201	518	719	24	Kamengo	50	47	97	6
Bulopa	271	472	743	9	Kilanda	43	50	93	3
Kayunga	222	507	729	13	Kamugali	100	-	100	7
Kapela	42	532	574	3	Ntwetwe	10	37	47	6
Kipigi	101	303	404	17	Zirobwe	44	43	87	3
Bulwe	221	341	562	14	Jenna	30	43	73	5
Kakala	62	425	487	5	Ngobio	74	-	74	7
Nakasongola	34	477	511	3	Buvus	70	-	70	3
Senuto	29	400	429	3	Vulula	37	-	37	3
Mukono	224	226	450	30	Mbuluti	37	-	37	5
Kiniba	55	395	450	5	Mitaga	12	25	37	7
Bugiri	322	8	330	11	Dova	26	8	34	2
Kassanda	115	203	318	6	Kisiba	37	-	37	3
Kassigati	13	333	346	11	Kasajje	23	-	23	5
Sekanyonyi	28	318	346	8	Nosaji	13	3	16	4
Busunja	53	290	343	9	Bukya	21	-	21	3
Nakasoke	100	243	343	10	Mogojje	12	-	12	5
Nageloma	100	155	255	15	Ntombi	3	-	3	4
Luwero	151	71	222	15					

Notes: Centres are ranked according to their respective populations. Recorded here are only those centres for which both population data and scores were available, 57 in total. The figures are not strictly comparable as urban population was taken from the Census of 1939, the last available, while scores are based on material gathered during 1955.

Many more centres than shown here offered services giving them a place in the hierarchical system, 34 in all, but no population data is available for them. Others, only 4, had no services to be recorded in spite of the availability of a number of inhabitants, Iganga being an exceptional case, having a population of 48 Non-Africans, 208 Africans making it a total of 256 persons.

THE WEIGHTING OF SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT BY LEVEL


SERVICE	POINTS
ADMINISTRATION	
1. Police:	
Police Station	2
Police Post	1
COMMUNICATION	
2. Post Office	
Departmental	2
Postal Agency	1
3. Petrol Station	
Service Station	2
Filling Station	1
4. Telephone Exchange	
Day and Night Service	2
Day Service	1
5. Road Junction	1
6. Bus Service	1
7. Railway Service	2
8. Electricity Supply	1
SOCIAL SERVICES	
9. Education	
Senior Secondary School or T.T.C.	2
Primary School	1
10. Medical Services	
Hospital (with over 50 bed capacity)	3
Hospital (Bed capacity 1-50)	2
Hospital (without beds)	1
COMMERCE & INDUSTRY	
11. Banks	2
12. Local Industry (Factories)	
With over 100 Employees	3
With 50-100 Employees	2
With less than 50 Employees	1

Note: This appendix lists down the various types of services and their levels by scores. In this process it was found convenient to distinguish THREE levels of services - LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH attaching one, two and three points to them respectively. By adding up the value of the full variety of services in each urban centre, it was possible to arrive at a measure of the quality of its services.

This method, however, has often been criticised on the grounds that it disregards the relative social value of different services. It is true to some extent that some services such as hospitals, may generally be considered to have greater value to the population of the centre and the surrounding area, than others such as post offices, even though their relative value cannot be measured. According to Grove and Huszar²⁸ "this argument would have some force if services were distributed among centres, without any regard to external economies" In practice, this is not the case. Services generally considered to be most valuable will usually occur in the bigger centres. They may of course, occur in smaller centres as well but this is often in relative isolation.

SCORE DIAGRAM

APPENDIX C



The Diagram above gives the basis from which the decision on the grading of central places was made. Five grades have been selected, distinguishable by lettering them A to E, A-level including centres of highest order, B next highest order etc., as shown below:

Grades	Scores
A	over 25
B	19-25
C	12-19
D	6-11
E	1-7

Each range of scores includes one definite peak and is divided by troughs. All of them except grade D include 0-7 scores. The selecting of as many as five levels of centrality in an area where centres are very much alike both in size and physical appearance could be criticized. Further research will reveal if the grading system will have to be changed.

In total 141 centres were recorded as can be seen from the table below:

Grade	District		Total
	Lugazi	Bugoya	
A	1	0	1
B	3	2	5
C	11	3	14
D	23	3	26
E	75	23	98
Total	113	31	144


It is apparent from the table that centres of D-level do not fit into the network of cities described by Christaller, where the number of cities of each successive grade increase in a geometric progression of 3, starting with one "prime city". If one makes the change of giving grade D a range of scores from 7-11, thus changing the range at E-level, a "better" relationship will be achieved.


From the Diagram below it may be shown that the five grades of centres tend towards discrete levels of population with some exceptions. If one changes the scoring ranges between D and E-levels, as suggested, this pattern would not be so evident. Therefore, when considering the Scatter Diagram, it was decided to keep the scoring ranges as presented in the paper.

Caution in making use of the diagram has to be exercised as the two variables described are not comparable in time, population being drawn from the 1969 Population Census and the scoring prepared from material gathered in 1968.

When working out the various coefficients, Lugazi, Mukono and Bugoya were excluded, as they show extreme combinations of population and score figures. The matter is discussed in the main body of the paper. The regression line fitted to the scatter of points reveals that a positive relation exists between population and levels of centrality, the correlation coefficient of 0.39 however indicates that the relationship is a comparatively weak one.

Notes on Scatter Diagram below: The data for the preparation of the Diagram can be found in Appendix A. Lugazi, not included in the Diagram, had a population of 3108 in 1969 and a score of 22 in 1968.





MENGO DISTRICT

BUSOGA DISTRICT

DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL
PLACES IN MENGO & BUSOGA
DISTRICTS

NOTATION

RATING BASED UPON AVAILABLE DATA
ON COMBINATIONS OF URBAN
SERVICES

○ A RATING

○ B RATING

○ C RATING

○ D RATING

○ E RATING



CENTRES NOT RATED

SCALE 1:100,000

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I.

Research into the legal systems of East Africa tends to assume that there is a relatively clear dichotomy between customary law on one side exemplified by the customary moots of a tribal system varied to include modern developments as might occur in a municipal housing estate, and the statutory law of the three East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda administered by the judiciary on the other. This assumption may have led observers to conclude that whether one system or another is utilised by the litigants is largely a function of the statutory law defining its own range and that there can be little opportunity for the participants to decide which system would be used.

It is suggested that this dichotomy is largely illusory and that both systems elide into each other and that there are wide variations within each system in which the litigant, suer, respondent, accuser or accused, whether they be private persons or government departments, as well as the hearing magistrates, have in practice considerable latitude in deciding which system and which type of court or moot within a system shall be used to hear the case.

In considering this matter, it is necessary to clearly distinguish what should happen according to the law; for example, that cattle theft is a serious crime which must be dealt with by the statutory courts as in Kenya where such an offence can receive up to 14 years imprisonment. Then what the persons concerned think happens, as when the police state that cattle offences are treated as serious crimes to be reported to headquarters, investigated and then taken to court and what actually happens when the public reject this legal system and report perhaps ten per cent of all such offences to the police, probably those involving members of other communities, preferring to deal with most offences within their own communities.

Whether an issue should be taken to one system or another depends upon the parties' assessment of a number of factors which include the publicity attached to the case, the chance of the case being successful, the magnitude of the grievance, degree of guilt known to exist, status of the persons involved and the relationship of the parties, the cost of the case and the effects of success. (1).

II

Broadly speaking, there are three legal systems in operation in East Africa. The first, containing the courts of Resident Magistrates and above, up to and including the East African Court of Appeal in which the Magistrate or Judge has a specific legal training and deals with judicial matters solely in terms of statutory law and the written record; for convenience this may be referred to as the 'paper' system.

The second system involves courts instituted by government which are presided over by magistrates who have had some legal training in government or quasi-government institutions, but who cannot be classified as members of the legal profession. In the colonial period, this included administrative officers who held part-time magisterial posts and who were required to pass certain law examinations set by their government, as well as the local courts conducted by the chiefs and magistrates sitting with local elders on the bench to assist them. After independence, this system included the new grade of district magistrates of local training, who have been instituted to replace the previous administrative class magistrate.

This system includes law which is statutory such as the Uganda law which codifies all customary criminal law, and a large amount of subsidiary legislation relating to taxation, licencing, agriculture, health and law and order. This system also deals with customary law cases involving land, marriage, adultery, inheritance and debt in which the community creates and defines what they consider to be their law; as this does not depend on written definitions or rulings, there are differences according to both time and place between similar cases within the jurisdiction of a single court. It can be appreciated that a court can operate in the first system for criminal law as in Uganda, and for customary law in the second so that the magistrate will change from a written record for a criminal case to a largely verbal trial and decision in a customary dispute.

These magistrates, operating in parts of two systems and because of a lack of sufficient English, pressure of work and the constant temptation to precis rather than record evidence and reasoning in full, result in this category being referred to as the 'impressionistic' system.

Lastly, there is the system of law processes which involve no formal structure and which expand and contract within the community according to the importance of the matter in issue. This would include a wide variety of systems from the moot of the Turkana to the heads

of families sitting in judgement. Also, it would include the neighbourhood and parish elders in town and country, the tribal associations in the cities and the political committees of parties in every country. In this category, no records are kept and enforcement of judgement is by consensus and will be referred to as the 'verbal' system.

It is now proposed to examine these three categories for the circumstances in which parties prefer them to be used.

III.

The public accept that the 'paper' system is imposed entirely by governments from ideas not present in their traditional life, and in this very isolation the 'paper' system gives every appearance of success because it deals with a very limited number of cases according to fixed rules of which itself is the mentor. (2) Even if they accept that this system deals with "natural" crimes, such as murder and theft, they infer that the results of this justice do not conform to custom. However, in some crimes, they prefer to use this system because there are no longer any customary methods of settlement acceptable to the public which can be carried out reasonably successfully without government taking action. Murder in itself is not a difficult problem to decide in terms of the evidence according to the 'paper' system, but in customary law, it involves blood responsibility - elders would have to make very serious decisions and live with the results - they are therefore often in a hurry to get the case dealt with by statutory law. Cases of bestiality tend also to be brought to court.

In cases in which the community cannot take the law into its own hands, because of the serious view taken of inter-tribal fighting and the long-term problems of revenge, police action is also preferred as a way of avoiding decisions which might well have serious after effects - typically cattle theft which is attributable to another community. In Musoma region of Tanzania in 1959, it was noticeable that cattle theft by the Masai was reported to the police but that far more frequent and economically damaging thefts within the district and its communities were rarely reported.

Professional criminals are almost invariably in favour of having their trial before statutory law magistrates and research within the Kenya criminal community did not produce a single complaint against the judicial system. Even illiterate criminals have a shrewd knowledge of the statutory law and are emphatic that they would prefer to be tried by it, especially when the evidence against them is mainly verbal. They state that the bias inherent in being tried by the 'impressionistic' system in the locality of the crime or where the criminal lives is ruled out. In the circumstances outlined, a criminal might admit to

previous convictions so that the police would take a more serious view of his crime and not consider sending it for trial to an 'impressionistic' court. Many of the appeals presented by criminals are based on this assumption that the law itself will find a loophole in the evidence and not that the evidence will be presented in any new way. Even within the 'paper' system, the experienced criminal litigant has considerable room for manoeuvre as he is acutely aware of the differences in sentences given by magistrates serving the courts in a particular town. He can get out of a court presided over by a magistrate known to give heavy sentences by declaring that it is not fair that he should be tried there as he has been up before that magistrate on a previous charge; he would not have to prove this statement to get his case transferred to another court.

The 'paper' system is almost invariably used in cross-racial situations. Prosecutions against non-Africans for behaviour involving insults to African dignitaries, flags and citizens which elsewhere would be treated as minor misdemeanours, get sent to court for trial. This is not done only because the new nations are rightly sensitive to such behaviour and wish to show that they are masters in their own homes, but because the police are nervous of stating to the complainant that there is no case to answer according to the evidence presented to them. It is also used in the provinces of Uganda with traditional rulers for the cases classified as 'insults to rulers', which are used as a method of social control against other tribes, for example, the prosecutions in Bunyoro and Ankole of persons wearing Kabaka Yekka badges.

In general, the police when faced with a case involving politics or important persons would take the case to court with inadequate evidence in the anticipation of a third party making the decision. It would be possible to conclude that the more important the case socially rather than criminally, the less likely the police would be to record on the file that there is no case to answer.

The 'paper' system is used by non-Africans, particularly Indians, when they are likely to obtain from it results that they cannot obtain in normal business relationships. In some cases, they see the statutory law as something totally divorced from the political and social reality in which they live - as if it was an institution guaranteeing them police enforcement of legally correct judgements on poor social foundations. A typical example of this would be the estate employer

who prosecutes employees for acts which are in fact criminal but which result from poor working conditions; using the law to obliquely reinforce sanctions on their employees which have not been successful through industrial relations channels.

As in general lawyers only function in these courts, any case in which the use of a lawyer is assumed to be profitable would be stated in terms making it come within the compass of their statutory powers. Inflating the subject matter in a civil suit is the most typical example.

There is also a 'potlatch' element in Indian and Arab life in which large sums are conspicuously consumed in litigation between members of the same family if not the same community. Mr. Mubar Gulbenkian's suit against his father costing many thousands of pounds in court and lawyer fees was initiated over a dispute concerning the cost of a chicken lunch eaten in the office and debited to expenses and might be considered a very comparable case. Possibly the result of the case is immaterial but the litigants receive publicity from the cost and persistence of their litigation which is personally satisfying. Especially within a family, whether the case is won or lost, both sides are impoverished - they do not expect to win, but to impoverish their opponent. An example of this from present day India stated: "A wealthy Thakur who went to court looked forward to not just one quick case, but to a series of cases, appeals, adjournments and counter appeals through which a poorer competitor could be ruined. Since British procedure and justice appeared capricious to the Indians, someone with a bad case was as prone to go to court as someone with a good case. The standard was not the justice of his case, but his ability to outlast his opponents. It became a mark of pride among the Thakurs to outwit an opponent through the use of the courts and law, and the prestige of a family was tied to its success as a litigant and its ability to ruin its competitors in court". (4) During a study of cousin marriage in Mombasa (3), several cases were found in which an in-bred family had been impoverished by litigation between siblings carried on in the statutory courts.

Perhaps this category might be extended to include the use of the courts by provincial governments to enforce or decide matters which are essentially political. The Buganda government's suits against the Central government over the legality of referendums, boundaries and taxes, must come within a class of conspicuous expenditure which is largely wasted

since the decisions must be political in the last instance.

Another class of cases involves the use of the 'paper' system to draw attention to a particular matter such as the validity of an insurance claim which would be greatly enhanced by the details appearing in court records.

The last category contains cases which are brought to court as a result of information received in which the evidence is circumstantial and is brought to court because of the ease with which a prosecution can be brought and a conviction obtained. The matters starting in private feuds involve the planting of a prohibited article in another's house and informing the police that there is a home-made gun in the grass roof, distilled spirit in the kitchen and marihuana under the bed. The 'impressionistic' courts would accept as evidence that the man was informed against and take into account circumstances which could not be proved or disproved in court, so that such cases would be dismissed.

IV.

The 'impressionistic' system is an attempt to have a working compromise between the demands of a developing state to have necessary statutory law and the requirements of most of their inhabitants to have a customary law known to them and within their powers of influence. While the 'paper' system can reach decisions without any reference to or cognisance of social conditions outside the courtroom, in this system even though the magistrate may be a government appointment, he must take much more cognisance of the neighbourhood in which he is working. He is probably socially isolated, assisted on the bench by local elders and subject to considerable off-duty direct and indirect pressures and although it may not be required, he may well feel the need to justify the decisions to those members of the community with whom he is in contact.

While he is subject to some extra-judicial pressures, he is divorced in the civil field from any responsibility for enforcing his decisions. While it is the intention of government to canalise as much judicial activity as possible into the courts subject to their control, it is very significant to note the very small proportion of civil cases in which the judgement is enforced by the court. It seems that the cases which come to court and this may well involve both civil and criminal cases, have been initiated outside the court and will ultimately be decided there. The litigants use the courts to obtain a judgement which can be used as one of the factors legitimising a claim through a

customary process, and giving it added weight.

Another class of cases are brought to court because the customary law processes have failed to make a decision which is acceptable to the parties concerned. The figures for cases heard in 1960 in the Mombasa African tribunal seem to suggest that in an urban setting some communities have a better system of settling their disputes than others. In criminal cases 147 Kamba were prosecuted by 71 persons, of whom 44 were Kamba, but in the case of the 90 Luhya prosecuted during the same period by 26 persons, only 4 were Luhya. In civil suits, there were only 86 cases recorded for the year of which 33 were Kamba with 17 of them Kamba respondents. If the Kamba community had evolved as efficient a system as the Luhya for the settling of their quarrels, these figures would have been different, but the relative distances from their homes may have been a contributory factor.

These courts are also used where the litigants are unrelated, such as the claim of a Kikuyu hairdresser in Kisumu against a Luo trader and where assumptions of political bias might be made by the alien party, or within a community in which they belong to different clans. In towns, there is no tribal association - which is usually used for the arbitration of civil and criminal disputes between the members - as in Mombasa in 1960, when there were only 25 suits involving bride-wealth heard in the local court of which 16 were between Nyika. They would also be used in towns where there was no common customary law between the litigants, for example, matrilineal versus patrilineal and differences in inheritance rules which can only be resolved by an uncommitted person. These courts are also used where there are no appropriate relatives who can settle a dispute or a difficulty as in the case of an abandoned woman who sees in the local tribunal the only hope of justice. It can also be used when one party to the case no longer accepts a customary law solution as the Kamba wife who refused to be inherited by her husband's brother and used the tribunal to assert her right to remarry whomsoever she pleased.

The location of the court has considerable influence on the cases which come before it. In many parts of East Africa, courts are few and far between and the litigant has to obtain lodgings near to the court if the case lasts more than a day which is almost inevitable. It can be assumed that the majority of non-urban cases come from within an approximate five mile radius of the court. Also, the nearer the litigants live to the court, the more influence can be brought to bear on the magistrate and court elders towards a solution acceptable to the community. Again, the courts only sit between fixed hours; the

usual office hours laid down by the government and industry so that the courts in the towns are used far more by the unemployed, self-employed, under employed and land-owning class than by the wage-earners, who cannot afford to lose wages and reliability status because of prolonged litigation. Also in these courts, there are a limited and identifiable number of officials to be influenced in comparison with the 'paper' courts in which the power-administering officials are usually unapproachable, or in the 'verbal' system where it is often impossible to approach individuals privately or where individuals have no power outside a consensus from a larger group which is more difficult to influence. This is not a specific accusation that bribery can be used to influence a court decision in a positive way because this is an infrequent and dangerous procedure, but to exercise influence to delay a case so that it is never heard, withdrawn or an ex-parte judgement delivered. In both criminal and civil cases, a series of adjournments will influence one of the parties so that if this tactic is prolonged with discretion, the other party will win by attrition and of course such adjournments are relatively easy to obtain. It can be seen from this that the landlord or shop-owner can, if he wishes, and the social circumstances surrounding the case make it permissible, sue in court and obtain a high proportion of ex-parte judgements. Distance has the same utility in county courts where an ex-parte judgement can be obtained merely because the respondent lives at a great distance from the court and he balances his loss of time in attending against the possible loss of the case.

In cases where one party sees no possibility of getting a satisfactory solution by an informal process and brings the respondent to court such as the trader and the civil servant with a debt about to go on transfer, or when the respondent sees himself in a difficult position in an informal tribunal and who puts in a counter claim in order to strengthen his own case.

Both the police and the public are aware that the 'paper' courts require higher standards in the presentation of evidence, even apart from their acceptance of the procedure and law involved as being a necessary evil. In Masoma in 1959 (5), cattle theft cases were brought before the local courts without reporting them to the police because the community, through the members of the court, could exercise social control over a troublesome problem without the difficulties involved in presenting evidence according to statutory requirements. Cases of this nature were often brought when the losses involved made them serious crimes. The defendants were able to appeal to a higher court where there was usually a virtual rehearing of the case, but sufficient judgements were upheld to justify this local control which was both quick and convenient,

Similarly, the police and indeed any prosecuting agency will put

their case into the court system most likely to bring success as when a case of grievous bodily harm is brought and there are no expert medical witnesses available so that the charge is altered to 'harm' and the case transferred to a local tribunal. The police would also tend to transfer to these 'impressionistic' courts cases in which the evidence is marginal, hoping to get a conviction which would not be obtainable in a 'paper' court, or generally for cases of less importance which would not, under the day to day circumstances of their work, justify the time and expense of producing the evidence in the necessary form.

The criminal himself is also aware of the maximum powers held by the magistrates in 'impressionistic' courts and the advantages which might come to him by pleading guilty there with the agreement of the police. The criminal with a long record of previous convictions and aware that the case against him is based on exhibits rather than verbal evidence would try to be heard in these courts.

V.

The 'verbal' law processes function almost independently of state authority in circumstances which are more comforting to the litigants who rationalise that this is utilising their traditions where there may be only an illusion of this.

This system is particularly used where community identity is so strong that the person attempting to go outside it for the settling of a dispute against a fellow-member of the same community would be heavily penalised. The Ismaili community carries within it so many social and economic benefits that almost all marriage and business disputes are settled through the local community heads, possibly even including some criminal matters. The case totals for the Mombasa African tribunal for 1960 show that with only 86 debt cases heard in a year for a trading seaport town with a population of 111,847 Africans, there must have been considerable private settlement of disputes involving business and house occupancy.

Above all in a town keeping business hours and with a high proportion of the population in employment, the 'verbal' system takes on an added popularity, probably equal to its utility in more traditional areas. Disputes can be settled with the minimum of fuss at times convenient to workers - the evenings after work, Sundays and Public Holidays. The 'paper' courts, by their system and hours of work, effectively put themselves to a very large extent out of the business which it is in the government's interest that they should adjudicate.

This system has to be used where either party has broken the law or

the dispute involves matters which involve connivance between the parties in defiance of the law or a previous agreement with a third party. It is often considered that the only advantage to be obtained from a licence to sell beer is the opportunity it confers to call the police if a fight breaks out; so that disputes and quarrels over unlicensed beer have to be settled informally. The person who hires an unlicensed taxi can only be sued informally. When there is a housing shortage there are often tenancy agreements which prohibit sub-tenants while charging high rents with the result that there are sub-sub-tenants renting pavement trading space from a sub-tenant of the ground-floor shop renting from the tenants of the house - these can only settle their affairs informally; similarly in some places government gives housing allowances but prohibits sub-tenants.

Neighbours in housing estates settle their disputes informally and there is considerable use of tribal associations, and local political party committees, probably more than before independence, with government officials tending to send disputes there because of their own overcrowded working hours and their expectation that these informal tribunals have stronger powers and more time to enforce settlements as well as individuals who aspire to gain power through settling disputes (5).

In many places, the 'paper' and 'impressionistic' courts represent an establishment which is unacceptable to many individuals and committees. This may be particularly so when community or family shame is involved as in cases of incest and homosexuality.

VI.

From these examples, it can be seen that there is considerable latitude in the ability to use one system instead of another and from this a series of hypotheses can be formulated:

1. The institution or person initiating a case will take it to where it is considered to stand the best chance of success. This evaluation is made in terms of the importance of the case for prestige or property, the relationship and relative importance of the litigants, convenience and existing systems of social control.
2. The issues will be presented in the form most favourable to the initiator in terms of chances of success and convenience - a positive choice will be made.
3. Faced with one or more methods of settlement of equal or unknown utility, the initiator will take the case to the legal system nearest to his own social system - a negative choice will be made.

4. Faced with a series of legal systems, each of which is only part of the total dispute-settling system of the initiator's society, the decision given in any one system will be taken as only one stage in the total process of settlement.
5. The greater the seriousness of the dispute, the more likely it is to be sent for settlement where there is less inter-personal relationship.
6. Agencies accepting a dispute will process it in the form most likely to finish quickly in terms of the time, work and prestige involved which may pass the matter to another part of the 'paper' or the 'impressionistic' systems, or down to a part of the 'verbal' system.

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